WEBVTT 00:00.360 --> 00:02.829 Perfect . Good afternoon everyone and 00:02.829 --> 00:05.051 welcome to Fort Bragg , the home of the 00:05.051 --> 00:06.940 18th Airborne Corps and America's 00:06.940 --> 00:08.773 contingency Response Force . I'm 00:08.773 --> 00:10.718 Brandon Pugh , the principal cyber 00:10.718 --> 00:12.885 advisor to the Secretary of the Army . 00:12.885 --> 00:15.051 It's my privilege to serve as the MC , 00:15.051 --> 00:16.996 uh , for today's inaugural Defense 00:16.996 --> 00:19.162 Critical Infrastructure Summit and for 00:19.162 --> 00:21.273 this , uh , media announcement . Uh , 00:21.273 --> 00:21.139 joining me , you'll see a number of 00:21.139 --> 00:23.361 federal interagency leaders , state and 00:23.361 --> 00:25.195 local officials , private sector 00:25.195 --> 00:26.972 utility executives , and senior 00:26.972 --> 00:29.306 military commanders from today's summit , 00:29.306 --> 00:31.739 all gathered here for one reason , the 00:31.739 --> 00:33.239 resilience of the critical 00:33.239 --> 00:35.406 infrastructure that underpin underpins 00:35.406 --> 00:37.295 our army's ability to project and 00:37.295 --> 00:40.209 sustain combat power , a whole nation 00:40.209 --> 00:42.265 response . Today , you're gonna hear 00:42.265 --> 00:44.376 from some of the leaders joining me . 00:44.376 --> 00:46.542 To starters , it's now my pleasure and 00:46.542 --> 00:48.542 honor to introduce a leader who has 00:48.542 --> 00:50.709 made defense critical infrastructure a 00:50.709 --> 00:52.876 strategic priority . Please welcome me 00:52.876 --> 00:52.770 and joining the twenty-sixth Secretary 00:52.770 --> 00:54.548 of the Army , the Honorable Dan 00:54.548 --> 00:57.240 Driscoll , Sir . Thank you . 01:00.720 --> 01:02.720 Um , very sincerely , thank you for 01:02.720 --> 01:04.998 being here today with us at Fort Bragg , 01:04.998 --> 01:07.109 the center of the universe and one of 01:07.109 --> 01:09.760 the United States Army's most powerful 01:09.760 --> 01:12.239 power projection units that we have in 01:12.239 --> 01:14.510 bases anywhere in the world . So the 01:14.510 --> 01:16.732 army has done two of these before where 01:16.732 --> 01:18.899 we brought in on kind of a large scale 01:18.899 --> 01:21.230 public-private partners to go after AI 01:21.230 --> 01:23.452 and what it could look like to do large 01:23.452 --> 01:25.452 scale investment on our bases , and 01:25.452 --> 01:27.619 those meetings led to some of the most 01:27.619 --> 01:29.841 powerful projects that we're working on 01:29.841 --> 01:31.897 as an army now . It led to GAA 401 , 01:31.897 --> 01:33.786 which is the country's preeminent 01:33.786 --> 01:35.841 counter drone task force . It led to 01:35.841 --> 01:37.786 200 proposals that we're currently 01:37.786 --> 01:40.008 reviewing with Treasury and OMB for all 01:40.008 --> 01:42.063 sorts of projects that can happen on 01:42.063 --> 01:44.230 bases around the world . And it led to 01:44.230 --> 01:46.286 our data centers that we've recently 01:46.286 --> 01:48.410 announced and our digital twinning of 01:48.410 --> 01:50.577 much of the processes of the army . So 01:50.577 --> 01:53.389 what was today ? Today was a DCI 01:53.389 --> 01:55.500 Defensive Critical Infrastructure war 01:55.500 --> 01:57.722 game . And it was the first of its kind 01:57.722 --> 01:59.833 that we've done at this scale with 14 01:59.833 --> 02:02.040 external partners from across the 02:02.040 --> 02:04.096 federal , state , local government , 02:04.096 --> 02:06.207 and private institutions that have so 02:06.207 --> 02:08.151 much impact on our bases . We went 02:08.151 --> 02:11.119 after 4 operational challenges using a 02:11.119 --> 02:13.240 threat similar to Operation Spider's 02:13.240 --> 02:15.240 Web , which occurred in Russia when 02:15.240 --> 02:17.407 Ukraine deep into the country was able 02:17.407 --> 02:20.380 to use drones to deeply impact Russia's 02:20.380 --> 02:22.324 operational abilities . So we went 02:22.324 --> 02:24.602 after the physical threats from drones , 02:24.602 --> 02:26.910 cyber impacts , force projection 02:26.910 --> 02:29.077 dependencies , and information sharing 02:29.077 --> 02:31.188 lag , and we work with these partners 02:31.188 --> 02:33.243 to start conversations that we think 02:33.243 --> 02:35.466 will have a deep impact on our nation's 02:35.466 --> 02:37.577 security . And all of this is because 02:37.577 --> 02:39.577 of President Trump and Secretary of 02:39.577 --> 02:41.800 War's headsetth air cover and mandate 02:41.800 --> 02:43.856 for us , the United States Army , to 02:43.856 --> 02:46.000 innovate and change as quickly as 02:46.000 --> 02:48.479 humanly possible to continue to protect 02:48.479 --> 02:50.701 our soldiers , their families , and the 02:50.701 --> 02:52.757 civilians and communities where they 02:52.757 --> 02:54.979 operate . With that , I'll hand it back 02:54.979 --> 02:56.701 to Brandon . Thank you , sir . 