WEBVTT

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Good afternoon , everybody , and good

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morning to anybody who is farther west

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than we are . Uh , my name is Matt

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Sandisberg . I'm deputy director of the

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Army Mad Scientist Initiative , uh ,

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here at Fort Eustace for the T2com G2 .

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Uh , very excited today . This is the

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second iteration of , uh , our speaker

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series that we've brought back . Um ,

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we're gonna be featuring , uh , Mr .

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Sam Bendit today . Sam has been a great

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friend of mad scientist . Uh , he's

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worked with us several times in the

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past on speaker series . He's been

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guests on , uh , Our podcast . Uh ,

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he's contributed to our conferences

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that we've had , and he's back again to

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talk to everybody today . So , he's

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gonna do a presentation for you , and

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then we'll leave some time for Q&A . Uh ,

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before we get to that , I'd like to

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encourage everyone to check out all of

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our content within Mad Sci the T2com G2 .

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So , uh , Madsciblog.t2com.army.mil is

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the place where you can see all of the

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work that we do . Um , there's , uh ,

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frequently updated blog posts . There's

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links to all other material , uh , all

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of our conference stuff , all of the

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videos that we've done . Um , you can

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kind of , that's our jumping off point

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for everything , mad Psy . You can get

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to our podcast , The Convergence there ,

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and go back and listen to everything

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that we've done there . Uh , for today ,

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um , there will be a Q&A session

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afterwards , and Rachel will be

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moderating that . You can put your

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questions in the chat if you want and

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have a discussion there , but there's

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also a Q&A function down in the Zoom

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toolbar . That will hold the questions

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there , so at the end of it , Rachel

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can look and she can run through all

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the questions from the chat and get

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them over to Sam . Um , I'd also like

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to say that , uh , our 3rd speaker

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series will be in June on the 23rd . We

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will have Ms , uh , Clara Kludorovich ,

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uh , who wrote an interesting article

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on the coming compute war in Ukraine .

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She's gonna come and talk to us about

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that and some other things . Um , so

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mark that on your calendar and , and ,

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uh , stick to the blog to see , uh ,

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when the registration opens up for that .

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Uh , so , without further ado , let's

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move on to Sam . So , Sam Benditz , uh ,

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he's a non-resident , uh , excuse me ,

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he is an advisor in the Russia studies

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program at CNA . His research focuses

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on Russian defense and technology

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developments , uncrewed robotic and

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autonomous military systems ,

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artificial intelligence , and Russian

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military capabilities . And honestly ,

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for my money , he is the Russian UAV or

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unmanned systems , uh , expert , um .

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Out there working in defense today .

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And so we're very lucky to have him

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here . We're very lucky to have him

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back and him to be , you know , a

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proclaimed mad scientist and part of

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our community . So , I will stop

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talking and I will hand it over to Sam

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for the presentation . Sam , over to

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you . Thank you so much . Thank you to

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the math scientists for inviting me

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again . I really appreciate the

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opportunity to speak to all of you

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today and to share , uh , some of the

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content and uh some of the , um , Uh ,

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information that I've learned over the

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years , uh , I will now share my screen .

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OK , so , uh , today's conversation

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will be about battlefield autonomy and

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its democratization around the world .

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Uh , prior to this talk , we have

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agreed that I would concentrate on the

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war in Ukraine specifically , and

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because it's such an expansive , such a

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detailed topic , and with so much

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information . Available on so many

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aspects of the war in Ukraine , I think

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it's best if I just summarize some of

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the main principles and some of the

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main developments that we are

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witnessing in this war . So , uh , just

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a few words about myself . I joined CNA

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Russia studies program in 2016 . CNA

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stands for Center for Naval Analysis ,

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and we are US Navy's federally funded

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and research and development center .

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We are working mostly on US Navy

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related , uh . Research and analysis

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and on the Russia team , uh , I look at

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the development of unmanned autonomous

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and robotic systems . Uh , my teammates

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are looking at all aspects of the

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Russian military , from how Russia

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fights to what kind of weapons and

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systems it fields . We are even looking

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at how Russian military is trying to

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adapt to the war in Ukraine when it

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comes to . Um , medical adaptations and

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practices . I wear several hats . I

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have several outside affiliations with

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CSIS and Center for New American

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Security , to , uh , US , um ,

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Washington DC based think tanks . I'm

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also affiliated with the US National

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Drone Association . And for those of

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you who don't know CNA , and I've

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encountered a lot of people even within

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the Department of , um , war who are

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not aware of who we are , you probably

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do know about CNA because if you watch

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the first Top Gun . Uh , you saw the

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character of Charlie as Tom Cruise's

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love interest . In fact , this

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character was based on a real life CNA

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analyst who was deployed to the Top Gun

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program during the Cold War , and

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Doctor Christine Fox went on to have an

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excellent career within the Pentagon .

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Uh , so , I'm very proud to be part of

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CNA . Our , um , research and analysis

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of all things military goes back all

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the way to World War II , uh , and , uh ,

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today I'm going to talk to you about

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some of the . Uh , public and

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unclassified and open source

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information that I have learned so far

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about the war in Ukraine , and that is

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available out there in the Russian and

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Ukrainian language sources . So , a

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couple of things uh to provide an

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overview of what we are witnessing so

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far . This conflict , starting with the

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Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 ,

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has went through several stages . And

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when it comes to unmanned and

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autonomous Autonomous systems . Some of

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the more interesting aspects ,

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objectively speaking , include the

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overlapping , complementary , and

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sometimes even competing functions of

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some of the commercial technology that

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was drafted into the military

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applications in 2022 onwards , um ,

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both sides turned to commercial UAVs

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such as DGI Mavic quadcopters , which

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are still used today . In 2023 and 2024 ,

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both sites started fielding FPV drones ,

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and those were also assembled from many

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commercial components and continued to

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be assembled from commercial components .

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To date , UAVs and unmanned systems in

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general in the war in Ukraine are

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actually performing multiple functions

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with UAVs spanning the gamut from

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intelligence , surveillance ,

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reconnaissance to all manner of combat

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and supporting roles . The war in

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Ukraine , as has been commented on and

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described by multiple analysts in

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Ukraine in . In the United States , in

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Europe , in Russia proper , and all

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over the world is a war of adaptation ,

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with each side racing to gain an

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advantage over the other side . And so

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the entire research , development ,

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testing , and evaluation cycle , a term

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used within the US military for the

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entire cycle of development and

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fielding of different systems , has

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shrunk to . Uh , just several months ,

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uh , and in some cases , several weeks .

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So , your advantage and your capability

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against your adversary can last you for

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some time until the adversary very

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quickly catches on and very quickly

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develops countermeasures or actually

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copies what you are doing . And what

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this means is that a lot of the Uh ,

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intellectual capital that has been

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developed prior to 2022 , such as

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doctrines , such as how-to manuals and

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official documents that guide how the

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military fights , are now becoming

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outdated as different types of

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technologies are impacting how the war

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in Ukraine is unfolding , how both

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sides . are using specific battlefield

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unmanned systems and how both sides are

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trying to defend themselves against the

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adversary . And this of course led in

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turn to the professionalization and

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specialization of certain skills

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related to unmanned systems , fielding ,

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development , and testing .

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This graphic is taken from a Ukrainian

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analysis , which talks about the gray

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zone in Ukraine , and it's excellent in

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its portrayal of how actually scary

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that environment is actually is . And

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so what you're witnessing in this image .

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Is that the line of contact , the

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actual fighting , fighting is dominated

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by multiple types and variants of

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unmanned aerial vehicles , which are

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widespread , which are ubiquitous , and

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are operating around the clock ,

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providing overwatch of the battlefield

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as well as multiple types of combat and

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kinetic capabilities . These UAVs can

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range anywhere from 0 to 5 kilometers ,

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5 to 1520 , 30 , or even 40 kilometers

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from the line of contact . And what

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this means and what this image actually

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shows is that a lot of combat in

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Ukraine has larger , heavier , and

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expensive systems actually pushed

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further back from the line of contact

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where they could be presumably better

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defended from adversarial UAVs which

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operate in very Very large numbers and

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the more expensive and sometimes a more

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capable system is , the farther from

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the line of contact it has to be pushed .

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When it comes to actual fighting , no

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longer can either side field a lot of

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soldiers , groups of soldiers , units

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of soldiers , groups of vehicles

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together and at the same time , because

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anything and everything that moves on

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that line . Of contact and many

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kilometers beyond can actually be

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sighted and therefore attacked by an

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adversarial , adversarial UAV . And so

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a lot of advances , a lot of assaults

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have actually devolved into attacks by

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very small groups of soldiers that try

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to seep through the adversarial

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defenses . Uh , they tried to dig in

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and then wait for their other soldiers

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to arrive . And so , a lot of

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capabilities , which in 2022 and 2023

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were still conducted in a pre-2022 .

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Capacity such as deliveries by vehicle ,

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deliveries by automobile , uh , groups

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of soldiers traveling at different

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hours of the day and night , are now

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slowly evolving into roles conducted by

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unmanned systems such as heavy UAVs for

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supplies and deliveries , and a growing

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number of unmanned ground vehicles for

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different types of supply , logistics ,

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evacuation , and other types of roles .

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So in this environment , in this gray

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zone , in this kill box where UAVs .

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Dominate at the tactical and

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operational levels . It is very

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difficult to conduct operations that

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involve large groups of vehicles and

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soldiers . That doesn't mean that this

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rule is absolute . There are of course

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attacks that do involve vehicles and

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systems , but they have to be well

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protected against adversarial UAVs ,

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and they have to function within the

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conditions where they could be seen and

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attacked by multiple types of unmanned

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aerial vehicles . I mentioned numbers

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and numbers actually are something that

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we probably haven't witnessed before .

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When it comes to the US military

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preparation and combat tactics , it is

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doubtful that any of the US military

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doctrines , and especially US Army

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doctrine envisioned millions of UAVs

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used every year of combat . Uh , and

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every month , thousands and tens of

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thousands of tactical and operational

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level UAVs are used on the .

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Battlefield by hundreds and thousands

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of UAV crews . And so the numbers are

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growing and roughly doubling for

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Ukraine year on and year out . So this

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year , Ukraine is expecting to field up

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to 7 million UAVs , and last year it

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fielded around 4 million UAVs , and a

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lot fewer in 2023 . Russians are trying

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to keep pace , and they too are trying

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to field millions . Of unmanned aerial

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vehicles both at the tactical line as

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well as for other long , long range

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strategic and operational level tactics .

