WEBVTT

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We convened publicly after a classified

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session on the posture of US Central

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Command and US Africa Command . At the

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outset , I wanna thank Admiral Cooper

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and General Anderson for their

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distinguished service to their country

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as well as for their , uh , candid

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testimony during the club session . Let

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me start by addressing the situation in

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the Middle East . Throughout Operation

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Epic Fury , Admiral Cooper commanded

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our highly trained and courageous men

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and women in uniform as they executed

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an exceptional military campaign . The

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campaign has rendered the Islamic

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Republic of Iran a shadow of its former

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self . The effort has not been without

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significant losses though , and

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certainly we continue to honor the

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memory of the 14 service members . Who

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lost their lives in this campaign , as

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well as the approximately 300 service

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members who've been injured since 1979 ,

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Iran's clerical regime has chosen to

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make the United States its number one

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enemy . The motto of Iran's ayatollahs

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has never been God bless Iran or

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long live Iran . They have chanted

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Death to America , death to Israel .

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The regime states its murderous goals

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plainly . The entire foreign policy of

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Iran revolves around killing others

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rather than building for its people .

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As part of Iran's war of choice against

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the United States , the regime has

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directed its terrorist proxies to kill

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hundreds of American service members ,

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take dozens of Americans hostage , and

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assassinate senior American officials ,

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including attempts on the life of

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President Trump . It has also developed

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a nuclear and ballistic missile program

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that aimed to hold multiple continents

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and dozens of US partners at risk .

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Every American president since Carter

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has had to deal with the consequences

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of Iran's war on the United States .

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Yet rather than dealing with the

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problem , successive Democrat and

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Republican administrations sought

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so-called de-escalation with Iran .

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This often afforded Iran the time and

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resources to develop its nuclear

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program , the ballistic missile program ,

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and global terrorist infrastructure . I

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commend President Trump for recognizing

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that the Iranian regime cannot be

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appeased . And for directing action to

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defeat this threat . Doing so will not

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be easy . The Iranian threat , um , the

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Iranian regime is deeply ideological

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and insists that it is winning even

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when it is losing by every conceivable

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metric . I look forward to Admiral

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Cooper sharing his assessment of how

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close we are to destroying Iran's

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military capabilities . I'd also like

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to hear . What he needs from

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Congress to ensure our men and women in

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the uniform have what they need to

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finish the job . Failing to complete

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the Iran mission would send our

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adversaries a dangerous signal about

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our nation's wherewithal and resolve .

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Would send that erroneous message to

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Iran and to other adversaries around

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the globe as we've seen the nature and

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scope of the threats we face transcend

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geographic boundaries . This is

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particularly true as we look to Africa .

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And that's where General Anderson comes

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in . The continent is not a distant

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concern for American national security .

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Rather , it is an arena of growing

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strategic consequence defined by

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converging threats from adversarial

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nation states like China . And Russia

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Radical Islamist terrorism and

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instability driven by weak governance .

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China and Russia recognize the

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strategic importance of Africa . China

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is leveraging economic coercion , debt

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diplomacy , and military basing to

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support President Xi's global ambition .

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Through its mercenaries and other

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proxies , Russia is destabilizing

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fragile states and extracting resources

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in order to bankroll its malign

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activities in Ukraine and elsewhere

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around the world . I look to General

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Anderson to provide his assessment of

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Chinese and Russian objectives in

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Africa . And to update the committee on

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how Africa Command is addressing the

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threat posed by these nefarious actors ,

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the terrorist threats across Africa

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remain persistent , adaptive , and

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dangerous . Increasingly , Africa is

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becoming the epicenter of global

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terrorism . Al Qaeda and ISIS senior

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leadership now reside in Africa . And

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their terrorist affiliates are

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expanding in size , capability , and

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geographic reach from the Sahel to the

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Horn of Africa . Their murderous

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ambitions are not confined to that

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continent . These groups remain intent

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on killing Americans around the world ,

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yet significant shortfalls in key

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military capabilities , including

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intelligence , surveillance , and

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reconnaissance , complicate our ability

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to track these groups and the threat

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they pose . So we look to General

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Anderson to let the committee know how

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these resource shortfalls are impacting

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his ability to combat the terrorist

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threat and where this committee can be

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helpful . I have noted in my remarks

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Africa is of increasing strategic

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importance to American national

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security interests . This is precisely

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why a dedicated combatant command for

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Africa is indispensable . Africa

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Command was established in 2007 because

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the United States recognized that these

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challenges require sustained and

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dedicated focus . This committee

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remains committed to ensuring Africa

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Command has the authorities , resources ,

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and strategic support necessary to

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protect American interests across the

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continent . With that , I turn to my

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partner and colleague Ranking Member

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Reed . Well , thank you very much , Mr .

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Chairman and Admiral Cooper , General

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Anderson , thank you for your

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dedication and service , uh , with

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great distinction over many years .

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Thank you . And also , uh , I think I

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expressed the concerns of all of us or

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the hopefuls that you convey our

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congratulations and appreciation to the

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men and women that you lead in your

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areas . Uh , I wanna also begin by

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expressing my deepest condolences to

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the families of the service members who

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we recently lost in the Middle East and

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Africa , and we owe them our greatest

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respect and gratitude . Amber Cooper ,

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we are 75 days into this war with Iran ,

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and I am concerned the president does

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not have a credible strategy to win .

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Every member of this committee shares

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the goal of preventing Iran from having

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a nuclear weapon , but there is no

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purely military solution to this

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problem . Instead , every president

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over the past 50 years has used

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diplomacy , sanctions , and

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international cooperation to At this

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point successfully prevent Iran from

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obtaining a nuclear weapon . President

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Trump tore up the Iran nuclear deal and

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instead of negotiating a new deal

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unilaterally took our nation to war .

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More than 12 service members have lost

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their lives and hundreds more have been

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wounded . We have suffered significant

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damages to our bases , dramatically

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expended our munition stockpiles , and

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sustained billions of dollars of

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damaged equipment . The Strait of

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Hormuz is still closed despite .

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Attempts to commercial ships while

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Secretaries Jesseth and Rubio have said

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Operation Epic Fury is concluded , it

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is unclear what objectives have been

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accomplished . Iran's regime is intact .

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Its nuclear material remains in place .

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The majority of its missiles and

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launches have reportedly been recovered .

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Iran has demonstrated its ability to

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shut down the strait , and most

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importantly or certainly of equal

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weight , American families are bearing

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real cost at the gas pump and the

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grocery store for a war they did not

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want and Congress has not authorized .

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Admiral Cooper , the military forces

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under your command have performed with

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exceptional skill and bravery , and

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that is attributable to your leadership

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and your chain of command . The

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firepower that we have brought to bear

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in Iran has been formidable . But We

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have not yet , I think , articulated a

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clear strategy going forward , and , uh ,

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this is uh continuing to hamper our

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objectives . Uh , I don't , I think

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everyone on this committee would love

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to see these peace negotiations succeed ,

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uh , and I'd be the first one to

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applaud significant results achieved

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through diplomacy . Uh , but one of the

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issues we're facing , and we've talked

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about it in a closed session , is at

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every turn we are not receiving the

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information that we are legally

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entitled to . Um , we've not seen the

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legal justification for this operation

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nor the execute orders , and the

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administration's explanation for cost

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and the path forward have shifted

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constantly . Uh This week , the

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president said that the ceasefire is on

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life support and It leaves us

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a fundamental question where are we and

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where are we going ? And I hope you can

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touch on that , Admiral Cooper .

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There's two other concerns in CENTCOM

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I'd like to address . First , we

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withdrew all of our troops from Syria ,

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and this has created some adverse

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consequences in my view . Our modest

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military footprint there produced

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significant returns . Including a very

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reliable partner in the Syrian

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Democratic Forces , a sustained counter

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ISIS mission which we conducted , and a

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degree of leverage in strategically

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important area of the world , and we

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gave that up very quickly when we

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withdrew . And if you could provide

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some understanding of the current

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situation , I'd appreciate it . Second ,

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the ceasefire in Lebanon is fragile ,

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and Israel's continued airstrikes and

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demolition operations to the south are

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eroding it . The Lebanese Armed Forces

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are one of the few genuine stabilizing

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instruments we have left in the region ,

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and we should be seriously investing in

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it . And again , Admiral , I'd like to

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know what resources you need to make

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this partnership successful , our

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partnership with the Lebanese military

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in displacing Hezbollah and

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establishing a reliable , uh ,

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government . General Anderson , I'm

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concerned by discussions about whether

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AFRICO should be maintained as an

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independent combatant command , the

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same , uh , concerns I believe the

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chairman has . That fight should be not

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necessary , and it really , I think ,

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reveals a misunderstanding of the

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continuing importance of Africa in so

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many different ways . If we were to

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merge AFRICO with UCO , I think that

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would be a mistake . It would signal to

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our allies and adversaries that Africa

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is not a priority for the United States .

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Uh , Russia and China are not making

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that mistake . Russia's Africa corps

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has expanded steadily across numerous

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countries , and China continues to

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build ports , infrastructure , and

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relationships across the continent .

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Both nations are filling a space that

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America . Has created for them by our

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disengagement and general , I would ask

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you to share your views on the current

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security situation and how you're

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working with allies and partners to

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address the political and economic

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instability in Africa . Finally , I

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would note that the dismantling of

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USAID has made this situation worse .

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More than $12 billion in annual

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assistance to sub-Saharan Africa is

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largely gone . This has translated

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directly into instability ,

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radicalization , and openings for our

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adversaries . The administration's from

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aid to trade slogan in Africa may be a

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reasonable long term aspiration , but

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it's not a near term substitute for

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what has been lost , and our partners

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on the ground know it . I'd like to

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know what authorities and support you

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need from this committee to effectively

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partner with vulnerable nations in

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Africa to keep us from losing more

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ground to China and Russia . Admiral

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Cooper , General Hanson , thank you for

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your leadership , your outstanding

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service , and I look forward to your

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testimony . Thank you , Admiral Cooper .

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You are now recognized for your opening

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statement , sir . Well , thank you very

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much , Chairman Wicker , Ranking Member

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Reed , members of this committee .

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Thank you for the opportunity to

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testify before you today and thank you

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all in this committee for your very

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steadfast support to the United States

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military and to our men and women

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deployed today . I'm pleased to be

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sitting here today with my good friend ,

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the commander of US Africa Command ,

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General Dog Anderson , and I'm joined

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by Fleet Command Master Chief Latief

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Compton , our senior enlisted leader at

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Central Command . Events in the central

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region have shown how quickly the

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course of history can change . In just

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the last few years , decades-old

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features of the strategic landscape ,

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once thought immutable , have been

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upended , bringing both challenges and

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opportunities . I strongly believe that

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every success that we have starts and

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ends with our people . In just the last

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7 months , America's sons and daughters

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serving in CENTCOM have played key

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roles in world events . Implementing

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the president's 20 point peace plan in

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Gaza , degrading the ISIS threat in

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Syria , preventing what I would

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characterize as an ISIS crisis by

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conducting a historic prisoner transfer

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to Iraq , creating the most integrated

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and effective air defense architecture

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ever seen , which was decades in the

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making , and most recently addressing

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the Iranian threat . The performance of

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our warfighters in combined Joint Task

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Force Operation Inherent Resolve ,

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often referred to as CJTFOIR , is

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particularly noteworthy . In January ,

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responding to a rapidly deteriorating

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security situation . They have executed

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an extraordinary transfer of more than

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5700 ISIS prisoners , all terrorists ,

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from Syria to Iraqi custody . Their

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effort prevented a mass prison break

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that risked large scale ISIS

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reconstitution and acute risk to the

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American homeland . In parallel , OIR

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has maintained relentless pressure on

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ISIS remnants in Syria . Most recently ,

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Operation Hawkeye strike removed over

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50 ISIS terrorists and 100 terror

15:12.090 --> 15:13.868
infrastructure targets from the

15:13.868 --> 15:16.469
battlefield . US Central Command was

15:16.469 --> 15:18.358
created in direct response to the

15:18.358 --> 15:20.469
threats posed by the Islamic Republic

15:20.469 --> 15:23.099
of Iran , and I am the 16th CETCOM

15:23.099 --> 15:25.070
commander to deal with the Iranian

15:25.070 --> 15:27.770
problem set . For 47 years , the

15:27.770 --> 15:29.659
Iranian regime has terrorized the

15:29.659 --> 15:31.881
region and made hostility to the United

15:31.881 --> 15:34.760
States a core tenet of its rule . Their

15:34.760 --> 15:36.871
hostile , lethal track record against

15:36.871 --> 15:39.038
the United States is well documented ,

15:39.038 --> 15:41.260
but I don't know that it is always well

15:41.260 --> 15:43.690
understood . Here's a data point . In

15:43.690 --> 15:45.746
just the last 30 months prior to the

15:45.746 --> 15:47.301
commencement of epic fury ,

15:47.380 --> 15:49.460
Iranian-supported terror groups have

15:49.460 --> 15:51.700
attacked US troops and diplomats more

15:51.700 --> 15:55.020
than 350 times , the equivalent of

15:55.020 --> 15:56.853
attack more than every 3rd day ,

15:57.049 --> 15:58.882
killing 4 US service members and

15:58.882 --> 16:01.570
wounding nearly 200 more . After more

16:01.570 --> 16:03.681
than two years of Iranian attempts to

16:03.681 --> 16:06.530
leverage October 7th , 2023 to tear the

16:06.530 --> 16:08.586
region apart at the direction of the

16:08.586 --> 16:10.697
president , the United States Central

16:10.697 --> 16:12.919
Command initiated Operation Epic Fury .

16:12.919 --> 16:15.030
In less than 40 days , CENTCOM forces

16:15.030 --> 16:17.252
achieved our military objectives . Most

16:17.252 --> 16:19.679
notably , we degraded Iran's ability to

16:19.679 --> 16:22.239
project power outside its borders and

16:22.239 --> 16:24.295
threaten the region and threaten our

16:24.295 --> 16:26.859
interests . As an example , we can all

16:26.859 --> 16:29.109
remember April and October of 2024 ,

16:29.320 --> 16:31.510
hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles

16:31.510 --> 16:33.650
and drones raining down in the Middle

16:33.650 --> 16:36.770
East . Today Iran can no longer attack

16:36.770 --> 16:39.059
with that mass and scale , and further ,

16:39.239 --> 16:42.039
with 90% of its defense industrial base

16:42.039 --> 16:44.119
destroyed , Iran won't be able to

16:44.119 --> 16:46.299
reconstitute those weapons for years .

16:47.880 --> 16:50.640
We also all watched Iran spend decades

16:50.640 --> 16:53.039
and billions and billions of dollars

16:53.039 --> 16:55.679
arming proxies . Today , Hamas ,

16:55.880 --> 16:58.102
Hezbollah , and the Houthis are all cut

16:58.102 --> 17:00.400
off from Iran's weapons supply and

17:00.400 --> 17:03.320
support . This , this result was not

17:03.320 --> 17:05.920
foreordained , nor was it brought by

17:05.920 --> 17:08.239
chance . It's the culmination of months

17:08.239 --> 17:10.469
of careful planning built upon decades

17:10.469 --> 17:13.430
of experience . These results also do

17:13.430 --> 17:16.038
not come without cost . We honor the

17:16.038 --> 17:18.218
memories of the 14 service members who

17:18.218 --> 17:20.162
paid the ultimate sacrifice during

17:20.162 --> 17:23.178
Operation Epic Fury and the 2 soldiers

17:23.269 --> 17:25.436
and the 1 civilian killed in Palmyra ,

17:25.438 --> 17:28.078
Syria . They represent truly the very

17:28.078 --> 17:30.838
best of all of us . As I sit here , we

17:30.838 --> 17:33.060
are clear-eyed . The situation in front

17:33.519 --> 17:35.909
front of us is very complex . High

17:35.909 --> 17:38.938
stakes negotiations continue . Our job

17:38.938 --> 17:42.119
is to be ready , and we are . I testify

17:42.119 --> 17:44.239
today on behalf of the 50,000+

17:44.239 --> 17:46.295
servicemen and women deployed to the

17:46.295 --> 17:48.517
central region . It's a great honor and

17:48.517 --> 17:50.517
privilege of a lifetime to serve as

17:50.517 --> 17:52.572
their commander , and thank you very

17:52.572 --> 17:52.400
much , and I look forward to your

17:52.400 --> 17:55.560
questions . Thank you very much ,

17:55.699 --> 17:59.359
General Anderson . Chairman

17:59.359 --> 18:01.303
Wicker , Ranking Member Reed , and

18:01.303 --> 18:03.581
distinguished members of the committee ,

18:03.581 --> 18:05.415
thank you for the opportunity to

18:05.415 --> 18:05.209
provide you an update on US Africa

18:05.209 --> 18:07.609
Command . I'm joined today by Command

18:07.609 --> 18:09.720
Sergeant Major Garrick Banfield , our

18:09.720 --> 18:11.887
senior enlisted leader , and I'm proud

18:11.887 --> 18:14.109
to sit beside my friend from US Central

18:14.109 --> 18:16.331
Command , Admiral Brad Cooper . We both

18:16.331 --> 18:18.442
appreciate your unwavering support to

18:18.442 --> 18:20.442
our nation's warfighters . Before I

18:20.442 --> 18:22.331
start , I'd like to recognize the

18:22.331 --> 18:24.387
service of First Lieutenant Kendrick

18:24.387 --> 18:26.609
Lamont Key Junior and Specialist Mariah

18:26.609 --> 18:28.776
Collington , who lost their lives in a

18:28.776 --> 18:30.998
tragic accident during African Lion and

18:30.998 --> 18:33.220
are returning home today . I would also

18:33.220 --> 18:35.387
like to express my appreciation to our

18:35.387 --> 18:35.130
allies and partners , particularly

18:35.130 --> 18:37.241
Morocco , who stepped forward when it

18:37.241 --> 18:41.219
mattered most . Africa sits at

18:41.219 --> 18:43.330
the crossroads of global commerce and

18:43.330 --> 18:45.219
security , bridging the strategic

18:45.219 --> 18:47.275
terrain between the Atlantic and the

18:47.275 --> 18:49.052
Indo-Pacific . It's the world's

18:49.052 --> 18:50.941
supplier of critical minerals for

18:50.941 --> 18:53.108
advanced defense system and home to 12

18:53.108 --> 18:53.099
of the world's 20 fastest growing

18:53.099 --> 18:56.140
economies . By 2050 , it will account

18:56.140 --> 18:58.380
for a third of the global working age

18:58.380 --> 19:01.380
population . Today , the epicenter of

19:01.380 --> 19:04.569
global terrorism is in Africa . ISIS

19:04.569 --> 19:08.099
leadership is African . Al Qaeda's

19:08.099 --> 19:11.410
economic engine is in Africa . Both of

19:11.410 --> 19:13.577
these groups share the will and intent

19:13.890 --> 19:16.270
to strike our homeland . Their

19:16.270 --> 19:18.829
affiliates , once isolated nodes , now

19:18.829 --> 19:21.630
show increased connectivity . Just as

19:21.630 --> 19:23.589
concerning as the nexus between al

19:23.589 --> 19:25.869
Qaeda's al-Shabaab and the Iranian

19:25.869 --> 19:29.160
sponsored Houthis . Africom is

19:29.160 --> 19:30.993
prioritizing willing and capable

19:30.993 --> 19:32.993
partners . We support partners with

19:32.993 --> 19:35.327
capabilities that only the US can bring .

19:36.239 --> 19:38.989
ISR targeting precision strike . These

19:38.989 --> 19:40.989
efforts have driven ISIS leaders in

19:40.989 --> 19:43.156
Somalia underground , disrupting their

19:43.156 --> 19:45.322
command and control of the global ISIS

19:45.322 --> 19:47.890
network . In West Africa , al Qaeda

19:47.890 --> 19:50.112
affiliate JM has demonstrated increased

19:50.112 --> 19:52.279
capacity to control key terrain in the

19:52.279 --> 19:54.501
Sahel , most notably by strangling fuel

19:54.501 --> 19:56.557
supplies around population centers .

19:56.770 --> 19:58.770
The capture of a capital city would

19:58.770 --> 20:00.992
provide al Qaeda with all the trappings

20:00.992 --> 20:02.992
of a nation state to sponsor global

20:02.992 --> 20:06.000
terrorism . With a 75% reduction in our

20:06.000 --> 20:08.222
regional posture over the past decade ,

20:08.222 --> 20:10.111
compounded by the drawdown of our

20:10.111 --> 20:11.722
allies , we struggle with an

20:11.722 --> 20:13.833
intelligence black hole . And without

20:13.833 --> 20:16.056
sufficient indicators and warnings , we

20:16.056 --> 20:16.040
risk being blind to the gathering

20:16.040 --> 20:18.199
dangers and threats in the region .

20:19.239 --> 20:21.017
Africom's lack of expeditionary

20:21.017 --> 20:22.906
capabilities and diminished force

20:22.906 --> 20:24.850
posture compromised our our crisis

20:24.850 --> 20:26.906
response . In a crisis we can always

20:26.906 --> 20:28.906
surge assets , but you cannot surge

20:28.906 --> 20:31.349
trust . Our reduced presence on the

20:31.349 --> 20:33.571
continent also allows disruptive actors

20:33.571 --> 20:35.550
to drive the agenda , undercutting

20:35.550 --> 20:38.650
American interests . China views Africa

20:38.650 --> 20:40.483
as a second continent , securing

20:40.483 --> 20:42.428
control over critical minerals and

20:42.428 --> 20:44.594
infrastructure , potentially boxing us

20:44.594 --> 20:46.539
out of resources that energize our

20:46.539 --> 20:48.761
industrial base . Africa also serves as

20:48.761 --> 20:50.872
Putin's purse , where Russia exploits

20:50.872 --> 20:53.349
instability to extract resources , to

20:53.349 --> 20:55.469
include human lives , to fuel its war

20:55.469 --> 20:58.290
machine . To contend with these threats ,

20:58.410 --> 21:00.140
Africom must think and operate

21:00.140 --> 21:02.969
differently . With less than 0.1% of

21:02.969 --> 21:04.858
the department's budget , we must

21:04.858 --> 21:06.969
maximize every taxpayer dollar to

21:06.969 --> 21:08.636
deliver an outsized return on

21:08.636 --> 21:10.989
investment . AFRICO continues to

21:10.989 --> 21:12.711
leverage low cost , high yield

21:12.711 --> 21:14.933
activities to amplify our impact on the

21:14.933 --> 21:16.600
continent . Programs like the

21:16.600 --> 21:18.656
International Military Education and

21:18.656 --> 21:20.600
Training and the State Partnership

21:20.600 --> 21:22.767
Program are reliable force multipliers

21:22.767 --> 21:24.933
that forge enduring relationships with

21:24.933 --> 21:26.822
African militaries and are proven

21:26.822 --> 21:28.656
models for cost effective burden

21:28.656 --> 21:30.822
sharing . The Africom exercise program

21:30.822 --> 21:33.045
is emerging as a battle lab to test and

21:33.045 --> 21:35.211
validate new technologies on behalf of

21:35.211 --> 21:37.267
both the joint force and our African

21:37.267 --> 21:39.211
partners . And finally , AFRICO is

21:39.211 --> 21:41.378
focused on the critical convergence of

21:41.378 --> 21:43.433
security and economics . Our efforts

21:43.433 --> 21:45.600
span all elements of national power as

21:45.600 --> 21:47.545
we coordinate closely with state ,

21:47.545 --> 21:49.711
commerce , energy , and treasury . The

21:49.711 --> 21:51.878
department's new economic defense unit

21:51.878 --> 21:53.920
has been an invaluable partner . To

21:53.920 --> 21:55.864
defend the homeland and promote US

21:55.864 --> 21:58.087
interests , and ensure effective crisis

21:58.087 --> 21:59.976
response , Africom needs targeted

21:59.976 --> 22:01.364
investments in layered ,

22:01.364 --> 22:04.140
non-traditional ISR . Innovative force

22:04.140 --> 22:06.430
protection . Programs that are able to

22:06.430 --> 22:08.390
en that enable willing and capable

22:08.390 --> 22:10.750
partners . The opportunity to conduct

22:10.750 --> 22:12.306
experimentation of emerging

22:12.306 --> 22:14.528
technologies and the ability to respond

22:14.528 --> 22:16.861
to crisis at the time and point of need .

22:17.469 --> 22:19.747
Africa is a continent of opportunities ,

22:19.747 --> 22:21.989
not only crises . With the continued

22:21.989 --> 22:23.878
support of this committee , I can

22:23.878 --> 22:25.711
assure you that every dollar you

22:25.711 --> 22:27.767
authorize for AFRICO will contribute

22:27.767 --> 22:29.989
directly to the security , safety , and

22:29.989 --> 22:32.211
prosperity of the United States . Thank

22:32.211 --> 22:34.489
you . I look forward to your questions .

22:34.869 --> 22:37.091
Well , thank you very much . Um , let's

22:37.091 --> 22:39.510
get right into , um , Iran , Admiral

22:39.510 --> 22:43.229
Cooper . And I think one of the basic

22:43.229 --> 22:47.209
questions is , was this . Exercise of

22:47.209 --> 22:49.650
hours , um , was this operation of

22:49.650 --> 22:51.489
hours of war of choice or war of

22:51.489 --> 22:53.810
necessity , um , let me get your

22:53.810 --> 22:57.290
military perspective . Um , did

22:57.290 --> 23:01.209
Iran have enriched uranium up to

23:01.209 --> 23:04.770
6% prior to Operation Midnight Hammer ?

23:05.880 --> 23:08.310
Yes sir , they did . And uh is there a

23:08.310 --> 23:11.839
civilian use at all for uranium that

23:11.839 --> 23:15.839
is enriched to 60% ? There's not ,

23:15.880 --> 23:19.829
Senator . Um Is it

23:19.829 --> 23:21.670
fair to say that Iran's nuclear

23:21.670 --> 23:25.439
breakout time Has been set back then

23:25.900 --> 23:28.869
thanks to Operation Midnight Hammer and

23:28.869 --> 23:31.619
Operation Epic Fury . Without talking

23:31.619 --> 23:33.563
specifics , uh , that's accurate ,

23:33.563 --> 23:36.209
Senator . All right . And has Iran ever

23:36.209 --> 23:38.750
been willing to curtail its ballistic

23:38.750 --> 23:40.750
missile program , ballistic missile

23:40.750 --> 23:42.750
program through negotiations ? They

23:42.750 --> 23:44.510
have not , sir . Um

23:46.400 --> 23:48.609
And then perhaps you can explain in

23:48.609 --> 23:51.869
some detail to what extent . Operation

23:51.869 --> 23:55.650
Epic Fury has set back . Iran's

23:55.650 --> 23:58.630
ballistic missile program . To what

23:58.630 --> 24:00.630
extent you can tell us in this open

24:00.630 --> 24:02.963
setting , yes sir , Senator , thank you ,

24:02.963 --> 24:05.186
thank you very much for that question .

24:05.186 --> 24:07.352
Uh , our military mission in Operation

24:07.352 --> 24:09.408
Epic Fury was crystal clear from the

24:09.408 --> 24:11.186
very outset and remained steady

24:11.186 --> 24:13.408
throughout . The mission was to degrade

24:13.408 --> 24:16.000
Iran's ability to project power on its

24:16.000 --> 24:18.189
neighbors and US interests . It had 3

24:18.189 --> 24:20.189
key components . Degrade Iran's

24:20.189 --> 24:22.133
ballistic missiles and the defense

24:22.133 --> 24:24.078
industrial base that supports it ,

24:24.078 --> 24:26.579
degrade Iran's drones and the divest

24:26.579 --> 24:28.760
and the defense industrial base that

24:28.760 --> 24:30.927
supports that , and degrade their navy

24:31.079 --> 24:33.135
and the defense industrial base that

24:33.135 --> 24:34.968
supports that . In each of those

24:34.968 --> 24:36.579
categories we met all of the

24:36.579 --> 24:38.819
achievements . Each of those systems ,

24:38.839 --> 24:41.239
uh , were significantly degraded . If I

24:41.239 --> 24:43.183
give you just a couple . Couple of

24:43.183 --> 24:45.406
examples , the defense industrial rates

24:45.406 --> 24:47.572
for their drones and their missiles in

24:47.572 --> 24:49.739
their navy were degraded by 90% . They

24:49.739 --> 24:51.964
have about 10% left for the Navy . My

24:51.964 --> 24:54.005
military assessment , uh , would be

24:54.005 --> 24:56.172
that , uh , the Navy will not begin to

24:56.172 --> 24:58.505
rebuild for 5 to 10 years . Many of you

24:58.505 --> 25:00.616
are , uh , serve in states that build

25:00.616 --> 25:02.172
ships . It's complex . It's

25:02.172 --> 25:04.172
particularly complex when you don't

25:04.172 --> 25:06.283
have an industrial base to build it .

25:06.283 --> 25:08.338
My professional uh uh perspective on

25:08.338 --> 25:10.561
this also is that Iran would not return

25:10.561 --> 25:12.819
to the same level of navy that it had

25:12.959 --> 25:16.089
for a generation . Now this 10% of

25:16.089 --> 25:19.030
drones left , are they exquisite or

25:20.199 --> 25:22.143
the sort of relatively inexpensive

25:22.143 --> 25:24.032
drones we've been hearing about ?

25:24.032 --> 25:26.255
Senator , thank you for this question .

25:26.255 --> 25:28.477
I think I'd like to use the opportunity

25:28.477 --> 25:30.532
to myth bust on drones . The days of

25:30.532 --> 25:33.069
$35,000 drones that we saw in the last

25:33.069 --> 25:35.180
couple of years , particularly in the

25:35.180 --> 25:37.236
fight against the Houthis in Yemen ,

25:37.236 --> 25:39.236
those days are behind us today . We

25:39.236 --> 25:41.291
face an increased threat from drones

25:41.291 --> 25:43.513
that are highly sophisticated . They're

25:43.513 --> 25:45.347
jet powered . They have high end

25:45.859 --> 25:48.137
sensors . They have electronic warfare .

25:48.150 --> 25:50.150
They have signals intelligence . So

25:50.150 --> 25:52.660
those days of using high value defenses

25:52.660 --> 25:54.827
to shoot down cheap targets are behind

25:54.827 --> 25:56.993
us . Quite the contrary , what we have

25:56.993 --> 25:59.780
been doing lately is using our own low

25:59.780 --> 26:01.930
cost one-way attack drones , uh ,

26:02.180 --> 26:04.280
attacking , attacking Iran , making

26:04.280 --> 26:06.002
them use . Use higher and more

26:06.002 --> 26:07.613
expensive weapons , so I can

26:07.613 --> 26:09.669
confidently tell you we have flipped

26:09.669 --> 26:11.724
the cost curve in many ways . Always

26:11.724 --> 26:13.836
work to be done , but I like where we

26:13.836 --> 26:16.002
are in this regard , OK ? And you know

26:16.002 --> 26:18.113
there's been a lot of talk about part

26:18.113 --> 26:20.336
of the negotiations being giving up the

26:20.890 --> 26:24.290
nuclear ambitions , um , but

26:25.010 --> 26:28.489
almost as important to me is is the

26:28.489 --> 26:31.780
support of terrorist proxies . So has

26:31.780 --> 26:34.939
Iran ever been willing to support for

26:34.939 --> 26:37.300
the terrorist proxies Hamas , the

26:37.300 --> 26:39.819
Houthis , Hezbollah ? They have not ,

26:39.910 --> 26:43.079
Senator . So to what extent has this

26:43.780 --> 26:47.099
exercise , this operation denied Iran

26:47.099 --> 26:49.780
resources for funding terrorism ?

