WEBVTT 00:00.540 --> 00:03.460 And about that time . Uh 00:05.140 --> 00:07.196 my God , he called me and told me we 00:07.196 --> 00:08.973 were being attacked by Japanese 00:08.973 --> 00:11.160 fighters . Uh huh 00:13.640 --> 00:15.696 I looked again and all of a sudden I 00:15.696 --> 00:17.584 was a Jap fleet . I could see the 00:17.584 --> 00:19.751 carrier there . Cannon to the right of 00:19.751 --> 00:23.140 them . Cannon to the left of Canon 00:23.140 --> 00:26.080 behind them , volleyed and thundered , 00:26.090 --> 00:28.980 stormed out with shot and shell they 00:28.980 --> 00:31.490 that had fought so well came through 00:31.490 --> 00:33.601 the jaws of death back from the mouth 00:33.601 --> 00:36.260 of hell . All that was left of them . 00:37.240 --> 00:39.620 All right . The Imperial Navy was 00:39.620 --> 00:42.030 poised to eliminate an american 00:42.030 --> 00:45.000 presence in the pacific . The Japanese 00:45.000 --> 00:48.990 at that time had taken the 00:48.990 --> 00:52.130 Philippines , taken Singapore . They 00:52.130 --> 00:54.470 had done things . People thought was 00:54.470 --> 00:57.340 impossible in their path was an 00:57.350 --> 01:00.250 insignificant coral outcropping just 01:00.260 --> 01:02.860 east of the international date line , 01:04.140 --> 01:07.700 Midway . This is the story of the 01:07.700 --> 01:10.410 sailors , marines and airmen who 01:10.410 --> 01:12.660 defiantly stood in the path of the 01:12.670 --> 01:16.110 Japanese naval armada of an admiral who 01:16.110 --> 01:19.330 sent his forces into harm's way . This 01:19.330 --> 01:22.790 is destination point . Luck 01:22.800 --> 01:24.660 voices from Midway . 01:27.540 --> 01:28.540 Mhm . 01:34.440 --> 01:37.590 Today oxidized iron coats , a three 01:37.590 --> 01:40.640 inch naval gun that still stands sentry 01:40.650 --> 01:44.320 on Midway's Eastern island . Old 01:44.320 --> 01:46.098 runways that service brewster , 01:46.098 --> 01:49.270 Buffalos , B seventeens and TBM 01:49.270 --> 01:52.750 Avengers now lie cracked and overgrown 01:53.110 --> 01:55.960 and everywhere there are gooney birds 01:57.210 --> 02:01.100 In the fall of 1940 This island and the 02:01.100 --> 02:03.590 ships of the pacific fleet teamed with 02:03.590 --> 02:06.480 young men ready to do battle . Who were 02:06.480 --> 02:09.320 these americans and what forged ? There 02:09.320 --> 02:13.150 will , there was no question that 02:13.150 --> 02:17.000 we're heading for war . But at that 02:17.010 --> 02:20.580 point in time , Just verbal accusations 02:20.590 --> 02:23.610 traded back and forth , 1939 . Hitler 02:23.610 --> 02:25.960 had invaded the low countries in Poland 02:26.940 --> 02:30.060 and the news was very frightening and I 02:30.060 --> 02:32.830 thought about that and I said , well if 02:32.830 --> 02:35.280 I go board a ship , I'll have something 02:35.280 --> 02:37.502 to eat , clean clothes and nothing will 02:37.502 --> 02:40.150 happen to it . They won't sink it . I 02:40.160 --> 02:43.710 think that that generation was 02:43.720 --> 02:47.690 unusual . Um Most 02:47.690 --> 02:50.480 of us came from poor families . I think 02:50.490 --> 02:53.830 one point that has to be mentioned as 02:53.830 --> 02:56.830 the , the country was emerging from a 02:56.830 --> 02:59.640 depression . It was very , very 02:59.650 --> 03:03.580 difficult to to go to school or find 03:03.580 --> 03:07.580 work . So the navy uh found itself in 03:07.580 --> 03:10.970 a rather comfortable position and 03:10.970 --> 03:12.990 they took advantage of 03:12.990 --> 03:16.660 it , November 26 , 1941 . 03:17.040 --> 03:20.030 The kiddo . But I , the Japanese mobile 03:20.030 --> 03:23.770 force leaves hit to Capo bay and 03:23.770 --> 03:26.600 steams at a steady 24 nuts for a 03:26.600 --> 03:30.500 240.230 miles south of Oahu 03:30.510 --> 03:34.250 in the Hawaiian islands . At six 03:34.260 --> 03:37.820 a.m. on December 7 , 1941 , the 03:37.820 --> 03:39.931 Japanese launched their first wave of 03:39.931 --> 03:42.750 fighters , bombers and torpedo planes 03:42.760 --> 03:45.320 for the attack on the US Pacific fleet 03:45.350 --> 03:49.130 at Pearl Harbor . America is at war 03:49.480 --> 03:52.410 and on the defensive . Pearl Harbor was 03:52.420 --> 03:56.100 awesome . You can still smell death in 03:56.100 --> 03:59.640 the air . The smoke . The ship's upside 03:59.640 --> 04:02.820 down a population hardened by a decade 04:02.820 --> 04:05.460 of depression and hardship rushes to 04:05.460 --> 04:06.160 serve 04:09.440 --> 04:12.720 On April 18 , 1942 , 04:12.730 --> 04:15.200 16 . American twin engine bombers 04:15.200 --> 04:17.960 appeared over the Japanese mainland 04:18.440 --> 04:20.970 launched from the carrier Hornet . The 04:20.970 --> 04:23.137 bombs dropped by the planes did little 04:23.137 --> 04:25.414 physical damage to the Japanese cities , 04:25.620 --> 04:28.360 but the psychological damage was great . 04:29.140 --> 04:32.190 Admiral Yamamoto had been pressing for 04:32.190 --> 04:34.330 a plan for the capture of both Midway 04:34.340 --> 04:37.600 and the aleutian islands . The Japanese 04:37.600 --> 04:39.322 army had resisted the plan for 04:39.322 --> 04:41.260 operations in the central pacific 04:41.270 --> 04:44.230 before the homeland was bombed . After 04:44.230 --> 04:48.140 the raid , Yamamoto's operation M I was 04:48.140 --> 04:51.770 fully supported . That was a real brave 04:51.770 --> 04:54.050 thing that those pilots did . That 04:54.060 --> 04:57.040 bombing really generated Admiral 04:57.050 --> 05:00.420 Yamamoto to see that they better get 05:00.430 --> 05:02.740 better go to Midway and defeat us in 05:02.740 --> 05:05.860 Midway . Now , when would the keto boot 05:05.860 --> 05:08.510 I strike next ? What was the Japanese 05:08.510 --> 05:10.621 army and navy planning in Russia . It 05:10.621 --> 05:12.677 was a real authority on the Japanese 05:12.677 --> 05:14.621 language . He spent three years in 05:14.621 --> 05:17.520 Japan as a language student , total 05:17.530 --> 05:19.970 immersion studying Japanese language 05:19.970 --> 05:22.780 culture . Commander Rochefort was not 05:22.780 --> 05:26.040 alone in Japan . In the 1930s , 05:26.390 --> 05:28.750 officers had gone through language and 05:28.750 --> 05:31.350 culture studies in Japan . Also 05:31.350 --> 05:33.461 studying there was Commander . Layton 05:33.461 --> 05:35.840 who was to become Chief of intelligence 05:35.850 --> 05:38.710 for the U . S . Pacific fleet from 1940 05:38.720 --> 05:42.060 on late New Yamamoto personally 05:42.640 --> 05:45.010 when , when they were in Japan , Layton 05:45.010 --> 05:47.900 was ambassador , unmarried . Rochefort 05:47.900 --> 05:50.122 was married and had his family with him 05:50.122 --> 05:53.320 but Layton uh went with the unmarried 05:53.320 --> 05:55.542 group , among other things . He used to 05:55.542 --> 05:57.598 play poker with mary alma mater . He 05:57.598 --> 05:59.931 wasn't an admiral then he was a captain , 05:59.931 --> 06:01.760 but Layton had had exposure and 06:01.760 --> 06:04.420 personal acquaintance with Yamamoto and 06:04.420 --> 06:07.800 he did have a feeling for or how the 06:07.800 --> 06:10.250 Japanese thought Russia would develop 06:10.250 --> 06:13.270 hunches about things he was seeing in 06:13.270 --> 06:16.980 communications intercept , which kind 06:16.980 --> 06:19.147 of remote things you couldn't put your 06:19.147 --> 06:22.630 finger on . And he anticipated 06:23.240 --> 06:25.370 He anticipated the midway attack 06:25.380 --> 06:28.160 beginning about two sometime in april 06:28.640 --> 06:32.490 1942 because he began to see a 06:32.490 --> 06:34.510 pattern developing even before the 06:34.510 --> 06:36.570 battle of the Coral Sea combat 06:36.570 --> 06:38.910 intelligence from both Australian coast 06:38.910 --> 06:41.430 Watchers and our own radio intercept 06:41.430 --> 06:44.320 units gave us advanced notice of 06:44.320 --> 06:47.350 Japanese plans for an attack upon port 06:47.350 --> 06:50.430 Moresby . The result was the battle of 06:50.430 --> 06:52.720 the Coral Sea . The first battle in 06:52.720 --> 06:55.090 naval history where the opposing forces 06:55.090 --> 06:57.540 ships were never in direct combat , but 06:57.550 --> 07:00.530 all action was between carrier launched 07:00.540 --> 07:03.610 planes just before they located our 07:03.610 --> 07:06.950 task force 17 and 11 mm 07:07.340 --> 07:10.230 and we sank the show ho , which was a 07:10.230 --> 07:13.480 light carrier and damage the Zoo 07:13.480 --> 07:17.160 Kaku and the show Kaku 07:18.240 --> 07:20.184 which calls them not to be able to 07:20.184 --> 07:22.296 whatever , not to be able to land the 07:22.296 --> 07:24.480 aircraft . So effectively had put that 07:24.490 --> 07:26.490 ship , that aircraft carrier out of 07:26.490 --> 07:29.550 business as far as the battle . 