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And so this actually redefines how

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militaries can fight , how militaries

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can deploy , how militaries can protect

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and defend themselves , not just close

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to the actual combat , but even dozens

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of miles . Before , and this of course

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impacts how for example command and

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control facilities are to be conducted .

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This pushes a lot of soldiers and a lot

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of key functions underground where in

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underground shelters and dugouts

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soldiers can actually conduct

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battlefield operations in a presumably

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protected environment from tactical and

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adversarial drones . Multiple

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types of UAVs either

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belligerent give rise to a

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countermeasure . And so lots and lots

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of different types of ISR ,

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intelligence surveillance and

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reconnaissance and attack drones

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fielded by both militaries resulted in

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both adversaries fielding interceptor

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UAVs to target the adversarial capacity .

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And so Ukraine right now is leading in .

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This race , uh , it has a lot of

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domestic companies and a lot of

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international cooperation with the

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United States , with Europe in fielding

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different types of interceptor UAVs

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that can go after operational and

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strategic level drones . Russia's

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development of interceptor UAVs is more

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centralized . There are fewer UAVs

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which are operating , but all of them

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share roughly the same capabilities .

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When it comes to the speed of

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interception , operational range , and

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limited capacity for artificial

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intelligence application to capture the

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target and go after the target , we can

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expect the numbers and the range of

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these type of drones to increase this

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year and next year if the fighting

13:43.469 --> 13:45.525
continues , especially as both sides

13:45.525 --> 13:47.849
are fielding a longer and more capable

13:48.270 --> 13:51.044
strategic level UAVs . Uh , that

13:51.044 --> 13:53.085
require a different approach to

13:53.085 --> 13:55.196
shooting them down . In other words ,

13:55.196 --> 13:57.252
the defense against adversarial UAVs

13:57.252 --> 13:58.974
cannot be as expensive or more

13:58.974 --> 14:00.974
expensive as the target that you're

14:00.974 --> 14:02.752
going after . So both sides are

14:02.752 --> 14:04.918
fielding relatively cheap and numerous

14:04.918 --> 14:07.005
interceptor UAVs that can go after

14:07.005 --> 14:09.275
adversarial capabilities in order to

14:09.275 --> 14:12.085
deny the adversary the ability to

14:12.085 --> 14:14.164
conduct battlefield overwatch and

14:14.164 --> 14:17.859
combat capacity . Other solutions which

14:17.859 --> 14:21.109
have been developed by both sides

14:21.200 --> 14:24.299
include UAVs that can evade electronic

14:24.299 --> 14:26.410
warfare and similar countermeasures .

14:26.619 --> 14:28.919
The use of fiber optic UAVs go back ,

14:29.429 --> 14:32.659
goes back to August 2024 , when

14:32.659 --> 14:34.659
Russians started fielding them on a

14:34.659 --> 14:36.715
large scale . The key advantage to a

14:36.715 --> 14:38.881
fiber optic drone is the fact that all

14:38.881 --> 14:41.299
command and control and video is

14:41.299 --> 14:43.243
transmitted via a thin fiber optic

14:43.243 --> 14:45.940
cable that unspools as the UAV flies .

14:46.320 --> 14:48.542
And that means the UAV technically does

14:48.542 --> 14:50.653
not emanate any signals that could be

14:50.653 --> 14:52.799
jammed . However , even fiber optic

14:52.799 --> 14:55.460
drones for all of their advantages ,

14:55.799 --> 14:58.679
still have some detriments , and they

14:58.679 --> 15:00.846
include the uh the fact that the fiber

15:00.846 --> 15:02.957
optic drone on which the UAV actually

15:02.957 --> 15:05.270
depends , can bend , it can snap , and

15:05.270 --> 15:07.492
when that happens , the UAV essentially

15:07.492 --> 15:09.599
goes down and loses control . Fiber

15:09.599 --> 15:11.821
optic drones are also a perfect example

15:11.821 --> 15:15.710
of trading range for . The kinetic

15:15.710 --> 15:17.877
capability . The longer the range of a

15:17.877 --> 15:20.043
fiber optic UAV , the larger the fiber

15:20.043 --> 15:22.377
optic spool , and therefore the smaller ,

15:22.429 --> 15:24.950
smaller the actual warhead that the UAV

15:24.950 --> 15:27.006
carries . There are some workarounds

15:27.006 --> 15:29.117
around that , some fiber optic spools

15:29.117 --> 15:32.049
are becoming lighter . For different

15:32.049 --> 15:34.979
types of UAV applications , but the

15:34.979 --> 15:37.609
large scale use of fiber optic drones

15:37.609 --> 15:39.729
actually drove the price of fiber

15:39.729 --> 15:41.849
optics sky high , and that is why on

15:41.849 --> 15:43.849
this particular slide , the word

15:43.849 --> 15:46.071
temporary is with a question mark , how

15:46.071 --> 15:48.650
long can both sides field these drones

15:48.650 --> 15:50.594
if their costs are actually rising

15:50.594 --> 15:52.817
because the cost of their components is

15:52.817 --> 15:55.340
also increasing . Nonetheless , Russia

15:55.340 --> 15:57.396
today claims to have assembled up to

15:57.396 --> 16:00.099
50,000 fiber optic UAVs each month ,

16:00.380 --> 16:02.436
and some of the more capable Russian

16:02.436 --> 16:04.602
UAV crews and UAV formations are using

16:04.602 --> 16:06.900
fiber optics to go after Ukrainian

16:06.900 --> 16:09.679
logistics , supply , and command and

16:09.679 --> 16:11.901
control capabilities , and Ukrainians ,

16:11.901 --> 16:13.846
of course , have also manufactured

16:13.846 --> 16:16.419
their own fiber optic UAVs , and this

16:16.419 --> 16:18.641
technology race continues this year and

16:18.641 --> 16:22.609
probably well into 2027 . I

16:22.609 --> 16:24.609
usually don't talk about long range

16:24.609 --> 16:26.720
UAVs because most of my work involves

16:26.720 --> 16:30.150
tactical Group 1 and Group 2 UAV uses ,

16:30.280 --> 16:32.500
but it is important to mention . How

16:32.500 --> 16:35.570
widespread is the use of long range

16:35.570 --> 16:38.059
unmanned aerial vehicles by both sides

16:38.059 --> 16:40.260
to target the adversaries's economic ,

16:40.539 --> 16:43.820
military , and civil society . Ukraine

16:43.820 --> 16:46.140
has gotten really good at using its

16:46.140 --> 16:48.210
long range strikes to target Russian

16:48.210 --> 16:50.266
oil facilities , energy facilities ,

16:50.619 --> 16:52.840
military installations , military .

16:54.330 --> 16:57.640
And , um Defense

16:57.640 --> 16:59.584
installations across the country ,

16:59.679 --> 17:02.440
mostly in Russia's western part , and

17:02.440 --> 17:04.440
that's the image on the left from a

17:04.440 --> 17:06.920
Russian language telegram channel . As

17:06.920 --> 17:09.142
you can see , most of the larger cities

17:09.142 --> 17:11.031
are within range of the Ukrainian

17:11.031 --> 17:13.359
drones , and the same situation exists

17:13.359 --> 17:16.208
in reverse for Ukraine . As Russia uses

17:16.208 --> 17:17.999
greater and greater number of

17:17.999 --> 17:20.918
long-range Shahed , Gerain , and

17:20.918 --> 17:23.698
different types of long range variant

17:23.698 --> 17:27.098
UEVs to attack Ukrainian targets ,

17:27.159 --> 17:29.048
which often happen to be civilian

17:29.048 --> 17:30.992
targets , which Russians claim are

17:30.992 --> 17:33.198
actually military targets . And so the

17:33.198 --> 17:34.976
attacks on Ukrainian cities are

17:34.976 --> 17:37.239
ubiquitous and commonplace as Russia

17:37.239 --> 17:39.519
launches these long-range UEVs from .

17:39.869 --> 17:43.579
Uh , within Russia proper or from its

17:43.579 --> 17:45.880
territories that it captured from

17:45.880 --> 17:47.491
Ukraine . And so some of the

17:47.491 --> 17:49.269
interceptor UAVs that have been

17:49.269 --> 17:51.102
developed as a response to these

17:51.102 --> 17:54.030
attacks are actually rapidly um

17:55.069 --> 17:56.958
Developing in their technological

17:56.958 --> 17:59.189
sophistication to deny the adversary

17:59.189 --> 18:01.390
the capability to launch these long

18:01.390 --> 18:03.810
range UAVs . Both sides are also trying

18:03.810 --> 18:06.670
to come up with a layered defense

18:06.670 --> 18:08.614
against such attacks that involves

18:08.614 --> 18:10.559
signals intelligence , electronics

18:10.559 --> 18:12.448
intelligence . Different types of

18:12.448 --> 18:14.059
jamming , as well as kinetic

18:14.059 --> 18:16.170
capabilities , mobile firing groups ,

18:16.170 --> 18:18.839
as well as physical protection on some

18:18.839 --> 18:21.061
of the targets and on the ground , uh ,

18:21.061 --> 18:23.283
in order to defend against these UAVs .

18:23.479 --> 18:25.646
But the development of long-range UAVs

18:25.646 --> 18:27.701
is likewise growing , and both sides

18:27.701 --> 18:29.757
are trying to field more and more in

18:29.757 --> 18:32.180
order to strike at the heart of other

18:33.079 --> 18:35.640
belligerents capacity to wage war .

18:37.209 --> 18:39.890
The use of artificial intelligence has

18:39.890 --> 18:42.650
grown significantly in this war . And

18:42.650 --> 18:45.189
uh while we are not yet seeing actual

18:45.369 --> 18:48.689
swarms of UAVs such as uh groups of

18:48.689 --> 18:51.089
UAVs that can communicate amongst

18:51.089 --> 18:53.290
themselves , identify targets on

18:53.290 --> 18:55.290
themselves and by themselves , and

18:55.290 --> 18:57.689
strike targets by themselves , we are

18:57.689 --> 18:59.689
witnessing a lot of developments on

18:59.689 --> 19:01.800
both sides that are actually pointing

19:01.800 --> 19:03.633
in that direction . As Ukrainian

19:03.633 --> 19:05.745
military and the Russian military are

19:05.745 --> 19:08.420
developing multiple projects that

19:08.420 --> 19:11.900
enable groups of UAVs to operate , um ,

19:12.930 --> 19:15.829
Together and try to overwhelm

19:16.050 --> 19:18.930
adversarial defenses . Ukrainian

19:18.930 --> 19:20.652
companies are cooperating with

19:20.652 --> 19:23.099
international partners , working on

19:23.099 --> 19:25.849
fielding AI enabled UAVs both at the

19:25.849 --> 19:28.449
tactical , strategic , and operational

19:28.449 --> 19:30.560
levels . But what's interesting about

19:30.560 --> 19:32.393
this is that a lot of Russian AI

19:32.393 --> 19:34.489
capabilities are actually enabled by

19:34.489 --> 19:37.369
imports of international and especially

19:37.369 --> 19:39.609
Western and American parts , uh ,

19:39.930 --> 19:43.569
bypass . A key component of both

19:43.569 --> 19:46.880
military strategy , as well as uh

19:46.880 --> 19:48.936
technological development , and both

19:48.936 --> 19:50.936
sides are trying to collect as much

19:50.936 --> 19:54.130
data as possible to train AI algorithms

19:54.130 --> 19:56.297
for eventual use in unmanned systems .

