WEBVTT

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Good afternoon and thanks to all of our

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witnesses for appearing today . The

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emerging threats and Capabilities

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Subcommittee meets today to receive

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testimony on the posture of our special

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operations forces . Gentlemen , thank

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you all for your Continued service to

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this great country and for being with

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us today . Your testimony will play an

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important role in this committee's work

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to ensure our special operators have

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what they need to be successful on the

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battlefields of today and in the future .

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The global security environment our

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nation faces is increasingly

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complicated and dangerous . China's

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unprecedented military buildup poses a

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lasting threat to our national security

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and global stability . Radical Islamic

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terrorists remain intent on killing

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Americans , and narco-terrorists

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operating in our hemisphere control

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international trafficking networks that

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poison our communities with deadly

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drugs . At the forefront of our

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nation's efforts to combat these

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threats are the men and women of

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Special Operations Command , who

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operate every day , often in distant

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locations far from their loved ones to

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keep America safe . We have also seen

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the inspiring courage and unmatched

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skill of our special operators in the

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daring raid to capture indicted

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dictator Nicolas Maduro from his

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heavily fortified compound and the

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successful rescue of the downed

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American pilot from a mountaintop in

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Iran . I look to our witnesses today to

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provide the committee with their

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assessment of the challenges facing the

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special operations community and

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describe how they are training ,

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equipping , and posturing their forces

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to succeed . Those of us on this

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committee must match that commitment by

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providing robust , sustained , and

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predictable funding as well as flexible

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and responsive authorities that reflect

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an evolving security environment .

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Lastly and most importantly , I want to

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talk about the greatest capability in

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soft , our special operations men and

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women , as the first soft truth says

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humans are more important than hardware .

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That's why I've been so supportive of

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the preservation of the Force and

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Families initiative . POTIF has been

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instrumental in taking care of the

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physical , mental , and spiritual needs

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of our operators and their families .

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POTIF truly is a readiness builder for

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the force . I look to our witnesses to

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describe how they're using POTIF and

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other programs to ensure our troops and

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their families get the support they

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need . I'd like to note for the members

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if we need to move into a closed

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hearing following we can do that . I do

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not anticipate that need right now . We

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will try and keep everything in an open

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session . Um , so again , thank you so

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much for being here and I now turn to

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ranking member Senator Slotkin for her

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opening comments . Thank you , um , uh ,

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Senator Ernst . I , I , um , I know we

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shocked you by having two senators show

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up early to a hearing . Um , and , uh ,

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um , I will shock you again by having

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very similar remarks to my chairwoman

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here . Um , thank you for what you do

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every day for the 72,000 , um , uh ,

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folks in SOCOM . Um , I am keenly aware

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that you're being asked to do more

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missions than ever and that the

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missions , um , are requiring us to

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think differently and more dynamically

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about , um , what we need ,

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particularly technology . As the

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chairwoman said , we're in the middle

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of this war in Iran . We're watching

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our adversaries use cheaper and more

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commercially available technology

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against us that's resulting in the

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death of US forces , the tracking of US

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forces in new ways , and asking folks

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like the Ukrainians to come help us

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train on things like counter drone

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technology . Um , we know that , um ,

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that you all often have more flexible

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authorities . You often have leaders in ,

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um , SOCOM who are thinking differently

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about acquisition , about the use of

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new tools , um , would love to hear

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particularly how you're thinking about

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the future . Of special operations and ,

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and technology because I think that's a

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very hot topic for , for many of us .

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Um , and , um , lastly , I'll , I'll

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just say , um , please pass along our

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thanks , um , to everyone who works for

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you . We are aware of the , the , um ,

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the push that is going on right now for

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you all to be in the lead in many

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places . We appreciate that work , um ,

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and I yield back . Thank you , ranking

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member and uh yes , I , I want to echo

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that as well . Thank you again to our

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witnesses for being here and for your

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senior enlisted leaders . Thank you for

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your presence as well and your support .

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Uh , we appreciate all of you and your

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teams , and we will start now with

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opening remarks , and you will be

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recognized for 5 minutes each . And

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because I , uh , am the chairman , I

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will take the prerogative of having the

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army go first . Uh , so Lieutenant

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General Ferguson , you're recognized

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for 5 minutes of remarks . Thank you ,

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ma'am . Chairwoman Ernst , Ranking

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Member Slotkin , and distinguished

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members of the subcommittee , thank you

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for your , the opportunity today to

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represent the remarkable men and women

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of the United States Army Special

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Operations Command . I'm honored to

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join my fellow component commanders

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today as we testify on behalf of the

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world's premier special operations

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forces . Our Army Special Operations

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formation represents less than 10% of

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the Army and is resourced by less than

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1% of the Army budget . Similarly , we

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constitute about 16% of US Special

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Operations Command's budget and roughly

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half of its people . For such a small

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investment , Army Special Operations

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provide an outsized return . Our core

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mission is to generate combat credible

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Army Special Operations soldiers and

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formations capable of operating in deep

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and denied areas in support of the Army

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and the joint force . To do this , we

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assess , select , train , and equip

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some of the top talent the Army has to

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offer . And provide them to geographic

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combatant commands to execute the full

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range of special operations . Our

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people are creative and audacious by

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nature , employing and adapting current

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tools and skills to meet the challenges

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and missions they face today .

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Simultaneously , they envision and

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integrate the advanced capabilities

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that will define tomorrow's fight .

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Events over the past 5 months clearly

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demonstrate that while special

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operations comprise a small percentage

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of our military , Both in size and cost .

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We continue to play a key role in

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enabling our joint force partners and

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allies to deliver strategic effects for

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the nation . Our global disposition ,

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generational relationships , and

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regional alignment . Routinely place us

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at the tip of the spear , and what we

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witnessed there drives my primary

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concern . Only sustainable ,

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predictable , timely and consistent

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funding will allow us to transform and

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modernize quickly enough to face the

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rapidly evolving threats we will

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encounter on tomorrow's battlefields .

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Our people , the army's finest , remain

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our competitive advantage , and it is

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our mandate to ensure they are

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organized , trained and equipped to win

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both today's and tomorrow's fight .

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That mandate drives our transformation

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efforts and further fuels my concern

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for appropriate resourcing going

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forward to adapt to the threats our

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adversaries will present . In closing ,

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I want to assure you that we are

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dedicated to our core mission . Your

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army's special operations forces are

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strategically ready , generating

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warfighting capabilities and asymmetric

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advantages for crisis response ,

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cooperation , competition . And for

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conflict both today and in the future .

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Thank you for the opportunity to

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testify and for your continued support

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to the Army's Special Operations forces .

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I look forward to your questions and

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working together as we defend our great

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nation and care for our remarkable

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soldiers and families . Thank you .

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Thank you , Lieutenant General Conley .

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You were recognized . Chairwoman Ernst ,

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Ranking Member Slotkins , distinguished

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members , thanks for this opportunity

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for Command Chief Freeman and I to

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represent the more than 21,000 airmen

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of Air Force Special Operations Command .

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My thanks to your committee for the

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continued support . I'm honored for the

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opportunity to be up here today with my

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SOCOM teammates , and I look forward to

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your questions in this session and any

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additional questions if we require a

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closed session . I'll be direct . In

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the last 5 months , AFSOC executed the

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two largest presidentially directed

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deployments in our 36 year history .

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While also maintaining a persistent

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operational tempo across five other

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geographic commands . From the first

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island chain to Iran and from South

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America to the Arctic , air commandos

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are defending the homeland and fighting

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for America's interests abroad

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alongside our joint teammates and

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allies . Late last year from a cold

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start , we deployed the vast majority

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of our CB-22 fleet from our operational

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squadrons , our schoolhouse , even

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staff members from my headquarters ,

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along with a large contingent of

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MC-130s to multiple locations in just

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days , not weeks . Less than two months

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later , your air commandos were needed

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again for another major operation . As

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the world recently witnessed , AFSOC

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was instrumental in bringing home our

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Air Force teammates . As our airmen and

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soft partners know , leaving an

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American behind is non-negotiable .

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Simultaneously , our MQ9 enterprise

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proved that adaptive airmen can

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transform any platform's mission

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envelope , destroying hundreds of

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targets in contested operating areas .

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I believe recent operations have been

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the MQ9 community's finest hour . We

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delivered all of this while receiving

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less than 0.5% of the Air Force budget

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in a proportional part of the US SOCOM

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budget , which collectively represents

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only about 2% of the overall defense

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budget . Without a doubt , AFSOC

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provides an outsized return on

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investment for America . But here's the

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reality . Over the last 5 years , flat

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budgets forced hard choices . We've

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realized more than a $1 billion

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reduction to our budget , which slashed

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modernization investment by nearly 40% .

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We've divested 84 aircraft ,

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prioritizing the retirement of legacy

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platforms that couldn't meet future

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operational demands , and have

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committed to reductions affecting an

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additional 31 combat platforms . These

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decisions reflect our commitment to

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fiscal responsibility , retiring what

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we can't afford to modernize . However ,

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we've now reached an inflection point .

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More than 1/3 of our fleet has been

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reduced while demand continues to rise .

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Further divestments will directly

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translate into missions we cannot

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execute . We invest heavily in training

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our airmen . AFSOC training is

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difficult , lengthy , and costly . We

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cannot mass produce air commandos , nor

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can we afford to lose their critical

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combat experience and ingenuity . Broad

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Air Force manning shortages have

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created an environment where units

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manned at 80% are considered healthy .

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For AFSOC , this means our airmen are

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being asked to achieve 100% mission

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success with a 20% personnel deficit .

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And while our air commandos are

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resilient , they're not invincible .

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Sustained excellence requires

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sustainable investment , equipping air

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commandos to operate at the pace and

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scale our nation demands . So on behalf

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of Air Commando Nation and our families ,

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Chief Freeman , I thank you for your

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continued support . Your commitment to

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our people enables , enables us to

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succeed in the most challenging

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environments and deliver anytime ,

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anyplace , anywhere . Thank you , sir .

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Major General Huntley , you're

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recognized for 5 minutes . Chairwoman

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Ernst , Ranking Member Slackin ,

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distinguished committee members , thank

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you for this opportunity and thank you

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for your enduring support . I'm honored

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to represent MSOC , especially as we

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celebrate our 20th anniversary . We

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meet at a pivotal moment . Today's

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threat environment is shaped by state

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adversaries , violent extremists , and

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criminal networks who are more aligned ,

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capable , and active across all domains

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than ever before . Against this , MSO's

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mission is clear deliver marine SOF to

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defend the homeland , deter aggression ,

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and fortify global networks . We

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reinforce SOF asymmetric value across

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the spectrum of conflict . For 20 years

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we have delivered outsized strategic

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value , less than 5% of SOCOM , 2% of

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the Marine Corps . We execute nearly

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10% of SOCOM's operational missions at

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2% of its budget , an unmatched return

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on investment . We face three primary

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challenges going forward . First ,

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deter gray zone adversaries and prepare

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for large scale conflict . Second ,

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confront blurring lines between state

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and non-state threats . And third ,

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adapt to the acceleration of autonomy

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and multi-domain fusion which are

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converging and reshaping the character

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of warfare . To address these

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challenges , Marsha ensures readiness ,

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forges and preserves the Raider team ,

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and supports enterprise modernization

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to outpace our adversaries . Our

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approach is nested within SOCOM's win ,

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people , and transform lines of effort .

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To win , we employ multi-domain

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targeting , deploying raider teams that

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synchronize operations , intelligence ,

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and information effects . We layer

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multi-discipline capabilities to

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generate these effects , providing

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options to solve the toughest joint

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force key operational problems . We

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further prioritize joint force

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integration as part of the stand-in

13:21.292 --> 13:23.403
force . Our persistent deployments in

13:23.403 --> 13:25.514
the first island chain exemplify this

13:25.514 --> 13:27.403
approach by concurrently enabling

13:27.403 --> 13:29.459
crisis response , counterterrorism ,

13:29.770 --> 13:32.130
deterrence , and of course preparation

13:32.130 --> 13:34.369
for conflict . Our posture is most

13:34.369 --> 13:36.425
heavily weighted within the Indoecom

13:36.425 --> 13:38.640
theater in order to deter China and

13:38.640 --> 13:40.929
support our regional allies . We also

13:40.929 --> 13:43.151
maintain significant investments in CEO

13:43.570 --> 13:46.169
and AFRO with tailored efforts

13:46.169 --> 13:48.599
elsewhere . We adjust these investments

13:48.599 --> 13:50.710
based on the strategic priorities and

13:50.710 --> 13:52.488
emerging theater requirements .

13:53.049 --> 13:55.271
Marsau's Foundation , our foundation is

13:55.271 --> 13:57.580
our people , the Raider team forged by

13:57.580 --> 13:59.580
the leadership and expertise of our

13:59.580 --> 14:01.524
operators , specialists , and Navy

14:01.524 --> 14:03.840
corpsmen . Our disciplined force

14:03.840 --> 14:06.007
generation process delivers reliable ,

14:06.007 --> 14:09.349
lethal , and resilient soft . Our agile

14:09.349 --> 14:11.489
teams support enduring campaigns and

14:11.489 --> 14:13.600
respond rapidly to emerging threats .

14:13.690 --> 14:15.412
Furthermore , their health and

14:15.412 --> 14:17.510
resilience are strong and frankly

14:17.650 --> 14:19.428
getting stronger thanks to your

14:19.428 --> 14:22.229
advocacy for programs like preservation

14:22.229 --> 14:24.830
of the force and families . Finally .

14:25.650 --> 14:27.761
Our imperative is to transform at the

14:27.761 --> 14:29.539
speed of the evolving operating

14:29.539 --> 14:31.094
environment . We accelerate

14:31.094 --> 14:33.206
modernization through operator-driven

14:33.206 --> 14:35.483
feedback loops , streamlining research ,

14:35.483 --> 14:37.539
development , and acquisitions . Our

14:37.539 --> 14:39.706
approach is to leverage any sensor for

14:39.706 --> 14:41.650
any shooter to support joint force

14:41.650 --> 14:43.594
fires and maneuver . This includes

14:43.594 --> 14:45.650
modernization of command and control

14:45.650 --> 14:47.761
and integrating autonomous systems at

14:47.761 --> 14:49.872
the tactical edge , and recent EOPECO

14:49.872 --> 14:52.840
exercises highlight the success and the

14:52.840 --> 14:55.479
progress of our systematic approach . M

14:56.500 --> 14:58.389
is purpose built for the nation's

14:58.389 --> 15:00.556
challenges . Leveraging two decades of

15:00.556 --> 15:02.667
counterterrorism success , we provide

15:02.667 --> 15:04.778
soft advantage in today's competition

15:04.778 --> 15:07.229
and in conflict . MASO will continue to

15:07.229 --> 15:09.309
win by leveraging our people as our

15:09.309 --> 15:11.510
platform and to transform through

15:11.510 --> 15:13.566
disciplined modernization to provide

15:13.566 --> 15:15.677
layered effects for the joint force .

15:16.440 --> 15:18.799
Our future success requires continued

15:18.799 --> 15:21.021
partnership with Congress across forest

15:21.021 --> 15:23.559
preservation , acquisition reform , and

15:23.559 --> 15:27.219
training modernization . Your Marine

15:27.219 --> 15:29.900
Raiders today remain ready to fight ,

15:30.049 --> 15:32.659
survive , and thrive in any clime in

15:32.659 --> 15:34.715
any place . Thank you again for your

15:34.715 --> 15:36.770
unwavering support for our Marines ,

15:36.940 --> 15:39.289
our sailors , and our families . I look

15:39.289 --> 15:41.456
forward to your questions . Happy 20th

15:41.456 --> 15:43.567
anniversary , and Admiral Alman , you

15:43.567 --> 15:45.539
are recognized for 5 minutes .