26:50.619 --> 26:52.730
Senator , this has been a significant

26:52.730 --> 26:54.786
priority from the outset , and as we

26:54.786 --> 26:57.008
sit here today , there are no resources

26:57.008 --> 26:59.008
and equipment that are flowing from

26:59.008 --> 27:01.420
Iran to Hamas , Hezbollah , or the

27:01.420 --> 27:04.989
Houthis . Those transfer paths and

27:04.989 --> 27:07.420
methods methods have been cut off . To

27:07.420 --> 27:09.760
the extent that that

27:11.369 --> 27:13.425
source of support has been cut off ,

27:13.425 --> 27:15.536
what are the other sources of support

27:15.536 --> 27:18.420
that these terrorist groups can look to ?

27:19.390 --> 27:21.501
I think some some of those pieces are

27:21.501 --> 27:23.501
best discussed in a more classified

27:23.501 --> 27:25.390
environment , but I think the key

27:25.390 --> 27:27.390
element of this is , uh , the , the

27:27.390 --> 27:29.739
main supplier of resources and training

27:30.119 --> 27:32.310
for decades and billions of dollars ,

27:32.479 --> 27:34.701
and we've seen all this before our very

27:34.701 --> 27:36.368
eyes . Those pieces have been

27:36.368 --> 27:38.423
completely cut off today . Thank you

27:38.423 --> 27:40.590
very much . We'll take another round ,

27:40.590 --> 27:42.479
but at this point I recognize the

27:42.479 --> 27:44.646
ranking member . Thank you very much ,

27:44.646 --> 27:46.757
Mr . Chairman . Uh , Admiral Cooper ,

27:46.757 --> 27:49.839
is Iran a military . Militarily still

27:49.839 --> 27:53.479
able to inflict significant damage on

27:53.479 --> 27:55.368
infrastructure of the surrounding

27:55.368 --> 27:59.150
countries in the Persian Gulf . Senator ,

27:59.189 --> 28:01.411
in this environment , what I would tell

28:01.411 --> 28:03.411
you is their capabilities have been

28:03.411 --> 28:05.578
dramatically degraded . That certainly

28:05.578 --> 28:05.069
doesn't mean that they don't have

28:05.069 --> 28:07.150
anything left , but the large scale

28:07.150 --> 28:09.261
volleys that we've seen over the last

28:09.261 --> 28:11.670
couple of years , Iran is no longer

28:11.670 --> 28:14.550
capable of executing those . This would

28:14.550 --> 28:16.819
be less large scale volleys than

28:16.819 --> 28:18.579
directed attacks on critical

28:18.579 --> 28:21.290
infrastructure which would set back .

28:22.079 --> 28:24.030
Petroleum production , even if the

28:24.030 --> 28:26.349
Strait of uh or petroleum distribution ,

28:26.400 --> 28:28.400
I would say , even if the Strait of

28:28.400 --> 28:30.511
Hormuz is open , does that capability

28:30.511 --> 28:33.199
still exist ? Capabilities across the

28:33.199 --> 28:35.143
board inside Iran still exist at a

28:35.143 --> 28:37.250
degraded scale . We've also , uh ,

28:37.319 --> 28:39.486
planned accordingly , uh , for each of

28:39.486 --> 28:41.652
these scenarios , uh , if necessary to

28:41.652 --> 28:43.708
deal with them on a from a defensive

28:43.708 --> 28:45.689
perspective . So , uh , would you

28:45.689 --> 28:48.079
characterize Iran as no longer a threat ?

28:49.160 --> 28:51.209
Iran has a significantly degraded

28:51.209 --> 28:53.153
threat and they no longer threaten

28:53.153 --> 28:55.650
regional , uh , uh , uh , regional

28:55.650 --> 28:57.761
partners or the United States in ways

28:57.761 --> 28:59.706
that they were able to do before .

28:59.706 --> 29:01.539
Across every domain they've been

29:01.539 --> 29:03.890
significantly degraded , but they can

29:03.890 --> 29:06.890
still threaten their partners . It's a

29:06.890 --> 29:09.001
very large country . They have , they

29:09.001 --> 29:11.168
have , they retain some , uh , mineral

29:11.168 --> 29:13.112
capability that that's correct and

29:13.112 --> 29:15.112
that's accurate and of course we've

29:15.112 --> 29:14.489
accounted for that from a defensive

29:14.489 --> 29:16.989
perspective , uh , General Anderson ,

29:17.050 --> 29:20.770
um . What's happened is that

29:20.770 --> 29:22.770
the administration recalled over 30

29:22.770 --> 29:25.349
career ambassadors in Africa , uh ,

29:25.760 --> 29:27.927
including , excuse me , over 30 Korean

29:27.927 --> 29:29.982
ambassadors overall , 12 in Africa .

29:30.650 --> 29:32.872
The United States has only 14 confirmed

29:32.872 --> 29:35.800
ambassadors . In other words , 40

29:35.800 --> 29:38.280
ambassadorial posts in Africa are

29:38.280 --> 29:40.989
vacant or filled by charge affairs . Uh ,

29:42.119 --> 29:45.000
is it essential to your work , uh , to

29:45.000 --> 29:47.119
have fully functioning embassies with

29:47.119 --> 29:51.020
ambassadors ? Senator , we work

29:51.020 --> 29:53.020
very closely with all the embassies

29:53.020 --> 29:55.353
across the continent to pursue and , uh ,

29:55.353 --> 29:57.520
further American interests and so that

29:57.520 --> 29:59.687
that relationship with these embassies

29:59.687 --> 30:01.576
is critical for AFICO's effective

30:01.576 --> 30:03.409
engagements , but what about the

30:03.409 --> 30:05.520
ambassadors ? Uh , yes sir , so the ,

30:05.520 --> 30:08.239
uh , ambassadors do enjoy access . I

30:08.239 --> 30:10.239
think that that's important to have

30:10.239 --> 30:12.461
ambassadors in place because , uh , the

30:12.461 --> 30:14.572
hierarchical , uh , nature of many of

30:14.572 --> 30:16.795
the African countries is that if you're

30:16.795 --> 30:18.961
not an ambassador you don't always get

30:18.961 --> 30:20.795
access and so there is obviously

30:20.795 --> 30:23.128
benefit to that , uh , and we , we , uh ,

30:23.128 --> 30:25.350
coordinate with them quite closely when

30:25.350 --> 30:27.517
we engage . Uh , thank you very much ,

30:27.520 --> 30:31.030
sir , uh . You are

30:31.030 --> 30:33.939
combating one of the most sophisticated

30:33.939 --> 30:36.150
information warfare operations , uh ,

30:36.160 --> 30:38.719
we've seen in a long time from Russia .

30:39.430 --> 30:43.430
Uh , what can we do to improve your

30:43.430 --> 30:46.140
ability to withstand this information

30:46.140 --> 30:49.150
operation and also to engage in

30:49.150 --> 30:51.229
something on the same level by the

30:51.229 --> 30:54.459
United States ? Yes , Senator , I , I

30:54.459 --> 30:56.515
appreciate the , uh , recognition of

30:56.515 --> 30:58.181
this concern because uh , our

30:58.181 --> 31:00.126
adversaries are very active in the

31:00.126 --> 31:02.237
information domain as you highlighted

31:02.237 --> 31:04.237
Russia . I'd also say China is also

31:04.237 --> 31:06.459
very active in these domains . They use

31:06.459 --> 31:08.626
this to undercut not only our interest

31:08.626 --> 31:10.459
but undercut and dis disrupt the

31:10.459 --> 31:12.939
democracies that are in in Africa . And

31:12.939 --> 31:14.995
this is one area that I've talked to

31:14.995 --> 31:16.772
several of the leaders across ,

31:16.772 --> 31:18.606
especially coastal West Africa .

31:18.606 --> 31:20.439
They're very concerned about the

31:20.439 --> 31:20.339
Russian propaganda that is

31:20.339 --> 31:22.709
destabilizing their . Their , uh ,

31:22.719 --> 31:25.800
democracies for me we have a limited

31:25.800 --> 31:28.439
budget that we are mostly in a reactive

31:28.439 --> 31:30.800
mode to respond to issues . What would

31:30.800 --> 31:32.578
be beneficial as one of the few

31:32.578 --> 31:34.800
entities that looks across the entirety

31:34.800 --> 31:36.689
of the econ of the continent is a

31:36.719 --> 31:38.941
consistent budget that would allow . Us

31:38.941 --> 31:41.108
to campaign in the information space ,

31:41.459 --> 31:43.515
uh , we coordinate very closely with

31:43.515 --> 31:45.737
State Department and others on this and

31:45.737 --> 31:47.626
work with the embassies , but our

31:47.626 --> 31:49.681
ability to look across the continent

31:49.681 --> 31:48.949
and highlight these things , I think ,

31:48.959 --> 31:51.181
is an area where we could be of benefit

31:51.181 --> 31:53.348
to the American interest . Thank you ,

31:53.348 --> 31:55.403
sir . Uh , Admiral Cooper , one more

31:55.403 --> 31:57.680
question . Do we still maintain a

31:57.680 --> 31:59.902
relationship with the Syrian Democratic

31:59.902 --> 32:03.650
Forces ? Senator ,

32:03.900 --> 32:06.067
we do have a nascent relationship with

32:06.067 --> 32:08.178
them in the context of evacuating the

32:08.178 --> 32:10.560
more than 5700 ISIS prisoners from

32:10.979 --> 32:13.201
predominantly northeast Syria to Iraq .

32:13.201 --> 32:15.760
A small number of prisoners , mostly

32:15.760 --> 32:17.649
chronically ill and with multiple

32:17.649 --> 32:19.920
amputees , stayed in the in the primary

32:19.920 --> 32:22.680
prison known as Hasakah , and SDF is

32:22.849 --> 32:26.099
today serving as the guards . Just a

32:26.099 --> 32:29.969
follow-on question , do you detect any

32:29.969 --> 32:33.329
kind of Resentment or um

32:33.930 --> 32:37.449
to our rapid departure from SES . I

32:37.449 --> 32:39.310
think Senator , we've had a long

32:39.310 --> 32:41.369
standing relationship with the SDF .

32:41.920 --> 32:44.031
The ceasefire that they have in place

32:44.031 --> 32:45.864
today with the Syrian government

32:45.864 --> 32:47.753
remains in effect , and we remain

32:47.753 --> 32:49.864
engaged . Thank you very much , sir .

32:49.864 --> 32:52.142
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Fisher .

32:52.142 --> 32:54.650
Thank you Mr . Chairman . Um , welcome ,

32:54.729 --> 32:56.785
Admiral General , thank you for your

32:56.785 --> 33:00.520
service . Admiral , uh , what did the

33:00.520 --> 33:03.540
Iranians , um , attempted

33:04.119 --> 33:06.880
missile attack on the island of Diego

33:06.880 --> 33:10.239
Garcia tell us about the ballistic

33:10.239 --> 33:12.959
missile program and , um , and their

33:12.959 --> 33:16.339
intent to use it . Did it come as a

33:16.339 --> 33:19.729
surprise ? Senator , uh , uh ,

33:19.989 --> 33:21.989
appropriate to talk in this forum .

33:21.989 --> 33:24.211
There's clearly because there's clearly

33:24.211 --> 33:26.433
a classified , uh , component to this .

33:26.433 --> 33:28.656
I think we've all heard publicly what ,

33:28.656 --> 33:30.267
uh , Iran described as their

33:30.267 --> 33:32.156
self-imposed limitations on their

33:32.156 --> 33:34.378
missile force . Uh , the execution of ,

33:34.378 --> 33:36.489
of that particular attempted strike ,

33:36.489 --> 33:38.378
uh , which failed , was twice the

33:38.378 --> 33:38.109
distance of what they previously

33:38.109 --> 33:40.109
advertised that they said that they

33:40.109 --> 33:42.165
would self-constrain themselves to .

33:42.359 --> 33:45.770
Thank you and um . As you look at

33:45.770 --> 33:48.369
the total operation , the conflict

33:48.369 --> 33:50.480
there , what lessons have you learned

33:50.480 --> 33:53.410
from that and how have you used those

33:53.410 --> 33:56.369
lessons thus far to ensure that your

33:56.369 --> 33:59.089
command is prepared for the fight that

33:59.089 --> 34:01.670
we have today ? Yeah , Senator , thank

34:01.670 --> 34:03.892
you very much for this . Uh , it's fair

34:03.892 --> 34:06.059
to say that we have captured thousands

34:06.059 --> 34:08.226
of lessons , mostly tactical . I think

34:08.226 --> 34:10.337
there's no military in the world that

34:10.337 --> 34:12.559
makes adjustments as well as the United

34:12.559 --> 34:14.781
States military does , uh , and whether

34:14.781 --> 34:16.892
they were in stride tactically with a

34:16.892 --> 34:18.392
lot of support , uh , from

34:18.392 --> 34:20.614
organizations back in the United States

34:20.614 --> 34:22.559
or they're more at the operational

34:22.559 --> 34:24.892
level , we took a very hard look inward .

34:24.892 --> 34:26.670
To see where can we improve our

34:26.670 --> 34:28.448
defenses , force protection and

34:28.448 --> 34:30.614
protecting our people is my number one

34:30.614 --> 34:32.726
priority . We focused on that first ,

34:32.726 --> 34:32.599
uh , made a significant number of

34:32.599 --> 34:35.279
adjustments to , to enhance what was

34:35.279 --> 34:37.279
already a very effective , uh , air

34:37.279 --> 34:39.557
defense umbrella , and that's where we ,

34:39.557 --> 34:41.779
we are predominantly focused as well as

34:41.779 --> 34:44.001
putting ourselves in a position to meet

34:44.001 --> 34:46.001
a wide range of contingencies going

34:46.001 --> 34:47.835
forward . Thank you , sir . Uh ,

34:47.835 --> 34:51.399
General Anderson . ISIS is on the rise

34:51.399 --> 34:53.510
in Africa and you've been very , very

34:53.510 --> 34:56.159
clear about that . How is your command

34:56.159 --> 34:58.310
working with our partners in order to

34:58.310 --> 35:01.949
address that ? Uh ,

35:02.120 --> 35:04.287
Senator , you are , are correct . ISIS

35:04.287 --> 35:06.509
is , uh , putting a concerted effort in

35:06.509 --> 35:08.842
its establishment on the continent . Uh ,

35:08.842 --> 35:11.009
we have been working very closely with

35:11.009 --> 35:13.120
willing partners who have been , uh ,

35:13.120 --> 35:15.342
willing to address this threat . So two

35:15.342 --> 35:17.509
examples of that in northern Somalia ,

35:17.509 --> 35:19.287
working with the Somali and the

35:19.287 --> 35:21.287
Puntland forces there to go up into

35:21.287 --> 35:23.342
those mountains . Uh , what has been

35:23.342 --> 35:25.231
key there to putting pressure and

35:25.231 --> 35:27.398
isolating the ISIS leadership there is

35:27.398 --> 35:29.564
the partner's ability to stay in those

35:29.564 --> 35:31.564
mountains and so our partnership to

35:31.564 --> 35:33.620
provide them the intelligence , some

35:33.620 --> 35:33.419
training , and some limited logistics

35:33.419 --> 35:35.860
that allow them to stay is iso helping

35:35.860 --> 35:38.310
isolate that leadership node in Somalia .

35:38.699 --> 35:40.755
We've also been working very closely

35:40.755 --> 35:42.755
with Nigeria who is in the last few

35:42.755 --> 35:45.020
months opened up , uh , with a very

35:45.020 --> 35:47.919
positive . Uh , engagement with intel

35:47.919 --> 35:50.090
sharing and , and ability to go after

35:50.090 --> 35:52.034
and target some of these terrorist

35:52.034 --> 35:54.090
threats that are in northern Nigeria

35:54.169 --> 35:56.225
and so that has been a positive area

35:56.225 --> 35:58.447
that we've seen as well . We would like

35:58.447 --> 36:00.113
to reestablish some pragmatic

36:00.113 --> 36:02.225
relationships in the Sahel where ISIS

36:02.225 --> 36:04.280
also has a stronghold where they are

36:04.280 --> 36:06.502
currently holding an American hostage .

36:06.502 --> 36:08.613
Uh , in order to gain better access ,

36:08.613 --> 36:10.780
and that's an area we need to continue

36:10.780 --> 36:10.580
to improve , to work with those

36:10.580 --> 36:13.179
partners for an intel sharing and

36:13.179 --> 36:15.235
understanding of what that threat is

36:15.235 --> 36:17.012
there , but we are working very

36:17.012 --> 36:18.901
deliberately with our partners to

36:18.901 --> 36:21.012
address these common threats . Do you

36:21.012 --> 36:22.735
feel that you're appropriately

36:22.735 --> 36:25.979
resourced to address these threats ? We

36:25.979 --> 36:28.540
have the minimum necessary resources in

36:28.540 --> 36:31.219
order to address the threats in order

36:31.219 --> 36:33.330
to do this because of the size of the

36:33.330 --> 36:35.441
continent and the complexity of those

36:35.441 --> 36:37.663
attacks or of those threats in order to

36:37.663 --> 36:39.441
thwart these , we have to shift

36:39.441 --> 36:41.608
resources and that entails taking some

36:41.608 --> 36:43.719
risk in those other areas in order to

36:43.719 --> 36:45.608
address the the primary efforts .

36:48.209 --> 36:50.153
I'd like to , I'd like to have you

36:50.153 --> 36:52.330
address some of the , uh , connections

36:52.330 --> 36:55.310
that we see with the drug cartels , uh ,

36:55.330 --> 36:57.199
with the terror groups . Can you

36:57.199 --> 37:00.129
elaborate on those , uh , especially

37:00.129 --> 37:03.000
with regards to the Central and South

37:03.000 --> 37:06.290
American cartels ? Uh , yes , senator ,

37:06.370 --> 37:08.703
that's an area that is emerging that is ,

37:08.703 --> 37:11.330
uh , causing us great concern . So two

37:11.330 --> 37:13.386
points to that , uh , recently there

37:13.386 --> 37:15.386
was an interdiction based on , uh ,

37:15.386 --> 37:17.552
some intelligence that we were able to

37:17.552 --> 37:19.719
provide that the Spanish interdicted a

37:19.719 --> 37:22.770
shipment of cocaine that was 35 tons of

37:22.770 --> 37:24.770
cocaine . We believe that's about a

37:24.770 --> 37:26.826
billion dollars of street value . We

37:26.826 --> 37:29.048
believe that's the largest interdiction

37:29.048 --> 37:30.937
in history that came out of South

37:30.937 --> 37:33.048
America . It was transiting along the

37:33.048 --> 37:35.048
west coast of Africa . Uh , towards

37:35.048 --> 37:36.992
another location that I could talk

37:36.992 --> 37:38.603
about in a , uh , classified

37:38.603 --> 37:40.714
environment , uh , the , and so we're

37:40.714 --> 37:42.770
seeing more of that drug trafficking

37:42.770 --> 37:44.659
coming in and the , the terrorist

37:44.659 --> 37:46.826
organizations are helping transit that

37:46.826 --> 37:46.510
they're getting payments through that

37:46.510 --> 37:48.566
and there's a symbiotic relationship

37:48.566 --> 37:50.732
that that money then comes back to our

37:50.732 --> 37:53.066
hemisphere to those , uh , drug cartels ,

37:53.066 --> 37:55.232
but also helps , uh , provide fuel for

37:55.232 --> 37:57.399
those terrorists . Another area that I

37:57.399 --> 37:59.732
think is important to highlight is that ,

37:59.732 --> 38:02.360
uh . In the last 18 to 24 months we

38:02.360 --> 38:04.520
have assisted in , uh , or at least

38:04.520 --> 38:07.600
tipped off many partner nations to drug

38:07.600 --> 38:09.767
activities and labs in their country .

38:09.767 --> 38:12.550
In this , in this time , 11 of the 12 ,

38:12.840 --> 38:14.507
uh , drug labs that have been

38:14.507 --> 38:16.507
interdicted have had , uh , Mexican

38:16.507 --> 38:18.840
cartel members on site to include the

38:18.840 --> 38:20.951
largest drug lab that had ever been ,

38:20.951 --> 38:23.179
uh , disrupted in South Africa . That

38:23.179 --> 38:25.235
there were Sinaloa cartel members on

38:25.235 --> 38:27.235
site and so they are actually doing

38:27.235 --> 38:29.457
production now in Africa as well as the

38:29.457 --> 38:31.623
transit of that across the continent .

38:31.623 --> 38:33.735
So we're watching this uh develop and

38:33.735 --> 38:35.901
it's of concern as this fuels both the

38:35.901 --> 38:38.123
terrorists and the cartels . What's the

38:38.123 --> 38:40.346
destination of those drugs ? Uh , those

38:40.346 --> 38:42.610
drugs are destined for . Uh , the

38:42.610 --> 38:44.832
Middle East for Europe , but we're also

38:44.832 --> 38:46.888
seeing them then come in through the

38:46.888 --> 38:49.054
northern route back into America as we

38:49.054 --> 38:51.166
have applied pressure on the southern

38:51.166 --> 38:53.388
border . They're finding other means to

38:53.388 --> 38:55.388
bring those drugs into our nation .

38:55.388 --> 38:57.443
Thank you . Uh , thank you , Senator

38:57.443 --> 38:59.388
Fisher , uh , Senator Blumenthal .

38:59.388 --> 39:01.610
Thanks , Mr . Chairman . Thank you both

39:01.610 --> 39:03.721
for being here . Thank you for your .

39:03.721 --> 39:05.777
Extraordinary service in a difficult

39:05.777 --> 39:07.777
time . General Anderson , I want to

39:07.777 --> 39:11.030
express my Condolences to you and your

39:11.030 --> 39:13.030
team and the families of Lieutenant

39:13.030 --> 39:15.669
General , uh Lieutenant uh Kendrick

39:15.830 --> 39:18.889
Lamont and Specialist Maria Collington .

39:19.270 --> 39:23.040
Uh , the army's lost to . Young

39:23.040 --> 39:24.889
patriots and dedicated .

39:27.280 --> 39:30.000
Man and woman , and I'm certain that

39:30.000 --> 39:32.056
the recovery mission was difficult .

39:32.679 --> 39:34.689
And I want to commend your team for

39:34.689 --> 39:37.500
bringing closure to their families . Uh

39:38.159 --> 39:41.899
Admiral , There's been public reporting

39:42.120 --> 39:46.050
that Iran continues to have Uh , as

39:46.050 --> 39:49.659
much as 70 to 75% of its

39:49.659 --> 39:53.149
missiles and launchers available to

39:53.419 --> 39:55.729
threaten shipping in the Strait of

39:55.729 --> 39:59.350
Hormuz . Uh Does that reporting

39:59.350 --> 40:02.689
conform roughly with your estimate as

40:02.689 --> 40:05.020
to Iran's continuing strength ?

40:07.600 --> 40:09.600
Senator , thank , thank you for the

40:09.600 --> 40:11.711
question and first thank you for your

40:11.711 --> 40:13.878
time , uh , these past few days . It's

40:13.878 --> 40:13.320
been meaningful and very much

40:13.320 --> 40:15.098
appreciated . Uh , I think it's

40:15.098 --> 40:16.931
appropriate in this forum not to

40:16.931 --> 40:18.598
discuss specific intelligence

40:18.598 --> 40:20.764
assessments . What I would say from my

40:20.764 --> 40:22.820
perspective is the numbers that I've

40:22.820 --> 40:24.987
seen in open source are not accurate .

40:24.987 --> 40:27.098
I think what also , uh , is not taken

40:27.098 --> 40:29.098
into consideration , it's more than

40:29.098 --> 40:31.320
just the numbers , it's the command and

40:31.320 --> 40:33.487
control that's been shattered . It's a

40:33.487 --> 40:35.376
significant degradation , uh , in

40:35.376 --> 40:37.598
capability , and it's the lack of any .

40:37.598 --> 40:39.820
Ability to then produce uh any missiles

40:39.820 --> 40:41.987
or drones on the back end . I think we

40:41.987 --> 40:44.042
have to take a holistic look at that

40:44.042 --> 40:45.876
and that's what we've done , but

40:45.876 --> 40:47.931
regardless of what the numbers are .

40:47.931 --> 40:50.270
Iran continues to pose a significant

40:50.270 --> 40:52.989
threat to shipping because it has

40:52.989 --> 40:55.300
missiles and fast boats and other

40:55.300 --> 40:58.010
assets that are available to attack

40:58.709 --> 41:00.550
shipping in the area . Correct ,

41:01.010 --> 41:03.121
Senator ? All , all , uh , in each of

41:03.121 --> 41:05.288
those cases their capability have been

41:05.288 --> 41:07.454
significantly degraded . If I just use

41:07.454 --> 41:09.566
my own professional experience , uh ,

41:09.566 --> 41:11.732
and 100 transits through the Strait of

41:11.732 --> 41:13.899
Hormuz , you would typically see 20 to

41:13.899 --> 41:16.121
40 , uh , fast boats , and , and lately

41:16.121 --> 41:19.310
we've seen 2 or 3 . So the degradation

41:19.310 --> 41:22.379
means uh it's been super it's been

41:22.379 --> 41:24.435
significant , uh , but some residual

41:24.435 --> 41:25.768
capability does exist .

41:28.010 --> 41:30.343
With respect to the threat that remains .

41:31.820 --> 41:34.419
Your forces were successful in Project

41:34.419 --> 41:37.639
Freedom in enabling ships to go through

41:38.139 --> 41:40.330
the strait , correct ? Uh , that's

41:40.330 --> 41:44.010
correct , sir , and Project Freedom was

41:44.010 --> 41:47.850
stopped . For what reason ? So ,

41:47.929 --> 41:50.096
I think , uh , I'll look back a couple

41:50.096 --> 41:52.207
of days ago on , uh , the Chairman of

41:52.207 --> 41:54.373
the Joint Chiefs' testimony before the

41:54.373 --> 41:53.810
Senate Appropriations Committee . I

41:53.810 --> 41:55.921
think he , he characterized it well .

41:56.169 --> 41:58.280
The situation in the Strait of Hormuz

41:58.280 --> 42:00.502
is , is rather complex these days , and

42:00.502 --> 42:02.669
I would offer just , just these , uh ,

42:02.669 --> 42:04.947
quick points . Uh , first and foremost ,

42:05.250 --> 42:07.729
uh , the United States controls , uh ,

42:07.770 --> 42:09.881
via our blockade , which I'd be happy

42:09.881 --> 42:11.770
to talk about the overall flow of

42:11.770 --> 42:13.881
commerce going into and out of Iran .

42:13.881 --> 42:16.489
The Iranian capability to stop commerce

42:16.489 --> 42:18.820
has been dramatically degraded through

42:18.820 --> 42:20.931
the Straits , but their voice is very

42:20.931 --> 42:23.290
loud , and those threats are clearly

42:23.290 --> 42:25.620
heard by the merchant industry and the

42:25.620 --> 42:27.898
insurance industry . Those are factors .

42:27.898 --> 42:30.009
They're certainly factors in energy ,

42:30.009 --> 42:32.064
and on top of all that project , I ,

42:32.064 --> 42:34.231
and I apologize for interrupting , but

42:34.231 --> 42:36.342
I'm going to run out of time , as you

42:36.342 --> 42:38.564
understand . Um , I , I think the point

42:38.564 --> 42:41.020
that I want to make here is that

42:41.030 --> 42:43.308
Project Freedom could be started again .

42:43.939 --> 42:47.739
And the voices of the Iranians , large

42:47.739 --> 42:51.199
as they are , could be contradicted

42:51.379 --> 42:54.459
or reduced in the impact .

42:55.100 --> 42:58.360
If Project Freedom were

42:58.620 --> 43:00.840
ongoing and the world could see that

43:00.979 --> 43:03.257
shipping was going through the straits ,

43:03.257 --> 43:06.689
am I off base in that view , Senator ?

43:06.699 --> 43:08.939
There's a wide range of contingencies

43:08.939 --> 43:11.161
that we are prepared to execute , and I

43:11.161 --> 43:13.106
would defer to the policymakers on

43:13.106 --> 43:15.328
anything having to do specifically with

43:15.328 --> 43:15.179
the Strait of Hormuz , particularly

43:15.179 --> 43:16.846
during this time of sensitive

43:16.846 --> 43:18.901
negotiations where it's , it's front

43:18.901 --> 43:21.199
and center in the negotiations . And

43:22.080 --> 43:24.360
Have you seen any progress in those

43:24.360 --> 43:27.250
negotiations ? Uh , Senator , I'd , I'd

43:27.250 --> 43:29.306
refer to the diplomats , uh , in the

43:29.306 --> 43:31.639
team , uh , engaged in the negotiations .

43:31.639 --> 43:34.659
Let me ask you , uh . In the time that

43:34.659 --> 43:36.979
I have left , uh , one of the

43:36.979 --> 43:39.500
objectives that President Trump

43:39.500 --> 43:41.556
articulated at the beginning of this

43:41.556 --> 43:43.620
war , which in my view could not be

43:43.620 --> 43:47.040
accomplished with bombing . was to

43:47.040 --> 43:50.479
secure the enriched uranium . Would you

43:50.479 --> 43:54.479
agree that Taking possession of

43:54.479 --> 43:57.290
that uranium . would require

43:58.709 --> 44:00.810
Boots on the ground and significant

44:00.810 --> 44:03.899
casualties for United States forces .

44:04.570 --> 44:06.737
Senator , in this particular forum , I

44:06.737 --> 44:08.626
think it's , it would be a highly

44:08.626 --> 44:08.610
inappropriate , uh , given the

44:08.610 --> 44:10.554
classified nature of , of , of any

44:10.554 --> 44:12.721
contingencies to talk , uh , about the

44:12.721 --> 44:14.777
nuclear program . Well , let me just

44:14.777 --> 44:17.489
finish by making the observation that

44:17.489 --> 44:20.159
you have . I think sought to be

44:20.159 --> 44:23.520
forthcoming to the committee in the

44:23.520 --> 44:26.879
classified setting where we had . An

44:26.879 --> 44:29.469
earlier conversation with questions and

44:29.469 --> 44:32.479
answers . My view is that .

44:33.489 --> 44:35.750
The vast majority of what you told us .

44:36.600 --> 44:39.010
Should also be told to the American

44:39.010 --> 44:42.389
people . They deserve to know And our

44:42.389 --> 44:45.360
adversaries know a lot of what we know .

44:48.040 --> 44:51.340
The ones who really don't know are the

44:51.340 --> 44:53.489
American people and they deserve more

44:53.489 --> 44:55.790
information , which is not . A

44:55.790 --> 44:59.090
criticism of you , it is of the

44:59.429 --> 45:02.770
system which causes . The withholding

45:02.770 --> 45:05.120
of this information and the

45:05.120 --> 45:07.231
administration , which has refused to

45:07.231 --> 45:10.729
provide figures . As to the cost of the

45:10.729 --> 45:14.639
war and other details that are relevant

45:14.639 --> 45:16.750
and important for the American people

45:16.889 --> 45:20.419
to know , so I'm hopeful that . We

45:20.419 --> 45:24.030
can have a way to Make more information

45:24.030 --> 45:25.974
available to the American people .

45:25.974 --> 45:28.199
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Admiral

45:28.199 --> 45:29.860
Cooper , um .