19:56.410 --> 19:58.640
And recently , Ukraine has collected so

19:58.640 --> 20:00.751
much of this battlefield data that it

20:00.751 --> 20:02.862
is now sharing it with its partners .

20:02.862 --> 20:04.584
Partners in order for both the

20:04.584 --> 20:06.584
Ukrainian and partner militaries to

20:06.584 --> 20:09.244
train their technologies and especially

20:09.244 --> 20:11.765
on manned systems on using AI . We

20:11.765 --> 20:13.876
probably have to assume that Russians

20:13.876 --> 20:15.821
are doing the same . They too have

20:15.821 --> 20:17.876
collected lots of battlefield data ,

20:17.876 --> 20:19.654
and they too are training their

20:19.654 --> 20:21.964
algorithms , um , in order to operate

20:21.964 --> 20:24.525
unmanned systems . Uh , it is worth

20:24.525 --> 20:26.747
pointing out that the increasing use of

20:26.747 --> 20:29.459
AI and um . Different types of high

20:29.459 --> 20:31.930
tech systems by both militaries is a

20:31.930 --> 20:34.099
cultural change , and in Ukraine , a

20:34.099 --> 20:36.155
lot of AI and high tech developments

20:36.155 --> 20:38.699
are facilitated by younger MOD

20:38.699 --> 20:40.866
officials from the Ministry of Defense

20:40.866 --> 20:43.032
and the government , some of whom have

20:43.032 --> 20:44.699
actually grown up without any

20:44.699 --> 20:47.050
connection . To the Soviet slash Cold

20:47.050 --> 20:50.170
War style way of fighting that was

20:50.170 --> 20:52.729
educated throughout the Soviet Union

20:52.729 --> 20:55.109
when Ukraine was also part of the USSR .

20:55.449 --> 20:57.227
For example , Ukrainian Defense

20:57.227 --> 20:59.569
Minister Mikhailo Fyodorov is only 35

20:59.569 --> 21:01.489
years old . He was born after the

21:01.489 --> 21:03.656
Soviet Union fell apart . Uh , some of

21:03.656 --> 21:05.878
the key personalities like the , like ,

21:07.219 --> 21:09.052
Uh , Mr . Banov in the Ukrainian

21:09.052 --> 21:12.130
intelligence is only 40 years old , so

21:12.130 --> 21:14.297
he too essentially grew up without the

21:14.297 --> 21:17.630
connection or any participation in the

21:17.630 --> 21:19.739
Soviet way of fighting in the Soviet

21:19.739 --> 21:21.961
military education . Even the commander

21:21.961 --> 21:24.349
of Ukrainian Unmanned Systems forces .

21:25.260 --> 21:27.900
Mr . Brody is 50 years old , but he

21:27.900 --> 21:30.339
came into this war from a commercial

21:30.339 --> 21:32.561
background , where he's familiar with a

21:32.561 --> 21:34.728
lot of IT and high-tech technologies .

21:34.739 --> 21:36.850
Uh , that's not quite the same on the

21:36.850 --> 21:38.739
Russian side , where a lot of key

21:38.739 --> 21:41.017
command posts are still held by people ,

21:41.380 --> 21:43.989
uh , who , uh , were part of the Soviet

21:43.989 --> 21:47.040
military and then , uh , former , um ,

21:47.420 --> 21:49.642
excuse me , uh , Russian military after

21:49.642 --> 21:52.400
1992 . And so , the familiarity with

21:52.400 --> 21:54.640
some of the AI related concepts and

21:54.640 --> 21:57.920
tactics is owed also to the cultural

21:57.920 --> 22:00.680
shift within the Ukrainian military and

22:00.680 --> 22:02.847
attempts at this cultural shift within

22:02.847 --> 22:04.736
the Russian military . Artificial

22:04.736 --> 22:06.513
intelligence in unmanned aerial

22:06.513 --> 22:08.513
vehicles , especially , is used for

22:08.513 --> 22:10.949
target lock and target capture . Uh ,

22:10.959 --> 22:12.939
it is used , uh , for autonomous

22:12.939 --> 22:15.430
navigation and strikes , both at the

22:15.430 --> 22:18.430
tactical and strategic level , and the

22:18.430 --> 22:20.430
use of these technologies and these

22:20.430 --> 22:22.989
concepts is only going to grow , as

22:22.989 --> 22:25.040
both sides are becoming better and

22:25.040 --> 22:27.390
better at integrating some of these

22:27.390 --> 22:29.390
high-tech concepts , and especially

22:29.390 --> 22:31.910
limited AI in their unmanned systems .

22:32.869 --> 22:35.489
The war has also resulted in the

22:35.489 --> 22:38.089
professionalization of how both sides

22:38.089 --> 22:40.650
are approaching using unmanned systems

22:40.650 --> 22:43.050
and especially UAVs . On the Russian

22:43.050 --> 22:45.569
side in 2024 , the Ministry of Defense

22:45.569 --> 22:48.199
has created a separate formation called

22:48.199 --> 22:50.719
Rubicon , which draws . The best and

22:50.719 --> 22:53.719
the brightest pilots , UAV operators ,

22:53.959 --> 22:55.640
counter UAV specialists , and

22:55.640 --> 22:57.640
technicians from across the Russian

22:57.640 --> 23:00.400
military , a centralization of sorts of

23:00.400 --> 23:03.199
best capacities that sometimes robs the

23:03.199 --> 23:06.160
rest of the Russian units of some of

23:06.160 --> 23:09.520
the best pilots . Uh , Rubicon is going

23:09.520 --> 23:12.680
after Ukrainian UAV supply , logistics ,

23:12.689 --> 23:14.856
and command and control capabilities ,

23:14.856 --> 23:17.078
and the image on the left shows some of

23:17.078 --> 23:20.640
the Rubicon targets for April of this

23:20.640 --> 23:22.989
year , and the bulk of the targets are

23:22.989 --> 23:25.359
actually Ukrainian UAVs , Ukrainian

23:25.359 --> 23:27.979
UGVs , Ukrainian command and control ,

23:28.160 --> 23:31.119
and fortification facilities , as well

23:31.119 --> 23:33.599
as Ukrainian SIGI and Eland

23:33.599 --> 23:36.189
capabilities as well . So this shows

23:36.189 --> 23:38.430
where the priorities are for Russians

23:38.430 --> 23:40.430
as they try to deny Ukraine the

23:40.430 --> 23:44.189
capability to field its UAVs in force .

23:44.459 --> 23:46.630
And Ukraine has done a lot of

23:46.630 --> 23:48.630
professionalization itself . It has

23:48.630 --> 23:51.910
expanded how it uses certain point

23:51.910 --> 23:54.589
systems to reward its UAV pilots and

23:54.589 --> 23:56.910
operators as they strike Russian

23:56.910 --> 23:59.589
targets . It has encouraged UAV crews

23:59.589 --> 24:01.478
and pilots to go . After specific

24:01.478 --> 24:03.410
targets and a number of specific

24:03.410 --> 24:05.670
targets each month in order , in order

24:05.670 --> 24:07.781
for them to earn points that they can

24:07.781 --> 24:09.760
then exchange for technologies and

24:09.760 --> 24:12.369
different types of assistance , both

24:12.369 --> 24:14.480
sides are now trying to go after each

24:14.480 --> 24:16.359
other's supply and logistics

24:16.359 --> 24:18.890
capabilities to deny the adversary the

24:18.890 --> 24:21.130
ability to deploy to the line of

24:21.130 --> 24:23.297
contact in the first place and destroy

24:23.297 --> 24:25.449
the capacity that supports the .

24:26.040 --> 24:28.359
Frontline operations , and this tactic

24:28.359 --> 24:31.520
and concept is likely going to persist

24:31.520 --> 24:34.699
for this year and well into 2027 .

24:35.280 --> 24:37.502
Unmanned ground vehicles have come into

24:37.502 --> 24:39.800
their own in this war , uh , from their

24:39.800 --> 24:42.560
very limited use in 202002 and 202023

24:42.560 --> 24:44.880
to essentially ubiquitous presence on

24:44.880 --> 24:47.119
the battlefield , as the line of

24:47.119 --> 24:49.880
contact and Uh , lots and lots of

24:49.880 --> 24:53.199
environments that stretch 5 , 1015 , 25

24:53.199 --> 24:55.421
kilometers from the line of contact are

24:55.421 --> 24:57.949
becoming more and more dangerous for

24:57.949 --> 25:00.239
soldiers because of the ubiquitous UAV

25:00.239 --> 25:03.640
presence . Some of the Um ,

25:03.650 --> 25:06.270
roles , which used to be relegated to

25:06.270 --> 25:09.329
foot soldiers or to different types of

25:09.329 --> 25:11.496
military vehicles are now relegated to

25:11.496 --> 25:13.662
unmanned ground vehicles , and so both

25:13.662 --> 25:17.030
sides are trying to use UGVs for supply ,

25:17.069 --> 25:19.969
logistics , as well as medical

25:19.969 --> 25:22.880
evacuations . More and more UGVs are

25:22.880 --> 25:24.824
used for different types of combat

25:24.824 --> 25:27.790
roles , and more and more UGVs are now

25:28.849 --> 25:30.849
taking on the roles that used to be

25:30.849 --> 25:32.905
held by soldiers . Ukrainians are on

25:32.905 --> 25:35.465
the record saying that they want to use

25:35.465 --> 25:38.105
their UGVs as much as possible in order

25:38.105 --> 25:40.272
to remove as many soldiers as possible

25:40.586 --> 25:42.808
from front frontline duties . And there

25:42.808 --> 25:45.426
are examples and cases where Ukrainian

25:45.426 --> 25:48.546
UGVs have conducted assaults that have

25:48.546 --> 25:50.865
captured Russian positions , or were

25:50.865 --> 25:54.485
actually used for a long time ,

25:54.706 --> 25:57.605
um , to protect and defend Ukrainian

25:57.745 --> 25:59.967
positions instead of using soldiers for

25:59.967 --> 26:01.634
that . Of course this doesn't

26:01.634 --> 26:03.634
necessarily negate the role of foot

26:03.634 --> 26:05.921
soldiers and infantry in order to truly

26:05.921 --> 26:08.088
take a position , to take a location ,

26:08.121 --> 26:10.343
to take a city or a town or a village ,

26:10.343 --> 26:12.565
you still need the infantry . But on my

26:12.565 --> 26:14.901
ground vehicles in combination of UAVs

26:15.121 --> 26:17.401
can conduct significant operations and

26:17.401 --> 26:19.345
degrade the adversary to the point

26:19.602 --> 26:22.192
where infantry assaults and use of

26:22.192 --> 26:24.121
human soldiers will not incur

26:24.121 --> 26:26.482
casualties , if any at all . In fact ,

26:26.621 --> 26:28.741
Ukrainian military is now combining .