07:30.140 --> 07:32.530 Never been in anything like that . It's 07:32.530 --> 07:34.697 just absolutely unbelievable what that 07:34.697 --> 07:37.590 guy up there is trying to kill me . And 07:37.590 --> 07:40.140 the other thing is when they had dive 07:40.140 --> 07:42.890 bombers , that dive bomber was after me . 07:42.900 --> 07:45.960 Nobody else my general quarters on the 07:45.960 --> 07:49.070 flight deck , but the twists and turns 07:49.080 --> 07:51.302 and I gotta say a good word for Captain 07:51.302 --> 07:53.420 Buckmaster . He saved that ship , 07:53.430 --> 07:55.630 Connie . get away from torpedoes and 07:55.630 --> 07:57.686 bombs . But anyway , we had a lot of 07:57.686 --> 08:00.210 clear uh close misses on the starboard 08:00.210 --> 08:03.500 side . But Captain Buckmaster would see 08:03.500 --> 08:06.870 the dive bombers coming down and give 08:06.870 --> 08:08.870 hard to port or hard to starboard , 08:08.870 --> 08:12.230 whichever . But we did take some real 08:12.230 --> 08:14.286 structural damage from near misses . 08:14.286 --> 08:17.110 The concussion and the shrapnel from 08:17.110 --> 08:19.430 the bombs causes severe damage . But 08:19.430 --> 08:23.210 the one bomb it hit the deck , Went 08:23.210 --> 08:25.266 down to the 4th level and killed the 08:25.266 --> 08:28.260 repair party at the Battle of Coral Sea . 08:28.340 --> 08:30.680 The Yorktown suffered damage . The 08:30.680 --> 08:32.736 Japanese were convinced the Yorktown 08:32.736 --> 08:34.860 was finished . The Japanese lost a 08:34.860 --> 08:37.030 light carrier and the fleet carrier 08:37.030 --> 08:40.490 Shikoku had serious bomb damage and the 08:40.490 --> 08:43.190 fleet carrier Zurich Oculus Air group 08:43.190 --> 08:44.560 was badly depleted . 08:48.950 --> 08:51.460 When Admiral Nimitz took over from 08:51.470 --> 08:54.690 Admiral Kimmel , he retained the staff 08:54.700 --> 08:56.811 and the Mets took over . He told late 08:56.811 --> 08:59.940 and he says , I want you to tell me 08:59.940 --> 09:02.107 what Admiral Yamamoto was thinking and 09:02.107 --> 09:04.890 planning and and most importantly , I 09:04.890 --> 09:06.930 want you to tell me today what he's 09:06.930 --> 09:09.660 going to do tomorrow . Japanese 09:10.140 --> 09:11.751 communications who are being 09:11.751 --> 09:15.190 transmitted by morse code and indigents 09:15.190 --> 09:18.240 in numbers . The digits of the J . N . 09:18.240 --> 09:21.390 25 code were five digits , five digit 09:21.390 --> 09:23.710 code groups . By the time of the Battle 09:23.710 --> 09:25.821 of Midway , we had recovered probably 09:25.821 --> 09:29.110 40% of those code groups and the result 09:29.110 --> 09:31.054 of that was , we were able to read 09:31.054 --> 09:33.360 enough of the message texts to make 09:33.540 --> 09:35.530 intelligent sense out of what the 09:35.530 --> 09:38.160 message was about . We knew from the 09:39.440 --> 09:41.607 follow up translations after the Pearl 09:41.607 --> 09:45.200 Harbor attack that , that Pearl harbor 09:45.200 --> 09:48.960 was A H . And 09:50.040 --> 09:53.290 we also had had references to Af and an 09:53.300 --> 09:57.230 Ak . We discovered that A . K . It was 09:57.230 --> 10:00.040 a K with french frigate shoals , that's 10:00.040 --> 10:02.660 what the submarines met . And we knew 10:02.660 --> 10:05.580 that Hawaii was a H . There was also 10:05.580 --> 10:07.710 one reference in some of that traffic 10:07.720 --> 10:10.810 to A . F , which we kind of 10:10.820 --> 10:14.790 deduced was Midway analysts at 10:14.790 --> 10:17.260 Pearl Harbor and in Washington were 10:17.260 --> 10:19.482 aware that the Japanese were planning a 10:19.482 --> 10:22.220 major operation . The analysts in 10:22.220 --> 10:24.442 Washington were convinced that it would 10:24.442 --> 10:27.170 be an attack against Hawaii or possibly 10:27.180 --> 10:29.360 the west coast of the United States , 10:29.940 --> 10:33.490 not a small atoll like Midway . 10:34.440 --> 10:37.690 And they were focused on that so so 10:37.700 --> 10:41.280 intently that they rejected the idea 10:41.280 --> 10:43.740 that it was Midway . All of our 10:43.740 --> 10:45.962 circumstantial evidence showed it to be 10:45.962 --> 10:48.570 Midway . And we told Admiral Nimitz at 10:48.580 --> 10:50.730 about 10 days prior to the battle , 10:51.070 --> 10:53.190 when Admiral Nimitz was preparing to 10:53.190 --> 10:55.260 send his inferior forces out against 10:55.260 --> 10:58.450 the Japanese fleet . Admiral King sent 10:58.450 --> 11:02.150 a communication to sink pack and said , 11:02.940 --> 11:05.060 I cannot permit you to risk your 11:05.060 --> 11:07.420 limited forces against this large fleet 11:07.610 --> 11:10.230 unless you know for certain what the 11:10.230 --> 11:13.080 target is . Better Homes was standing 11:13.080 --> 11:16.360 by my desk talking to me when Commander 11:16.360 --> 11:18.510 Rochefort approached him and said , 11:18.510 --> 11:21.510 Jasper , we've got to do something to 11:21.510 --> 11:24.750 prove to the world that AFP is Midway . 11:25.240 --> 11:27.296 Jasper Homes had been an engineering 11:27.296 --> 11:29.650 professor at the University of Hawaii 11:30.040 --> 11:32.050 and had worked on studies on how to 11:32.050 --> 11:35.040 provision Midway Island and knew that 11:35.040 --> 11:37.220 fresh water had to be produced by 11:37.220 --> 11:41.180 evaporator . He proposed Pearl Harbor 11:41.180 --> 11:43.990 contact Midway Island via the 11:44.000 --> 11:46.420 underwater phone cable that's still 11:46.420 --> 11:49.740 connected both islands . He reasoned 11:49.750 --> 11:51.750 that if we ordered the commander to 11:51.750 --> 11:53.917 broadcast a radio message in the clear 11:53.917 --> 11:55.750 that his freshwater system had a 11:55.750 --> 11:57.917 problem and that if we could intercept 11:57.917 --> 12:00.330 the follow up Japanese message , we 12:00.330 --> 12:04.310 could prove a F . Was Midway the 12:04.310 --> 12:07.520 next day . They reported to Tokyo , the 12:07.530 --> 12:10.680 commanding officer of the naval air 12:10.680 --> 12:14.030 station at A . F . Had reported to his 12:14.030 --> 12:16.260 headquarters in a way that he had a 12:16.270 --> 12:19.470 water casualty and needed at a limited 12:19.470 --> 12:21.780 supply of fresh water that sensed it . 12:22.540 --> 12:25.150 That since that A F . Was midway 12:28.840 --> 12:31.790 on our way back from the battle of 12:31.790 --> 12:35.250 Coral Sea . We stopped in the island 12:36.440 --> 12:40.080 called Tonga taboo and we got 12:40.080 --> 12:43.850 some food aboard ship and we re fuel . 12:44.340 --> 12:46.580 Well , we felt we felt very good about 12:46.580 --> 12:49.370 it coming out like we did . They have 12:49.370 --> 12:52.530 two carriers out now we have been 12:52.530 --> 12:56.410 damaged but not beyond repair . And 12:56.420 --> 12:59.950 uh , we lost only 56 men in that in 12:59.950 --> 13:02.340 that battle . The refrigeration system 13:02.350 --> 13:04.430 had been blown out . All our 13:04.430 --> 13:08.220 perishables had been used up . We had 13:08.220 --> 13:10.870 nothing fresh vegetables , no fresh 13:10.870 --> 13:14.760 meat . We had been a hit in 13:15.240 --> 13:17.351 the coral sea , pretty valley , wiped 13:17.351 --> 13:19.573 out the marine compartment completely . 13:19.573 --> 13:23.170 Our living quarters On 27 May and 13:23.180 --> 13:26.620 600 hours . Four carriers of Kiddo 13:26.620 --> 13:30.460 booty , Akagi here , you , sore , you 13:30.470 --> 13:33.080 and Kaga followed . Light cruiser 13:33.080 --> 13:35.500 Nagara out of the fleet Anchorage and 13:35.500 --> 13:39.050 Hiroshima Bay destination Midway . 13:39.840 --> 13:41.896 When we come back to Pearl , Admiral 13:41.896 --> 13:44.062 Nimitz immediately came aboard because 13:44.062 --> 13:46.380 he knew he'd received a bomb head . And 13:46.390 --> 13:48.612 in the discussions , Captain Buckmaster 13:48.612 --> 13:51.090 asked , asked the Admiral For a six 13:51.090 --> 13:54.270 month overhaul . Now I have to say this . 13:54.280 --> 13:57.080 We had missed overhauls for a couple of 13:57.080 --> 13:59.400 years for at least a couple of years . 13:59.410 --> 14:01.632 Do the other things that had happened . 14:01.632 --> 14:05.080 We were overdue for an overhaul . The 14:05.080 --> 14:06.840 shipyard workers and our own 14:06.840 --> 14:09.180 engineering estimated three months to 14:09.180 --> 14:12.090 make the Yorktown say worthy one , it 14:12.090 --> 14:15.480 was worn out within at sea of 101 days 14:16.240 --> 14:19.080 and number two . The crew were just 14:19.090 --> 14:21.460 tired . The word between 14:22.040 --> 14:25.860 Admiral Letter and Amos was 14:25.870 --> 14:29.070 we needed at least three weeks to 14:29.070 --> 14:31.348 prepare that chip to go back to midway . 