15:47.320 --> 15:49.376
Congresswoman Ernst , Ranking Member

15:49.376 --> 15:51.487
Slotin , and Distinguished members of

15:51.487 --> 15:53.542
the subcommittee . Thank you for the

15:53.542 --> 15:53.479
opportunity to speak today about the

15:53.479 --> 15:55.479
current posture and future of Naval

15:55.479 --> 15:57.312
Special Warfare at this critical

15:57.312 --> 15:59.312
juncture in our nation's security .

15:59.640 --> 16:01.862
Naval Special Warfare's core mission is

16:01.862 --> 16:04.000
to deliver maritime-based special

16:04.000 --> 16:06.200
operations capabilities from the most

16:06.200 --> 16:09.039
strategic locations , spanning seabed

16:09.039 --> 16:11.599
to space to support the fleet and joint

16:11.599 --> 16:14.140
force . We are guided by the national

16:14.140 --> 16:16.719
defense strategy and priorities set

16:16.719 --> 16:18.900
forth by US Special Operations Command

16:19.119 --> 16:21.119
and the Chief of Naval Operations .

16:21.690 --> 16:23.412
Today , our force is balancing

16:23.412 --> 16:25.690
significant operational demands in all

16:25.690 --> 16:27.690
theaters while also pursuing an

16:27.690 --> 16:29.960
aggressive path of modernization to

16:29.960 --> 16:32.520
outpace these evolving threats . Naval

16:32.520 --> 16:34.239
Special Warfares forces are

16:34.239 --> 16:36.929
relentlessly driving innovation and

16:36.929 --> 16:39.390
experimentation . Pairing our

16:39.390 --> 16:41.557
experienced operators with engineers ,

16:41.710 --> 16:44.229
in industry , and in academia ,

16:44.780 --> 16:46.947
supported by resourcing specialists to

16:46.947 --> 16:48.669
accelerate the fielding of new

16:48.669 --> 16:51.309
capabilities . Partner with SOCOM , we

16:51.309 --> 16:53.510
are delivering unmanned surface and

16:53.510 --> 16:56.270
undersea systems to generate asymmetric

16:56.270 --> 16:58.590
sea denial , challenge our adversaries'

16:58.590 --> 17:00.646
capabilities , and improve the joint

17:00.646 --> 17:04.069
forces' ability to deliver effects . As

17:04.069 --> 17:06.589
we have done for the past 25 years , we

17:06.589 --> 17:08.645
also stand ready to defeat terrorist

17:08.645 --> 17:10.989
networks that threaten our homeland and

17:10.989 --> 17:13.750
interests abroad . The reality is that

17:13.989 --> 17:15.670
global security landscape has

17:15.670 --> 17:17.660
fundamentally changed . Thereof

17:17.660 --> 17:19.930
uncontested maritime access is over .

17:20.189 --> 17:22.300
We are increasingly challenged by our

17:22.300 --> 17:24.411
adversaries' maturing efforts in this

17:24.411 --> 17:26.849
domain . We have entered what the CNO

17:26.849 --> 17:28.460
calls the maritime century ,

17:28.969 --> 17:31.191
characterized by contested sea lines of

17:31.191 --> 17:33.369
communication , the rise of new naval

17:33.369 --> 17:35.609
powers , and the need to protect our

17:35.609 --> 17:39.560
critical maritime infrastructure . The

17:39.560 --> 17:41.727
United States' blockade of the Straits

17:41.727 --> 17:43.838
of Hormuz is a reminder of the global

17:43.838 --> 17:46.150
commerce , communication , resources ,

17:46.160 --> 17:48.439
and military advantage are more closely

17:48.439 --> 17:50.839
tied to the sea today than at any point

17:50.839 --> 17:53.079
in history . The naval Special warfare

17:53.079 --> 17:55.400
is uniquely positioned to project

17:55.400 --> 17:58.199
focused effects within contested

17:58.199 --> 18:02.109
maritime areas . We're also working

18:02.109 --> 18:04.300
hand in hand with our generational

18:04.300 --> 18:07.189
allies and partners to enhance our

18:07.189 --> 18:09.180
capabilities , expand their

18:09.180 --> 18:12.030
interoperability within our force , and

18:12.030 --> 18:14.869
ultimately capitalize on the proximate

18:14.869 --> 18:17.036
access to enable combined operations .

18:17.859 --> 18:19.803
Our force , though small in size ,

18:20.270 --> 18:22.326
delivers outsized strategic impact .

18:23.189 --> 18:25.989
Comprising just 2.5% of the navy and

18:25.989 --> 18:29.020
15% of SOCOM , we are forward postured ,

18:29.270 --> 18:32.560
technologically advanced . And able to

18:32.560 --> 18:34.920
rapidly transition from competition to

18:34.920 --> 18:38.880
crisis if deterrence fails . Our most

18:38.880 --> 18:41.102
decisive advantage remains our people .

18:42.010 --> 18:44.010
We continue to make significant

18:44.010 --> 18:46.270
investments . In our assessment and

18:46.270 --> 18:49.510
selection processes , a rigorous basic

18:49.510 --> 18:52.300
training pipeline . tactical training

18:52.300 --> 18:54.380
cycles , and our commitment to

18:54.380 --> 18:56.436
maintaining the highest physical and

18:56.436 --> 18:59.060
mental readiness of our operators . We

18:59.060 --> 19:02.300
also are stalwart about our family

19:02.300 --> 19:04.130
support programs , knowing that

19:04.130 --> 19:06.780
resilience at the home translates

19:06.780 --> 19:09.002
directly to an operator's effectiveness

19:09.002 --> 19:12.150
on the battlefield . In closing , Naval

19:12.150 --> 19:14.483
Special Warfare stands ready to compete ,

19:14.510 --> 19:17.140
deter , and win across the full

19:17.140 --> 19:19.310
spectrum of operations . With your

19:19.310 --> 19:21.859
continued support , including sustained .

19:22.739 --> 19:25.020
Investments in modernization and

19:25.020 --> 19:27.869
flexible acquisition authorities , we

19:27.869 --> 19:30.091
will ensure the United States maintains

19:30.091 --> 19:31.980
its decisive edge in the maritime

19:31.980 --> 19:34.280
domain . Thank you for your support ,

19:34.540 --> 19:36.707
for the opportunity to testify today .

19:37.079 --> 19:39.246
Yeah , thank you very much gentlemen ,

19:39.246 --> 19:40.968
and now we will enter into the

19:40.968 --> 19:43.760
senator's rounds of questions and I

19:43.760 --> 19:45.920
will start the questions uh with 5

19:45.920 --> 19:48.560
minutes and I'd like to start with

19:48.560 --> 19:50.760
POTUF . uh this is an issue I've been

19:51.199 --> 19:54.660
working uh with many of your

19:54.920 --> 19:57.142
current leaders , former leaders within

19:57.142 --> 19:59.680
SOCOM , uh , to . Make sure that we're

19:59.680 --> 20:01.650
optimizing and sustaining soft

20:01.650 --> 20:05.050
readiness , longevity and performance

20:05.050 --> 20:06.883
through these integrated support

20:06.883 --> 20:08.849
programs , uh , as the operational

20:08.849 --> 20:11.550
tempo and demands on the force continue ,

20:11.790 --> 20:13.849
we also have the responsibility to

20:13.849 --> 20:16.290
ensure that these services are actually

20:16.290 --> 20:18.512
reaching the operators and the families

20:18.512 --> 20:21.969
who really need them the most . GAO has

20:21.969 --> 20:24.569
previously found that access to POTAF

20:24.569 --> 20:26.930
resources can vary significantly

20:26.930 --> 20:29.609
depending on the location and the

20:29.609 --> 20:32.410
component , and that SOCOM's allocation

20:32.410 --> 20:34.770
model does not always align providers

20:34.770 --> 20:37.609
with the areas of greatest demand . As

20:37.609 --> 20:39.609
component commanders , you have the

20:39.609 --> 20:41.689
closest visibility into how these

20:41.689 --> 20:43.856
programs are functioning on the ground

20:43.859 --> 20:46.250
across your formation . So with that in

20:46.250 --> 20:48.810
mind . Where do you still see the

20:48.810 --> 20:51.729
greatest unmet demand within P POTIF ,

20:52.010 --> 20:54.288
whether that be psychological services ,

20:54.288 --> 20:55.899
spiritual support , physical

20:55.899 --> 20:58.650
rehabilitation , or family care

20:58.650 --> 21:01.369
resources , and we'll reverse the order

21:01.369 --> 21:03.410
actually and Admiral Alman , if we

21:03.410 --> 21:05.077
could start with you please .

21:07.719 --> 21:10.079
Yes , Senator . Um , so I would say

21:10.079 --> 21:12.579
that our biggest challenge is probably

21:13.400 --> 21:16.910
in the per , per capita ratio of ,

21:17.040 --> 21:18.873
of strength and conditioning and

21:18.873 --> 21:21.800
rehabilitation for our operators . Um ,

21:21.959 --> 21:24.439
that would be number 1 and number 2 , I

21:24.439 --> 21:26.599
think we always have a lot of room to

21:26.599 --> 21:28.877
make up in our support to the families .

21:29.079 --> 21:31.469
I think the biggest area for us , the ,

21:31.479 --> 21:33.257
the biggest challenge for us is

21:33.257 --> 21:35.199
probably in our West Coast . Um ,

21:35.310 --> 21:37.599
Southern California teams , um ,

21:38.270 --> 21:40.492
somewhat based on the geography and the

21:40.492 --> 21:42.548
fact that most families live up to 1

21:42.548 --> 21:44.770
hour or 90 minutes away from the base ,

21:44.770 --> 21:46.992
and so it makes it more challenging for

21:46.992 --> 21:49.048
them to access some of the support ,

21:49.048 --> 21:51.319
but Like I said , I , the , the

21:51.319 --> 21:55.000
flatline funding . I , I feel like we

21:55.000 --> 21:57.056
just need to be better in supporting

21:57.056 --> 21:58.500
our families in general .

22:01.699 --> 22:03.588
Yes , Senator , thank you for the

22:03.588 --> 22:05.810
question . Um , although I'd say we , I

22:05.810 --> 22:07.921
feel pretty good about where we're at

22:07.921 --> 22:10.143
right now on the physical , uh , side ,

22:10.143 --> 22:12.366
uh , then to include not only the , the

22:12.366 --> 22:14.643
performance , uh , uh , training , but ,

22:14.643 --> 22:16.810
but also the , uh , physical therapy .

22:16.810 --> 22:16.689
Uh , the cognitive , I feel good , I

22:16.689 --> 22:18.800
feel pretty strong about . If there's

22:18.800 --> 22:21.022
one place that we could use more help ,

22:21.022 --> 22:23.133
that is on the family side . Uh , our

22:23.133 --> 22:25.189
experience , uh , um , going all the

22:25.189 --> 22:27.133
way back , uh , to the early 2000s

22:27.133 --> 22:28.856
through now , through multiple

22:28.856 --> 22:30.911
deployments , uh , times where we've

22:30.911 --> 22:32.856
had very challenging times for the

22:32.856 --> 22:35.022
command , uh , to be able to develop ,

22:35.022 --> 22:36.967
uh , and facilitate those informal

22:36.967 --> 22:39.078
networks with the families . Not only

22:39.078 --> 22:41.300
does it connect the families together ,

22:41.300 --> 22:43.522
but it connects them to the command and

22:43.522 --> 22:45.689
to the command leadership . Uh , I , I

22:45.689 --> 22:47.745
place that as invaluable when , when

22:47.745 --> 22:49.800
times get hard and , uh , and people

22:49.800 --> 22:51.800
are getting injured or we're losing

22:51.800 --> 22:53.800
people , uh , those networks , uh ,

22:53.800 --> 22:55.856
have , have really carried the day .

22:55.856 --> 22:58.189
That's where we could use the most help ,

22:58.189 --> 23:00.522
ma'am . OK , thank you , General Conley .

23:00.522 --> 23:02.856
Thank you for the question , Chairwoman .

23:02.856 --> 23:04.856
Uh , and I appreciate the continued

23:04.856 --> 23:06.745
support of POTA . It's incredibly

23:06.745 --> 23:08.911
important to the FSOC formation . Um ,

23:08.911 --> 23:11.022
I'd say I'm largely aligned with my ,

23:11.022 --> 23:13.133
my teammates up here , uh , more with

23:13.133 --> 23:15.300
families , uh , but each location is a

23:15.300 --> 23:17.467
little different , as you mentioned in

23:17.467 --> 23:19.467
your question . Uh , I'd say we see

23:19.467 --> 23:21.578
episodic challenges of Manning , uh ,

23:21.578 --> 23:23.689
some of them , and , but nothing that

23:23.689 --> 23:23.319
concerns me , you know , with a

23:23.319 --> 23:25.597
forward-based wing in , in Milton Hall ,

23:25.597 --> 23:27.875
uh , which I know you visited recently .

23:27.875 --> 23:30.329
And another one over in Okinawa , uh ,

23:30.550 --> 23:32.589
and split to into , uh , Yokota and

23:32.589 --> 23:35.219
Tokyo . Uh , sometimes the overseas

23:35.219 --> 23:37.275
specialties , uh , go through cycles

23:37.275 --> 23:39.275
where we have a hard time manning ,

23:39.275 --> 23:41.330
finding contractors to go over there

23:41.330 --> 23:43.275
across all the disciplines , but I

23:43.275 --> 23:42.859
think generally speaking , it's

23:42.859 --> 23:45.069
manageable . The , the one area that ,

23:45.189 --> 23:47.550
that I'm challenged with at times just

23:47.550 --> 23:51.099
with reduced budgets is AFSOC is unique

23:51.099 --> 23:53.266
from the other components in the sense

23:53.266 --> 23:55.589
that we own installations . And , uh ,

23:56.109 --> 23:58.109
So for Holbert Field and Cannon Air

23:58.109 --> 23:59.942
Force Base , uh , I have a large

23:59.942 --> 24:02.349
support , uh , population , folks that

24:02.349 --> 24:04.209
are running , uh , Running the

24:04.209 --> 24:06.369
facilities on base , uh , maintaining

24:06.369 --> 24:09.010
what is a small city , and so sometimes

24:09.010 --> 24:11.290
that's lost in translation . Uh , PTI

24:11.290 --> 24:13.512
is designed for operators , and , and I

24:13.512 --> 24:15.512
fully respect that , but , uh , the

24:15.512 --> 24:17.734
support people in ASOC make the machine

24:17.734 --> 24:19.901
run and so trying to thread the needle

24:19.901 --> 24:21.734
on making sure our , our special

24:21.734 --> 24:23.901
tactics and our aviators get the level

24:23.901 --> 24:25.846
of PTIF support they need from the

24:25.846 --> 24:28.209
physical cognitive , uh , domains , but

24:28.209 --> 24:30.449
also not leaving teammates behind that

24:30.449 --> 24:32.505
need , need help in different ways .

24:32.505 --> 24:34.393
Thank you . And if you could just

24:34.393 --> 24:36.449
finish up , General Ferguson . Yes ,

24:36.449 --> 24:38.671
ma'am , very quickly , the , I , I very

24:38.671 --> 24:40.782
similar challenges for us . The , the

24:40.782 --> 24:43.145
one advantage that we do have as , as

24:43.145 --> 24:45.344
being part of the Army is that we do

24:45.344 --> 24:47.511
have access to the holistic health and

24:47.511 --> 24:49.400
fitness program . And so the Army

24:49.400 --> 24:51.677
partners with us , uh , in many of our ,

24:51.677 --> 24:53.844
at all of our installations to balance

24:53.844 --> 24:56.066
out the challenges we have with POTIF ,

24:56.066 --> 24:58.233
but small installations are where we ,

24:58.233 --> 25:00.400
we are challenged also . Yes , ma'am .