26:29.459 --> 26:31.681
Some of the assault units together with

26:31.681 --> 26:35.390
UGV and UAV formations for a brand new

26:35.390 --> 26:37.689
type of an assault formation against

26:37.689 --> 26:39.859
Russian forces , and both sides are

26:39.859 --> 26:41.390
trying to utilize advanced

26:41.390 --> 26:43.469
communication technologies and are

26:43.469 --> 26:45.910
aiming to better protect and defend

26:45.910 --> 26:48.589
their UGVs against adversarial UAV

26:48.589 --> 26:51.550
strikes . Ukraine is using thousands of

26:51.550 --> 26:53.717
UGVs and different types of missions ,

26:53.829 --> 26:55.940
and of course , Russians are probably

26:55.940 --> 26:57.996
doing the same , even if they're not

26:57.996 --> 27:00.162
necessarily talking publicly about the

27:00.162 --> 27:02.390
numbers . But we can expect the role of

27:02.390 --> 27:05.130
UGVs to increase as Ukrainian military

27:05.750 --> 27:08.579
claims that it will field up to 50,000

27:08.579 --> 27:11.319
UGVs this year . A lot of these uh

27:11.319 --> 27:13.719
technologies are actually assembled and

27:13.719 --> 27:16.219
modified right there at the front . So ,

27:16.439 --> 27:18.939
creating a , um , communication line

27:19.280 --> 27:21.502
between the end users and developers is

27:21.502 --> 27:23.280
absolutely essential to develop

27:23.280 --> 27:25.391
technology that can best respond to a

27:25.391 --> 27:27.630
battlefield challenge . A lot has been

27:27.630 --> 27:29.589
said and written about Ukrainian

27:29.589 --> 27:32.010
unmanned surface vessels . And I'm sure

27:32.229 --> 27:34.630
in other talks , um , that mad

27:34.630 --> 27:36.519
scientist is going to have in the

27:36.519 --> 27:38.741
coming months , um , we will talk about

27:38.741 --> 27:40.989
Ukrainian capacity to field autonomous

27:40.989 --> 27:43.211
systems , artificial intelligence , and

27:43.211 --> 27:45.378
of course , unmanned surface vessels .

27:45.378 --> 27:47.378
But , uh , what Ukraine has done is

27:47.378 --> 27:49.670
truly re remarkable . It has taken this

27:49.670 --> 27:52.920
capability . It has enabled their USVs

27:52.920 --> 27:54.920
to operate with different types of

27:54.920 --> 27:58.439
weapons and systems to actually negate

27:58.760 --> 28:00.979
the Russian Black Sea fleet capability

28:00.979 --> 28:03.199
altogether . And today , the Russian

28:03.199 --> 28:05.040
Black Sea fleet is holed up in

28:05.040 --> 28:07.151
Sevastopol in the Crimea , as well as

28:07.151 --> 28:09.099
in Novorosiysk on the Black Sea's

28:09.099 --> 28:13.060
eastern coast , and uh USVs are

28:13.560 --> 28:15.616
essentially a weapon of choice right

28:15.616 --> 28:18.109
now in the maritime environment in that

28:18.400 --> 28:20.456
particular area of operations . Uh ,

28:20.839 --> 28:23.380
because a relatively cheap USV can

28:23.380 --> 28:25.269
actually cause significant damage

28:25.709 --> 28:28.050
against multiple types of Russian naval

28:28.229 --> 28:30.451
and other military assets . And so this

28:30.451 --> 28:33.390
image , uh , from , um , a Russian

28:33.390 --> 28:36.099
language source discusses how , uh ,

28:36.109 --> 28:37.979
Russians had to face a combined

28:37.979 --> 28:41.589
Ukrainian USV and a UAV attack on the

28:41.589 --> 28:44.709
Crimea . The list on the right is

28:44.709 --> 28:47.390
actually from a former Russian Chief of

28:47.390 --> 28:49.869
Naval Operations , Admiral Yevmenov ,

28:50.199 --> 28:52.989
uh , where he tried to put on paper

28:52.989 --> 28:55.109
some of the tactics and concepts that

28:55.109 --> 28:57.510
the Russian military needs to do in

28:57.510 --> 28:59.770
order to better protect its facilities

29:00.030 --> 29:02.252
against Ukrainian USV attacks . And the

29:02.252 --> 29:04.474
last two points are very Important . It

29:04.474 --> 29:06.808
isn't just enough to build the defenses .

29:06.808 --> 29:09.444
It isn't just enough to shoot down or

29:09.444 --> 29:11.666
interdict these USVs . What's important

29:11.666 --> 29:14.265
is to educate the entire naval force

29:14.515 --> 29:16.844
about this threat so that every sailor

29:16.844 --> 29:19.285
and every commander on every ship knows

29:19.285 --> 29:21.635
how to identify and attempt to

29:21.635 --> 29:24.160
interdict this particular threat . Uh ,

29:24.250 --> 29:26.417
Russians are also recognizing that the

29:26.417 --> 29:28.729
Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles and

29:28.729 --> 29:31.609
the technologies that , uh , they will

29:31.609 --> 29:34.089
influence , such as those that are used

29:34.089 --> 29:36.599
by other militaries . Can be a long

29:36.599 --> 29:38.680
term threat to Russian military and

29:38.680 --> 29:40.902
civilian naval assets , not just in the

29:40.902 --> 29:43.790
Black Sea , but in other areas of

29:43.790 --> 29:45.846
operation . But the Russians are now

29:45.846 --> 29:48.520
trying to develop certain facilities

29:48.520 --> 29:50.800
and technologies to monitor the Black

29:50.800 --> 29:53.880
Sea , to , to monitor their aerials .

29:54.390 --> 29:56.279
And maritime littorals around the

29:56.279 --> 29:58.446
Sevastopol and the Crimea , especially

29:58.589 --> 30:00.619
in order to identify and interdict

30:00.619 --> 30:03.829
these USVs , but Ukraine is also racing

30:03.829 --> 30:05.989
against these defenses in fielding

30:05.989 --> 30:08.959
better capacity and USVs that feature

30:08.959 --> 30:11.510
different types of weapons and systems

30:12.719 --> 30:14.608
to go after multitudes of Russian

30:14.608 --> 30:18.300
targets . Both militaries in this

30:18.300 --> 30:21.060
war are greatly aided by their

30:21.060 --> 30:23.171
respective civil societies , and this

30:23.171 --> 30:25.449
is a relatively interesting phenomenon .

30:25.560 --> 30:27.560
Not just for Ukraine , but also for

30:27.560 --> 30:29.838
Russia proper , specifically in Russia ,

30:29.838 --> 30:32.839
where most and practically all military

30:32.839 --> 30:34.783
development as well as weapons and

30:34.783 --> 30:37.006
systems development has always been the

30:37.006 --> 30:38.839
monopoly of the state . But what

30:38.839 --> 30:40.783
actually took place in Ukraine and

30:40.783 --> 30:43.680
Russia after 2022 is that multiple

30:43.680 --> 30:45.599
civil society efforts , technical

30:45.599 --> 30:48.520
volunteers , small startups , technical

30:48.520 --> 30:51.270
companies have started to

30:51.739 --> 30:53.517
Essentially address some of the

30:53.517 --> 30:55.579
challenges and gaps encountered by

30:55.579 --> 30:57.746
their respective militaries , and they

30:57.746 --> 30:59.857
started buying civilian technology to

30:59.857 --> 31:02.190
send to the front like DGI Mavic drones .

31:02.190 --> 31:04.301
They started to assemble FPV drones ,

31:04.301 --> 31:06.412
some of the other UAV and counter UAV

31:06.412 --> 31:08.246
related technologies . They were

31:08.246 --> 31:10.479
fundraising for all manner of supplies

31:10.780 --> 31:12.836
for their soldiers . And all of this

31:12.836 --> 31:15.319
ecosystem , uh , of volunteers ,

31:15.760 --> 31:18.459
startups , and other types of efforts ,

31:18.640 --> 31:21.369
um , essentially became quite impactful .

31:21.680 --> 31:24.239
And Ukraine has built ramps and

31:24.239 --> 31:26.640
essentially avenues for the military to

31:26.640 --> 31:28.918
better engage the civil society effort .

31:29.119 --> 31:31.230
And it has created organizations like

31:31.230 --> 31:33.869
Brave One . Which seek solutions from

31:33.869 --> 31:35.980
the private sector and from the civil

31:35.980 --> 31:38.202
society to be tested and applied by the

31:38.202 --> 31:40.425
military . On the Russian side , things

31:40.425 --> 31:42.536
are much worse for the volunteers and

31:42.536 --> 31:44.709
startups , as the Russian military

31:44.709 --> 31:46.630
prefers a vertical approach , a

31:46.630 --> 31:48.750
controlling approach to all manner of

31:48.750 --> 31:50.639
weapons and systems development .

31:50.639 --> 31:52.670
Nonetheless , certain high profile

31:52.670 --> 31:56.040
efforts were actually Um , operating

31:56.040 --> 31:58.209
and continue to operate in Russia ,

31:58.459 --> 32:00.237
where former volunteers are now

32:00.237 --> 32:02.070
cooperating with the Ministry of

32:02.070 --> 32:03.792
Defense and Defense industrial

32:03.792 --> 32:07.359
enterprises to test and field , their

32:07.359 --> 32:09.819
technologies for fast iteration and

32:09.819 --> 32:12.560
fast adaptation by the military and

32:12.560 --> 32:15.140
potentially be scaled up by the defense

32:15.140 --> 32:17.780
industrial sector and be manufactured

32:17.780 --> 32:20.180
in large numbers . And so Ukraine has

32:20.180 --> 32:22.920
done a lot to engage in civil society

32:23.060 --> 32:25.579
and to build goodwill between the end

32:25.579 --> 32:28.060
users , the military , industrial

32:28.060 --> 32:30.390
sector , and the civil society effort .