14:31.440 --> 14:33.384 I never said you have no more than 14:33.384 --> 14:35.551 three days . The # one man said it and 14:35.551 --> 14:38.850 that's it . Mhm . And so we went into 14:38.850 --> 14:42.460 drydock and immediately and I'll have 14:42.460 --> 14:44.571 to say a good word for the yard force 14:44.571 --> 14:47.880 at Pearl . These guys came aboard with 14:47.890 --> 14:49.946 welders and whatever they had , they 14:49.946 --> 14:53.940 had no blueprints . The , the command 14:53.940 --> 14:56.760 of them was walk through the ship , 14:57.340 --> 15:00.640 whatever is broke , fix it and that's 15:00.640 --> 15:03.410 exactly what they did . and in 72 hours 15:03.410 --> 15:06.140 we went out now , mainly they fixed the 15:06.140 --> 15:08.307 hole on the flight decks so we'll have 15:08.307 --> 15:10.650 flat operations . They replaced 15:10.660 --> 15:12.760 watertight doors that had been 15:12.760 --> 15:15.110 shattered . Anything of that nature . 15:15.920 --> 15:18.570 But when we left Pearl , we left for 15:18.570 --> 15:22.480 three boilers . Still not operating and 15:22.480 --> 15:24.702 it's tough to fight a battle . That's , 15:24.702 --> 15:26.480 that's what cost us at Midway . 15:26.480 --> 15:28.702 Yamamoto expected the american carriers 15:28.702 --> 15:30.840 and battleships to sortie from Pearl 15:30.840 --> 15:33.220 Harbor after Japanese landings on that 15:33.230 --> 15:35.350 too . And Midway , a Japanese , 15:35.350 --> 15:37.920 northern and southern submarine cordon 15:37.990 --> 15:39.990 was to be established to detect the 15:39.990 --> 15:42.890 american ships . A large Japanese 15:42.890 --> 15:45.370 Kawanishi seaplane was to provide an 15:45.380 --> 15:48.140 aerial patrol from french frigate 15:48.140 --> 15:51.080 shoals where it was to be re fueled by 15:51.080 --> 15:54.960 a Japanese fleet submarines . Mhm I'll 15:54.960 --> 15:57.050 admit it was a surprise to me when I 15:57.050 --> 15:59.161 later found out that the Japanese had 15:59.161 --> 16:01.272 tried to come in there and found that 16:01.272 --> 16:03.328 there were two U . S . Ships had , I 16:03.328 --> 16:05.050 think that Layton was probably 16:05.050 --> 16:07.730 sensitive enough to the Japanese use of 16:07.730 --> 16:09.897 french frigate shoals that he may well 16:09.897 --> 16:13.650 have encouraged Mhm backstreets staff 16:13.660 --> 16:15.660 to get a couple of ships up there . 16:15.660 --> 16:16.827 Just as a precaution 16:21.340 --> 16:25.340 On 30 May 1942 Yorktown left the yard 16:25.340 --> 16:28.190 and headed back to see patched but not 16:28.190 --> 16:31.070 completely repaired Under Rear Admiral 16:31.070 --> 16:34.550 Frank Jack Fletcher Yorktown and their 16:34.550 --> 16:38.320 escorts formed Task Force 17 the day 16:38.320 --> 16:41.970 before Task Force 16 had sort Ead 16:42.050 --> 16:44.810 comprised of carriers Hornet and 16:44.810 --> 16:48.260 enterprise and additional vessels . 16:48.840 --> 16:52.290 Both task forces left Pearl before the 16:52.290 --> 16:54.234 Japanese submarine pickets were in 16:54.234 --> 16:58.050 place and stood on deck and 16:58.050 --> 17:00.920 watched the hornet go out and the 17:00.920 --> 17:03.890 Enterprise Follower and 17:03.900 --> 17:07.370 the cruisers and 17:07.370 --> 17:09.900 destroyers that were our ships and so 17:09.900 --> 17:11.990 on . And I was aware that this was 17:11.990 --> 17:13.823 something like nelson sailing to 17:13.823 --> 17:16.550 Trafalgar . It was a great moment in 17:16.550 --> 17:19.170 naval history . Here was an opportunity 17:19.430 --> 17:22.680 And and instead of being ambushed , you 17:22.680 --> 17:26.270 are the ambush er And and 17:27.440 --> 17:31.170 I think Admiral Nimitz , Well , he 17:31.170 --> 17:33.392 made that big decision . I think he did 17:33.392 --> 17:37.360 it with confidence task for 16 And task 17:37.360 --> 17:39.980 for 17 were sent to a point 17:39.980 --> 17:43.280 approximately 300 miles north east of 17:43.290 --> 17:46.640 Kiddo booties , anticipated axis of 17:46.640 --> 17:49.670 advance . The spot was open Ocean 17:50.240 --> 17:53.450 32 North 1 73 West . 17:53.520 --> 17:57.160 Known as point luck . 17:58.240 --> 18:00.970 Uh , nemesis was was a brilliant , 18:00.970 --> 18:03.520 brilliant person . He considered 18:03.520 --> 18:05.810 everything possibility in the words as 18:05.810 --> 18:08.220 the suffering gent there . He knew 18:08.230 --> 18:11.530 exactly what could be done , you know , 18:11.530 --> 18:13.808 by the enemy . What could be done this ? 18:13.808 --> 18:15.919 What was the odds here ? What was the 18:15.919 --> 18:18.141 odds there ? And I should thank God for 18:18.141 --> 18:20.197 the good brains on top . Like Nimitz 18:20.540 --> 18:23.860 fletcher and spruance , The 18:23.860 --> 18:25.804 intelligence group in Pearl Harbor 18:25.804 --> 18:28.630 Highboy Unit . They did a great job in 18:28.630 --> 18:30.820 breaking the code . In fact limits . 18:30.820 --> 18:32.987 Admiral Nimitz made a statement then , 18:33.740 --> 18:37.330 which seemed arrogant . He says I'm 18:37.330 --> 18:40.170 going to ambush the Japanese , but 18:40.170 --> 18:43.440 that's exactly what he did . We were , 18:43.450 --> 18:45.728 there was that place called point luck . 18:46.040 --> 18:49.280 So we went off and and that was how 18:49.280 --> 18:51.520 come we got out to the end of our line 18:51.520 --> 18:53.687 and we weren't attacked and we thought 18:53.687 --> 18:56.260 we should be . So we decided to go a 18:56.260 --> 18:58.320 little bit further . So we went out 18:58.320 --> 19:01.450 about 15 more minutes and still haven't 19:01.450 --> 19:03.617 been attacked . And we asked him about 19:03.617 --> 19:06.130 one more time and he said , well This 19:06.130 --> 19:09.710 is the last one . We had gone about 19:09.710 --> 19:11.950 five minutes into that second extension 19:11.960 --> 19:15.360 when General 4th Horn went off 19:15.840 --> 19:19.820 on june 3rd 1942 at 09 19:19.820 --> 19:23.530 25 after extending his patrol leg 19:23.540 --> 19:25.690 and Saint Jacque Reid at the controls 19:25.690 --> 19:29.260 of P . B . Y eight V 55 . Radio 19:29.360 --> 19:32.270 cited main body and two minutes later 19:32.270 --> 19:35.790 radio bearing 26 to distance 19:35.790 --> 19:39.500 700 . I immediately thought 19:39.510 --> 19:43.260 we were under 19:43.260 --> 19:45.760 attack and I ran up between the pilots . 19:45.760 --> 19:47.927 You sit up a little higher like that , 19:47.927 --> 19:50.230 you run up like that between them and 19:50.230 --> 19:53.990 I'm looking up and yeah , they 19:54.000 --> 19:56.222 tapped me on the shoulder and said look 19:56.222 --> 19:58.670 down . I did . That's when I lost my 19:58.670 --> 20:00.726 enthusiasm right there because there 20:00.726 --> 20:02.820 was a lemon enemy ships coming right 20:02.830 --> 20:06.090 towards us . Back on Midway . Commander 20:06.090 --> 20:08.700 Cyrille , Simard , Naval Air station 20:08.700 --> 20:10.589 Commander wanted more information 20:10.589 --> 20:12.930 before launching the Army Air Corps B 20:12.930 --> 20:15.610 seventeens and his disposal against the 20:15.610 --> 20:18.610 sighting of a main body . Then we got 20:18.610 --> 20:20.610 around behind them and they kept us 20:20.610 --> 20:22.550 there for over three hours . I'll 20:22.550 --> 20:25.630 always amplify amplify all there . Uh 20:25.630 --> 20:28.690 huh Things they wanted more information 20:28.690 --> 20:31.230 about the ships and more that we knew 20:31.230 --> 20:33.730 we were going to be dead five minutes 20:33.730 --> 20:37.160 anyway , so we would try our best 20:37.640 --> 20:40.390 get to the next group grew up and take 20:40.390 --> 20:42.630 a look at try to figure out what they 20:42.630 --> 20:45.450 were . Nine B seventeens under the 20:45.450 --> 20:47.506 command of Lieutenant Colonel walter 20:47.506 --> 20:49.830 Sweeney were launched from Midway on 20:49.830 --> 20:53.590 june 3rd . Just after 1640 , they 20:53.590 --> 20:56.470 found their target . The Army Air Corps 20:56.470 --> 20:58.581 bombers dropped their bombs and three 20:58.581 --> 21:01.160 passes from high altitude , scattering 21:01.160 --> 21:03.520 the Japanese ships but achieving no 21:03.520 --> 21:05.640 hits back at Pearl harbor . Admiral 21:05.640 --> 21:07.730 Nimitz responded to Anson Reed's 21:07.730 --> 21:09.970 message of citing the main body by 21:09.970 --> 21:12.170 sending a coded message to Admiral 21:12.170 --> 21:15.600 FLetcher . This is not repeat 21:15.610 --> 21:18.950 not the enemy striking force stop . 