25:00.400 --> 25:02.455
OK , thank you , gentlemen . Senator

25:02.455 --> 25:05.290
Slotkin . Um , thanks for being here .

25:05.339 --> 25:07.395
A couple of questions , you know , I

25:07.395 --> 25:09.506
think what we're watching right now ,

25:09.506 --> 25:11.728
um , with Iran and , and sort of always

25:11.728 --> 25:13.839
thinking about when it comes to China

25:13.839 --> 25:16.117
is the incorporation of new technology ,

25:16.117 --> 25:18.283
and I really see the AI race as like ,

25:18.339 --> 25:20.540
it's not who can invent the coolest

25:20.540 --> 25:22.880
tools , um , it's who can incorporate

25:22.880 --> 25:26.209
the coolest tools the fastest , and You

25:26.209 --> 25:28.320
know , um , as I said in my opening ,

25:28.320 --> 25:31.189
I'm concerned about , um , Some of the

25:31.189 --> 25:33.522
ways we've been exposed in recent years ,

25:33.522 --> 25:35.522
in recent months to , you know , an

25:35.522 --> 25:37.689
adversary having technology that we're

25:37.689 --> 25:41.060
not prepared for and killing us because

25:41.060 --> 25:43.709
of it . Um , so can you guys just walk

25:43.709 --> 25:46.310
through for me , um , um , the way that

25:46.310 --> 25:48.869
you are and give me some examples , the

25:48.869 --> 25:51.390
way that you're incorporating AI into

25:51.390 --> 25:53.910
warfare today , not like as a future

25:53.910 --> 25:56.390
thing , but what are you as leaders do

25:56.390 --> 25:58.501
you see actually being incorporated .

25:58.501 --> 26:00.744
And give a little meat on the bones so

26:00.744 --> 26:02.855
that I , we have confidence that even

26:02.855 --> 26:04.966
with the budget , which we know you'd

26:04.966 --> 26:06.966
like to be larger , that , um , you

26:06.966 --> 26:09.185
know , it's not just about airframes

26:09.185 --> 26:11.296
and , and old school tools , it's the

26:11.296 --> 26:13.463
new stuff . So give me some confidence

26:13.463 --> 26:15.629
that we're actually meeting the moment

26:15.629 --> 26:17.629
on this and we can just go down the

26:17.629 --> 26:19.796
line if that's OK , keeping it brief .

26:19.796 --> 26:19.765
Yes , ma'am , thank you for the

26:19.765 --> 26:22.584
question . So we see AI really as a

26:22.584 --> 26:25.104
critical tool for , for , for cueing

26:25.104 --> 26:27.699
human action . And then offloading the

26:27.699 --> 26:30.780
cognitive burden on human operators and

26:30.780 --> 26:32.891
human intelligence professionals that

26:32.891 --> 26:34.939
are executing or conducting

26:34.939 --> 26:37.050
intelligence assessments based off of

26:37.050 --> 26:39.272
the information that's coming in from ,

26:39.272 --> 26:41.495
from different systems . So right now ,

26:41.495 --> 26:43.328
I mean , it's not a , it's not a

26:43.328 --> 26:45.550
replacement for human decision making .

26:45.550 --> 26:47.717
We do not see it as , as that at all .

26:47.717 --> 26:49.550
Uh , right now , the , the , the

26:49.550 --> 26:51.772
biggest area . in which we are using it

26:51.772 --> 26:53.661
within US Army Special Operations

26:53.661 --> 26:55.328
Command is within predict for

26:55.328 --> 26:57.495
predictive maintenance with our rotary

26:57.495 --> 26:59.606
wing aviation fleet . So it's , we've

26:59.606 --> 27:01.717
been using it there for several years

27:01.717 --> 27:03.828
and it's proven very valuable in that

27:03.828 --> 27:06.050
arena . Another area that we , so we'll

27:06.050 --> 27:07.828
continue to do that , that will

27:07.828 --> 27:09.772
continue to get better , uh , with

27:09.772 --> 27:11.661
respect to the employment of AI ,

27:11.661 --> 27:13.383
artificial intelligence on the

27:13.383 --> 27:15.328
battlefield . Uh , the first place

27:15.328 --> 27:17.383
we're really looking to employ it is

27:17.383 --> 27:19.606
within the , the , within processing of

27:19.750 --> 27:21.750
ISR intelligence , surveillance and

27:21.750 --> 27:23.750
reconnaissance information . And in

27:23.750 --> 27:25.972
that respect , we see it more as a tool

27:25.972 --> 27:28.083
for screening out . That's really the

27:28.083 --> 27:30.139
offloading the cognitive burden from

27:30.139 --> 27:32.520
the human that's on or in the loop . Uh ,

27:32.880 --> 27:34.991
eventually we , I'm sure that we will

27:34.991 --> 27:37.280
want to apply it , uh , broader to , to

27:37.280 --> 27:39.520
some of our unmanned systems . But

27:39.520 --> 27:41.687
again , we're going to , we're gonna ,

27:42.670 --> 27:44.726
we're gonna employ the capability in

27:44.726 --> 27:46.559
those systems in a way that will

27:46.559 --> 27:48.503
offload that cognitive , cognitive

27:48.503 --> 27:50.670
burden on the operator . Great . Thank

27:50.670 --> 27:52.726
you , General Conley . Thank you for

27:52.726 --> 27:54.781
the question , Senator . I'll , I'll

27:54.781 --> 27:56.726
give you just two quick real-world

27:56.726 --> 27:59.059
vignettes . Uh , I think sometimes , uh ,

27:59.059 --> 27:58.689
necessity is the mother of invention .

27:59.310 --> 28:01.949
And uh since the start of hostilities

28:01.949 --> 28:04.005
with Iran , I have a small team that

28:04.005 --> 28:05.838
was put together to do something

28:05.838 --> 28:07.893
completely different . But , uh , on

28:07.893 --> 28:10.005
the first day , they realized that uh

28:10.005 --> 28:12.060
our MQ-9s and other aircraft were at

28:12.060 --> 28:14.116
risk in a very hostile environment ,

28:14.116 --> 28:16.060
and they were able to take uh some

28:16.060 --> 28:17.727
smart people , use artificial

28:17.727 --> 28:19.616
intelligence tools , uh , and put

28:19.616 --> 28:21.671
humans on the loop instead of in the

28:21.671 --> 28:23.989
process the whole time and move , uh ,

28:24.229 --> 28:27.390
top secret , um , national level intel

28:27.390 --> 28:30.650
collect , uh . In a process that would

28:30.650 --> 28:32.872
take the humans 20 to 30 minutes to get

28:32.872 --> 28:35.094
that to a crew into a cockpit or into a

28:35.094 --> 28:37.428
ground control station for an MQ-9 crew ,

28:37.428 --> 28:39.839
automated it , uh , using AI bots , uh ,

28:39.969 --> 28:42.136
put it down to a secret level , put it

28:42.136 --> 28:44.358
into the cockpit in 2 to 3 seconds from

28:44.358 --> 28:46.469
detect , and , uh , we , we have data

28:46.469 --> 28:49.869
to , to . That indicates that we've

28:49.869 --> 28:52.869
saved a lot of aircraft over the last

28:52.869 --> 28:55.229
60 days , uh , using that tool just to

28:55.229 --> 28:57.396
provide better battlefield situational

28:57.396 --> 28:59.790
awareness . The other example I have is

28:59.790 --> 29:02.390
our agile process exploit and uh

29:02.390 --> 29:05.290
disseminate tools where our intel

29:05.290 --> 29:07.179
analysts that are looking at full

29:07.179 --> 29:09.310
motion video , uh , you know , a very

29:09.310 --> 29:11.630
heavy human , uh , intensive process .

29:11.750 --> 29:13.861
They've been able to use AI . Again ,

29:13.989 --> 29:16.322
uh , just smart humans getting together ,

29:16.322 --> 29:18.656
figuring out solutions in order to , uh ,

29:18.656 --> 29:20.656
proliferate , uh , that information

29:20.656 --> 29:22.767
across the intel community in seconds

29:22.767 --> 29:24.711
rather than , uh , what could take

29:24.711 --> 29:26.822
hours , uh , in normal processes . So

29:26.822 --> 29:29.045
we're learning every day and , uh , and

29:29.045 --> 29:31.322
we're getting better every day . Great ,

29:31.322 --> 29:33.433
General Huntley , Senator , thank you

29:33.433 --> 29:35.600
for that question . Uh , in my opening

29:35.600 --> 29:37.545
comment , uh , comments , I talked

29:37.545 --> 29:39.878
about , uh , any sensor and any shooter .

29:39.878 --> 29:42.100
Um , we currently have a , a commitment

29:42.100 --> 29:44.322
with a , uh , a task force within the ,

29:44.322 --> 29:46.267
the first island chain . Uh , what

29:46.267 --> 29:48.156
we're seeing and what we see as a

29:48.156 --> 29:50.156
mission requirement going forward ,

29:50.156 --> 29:52.378
that if we do go to conflict , that our

29:52.378 --> 29:54.600
adversary will have a significant scale

29:54.600 --> 29:56.767
advantage . So our ability to leverage

29:56.767 --> 29:58.933
a variety of sensors , whether they're

29:58.933 --> 30:01.100
coming from national technical means ,

30:01.100 --> 30:03.322
whether they're top secrets . Secret or

30:03.322 --> 30:05.489
more than likely something coming from

30:05.489 --> 30:07.711
our , our partners , um , to be able to

30:07.711 --> 30:09.878
ingest , uh , the data , uh , from all

30:09.878 --> 30:11.933
those various , uh , type models and

30:11.933 --> 30:13.989
series of , of sensing platforms and

30:13.989 --> 30:16.045
then put it on the one pane of glass

30:16.045 --> 30:18.211
and able to , uh , then push it into ,

30:18.211 --> 30:20.211
uh , the joint fires network at the

30:20.211 --> 30:22.378
theater level . That's , that's , uh ,

30:22.378 --> 30:24.489
what we're working on very hard right

30:24.489 --> 30:26.656
now . And as we go through a series of

30:26.656 --> 30:28.822
exercises that the Endo Paycom holds ,

30:28.822 --> 30:31.045
uh , we're working to progress that . I

30:31.045 --> 30:30.930
feel pretty good about the progress

30:30.930 --> 30:33.569
we're making . We're not there yet , um ,

30:33.729 --> 30:36.007
but we , we are making progress . Well ,

30:36.007 --> 30:38.007
I'm getting , um , uh , I'm sorry ,

30:38.007 --> 30:40.173
I've been watching a stopped clock and

30:40.173 --> 30:42.062
thinking I just constantly have 1

30:42.062 --> 30:44.118
minute and 21 seconds left . Um , so

30:44.118 --> 30:46.451
I've been alerted the old fashioned way .

30:46.451 --> 30:48.285
So if it's OK , if you , if just

30:48.285 --> 30:50.562
briefly , I'm sorry , uh , Madam Chair .

30:51.979 --> 30:54.312
Yes , ma'am , not to repeat any of that .

30:54.312 --> 30:56.479
I think we're finding some benefits to

30:56.479 --> 30:58.701
the persona targeting and leveraging AI

30:58.701 --> 31:00.590
to have a deeper understanding of

31:00.590 --> 31:02.812
linkages and networks and expanding the

31:02.812 --> 31:04.868
library uh , of potential associates

31:04.868 --> 31:06.979
and then Secondarily , I think in the

31:06.979 --> 31:09.890
same respects , um , our own protection

31:09.890 --> 31:12.219
of the force , um , understanding our

31:12.219 --> 31:14.380
own potential risks and digital

31:14.380 --> 31:17.140
expression , etc . um , leveraging AI

31:17.140 --> 31:19.307
as a red cell tool could , could be an

31:19.307 --> 31:21.719
opportunity for us as well to deepen

31:22.300 --> 31:24.522
the overall protection and preservation

31:24.522 --> 31:26.744
of our forces . Thank you . Thank you ,

31:27.310 --> 31:29.760
Senator Budd . Thank you for yielding

31:29.760 --> 31:32.140
me the 1 minute 21 seconds perpetually .

31:34.160 --> 31:37.010
Good to see you all again , um . Uh ,

31:37.109 --> 31:39.387
General Conley , uh , General Ferguson ,

31:39.400 --> 31:41.630
um , I wanna congratulate you all and

31:41.630 --> 31:43.797
thank you all for your work with ASSOC

31:43.797 --> 31:46.019
and Yao's role in recovering the Strike

31:46.019 --> 31:48.510
Eagle crew , um , a few weeks back , a

31:48.510 --> 31:52.040
very significant Easter , um . Can you

31:52.040 --> 31:54.430
talk about the aircraft that you lost

31:54.569 --> 31:56.625
in the operation , how critical they

31:56.625 --> 31:58.513
are and how we can replace them ?

31:58.513 --> 32:01.030
General Connolly , start with you . Uh ,

32:01.119 --> 32:03.286
thank you , Senator . It's good seeing

32:03.286 --> 32:03.280
you again and thanks for the time in

32:03.280 --> 32:05.391
the office call . Um , yeah , we , we

32:05.391 --> 32:07.613
lost two of our aircraft , uh , in , in

32:07.613 --> 32:09.724
a perfect world , I'd like to get two

32:09.724 --> 32:11.947
replacements as soon as possible . Uh ,

32:11.947 --> 32:14.010
as , as we look at my MC-130 fleet

32:14.010 --> 32:16.177
globally , uh , we're in high demand .

32:16.177 --> 32:19.469
Uh , we have permanent , uh , aircraft

32:19.469 --> 32:21.580
station in , in Japan . So inside the

32:21.580 --> 32:23.802
first island chain , we also have our ,

32:23.802 --> 32:26.025
our launch pad out of our F Milton Hall

32:26.025 --> 32:28.302
with , with a squadron over there . Um ,

32:28.302 --> 32:30.413
they are SOCOM's maneuver force . And

32:30.413 --> 32:32.580
so , uh , you know , I owe it to the ,

32:32.580 --> 32:34.636
the teammates here and their men and

32:34.636 --> 32:36.636
women to be able to get them to the

32:36.636 --> 32:38.525
place of need , uh , in contested

32:38.525 --> 32:40.191
environments , uh , in benign

32:40.191 --> 32:42.025
environments , uh , whatever the

32:42.025 --> 32:44.247
mission is , uh , we're here to support

32:44.247 --> 32:46.191
them . The MC-130s don't exist for

32:46.191 --> 32:48.358
their own sake . They exist to support

32:48.358 --> 32:50.302
the team , and , uh , every loss ,

32:50.302 --> 32:52.525
decrements my ability to support them .

32:52.525 --> 32:54.636
Any , um , sticking points in getting

32:54.636 --> 32:57.449
them replaced ? Uh , it's a little

32:57.449 --> 33:00.530
early still . Um , uh , uh , I think

33:00.530 --> 33:02.363
it'll take time . I think , uh ,

33:02.363 --> 33:04.197
clearly there's a funding , uh ,

33:04.197 --> 33:06.530
requirement that will be needed to , uh ,

33:06.530 --> 33:08.586
be reconciled , and then it's just a

33:08.586 --> 33:10.808
matter of , uh , if we can get into the

33:10.808 --> 33:12.752
production line , uh , in a timely

33:12.752 --> 33:14.863
manner . But , uh , I'm confident our

33:14.863 --> 33:17.197
relationship with our industry partners ,

33:17.197 --> 33:19.308
uh , will , will get us to yes if the

33:19.308 --> 33:21.641
funding's there . Very good . Thank you ,

33:21.641 --> 33:23.919
General . Senator . In all seriousness ,

33:23.919 --> 33:25.863
I would also like to see my friend

33:25.863 --> 33:27.919
General Conley get us 2 , get 2 more

33:27.919 --> 33:29.979
airplanes because the , it , it , as

33:29.979 --> 33:32.035
you know , that was , that was the ,

33:32.035 --> 33:34.146
the definition of a joint operation .