32:30.699 --> 32:33.500
And the same efforts are also existing

32:33.500 --> 32:35.556
on the Russian side , but it is much

32:35.556 --> 32:37.278
more difficult for the Russian

32:37.278 --> 32:39.611
volunteers to do the same . Nonetheless ,

32:39.611 --> 32:41.889
there are again , some success stories ,

32:41.889 --> 32:44.000
because these volunteers and startups

32:44.000 --> 32:46.056
can develop something very quickly ,

32:46.056 --> 32:48.167
can iterate quickly , can incorporate

32:48.167 --> 32:50.278
frontline feedback very quickly , but

32:50.278 --> 32:52.056
have no capacity to scale their

32:52.056 --> 32:53.944
development . This is where state

32:53.944 --> 32:56.400
sector has to come in , recognize these

32:56.400 --> 32:59.160
efforts , and scale them up . And so ,

32:59.270 --> 33:02.439
this is an ongoing evolution . And by

33:02.439 --> 33:05.420
mid 2026 , most efforts in Russia have

33:05.420 --> 33:07.476
been folded into the state sector or

33:07.476 --> 33:09.364
have been absorbed . In Ukraine ,

33:10.380 --> 33:12.699
Multiple civil society and startups

33:12.699 --> 33:16.300
still exist and are operational , and

33:16.300 --> 33:18.930
Ukrainian military is trying to better

33:18.930 --> 33:22.390
engage these efforts . Uh , both

33:22.390 --> 33:24.750
ministries of defense have responded to

33:24.750 --> 33:27.109
different types of threats in a similar

33:27.109 --> 33:29.189
fashion . So both Ukraine and the

33:29.189 --> 33:32.550
Russian Federation today have separate

33:32.550 --> 33:34.772
military branches which are devoted and

33:34.772 --> 33:37.050
dedicated just to the unmanned systems .

33:37.099 --> 33:39.155
And so Ukraine launched its unmanned

33:39.155 --> 33:42.500
Systems Forces branch in 2024 . Russia

33:42.500 --> 33:44.667
followed with its own unmanned systems

33:44.667 --> 33:47.510
branch in late 2025 . There are a lot

33:47.510 --> 33:49.232
of efforts on both sides , and

33:49.232 --> 33:51.066
especially The Ukrainian side to

33:51.066 --> 33:53.232
develop a common operating picture for

33:53.232 --> 33:55.399
all the data , for all the information

33:55.399 --> 33:57.732
from all kinds of unmanned systems , uh ,

33:57.732 --> 34:00.550
to essentially go into a central node

34:00.550 --> 34:02.328
to be analyzed with the help of

34:02.328 --> 34:04.750
artificial intelligence and deliver

34:04.750 --> 34:07.670
solutions or advice on how to deal with

34:07.670 --> 34:09.750
specific targets . Russia is also

34:09.750 --> 34:11.750
working on its own common operating

34:11.750 --> 34:14.510
picture and its own solutions at the

34:14.510 --> 34:16.677
operational , strategic , and tactical

34:16.677 --> 34:18.621
levels . There's a drive , as I've

34:18.621 --> 34:20.566
mentioned , for better cooperation

34:20.566 --> 34:22.732
between civil society efforts that are

34:22.732 --> 34:24.739
quite impactful , and the

34:24.749 --> 34:27.148
military-industrial complex , which is

34:27.148 --> 34:29.509
often uncomfortable at the , at the

34:29.509 --> 34:32.218
fact that it has to cooperate with

34:32.229 --> 34:35.069
small startups that have no proper

34:35.069 --> 34:37.125
documentation and no way of properly

34:37.125 --> 34:39.300
testing . Their systems , but Ukraine

34:39.300 --> 34:41.100
has done a lot , and Russia is

34:41.100 --> 34:43.020
attempting to forge a better

34:43.020 --> 34:45.639
relationship between this volunteer

34:46.379 --> 34:48.860
ecosystem and its military . As I've

34:48.860 --> 34:51.300
already mentioned , the multitudes of

34:51.300 --> 34:53.522
different types of unmanned systems are

34:53.522 --> 34:55.578
impacting how militaries fight , how

34:55.578 --> 34:57.744
militaries understand and analyze this

34:57.744 --> 35:00.139
war . And so , military training and

35:00.139 --> 35:02.750
education must reflect the realities in

35:02.750 --> 35:04.917
Ukraine war , because the realities of

35:04.917 --> 35:07.669
Ukraine combat are reverberating around

35:07.669 --> 35:10.590
the world . And so , um , in the United

35:10.590 --> 35:12.870
States , in different US military

35:12.870 --> 35:14.989
services , and all around the world ,

35:15.270 --> 35:17.669
there's now a lot of efforts to

35:17.669 --> 35:20.030
understand and analyze the lessons from

35:20.030 --> 35:22.197
Ukraine combat . And what this means ,

35:22.320 --> 35:24.429
Is that Ukrainian and Russian

35:24.429 --> 35:26.719
militaries , but also other countries

35:26.719 --> 35:28.719
which are paying close attention to

35:28.719 --> 35:30.497
this war , are trying to better

35:30.497 --> 35:32.830
integrate UAV , UGV , unmanned surface ,

35:32.840 --> 35:34.840
and unmanned underwater vehicle

35:34.840 --> 35:37.149
technology into the combined arms

35:37.149 --> 35:39.149
operations and into the current and

35:39.149 --> 35:42.479
future concept of operations . What

35:42.479 --> 35:45.719
this means is that education is , is

35:45.719 --> 35:48.649
continuing . And just because uh the

35:48.649 --> 35:51.290
war in Ukraine is now lasting into its

35:51.290 --> 35:53.290
5th year , it doesn't actually mean

35:53.290 --> 35:55.401
that militaries that should be paying

35:55.401 --> 35:57.734
attention are actually paying attention .

35:57.734 --> 35:59.901
So , exactly 1 year ago , NATO held an

35:59.901 --> 36:02.949
exercise . Where a large NATO formation

36:02.949 --> 36:05.429
was destroyed , quote unquote , by just

36:05.429 --> 36:08.300
10 Ukrainian UAV operators , because

36:08.310 --> 36:10.310
that NATO formation deployed in a

36:10.310 --> 36:12.532
manner that didn't necessarily take all

36:12.532 --> 36:14.699
of the Ukrainian combat realities into

36:14.699 --> 36:16.921
consideration . And just recently there

36:16.921 --> 36:18.977
was another exercise where a Swedish

36:18.977 --> 36:21.080
military force was also defeated by

36:21.080 --> 36:23.399
Ukrainian drone operators . It is very

36:23.399 --> 36:25.232
difficult for large militaries ,

36:25.439 --> 36:27.639
established militaries , to quickly

36:27.639 --> 36:30.260
incorporate lessons from Ukraine war

36:30.600 --> 36:32.750
because they still depend on legacy

36:32.750 --> 36:34.750
systems , tactics , and essentially

36:34.750 --> 36:36.917
ways of fighting . But it is essential

36:36.917 --> 36:38.583
and it is important for those

36:38.583 --> 36:40.694
militaries to take these lessons into

36:40.694 --> 36:42.639
example . Russia is exchanging its

36:42.639 --> 36:44.861
combat information and data with Iran .

36:45.370 --> 36:47.729
With China , with North Korea , and we

36:47.729 --> 36:49.673
are witnessing already how some of

36:49.673 --> 36:52.260
these lessons may be impacting . How US

36:52.260 --> 36:54.540
allies are affected across the Middle

36:54.540 --> 36:57.020
East , how Iranian proxies are fighting .

36:57.260 --> 36:58.927
We are witnessing some of the

36:58.927 --> 37:01.038
technologies similar to those used in

37:01.038 --> 37:03.093
Ukraine , also utilized by non-state

37:03.093 --> 37:05.810
actors in Africa , in Southeast Asia ,

37:05.939 --> 37:08.179
as well as in Latin America . There's a

37:08.179 --> 37:10.179
lot of data and information already

37:10.179 --> 37:11.810
available . Essentially , an

37:11.810 --> 37:14.219
enterprising individual or an

37:14.219 --> 37:16.052
organization can spend some time

37:16.052 --> 37:18.330
learning and translating how to manual .

37:18.594 --> 37:22.074
And uh looking at uh publicly sourced

37:22.074 --> 37:24.241
information in order to forge a fairly

37:24.241 --> 37:26.635
competent concept of operation and

37:26.635 --> 37:28.857
develop certain types of tactics . So ,

37:28.857 --> 37:30.746
it is important to understand how

37:30.746 --> 37:32.913
unmanned systems are used in Ukraine ,

37:32.913 --> 37:35.135
how they're used by both belligerents ,

37:35.135 --> 37:37.246
what counter unmanned systems tactics

37:37.246 --> 37:39.715
and concepts actually exist , and start

37:39.715 --> 37:43.104
incorporating them into their um

37:43.114 --> 37:46.979
regular operations . Uh , I

37:46.979 --> 37:49.090
will take your questions and comments

37:49.090 --> 37:51.257
at this point . My CNA Russia team has

37:51.257 --> 37:53.257
conducted lots of research into the

37:53.257 --> 37:55.479
Russian military starting in 2022 , and

37:55.479 --> 37:57.830
those reports are available publicly at

37:57.830 --> 38:00.270
the link that I posted . I post a lot

38:00.270 --> 38:02.548
of this information on my social media .

38:02.548 --> 38:05.149
I encourage you to follow me and ask me

38:05.149 --> 38:07.316
any questions . Thank you , and I look

38:07.316 --> 38:10.449
forward to your questions now . Awesome ,

38:10.530 --> 38:12.697
great job , Sam . We really appreciate

38:12.697 --> 38:14.252
it on , uh , you know , the

38:14.252 --> 38:16.474
presentation on a topic that , um , you

38:16.474 --> 38:18.697
know , if I can be a little provocative

38:18.697 --> 38:20.919
is You know , one of the biggest , uh ,

38:20.919 --> 38:23.086
evolutions or changes in the character

38:23.086 --> 38:25.252
warfare that we've seen in some time .