02:56.701 --> 02:58.757 Appreciate it . Uh , I'll add just a 02:58.757 --> 03:00.923 few additional , uh , thoughts on what 03:00.923 --> 03:00.250 the secretary said before I turn it 03:00.250 --> 03:02.600 over to other leaders here . Um , so in 03:02.600 --> 03:04.656 addition to my role overseeing cyber 03:04.656 --> 03:06.822 for the army , I have the privilege of 03:06.822 --> 03:08.822 serving as the secretariat lead for 03:08.822 --> 03:10.878 defense of critical infrastructure , 03:10.878 --> 03:12.989 both physical and cyber , but I wanna 03:12.989 --> 03:14.989 to ground you on a few , uh , other 03:14.989 --> 03:17.156 items . The Army has approximately 288 03:17.156 --> 03:19.322 camps , posts , and stations , and the 03:19.322 --> 03:21.433 overwhelming majority of them rely on 03:21.433 --> 03:23.433 privately owned utilities , power , 03:23.639 --> 03:26.250 water , natural gas , and so on . Uh , 03:26.289 --> 03:28.400 and we recognize that our interagency 03:28.400 --> 03:30.511 partners are also critical , and that 03:30.511 --> 03:32.678 DCI requires a collaborative and joint 03:32.678 --> 03:34.900 approach . Disruption of these services 03:34.900 --> 03:37.067 can interfere with our ability to move 03:37.067 --> 03:39.345 forces and equipment in a time of need . 03:39.345 --> 03:41.529 This is a no-fail mission and is a 03:41.529 --> 03:43.690 national security imperative . The 03:43.690 --> 03:46.309 threat to DCI is real , persistent , 03:46.729 --> 03:48.951 and growing . That is why a summit like 03:48.951 --> 03:50.840 this matters , uh , following the 03:50.840 --> 03:53.062 secretary's leadership and why the army 03:53.062 --> 03:55.285 is committed to three things . First is 03:55.285 --> 03:57.173 elevating the priority . Critical 03:57.173 --> 03:58.896 infrastructure resilience is a 03:58.896 --> 04:00.785 strategic imperative , not a back 04:00.785 --> 04:03.070 office function . Second is breaking 04:03.070 --> 04:04.959 down barriers . We know there are 04:04.959 --> 04:07.429 regulatory , contractual , and policy 04:07.429 --> 04:09.651 friction points . The army will use its 04:09.651 --> 04:11.985 convening authority , procurement power , 04:11.990 --> 04:14.850 and partnerships to remove them . Third 04:14.850 --> 04:17.309 is building lasting partnerships . We 04:17.309 --> 04:19.829 cannot survive in a vacuum . True 04:19.829 --> 04:21.551 resilience requires integrated 04:21.551 --> 04:24.339 partnerships , interagency , industry , 04:24.670 --> 04:26.950 state , and local partners , soldiers 04:26.950 --> 04:29.410 and civilians all have a role to play . 04:30.029 --> 04:32.307 Today is the start of the conversation , 04:32.307 --> 04:34.440 not the end . The themes and content 04:34.440 --> 04:36.570 drawn out will inform a DCI playbook 04:36.720 --> 04:39.559 that guides ongoing collaboration along 04:39.559 --> 04:41.959 with lasting partnerships . With that , 04:42.230 --> 04:44.452 I'm pleased to turn it over to our next 04:44.452 --> 04:46.619 speaker , Chairman Brendan Carr of the 04:46.619 --> 04:47.880 FCC . Sir , thanks . 04:52.559 --> 04:54.726 Oh , thank you to President Trump , to 04:54.726 --> 04:56.837 Secretary Hag Seth , and to Secretary 04:56.837 --> 04:58.910 Driscoll in particular for your very 04:58.910 --> 05:00.799 strong leadership . The work that 05:00.799 --> 05:02.910 Secretary Driscoll is doing is really 05:02.910 --> 05:04.920 changing the game for America's 05:04.920 --> 05:07.142 warfighters . I had the chance to spend 05:07.142 --> 05:09.309 time with him . Visiting with soldiers 05:09.309 --> 05:11.476 and troops across the base and you can 05:11.476 --> 05:13.642 see how inspiring he is to the men and 05:13.642 --> 05:15.753 women who work there and he's cutting 05:15.753 --> 05:17.976 through red tape and empowering them to 05:17.976 --> 05:17.910 do their job . Today's summit was 05:18.089 --> 05:20.145 critically important . It used to be 05:20.145 --> 05:21.867 that power was the predominant 05:21.867 --> 05:23.811 infrastructure that we had to care 05:23.811 --> 05:25.700 about . Now there's so many other 05:25.700 --> 05:27.922 