21:19.630 --> 21:21.890 This is the landing force . The 21:21.890 --> 21:24.040 striking force will hit from the 21:24.040 --> 21:26.220 northwest tomorrow . Of course . That 21:26.220 --> 21:29.550 was a great feather in our cap . 21:30.140 --> 21:32.307 And Admiral Nimitz made the comment to 21:32.307 --> 21:34.529 Captain Commander Layton at that time . 21:34.529 --> 21:36.473 He said , you were , You were five 21:36.473 --> 21:38.970 miles 5 minutes off in your , in your 21:38.970 --> 21:42.960 projection . But uh , 21:43.540 --> 21:47.370 are the orders to Admiral fletcher 21:47.370 --> 21:50.240 and Animal Halsey . We're not to launch 21:50.250 --> 21:53.180 any aircraft . Any searches 21:53.440 --> 21:56.730 against the Japanese fleet or any 21:56.730 --> 21:59.890 attacks until we had had an attack on 21:59.890 --> 22:02.880 Midway . In fact , our flight leader , 22:02.880 --> 22:05.450 Lieutenant Fever ling had called us all 22:05.450 --> 22:09.020 together and said that the navy 22:09.020 --> 22:11.140 new that there was going to be a 22:11.140 --> 22:15.140 Japanese attack against Midway . The 22:15.140 --> 22:17.251 Japanese launched their aircraft from 22:17.251 --> 22:19.950 the four carriers of Kindu booty and at 22:19.960 --> 22:23.470 oh 4 45 108 Enemy 22:23.470 --> 22:26.430 aircraft formed up and headed southeast 22:26.430 --> 22:30.140 toward Midway at 125 knots , 22:31.040 --> 22:32.762 the Japanese also launched the 22:32.762 --> 22:34.800 reconnaissance of their own seven 22:34.800 --> 22:38.370 planes , Type 97 aircraft from Akagi 22:38.380 --> 22:41.090 and Kaga and float planes from cruisers 22:41.100 --> 22:45.100 tone she kuma and Haruna , A 22:45.110 --> 22:48.180 haphazard and poorly executed , fan 22:48.180 --> 22:50.620 shaped aerial search that would have 22:50.620 --> 22:53.100 disastrous results for the Imperial 22:53.100 --> 22:57.060 Navy . At oh 5 45 Lieutenant 22:57.060 --> 23:00.090 J . G . William Chase aboard P . B Y 23:00.090 --> 23:03.150 three V 58 added in a clear with an 23:03.160 --> 23:06.650 uncoated message . Many planes heading 23:06.660 --> 23:10.360 midway bearing 3 - 0° distance . 23:10.370 --> 23:14.260 150 . This was to be followed at oh 5 23:14.260 --> 23:16.550 50 to buy a second message from chase , 23:16.560 --> 23:19.670 two carriers and main body ships 23:19.680 --> 23:23.650 carriers in front of course , 135 speed 23:23.660 --> 23:27.140 35 . Well , we were quite excited about 23:27.140 --> 23:29.196 the opportunity to strike and barely 23:29.196 --> 23:32.730 joined up and we information when my 23:32.740 --> 23:35.100 turret gunner called me and said he 23:35.100 --> 23:37.322 could see firing back from the island . 23:38.240 --> 23:40.730 Midway defenders face . The Japanese 23:40.730 --> 23:42.930 attacked with courage but with 23:42.930 --> 23:45.260 antiquated planes , The the old 23:45.260 --> 23:47.640 brewster Buffalos especially were no 23:47.640 --> 23:50.010 match for the zero fighters . The 23:50.010 --> 23:52.177 Japanese had hoped to use the airfield 23:52.177 --> 23:54.560 on eastern island after their invasion 23:54.860 --> 23:57.560 and had not bombed the runways , but 23:57.560 --> 23:59.550 opposition from anti aircraft and 23:59.550 --> 24:02.260 ground fire was fiercer than expected , 24:02.840 --> 24:05.530 prompting the Japanese flight leader to 24:05.530 --> 24:09.070 radio at 700 . There is need for a 24:09.070 --> 24:12.850 second attack wave had they have 24:12.850 --> 24:16.070 landed the way we expected them . We 24:16.070 --> 24:19.580 were sure fair . Even if they have 24:19.580 --> 24:21.802 blown out a lot of the defenses , there 24:21.802 --> 24:23.913 has still been some guns . There have 24:23.913 --> 24:26.136 been 50 calibers dug in and those banks 24:26.136 --> 24:28.358 that survived Maybe our old 3" mighta . 24:28.358 --> 24:31.800 You don't know . Uh huh . We've had a 24:31.800 --> 24:33.800 lot of rifle power and you read the 24:33.800 --> 24:36.490 history of Wake Island , you see what 24:36.500 --> 24:39.220 men can do , determined people . It 24:39.220 --> 24:41.331 would have been a bloodbath . There's 24:41.331 --> 24:43.760 not to make reply , there's not to 24:43.760 --> 24:47.620 reason why theirs but to do and 24:47.620 --> 24:48.160 die . 24:54.140 --> 24:57.920 Oh 600 fi Burling six Avengers 24:57.920 --> 25:00.370 based on Midway . Originally part of 25:00.370 --> 25:03.310 hornets , VP eight took off to engage 25:03.310 --> 25:06.120 the Japanese almost an hour out from 25:06.120 --> 25:08.700 the take off Burt called over the 25:08.700 --> 25:12.450 intercom and said I can see some ships 25:12.460 --> 25:15.320 on the horizon . Large ships almost 25:15.330 --> 25:18.770 within minutes of that occurring in 25:19.140 --> 25:21.196 manning called over the intercom and 25:21.196 --> 25:23.980 said we're being attacked by Japanese 25:23.980 --> 25:25.980 fighter planes but there wasn't any 25:25.980 --> 25:27.869 question but we have found them . 25:27.869 --> 25:31.620 Question with who had found her . I was 25:31.630 --> 25:34.470 down on my knees with my 30 caliber 25:34.470 --> 25:36.650 machine gun so I looked back over my 25:36.650 --> 25:39.100 shoulder and I can see the turret had 25:39.100 --> 25:43.020 stowed in that jim was hanging just in 25:43.020 --> 25:46.440 the harness . Obviously blood 25:46.440 --> 25:48.950 everywhere that he was obviously that 25:50.220 --> 25:52.498 and we drove , drove down to the water . 25:52.940 --> 25:55.440 The other section of three did the same , 25:55.440 --> 25:58.070 but they were a little behind us . I 25:58.070 --> 26:00.181 never could see exactly what happened 26:00.181 --> 26:02.870 to them . I just don't remember exactly 26:02.870 --> 26:05.220 when they stopped firing at me and I 26:05.220 --> 26:07.442 guess they never stopped firing at me . 26:07.442 --> 26:09.664 Then the next thing I remember , I felt 26:09.664 --> 26:11.720 a real hot , almost like a soldering 26:11.720 --> 26:13.887 iron on my wrist . It was actually a a 26:13.887 --> 26:16.720 bullet had grazed me and cut my wrist 26:16.720 --> 26:19.360 open , but not severely , just enough 26:20.340 --> 26:22.380 to cause some bleeding . But then I 26:22.380 --> 26:25.480 went back to my gun position still down 26:25.480 --> 26:28.040 on my knees . And then the next thing 26:28.050 --> 26:31.970 that I do remember was hanging down 26:31.980 --> 26:34.680 coming to and I put my hand up on my 26:34.690 --> 26:37.580 head and it almost felt like a hole in 26:37.580 --> 26:40.840 my head and just blood pouring off . 26:40.850 --> 26:43.900 And I was wearing a baseball cap at the 26:43.900 --> 26:47.840 time and this is my cap that 26:47.840 --> 26:51.680 I had on . And there's the bullet hole 26:51.680 --> 26:54.410 in the cap where I had been hit on the 26:54.410 --> 26:58.310 head about that 26:58.310 --> 27:02.120 time . Uh , my stick went left in the 27:02.120 --> 27:04.480 hand , my hand you started down just 27:04.480 --> 27:06.702 slightly because the trim just slightly 27:06.702 --> 27:08.670 nose down . I figured , well 27:10.040 --> 27:12.207 anything I can do , I'm going to go in 27:12.207 --> 27:14.207 the water , but I'm gonna drop this 27:14.207 --> 27:16.540 tour peter or something . Anyway , so I 27:16.540 --> 27:18.990 kicked their plane to the life . But I 27:18.990 --> 27:21.101 got in the position where I thought I 27:21.101 --> 27:24.770 had a decent lead on the ship and drop 27:24.770 --> 27:27.420 and I dropped the torpedo after I 27:27.420 --> 27:29.850 dropped the torpedo as I was about to 27:29.850 --> 27:32.780 hit the water and roll the elevator 27:32.790 --> 27:36.200 trip back , which I hadn't , I'd 27:36.200 --> 27:38.311 forgotten . I thought when I , when I 27:38.311 --> 27:40.533 lost it and she started going down that 27:40.533 --> 27:43.610 elevators were gone . The elevator trim 27:43.610 --> 27:47.230 tabs were still there and I had moved 27:47.230 --> 27:49.560 and not realized it . Maybe it saved my 27:49.560 --> 27:52.620 life . I don't know when you're in a 27:52.620 --> 27:55.580 situation like that time almost loses 27:55.590 --> 27:58.750 any significance . And what I can 27:58.750 --> 28:00.694 remember hearing stuff hitting the 28:00.694 --> 28:03.020 airplane . Mhm . And then after a while 28:03.030 --> 28:06.240 it got pretty quiet . And so then I got 28:06.240 --> 28:09.020 on the intercom and called ends in 28:09.020 --> 28:12.680 earnest and told him that Jim was 28:12.690 --> 28:16.150 dead and asked for permission to climb 28:16.150 --> 28:18.520 up into the second seat behind the 28:18.520 --> 28:21.820 pilot and he gave me permission to do 28:21.820 --> 28:25.390 that . And then we just motored on for 28:25.400 --> 28:29.250 probably an hour close to an hour . And 28:29.260 --> 28:31.770 I guess simultaneously both he and I 28:31.770 --> 28:34.040 could see a lot of black smoke on the 28:34.040 --> 28:36.660 horizon and made the assumption that 28:36.660 --> 28:39.000 that's probably with Midway and Midway 28:39.000 --> 28:42.750 was on fire . Mm hmm . Yeah . 