38:25.252 --> 38:27.530
Um , you always do a great job on that ,

38:27.530 --> 38:26.719
you always have up to-date information

38:26.719 --> 38:28.830
and , and , and your analysis is spot

38:28.830 --> 38:31.052
on . So we do have several questions in

38:31.052 --> 38:33.219
the chat . I have several questions of

38:33.219 --> 38:32.110
my own , but we're gonna get to the

38:32.110 --> 38:34.870
audience first . So , uh , Rachel , if

38:34.870 --> 38:36.870
you wanna go ahead and , uh , start

38:36.870 --> 38:38.926
asking the questions from the chat ,

38:38.926 --> 38:41.229
please . Sure . All right , Rosada ,

38:41.389 --> 38:43.500
we'll start off with this first one .

38:44.590 --> 38:47.729
so , sir , are UGVs susceptible to EW

38:47.729 --> 38:49.951
attacks , and if so , do they use fiber

38:49.951 --> 38:52.189
optic cables , or does the nature of

38:52.189 --> 38:54.030
land make fiber optic cables

38:54.030 --> 38:57.010
impractical ? They are actually

38:57.010 --> 38:59.121
susceptible . A lot of the UGVs right

38:59.121 --> 39:01.288
now , especially on the Russian side ,

39:01.288 --> 39:03.399
are radio controlled , and they could

39:03.399 --> 39:05.510
be jammed . Fiber optics are actually

39:05.510 --> 39:07.621
utilized . I actually had that listed

39:07.621 --> 39:09.843
in my UGV slide as well , as one of the

39:09.969 --> 39:11.810
capabilities , but Ukrainian

39:11.810 --> 39:14.032
battlefield is very complex . It's very

39:14.032 --> 39:15.754
complicated , and it's full of

39:15.754 --> 39:17.977
different types of man-made and natural

39:17.977 --> 39:20.032
countermeasures . And so fiber optic

39:20.032 --> 39:22.199
cable can actually snap quite easily .

39:22.199 --> 39:24.310
Ukraine often uses Starlink terminals

39:24.310 --> 39:26.421
for its UGV command and control , and

39:26.421 --> 39:28.254
Russians have also used Starlink

39:28.254 --> 39:30.254
terminals for their UGV command and

39:30.254 --> 39:32.477
control prior to the cutoff in February

39:32.477 --> 39:34.500
of 2026 . Uh , because of these

39:34.500 --> 39:36.333
countermeasures , both sides are

39:36.333 --> 39:38.530
actually now aiming for greater UGV

39:38.530 --> 39:40.641
autonomy , so that there will be less

39:40.641 --> 39:42.697
dependence on communication with the

39:42.697 --> 39:44.959
operator or with the um .

39:45.860 --> 39:49.020
UGV crew , uh , which is why I've

39:49.020 --> 39:51.242
mentioned that Ukraine has collected so

39:51.242 --> 39:53.131
much battlefield data , it is now

39:53.131 --> 39:55.076
aiming to train different types of

39:55.076 --> 39:57.187
algorithms that could then be applied

39:57.187 --> 39:59.939
in different manner of unmanned systems .

40:03.850 --> 40:06.090
Great . All right , move on to our next

40:06.090 --> 40:08.760
question . What happens to this

40:08.760 --> 40:10.816
technology once the necessity of the

40:10.816 --> 40:13.120
combat innovation cycle ends , i.e. ,

40:13.169 --> 40:15.689
the war ends ? How will major powers

40:15.689 --> 40:17.745
respond ? Will the capability become

40:17.745 --> 40:20.050
gold plated and built to fight the last

40:20.050 --> 40:22.760
war better ? That's a very good

40:22.760 --> 40:24.927
question , and uh we don't have a good

40:24.927 --> 40:27.149
answer right now . It really depends on

40:27.149 --> 40:28.989
who in a given military . We can

40:28.989 --> 40:31.080
understand how these technologies

40:31.080 --> 40:33.080
impacted the war in Ukraine and can

40:33.080 --> 40:35.080
incorporate those technologies . We

40:35.080 --> 40:37.360
know that in the US Marine Corps , in

40:37.360 --> 40:39.560
the US Army , and in other branches ,

40:39.679 --> 40:41.790
there's a lot of experimentation with

40:41.790 --> 40:44.068
tactical and operational level systems .

40:44.068 --> 40:46.179
There's an understanding that some of

40:46.179 --> 40:48.290
these technologies can be quickly and

40:48.290 --> 40:50.560
cheaply manufactured and fielded by all

40:50.560 --> 40:52.727
manner of adversaries , not just state

40:52.727 --> 40:55.004
militaries , but also non-state actors .

40:55.004 --> 40:57.004
And so it is important to recognize

40:57.004 --> 40:59.171
this threat and incorporate them . But

40:59.171 --> 41:01.338
as I've already mentioned , even years

41:01.338 --> 41:03.393
into this conflict , some militaries

41:03.393 --> 41:05.504
are still not ready and are still not

41:05.504 --> 41:07.671
necessarily understanding exactly what

41:07.671 --> 41:09.838
the impact is . There's no way to know

41:09.838 --> 41:11.909
whether or not a given military will

41:11.909 --> 41:13.742
essentially shelve some of these

41:13.742 --> 41:15.739
solutions because it already has

41:15.739 --> 41:18.060
investments in legacy systems that it

41:18.060 --> 41:20.209
still thinks are going to be useful ,

41:20.389 --> 41:23.060
but unmanned systems are going to be um .

41:23.760 --> 41:26.500
Widespread in all theaters of operation

41:26.679 --> 41:28.512
across all continents and can be

41:28.512 --> 41:30.457
readily available to all manner of

41:30.457 --> 41:32.457
adversaries that the US military is

41:32.457 --> 41:34.457
going to face . So it is absolutely

41:34.457 --> 41:36.457
important to take the right lessons

41:36.457 --> 41:38.679
from this war and to train the force on

41:38.679 --> 41:41.459
understanding this threat . That's a

41:41.459 --> 41:44.060
great response . Um , all right , our

41:44.060 --> 41:46.282
next question here , where are the best

41:46.282 --> 41:49.000
opportunities for European and US firms

41:49.179 --> 41:51.179
to jointly produce unmanned systems

41:51.179 --> 41:53.459
with Ukraine physically or with Ukraine

41:53.459 --> 41:55.949
expert guidance ? Well , I think

41:55.949 --> 41:58.149
Ukrainians are , are better suited to

41:58.149 --> 42:00.620
answering the questions themselves , um ,

42:00.909 --> 42:03.076
themselves . I think your next speaker

42:03.076 --> 42:05.187
in June can also address those , um ,

42:05.187 --> 42:07.459
um , Those inquiries too . Uh ,

42:07.600 --> 42:09.767
Ukrainian military is basically saying

42:09.767 --> 42:11.989
that if any company anywhere around the

42:11.989 --> 42:14.540
world is manufacturing a UAV , then it

42:14.540 --> 42:16.651
has to be tested in Ukraine , because

42:16.651 --> 42:18.540
Ukrainian battlefield is the most

42:18.540 --> 42:20.429
sophisticated , complicated , and

42:20.429 --> 42:22.651
dangerous environment for these type of

42:22.651 --> 42:24.873
systems . And if a given technology can

42:24.873 --> 42:26.707
actually withstand the Ukrainian

42:26.707 --> 42:28.762
battlefield and survive it , then it

42:28.762 --> 42:30.873
can actually be used , um , uh , from

42:30.873 --> 42:32.975
that point on . And so , There are

42:32.975 --> 42:35.175
different avenues for Western American

42:35.175 --> 42:37.175
and European companies to cooperate

42:37.375 --> 42:39.486
with the Ukrainian developers . There

42:39.486 --> 42:41.708
are efforts already , multiple types of

42:41.708 --> 42:43.875
efforts , uh , from Germany , from the

42:43.875 --> 42:46.042
United Kingdom , from Poland and other

42:46.042 --> 42:48.264
countries , which certainly manufacture

42:48.264 --> 42:50.208
and test different types of , um ,

42:50.208 --> 42:52.574
unmanned systems . So , uh , I , I ,

42:52.695 --> 42:54.806
again , I think Ukrainians themselves

42:54.895 --> 42:56.935
are much better at answering this

42:56.935 --> 43:00.830
particular inquiry . Great . Um ,

43:01.219 --> 43:03.820
have we seen multi-domain collaboration

43:03.820 --> 43:05.931
between air , sea , and land drones ?

43:07.489 --> 43:09.656
Yes , we have witnessed how Ukrainians

43:09.656 --> 43:13.280
are combining USVs and UAVs and attacks

43:13.280 --> 43:16.070
against Russian targets . Uh , in , um ,

43:16.489 --> 43:18.711
uh , on the Ukrainian line of contact ,

43:18.711 --> 43:21.760
there are multiple scenarios where UAVs

43:21.760 --> 43:24.038
and UGVs are actually working together ,

43:24.889 --> 43:27.719
especially with UAVs in oversight ,

43:27.929 --> 43:29.929
overwatch , and command and control

43:29.929 --> 43:32.870
capability for these particular uh UGVs .

43:32.969 --> 43:34.889
I've mentioned how the Ukrainian

43:34.889 --> 43:37.199
military is starting to combine . Uh ,

43:37.270 --> 43:39.909
or starting to form new formations that

43:39.909 --> 43:41.853
actually incorporate assault units

43:42.149 --> 43:44.689
together with UGV and UAV formations

43:44.949 --> 43:47.229
into basically a , a brand new type of

43:47.229 --> 43:49.062
a fighting force . And there are

43:49.062 --> 43:51.285
indications that Russians are trying to

43:51.285 --> 43:51.270
do the same .

43:55.870 --> 43:58.389
All right . Another question we have

43:58.389 --> 44:00.709
here is , can you please discuss the

44:00.709 --> 44:03.149
mesh networks that Russia is developing

44:03.149 --> 44:05.038
for comms reliance and increasing

44:05.038 --> 44:08.500
ranges of drones . According to public

44:08.500 --> 44:10.722
sourcing , a lot of these mesh networks

44:10.722 --> 44:12.944
are actually used in Russian long-range

44:12.944 --> 44:15.419
UAVs such as the Gerin and Gerbera , as

44:15.419 --> 44:18.800
well as Moa and other types of UAVs .