33:34.146 --> 33:36.368
And so the , the rotary wing aircraft ,

33:36.368 --> 33:38.368
we lost 4 on that mission and the 4

33:38.368 --> 33:40.590
rotary wing aircraft we lost , we would

33:40.590 --> 33:42.812
not have gotten there had , uh , we not

33:42.812 --> 33:45.146
had been able to , to get them there in ,

33:45.146 --> 33:47.368
in the MC-130s . And so . You know , no

33:47.368 --> 33:49.423
one else on planet Earth can , could

33:49.423 --> 33:51.479
have executed that operation because

33:51.479 --> 33:53.701
they don't have the capabilities . They

33:53.701 --> 33:55.701
don't have the people to do it . So

33:55.701 --> 33:57.923
it's in , it's very important for us to

33:57.923 --> 34:00.035
get those aircraft replaced as , uh ,

34:00.035 --> 34:02.146
as Mike said , uh , and we know SOCOM

34:02.146 --> 34:04.312
is working diligently to , to sort out

34:04.312 --> 34:06.535
the , the methodology to , to spend the

34:06.535 --> 34:08.479
money and , and get those aircraft

34:08.479 --> 34:10.479
replaced . So there is a plan , but

34:10.479 --> 34:12.701
it's not going to happen quickly , no ,

34:12.701 --> 34:14.812
sir . Thank you . We have our support

34:14.812 --> 34:14.729
on that and just the , the efforts in

34:14.729 --> 34:17.062
that operation just sent a great signal .

34:17.299 --> 34:19.521
To the uh war fighting community , much

34:19.521 --> 34:21.577
appreciated . General Huntley , uh ,

34:21.577 --> 34:23.466
enjoyed seeing you this morning .

34:23.466 --> 34:25.466
Thanks for , uh , the time . Um , I

34:25.466 --> 34:27.577
know you've talked about multi-domain

34:27.577 --> 34:29.688
ranges , uh , to replicate the modern

34:29.688 --> 34:31.743
battlefield . Can you share what you

34:31.743 --> 34:33.799
need , uh , where the gap is , where

34:33.799 --> 34:36.021
you fall short , sir , and how Congress

34:36.021 --> 34:38.132
can help ? Uh , thank you , Senator ,

34:38.132 --> 34:40.299
for that , that question and thank you

34:40.299 --> 34:42.521
for the office call this morning . Um ,

34:42.521 --> 34:42.269
as we look right now , you know , right

34:42.269 --> 34:45.108
now , a lot of , uh , focus on Centcom ,

34:45.188 --> 34:47.244
but really if you look globally , at

34:47.244 --> 34:49.410
all the operations that soft and , and

34:49.410 --> 34:51.521
frankly , the Joint Force is involved

34:51.521 --> 34:53.744
in , in pretty much every theater right

34:53.744 --> 34:55.966
now . Uh , the operating environment is

34:55.966 --> 34:58.132
evolving very quickly . Even if it's a

34:58.132 --> 35:00.419
non-state actor in South America or in ,

35:00.429 --> 35:02.596
uh , Eastern Africa , they're going to

35:02.596 --> 35:04.818
have capabilities they didn't have just

35:04.818 --> 35:07.040
a few years ago , to say nothing of a ,

35:07.040 --> 35:09.040
of a peer adversary . Uh , the good

35:09.040 --> 35:10.929
news is , is that we are evolving

35:10.929 --> 35:13.096
quickly . We need to move faster . But

35:13.096 --> 35:15.262
going forward , what I see is probably

35:15.262 --> 35:17.318
one of our primary challenges is the

35:17.318 --> 35:19.485
time to train . And what's driving the

35:19.485 --> 35:21.651
stress on our time to train is that we

35:21.651 --> 35:21.600
still need to be able to shoot , move ,

35:21.610 --> 35:23.554
and communicate and medicate as we

35:23.554 --> 35:26.040
always have . But now we have to employ

35:26.040 --> 35:28.379
autonomous systems at the tactical edge

35:28.379 --> 35:30.889
and higher . Uh , AI is coming on very

35:30.889 --> 35:34.370
fast , um , and the , the tasks for

35:34.370 --> 35:36.750
training are compounding very quickly .

35:37.169 --> 35:39.391
Right now as it stands to be able to do

35:39.391 --> 35:41.613
multi-domain training in the collective

35:41.613 --> 35:43.780
sense , uh , at least for MSO , I have

35:43.780 --> 35:45.502
to send our people west of the

35:45.502 --> 35:47.725
Mississippi , out to the western desert

35:47.725 --> 35:49.891
somewhere , uh , in order to do that .

35:49.891 --> 35:52.113
The time , the resource that that takes

35:52.113 --> 35:54.391
puts a significant stress on the force ,

35:54.391 --> 35:56.336
and it's only getting worse , so .

35:56.336 --> 35:58.558
Right now , if we had ranges that would

35:58.558 --> 35:58.379
allowed us to do these type of

35:58.379 --> 36:01.010
multi-domain operations closer to home

36:01.010 --> 36:03.232
station or preferably at home station ,

36:03.232 --> 36:05.454
uh , that would be a significant help ,

36:05.454 --> 36:07.510
uh , for us not only going forward ,

36:07.510 --> 36:09.732
and being able to incorporate these new

36:09.732 --> 36:11.566
capabilities , but also maybe as

36:11.566 --> 36:13.788
important , if not more important , the

36:13.788 --> 36:15.788
stress on the force in the future .

36:15.788 --> 36:15.540
Thank you , sir . Another question ,

36:15.659 --> 36:17.881
General Huntley , about Marsak . You're

36:17.881 --> 36:21.020
authorized to have , uh , 3,337 .

36:21.550 --> 36:23.159
Billets . You had a recent

36:23.159 --> 36:25.159
congressional inquiry revealed that

36:25.159 --> 36:27.830
only 2802 , uh , positions are filled ,

36:27.919 --> 36:31.080
so about 500 short . Um , is this a

36:31.080 --> 36:32.802
concern and , uh , how are you

36:32.802 --> 36:35.439
addressing it and how can we help ? It ,

36:35.520 --> 36:37.742
it is a concern , Senator , and , and ,

36:37.742 --> 36:39.853
and thank you for that question . And

36:39.853 --> 36:42.020
the preponderance of those , uh , um ,

36:42.020 --> 36:44.131
pieces of structure that were Marines

36:44.131 --> 36:46.131
that we don't have at this time are

36:46.131 --> 36:48.242
from high demand , low density MOSs ,

36:48.242 --> 36:50.520
mostly within the Intel communications .

36:50.520 --> 36:52.409
Uh , even the Marine Corps has an

36:52.409 --> 36:54.679
unmanned systems MOS now that , uh ,

36:54.840 --> 36:56.784
that we are lucky enough to have .

36:56.784 --> 36:58.784
We're working very closely with the

36:58.784 --> 37:00.951
service as they go through their force

37:00.951 --> 37:03.007
structure review , uh , to make sure

37:03.007 --> 37:05.118
that , uh , MSO prioritization . Uh ,

37:05.118 --> 37:07.062
is at a level that facilitates our

37:07.062 --> 37:10.409
manning , getting a , a , a peer level

37:10.409 --> 37:13.070
of manning to priority units within the

37:13.070 --> 37:15.237
Marine Corps . Thank you , sir . Thank

37:15.237 --> 37:19.159
you all . Great , we'll go ahead and do

37:19.159 --> 37:21.739
a second round of questions as well ,

37:21.760 --> 37:23.816
and uh I would like to talk a little

37:23.816 --> 37:26.899
bit about acquisition as well and , and

37:26.899 --> 37:29.469
uh this is near and dear to all of you .

37:29.600 --> 37:31.719
Um , SOCOM does use SoftWorks they've

37:31.719 --> 37:34.739
done that since 2015 and since then ,

37:34.840 --> 37:37.639
uh , we have seen the execution of . Uh ,

37:37.719 --> 37:41.439
let's see , 1600 agreements , uh , at a

37:41.439 --> 37:45.439
cost of $460 million and it's a , a

37:45.439 --> 37:47.919
pretty strong track record for moving

37:47.919 --> 37:51.439
innovation faster , uh , so it's been a

37:51.439 --> 37:54.600
great model , but even , uh , this

37:54.600 --> 37:56.959
really successful model , it , it is

37:56.959 --> 37:59.360
still facing friction . And

37:59.360 --> 38:02.290
particularly as SOCOM shifts more from

38:02.290 --> 38:05.379
uh uh software defined capabilities

38:05.560 --> 38:07.939
while much of this acquisition system

38:08.330 --> 38:11.719
remains built around hardware . Uh , so

38:11.719 --> 38:13.775
we're seeing growing concerns around

38:13.775 --> 38:15.830
vendor lock and proprietary software

38:15.830 --> 38:18.639
restrictions . So where do you believe

38:18.639 --> 38:20.679
the greatest friction point still

38:20.679 --> 38:22.659
exists between identifying an

38:22.659 --> 38:24.820
operational need and then actually

38:24.820 --> 38:26.780
fielding that capability with your

38:26.780 --> 38:29.429
operators ? And General Conley , why

38:29.429 --> 38:31.729
don't we start with you ? Thank you ,

38:31.800 --> 38:35.600
Senator . Um , I , I think the If

38:35.600 --> 38:37.840
I'm candid , the , the biggest friction

38:37.840 --> 38:39.618
point is just the timing on our

38:39.618 --> 38:42.360
budgeting processes . So , uh , I can

38:42.360 --> 38:44.582
operate if I want something right now ,

38:44.582 --> 38:46.749
I have to have money left in my budget

38:46.749 --> 38:48.971
for this year to , to put money towards

38:48.971 --> 38:50.971
it . And I've probably already have

38:50.971 --> 38:53.193
that earmarked against something else .

38:53.193 --> 38:55.249
Uh , so if it's emerging , uh , it's

38:55.249 --> 38:57.471
hard to do . Um , and then , you know ,

38:57.471 --> 38:59.638
we're building the 28 palm right now .

38:59.638 --> 39:01.860
So the next round to get to that , uh ,

39:01.860 --> 39:03.916
consistent funding stream is 3 years

39:03.916 --> 39:06.027
from now , 2 years from now . Uh , we

39:06.027 --> 39:08.249
work in the margins in between to , and

39:08.249 --> 39:10.138
we have a great relationship with

39:10.138 --> 39:12.360
SoftWorks . Uh , they do a lot of great

39:12.360 --> 39:14.304
things for us . Uh , so that's one

39:14.304 --> 39:16.527
challenge . The other one is how do you

39:16.527 --> 39:16.419
get it and scale it across a fleet of

39:16.419 --> 39:18.530
aircraft or across a fleet of special

39:18.530 --> 39:21.270
tactics teams . Um , so the scaling

39:21.270 --> 39:23.603
transition often becomes a sticky point ,

39:23.603 --> 39:25.548
but , uh , we're better because of

39:25.548 --> 39:27.889
SoftWorks , uh , you know , SOCOM is

39:28.229 --> 39:31.550
absolutely General Huntley . Uh , yes ,

39:31.669 --> 39:34.149
Senator . The , uh , uh , of course ,

39:34.290 --> 39:36.068
uh , anything that allows us to

39:36.068 --> 39:37.901
incorporate the new capabilities

39:37.901 --> 39:40.139
quicker , as I said before , uh , the ,

39:40.270 --> 39:42.326
the characteristics of the operating

39:42.326 --> 39:44.492
environment are , are moving as faster

39:44.492 --> 39:46.603
than they have in my 37 years of , of

39:46.603 --> 39:48.326
service . Um , right now , the

39:48.326 --> 39:50.492
traditional way of doing it , it the ,

39:50.492 --> 39:52.659
the lead times are just , are just too

39:52.659 --> 39:54.770
long . I , I would cite as an example

39:54.770 --> 39:56.937
is , uh , Our recent , uh , program of

39:56.937 --> 39:58.881
records that we've established for

39:58.881 --> 40:00.992
three unmanned systems . They're fine

40:00.992 --> 40:03.214
and they're doing well , but we started

40:03.214 --> 40:05.159
that requirement back in 2019 . So

40:05.159 --> 40:08.100
right now , we still can . Use O&M

40:08.979 --> 40:11.201
to purchase equipment , but in order to

40:11.201 --> 40:13.423
do the full capability , the doctrine ,

40:13.423 --> 40:15.423
the operations , the training , the

40:15.423 --> 40:17.257
manpower that's required and the

40:17.257 --> 40:19.257
sustainment for these programs , it

40:19.257 --> 40:21.699
requires our acquisition system to move

40:21.699 --> 40:23.810
faster . Anything that can be done on

40:23.810 --> 40:26.169
that front would be not only helpful ,

40:26.419 --> 40:28.641
but I think it would be an imperative .

40:28.641 --> 40:30.530
Wonderful , thank you and Admiral

40:30.530 --> 40:34.270
Almand . Yes , ma'am . Thank you . Um ,

40:34.570 --> 40:36.681
I would also add to General Huntley's

40:36.681 --> 40:40.449
that longer dwell money , um , passed

40:40.449 --> 40:42.929
over the fiscal year to help finish

40:42.929 --> 40:45.096
projects and see them through would be

40:45.096 --> 40:47.669
advantageous . And then with respect to ,

40:47.929 --> 40:51.489
to SOCOM , the SoftWorks experiment was

40:51.489 --> 40:54.780
a good has been a good foundation for

40:54.780 --> 40:56.891
how we interact with industry . And I

40:56.891 --> 40:58.780
think most recently the way we've

40:58.780 --> 41:00.613
divided and conquered and worked

41:00.613 --> 41:02.502
together as components , um , for

41:02.502 --> 41:04.613
unmanned surface vessels and undersea

41:04.613 --> 41:07.379
and unmanned aerial vehicles , um , to

41:07.379 --> 41:09.620
rapidly develop some capability is one

41:09.620 --> 41:12.020
of , is it , I think is a highlight for

41:12.020 --> 41:14.139
the joint force in , in terms of how

41:14.139 --> 41:16.739
SOCOM can effectively partner with

41:16.739 --> 41:18.850
industry , commit our operators who

41:18.850 --> 41:21.179
have a depth of combat experience and ,

41:21.260 --> 41:23.709
and . A very high aptitude and

41:23.709 --> 41:25.709
expectation of performance to , to

41:26.110 --> 41:28.054
ensure that the companies that are

41:28.054 --> 41:29.943
providing prototypes are actually

41:29.943 --> 41:31.943
delivering and making the necessary

41:31.943 --> 41:34.110
changes to , to field something that's

41:35.179 --> 41:37.235
operationally fit . Yeah , thank you

41:37.235 --> 41:39.389
and General Ferguson , ma'am , uh ,

41:39.510 --> 41:41.677
just to wrap up , every , every one of

41:41.677 --> 41:43.732
us at the table , all , all of our ,

41:43.732 --> 41:46.629
all of our people need the authority to

41:46.629 --> 41:48.796
be able to adapt and evolve technology

41:48.796 --> 41:51.018
at the edge . Uh , employing commercial

41:51.018 --> 41:53.129
off the shelf solutions . You touched

41:53.129 --> 41:55.073
on this already . Instead of being

41:55.073 --> 41:57.296
bound by vendor lock , uh , being bound

41:57.296 --> 41:59.296
by proprietary software , you , you

41:59.296 --> 42:01.462
mentioned also that we're getting into

42:01.462 --> 42:03.518
more software defined capabilities .