45:32.800 --> 45:34.639
During the brief time of Project

45:34.639 --> 45:38.260
Freedom . Before it was closed off

45:38.260 --> 45:41.909
again , did , did we ? Can you

45:41.909 --> 45:44.800
say in this setting whether or not

45:45.550 --> 45:48.550
um . Our service ,

45:49.290 --> 45:51.729
um , our services were able to open the

45:51.729 --> 45:54.550
strait . Senator , uh , thank you for

45:54.550 --> 45:56.828
this . Uh , very much appreciated , uh ,

45:56.828 --> 45:59.161
as , uh , has been publicly highlighted ,

45:59.161 --> 46:01.328
uh , the first , uh , two ships , uh ,

46:01.328 --> 46:03.383
to flow from the Arabian Gulf , uh ,

46:03.469 --> 46:05.580
from , from the western part into the

46:05.580 --> 46:07.858
east through the Strait of Hormuz , uh ,

46:07.858 --> 46:10.080
were US flagged vessels , uh , that was

46:10.080 --> 46:12.870
successfully executed , uh , and US

46:12.870 --> 46:14.814
Navy destroyers then came into the

46:14.814 --> 46:17.037
Arabian Gulf , operated for a number of

46:17.037 --> 46:19.148
days , and then , as you subsequently

46:19.148 --> 46:21.148
saw , uh , float out of the Arabian

46:21.148 --> 46:23.219
Gulf . OK , so Senator Blumenthal's

46:23.219 --> 46:26.800
question . Presumed that that you could

46:26.800 --> 46:29.570
give . In public your judgment as to

46:29.570 --> 46:33.479
whether Whether the United States is

46:33.479 --> 46:35.760
capable of doing that again , Senator ,

46:35.840 --> 46:37.562
there's a , there's a military

46:37.562 --> 46:39.618
component of this , and then there's

46:39.618 --> 46:41.784
also a policy component that I believe

46:41.784 --> 46:43.729
to the policymakers , but from the

46:43.729 --> 46:45.951
military standpoint we could , we could

46:45.951 --> 46:48.118
do that again , could we not ? We just

46:48.118 --> 46:50.709
did it last week . Thank you , uh ,

46:50.909 --> 46:53.790
Senator Ernst , I believe . Thank you ,

46:53.830 --> 46:55.886
Mr . Chair and gentlemen , thank you

46:55.886 --> 46:58.052
for being here today and to your teams

46:58.052 --> 47:00.110
as well . We truly appreciate your

47:00.110 --> 47:03.129
service and dedication to our nation ,

47:03.179 --> 47:05.790
and I also want to acknowledge the loss

47:05.790 --> 47:08.165
of , uh , the two . Individuals in

47:08.165 --> 47:10.804
Morocco and thank our Moroccan partners

47:10.804 --> 47:13.084
as well uh for their contribution in

47:13.084 --> 47:15.725
the recovery efforts . Uh , I do want

47:15.725 --> 47:17.725
to recognize Admiral Cooper , those

47:17.725 --> 47:20.645
that we have lost , uh , during this

47:20.645 --> 47:22.955
current operation or the former

47:22.955 --> 47:25.165
operation Epic Fury , uh , as well as

47:25.165 --> 47:27.387
the two Iowa National Guardsmen that we

47:27.387 --> 47:30.564
lost in Syria this last December . Uh ,

47:30.645 --> 47:32.965
we have also more than 380 who have

47:32.965 --> 47:35.969
been wounded . In this fight , uh , so

47:35.969 --> 47:38.080
for all of those service members that

47:38.080 --> 47:39.858
have given so much and to their

47:39.858 --> 47:41.691
families , uh , they will not be

47:41.691 --> 47:43.747
forgotten . Uh , the operations that

47:43.747 --> 47:45.802
have been conducted against Iran and

47:45.802 --> 47:47.969
its proxies across the Central Command

47:47.969 --> 47:51.409
AOR wouldn't have been possible without

47:51.409 --> 47:54.449
some really tremendous partners in that

47:54.449 --> 47:57.889
region , and we have seen a large

47:57.889 --> 48:01.729
burden borne by Israel and Jordan .

48:02.120 --> 48:05.129
Uh , we've seen assistance coming from

48:05.129 --> 48:08.969
Bahrain and UAE , who has taken a

48:08.969 --> 48:11.080
significant amount of incoming fire .

48:11.189 --> 48:14.449
Saudi Arabia , Qatar , um , they

48:14.449 --> 48:16.969
haven't all been passive bystanders .

48:17.010 --> 48:19.479
They've been actively engaged , so . Uh ,

48:19.580 --> 48:21.747
they have contributed to every line of

48:21.747 --> 48:24.060
effort , and we appreciate them

48:24.060 --> 48:26.979
contributing to our successes . Uh , we

48:26.979 --> 48:29.340
can't overstate what they're basing

48:29.340 --> 48:31.451
access logistics , their networks and

48:31.451 --> 48:34.320
intelligence cooperations have meant

48:34.320 --> 48:36.889
operationally to us . So Admiral Cooper ,

48:37.139 --> 48:39.600
what is the one or maybe two things ,

48:39.820 --> 48:41.939
uh , that you want all of us to

48:41.939 --> 48:43.828
understand as we walk out of this

48:43.828 --> 48:47.189
hearing . Knowing about what our allies

48:47.189 --> 48:49.330
have assisted with in this fight .

48:52.040 --> 48:54.096
Senator , first , uh , thank you for

48:54.096 --> 48:56.096
the question and thank you for your

48:56.096 --> 48:56.020
leadership and , and thank you for , uh ,

48:56.080 --> 48:58.302
all that has been done by the great men

48:58.302 --> 49:00.524
and women from , uh , from your state .

49:00.524 --> 49:02.691
Uh , they played an outsized role , so

49:02.691 --> 49:04.747
thank you for that . In terms of our

49:04.747 --> 49:06.969
partners , uh , I think the key , a key

49:06.969 --> 49:08.969
feature is we have enhanced mill to

49:08.969 --> 49:11.136
mill relationships across the board in

49:11.136 --> 49:13.302
the Middle East . As we sit here right

49:13.302 --> 49:15.136
now , we have 5 specific partner

49:15.136 --> 49:17.489
nations who are not just conceptually

49:17.489 --> 49:20.209
side by side but literally side by side

49:20.209 --> 49:22.820
with the United States in defense , uh ,

49:23.090 --> 49:25.270
the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain ,

49:25.760 --> 49:27.760
Kuwait , Qatar , and Saudi Arabia .

49:27.969 --> 49:30.010
Over the course of epic fury , uh ,

49:30.169 --> 49:32.169
they , they defended themselves and

49:32.169 --> 49:34.280
they defended Americans . In addition

49:34.280 --> 49:36.580
to those key allies , uh , everything

49:36.580 --> 49:38.913
that we've accomplished would have been ,

49:38.913 --> 49:40.858
uh , impossible without , uh , the

49:40.858 --> 49:43.080
Kingdom of Jordan . Uh , and clearly we

49:43.080 --> 49:45.136
were operating very closely with the

49:45.136 --> 49:44.929
state of Israel . I think that group in

49:44.929 --> 49:47.151
particular , uh , should be commended .

49:47.151 --> 49:49.151
They didn't just execute missions ,

49:49.151 --> 49:51.373
they served side by side with Americans

49:51.373 --> 49:53.485
and protected Americans . Thank you .

49:53.485 --> 49:55.596
And this takes years to develop those

49:55.596 --> 49:57.873
friendships , those relationships , uh ,

49:57.873 --> 50:00.040
the mill to mill work that you do , is

50:00.040 --> 50:01.985
that correct ? It does . There's ,

50:01.985 --> 50:04.207
there's the mill to mill work . There's

50:04.207 --> 50:06.318
the friendships . Uh , it's all about

50:06.318 --> 50:06.199
bringing these together and the air

50:06.199 --> 50:08.366
defense umbrella that's been created ,

50:08.366 --> 50:10.310
has been in concept , uh , for the

50:10.310 --> 50:12.477
better part of a decade and a half now

50:12.477 --> 50:14.532
fully realized . Mhm . And again , I

50:14.532 --> 50:16.532
just want to reiterate that we have

50:16.532 --> 50:18.588
such tremendous partnerships with so

50:18.588 --> 50:20.588
many of those nations , and we , we

50:20.588 --> 50:22.800
thank them for that . Um , I'll , I'll

50:22.800 --> 50:25.050
move to AFRICO now , General Anderson ,

50:25.370 --> 50:27.426
uh , over the past couple of years ,

50:27.426 --> 50:30.120
the US has been withdrawing forces , uh ,

50:30.290 --> 50:32.457
from a number of countries including ,

50:32.457 --> 50:36.290
um , Mali , and Chad , and Russia's

50:36.290 --> 50:39.610
African corps has moved in to fill that

50:39.610 --> 50:42.399
vacuum where we don't exist , others

50:42.399 --> 50:45.449
will , um , but just a few weeks ago

50:45.449 --> 50:48.010
they retreated from Kidal , Mali under

50:48.010 --> 50:50.860
fire . Uh , they had surrendered to the

50:50.860 --> 50:53.139
very militants that they were sent to

50:53.139 --> 50:56.580
defeat , so we have some really

50:56.580 --> 50:59.060
interesting dynamics going on in , in

50:59.060 --> 51:01.820
that region , and AFRICO is left with a

51:01.820 --> 51:04.899
res uh responsibility for a lot more

51:04.899 --> 51:07.066
high risk , high threat posts than any

51:07.066 --> 51:09.232
other combatant command in the world .

51:09.560 --> 51:11.580
Um , so walk us through just very

51:11.580 --> 51:15.239
briefly what AFRICO cannot do today

51:15.500 --> 51:18.120
that it could five years ago .

51:20.560 --> 51:22.782
Well , Senator , I think , uh , there's

51:22.782 --> 51:24.838
one very poignant example that I can

51:24.838 --> 51:27.060
use very quickly is that , uh , 5 years

51:27.060 --> 51:28.727
ago as a commander of Special

51:28.727 --> 51:30.671
Operations Command Africa , Philip

51:30.671 --> 51:32.449
Walton was taken hostage in and

51:32.449 --> 51:34.560
transported by bandits who were being

51:34.560 --> 51:36.504
prepared to be sold to a terrorist

51:36.504 --> 51:36.350
organizations . We were able to

51:36.350 --> 51:38.572
identify him in 24 hours . We were able

51:38.572 --> 51:40.794
to pinpoint his location within 48 . He

51:40.794 --> 51:42.961
was rescued in less than 96 . That was

51:42.961 --> 51:45.183
largely due to the access that we had ,

51:45.183 --> 51:46.850
also the partnerships and the

51:46.850 --> 51:49.072
relationships that we enjoyed . Today ,

51:49.969 --> 51:52.570
Kevin Rideout is on day 205 of

51:52.570 --> 51:54.649
captivity , largely because we don't

51:54.649 --> 51:56.816
have the access that we had before and

51:56.816 --> 51:58.982
the relationships that are necessary ,

51:58.982 --> 52:00.982
and that posture reduction has been

52:00.982 --> 52:03.093
difficult , and he was also taken out

52:03.093 --> 52:05.205
of Niameh . Unfortunately he was then

52:05.205 --> 52:07.149
sold by the bandits to ISIS and is

52:07.149 --> 52:09.093
being held there today . And , and

52:09.093 --> 52:11.260
thank you for that and Mr . Chairman ,

52:11.260 --> 52:13.570
I just want folks to understand , um ,

52:13.790 --> 52:15.989
the lack of presence that we have in

52:15.989 --> 52:19.070
AFRICO and that exact difference . So

52:19.070 --> 52:21.292
thank you General Anderson for a very ,

52:21.292 --> 52:25.110
very specific example of what a lack

52:25.110 --> 52:27.110
of presence has meant . Thank you ,

52:27.110 --> 52:29.277
Senator Ernst . Um , there , there's a

52:29.699 --> 52:32.090
there's a proposal for substantially

52:32.590 --> 52:34.989
more funding for your command , is that

52:34.989 --> 52:37.610
right , General Anderson ? Uh , Senator ,

52:37.669 --> 52:39.280
that is correct . The , uh ,

52:39.280 --> 52:40.780
presidential budget , uh ,

52:40.820 --> 52:42.987
significantly increases our budget and

52:42.987 --> 52:45.153
addresses some of these key concerns .

52:45.153 --> 52:47.376
Well , that , that one example you just

52:47.376 --> 52:50.500
gave , would that be addressed by these

52:50.500 --> 52:52.556
proposed additionals ? So , uh , not

52:52.556 --> 52:54.778
entirely , Senator , because the access

52:54.778 --> 52:56.778
and relationships are what were key

52:56.778 --> 52:59.056
there , uh , but we do because of this ,

52:59.056 --> 53:01.222
because of that lack of posture , need

53:01.222 --> 53:03.056
more investment in expeditionary

53:03.056 --> 53:04.889
capabilities , and that is being

53:04.889 --> 53:07.056
addressed in the proposed budget . But

53:07.056 --> 53:09.222
those uh that those relationships that

53:09.222 --> 53:11.444
uh the center highlight and maintaining

53:11.444 --> 53:13.389
those relationships are absolutely

53:13.389 --> 53:15.611
critical because you cannot surge trust

53:15.611 --> 53:17.722
in the time of need . OK , well , you

53:17.722 --> 53:19.778
and I have gone back and forth about

53:19.778 --> 53:21.944
unfunded requirements , and so I guess

53:21.944 --> 53:24.600
your testimony is . Is that that's not

53:24.600 --> 53:26.550
a matter of funding , it's just a

53:26.550 --> 53:29.830
matter of relationships . Uh , uh ,

53:29.969 --> 53:32.209
Senator , that is , uh , a matter of

53:32.209 --> 53:34.209
relationships . The funding that we

53:34.209 --> 53:36.431
would ask for that would encourage that

53:36.431 --> 53:38.265
would help us is the contingency

53:38.265 --> 53:40.487
response , uh , ability expeditionary ,

53:40.487 --> 53:42.653
but also , uh , some targeted programs

53:42.653 --> 53:44.542
to work with key partners who are

53:44.542 --> 53:46.709
willing and able to address the threat

53:46.709 --> 53:46.439
to increase their capability and

53:46.439 --> 53:48.606
capacity to do that . So those are the

53:48.606 --> 53:50.828
investments , those are all included in

53:50.828 --> 53:52.883
the proposed budget . So right now I

53:52.883 --> 53:55.530
don't have , uh , many needs , very

53:55.530 --> 53:58.639
well , um , Senator Kaine . Thank you

53:58.639 --> 54:00.861
Mr . Chair and , and to our witnesses ,

54:00.861 --> 54:02.528
President Trump's decision to

54:02.528 --> 54:04.528
unilaterally take the United States

54:04.528 --> 54:06.520
into a war with Iran is deeply

54:06.520 --> 54:09.320
unpopular in Virginia . We are a very

54:09.320 --> 54:11.639
pro-military state , a very

54:11.639 --> 54:13.959
pro-military state , and as I've

54:13.959 --> 54:16.126
traveled around Virginia and talked to

54:16.126 --> 54:18.237
Virginians , the unpopularity sort of

54:18.237 --> 54:20.403
gets crystallized into have we learned

54:20.403 --> 54:22.403
nothing from 25 years of war in the

54:22.403 --> 54:25.469
region . 14,000 American troops and

54:25.469 --> 54:27.629
contractors died in the war on terror

54:27.629 --> 54:29.629
in Iraq and Afghanistan . More than

54:29.629 --> 54:32.530
65,000 injured , $8 trillion spent ,

54:33.100 --> 54:35.100
and Virginians who've watched their

54:35.100 --> 54:37.267
friends and family repeatedly deployed

54:37.267 --> 54:39.211
over the last quarter century have

54:39.211 --> 54:40.878
grave concerns about what was

54:40.878 --> 54:43.409
accomplished and was the sacrifice

54:43.409 --> 54:46.209
worth it . Our troops sacrificed so

54:46.209 --> 54:48.330
bravely . Um , Chief Warrant Officer

54:48.330 --> 54:50.497
Robert Marzon , one of the 14 who have

54:50.497 --> 54:52.489
died in epic fury , Spottsylvania

54:52.489 --> 54:55.360
County , Virginia . Our For carrier

54:55.360 --> 54:57.527
strike group just returned the longest

54:57.527 --> 54:59.770
post-Vietnam deployment of any , uh any

55:00.080 --> 55:03.189
carrier . Our folks sacrifice . They

55:03.189 --> 55:05.411
want civilian leaders to make the right

55:05.411 --> 55:07.760
decisions about whether and when and

55:07.760 --> 55:09.982
how they should sacrifice , and there's

55:09.982 --> 55:12.389
deep concern that in this instance the

55:12.389 --> 55:15.459
decision is a wrong one . Um , part of

55:15.459 --> 55:18.159
it is , is a failure to really grapple

55:18.159 --> 55:20.215
with history in , in the hearings in

55:20.215 --> 55:22.437
this committee I've heard over and over

55:22.437 --> 55:22.419
again and I've heard the president ,

55:22.770 --> 55:25.219
Secretary of Defense talk about Iran's

55:25.219 --> 55:27.709
bad actions since 1979 and everything

55:27.709 --> 55:29.598
that's been said about Iran's bad

55:29.598 --> 55:32.360
actions are true , but there's a lot of

55:32.360 --> 55:34.582
the story that folks don't talk about .

55:34.582 --> 55:37.080
History didn't begin in 1979 . Iran and

55:37.080 --> 55:39.247
the United States were allies in World

55:39.247 --> 55:41.358
War II . One of the pivotal events in

55:41.358 --> 55:43.469
World War 2 was the Tehran Conference

55:43.469 --> 55:45.469
where President Roosevelt , Winston

55:45.469 --> 55:47.691
Churchill , Joseph Stalin met in Tehran

55:47.691 --> 55:50.610
to guarantee Iran independence , stable

55:50.610 --> 55:54.320
borders , and sovereignty . Iran loved

55:54.320 --> 55:57.879
the United States . The United States

55:57.879 --> 56:00.101
led a coup to topple the democratically

56:00.101 --> 56:02.399
elected government of Iran in 1953

56:02.399 --> 56:04.566
during the Eisenhower administration .

56:05.239 --> 56:06.961
The United States propped up a

56:06.961 --> 56:08.929
dictatorship , the Shah of Iran ,

56:09.600 --> 56:11.822
trained the secret police , the SAVAK ,

56:11.822 --> 56:14.820
that tortured , exiled . Imprisoned ,

56:14.959 --> 56:18.860
killed Iranians by the thousands . And

56:18.860 --> 56:20.820
26 years after that there was a

56:20.820 --> 56:23.270
revolution in 1979 , and yet , yes ,

56:23.419 --> 56:26.179
then it was death to America . The US

56:26.179 --> 56:28.290
funding a dictatorship and toppling a

56:28.290 --> 56:30.540
democratic elected government led to an

56:30.540 --> 56:32.651
Iran that has been very hostile , and

56:32.651 --> 56:34.540
all the events my colleagues have

56:34.540 --> 56:36.707
talked about since then are accurate .

56:37.840 --> 56:40.007
But just as Iran seized our embassy in

56:40.007 --> 56:42.729
violation of international law , Then

56:42.729 --> 56:45.330
the United States funded Saddam Hussein

56:45.330 --> 56:47.386
for Iraq to wage war against Iran in

56:47.386 --> 56:49.163
the 1980s , killing hundreds of

56:49.163 --> 56:51.270
thousands of Iranians . And just as

56:51.270 --> 56:53.750
Iran funded proxies that bombed a

56:53.750 --> 56:55.750
marine barracks on our embassy in

56:55.750 --> 56:58.620
Beirut , the USS Navy shot down an

56:58.620 --> 57:00.989
Iranian civilian aircraft in 1989 ,

57:01.070 --> 57:04.360
killing 290 civilians . And the US

57:04.360 --> 57:06.471
invaded Iran's next door neighbors to

57:06.471 --> 57:08.527
topple their government , and then ,

57:08.527 --> 57:10.416
yes , Iranians attacked US troops

57:10.416 --> 57:12.527
arrayed near their border , and we've

57:12.527 --> 57:14.693
attacked and killed their leadership .

57:14.693 --> 57:17.860
I'm not saying that Iran is good . Iran

57:17.860 --> 57:21.260
is horrible , horrible to its neighbors ,

57:21.330 --> 57:23.608
horrible to people outside its borders ,

57:23.608 --> 57:25.774
and even worse to its own people . But

57:25.774 --> 57:27.886
if you ignore the history of the back

57:27.886 --> 57:30.108
and forth between the US and Iran , you

57:30.108 --> 57:33.120
will not get this right . If more war

57:33.120 --> 57:35.453
between the US and Iran were the answer ,

57:35.453 --> 57:37.676
we would have found the answer sometime

57:37.676 --> 57:40.310
between 1953 and now . Here's something

57:40.310 --> 57:41.977
I think it's important for my

57:41.977 --> 57:45.250
colleagues to know . We did look for a

57:45.250 --> 57:48.929
path , a diplomatic path to end this

57:48.929 --> 57:50.985
hostility that's been going on since

57:50.985 --> 57:53.040
1953 , and President Trump tore up a

57:53.040 --> 57:55.969
diplomatic deal over the advice of his

57:55.969 --> 57:58.080
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of

57:58.080 --> 58:00.479
State , and many of us said at the time ,

58:00.729 --> 58:04.050
if you do this , it is likely to lead

58:04.050 --> 58:05.883
to Americans dying . If you make

58:05.883 --> 58:07.939
diplomacy impossible , you will make

58:07.939 --> 58:09.883
war inevitable , and I believe the

58:09.883 --> 58:11.883
troops who have been killed in epic

58:11.883 --> 58:13.828
fury would be alive today . If the

58:13.828 --> 58:15.661
United States had not decided to

58:15.661 --> 58:17.870
abandon the diplomatic deal . Admiral

58:17.870 --> 58:19.814
Cooper and to my colleagues on the

58:19.814 --> 58:21.814
committee , here's something that's

58:21.814 --> 58:24.037
pretty amazing that we shouldn't settle

58:24.037 --> 58:26.259
for . The administration is refusing to

58:26.259 --> 58:28.426
allow members of this committee to see

58:28.426 --> 58:31.429
the OLC opinion stating the legal case

58:31.429 --> 58:34.489
for war . We've always had the ability ,

58:34.610 --> 58:36.840
we're armed services members . We're

58:36.840 --> 58:39.959
being asked to fund a $1.5 trillion

58:39.959 --> 58:42.169
budget , but our request to the DOJ to

58:42.169 --> 58:45.010
see the OLC opinion justifying this war ,

58:45.090 --> 58:47.201
they have refused to allow members of

58:47.201 --> 58:49.479
the Armed Services Committee to see it .

58:49.979 --> 58:52.810
US senators , appropriators , we're not

58:52.810 --> 58:55.419
allowed to see it . What are they

58:55.419 --> 58:58.679
hiding ? If they're , if they will not

58:58.679 --> 59:01.080
allow us to see the legal rationale for

59:01.080 --> 59:04.419
the war . What are they hiding ? And Mr .

59:04.429 --> 59:06.596
Charles just conclude and say , I hope

59:06.596 --> 59:08.762
we might as a committee , whatever our

59:08.762 --> 59:10.707
agreements about the wisdom or the

59:10.707 --> 59:12.818
legality of the war , I hope we might

59:12.818 --> 59:14.985
as a committee agree that we should at

59:14.985 --> 59:17.149
least in a classified setting be able

59:17.149 --> 59:20.110
to read the legal opinion . Upon which

59:20.110 --> 59:23.760
this entire 76 day war is based . Thank

59:23.760 --> 59:26.959
you , Mr . Chair . Yes , uh , um ,

59:27.419 --> 59:30.659
thank you . Senator , you , you have

59:32.439 --> 59:34.606
Made a statement that raises questions

59:34.606 --> 59:37.760
that these two witnesses are .

59:38.550 --> 59:40.772
Unable to answer because you've asked ,

59:40.790 --> 59:42.989
you've raised policy questions and so

59:42.989 --> 59:44.878
I'm just for the benefit of those

59:44.878 --> 59:47.479
listening in . Um , we have had the

59:47.479 --> 59:49.679
civilian leadership before this

59:49.679 --> 59:52.120
committee , uh , to answer questions

59:52.120 --> 59:55.320
like , like that , and , uh , these two

59:55.320 --> 59:58.760
gentlemen would have to decline if , if

59:58.760 --> 01:00:01.149
you had formed that and stated that in

01:00:01.149 --> 01:00:03.316
the form of a question they would have

01:00:03.316 --> 01:00:05.482
to decline to answer because that is a

01:00:05.482 --> 01:00:08.659
matter of policy . Um , who is , uh ,

01:00:08.790 --> 01:00:12.080
next , uh , Senator Moody , you're

01:00:12.080 --> 01:00:14.949
recognized . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:00:15.280 --> 01:00:17.800
Uh , and , and thank you for being here

01:00:17.800 --> 01:00:20.649
today . Um , Admiral Cooper , General

01:00:20.649 --> 01:00:22.316
Anderson , thank you for your

01:00:22.316 --> 01:00:24.260
leadership to the men and women of

01:00:24.260 --> 01:00:26.205
CENTCOM and AFRICO . Thank you for

01:00:26.205 --> 01:00:28.260
everything that you have . Have done

01:00:28.260 --> 01:00:30.482
over the course of your careers and are

01:00:30.482 --> 01:00:32.593
continuing to do to serve our country

01:00:32.593 --> 01:00:32.290
and I see there are so many men and

01:00:32.290 --> 01:00:34.346
women with you behind you to support

01:00:34.346 --> 01:00:36.739
these efforts today , um , to speak

01:00:36.739 --> 01:00:38.850
with us , to meet with us , to answer

01:00:38.850 --> 01:00:40.628
our questions . I know a lot of

01:00:40.628 --> 01:00:42.628
preparation goes into that and so I

01:00:42.628 --> 01:00:44.961
thank you as well . um , Admiral Cooper ,

01:00:44.961 --> 01:00:47.295
the fight you're leading certainly , um .

01:00:48.070 --> 01:00:50.629
With Centcom under your command . Uh ,

01:00:50.709 --> 01:00:52.765
I'm always proud to say that that is

01:00:52.765 --> 01:00:54.931
from my home , based in my home county

01:00:54.931 --> 01:00:56.876
in Florida , Hillsborough County ,

01:00:56.876 --> 01:00:58.987
Florida . That's where I was born and

01:00:58.987 --> 01:01:01.098
raised . It's been there since 1983 ,

01:01:01.098 --> 01:01:04.070
43 years of , um , Commanding

01:01:04.070 --> 01:01:06.403
operations like we're involved in today .

01:01:06.403 --> 01:01:09.250
So proud to have you here , sir . Um ,

01:01:09.580 --> 01:01:12.419
Florida is so involved from SOCOM ,

01:01:12.510 --> 01:01:14.566
Space Forces Central , Patrick Space

01:01:14.566 --> 01:01:16.649
Force Base , Cape Canaveral . We're

01:01:16.649 --> 01:01:19.479
both the command hub and launch pad for

01:01:20.020 --> 01:01:22.340
most all conflict . So we are proud to

01:01:22.340 --> 01:01:24.620
be that , proud to be , uh , a , a

01:01:24.620 --> 01:01:26.787
stakeholder and everything that's done

01:01:26.820 --> 01:01:28.987
within the military . And so on behalf

01:01:28.987 --> 01:01:31.209
of all the service members in Florida ,

01:01:31.209 --> 01:01:33.542
civilian . And their families , um , we ,

01:01:33.542 --> 01:01:35.653
we wanna say thank you to them . Uh ,

01:01:35.653 --> 01:01:37.542
you know , it's , I am the newest

01:01:37.542 --> 01:01:39.709
member of this committee . It's , it's

01:01:39.709 --> 01:01:41.764
always interesting to me to hear the

01:01:41.764 --> 01:01:41.310
different perspectives from other

01:01:41.310 --> 01:01:43.532
members on this committee , committee .

01:01:43.550 --> 01:01:45.661
Uh , you would think from some of the

01:01:45.661 --> 01:01:47.828
questioning previously that , uh , the

01:01:47.828 --> 01:01:50.050
United States willy-nilly abandoned all

01:01:50.050 --> 01:01:52.217
diplomatic efforts , uh , didn't think

01:01:52.217 --> 01:01:53.772
through that . There was no

01:01:53.772 --> 01:01:55.939
justification , and , uh , I , I , I'm

01:01:55.939 --> 01:01:58.272
wondering , I know if you could tell me ,

01:01:58.272 --> 01:02:00.750
um . Admiral Cooper , what is your

01:02:00.750 --> 01:02:02.861
background working with CETCO and all

01:02:02.861 --> 01:02:05.194
of the leadership positions you've held ?

01:02:06.830 --> 01:02:08.886
Senator , first , uh , thank you for

01:02:08.886 --> 01:02:10.997
the question and thanks for your time

01:02:10.997 --> 01:02:10.590
yesterday and , and , and thanks for

01:02:10.590 --> 01:02:12.590
your leadership . Uh , thousands of

01:02:12.590 --> 01:02:14.646
Floridians are serving in the Middle

01:02:14.646 --> 01:02:16.757
East today and they're serving , uh ,

01:02:16.757 --> 01:02:18.923
what specifically have been your roles

01:02:18.923 --> 01:02:21.034
with CENTCOM ? Uh , I've been focused

01:02:21.034 --> 01:02:23.034
on the Middle East for the last 5 .

01:02:23.034 --> 01:02:25.146
Years , 3 years of which were serving

01:02:25.146 --> 01:02:27.257
in Bahrain as the fleet commander and

01:02:27.257 --> 01:02:29.201
then about 16 months as the deputy

01:02:29.201 --> 01:02:31.479
commander prior to my current position .

01:02:31.479 --> 01:02:33.479
And how long have you been familiar

01:02:33.479 --> 01:02:35.735
with , um , Iran and its leadership and

01:02:35.735 --> 01:02:39.179
its uh . Attacks against the United

01:02:39.179 --> 01:02:41.459
States . I've studied or been a part of

01:02:41.459 --> 01:02:43.792
it for the better part of three decades ,

01:02:43.792 --> 01:02:45.737
particularly acutely in the last 5

01:02:45.737 --> 01:02:48.860
years and leading up to February 28th .

01:02:50.429 --> 01:02:52.669
Months prior to that , what , what was

01:02:52.669 --> 01:02:54.613
jarring to you that you saw , uh ,

01:02:55.350 --> 01:02:57.517
different than what had been for those

01:02:57.517 --> 01:02:59.794
many decades that you've been involved ?

01:02:59.794 --> 01:03:01.961
I think it's important to note just in

01:03:01.961 --> 01:03:04.072
the 30 months before , uh , Epic Fury

01:03:04.072 --> 01:03:06.183
commenced . Uh , Iran and its proxies

01:03:06.183 --> 01:03:08.294
had been attacking US service members

01:03:08.294 --> 01:03:10.570
and diplomats about 350 times . Can you

01:03:10.570 --> 01:03:12.681
repeat that about every , about every

01:03:12.681 --> 01:03:14.903
3rd day , Iran and its proxies attacked

01:03:14.903 --> 01:03:17.014
American service members 350 times in

01:03:17.014 --> 01:03:19.280
the Middle East . I don't think that

01:03:19.280 --> 01:03:21.447
Americans were aware of that , that in

01:03:21.447 --> 01:03:23.502
the 30 months that they had attacked

01:03:23.639 --> 01:03:25.860
Americans or their service members 350

01:03:25.860 --> 01:03:27.971
times . Does that surprise you that I

01:03:27.971 --> 01:03:30.149
would say that ? That I don't believe

01:03:30.149 --> 01:03:32.205
that everyday American going to work

01:03:32.205 --> 01:03:35.110
knew that . It's , it's disappointing ,

01:03:35.270 --> 01:03:38.030
but between the actions of proxies in

01:03:38.030 --> 01:03:40.510
Iraq and Syria , as well as the Houthis ,

01:03:40.750 --> 01:03:42.972
that's , that's simply the fact of what

01:03:42.972 --> 01:03:44.861
happened . And the and the months

01:03:44.861 --> 01:03:47.083
leading up to that decision , that very

01:03:47.083 --> 01:03:49.083
serious decision on February 28th ,

01:03:49.110 --> 01:03:51.221
what were your concerns regarding the

01:03:51.221 --> 01:03:53.100
proliferation of missiles or the

01:03:53.100 --> 01:03:55.044
ability of the United States to do

01:03:55.044 --> 01:03:56.822
anything if that nuclear threat

01:03:56.822 --> 01:03:58.933
escalated ? Senator , in this venue ,

01:03:58.933 --> 01:04:00.989
what I would say is , uh , since our

01:04:00.989 --> 01:04:03.267
number one priority is to prevent , uh ,

01:04:03.267 --> 01:04:05.840
a nuclear capable Iran , uh , I've

01:04:05.949 --> 01:04:07.782
always every day focused on that

01:04:07.782 --> 01:04:09.949
problem , but what we saw in the weeks

01:04:09.949 --> 01:04:12.171
and months leading up to the uh to epic

01:04:12.171 --> 01:04:14.350
fury was an increase in the production

01:04:14.350 --> 01:04:16.517
capability of ballistic missiles which

01:04:16.517 --> 01:04:18.709
presented a very significant risk both

01:04:18.709 --> 01:04:20.790
to the partners and ourselves , and

01:04:20.790 --> 01:04:23.012
this is why it was part of our military

01:04:23.012 --> 01:04:25.290
objectives to eliminate those missiles .