sectors of the infrastructure area that 05:27.922 --> 05:30.089 we need to make sure either don't fail 05:30.089 --> 05:32.145 or if there is a challenge to them , 05:32.145 --> 05:34.311 it's back online quickly . For my part 05:34.311 --> 05:36.311 at the FCC , we are working to make 05:36.311 --> 05:38.422 sure that we have ubiquitous . Robust 05:38.422 --> 05:40.645 resilient communications infrastructure 05:40.645 --> 05:42.867 all across the country and particularly 05:42.867 --> 05:45.339 at critical defense areas like this 05:45.339 --> 05:47.561 base right here . We're working hard to 05:47.561 --> 05:49.728 implement President Trump's vision for 05:49.728 --> 05:51.950 American drone dominance . We have kept 05:51.950 --> 05:54.061 out of the US market foreign produced 05:54.061 --> 05:56.117 drones that may pose an unacceptable 05:56.260 --> 05:58.482 national security threat . We're moving 05:58.482 --> 06:00.459 faster at the FCC and across the 06:00.459 --> 06:03.540 regulatory agencies to approve new US 06:03.540 --> 06:06.250 domestic drones . And we're making sure 06:06.250 --> 06:07.917 that we have robust resilient 06:07.917 --> 06:09.639 communication infrastructure , 06:09.639 --> 06:12.489 including directly from space . One of 06:12.489 --> 06:14.656 the things that we've done , including 06:14.656 --> 06:16.656 just this week , is allowing , uh , 06:16.850 --> 06:19.017 satellite providers including StarLink 06:19.017 --> 06:21.489 and soon Amazon to do a new technology 06:21.489 --> 06:23.656 called Direct to Cell where you can go 06:23.656 --> 06:25.878 straight from a satellite right to your 06:25.878 --> 06:27.767 smartphone so you have ubiquitous 06:27.767 --> 06:29.989 robust connectivity no matter where you 06:29.989 --> 06:32.100 are . So even if you lose terrestrial 06:32.100 --> 06:34.267 infrastructure , there'll still be the 06:34.267 --> 06:36.267 capacity for connectivity . Today's 06:36.267 --> 06:38.322 summit was immensely helpful for the 06:38.322 --> 06:40.267 work that we're doing at the FCC , 06:40.267 --> 06:42.267 bringing together state officials , 06:42.267 --> 06:44.211 federal officials , officials from 06:44.211 --> 06:46.267 every single critical infrastructure 06:46.267 --> 06:47.767 from water to power to the 06:47.767 --> 06:49.878 communication side , making sure that 06:49.878 --> 06:51.878 if we ever have an issue that we're 06:51.878 --> 06:53.878 both prepared with a game plan , we 06:53.878 --> 06:55.989 have the relationships built , we can 06:55.989 --> 06:58.100 quickly respond . So again , I'm very 06:58.100 --> 06:59.933 grateful for the leadership that 06:59.933 --> 07:02.045 Secretary Driscoll is doing . This is 07:02.045 --> 07:04.267 an important place . This is where this 07:04.267 --> 07:06.211 country projects our strength in a 07:06.211 --> 07:08.378 matter of hours or sometimes less . We 07:08.378 --> 07:10.545 need to get people loaded up and going 07:10.545 --> 07:12.767 anywhere in the world and so we have to 07:12.767 --> 07:14.989 make sure that connectivity continues , 07:14.989 --> 07:14.579 the critical infrastructure that feeds 07:14.579 --> 07:16.859 into this facility continues and so 07:16.859 --> 07:19.100 exercises like this are very helpful to 07:19.100 --> 07:21.322 doing that . So just thank you again to 07:21.322 --> 07:23.433 Secretary Driscoll for his leadership 07:23.433 --> 07:23.380 in bringing this group of people 07:23.380 --> 07:27.000 together today . Thanks . Thank you , 07:27.040 --> 07:29.207 uh , Chairman Carr , uh , turning over 07:29.207 --> 07:31.373 to one of our industry partners , Mr . 07:31.373 --> 07:33.596 Garti Tago from Duke Energy Carolinas . 07:39.320 --> 07:42.010 Thank you Secretary Driscoll for having 07:42.010 --> 07:44.177 this event . This was a very important 07:44.177 --> 07:46.343 event , uh , not only for the base but 07:46.343 --> 07:49.010 for us as well , because at Duke Energy 07:49.010 --> 07:51.929 we understand that energy resilience is 07:51.929 --> 07:54.500 essential to mission readiness . We are 07:54.500 --> 07:56.660 proud to partner with the US Army to 07:56.660 --> 07:59.079 help ensure Fort Bragg has the reliable , 07:59.480 --> 08:02.260 resilient power it needs to support 08:02.260 --> 08:04.480 national defense , and we're grateful 08:04.480 --> 08:06.489 for the Army's strong partnership 08:06.980 --> 08:09.202 because preparing for and responding to 08:09.202 --> 08:11.700 high stake events like this , uh , and , 08:11.720 --> 08:14.059 and the issues we discussed today takes 08:14.059 --> 08:16.739 trust , coordination , and a shared 08:16.739 --> 08:18.820 commitment to getting it right , and 08:18.820 --> 08:20.876 we're very honored to have been made 08:20.876 --> 08:22.931 part of this . Thank you very much . 