42:03.518 --> 42:05.796
You see that in , uh , in Ukraine , uh ,

42:05.796 --> 42:08.018
they've , they've . They've not reached

42:08.018 --> 42:10.296
the limit of physics , but physics has ,

42:10.296 --> 42:12.240
uh , has , there , there is a line

42:12.240 --> 42:14.462
there , uh , that physics draws , so to

42:14.462 --> 42:16.290
speak , and so software defined

42:16.290 --> 42:18.234
solutions is , is , is really what

42:18.234 --> 42:20.457
you're seeing and what we have seen for

42:20.457 --> 42:22.679
the last couple of years . Uh , I would

42:22.679 --> 42:24.679
say that in the first , in the five

42:24.679 --> 42:26.901
weeks of . The , the war with Iran , we

42:26.901 --> 42:29.123
probably made about 2 years of progress

42:29.123 --> 42:31.012
based off of our ability to adapt

42:31.012 --> 42:33.068
rapidly because of where we were and

42:33.068 --> 42:35.123
the , the , the lack of restrictions

42:35.123 --> 42:37.260
from whether it was from , uh , what

42:37.260 --> 42:39.482
they could actually do with the systems

42:39.482 --> 42:41.704
or the areas that they could train with

42:41.704 --> 42:43.816
them overseas . So we need to be able

42:43.816 --> 42:45.982
to move at the speed of relevance then

42:45.982 --> 42:48.038
yes ma'am . OK , thank you so much ,

42:48.038 --> 42:51.370
Senator Slotkin . Um , General Huntley ,

42:51.449 --> 42:53.929
I feel like I've paid you , um , to

42:53.929 --> 42:55.929
prompt the question like where do I

42:55.929 --> 42:57.985
train east of the Mississippi . Um ,

42:57.985 --> 43:00.096
Michigan , Northern Michigan is where

43:00.096 --> 43:02.373
you train east of the Mississippi . Um ,

43:02.373 --> 43:04.729
we have the largest multi-domain , uh ,

43:04.810 --> 43:07.409
uh , um , military exercise east of the

43:07.409 --> 43:09.242
Mississippi , the most available

43:09.242 --> 43:11.520
airspace , the most available spectrum ,

43:11.520 --> 43:13.850
and the Army just named our facility up

43:13.850 --> 43:16.022
north the Nadwick . Their very first

43:16.022 --> 43:18.663
drone testing site in the country , so

43:18.663 --> 43:21.062
you are welcome , sir , um , to come

43:21.062 --> 43:23.772
and test , and you can test it all , uh ,

43:23.943 --> 43:26.603
drone , counter drone , um , you can ,

43:27.103 --> 43:29.462
you can test soft boats , um , all in

43:29.462 --> 43:31.903
one facility , um , robotics , the

43:31.903 --> 43:34.014
whole thing , um , and because it's ,

43:34.014 --> 43:36.062
uh , it's an area where we're very

43:36.062 --> 43:38.395
supportive of this kind of stuff , like ,

43:38.395 --> 43:40.340
you know , we bring industry in to

43:40.340 --> 43:42.451
share with . With us and work with us

43:42.451 --> 43:44.562
as we do things . So anyways , you're

43:44.562 --> 43:46.729
more than welcome all of you to come ,

43:46.729 --> 43:46.635
um , as you should to Michigan . Is

43:46.635 --> 43:49.585
that the county called Canada ? No ,

43:50.916 --> 43:52.972
what are you talking about ? We were

43:52.972 --> 43:55.216
getting along so well up here . Um ,

43:55.436 --> 43:58.545
the , um , uh , I would say , um , I'm

43:58.545 --> 44:02.035
interested in your , um , all of your

44:02.035 --> 44:04.595
responses a year later from this

44:04.595 --> 44:07.669
hearing . Um , a year ago where , uh ,

44:07.709 --> 44:10.050
the SOCOM commander talked about allies

44:10.050 --> 44:13.229
as the pacing item . Um , and I know

44:13.229 --> 44:15.340
from my time at the Pentagon that you

44:15.340 --> 44:17.562
all work very closely . I think there's

44:17.562 --> 44:19.785
28+ allies that you all work with , but

44:19.785 --> 44:21.951
it's hard to miss that there are a lot

44:21.951 --> 44:24.007
of allies who are not with us in the

44:24.007 --> 44:26.229
war in Iran . So I'd like you all to ,

44:26.350 --> 44:29.729
to testify , um , what has been the

44:29.729 --> 44:32.510
operational impact , um , of tensions

44:32.510 --> 44:34.566
at the top level , which you are not

44:34.566 --> 44:36.689
responsible for . Um , um , what is

44:36.689 --> 44:39.022
that done operationally ? Are there any ,

44:39.090 --> 44:41.290
I mean , I'm very aware , um , General

44:41.290 --> 44:43.457
Connally , that , uh , as I understand

44:43.457 --> 44:45.679
it , allies were very important in even

44:45.679 --> 44:48.239
in just airspace and , um , for the

44:48.239 --> 44:50.183
recovery of the pilot , the downed

44:50.183 --> 44:53.550
pilot inside of Iran . So tell me

44:53.550 --> 44:55.606
operationally , um , very honestly ,

44:55.606 --> 44:58.250
what has changed or had to be amended

44:58.250 --> 45:01.169
given allied reservations about this

45:01.169 --> 45:04.010
conflict , and we can start anywhere

45:04.010 --> 45:06.020
we'd like . Uh , thanks , Senator .

45:06.060 --> 45:08.340
That's a great question . Um , I'd ,

45:08.419 --> 45:10.586
I'd say you've kind of hit it a little

45:10.586 --> 45:13.060
bit already for , from an aviation lens

45:13.060 --> 45:15.282
where we're often coming from a farther

45:15.282 --> 45:17.629
distance , uh , or globally , um ,

45:17.820 --> 45:19.939
access basing and overflight . Uh , I

45:19.939 --> 45:22.161
think we've learned a lot over the last

45:22.161 --> 45:24.383
couple of months that , um , we rely on

45:24.383 --> 45:26.699
our partners , uh , for lily pads to

45:26.699 --> 45:28.588
get us from the United States and

45:28.588 --> 45:31.229
wherever we're going . Uh , and I think

45:31.229 --> 45:33.562
maybe we've taken that for granted , uh ,

45:33.562 --> 45:35.507
to some degree over the years that

45:35.507 --> 45:37.618
there , the bases are always going to

45:37.618 --> 45:39.785
be open for our use , and , uh , we've

45:39.785 --> 45:42.007
been able to adapt and , and we've been

45:42.007 --> 45:41.870
able to get the missions complete , but ,

45:42.169 --> 45:44.790
uh , not having the , the assured

45:44.790 --> 45:47.012
access that we're used to , uh , with ,

45:47.012 --> 45:49.123
uh , mainly , uh , European countries

45:49.123 --> 45:51.457
as we transit , uh , transatlantic , uh ,

45:51.510 --> 45:53.621
towards CEO , uh , has been something

45:53.621 --> 45:55.621
we've had to work hard to , to , to

45:55.621 --> 45:59.239
make happen . Senator ,

45:59.560 --> 46:01.669
where we have our most pronounced

46:01.669 --> 46:04.399
relationships right now was within the

46:04.399 --> 46:06.399
Republic of the Philippines . We've

46:06.399 --> 46:08.820
been there for at least from a MSO

46:08.820 --> 46:12.000
perspective in force since 2015 . We've

46:12.000 --> 46:14.111
been through the big counterterrorism

46:14.111 --> 46:16.969
fights with them and recently . We've

46:16.969 --> 46:19.310
worked very close with them as they

46:19.310 --> 46:21.929
look to push back against PRC incursion

46:22.129 --> 46:24.129
into their territorial waters , and

46:24.129 --> 46:26.351
we're currently working very close with

46:26.351 --> 46:28.520
them to help them with deterrence by

46:28.520 --> 46:30.889
preparing them for conflict . So right

46:30.889 --> 46:33.000
now I would describe our relationship

46:33.000 --> 46:34.833
with the Filipino government and

46:34.833 --> 46:36.945
Filipino South along with the rest of

46:36.945 --> 46:39.111
the Filipino military as very strong .

46:39.111 --> 46:41.111
It's just it's outside of the areas

46:41.111 --> 46:43.310
that may be affected . Uh , and then ,

46:43.429 --> 46:45.989
uh , likewise , uh , we're , uh , also

46:45.989 --> 46:48.469
partnered with , uh , uh , a variety of

46:48.469 --> 46:51.300
both Somali but , uh , also , um , um ,

46:51.510 --> 46:54.229
Spanish , uh , uh , partners within ,

46:54.350 --> 46:56.572
in Somalia right now . But right now at

46:56.572 --> 46:58.850
those levels and where we're operating ,

46:58.850 --> 47:01.128
we have had , we've had minimal impact .

47:01.128 --> 47:03.294
OK , thank you . Senator , I would add

47:03.294 --> 47:05.461
that we're , we're deployed globally .

47:05.461 --> 47:07.517
Uh , we are always learning from our

47:07.517 --> 47:09.406
partners and , and trying to seek

47:09.406 --> 47:11.628
technical , technological advantage and

47:11.628 --> 47:13.739
so we're doing that in Europe , we're

47:13.739 --> 47:15.961
doing that in the Pacific , and I , and

47:16.310 --> 47:18.669
really trying to learn and translate

47:18.669 --> 47:21.002
those lessons into the current conflict .

47:21.002 --> 47:23.280
And I think we've been successful in a ,

47:23.280 --> 47:25.391
in a few areas and One-way attack and

47:25.391 --> 47:28.120
counter UAS to improve our own defenses

47:28.120 --> 47:30.510
and inability to operate in the CCR .

47:30.800 --> 47:32.967
But just so I'm clear for both General

47:32.967 --> 47:35.189
Huntley and Admiral Altman , is there ,

47:35.280 --> 47:37.280
is your , is it your testimony that

47:37.280 --> 47:39.520
there's been no operational impacts in

47:39.520 --> 47:41.580
your engagement in the Middle East

47:42.080 --> 47:44.715
because of Kind of political

47:44.715 --> 47:46.882
considerations that are happening at ,

47:46.882 --> 47:49.159
you know , way above your , your level .

47:49.159 --> 47:51.326
There's , it , I just , I want to make

47:51.326 --> 47:53.493
sure I understand what you're saying .

47:53.493 --> 47:55.382
Uh , I heard about overflight and

47:55.382 --> 47:57.548
access in particularly in Europe , but

47:57.548 --> 47:59.604
are you both testifying that there's

47:59.604 --> 48:01.715
been no changes based on concerns and

48:01.715 --> 48:03.937
considerations at the political level ?

48:04.149 --> 48:06.590
Senator , uh , we do have relationships

48:06.590 --> 48:09.229
within the CEO AOR , uh , but right now

48:09.229 --> 48:10.899
they're involved with ongoing

48:10.899 --> 48:13.066
operations . Uh , so in this setting ,

48:13.066 --> 48:15.066
uh , I'd be hesitant , uh , to talk

48:15.066 --> 48:17.288
about that , but I'd be happy , uh , in

48:17.288 --> 48:19.566
a closed setting or to submit , uh , a ,

48:19.566 --> 48:22.879
post-brief . OK , and I would say we're ,

48:22.959 --> 48:25.320
we are still benefiting from , from the

48:25.320 --> 48:27.360
partners who are who are housing us

48:27.360 --> 48:29.489
there in Centcom , um , for a , for a

48:29.489 --> 48:32.909
good combined relationship . OK . And ,

48:32.989 --> 48:35.270
and ma'am , in , insofar as we , we

48:35.270 --> 48:37.437
operate jointly most of the time , the

48:37.437 --> 48:39.659
things that affect Mike's formations as

48:39.659 --> 48:41.826
far as access spacing and overflight ,

48:41.826 --> 48:43.659
those do affect us because we're

48:43.659 --> 48:45.881
usually along for the ride . Uh , but ,

48:45.881 --> 48:48.048
but like , uh , like my , my teammates

48:48.048 --> 48:50.048
here at the table , we are deployed

48:50.048 --> 48:51.830
globally and our generational

48:51.830 --> 48:53.886
relationships with , uh , especially

48:53.886 --> 48:56.129
with when I . Within our special forces

48:56.129 --> 48:58.419
formations they've been those

48:58.419 --> 49:00.860
relationships have been around for so

49:00.860 --> 49:02.971
long that we have seen very we , I've

49:02.971 --> 49:05.860
not seen any impact as far as uh allies

49:05.860 --> 49:08.100
being hesitant to work with us , uh ,

49:08.340 --> 49:10.284
you know , we've just been on , on

49:10.284 --> 49:12.229
travel to , we were in Europe just

49:12.229 --> 49:14.300
recently and , and we're , we're not

49:14.300 --> 49:16.659
seeing those kinds of impacts . Thank

49:16.659 --> 49:17.659
you . Thank you .

49:24.560 --> 49:26.393
Are you prepared for questions ,

49:26.393 --> 49:29.070
Senator Sheehy ? OK , go ahead ,

49:29.189 --> 49:31.300
Senator Budd . Thank you . Uh , thank

49:31.300 --> 49:33.578
you . So just to pick up on a question ,

49:33.669 --> 49:37.090
General Huntley , um , from our earlier

49:37.090 --> 49:38.812
conversation , what additional

49:38.812 --> 49:40.868
authorities would you need to better

49:40.868 --> 49:42.868
conduct operations against al Qaeda

49:42.868 --> 49:45.146
affiliates in Somalia ? You know , I'm ,

49:45.146 --> 49:47.479
I'm thinking about your advise and , uh ,

49:47.479 --> 49:49.479
assist missions that we spoke about

49:49.479 --> 49:51.590
with the Somali army . So what , what

49:51.590 --> 49:54.070
do you , what else would you need ? Uh ,

49:54.149 --> 49:56.149
Senator , thank you for that , uh ,

49:56.149 --> 49:58.371
question , in , in , in advance , thank

49:58.371 --> 50:00.590
you for what the , uh , the 127 , uh ,

50:00.750 --> 50:02.917
Delta and Echo , um , authorities have

50:02.917 --> 50:04.917
been granted . Those are incredibly

50:04.917 --> 50:07.083
helpful , uh , in accomplishing , uh ,

50:07.083 --> 50:08.917
our assigned task for the Global

50:08.917 --> 50:11.083
combatant commanders . But , uh , I'll

50:11.083 --> 50:13.250
describe it if , if we had , uh , um ,

50:13.250 --> 50:17.030
more freedom of action , uh , um , in

50:17.030 --> 50:19.141
that theater , we , uh , we'd be able

50:19.141 --> 50:20.709
to , um , suppress , uh ,

50:20.909 --> 50:23.020
counterterrorism threats specifically

50:23.020 --> 50:25.040
to the homeland . Uh , in , in a

50:25.040 --> 50:26.040
quicker manner .

50:28.659 --> 50:31.840
Um , the question for all of you . Uh

50:32.949 --> 50:35.320
I asked Admiral Bradley the other day ,

50:35.330 --> 50:37.497
uh , when he was here , I noticed that

50:37.497 --> 50:40.229
SOCOM's O&M has only increased from 9.4

50:40.229 --> 50:43.189
to 10.9 billion , uh , but that's

50:43.189 --> 50:46.709
between 2019 and 2027 , so it fails to

50:46.709 --> 50:49.429
keep pace with inflation , more

50:49.429 --> 50:51.651
importantly , the increased operational

50:51.651 --> 50:53.873
tempo that that we've seen . So can you

50:53.873 --> 50:55.985
talk about some of the top priorities

50:55.985 --> 50:58.040
and capabilities if you had a higher

50:58.040 --> 51:00.207
top line . What , what do you not have

51:00.207 --> 51:02.373
now and what would you get with more ?

