WEBVTT 00:00.810 --> 00:04.329 Acting Secretary Cal . Admiral 00:04.329 --> 00:08.270 Carl , General Smith , welcome . I 00:08.270 --> 00:10.437 want to start by acknowledging the men 00:10.437 --> 00:12.437 and women of the US Navy and Marine 00:12.437 --> 00:15.550 Corps . They continue to meet lengthy 00:15.550 --> 00:19.440 deployments . A high operational 00:19.440 --> 00:22.709 tempo . And evolving threats . 00:23.590 --> 00:25.757 With professionalism , determination . 00:26.520 --> 00:29.889 And bravery . That are a credit to the 00:29.889 --> 00:33.759 entire force . You know 00:33.759 --> 00:36.040 as well as anyone how the operational 00:36.040 --> 00:38.720 capacity of the fleet , the production 00:38.720 --> 00:41.790 capacity of the industrial base , And 00:41.790 --> 00:44.560 the depth of our magazines are being 00:45.459 --> 00:49.020 severely tested today . You know how 00:49.020 --> 00:52.770 little room . Or mistakes There 00:52.770 --> 00:54.826 is in the training , readiness , and 00:54.826 --> 00:57.580 deployment . Of the world's greatest 00:57.580 --> 01:01.049 fighting force . So I must tell you , 01:01.090 --> 01:04.610 the way the president's request is 01:04.610 --> 01:07.250 structured . Particularly in accounts 01:07.250 --> 01:09.028 that matter a great deal to the 01:09.028 --> 01:11.459 Department of the Navy . is a mistake . 01:12.470 --> 01:14.748 And unfortunately , it's not a new one . 01:16.589 --> 01:20.059 Last year , the ink was barely dry . On 01:20.059 --> 01:22.226 the one-time reconciliation investment 01:22.226 --> 01:24.669 in shipbuilding . When this 01:24.669 --> 01:26.447 subcommittee began to hear from 01:26.447 --> 01:29.669 uniformed leaders . About budget 01:29.669 --> 01:33.639 discrepancies , shortfalls . And broken 01:33.639 --> 01:37.519 glass in major accounts . Actually , 01:37.599 --> 01:39.959 this is not a surprise . It was the 01:39.959 --> 01:41.848 avoidable consequence of treating 01:41.848 --> 01:44.760 one-time infusions of cash like a 01:44.760 --> 01:46.919 substitute for a full year of budget 01:46.919 --> 01:50.800 spending . This is not a 01:50.800 --> 01:54.769 mistake worth repeating . But the way 01:54.769 --> 01:58.120 OMB has structured your budget suggests . 01:58.800 --> 02:00.856 The administration is willing to run 02:00.856 --> 02:03.910 even more significant risk . In fiscal 02:03.910 --> 02:06.849 27 . Take 02:07.230 --> 02:10.080 munitions . Last year , the 02:10.080 --> 02:12.136 subcommittee fully funded one of the 02:12.136 --> 02:14.880 Navy's top unfunded priorities , 02:14.960 --> 02:17.080 accelerated development of the Mays 02:17.080 --> 02:20.729 cruise missile . This year , 02:21.270 --> 02:23.949 the budget request would put funds for 02:23.949 --> 02:27.460 procuring these new munitions . Not in 02:27.460 --> 02:29.570 sustainable annual . 02:30.460 --> 02:33.610 Appropriations , but in a one-time 02:33.610 --> 02:37.259 reconciliation slug . Likewise , the 02:37.259 --> 02:40.440 budget requests strangely split funding 02:40.440 --> 02:43.779 of multi-year procurement contracts for 02:43.779 --> 02:46.179 key navy munitions between annual 02:46.179 --> 02:49.250 appropriations . And one time 02:49.350 --> 02:53.110 reconciliation . So 02:53.110 --> 02:55.110 gentlemen , the entire premise of 02:55.110 --> 02:58.000 multi-year procurement . is 02:58.000 --> 03:01.000 consistent yearly appropriations . 03:02.399 --> 03:05.240 It's right there in the name , how the 03:05.240 --> 03:07.660 department expects to send a consistent 03:07.660 --> 03:10.699 and reliable demand signal to industry . 03:11.470 --> 03:15.020 With one-off reconciliation case . is 03:15.020 --> 03:18.910 beyond me . Maybe you can explain . To 03:18.910 --> 03:21.132 be clear , I'm glad to see basic things 03:21.132 --> 03:23.077 like ship operations appropriately 03:23.077 --> 03:26.110 built into the fiscal 27 days . The 03:26.110 --> 03:29.529 same goes for sustainment of the F-35 , 03:29.669 --> 03:32.690 even belatedly . It's good to see this 03:33.020 --> 03:34.979 critical platform's operational 03:34.979 --> 03:37.820 readiness . Given a high priority . 03:39.770 --> 03:41.992 But requesting new procurement for this 03:41.992 --> 03:44.009 aircraft in one-time reconciliation 03:44.009 --> 03:46.649 spending . It's just an unnecessary 03:46.649 --> 03:50.210 risk . Also , on top of aviation , I 03:50.210 --> 03:53.619 hope you have good news on FAXX . 03:54.139 --> 03:56.306 We've seen more than a year's worth of 03:56.306 --> 03:59.699 delays and $250 million wasted on 03:59.699 --> 04:03.580 contract extensions . Per XX . 04:04.490 --> 04:07.490 Our adversaries have American air super 04:07.490 --> 04:10.800 in our crosshairs . The longer we delay 04:10.800 --> 04:13.949 these investments , the more our edge 04:14.330 --> 04:17.589 is blunted . So , Admiral Carla , 04:18.100 --> 04:20.100 I know you've been outspoken on the 04:20.100 --> 04:23.339 importance , quote , workhouse , 04:23.570 --> 04:27.339 workhouse , horse , end quote , role 04:27.339 --> 04:29.579 that destroyers play in today's surface 04:29.579 --> 04:32.839 fleet . So I'll also need to hear you 04:32.839 --> 04:35.899 square this request failure to include 04:35.899 --> 04:39.679 a 2nd DDG with the continued high 04:39.679 --> 04:41.457 demand for their capabilities . 04:43.160 --> 04:45.640 Gentlemen , on another topic we'll need 04:45.640 --> 04:48.160 to hear from you on is the lessons 04:48.160 --> 04:50.589 you're taking . From the current 04:50.589 --> 04:53.720 conflicts and how they inform your 04:53.720 --> 04:56.779 thinking about the navy . And Marine 04:56.779 --> 05:00.109 Corps modernization . In mission March . 05:00.869 --> 05:03.149 Iran has extracted a price , 05:03.350 --> 05:05.750 effectively striking US and partner 05:05.750 --> 05:08.910 military targets all across the region . 05:09.690 --> 05:12.059 We've also continued to use extricate 05:12.059 --> 05:15.410 interceptors to take down . Cheap uh 05:15.410 --> 05:19.190 turbit , uh , uh , these cheap 05:19.320 --> 05:22.839 drones . Why haven't we adapted more 05:22.839 --> 05:26.359 quickly to the modern battlefield ? 2 05:26.359 --> 05:28.720 weeks ago Iran used small boats and 05:28.720 --> 05:32.049 drones . Against US destroyers in the 05:32.049 --> 05:35.679 Strait of Hormuz . Threatening these 05:35.679 --> 05:38.320 billion dollar warships and the sailors 05:38.320 --> 05:42.010 who operate them . So what are we 05:42.010 --> 05:43.954 doing to increase protection while 05:43.954 --> 05:46.850 reducing the cost of defending these 05:46.850 --> 05:50.470 ships ? Should we be using drone 05:50.470 --> 05:54.149 boats to add layers of protection for 05:54.149 --> 05:57.260 sailors ? Why aren't we more prepared 05:57.260 --> 05:59.440 to use drones for countermine 06:00.489 --> 06:03.299 operations ? Meanwhile , Ukraine 06:03.299 --> 06:06.000 continues to use drone vessels 06:06.579 --> 06:10.399 effectively . Against Russian 06:10.399 --> 06:13.420 access in the Black Sea . What happens 06:13.420 --> 06:15.920 if Iran learns these lessons before we 06:15.920 --> 06:19.500 do ? Or when China adopts them at 06:19.500 --> 06:22.779 scale . At the most basic level , what 06:22.779 --> 06:25.500 is the , what is the Department of the 06:25.500 --> 06:27.980 Navy doing to ensure that US sailors 06:27.980 --> 06:31.600 and Marines Benefit from every possible 06:31.859 --> 06:35.179 advantage of modern military technology . 06:35.260 --> 06:38.779 If you ask me . One of the obvious ways . 06:39.630 --> 06:41.408 is to continue to invest in the 06:41.408 --> 06:43.790 alliances and partnerships that extend 06:43.790 --> 06:47.140 our reach and amplify our 06:47.140 --> 06:49.910 deterrent power . There's nothing to be 06:49.910 --> 06:52.670 gained , nothing to be gained from 06:52.670 --> 06:54.790 opting out of close engagement with 06:54.790 --> 06:57.899 battlefield experts like the Ukrainians . 06:58.540 --> 07:01.160 And with capable and committed partners 07:01.579 --> 07:04.779 from the first Alan Chain to NATO 07:04.779 --> 07:08.450 Eastern Front . So Ms . S and McAle . 07:09.940 --> 07:12.260 General Smith , look forward to hearing 07:12.260 --> 07:14.480 your views on these and other topics . 07:15.250 --> 07:17.250 We'll turn to you momentarily after 07:17.250 --> 07:19.850 opening comments from Senator Coons . 07:20.290 --> 07:22.401 Thank you , Chairman McConnell . Um , 07:22.401 --> 07:24.568 thank you all for your service and for 07:24.568 --> 07:26.790 being here . We have a number of issues 07:26.790 --> 07:28.790 to get through today . Uh , I agree 07:28.790 --> 07:30.846 with most of the points just made by 07:30.846 --> 07:32.957 the chairman , so I'll , um , move to 07:32.957 --> 07:34.846 the things where perhaps I've got 07:34.846 --> 07:37.068 something to add , uh , as we move into 07:37.068 --> 07:39.179 Memorial Day weekend , I also want to 07:39.179 --> 07:41.290 begin by expressing , uh , my undying 07:41.290 --> 07:43.290 gratitude , uh , to the sailors and 07:43.290 --> 07:43.089 marines , uh , who've served and 07:43.089 --> 07:45.260 sacrificed and To whom we owe our 07:45.260 --> 07:47.940 freedom , uh , and my general gratitude 07:47.940 --> 07:49.996 to the sailors and marines currently 07:49.996 --> 07:51.940 serving in conflicts , uh , in the 07:51.940 --> 07:54.220 Persian Gulf , uh , in , uh , the 07:54.220 --> 07:56.331 Southern Caribbean and throughout the 07:56.331 --> 07:58.387 world , uh , without them , we would 07:58.387 --> 08:00.609 not be the nation that we are . Um , so 08:00.609 --> 08:02.498 to Acting Secretary Coo , Admiral 08:02.498 --> 08:04.442 Caudle , uh , General Smith , um , 08:04.442 --> 08:06.498 thank you for being here and for the 08:06.498 --> 08:08.720 forces that you lead . Um , as a result 08:08.720 --> 08:10.664 of Operation Epic Fury , we're now 08:10.664 --> 08:12.887 deeply vulnerable in the Indo-Pacific , 08:12.887 --> 08:14.887 a theater home to three of our most 08:14.887 --> 08:16.887 threatening adversaries , the PRC , 08:16.887 --> 08:19.160 DPRK , and even Russia . Uh , we've 08:19.160 --> 08:21.271 redirected more than 2000 Marines and 08:21.271 --> 08:23.438 at least one amphibious assault ship , 08:23.438 --> 08:25.549 uh , the Tripoli from Japan , as well 08:25.549 --> 08:27.493 as the missile defense system from 08:27.493 --> 08:29.604 South Korea towards the Gulf . And in 08:29.604 --> 08:31.771 one striking illustration of Operation 08:31.771 --> 08:33.993 Epic Fury's drain on our readiness , we 08:33.993 --> 08:36.327 just need to take a moment and consider . 08:36.327 --> 08:38.438 Um , the USS Gerald R . Ford , having 08:38.438 --> 08:40.160 just returned from the longest 08:40.160 --> 08:42.160 operational deployment by a carrier 08:42.160 --> 08:44.438 group since the end of the Vietnam War , 08:44.438 --> 08:46.327 uh , facing a slew of operational 08:46.327 --> 08:48.549 challenges , it'll now be out of action 08:48.549 --> 08:50.660 for up to 14 months as it undergoes , 08:50.660 --> 08:52.660 uh , repairs . Our heightened naval 08:52.660 --> 08:54.827 presence around Iran and ongoing naval 08:54.827 --> 08:56.993 deployments in the eastern Pacific and 08:56.993 --> 08:58.993 Southern Caribbean around Venezuela 08:58.993 --> 09:01.104 begs the question , how long will our 09:01.104 --> 09:02.993 naval assets be deployed in these 09:02.993 --> 09:05.179 theaters ? At what cost and with what 09:05.179 --> 09:07.290 consequence for our deterrence in the 09:07.290 --> 09:09.457 East China Sea , South China Sea , and 09:09.457 --> 09:11.809 wider Indo-Pacific . Um , I'm also 09:11.809 --> 09:14.309 gravely concerned by another abrupt 09:14.309 --> 09:16.820 firing of a senior Pentagon official 09:16.820 --> 09:19.219 during wartime , the former Secretary 09:19.219 --> 09:21.219 of the Navy , John Phelan . Uh , we 09:21.219 --> 09:23.330 have gotten no clear input or answers 09:23.330 --> 09:25.497 as to why that happened . There are in 09:25.497 --> 09:27.441 other branches , uh , other senior 09:27.441 --> 09:29.608 individuals who've been fired abruptly 09:29.608 --> 09:31.497 as well . Um , more broadly , the 09:31.497 --> 09:33.663 topics I'm going to want to address in 09:33.663 --> 09:35.663 today's conversation . Is uh how to 09:35.663 --> 09:37.719 reform our shipbuilding enterprise , 09:37.719 --> 09:39.552 how do we proliferate autonomous 09:39.552 --> 09:41.330 systems , how do we rebuild our 09:41.330 --> 09:43.497 magazine depth , and how do we address 09:43.497 --> 09:45.719 your services near-term operation and 09:45.719 --> 09:48.299 maintenance challenges . The 09:48.299 --> 09:50.466 department's fiscal 27 request is more 09:50.466 --> 09:52.659 than $286 billion in base funding for 09:52.659 --> 09:54.881 the Navy . I'm pleased to see more than 09:54.881 --> 09:56.715 $43 billion a sizable percentage 09:56.715 --> 09:58.826 increase for the United States Marine 09:58.826 --> 10:00.659 Corps . Um , but as the chairman 10:00.659 --> 10:02.940 commented , it relies on $38 billion in 10:02.940 --> 10:05.051 reconciliation funding , an uncertain 10:05.051 --> 10:08.659 and partisan process . Um , and core 10:08.659 --> 10:10.659 examples include about half of your 10:10.659 --> 10:12.770 munitions request , all of the Marine 10:12.770 --> 10:14.715 Corps's medium landing ships , the 10:14.715 --> 10:16.937 submarine industrial base investments . 10:16.937 --> 10:18.992 Um , last year , the Navy would have 10:18.992 --> 10:20.881 halted sailing worldwide had this 10:20.881 --> 10:23.109 subcommittee not fixed the so-called 10:23.109 --> 10:25.640 broken glass , the reconciliation , uh , 10:25.669 --> 10:27.836 mistakes in our bill , and there was a 10:27.836 --> 10:30.058 similar challenge with the Marine Corps 10:30.058 --> 10:32.280 barracks modernization . Uh , we worked 10:32.280 --> 10:34.002 as best we could in a diligent 10:34.002 --> 10:36.225 bipartisan way to address that , but it 10:36.225 --> 10:38.447 was an unforced error , and this year's 10:38.447 --> 10:41.219 department request triples down on the 10:41.219 --> 10:43.909 potential risk here . So , Um , our 10:43.909 --> 10:46.020 experience was that the White House's 10:46.020 --> 10:48.020 decision created a host of problems 10:48.020 --> 10:50.076 last year , and I'm deeply concerned 10:50.076 --> 10:51.909 we're doing more to create those 10:51.909 --> 10:53.950 mistakes this year . So , as a 10:53.950 --> 10:55.909 subcommittee , we need to clearly 10:55.909 --> 10:58.076 understand the nature and scope of the 10:58.076 --> 11:00.298 risks the administration is taking with 11:00.298 --> 11:02.298 your funding . As I mentioned , I'm 11:02.298 --> 11:04.465 concerned about readiness levels . The 11:04.465 --> 11:06.520 Navy , if I understand properly , is 11:06.520 --> 11:08.631 going to run out of , run out of ship 11:08.631 --> 11:10.520 operations funding in July . Uh , 11:10.520 --> 11:12.520 because of unbudgeted operations in 11:12.520 --> 11:14.631 South in Southern Command and against 11:14.631 --> 11:16.631 Iran as well as the rising price of 11:16.631 --> 11:18.853 fuel that impacts all of us , and there 11:18.853 --> 11:21.020 will be , as I mentioned , significant 11:21.020 --> 11:23.020 repair costs for the Ford and other 11:23.020 --> 11:25.076 ships . We don't have currently good 11:25.076 --> 11:27.187 estimates about what that will cost . 11:27.187 --> 11:29.242 Um , Commandant General Smith , um , 11:29.242 --> 11:31.465 this committee has been very supportive 11:31.465 --> 11:33.298 of the Marine Corps force design 11:33.298 --> 11:35.353 reforms . They were thoughtfully put 11:35.353 --> 11:37.465 together , executed efficiently , and 11:37.465 --> 11:39.520 better positioned Marines for modern 11:39.520 --> 11:41.520 combat . Um , you consulted closely 11:41.520 --> 11:43.687 with Congress throughout all of this , 11:43.687 --> 11:45.909 so we understood your vision and how it 11:45.909 --> 11:47.853 would work , and I look forward to 11:47.853 --> 11:50.020 continuing to hear about how that work 11:50.020 --> 11:52.242 is playing out and how we can invest in 11:52.242 --> 11:52.219 your force readiness . I'm very pleased 11:52.219 --> 11:53.886 to see a strong investment in 11:53.886 --> 11:56.052 shipbuilding . Uh , I think we are far 11:56.052 --> 11:58.219 behind and we need to catch up as best 11:58.219 --> 12:00.219 we possibly can . Uh , I'm proud to 12:00.219 --> 12:02.163 work closely with the Pennsylvania 12:02.163 --> 12:04.163 delegation in supporting the Philly 12:04.163 --> 12:05.830 shipyard , one of a number of 12:05.830 --> 12:07.886 shipbuilding capabilities we need to 12:07.886 --> 12:09.997 invest in more . Um , I support smart 12:09.997 --> 12:11.663 and robust investments in our 12:11.663 --> 12:13.830 industrial base , um , but that starts 12:13.830 --> 12:15.608 with expediting , incorporating 12:15.608 --> 12:17.719 advanced manufacturing technologies . 