28:43.610 --> 28:46.880 What ? The first attack by American 28:46.880 --> 28:49.047 forces on June four against the Ghetto 28:49.047 --> 28:51.390 Booty registered no hits on the 28:51.400 --> 28:54.020 Japanese ships . The american pilots 28:54.020 --> 28:56.760 and planes were not that fortunate . In 28:56.760 --> 28:59.320 the midst of this confusion . Uss 28:59.320 --> 29:01.750 Nautilus a submarine attacked Kiddo , 29:01.750 --> 29:04.710 but I with torpedoes and was counter 29:04.710 --> 29:08.230 attacked with depth charges . Nautilus 29:08.230 --> 29:10.397 was to be a persistent observer to the 29:10.397 --> 29:13.660 battle . Then we got to talking 29:14.740 --> 29:18.360 like early afternoon dive 29:18.360 --> 29:21.260 bombers during attack on the atoll . 29:21.270 --> 29:25.170 But they're pretty mhm disappointed 29:26.240 --> 29:28.770 this whole time , but they're all my 29:28.770 --> 29:32.030 shipmates were . We finally realized 29:32.030 --> 29:35.400 we're gone and wonder as the TBM 29:35.400 --> 29:37.750 Avengers in B 26 bombers were making 29:37.750 --> 29:39.860 their attack on the Japanese fleet . 29:39.870 --> 29:42.210 The planes from Hornet and Enterprise , 29:42.220 --> 29:44.276 we're just leaving the flight deck . 29:44.640 --> 29:48.440 When can the glory fade ? Oh , the 29:48.440 --> 29:51.350 wild charge ! They made all the world 29:51.350 --> 29:54.460 wondered , honor the charge they made 29:55.840 --> 29:58.350 Actually , we made our attack when the 29:58.350 --> 30:00.517 carriers were just beginning to launch 30:00.517 --> 30:02.683 their aircraft Torpedo didn't make its 30:02.683 --> 30:05.460 attack torpedo eight until sometime 30:05.460 --> 30:07.820 after 10 a.m. In the morning . We had 30:07.820 --> 30:11.260 attacked at 17 Admiral Spruance 30:11.260 --> 30:14.220 launched the plains of Task Force 16 at 30:14.230 --> 30:16.800 the earliest possible time and at the 30:16.800 --> 30:20.340 limit of their range . The plan was to 30:20.350 --> 30:22.790 catch the Japanese planes returning 30:22.800 --> 30:26.680 from the Midway strike On the 30:26.690 --> 30:30.130 4th of of june 30:30.220 --> 30:33.540 when we were all launched to go out and 30:33.550 --> 30:36.790 bomb the jabs . The Enterprise and the 30:36.800 --> 30:39.820 Hornet were launched with a full full 30:39.820 --> 30:42.930 group , all the squatters and all the 30:42.930 --> 30:44.980 planes . So the first thing is 30:44.990 --> 30:47.200 Mccloskey , who is as the group 30:47.200 --> 30:50.320 commander had to launch all our planes . 30:50.320 --> 30:52.376 We've been sitting ready ready to go 30:52.376 --> 30:55.120 for more than a couple of days and 30:55.130 --> 30:59.110 ready to go . And so we took off 30:59.110 --> 31:02.500 and we headed towards the Yorktown and 31:02.510 --> 31:05.390 uh expecting new york town planes to 31:05.390 --> 31:08.010 follow us . Yorktown didn't do this . 31:08.010 --> 31:10.350 The Admiral on new york town said , 31:10.360 --> 31:14.050 well , I'm going to wait until we 31:14.050 --> 31:16.050 find out if there are more than two 31:16.050 --> 31:18.160 carriers , I guess there was 31:18.160 --> 31:20.150 trepidation in some concern . I 31:20.150 --> 31:22.261 wouldn't say that I was ever scared , 31:22.261 --> 31:24.810 but there was certainly concerned . And 31:24.810 --> 31:27.560 the minute I got in that cockpit 31:28.040 --> 31:32.030 and took off training 31:32.030 --> 31:35.410 took over . Led by leaders like Best 31:35.530 --> 31:38.830 wade , McClusky and john waldron Planes 31:38.830 --> 31:40.940 from three American carriers flew 31:40.940 --> 31:43.580 towards the Japanese fleet . Not all 31:43.580 --> 31:47.400 the aircraft found the Japanese eric 31:47.400 --> 31:49.567 group commander said , you're going to 31:49.567 --> 31:52.720 find my course , a commander stanhope C 31:52.720 --> 31:55.940 Ring , he was a guy . So when we went 31:55.950 --> 31:58.490 flying our course that we were going to 31:58.490 --> 32:01.510 intercept the Jabs , we were on that 32:01.510 --> 32:05.030 course for a short time and the torpedo 32:05.030 --> 32:08.180 planes broke off from that course and 32:08.180 --> 32:10.090 went their own course plans for a 32:10.090 --> 32:12.550 coordinated attack quickly ended . 32:14.040 --> 32:17.420 Then Mccloskey , it was a fighter pilot , 32:17.420 --> 32:20.410 you know , he figured , you know , the 32:20.420 --> 32:22.587 first one that hit the other fellow is 32:22.587 --> 32:24.970 going to win And our fuel gauges just 32:24.970 --> 32:28.890 going down down , down . So 32:28.900 --> 32:32.170 when we , when we hear looked at the 32:32.170 --> 32:34.281 spot where the carrier is supposed to 32:34.281 --> 32:37.260 be nothing there , Lieutenant Commander , 32:37.270 --> 32:39.350 john waldron lead torpedo eight 32:39.350 --> 32:41.550 straight to the Japanese fleet . They 32:41.550 --> 32:45.200 found the Japs . And it so happened 32:45.210 --> 32:49.060 that the Torpedo planes torpedo 32:49.060 --> 32:52.980 eight uh went right 32:52.990 --> 32:55.360 to the point where the Japs were 32:59.640 --> 33:01.840 and they made their attack . And of 33:01.840 --> 33:04.410 course they were all shot down by the 33:04.420 --> 33:07.260 zeros and 33:08.240 --> 33:10.296 except for , well they were all shot 33:10.296 --> 33:13.060 down . But gay was the one that 33:13.440 --> 33:17.320 was in the life raft . But those 33:17.320 --> 33:19.431 guys who flew those planes , they had 33:19.431 --> 33:22.000 the guts to make them go and do what 33:22.000 --> 33:24.850 they could , you know . But that's the 33:24.850 --> 33:26.961 american spirit though . Really . The 33:26.961 --> 33:29.990 dvds , the torpedo planes , well , the 33:29.990 --> 33:32.260 worst of the world . I mean carrying 33:32.260 --> 33:35.020 their their torpedoes about 100 knots , 33:35.020 --> 33:37.430 is about as fast as they could go . 33:37.440 --> 33:39.990 Imagine this thing , torpedo planes 33:39.990 --> 33:41.823 going on this thing , you know , 33:41.840 --> 33:44.660 Knowing that they had exactly zero 33:45.830 --> 33:48.052 likelihood of ever getting back and yet 33:48.540 --> 33:51.220 they knew that there mission out there 33:51.220 --> 33:54.770 was really essential is like riding in 33:54.770 --> 33:58.460 a hearse and the torpedoes 33:58.460 --> 34:01.690 that we had were lousy 34:02.640 --> 34:04.590 and what was going on for Admiral 34:04.590 --> 34:07.080 Nagumo . After getting word that a 34:07.080 --> 34:09.490 second strike on Midway was needed , he 34:09.490 --> 34:12.010 had a dilemma . Planes had to be 34:12.010 --> 34:14.170 rearmed refuelled and re spotted . 34:14.840 --> 34:17.280 Unlike american carrier doctrine , the 34:17.290 --> 34:19.790 Japanese did not arm and fuel planes on 34:19.790 --> 34:22.180 the flight deck . Returning planes had 34:22.180 --> 34:24.460 to land and then we moved to the hangar 34:24.460 --> 34:28.250 deck Commander , Waldron and VT eight 34:28.250 --> 34:30.750 made their gallant attack at about 09 34:30.750 --> 34:34.200 30 two . Things happened . The 34:34.200 --> 34:37.050 Japanese combat Air patrol was brought 34:37.050 --> 34:39.640 down from a high altitude and the 34:39.640 --> 34:42.260 Japanese ships maneuvered to evade 34:42.270 --> 34:45.350 torpedo attacks and reversed course out 34:45.350 --> 34:47.760 of the wind , unable to immediately 34:47.760 --> 34:51.280 launch a counterattack . Where were the 34:51.280 --> 34:54.050 rest of the american planes Andy 34:54.050 --> 34:57.360 McCluskey who was the air group 34:57.360 --> 35:00.510 commander happened to side the Japanese 35:00.520 --> 35:03.750 destroyer down on 35:03.760 --> 35:07.110 that was going like hell in one 35:07.110 --> 35:09.221 direction and he decided to follow it 35:09.640 --> 35:11.900 and he led them right to the Japs , 35:12.000 --> 35:15.750 right to the characters . The destroyer 35:15.750 --> 35:18.180 was the Iraqi returning to the imperial 35:18.180 --> 35:20.820 fleet after attempting to depth charge 35:20.830 --> 35:23.330 U . S . S . Nautilus . Well then then 35:23.330 --> 35:25.570 we came there and here with the three 35:25.570 --> 35:28.520 aircraft carriers and then when we saw 35:28.520 --> 35:31.760 the fleets of course , you know , you 35:32.840 --> 35:35.320 you have images of things that you see 35:35.610 --> 35:38.180 sitting right here . I can see that 35:38.190 --> 35:41.010 fleet just the same as I saw it on June 35:41.020 --> 35:44.050 four at oh 9 35:44.050 --> 35:47.210 49 cruisers . Sakuma radio carrier 35:47.220 --> 35:50.800 akagi 14 Enemy planes 50 35:50.800 --> 35:54.600 km deport . Thus began the second 35:54.600 --> 35:56.860 series of torpedo attacks on the 35:56.860 --> 35:59.530 Japanese fleet by planes from the free 35:59.530 --> 36:01.780 american flat tops to be followed by 36:01.780 --> 36:04.430 the accidental coordinated attack by U . 