01:04:25.290 --> 01:04:27.401
And equally if not more importantly ,

01:04:27.401 --> 01:04:29.623
eliminate the ability for Iran in those

01:04:29.623 --> 01:04:31.846
couple of months leading right up until

01:04:31.846 --> 01:04:33.957
that you saw a dramatic escalation in

01:04:33.957 --> 01:04:36.012
that ability on Iran's part . That's

01:04:36.012 --> 01:04:38.012
correct . Between starting in about

01:04:38.012 --> 01:04:37.495
November and December , you started ,

01:04:37.574 --> 01:04:39.463
you started to see an increase in

01:04:39.463 --> 01:04:42.114
Iran's capability and intent to produce

01:04:42.114 --> 01:04:44.058
more ballistic missile . And if we

01:04:44.058 --> 01:04:47.239
couldn't have um . Neutralized that

01:04:47.239 --> 01:04:49.461
threat diplomatically . Does there come

01:04:49.461 --> 01:04:51.406
a point where that , that's not an

01:04:51.406 --> 01:04:53.517
option anymore , where there may be a

01:04:53.517 --> 01:04:53.199
slippery slope where we can't get back

01:04:53.199 --> 01:04:55.909
to our ability to be effective to , um ,

01:04:55.969 --> 01:04:58.300
quell that threat ? Without crossing

01:04:58.300 --> 01:05:00.467
into classified lanes , uh , the short

01:05:00.467 --> 01:05:04.439
answer is yes . Iran has had a large

01:05:04.439 --> 01:05:06.550
scale capability to produce ballistic

01:05:06.550 --> 01:05:09.620
missiles beyond which could potentially

01:05:09.620 --> 01:05:11.620
be defended . I think that's a very

01:05:11.620 --> 01:05:13.731
important point . The second point is

01:05:13.731 --> 01:05:15.676
that capability has been virtually

01:05:15.676 --> 01:05:17.842
eliminated , and I believe I heard you

01:05:17.842 --> 01:05:17.699
say at this point you believe Epic Fury

01:05:17.699 --> 01:05:20.820
has satisfied its mission . Senator ,

01:05:20.860 --> 01:05:22.860
we met every military objective for

01:05:22.860 --> 01:05:24.749
epic . And what is the difference

01:05:24.749 --> 01:05:26.804
between where we were on the 28th of

01:05:26.804 --> 01:05:28.860
February and right now ? If I used a

01:05:28.860 --> 01:05:30.979
couple of examples , uh , the Iranian

01:05:30.979 --> 01:05:33.800
navy went from , uh , harassing , uh ,

01:05:33.899 --> 01:05:35.788
throughout the region and being a

01:05:35.788 --> 01:05:37.732
regional power to having no navy .

01:05:37.732 --> 01:05:39.955
Thank you . Thank you , Senator Moody ,

01:05:39.955 --> 01:05:42.889
uh , Senator King . Thank you , thank

01:05:42.889 --> 01:05:44.945
you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , Admiral ,

01:05:44.945 --> 01:05:47.111
you mentioned , you used the word myth

01:05:47.111 --> 01:05:49.111
busting a few minutes ago and I , I

01:05:49.111 --> 01:05:51.000
have , I have to do a little myth

01:05:51.000 --> 01:05:53.056
busting . Uh , it's sort of a common

01:05:53.056 --> 01:05:55.167
rhetoric today that no administration

01:05:55.167 --> 01:05:57.222
prior to this one has confronted the

01:05:57.222 --> 01:05:59.278
threats of Iran . In fact , the most

01:05:59.278 --> 01:06:01.629
effective confrontation with the threat

01:06:01.850 --> 01:06:03.906
from Iran , the nuclear threat , was

01:06:03.906 --> 01:06:06.128
during President Obama's administration

01:06:06.128 --> 01:06:08.800
with the JCPOA . I would point out that

01:06:08.850 --> 01:06:11.530
at the time that President Trump tore

01:06:11.530 --> 01:06:15.090
up unilaterally tore up the nuclear

01:06:15.090 --> 01:06:18.459
agreement with Iran , Iran had zero

01:06:18.530 --> 01:06:21.399
highly enriched uranium . As you know ,

01:06:21.639 --> 01:06:23.800
today , one of the focuses of this

01:06:23.800 --> 01:06:26.760
whole enterprise is 400 kg of highly

01:06:26.760 --> 01:06:29.469
enriched uranium that's in place in

01:06:29.469 --> 01:06:31.959
Iran that was produced since the

01:06:31.959 --> 01:06:35.560
unilateral dissolution of the JCPOA . I ,

01:06:36.340 --> 01:06:38.340
I , the , the idea that nobody ever

01:06:38.340 --> 01:06:41.629
confronted this , this problem is just

01:06:41.629 --> 01:06:43.949
not true . And we're now confronting a

01:06:43.949 --> 01:06:46.149
problem that was created by the

01:06:46.149 --> 01:06:48.371
abandonment of the JCPOA , which is the

01:06:48.371 --> 01:06:50.449
most comprehensive nuclear control

01:06:50.770 --> 01:06:53.429
agreement ever , and the most highly

01:06:53.429 --> 01:06:56.270
inspected by the International Atomic

01:06:56.270 --> 01:06:59.780
Energy Agency in world history . So ,

01:07:00.760 --> 01:07:02.760
we're confronted with a problem now

01:07:02.760 --> 01:07:04.929
that in many ways this administration

01:07:04.929 --> 01:07:08.709
created in 2018 by abandoning this

01:07:08.709 --> 01:07:12.370
uh this agreement . Um , let me move

01:07:12.370 --> 01:07:14.770
on . Uh , do we , do we have any

01:07:14.770 --> 01:07:16.850
clarity now as to who's in charge in

01:07:16.850 --> 01:07:20.649
Iran ? Do we know who , who is , has

01:07:20.649 --> 01:07:22.427
the power to negotiate and make

01:07:22.427 --> 01:07:25.770
agreements ? Senator , the , the

01:07:25.770 --> 01:07:28.169
negotiations themselves are held via

01:07:28.169 --> 01:07:30.058
diplomatic channels , and I would

01:07:30.058 --> 01:07:31.891
really refer to the diplomats to

01:07:31.891 --> 01:07:33.780
address that . But clearly from a

01:07:33.780 --> 01:07:35.725
military perspective their command

01:07:35.725 --> 01:07:37.891
control was significantly fractured as

01:07:37.891 --> 01:07:40.002
a result of our strikes and Operation

01:07:40.002 --> 01:07:42.169
Epic Fury , and command and control is

01:07:42.169 --> 01:07:44.447
another way of saying their leadership .

01:07:44.447 --> 01:07:46.225
They , there's a communications

01:07:46.225 --> 01:07:48.336
difficulty . Is the IRGC in charge at

01:07:48.336 --> 01:07:50.330
this point ? From the IRGC is

01:07:50.330 --> 01:07:54.290
exercising significant authority . Um ,

01:07:55.810 --> 01:07:58.639
General Anderson , uh , Talk to me

01:07:58.639 --> 01:08:00.917
about the loss of soft power in Africa ,

01:08:00.917 --> 01:08:04.219
our abandonment of of USAID and what

01:08:04.639 --> 01:08:06.695
what's happened with the Chinese and

01:08:06.695 --> 01:08:08.806
the Russians that my understanding is

01:08:08.806 --> 01:08:12.310
are now filling that that gap , uh , in

01:08:12.310 --> 01:08:14.143
addition to the other aggressive

01:08:14.143 --> 01:08:15.810
actions that they're taking .

01:08:17.939 --> 01:08:20.106
Uh , Senator , I would say that , uh ,

01:08:20.106 --> 01:08:22.328
we look at all facets of national power

01:08:22.328 --> 01:08:24.439
and how to bring those to bear on the

01:08:24.439 --> 01:08:26.606
continent in order to provide security

01:08:26.606 --> 01:08:28.828
outcomes . Oftentimes , uh , taking one

01:08:28.828 --> 01:08:30.828
facet of our national power off the

01:08:30.828 --> 01:08:32.772
table unilaterally for no , for no

01:08:32.772 --> 01:08:35.399
apparent reason . The , the whim of

01:08:35.410 --> 01:08:39.189
Elon Musk . Senator , we work very

01:08:39.189 --> 01:08:41.870
closely with state , with commerce and

01:08:41.870 --> 01:08:44.092
energy in order to look at the security

01:08:44.092 --> 01:08:46.259
requirements on the continent . I have

01:08:46.259 --> 01:08:48.314
a Foreign Service commercial officer

01:08:48.314 --> 01:08:50.537
joining my staff this summer along with

01:08:50.537 --> 01:08:52.759
a liaison from the Department of Energy

01:08:52.759 --> 01:08:52.129
in order to look at economic

01:08:52.129 --> 01:08:54.129
opportunities . We have essentially

01:08:54.669 --> 01:08:58.209
left all of the role that USAID played

01:08:58.669 --> 01:09:00.836
on the continent . That's gone , isn't

01:09:00.836 --> 01:09:03.058
that that that's a yes or no question .

01:09:03.689 --> 01:09:06.330
Senator , there are still aid programs

01:09:06.330 --> 01:09:08.552
that are active on the continent . They

01:09:08.552 --> 01:09:10.608
are much reduced from what they were

01:09:10.608 --> 01:09:12.830
before , much , much reduced . That's a

01:09:12.830 --> 01:09:14.997
fair way of stating it . You mentioned

01:09:14.997 --> 01:09:18.549
earlier that the al Qaeda and ISIS have

01:09:18.600 --> 01:09:21.250
have resurged in Africa . Now the term

01:09:21.250 --> 01:09:23.361
epicenter has been used several times

01:09:23.361 --> 01:09:25.810
of world terrorism . You , you use the

01:09:25.810 --> 01:09:27.921
term , they said , you said they have

01:09:27.921 --> 01:09:29.810
the will and intent to attack the

01:09:29.810 --> 01:09:31.810
homeland . My question is , do they

01:09:31.810 --> 01:09:33.977
have the capacity ? Do they , are they

01:09:33.977 --> 01:09:37.799
developing ? Weapons , strategies ,

01:09:38.580 --> 01:09:41.850
other ways to , to take that will and

01:09:41.850 --> 01:09:44.988
intent and turn it into something . Of

01:09:44.988 --> 01:09:47.266
imminent danger to the American people ,

01:09:47.266 --> 01:09:49.548
Senator , that is the exact issue that

01:09:49.548 --> 01:09:52.269
is my top concern is being able to

01:09:52.269 --> 01:09:54.436
provide they have the assets necessary

01:09:54.436 --> 01:09:56.602
to provide the indication and warnings

01:09:56.602 --> 01:09:58.658
to know and be able to identify when

01:09:58.658 --> 01:10:00.658
they shift from that will intent to

01:10:00.658 --> 01:10:02.325
have to have the capacity and

01:10:02.325 --> 01:10:04.491
capability . That is something that is

01:10:04.491 --> 01:10:04.429
very difficult for us to ascertain in

01:10:04.429 --> 01:10:06.540
the Sahel right now given our limited

01:10:06.540 --> 01:10:08.707
posture . That was , that was going to

01:10:08.707 --> 01:10:10.873
be my follow up question is do we have

01:10:10.873 --> 01:10:12.651
the capacity to determine their

01:10:12.651 --> 01:10:14.985
capacity ? It sounds like you just said .

01:10:14.985 --> 01:10:17.207
Uh , we have We don't have the capacity

01:10:17.207 --> 01:10:19.609
that we should have or need , Senator .

01:10:19.669 --> 01:10:22.229
We are , that's why in the president's

01:10:22.229 --> 01:10:24.229
budget we have asked for additional

01:10:24.229 --> 01:10:25.896
intelligence surveillance and

01:10:25.896 --> 01:10:27.896
reconnaissance capabilities and why

01:10:27.896 --> 01:10:29.785
we're also looking at . A layered

01:10:29.785 --> 01:10:31.785
approach to look at everything from

01:10:31.785 --> 01:10:31.500
surface to space , to look at

01:10:31.500 --> 01:10:33.611
commercial assets to look at emerging

01:10:33.611 --> 01:10:35.778
technologies open source as well , and

01:10:35.778 --> 01:10:37.778
use these technologies , especially

01:10:37.778 --> 01:10:39.889
artificial intelligence , in order to

01:10:39.889 --> 01:10:42.056
fuse these multiple different types of

01:10:42.056 --> 01:10:43.944
layered ISR in order to gain that

01:10:43.944 --> 01:10:46.167
understanding and illuminate this black

01:10:46.167 --> 01:10:48.167
hole of intelligence in the Sahel .

01:10:48.167 --> 01:10:50.222
Cannot sustainably afford to do that

01:10:50.222 --> 01:10:52.333
solely with airborne ISR , so we have

01:10:52.333 --> 01:10:54.389
to look at a multifaceted approach .

01:10:54.389 --> 01:10:56.556
There are some very promising emerging

01:10:56.556 --> 01:10:58.854
technologies that we are looking into

01:10:58.854 --> 01:11:01.076
and that are affordable and sustainable

01:11:01.076 --> 01:11:02.854
and that also can work with our

01:11:02.854 --> 01:11:05.021
partners because one of the key points

01:11:05.021 --> 01:11:07.243
to this is this is not necessarily ours

01:11:07.243 --> 01:11:09.243
to action . So having that tech the

01:11:09.243 --> 01:11:11.243
intelligence that we can share with

01:11:11.243 --> 01:11:13.410
partners so they can then action those

01:11:13.410 --> 01:11:15.521
on a mutual threat is going to be key

01:11:15.521 --> 01:11:17.410
to our future , but being able to

01:11:17.410 --> 01:11:19.298
understand that is the number one

01:11:19.298 --> 01:11:21.354
priority of the command and where we

01:11:21.354 --> 01:11:23.521
are looking at investing with emerging

01:11:23.521 --> 01:11:22.660
technologies . And I think as you've

01:11:22.660 --> 01:11:24.549
testified , if they take over the

01:11:24.549 --> 01:11:26.771
capital of Bali , that's a , that's a ,

01:11:26.771 --> 01:11:28.882
that's a very dangerous moment . That

01:11:28.882 --> 01:11:30.716
that would be a game changer , I

01:11:30.716 --> 01:11:33.180
believe , in how they would be viewed

01:11:33.180 --> 01:11:35.180
internationally and what attraction

01:11:35.180 --> 01:11:37.180
they would be then I think to other

01:11:37.180 --> 01:11:39.402
adherents . Thank you . Thank you . How

01:11:39.402 --> 01:11:41.624
would that affect Americans , general ?

01:11:41.624 --> 01:11:43.624
Well , I think that would then give

01:11:43.624 --> 01:11:45.180
momentum to these terrorist

01:11:45.180 --> 01:11:47.236
organizations that have the will and

01:11:47.236 --> 01:11:46.740
intent , and it would allow them to

01:11:46.740 --> 01:11:48.407
then start moving towards the

01:11:48.407 --> 01:11:50.573
capability and capacities that Senator

01:11:50.573 --> 01:11:52.740
King just mentioned . And so that then

01:11:52.740 --> 01:11:54.962
I think poses a threat in the long term

01:11:54.962 --> 01:11:57.073
to the United States as they continue

01:11:57.073 --> 01:11:59.073
to develop this . We know that they

01:11:59.073 --> 01:12:01.073
have not given up this intent . And

01:12:01.073 --> 01:12:03.184
it's just a matter of having the time

01:12:03.184 --> 01:12:05.129
and space to develop them , and it

01:12:05.129 --> 01:12:07.240
would be Vladimir Putin that would be

01:12:07.240 --> 01:12:09.462
happiest about this , is that correct ?

01:12:09.462 --> 01:12:11.629
The prudent that what , sir ? It would

01:12:11.629 --> 01:12:13.959
be President Vladimir Putin who would

01:12:13.959 --> 01:12:16.399
rejoice at such a . Um ,

01:12:17.500 --> 01:12:20.350
contingency , or would it be Xi Jinping ?

01:12:21.399 --> 01:12:23.510
I , I can't speak for what either one

01:12:23.510 --> 01:12:25.677
of those leaders would believe , but I

01:12:25.677 --> 01:12:27.899
think that that we , they would be able

01:12:27.899 --> 01:12:30.232
to parlay that to their interest . Well ,

01:12:30.232 --> 01:12:32.399
who's financing this contingency if it

01:12:32.399 --> 01:12:35.470
were to happen ? Uh , of the terrorists ,

01:12:35.950 --> 01:12:38.117
they're gaining , uh , they're through

01:12:38.117 --> 01:12:40.339
lots of illicit materials , so it's not

01:12:40.339 --> 01:12:42.672
necessarily directly from a state actor .

01:12:42.672 --> 01:12:44.783
They're working with , as I mentioned

01:12:44.783 --> 01:12:44.629
earlier , the narcoterrorist , uh ,

01:12:44.669 --> 01:12:46.502
trafficking . They're doing this

01:12:46.502 --> 01:12:48.447
through , uh , kidnap for ransom .

01:12:48.447 --> 01:12:50.280
They're doing this through other

01:12:50.280 --> 01:12:52.391
illegal smuggling . They even do have

01:12:52.391 --> 01:12:54.336
their own taxation networks in the

01:12:54.336 --> 01:12:53.910
territories that they control where

01:12:53.910 --> 01:12:56.720
they generate millions of dollars . And

01:12:56.720 --> 01:12:58.959
before I turn to Senator Scott with

01:12:58.959 --> 01:13:02.319
regard to the , the funds that we're

01:13:02.319 --> 01:13:06.120
not spending anymore on USAID but have

01:13:06.120 --> 01:13:08.919
been supplemented elsewhere , um .

01:13:11.140 --> 01:13:13.979
In terms of dollars , let's , let's

01:13:13.979 --> 01:13:15.759
talk in terms of US dollar

01:13:17.319 --> 01:13:21.060
equivalents . How does the food

01:13:21.060 --> 01:13:24.549
aid , health aid , and , um . And

01:13:24.549 --> 01:13:27.009
development aid that we're currently

01:13:27.450 --> 01:13:30.649
delivering in your jurisdiction compare

01:13:30.910 --> 01:13:34.669
to to . To what China and

01:13:34.669 --> 01:13:38.319
Russia are doing . Uh , Senator , I

01:13:38.319 --> 01:13:40.430
don't have those exact numbers . Uh ,

01:13:40.430 --> 01:13:42.652
I'd have to get back to you on those as

01:13:42.652 --> 01:13:44.819
those are often in other departments ,

01:13:44.819 --> 01:13:46.986
other agencies within the government ,

01:13:46.986 --> 01:13:49.097
but we can look into that for you and

01:13:49.097 --> 01:13:48.919
look at what that comparison is between ,

01:13:49.390 --> 01:13:51.120
uh , well , if you would then

01:13:51.120 --> 01:13:53.176
supplement that on the record for us

01:13:53.176 --> 01:13:55.453
because I don't know the answer either ,

01:13:55.453 --> 01:13:59.240
uh , Senator Scott . Thank you ,

01:13:59.270 --> 01:14:01.381
Chairman . Thank , uh , thank both of

01:14:01.381 --> 01:14:03.603
you for , um , for your service and all

01:14:03.603 --> 01:14:05.714
the men and women that work for you .

01:14:05.714 --> 01:14:07.714
Admiral Cooper Cooper , can you , I

01:14:07.714 --> 01:14:07.229
know , uh , this is not a classified

01:14:07.229 --> 01:14:09.451
setting , but can you talk a little bit

01:14:09.451 --> 01:14:11.618
about , uh , what other countries have

01:14:11.618 --> 01:14:13.562
done , uh , to help us either with

01:14:13.562 --> 01:14:15.229
intelligence or with military

01:14:15.229 --> 01:14:17.340
capabilities , and , and I don't know

01:14:17.340 --> 01:14:19.396
whether you want to do this or not ,

01:14:19.396 --> 01:14:21.507
something that you would like to have

01:14:21.507 --> 01:14:24.069
done more . So , I think the most

01:14:24.069 --> 01:14:26.236
prominent 7 countries , uh , that have

01:14:26.236 --> 01:14:28.291
been most helpful and served side by

01:14:28.291 --> 01:14:31.299
side are 5 of the 6 GCC countries , uh ,

01:14:31.310 --> 01:14:33.910
UAE , Bahrain , Qatar , Kuwait , and

01:14:33.910 --> 01:14:36.220
Saudi Arabia . Also indispensable in

01:14:36.220 --> 01:14:38.164
our effort has been the Kingdom of

01:14:38.164 --> 01:14:40.276
Jordan and clearly Israel , uh , with

01:14:40.276 --> 01:14:42.331
whom we conducted the strikes . Um ,

01:14:42.331 --> 01:14:43.942
we're always eager to expand

01:14:43.942 --> 01:14:45.998
partnerships . Uh , there's a couple

01:14:45.998 --> 01:14:47.887
that I think I could address in a

01:14:47.887 --> 01:14:49.887
classified setting , uh , that were

01:14:49.887 --> 01:14:51.887
less than stellar . And do you feel

01:14:51.887 --> 01:14:54.109
like we've been a great partner to them

01:14:54.109 --> 01:14:54.049
and helping them build up their um

01:14:54.049 --> 01:14:56.105
their capabilities over the over the

01:14:56.105 --> 01:14:58.327
last 20 years or so , Senator , I think

01:14:58.327 --> 01:15:00.549
it's been an excellent two-way street ,

01:15:00.549 --> 01:15:02.216
and if I look at mill to mill

01:15:02.216 --> 01:15:04.438
relationships , it's been very strong .

01:15:04.438 --> 01:15:06.438
I , I'd simply highlight , uh , the

01:15:06.438 --> 01:15:08.105
result of years of effort and

01:15:08.105 --> 01:15:10.160
collaboration and partnership , uh ,

01:15:10.160 --> 01:15:12.382
but our partners literally side by side

01:15:12.382 --> 01:15:14.216
with Patriot defenses , with our

01:15:14.216 --> 01:15:16.382
partners defending Americans . I think

01:15:16.382 --> 01:15:15.930
that sends a lot . I think that sends a

01:15:15.930 --> 01:15:18.919
good signal and says a lot . So , uh ,

01:15:18.970 --> 01:15:20.914
uh , I think , uh , Senator Wicker

01:15:20.914 --> 01:15:23.137
asked you some questions about drones .

01:15:23.137 --> 01:15:25.248
We had a , we had a meeting the other

01:15:25.248 --> 01:15:27.359
day and , um , the individual came in

01:15:27.359 --> 01:15:29.359
and said that Ukraine is building 5

01:15:29.359 --> 01:15:31.810
million drones a year . Um , and so

01:15:31.810 --> 01:15:34.049
they probably are ahead of most people

01:15:34.049 --> 01:15:36.160
because they've had to , um , because

01:15:36.160 --> 01:15:38.271
of war they're in . So , can you talk

01:15:38.271 --> 01:15:41.000
about , um , are we where we need to be

01:15:41.000 --> 01:15:43.222
with drone technology ? Are we using it

01:15:43.222 --> 01:15:45.389
everywhere we can ? Are we using , are

01:15:45.389 --> 01:15:47.444
we where we need to be with regard ,

01:15:47.444 --> 01:15:49.890
with regard to drone , um , defense

01:15:49.890 --> 01:15:51.834
capabilities ? Can you just talk a

01:15:51.834 --> 01:15:53.779
little bit more about that ? Yes ,

01:15:53.779 --> 01:15:55.779
Senator , first I , I , I would say

01:15:55.779 --> 01:15:58.001
that the Secretary and the department's

01:15:58.001 --> 01:15:59.890
focus on drone domination , drone

01:15:59.890 --> 01:16:02.520
dominance has really kickstarted our ,

01:16:02.540 --> 01:16:05.060
our capabilities and flowed more

01:16:05.060 --> 01:16:06.949
capabilities into the region much

01:16:06.949 --> 01:16:09.004
faster than we had seen before , and

01:16:09.004 --> 01:16:11.004
many of those capabilities have now

01:16:11.004 --> 01:16:13.060
been proven in combat . I think in a

01:16:13.060 --> 01:16:15.171
classified setting , I'd like to tell

01:16:15.171 --> 01:16:14.819
you what that looked like , but as we

01:16:14.819 --> 01:16:16.541
sit here today , we have drone

01:16:16.541 --> 01:16:18.708
capabilities in the air , on the sea ,

01:16:18.708 --> 01:16:20.819
and under the sea as a result of this

01:16:20.819 --> 01:16:22.930
initiative . Do you have any feel for

01:16:22.930 --> 01:16:25.152
whether uh the the impact you've had on

01:16:25.152 --> 01:16:27.779
uh Iran is impacting uh their ability

01:16:27.779 --> 01:16:29.779
to help Russia in their war against

01:16:29.779 --> 01:16:32.970
Ukraine ? So I think uh best to discuss

01:16:32.970 --> 01:16:35.770
that in a classified setting clearly uh

01:16:35.930 --> 01:16:37.930
uh Iran and Russia have had a years

01:16:37.930 --> 01:16:40.041
long relationship , particularly when

01:16:40.041 --> 01:16:42.097
it comes to drones . So what are you

01:16:42.097 --> 01:16:44.208
most proud of ? What do you , what do

01:16:44.208 --> 01:16:43.850
you , what are you most proud of that

01:16:43.850 --> 01:16:45.906
you've accomplished since you've had

01:16:45.906 --> 01:16:49.129
this role ? Absolutely , 12 , and 3 .

01:16:49.430 --> 01:16:51.652
I'm most proud of the men and women who

01:16:51.652 --> 01:16:53.709
executed an extraordinarily complex

01:16:53.709 --> 01:16:55.899
mission , the first major combat

01:16:55.899 --> 01:16:58.010
operations that the United States has

01:16:58.010 --> 01:17:00.121
seen in a generation , establishing ,

01:17:00.121 --> 01:17:01.955
in my mind , the latest greatest

01:17:01.955 --> 01:17:04.121
generation of American warriors . Same

01:17:04.121 --> 01:17:06.288
question , Joe Anderson . What are you

01:17:06.288 --> 01:17:08.455
most proud of that you've accomplished

01:17:08.455 --> 01:17:11.649
so far ? Senator , I think the , uh , I

01:17:11.649 --> 01:17:13.816
would agree with , uh , Admiral Cooper

01:17:13.816 --> 01:17:15.871
that's the men and women of the very

01:17:15.871 --> 01:17:17.982
small footprint and very small amount

01:17:17.982 --> 01:17:19.982
of resources , uh , punch way above

01:17:19.982 --> 01:17:22.038
their weight class and have outsized

01:17:22.038 --> 01:17:24.260
impacts on the continent . What we just

01:17:24.260 --> 01:17:26.205
did in African line in Morocco was

01:17:26.205 --> 01:17:28.371
significant in our largest exercise on

01:17:28.371 --> 01:17:30.260
the continent of bringing over 40

01:17:30.260 --> 01:17:32.482
nations together , uh , to include over

01:17:32.482 --> 01:17:34.593
3 dozen African countries and nations

01:17:34.593 --> 01:17:36.760
as far away as Brazil and Japan . That

01:17:36.760 --> 01:17:38.927
ability to convene is one of the great

01:17:38.927 --> 01:17:40.871
powers of the United States and it

01:17:40.871 --> 01:17:43.093
differentiates us from many others . So

01:17:43.093 --> 01:17:45.205
I am proud of the fact that we can do

01:17:45.205 --> 01:17:47.205
that and that we cannot just , uh ,

01:17:47.205 --> 01:17:49.316
pursue our own readiness but actually

01:17:49.316 --> 01:17:51.260
bring multiple nations together to

01:17:51.260 --> 01:17:53.482
address common threats . Thanks both of

01:17:53.482 --> 01:17:53.220
you and thanks to all the men and women

01:17:53.220 --> 01:17:56.339
that work for you . Thank you very much

01:17:56.339 --> 01:17:58.509
Senator . We , we have , uh , Shaheen

01:17:58.509 --> 01:18:00.950
and then Hirono . Thank you , Mr .

01:18:01.109 --> 01:18:03.276
Chairman , and again thank you to both

01:18:03.276 --> 01:18:05.220
of you for being here and for your

01:18:05.220 --> 01:18:08.569
service , um . I wanted to pick up on

01:18:08.569 --> 01:18:11.439
Senator King's questions about the .

01:18:12.720 --> 01:18:14.740
Closing of so much of our foreign

01:18:14.740 --> 01:18:16.962
assistance in Africa , General Anderson

01:18:16.962 --> 01:18:19.018
and , um , Senator Wicker asked what

01:18:19.018 --> 01:18:21.520
we're seeing in terms of China . I have

01:18:21.520 --> 01:18:23.959
a couple of examples that I think are

01:18:23.959 --> 01:18:26.529
worth pointing out how much um .

01:18:27.830 --> 01:18:29.774
That has meant in terms of China's

01:18:29.774 --> 01:18:32.319
ability to make inroads because China

01:18:32.319 --> 01:18:34.319
has actually eclipsed Russia as the

01:18:34.319 --> 01:18:37.160
largest weapons exporter to sub-Saharan

01:18:37.160 --> 01:18:39.493
Africa , which I'm sure you're aware of ,

01:18:39.493 --> 01:18:41.799
and 70% of all African armies now

01:18:41.799 --> 01:18:45.419
operate vehicles from the PRC

01:18:45.640 --> 01:18:47.859
as opposed to the United States .