12:17.719 --> 12:19.886 Uh , I think we need to learn from and 12:19.886 --> 12:21.608 partner with the best in class 12:21.608 --> 12:23.275 shipyards in the world , um , 12:23.275 --> 12:25.219 relatively few of which are in our 12:25.219 --> 12:27.219 country . The Navy is making steady 12:27.219 --> 12:29.441 incremental progress , um , but it , it 12:29.441 --> 12:31.775 lacks in my view , the sense of urgency , 12:31.775 --> 12:33.608 um , from our partners , uh , in 12:33.608 --> 12:35.330 shipbuilding . Uh , we need to 12:35.330 --> 12:37.497 understand real outcomes and metrics . 12:37.497 --> 12:39.386 We're putting a ton of money into 12:39.386 --> 12:41.497 industrial base , um , and we need to 12:41.497 --> 12:43.441 see how that money is reaching the 12:43.441 --> 12:45.330 sub-tier suppliers to broaden and 12:45.330 --> 12:47.497 strengthen that base . Um , and then a 12:47.497 --> 12:49.441 clear understanding about what the 12:49.441 --> 12:51.552 government's responsible for and what 12:51.552 --> 12:53.608 industry is responsible for . Uh , I 12:53.608 --> 12:53.570 admire the deputy secretary's fierce 12:53.570 --> 12:56.330 determination to shake up elements of 12:56.330 --> 12:59.099 the system . Paying competitive wages , 12:59.419 --> 13:01.586 keeping the shipyard infrastructure in 13:01.586 --> 13:03.820 decent shape is industry's job , and 13:03.820 --> 13:05.709 they need to prioritize that over 13:05.709 --> 13:07.931 paying billions in stock buybacks , and 13:07.931 --> 13:09.987 I think collectively we need to hold 13:09.987 --> 13:12.153 them accountable . Uh , Last , there , 13:12.153 --> 13:14.098 there's a number of other areas of 13:14.098 --> 13:16.264 concern in this request , but I just , 13:16.264 --> 13:18.042 um , I have to point to you are 13:18.042 --> 13:19.987 requesting dramatic sums for a new 13:19.987 --> 13:22.153 class of battleship . In my view , the 13:22.153 --> 13:24.153 entire concept flies in the face of 13:24.153 --> 13:25.820 current naval doctrine . Uh , 13:25.820 --> 13:27.987 everything we know about survivability 13:27.987 --> 13:30.098 in the current . Um , warspace , uh , 13:30.098 --> 13:32.320 you heard the chairman's comments about 13:32.320 --> 13:34.264 Ukraine and the remarkable success 13:34.264 --> 13:36.376 they've had against the Russian Black 13:36.376 --> 13:38.376 Sea fleet . I will associate myself 13:38.376 --> 13:40.598 with those comments . You're requesting 13:40.598 --> 13:42.820 over a five-year period , I believe $50 13:42.820 --> 13:44.929 billion but as I understand it , you 13:44.929 --> 13:46.985 don't have a design , you don't know 13:46.985 --> 13:49.207 what's gonna be on it , you're counting 13:49.207 --> 13:51.429 on multiple unproven technologies , and 13:51.429 --> 13:50.969 you don't know how you're gonna build 13:50.969 --> 13:54.039 it . Um , in my view , that's a program 13:54.039 --> 13:55.880 designed to fail . And we should 13:55.880 --> 13:57.840 instead be putting those funds in 13:57.840 --> 13:59.896 rapidly characterizing , acquiring , 13:59.896 --> 14:02.320 and deploying critically needed drones 14:02.320 --> 14:04.640 that will allow us um below and on the 14:04.640 --> 14:07.000 surface and above the sea , um , to be 14:07.000 --> 14:09.559 the dominant force we need to be going 14:09.559 --> 14:11.670 ahead . So we have a lot of ground to 14:11.670 --> 14:13.892 cover today . Uh , this is the start of 14:13.892 --> 14:13.799 our conversations for this 14:13.799 --> 14:16.119 appropriations year , uh , and I am 14:16.119 --> 14:18.175 hopeful there will be an improvement 14:18.175 --> 14:20.397 from last year and that our information 14:20.397 --> 14:22.675 sharing will be transparent , thorough , 14:22.675 --> 14:24.675 and proactive . Thank you again for 14:24.675 --> 14:24.599 your service and thank you , Mr . 14:24.640 --> 14:27.890 Chairman . Thank you , Senator Coons . 14:28.169 --> 14:30.840 We'll ask each of you to make a brief 14:30.840 --> 14:34.150 statement . Starting with you , Acting 14:34.150 --> 14:37.799 Secretary Cal . Good morning , 14:37.960 --> 14:39.960 Chairman McConnell , Ranking Member 14:39.960 --> 14:42.016 Coons , distinguished members of the 14:42.016 --> 14:43.904 Senate Appropriations Committee . 14:43.904 --> 14:46.127 Senator Coons , thank you , sir , for , 14:46.127 --> 14:48.182 for reminding us , uh , on days like 14:48.182 --> 14:50.293 Memorial Day that freedom is not free 14:50.293 --> 14:52.460 is paid for by young men and women who 14:52.460 --> 14:54.627 we will never see tomorrow . America's 14:54.627 --> 14:56.682 sailors and marines are currently on 14:56.682 --> 14:56.510 the front lines of freedom in 14:56.510 --> 14:58.566 operations to protect our republic . 14:59.039 --> 15:01.206 Lincoln and Bush carrier strike groups 15:01.206 --> 15:03.428 and Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group with 15:03.428 --> 15:05.595 the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit are 15:05.595 --> 15:07.761 in the Arabian Sea protecting merchant 15:07.761 --> 15:09.928 ships and stopping illicit shipping by 15:09.928 --> 15:12.039 a terrorist regime . Destroyers Arley 15:12.039 --> 15:14.095 Burke , Bulkley , Oscar Austin , and 15:14.095 --> 15:16.239 Gonzalez are protecting our allies in 15:16.239 --> 15:18.072 the Mediterranean against cruise 15:18.072 --> 15:20.510 missile attacks from Iran . In the 15:20.510 --> 15:22.830 Caribbean , Iwo Jima Argmu and USS 15:22.830 --> 15:24.886 Dwight D . Eisenhower carrier strike 15:24.886 --> 15:27.349 Group , a 49-year-old nuclear-powered 15:27.349 --> 15:29.127 aircraft carrier , are stopping 15:29.127 --> 15:30.905 narco-terrorists from poisoning 15:30.905 --> 15:33.280 Americans with illegal drugs . In the 15:33.280 --> 15:36.510 Pacific , Boxer AGMu and Destroyer 15:36.510 --> 15:38.732 Squadron 7 are enforcing the freedom of 15:38.732 --> 15:40.899 navigation in the South China Sea . At 15:40.899 --> 15:43.066 home , we're preparing Macon Island Am 15:43.066 --> 15:45.049 for a deployment . On our southern 15:45.049 --> 15:47.216 border , our sailors and marines stand 15:47.216 --> 15:49.382 watch tonight saying , nothing's gonna 15:49.382 --> 15:51.549 hurt you tonight , not on my watch . 4 15:51.549 --> 15:53.549 weeks ago I was tasked by President 15:53.549 --> 15:55.605 Trump to lead the United States Navy 15:55.605 --> 15:57.827 and the United States Marine Corps . My 15:57.827 --> 15:59.882 3 priorities are to take care of our 15:59.882 --> 16:01.938 sailors' Marines , build ships , and 16:01.938 --> 16:04.105 protect our homeland . 120 years ago , 16:04.105 --> 16:05.827 the Great White Fleet extended 16:05.827 --> 16:07.771 America's reach across the globe . 16:07.771 --> 16:09.771 We're currently at the forefront of 16:09.771 --> 16:11.938 history with a budget that will create 16:11.938 --> 16:13.993 the Golden Fleet , which renews that 16:13.993 --> 16:15.827 maritime dominance . We have the 16:15.827 --> 16:17.771 obligation to give our sailors and 16:17.771 --> 16:19.882 marines the very best equipment to do 16:19.882 --> 16:22.049 their jobs . In our historic budget of 16:22.049 --> 16:24.289 $377.5 billion we're adding 34 new 16:24.289 --> 16:26.210 ships varying from small to large 16:26.210 --> 16:29.479 combatant combatants , 123 new 16:29.479 --> 16:31.710 aircrafts along with 5 unmanned ships . 16:32.090 --> 16:34.450 In 5 years , we will add 122 manned 16:34.450 --> 16:37.979 ships and 63 unmanned ships . We're 16:37.979 --> 16:40.090 funding the readiness of our fleet to 16:40.090 --> 16:42.659 95% . We're procuring exquisite 16:42.659 --> 16:44.890 munitions that will keep our forces 16:44.900 --> 16:46.900 outside the weapons engagement zone 16:46.900 --> 16:48.678 while investing in research and 16:48.678 --> 16:51.011 development for the fight of the future . 16:51.090 --> 16:53.312 More importantly , we're increasing our 16:53.312 --> 16:55.257 service member pays , investing in 16:55.257 --> 16:57.201 family and unaccompanied housing , 16:57.201 --> 16:59.312 child development centers so that our 16:59.312 --> 17:01.534 sailors and marines have a safe , clean 17:01.534 --> 17:01.330 and comfortable place to live and not 17:01.330 --> 17:03.552 have to worry about their families when 17:03.552 --> 17:06.558 deployed in harm's way . We have 17:06.558 --> 17:08.336 greatly exceeded recruiting and 17:08.336 --> 17:10.225 retention goals , and that is due 17:10.225 --> 17:12.114 solely to the sheer leadership of 17:12.114 --> 17:14.336 President Trump and Secretary Hegseth . 17:14.336 --> 17:16.225 Two weeks ago , I was a board USS 17:16.225 --> 17:18.558 Gerald R . Ford , USS Winston Churchill , 17:18.558 --> 17:20.336 and USS Bainbridge as they were 17:20.336 --> 17:22.280 returning from the 11-month combat 17:22.280 --> 17:24.280 deployment in two theaters . Do not 17:24.280 --> 17:26.447 believe the fake news that claims food 17:26.447 --> 17:28.614 shortages , backed up toilets , or low 17:28.614 --> 17:30.336 morale . What I witnessed were 17:30.336 --> 17:32.169 motivated and professional young 17:32.169 --> 17:34.169 Americans pushing the boundaries of 17:34.169 --> 17:36.280 performance for their country . It is 17:36.280 --> 17:38.391 imperative that we pass this budget . 17:38.391 --> 17:40.447 Ship construction and readiness were 17:40.447 --> 17:42.502 built pairs for Iraq and Afghanistan 17:42.502 --> 17:44.502 for 20 years . While our industrial 17:44.502 --> 17:46.280 base atrophied , America's peer 17:46.280 --> 17:47.947 competitors grew stronger and 17:47.947 --> 17:50.114 threatened our sovereignty . Their 100 17:50.114 --> 17:52.760 year plan has one goal total global 17:52.760 --> 17:55.640 domination . Only one thing stands in 17:55.640 --> 17:57.862 our way , and that is the United States 17:57.862 --> 18:00.140 of America . The Navy and Marine Corps 18:00.140 --> 18:02.500 are America's 911 force , capable of 18:02.500 --> 18:04.444 being anywhere as a carrier strike 18:04.444 --> 18:06.556 group or marine air-ground task force 18:06.556 --> 18:08.778 with overwhelming firepower , as we saw 18:08.778 --> 18:11.770 in absolute resolve and epic fury . A 18:11.770 --> 18:13.992 year ago I testified in my confirmation 18:13.992 --> 18:16.103 hearing that it would create the most 18:16.103 --> 18:18.326 lethal Navy Marine Corps team the world 18:18.326 --> 18:20.159 has ever seen . I will keep that 18:20.159 --> 18:22.326 promise , having worn the cloth of our 18:22.326 --> 18:24.548 nation for 32 years , most of which was 18:24.548 --> 18:26.603 in combat . I also do this because I 18:26.603 --> 18:28.826 will not allow my oldest son , who will 18:28.826 --> 18:30.992 be commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant of 18:30.992 --> 18:33.326 the United States Marine Corps tomorrow , 18:33.326 --> 18:35.548 to go through war the way I did without 18:35.548 --> 18:37.659 the equipment that we needed . I will 18:37.659 --> 18:37.339 not allow this for any of America's 18:37.339 --> 18:40.449 sons or daughters . They signed a blank 18:40.449 --> 18:42.671 check to to this nation up to including 18:42.671 --> 18:44.838 their lives , and we owe it to them to 18:44.838 --> 18:47.060 do our due diligence to fund a historic 18:47.060 --> 18:49.005 budget that will care for them and 18:49.005 --> 18:48.930 their families while giving them the 18:48.930 --> 18:50.986 tools they need to answer the call . 18:51.930 --> 18:54.097 I've seen firsthand what communism and 18:54.097 --> 18:56.369 authoritarian regimes have done to 18:56.369 --> 18:58.689 thriving nations . Members of my family 18:58.689 --> 19:01.209 were murdered by communists . In 1975 , 19:01.290 --> 19:03.234 we had no flag to stand under or a 19:03.234 --> 19:05.280 country to call our own . But the 19:05.280 --> 19:07.613 United States gave us hope and a future . 19:08.119 --> 19:10.286 I've dedicated my entire adult life to 19:10.286 --> 19:12.452 defend this nation under God , so that 19:12.452 --> 19:14.760 we would never see this , and our 19:14.760 --> 19:16.760 children and our grandchildren will 19:16.760 --> 19:19.040 never experience this ever . Thank you 19:19.040 --> 19:21.096 again for the opportunity to testify 19:21.096 --> 19:23.207 before you . I'm ready to answer your 19:23.207 --> 19:25.040 question , sir . Mr . Chairman . 19:26.979 --> 19:27.900 Mr . Chairman , 19:32.650 --> 19:34.810 Mr . Chairman , Senator Kennedy , 19:35.130 --> 19:36.963 forgive me , Mr . Chairman , for 19:36.963 --> 19:39.329 interrupting , and I say this with 19:39.329 --> 19:42.699 respect . For you and , and these three 19:42.699 --> 19:44.921 gentlemen , but as you know , we've got 19:44.921 --> 19:47.199 a very important meeting at 11 o'clock . 19:47.339 --> 19:49.859 We're gonna have to leave . I would 19:49.859 --> 19:53.619 respectfully ask if we could limit the 19:53.619 --> 19:56.380 opening remarks so we could get to ask 19:56.380 --> 19:58.713 a few questions . Senator Kennedy , I'm , 19:58.713 --> 20:00.824 uh , Senator Coons has been perfectly 20:00.824 --> 20:03.459 all right with taking 2 on our side 20:03.459 --> 20:07.400 first , and then they get 2 . So we'll 20:07.619 --> 20:09.897 be able to get to both of you . I know , 20:09.897 --> 20:12.119 but my point is we're gonna start at 11 20:12.119 --> 20:14.140 o'clock . I've got to be there and 20:14.140 --> 20:16.251 these gentlemen have some wonderful , 20:16.420 --> 20:19.140 uh , prepared statements , but I can 20:19.140 --> 20:21.949 read faster than they can talk . And 20:21.949 --> 20:24.060 I'm , I was hoping if they could give 20:24.060 --> 20:26.282 us the Cliff's Notes version , we might 20:26.282 --> 20:28.849 have enough time to , to ask you 20:28.849 --> 20:31.189 questions or go ahead and ask the 20:31.189 --> 20:33.356 question . Do you mind ? Do you mind , 20:33.356 --> 20:35.540 gentlemen ? Sir , not at all . All 20:35.540 --> 20:37.596 right , I'll , I'll , I'll try to be 20:37.596 --> 20:39.762 brief , Mr . Secretary . Thank you for 20:39.762 --> 20:42.189 being here . We need more ships . We're 20:42.189 --> 20:44.133 gonna give you money to build more 20:44.133 --> 20:46.349 ships . You need to get those ships 20:46.349 --> 20:49.130 built . Need to build as many of them 20:49.130 --> 20:51.900 as you can in Louisiana , but let's get 20:51.900 --> 20:54.150 them built . Uh , general 20:56.300 --> 21:00.130 Uh , is Russia our friend ? Sir , 21:00.209 --> 21:04.069 they're not . Between Ukraine 21:04.069 --> 21:07.109 and Russia . Who do we want to win that 21:07.109 --> 21:09.550 war ? Well , we'd prefer there not be a 21:09.550 --> 21:12.030 war , but obviously , but there is . 21:12.109 --> 21:14.165 Who do we want to win ? Obviously we 21:14.165 --> 21:16.387 want Ukraine to stand independently and 21:16.387 --> 21:18.442 not be consumed by Russia . OK . Now 21:18.442 --> 21:20.670 when Putin went into Ukraine , he 21:20.670 --> 21:23.109 thought he was going to roll in and 21:23.109 --> 21:25.670 take it over in 2 days like thunder on 21:25.670 --> 21:28.160 a summer night , didn't he ? I believe 21:28.160 --> 21:30.959 he did , but the Ukrainian people have 21:30.959 --> 21:34.060 fought back , haven't they ? Yes sir , 21:34.170 --> 21:36.392 they have fought back and they now have 21:36.392 --> 21:38.614 some , some of the most sophisticated . 21:39.130 --> 21:41.500 Drone technology in the history of the 21:41.500 --> 21:43.500 world , don't they ? So , they do . 21:43.500 --> 21:45.611 They're doing very well with drones , 21:45.611 --> 21:47.500 and , and they're giving with the 21:47.500 --> 21:49.611 limited resources they have , they're 21:49.611 --> 21:51.778 giving Russia a curb stomping , aren't 21:51.778 --> 21:54.000 they ? I would say they are . In fact , 21:54.099 --> 21:55.932 they have knocked out with their 21:55.932 --> 21:58.729 limited resources 40% of Russia's 21:58.729 --> 22:02.729 export ability of their oil . Uh , they , 22:02.930 --> 22:06.209 since January , using their drones and 22:06.209 --> 22:09.550 limited cruise missiles , they have hit , 22:09.930 --> 22:12.949 uh , oil and , and gas facilities 22:13.349 --> 22:16.329 within Russia over 100 times , not on 22:16.329 --> 22:18.540 the border within Russia . Right ? 