36:04.430 --> 36:07.770 S . Dive bombers . Here comes the 36:07.780 --> 36:09.950 Enterprise torpedo planes 36:11.130 --> 36:14.410 and most of them were shot there except 36:14.410 --> 36:18.120 for a few . And then almost immediately 36:18.120 --> 36:20.176 after that , here comes the Yorktown 36:20.176 --> 36:22.690 torpedo planes . So one after another 36:22.690 --> 36:26.670 torpedo attacks on this uh on three 36:26.670 --> 36:29.310 carries the McCluskey and his to 36:29.310 --> 36:33.070 violence and saw that the myth . Then 36:33.070 --> 36:36.550 I watched Earl Gallagher and he hit and 36:36.550 --> 36:38.900 I thought that's probably was his £200 36:38.900 --> 36:41.490 and centuries and next thing you know 36:41.500 --> 36:43.556 here , this whole thing , you know , 36:43.556 --> 36:46.000 going from that little thing up into it 36:46.000 --> 36:49.760 was a wall of flames like 50 ft high 36:49.770 --> 36:52.260 and coming up towards the , the front 36:52.260 --> 36:54.530 of the ship , Pearl Gallagher went as 36:54.530 --> 36:57.250 low as as possible . His pullout was 36:57.730 --> 37:00.520 probably less than 500 ft and I don't 37:00.520 --> 37:02.920 think mine was much higher than that 37:02.920 --> 37:04.920 either just to make absolutely sure 37:04.920 --> 37:06.976 that we're going to get a hit . So I 37:06.976 --> 37:09.087 watched make sure that I had landed , 37:09.087 --> 37:10.976 you know right , right nearly red 37:10.976 --> 37:13.730 circle because of the structure of the 37:13.730 --> 37:17.360 Japanese ships . The hangar decks 37:17.370 --> 37:20.310 have no access to the outside , they're 37:20.320 --> 37:23.860 all closed in . So if a bomb goes 37:23.860 --> 37:27.740 down to the hangar that and explodes 37:28.130 --> 37:30.210 it ain't gonna be out the side . The 37:30.210 --> 37:34.100 explosion won't uh go out the side it 37:34.110 --> 37:37.730 all takes place inside . So it's just 37:37.730 --> 37:41.130 like a uh explosion followed by an 37:41.130 --> 37:44.590 imposed are released and uh uh 37:44.600 --> 37:46.489 immediately turned to counter his 37:46.489 --> 37:48.378 attacks and got down slow and the 37:48.378 --> 37:51.020 waters and we're now in the middle of 37:51.020 --> 37:54.510 the japanese sleep . It's kind of 37:54.510 --> 37:57.690 comical that the uh my real seat gonna 37:57.690 --> 37:59.660 Anderson by name said , 38:01.820 --> 38:05.250 let's get the hell out of here . I said , 38:05.250 --> 38:07.540 what do you think ? I'm trying to dive 38:07.540 --> 38:09.762 bombers from the enterprise in Yorktown 38:09.762 --> 38:11.818 successfully attacked three Japanese 38:11.818 --> 38:15.490 carriers , akagi saw you and Kaga but 38:15.490 --> 38:18.370 here you was not hit but as of 10 20 in 38:18.370 --> 38:22.230 the morning , not a single ship 38:22.240 --> 38:25.770 had been damaged a and at 38:25.780 --> 38:28.820 10:25 or 10:26 depending on who you 38:28.820 --> 38:31.340 listen to three carriers were sunk . 38:35.420 --> 38:37.680 The amazing thing about it is they had 38:37.680 --> 38:41.040 no idea the american fleet was there 38:41.820 --> 38:44.530 no idea whatsoever . It's tough to 38:44.530 --> 38:46.980 fight a battle like that . You know how , 38:46.980 --> 38:49.202 when you're certain area you have a pie 38:49.202 --> 38:52.900 shaped art form . They sent scout 38:52.900 --> 38:54.844 planes all through that to find if 38:54.844 --> 38:56.956 there's an american fleet out there . 38:57.120 --> 39:00.750 The japanese cruiser tone was to launch 39:00.750 --> 39:02.940 their ship , their plane for a 39:02.940 --> 39:05.273 particular piece of that pie . That arc , 39:05.920 --> 39:08.142 The plane was 30 minutes late . Getting 39:08.142 --> 39:10.990 off the Admiral should have replaced 39:10.990 --> 39:13.268 that plane immediately , but he didn't . 39:14.420 --> 39:17.900 And then , uh , so that one place where 39:17.900 --> 39:21.460 they did not see is where we were dive 39:21.460 --> 39:23.627 bombers from the enterprise and hornet 39:23.627 --> 39:25.870 arrived almost simultaneously . And in 39:25.870 --> 39:28.040 less than 10 minutes , the balance of 39:28.040 --> 39:30.350 neighbor momentum changed in the 39:30.350 --> 39:32.610 Pacific . But what happened to the 39:32.610 --> 39:34.666 planes of the 3rd American carrier ? 39:34.770 --> 39:37.680 USS Hornet . Our air 39:37.680 --> 39:41.520 group wasn't a very good air group 39:41.530 --> 39:44.750 because we didn't have the practice of 39:45.520 --> 39:48.530 uh , doing anything together . 39:49.720 --> 39:52.510 We're the only thing we did together at 39:52.510 --> 39:54.760 any time was on our shakedown cruise . 39:56.120 --> 39:59.860 Uh , it's like a baseball team . We 39:59.860 --> 40:03.800 had no spring training . We had no 40:03.810 --> 40:06.870 season and we went right straight to 40:06.870 --> 40:08.810 the World Series at the Battle of 40:08.810 --> 40:11.230 Midway , in the case of the Enterprise 40:11.230 --> 40:13.480 group , in New york town group , they 40:13.480 --> 40:16.410 were combat ready without the sacrifice 40:16.410 --> 40:19.000 of the torpedo squadrons . That brief 40:19.000 --> 40:22.810 window and time may have closed . And 40:22.810 --> 40:24.977 I continually think , you know , of my 40:24.977 --> 40:28.150 good friend tom ever sold Pocatello 40:28.150 --> 40:28.770 Idaho 40:32.410 --> 40:36.060 here a he 40:36.070 --> 40:39.570 knew that his chances 40:39.580 --> 40:42.440 of survival were 40:43.310 --> 40:46.360 of ourselves . And yet in the words , 40:46.370 --> 40:49.700 still going out there , doing his thing , 40:49.700 --> 40:53.520 you know , doing this , this 40:54.270 --> 40:56.520 incredible thing , giving us just a 40:56.530 --> 40:59.330 perfect chance to do our job . And I 40:59.330 --> 41:01.670 figured well if there aren't any saints 41:01.670 --> 41:05.330 in heaven , he has to be going Mhm . 41:07.410 --> 41:10.110 Between 11 and 11 , 15 in the morning , 41:10.120 --> 41:12.710 American planes began appearing over 41:12.710 --> 41:15.000 their respective carriers after the 41:15.000 --> 41:18.590 strike on Kiddo beauty . So I don't 41:18.590 --> 41:20.423 know how much gas I have , but I 41:20.423 --> 41:23.600 certainly didn't have much . I think 41:23.600 --> 41:26.990 Dusty Cleese claims he had a a couple 41:26.990 --> 41:28.060 of teaspoons 41:30.610 --> 41:34.050 At 1100 . Here you sent 18 dive bombers 41:34.060 --> 41:37.380 and six fighters aloft , followed by 10 41:37.390 --> 41:39.800 torpedo bombers and six more fighters . 41:39.800 --> 41:43.570 At 1331 . Shortly after noon , the val 41:43.570 --> 41:46.580 dive bombers found the Yorktown and its 41:46.580 --> 41:49.440 task force still taking aboard its dive 41:49.440 --> 41:53.000 bombers . Yorktown had 12 Wildcats 41:53.000 --> 41:55.770 overhead flying cap and these fighters 41:55.770 --> 41:58.200 took out half the valves . New york 41:58.200 --> 42:00.760 towns escorts took out two more with a 42:00.760 --> 42:04.110 A but eight valves made it through And 42:04.110 --> 42:08.010 scored three bomb hits on Yorktown . I 42:08.020 --> 42:10.131 can remember on the starboard looking 42:10.131 --> 42:12.298 out from the starboard side , I was on 42:12.298 --> 42:14.570 the flight deck . Uh here was about 42:14.580 --> 42:17.320 three or four at least Japanese planes 42:17.320 --> 42:19.376 going down that had been shot down . 42:19.376 --> 42:22.900 And just I say minutes seconds 42:22.900 --> 42:25.030 later , there was this guy dropped a 42:25.030 --> 42:27.640 bomb on us . But the thing I remember 42:27.640 --> 42:29.807 about it , so I said it was tumbling . 