01:18:48.450 --> 01:18:50.506
Beijing's looking to expand military

01:18:50.506 --> 01:18:52.728
grants , training , and joint exercises

01:18:52.728 --> 01:18:54.950
between the PRC and African countries ,

01:18:54.970 --> 01:18:58.350
and we don't have the kind of

01:18:58.649 --> 01:19:02.229
foreign assistance , um , soft power

01:19:02.229 --> 01:19:05.430
that we did before the elimination of

01:19:05.430 --> 01:19:08.649
USAID . Um , but you mentioned General

01:19:08.649 --> 01:19:10.982
Anderson that you've taken on a foreign ,

01:19:11.299 --> 01:19:13.521
uh , commercial service officer , which

01:19:13.521 --> 01:19:15.577
I think is a really interesting idea

01:19:15.577 --> 01:19:17.355
and as you're aware I'm sure at

01:19:17.355 --> 01:19:21.000
EndoPaycom Admiral Paparo has really

01:19:21.049 --> 01:19:22.605
used this to good advantage

01:19:22.605 --> 01:19:24.882
coordinating with the State Department ,

01:19:24.882 --> 01:19:26.493
with the Development Finance

01:19:26.493 --> 01:19:28.271
Corporation , with the US Trade

01:19:28.271 --> 01:19:30.382
Development Agency and the Millennium

01:19:30.382 --> 01:19:32.382
Challenge Corporation . To identify

01:19:32.382 --> 01:19:34.600
potential projects um to work on in

01:19:34.600 --> 01:19:37.399
that AOR so can you talk a little bit

01:19:37.399 --> 01:19:39.950
more about how you're identifying

01:19:39.950 --> 01:19:42.006
development projects and whether you

01:19:42.006 --> 01:19:43.950
need any other authorizations from

01:19:43.950 --> 01:19:46.040
Congress or support for this effort

01:19:46.040 --> 01:19:48.839
from us so that you can help implement

01:19:48.839 --> 01:19:51.520
the kind of coordination that's going

01:19:51.520 --> 01:19:55.330
on in IndoPaycom . Senator , yes , I

01:19:55.330 --> 01:19:57.552
very much appreciate your interest here

01:19:57.552 --> 01:19:59.497
because this is an area I think is

01:19:59.497 --> 01:20:01.719
emerging on the continent with the just

01:20:01.719 --> 01:20:03.830
the demographics of the continent and

01:20:03.830 --> 01:20:05.830
the growing economies being able to

01:20:05.830 --> 01:20:07.941
identify these in the intersection of

01:20:07.941 --> 01:20:09.997
security and economics is absolutely

01:20:09.997 --> 01:20:09.890
vital . All of the agencies you

01:20:09.890 --> 01:20:11.612
mentioned are ones that we are

01:20:11.612 --> 01:20:13.612
coordinating with to make sure that

01:20:13.612 --> 01:20:15.834
those investments go into the continent

01:20:15.834 --> 01:20:17.779
and have the greatest effect , but

01:20:17.779 --> 01:20:19.668
they're also informed by what the

01:20:19.668 --> 01:20:21.890
security implications . So sometimes it

01:20:21.890 --> 01:20:21.560
may not have the same . Economic return

01:20:21.899 --> 01:20:24.066
but that return may come in security ,

01:20:24.066 --> 01:20:26.121
and that's where we come in is being

01:20:26.121 --> 01:20:28.343
able to convene some of these different

01:20:28.343 --> 01:20:30.566
agencies as well as private industry to

01:20:30.566 --> 01:20:30.419
be able to articulate what those

01:20:30.419 --> 01:20:32.363
security concerns are , what those

01:20:32.363 --> 01:20:34.419
implications are , and then also the

01:20:34.419 --> 01:20:36.252
fact that we are able to execute

01:20:36.252 --> 01:20:38.363
exercises and other things around the

01:20:38.363 --> 01:20:40.586
continent helps go into the calculus of

01:20:40.586 --> 01:20:42.752
those investments and buy down some of

01:20:42.752 --> 01:20:42.709
that risk . So that is what we're

01:20:42.709 --> 01:20:45.470
looking to uh to develop . So do those

01:20:45.470 --> 01:20:47.750
agencies routinely check with you if

01:20:47.750 --> 01:20:49.806
there's a major project that they're

01:20:49.806 --> 01:20:51.806
looking to fund in Africa ? So , so

01:20:51.806 --> 01:20:53.750
historically , no , and that's why

01:20:53.750 --> 01:20:55.750
we're standing up a very small unit

01:20:55.750 --> 01:20:57.750
within the headquarters in order to

01:20:57.750 --> 01:20:59.861
have that , uh , point where they can

01:20:59.861 --> 01:21:01.750
help facilitate these discussions

01:21:01.750 --> 01:21:01.350
because often they didn't know where to

01:21:01.350 --> 01:21:03.910
have them . And is that something that

01:21:03.910 --> 01:21:06.021
Congress can be helpful with in terms

01:21:06.021 --> 01:21:08.430
of trying to encourage that sort of

01:21:08.430 --> 01:21:10.541
coordination ? I , I think there is ,

01:21:10.660 --> 01:21:12.716
there are ways that encouraging that

01:21:12.716 --> 01:21:14.993
coordination would be very helpful and ,

01:21:14.993 --> 01:21:16.938
uh , being able to articulate this

01:21:16.938 --> 01:21:18.882
across the committees that oversee

01:21:18.882 --> 01:21:20.382
these various agencies and

01:21:20.382 --> 01:21:22.604
understanding how that interrelation of

01:21:22.604 --> 01:21:22.459
national power can come together that

01:21:22.459 --> 01:21:24.681
it's not always the military lever that

01:21:24.681 --> 01:21:26.903
produces a security outcome , but being

01:21:26.903 --> 01:21:28.959
able to have that dialogue , I think

01:21:28.959 --> 01:21:31.181
would be critical . The other area that

01:21:31.181 --> 01:21:33.292
I think would be very helpful also is

01:21:33.292 --> 01:21:32.830
incentives . Structures that help

01:21:33.009 --> 01:21:35.750
energize our industrial base to help

01:21:35.750 --> 01:21:37.972
produce the equipment that our partners

01:21:37.972 --> 01:21:40.194
want . They would much prefer to buy US

01:21:40.194 --> 01:21:42.689
equipment , but often our systems take

01:21:42.689 --> 01:21:45.870
so long and are so long to deliver

01:21:46.290 --> 01:21:48.457
because often the incentive structures

01:21:48.457 --> 01:21:50.568
not there that they go to , they turn

01:21:50.568 --> 01:21:52.790
to China out of necessity , not because

01:21:52.790 --> 01:21:54.734
of desire . They often see that as

01:21:54.734 --> 01:21:56.679
inferior equipment , uh , and they

01:21:56.679 --> 01:21:58.957
would much prefer to buy American . Uh ,

01:21:58.957 --> 01:22:01.068
we need to incentivize our industrial

01:22:01.068 --> 01:22:03.068
base to meet that demand . Yeah , I

01:22:03.068 --> 01:22:05.290
agree and as you know it's an issue not

01:22:05.290 --> 01:22:07.512
just in that , um , in that respect but

01:22:07.512 --> 01:22:09.679
in a whole lot of other areas in terms

01:22:09.679 --> 01:22:11.790
of the challenges with the industrial

01:22:11.790 --> 01:22:14.080
base . Admiral Cooper , um , one of the

01:22:14.859 --> 01:22:16.970
things that's gotten a fair amount of

01:22:16.970 --> 01:22:19.819
tension , um . In recent weeks has been

01:22:19.819 --> 01:22:22.020
President Zelensky's working with some

01:22:22.020 --> 01:22:25.020
of our allies and partners in the

01:22:25.020 --> 01:22:27.131
Middle East in response to the war in

01:22:27.131 --> 01:22:30.459
Iran on their the expertise that the

01:22:30.459 --> 01:22:33.479
Ukrainians have developed to address

01:22:33.479 --> 01:22:36.680
counter drone . Responses , can you

01:22:36.680 --> 01:22:38.680
talk a little bit about what you're

01:22:38.680 --> 01:22:40.624
seeing with respect to that and um

01:22:40.624 --> 01:22:42.700
whether our allies and partners find

01:22:42.700 --> 01:22:45.640
that kind of um support helpful from

01:22:45.640 --> 01:22:48.689
the Ukrainians ? Senator , I think most

01:22:48.689 --> 01:22:50.911
significantly we adopted a large number

01:22:50.911 --> 01:22:52.578
of tactics , techniques , and

01:22:52.578 --> 01:22:54.300
procedures , uh , that the the

01:22:54.300 --> 01:22:56.300
Ukrainians have passed us that have

01:22:56.300 --> 01:22:58.411
helped us , uh , defend Americans and

01:22:58.411 --> 01:23:00.578
all of our partners are working , uh ,

01:23:00.578 --> 01:23:00.370
with Ukraine in some way , shape or

01:23:00.370 --> 01:23:02.481
form . I'd really defer to them , but

01:23:02.481 --> 01:23:04.370
talk about it , but are they more

01:23:04.370 --> 01:23:06.703
effective as a result ? Yes , thank you .

01:23:06.703 --> 01:23:08.703
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Senator

01:23:08.703 --> 01:23:10.648
Hirono . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:23:10.779 --> 01:23:13.569
Before , um , I begin my questions , I

01:23:13.569 --> 01:23:16.209
wanna again take a moment to highlight

01:23:16.209 --> 01:23:18.450
the true costs both for the military

01:23:18.450 --> 01:23:20.450
and everyday Americans of the

01:23:20.450 --> 01:23:22.561
president's illegal war with Iran and

01:23:22.561 --> 01:23:25.189
summarize , uh , how we got here . 13

01:23:25.189 --> 01:23:28.250
brave US soldiers have been killed and

01:23:28.250 --> 01:23:31.250
more than 400 have been wounded . The

01:23:31.250 --> 01:23:34.290
DOD is now estimating that this war has

01:23:34.290 --> 01:23:37.689
cost over $29 billion and costing more

01:23:37.689 --> 01:23:39.899
every single day . The continued

01:23:39.899 --> 01:23:42.121
closure of the Strait of Hormuz , which

01:23:42.121 --> 01:23:43.899
somehow caught the president by

01:23:43.899 --> 01:23:46.066
surprise , is directly contributing to

01:23:46.066 --> 01:23:48.177
the growing affordability crisis that

01:23:48.177 --> 01:23:50.399
Americans are facing , and negotiations

01:23:50.399 --> 01:23:52.566
are at a stalemate , but a stalemate ,

01:23:52.566 --> 01:23:54.455
but it's becoming clear that this

01:23:54.455 --> 01:23:57.419
president's plan is to attempt to

01:23:57.419 --> 01:23:59.779
secure an agreement that looks very

01:23:59.779 --> 01:24:02.770
similar to the 2015 JCPOA which my

01:24:02.770 --> 01:24:04.548
colleague , uh , Senator King .

01:24:04.709 --> 01:24:06.870
Referred to which this president

01:24:06.870 --> 01:24:09.750
recklessly tore up in 2018 as you

01:24:09.750 --> 01:24:12.270
recall the JCPOA , which was an

01:24:12.270 --> 01:24:15.330
agreement that also included countries ,

01:24:15.509 --> 01:24:18.229
not just us , it included France , the

01:24:18.229 --> 01:24:21.169
UK , Germany , China , and Russia .

01:24:22.259 --> 01:24:25.529
And the JCOPOA put limits on Iran's

01:24:25.529 --> 01:24:28.529
nuclear program with a rigorous

01:24:28.529 --> 01:24:31.430
inspection and monetary program run by

01:24:31.430 --> 01:24:34.529
the IAEA , all of which was tossed out

01:24:34.750 --> 01:24:37.580
by President Trump . And while that

01:24:37.580 --> 01:24:39.636
agreement did have a sunset clause ,

01:24:39.636 --> 01:24:41.524
what we should have done was work

01:24:41.524 --> 01:24:43.413
diplomatically with our allies to

01:24:43.413 --> 01:24:46.220
extend it . Instead , here we are

01:24:46.220 --> 01:24:48.560
engaged in another endless war in the

01:24:48.560 --> 01:24:51.569
Middle East , no end in sight . That is

01:24:51.569 --> 01:24:53.810
driving up costs , undermining military

01:24:53.810 --> 01:24:56.770
readiness and alienating our allies

01:24:56.770 --> 01:24:59.009
with neither a clear rationale for

01:24:59.009 --> 01:25:00.787
starting the conflict which the

01:25:00.787 --> 01:25:02.898
president originally said , oh well ,

01:25:02.898 --> 01:25:05.065
then maybe there'll be regime change ,

01:25:05.065 --> 01:25:07.398
and now he seems to have landed on , uh ,

01:25:07.398 --> 01:25:09.676
preventing a a nuclear nuclear capable ,

01:25:09.810 --> 01:25:11.921
uh , Iran , which is was exactly what

01:25:11.921 --> 01:25:14.939
the JCPOA was intended to do . Admiral

01:25:14.939 --> 01:25:17.161
Cooper , did the president ever explain

01:25:17.161 --> 01:25:19.209
to you why he tore up the JCPOA ?

01:25:22.649 --> 01:25:24.649
Uh , Senator , that's a , a , a , a

01:25:24.649 --> 01:25:26.816
policy matter , uh , that I would have

01:25:26.816 --> 01:25:28.760
expected anyone to , uh , he never

01:25:28.760 --> 01:25:30.760
explained to you why he tore up the

01:25:30.760 --> 01:25:33.120
JCPOA . He either explained it to you

01:25:33.120 --> 01:25:35.231
or he didn't . I'm not asking you for

01:25:35.231 --> 01:25:37.342
the convers actual conversation , but

01:25:37.560 --> 01:25:40.299
did he happen to explain to you why he

01:25:40.560 --> 01:25:42.859
did something which led to the very ,

01:25:43.040 --> 01:25:45.250
uh , uh , nuclear crisis that we're ,

01:25:45.259 --> 01:25:47.759
uh , now confronting regarding Iran and

01:25:47.759 --> 01:25:50.310
their enriched uranium ? Uh , Senator ,

01:25:50.359 --> 01:25:52.137
I was in a completely different

01:25:52.137 --> 01:25:54.192
assignment when when this occurred 8

01:25:54.192 --> 01:25:56.248
years ago . So , uh , apparently the

01:25:56.248 --> 01:25:57.970
president , uh , didn't have a

01:25:57.970 --> 01:25:59.970
discussion with , um , anybody . In

01:25:59.970 --> 01:26:02.137
fact , it was a , uh , uh , unilateral

01:26:02.560 --> 01:26:04.839
decision that he made . Now , uh , you

01:26:04.839 --> 01:26:08.200
have vast experience , Admiral , and

01:26:08.200 --> 01:26:10.950
the , the Navy , etc . and , uh , uh ,

01:26:10.959 --> 01:26:13.080
before we went into , uh , before we

01:26:13.080 --> 01:26:15.299
attacked Iran , did it cross your mind

01:26:15.299 --> 01:26:17.188
that Iran may close the Strait of

01:26:17.188 --> 01:26:20.160
Hormuz ? Senator , as you know , one of

01:26:20.160 --> 01:26:22.104
my responsibilities as a combatant

01:26:22.104 --> 01:26:24.216
commander is to generate a wide range

01:26:24.216 --> 01:26:26.438
of options with associated risks , uh ,

01:26:26.438 --> 01:26:28.716
and opportunities , present those , uh ,

01:26:28.716 --> 01:26:30.882
to the secretary and the president . I

01:26:30.882 --> 01:26:30.799
think it'd be inappropriate to talk

01:26:30.799 --> 01:26:32.799
about what those specifically . I'm

01:26:32.799 --> 01:26:35.021
just asking whether we always make them

01:26:35.021 --> 01:26:37.243
very comprehensively . Excuse me , uh ,

01:26:37.243 --> 01:26:39.577
I'm asking whether with your experience ,

01:26:39.600 --> 01:26:42.379
the thought that should we attack Iran

01:26:42.379 --> 01:26:44.439
that they would close the Strait of

01:26:44.439 --> 01:26:46.899
Hormuz , did that cross your mind ?

01:26:47.660 --> 01:26:49.716
Senator , I've transited through the

01:26:49.716 --> 01:26:51.938
Strait about 100 times . I think of the

01:26:51.938 --> 01:26:54.160
Strait of Hormuz , uh , virtually every

01:26:54.160 --> 01:26:57.649
day . So is that a yes that you are

01:26:57.649 --> 01:26:59.816
very aware that the Strait of Hormuz ,

01:26:59.816 --> 01:27:01.816
the very thing that happened , that

01:27:01.816 --> 01:27:04.038
that is something that you contemplated

01:27:04.038 --> 01:27:06.038
happening . I hope that is the case

01:27:06.038 --> 01:27:08.205
because with your experience , I , I ,

01:27:08.205 --> 01:27:10.427
um , I have to conclude that you , um .

01:27:11.169 --> 01:27:14.620
Contemplated that possibility . So you

01:27:14.620 --> 01:27:17.859
did mention that uh our diplomats are

01:27:17.859 --> 01:27:20.192
engaged in the nego negotiations . Well ,

01:27:20.192 --> 01:27:22.740
who are those diplomats ? Uh , uh ,

01:27:22.750 --> 01:27:24.861
Senator , I really would refer to the

01:27:24.861 --> 01:27:27.194
White House who specifically is engaged ,

01:27:27.194 --> 01:27:28.972
uh , in , well , apparently the

01:27:28.972 --> 01:27:30.917
diplomats are Jared Kushner , uh ,

01:27:30.917 --> 01:27:33.083
Kushner , who I don't think even works

01:27:33.083 --> 01:27:34.972
for our country , and , uh , Mr .

01:27:34.972 --> 01:27:37.194
Whitlock , Steve Whitlock , who happens

01:27:37.194 --> 01:27:39.399
to be a , um , I don't know , a . I

01:27:39.399 --> 01:27:41.399
don't think he has a lot of uh

01:27:41.399 --> 01:27:43.510
experience engaging in these kinds of

01:27:43.510 --> 01:27:45.520
negotiations . So here we are , the

01:27:45.520 --> 01:27:48.680
JCPOA , which was , um , a , a very

01:27:48.680 --> 01:27:50.624
intense , uh , the results of very

01:27:50.624 --> 01:27:52.402
intense negotiations among many

01:27:52.402 --> 01:27:55.100
countries , and for us to act as though ,

01:27:55.279 --> 01:27:57.520
uh , the , the idea of a nuclear Iran

01:27:57.520 --> 01:27:59.464
is just something that occurred to

01:27:59.464 --> 01:28:01.600
President Trump and not to , uh , his

01:28:01.600 --> 01:28:05.149
predecessors is pretty ridiculous . And

01:28:05.149 --> 01:28:07.790
in fact we had in place a regime that

01:28:07.790 --> 01:28:10.819
was intended to do that , uh , that

01:28:10.819 --> 01:28:12.708
very thing which was to prevent a

01:28:12.708 --> 01:28:14.763
nuclear Iran . Mr . Chairman , thank

01:28:14.763 --> 01:28:16.709
you . Thank you , Senator Hirono ,

01:28:16.830 --> 01:28:19.330
Senator Cotton . Gentlemen , thank you

01:28:19.330 --> 01:28:21.552
for your appearance and your service to

01:28:21.552 --> 01:28:23.774
our nation , and many thanks to all the

01:28:23.774 --> 01:28:25.608
troops that you represent , um .

01:28:25.700 --> 01:28:29.399
Admiral Cooper , um , some critics

01:28:29.540 --> 01:28:31.762
of Operation Epic Fury have referred to

01:28:31.762 --> 01:28:35.000
it as another forever war . In your

01:28:35.000 --> 01:28:37.333
opening statement in the third sentence ,

01:28:37.359 --> 01:28:40.240
in fact , you say since 1979 , the

01:28:40.240 --> 01:28:42.129
Iranian regime has terrorized the

01:28:42.129 --> 01:28:44.129
region . Is it fair to say the only

01:28:44.129 --> 01:28:47.919
forever war here is the war of terror

01:28:47.919 --> 01:28:50.086
that Iran has waged against the United

01:28:50.086 --> 01:28:52.197
States and the civilized world for 47

01:28:52.197 --> 01:28:54.549
years ? Uh , I , I would agree that

01:28:54.560 --> 01:28:56.893
that that was a sustained effort by the ,

01:28:56.893 --> 01:29:00.169
by Iran . OK , um , let's , uh , take a

01:29:00.169 --> 01:29:02.169
look in context since my Democratic

01:29:02.169 --> 01:29:04.169
friends have wanted to talk so much

01:29:04.169 --> 01:29:06.169
about the JCPOA about not just epic

01:29:06.169 --> 01:29:08.447
fury but about Midnight Hammer as well .

01:29:08.447 --> 01:29:11.169
So where we stand today in mid-May

01:29:11.169 --> 01:29:13.529
versus where we were not even a year

01:29:13.529 --> 01:29:17.169
ago , 1211 months ago , um .

01:29:17.790 --> 01:29:20.350
Based on your extensive military

01:29:20.350 --> 01:29:22.461
experience , do you believe that Iran

01:29:22.461 --> 01:29:24.350
posed a significant threat to the

01:29:24.350 --> 01:29:26.410
United States 11 months ago before

01:29:26.470 --> 01:29:28.803
Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury ?

01:29:29.009 --> 01:29:31.689
Senator , attacked US forces 350 times

01:29:31.689 --> 01:29:33.856
in the 30 months preceding epic fury .

01:29:34.089 --> 01:29:36.569
Do you believe that it absent Midnight

01:29:36.569 --> 01:29:38.680
Hammer and epic fury , do you believe

01:29:38.680 --> 01:29:40.791
that threat was likely to continue to

01:29:40.791 --> 01:29:43.959
grow ? Yes . Microphone please so we

01:29:43.959 --> 01:29:46.759
can get for the record I do . Um , is

01:29:46.759 --> 01:29:49.640
Iran now less of a threat than it was

01:29:49.640 --> 01:29:52.160
11 months ago ? They are significantly

01:29:52.160 --> 01:29:54.479
less of a threat . Um , is it fair to

01:29:54.479 --> 01:29:57.220
say that . The Iranian regime is still

01:29:57.220 --> 01:29:59.331
a revolutionary terrorist regime even

01:29:59.331 --> 01:30:01.387
after all the deaths of their senior

01:30:01.387 --> 01:30:05.270
leaders . They are , yeah . Is it fair

01:30:05.270 --> 01:30:07.214
to say the revolutionary terrorist

01:30:07.214 --> 01:30:09.709
regime no longer has nearly as much

01:30:09.709 --> 01:30:11.750
military capability to act on its

01:30:11.750 --> 01:30:14.339
revolutionary terrorist intentions ? Uh ,

01:30:14.509 --> 01:30:16.565
that is fair , uh , and I think it's

01:30:16.565 --> 01:30:18.676
also fair to say across every element

01:30:18.676 --> 01:30:20.398
of national power they've been

01:30:20.398 --> 01:30:22.799
significantly degraded . You , you

01:30:22.799 --> 01:30:25.270
state in your opening statement that

01:30:26.279 --> 01:30:28.040
Centcom forces systematically

01:30:28.040 --> 01:30:30.560
dismantled what Iran spent 4 decades

01:30:30.560 --> 01:30:32.338
and tens of billions of dollars

01:30:32.338 --> 01:30:35.629
building . How long do you assess that

01:30:35.629 --> 01:30:38.279
it will take them to get back to where

01:30:38.279 --> 01:30:40.870
they were in terms of their military

01:30:40.870 --> 01:30:43.069
and other capabilities just 11 months

01:30:43.069 --> 01:30:45.549
ago before Centcom dismantled it all ,

01:30:46.100 --> 01:30:48.322
Senator , I would assess that the drone

01:30:48.322 --> 01:30:50.378
and missile force will take years to

01:30:50.378 --> 01:30:52.378
reconstitute . Uh , the Navy likely

01:30:52.378 --> 01:30:54.544
will not get back to its previous size

01:30:54.544 --> 01:30:57.390
for a full generation . Is that why you

01:30:57.390 --> 01:30:59.334
say in your opening statement that

01:30:59.334 --> 01:31:01.439
CENTCOM assesses Iran can no longer

01:31:01.439 --> 01:31:03.439
project power across the region nor

01:31:03.439 --> 01:31:05.606
pose a persistent threat to the United

01:31:05.606 --> 01:31:07.890
States or our partners than it did

01:31:08.830 --> 01:31:11.109
prior to Operation Epic Fury . They

01:31:11.109 --> 01:31:13.276
certainly cannot do it at the level of

01:31:13.276 --> 01:31:15.387
mass that we all saw with hundreds of

01:31:15.387 --> 01:31:17.553
missiles and drones raining across the

01:31:17.553 --> 01:31:19.609
Middle East . That doesn't mean they

01:31:19.609 --> 01:31:21.665
don't have any capability , but that

01:31:21.665 --> 01:31:23.720
broad power projection capability no

01:31:23.720 --> 01:31:27.049
longer exists . And the whole world saw

01:31:27.049 --> 01:31:29.569
that just in a number of days after the

01:31:29.569 --> 01:31:31.791
beginning of your operation , correct ?

01:31:31.791 --> 01:31:33.791
In the number of , I think it was a

01:31:33.791 --> 01:31:36.970
near 90% decline um in Iran's attacks

01:31:36.970 --> 01:31:39.137
on the United States and its neighbors

01:31:39.137 --> 01:31:41.303
in the region . That's correct . Early

01:31:41.303 --> 01:31:43.414
on , the attacks were in the hundreds

01:31:43.414 --> 01:31:45.709
and they went to uh to the teens . OK ,

01:31:46.250 --> 01:31:48.472
um . I , I know that there's been a lot

01:31:48.472 --> 01:31:50.806
of questions about the Strait of Hormuz .

01:31:50.806 --> 01:31:53.028
To , to be clear , the Strait of Hormuz

01:31:53.028 --> 01:31:56.680
was never part of our objectives . But

01:31:56.680 --> 01:31:59.359
we knew , as anyone who looks at a map

01:31:59.359 --> 01:32:01.709
would know that Iran has the power to

01:32:01.709 --> 01:32:03.987
temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz .

01:32:03.987 --> 01:32:05.987
Is that correct ? That's accurate ,

01:32:05.987 --> 01:32:08.042
Senator . Is it fair to say that the

01:32:08.042 --> 01:32:10.265
United States and our partners have the

01:32:10.265 --> 01:32:12.320
power to permanently open the strait

01:32:12.509 --> 01:32:14.509
without getting into specifics ? We

01:32:14.509 --> 01:32:16.565
have the military power . Yes , um ,

01:32:16.565 --> 01:32:18.787
could you talk to us a little bit about

01:32:18.787 --> 01:32:21.200
what the blockade in the meantime has

01:32:21.200 --> 01:32:23.709
done to Iran ? Yes sir , the blockade

01:32:23.709 --> 01:32:26.290
was implemented , uh , within 24 hours

01:32:26.290 --> 01:32:28.457
of presidential direction , uh , based

01:32:28.457 --> 01:32:30.623
on the plan that we had on the shelf .

01:32:30.623 --> 01:32:32.457
Uh , uh , the blockade itself is

01:32:32.457 --> 01:32:34.568
designed to prevent any commerce from

01:32:34.568 --> 01:32:36.679
leaving Iranian ports , uh , going to

01:32:36.679 --> 01:32:38.846
global distribution , and any commerce

01:32:38.846 --> 01:32:40.901
from coming around the world , going

01:32:40.901 --> 01:32:43.068
back to global , uh . Back into Iran ,

01:32:43.068 --> 01:32:45.290
uh , there's been zero trade going into

01:32:45.290 --> 01:32:47.457
or out of Iran in the last month . And

01:32:47.457 --> 01:32:49.512
just finally , what , what is Iran's

01:32:49.512 --> 01:32:51.568
current ability since it retains its

01:32:51.568 --> 01:32:54.279
revolutionary terrorist ambitions to

01:32:54.279 --> 01:32:56.589
support its terror proxy network in the

01:32:56.589 --> 01:32:59.439
region versus where it was just 11

01:32:59.439 --> 01:33:01.879
months ago , as we sit here today , uh ,

01:33:02.000 --> 01:33:04.419
they are unable to resource and supply

01:33:04.950 --> 01:33:07.319
Hezbollah , Hamas , uh , or the Houthis .

01:33:08.209 --> 01:33:10.320
chapter to be seen of what that looks

01:33:10.320 --> 01:33:12.542
like in Iraq . New prime minister wants

01:33:12.542 --> 01:33:14.770
to distance himself from Iran , but

01:33:14.770 --> 01:33:16.937
we'll see . That's what he's committed

01:33:16.937 --> 01:33:19.048
to . We'll see what that looks like .

01:33:19.048 --> 01:33:21.159
So they can't support their terrorist

01:33:21.159 --> 01:33:23.326
proxies . They're years and years away

01:33:23.326 --> 01:33:25.548
from reconstituting , if at all , their

01:33:25.548 --> 01:33:25.089
missile and drone forces and their

01:33:25.089 --> 01:33:27.200
nuclear program , and they're a

01:33:27.200 --> 01:33:29.689
generation away from rebuilding their

01:33:29.689 --> 01:33:32.439
navy . Seems to me like a little bit

01:33:32.439 --> 01:33:34.550
better position than we were relative

01:33:34.550 --> 01:33:36.870
to Iran . Under Barack Obama and Joe

01:33:36.870 --> 01:33:39.092
Biden's disastrous nuclear deal . Thank

01:33:39.092 --> 01:33:41.037
you . Thank you , Senator Cotton ,

01:33:41.037 --> 01:33:43.839
Senator Slotkin . Um , thank you , uh ,

01:33:43.910 --> 01:33:45.966
gentlemen , for being here and thank

01:33:45.966 --> 01:33:48.021
you for what you're doing . Um , I'm

01:33:48.021 --> 01:33:50.021
gonna direct my questions to , uh ,

01:33:50.021 --> 01:33:52.299
General , um , uh , Cooper , I'm sorry ,

01:33:52.299 --> 01:33:54.354
Admiral Cooper , excuse me , and I'm

01:33:54.354 --> 01:33:56.354
gonna give a good pass to my fellow

01:33:56.354 --> 01:33:58.688
Michigander , um , from Ipsy , Michigan .

01:33:58.688 --> 01:34:00.854
Um , we're , we're happy to see you in

01:34:00.854 --> 01:34:02.854
service . Thank you for what you're

01:34:02.854 --> 01:34:04.910
doing and you're always welcome back

01:34:04.910 --> 01:34:06.854
home when you retire . Um , uh , I

01:34:06.854 --> 01:34:09.770
think the , you know . I feel , um ,

01:34:09.810 --> 01:34:12.410
like whatever , whatever feelings I

01:34:12.410 --> 01:34:14.979
have about the imminence of the threat

01:34:15.169 --> 01:34:18.850
from Iran , um , or not , um , we

01:34:18.850 --> 01:34:22.049
want our military to come through this

01:34:22.049 --> 01:34:24.810
war as successfully and safely as

01:34:24.810 --> 01:34:28.220
possible . I am interested , um , in

01:34:28.220 --> 01:34:30.990
making sure we get out of this , um ,

01:34:31.089 --> 01:34:34.540
quickly and safely . Um ,

01:34:35.020 --> 01:34:37.979
and I have actually no doubt that with

01:34:37.979 --> 01:34:40.035
all the firepower we've used in this

01:34:40.035 --> 01:34:42.257
war , that we've degraded their nuclear

01:34:42.257 --> 01:34:44.312
capability , their ballistic missile

01:34:44.312 --> 01:34:46.646
capability , their terrorism capability ,

01:34:46.646 --> 01:34:48.590
and as someone who served , um , 3

01:34:48.590 --> 01:34:50.812
tours in Iraq , I saw that terrorism up

01:34:50.812 --> 01:34:53.270
close and personal . Um , but it is

01:34:53.270 --> 01:34:56.029
hard to say sitting here , um , with

01:34:56.029 --> 01:34:59.270
the Strait of Hormuz closed and every

01:34:59.270 --> 01:35:02.049
American feeling , um , a deep , deep

01:35:02.049 --> 01:35:04.609
spike in the price of gas , and that

01:35:04.950 --> 01:35:07.061
we're only in the beginning of that ,

01:35:07.061 --> 01:35:09.350
that we can't say we , we are overall

01:35:09.350 --> 01:35:11.990
better off until that strait is opened .

01:35:12.779 --> 01:35:16.540
And while I believe we could

01:35:16.540 --> 01:35:19.439
militarily open the straits ,

01:35:20.660 --> 01:35:23.259
it seems to me that the Iranians have

01:35:23.259 --> 01:35:25.410
strategic geography . They have the

01:35:25.410 --> 01:35:27.521
ability , even though it's degraded ,

01:35:27.521 --> 01:35:30.439
to project power onto . Things like the

01:35:30.439 --> 01:35:32.720
oil infrastructure in places like Saudi

01:35:32.720 --> 01:35:34.990
Arabia or Kuwait or anywhere they want

01:35:35.250 --> 01:35:37.959
further hurting the world economy , you

01:35:37.959 --> 01:35:40.839
know , the United States , um , do you

01:35:40.839 --> 01:35:43.470
believe , is that correct that , um ,

01:35:43.640 --> 01:35:46.120
while militarily we may be able to

01:35:46.120 --> 01:35:48.919
physically open the straits that they

01:35:48.919 --> 01:35:51.689
still retain the ability to affect

01:35:52.080 --> 01:35:54.640
infrastructure in the region , um , and

01:35:54.640 --> 01:35:56.959
therefore kind of have a veto power

01:35:56.959 --> 01:35:58.903
over the world economy right now .