22:20.380 --> 22:22.829 Yes sir . And Putin was so scared he 22:22.829 --> 22:25.099 almost had to , to , to , uh , cancel 22:25.099 --> 22:28.050 their military parade . It didn't 22:29.060 --> 22:31.393 Well , I'm not sure that's true , but I , 22:31.393 --> 22:33.560 I will take your word for that , sir . 22:33.560 --> 22:35.819 OK . All right . Well , how , how much 22:35.819 --> 22:38.500 money now , let me just lead you . 22:39.130 --> 22:42.530 The world has $300 22:42.530 --> 22:45.949 billion of frozen . Uh , Russian 22:45.949 --> 22:49.900 assets in escrow , don't we ? I , I 22:49.900 --> 22:51.844 don't know , sir . I do . It's 300 22:51.844 --> 22:54.800 billion , and 2/3 of that , about 200 , 22:54.859 --> 22:58.180 225 billion , is sitting in , in , uh , 22:58.500 --> 23:01.109 Europe , isn't it ? Against her , I'm 23:01.109 --> 23:04.140 not sure of that . Well , I am , and , 23:04.270 --> 23:06.550 and I'm surprised , no disrespect that 23:06.550 --> 23:10.359 you don't know , um . And Europe has 23:10.359 --> 23:13.170 asked our permission . To take that 23:13.170 --> 23:17.089 $200 to $225 billion . Well , let 23:17.089 --> 23:20.689 me strike that that $225 billion humor 23:20.689 --> 23:22.949 me , uh , that's sitting there frozen , 23:23.469 --> 23:25.770 not a single penny is American taxpayer 23:25.770 --> 23:27.992 money , is it ? I don't believe it is . 23:27.992 --> 23:30.214 No , it all belongs to Russia , doesn't 23:30.214 --> 23:32.270 it ? I believe that is correct , and 23:32.270 --> 23:34.910 the EU has asked our permission to take 23:34.910 --> 23:38.699 that money . And give it to Ukraine 23:39.359 --> 23:41.415 so they can knock Russia in the next 23:41.415 --> 23:43.359 week and let's get this war over . 23:43.520 --> 23:45.687 That's a good idea , don't you think ? 23:45.800 --> 23:47.800 Well , I think anything that can be 23:47.800 --> 23:49.967 done to stop that war is a good idea , 23:49.967 --> 23:49.790 sir . Would , would you support giving 23:49.790 --> 23:53.709 that 200 , 225 billion no taxpayer 23:53.709 --> 23:56.280 money in America to , to Ukraine ? 23:56.790 --> 23:59.012 Again , sir , that's outside my purview 23:59.012 --> 24:01.439 as a service chief . OK , um , Admiral , 24:01.660 --> 24:04.469 let , let me ask you a question . Um , 24:08.030 --> 24:11.939 Would it be fair to say Based on his 24:11.939 --> 24:15.099 public and notorious comments . 24:16.050 --> 24:19.209 Both before , during , and after . 24:20.760 --> 24:24.540 The summit between President Xi . And , 24:24.640 --> 24:26.540 uh , and President Trump . 24:28.890 --> 24:31.890 That President Xi , how can I put this ? 24:33.119 --> 24:36.589 He's nervous as a pregnant nun about 24:36.589 --> 24:38.700 what we're gonna do on Taiwan , isn't 24:38.700 --> 24:42.239 he ? So , I do think he is concerned 24:42.239 --> 24:44.072 about our capability against any 24:44.072 --> 24:46.017 invasion of Taiwan . I mean , talk 24:46.017 --> 24:48.079 about , talk about telegraphing your 24:48.079 --> 24:51.400 insecurities . I mean , he talked about 24:51.400 --> 24:53.233 it right out of the chute . He's 24:53.233 --> 24:56.189 practically . Sending us a , a 24:56.189 --> 24:58.510 television ad saying I'm very worried 24:58.510 --> 25:02.219 about Taiwan . Now we don't want a war 25:02.219 --> 25:04.330 with China , do we ? Absolutely not . 25:04.630 --> 25:06.869 No , we want stability though with 25:06.869 --> 25:10.180 China , don't we ? And China doesn't 25:10.189 --> 25:12.349 recognize President Xi doesn't 25:12.349 --> 25:15.469 recognize charity , does he ? I can't 25:15.469 --> 25:17.247 speak to that , but I would say 25:17.247 --> 25:19.339 probably not . Well , he , he 25:19.339 --> 25:21.450 appreciates strength , doesn't he ? I 25:21.450 --> 25:23.672 would say so , yes , if you're in a bar 25:23.672 --> 25:25.895 fight . With President Xi and you start 25:25.895 --> 25:28.140 quoting Socrates like we did under 25:28.479 --> 25:30.701 President Biden , you're , you're gonna 25:30.701 --> 25:32.979 get your rear end whipped , aren't you ? 25:32.979 --> 25:35.035 That's probably not a good course of 25:35.035 --> 25:37.369 action . Yes , OK , so why don't we go 25:37.369 --> 25:39.536 ahead ? Don't you think it'd be a good 25:39.536 --> 25:41.702 idea for us to , to , to gain leverage 25:41.702 --> 25:44.150 to , to make weapons sales to Taiwan 25:44.150 --> 25:46.920 right now ? Sir , again , these things 25:46.920 --> 25:49.439 are very complex and a full calculus of 25:49.439 --> 25:51.606 all the levers of power that are being 25:51.606 --> 25:53.772 negotiated and worked . So generally , 25:53.772 --> 25:56.160 what , but I , I'm sorry , what more do 25:56.160 --> 25:58.271 we have to know ? Adam ? President Xi 25:58.271 --> 26:01.959 has tele telegraphed . His anxiety , 26:02.040 --> 26:04.262 his insecurity , now that he knows that 26:04.262 --> 26:06.373 America has learned how to fight . We 26:06.373 --> 26:08.596 want leverage . We want stability , not 26:08.596 --> 26:10.760 a hot war . We want leverage . What's 26:10.760 --> 26:13.839 his insecurity ? Taiwan . Why don't we 26:13.839 --> 26:16.680 just go ahead and sell the weapons to 26:16.680 --> 26:18.599 Taiwan that Taiwan wants ? The 26:18.599 --> 26:20.932 president can call President Xi and say , 26:20.959 --> 26:23.119 Hey , President Xi , don't take it 26:23.119 --> 26:25.359 personally . Don't get excited . Don't 26:25.359 --> 26:27.560 get your bowels in an uproar , but I'm 26:27.560 --> 26:30.390 selling these weapons . Why wouldn't we 26:30.390 --> 26:33.160 do that ? We definitely want Taiwan to 26:33.160 --> 26:35.160 be as strong as they can be , sir . 26:35.160 --> 26:37.271 They'd be stronger with those weapons 26:37.271 --> 26:39.327 though , wouldn't they ? Yes , sir . 26:39.327 --> 26:41.549 Don't you think we ought to sell them , 26:41.549 --> 26:41.239 sir , I'm not going to get in front of 26:41.239 --> 26:43.350 the administration's overall calculus 26:43.350 --> 26:45.461 on that . That's just not a , I'm not 26:45.461 --> 26:47.628 going to make a statement on that as a 26:47.628 --> 26:49.739 service chief . But I , but the , the 26:49.739 --> 26:51.850 capabilities that we're talking about 26:51.850 --> 26:53.906 would make them more effective . I'm 26:53.906 --> 26:56.017 sorry to go over . I'm sorry . I just 26:56.017 --> 26:58.183 wanted to get my points in . Thank you 26:58.183 --> 27:00.295 so much , Mr . Chairman . I've got to 27:00.295 --> 27:02.517 go , gentlemen . I'm really sorry , and 27:02.517 --> 27:04.739 I don't mean any disrespect by being so 27:04.739 --> 27:06.850 direct , but we're down to it . We're 27:06.850 --> 27:07.850 down to it . 27:13.449 --> 27:15.727 indicated there's a conference meeting , 27:15.727 --> 27:18.050 which I'm not going to myself , that a 27:18.050 --> 27:21.810 number of our side I have to attend and 27:22.300 --> 27:25.359 so I'll go next to Susan and then to 27:26.209 --> 27:27.209 John Hoban . 27:46.839 --> 27:50.560 Thank you for your service . Thank you 27:50.560 --> 27:53.160 very much , um , Mr . Chairman . If I 27:53.160 --> 27:55.327 may interject , what we're gonna do is 27:55.327 --> 27:57.493 just skip you all's opening statements 27:57.493 --> 27:59.438 and go straight to the questions . 27:59.438 --> 28:01.560 Thank you . Um , in light of the 28:01.560 --> 28:04.880 briefing we have this morning , I wanna 28:05.250 --> 28:08.530 thank my Democratic colleagues for also 28:08.530 --> 28:12.010 being accommodating . Um , Secretary 28:12.010 --> 28:15.050 Cow , uh , Secretary Hegseth 28:15.849 --> 28:19.630 just recently has described destroyers 28:19.890 --> 28:23.550 as being the backbone of the fleet . 28:23.979 --> 28:26.900 Uh , the fiscal year 27 budget request , 28:26.989 --> 28:30.609 however , includes funding for only one 28:30.910 --> 28:34.609 DDG 51 compared to two 28:34.790 --> 28:38.790 in fiscal year 26 and three in fiscal 28:38.790 --> 28:42.550 year 25 . Such a reduction would send 28:42.550 --> 28:45.530 a troubling signal to the industrial 28:45.530 --> 28:49.089 base at a time when the navy continues 28:49.089 --> 28:53.060 to emphasize the need for greater fleet 28:53.060 --> 28:57.050 capability and resiliency . Bathheim 28:57.050 --> 28:59.910 Works in Maine , which is one of only 2 28:59.910 --> 29:03.430 surface combatant shipyards in the 29:03.430 --> 29:07.410 country , has made real progress 29:07.410 --> 29:10.530 in workforce retention and 29:10.540 --> 29:14.449 accelerating production stability due 29:14.449 --> 29:18.310 to the steady command , the steady 29:18.310 --> 29:22.130 demand signal . Based on the 29:22.130 --> 29:25.890 future year defense plan , how can 29:25.890 --> 29:29.369 we sustain the current production alone , 29:30.130 --> 29:34.050 be sufficient to sustain both shipyards 29:34.050 --> 29:37.930 and the supplier base without restoring 29:37.930 --> 29:41.390 a stable 2 DDG per year 29:42.010 --> 29:44.599 procurements , and I would mention that 29:44.599 --> 29:48.369 when you start contrasting the size of 29:48.369 --> 29:51.484 our fleet . With China's , it should be 29:51.484 --> 29:54.604 of great alarm to all of us . 29:55.135 --> 29:58.275 China now feels a navy approaching 29:58.694 --> 30:02.635 400 ships and is expanding its fleet 30:02.635 --> 30:05.895 at a pace that far exceeds ours . At 30:05.895 --> 30:07.935 the US Navy is down to 30:07.935 --> 30:11.814 291 ships . That is 30:11.814 --> 30:15.645 very troubling to me and to me , 30:15.655 --> 30:19.209 this is the last time . Um , that we 30:19.209 --> 30:22.150 should be cutting back on the workhorse 30:22.150 --> 30:25.969 of the fleet , the DDGs , uh , which , 30:26.050 --> 30:29.469 by the way , also have proven 30:30.250 --> 30:34.060 themselves in recent conflicts . Um , I 30:34.109 --> 30:36.750 Remember a bath-filled ship shooting 30:36.750 --> 30:39.949 down every single missile that the 30:39.949 --> 30:43.260 Houthi terrorists were firing , 30:43.630 --> 30:47.469 and it just is something that I 30:47.469 --> 30:49.209 can't understand the budget 30:49.209 --> 30:52.630 recommendation on . Chairwoman 30:52.630 --> 30:54.686 Collins , thank you so much for that 30:54.686 --> 30:56.797 question , and I share with you the , 30:56.797 --> 30:58.908 the love of the destroyers . They are 30:58.908 --> 31:01.019 the workhorse and the backbone of the 31:01.019 --> 31:03.186 United States Navy . Uh , right now we 31:03.186 --> 31:05.408 have 80 ships on contract , uh , and 59 31:05.408 --> 31:07.463 in , in construction in Bath alone , 31:07.630 --> 31:09.741 which Bath creates amazing ships like 31:09.741 --> 31:11.797 you said , they've , they've been in 31:11.797 --> 31:11.410 the forefront of this war and , and 31:11.410 --> 31:13.719 just doing amazing work there . In Bath 31:13.719 --> 31:16.052 alone we have 11 destroyers on contract , 31:16.052 --> 31:18.275 7 are in construction . We haven't even 31:18.275 --> 31:20.535 begun to . Cut metal for the other 4 31:20.535 --> 31:22.646 yet and so I'm just , we're trying to 31:22.646 --> 31:24.757 allow the industrial base to catch up 31:24.757 --> 31:26.868 and Senator , if you want to , I'll , 31:26.868 --> 31:29.035 I'll go up , I'll gladly go up to Bath 31:29.035 --> 31:31.257 with you to reassure the workforce that 31:31.257 --> 31:33.313 their work is valued and we will add 31:33.313 --> 31:35.424 the ships in , in future years . It's 31:35.424 --> 31:37.591 just right now I'm trying to give them 31:37.591 --> 31:37.494 the ability to , to catch up to the 31:37.494 --> 31:39.716 work , uh , uh , as , as of right now , 31:39.716 --> 31:42.765 ma'am . What happens , as you well know , 31:42.824 --> 31:45.515 that these ships take a lot of time to . 31:45.900 --> 31:49.060 Uh , construct , although Bath is fast 31:49.060 --> 31:52.339 approaching a production rate of 1.5 31:52.339 --> 31:55.839 ships a year , but what you create 31:55.839 --> 31:59.410 is a gap at the steels 31:59.420 --> 32:02.660 cutting stage , for example , if you 32:02.660 --> 32:06.000 don't have the steady , uh , throughput 32:06.000 --> 32:09.979 of ships , and that is my concern , and 32:09.979 --> 32:12.939 I would very much welcome , uh , your 32:12.939 --> 32:16.810 visit . Uh , General Smith , I , I want 32:16.959 --> 32:19.930 to , uh , commend the Marine Corps for 32:19.930 --> 32:23.449 its proactive approach to autonomous 32:23.449 --> 32:26.849 and unmanned capabilities as part of 32:26.849 --> 32:29.810 your broader modernization and force 32:29.810 --> 32:32.609 design . I'm encouraged by the decision 32:32.609 --> 32:35.420 to leverage existing army investments 32:35.609 --> 32:38.209 in robotic combat vehicles and 32:38.209 --> 32:41.650 commercially available autonomy systems . 32:41.755 --> 32:45.675 Programs such as the M1 unmanned 32:45.675 --> 32:49.354 Gram vehicle demonstrate a commitment 32:49.354 --> 32:52.094 to rapid experimentation in fielding 32:52.435 --> 32:55.555 emergency emerging technologies . 32:55.915 --> 32:58.474 You're clearly exploring how these 32:58.474 --> 33:01.354 platforms can support logistics , 33:01.395 --> 33:04.635 reconnaissance , counter UAS missions , 33:04.875 --> 33:07.915 and targeting , particularly in 33:07.915 --> 33:08.974 distributed . 33:09.660 --> 33:12.770 Indo-Pacific operations and we've 33:12.770 --> 33:15.119 learned a lot of lessons from Ukraine 33:15.579 --> 33:18.180 on how important autonomous and 33:18.180 --> 33:21.900 unmanned systems are in transforming 33:21.900 --> 33:25.550 the battlefield . So I am 33:25.550 --> 33:29.020 concerned that if we wait too long and 33:29.020 --> 33:32.089 have prolonged experimentation 33:32.089 --> 33:34.609 prototyping , that that's going to 33:34.609 --> 33:37.650 delay operational . Capacity 33:38.859 --> 33:41.569 while our adversaries are already 33:42.069 --> 33:44.589 integrating autonomous systems into 33:44.589 --> 33:48.410 combat operations . How do you see 33:48.410 --> 33:51.810 the Marine Corps employing unmanned 33:52.530 --> 33:55.469 ground vehicles in the Indo-Pacific 33:55.469 --> 33:58.619 over the next 1 to 2 years ? Well , 33:58.670 --> 34:00.837 ma'am , we've got a remote operational 34:00.837 --> 34:02.948 ground unit expeditionary , our rogue 34:02.948 --> 34:05.114 Nemesis Navy Marine Expeditionary ship 34:05.114 --> 34:07.281 interdiction system , uh , which fires 34:07.281 --> 34:09.337 an anti-ship missile off of a remote 34:09.337 --> 34:12.000 operated vehicle . That is our , that 34:12.000 --> 34:14.167 is our commitment . That's our primary 34:14.167 --> 34:16.222 mover of that nemesis system . We're 34:16.222 --> 34:18.167 going to continue to expand that . 34:18.167 --> 34:20.389 We're going to continue to increase our 34:20.389 --> 34:20.120 magazine depth , and we're going to 34:20.120 --> 34:22.439 continue to , to look into all of the 34:22.439 --> 34:24.439 unmanned platforms because I as an 34:24.439 --> 34:26.606 instrument , I was taught never send a 34:26.606 --> 34:28.661 marine where you can send a bullet , 34:28.661 --> 34:30.606 and I am , I am fully committed to 34:30.606 --> 34:32.606 autonomy up to the , to the leading 34:32.606 --> 34:34.661 edge both in drone technology and in 34:34.661 --> 34:36.939 vehicle technology . Great , thank you . 34:36.939 --> 34:39.272 Yes , ma'am . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 34:41.120 --> 34:43.231 Senator Hovans , and then we're gonna 34:43.231 --> 34:45.939 go to the Democratic side and take 34:46.129 --> 34:48.840 several of them , uh , in order . Thank 34:48.840 --> 34:52.399 you for giving us a chance . My thanks 34:52.399 --> 34:54.510 as well . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 34:54.510 --> 34:56.979 Uh , and , uh , I'd like to start with 34:56.979 --> 35:00.770 uh Secretary Coo , um . With the 35:00.770 --> 35:02.770 blockade that we have in the Middle 35:02.770 --> 35:05.048 East right now in the Strait of Hormuz , 35:05.048 --> 35:08.449 how do we continue to make that more 35:08.449 --> 35:10.671 effective and in your opinion , how can 35:10.671 --> 35:14.250 we make that sufficiently effective so 35:14.250 --> 35:16.550 that we constrain not only constrain 35:16.889 --> 35:19.056 Iran from moving any of their ships in 35:19.056 --> 35:21.969 and out of the Gulf , but that we open 35:21.969 --> 35:23.636 the Gulf for other shipping . 