08:26.730 --> 08:28.841 Thank you , sir . And uh next will be 08:28.841 --> 08:30.508 Alex Fitzsimmons , the acting 08:30.508 --> 08:32.341 Undersecretary of Energy for the 08:32.341 --> 08:34.286 Department of Energy . Thank you . 08:36.530 --> 08:38.641 All right , thank you all . Thank you 08:38.641 --> 08:40.641 to Secretary Driscoll for having me 08:40.641 --> 08:44.049 here today . On day one of President 08:44.049 --> 08:46.090 Trump's second term , he declared a 08:46.090 --> 08:48.750 national energy emergency because 08:49.270 --> 08:51.929 energy security is national security , 08:51.940 --> 08:54.179 and we have no more important mission 08:54.179 --> 08:56.890 than to ensure the security and 08:56.890 --> 08:59.849 resilience of the US energy sector 08:59.849 --> 09:03.210 against all threats . And so , That's 09:03.210 --> 09:05.210 why events like this are absolutely 09:05.210 --> 09:08.090 critical . Our partnership with DOW and , 09:08.330 --> 09:11.830 uh , between DOW and DOE we've launched 09:12.039 --> 09:14.261 a new partnership called , uh , Project 09:14.261 --> 09:16.739 Armor to rapidly assess and harden 09:16.969 --> 09:19.330 critical energy infrastructure that's , 09:19.340 --> 09:21.809 uh , essential to economic security and 09:21.809 --> 09:25.429 national security . I'd say . We're in 09:25.429 --> 09:29.280 a race to reindustrialize America , to 09:29.280 --> 09:31.349 win the AI race and to lower energy 09:31.349 --> 09:33.869 costs for the American people . That 09:33.869 --> 09:35.789 requires us to build the most 09:35.789 --> 09:38.270 affordable , reliable , and secure 09:38.270 --> 09:40.492 energy system for the American people , 09:40.510 --> 09:42.177 and we will do that under the 09:42.177 --> 09:43.954 leadership of President Trump , 09:43.954 --> 09:46.121 Secretary Wright , Secretary Hegseth , 09:46.121 --> 09:48.121 and , uh , through events like this 09:48.121 --> 09:50.121 with our strong partnerships , uh , 09:50.121 --> 09:52.232 with our , with our colleagues in the 09:52.232 --> 09:54.454 interagency and the private sector . So 09:54.454 --> 09:53.489 thank you for having me here today . 09:57.719 --> 09:59.941 Thank you , Alex . And our last speaker 09:59.941 --> 10:02.108 before we take uh a few questions , is 10:02.108 --> 10:04.275 uh Nick Anderson , the acting director 10:04.275 --> 10:03.580 of SISA , Nick . 10:08.260 --> 10:10.371 Thank you , uh , Secretary Discrell , 10:10.371 --> 10:12.593 and , uh , thank you to , uh , the Army 10:12.593 --> 10:14.816 and our partners here at Fort Bragg and 10:14.816 --> 10:14.729 everyone who participated in , uh , 10:14.739 --> 10:16.739 this year's , uh , Defense Critical 10:16.739 --> 10:18.572 Infrastructure summit . I'm Nick 10:18.572 --> 10:20.461 Anderson , and I serve the acting 10:20.461 --> 10:22.406 director of the Cyber Security and 10:22.406 --> 10:24.683 Infrastructure Security Agency at , uh , 10:24.683 --> 10:24.219 the Department of Homeland Security . 10:24.580 --> 10:26.580 It is your nation's civilian cyber 10:26.580 --> 10:28.358 defense agency and the national 10:28.358 --> 10:30.691 coordinator for critical infrastructure , 10:30.691 --> 10:32.802 security and resilience . What we saw 10:32.802 --> 10:35.024 today was really resilience in action . 10:35.024 --> 10:36.802 This is leaders from across our 10:36.802 --> 10:39.024 nation's military , from our government 10:39.024 --> 10:41.247 at all levels , from our private sector 10:41.247 --> 10:43.136 partners coming together to solve 10:43.136 --> 10:45.191 common challenges before they become 10:45.191 --> 10:47.191 crises . Uh , that collaboration is 10:47.191 --> 10:46.830 really what strengthens our national 10:46.830 --> 10:49.109 preparedness . That's why this summit 10:49.109 --> 10:50.665 matters . It's building the 10:50.665 --> 10:52.831 relationships and the coordination and 10:52.831 --> 10:54.831 these priority areas that matter to 10:54.831 --> 10:56.942 identify the gaps and build the trust 10:56.942 --> 10:58.998 that is necessary to respond when it 10:58.998 --> 11:00.776 matters most . This comes at an 11:00.776 --> 11:02.776 important moment for CISA . Earlier 11:02.776 --> 11:04.831 this month , we launched a series of 11:04.831 --> 11:06.887 new initiatives , one of which is CI 11:06.887 --> 11:08.942 Fortify , or Critical Infrastructure 11:08.942 --> 11:11.220 Fortify Initiative . It's an important , 11:11.220 --> 11:13.331 uh , nationwide effort to bolster the 11:13.331 --> 11:13.289 resilience of the isolation and 11:13.289 --> 11:15.489 recovery capabilities of our nation's 11:15.489 --> 11:17.545 critical infrastructure providers to 11:17.545 --> 11:19.433 make sure that we can continue to 11:19.433 --> 11:21.433 provide essential services that are 11:21.433 --> 11:23.711 essential during times of cyber duress , 11:23.711 --> 11:25.656 minimizing impact and accelerating 11:25.656 --> 11:27.933 recovery from significant cyberattacks . 