01:36:01.080 --> 01:36:02.969
Senator , I would from a military

01:36:02.969 --> 01:36:04.747
perspective , I would , I would

01:36:04.747 --> 01:36:06.858
characterize Iran as having a remnant

01:36:06.858 --> 01:36:09.399
capability across multiple domains uh

01:36:09.750 --> 01:36:13.040
uh in terms of veto power . I'd really

01:36:13.040 --> 01:36:15.240
would defer to policymakers for that

01:36:15.240 --> 01:36:17.462
characterization . But sorry , can they

01:36:17.462 --> 01:36:21.229
strike ? Oil infrastructure across

01:36:21.609 --> 01:36:24.009
the Persian Gulf . They have a very

01:36:24.009 --> 01:36:26.410
moderate , uh , if not small capability

01:36:26.410 --> 01:36:28.299
to continue strikes , and we , of

01:36:28.299 --> 01:36:30.521
course , have , uh , uh , accordingly ,

01:36:30.521 --> 01:36:32.688
uh , prepared for such a contingency .

01:36:32.688 --> 01:36:35.850
OK , but , but if we could , if we have

01:36:35.850 --> 01:36:37.683
the power to militarily open the

01:36:37.683 --> 01:36:39.572
straits and their threat is quote

01:36:39.572 --> 01:36:41.750
moderate or small , why wouldn't we

01:36:41.750 --> 01:36:44.700
just do it ? So I really would defer to

01:36:44.709 --> 01:36:46.987
policymakers in this particular matter ,

01:36:47.140 --> 01:36:49.362
and the strait clearly is in the middle

01:36:49.362 --> 01:36:51.696
of the negotiation being undertaken now .

01:36:51.696 --> 01:36:53.696
Yeah , I mean , it just seems to me

01:36:53.696 --> 01:36:55.918
that they still certainly have , it may

01:36:55.918 --> 01:36:58.140
be diminished power , but if the United

01:36:58.140 --> 01:37:00.029
States military is not physically

01:37:00.029 --> 01:37:02.084
opening the straits right now , it's

01:37:02.084 --> 01:37:04.196
because the Iranians do have the real

01:37:04.196 --> 01:37:07.020
capability to affect . Um , uh ,

01:37:07.109 --> 01:37:10.149
strikes in or drone strikes into the

01:37:10.149 --> 01:37:12.093
Gulf countries affecting their oil

01:37:12.093 --> 01:37:14.316
infrastructure and sending the price of

01:37:14.316 --> 01:37:16.790
oil worldwide even higher . So , you

01:37:16.790 --> 01:37:18.957
know , it may be diminished , but it's

01:37:18.957 --> 01:37:20.901
real capability unless I'm missing

01:37:20.901 --> 01:37:23.509
something . Um , you know , can you

01:37:23.509 --> 01:37:25.342
describe for me , I'm , I'm very

01:37:25.342 --> 01:37:28.359
sensitive about the , the , um , Way

01:37:28.359 --> 01:37:31.160
that countries like Russia or China may

01:37:31.160 --> 01:37:34.080
be enabling the Iranians to target and

01:37:34.080 --> 01:37:37.180
kill American forces or to provide um

01:37:37.189 --> 01:37:39.759
intelligence on their locations in real

01:37:39.759 --> 01:37:43.319
or near real time . Um , uh , is it

01:37:43.319 --> 01:37:46.200
fair to say that the that the Chinese

01:37:46.200 --> 01:37:49.120
are providing intelligence to the

01:37:49.120 --> 01:37:52.020
Iranians to help them target US forces ?

01:37:52.669 --> 01:37:54.725
So , I think it's best to talk about

01:37:54.725 --> 01:37:56.780
anything regarding intelligence in a

01:37:56.780 --> 01:37:59.002
classified manner . What I can say is ,

01:37:59.002 --> 01:38:01.058
uh , the Iranian military is largely

01:38:01.058 --> 01:38:02.780
made up of Russian and Chinese

01:38:02.780 --> 01:38:05.330
equipment . OK , I , I , I think , you

01:38:05.330 --> 01:38:08.970
know , um , It , it feels like

01:38:08.970 --> 01:38:11.569
either Chinese government and or

01:38:11.569 --> 01:38:14.609
Chinese companies are helping and

01:38:14.609 --> 01:38:17.609
aiding and abetting , um , the Iranians

01:38:17.609 --> 01:38:19.776
in , in providing that information . I

01:38:19.776 --> 01:38:21.998
understand we don't want to go into the

01:38:21.998 --> 01:38:24.165
details , but some of this is like out

01:38:24.165 --> 01:38:26.109
in open press . I would just say I

01:38:26.109 --> 01:38:28.109
personally feel like that crosses a

01:38:28.109 --> 01:38:30.359
Rubicon . Um , anytime we have another

01:38:30.359 --> 01:38:32.081
country providing that kind of

01:38:32.081 --> 01:38:34.248
intelligence to an adversary , I think

01:38:34.248 --> 01:38:36.303
that should play very heavily in our

01:38:36.303 --> 01:38:38.470
calculus in our conversations . I know

01:38:38.470 --> 01:38:40.359
the president is with the Chinese

01:38:40.359 --> 01:38:42.759
government right now , um , but I hope

01:38:42.759 --> 01:38:44.926
that no matter what party we're from ,

01:38:44.926 --> 01:38:47.092
that's just a Rubicon . We all believe

01:38:47.092 --> 01:38:49.092
once you cross it , we're in a very

01:38:49.092 --> 01:38:51.092
different conversation , and I hope

01:38:51.092 --> 01:38:53.315
that's playing out in Beijing . I yield

01:38:53.315 --> 01:38:55.426
back , Chairman . Thank you , Senator

01:38:55.426 --> 01:38:57.315
Banks . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:38:57.315 --> 01:38:59.370
Admiral Cooper , any , any update at

01:38:59.370 --> 01:39:01.203
all on activities in Afghanistan

01:39:01.203 --> 01:39:04.580
increased , uh . Activity from ISIS or

01:39:04.580 --> 01:39:06.580
any other groups that concern you ,

01:39:06.580 --> 01:39:08.747
anything at all that you can tell us ?

01:39:08.747 --> 01:39:10.858
Uh , Senator , just , uh , uh , thank

01:39:10.858 --> 01:39:13.080
you for the question . Uh , Afghanistan

01:39:13.080 --> 01:39:15.413
remains , uh , uh , on the forefront of ,

01:39:15.413 --> 01:39:15.359
of what we're watching in terms of

01:39:15.359 --> 01:39:17.415
terrorist activity . I think best to

01:39:17.415 --> 01:39:19.748
address that in a classified forum , uh ,

01:39:19.748 --> 01:39:21.859
for right now our partnerships in the

01:39:21.859 --> 01:39:21.520
region are suppressing that threat .

01:39:21.720 --> 01:39:23.998
Can you give us any update at all , uh ,

01:39:23.998 --> 01:39:26.759
uh , for the record , uh , no , no

01:39:26.759 --> 01:39:29.000
remain remains an area of concern for

01:39:29.000 --> 01:39:30.889
CETCOM . You're , you're , you're

01:39:30.889 --> 01:39:32.889
tracking , paying attention to it .

01:39:32.979 --> 01:39:35.201
We're not we're not completely ignoring

01:39:35.201 --> 01:39:37.035
Afghanistan . Remains an area of

01:39:37.035 --> 01:39:39.201
concern . We're paying close attention

01:39:39.201 --> 01:39:41.201
to a variety of partnerships . Uh ,

01:39:41.201 --> 01:39:43.423
we're suppressing any threat . Thanks .

01:39:43.423 --> 01:39:45.590
Um , thank you for your leadership . I

01:39:45.590 --> 01:39:47.423
mean , I think this is . Uh , an

01:39:47.423 --> 01:39:49.423
incredible moment . You're doing an

01:39:49.423 --> 01:39:51.479
incredible job when it comes to Iran

01:39:51.479 --> 01:39:53.646
and degrading , their military , their

01:39:53.646 --> 01:39:55.757
defense industrial base . You cite in

01:39:55.757 --> 01:39:57.479
your testimony that the US has

01:39:57.479 --> 01:39:59.368
delivered a long term rollback of

01:39:59.368 --> 01:40:01.535
Iran's ability to project power in the

01:40:01.535 --> 01:40:03.312
region and beyond , end quote ,

01:40:03.312 --> 01:40:06.339
damaging or destroying over 85% . Of

01:40:06.339 --> 01:40:08.339
its ballistic missile , drone , and

01:40:08.339 --> 01:40:10.450
naval defense industrial base and 82%

01:40:10.450 --> 01:40:12.506
of its air defense missile systems ,

01:40:12.506 --> 01:40:14.839
that , that's , that's pretty good , um ,

01:40:14.839 --> 01:40:17.172
that , that's a strong , um , statement ,

01:40:17.180 --> 01:40:19.291
and I'm , I'm proud of your efforts .

01:40:19.470 --> 01:40:22.089
The NDS talks about the concept of

01:40:22.629 --> 01:40:26.149
simultaneity in which our adversaries

01:40:26.149 --> 01:40:28.540
could undertake simultaneous aggression

01:40:28.540 --> 01:40:31.220
across multiple theaters . Does

01:40:31.220 --> 01:40:33.299
Operation Epic Fury's degradation of

01:40:33.299 --> 01:40:35.132
the Iranian military and defense

01:40:35.132 --> 01:40:37.899
industrial base reduce the problem of

01:40:37.899 --> 01:40:41.600
simultaneity ? Senator , I think

01:40:41.600 --> 01:40:43.810
there's , it remains to be seen what

01:40:43.810 --> 01:40:46.850
happens going forward with Iran . Uh ,

01:40:46.890 --> 01:40:48.946
but I , what I think we've seen is a

01:40:48.946 --> 01:40:51.057
combination of ability for the United

01:40:51.057 --> 01:40:53.279
States to project power and influence ,

01:40:53.279 --> 01:40:55.168
uh , and defeat an adversary very

01:40:55.168 --> 01:40:57.334
quickly , 38 days . Uh , the effects ,

01:40:57.334 --> 01:40:59.279
uh , on other theaters , I think I

01:40:59.279 --> 01:41:01.168
would really refer to US European

01:41:01.168 --> 01:41:03.057
Commander and the Pacific Command

01:41:03.057 --> 01:41:05.001
commander , but clearly the United

01:41:05.001 --> 01:41:07.168
States is agile , and we can move from

01:41:07.168 --> 01:41:09.279
theater to theater very quickly . Can

01:41:09.279 --> 01:41:11.612
you unpack this concept of simultaneity ?

01:41:11.629 --> 01:41:13.629
Will the United States . The United

01:41:13.629 --> 01:41:15.685
States has significant capacity . We

01:41:15.685 --> 01:41:17.870
have forces deployed around the world

01:41:17.870 --> 01:41:20.189
addressing a variety of issues . We're

01:41:20.189 --> 01:41:22.310
focused today largely on Iran , but

01:41:22.310 --> 01:41:24.750
clearly , uh , General Anderson is

01:41:24.750 --> 01:41:27.870
actioning key and critical matters in

01:41:27.870 --> 01:41:29.870
Africa . We're doing it in Europe .

01:41:29.870 --> 01:41:32.037
We're doing it in Asia and we're doing

01:41:32.037 --> 01:41:34.037
it in South America and we're we're

01:41:34.037 --> 01:41:35.981
able to do that at the same time .

01:41:35.981 --> 01:41:38.092
That's how the United States military

01:41:38.092 --> 01:41:37.979
rolls . You also write in your

01:41:37.979 --> 01:41:39.812
testimony that Iran's ability to

01:41:39.812 --> 01:41:41.899
reconstitute its military capability

01:41:41.899 --> 01:41:44.580
will quote depend in large part on

01:41:44.580 --> 01:41:47.000
decisions we and our partners make .

01:41:47.959 --> 01:41:50.015
What should we be doing to press our

01:41:50.015 --> 01:41:52.740
advantage ? I think there's a policy

01:41:52.740 --> 01:41:55.020
component to this , Senator , and

01:41:55.020 --> 01:41:57.242
potentially , potentially a legislative

01:41:57.242 --> 01:41:59.464
component . Then there are a restricted

01:41:59.464 --> 01:42:01.631
number of countries . There's a finite

01:42:01.631 --> 01:42:03.298
number of countries that have

01:42:03.298 --> 01:42:05.242
historically had trade with Iran .

01:42:06.419 --> 01:42:08.419
Addressing those countries and what

01:42:08.419 --> 01:42:10.752
they are trading , how they're doing it ,

01:42:10.752 --> 01:42:12.863
and what that looks like , I think is

01:42:12.863 --> 01:42:12.479
something we should take a look at ,

01:42:13.459 --> 01:42:15.626
because if they don't have the parts ,

01:42:15.626 --> 01:42:17.903
they're not going to build the weapons .

01:42:17.903 --> 01:42:20.070
Well put . I , I was very proud to see

01:42:20.070 --> 01:42:22.181
the Lucas drones deployed and used in

01:42:22.181 --> 01:42:24.292
CEO . Uh , the Indiana National Guard

01:42:24.292 --> 01:42:26.181
played a really important role in

01:42:26.181 --> 01:42:27.959
testing the Lucas drone at Camp

01:42:27.959 --> 01:42:29.848
Atterbury in my state . What , if

01:42:29.848 --> 01:42:32.015
anything , can we extrapolate from the

01:42:32.015 --> 01:42:34.015
performance of our Lucas drones and

01:42:34.015 --> 01:42:36.070
other conflicts ? Yes , Senator , so

01:42:36.070 --> 01:42:37.903
the Lucas drones were the United

01:42:37.903 --> 01:42:39.959
States' first opportunity to use our

01:42:39.959 --> 01:42:42.015
own one-way attack drones against an

01:42:42.015 --> 01:42:43.792
adversary . I remember well the

01:42:43.792 --> 01:42:45.515
training that happened at Camp

01:42:45.515 --> 01:42:47.570
Atterbury . I was watching it like a

01:42:47.570 --> 01:42:49.848
hawk . That training has produced , uh ,

01:42:49.848 --> 01:42:51.903
additional capability that we've now

01:42:51.903 --> 01:42:51.560
employed against an adversary . Very

01:42:51.560 --> 01:42:53.671
effectively , what , what else can we

01:42:53.671 --> 01:42:55.727
learn from it ? Well , there's a lot

01:42:55.727 --> 01:42:57.838
more to be learned from it . Uh , I'd

01:42:57.838 --> 01:43:00.060
love to take it in a classified setting

01:43:00.060 --> 01:42:59.279
and in particularly given where we are

01:42:59.279 --> 01:43:01.335
right now vis a vis Iran . I think I

01:43:01.335 --> 01:43:03.335
would just like to keep that in the

01:43:03.335 --> 01:43:03.319
classified setting . For more than a

01:43:03.319 --> 01:43:05.319
month our warfighters in the Middle

01:43:05.319 --> 01:43:07.399
East were hammered by small drones .

01:43:08.120 --> 01:43:10.231
How can we ensure that doesn't happen

01:43:10.231 --> 01:43:12.564
again if combat operations resume ? Yes ,

01:43:12.564 --> 01:43:14.787
Senator , a little bit of a myth buster

01:43:14.787 --> 01:43:16.842
on this . Uh , Iranian drones , uh ,

01:43:16.842 --> 01:43:19.450
are , uh , significantly capable in the

01:43:19.450 --> 01:43:22.410
days of $35,000 Walmart light drones ,

01:43:22.490 --> 01:43:24.546
those , those things are behind us .

01:43:24.546 --> 01:43:26.657
Iran has a very capable drone force .

01:43:26.657 --> 01:43:29.220
We have very capably defeated it . Good .

01:43:29.490 --> 01:43:31.601
Uh , well put . Thank you very much .

01:43:31.601 --> 01:43:33.823
Uh , that's all I have . I yield back ,

01:43:33.823 --> 01:43:33.689
Mr . Chairman . Uh , thank you ,

01:43:33.770 --> 01:43:35.709
Senator Kelly , and then Senator

01:43:35.709 --> 01:43:38.189
Gillibrand . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

01:43:38.370 --> 01:43:40.770
Admiral Cooper . General Anderson ,

01:43:40.850 --> 01:43:42.961
thank you both for being here today .

01:43:43.080 --> 01:43:45.413
Admiral Cooper , I wanna start with you .

01:43:45.413 --> 01:43:47.469
I've got questions for both of you ,

01:43:47.469 --> 01:43:49.524
but , um , I wanna talk a little bit

01:43:49.524 --> 01:43:52.189
about the civilian harm mitigation team ,

01:43:52.549 --> 01:43:55.250
uh , at CENCOM . My understanding is

01:43:55.250 --> 01:43:58.330
that you've gone from 10 down to 1 as

01:43:58.330 --> 01:44:02.200
part of a department-wide reduction in

01:44:02.200 --> 01:44:05.709
shimmer , that their role

01:44:05.770 --> 01:44:08.910
is to try to minimize harm . To

01:44:08.910 --> 01:44:11.430
civilians when we're conducting combat ,

01:44:11.439 --> 01:44:13.550
combat operations , is that correct ?

01:44:13.550 --> 01:44:16.459
You've gone from 10 to 1 . Yes sir ,

01:44:16.560 --> 01:44:18.449
that's the billet , but there's a

01:44:18.449 --> 01:44:20.616
larger component to this . Over , over

01:44:20.616 --> 01:44:22.616
a course of years we've gone from a

01:44:22.616 --> 01:44:24.282
compliance to , uh , civilian

01:44:24.282 --> 01:44:26.338
casualties and risk mitigation being

01:44:26.338 --> 01:44:28.393
just part of the culture . There are

01:44:28.393 --> 01:44:30.449
dozens if not hundreds of people who

01:44:30.449 --> 01:44:32.560
are involved in this process . What ,

01:44:32.560 --> 01:44:34.727
what did those nine individuals do who

01:44:34.727 --> 01:44:36.838
were , um , removed from their , from

01:44:36.838 --> 01:44:38.616
their jobs ? They're now , uh ,

01:44:38.616 --> 01:44:40.449
integrated in other capacities .

01:44:40.449 --> 01:44:42.504
They've retained . Capacities in the

01:44:42.504 --> 01:44:44.727
joint what we would call joint but what

01:44:44.727 --> 01:44:44.475
were they doing when they were part of

01:44:44.475 --> 01:44:47.564
the civilian harm mitigation team ?

01:44:47.915 --> 01:44:50.785
They're playing a key role in , uh ,

01:44:50.794 --> 01:44:53.115
helping us move from compliance to

01:44:53.115 --> 01:44:55.134
culture , uh , on , on CIFCAS ,

01:44:55.354 --> 01:44:57.465
focusing on it every day , which they

01:44:57.465 --> 01:44:59.687
continue to do . So by your estimates ,

01:44:59.745 --> 01:45:01.912
how many civilians have been killed or

01:45:01.912 --> 01:45:04.023
injured over the course of this war ?

01:45:04.779 --> 01:45:07.180
The investigation on on on the one

01:45:07.180 --> 01:45:09.402
incident that we've had after more than

01:45:09.402 --> 01:45:11.624
13,000 strikes is still underway . Uh ,

01:45:11.859 --> 01:45:13.859
we'll certainly be transparent , at

01:45:13.859 --> 01:45:15.803
least that when we can . This is a

01:45:15.803 --> 01:45:17.970
matter that I'm , I'm , I'm passionate

01:45:17.970 --> 01:45:20.192
about . I'd like to use the occasion to

01:45:20.192 --> 01:45:22.081
invite you , other members of the

01:45:22.081 --> 01:45:24.303
committee , and your staffs to Tampa to

01:45:24.303 --> 01:45:24.180
take a look at what our targeting

01:45:24.180 --> 01:45:26.180
process looks like . If you were to

01:45:26.180 --> 01:45:28.402
find out that there was an error in the

01:45:28.402 --> 01:45:30.624
targeting process , would you reinstate

01:45:30.624 --> 01:45:32.791
some of those people that were removed

01:45:32.791 --> 01:45:34.458
from that team ? Sir , it's a

01:45:34.458 --> 01:45:36.624
hypothetical . I think we , we , I'm ,

01:45:36.624 --> 01:45:38.513
I'm always looking to organize to

01:45:38.513 --> 01:45:40.680
purpose , uh , and we'll just see what

01:45:40.680 --> 01:45:40.240
the investigation . Are you taking any

01:45:40.240 --> 01:45:42.319
additional steps now because of the

01:45:42.660 --> 01:45:44.827
civilian civilian casualties to date ?

01:45:45.509 --> 01:45:47.342
We have taken additional steps .

01:45:47.342 --> 01:45:49.120
Additional steps have been very

01:45:49.120 --> 01:45:51.176
proactive throughout epic fury . Our

01:45:51.176 --> 01:45:53.287
staff specifically warned the Iranian

01:45:53.287 --> 01:45:55.342
people more than 100 times about the

01:45:55.342 --> 01:45:57.287
threat of them being used as human

01:45:57.287 --> 01:45:59.176
shields . I personally warned the

01:45:59.176 --> 01:46:01.231
Iranian people on March 8th , 11th ,

01:46:01.231 --> 01:46:02.953
and the 23rd that they had the

01:46:02.953 --> 01:46:05.009
potential to be human shields , uh ,

01:46:05.009 --> 01:46:07.065
and that that communication was very

01:46:07.065 --> 01:46:06.680
effective . So again , we're moving not

01:46:06.680 --> 01:46:08.902
just targeting but a proactive measures

01:46:08.902 --> 01:46:11.124
to minimize . All right , thank you for

01:46:11.124 --> 01:46:13.347
doing that . Uh , General Anderson , so

01:46:13.347 --> 01:46:15.347
China and Russia continue to expand

01:46:15.347 --> 01:46:17.291
their influence across Africa . We

01:46:17.291 --> 01:46:20.220
discussed this with misinformation , uh ,

01:46:20.379 --> 01:46:23.439
disinformation , uh , across many

01:46:23.899 --> 01:46:26.950
African countries . You requested $94

01:46:26.950 --> 01:46:28.839
million for information operation

01:46:28.839 --> 01:46:31.270
activities . You were promised , and

01:46:31.270 --> 01:46:33.470
this is in fiscal year 26 , you were

01:46:33.470 --> 01:46:35.137
promised $25 million from the

01:46:35.137 --> 01:46:37.192
department . You ultimately received

01:46:37.192 --> 01:46:39.279
only 19 million . Can you talk about

01:46:39.279 --> 01:46:41.750
the difference between having $19

01:46:41.750 --> 01:46:44.028
million to do that job and $94 million ?

01:46:44.028 --> 01:46:46.028
Like what are you able to do if you

01:46:46.028 --> 01:46:48.439
were fully funded ? General Anderson ,

01:46:48.509 --> 01:46:50.731
I , I , I get it . I mean , we see this

01:46:50.731 --> 01:46:52.676
stuff all the time , the amount of

01:46:52.676 --> 01:46:54.620
misinformation that comes from the

01:46:54.620 --> 01:46:56.842
Chinese and the Russians , it is a huge

01:46:56.842 --> 01:46:59.065
problem . But if you could just explain

01:46:59.065 --> 01:47:01.287
to us a little bit about what you could

01:47:01.287 --> 01:47:03.398
do if you had the full request . Uh ,

01:47:03.398 --> 01:47:05.453
Senator , I think that the key point

01:47:05.453 --> 01:47:07.176
there is right now we are in a

01:47:07.176 --> 01:47:09.589
reactionary mode to propaganda and to

01:47:09.589 --> 01:47:11.979
other information operations to what we

01:47:11.979 --> 01:47:14.430
can do at the moment . What the fuller

01:47:14.430 --> 01:47:16.541
funding would do , especially if it's

01:47:16.541 --> 01:47:18.652
consistent over time , would allow us

01:47:18.652 --> 01:47:20.708
to build an information campaign and

01:47:20.708 --> 01:47:22.486
address these issues across the

01:47:22.486 --> 01:47:22.189
continent . We're one of the few .

01:47:22.444 --> 01:47:24.444
Organizations that looks across the

01:47:24.444 --> 01:47:26.333
entirety of the continent and can

01:47:26.333 --> 01:47:28.500
understand how these uh propaganda and

01:47:28.500 --> 01:47:30.611
misinformations play across borders .

01:47:30.685 --> 01:47:32.685
We work very closely with the State

01:47:32.685 --> 01:47:34.741
Department , US embassies on this to

01:47:34.741 --> 01:47:36.796
make sure our messaging is key , but

01:47:36.796 --> 01:47:38.685
this would allow us to do is help

01:47:38.685 --> 01:47:40.518
coordinate that messaging across

01:47:40.518 --> 01:47:42.518
regions and across the continent to

01:47:42.518 --> 01:47:44.574
highlight the . The issues that come

01:47:44.574 --> 01:47:44.450
with this misinformation , especially

01:47:44.450 --> 01:47:46.500
as much of it is destabilizing the

01:47:46.500 --> 01:47:48.667
democracies across the region . Do you

01:47:48.667 --> 01:47:50.833
ever feel like we should be countering

01:47:50.833 --> 01:47:52.722
some of their disinformation with

01:47:52.722 --> 01:47:55.240
disinformation of our own ? Sir , I

01:47:55.240 --> 01:47:57.462
think the most powerful tool we have is

01:47:57.462 --> 01:47:59.684
the truth . What America brings is very

01:47:59.684 --> 01:48:01.796
unique . We're still a beacon of hope

01:48:01.796 --> 01:48:04.018
and light in the world , and I think we

01:48:04.018 --> 01:48:03.720
should be willing to talk about who we

01:48:03.720 --> 01:48:05.387
are . This is America's 250th

01:48:05.387 --> 01:48:07.553
anniversary . There's a long history ,

01:48:07.553 --> 01:48:09.831
uh , on the continent that is , I mean ,

01:48:09.831 --> 01:48:11.942
it's good and bad , but there's a lot

01:48:11.942 --> 01:48:14.109
of good that we can talk about of what

01:48:14.109 --> 01:48:16.331
America brings . The fact that John C .

01:48:16.331 --> 01:48:18.498
Robinson founded the Tuskegee Airmen ,

01:48:18.498 --> 01:48:20.609
two years later founded the Ethiopian

01:48:20.609 --> 01:48:22.720
Air Force , and then went on to found

01:48:22.720 --> 01:48:24.942
Ethiopian Airlines , which is . Now the

01:48:24.942 --> 01:48:24.854
pride not only of Ethiopia but Africa ,

01:48:25.194 --> 01:48:27.250
it's not a story that's well known ,

01:48:27.250 --> 01:48:29.194
but that is a tie that we have had

01:48:29.194 --> 01:48:31.250
between the aviation communities for

01:48:31.250 --> 01:48:33.472
years . There are multiple stories like

01:48:33.472 --> 01:48:32.834
that across the continent that we need

01:48:32.834 --> 01:48:34.778
to propagate and talk about . So I

01:48:34.778 --> 01:48:36.612
would say we should focus on the

01:48:36.612 --> 01:48:38.834
goodness and the positivity of engaging

01:48:38.834 --> 01:48:40.945
with America and worry less about the

01:48:40.945 --> 01:48:43.001
disinformation that our partners put

01:48:43.001 --> 01:48:45.001
out , but we have to engage in this

01:48:45.001 --> 01:48:44.515
environment . We have to be active in

01:48:44.515 --> 01:48:46.459
the information space . So you got

01:48:46.459 --> 01:48:48.571
about 25% of the requests . So if you

01:48:48.571 --> 01:48:50.682
got the full amount , you could put .

01:48:51.569 --> 01:48:53.890
More out there , positive stuff that

01:48:53.890 --> 01:48:56.001
the United States is doing and I know

01:48:56.001 --> 01:48:57.946
these are , you know , challenging

01:48:57.946 --> 01:49:00.057
times with resources even beyond what

01:49:00.057 --> 01:49:03.609
DOD has , USAID and others , but do you

01:49:03.609 --> 01:49:07.459
think the , um . That that would

01:49:07.459 --> 01:49:10.899
be sufficient to counter Chinese and

01:49:10.899 --> 01:49:13.770
Russian misinformation . Uh , Senator ,

01:49:13.890 --> 01:49:16.330
I think , uh , information operations

01:49:16.330 --> 01:49:19.399
is one of the lower cost investments

01:49:19.399 --> 01:49:21.288
that we can make to have outsized

01:49:21.288 --> 01:49:23.330
return and help amplify the limited

01:49:23.330 --> 01:49:25.709
resources we have in the military side

01:49:26.049 --> 01:49:28.160
and highlight the benefits that those

01:49:28.160 --> 01:49:30.216
provide and being able to talk about

01:49:30.216 --> 01:49:32.271
that broadly , I do think is outside

01:49:32.271 --> 01:49:34.493
proportion , so . Small investments can

01:49:34.493 --> 01:49:36.549
have a large impact , and this is an

01:49:36.549 --> 01:49:36.524
area of information where I think we

01:49:36.524 --> 01:49:39.444
can make a lot of gains even despite

01:49:39.444 --> 01:49:41.714
our smaller physical presence that can

01:49:41.714 --> 01:49:43.658
highlight the totality of what the

01:49:43.658 --> 01:49:45.725
United States brings . I 100% agree

01:49:45.725 --> 01:49:47.669
with you , General , and we should

01:49:47.669 --> 01:49:49.503
really look into getting you the

01:49:49.503 --> 01:49:51.503
resources you need to do this job .

01:49:51.503 --> 01:49:53.281
Thank you . Thank you . General

01:49:53.281 --> 01:49:55.830
Anderson , I 100% agree with you .

01:49:57.120 --> 01:49:59.600
Um , Senator Gillibrand , Admiral

01:49:59.600 --> 01:50:02.359
Cooper , uh , we had Secretary Hagseth

01:50:02.359 --> 01:50:05.680
here a week or so ago , and we did not

01:50:05.680 --> 01:50:09.200
get satisfy , uh , satisfactory answers

01:50:09.200 --> 01:50:11.759
about Iran . So what is your mission in

01:50:11.759 --> 01:50:15.620
Iran right now ? Senator ,

01:50:15.669 --> 01:50:17.930
with epic fury now , uh , formally

01:50:17.930 --> 01:50:19.763
ended , uh , for the president's

01:50:19.763 --> 01:50:21.874
notification , uh , we shifted , uh ,

01:50:21.874 --> 01:50:24.041
our mission to a blockade mission in ,

01:50:24.041 --> 01:50:26.152
in the following day , and that we're

01:50:26.152 --> 01:50:28.152
implementing that mission , uh , in

01:50:28.152 --> 01:50:27.979
accordance with the international armed

01:50:27.979 --> 01:50:29.923
conflict . That's our main mission

01:50:29.923 --> 01:50:31.868
today as well as to be ready for a

01:50:31.868 --> 01:50:34.060
broad range of contingencies . And do

01:50:34.060 --> 01:50:37.180
you feel that uh President Trump's

01:50:37.180 --> 01:50:40.040
declaration that we have obliterated

01:50:40.620 --> 01:50:42.676
all of Iran's capabilities and their

01:50:42.676 --> 01:50:45.560
nuclear program , is that accurate ?

01:50:46.250 --> 01:50:48.139
Senator , I speak from a military

01:50:48.139 --> 01:50:50.450
perspective . We have significantly

01:50:50.450 --> 01:50:52.561
degraded their drone , missile , uh ,

01:50:52.561 --> 01:50:54.283
and naval capabilities . We've

01:50:54.283 --> 01:50:56.394
fractured their command and control .