44:18.909 --> 44:20.979
For those UAVs to operate at

44:20.979 --> 44:23.340
significant distances , and in groups ,

44:23.419 --> 44:25.419
uh , mesh network allows a group of

44:25.419 --> 44:28.179
UAVs to operate jointly as they

44:28.179 --> 44:30.012
approach the target . It isn't a

44:30.012 --> 44:32.123
substitute for an intelligent swarm ,

44:32.123 --> 44:34.123
but it is an important step in that

44:34.123 --> 44:36.235
particular direction . Ukrainians are

44:36.235 --> 44:38.401
also using mesh networks for their own

44:38.401 --> 44:40.699
long range as well as uh tactical and

44:40.699 --> 44:43.340
strategic level strikes . We can expect

44:43.340 --> 44:46.129
both sides to invest in mesh networks

44:46.129 --> 44:50.060
as a solution that uh both

44:50.060 --> 44:52.129
amplifies current capabilities , and

44:52.129 --> 44:54.610
for example , on the Russian side , can

44:54.610 --> 44:56.899
act as a substitute for reliance on

44:56.899 --> 44:59.010
imported technologies like Starlink .

45:03.399 --> 45:05.510
Awesome . We've got , we've got a lot

45:05.510 --> 45:07.621
of questions for you , sir . So we're

45:07.621 --> 45:09.732
just gonna keep , keep going down the

45:09.732 --> 45:11.677
list here . Uh , so next , are you

45:11.677 --> 45:13.677
aware of any way the Ukrainians are

45:13.677 --> 45:15.621
integrating autonomy slash AI into

45:15.621 --> 45:18.949
their interceptor drones ? Yes , um ,

45:19.159 --> 45:21.326
some of the interceptors used actually

45:21.326 --> 45:23.560
feature that capability for , uh , for

45:23.560 --> 45:25.520
target lock and target recognition

45:25.520 --> 45:27.520
technology . Russians are doing the

45:27.520 --> 45:29.409
same , especially on their Yoka .

45:29.409 --> 45:31.464
Interceptor drone , uh , this is the

45:31.464 --> 45:33.687
best way for these type of interceptors

45:33.820 --> 45:35.820
to operate at high speeds . Once it

45:35.820 --> 45:37.889
actually captures the target that is

45:37.889 --> 45:39.899
recognized as a threat , the UAV

45:39.899 --> 45:42.066
essentially goes to that target on its

45:42.066 --> 45:45.419
own . And this type of capability is

45:45.419 --> 45:48.580
key for developing aerial UAV

45:48.580 --> 45:49.580
interceptors .

45:52.699 --> 45:55.179
All right , thanks so much . So our ,

45:55.290 --> 45:57.512
our next question here is , can Western

45:57.512 --> 46:00.939
AI make up for Ukraine battle expertise

46:01.179 --> 46:03.290
in operating UAS with their effective

46:03.290 --> 46:07.129
layers of attack ? Well , obviously ,

46:07.540 --> 46:09.500
United States offers a lot of

46:09.500 --> 46:11.620
capability , and I think Ukrainian

46:11.620 --> 46:13.689
military has recently forged a

46:13.689 --> 46:16.860
partnership with Palantir on AI

46:16.860 --> 46:19.027
research development and application .

46:19.100 --> 46:21.267
But what Ukraine has is something that

46:21.267 --> 46:23.267
no one has , and that is absolutely

46:23.267 --> 46:25.620
vast amounts of battlefield data that

46:25.620 --> 46:27.787
could be used to train AI algorithms .

46:27.959 --> 46:30.719
Um , multiple data points , such as

46:30.719 --> 46:33.120
satellites , aircraft , thousands of

46:33.120 --> 46:35.949
thousands of UAVs , uh , filming the

46:35.949 --> 46:38.780
battlefield , social media , uh ,

46:39.000 --> 46:41.056
content from soldiers , so on and so

46:41.056 --> 46:43.278
forth . All of that is combined into an

46:43.278 --> 46:46.020
absolute treasure trove for , um ,

46:46.110 --> 46:48.100
artificial intelligence training ,

46:48.120 --> 46:50.229
because AI essentially needs data in

46:50.229 --> 46:52.173
order to To become better and more

46:52.173 --> 46:54.396
effective . So , while , um , Western ,

46:54.396 --> 46:56.804
um , artificial intelligence may

46:56.804 --> 46:58.748
feature better and faster and more

46:58.748 --> 47:00.915
powerful compute , it is the Ukrainian

47:00.915 --> 47:02.965
battlefield data that is absolutely

47:02.965 --> 47:05.076
essential . And so that's why Ukraine

47:05.076 --> 47:08.844
is opening up its um cooperation on AI

47:09.004 --> 47:11.115
with American and Western firms , and

47:11.115 --> 47:13.337
I've mentioned that in the presentation

47:13.337 --> 47:17.080
as well . So on that topic , do

47:17.080 --> 47:19.060
we understand how the Ukrainian

47:19.060 --> 47:21.116
government is collecting and holding

47:21.116 --> 47:24.719
the mission data for drones ? Uh ,

47:24.840 --> 47:27.070
we understand that , uh , Ukraine is ,

47:27.080 --> 47:29.136
uh , feeding all of that information

47:29.136 --> 47:32.060
into a central node . Um , and , uh ,

47:32.620 --> 47:34.760
this is where most of that data is

47:34.760 --> 47:37.429
actually analyzed . Um , and , uh ,

47:37.439 --> 47:39.661
once the data is analyzed , it can be ,

47:39.661 --> 47:41.661
it can be pushed down to individual

47:41.661 --> 47:43.995
units and even individual soldiers . So ,

47:43.995 --> 47:45.919
systems like Delta are absolutely

47:45.919 --> 47:48.689
essential when it comes to , uh , The

47:48.689 --> 47:50.580
collection of this battlefield

47:51.209 --> 47:53.376
information , but Ukraine probably has

47:53.376 --> 47:55.042
other avenues to collect vast

47:55.042 --> 47:57.098
quantities of data that will be used

47:57.098 --> 47:59.689
specifically to train AI algorithms .

47:59.729 --> 48:02.389
And so again , I think if you ever host

48:02.389 --> 48:04.689
Ukrainian speakers here , they could

48:04.689 --> 48:08.320
best answer that question . Gotcha .

48:08.500 --> 48:11.139
So , uh , our next question here , how

48:11.139 --> 48:13.379
can the tactical successes that can be

48:13.379 --> 48:15.435
achieved with drones , so taking out

48:15.435 --> 48:17.899
enemy vehicles , troops , bunkers , be

48:17.899 --> 48:19.677
translated into operational and

48:19.677 --> 48:22.139
strategic success , gaining territory ,

48:22.300 --> 48:24.467
degrading the enemy's capability , and

48:24.467 --> 48:26.633
our will to fight ? It took a while to

48:26.633 --> 48:28.356
effectively integrate then new

48:28.356 --> 48:30.633
capabilities like machine guns , tanks ,

48:30.633 --> 48:32.633
and aircraft into war fighting . So

48:32.633 --> 48:34.689
where are we regarding combined arms

48:34.689 --> 48:37.469
maneuver with drones ? We as in the

48:37.469 --> 48:40.310
United States and NATO , or we as in in

48:40.310 --> 48:41.310
general .

48:44.530 --> 48:46.429
Maybe Both ?

48:48.820 --> 48:50.939
Well , I , I think , based on all the

48:50.939 --> 48:53.161
publicly available information , we are

48:53.161 --> 48:55.399
starting out to better understand how

48:55.780 --> 48:58.540
UAV specifically can impact our

48:58.540 --> 49:01.179
tactical and operational environment .

49:01.469 --> 49:03.580
We have units within the Marine Corps

49:03.580 --> 49:05.820
and Army , which are now using tactical

49:05.820 --> 49:08.149
UAVs as well as tactical counter UAV

49:08.149 --> 49:10.371
systems . We also have an understanding

49:10.371 --> 49:12.316
on how to use . Long range one-way

49:12.316 --> 49:14.750
attack drones such as Lucas against

49:14.750 --> 49:16.917
potential adversaries , and we have an

49:16.917 --> 49:19.590
understanding how to better defend and

49:19.590 --> 49:22.469
protect our environment from incoming

49:22.469 --> 49:24.636
adversarial UEVs that will be deployed

49:24.636 --> 49:26.750
in large numbers , but United States

49:26.750 --> 49:29.540
military is just starting out in that ,

49:29.550 --> 49:31.606
and a lot of initiatives are , are ,

49:31.606 --> 49:33.828
are barely a year old , while Ukrainian

49:33.828 --> 49:36.050
military and Russian military have been

49:36.050 --> 49:38.689
fighting for years . And are probably

49:38.689 --> 49:41.090
best forces around the world right now

49:41.090 --> 49:43.449
when it comes to the use of different

49:43.449 --> 49:45.616
types of unmanned systems and unmanned

49:45.616 --> 49:47.560
technologies . And so , the United

49:47.560 --> 49:49.782
States needs to continue to educate its

49:49.782 --> 49:52.189
force , needs to continue to practice

49:52.330 --> 49:54.163
and understand how these type of

49:54.163 --> 49:56.629
unmanned systems can impact our

49:57.679 --> 49:59.790
operations on land , in the air , and

49:59.790 --> 50:02.012
at sea , and there are indications that

50:02.012 --> 50:04.235
this is already happening . But again ,

50:04.235 --> 50:06.790
the United States took some time . Uh ,

50:06.810 --> 50:09.129
for a variety of reasons to actually

50:09.129 --> 50:11.129
start this process while Russia and

50:11.129 --> 50:14.870
Ukraine have been at it for years . All

50:14.870 --> 50:17.270
right . And we got 2 more questions ,

50:17.310 --> 50:19.489
uh , more towards your observations .

50:19.989 --> 50:22.100
So first , what is the greatest depth

50:22.100 --> 50:24.030
we have observed for UGVs ?

50:27.330 --> 50:29.610
I believe , and I don't want to be

50:29.610 --> 50:31.750
wrong here , but uh when it comes to

50:31.889 --> 50:34.000
open sources and public information ,

50:34.449 --> 50:37.129
they can operate up to , up to 10

50:37.129 --> 50:40.389
kilometers , um , but mostly ,

50:41.050 --> 50:43.129
the UGB operators have to be close .

50:43.489 --> 50:45.322
They're usually located within 1

50:45.322 --> 50:47.449
kilometer from the actual vehicle for

50:47.449 --> 50:50.290
all manner of , of reasons . Um ,

50:50.370 --> 50:52.592
Russians claimed in their state media .

50:53.129 --> 50:55.296
That their UGVs have traveled for many

50:55.296 --> 50:57.870
kilometers , um , to reach their

50:59.169 --> 51:02.129
targets or uh Russian units to deliver

51:02.129 --> 51:04.351
supply and logistics . Ukraine has also

51:04.351 --> 51:06.929
indicated that some of their UGVs have

51:07.209 --> 51:09.320
traveled for kilometers , but for the

51:09.320 --> 51:11.431
most part , and for the bulk of these

51:11.479 --> 51:13.701
applications , a UGV operator has to be

51:13.701 --> 51:14.701
fairly close .