11:27.933 --> 11:29.989 At its core , this reflects a simple 11:29.989 --> 11:31.822 reality that resilience can't be 11:31.822 --> 11:34.045 achieved by any one organization acting 11:34.045 --> 11:35.822 alone . It requires a sustained 11:35.822 --> 11:37.989 partnership from across government and 11:37.989 --> 11:39.989 industry working together . In that 11:39.989 --> 11:41.656 same spirit , uh , we've also 11:41.656 --> 11:41.640 established a homeland defense working 11:41.640 --> 11:43.640 group to be able to unify our US 11:43.640 --> 11:45.320 government efforts to ensure 11:45.320 --> 11:47.320 prioritized critical infrastructure 11:47.320 --> 11:49.487 entities can continue to deliver those 11:49.487 --> 11:51.653 essential services during that time of 11:51.653 --> 11:53.598 crisis and during these periods of 11:53.598 --> 11:53.359 heightened cyber risk that we find 11:53.359 --> 11:55.581 ourselves operating within , uh , every 11:55.581 --> 11:57.470 day . Through this effort , we're 11:57.470 --> 11:59.303 aligning the federal outreach to 11:59.303 --> 12:01.526 critical infrastructure owner operators 12:01.526 --> 12:03.748 to reduce the duplication and to ensure 12:03.748 --> 12:03.440 we , uh , have that unity of effort 12:03.659 --> 12:05.826 that helps to remove barriers to entry 12:05.826 --> 12:07.659 and ease burden when it comes to 12:07.659 --> 12:09.881 collaboration between federal , state , 12:09.881 --> 12:12.048 local , tribal , territorial , and our 12:12.048 --> 12:14.103 private sector partners . As part of 12:14.103 --> 12:15.992 these efforts , we'll be offering 12:15.992 --> 12:17.881 targeted assessments for critical 12:17.881 --> 12:17.520 infrastructure entities to identify 12:17.520 --> 12:19.687 these barriers to isolation , recovery 12:19.687 --> 12:21.798 and to support them in developing and 12:21.798 --> 12:24.020 exercising these capabilities and fully 12:24.020 --> 12:26.076 recognizing that our state and local 12:26.076 --> 12:28.076 partners are really the ones on the 12:28.076 --> 12:27.719 front lines here protecting these 12:27.719 --> 12:29.719 essential services . We continue to 12:29.719 --> 12:31.886 invest heavily in supporting the cyber 12:31.886 --> 12:34.108 and physical resilience through a suite 12:34.108 --> 12:36.429 of services designed to strengthen our 12:36.429 --> 12:38.429 defenses and enhance our ability to 12:38.429 --> 12:40.540 prepare and recover from disruption . 12:40.540 --> 12:42.540 As well as providing regional teams 12:42.540 --> 12:44.596 with aligned expertise to be able to 12:44.596 --> 12:44.229 build relationships in local 12:44.229 --> 12:46.340 communities where they matter most to 12:46.340 --> 12:48.190 provide that hands-on localized 12:48.190 --> 12:49.801 experience and vulnerability 12:49.801 --> 12:51.634 assessments to incident response 12:51.634 --> 12:53.857 coordination . The takeaway for me from 12:53.857 --> 12:55.968 the summit is clear . Resilience is a 12:55.968 --> 12:57.857 shared mission , and at CISA , we 12:57.857 --> 12:59.857 remain committed to working side by 12:59.857 --> 13:01.968 side with partners across every level 13:01.968 --> 13:01.890 of government and the private sector to 13:01.890 --> 13:04.057 strengthen the security and resilience 13:04.057 --> 13:06.390 of our nation's critical infrastructure . 13:06.390 --> 13:08.334 Uh , I'd like to thank you again , 13:08.334 --> 13:07.650 Secretary Driscoll , for your 13:07.650 --> 13:09.761 leadership in this matter , and thank 13:09.761 --> 13:11.594 you to all of our partners for a 13:11.594 --> 13:13.039 successful summit today . 13:17.000 --> 13:19.333 Well , thank you , Nick , uh , for your , 13:19.333 --> 13:21.611 for attending and for your partnership . 