01:50:56.394 --> 01:50:58.172
Uh , we've eliminated the large

01:50:58.172 --> 01:51:00.339
preponderance of their space program .

01:51:00.339 --> 01:51:02.617
Uh , they , uh , by every measure , uh ,

01:51:02.617 --> 01:51:04.728
are degraded significantly across all

01:51:04.728 --> 01:51:06.894
measures of national power . So what's

01:51:06.894 --> 01:51:09.061
your exit strategy to end the conflict

01:51:09.061 --> 01:51:11.283
with Iran , Senator , that's , that's a

01:51:11.283 --> 01:51:13.506
policy decision . And don't you have to

01:51:13.506 --> 01:51:15.339
offer the president various exit

01:51:15.339 --> 01:51:17.506
strategies so he knows how to get from

01:51:17.506 --> 01:51:19.728
A to B ? Uh , Senator , consistent with

01:51:19.728 --> 01:51:21.506
my statutory obligations , I've

01:51:21.506 --> 01:51:23.728
provided a broad range of options along

01:51:23.728 --> 01:51:25.894
with the risks and mitigations through

01:51:25.894 --> 01:51:28.006
the Secretary . So given your current

01:51:28.006 --> 01:51:30.172
mission , how many more days , weeks ,

01:51:30.172 --> 01:51:32.228
months , years are we going to be at

01:51:32.228 --> 01:51:34.520
war with Iran ? Well , as , as we sit

01:51:34.520 --> 01:51:36.576
here today , we are in a ceasefire ,

01:51:37.020 --> 01:51:39.242
and the way ahead will be determined by

01:51:39.242 --> 01:51:41.409
our policymakers . Well , currently we

01:51:41.409 --> 01:51:43.576
are still spending a billion dollars a

01:51:43.576 --> 01:51:45.687
day on this war with Iran , and I can

01:51:45.687 --> 01:51:47.964
tell you from my New York constituents ,

01:51:47.964 --> 01:51:49.909
they're furious about it because a

01:51:49.909 --> 01:51:52.131
billion dollars a day could be lowering

01:51:52.131 --> 01:51:54.187
their housing costs , lowering their

01:51:54.187 --> 01:51:56.353
food costs , lowering their healthcare

01:51:56.353 --> 01:51:58.520
costs , lowering the costs of everyday

01:51:58.520 --> 01:51:58.419
expenses that continue to go up because

01:51:58.419 --> 01:52:00.475
of the war in Iran with the price of

01:52:00.475 --> 01:52:02.586
gas . As high as it is , the price of

01:52:02.586 --> 01:52:04.530
diesel as high as it is , it means

01:52:04.530 --> 01:52:06.586
everything that they have to buy for

01:52:06.586 --> 01:52:08.697
their families is more expensive . So

01:52:08.697 --> 01:52:11.629
we expect from our military leaders a

01:52:11.629 --> 01:52:14.270
plan about why and how long we are

01:52:14.270 --> 01:52:16.437
going to be spending a billion dollars

01:52:16.437 --> 01:52:18.548
a day , and I have not seen that plan

01:52:18.548 --> 01:52:20.509
or the why from President Trump or

01:52:20.509 --> 01:52:22.870
Secretary Hegseth . So I'm hoping as

01:52:22.870 --> 01:52:25.339
the military person in charge of

01:52:25.339 --> 01:52:27.830
operations that you have a plan to .

01:52:28.220 --> 01:52:30.580
End this war and to stop spending a

01:52:30.580 --> 01:52:33.209
billion dollars a day . Senator , we

01:52:33.209 --> 01:52:35.490
have a broad range of plans and

01:52:35.490 --> 01:52:37.700
contingencies , uh , consistent with ,

01:52:37.709 --> 01:52:40.169
uh , my obligation to provide that

01:52:40.169 --> 01:52:42.225
advice both to the Secretary and the

01:52:42.225 --> 01:52:44.336
President . Uh , we've done so . Uh ,

01:52:44.336 --> 01:52:46.502
Decisions will be made by our civilian

01:52:46.502 --> 01:52:46.410
leadership , and my job will be to

01:52:46.410 --> 01:52:48.450
execute them . The second concern I

01:52:48.450 --> 01:52:50.770
have , Admiral Cooper , is , uh , how

01:52:50.770 --> 01:52:53.169
we've prosecuted this war to date . Uh ,

01:52:53.259 --> 01:52:55.700
we have data and information publicly

01:52:55.700 --> 01:52:57.867
available in publications like The New

01:52:57.867 --> 01:53:00.339
York Times that 22 schools have been

01:53:00.339 --> 01:53:02.819
hit . Hospitals , dozens of hospitals

01:53:02.819 --> 01:53:05.069
have been hit . Uh , we have

01:53:05.069 --> 01:53:07.709
regulations . We have the law of war .

01:53:07.990 --> 01:53:10.790
We have human rights obligations . We

01:53:10.790 --> 01:53:13.229
have our own , um , targeting

01:53:13.229 --> 01:53:15.451
requirements to avoid civilian harm and

01:53:15.451 --> 01:53:17.709
death . Have you been implementing all

01:53:17.709 --> 01:53:19.649
the laws that are required under

01:53:20.029 --> 01:53:23.009
current law to minimize civilian death ?

01:53:23.830 --> 01:53:26.589
Senator , we have executed every

01:53:26.589 --> 01:53:28.645
operation consistent with the law of

01:53:28.645 --> 01:53:30.422
armed conflict . The subject of

01:53:30.422 --> 01:53:32.422
civilian casualties is a particular

01:53:32.422 --> 01:53:34.533
passion of mine . We pay attention to

01:53:34.533 --> 01:53:36.645
it . We follow all the procedures and

01:53:36.645 --> 01:53:38.756
have gone above and beyond to , in my

01:53:38.756 --> 01:53:40.700
case , personally warn the Iranian

01:53:40.700 --> 01:53:42.645
people of several instances during

01:53:42.645 --> 01:53:42.640
conflict where they were being

01:53:42.640 --> 01:53:44.751
potentially they've been warned . How

01:53:44.751 --> 01:53:47.290
did we then bomb 22 schools ? There's

01:53:47.290 --> 01:53:49.346
no indication that we have that that

01:53:49.346 --> 01:53:51.457
that has been corroborated . How many

01:53:51.457 --> 01:53:53.568
schools have we bombed ? There is one

01:53:53.568 --> 01:53:55.734
active civilian casualty investigation

01:53:55.734 --> 01:53:58.490
from the 13,629 munitions . So how do

01:53:58.490 --> 01:54:00.434
you explain the publicly available

01:54:00.434 --> 01:54:02.546
information that 22 schools have been

01:54:02.546 --> 01:54:04.810
hit and multiple hospitals ? There's no

01:54:04.810 --> 01:54:06.921
way that we can corroborate that , no

01:54:06.921 --> 01:54:09.254
indication of that whatsoever , Senator .

01:54:09.254 --> 01:54:11.366
There's no way you can corroborate or

01:54:11.366 --> 01:54:13.421
no indication of it . Which one ? No

01:54:13.421 --> 01:54:15.532
indication . Well , the indication is

01:54:15.532 --> 01:54:17.588
what's publicly available . There is

01:54:17.588 --> 01:54:19.532
indication . Have you investigated

01:54:19.532 --> 01:54:21.643
those claims ? We have not . Why have

01:54:21.643 --> 01:54:23.977
you not ? If this is a passion of yours ,

01:54:23.977 --> 01:54:25.810
if you believe that the civilian

01:54:25.810 --> 01:54:27.977
casualties are not consistent with the

01:54:27.977 --> 01:54:29.921
law of war and not consistent with

01:54:29.921 --> 01:54:31.810
human rights obligations that our

01:54:31.810 --> 01:54:33.921
military regularly follows with great

01:54:33.921 --> 01:54:35.977
pride and great diligence , why have

01:54:35.977 --> 01:54:38.143
you not investigated those allegations

01:54:38.143 --> 01:54:40.366
when they're publicly being made on the

01:54:40.366 --> 01:54:42.477
cover of The New York Times ? I'll be

01:54:42.477 --> 01:54:44.477
happy to take a look at the in each

01:54:44.477 --> 01:54:44.290
instance . I would like a report that .

01:54:44.979 --> 01:54:47.180
I would like a report from you , from

01:54:47.180 --> 01:54:50.839
your team about whether there have been .

01:54:53.100 --> 01:54:55.049
Attacks that have resulted in the

01:54:55.049 --> 01:54:57.459
destruction of schools and hospitals ,

01:54:57.620 --> 01:55:00.859
and if so , why and how then last have

01:55:00.859 --> 01:55:03.580
you managed the 90% cut to the

01:55:03.580 --> 01:55:05.700
personnel who are supposed to avoid

01:55:05.700 --> 01:55:08.560
civilian targets ? Happy to provide any ,

01:55:08.609 --> 01:55:10.831
any report , and I would invite you and

01:55:10.831 --> 01:55:12.776
every staff member here to come to

01:55:12.776 --> 01:55:14.776
Tampa to look at the process to see

01:55:14.776 --> 01:55:17.053
exactly how , how it works . Thank you .

01:55:17.053 --> 01:55:20.600
Thank you , Admiral . Senator

01:55:20.600 --> 01:55:24.580
Duckworth Thank you Mr . Chairman

01:55:24.580 --> 01:55:26.858
and thank you gentlemen for being here .

01:55:26.858 --> 01:55:29.024
Admiral Cooper , the Senate received a

01:55:29.024 --> 01:55:31.247
letter from President Trump on Friday ,

01:55:31.247 --> 01:55:33.469
May 1st , stating that hostilities with

01:55:33.469 --> 01:55:35.580
Iran have ended , and you just stated

01:55:35.580 --> 01:55:37.358
here that we're no longer uh uh

01:55:37.358 --> 01:55:39.524
operating under Operation uh uh Urgent

01:55:39.524 --> 01:55:41.636
Fury . Um , would you say that , uh ,

01:55:41.636 --> 01:55:43.691
we are still engaging in hostilities

01:55:43.691 --> 01:55:45.413
with Iran or have they ended ?

01:55:46.549 --> 01:55:48.827
Consistent with the president's letter ,

01:55:48.827 --> 01:55:51.310
uh , those epic fury is complete . We

01:55:51.310 --> 01:55:53.532
are operating under international armed

01:55:53.532 --> 01:55:55.754
conflict rules in the implementation of

01:55:55.754 --> 01:55:57.977
the blockade . So , so , are we engaged

01:55:57.977 --> 01:56:00.143
in hostilities with Iran ? Yes or no ?

01:56:00.143 --> 01:56:02.366
We are not . We're in a ceasefire . The

01:56:02.366 --> 01:56:04.310
Strait of Hormuz remains blocked ,

01:56:04.310 --> 01:56:04.109
right ? You're , you're , you're

01:56:04.109 --> 01:56:06.220
engaged in a blockade , are you not ?

01:56:06.290 --> 01:56:08.512
The blockade is against Iranian ports ,

01:56:08.529 --> 01:56:10.729
commerce going in and coming out . It

01:56:10.729 --> 01:56:12.840
is the last thing we would want to do

01:56:12.840 --> 01:56:15.007
is blockade the Strait of Hormuz . And

01:56:15.007 --> 01:56:17.173
as we've seen in the last week , there

01:56:17.173 --> 01:56:19.340
have been instances of ships coming in

01:56:19.340 --> 01:56:21.562
and out , including our own . But under

01:56:21.562 --> 01:56:21.450
international law , a blockade is an

01:56:21.450 --> 01:56:24.740
act of war . So are we , if you're

01:56:24.740 --> 01:56:26.859
blockading actively block blockading

01:56:26.859 --> 01:56:29.299
Iran , then you are engaged in an act

01:56:29.299 --> 01:56:31.466
we are currently in an act of war with

01:56:31.466 --> 01:56:33.466
Iran under international law that a

01:56:33.466 --> 01:56:35.577
blockade is one of the definitions of

01:56:35.577 --> 01:56:37.688
an act of war under international law

01:56:37.688 --> 01:56:39.743
consistent with the uh the direction

01:56:39.743 --> 01:56:41.021
we've been given those

01:56:41.021 --> 01:56:43.243
characterizations are best done through

01:56:43.243 --> 01:56:42.819
uh the department's legal counsel .

01:56:42.990 --> 01:56:45.157
It's not , it's not characterization ,

01:56:45.157 --> 01:56:47.323
it's international law . It's listed a

01:56:47.323 --> 01:56:49.779
blockade is an act of war , um , so

01:56:49.779 --> 01:56:53.000
let's . We've now

01:56:53.660 --> 01:56:55.716
engaged in the United States and and

01:56:55.716 --> 01:56:57.771
the United States and Iranian forces

01:56:57.771 --> 01:56:59.882
are training fire as they continue to

01:56:59.882 --> 01:56:59.339
launch missiles , drones , from our

01:56:59.339 --> 01:57:01.450
boat stacks . President Trump himself

01:57:01.450 --> 01:57:03.672
says the ceasefire is on life support ,

01:57:03.672 --> 01:57:05.895
and he repeatedly threatens to renew US

01:57:05.895 --> 01:57:08.117
military strikes . And to be clear , no

01:57:08.117 --> 01:57:09.839
one is disputing the valor and

01:57:09.839 --> 01:57:12.180
professionalism of our military , but

01:57:12.180 --> 01:57:14.291
the civilian leaders are abdicating ,

01:57:14.299 --> 01:57:16.355
uh , their responsibility to craft a

01:57:16.355 --> 01:57:18.410
clear strategy , and service members

01:57:18.410 --> 01:57:20.466
and the American people are the ones

01:57:20.466 --> 01:57:19.919
who will suffer under this leadership

01:57:19.919 --> 01:57:21.979
vacuum . Admiral Cooper , before

01:57:21.979 --> 01:57:24.299
Operation Epic Fury began , what

01:57:24.299 --> 01:57:26.859
desired end state for the operation

01:57:26.859 --> 01:57:28.779
were you given by your civilian

01:57:28.779 --> 01:57:30.939
leadership ? Senator , I was given

01:57:30.939 --> 01:57:33.160
crystal clear guidance . Our military

01:57:33.160 --> 01:57:35.271
mission was to degrade Iran's ability

01:57:35.271 --> 01:57:37.382
to project power on its neighbors and

01:57:37.382 --> 01:57:39.216
US interests . It included three

01:57:39.216 --> 01:57:41.216
specific objectives degrade Iranian

01:57:41.216 --> 01:57:43.271
ballistic missiles and their defense

01:57:43.271 --> 01:57:45.640
defense industrial base , degrade their

01:57:45.640 --> 01:57:47.862
drones in the defense industrial base ,

01:57:47.862 --> 01:57:49.807
degrade their navy and the defense

01:57:49.807 --> 01:57:52.189
industrial base . All of those were

01:57:52.189 --> 01:57:55.049
achieved , uh , as I've discussed . And

01:57:55.049 --> 01:57:57.271
because they were achieved , that's why

01:57:57.271 --> 01:57:58.993
the operation ended or did the

01:57:58.993 --> 01:58:00.993
operation end because the president

01:58:00.993 --> 01:58:00.810
said let's end the operation ?

01:58:02.089 --> 01:58:04.290
Operations commencing and ending are

01:58:04.290 --> 01:58:06.810
made by our civilian leadership , uh ,

01:58:07.080 --> 01:58:09.413
and not a military decision . OK , well ,

01:58:09.413 --> 01:58:11.469
that civilian leadership , President

01:58:11.469 --> 01:58:13.524
Trump has provided many possible end

01:58:13.524 --> 01:58:15.691
states in only 2 months , including in

01:58:15.691 --> 01:58:17.802
just 2 months , he said unconditional

01:58:17.802 --> 01:58:19.913
surrender and regime change in Iran ,

01:58:19.913 --> 01:58:21.913
which have not happened . Um , he's

01:58:21.913 --> 01:58:24.136
talked about , OK , operations will end

01:58:24.136 --> 01:58:24.049
when there's destruction of Iranian

01:58:24.049 --> 01:58:25.827
nuclear sites allegedly already

01:58:25.827 --> 01:58:27.549
accomplished last summer under

01:58:27.549 --> 01:58:29.771
Operation Midnight Hammer . Um , he's ,

01:58:29.810 --> 01:58:32.250
he's also said that Iran will never

01:58:32.250 --> 01:58:34.417
have nuclear weapons , which cannot be

01:58:34.417 --> 01:58:36.250
accomplished with only a bombing

01:58:36.250 --> 01:58:38.417
campaign . He said that his goal is to

01:58:38.417 --> 01:58:40.639
destroy the Iranian military forces and

01:58:40.639 --> 01:58:42.750
infrastructure completely , which the

01:58:42.750 --> 01:58:44.972
intelligence community assesses has not

01:58:44.972 --> 01:58:47.139
happened . And now , uh , he said that

01:58:47.139 --> 01:58:49.028
it's a reopening of the Strait of

01:58:49.028 --> 01:58:51.250
Hormuz , which is a reminder was opened

01:58:51.250 --> 01:58:53.361
before the war began . So if we don't

01:58:53.361 --> 01:58:55.250
know what we're fighting for , we

01:58:55.250 --> 01:58:54.850
certainly don't know how long we'll be

01:58:54.850 --> 01:58:56.961
fighting . Admiral Cooper , what have

01:58:56.961 --> 01:58:59.017
you been given ? Have you been given

01:58:59.017 --> 01:59:01.072
any timeline for how long our forces

01:59:01.072 --> 01:59:03.294
will be in the Strait of Hormuz or near

01:59:03.294 --> 01:59:05.461
Iran or blockading Iran , um , whether

01:59:05.461 --> 01:59:07.649
by a timeline or a condition , an end

01:59:07.649 --> 01:59:10.009
state for how long you'll be blockading

01:59:10.009 --> 01:59:12.379
Iran ? Senator , I think it's important

01:59:12.379 --> 01:59:14.459
from a military perspective that my

01:59:14.459 --> 01:59:17.259
advice related to options be provided

01:59:17.259 --> 01:59:19.592
to both the Secretary and the President .

01:59:19.592 --> 01:59:21.537
We've done that . The decisions on

01:59:21.537 --> 01:59:23.592
timeline and execution are up to our

01:59:23.592 --> 01:59:25.759
civilian leadership , OK . Um , so you

01:59:25.759 --> 01:59:27.926
mentioned the Secretary of Defense who

01:59:27.926 --> 01:59:30.092
only talks tactics and a president who

01:59:30.092 --> 01:59:29.919
changes his strategy on social media

01:59:29.919 --> 01:59:32.220
multiple times a day . This is who's

01:59:32.359 --> 01:59:34.248
giving you the orders . Secretary

01:59:34.248 --> 01:59:36.415
Heckseth has touted the destruction of

01:59:36.415 --> 01:59:38.415
tens of thousands of targets across

01:59:38.415 --> 01:59:40.637
Iran . He said that Iran's air defenses

01:59:40.637 --> 01:59:42.637
are flattened , his words , and its

01:59:42.637 --> 01:59:44.359
industrial base overwhelmingly

01:59:44.359 --> 01:59:46.470
destroyed and claims that Iran's navy

01:59:46.470 --> 01:59:48.470
is at the bottom of the sea . Every

01:59:48.470 --> 01:59:48.470
metric that the Secretary offers is one

01:59:48.470 --> 01:59:50.637
of destruction , and destruction alone

01:59:50.637 --> 01:59:52.709
is not an end state . Especially not

01:59:52.709 --> 01:59:54.598
with new public reporting that US

01:59:54.598 --> 01:59:56.820
intelligence officials believe Iran has

01:59:56.820 --> 01:59:58.709
operational access to most of its

01:59:58.709 --> 02:00:00.598
missile capacity and that Iran is

02:00:00.598 --> 02:00:02.653
clearly still capable of controlling

02:00:02.653 --> 02:00:04.709
the Strait of Hormuz . Americans are

02:00:04.709 --> 02:00:06.876
not safer . Our service members are at

02:00:06.876 --> 02:00:09.042
risk . Prices at home are higher , and

02:00:09.042 --> 02:00:08.870
Iran has more control over the Strait

02:00:08.870 --> 02:00:10.926
of global economy than it did before

02:00:10.926 --> 02:00:13.148
this whole thing started . The American

02:00:13.148 --> 02:00:15.203
people , our service members deserve

02:00:15.203 --> 02:00:17.426
clear answers . What does done with the

02:00:17.426 --> 02:00:19.648
war look like and how do we get there ?

02:00:19.648 --> 02:00:18.890
We have no strategy as we saw in

02:00:18.890 --> 02:00:21.112
Afghanistan . If you don't have a sound

02:00:21.112 --> 02:00:23.001
strategy , you keep doing tactics

02:00:23.001 --> 02:00:25.168
forever . This is not your fault , but

02:00:25.168 --> 02:00:27.112
this is where we are . And Admiral

02:00:27.112 --> 02:00:29.223
Cooper , have you been asked for your

02:00:29.223 --> 02:00:31.390
advice and under what conditions would

02:00:31.390 --> 02:00:33.557
you advise deploying ground troops for

02:00:33.557 --> 02:00:35.779
any purpose in Iran ? Senator , I think

02:00:35.779 --> 02:00:35.580
it would , uh , it would be

02:00:35.580 --> 02:00:37.358
inappropriate to talk about any

02:00:37.358 --> 02:00:39.580
contingency planning in this particular

02:00:39.580 --> 02:00:41.358
forum . It's my obligation as a

02:00:41.358 --> 02:00:43.524
combatant commander to provide a broad

02:00:43.524 --> 02:00:45.691
range of options through the secretary

02:00:45.691 --> 02:00:47.802
and to the president . Can you answer

02:00:47.802 --> 02:00:47.060
that question for me in the SCIF at a

02:00:47.060 --> 02:00:49.227
later time ? I'd be more than happy to

02:00:49.227 --> 02:00:51.282
talk about anything classified . All

02:00:51.282 --> 02:00:53.504
right , ma'am . Thank you . Thank you ,

02:00:53.504 --> 02:00:55.282
Mr . Chairman . Senator Kelly .

02:00:58.660 --> 02:01:01.060
No further questions , Mr . Chairman .

02:01:02.689 --> 02:01:04.633
Sorry , I didn't , didn't mark off

02:01:04.633 --> 02:01:07.339
Senator Senator Peters . Thank you , uh ,

02:01:07.419 --> 02:01:09.252
thank you , Mr . uh , Chairman ,

02:01:09.252 --> 02:01:11.363
gentlemen , thank you , uh , both for

02:01:11.363 --> 02:01:13.419
being here and , uh , I speak , uh ,

02:01:13.419 --> 02:01:15.419
for myself and I think everybody on

02:01:15.419 --> 02:01:15.299
this panel , we appreciate the

02:01:15.299 --> 02:01:17.355
incredible professionalism of , uh ,

02:01:17.355 --> 02:01:19.688
men and women , uh , in uniform and the ,

02:01:19.688 --> 02:01:21.799
and the , uh , job that they do every

02:01:21.799 --> 02:01:23.966
day with professionalism and heroism ,

02:01:23.966 --> 02:01:26.077
and , uh , thank you for doing that ,

02:01:26.077 --> 02:01:28.132
but we do have a number of questions

02:01:28.132 --> 02:01:30.188
about how we win this war and , uh ,

02:01:30.188 --> 02:01:32.466
end it , uh , going forward , uh , and ,

02:01:32.466 --> 02:01:34.243
and those are usually political

02:01:34.243 --> 02:01:35.966
questions related to political

02:01:35.966 --> 02:01:37.855
leadership . The men and women in

02:01:37.855 --> 02:01:40.077
uniform execute those orders , and they

02:01:40.077 --> 02:01:42.299
and they have demonstrated that they're

02:01:42.299 --> 02:01:44.410
certainly the best in the world . But

02:01:44.410 --> 02:01:46.632
Emerald Cooper , you mentioned that the

02:01:46.632 --> 02:01:48.799
current mission right now is basically

02:01:48.799 --> 02:01:52.359
the the US blockade of Iranian ships or

02:01:52.359 --> 02:01:54.470
ships that are transiting the Straits

02:01:54.470 --> 02:01:56.649
of Hormuz to Iranian ports . Uh ,

02:01:57.000 --> 02:01:59.279
that's in response to Iran basically

02:01:59.279 --> 02:02:02.120
effectively shutting down the Strait of

02:02:02.120 --> 02:02:04.270
Hormuz before that . As you know ,

02:02:04.390 --> 02:02:06.919
experts across the political spectrum

02:02:06.919 --> 02:02:08.975
and , and multiple administrations ,

02:02:08.975 --> 02:02:10.919
political administrations have all

02:02:10.919 --> 02:02:14.310
agreed that a war against Iran , Iran's

02:02:14.310 --> 02:02:16.310
first moves would be to mine the

02:02:16.310 --> 02:02:18.370
Straits of Hormuz to prevent tanker

02:02:18.509 --> 02:02:21.910
traffic . But despite these known risks

02:02:21.910 --> 02:02:24.189
and repeated claims that the DOD has

02:02:24.189 --> 02:02:26.411
planned , and I'm sure you have plans ,

02:02:26.411 --> 02:02:28.467
I've attended the War College , I've

02:02:28.467 --> 02:02:30.356
served in the Navy . There are no

02:02:30.356 --> 02:02:32.467
shortage of plans that we have , that

02:02:32.467 --> 02:02:34.689
you have plans to deal with the closing

02:02:34.689 --> 02:02:36.800
of the strait . We had 4 minesweepers

02:02:36.800 --> 02:02:39.078
that were stationed in the Middle East ,

02:02:39.078 --> 02:02:41.189
were just retired last year , and our

02:02:41.189 --> 02:02:43.133
remaining minesweepers were either

02:02:43.133 --> 02:02:45.740
stationed in Japan or not prepositioned

02:02:45.740 --> 02:02:48.220
in the region . This is despite public

02:02:48.220 --> 02:02:50.220
reporting that we currently already

02:02:50.220 --> 02:02:53.819
have a limited unmanned mine clearance

02:02:53.819 --> 02:02:56.339
capacity . And reports from The New

02:02:56.339 --> 02:02:58.117
York Times and Reuters has also

02:02:58.117 --> 02:03:01.390
indicated that Iran still has hundreds ,

02:03:01.569 --> 02:03:04.129
if not thousands of small boats that

02:03:04.129 --> 02:03:06.330
can lay mines or perform hit and run

02:03:06.330 --> 02:03:08.569
attacks on top of their existing land

02:03:08.569 --> 02:03:10.810
missiles and drones , which I'm sure

02:03:10.810 --> 02:03:13.000
they're building at a furious pace

02:03:13.000 --> 02:03:15.430
right now to restock what they have ,

02:03:16.290 --> 02:03:18.401
and this is on top of existing land ,

02:03:18.401 --> 02:03:20.623
land missiles and drones . The American

02:03:20.623 --> 02:03:23.069
people , as we all know , are already

02:03:23.069 --> 02:03:25.979
paying higher prices in the United

02:03:25.979 --> 02:03:28.201
States . Inflation is up as a result of

02:03:28.201 --> 02:03:30.390
chaotic tariffs that President Trump

02:03:30.390 --> 02:03:32.557
has put into place . And now thanks to

02:03:32.557 --> 02:03:34.501
this war and the straits closure ,

02:03:34.501 --> 02:03:36.501
they're paying high gas prices that

02:03:36.501 --> 02:03:38.557
continue to rise as well , putting a

02:03:38.557 --> 02:03:40.509
strain on family budgets . So my

02:03:40.509 --> 02:03:42.453
question for you is , if there was

02:03:42.453 --> 02:03:44.620
advanced planning , and I'm sure there

02:03:44.620 --> 02:03:46.842
was advanced planning about the straits

02:03:46.842 --> 02:03:49.065
closure . Why were the minesweepers not

02:03:49.065 --> 02:03:51.287
prepositioned in the region when it had

02:03:51.287 --> 02:03:53.509
been publicly reported that we publicly

02:03:53.509 --> 02:03:55.620
reported that we already have limited

02:03:55.620 --> 02:03:57.676
unmanned mine clearance capacities ?

02:03:57.676 --> 02:03:59.787
When you have a plan , usually before

02:03:59.787 --> 02:04:01.842
you execute the plan , you make sure

02:04:01.842 --> 02:04:03.898
that all your assets are in place to

02:04:03.898 --> 02:04:03.669
actually execute that plan . So it's

02:04:03.669 --> 02:04:05.629
curious that those assets were not

02:04:05.629 --> 02:04:07.851
there . Why ? Uh , Senator , I think it

02:04:07.851 --> 02:04:10.229
best to talk specific tactics and

02:04:10.229 --> 02:04:12.507
operations in a classified environment .

02:04:12.507 --> 02:04:14.451
What I can say here is we did have

02:04:14.451 --> 02:04:16.229
sufficient and continue to have

02:04:16.229 --> 02:04:18.451
sufficient mine clearance capability in

02:04:18.451 --> 02:04:20.618
the theater because it happened to not

02:04:20.618 --> 02:04:22.396
be in those 4 vessels that were

02:04:22.396 --> 02:04:24.729
decommissioned after decades of service .

02:04:24.729 --> 02:04:24.560
Uh , I think it is an interesting point .

02:04:25.220 --> 02:04:27.387
The support and the ability to conduct

02:04:27.387 --> 02:04:29.220
counter mining comes in a lot of

02:04:29.220 --> 02:04:31.387
different flavors best to discuss in a

02:04:31.387 --> 02:04:33.442
classified environment , and I don't

02:04:33.442 --> 02:04:33.439
mean to get into that . I understand

02:04:33.439 --> 02:04:35.717
that totally . You don't want to do it ,

02:04:35.717 --> 02:04:37.883
but it's clear that there is a concern

02:04:37.883 --> 02:04:40.106
about mines . We aren't seeing ships go

02:04:40.106 --> 02:04:42.328
through there . Commercial companies do

02:04:42.328 --> 02:04:41.169
not want to go through the straits .

02:04:41.220 --> 02:04:43.442
They're not going to put their ships at

02:04:43.442 --> 02:04:45.609
risk , so they don't feel safe . To me

02:04:45.609 --> 02:04:47.664
that speaks volumes as to whether or

02:04:47.664 --> 02:04:49.720
not it's safe , that there is a real

02:04:49.720 --> 02:04:51.776
concern there , and we know that the

02:04:51.776 --> 02:04:53.942
Iranians have significant capabilities

02:04:53.942 --> 02:04:56.109
to deal with that . You know , I asked

02:04:56.109 --> 02:04:58.220
a previous question , uh , related to

02:04:58.220 --> 02:05:00.442
strategy and , and really , uh , talked

02:05:00.442 --> 02:05:02.498
about von Clausewitz , uh , on war ,

02:05:02.498 --> 02:05:04.553
which is , as you know , the seminal

02:05:04.553 --> 02:05:04.459
text , uh , on , on strategy that is

02:05:04.459 --> 02:05:06.600
taught in all the war colleges , uh ,

02:05:06.680 --> 02:05:08.902
and you know it better than I will ever

02:05:08.902 --> 02:05:11.479
know it . Uh , the , uh , uh , concept

02:05:11.479 --> 02:05:13.701
of that is that in order to win a war ,

02:05:13.701 --> 02:05:15.535
you've got to know the center of

02:05:15.535 --> 02:05:17.757
gravity of your enemy , and you have to

02:05:17.757 --> 02:05:20.035
be focused and able to neutralize that .

02:05:20.035 --> 02:05:22.146
Uh , what is the center of gravity in

02:05:22.146 --> 02:05:24.257
Iran ? What , what's , what , what do

02:05:24.257 --> 02:05:26.479
you , how are you planning ? And that's

02:05:26.479 --> 02:05:28.590
a military decision as to what is the

02:05:28.590 --> 02:05:28.410
center of gravity . That's the kind of

02:05:28.410 --> 02:05:30.410
advice you would give a president .