35:25.919 --> 35:28.141 Senator , thank you for that question . 35:28.141 --> 35:30.252 You're , you're right . I mean , uh , 35:30.252 --> 35:32.419 doing a blockade is very tough , and I 35:32.419 --> 35:31.719 will turn over to , uh , the Chief of 35:31.719 --> 35:33.552 Naval Operations in a second for 35:33.552 --> 35:35.830 tactics , techniques , procedures , uh , 35:35.830 --> 35:37.719 while we do that . But you know , 35:37.719 --> 35:40.052 there's a lot of things we can leverage , 35:40.052 --> 35:42.163 uh , including , I think , unmanned , 35:42.163 --> 35:44.386 uh , unmanned surface platforms will be 35:44.386 --> 35:46.441 important as well as maritime domain 35:46.441 --> 35:48.663 awareness . But I will turn over to the 35:48.663 --> 35:50.775 Chief of Naval Operations . where I'm 35:50.775 --> 35:52.775 going with , I mean , obviously the 35:52.775 --> 35:55.052 pressure on us is , is gasoline prices , 35:55.052 --> 35:57.163 right ? And that's what that's really 35:57.163 --> 35:59.939 the only lever that Iran has left , and 35:59.939 --> 36:02.106 that's to create enough uncertainty so 36:02.106 --> 36:04.439 that the ships can't transit the strait . 36:04.459 --> 36:06.459 But if we take that away and we not 36:06.459 --> 36:08.515 only bottle them up , but we open up 36:08.515 --> 36:10.899 traffic , then the pressure is off us 36:10.899 --> 36:13.010 and the blockade pressure continues . 36:13.010 --> 36:15.459 Whatever kinetic steps we decide to 36:15.459 --> 36:17.570 take over and beyond that , we'll see 36:17.570 --> 36:19.780 what the administration decides , but 36:19.780 --> 36:22.139 that truly keeps the pressure on them 36:22.139 --> 36:25.659 increasingly so . And it 36:26.100 --> 36:28.211 takes it away from us . So you know , 36:28.211 --> 36:30.820 as their terrible regime says , oh well , 36:30.889 --> 36:33.620 our people are used to suffering . You 36:33.620 --> 36:35.620 know , and so they can , they think 36:35.620 --> 36:38.320 they can outlast us . So how do we flip 36:38.580 --> 36:40.802 that equation ? That's what I'm getting 36:40.802 --> 36:42.949 at . Well , sir , the blockade has 36:42.949 --> 36:45.171 probably been the single most important 36:45.171 --> 36:47.393 military operation we've done to try to 36:47.393 --> 36:49.393 get negotiations to the place where 36:49.393 --> 36:51.282 they even are , and we're getting 36:51.282 --> 36:53.171 better at it . We're getting more 36:53.171 --> 36:52.889 efficient at it . We are . That comes 36:52.889 --> 36:55.056 with really good rules of engagement . 36:55.056 --> 36:57.222 We're really good at understanding how 36:57.222 --> 36:59.222 to determine this . It comes from . 36:59.222 --> 37:01.459 Artificially intelligent , um , enabled 37:01.459 --> 37:03.626 common operational picture to actually 37:03.626 --> 37:05.515 know who we go after intel , deep 37:05.515 --> 37:07.681 intelligence , and then the ability to 37:07.681 --> 37:09.699 utilize security forces to board if 37:09.699 --> 37:11.588 necessary or disable if necessary 37:11.588 --> 37:13.860 leakers . So that's important . But to 37:13.860 --> 37:17.419 open the flow of commerce to um 37:17.889 --> 37:20.000 Partners who want to leave the Strait 37:20.000 --> 37:22.370 of Hormuz and , and we're , we know 37:22.370 --> 37:24.610 there have been mines in place , so 37:24.610 --> 37:26.777 that's challenging for them . If we go 37:26.777 --> 37:28.832 try to do with that , we have looked 37:28.832 --> 37:30.943 into that . That's a very challenging 37:30.943 --> 37:33.166 mission in that narrow strait when it's 37:33.166 --> 37:35.459 contested . And so when you're in a 37:35.459 --> 37:37.459 contested environment to demine the 37:37.459 --> 37:39.820 Strait of Hormoose or to do duty is not 37:39.820 --> 37:41.987 something that's easy to do . So we're 37:41.987 --> 37:44.042 going to have to get to a place that 37:44.042 --> 37:45.820 that that strait is open with a 37:45.820 --> 37:47.820 generally accepted ceasefire before 37:47.820 --> 37:50.042 that can be turned on en masse . So are 37:50.042 --> 37:52.419 you saying you can't , it's not in your 37:52.419 --> 37:54.800 opinion , you're not able to completely . 37:56.040 --> 37:58.360 Open the strait and maintain the 37:58.360 --> 38:00.790 blockade other than through some type 38:00.790 --> 38:03.949 of agreement , ceasefire militarily , 38:03.959 --> 38:06.015 can we do it ? Are there things that 38:06.015 --> 38:08.181 you can continue to do to enhance your 38:08.181 --> 38:10.237 ability on that blockade and control 38:10.237 --> 38:12.237 the strait to mitigate the risk for 38:12.237 --> 38:14.292 ships to go through ? There are many 38:14.292 --> 38:16.515 things we can continue doing to enhance 38:16.515 --> 38:18.469 the blockade . And but to actually 38:18.469 --> 38:20.247 start doing something where I'm 38:20.247 --> 38:22.413 providing services through a contested 38:22.413 --> 38:24.510 strait will , will , in my military 38:24.510 --> 38:26.566 opinion , exceed the capacity of the 38:26.566 --> 38:28.788 navy to do that effectively . Escorts , 38:28.788 --> 38:30.954 I understand , but every step you take 38:30.954 --> 38:32.954 that . Creates more opportunity for 38:32.954 --> 38:35.010 ships to flow other than the ones we 38:35.010 --> 38:37.066 blockade , puts pressure on them and 38:37.066 --> 38:39.121 relieves pressure . It does and that 38:39.121 --> 38:41.288 that goes down to servicing their mine 38:41.288 --> 38:43.454 layers , you know , we've , we've shot 38:43.454 --> 38:43.439 a lot of them , and that takes a lot of 38:43.439 --> 38:46.620 intel and a lot of dynamic targeting to 38:46.620 --> 38:48.731 do that effectively , and we continue 38:48.731 --> 38:50.787 to do that . We have to continue our 38:50.787 --> 38:54.760 expeditionary UUV enabled demining 38:54.760 --> 38:56.871 operations . So all those things come 38:56.871 --> 38:58.982 together to give us confidence that . 38:58.982 --> 39:01.038 That commercial shipping can transit 39:01.038 --> 39:04.820 that strait safely . Uh General 39:06.889 --> 39:09.056 Smith , um , kind of the same question 39:09.056 --> 39:11.879 but reverse . I was in Taiwan . I've 39:11.879 --> 39:13.823 been in Japan , South Korea fairly 39:13.823 --> 39:16.620 recently . Increasingly , China is 39:16.620 --> 39:19.260 creating a de facto blockade around 39:19.260 --> 39:22.179 Taiwan , just with live fire exercises , 39:22.260 --> 39:25.340 with , you know , their ship exercises , 39:25.699 --> 39:27.921 aircraft exercises , on and on and on . 39:28.699 --> 39:30.820 De facto , they're increasingly doing 39:30.820 --> 39:33.750 that . Other than making Taiwan a 39:33.750 --> 39:35.709 porcupine , what other steps are 39:35.709 --> 39:38.270 effective in slowing that down , 39:38.469 --> 39:40.136 preventing it , stopping it , 39:40.136 --> 39:42.260 addressing it ? Well , sir , your , 39:42.350 --> 39:44.239 your last point about a porcupine 39:44.239 --> 39:46.350 defense does work . Um , nobody wants 39:46.350 --> 39:48.780 to bite into a porcupine . So back to 39:48.780 --> 39:51.058 what Senator Kennedy was talking about . 39:51.058 --> 39:53.169 Yes sir , you want to have a , a deep 39:53.169 --> 39:55.280 missile depth . You want to make it . 39:55.280 --> 39:57.224 It's one thing to start across the 39:57.224 --> 39:59.391 straits . It's another thing to get to 39:59.391 --> 40:01.558 the shore of Taiwan , and it's another 40:01.558 --> 40:03.502 thing to get from the shore to the 40:03.502 --> 40:05.669 capital . And so what we're doing is , 40:05.669 --> 40:07.669 is we're . Working closely with our 40:07.669 --> 40:09.613 allies and partners to ensure that 40:09.613 --> 40:12.540 every step of that possible action by 40:12.540 --> 40:14.659 the PRC is contested . The Marines at 40:14.659 --> 40:17.379 Okinawa are doing incredible work , and 40:17.379 --> 40:19.546 you don't realize how amazing the work 40:19.546 --> 40:21.768 there is they're doing and what they're 40:21.768 --> 40:24.159 doing on land and sea . The whole drone 40:24.159 --> 40:26.739 thing is a huge , huge part of that and 40:26.739 --> 40:28.850 changing everything , air and water . 40:28.850 --> 40:31.017 It's unbelievable . Congratulations to 40:31.017 --> 40:33.183 your guys . And thanks to all three of 40:33.183 --> 40:35.017 you very much . Thank you , Mr . 40:35.017 --> 40:37.350 Chairman , and thanks to our colleagues . 40:37.350 --> 40:39.350 Senator Coons , followed by Senator 40:39.350 --> 40:41.870 Durby and Durbin and Shaheen . Thank 40:41.870 --> 40:43.981 you , Mr . Chairman . I will defer to 40:43.981 --> 40:46.259 my friend and colleague Senator Durbin , 40:46.259 --> 40:48.426 and then to Senator Shaheen , and then 40:48.426 --> 40:50.426 I'll question . Thank you , Senator 40:50.426 --> 40:52.592 Coons . Uh , for a number of us , this 40:52.592 --> 40:52.070 is the last time we'll meet in these 40:52.070 --> 40:54.070 circumstances . We've announced our 40:54.070 --> 40:56.181 retirement from the Senate . I wanted 40:56.181 --> 40:58.348 to take 60 seconds just to acknowledge 40:58.348 --> 41:00.570 how I got started in the Senate because 41:00.570 --> 41:02.459 it involves the Marine Corps . It 41:02.459 --> 41:04.459 involves a man named Paul Douglas . 41:04.459 --> 41:06.348 Paul Douglas was the senator from 41:06.348 --> 41:08.899 Illinois from 1948 to 1966 , college 41:08.899 --> 41:11.330 professor who enlisted in the Marine 41:11.330 --> 41:14.830 Corps in March of 194342 , I'm sorry , 41:15.030 --> 41:17.820 March of 1942 . Uh , what was unique 41:17.820 --> 41:20.550 about that was he's the oldest recruit 41:20.550 --> 41:22.772 in the history of the Marine Corps . He 41:22.772 --> 41:24.883 went through basic training at Parris 41:24.883 --> 41:28.189 Island at the age of 50 . Uh , and 41:28.209 --> 41:30.790 became a captain , uh , in rank and 41:30.790 --> 41:33.050 begged to be in combat . They 41:33.050 --> 41:35.370 eventually assigned him to Okinawa . He 41:35.370 --> 41:37.810 was involved in combat and lost the use 41:37.810 --> 41:39.977 of his left arm , which he referred to 41:39.977 --> 41:42.310 as his paperweight the rest of his life . 41:42.310 --> 41:44.310 Senator Douglas insisted on signing 41:44.310 --> 41:46.199 every letter that went out of his 41:46.199 --> 41:48.088 office , and that meant that some 41:48.088 --> 41:47.810 somebody had to sit next to him and 41:47.810 --> 41:49.866 pull the letters as he signed them . 41:49.939 --> 41:51.995 Interns , and that was me and that's 41:51.995 --> 41:54.161 where I started in this business , but 41:54.161 --> 41:56.161 I'm very proud of his service and I 41:56.161 --> 41:58.217 want to make a record of it today in 41:58.217 --> 42:00.272 this testimony in here and thank you 42:00.272 --> 42:02.495 for your service to this country . Uh , 42:02.495 --> 42:04.719 Secretary Cowell , I think the source , 42:05.080 --> 42:07.136 the greatest source of pride in , in 42:07.136 --> 42:09.302 Illinois is Great Lakes Naval Training 42:09.302 --> 42:11.413 Station . To think that every recruit 42:11.413 --> 42:13.580 in the United States Navy goes through 42:13.580 --> 42:15.747 Great Lakes is a great source of pride 42:15.747 --> 42:17.959 to us . I was there just last week as 42:17.959 --> 42:19.959 we dedicated the expansion of the 42:19.959 --> 42:22.015 school for the families that live in 42:22.015 --> 42:25.080 the area . Here's a challenge we face 42:25.080 --> 42:27.191 which I want you to be sensitive to , 42:27.191 --> 42:29.300 maybe you already are , is the fact 42:29.300 --> 42:32.120 that this Operation Midway Blitz or 42:32.120 --> 42:35.840 whatever they call it by uh DHS and ICE 42:35.840 --> 42:38.149 and the like has scared the hell out of 42:38.149 --> 42:39.989 many people in that region , 42:40.399 --> 42:42.566 particularly the Hispanic population . 42:42.729 --> 42:45.969 Every week we have literally thousands 42:45.969 --> 42:48.850 of graduates at a beautiful ceremony at 42:48.850 --> 42:51.100 Great Lakes who come in from all over 42:51.100 --> 42:54.260 the United States . My concern is their 42:54.260 --> 42:56.979 concern . Some of them are not citizens 42:56.979 --> 42:59.035 of the United States , and yet their 42:59.035 --> 43:01.201 sons and daughters are volunteering to 43:01.201 --> 43:04.060 serve in the Navy . We have more than 43:04.060 --> 43:06.770 1000 each year that become citizens , 43:06.820 --> 43:09.739 actually sworn into citizenship at that 43:09.739 --> 43:12.840 base . We have warned DHS stay away 43:12.840 --> 43:14.840 from Great Lakes . Don't intimidate 43:14.840 --> 43:17.169 these families in any way . Give them a 43:17.169 --> 43:19.391 chance to have one of the greatest days 43:19.391 --> 43:21.336 of their lives with their sons and 43:21.336 --> 43:23.502 daughters . Are you familiar with this 43:23.502 --> 43:26.979 issue ? Senator , thank you for , for 43:26.979 --> 43:29.201 this question , and again , I , I share 43:29.201 --> 43:31.201 your concern of , of , uh , being a 43:31.201 --> 43:33.146 refugee to this country and , uh , 43:33.146 --> 43:35.368 serving this nation . I , I know what , 43:35.368 --> 43:37.590 what it's like to not have a country to 43:37.590 --> 43:39.646 call my own and having to You know , 43:39.646 --> 43:41.812 having the United States open up their 43:41.812 --> 43:43.701 arms , and that's why I served in 43:43.701 --> 43:45.701 combat for this country for so many 43:45.701 --> 43:47.868 years . Uh , I , I , what I know about 43:47.868 --> 43:49.923 the DHS in Great Lakes is they're no 43:49.923 --> 43:52.201 longer on board the Great Lakes at all . 43:52.201 --> 43:54.479 That's what I understand too . Yes sir . 43:54.479 --> 43:56.423 So , but I'm not aware of Midnight 43:56.423 --> 43:58.757 Blitz or any other operation within DHS , 43:58.757 --> 44:00.923 sir . I , I just want to sensitize you 44:00.923 --> 44:03.090 to the fact that thousands of families 44:03.090 --> 44:04.812 come to that base each week to 44:04.812 --> 44:06.812 celebrate one of the most important 44:06.812 --> 44:08.868 days of their families' lives . Uh , 44:08.868 --> 44:11.035 and many of them are in fear that just 44:11.035 --> 44:13.146 around the corner someone is going to 44:13.146 --> 44:15.368 ask them to show identification . We've 44:15.368 --> 44:17.368 got to keep that operation at Great 44:17.368 --> 44:19.830 Lakes separate from this midway blitz 44:19.830 --> 44:23.290 and ICE agents assignment 44:23.909 --> 44:26.131 in order to maintain its integrity . So 44:26.131 --> 44:28.298 I hope you'll keep that in mind as you 44:28.298 --> 44:30.520 chart your conduct in the future . I'll 44:30.520 --> 44:32.631 keep it in mind , Senator . I yield . 44:33.699 --> 44:34.090 Yes 44:37.840 --> 44:40.479 Senator Sheen , well , thank you for 44:40.479 --> 44:42.590 giving us the opportunity to go ahead 44:42.590 --> 44:44.679 and ask questions ahead of you . We 44:44.679 --> 44:46.512 appreciate it . Um , thank you , 44:46.512 --> 44:48.623 gentlemen , for being here . I'm sure 44:48.623 --> 44:50.735 you will not be surprised , Secretary 44:50.735 --> 44:52.790 Cow , to know that I have a question 44:52.790 --> 44:54.901 about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard . 44:54.901 --> 44:57.012 I'm sure Admiral Cottle was expecting 44:57.012 --> 44:58.909 that . Um , but , but this is 44:58.909 --> 45:01.076 distressing because the shipyard has a 45:01.076 --> 45:04.149 funding shortfall of 65 million since 45:04.149 --> 45:07.629 October . 