51:02.373 --> 51:04.373
We'll start with you , uh , Admiral

51:04.373 --> 51:06.207
Almond . Senator , our , our top

51:06.207 --> 51:07.985
priority right now is providing

51:07.985 --> 51:10.699
maritime capabilities , um , so that we

51:10.699 --> 51:13.300
can project , project effects in places

51:13.300 --> 51:15.580
that nobody else can get to . So that

51:15.580 --> 51:17.747
is both in our surface combatant craft

51:17.747 --> 51:19.969
in which we have a modernization effort

51:19.969 --> 51:22.810
happening now , um , and then most

51:22.810 --> 51:25.032
impactfully probably in subsea , in the

51:25.032 --> 51:27.449
undersea and subsea seabed warfare , um ,

51:27.699 --> 51:30.100
and how we are seeking to ensure that

51:30.100 --> 51:31.822
America retains its asymmetric

51:31.822 --> 51:34.030
advantage in the undersea . Um , our

51:34.030 --> 51:36.197
partnership with the submarine force ,

51:36.229 --> 51:39.310
um , we've got a new multi-mission dry

51:39.310 --> 51:42.479
submersible , um , in the build stages

51:42.479 --> 51:44.350
now . These are just expensive

51:44.350 --> 51:47.310
platforms , um , that , that take a

51:47.310 --> 51:49.643
significant amount of SOCOM's resources ,

51:49.909 --> 51:51.853
but yet provide enormous strategic

51:51.853 --> 51:55.629
advantage to our nation . Senator ,

51:55.780 --> 51:58.189
uh , to be short , um , I would

51:58.189 --> 52:00.520
accelerate , uh , our ability to ingest

52:00.520 --> 52:04.070
data , uh , sensor agnostic , uh , and

52:04.070 --> 52:06.181
then quickly , quickly get to scale .

52:06.199 --> 52:07.977
Like I said , we're making good

52:07.977 --> 52:10.199
progress right now , um , but , uh , if

52:10.199 --> 52:13.409
we can't move fast enough . Thank you ,

52:13.459 --> 52:15.015
Senator . I would put it in

52:15.015 --> 52:17.181
modernization efforts , near-term ones

52:17.181 --> 52:19.070
that we , um , that we've already

52:19.070 --> 52:21.403
started that I believe are cutting edge ,

52:21.403 --> 52:23.570
uh , that are bringing us capabilities

52:23.570 --> 52:25.237
that'll help us win on future

52:25.237 --> 52:27.292
battlefields . But , uh , just the ,

52:27.292 --> 52:29.570
the stop-start sometimes of the budget ,

52:29.570 --> 52:31.570
we , we have just enough to keep it

52:31.570 --> 52:33.792
going , but not to scale it and move it

52:33.792 --> 52:35.903
at a , at a speed that will get it to

52:35.903 --> 52:38.639
our airmen quickly . Uh , yes , Senator .

52:38.760 --> 52:40.482
Uh , likewise for me , it'd be

52:40.482 --> 52:42.593
transformation , modernization . Just

52:42.593 --> 52:44.593
looking at the , between the Maduro

52:44.593 --> 52:46.927
raid and the ongoing operations in Iran ,

52:47.080 --> 52:50.820
the , our ability to continue to , Not

52:50.820 --> 52:52.653
keep pace with , but outpace our

52:52.653 --> 52:54.820
adversaries so that we can continue to

52:54.820 --> 52:56.987
conduct operations like that , special

52:56.987 --> 52:59.098
operations , joint special operations

52:59.098 --> 53:01.320
raids with impunity is we're only going

53:01.320 --> 53:03.098
to be able to do that if we are

53:03.098 --> 53:05.264
resourcing , transforming , developing

53:05.264 --> 53:07.209
our capabilities with for deep and

53:07.209 --> 53:09.153
denied area penetration . With our

53:09.153 --> 53:11.495
rotary platforms , space-enabled

53:11.495 --> 53:13.717
operations , cyber-enabled operations ,

53:13.717 --> 53:15.828
both , both offensive and defensive ,

53:16.054 --> 53:18.415
counter UAS capabilities to protect our

53:18.415 --> 53:21.014
forces that we projected into denied

53:21.014 --> 53:23.294
territory , our ability to sustain

53:23.294 --> 53:25.238
those elements in that territory .

53:26.050 --> 53:28.106
That's , that's a big laundry list ,

53:28.106 --> 53:30.161
but those are the things that , that

53:30.161 --> 53:32.370
allow us at , at right now to be able

53:32.370 --> 53:34.550
to execute those types of operations .

53:34.850 --> 53:36.906
And so that's what I'm interested in

53:36.906 --> 53:38.739
investing in across , across our

53:38.739 --> 53:40.906
formation and really across all of the

53:40.906 --> 53:42.961
SOCOM formations . Thank you , sir .

53:44.580 --> 53:48.350
Senator Sheehy , you're recognized . Uh ,

53:48.419 --> 53:50.752
thanks , gentlemen for being here today .

53:50.752 --> 53:54.340
The , um , Core capabilities of our

53:54.340 --> 53:56.659
broader soft formations are never gonna

53:56.659 --> 53:58.715
change . Obviously we're never gonna

53:58.715 --> 54:00.659
get away from the basics and we're

54:00.659 --> 53:59.939
never gonna get away from the need for

53:59.939 --> 54:02.610
high quality individuals uh across the

54:02.610 --> 54:04.419
force . What will be constantly

54:04.419 --> 54:07.379
evolving is our need for technology and

54:07.379 --> 54:09.490
platforms that empower those missions

54:09.490 --> 54:11.601
like , you know , the next generation

54:11.601 --> 54:13.935
helicopter , next generation fixed wing ,

54:13.935 --> 54:16.101
uh , submersibles for both , uh , your

54:16.101 --> 54:18.212
formations , uh , in our force . So ,

54:18.212 --> 54:20.860
um , how can we . Uh , budget increase ,

54:20.939 --> 54:23.161
of course , uh , as Senator Budd said ,

54:23.161 --> 54:25.219
no question , we do need a massive

54:25.219 --> 54:27.275
increase in SOCOMs and the Component

54:27.275 --> 54:29.497
command's baseline budget , but how can

54:29.497 --> 54:31.830
we empower with acquisition authorities ,

54:31.830 --> 54:33.830
um , all of your components more so

54:33.830 --> 54:35.830
that we can make sure we're keeping

54:35.830 --> 54:38.108
pace with that those platform upgrades ,

54:38.108 --> 54:40.330
whether it's space , cyber , electronic

54:40.330 --> 54:42.163
warfare , spectrum , or physical

54:42.163 --> 54:44.219
mobility platforms to make sure that

54:44.219 --> 54:46.386
your forces are staying at the cutting

54:46.386 --> 54:46.340
edge . Well , what other acquisition

54:46.340 --> 54:49.500
authorities do you need ? Yes , sir .

54:49.550 --> 54:51.550
I'll , thank you for the question .

54:51.550 --> 54:53.328
I'll , I'll start for us , it's

54:53.328 --> 54:55.550
probably smaller scale than it is for ,

54:55.550 --> 54:57.883
for my teammate Mike here . But we , uh ,

54:57.883 --> 55:00.050
I touched on it earlier in answer to ,

55:00.050 --> 55:02.383
uh , Senator Ernst's question , but the ,

55:02.383 --> 55:04.360
our ability to adapt and evolve

55:05.370 --> 55:07.259
technology at the edge and not be

55:07.259 --> 55:08.870
locked by vendors because of

55:08.870 --> 55:11.092
acquisition authorities , not be locked

55:11.092 --> 55:13.259
into proprietary software , firmware ,

55:13.259 --> 55:15.370
sensors , those type of things , that

55:15.370 --> 55:17.370
will make a tremendous difference .

55:17.370 --> 55:19.426
When you look at the capability that

55:19.426 --> 55:21.537
our , our forces are going to need to

55:21.537 --> 55:23.648
be able to apply on the battlefield ,

55:23.648 --> 55:25.703
long range , one-way attack , strike

55:25.703 --> 55:28.320
capability , etc . Uh , that takes a

55:28.320 --> 55:30.879
lot of , a lot of activity at the

55:30.879 --> 55:33.101
tactical edge by the , by the operators

55:33.101 --> 55:35.323
as they continue to adapt and deal with

55:35.323 --> 55:37.212
the , with the threats that those

55:37.212 --> 55:39.323
systems are going to encounter on the

55:39.323 --> 55:41.379
battlefield . And with the current ,

55:41.379 --> 55:40.959
with the current acquisition

55:40.959 --> 55:43.719
authorities as they are , we are , we

55:43.719 --> 55:47.080
are stuck with , uh , proprietary

55:47.080 --> 55:49.191
solutions and , and vendors providing

55:49.191 --> 55:51.358
those capabilities . Thank you . Thank

55:51.358 --> 55:53.580
you for that question , Senator . I , I

55:53.580 --> 55:55.580
agree with Gil on this . Uh , but I

55:55.580 --> 55:57.802
would add , uh , it is one of the areas

55:57.802 --> 56:00.024
we're leaning hard into an AFSOC , uh ,

56:00.024 --> 56:01.913
is part of the Defense Autonomous

56:01.913 --> 56:04.080
Warfare Group is the , um , long-range

56:04.080 --> 56:06.136
one-way capabilities , uh , both air

56:06.136 --> 56:08.840
and , and ground launched . Um , we

56:08.840 --> 56:10.896
need , it might not be acquisition ,

56:10.896 --> 56:13.007
reform or change , but we need help ,

56:13.007 --> 56:16.000
uh , navigating through a system that

56:16.000 --> 56:18.333
is not used to buying a tradable things .

56:18.840 --> 56:21.179
Um , the , you know , we buy defense

56:21.179 --> 56:23.379
systems for life , and then , uh , you

56:23.379 --> 56:25.379
know , we , we go through years and

56:25.379 --> 56:27.268
years of sustainment . The future

56:27.268 --> 56:29.323
warfare needs more affordable , more

56:29.323 --> 56:31.268
tradable things that , uh , we can

56:31.268 --> 56:33.546
acknowledge that we're going to buy in ,

56:33.546 --> 56:35.729
in 6 months , a year , maybe 6 weeks ,

56:35.780 --> 56:37.891
they're going to be outdated . And so

56:37.891 --> 56:40.002
the , the , our processes are not set

56:40.002 --> 56:42.229
up to To move fast and , and

56:42.229 --> 56:44.350
acknowledge that , hey , this worked

56:44.350 --> 56:46.628
great last week , but next week , it's ,

56:46.628 --> 56:48.850
it's no longer the thing we need and we

56:48.850 --> 56:50.850
need to off-ramp that and bring new

56:50.850 --> 56:54.070
things on . Senator , thank you for

56:54.070 --> 56:56.560
that question . Uh , I , I would

56:56.560 --> 56:58.782
describe it as , as the ability to work

56:58.782 --> 57:00.893
with a , with a vendor , whether it's

57:00.893 --> 57:00.739
big or whether it's something that's

57:00.739 --> 57:03.159
emerging to harness technology and then

57:03.159 --> 57:05.159
be able to spiral develop that very

57:05.159 --> 57:07.429
quickly , uh , into a capability . And

57:07.429 --> 57:09.540
then as new technologies come along ,

57:09.590 --> 57:12.290
having the , the freedom of action to ,

57:12.310 --> 57:14.199
uh , upgrade to the , to the next

57:14.199 --> 57:16.366
capabilities as that comes along . The

57:16.366 --> 57:18.477
technology is out there , our ability

57:18.477 --> 57:18.310
to get our hands on it from a

57:18.310 --> 57:20.532
resourcing , and then the time it takes

57:20.532 --> 57:22.643
to turn that into a real capability .

57:22.643 --> 57:24.866
Uh , it's improving , but it's , it's ,

57:24.866 --> 57:28.530
it's too slow right now . Senator ,

57:28.610 --> 57:30.666
I'll just wrap it up by saying I , I

57:30.666 --> 57:32.999
think the top line increase at SOCOM is ,

57:32.999 --> 57:34.832
is responsible because as you're

57:34.832 --> 57:37.054
hearing from us , we divide and conquer

57:37.054 --> 57:38.943
to , to rapidly experiment across

57:39.129 --> 57:41.296
different domains and ensure we're not

57:41.296 --> 57:43.518
being redundant and then we collaborate

57:43.518 --> 57:45.685
and put these things , put the tools ,

57:45.709 --> 57:47.760
um , into a forward evaluation ,

57:48.120 --> 57:50.287
determine they work , and then share ,

57:50.550 --> 57:52.661
share the outcome of , of that work .

57:53.340 --> 57:55.451
Well , I think specifically for you ,

57:55.451 --> 57:57.729
Admiral , I think obviously I'm biased ,

57:57.729 --> 57:59.896
but , uh , you know , 70% of the world

57:59.896 --> 58:02.062
is , is water and the domain under the

58:02.062 --> 58:04.007
sea , uh , is an area that we have

58:04.007 --> 58:06.050
unique capabilities both within the

58:06.050 --> 58:08.161
special operations enterprise as well

58:08.161 --> 58:10.530
as just military-wide and , um , I , I

58:10.530 --> 58:12.909
think for too long we've , we've , uh ,

58:13.429 --> 58:15.596
taken , uh , for granted the fact that

58:15.596 --> 58:18.050
we have that capability , but when that .

58:19.070 --> 58:20.903
Capability is asked to become an

58:20.903 --> 58:23.870
enterprise with an up tempo reflective

58:23.870 --> 58:25.537
of what GWALT was , where the

58:25.537 --> 58:27.703
expectation is we can launch operators

58:27.703 --> 58:30.870
24/7 , 365 and missions wherever we

58:30.870 --> 58:33.300
need them . Um , our undersea

58:33.300 --> 58:35.578
enterprise doesn't have that yet , and ,

58:35.578 --> 58:37.522
and we need to get to that because

58:37.522 --> 58:39.522
that's the expectation that Admiral

58:39.522 --> 58:41.633
Paparo and others will have , uh , if

58:41.633 --> 58:43.856
we have to , uh , unfortunately fight a

58:43.856 --> 58:46.022
conflict in Westpac . So . Um , as you

58:46.022 --> 58:47.967
evaluate the undersea enterprise ,

58:47.967 --> 58:47.739
which of course is , is a unique

58:47.739 --> 58:50.179
component of this to your command , um ,

58:50.340 --> 58:52.300
what is it we can do to make sure

58:52.300 --> 58:54.467
you're prepared as possible for that ,

58:54.467 --> 58:56.522
for that conflict ? Yes , sir . Um ,

58:56.522 --> 58:58.411
while the expense of our undersea

58:58.411 --> 59:00.633
systems and , and , and our partnership

59:00.633 --> 59:02.744
and ability to develop , whether it's

59:02.744 --> 59:04.856
robotic vehicles or unmanned undersea

59:04.856 --> 59:07.078
vehicles that work in , in concert with

59:07.078 --> 59:09.300
the submarine force , just provide that

59:09.300 --> 59:11.356
tremendous capability that is , that

59:11.356 --> 59:13.244
can only be found in . Um , naval

59:13.244 --> 59:15.244
special warfare and our partnership

59:15.244 --> 59:17.411
with the subforce , so investments and

59:17.411 --> 59:19.522
then allowing us to iterate at a much

59:19.522 --> 59:21.689
faster rate to , to conduct operations

59:21.689 --> 59:23.800
multiple times a month vice what what

59:23.800 --> 59:26.600
used to be , um , once or twice a year ,

59:26.659 --> 59:29.780
um , is what will be necessary to get

59:29.780 --> 59:31.949
after the challenges in the undersea .