02:05:30.410 --> 02:05:32.466
What is the center of gravity ? So I

02:05:32.466 --> 02:05:34.632
really would defer to our policymakers

02:05:34.632 --> 02:05:36.577
to determine what they view from a

02:05:36.577 --> 02:05:38.466
policy perspective as a center of

02:05:38.466 --> 02:05:40.688
gravity . From a military perspective ,

02:05:40.688 --> 02:05:42.688
we're focused on achieving military

02:05:42.688 --> 02:05:44.854
objectives , which is exactly what our

02:05:44.854 --> 02:05:43.979
men and women have done , and they've

02:05:43.979 --> 02:05:46.819
done it extremely well . Well , you do ,

02:05:46.979 --> 02:05:48.979
as you know , and every , every war

02:05:48.979 --> 02:05:51.090
plan has a center of gravity that you

02:05:51.090 --> 02:05:53.090
identify , and then you work around

02:05:53.090 --> 02:05:55.146
that . So , so there is the war plan

02:05:55.146 --> 02:05:57.312
that we have for Iran . Would have the

02:05:57.312 --> 02:05:59.535
center of gravity . Why can't you share

02:05:59.535 --> 02:06:01.701
what that is ? That's in the past it's

02:06:01.701 --> 02:06:03.590
been before we knew the center of

02:06:03.590 --> 02:06:05.590
gravity in the Persian Gulf War for

02:06:05.590 --> 02:06:07.620
Iraq . Colin Powell said it was the

02:06:07.620 --> 02:06:09.787
Republican Guard troops , Iraq's elite

02:06:09.787 --> 02:06:12.500
unit there . Obama administration in

02:06:12.500 --> 02:06:14.500
Afghanistan , Admiral Mike Mullen

02:06:14.500 --> 02:06:17.060
defined the center of gravity as

02:06:17.060 --> 02:06:19.116
building Afghan government support .

02:06:19.116 --> 02:06:21.171
They made this public . They weren't

02:06:21.171 --> 02:06:23.338
hiding the center of gravity , and our

02:06:23.338 --> 02:06:25.504
enemy knows what our center of gravity

02:06:25.504 --> 02:06:27.616
is and We know what theirs is there's

02:06:27.616 --> 02:06:29.449
no reason to to keep that secret

02:06:29.449 --> 02:06:31.393
because the American people have a

02:06:31.393 --> 02:06:31.250
right to know what , what , what is it

02:06:31.250 --> 02:06:33.250
that we're trying to accomplish and

02:06:33.250 --> 02:06:35.306
that's outlined very clearly in that

02:06:35.306 --> 02:06:37.361
term , a part of every military plan

02:06:37.361 --> 02:06:39.850
that is put forward . Yes sir , I , I

02:06:39.850 --> 02:06:41.906
agree every war plan has a center of

02:06:41.906 --> 02:06:43.683
gravity and those war plans are

02:06:43.683 --> 02:06:45.850
classified . I'd be more than happy to

02:06:45.850 --> 02:06:48.128
talk about in a classified environment .

02:06:48.128 --> 02:06:50.072
Fair enough , um , Senator Rosen .

02:06:51.850 --> 02:06:54.072
Thank you , Chairman Wicker , and thank

02:06:54.072 --> 02:06:56.294
you , Admiral Cooper , General Anderson

02:06:56.294 --> 02:06:57.906
for your service and uh your

02:06:57.906 --> 02:06:59.961
willingness to continue to serve our

02:06:59.961 --> 02:07:02.128
nation . Um , Admiral Cooper , I wanna

02:07:02.128 --> 02:07:03.739
talk about the International

02:07:03.739 --> 02:07:06.089
Stabilization Force . Um , it's been

02:07:06.089 --> 02:07:08.311
publicly reported that CENTCOM is gonna

02:07:08.311 --> 02:07:10.367
play a role in the , in the proposed

02:07:10.367 --> 02:07:12.422
International stabilization Force in

02:07:12.422 --> 02:07:14.459
Gaza . Uh , we'll just call it ISF

02:07:14.459 --> 02:07:16.515
going forward through many questions

02:07:16.515 --> 02:07:18.626
remain , though many questions remain

02:07:18.626 --> 02:07:20.681
on what the ISF is , when it will be

02:07:20.681 --> 02:07:23.330
deployed , and how it will operate . So

02:07:23.330 --> 02:07:25.552
can you clarify the roles of the US and

02:07:25.552 --> 02:07:28.129
CENTCOM in the ISF ? Specifically , is

02:07:28.129 --> 02:07:30.009
the vision for CENTCOM to retain

02:07:30.009 --> 02:07:32.049
command and control , or is there a

02:07:32.049 --> 02:07:34.089
timeline and mechan mechanism for

02:07:34.089 --> 02:07:35.700
transitioning oversight to a

02:07:35.700 --> 02:07:39.169
multinational or civilian-led uh

02:07:39.169 --> 02:07:41.709
structure ? Senator , uh , first ,

02:07:41.790 --> 02:07:43.846
great to see you again and thank you

02:07:43.846 --> 02:07:46.068
for the question . Uh , our role , uh ,

02:07:46.068 --> 02:07:48.290
can be simply defined as one of support

02:07:48.290 --> 02:07:49.957
right now . The International

02:07:49.957 --> 02:07:51.957
Stabilization Force commander who's

02:07:51.957 --> 02:07:54.123
been designated is also dual-hatted as

02:07:54.123 --> 02:07:56.123
the commander of Special Operations

02:07:56.123 --> 02:07:58.910
Command Central . He has about 45 , uh ,

02:07:59.029 --> 02:08:01.085
members of the Joint force presently

02:08:01.085 --> 02:08:03.196
working for him . We're really at the

02:08:03.196 --> 02:08:05.307
infancy of forming that international

02:08:05.307 --> 02:08:07.362
stabilization force thus . Far there

02:08:07.362 --> 02:08:09.307
have been 4 countries who've uh uh

02:08:09.307 --> 02:08:11.362
committed to provide forces and so I

02:08:11.362 --> 02:08:11.350
think as we look to the future I'd be

02:08:11.350 --> 02:08:13.517
happy to come back to you on what that

02:08:13.517 --> 02:08:15.739
looks like uh later on uh we're heading

02:08:15.739 --> 02:08:17.850
in the right direction but we're just

02:08:17.850 --> 02:08:19.961
in the infancy of the process . Thank

02:08:19.961 --> 02:08:22.072
you . And speaking of uh heading in a

02:08:22.072 --> 02:08:21.470
direction we need to talk about

02:08:21.470 --> 02:08:23.750
munitions , uh , sustainment because

02:08:23.750 --> 02:08:25.917
Admiral Cooper , according to publicly

02:08:25.917 --> 02:08:27.861
available resources , the US has .

02:08:27.861 --> 02:08:30.310
Fired at least 45% of its Patriot

02:08:30.310 --> 02:08:32.532
missile interceptors and more than half

02:08:32.532 --> 02:08:34.589
of its THAAD interceptors so far in

02:08:34.589 --> 02:08:37.029
Operation Epic Fury , and it's had to

02:08:37.029 --> 02:08:39.240
move air defense from other theaters .

02:08:39.629 --> 02:08:41.830
So can you talk to me about how this

02:08:41.830 --> 02:08:43.997
constrains our air and missile defense

02:08:43.997 --> 02:08:46.163
and those of our regional partners and

02:08:46.163 --> 02:08:48.386
allies like the Israel , UAE and others

02:08:48.386 --> 02:08:50.330
who are also , um , under attack ?

02:08:50.399 --> 02:08:52.470
Senator , I have all the munitions

02:08:52.470 --> 02:08:56.000
necessary to both defend our forces as

02:08:56.000 --> 02:08:57.833
well as conduct a broad range of

02:08:57.833 --> 02:09:01.029
contingencies . Our partners also have

02:09:01.040 --> 02:09:03.589
the sufficient munitions necessary for

02:09:03.589 --> 02:09:05.811
defensive have estimates about how long

02:09:05.811 --> 02:09:07.645
it would take us to replenish or

02:09:07.645 --> 02:09:09.645
rebuild our stockpile . I would , I

02:09:09.645 --> 02:09:11.811
would really defer to the folks who do

02:09:11.811 --> 02:09:14.033
this on an everyday basis , both in the

02:09:14.033 --> 02:09:16.367
department and the services . Thank you .

02:09:16.367 --> 02:09:15.580
I'm gonna continue on you and then

02:09:15.580 --> 02:09:17.747
we'll move over to General Anderson in

02:09:17.747 --> 02:09:19.802
a minute because I wanna just take a

02:09:19.802 --> 02:09:21.969
moment to talk about Lebanon because I

02:09:21.969 --> 02:09:24.191
do appreciate that you've applauded the

02:09:24.191 --> 02:09:26.413
Lebanese Armed Forces for their efforts

02:09:26.413 --> 02:09:28.636
to disarm Hezbollah . While the current

02:09:28.636 --> 02:09:30.302
effort , uh , in conflict has

02:09:30.302 --> 02:09:32.136
demonstrated the extent to which

02:09:32.136 --> 02:09:33.913
Hezbollah is rearmed , a strong

02:09:33.913 --> 02:09:36.080
Lebanese Armed Forces remains the best

02:09:36.080 --> 02:09:38.080
pathway for Lebanon . Through which

02:09:38.080 --> 02:09:40.247
Hezbollah can be disarmed once and for

02:09:40.247 --> 02:09:42.524
all , and we know that needs to happen .

02:09:42.524 --> 02:09:44.580
So what can the US do to support the

02:09:44.580 --> 02:09:46.636
Lebanese Armed Forces to ensure that

02:09:46.636 --> 02:09:48.636
they have the necessary capacity to

02:09:48.636 --> 02:09:50.636
disarm Hezbollah while also holding

02:09:50.636 --> 02:09:53.299
them accountable ? Senator , taking on

02:09:53.299 --> 02:09:55.466
the disarmament of Hezbollah is a tall

02:09:55.466 --> 02:09:57.870
order . They've been funded by Iran for

02:09:57.870 --> 02:10:00.037
decades with billions of dollars , and

02:10:00.037 --> 02:10:01.981
Hezbollah is inculcated into every

02:10:01.981 --> 02:10:04.259
fabric of the Lebanese society . I

02:10:04.259 --> 02:10:05.926
think right now our continued

02:10:05.926 --> 02:10:08.979
commitment with modest dollars to the

02:10:08.979 --> 02:10:11.379
Lebanese Armed Forces is helpful . They

02:10:11.379 --> 02:10:13.899
have in particular several units who

02:10:13.899 --> 02:10:16.660
can do more . We have to be , I believe

02:10:16.660 --> 02:10:18.827
our commitment could be to provide the

02:10:18.827 --> 02:10:20.938
funding necessary so that they can do

02:10:20.938 --> 02:10:23.339
more . Thank you . I'm gonna move over

02:10:23.339 --> 02:10:26.060
to uh AFRICO now General Anderson ,

02:10:26.299 --> 02:10:28.466
because ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliates ,

02:10:28.466 --> 02:10:30.970
uh , well , we know they've spanned the

02:10:30.970 --> 02:10:33.470
African continent and so understanding

02:10:33.470 --> 02:10:35.692
of course this is an open setting , can

02:10:35.692 --> 02:10:37.637
you talk about the extent to which

02:10:37.637 --> 02:10:39.803
these franchises that they work across

02:10:39.803 --> 02:10:41.637
borders within local settings to

02:10:41.637 --> 02:10:43.660
coordinate with one another and the

02:10:43.660 --> 02:10:45.370
threat that this poses to our

02:10:45.370 --> 02:10:47.426
priorities in the regions and do you

02:10:47.426 --> 02:10:48.926
think there's a need for a

02:10:48.926 --> 02:10:50.759
comprehensive CT strategy on the

02:10:50.759 --> 02:10:52.926
continent ? And if so , um , could you

02:10:52.926 --> 02:10:54.926
outline again , considering it's an

02:10:54.926 --> 02:10:57.148
open setting , uh , broadly , what that

02:10:57.148 --> 02:10:59.140
strategy might include , please .

02:11:00.290 --> 02:11:02.179
Senator , I appreciate the , uh ,

02:11:02.179 --> 02:11:04.512
highlighting of the , the transnational ,

02:11:04.520 --> 02:11:06.742
uh , threat that both al Qaeda and ISIS

02:11:06.742 --> 02:11:09.640
pose . I can say in this setting that ,

02:11:09.649 --> 02:11:11.871
uh , ISIS has several affiliates across

02:11:11.871 --> 02:11:13.871
the continent that are coordinating

02:11:13.871 --> 02:11:15.982
more and more whether that's . In the

02:11:15.982 --> 02:11:18.149
Golis Mountains of Somalia or the Lake

02:11:18.149 --> 02:11:20.260
Chad Basin of Nigeria or in the Sahel

02:11:20.260 --> 02:11:23.075
as well as Mozambique and others , so

02:11:23.075 --> 02:11:24.995
this terrorist network has to be

02:11:24.995 --> 02:11:27.106
addressed holistically . They have to

02:11:27.106 --> 02:11:29.217
look at the entirety of the network .

02:11:29.217 --> 02:11:31.384
It's not any single node anymore . And

02:11:31.384 --> 02:11:33.106
so as we look at this , I work

02:11:33.106 --> 02:11:32.834
coordinate very closely with Admiral

02:11:32.834 --> 02:11:35.001
Cooper because ISIS still has a strong

02:11:35.001 --> 02:11:37.834
presence in Centcom's AOR as well as al

02:11:37.834 --> 02:11:40.100
Qaeda . Uh , as we look at this , the

02:11:40.100 --> 02:11:42.156
strategy to go after this is to work

02:11:42.156 --> 02:11:44.267
with our partners , those willing and

02:11:44.267 --> 02:11:46.322
capable partners , enable them first

02:11:46.322 --> 02:11:48.433
and foremost to take on this threat .

02:11:48.433 --> 02:11:50.711
When they are unable , uh , to do that ,

02:11:50.711 --> 02:11:52.544
then bringing in only the unique

02:11:52.544 --> 02:11:54.656
capabilities that the US can bring in

02:11:54.656 --> 02:11:56.822
order to address those threats . We've

02:11:56.822 --> 02:11:56.540
seen that in the Goli Mountains where

02:11:56.540 --> 02:11:58.762
we've been able to bring intelligence ,

02:11:59.020 --> 02:12:00.798
limit ISR , some limited strike

02:12:00.798 --> 02:12:03.020
capabilities . Has it been . To disrupt

02:12:03.479 --> 02:12:05.680
their leadership network , uh , this

02:12:05.680 --> 02:12:07.902
needs to be applied across all of these

02:12:07.902 --> 02:12:09.958
areas . So investments in additional

02:12:09.958 --> 02:12:12.279
ISR , investments in expeditionary

02:12:12.279 --> 02:12:14.501
capabilities such as in a float forward

02:12:14.501 --> 02:12:16.557
staging base like the Herschel Woody

02:12:16.557 --> 02:12:18.668
Williams that allow us to move to the

02:12:18.668 --> 02:12:20.890
point of need at the time of need , and

02:12:20.890 --> 02:12:23.057
then the force protection requirements

02:12:23.057 --> 02:12:22.959
that are necessary to protect that

02:12:22.959 --> 02:12:25.181
force in the expeditionary area , and I

02:12:25.181 --> 02:12:26.903
would add . Not just the force

02:12:26.903 --> 02:12:28.959
protection as in the counter UAS and

02:12:28.959 --> 02:12:31.015
the integrated air missile defense ,

02:12:31.015 --> 02:12:32.681
which are critical , but also

02:12:32.681 --> 02:12:34.737
investments in emerging technologies

02:12:34.737 --> 02:12:34.640
that allow austere medicine , forward

02:12:34.640 --> 02:12:36.560
medicine , remote medicine . Uh ,

02:12:36.680 --> 02:12:38.902
automated , uh , CASAA , these types of

02:12:38.902 --> 02:12:40.624
things allow us to become more

02:12:40.624 --> 02:12:42.680
expeditionary in order to , uh , get

02:12:42.680 --> 02:12:44.902
after these critical threats , and only

02:12:44.902 --> 02:12:47.124
the critical threats that pose a threat

02:12:47.124 --> 02:12:49.236
to the US and then enable partners as

02:12:49.236 --> 02:12:51.402
able to address these common threats .

02:12:51.402 --> 02:12:53.458
So it is a multifaceted strategy . I

02:12:53.458 --> 02:12:55.513
could even go into more . I won't in

02:12:55.513 --> 02:12:55.240
this detail , but really maintaining

02:12:55.240 --> 02:12:57.351
the relationships and the engagements

02:12:57.351 --> 02:12:59.573
are equally important . And having that

02:12:59.573 --> 02:13:01.684
pragmatic approach , opening dialogue

02:13:01.684 --> 02:13:03.962
with the AES states in the Sahel again ,

02:13:03.962 --> 02:13:06.184
addressing this with , uh , places like

02:13:06.184 --> 02:13:08.351
Algeria and Morocco and Libya even who

02:13:08.351 --> 02:13:10.462
share these concerns , building those

02:13:10.462 --> 02:13:12.407
relationships are absolutely vital

02:13:12.407 --> 02:13:14.629
because you cannot surge trust . If the

02:13:14.629 --> 02:13:16.796
chairman would indulge me , can I have

02:13:16.796 --> 02:13:16.439
a follow-up question on the Sahel since

02:13:16.439 --> 02:13:18.661
he brought it up ? Uh , yes , why don't

02:13:18.661 --> 02:13:21.479
you do that ? Thank you , um . We know

02:13:21.479 --> 02:13:23.479
you brought up the Sahel , but last

02:13:23.479 --> 02:13:25.535
month the JNIM and local militias in

02:13:25.535 --> 02:13:27.790
Mali executed coordinated nationwide

02:13:27.790 --> 02:13:29.846
offensive attacks , attacking Mali's

02:13:29.846 --> 02:13:31.734
capital , seizing the key towns ,

02:13:31.959 --> 02:13:34.319
killing the Malayan defense minister .

02:13:34.479 --> 02:13:36.535
Though these attacks were greater in

02:13:36.535 --> 02:13:38.701
scale , intensity than any other since

02:13:38.701 --> 02:13:40.535
2012 and clearly demonstrate the

02:13:40.535 --> 02:13:42.535
attackers' ability to , uh , strike

02:13:42.535 --> 02:13:44.950
against it . Expansive geographical

02:13:44.950 --> 02:13:47.117
areas . So you're talking a little bit

02:13:47.117 --> 02:13:48.950
about the , uh , Sahel , but the

02:13:48.950 --> 02:13:50.950
permissive environment in the Sahel

02:13:50.950 --> 02:13:53.006
that's making these attacks possible

02:13:53.006 --> 02:13:55.283
and , uh , what , what more can you do ?

02:13:55.283 --> 02:13:57.339
Would you like to add if you want to

02:13:57.339 --> 02:13:59.006
speak a little bit more about

02:13:59.006 --> 02:14:01.172
instability there ? I , I would , uh ,

02:14:01.172 --> 02:14:00.779
there are a few things I would like to

02:14:00.779 --> 02:14:03.001
add in this setting . I can talk to you

02:14:03.001 --> 02:14:05.223
more in a classified setting that would

02:14:05.223 --> 02:14:07.390
be , uh , highly appropriate to this ,

02:14:07.390 --> 02:14:07.069
but . To your point , there is no

02:14:07.069 --> 02:14:09.509
effective external counterterrorism

02:14:09.509 --> 02:14:11.709
effect effort in the Sahel right now .

02:14:11.830 --> 02:14:13.997
The Russians have claimed to do that ,

02:14:13.997 --> 02:14:16.052
but we saw that they had to withdraw

02:14:16.052 --> 02:14:18.052
from Kadal . We're unable to defend

02:14:18.052 --> 02:14:20.108
against that threat there . They are

02:14:20.108 --> 02:14:22.330
providing some limited support , but we

02:14:22.330 --> 02:14:22.089
do not see the same Western presence

02:14:22.609 --> 02:14:24.831
because of that . Then how do we enable

02:14:24.831 --> 02:14:26.942
the partners , uh , the other nations

02:14:26.942 --> 02:14:28.887
that are there ? How do we look at

02:14:28.887 --> 02:14:30.998
expeditionary capabilities again that

02:14:30.998 --> 02:14:30.990
we can result in this ? One of the key

02:14:30.990 --> 02:14:32.790
areas that we would need some

02:14:32.790 --> 02:14:34.957
assistance with is the authorities and

02:14:34.957 --> 02:14:37.012
ability . To bring in and experiment

02:14:37.012 --> 02:14:38.957
with emerging technologies whether

02:14:38.957 --> 02:14:41.179
that's in the surveillance and ISR type

02:14:41.179 --> 02:14:43.234
of technologies or in other over the

02:14:43.234 --> 02:14:45.068
horizon type capabilities like I

02:14:45.068 --> 02:14:47.012
mentioned with the uh medicine and

02:14:47.012 --> 02:14:49.179
others in order to reach uh when there

02:14:49.179 --> 02:14:51.401
is a threat that threatens the homeland

02:14:51.401 --> 02:14:53.401
to be able to reach it and and take

02:14:53.401 --> 02:14:55.179
care of it but more importantly

02:14:55.179 --> 02:14:57.123
continue to enable the partners to

02:14:57.123 --> 02:14:59.234
address the threats in their uh local

02:14:59.234 --> 02:14:58.779
areas and a lot of that's through

02:14:58.779 --> 02:15:00.946
intelligence sharing . I , I , I would

02:15:00.946 --> 02:15:03.168
be happy in a classified environment to

02:15:03.168 --> 02:15:05.112
talk in more depth . Thank you . I

02:15:05.112 --> 02:15:07.057
appreciate that . Thank you , uh ,

02:15:07.057 --> 02:15:06.890
Admiral General . Thank you , Chairman

02:15:06.890 --> 02:15:08.890
Wicker . Uh , thank you very much ,

02:15:08.890 --> 02:15:10.810
Senator Rosen , and I'm glad you

02:15:11.129 --> 02:15:13.890
brought up , um , Lebanon and , and

02:15:13.890 --> 02:15:17.169
Hezbollah . Um , so I'm gonna take

02:15:17.169 --> 02:15:20.060
another round , um , Admiral Cooper .

02:15:21.330 --> 02:15:24.850
And to stop me when I'm wrong . Um ,

02:15:25.560 --> 02:15:28.720
on March 2nd of this year , Hezbollah

02:15:28.720 --> 02:15:31.220
attacked Israel in response to

02:15:31.220 --> 02:15:34.350
Operation Epic Fury . Is that correct ?

02:15:36.459 --> 02:15:39.259
Uh , that's correct , sir . Um ,

02:15:40.669 --> 02:15:42.947
According to Israel's foreign minister ,

02:15:43.560 --> 02:15:46.759
Hezbollah has fired 10,000 missiles ,

02:15:46.879 --> 02:15:48.990
rockets , and drones at Israel during

02:15:48.990 --> 02:15:51.212
the past two months . Is that correct ?

02:15:51.212 --> 02:15:53.600
I believe that's correct , sir . And in

02:15:53.600 --> 02:15:55.544
response to these attacks , Israel

02:15:55.544 --> 02:15:58.799
initiated a ground offensive in

02:15:58.799 --> 02:16:01.140
southern Lebanon aiming to create an

02:16:01.520 --> 02:16:03.409
uninhabited buffer zone along its

02:16:03.409 --> 02:16:05.859
northern border and border and to push

02:16:06.040 --> 02:16:09.299
Hezbollah north to

02:16:09.950 --> 02:16:12.359
the Latini River . Is that correct ?

02:16:12.720 --> 02:16:15.629
That's correct , Senator . Um ,

02:16:17.970 --> 02:16:20.580
To enable this operation , the Israeli

02:16:20.580 --> 02:16:23.850
military ordered the evacuation of

02:16:23.850 --> 02:16:27.580
southern Lebanon . Displacing over 1

02:16:27.580 --> 02:16:29.379
million people , nearly 20% of

02:16:29.379 --> 02:16:31.779
Lebanon's population , that is also

02:16:31.779 --> 02:16:34.250
correct . I don't know that that number

02:16:34.250 --> 02:16:36.361
specifically is correct , but the but

02:16:36.361 --> 02:16:38.250
the concept of , of , uh , of the

02:16:38.250 --> 02:16:39.583
evacuation is correct .

02:16:44.370 --> 02:16:47.209
While governments of Israel and Lebanon

02:16:47.370 --> 02:16:49.481
declared a ceasefire in April of this

02:16:49.481 --> 02:16:52.129
year , Hezbollah Secretary General Naim

02:16:52.129 --> 02:16:54.769
Qassem announced that his organization

02:16:54.769 --> 02:16:57.209
would not recognize the ceasefire and

02:16:57.209 --> 02:16:59.969
would never agree to disarm . Is that

02:16:59.969 --> 02:17:02.359
correct ? Uh , his statement , that

02:17:02.359 --> 02:17:04.470
statement is correct . Yeah , he made

02:17:04.470 --> 02:17:06.248
that statement . Hezbollah then

02:17:06.248 --> 02:17:08.192
continued to fire projectiles into

02:17:08.192 --> 02:17:10.248
Israel , and Israel has continued to

02:17:10.248 --> 02:17:12.415
strike Hezbollah positions in southern

02:17:12.415 --> 02:17:14.526
Lebanon . That's also correct , isn't

02:17:14.526 --> 02:17:16.570
it ? That's correct , sir . Um ,

02:17:19.759 --> 02:17:22.759
And I think Senator Rosen would

02:17:22.919 --> 02:17:26.610
wholeheartedly agree with me that

02:17:26.610 --> 02:17:29.639
peace between Israel and I , I can't

02:17:29.639 --> 02:17:32.919
ask questions to my , my friend and

02:17:32.919 --> 02:17:35.030
colleague , but I think we would both

02:17:35.030 --> 02:17:37.030
agree that peace between Israel and

02:17:37.030 --> 02:17:38.641
Lebanon would be a wonderful

02:17:38.641 --> 02:17:40.975
development and a wonderful development ,

02:17:40.975 --> 02:17:44.200
um , for , um , America and for

02:17:44.200 --> 02:17:48.019
Israel , um . But

02:17:48.019 --> 02:17:50.209
peace between Israel and Lebanon

02:17:50.209 --> 02:17:52.153
depends on the Lebanese government

02:17:52.153 --> 02:17:54.790
having both the capability and the will

02:17:54.929 --> 02:17:58.758
to disarm Hezbollah . Has the United

02:17:58.758 --> 02:18:01.439
States provided the Lebanese Armed

02:18:01.439 --> 02:18:03.798
Forces with approximately $3 billion

02:18:03.798 --> 02:18:07.468
since 2006 ? So I'd , I'd have to take

02:18:07.468 --> 02:18:09.749
that specific volume , that , that

02:18:09.749 --> 02:18:11.638
specific number of , uh , for the

02:18:11.638 --> 02:18:13.860
record and follow up , but we have been

02:18:13.860 --> 02:18:15.971
providing aid for two decades . Is it

02:18:15.971 --> 02:18:18.193
fair to say that the primary goal of US

02:18:18.193 --> 02:18:21.178
support for the LAF , the Lebanese

02:18:21.279 --> 02:18:24.039
Armed Forces , was to counter Hezbollah ?

02:18:25.339 --> 02:18:28.099
Yes sir . And from 2006 until

02:18:28.099 --> 02:18:31.620
2023 , is it accurate to say that

02:18:31.620 --> 02:18:34.240
Hezbollah's rocket and missile arsenal

02:18:34.730 --> 02:18:38.168
grew ? From 2006 to

02:18:38.168 --> 02:18:40.989
2023 , from approximately

02:18:41.249 --> 02:18:44.208
9000 rockets and missiles to

02:18:44.208 --> 02:18:48.070
150,000 . As a

02:18:48.070 --> 02:18:50.030
result of decades and billions of

02:18:50.030 --> 02:18:52.030
dollars of Iranian support , that's

02:18:52.030 --> 02:18:55.689
correct . Israel's

02:18:55.689 --> 02:18:56.745
foreign minister .

02:18:59.040 --> 02:19:01.280
Alleges that Hezbollah fired more than

02:19:01.280 --> 02:19:04.820
10,000 projectiles at Israel since

02:19:05.559 --> 02:19:08.040
the beginning of March of this year in

02:19:08.040 --> 02:19:11.639
light of . The Lebanese Armed

02:19:11.639 --> 02:19:14.259
Forces in action was Israel

02:19:15.719 --> 02:19:17.839
was Israel's offensive into southern

02:19:17.839 --> 02:19:21.419
Lebanon militarily

02:19:21.429 --> 02:19:24.839
necessary if Hezbollah's attacks were

02:19:24.839 --> 02:19:26.728
going to be countered ? Was there

02:19:26.728 --> 02:19:28.929
another way to do that ? Senator , I

02:19:28.929 --> 02:19:31.570
would really defer to Israel on intent

02:19:31.570 --> 02:19:33.490
and effectiveness , but just as a

02:19:33.490 --> 02:19:35.712
general statement . Militarily though ,

02:19:37.450 --> 02:19:40.200
it is an option among options , of

02:19:40.200 --> 02:19:42.440
which there are few . To deal with the

02:19:42.440 --> 02:19:44.607
Hezbollah problem . I , I , I just , I

02:19:44.607 --> 02:19:47.080
appreciate , uh , uh , Senator Rosen

02:19:47.269 --> 02:19:51.059
bringing this up , um . And , and , uh ,

02:19:51.349 --> 02:19:53.405
it just would go back to the central

02:19:53.405 --> 02:19:56.150
point . It would , it would be a

02:19:56.150 --> 02:19:59.530
tremendous achievement , uh , for

02:19:59.709 --> 02:20:02.799
Israel , Lebanon . Um ,

02:20:03.730 --> 02:20:05.952
The United States and the Middle East ,

02:20:07.009 --> 02:20:10.690
if Hezbollah could be eliminated and

02:20:10.700 --> 02:20:13.169
allow the Lebanese people and the

02:20:13.169 --> 02:20:16.450
Lebanese government to resume

02:20:16.969 --> 02:20:20.269
the happy relations that that we once

02:20:20.269 --> 02:20:23.610
had and . Um , strive

02:20:23.830 --> 02:20:26.549
for , um , between the United States

02:20:26.549 --> 02:20:30.179
and Lebanon . Would , um , Senator

02:20:30.179 --> 02:20:33.860
Rosen have any further questions ? Uh ,

02:20:33.980 --> 02:20:37.339
that then this concludes today's

02:20:37.339 --> 02:20:39.450
hearing . I wanna thank our witnesses

02:20:39.450 --> 02:20:41.889
for , uh , their testimony , and , and ,

02:20:41.900 --> 02:20:44.233
um , I would acknowledge that many , um .

02:20:45.120 --> 02:20:49.049
Many of the arrows . Um , aimed at

02:20:49.049 --> 02:20:52.730
these two witnesses , um , uh .

02:20:54.870 --> 02:20:58.419
Were We're better aimed at

02:20:58.419 --> 02:21:00.540
people in the civilian leadership who

02:21:00.540 --> 02:21:02.820
according to our great Constitution and

02:21:02.820 --> 02:21:05.879
our principles dating back to George

02:21:05.879 --> 02:21:09.099
Washington uh um are in control of

02:21:09.099 --> 02:21:12.839
policy and I would commend these two

02:21:13.099 --> 02:21:16.780
military veterans for

02:21:16.780 --> 02:21:19.200
adhering to that constitutional

02:21:19.299 --> 02:21:22.179
principle and with that we are , uh ,

02:21:22.190 --> 02:21:24.059
uh , I would inform members that

02:21:24.059 --> 02:21:26.115
questions for the record be due . To

02:21:26.115 --> 02:21:28.170
the committee within 2 business days

02:21:28.170 --> 02:21:28.629
and we are adjourned .