42:29.807 --> 42:32.029 It didn't come right straight down like 42:32.029 --> 42:34.251 most bombs did . And I think that's why 42:34.251 --> 42:36.680 the explosive on that one all went to 42:36.680 --> 42:39.320 starboard and it wiped out the 1.1 42:39.320 --> 42:41.487 million . That was horrible . We had a 42:41.487 --> 42:44.520 fire hose there and he took that and 42:45.100 --> 42:47.870 I turned the water on four and you've 42:47.870 --> 42:49.420 got the fire out then 42:51.500 --> 42:55.430 started helping getting The guys that 42:55.430 --> 42:59.120 were still alive down off 11 month 43:01.900 --> 43:05.430 all happened very quickly Blew a hole 43:05.430 --> 43:07.600 in the flight deck about as large as 43:07.610 --> 43:10.510 the living after midday when New York 43:10.510 --> 43:13.500 Town was attacked , we were about 5 10 43:13.500 --> 43:16.130 miles away . We stood , it was like a 43:16.130 --> 43:19.030 movie watching the attack on new york 43:19.030 --> 43:20.974 town but they stopped there . They 43:20.974 --> 43:23.310 never came near us . The sky is black 43:23.700 --> 43:26.590 and what you're seeing is about the one 43:26.590 --> 43:30.330 out of five burst . The others are 43:30.340 --> 43:32.396 you don't , you don't really see the 43:32.396 --> 43:36.380 except the tracers . So the sky is 43:36.380 --> 43:39.360 really full of dangerous objects and 43:39.360 --> 43:41.471 you're flying right through it . They 43:41.471 --> 43:44.140 were determined to press forward their 43:44.140 --> 43:46.362 attacker in new york town . But I think 43:46.362 --> 43:48.473 we come out of it pretty good with as 43:48.473 --> 43:51.540 far as the bombs are concerned that one 43:51.540 --> 43:54.160 of them hit the stack and blew out the 43:54.160 --> 43:56.680 fire rooms and so we were dead in the 43:56.680 --> 43:58.791 water . The next one hit down and the 43:58.791 --> 44:01.840 forward bow started a persistent fire 44:01.850 --> 44:04.040 in the rag locker . The low point was 44:04.040 --> 44:07.400 when Admiral fletcher left us to go 44:07.400 --> 44:09.456 aboard a cruiser , but we had a very 44:09.456 --> 44:12.360 fine engineering crew and in two hours 44:12.370 --> 44:14.330 or one hour I think it was . They 44:14.330 --> 44:17.030 completely got the engines up running 44:17.030 --> 44:19.141 again and got the scheme in the right 44:19.141 --> 44:22.010 places . However , we could only do 15 44:22.010 --> 44:25.030 nuts and to dodge torpedoes , You've 44:25.030 --> 44:27.480 got to do better than that In the Coral 44:27.480 --> 44:30.130 Sea . We dodged 12 torpedoes on a run . 44:30.690 --> 44:32.468 And of course Yorktown then did 44:32.468 --> 44:35.420 probably 32 , knots and the skipper 44:35.420 --> 44:38.160 missed them all . But now you do 15 44:38.160 --> 44:38.570 knots 44:43.590 --> 44:46.260 At 1443 , the Japanese torpedo , 44:46.260 --> 44:48.316 Obama's passed through the destroyer 44:48.316 --> 44:50.427 and cruiser screen and launched their 44:50.427 --> 44:53.200 fish at Yorktown . two torpedoes from 44:53.200 --> 44:55.790 this attack hit the carrier on the port 44:55.790 --> 44:59.460 side and finally we hear the word 44:59.470 --> 45:02.060 standby for torpedo attack . The water 45:02.060 --> 45:05.690 was very clear in the warheads on their 45:05.690 --> 45:08.290 torpedoes . On these two anyway , were 45:08.290 --> 45:10.760 painted bright yellow and I can see 45:10.760 --> 45:12.816 them under the water come in and hit 45:12.816 --> 45:16.280 the bomb blasted . A blast torpedo is 45:16.280 --> 45:18.440 kind of like a grumbling roar , one 45:18.440 --> 45:20.710 Admiral said . It's like a little dog 45:20.720 --> 45:23.620 shaking Right , right , it's just a 45:23.620 --> 45:25.842 roller rumble . But you know , the guts 45:25.842 --> 45:27.953 of your ship are being tore out , but 45:27.953 --> 45:29.953 you don't know where , it's quite a 45:29.953 --> 45:31.953 sensation to get hit by a torpedo . 45:33.790 --> 45:36.620 The Yorktown was 20 tons or whatever 45:36.620 --> 45:38.842 and I'll swear it lifted us a couple of 45:38.842 --> 45:41.064 feet off the straight up in the air and 45:41.064 --> 45:43.420 right back down , the ship rolled , up 45:43.790 --> 45:47.220 right ship , stem to stern shook . 45:47.870 --> 45:49.981 I thought we were gonna go right over 45:50.290 --> 45:52.234 the hangar deck , went down to the 45:52.234 --> 45:55.870 water 26 , and you couldn't walk on the 45:55.870 --> 45:57.703 decks . Finally , the commanding 45:57.703 --> 46:00.030 officer , uh , put the Lord over the 46:00.040 --> 46:03.850 speakers abandon ship , you take your 46:03.850 --> 46:07.260 shoes off And climb up the deck . And 46:07.270 --> 46:10.700 the deck crew had dropped 2" lines 46:11.180 --> 46:13.347 from the flight deck down to the water 46:13.840 --> 46:15.896 all along the ship , probably two or 46:15.896 --> 46:17.896 345 ft apart , all along the ship . 46:17.980 --> 46:20.770 People from the bridge and the flight 46:20.770 --> 46:23.850 deck would come down those lines . We 46:23.850 --> 46:25.906 from below would go up to the hangar 46:25.906 --> 46:27.906 deck , find the high side where the 46:27.906 --> 46:30.770 legs are , find a space on the line and 46:30.770 --> 46:33.560 go down to the water . The problem was 46:33.570 --> 46:35.900 when you're abandoning ship like that , 46:36.930 --> 46:38.763 there's all out over the water . 46:39.380 --> 46:42.150 Vapours are coming up , it burns your 46:42.150 --> 46:45.310 eyes , it burns your nostril if you get 46:45.310 --> 46:47.421 any of that in your mouth , you throw 46:47.421 --> 46:49.588 up , we had tape off lifejackets , the 46:49.588 --> 46:51.699 old Mae West life jackets and all you 46:51.699 --> 46:53.810 do is stay afloat till you get picked 46:53.810 --> 46:57.800 up . And so but what happened there 46:57.800 --> 47:01.730 was our own destroyers would come up 47:01.740 --> 47:05.370 in a group of people really slow . So 47:05.370 --> 47:07.870 it's not to turn them up and move in 47:07.870 --> 47:09.926 real slow . Hang cargo nets over the 47:09.926 --> 47:13.010 side and you can't swim in that stuff . 47:13.020 --> 47:14.853 But as the sea would wash you up 47:14.853 --> 47:17.530 alongside any of these destroyers , you 47:17.530 --> 47:19.641 would hang on then they had men there 47:19.641 --> 47:22.140 to pull you over on the deck so they 47:22.150 --> 47:24.150 picked me up and fly me on the cold 47:24.150 --> 47:27.660 steel deck and I look for a place to go 47:27.660 --> 47:29.890 in the decks covered with sailors , 47:29.900 --> 47:32.600 different conditions went down below 47:33.180 --> 47:35.347 and the mess tables are being used for 47:35.347 --> 47:37.291 operating tables , people in shock 47:37.291 --> 47:39.513 under blankets and that sort of thing . 47:39.513 --> 47:41.624 My skipper , for example , Best was I 47:41.624 --> 47:44.200 think the one that kept making the 47:44.200 --> 47:46.200 point . There's another carrier out 47:46.200 --> 47:49.030 there . And so that afternoon we put 47:49.030 --> 47:51.197 together what was left of our planes , 47:51.197 --> 47:54.300 what was left the Yorktown and some of 47:54.300 --> 47:56.411 the haunted planes had gotten back to 47:56.411 --> 47:58.650 the carriers , their carrier , so put 47:58.650 --> 48:01.270 them all together and They went out . 48:01.280 --> 48:03.270 Admiral spruance aboard enterprise 48:03.270 --> 48:05.660 centered off 24 aircraft under the 48:05.660 --> 48:07.716 command of Earl Gallagher of v . S . 48:07.716 --> 48:09.760 six . The complement of aircraft 48:09.760 --> 48:12.350 included planes from VB six And 48:12.350 --> 48:14.880 Yorktown VB three . There were no 48:14.880 --> 48:17.410 accompanying fighters as they were 48:17.410 --> 48:20.440 providing cover to the carriers , er 48:20.440 --> 48:24.190 Gallagher uh missed . So I I took his 48:24.190 --> 48:26.301 corrections , you know , figure , you 48:26.301 --> 48:28.523 know , he had already added this much . 48:28.523 --> 48:30.900 So I added that they did in the morning 48:31.270 --> 48:33.214 and I'm pretty sure they landed on 48:33.214 --> 48:37.170 exactly on the same place on the ship 48:37.180 --> 48:39.840 when they hear you as I did that 48:39.850 --> 48:43.220 morning on the cargo . Four hits on 48:43.220 --> 48:46.000 here , you inflicted massive damage . 48:46.470 --> 48:49.270 The fires became uncontrollable and the 48:49.270 --> 48:51.660 order to abandon ship was given in the 48:51.660 --> 48:55.520 early hours of June five . The 48:55.520 --> 48:58.590 four carriers sent to conquer Midway 48:58.590 --> 49:01.560 and draw out . The U . S . Fleet rested 49:01.570 --> 49:04.420 on the floor of the pacific Ocean . 49:06.070 --> 49:08.320 They didn't really have to go in june . 49:08.320 --> 49:10.487 They could have waited until the Zoo , 49:10.487 --> 49:13.270 Kaku and and the show kohaku are 49:13.270 --> 49:15.381 operational and boy , that would have 49:15.381 --> 49:17.492 been a different situation . Had they 49:17.492 --> 49:19.930 done that on the evening of june 4th , 49:19.930 --> 49:22.580 Admiral Coady Taz , four heavy cruisers , 49:22.590 --> 49:25.960 Kumano , Zoya , Takuma and 49:25.960 --> 49:28.780 Nogami with two destroyer escorts were 49:28.780 --> 49:31.090 steaming toward Midway for a night 49:31.090 --> 49:33.146 bombardment of the island with their 49:33.146 --> 49:35.950 eight inch guns . They were cited by U . 