59:33.270 --> 59:35.270
Well , thanks , gentlemen . I would

59:35.270 --> 59:37.326
just reiterate from our level , um ,

59:37.326 --> 59:38.992
you know , no matter what the

59:38.992 --> 59:41.103
engagement looks like , no matter who

59:41.103 --> 59:43.214
the adversary is , whether it's a , a

59:43.214 --> 59:45.548
navy fight or an aviation fight or , uh ,

59:45.548 --> 59:47.750
uh , a ground war , uh , the soft

59:47.750 --> 59:49.917
button is always being pushed and it's

59:49.917 --> 59:52.139
being pushed faster and more often than

59:52.139 --> 59:54.472
it ever has before . Um , so your force ,

59:54.472 --> 59:56.694
your broader enterprise , um , is going

59:56.694 --> 59:58.806
to continue to be called on at , at a

59:58.806 --> 01:00:00.639
higher up tempo and for the most

01:00:00.639 --> 01:00:02.861
important missions possible , so . Uh ,

01:00:02.861 --> 01:00:04.917
be as vocal as you can with us about

01:00:04.917 --> 01:00:07.083
what you need because we need you guys

01:00:07.083 --> 01:00:09.306
more than ever and we need to make sure

01:00:09.306 --> 01:00:08.439
you have what you need to get the job

01:00:08.439 --> 01:00:10.760
done . So thanks . Thank you , Senator

01:00:10.760 --> 01:00:13.580
Sheehy . Senator Kelly . Well , it

01:00:13.580 --> 01:00:15.747
sounds like uh you're probably talking

01:00:15.747 --> 01:00:18.080
about where my question was going to be ,

01:00:18.080 --> 01:00:20.479
Admiral , um , about , uh , You know ,

01:00:20.600 --> 01:00:22.600
maritime unmanned systems , other

01:00:22.600 --> 01:00:25.229
advanced platforms that you need . I

01:00:25.229 --> 01:00:27.580
will just say I've been pushing my , uh ,

01:00:27.590 --> 01:00:29.812
Ships for America Act to try to rebuild

01:00:29.812 --> 01:00:31.919
the maritime industrial base here

01:00:31.919 --> 01:00:34.879
domestically , you know , so we can do

01:00:34.879 --> 01:00:37.046
improve shipbuilding , but that , that

01:00:37.046 --> 01:00:39.212
also extends to the , to the stuff you

01:00:39.212 --> 01:00:40.990
need , you know , those kind of

01:00:40.990 --> 01:00:43.046
capabilities we require , you know ,

01:00:43.046 --> 01:00:46.629
that , that workforce , um . Could you

01:00:46.629 --> 01:00:49.689
talk a little bit about . You know ,

01:00:49.770 --> 01:00:51.659
just so I know , and you may have

01:00:51.659 --> 01:00:53.881
already said this today , where are you

01:00:53.881 --> 01:00:56.800
today in , in underwater systems and

01:00:56.800 --> 01:00:58.856
other unmanned systems , and where ,

01:00:58.856 --> 01:01:00.967
where do you want to be , let's say 5

01:01:00.967 --> 01:01:04.129
or 10 years in the future ? Thank you ,

01:01:04.189 --> 01:01:07.050
Senator . Um , we , we have been making

01:01:07.050 --> 01:01:09.106
progress , um , in , in our undersea

01:01:09.106 --> 01:01:11.250
assets , but we have a significant

01:01:11.250 --> 01:01:13.060
build coming up in our , um ,

01:01:13.250 --> 01:01:15.409
multi-mission dry combat submersible

01:01:15.409 --> 01:01:17.465
which will partner with the Virginia

01:01:17.465 --> 01:01:19.830
class and give us access to , to nearly ,

01:01:20.290 --> 01:01:23.050
um , anywhere on the planet we need to

01:01:23.050 --> 01:01:25.199
go in the undersea and so that

01:01:25.199 --> 01:01:27.610
investment is just beginning , um , and

01:01:27.610 --> 01:01:30.540
so . Uh , that capability will return

01:01:30.540 --> 01:01:32.484
to , to a capability we had in the

01:01:32.484 --> 01:01:34.429
early 2000s , uh , that is just so

01:01:34.429 --> 01:01:37.000
strategically important that , um , the

01:01:37.000 --> 01:01:39.056
investment in both the platforms and

01:01:39.056 --> 01:01:41.056
the Milon that will be necessary to

01:01:41.056 --> 01:01:42.889
launch and recovery , launch and

01:01:42.889 --> 01:01:44.944
recovery of the platform is probably

01:01:44.944 --> 01:01:47.167
our most significant needs are , yeah .

01:01:47.167 --> 01:01:49.320
Have you given any thought to , this

01:01:49.320 --> 01:01:51.979
might sound crazy . I've , uh , you

01:01:51.979 --> 01:01:54.146
know , given a little thought as the ,

01:01:54.146 --> 01:01:56.312
uh , cost to , uh , to launch , to get

01:01:56.312 --> 01:01:59.379
into orbit continues to go down , and

01:01:59.379 --> 01:02:01.490
might go down significantly enough at

01:02:01.490 --> 01:02:03.379
some point . But if you guys ever

01:02:03.379 --> 01:02:05.601
wanted to get somewhere really , really

01:02:05.601 --> 01:02:07.823
fast , You know , if we were willing to

01:02:07.823 --> 01:02:10.389
commit , I'm , I'm talking maybe 1015 ,

01:02:10.489 --> 01:02:12.600
20 years from now , commit to keeping

01:02:12.600 --> 01:02:14.767
something somewhere on a pad and ready

01:02:14.767 --> 01:02:17.310
to go . You could get somewhere in 20

01:02:17.310 --> 01:02:20.500
minutes . You guys ever , ever , ever ,

01:02:20.709 --> 01:02:22.987
ever talk about like these crazy ideas ?

01:02:23.639 --> 01:02:25.909
I'll defer to my , my colleague here ,

01:02:26.000 --> 01:02:28.699
but uh . Senator , thanks for the

01:02:28.699 --> 01:02:30.977
questions . Good seeing you again , um .

01:02:31.649 --> 01:02:33.760
We're looking at it , um , you know ,

01:02:33.760 --> 01:02:35.760
we'd look at it from a rocket cargo

01:02:35.760 --> 01:02:37.816
type of a lens . How could we get it

01:02:37.816 --> 01:02:39.982
across the world , uh , in minutes and

01:02:39.982 --> 01:02:42.989
not days , um , but , uh , Not deep

01:02:42.989 --> 01:02:44.989
thought into it yet . We've , we've

01:02:44.989 --> 01:02:47.590
dabbled in some con op development and

01:02:47.590 --> 01:02:49.812
trying to figure out what it might look

01:02:49.812 --> 01:02:51.757
in order to , to service the , the

01:02:51.757 --> 01:02:53.923
other soft partners , but , uh , we're

01:02:53.923 --> 01:02:55.757
probably a ways away , uh , from

01:02:55.757 --> 01:02:57.790
investing ASock money in it . But I

01:02:57.790 --> 01:02:59.846
agree with you , it's , uh , it gets

01:02:59.846 --> 01:03:01.957
cheaper every day . Yeah , as it gets

01:03:01.957 --> 01:03:01.870
cheaper , it's something that we could

01:03:01.870 --> 01:03:04.092
even maybe get people on the other side

01:03:04.092 --> 01:03:06.314
of the planet very quickly , you know ,

01:03:06.314 --> 01:03:08.649
30 , basically 30 , 40 minutes anywhere ,

01:03:09.000 --> 01:03:12.429
um . I was thinking Navy .

01:03:14.149 --> 01:03:17.739
It's a ship . It's a spaceship , Tim .

01:03:21.000 --> 01:03:23.167
From seabed to space . I know , I know

01:03:23.167 --> 01:03:26.620
you would sign up to do this . Yeah ,

01:03:26.649 --> 01:03:30.489
yeah . Um , And then general ,

01:03:30.520 --> 01:03:33.459
um , you know , just on , um , the

01:03:33.459 --> 01:03:35.570
conversation we had a couple of weeks

01:03:35.570 --> 01:03:37.792
ago at the power projection wing , uh ,

01:03:37.792 --> 01:03:40.070
I was talking to Admiral Anderson , uh ,

01:03:40.070 --> 01:03:42.739
just today , you know , ACO commander

01:03:42.739 --> 01:03:45.909
about , um , the OA1K

01:03:46.780 --> 01:03:49.620
and the ability to , you know , with

01:03:49.620 --> 01:03:52.719
that platform , um , to be able to ,

01:03:53.100 --> 01:03:56.040
you know , put some effects on a target ,

01:03:56.050 --> 01:03:59.429
and it seems like It's , uh , well

01:03:59.429 --> 01:04:01.485
suited , obviously for special ops .

01:04:01.485 --> 01:04:03.707
That's why it's in the power projecting

01:04:03.707 --> 01:04:05.873
wing , wing here . Could you give me a

01:04:05.873 --> 01:04:08.040
little , um , update on where we are ,

01:04:09.070 --> 01:04:12.389
uh , with standing up the wing at Davis

01:04:12.389 --> 01:04:15.050
Mothin ? Yes , Senator , I , I

01:04:15.050 --> 01:04:17.217
certainly can . So , uh , we just took

01:04:17.217 --> 01:04:19.530
possession of our 18th OA1K . And I

01:04:19.530 --> 01:04:21.752
think from an operational perspective ,

01:04:21.752 --> 01:04:23.863
uh , you're right . Um , we , we have

01:04:23.863 --> 01:04:26.086
yet to put it into combat . We're still

01:04:26.086 --> 01:04:28.030
building out the initial cadre and

01:04:28.030 --> 01:04:30.308
training crews . I think it'll provide ,

01:04:30.308 --> 01:04:32.474
uh , combatant commanders a Swiss Army

01:04:32.474 --> 01:04:34.697
knife capability where one day it could

01:04:34.697 --> 01:04:36.969
do exquisite SIGI , collect intel , ISR

01:04:36.969 --> 01:04:38.969
things and also be armed with up to

01:04:38.969 --> 01:04:41.302
6000 pounds of payload , whether that's ,

01:04:41.302 --> 01:04:43.580
uh , Hellfires , rockets , uh , maybe

01:04:43.580 --> 01:04:45.691
some small cruise missiles that we're

01:04:45.691 --> 01:04:47.913
working on . So I think it , again , it

01:04:47.913 --> 01:04:49.747
provides , uh , the ground force

01:04:49.747 --> 01:04:51.858
commander lots of options , uh , at a

01:04:51.858 --> 01:04:53.913
very affordable , uh , price point .

01:04:54.020 --> 01:04:57.340
Flight hours that are roughly 50% , uh ,

01:04:57.699 --> 01:05:00.080
less cost per hour than an MQ-9 even .

01:05:00.659 --> 01:05:03.100
Um , as far as Davis-Monton , uh , we

01:05:03.100 --> 01:05:05.322
have already planted some seed corn out

01:05:05.322 --> 01:05:07.267
there with our personnel , uh , to

01:05:07.267 --> 01:05:09.267
build it out next summer . Um , our

01:05:09.267 --> 01:05:11.489
wing commander will take command of the

01:05:11.489 --> 01:05:13.711
wing out at Davis-Monton . Uh , we will

01:05:13.711 --> 01:05:15.878
get our first OA1K delivered out there

01:05:15.878 --> 01:05:18.360
later this fall . Our 1st 2 OA1

01:05:18.360 --> 01:05:20.870
operational OA1K squadrons will be at ,

01:05:20.909 --> 01:05:23.389
um , at Davis-Monton , and then we're

01:05:23.389 --> 01:05:25.278
working through the environmental

01:05:25.278 --> 01:05:27.389
analysis , uh , with a recommendation

01:05:27.389 --> 01:05:29.445
to move a CB-22 squadron out there .

01:05:29.590 --> 01:05:31.646
Great . I was in , I was in Jordan a

01:05:31.646 --> 01:05:34.090
couple years ago , and they had some

01:05:34.310 --> 01:05:36.620
sitting on the ramp . Some of the air

01:05:36.620 --> 01:05:39.459
tractors and um they had a lot of stuff

01:05:39.459 --> 01:05:42.209
hanging off of it . Thank you . Thank

01:05:42.209 --> 01:05:45.409
you , Senator Moody . Thank you so much .

01:05:45.570 --> 01:05:47.681
Great to see you , gentlemen . I will

01:05:47.681 --> 01:05:49.903
just note that I was born and raised in

01:05:49.903 --> 01:05:52.014
Hillsborough County , Florida , where

01:05:52.014 --> 01:05:54.348
SOCOM has been headquartered since 1987 ,

01:05:54.348 --> 01:05:56.610
since its inception . Great things come

01:05:56.610 --> 01:05:58.777
out of Hillsborough County , Florida .

01:05:58.777 --> 01:06:00.832
It's great to see you again . Uh , I

01:06:00.832 --> 01:06:02.888
was really interested in some of the

01:06:02.888 --> 01:06:06.090
comments that you made regarding the

01:06:06.090 --> 01:06:09.639
need to . The way we approach

01:06:09.639 --> 01:06:12.750
procurement of Um ,

01:06:13.739 --> 01:06:16.939
Weapons resources for the military and

01:06:16.939 --> 01:06:19.161
the way we look at that it might not be

01:06:19.161 --> 01:06:21.419
something we we get and we maintain for

01:06:21.419 --> 01:06:23.459
years and years and years uh it's a

01:06:23.459 --> 01:06:25.540
totally different mindset uh and you

01:06:25.540 --> 01:06:27.762
said we need to address that and then I

01:06:27.762 --> 01:06:30.020
think there was an also this um .

01:06:30.570 --> 01:06:32.792
Understanding that we need to have some

01:06:32.792 --> 01:06:34.737
more real time . Once we get these

01:06:34.737 --> 01:06:36.681
assets , we need to have some more

01:06:36.681 --> 01:06:38.737
real-time interaction with maybe the

01:06:38.737 --> 01:06:40.681
manufacturers as we're tweaking or

01:06:40.681 --> 01:06:42.681
maintaining or , you know , dealing

01:06:42.681 --> 01:06:44.570
with the technology or the actual

01:06:44.570 --> 01:06:46.729
hardware , um . And so I'm kind of

01:06:46.729 --> 01:06:48.896
going a little bit off what I intended

01:06:48.896 --> 01:06:51.062
to ask , and I'd like to hear from all

01:06:51.062 --> 01:06:53.340
of you , really , but specifically the ,

01:06:53.340 --> 01:06:55.540
the two that made those comments . Is

01:06:55.540 --> 01:06:57.780
it something that in our statutes we

01:06:57.780 --> 01:07:00.002
need to address regarding procurement ?

01:07:00.002 --> 01:07:02.002
Is it something within the military

01:07:02.002 --> 01:07:04.224
itself and how you go about doing those

01:07:04.224 --> 01:07:06.391
things ? Like , what is it that we can

01:07:06.391 --> 01:07:06.340
do to help with that ? You just talked

01:07:06.340 --> 01:07:08.562
about those issues that we need to kind

01:07:08.562 --> 01:07:10.729
of reframe how we approach it , and we

01:07:10.729 --> 01:07:12.840
need to have more engagement with the

01:07:12.840 --> 01:07:14.951
manufacturers . So how do we help you

01:07:14.951 --> 01:07:16.784
build on that as opposed to just

01:07:16.784 --> 01:07:18.896
commenting that it's a problem ? What

01:07:18.896 --> 01:07:20.951
can we do tangibly to help you solve

01:07:20.951 --> 01:07:23.007
that ? And we'll just start down and

01:07:23.007 --> 01:07:25.118
work . Yes , ma'am , with , without ,

01:07:25.260 --> 01:07:27.709
without diving into statutory

01:07:27.709 --> 01:07:30.239
authorities that I will be , uh ,

01:07:30.469 --> 01:07:33.389
unfamiliar with . The , the biggest

01:07:33.389 --> 01:07:35.590
challenge that , that we face , at

01:07:35.590 --> 01:07:37.750
least within the majority of our

01:07:37.750 --> 01:07:41.719
formations is . The , it's the

01:07:41.719 --> 01:07:44.540
inability of the operator at the edge

01:07:44.760 --> 01:07:47.429
to have the authority to tinker . I

01:07:47.429 --> 01:07:49.485
would use that word , to tinker with

01:07:49.485 --> 01:07:52.389
the system . Uh , if , if a system is

01:07:52.389 --> 01:07:56.040
employed and it fails , uh , we don't

01:07:56.040 --> 01:07:59.179
have the ability to , to , to apply .