13:21.611 --> 13:20.719 I think we'll have time for about a 13:20.719 --> 13:23.799 couple of questions . Um , and , uh , 13:23.840 --> 13:26.062 I'll , I'll , we have one submitted and 13:26.062 --> 13:28.229 then we , we should have one , time to 13:28.229 --> 13:30.284 take one , from , from those present 13:30.284 --> 13:32.507 here . First is from Jay Price with NPR 13:32.507 --> 13:34.396 radio . Uh , it looks like he has 13:34.396 --> 13:36.562 two-part question . I'll read them out 13:36.562 --> 13:36.400 loud . Uh , when you look at the 13:36.400 --> 13:38.344 various areas in which you want to 13:38.344 --> 13:40.511 improve installation security , how do 13:40.511 --> 13:42.456 you list those in terms of current 13:42.456 --> 13:44.678 priority ? In short , what are you most 13:44.678 --> 13:46.844 concerned about ? The second part is , 13:46.844 --> 13:49.011 how can you explain a little bit about 13:49.011 --> 13:51.122 why you put them in that order . Um , 13:51.122 --> 13:53.178 so , uh , you know , answering these 13:53.178 --> 13:55.344 questions , uh , defer to anybody else 13:55.344 --> 13:55.030 that would like to weigh in . Uh , this 13:55.030 --> 13:57.030 one is probably slightly insulation 13:57.030 --> 13:59.252 heavy , but , uh , Jordan , if you want 13:59.252 --> 14:01.419 to chime in , you can . If not , maybe 14:01.419 --> 14:03.586 I'll give some framing thoughts , uh , 14:03.586 --> 14:02.909 to go forward . So it is hard . 14:02.989 --> 14:05.211 Everybody always asks like , what keeps 14:05.211 --> 14:05.099 you up at night ? Do you have one 14:05.099 --> 14:06.988 central priority ? I would say in 14:06.988 --> 14:09.229 reality , it's several buckets , um , 3 14:09.229 --> 14:11.396 of which came out through the scenario 14:11.396 --> 14:13.729 today . You have cybersecurity concerns . 14:13.729 --> 14:16.062 How are they going ? Uh , uh , you know , 14:16.062 --> 14:17.840 attacking potential interagency 14:17.840 --> 14:20.007 partners , the utility partners , uh , 14:20.007 --> 14:22.173 and the installation itself . Then you 14:22.173 --> 14:21.825 have physical concerns , many of which 14:21.825 --> 14:24.047 we concerned for a long , a long time , 14:24.047 --> 14:26.214 whether that be , you know , terrorist 14:26.214 --> 14:28.269 actors , uh , or otherwise . And the 14:28.269 --> 14:30.492 third would be the growing UAS or drone 14:30.492 --> 14:32.603 threat . I would say we can't neglect 14:32.603 --> 14:34.603 one or ignore one at the expense of 14:34.603 --> 14:36.769 others . We have to be focusing on all 14:36.769 --> 14:39.047 three at the same time . A reoccurring . 14:39.047 --> 14:41.103 theme you heard though was that just 14:41.103 --> 14:40.601 the priority of critical infrastructure 14:40.601 --> 14:42.545 by our leadership . Uh , many have 14:42.545 --> 14:44.601 picked up on President Trump and his 14:44.601 --> 14:46.657 cybersecurity strategy for America . 14:46.657 --> 14:48.545 Not only did he call out critical 14:48.545 --> 14:50.601 infrastructure , specifically called 14:50.601 --> 14:52.712 out defense critical infrastructure , 14:52.712 --> 14:55.045 raising unique concerns that bases face , 14:55.045 --> 14:57.157 uh , on a daily basis and the no fail 14:57.157 --> 14:59.323 mission associated with them . So I'll 14:59.323 --> 15:01.323 pause there and see if anybody else 15:01.323 --> 15:03.434 wishes to , to add to that , please . 15:03.770 --> 15:05.881 Oh , what a nice surprise . Thank you 15:05.881 --> 15:08.048 for the opportunity . Um , so a couple 15:08.048 --> 15:09.937 of quick points , uh , we've said 15:09.937 --> 15:12.103 before , but it bears repeating , uh , 15:12.103 --> 15:14.103 installations are not just where we 15:14.103 --> 15:16.103 live and work increasingly they are 15:16.103 --> 15:18.159 where we fight from and as always , 15:18.440 --> 15:20.384 especially installations like Fort 15:20.384 --> 15:22.551 Bragg are critically important because 15:22.551 --> 15:25.270 this is where we deploy to fight . And 15:25.270 --> 15:28.030 win our nation's wars . Uh , the way we 15:28.030 --> 15:30.141 look at vulnerabilities , it's really 15:30.469 --> 15:32.580 against the critical missions that we 15:32.580 --> 15:34.747 have . And so the answer would be , it 15:34.747 --> 15:36.302 depends . It depends on the 15:36.302 --> 15:38.309 installation and it depends on the 15:38.309 --> 15:40.770 critical mission . And so finally . 15:41.460 --> 15:43.820 Left to our own devices , Army would 15:43.820 --> 15:46.299 toil relentlessly in our own little 15:46.299 --> 15:49.289 silos to get after those , uh , and , 15:49.460 --> 15:51.700 and we'll be successful , but the 15:51.700 --> 15:53.929 commitment here today and the 15:53.929 --> 15:56.780 engagement with state and local , uh , 15:56.859 --> 15:59.969 municipalities and partners , local 15:59.969 --> 16:02.191 providers , and then more importantly . 