30 million of that is to 45:07.629 --> 45:10.510 cover Secretary Hegseth's directive to 45:10.510 --> 45:12.709 provide bonuses to randomly selected 45:12.709 --> 45:16.709 workers . So , The idea 45:16.709 --> 45:18.931 of recognizing workers , I think we can 45:18.931 --> 45:21.098 all support , but if we're going to do 45:21.098 --> 45:23.098 that , then the department needs to 45:23.098 --> 45:25.209 provide the funding to , to make that 45:25.209 --> 45:27.431 recognition , and they didn't do that , 45:27.431 --> 45:29.598 so the shipyard had to take funds from 45:29.598 --> 45:31.709 their existing budget . In addition , 45:31.709 --> 45:34.320 DOD is pulling back another 33 million 45:34.679 --> 45:37.600 from the shipyard for its under 45:37.600 --> 45:40.760 execution of hiring , which doesn't 45:40.760 --> 45:44.000 make any sense because as Admiral Cale 45:44.000 --> 45:47.340 can . Speak to because we've had this 45:47.340 --> 45:49.590 conversation , they were prevented from 45:49.590 --> 45:51.757 hiring workers before Congress stepped 45:51.757 --> 45:54.550 in and exempted them from Secretary 45:54.550 --> 45:56.830 Hegseth's civilian hiring freeze . It's 45:56.830 --> 45:58.608 an issue that I raised with the 45:58.608 --> 46:01.239 previous Navy Secretary , which he said 46:01.389 --> 46:03.333 he was trying to address . It's an 46:03.333 --> 46:05.556 issue I raised with Secretary Hegseth . 46:05.556 --> 46:07.722 He said they were gonna , you all were 46:07.722 --> 46:09.667 going to look into it . And yet we 46:09.667 --> 46:11.833 still have this funding shortfall that 46:11.833 --> 46:15.649 is having a real impact on the ability 46:15.649 --> 46:18.290 of the shipyard to do their jobs at a 46:18.290 --> 46:20.889 time when it is critical that we keep 46:20.889 --> 46:23.889 the maintenance of our nuclear subs at 46:23.889 --> 46:25.945 the forefront and get those ships in 46:25.945 --> 46:29.580 and out on schedule , so . Acting 46:29.580 --> 46:32.899 Secretary Cal , can you commit that you 46:32.899 --> 46:35.090 will restore the funding that 46:35.090 --> 46:38.139 Portsmouth has lost because of the 46:38.139 --> 46:41.159 actions of the department ? Senator , 46:41.239 --> 46:43.350 thank you for that question . I , I , 46:43.350 --> 46:45.350 um . I share with you that that the 46:45.350 --> 46:47.517 workers at Portsmouth are just amazing 46:47.517 --> 46:49.350 and so we need to make sure that 46:49.350 --> 46:51.406 they're , they're paid and and given 46:51.406 --> 46:53.572 the bonuses they , they deserve . Uh , 46:53.572 --> 46:55.572 the Chief of Naval Operations and I 46:55.572 --> 46:57.739 were talking about this this morning . 46:57.739 --> 46:57.500 We will delve into this and take this 46:57.500 --> 46:59.722 for record and I'll personally bring it 46:59.722 --> 47:01.778 to your office to , to report back , 47:01.778 --> 47:04.000 ma'am . Thank you . I appreciate that . 47:04.000 --> 47:05.944 And Admiral Cadell , as you know , 47:05.944 --> 47:08.056 Congress has appropriated significant 47:08.056 --> 47:10.111 funding to expand the Virginia class 47:10.111 --> 47:12.570 submarine production capacity . And 47:12.580 --> 47:16.020 that's alongside of our commitment with 47:16.020 --> 47:19.159 Australia under Acus , um , to 47:19.929 --> 47:22.207 increase the submarine industrial base . 47:23.449 --> 47:26.879 We have challenges producing the 47:27.179 --> 47:29.219 submarines that are part of the 47:29.219 --> 47:32.459 existing pipeline . So can you talk 47:32.459 --> 47:35.250 about how we're addressing the Auss 47:35.250 --> 47:37.860 piece of that and how the Navy is 47:37.860 --> 47:40.139 spending the investment that Australia 47:40.139 --> 47:41.899 is making in Auss ? 47:45.340 --> 47:48.570 Yes , ma'am , you know , um . The money 47:48.570 --> 47:51.090 that Australia has given us , the $2 47:51.090 --> 47:52.889 billion will become part of the 47:52.889 --> 47:55.449 generalized fund as part of the SIB 47:55.449 --> 47:57.010 investment . The submarine 47:57.010 --> 47:59.850 industrial-based investment is a set of 47:59.850 --> 48:02.409 money that I know you know also all too 48:02.409 --> 48:05.370 well , goes to improving many facets of 48:05.370 --> 48:07.370 the way we do new construction . It 48:07.370 --> 48:09.969 goes to improving the tooling and , and 48:09.969 --> 48:12.136 capabilities there , bringing state of 48:12.136 --> 48:14.070 the art robotics . And artificial 48:14.070 --> 48:17.300 intelligence into drawings of workflows . 48:17.550 --> 48:19.669 It goes into recruiting and retaining 48:19.669 --> 48:21.750 and developing the best workforce 48:21.750 --> 48:23.806 possible . It goes into ensuring the 48:23.806 --> 48:27.010 compensation of those workers is , is 48:27.010 --> 48:29.232 at , at a level that we can drive these 48:29.232 --> 48:31.540 retention . Uh , numbers the way they 48:31.540 --> 48:33.707 are and they , and we're responding to 48:33.707 --> 48:35.984 that . We're seeing that at all of our , 48:35.984 --> 48:38.318 our private yards , so it is paying off . 48:38.318 --> 48:40.318 Um , you know , I like to say we've 48:40.318 --> 48:42.729 delivered 7 Virginia class submarines 48:42.729 --> 48:45.060 in the last 4 years and while we're not 48:45.060 --> 48:47.227 on plan , that's pretty close to , you 48:47.227 --> 48:49.338 know , where we need to get to . It's 48:49.338 --> 48:51.560 my estimate in the , you know , by 2030 48:51.560 --> 48:53.570 to 2032 time frame , we will be 48:53.570 --> 48:55.689 delivering exactly what we need , the 48:55.689 --> 48:58.370 2.0 for us and the , and the submarines 48:58.370 --> 49:00.592 necessary to actually make sure that we 49:00.592 --> 49:02.703 make good on August pillar one . So I 49:02.703 --> 49:04.537 think the investments are good . 49:04.537 --> 49:06.759 They're starting to pay off . We didn't 49:06.759 --> 49:08.926 get here overnight and it's taken some 49:08.926 --> 49:11.092 time for us to actually get back up on 49:11.092 --> 49:11.010 step to where we need to be , but I 49:11.010 --> 49:13.232 really do believe we're getting there . 49:13.232 --> 49:15.566 And I think the leadership part of this , 49:15.566 --> 49:17.454 I'll finish under our director of 49:17.454 --> 49:19.121 submarine programs , which is 49:19.121 --> 49:20.954 dual-hatted under Vice Admiral . 49:20.954 --> 49:23.165 Goucher as Durham submarines and the 49:23.165 --> 49:25.387 programs and the PAE that works for the 49:25.387 --> 49:27.764 Secretary , was a great step there to , 49:27.925 --> 49:29.869 to tighten up the chain of command 49:29.869 --> 49:31.869 there to put the necessary heat and 49:31.869 --> 49:34.725 light on the actual shipyard to make 49:34.725 --> 49:36.781 sure that we're effectively spending 49:36.781 --> 49:39.469 those dollars . So you , you feel 49:39.469 --> 49:41.636 confident that that's going to help us 49:41.636 --> 49:44.770 get the Virginia schedule up to where 49:45.070 --> 49:47.949 we want it to be . I do . All the , all 49:47.949 --> 49:50.005 the trends are positive . You know , 49:50.005 --> 49:52.116 it's not like getting the rudder over 49:52.116 --> 49:54.227 on a ship and it turns immediately on 49:54.227 --> 49:56.393 something like this , but everything I 49:56.393 --> 49:58.560 see and every report . I see from days 49:58.560 --> 50:00.782 of maintenance delay to recouping , you 50:00.782 --> 50:02.616 know , idle submarine that we're 50:02.616 --> 50:04.838 actually down to 0 now and the work you 50:04.838 --> 50:06.671 see going on at Portsmouth Naval 50:06.671 --> 50:08.671 Shipyard , and that's in the public 50:08.671 --> 50:10.671 yard sector , every one of those is 50:10.671 --> 50:12.505 actually in a positive trend and 50:12.505 --> 50:14.671 actually getting better . So I'm quite 50:14.671 --> 50:16.727 confident in what I'm saying . Thank 50:16.727 --> 50:16.479 you very much . Thank you , Mr . 50:16.639 --> 50:17.639 Chairman . 50:22.459 --> 50:24.840 We passed , uh , for a while . 50:26.360 --> 50:28.638 Um , thank you , um , and I appreciate , 50:28.719 --> 50:30.830 uh , the testimony we've heard so far 50:30.830 --> 50:32.719 and I'm , uh , looking forward to 50:32.719 --> 50:34.441 reviewing all of your prepared 50:34.441 --> 50:36.719 statements . Um , I'm a huge proponent , 50:36.719 --> 50:38.886 as is Senator Collins and many of us , 50:38.899 --> 50:41.439 of unmanned systems , uh , and I 50:41.439 --> 50:43.328 appreciate the answer , uh , from 50:43.328 --> 50:45.439 General Smith about your engagement , 50:45.439 --> 50:47.495 but I'd like to hear more about this 50:47.495 --> 50:49.717 from the Navy . Um , you're proposing , 50:49.717 --> 50:51.606 I believe , 2.2 billion , uh , in 50:51.606 --> 50:53.772 investments for unmanned systems , and 50:53.772 --> 50:55.939 I'm , I'm concerned about . Whether or 50:55.939 --> 50:58.161 not we've learned the lessons from past 50:58.161 --> 51:00.050 drone initiatives that focused on 51:00.050 --> 51:02.161 procuring end items with little or no 51:02.161 --> 51:04.106 thought to how they'll actually be 51:04.106 --> 51:06.272 employed or sustained . If you could , 51:06.272 --> 51:08.606 Acting Secretary Cow and Admiral Caudle , 51:08.606 --> 51:10.661 how's the Navy thinking about um the 51:10.661 --> 51:12.717 deployment and the use of systems in 51:12.717 --> 51:14.939 the future to make sure they're fit for 51:14.939 --> 51:17.050 um the challenges we face and how are 51:17.050 --> 51:16.679 you incorporating the lessons learned 51:16.679 --> 51:19.120 from Ukraine and the ongoing operations 51:19.120 --> 51:20.953 in Iran as you just referenced , 51:20.953 --> 51:23.120 Admiral Caudle , the . Um , unmanned 51:23.120 --> 51:25.320 systems for demining , um , to make 51:25.320 --> 51:27.042 sure that these investments in 51:27.042 --> 51:29.264 autonomous systems meet our operational 51:29.264 --> 51:31.376 needs . Thank you for that question , 51:31.376 --> 51:33.709 Senator . Again , as an EOD tech myself , 51:33.709 --> 51:35.820 I , I've used robots my entire career 51:35.820 --> 51:37.931 where I'd rather send an uh , a robot 51:37.931 --> 51:40.153 down than send a , a , an EUD tech down 51:40.153 --> 51:42.431 there with a set of wire cutters . And , 51:42.431 --> 51:44.487 uh , you know , likewise , uh , in , 51:44.949 --> 51:46.949 while we're doing underwater , uh , 51:46.949 --> 51:49.171 demining , we use right now the Mark 18 51:49.239 --> 51:52.280 UUV in order to do that . Um , pilots 51:52.280 --> 51:54.280 will say all the time that they use 51:54.280 --> 51:56.502 that , uh , unmanned systems for a long 51:56.502 --> 51:59.320 time with AIM 9 and AIM 120 . Uh , so 51:59.320 --> 52:01.320 right now we're , we're studying to 52:01.320 --> 52:03.542 make sure we're , we're doing the right 52:03.542 --> 52:05.820 thing with , especially with MOSA , uh , 52:05.820 --> 52:07.487 the , the , um , open systems 52:07.487 --> 52:09.653 architecture . We , we want to be able 52:09.653 --> 52:11.931 for every system to talk to each other , 52:11.931 --> 52:14.153 just like my , my iPhone should be able 52:14.153 --> 52:15.876 to talk to , to someone else's 52:15.876 --> 52:18.098 BlackBerry , you know , we want . To be 52:18.098 --> 52:20.209 able that everything works together . 52:20.209 --> 52:19.916 We are taking lessons learned from 52:19.916 --> 52:21.972 Ukraine . The , the thing is we have 52:21.972 --> 52:24.083 the tyranny of distance . Ukraine can 52:24.083 --> 52:26.249 just put it in their backyard and send 52:26.249 --> 52:28.194 it out , whereas we have to travel 52:28.194 --> 52:30.476 10,000 miles or even greater if we're 52:30.476 --> 52:32.698 talking about Indoaycom in order to get 52:32.698 --> 52:34.698 the systems there . And I will turn 52:34.698 --> 52:36.809 over to the Chief of Naval Operations 52:36.809 --> 52:38.976 to tell you how we , we're integrating 52:38.976 --> 52:41.032 the systems , especially with the TR 52:41.032 --> 52:40.635 battle group . We're getting ready to 52:40.635 --> 52:42.552 go out and be the first . Carry a 52:42.552 --> 52:45.162 strike group to use unmanned systems . 52:45.431 --> 52:47.375 Thank you , AdmiralConnell . Hey , 52:47.375 --> 52:49.375 Senator Coons , sir , thank you for 52:49.375 --> 52:51.598 that . You know , first of all , let me 52:51.598 --> 52:53.709 just say the ultimate unmanned weapon 52:53.709 --> 52:55.820 is the SM-6 , the conventional prompt 52:55.820 --> 52:57.931 strike missile , the heavyweight Mark 52:57.931 --> 53:00.153 48 torpedo , LRASM . Those are unmanned 53:00.153 --> 53:02.375 vehicles themselves , and they're quite 53:02.375 --> 53:04.598 capable , and we need to make sure that 53:04.598 --> 53:06.653 our munitions , you know , are fully 53:06.653 --> 53:08.709 funded . So let me just state that . 53:08.709 --> 53:11.042 You know , the secretary's got it right . 53:11.042 --> 53:13.264 It's , you know , it's , it's one thing 53:13.264 --> 53:13.260 to be able to launch unmanned kit which 53:13.260 --> 53:15.879 has limited range when you're in an arc 53:15.879 --> 53:18.659 of achievability like Ukraine is to 53:18.659 --> 53:20.689 their target sets . Let me , not to 53:20.689 --> 53:22.911 interrupt , but I'll interrupt . One of 53:22.911 --> 53:25.078 the things that's most impressed , and 53:25.078 --> 53:27.133 you've heard it from several of us . 53:27.133 --> 53:29.245 About Ukraine's work is that they are 53:29.245 --> 53:31.467 launching successful drone strikes 1000 53:31.467 --> 53:33.689 miles from Ukraine . Yes , part of what 53:33.689 --> 53:35.467 has changed the momentum on the 53:35.467 --> 53:37.689 battlefield is their successful strikes 53:37.689 --> 53:39.830 in Moscow and the stunning success of 53:39.830 --> 53:41.770 Operation Spider Web to deliver 53:41.770 --> 53:45.209 significant damage to strategic airlift 53:45.590 --> 53:48.943 1000 miles away . So it Not entirely 53:48.943 --> 53:51.165 true that they aren't covering also the 53:51.165 --> 53:53.472 tyranny of distance given the depth 53:53.472 --> 53:55.792 that the Russians are using to launch 53:55.792 --> 53:58.014 attacks on Ukraine . So forgive me , no 53:58.014 --> 54:00.181 question , sir , but I've got to carry 54:00.181 --> 54:02.348 that kit as a navy to the forward part 54:02.348 --> 54:04.459 of the theater and then get that last 54:04.459 --> 54:06.403 1000 miles , OK , so I can do that 54:06.403 --> 54:08.292 through my own ships , so you can 54:08.292 --> 54:10.403 envision what mother ships would look 54:10.403 --> 54:12.348 like . Certainly that would be our 54:12.348 --> 54:14.236 medium unmanned surface vehicle , 54:14.236 --> 54:16.345 containerized payloads with swarm 54:16.345 --> 54:18.555 drones in that , all types of long 54:18.555 --> 54:21.035 range munitions in that , undersea 54:21.035 --> 54:22.479 capabilities in that . So 54:22.479 --> 54:24.591 containerization is huge for me to do 54:24.591 --> 54:26.676 that . I have to also not only the 54:26.676 --> 54:28.509 distance , I have to have things 54:28.509 --> 54:30.398 survivable in sea state . Monsoon 54:30.398 --> 54:32.565 season is about to hit . So if I tried 54:32.565 --> 54:34.787 to go put a bunch of unmanned right now 54:34.787 --> 54:36.898 in this monsoon season , it would not 54:36.898 --> 54:39.500 be survivable in itself . So I love the 54:39.500 --> 54:41.580 asymmetry and the overmatch that you 54:41.580 --> 54:43.580 can get from robotic and autonomous 54:43.580 --> 54:45.580 systems . But as the Navy chief , I 54:45.580 --> 54:47.580 have to bring that forward in a way 54:47.580 --> 54:49.802 that I can launch that into the theater 54:49.802 --> 54:52.024 with valid targets that I can't service 54:52.024 --> 54:54.247 through other means . Sir , what , what 54:54.247 --> 54:56.247 role do you imagine that our treaty 54:56.247 --> 54:58.302 allies play in this force projection 54:58.302 --> 55:00.136 because You know , frankly , the 55:00.136 --> 55:02.469 Australians , uh , the Philippines , uh , 55:02.469 --> 55:04.409 Korea , Japan , um , they are 55:04.409 --> 55:06.687 technologically sophisticated partners . 55:06.870 --> 55:09.389 Um , they are close partners with us , 55:09.469 --> 55:12.050 uh , and they have the ability , uh , 55:12.070 --> 55:13.903 to support , to service , and to 55:13.903 --> 55:16.014 project . The first time I really was 55:16.014 --> 55:18.181 struck by what is possible in this was 55:18.181 --> 55:20.379 in Australia . I was there last summer 55:20.379 --> 55:22.429 for the USAustralia Aucus related 55:22.429 --> 55:24.651 dialogue and visited an ANRO facility . 