51:17.560 --> 51:19.959
All right . And have you seen a Russian

51:19.959 --> 51:22.439
or Ukrainian description of attributes

51:22.439 --> 51:24.600
best suited for drone operators ? We

51:24.600 --> 51:26.544
have seen references to recruiting

51:26.544 --> 51:28.840
gamers and people of the like , so

51:28.969 --> 51:30.858
we've seen a description of these

51:30.858 --> 51:34.409
attributes . Yes , Russian military is

51:34.409 --> 51:36.465
very public on its recruitment drive

51:36.465 --> 51:38.798
for its unmanned systems forces . It is ,

51:38.798 --> 51:41.120
it is essentially aiming to attract

51:41.379 --> 51:44.290
people ages 18 to 35 who are in good

51:44.290 --> 51:46.919
physical and mental shape , who have no

51:47.689 --> 51:51.379
prior criminal record , who who can .

51:52.060 --> 51:54.770
Uh , operate under physical stress and ,

51:54.780 --> 51:57.699
uh , under different types of mental

51:57.699 --> 51:59.866
stress as well . Obviously , there's a

51:59.866 --> 52:02.300
lot of emphasis on gamers , um , and

52:02.300 --> 52:04.729
people who are familiar with all manner

52:04.729 --> 52:07.300
of IT and computer technologies . But

52:07.300 --> 52:09.356
these type of recruitment drives are

52:09.356 --> 52:11.411
not necessarily ageist . Obviously ,

52:11.411 --> 52:13.820
older people can also apply . Uh , but

52:13.820 --> 52:15.931
they have to demonstrate that they're

52:15.931 --> 52:18.780
capable of operating in a complex

52:18.780 --> 52:20.780
environment that combines IT , high

52:20.780 --> 52:23.860
tech , computer , and regular military

52:23.860 --> 52:26.399
stress . So , um , in fact , these

52:26.659 --> 52:30.100
criteria are essential for the Russian

52:30.100 --> 52:31.989
military and its unmanned systems

52:31.989 --> 52:34.139
forces drive , and that's why some of

52:34.139 --> 52:36.306
the recruits into the Russian Unmanned

52:36.306 --> 52:38.195
Systems Forces are paid so well .

52:39.399 --> 52:41.455
Awesome , Sam . Um , we've got a few

52:41.455 --> 52:43.621
minutes left , uh , so I'll just round

52:43.621 --> 52:43.610
out . I have a couple of questions for

52:43.610 --> 52:45.610
you as well . You mentioned in your

52:45.610 --> 52:47.721
presentation that it took a long time

52:47.721 --> 52:49.832
to see UGVs on the battlefield . Um ,

52:49.832 --> 52:51.888
now that they're , they're there and

52:51.888 --> 52:54.054
they're being used a little bit more .

52:54.054 --> 52:56.277
What do you see their evolution looking

52:56.277 --> 52:58.277
like , as we saw UAVs sort of going

52:58.277 --> 53:00.110
from uh scouting to ISR now then

53:00.110 --> 53:02.277
kinetic payloads , first person view ,

53:02.277 --> 53:04.499
things like that . What do you , do you

53:04.499 --> 53:04.300
see the , the evolution of UGVs in , in

53:04.300 --> 53:07.469
a similar way ? Well , there are

53:07.469 --> 53:09.669
already um developments and tests that

53:09.669 --> 53:11.669
involve greater autonomy for UGVs

53:11.669 --> 53:13.669
certainly in the United States , as

53:13.669 --> 53:15.725
well as in Europe and in Ukraine and

53:15.725 --> 53:17.870
Russia proper . Uh , there is a , a

53:17.870 --> 53:20.149
trend and evolution towards fielding

53:20.149 --> 53:22.550
heavier systems against the adversaries ,

53:22.669 --> 53:25.060
such as , um , fielding a range of

53:25.060 --> 53:27.989
different types of kinetic systems . Uh ,

53:28.149 --> 53:30.419
there's also a drive to protect and

53:30.419 --> 53:32.469
defend UGVs against all manner of

53:32.469 --> 53:36.000
aerial threats . Uh , and again , um ,

53:36.939 --> 53:39.850
This war will tell whether mass scale

53:39.850 --> 53:41.961
application of UGVs for all manner of

53:41.961 --> 53:44.072
roles can actually work . We're still

53:44.072 --> 53:47.379
at the beginning of , um , of this

53:47.379 --> 53:49.601
drive simply because uh the bulk of the

53:49.601 --> 53:51.823
missions are still conducted sort of by

53:51.823 --> 53:55.709
soldiers and uh Uh , in , um , um , in

53:55.709 --> 53:57.876
a way that utilizes some of the legacy

53:57.876 --> 53:59.876
systems . And that's why Ukrainians

53:59.876 --> 54:01.820
want to remove as many soldiers as

54:01.820 --> 54:03.709
possible from dangerous frontline

54:03.709 --> 54:05.709
missions and to incorporate as many

54:05.709 --> 54:07.959
sophisticated UGVs as possible . Uh ,

54:08.020 --> 54:10.187
in combat . Of course , there's also a

54:10.187 --> 54:12.298
debate about cost versus capability .

54:12.298 --> 54:14.353
The more sophisticated the UGV , the

54:14.353 --> 54:16.631
more expensive it's likely going to be .

54:16.631 --> 54:18.742
So , if you're fielding a cheap and a

54:18.742 --> 54:20.853
tradeable UGV , there's a , um , cost

54:20.853 --> 54:23.076
versus capability discussion . Uh , can

54:23.076 --> 54:25.550
it be expensive and expendable , uh ,

54:25.560 --> 54:29.459
at the same time ? And

54:29.459 --> 54:31.459
then one final question , and we'll

54:31.459 --> 54:33.570
wrap up , and , and you hit on this a

54:33.570 --> 54:35.792
little bit in the presentation about um

54:35.792 --> 54:38.015
the unmanned systems being built with ,

54:38.015 --> 54:37.780
you know , parts from , from different

54:37.780 --> 54:39.669
nations and things . Talk to us a

54:39.669 --> 54:41.939
little bit about the , we use the term

54:41.939 --> 54:44.106
authoritarian collusion , uh , you can

54:44.106 --> 54:46.106
look at its cooperation , sharing ,

54:46.106 --> 54:48.328
whatever you want to , but the software

54:48.328 --> 54:50.495
side of it , um , I mean , in , in the

54:50.495 --> 54:52.717
UAVs and and such that the Russians are

54:52.717 --> 54:54.661
using , how much of that is native

54:54.661 --> 54:54.050
software that they're building ? How

54:54.050 --> 54:55.994
much are they borrowing from other

54:55.994 --> 54:58.217
nations or sharing , and , and what are

54:58.217 --> 55:00.439
the implications with that ? It's a mix

55:00.439 --> 55:02.661
for a lot of commercial drones that are

55:02.661 --> 55:02.510
repurposed for military applications .

55:02.840 --> 55:05.280
The software is also imported and is a

55:05.280 --> 55:07.560
commercial origin from the West and ,

55:07.580 --> 55:09.800
and other countries . Um , when it

55:09.800 --> 55:12.078
comes to some of the military software ,

55:12.078 --> 55:14.022
Russians are claiming that they're

55:14.022 --> 55:15.744
actually writing their own and

55:15.744 --> 55:15.679
developing their own , and certainly

55:15.679 --> 55:18.310
Ukraine has also written software for

55:18.310 --> 55:20.409
its own UAV uses , but it really

55:20.409 --> 55:23.330
depends on the type of a , uh , UAV and

55:23.330 --> 55:25.219
the type of a mission in which an

55:25.219 --> 55:27.330
unmanned system is actually engaged .

55:27.330 --> 55:29.959
Going back to pre-2022 days , uh ,

55:30.129 --> 55:32.610
Russian government has admitted openly

55:32.610 --> 55:34.832
that its strength when it comes to high

55:34.832 --> 55:36.943
tech is in software , not necessarily

55:36.943 --> 55:38.999
hardware , which they have to import

55:38.999 --> 55:41.770
either from China or from the West . Uh ,

55:41.889 --> 55:44.111
and so we can expect that some of these

55:44.290 --> 55:46.512
domestic developments are going to grow

55:46.512 --> 55:48.457
in importance and sophistication .

55:51.209 --> 55:53.376
No , it's fantastic . Um , thank you ,

55:53.376 --> 55:55.487
Sam , so much for coming on and doing

55:55.487 --> 55:57.431
this speaker series with us . Um ,

55:57.431 --> 55:59.487
folks , I wasn't exaggerating when I

55:59.487 --> 55:58.800
said , I think , you know , this is

55:58.800 --> 56:00.856
probably the , uh , the premier mind

56:00.856 --> 56:02.856
out there when it comes to unmanned

56:02.856 --> 56:04.856
systems , especially in the current

56:04.856 --> 56:06.744
conflicts , uh , and dealing with

56:06.744 --> 56:08.856
Russia . Um , so he mentioned all the

56:08.856 --> 56:11.078
places you can follow him , um , if you

56:11.078 --> 56:10.649
want up to-date information on this

56:10.649 --> 56:12.760
stuff , and I mean , you know , up to

56:12.760 --> 56:14.871
date , uh , Sam's your guy for that .

56:14.879 --> 56:17.080
Um , it will have a recording of this

56:17.080 --> 56:19.136
for anybody who missed it or anybody

56:19.136 --> 56:21.080
who wants to go back . Uh , we are

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currently working right now to put all

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of our videos up on a government , uh ,

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video sharing site , uh , called DD ,

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so we'll have everything up there and

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there , there will be links to it on

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our Mad Scientist blog . Uh , if you'd

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like to go back and check out this one ,

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or any of the other work Mad Scientist

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has done , or some of the other , uh ,

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speaker series presentations that Sam

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has done for us . Um , please do be on

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the lookout for our next speaker series ,

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uh , with Clara Kaludorovich . Uh ,

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that'll be June 23rd . We'll have a

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registration just like we did for this

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one up there on the , the Mad Scientist

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blog . Uh , please do register , we'll

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have the same set up like this . Um ,

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and , uh , I hope to see everyone back

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there again . Sam , thank you so much

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for coming on today . It's always a

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pleasure to have you talk to us , and

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we always learn a ton when you come in

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here . And so , please do , um , you

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know , uh , uh , come back and talk to

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us again . Uh , keep , keep being such

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a , a good steward of the mad scientist

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name out there . I appreciate it .

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Thank you so much for hosting me , and

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I look forward to engaging with you in

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the future . Awesome . Thanks ,

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everyone , and out here .