16:02.275 --> 16:04.544 The whole of government and all of our 16:04.544 --> 16:06.895 other agency and federal partners 16:06.895 --> 16:09.604 really is a force multiplier to help 16:09.604 --> 16:11.804 the army get after those 16:11.804 --> 16:14.575 vulnerabilities , get after those gaps , 16:14.784 --> 16:16.895 and it's going to deliver quicker and 16:16.895 --> 16:19.184 better results against all the 16:19.184 --> 16:21.364 vulnerabilities at each installation , 16:21.385 --> 16:24.169 against all the critical missions . Uh , 16:24.250 --> 16:26.028 and that , and that was my , my 16:26.028 --> 16:28.194 apologies for not introducing Jordan . 16:28.194 --> 16:30.417 Jordan Gillis , the assistant secretary 16:30.417 --> 16:32.639 for IENE insulations , Energy , and the 16:32.639 --> 16:34.861 Environment . I have that right ? Yes , 16:34.861 --> 16:37.083 uh , my apologies . Um , OK , uh , over 16:37.083 --> 16:39.306 to our , our , another question is from 16:39.306 --> 16:41.583 Penelope Lopez , uh , from ABC 11 . Uh , 16:41.583 --> 16:43.472 essentially the question is , and 16:43.472 --> 16:43.090 correct me if you have additional 16:43.090 --> 16:45.368 points on this , what is the way ahead ? 16:45.368 --> 16:47.368 Um , so I'll also . Welcome anybody 16:47.368 --> 16:49.701 else , uh , that would like to weigh in , 16:49.701 --> 16:49.679 uh , maybe a couple of framing remarks 16:49.679 --> 16:51.790 for me to kick us off . Uh , it's two 16:51.790 --> 16:54.280 things , you heard that this defense 16:54.280 --> 16:56.502 critical infrastructure is not , cannot 16:56.502 --> 16:58.613 exist in silos . So the relationships 16:58.613 --> 17:00.669 that were built today should help in 17:00.669 --> 17:02.836 two ways assisting 18th Airborne Corps 17:02.836 --> 17:04.613 as some , uh , ways forward and 17:04.613 --> 17:06.613 continuing those partnerships , but 17:06.613 --> 17:08.613 also leaning on the interagency and 17:08.613 --> 17:10.669 industry partners to help . The Army 17:10.669 --> 17:10.550 and arguably Department of War as a 17:10.550 --> 17:12.979 whole as we we scale this across the 17:12.979 --> 17:15.109 288 camps , posts and stations in the 17:15.109 --> 17:17.165 Army , uh , ideally we will create a 17:17.165 --> 17:19.229 playbook taking best practices that 17:19.229 --> 17:20.951 we've learned here so garrison 17:20.951 --> 17:23.189 commanders across our army footprint 17:23.189 --> 17:25.245 can learn from that , uh , and , and 17:25.245 --> 17:27.356 realize the critical needs of getting 17:27.356 --> 17:29.578 after DCI . So I'll pause there and see 17:29.578 --> 17:31.522 if others have any additional ways 17:31.522 --> 17:33.689 forward . Sorry , um , so I think what 17:33.689 --> 17:35.800 we want to do here is we look back in 17:35.800 --> 17:37.640 time 8 or 10 months and . Under 17:37.640 --> 17:39.529 President Trump's leadership with 17:39.529 --> 17:41.584 Secretary of Warhead said one of the 17:41.584 --> 17:43.584 things we've known was happening is 17:43.584 --> 17:45.751 this drone threat . And so what we did 17:45.751 --> 17:47.807 10 months ago is we stood up a joint 17:47.807 --> 17:49.807 interagency task force , which just 17:49.807 --> 17:51.862 sounds like bureaucratic speak , but 17:51.862 --> 17:53.973 what that fundamentally means is your 17:53.973 --> 17:56.196 federal government went out and said we 17:56.196 --> 17:58.251 have got to as a whole go after this 17:58.251 --> 18:00.529 problem , and I'm gonna call Matt , uh , 18:00.529 --> 18:00.390 General Ross up in a moment who's 18:00.390 --> 18:02.501 leading that for us , but 10 months . 18:02.501 --> 18:04.723 Ago , we started looking at the problem 18:04.723 --> 18:06.779 and actively trying to solve it with 18:06.779 --> 18:08.946 state , local , and federal partners . 18:08.946 --> 18:11.057 We've since expanded to allies around 18:11.057 --> 18:13.001 the country or around the world to 18:13.001 --> 18:14.834 basically say , what is the most 18:14.834 --> 18:17.057 effective and efficient way that we can 18:17.057 --> 18:16.489 go after the drone threat ? And why 18:16.489 --> 18:19.130 this matters is when the conflict in 18:19.130 --> 18:21.186 the Middle East kicked off , we were 18:21.186 --> 18:23.849 able on day 5 to go and start the 18:23.849 --> 18:26.689 process to get 23,000 intercepted . 