49:35.950 --> 49:38.530 S . Submarine Tambor as they maneuver 49:38.540 --> 49:41.430 to evade and attack the sub . Cruz's mo 49:41.430 --> 49:43.930 ga , me and my kuna collided . The 49:43.930 --> 49:45.652 damaged Nogami was left in the 49:45.652 --> 49:48.130 protection of Mokoena and the rest of 49:48.130 --> 49:50.700 Caritas cruisers sped off . 49:51.670 --> 49:54.520 And but anyway , we caught up with him , 49:54.520 --> 49:56.400 you know , the second day . 49:58.570 --> 50:01.860 And so we , 50:02.560 --> 50:04.900 the weather was just ideal and so on 50:04.900 --> 50:07.990 here . Where was the they ship 50:08.860 --> 50:12.680 going this way ? And uh 50:13.860 --> 50:16.630 well , we just made shambles out of out 50:16.630 --> 50:20.180 of the um well , yeah , 50:21.960 --> 50:24.790 On June six , he abandoned Yorktown , 50:24.790 --> 50:26.920 we're still afloat and listing . 50:26.930 --> 50:29.030 Captain Buckmaster came back to the 50:29.040 --> 50:31.280 Hamlin , he was looking for volunteers 50:31.290 --> 50:33.630 of the different professionals or 50:33.630 --> 50:36.560 classifications . So he knew me . So 50:36.560 --> 50:39.380 when I stepped up , he says over there 50:39.860 --> 50:43.670 signed your name . So 141 invested 50:43.770 --> 50:47.100 and I think 15 or 20 officers of the 50:47.100 --> 50:49.620 different disciplines , engineering , 50:49.620 --> 50:52.060 electronics or whatever . All 50:52.060 --> 50:55.500 volunteered aboard to Hammond And we 50:55.500 --> 50:59.390 went back early morning June 26 Yeah . 50:59.960 --> 51:02.450 And went aboard the Yorktown . Then it 51:02.450 --> 51:04.283 went down to where we're pushing 51:04.283 --> 51:07.130 airplanes overboard and we're loading 51:07.130 --> 51:09.440 from the overhead brand new torpedo 51:09.440 --> 51:12.270 planes . Especially they were spares . 51:13.060 --> 51:14.782 We lured them down , push them 51:14.782 --> 51:17.490 overboard . one of those torpedo planes , 51:17.490 --> 51:21.170 the TBD one is mine when they 51:21.170 --> 51:23.170 pushed through the hangar deck door 51:23.170 --> 51:24.892 that was open . I said Captain 51:24.892 --> 51:27.059 Buckmaster , I was a little brazen . I 51:27.059 --> 51:29.059 guess . Please give me this torpedo 51:29.059 --> 51:31.226 plane . He says you got it wrong . And 51:31.226 --> 51:33.337 we over it went splashed in the ocean 51:33.337 --> 51:33.250 and floated a little bit and down it 51:33.250 --> 51:36.180 went . So I have one at 70,000 ft . If 51:36.180 --> 51:38.460 I can go get it someday . As you said , 51:38.460 --> 51:40.516 they were toying York . I'm going to 51:40.516 --> 51:42.627 talk back to Pearl Harbor With the 27 51:42.627 --> 51:44.850 degree list at one and a quarter . Not 51:44.860 --> 51:48.540 per hour . Uh huh . What they were 51:48.540 --> 51:50.707 doing . That's on the fleet tug out to 51:50.707 --> 51:52.596 do that . They would have made it 51:52.596 --> 51:55.880 except two days later . Late june 6th . 51:57.060 --> 52:00.710 The submarine I 158 got inside the 52:00.710 --> 52:04.640 radar range of the destroyers And 52:04.640 --> 52:08.080 they fired four shots . one 52:08.080 --> 52:10.690 missed . Two courtyard down below the 52:10.700 --> 52:13.300 bridge field and one caught the Hammond . 52:13.590 --> 52:15.479 The Hammond had come alongside to 52:15.479 --> 52:17.860 supply water and electricity . They 52:17.860 --> 52:20.082 were going to try to flood the Yorktown 52:20.082 --> 52:22.230 and write it . But that submarine , 52:22.240 --> 52:24.550 that wonder when told me to cut the 52:24.560 --> 52:26.660 Hammond nearly brought Mitchell 52:26.660 --> 52:28.970 broadside and broke the thing in half . 52:28.980 --> 52:31.091 And I , I think nearly all hands went 52:31.091 --> 52:33.590 down because their depth charges went 52:33.590 --> 52:36.010 off in the water in a matter of minutes 52:36.010 --> 52:38.500 the Hammond sank and the salvage crew 52:38.500 --> 52:40.920 of Yorktown prepared to abandon ship a 52:40.920 --> 52:43.031 second time went up to the bridge and 52:43.031 --> 52:45.031 he says , take some pictures . So I 52:45.031 --> 52:47.950 took pictures and suddenly The Air 52:47.950 --> 52:49.950 Yorktown Rolled to Port , went down 52:49.950 --> 52:52.870 Stern 1st . Yeah . 52:55.950 --> 52:59.610 Mhm . Admiral Spruance and fletcher 52:59.620 --> 53:02.410 had successfully carried out Admiral 53:02.410 --> 53:04.632 Nimitz . His order , Midway changed the 53:04.632 --> 53:08.210 world at that time in that 53:08.220 --> 53:11.050 great Japan , not a great navy . 53:11.060 --> 53:14.210 They're not to be underrated . Well , I 53:14.210 --> 53:16.460 guess because we depended on a lot of 53:16.460 --> 53:19.420 luck to win . It was a big gamble . I 53:19.420 --> 53:21.420 thought it was a brilliant name . I 53:21.420 --> 53:23.531 don't know . I don't think I realized 53:23.531 --> 53:25.753 it at the time . I don't think many did 53:25.753 --> 53:27.753 that we could have lost that battle 53:27.753 --> 53:28.980 very , very easily . 53:31.650 --> 53:35.220 So if we had lost 53:35.440 --> 53:39.060 Midway , we 53:39.180 --> 53:41.347 probably would have lost water canal , 53:41.750 --> 53:44.270 Australia would have been risk . 53:47.750 --> 53:51.190 It was truly a dynamic situation . What 53:51.190 --> 53:53.760 kind of nerves did Admiral Nimitz have 53:53.760 --> 53:56.060 to risk the striking force of the 53:56.060 --> 53:59.030 american navy in one major sea battle . 53:59.360 --> 54:01.360 I don't know whether he was a poker 54:01.360 --> 54:04.900 player himself or not , but he made it 54:04.900 --> 54:07.410 clear he made it clear to his staff and 54:07.410 --> 54:10.250 to his subordinates that 54:12.140 --> 54:13.970 you were going into this battle 54:15.030 --> 54:17.500 employing the doctrine of calculated 54:17.500 --> 54:21.050 risk . He knew the risks . He knew that 54:21.050 --> 54:23.161 we could have lost everything or been 54:23.161 --> 54:26.670 totally ineffective . Ah But he , 54:27.140 --> 54:29.840 he urged them to do their best and they 54:29.850 --> 54:32.900 did as I say , I still think there was 54:32.900 --> 54:35.340 a big element of luck . Commander 54:35.340 --> 54:38.520 Rochefort for example , uh , broke the 54:38.520 --> 54:40.720 japanese code and convinced adam 54:40.720 --> 54:42.887 amendments that , you know , there was 54:42.887 --> 54:44.776 going to be an attack on Midway . 54:45.040 --> 54:48.260 Admiral Nimitz believed in and 54:49.240 --> 54:52.560 mm committed the whole pacific fleet at 54:52.560 --> 54:54.616 that point in time to this battle of 54:54.616 --> 54:58.070 Midway intelligence enabled the United 54:58.070 --> 55:00.470 States Navy to participate in the 55:00.480 --> 55:04.360 battle . The battle was won by the 55:05.040 --> 55:07.190 courage and action mainly of the 55:07.190 --> 55:09.870 aviators as well as people supporting 55:09.870 --> 55:12.300 them to ship drivers and the marines . 55:12.300 --> 55:14.570 On Midway , the four ship that bombed 55:14.570 --> 55:17.260 Pearl harbor were sinking Midway and I 55:17.260 --> 55:20.340 think it's probably true . Yeah , yeah , 55:21.140 --> 55:24.260 he lost it Midway . And our 55:24.740 --> 55:27.470 probable reaction to that loss 55:28.940 --> 55:32.170 could well have delayed our progress in 55:32.180 --> 55:35.780 giving priority to the european war . 55:35.790 --> 55:38.250 Could have delayed it by a year , maybe 55:38.260 --> 55:40.880 two prolonged the entire war . We 55:40.880 --> 55:43.200 celebrated anyway every year . In fact , 55:43.210 --> 55:45.266 uh , what was it ? Two years ago ? I 55:45.266 --> 55:48.180 think Chief of Naval operations issued 55:48.180 --> 55:51.670 an edict . The Navy will celebrate two 55:51.670 --> 55:54.020 days every year will stand down and 55:54.020 --> 55:56.330 celebrate two days . Where is the 55:56.330 --> 55:58.630 birthday of the Navy ? And one is to 55:58.630 --> 56:01.810 observe the victory at Midway ? The 56:01.820 --> 56:04.070 Battle of Midway ? Was it ? As far as 56:04.070 --> 56:07.220 World War Two is concerned , it was the 56:07.220 --> 56:08.220 deciding factor . 56:22.830 --> 56:23.830 Mhm . 56:30.830 --> 56:31.960 Yeah . Mhm . 56:44.630 --> 56:47.230 Yeah . Yeah . 57:11.630 --> 57:12.630 Yeah . Yeah . 57:19.430 --> 57:22.190 Yeah . Yeah . Mm hmm , 57:23.330 --> 57:24.460 mm 57:28.430 --> 57:29.240 mm . Mhm .