55:25.000 --> 55:27.111 And saw their ghost shark product and 55:27.111 --> 55:29.167 was really quite struck at what they 55:29.167 --> 55:31.479 are deploying . What role do you see 55:31.479 --> 55:33.760 our close allies playing in developing , 55:33.919 --> 55:36.070 testing , and deploying autonomous 55:36.070 --> 55:38.070 systems ? Well , Ranking Raccoons , 55:38.070 --> 55:41.719 again , I don't see any world that our 55:41.719 --> 55:44.600 allies don't play a prominent role in 55:44.600 --> 55:47.260 how we leverage autonomy . I need their 55:47.260 --> 55:50.149 ABO . I need them to invest in it . I 55:50.149 --> 55:52.149 need to actually work with them and 55:52.149 --> 55:54.038 integrate it into the schemes and 55:54.038 --> 55:56.389 maneuver and how we do mass fires . So 55:56.389 --> 55:58.278 it's a vital question what you're 55:58.278 --> 56:00.445 bringing up . If we're going to launch 56:00.445 --> 56:02.111 and have effective unmanned . 56:02.209 --> 56:04.270 Capability going forward , then that 56:04.270 --> 56:06.340 has to be done , I think in close 56:06.340 --> 56:08.618 collaboration with allies and partners . 56:08.618 --> 56:10.729 I need to be able to sustain that kit 56:10.729 --> 56:13.007 forward to be able to bring it to bear . 56:13.007 --> 56:15.229 That will require partnerships with our 56:15.229 --> 56:17.396 allies . My last question this round , 56:17.396 --> 56:19.989 if I could . Look , as I understand our 56:19.989 --> 56:23.070 shipbuilding challenges , um , all of 56:23.070 --> 56:25.189 the existing shipyards are working at 56:25.189 --> 56:27.356 full capacity . You're asking for more 56:27.356 --> 56:29.522 money to increase their capacity , but 56:29.522 --> 56:31.745 we are literally years behind , and the 56:31.745 --> 56:33.969 best in class shipyards in the world 56:33.969 --> 56:36.247 are in Japan , South Korea , and China . 56:36.469 --> 56:38.636 50 years ago we had the best shipyards 56:38.636 --> 56:41.250 in the world . Today we do not . And 56:41.250 --> 56:44.050 I'm a strong believer that we need to 56:44.050 --> 56:46.161 make sure we are protecting America's 56:46.161 --> 56:48.649 industrial base and exploring deeper 56:48.649 --> 56:50.850 partnerships . You asked for 1.8 56:50.850 --> 56:52.909 billion to study using foreign 56:53.239 --> 56:55.461 shipyards and foreign designs . That is 56:55.461 --> 56:57.572 a lot for a study . If you could just 56:57.572 --> 56:59.770 briefly describe what the point is for 56:59.770 --> 57:03.000 that much of a study . And what extra 57:03.000 --> 57:05.320 capacity do you think we might look to 57:05.320 --> 57:07.800 our treaty allies to provide both for 57:07.800 --> 57:09.911 servicing to your point of tyranny of 57:09.911 --> 57:12.419 distance and potentially constructing 57:12.419 --> 57:14.520 ships in partnership with us . I'm a 57:14.520 --> 57:16.742 big believer in the Aus partnership . I 57:16.742 --> 57:18.687 think we need to be looking to our 57:18.687 --> 57:20.853 close allies and partners . As long as 57:20.853 --> 57:22.576 we are protecting our domestic 57:22.576 --> 57:24.885 shipyards and they have robust and 57:24.885 --> 57:26.996 sustained opportunities to contribute 57:26.996 --> 57:29.107 to this work , Ranking Member Kontz , 57:29.107 --> 57:31.107 that's a wonderful question , sir , 57:31.107 --> 57:33.107 because , uh , we're the , the RDTE 57:33.107 --> 57:35.218 we're getting with that is to see the 57:35.218 --> 57:37.218 integration of those , uh , foreign 57:37.218 --> 57:39.052 ships to see how they fit in our 57:39.052 --> 57:41.274 formation , and if it works , we're not 57:41.274 --> 57:43.385 buying into foreign shipyards , we're 57:43.385 --> 57:45.718 having them invest in the United States . 57:45.718 --> 57:47.663 We , we want them to bring their , 57:47.663 --> 57:49.607 their operations here with the way 57:49.607 --> 57:51.385 they're able to crank out a , a 57:51.385 --> 57:53.441 destroyer in 2 years , and that will 57:53.441 --> 57:55.496 create basically 540,000 jobs in the 57:55.496 --> 57:57.496 United States and not just to build 57:57.496 --> 57:59.552 destroyers and , and frigates , uh , 57:59.552 --> 58:01.385 frigates and battleships , we're 58:01.385 --> 58:03.607 talking about also merchant ships right 58:03.607 --> 58:05.774 now we only have 188 , um , you know , 58:05.774 --> 58:09.129 flagged merchant ships and 105 military 58:09.129 --> 58:11.129 seal of command ships , and we need 58:11.129 --> 58:13.462 more in the United States . States , we , 58:13.462 --> 58:15.240 there's the Chinese have 11,000 58:15.240 --> 58:17.296 merchant ships , and we need to , to 58:17.296 --> 58:19.462 build capacity . That's why to be able 58:19.462 --> 58:21.740 to have them invest over here . I mean , 58:21.740 --> 58:21.683 my , my Toyota is not built in Japan , 58:21.762 --> 58:23.818 it's built in the United States . So 58:23.818 --> 58:26.151 have them build their , their , uh , uh , 58:26.151 --> 58:28.151 factories over here , sir . Hanwa's 58:28.151 --> 58:30.206 dramatic commitment to invest in the 58:30.206 --> 58:32.206 Philly shipyard is just one of many 58:32.206 --> 58:33.984 such . Investments , is it your 58:33.984 --> 58:35.706 testimony then that you're not 58:35.706 --> 58:37.818 considering any production overseas , 58:37.818 --> 58:40.151 only investments in US shipyards ? Well , 58:40.151 --> 58:42.318 obviously initially we have to see how 58:42.318 --> 58:41.785 they build those ships over there and 58:41.785 --> 58:43.785 then , uh , and then bring American 58:43.785 --> 58:45.729 workers over there , learn the way 58:45.729 --> 58:47.841 their , their modalities , how they , 58:47.841 --> 58:49.952 they work and how they , they're able 58:49.952 --> 58:52.007 to streamline processes , bring that 58:52.007 --> 58:51.615 over here , here in the United States , 58:51.706 --> 58:52.706 sir . 58:57.159 --> 59:01.020 You've been Or , but We've 59:01.020 --> 59:04.959 encouraged Taiwan . To buy arms from us . 59:06.229 --> 59:08.340 And all of a sudden there's a pause . 59:09.209 --> 59:12.350 What are you hearing from the Taiwanese 59:12.550 --> 59:13.649 about the pause ? 59:16.840 --> 59:18.896 Chairman , I have not heard , uh , I 59:18.896 --> 59:20.840 have not spoken to the Taiwanese . 59:20.840 --> 59:22.896 However , we are , we have done some 59:22.896 --> 59:25.062 military , uh , foreign military sales 59:25.062 --> 59:27.007 to them in the it's just right now 59:27.007 --> 59:29.062 we're doing a pause in order to , to 59:29.062 --> 59:31.229 make sure we have the , uh , munitions 59:31.229 --> 59:33.340 we need for Epic Fury , which we have 59:33.340 --> 59:35.562 plenty , but we're just making , making 59:35.562 --> 59:37.896 sure we have everything . But then , uh , 59:37.896 --> 59:37.280 the mil foreign military sales will 59:37.280 --> 59:39.919 continue , uh , when the administration 59:39.919 --> 59:42.570 deems , uh , necessary , sir . Put it 59:42.570 --> 59:45.129 another way , do you expect the sale to 59:45.129 --> 59:48.629 be approved at some point ? Uh , 59:48.739 --> 59:50.906 Senator , uh , that would be up to the 59:50.906 --> 59:52.961 Secretary of War and the , uh , uh , 59:52.961 --> 59:55.239 Secretary of State , sir . Yeah , well , 59:55.239 --> 59:57.461 that's what's really distressing , um . 59:58.709 --> 01:00:01.110 Belatedly , the administration seems to 01:00:01.110 --> 01:00:03.360 be mad at the Europeans for not 01:00:03.419 --> 01:00:05.290 engaging in the Middle East . 01:00:07.250 --> 01:00:10.949 But as a practical matter , Without 01:00:10.949 --> 01:00:13.709 basing and sustainment from NATO allies , 01:00:13.870 --> 01:00:16.270 we wouldn't be able to project power in 01:00:16.270 --> 01:00:19.590 the Middle East . So what role should 01:00:19.590 --> 01:00:22.550 NATO play out in the Indo-Pacific ? 01:00:25.629 --> 01:00:27.740 Well , Chairman , uh , first of all , 01:00:27.740 --> 01:00:30.110 NATO playing a role for I would love to 01:00:30.110 --> 01:00:31.999 see NATO , uh , doing some , uh , 01:00:31.999 --> 01:00:34.229 demining in the , the straits also . I 01:00:34.229 --> 01:00:36.409 mean this is a mutually beneficial for 01:00:36.629 --> 01:00:38.518 all the world if we can clear the 01:00:38.518 --> 01:00:40.462 straits , uh , right now and , and 01:00:40.462 --> 01:00:42.629 really provide security and NATO again 01:00:42.629 --> 01:00:44.851 would be a great . ally to us in the in 01:00:44.851 --> 01:00:46.895 the Pacific , uh , and just to , to 01:00:46.895 --> 01:00:48.506 maintain the , the sea lanes 01:00:48.506 --> 01:00:50.673 communication . We , the United States 01:00:50.673 --> 01:00:52.728 are a maritime nation . We depend on 01:00:52.728 --> 01:00:54.839 the Pacific and the Atlantic for free 01:00:54.839 --> 01:00:57.006 trade and the world does also . And so 01:00:57.006 --> 01:00:58.784 this is why we need to all work 01:00:58.784 --> 01:01:00.895 together to protect the sea lanes and 01:01:00.895 --> 01:01:03.860 communications for the world , sir . I 01:01:03.860 --> 01:01:05.916 think the way to think about NATO is 01:01:05.916 --> 01:01:07.693 it's important not only for the 01:01:07.693 --> 01:01:09.804 Europeans and ourselves , but for the 01:01:09.804 --> 01:01:11.971 rest of the world . They're looking at 01:01:11.971 --> 01:01:14.193 NATO , coming to NATO meetings from the 01:01:14.193 --> 01:01:18.090 Pacific . Um This is a 01:01:18.090 --> 01:01:21.260 potential framework . For us to be the 01:01:21.260 --> 01:01:23.919 leader of the free world . All the 01:01:23.919 --> 01:01:27.600 world , not just Europe . Because we 01:01:27.600 --> 01:01:29.544 all know who our adversaries are . 01:01:30.820 --> 01:01:34.350 China , Russia . North Korea , Iran . 01:01:35.629 --> 01:01:38.070 They all have one thing in common , 01:01:38.159 --> 01:01:41.209 they hate us . So we can either stand 01:01:41.209 --> 01:01:44.389 up to that . Or hunker down and hope 01:01:44.389 --> 01:01:47.550 for the best . Finally , Mr . Secretary , 01:01:47.679 --> 01:01:51.229 uh , fiscal year 26 , we funded . 01:01:52.110 --> 01:01:54.510 Naval drone and counter drone 01:01:54.510 --> 01:01:57.929 capabilities via fully appropriations . 01:01:58.830 --> 01:02:00.830 This year's request would only fund 01:02:00.830 --> 01:02:04.810 Navy drone programs in Reconciliation . 01:02:05.899 --> 01:02:08.739 Do you have some view about that ? 01:02:10.760 --> 01:02:12.871 Oh , I'm sorry , is this , you know , 01:02:12.871 --> 01:02:14.982 I'm sorry , go ahead . Would you like 01:02:14.982 --> 01:02:16.982 to see a note to answer that , uh , 01:02:16.982 --> 01:02:20.790 chairman or myself ? Uh , Chairman 01:02:20.790 --> 01:02:24.429 McConnell , um , you know , the risk of , 01:02:24.590 --> 01:02:26.701 you know , not having the , the total 01:02:27.439 --> 01:02:30.350 discretionary and mandatory bill is 01:02:30.350 --> 01:02:32.461 significant for the Navy . You know , 01:02:32.461 --> 01:02:34.683 you , we've , in the opening statements 01:02:34.683 --> 01:02:36.906 that have been made by you and others , 01:02:36.906 --> 01:02:38.906 we take risk in munitions , we take 01:02:38.906 --> 01:02:40.850 risk in F-35 , and we take risk in 01:02:40.850 --> 01:02:42.906 PISRM to maintain our facilities and 01:02:42.906 --> 01:02:45.128 our foundry as I like to call it . So , 01:02:45.128 --> 01:02:47.294 you know , if , if the majority of the 01:02:47.294 --> 01:02:49.340 counter UAS and counter drone 01:02:49.340 --> 01:02:51.739 technologies and capabilities are , are 01:02:51.739 --> 01:02:54.540 in the mandatory and that's not funded , 01:02:54.629 --> 01:02:56.979 of course I take risks there . And so 01:02:56.979 --> 01:02:58.979 that's why , you know , for me as a 01:02:58.979 --> 01:03:01.146 service chief , uh , the , the passing 01:03:01.146 --> 01:03:03.312 of the total bill is so vital for me . 01:03:06.520 --> 01:03:10.000 What , uh Specific 01:03:10.000 --> 01:03:12.540 lessons has the Navy learned from 01:03:12.540 --> 01:03:16.050 what's going on . In Ukraine . 01:03:18.520 --> 01:03:21.800 It's all Been described as the Silicon 01:03:21.800 --> 01:03:24.840 Valley of warfare . I'm wondering if 01:03:24.840 --> 01:03:26.879 any of the senior navy leaders have 01:03:26.879 --> 01:03:29.850 been to Ukraine and to gather lessons 01:03:29.850 --> 01:03:32.010 firsthand from the front lines of 01:03:32.010 --> 01:03:33.129 modern warfare . 01:03:36.459 --> 01:03:38.681 Chairman McConnell , the , um , there's 01:03:38.681 --> 01:03:40.959 a lot of lessons . Um , one , you know , 01:03:41.040 --> 01:03:43.096 how you command and control forces . 01:03:43.320 --> 01:03:45.679 Two , how you have great intelligence 01:03:45.679 --> 01:03:49.639 apparatus , sustained ISR , and , and 01:03:49.639 --> 01:03:51.850 not only just ISR for targeting and 01:03:51.850 --> 01:03:54.072 getting valid targets , that actually , 01:03:54.072 --> 01:03:56.294 you know , cripple the , the supply and 01:03:56.294 --> 01:03:58.406 logistics and , and force correlation 01:03:58.406 --> 01:04:00.679 nodes of an adversary , but the actual 01:04:00.679 --> 01:04:02.949 ISR to do battle damage assessment is 01:04:02.949 --> 01:04:06.159 vital . We've seen the outsized 01:04:06.459 --> 01:04:08.659 asymmetric effort that's been able to 01:04:08.659 --> 01:04:10.820 be done by the Ukrainian forces 01:04:10.820 --> 01:04:12.709 leveraging robotic and autonomous 01:04:12.709 --> 01:04:14.620 systems , but that comes , that 01:04:14.620 --> 01:04:16.898 requires great targeting to go do that . 01:04:17.100 --> 01:04:19.489 And so that's been a piece of that . So , 01:04:19.550 --> 01:04:21.772 um , you know , logistics win wars , we 01:04:21.772 --> 01:04:23.828 know that , and so that's been a big 01:04:23.828 --> 01:04:25.939 lessons learned . And we've seen that 01:04:25.939 --> 01:04:28.050 it takes partnerships , you know , to 01:04:28.050 --> 01:04:30.790 actually sustain Ukraine against a much 01:04:30.790 --> 01:04:33.149 larger force that Russia fields . So 01:04:33.149 --> 01:04:35.093 there's been a lot of lessons that 01:04:35.093 --> 01:04:37.389 we've , we've looked at very hard and 01:04:37.389 --> 01:04:39.445 that we will use and leverage in our 01:04:39.445 --> 01:04:40.445 own fights . 01:04:44.629 --> 01:04:47.189 Baldwin , thank you , Mr . Chairman . 01:04:48.080 --> 01:04:51.570 Um , Secretary Cow , uh , uh , Admiral 01:04:51.570 --> 01:04:54.929 O'Connell , uh . Uh , General Smith , 01:04:55.050 --> 01:04:57.409 uh , thank you all for being here this , 01:04:57.500 --> 01:05:01.429 uh , this morning . Uh , General Smith , 01:05:01.520 --> 01:05:03.409 over the last several years , the 01:05:03.409 --> 01:05:05.520 subcommittee has supported the Marine 01:05:05.520 --> 01:05:08.669 Corps efforts to transform into a more 01:05:08.669 --> 01:05:11.550 mobile and capable force prepared to 01:05:11.550 --> 01:05:14.389 fight in a potential naval war in the 01:05:14.389 --> 01:05:16.989 Pacific . Can you describe the 01:05:16.989 --> 01:05:20.090 importance of the medium landing ship 01:05:20.429 --> 01:05:22.429 to the Marine Corps' approach to 01:05:22.429 --> 01:05:25.719 fighting this war ? Senator , I can , 01:05:25.760 --> 01:05:27.871 and thank you for that question . The 01:05:27.871 --> 01:05:29.927 LSM or landing ship medium , uh , we 01:05:29.927 --> 01:05:32.093 always have to do landing ship , comma 01:05:32.093 --> 01:05:34.260 medium in the Marine Corps . It's just 01:05:34.260 --> 01:05:35.816 the way we do it . It is an 01:05:35.816 --> 01:05:38.038 inter-island connector . It enables our 01:05:38.038 --> 01:05:40.479 forces to aggregate and disaggregate 01:05:40.479 --> 01:05:43.159 rapidly and to go to places that other 01:05:43.159 --> 01:05:45.239 conventional navy ships cannot go 01:05:45.239 --> 01:05:47.183 because of beach gradients . So it 01:05:47.183 --> 01:05:48.961 allows us to have access to the 01:05:48.961 --> 01:05:51.017 totality of the first island chain , 01:05:51.017 --> 01:05:53.072 and it's vital . It's going to bring 01:05:53.072 --> 01:05:55.072 our media . missile batteries , our 01:05:55.072 --> 01:05:54.639 nemesis , our Navy Marine ship 01:05:54.639 --> 01:05:56.639 interdiction system , it's going to 01:05:56.639 --> 01:05:58.750 bring all that to bear in places that 01:05:58.750 --> 01:06:00.917 otherwise the adversary would not have 01:06:00.917 --> 01:06:03.028 to calculate . They look at their ISR 01:06:03.028 --> 01:06:05.361 platform , when they look at where they , 01:06:05.361 --> 01:06:07.028 where are they focusing their 01:06:07.028 --> 01:06:06.929 intelligence surveillance and 01:06:06.929 --> 01:06:09.096 reconnaissance . Now they have to look 01:06:09.096 --> 01:06:11.373 at the totality of the map . Thank you . 