18:27.140 --> 18:29.060 flowing into theater . We had 18:29.060 --> 18:31.171 contracted for them by day 10 , which 18:31.171 --> 18:33.979 is 5 days , and by day 20 , thousands 18:33.979 --> 18:36.146 of these systems were starting to flow 18:36.146 --> 18:38.312 into theater to protect our soldiers . 18:38.312 --> 18:40.479 And what we are doing is we are taking 18:40.479 --> 18:42.479 those lessons learned from theaters 18:42.479 --> 18:44.701 around the world and through Dry out of 18:44.701 --> 18:46.868 401 , we're bringing them back home to 18:46.868 --> 18:48.923 protect our border and our ports and 18:48.923 --> 18:50.868 our stadiums and our arena and our 18:50.868 --> 18:50.500 bases and our communities . Matt , you 18:50.500 --> 18:52.611 want to talk a little more about it ? 18:53.810 --> 18:55.866 Thanks , Secretary . Uh , my name is 18:55.866 --> 18:57.977 Brigadier General Matt Ross . I'm the 18:57.977 --> 18:59.921 director of Joint Interagency Task 18:59.921 --> 19:01.866 Force 401 , and we were , like the 19:01.866 --> 19:03.921 Secretary said , we were established 19:03.921 --> 19:05.810 about 8 months ago to synchronize 19:05.810 --> 19:07.532 counter UAS efforts across the 19:07.532 --> 19:09.532 department and with our interagency 19:09.532 --> 19:11.477 partners . And so with the growing 19:11.477 --> 19:13.588 threat of the illegal use of unmanned 19:13.588 --> 19:15.643 systems , I would say counter UAS is 19:15.643 --> 19:17.588 both a war fighting and a homeland 19:17.588 --> 19:19.643 defense imperative . And so like the 19:19.643 --> 19:21.588 secretary said , with the onset of 19:21.588 --> 19:23.810 Operation Epic Fury , we surged support 19:23.810 --> 19:25.890 to provide additional counter UAS 19:25.890 --> 19:27.834 capability to our troops that were 19:27.834 --> 19:29.834 deploying over to the Middle East . 19:29.969 --> 19:31.969 Some of those troops came from Fort 19:31.969 --> 19:34.080 Bragg , so we were able to surge some 19:34.080 --> 19:36.247 capability down here , working closely 19:36.247 --> 19:38.247 with General Anderson and the Joint 19:38.247 --> 19:40.136 Innovation Outpost . We gave them 19:40.136 --> 19:42.358 additional capability to take forward . 19:42.358 --> 19:44.358 Um , just last week , I was able to 19:44.358 --> 19:46.525 travel forward and see them using that 19:46.525 --> 19:48.747 capability , uh , throughout the Middle 19:48.747 --> 19:50.802 East . And then this morning , as we 19:50.802 --> 19:52.913 talk about translating that back to a 19:52.913 --> 19:55.080 homeland defense imperative right here 19:55.080 --> 19:54.650 on Fort Bragg , we were doing training 19:54.650 --> 19:56.930 with soldiers that remain here on some 19:56.930 --> 19:58.810 of those same drone on drone 19:58.810 --> 20:00.729 interceptors that will provide 20:00.729 --> 20:03.010 additional capability in a layered 20:03.010 --> 20:04.899 defense to be able to protect our 20:04.899 --> 20:08.069 installations . Anything additional 20:08.069 --> 20:10.125 from any of our other leaders on the 20:10.125 --> 20:12.469 stage here ? Great . OK , uh , well , 20:12.550 --> 20:14.606 seeing , uh , seeing none , uh , I'd 20:14.606 --> 20:16.828 really like to thank every speaker here 20:16.828 --> 20:18.828 that joined us to the 18th Airborne 20:18.828 --> 20:18.630 Corps , uh , commanded by the 20:18.630 --> 20:20.797 Commanding General , uh , uh , General 20:20.797 --> 20:22.949 Anderson , uh , and for hosting us at 20:22.949 --> 20:24.949 this beautiful facility , the Joint 20:24.949 --> 20:26.671 Innovation Outpost . I want to 20:26.671 --> 20:28.616 highlight three takeaways that you 20:28.616 --> 20:30.560 heard as a reoccurring theme . The 20:30.560 --> 20:32.727 threat is real and it's here at home . 20:32.727 --> 20:34.616 Second , it's , it's solving , it 20:34.616 --> 20:36.893 requires a true whole of nation effort . 20:36.893 --> 20:39.116 No single agency , company , or service 20:39.116 --> 20:41.227 can do it alone . Third , the Army is 20:41.227 --> 20:43.393 committed to listening under Secretary 20:43.393 --> 20:45.560 Driscoll's leadership to acting and to 20:45.560 --> 20:47.727 sustaining this engagement well beyond 20:47.727 --> 20:49.838 just today . Uh , before we close , I 20:49.838 --> 20:52.060 just want to thank everybody once again 20:52.060 --> 20:51.619 for putting this together for Secretary 20:51.619 --> 20:53.619 Driscoll's leadership and for other 20:53.619 --> 20:55.841 leaders , uh , that joined us here . So 20:55.841 --> 20:55.729 thank you . Perfect .