01:06:11.489 --> 01:06:13.711 The current requirement laid out by the 01:06:13.711 --> 01:06:16.929 Navy and Marine Corps is to procure 35 01:06:16.929 --> 01:06:19.810 medium landing ships . How critical to 01:06:19.810 --> 01:06:22.270 the Marine Corps is it for the US to 01:06:22.409 --> 01:06:25.770 build at least 35 of them ? Ma'am , 01:06:25.810 --> 01:06:27.921 it's vital , uh , because we're going 01:06:27.921 --> 01:06:30.143 to need to move the forces that need to 01:06:30.143 --> 01:06:32.310 be moved . Um , those forces in 3 MF , 01:06:32.429 --> 01:06:34.500 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force , are 01:06:34.500 --> 01:06:36.667 going to have to be moved , and even 1 01:06:36.667 --> 01:06:38.722 MEF , 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 01:06:38.722 --> 01:06:40.889 out of Camp Pendleton , once they move 01:06:40.889 --> 01:06:43.111 forward , they're going to have to have 01:06:43.111 --> 01:06:45.167 the ability to move around the first 01:06:45.167 --> 01:06:47.111 island chain . And again , the LSM 01:06:47.111 --> 01:06:48.944 blends itself in with commercial 01:06:48.944 --> 01:06:50.889 shipping . It looks like any other 01:06:50.889 --> 01:06:53.111 small ship that's transiting the area . 01:06:53.111 --> 01:06:55.111 There's some exquisite capabilities 01:06:55.111 --> 01:06:54.469 that we can put on it that we can't 01:06:54.469 --> 01:06:56.636 talk about in an open hearing , but we 01:06:56.636 --> 01:06:58.969 could talk about it in a closed hearing . 01:06:58.969 --> 01:07:01.191 That will enable to quote fuzz it up so 01:07:01.191 --> 01:07:01.169 that it looks like any other tramp 01:07:01.169 --> 01:07:03.780 steamer that's out there . And then the 01:07:03.780 --> 01:07:05.949 navy expects to be building medium 01:07:05.949 --> 01:07:08.282 landing ships for about the next decade . 01:07:08.282 --> 01:07:11.030 At the same time , uh , President Xi 01:07:11.270 --> 01:07:13.449 has directed the People's Liberation 01:07:13.449 --> 01:07:15.989 Army to be prepared to take Taiwan by 01:07:15.989 --> 01:07:19.189 force as soon as next year . So , time 01:07:19.189 --> 01:07:21.100 is of the essence if the US is to 01:07:21.100 --> 01:07:23.389 maintain our military edge in the 01:07:23.389 --> 01:07:25.270 Pacific . Do you believe it is 01:07:25.270 --> 01:07:28.469 important to Marine Corps readiness to 01:07:28.469 --> 01:07:30.691 acquire medium landing ships as quickly 01:07:30.691 --> 01:07:32.669 as we can ? Absolutely , ma'am . 01:07:32.830 --> 01:07:34.997 There's a saying that if your neighbor 01:07:34.997 --> 01:07:37.108 says he's gonna kill you , you should 01:07:37.108 --> 01:07:39.540 believe him . So , um , thank you , um , 01:07:39.750 --> 01:07:42.520 Secretary Cow , um , I am very 01:07:42.520 --> 01:07:44.631 concerned that the Navy's request for 01:07:44.631 --> 01:07:47.389 funding to procure 6 medium landing 01:07:47.389 --> 01:07:49.949 ships was included in the , the 01:07:49.949 --> 01:07:52.350 partisan and mandatory spending part of 01:07:52.350 --> 01:07:55.209 the department's budget request . That 01:07:55.209 --> 01:07:57.376 request is outside the jurisdiction of 01:07:57.376 --> 01:07:59.790 this subcommittee and is in serious 01:07:59.790 --> 01:08:02.169 danger , I think , of not passing this 01:08:02.169 --> 01:08:04.489 year . That makes me question the 01:08:04.489 --> 01:08:07.429 Navy's commitment to maintaining this 01:08:07.429 --> 01:08:10.129 program . So what is the Navy's backup 01:08:10.129 --> 01:08:13.229 plan for procuring medium landing ships 01:08:13.370 --> 01:08:15.969 if the administration's partisan 01:08:15.969 --> 01:08:18.410 spending request fails to advance ? 01:08:20.040 --> 01:08:22.373 Senator , I share your concerns that we , 01:08:22.373 --> 01:08:24.540 we need this whole $1.5 trillion . The 01:08:24.540 --> 01:08:27.000 Navy and Marine Corps has taken a lot 01:08:27.000 --> 01:08:29.029 of hits over 20 years in Iraq and 01:08:29.029 --> 01:08:31.251 Afghanistan , ma'am . And so that's why 01:08:31.251 --> 01:08:33.418 we need , we need this one-time budget 01:08:33.418 --> 01:08:35.362 in order to fix all these things , 01:08:35.362 --> 01:08:37.418 however you appropriate to us , us , 01:08:37.418 --> 01:08:39.529 whether one bill or two bills , we're 01:08:39.529 --> 01:08:41.751 completely agnostic to that , uh , as a 01:08:41.751 --> 01:08:43.807 Navy and Marine Corps , we , we need 01:08:43.807 --> 01:08:45.918 that . In order to build these medium 01:08:45.918 --> 01:08:48.140 landing ships , and again , Pinke Terry 01:08:48.140 --> 01:08:47.754 is going to turn it out quickly , and , 01:08:47.805 --> 01:08:49.972 and I know that's why we're going with 01:08:49.972 --> 01:08:52.083 a design that's already proven . It's 01:08:52.083 --> 01:08:54.249 already built , and we're not going to 01:08:54.249 --> 01:08:56.527 deviate from that like we did with the , 01:08:56.527 --> 01:08:58.638 the previous models . That's why it's 01:08:58.638 --> 01:09:00.583 so imperative that we get the $1.5 01:09:00.583 --> 01:09:02.805 trillion especially for the Navy Marine 01:09:02.805 --> 01:09:05.138 Corps , to get the $377.5 billion ma'am . 01:09:05.138 --> 01:09:07.083 Yeah , but , uh , well , President 01:09:07.083 --> 01:09:09.138 Trump and this administration talk a 01:09:09.138 --> 01:09:11.249 lot about wanting to build more ships 01:09:11.249 --> 01:09:13.249 in America . And I absolutely agree 01:09:13.249 --> 01:09:15.138 with that , but bringing back our 01:09:15.138 --> 01:09:17.659 domestic shipbuilding industry requires 01:09:17.659 --> 01:09:20.778 a consistent demand signal , and 01:09:20.778 --> 01:09:22.778 decisions like these jeopardize the 01:09:22.778 --> 01:09:25.019 stability of the medium landing ship 01:09:25.019 --> 01:09:27.418 program and the thousands of jobs , um , 01:09:27.699 --> 01:09:29.979 including those in Wisconsin , um , 01:09:30.019 --> 01:09:33.028 which depend on it . So , do you agree 01:09:33.028 --> 01:09:35.488 that consistent demand is important to 01:09:35.488 --> 01:09:37.710 our shipbuilding industry ? And if so , 01:09:37.909 --> 01:09:40.528 why wasn't the request for the medium 01:09:40.528 --> 01:09:43.329 landing ship funding included in the 01:09:43.329 --> 01:09:46.608 Navy's base budget , like all other 01:09:46.608 --> 01:09:50.410 battle force ships ? Senator , 01:09:50.529 --> 01:09:52.689 again , we , we need , however we get 01:09:52.689 --> 01:09:54.800 this money , we need , we need it all 01:09:54.800 --> 01:09:57.078 for , for to fix the Navy Marine Corps , 01:09:57.078 --> 01:09:59.189 and , and I know you weren't here for 01:09:59.189 --> 01:09:58.490 my opening statement , but my son's 01:09:58.490 --> 01:10:00.490 gonna be commissioned United States 01:10:00.490 --> 01:10:02.657 Marine , uh , tomorrow from the United 01:10:02.657 --> 01:10:04.657 States Naval Academy . I , I cannot 01:10:04.657 --> 01:10:06.879 have him go to war the way I did . We , 01:10:06.879 --> 01:10:08.879 we , we just can't . Do this to our 01:10:08.879 --> 01:10:08.419 sailors , marines . These are American 01:10:08.419 --> 01:10:10.530 sons and daughters , and we owe it to 01:10:10.530 --> 01:10:12.697 them to give them what they need . And 01:10:12.697 --> 01:10:14.752 this is why we , we just need to get 01:10:14.752 --> 01:10:16.586 this out . But when , when we're 01:10:16.586 --> 01:10:18.808 balancing the needs of , uh , quality , 01:10:18.808 --> 01:10:18.609 quality of life , quality service , 01:10:18.859 --> 01:10:21.459 housing for them , uh , pay and 01:10:21.459 --> 01:10:23.770 everything else , it's just , it's just 01:10:23.770 --> 01:10:25.937 the way the , uh , the budget was laid 01:10:25.937 --> 01:10:28.159 out , ma'am . Yeah , it's , it's , it's 01:10:28.159 --> 01:10:30.270 a problem that it's laid out that way 01:10:30.270 --> 01:10:32.437 because the Navy and Marine Corps both 01:10:32.437 --> 01:10:34.603 emphasized the importance of procuring 01:10:34.603 --> 01:10:37.200 the medium landing ships quickly . Do 01:10:37.200 --> 01:10:39.919 you support , uh , uh , procuring them 01:10:39.919 --> 01:10:42.141 as quickly as our shipyards are able to 01:10:42.141 --> 01:10:44.419 build them , Senator , I , I do support 01:10:44.799 --> 01:10:46.855 building them as quickly as possible 01:10:46.855 --> 01:10:49.021 and getting as many as we can possibly 01:10:49.021 --> 01:10:48.180 get . 01:10:57.740 --> 01:11:01.259 Let me try again on the question I 01:11:01.259 --> 01:11:04.049 asked you earlier about which of the 01:11:04.459 --> 01:11:07.839 Navy leaders have been to Ukraine . 01:11:12.560 --> 01:11:15.129 Sir , I , I can't tell you , uh , in 01:11:15.129 --> 01:11:17.240 total how many Navy leaders have been 01:11:17.240 --> 01:11:19.296 there . I have not been to Ukraine , 01:11:19.296 --> 01:11:21.296 but I do know that the commander of 01:11:21.296 --> 01:11:24.250 Naval Forces Europe and Africa , uh , 01:11:24.410 --> 01:11:26.410 which headquartered out of Naples , 01:11:26.410 --> 01:11:29.430 Italy , and Commander 6th Fleet , uh , 01:11:29.569 --> 01:11:31.513 um , have been there . And if they 01:11:31.513 --> 01:11:34.279 haven't been there exactly on boots on 01:11:34.279 --> 01:11:36.390 the ground , they certainly have been 01:11:36.390 --> 01:11:38.223 to all the Black Sea states that 01:11:38.223 --> 01:11:40.057 surround it . And they work very 01:11:40.057 --> 01:11:41.946 closely every single day with the 01:11:41.946 --> 01:11:44.250 Ukrainian navy and their entire joint 01:11:44.250 --> 01:11:46.450 force to support their needs to the 01:11:46.450 --> 01:11:48.450 extent the United States Navy can . 01:11:50.410 --> 01:11:52.729 What about the civilian leadership ? 01:11:56.109 --> 01:11:58.220 Senator , I , I have not been to , to 01:11:58.220 --> 01:12:00.387 Ukraine yet , but , uh , I've , I've , 01:12:00.387 --> 01:12:02.899 in my previous life when I was in 01:12:02.899 --> 01:12:05.709 uniform , I did send , send , uh , some 01:12:05.709 --> 01:12:08.589 of our operators there . I'm very well , 01:12:08.990 --> 01:12:11.470 very familiar with , uh , with the 01:12:11.470 --> 01:12:13.692 research and development we're doing in 01:12:13.692 --> 01:12:15.748 Ukraine . I know the former US Naval 01:12:15.748 --> 01:12:18.109 Forces Europe and , uh , Africa was one 01:12:18.109 --> 01:12:20.220 of my longtime mentors , uh , Admiral 01:12:20.220 --> 01:12:22.220 Stu Munch . He , he knows that area 01:12:22.220 --> 01:12:24.640 extremely well . And he's , uh , his 01:12:24.640 --> 01:12:27.129 forces operated there both as NATO and 01:12:27.129 --> 01:12:30.919 US forces , sir . I know you guys are 01:12:30.919 --> 01:12:33.939 not policymakers , but let me say again 01:12:34.680 --> 01:12:38.240 that an effort to cut off help for 01:12:38.240 --> 01:12:40.419 Ukraine is not going to work in the 01:12:40.799 --> 01:12:43.830 Senate or in the House . Um , 01:12:45.080 --> 01:12:48.319 We put in $400 million last year and we 01:12:48.319 --> 01:12:50.669 had to embarrass the administration in 01:12:50.669 --> 01:12:54.209 public . To get them to actually spend 01:12:54.209 --> 01:12:57.689 it . We're going to have 01:12:57.689 --> 01:13:01.080 additional Ukraine money this year . I 01:13:01.080 --> 01:13:03.399 would say to the policymakers at the 01:13:03.399 --> 01:13:05.740 White House and the Pentagon , the 01:13:05.740 --> 01:13:07.684 American people are in favor of us 01:13:07.684 --> 01:13:10.270 helping Ukraine . Republicans are in 01:13:10.270 --> 01:13:12.620 favor of us helping Ukraine . Democrats 01:13:12.620 --> 01:13:15.629 are in favor of helping Ukraine . We're 01:13:15.629 --> 01:13:19.220 pretty together on this issue , so . 01:13:20.040 --> 01:13:22.129 We're not going away . One final 01:13:22.129 --> 01:13:25.020 question . What are the specific 01:13:25.020 --> 01:13:29.020 objectives ? Of US strategy up in the 01:13:29.020 --> 01:13:31.819 Arctic . What role will our 01:13:33.040 --> 01:13:36.319 allies like Denmark and Norway play in 01:13:36.319 --> 01:13:40.169 achieving them ? Sir , I 01:13:40.169 --> 01:13:42.180 can address some of that . Um , you 01:13:42.180 --> 01:13:44.500 know , I'm a huge proponent , uh , of 01:13:44.500 --> 01:13:46.660 the Arctic and my job at US Police 01:13:46.660 --> 01:13:49.520 Forces , uh , you know , as the NRTHCOM 01:13:50.419 --> 01:13:52.580 component commander , I , I think 01:13:52.580 --> 01:13:54.879 played a vital role with the NHCOM team 01:13:55.180 --> 01:13:57.419 to enhance our presence in the Arctic . 01:13:57.859 --> 01:14:00.081 Uh , we do that in partnership with the 01:14:00.081 --> 01:14:01.970 European Command and Indo-Pacific 01:14:01.970 --> 01:14:04.137 Command commander . I kind of break it 01:14:04.137 --> 01:14:06.509 down a couple of ways . One , it's 01:14:06.509 --> 01:14:09.439 important to have presence there . You 01:14:09.439 --> 01:14:11.050 got to , you got to walk the 01:14:11.050 --> 01:14:13.161 battlefield , so that means operating 01:14:13.161 --> 01:14:15.217 above the Arctic Circle consistently 01:14:15.217 --> 01:14:17.161 with surface ships , with aircraft 01:14:17.161 --> 01:14:19.328 carriers , and of course our submarine 01:14:19.328 --> 01:14:21.217 force . Second , you have to have 01:14:21.217 --> 01:14:23.439 special capabilities to be successful . 01:14:23.439 --> 01:14:25.161 Successful up there . It means 01:14:25.161 --> 01:14:27.328 communication systems that can work at 01:14:27.328 --> 01:14:29.383 high latitudes . It means systems on 01:14:29.383 --> 01:14:30.939 board that can handle those 01:14:30.939 --> 01:14:32.495 temperatures , and it means 01:14:32.495 --> 01:14:34.495 understanding flows of marginal ice 01:14:34.495 --> 01:14:36.439 zone and the weather conditions up 01:14:36.439 --> 01:14:38.550 there . They're significant , and the 01:14:38.550 --> 01:14:40.606 climate is quite something . And the 01:14:40.606 --> 01:14:42.828 third thing , you have to have partners 01:14:42.828 --> 01:14:44.995 and allies and the Arctic Council team 01:14:44.995 --> 01:14:47.050 is , is , you know , that we all are 01:14:47.050 --> 01:14:49.217 part of NATO now with the exception of 01:14:49.217 --> 01:14:51.328 Russia . So partnerships matter above 01:14:51.328 --> 01:14:53.661 the Arctic Circle . So Finland , Sweden , 01:14:53.661 --> 01:14:55.772 Norway , of course , and a big one is 01:14:55.772 --> 01:14:57.995 Canada , of course , and we do a lot of 01:14:57.995 --> 01:15:00.050 operations with them . You know , we 01:15:00.050 --> 01:15:02.050 just came off our biannual exercise 01:15:02.050 --> 01:15:04.328 called ISX where we're just there with , 01:15:04.328 --> 01:15:06.328 you know , where we do that every 2 01:15:06.328 --> 01:15:08.950 years . We know the Russians want to 01:15:08.950 --> 01:15:11.379 actually , you know , call it their own . 01:15:11.629 --> 01:15:13.851 They'd like a nine-dash line around the 01:15:13.851 --> 01:15:16.073 North Pole , and we're not going to let 01:15:16.073 --> 01:15:18.240 that happen . We know that China wants 01:15:18.240 --> 01:15:20.407 to call the Arctic a near , you know , 01:15:20.407 --> 01:15:22.518 Arctic nation state . We're not going 01:15:22.518 --> 01:15:24.573 to let them operate up there without 01:15:24.573 --> 01:15:26.629 being contested either . And so it's 01:15:26.629 --> 01:15:26.470 very important , and this goes to what 01:15:26.470 --> 01:15:28.430 we're doing in Alaska and the 01:15:28.430 --> 01:15:29.819 recapitalization and the 01:15:29.819 --> 01:15:32.714 Facillitization of some of the places 01:15:32.714 --> 01:15:34.936 we're working in with the senators from 01:15:34.936 --> 01:15:36.984 Alaska . This goes to collaboration 01:15:36.984 --> 01:15:38.984 with the Coast Guard and what we're 01:15:38.984 --> 01:15:40.928 doing to rebuild their icebreaking 01:15:40.928 --> 01:15:42.651 fleet and how we sustain their 01:15:42.651 --> 01:15:44.984 operations . So the Arctic is extremely 01:15:44.984 --> 01:15:46.984 important . trillions of dollars of 01:15:46.984 --> 01:15:49.206 minerals , natural gas , oil , and rare 01:15:49.206 --> 01:15:51.904 earths , and the United States has to 01:15:51.904 --> 01:15:54.890 have a presence there , sir . Speaking 01:15:54.890 --> 01:15:57.709 of Denmark , after the suggestion that 01:15:57.709 --> 01:16:01.009 somehow we wanted to take Greenland , 01:16:01.169 --> 01:16:03.759 um , How are we getting along with the 01:16:03.759 --> 01:16:07.060 Denmark ? NATO member , Sir , Denmark 01:16:07.060 --> 01:16:10.899 is a very close naval ally . We do a 01:16:10.899 --> 01:16:13.121 lot with Denmark . They punch way above 01:16:13.121 --> 01:16:15.343 their weight class , very sophisticated 01:16:15.343 --> 01:16:17.510 set of capabilities that they bring to 01:16:17.510 --> 01:16:19.510 bear , and I think our relationship 01:16:19.510 --> 01:16:21.510 with them is very close . They know 01:16:21.510 --> 01:16:23.343 that from a navy perspective how 01:16:23.343 --> 01:16:25.566 important . Greenland is is key terrain 01:16:25.566 --> 01:16:27.677 and our ability to operate in and out 01:16:27.677 --> 01:16:29.732 of Greenland to protect the Atlantic 01:16:29.732 --> 01:16:31.839 GIUK gap from out of area Russian 01:16:31.839 --> 01:16:34.061 deployers is extremely important . They 01:16:34.061 --> 01:16:35.950 know it's important from an early 01:16:35.950 --> 01:16:38.680 warning radar system to understand ICBM 01:16:38.680 --> 01:16:40.458 threats and other threats could 01:16:40.458 --> 01:16:44.439 approach our homeland . So whatever 01:16:44.439 --> 01:16:46.661 concern there may have been , you think 01:16:46.661 --> 01:16:49.470 is blown over . Sir , I won't speak to 01:16:49.470 --> 01:16:51.526 the political aspects of that , uh , 01:16:51.526 --> 01:16:53.803 but I can just tell you , navy to navy , 01:16:53.803 --> 01:16:55.803 we're strong with Denmark . They're 01:16:55.803 --> 01:16:59.620 good . Thank you , Mr . Chairman and um 01:16:59.620 --> 01:17:01.676 thank you for your testimony today . 01:17:01.676 --> 01:17:03.842 I'm just gonna pick up on a theme that 01:17:03.842 --> 01:17:06.009 you've heard from all of us , from the 01:17:06.009 --> 01:17:08.231 first questions from Senator Kennedy to 01:17:08.231 --> 01:17:10.453 the last questions from the chairman to 01:17:10.453 --> 01:17:12.439 that recent engagement . With our 01:17:12.439 --> 01:17:14.890 allies , we are strong . With our 01:17:14.890 --> 01:17:16.970 allies , we can project force , with 01:17:16.970 --> 01:17:19.779 our allies , we can deter China , 01:17:19.970 --> 01:17:22.359 Russia , Iran , DPRK . They are 01:17:22.359 --> 01:17:24.419 increasingly aligned . But we 01:17:24.419 --> 01:17:26.979 increasingly are not . I led a 01:17:26.979 --> 01:17:29.035 bipartisan delegation , a bipartisan 01:17:29.035 --> 01:17:31.779 bicameral delegation to Denmark the 01:17:31.779 --> 01:17:34.339 same week our president threatened to 01:17:34.339 --> 01:17:37.290 take Greenland by force from our NATO 01:17:37.290 --> 01:17:39.379 ally Denmark . I appreciate your 01:17:39.379 --> 01:17:41.546 testimony , Admiral , that at the navy 01:17:41.546 --> 01:17:43.859 to navy level we're strong , but their 01:17:43.859 --> 01:17:46.459 capabilities are not just terrific . 01:17:47.100 --> 01:17:50.700 The service alongside us when we asked 01:17:50.939 --> 01:17:53.520 in Afghanistan was outstanding . And 01:17:53.520 --> 01:17:55.959 their sacrifice as we come to our 01:17:55.959 --> 01:17:58.299 Memorial Day , we should not forget . 01:17:58.790 --> 01:18:02.060 52 Danes died in service in Afghanistan , 01:18:02.109 --> 01:18:03.998 and as Senator Tillis and Senator 01:18:03.998 --> 01:18:06.600 Murkowski and Senator Durbin and I were 01:18:06.600 --> 01:18:08.910 there at the memorial to the Danes who 01:18:08.910 --> 01:18:12.080 served and died alongside us , we 01:18:12.080 --> 01:18:14.439 should not forget that when our 01:18:14.439 --> 01:18:16.799 president says we never asked NATO for 01:18:16.799 --> 01:18:18.855 anything and they never did anything 01:18:18.855 --> 01:18:21.129 for us . That's heard loud and clear by 01:18:21.129 --> 01:18:23.770 our NATO allies . I am gravely 01:18:23.770 --> 01:18:25.826 concerned that in the Arctic , where 01:18:25.826 --> 01:18:27.714 the Canadians are stepping up and 01:18:27.714 --> 01:18:29.826 investing , we're walking away from a 01:18:29.826 --> 01:18:32.290 decades-old partnership with them . In 01:18:32.290 --> 01:18:34.490 Europe , where Russia is the single 01:18:34.490 --> 01:18:36.490 greatest threat to our security and 01:18:36.490 --> 01:18:38.601 stability , we're putting at risk the 01:18:38.601 --> 01:18:40.770 trust that we've earned by abruptly 01:18:40.770 --> 01:18:42.937 announcing withdrawals of thousands of 01:18:42.937 --> 01:18:44.992 American troops in a way that is not 01:18:44.992 --> 01:18:47.109 clearly planned or executed . And the 01:18:47.109 --> 01:18:49.470 chairman referenced the $400 million . 01:18:49.830 --> 01:18:52.052 When the secretary was in front of us , 01:18:52.109 --> 01:18:54.620 he got asked by several of us , We 01:18:54.620 --> 01:18:58.270 appropriated $400 million last year for 01:18:58.270 --> 01:19:01.149 Ukraine . Has it been spent ? No . When 01:19:01.149 --> 01:19:03.316 will we get a spend plan ? Last week . 01:19:03.350 --> 01:19:05.830 Do we have it today ? No . I know this 01:19:05.830 --> 01:19:07.779 is above your pay grade , but Mr . 01:19:07.910 --> 01:19:10.910 Secretary , I hope you will convey , as 01:19:10.910 --> 01:19:13.132 you've heard from many of us , from the 01:19:13.132 --> 01:19:15.354 first questions from the chairman to my 01:19:15.354 --> 01:19:17.577 last question now . You're submitting a 01:19:17.577 --> 01:19:20.569 budget that puts things across the line 01:19:20.850 --> 01:19:24.009 from base budget to reconciliation , 01:19:24.290 --> 01:19:27.839 munitions , shipbuilding , the 01:19:27.839 --> 01:19:30.629 LSM that is essential to your ability 01:19:31.310 --> 01:19:33.643 to fight and win in the Western Pacific . 01:19:34.149 --> 01:19:36.589 If the reconciliation piece of this 01:19:36.589 --> 01:19:38.589 doesn't go through , we're going to 01:19:38.589 --> 01:19:40.890 have even bigger problems this year 01:19:40.890 --> 01:19:43.229 than last . So let me just briefly ask 01:19:43.229 --> 01:19:45.029 about those two things . Um , 01:19:45.189 --> 01:19:47.470 Commandant , how important is it that 01:19:47.470 --> 01:19:51.410 you have the LSMs in the year ahead 01:19:51.709 --> 01:19:55.310 and how , what will you do if that does 01:19:55.310 --> 01:19:57.990 not come through in reconciliation ? 01:19:58.069 --> 01:20:00.180 How will that impact your warfighting 01:20:00.180 --> 01:20:02.069 capability ? Well , we'll be less 01:20:02.069 --> 01:20:03.791 mobile . We'll be less able to 01:20:03.791 --> 01:20:05.958 aggregate and disaggregate , and we'll 01:20:05.958 --> 01:20:08.125 be less able to contend with the PRC . 01:20:08.700 --> 01:20:12.620 and is the major . Adversary 01:20:12.890 --> 01:20:15.560 for whom you are currently planning and 01:20:15.560 --> 01:20:17.939 for which we are currently investing in 01:20:17.939 --> 01:20:20.890 the Western Pacific , the PRC . It is 01:20:20.890 --> 01:20:23.669 true . Admiral Caudle , 01:20:24.339 --> 01:20:27.339 um , we spoke before and you've spoken 01:20:27.339 --> 01:20:29.228 now about how the Ukrainians have 01:20:29.228 --> 01:20:31.939 demonstrated remarkable mastery . Of 01:20:31.939 --> 01:20:34.161 naval drones and in fact they've pushed 01:20:34.161 --> 01:20:37.020 back Russia's Black Sea fleet 01:20:37.020 --> 01:20:40.339 significantly . What happens to the 01:20:40.339 --> 01:20:42.899 navy if your significant munitions 01:20:42.899 --> 01:20:44.979 request , which is divided between 01:20:44.979 --> 01:20:47.439 reconciliation regulation , is denied 01:20:47.439 --> 01:20:49.661 and you don't get those munitions , and 01:20:49.661 --> 01:20:51.709 what does that do to shipbuilding , 01:20:51.899 --> 01:20:54.066 drones , and munitions for this coming 01:20:54.066 --> 01:20:56.009 year ? Sir , that's why it's so 01:20:56.009 --> 01:20:58.231 important , you know , the way I put it 01:20:58.231 --> 01:21:00.176 into a context , my base budget is 01:21:00.176 --> 01:21:02.649 about $270 billion about 1/10 of that , 01:21:02.790 --> 01:21:06.370 11th is , is in my mandatory . You know , 01:21:06.490 --> 01:21:08.434 so , you know , the way it kind of 01:21:08.434 --> 01:21:10.546 looks across the entire budget , it's 01:21:10.546 --> 01:21:12.768 like a third is over in mandatory , but 01:21:12.768 --> 01:21:14.879 for me , the Navy , 1/10 of my budget 01:21:14.879 --> 01:21:16.770 is there . The lion's share is in 01:21:16.770 --> 01:21:19.089 discretionary , so , but I I need both , 01:21:19.290 --> 01:21:21.649 to your point . I need both . And so to 01:21:21.649 --> 01:21:24.080 the specifics of the risk , as I stated 01:21:24.080 --> 01:21:26.439 earlier , it is an F-35 procurement . 01:21:26.729 --> 01:21:28.770 It is an LSM , no question , that's 01:21:28.770 --> 01:21:31.080 where all six live . And the risk of 01:21:31.080 --> 01:21:33.358 munitions and the risk in the fiS room , 01:21:33.529 --> 01:21:35.585 we need to sustain our bases and our 01:21:35.585 --> 01:21:37.418 infrastructure . So the reason I 01:21:37.418 --> 01:21:39.362 mentioned this in my opening , I'm 01:21:39.362 --> 01:21:41.473 mentioning it now , is that last year 01:21:41.473 --> 01:21:43.473 the lack of coordination . Produced 01:21:43.473 --> 01:21:45.473 billions of dollars in what we call 01:21:45.473 --> 01:21:47.529 broken glass , uh , problems that we 01:21:47.529 --> 01:21:50.149 had to fix because they were not fixed 01:21:50.149 --> 01:21:52.205 by the White House , and I recognize 01:21:52.205 --> 01:21:54.038 it's the White House , OMB , the 01:21:54.038 --> 01:21:55.982 Secretary's office that are making 01:21:55.982 --> 01:21:58.149 these decisions , but you've now heard 01:21:58.149 --> 01:22:00.038 from a whole series of senators , 01:22:00.038 --> 01:22:02.038 Republican and Democrat , um , that 01:22:02.038 --> 01:22:04.205 we've got clear priorities that we are 01:22:04.205 --> 01:22:05.982 at risk of not meeting . I also 01:22:05.982 --> 01:22:07.927 mentioned in my opening , I , I am 01:22:07.927 --> 01:22:09.982 really struggling , Mr . Secretary , 01:22:09.982 --> 01:22:12.205 with the Navy's headlong rush towards a 01:22:12.205 --> 01:22:14.371 Trump class battleship . We have never 01:22:14.371 --> 01:22:16.669 previously named a class of ships for a 01:22:16.669 --> 01:22:18.780 currently serving president . In your 01:22:18.780 --> 01:22:20.725 opening , you referenced the Great 01:22:20.725 --> 01:22:22.780 White Fleet of 100 years ago , which 01:22:22.780 --> 01:22:24.725 helped project naval power for the 01:22:24.725 --> 01:22:26.930 United States . But I don't see how a 01:22:26.930 --> 01:22:29.490 new class of battleship at a cost of 01:22:29.490 --> 01:22:33.450 $50 billion over 5 years meets 01:22:33.450 --> 01:22:35.649 our operational needs at a time when 01:22:35.649 --> 01:22:37.760 most of our exchanges have been about 01:22:37.760 --> 01:22:40.330 how the lessons learned of Ukraine and 01:22:40.330 --> 01:22:42.552 the likely lessons being learned by the 01:22:42.552 --> 01:22:45.850 PRC are about the urgency of moving 01:22:45.850 --> 01:22:48.200 towards distributed autonomous systems . 01:22:48.569 --> 01:22:50.791 What operational problem are you trying 01:22:50.791 --> 01:22:53.109 to solve that isn't met ? By carriers 01:22:53.109 --> 01:22:55.350 and destroyers , submarines , and 01:22:55.350 --> 01:22:57.669 autonomous systems being deployed at a 01:22:57.669 --> 01:22:59.502 greater scale , Mr . Secretary . 01:23:01.350 --> 01:23:03.910 Ranking Member Coons , I , I , I 01:23:03.910 --> 01:23:06.077 understand your , your concern , sir . 01:23:06.077 --> 01:23:09.209 As far as I can remember , uh , Just 01:23:09.209 --> 01:23:11.410 even looking at Popular Mechanics back 01:23:11.410 --> 01:23:13.930 in July of '88 , it said the Battle 01:23:13.930 --> 01:23:16.370 Cruiser 2000 , basically this large 01:23:16.370 --> 01:23:18.680 arsenal ship . When I was in Upna in 01:23:18.680 --> 01:23:21.209 '96 , the surface Warfare Division in 01:23:21.209 --> 01:23:24.169 2011 , we had a requirement for CGX , a 01:23:24.169 --> 01:23:26.225 large combatant . We've always had a 01:23:26.225 --> 01:23:28.336 requirement for large combatant . The 01:23:28.336 --> 01:23:30.225 problem right now is the DDGs are 01:23:30.225 --> 01:23:32.336 completely decked out . Uh , the only 01:23:32.336 --> 01:23:34.502 ship with the Slick 32 Victor 7 is the 01:23:34.663 --> 01:23:36.830 USS Pinckney . It , it looks like this 01:23:36.830 --> 01:23:38.774 chipmunk with a cheek full of nuts 01:23:38.774 --> 01:23:40.885 right now because it's , it's just so 01:23:40.885 --> 01:23:43.052 big . It's , you can't add more , more 01:23:43.052 --> 01:23:45.143 to that ship . So we're looking at a 01:23:45.143 --> 01:23:47.365 large combatant in order to put those , 01:23:47.365 --> 01:23:49.587 those systems in there to , to have 200 01:23:49.587 --> 01:23:51.699 VLS cells , to have conventional prom 01:23:51.699 --> 01:23:53.921 strike , as well as the speed necessary 01:23:53.921 --> 01:23:56.143 to get from point A to point B . That's 01:23:56.143 --> 01:23:58.199 why we're looking at the The nuclear 01:23:58.199 --> 01:24:00.310 power for that . I mean , look at the 01:24:00.310 --> 01:24:02.032 Ford . She was able to go from 01:24:02.032 --> 01:24:04.155 Venezuela to the to the Mediterranean 01:24:04.155 --> 01:24:06.755 in 5 days . That's what we need right 01:24:06.755 --> 01:24:08.922 now to be able to bring an arsenal out 01:24:08.922 --> 01:24:11.036 there quickly with a lot of firepower 01:24:11.036 --> 01:24:13.147 and launch missiles and return back , 01:24:13.235 --> 01:24:16.275 sir . If we look at just , I , I look 01:24:16.275 --> 01:24:18.355 in 1988 in Popular Mechanics , that 01:24:18.355 --> 01:24:20.577 might have been an interesting proposal 01:24:20.577 --> 01:24:22.522 if we just look back at the abrupt 01:24:22.522 --> 01:24:24.688 canceling of the frigates . If we look 01:24:24.688 --> 01:24:26.799 back at the LCS and what's happened , 01:24:26.799 --> 01:24:28.799 we have a profound mismatch between 01:24:28.799 --> 01:24:31.439 ship design , shipbuilding capability , 01:24:31.669 --> 01:24:34.149 and our capacity to deploy ships at 01:24:34.149 --> 01:24:36.870 scale . I am profoundly concerned that 01:24:36.870 --> 01:24:39.910 this is a $50 billion boondoggle where 01:24:39.910 --> 01:24:42.549 the delivery timeline is a political 01:24:42.549 --> 01:24:44.660 timeline , not a practical timeline , 01:24:44.790 --> 01:24:46.957 and where the clear lessons of Ukraine 01:24:47.029 --> 01:24:50.149 and the clear threats facing Taiwan are 01:24:50.149 --> 01:24:51.816 not being well served by that 01:24:51.816 --> 01:24:53.705 investment . You've been asked by 01:24:53.705 --> 01:24:55.816 Republicans and Democrats , should we 01:24:55.816 --> 01:24:57.871 sell to Taiwan the weapons that have 01:24:57.871 --> 01:25:00.649 already been promised ? I say yes , and 01:25:00.649 --> 01:25:02.705 you've been asked by senators , both 01:25:02.705 --> 01:25:04.538 Republican and Democrat , are we 01:25:04.538 --> 01:25:06.649 learning the lessons of Ukraine ? And 01:25:06.649 --> 01:25:08.371 to show that we do , we should 01:25:08.371 --> 01:25:10.689 prioritize drones over massive 01:25:10.689 --> 01:25:14.290 battleships . My view is that 01:25:14.290 --> 01:25:16.457 Ukraine today is on the front lines of 01:25:16.457 --> 01:25:18.623 freedom , and we need to act like it . 01:25:18.623 --> 01:25:20.734 I carry this in my pocket every day . 01:25:20.870 --> 01:25:22.814 It was handed to me a month ago in 01:25:22.814 --> 01:25:25.779 Odessa by a Navy chaplain from Ukraine . 01:25:26.229 --> 01:25:28.285 We've got more lessons to learn from 01:25:28.285 --> 01:25:30.340 them than we have learned , and this 01:25:30.340 --> 01:25:32.451 budget doesn't , in my view , reflect 01:25:32.451 --> 01:25:36.370 that . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . All 01:25:36.370 --> 01:25:38.410 right , we'll insert your opening 01:25:38.410 --> 01:25:41.330 statements in the record . Um , this 01:25:41.330 --> 01:25:44.689 will complete our hearing today and I 01:25:44.689 --> 01:25:47.569 want to thank you for coming up . We'll 01:25:47.569 --> 01:25:49.569 have a week to submit additional 01:25:49.569 --> 01:25:53.049 questions for the record . Senators may 01:25:53.049 --> 01:25:55.229 do that and we'd like to have them 01:25:56.089 --> 01:25:58.609 responded to , uh , promptly . 01:26:01.060 --> 01:26:02.979 The subcommittee meetings adjourned .