01:07:59.659 --> 01:08:02.020
The , the know-how that our individuals

01:08:02.020 --> 01:08:04.820
have , the expertise that they , they ,

01:08:04.939 --> 01:08:07.340
they have , uh , both for their , their

01:08:07.340 --> 01:08:09.451
craft and , and potentially even that

01:08:09.451 --> 01:08:13.139
particular system to develop solutions

01:08:13.139 --> 01:08:14.989
to potentially resolve whatever

01:08:14.989 --> 01:08:17.211
challenge that system is having . And ,

01:08:17.211 --> 01:08:19.322
uh , specifically , I'm thinking of ,

01:08:19.322 --> 01:08:21.378
of UAA , you know , unmanned systems

01:08:21.378 --> 01:08:23.322
right now , mainly unmanned aerial

01:08:23.322 --> 01:08:26.500
systems . And so , So we're , we are

01:08:26.500 --> 01:08:30.459
bound right now to , uh , to

01:08:30.459 --> 01:08:32.819
the actual vendor of that system , uh ,

01:08:32.899 --> 01:08:35.010
that has the proprietary capability .

01:08:35.010 --> 01:08:38.240
And so , uh , so what we're looking for

01:08:38.240 --> 01:08:40.459
is an ability for our people at the

01:08:40.459 --> 01:08:43.770
edge to have the right to repair . I

01:08:43.770 --> 01:08:45.826
know the , the Secretary of the Army

01:08:45.826 --> 01:08:48.159
spoke about that earlier today . That's ,

01:08:48.159 --> 01:08:50.159
that's really what we're driving at

01:08:50.159 --> 01:08:52.103
with , with our , with most of our

01:08:52.103 --> 01:08:54.270
formation , ma'am . Thanks , Senator .

01:08:54.270 --> 01:08:56.492
It's good to see you again . The , um ,

01:08:56.492 --> 01:08:58.714
I would expand on that . So from an Air

01:08:58.714 --> 01:09:00.770
Force lens , I get , I don't know if

01:09:00.770 --> 01:09:02.659
it's , I could speak to statutory

01:09:02.659 --> 01:09:04.826
changes , but from an Air Force lens ,

01:09:04.826 --> 01:09:06.992
we tend to buy things for many years ,

01:09:06.992 --> 01:09:09.048
you know , so if you look at the Air

01:09:09.048 --> 01:09:11.103
Force fleet right now , not just the

01:09:11.103 --> 01:09:10.649
AFSOC fleet , which is relatively

01:09:10.649 --> 01:09:12.871
healthy compared to the rest of the Air

01:09:12.871 --> 01:09:14.871
Force . We're , we're flying planes

01:09:14.871 --> 01:09:17.370
that are 50 , 60 , 70 years old . Um ,

01:09:17.459 --> 01:09:20.220
and what I have in my large fleet of ,

01:09:20.299 --> 01:09:22.188
I'll , I'll just use C-130s as an

01:09:22.188 --> 01:09:24.021
example . I've got two exquisite

01:09:24.021 --> 01:09:26.243
variants of that that I can do a lot of

01:09:26.243 --> 01:09:28.410
things with . I want to be able to use

01:09:28.410 --> 01:09:30.132
untapped capacity within those

01:09:30.132 --> 01:09:32.339
airframes to do new things . So if I

01:09:32.339 --> 01:09:35.029
want to put , um , a long-range small

01:09:35.029 --> 01:09:37.259
cruise missile on one of those aircraft

01:09:37.259 --> 01:09:39.379
that can fire at a target 50 , 600 ,

01:09:39.439 --> 01:09:41.770
700 miles away . Uh , I want to be able

01:09:41.770 --> 01:09:43.714
to iterate quickly on the software

01:09:43.714 --> 01:09:45.603
within that . And as , as General

01:09:45.603 --> 01:09:47.826
Ferguson mentioned , often working with

01:09:47.826 --> 01:09:49.770
the large vendors , uh , there's ,

01:09:49.770 --> 01:09:51.937
there's proprietary information to get

01:09:51.937 --> 01:09:53.992
into the mission computers . Uh , we

01:09:53.992 --> 01:09:56.048
hit , we hit walls , uh , that small

01:09:56.048 --> 01:09:58.103
vendors that are trying to move fast

01:09:58.103 --> 01:10:00.214
and give us those capabilities , uh ,

01:10:00.214 --> 01:10:02.381
sometimes get outmuscled by the , uh ,

01:10:02.381 --> 01:10:04.548
the bigger , the bigger vendors , uh ,

01:10:04.548 --> 01:10:06.826
and they can't break through . Um , so ,

01:10:06.826 --> 01:10:08.714
Uh , that doesn't mean the bigger

01:10:08.714 --> 01:10:08.589
vendors aren't great partners . It's

01:10:08.589 --> 01:10:11.140
just the business model that they use .

01:10:11.229 --> 01:10:12.930
And so any help we could get

01:10:13.189 --> 01:10:15.709
encouraging , uh , again , uh , the

01:10:15.709 --> 01:10:17.709
ability to , to partner with , with

01:10:17.709 --> 01:10:19.598
smaller companies on the , on the

01:10:19.598 --> 01:10:21.876
offline , that would be really helpful .

01:10:21.876 --> 01:10:24.098
I think . I would really like to know .

01:10:24.098 --> 01:10:23.540
I think my colleagues would like to

01:10:23.540 --> 01:10:25.890
know which big vendors you're speaking

01:10:25.890 --> 01:10:27.946
of that are making it harder for our

01:10:27.946 --> 01:10:30.168
military men and women to do their jobs

01:10:30.168 --> 01:10:32.334
because they cannot address what we've

01:10:32.334 --> 01:10:34.890
spent so much money acquiring to . Make

01:10:34.890 --> 01:10:36.810
it work for what we need in a

01:10:36.810 --> 01:10:39.299
particular mission or in a modification .

01:10:39.729 --> 01:10:41.951
I would be very interested to know what

01:10:41.951 --> 01:10:44.118
are the top folks that are giving us a

01:10:44.118 --> 01:10:45.118
hard time . OK .

01:10:48.100 --> 01:10:50.267
Senator , thank you for the question .

01:10:50.267 --> 01:10:52.520
Uh , as I talked about before , um ,

01:10:52.859 --> 01:10:55.520
you know , having the ability , uh , to

01:10:55.609 --> 01:10:59.410
be able to , uh , uh . Acquire new

01:10:59.410 --> 01:11:01.740
technologies quickly whether it's from

01:11:01.740 --> 01:11:03.851
a small vendor or whether it's from a

01:11:03.851 --> 01:11:05.962
more traditional vendor , and then be

01:11:05.962 --> 01:11:07.796
able to incorporate that into an

01:11:07.796 --> 01:11:10.018
operational capability . The quicker we

01:11:10.018 --> 01:11:12.184
can do that , the better it would be .

01:11:12.184 --> 01:11:14.073
A great example would be , uh , I

01:11:14.073 --> 01:11:16.296
talked about before , our ability to do

01:11:16.296 --> 01:11:18.184
targeting at scale , leveraging a

01:11:18.184 --> 01:11:20.351
variety of sensors , to be able to put

01:11:20.351 --> 01:11:22.573
it onto one pane of glass and interface

01:11:22.573 --> 01:11:24.796
with the with the joint fires network .

01:11:24.796 --> 01:11:27.018
No , our partnership with that was with

01:11:27.018 --> 01:11:26.669
a relatively small company that was

01:11:26.669 --> 01:11:28.939
unknown that was just really an

01:11:28.939 --> 01:11:31.689
emerging , uh , name in the , uh , uh ,

01:11:31.709 --> 01:11:33.830
in the AI AI field . So it's really a

01:11:33.830 --> 01:11:36.108
software thing , you know , they had a ,

01:11:36.108 --> 01:11:37.997
you know , they had a basically a

01:11:37.997 --> 01:11:40.052
capability , not necessarily purpose

01:11:40.052 --> 01:11:42.274
built for our , what we needed it for ,

01:11:42.274 --> 01:11:42.149
but the partnership that we had with

01:11:42.149 --> 01:11:44.316
them has allowed us to be able to move

01:11:44.316 --> 01:11:46.371
forward in the development that in a

01:11:46.371 --> 01:11:48.427
perfect world or in a better world ,

01:11:48.427 --> 01:11:50.427
we'd be able to do that and move it

01:11:50.427 --> 01:11:52.427
quicker to a , to a real . The same

01:11:52.427 --> 01:11:54.427
thing could be said at the tactical

01:11:54.427 --> 01:11:56.371
side , you know , where are people

01:11:56.371 --> 01:11:58.427
fight in the future , you know , the

01:11:58.427 --> 01:11:58.120
folks across the field for them are

01:11:58.120 --> 01:12:00.009
going to have capabilities at the

01:12:00.009 --> 01:12:01.953
tactical edge that we haven't seen

01:12:01.953 --> 01:12:04.064
before . You know , when you see some

01:12:04.064 --> 01:12:06.176
of the stuff that the cartels have or

01:12:06.176 --> 01:12:08.231
the things that we see al-Shabaab or

01:12:08.231 --> 01:12:07.390
some of the other people of that ilk .

01:12:09.020 --> 01:12:11.669
A great example would be small UASs ,

01:12:11.750 --> 01:12:13.861
right ? They're out there . I can buy

01:12:13.861 --> 01:12:16.028
them right now . I can put them in the

01:12:16.028 --> 01:12:17.861
hands of our operators , but the

01:12:17.861 --> 01:12:20.028
ability to kind of adapt them and make

01:12:20.028 --> 01:12:22.250
them a real military capability at some

01:12:22.250 --> 01:12:24.472
form of scale is very challenging right

01:12:24.472 --> 01:12:26.583
now . So anything that we can do , of

01:12:26.583 --> 01:12:28.694
course , on the military side , we'll

01:12:28.694 --> 01:12:30.861
do our part , but anything that allows

01:12:30.861 --> 01:12:32.806
us to move faster from a statutory

01:12:32.806 --> 01:12:32.569
perspective would be very helpful .

01:12:32.750 --> 01:12:35.520
Thank you . I , I don't , they're

01:12:35.520 --> 01:12:37.742
telling me my time has expired , so I'm

01:12:37.742 --> 01:12:39.964
trying to be mindful . Not that I don't

01:12:39.964 --> 01:12:39.439
want to hear all that you have . No ,

01:12:39.560 --> 01:12:41.449
actually , Admiral , if you would

01:12:41.449 --> 01:12:45.200
respond , please . Thank you . I , I

01:12:45.200 --> 01:12:47.311
think , I think the team covered it .

01:12:47.311 --> 01:12:49.478
Um , it is , it is challenging because

01:12:49.478 --> 01:12:51.478
we are , we have a high expectation

01:12:51.478 --> 01:12:53.422
we're forcing whether it's a small

01:12:53.422 --> 01:12:55.589
company or a mid-grade company to , to

01:12:55.600 --> 01:12:57.919
iterate with us , um , with no true

01:12:57.919 --> 01:12:59.919
commitment to a number of platforms

01:12:59.919 --> 01:13:02.141
until they deliver . So a little bit of

01:13:02.141 --> 01:13:04.141
a paradigm shift from a requirement

01:13:04.141 --> 01:13:06.308
through a long dwell program where the

01:13:06.308 --> 01:13:08.475
whoever the business or company is has

01:13:08.475 --> 01:13:10.308
a multi-year expectation of , of

01:13:10.308 --> 01:13:14.250
payment . Mhm Wonderful , and I'll

01:13:14.250 --> 01:13:16.194
turn to the ranking member for any

01:13:16.194 --> 01:13:18.361
closing comments . Thank you for being

01:13:18.361 --> 01:13:20.583
here . Thank you for all you're doing .

01:13:20.583 --> 01:13:22.917
I know you're incredibly busy . Um , uh ,

01:13:23.009 --> 01:13:25.065
appreciate your time and what you do

01:13:25.065 --> 01:13:28.680
every day . Absolutely , very quickly ,

01:13:29.810 --> 01:13:31.810
very quickly , Senator Sheehy , you

01:13:31.810 --> 01:13:34.032
have a cocktail hour to be at . We have

01:13:34.032 --> 01:13:36.609
an ag committee . All right , uh , uh ,

01:13:36.779 --> 01:13:39.001
what year of car do you drive , General

01:13:39.001 --> 01:13:42.819
Connolly ? Depends on the

01:13:42.819 --> 01:13:44.930
day . What's your daily driver ? Uh ,

01:13:45.149 --> 01:13:47.729
sometimes it's a 1998 Jeep Wrangler .

01:13:47.939 --> 01:13:51.830
Other times it's a 2025 Ty ride .

01:13:51.979 --> 01:13:55.479
How about you , Gil ? I got a 2004

01:13:55.479 --> 01:13:59.430
Chevy Suburban . And a 2016 Chevy SS .

01:13:59.870 --> 01:14:01.926
What's the average age of the little

01:14:01.926 --> 01:14:04.430
birds , helicopters that are under your

01:14:04.430 --> 01:14:06.779
purview ? Much older than that . What's

01:14:06.779 --> 01:14:09.359
the average age of your C-130 airframes ?

01:14:09.569 --> 01:14:11.791
We're , we're blessed on the C-130 side

01:14:11.791 --> 01:14:14.125
because we've recapped our entire fleet .

01:14:14.125 --> 01:14:16.291
So most of them are , are less than 10

01:14:16.291 --> 01:14:18.402
years old . All of them are less than

01:14:18.402 --> 01:14:18.270
10 years old , so we're blessed there .

01:14:18.390 --> 01:14:20.557
I can't complain when I look across to

01:14:20.557 --> 01:14:22.668
my Air Force teammates . When was the

01:14:22.668 --> 01:14:24.668
last time you got an iPhone , a new

01:14:24.668 --> 01:14:27.100
iPhone ? Two years ago , right , yeah ,

01:14:27.220 --> 01:14:29.387
so we upgrade our , the average age of

01:14:29.387 --> 01:14:32.259
a US airliner is 15 years that carries

01:14:32.259 --> 01:14:34.426
passengers . Most of us probably get a

01:14:34.426 --> 01:14:36.537
new smartphone every other year , and

01:14:36.537 --> 01:14:38.537
most of us probably drive cars less

01:14:38.537 --> 01:14:40.537
than 10 years old . Yet we send our

01:14:40.537 --> 01:14:42.703
best troops into combat on helicopters

01:14:42.703 --> 01:14:44.926
that are . Half century old , sometimes

01:14:44.926 --> 01:14:47.092
maybe a little less . Uh , we wouldn't

01:14:47.092 --> 01:14:49.203
drive to work every day in a car that

01:14:49.203 --> 01:14:51.315
old , but we send our guys down range

01:14:51.315 --> 01:14:53.481
in helicopters that old , and we drive

01:14:53.481 --> 01:14:55.592
many subs that were around when Nixon

01:14:55.592 --> 01:14:57.870
was president . So , um , I think , uh ,

01:14:57.870 --> 01:15:00.092
we , we make do a lot of amazing things

01:15:00.092 --> 01:15:02.315
with little stuff . It's time we , we ,

01:15:02.315 --> 01:15:04.537
uh , get the force they need . Thanks .

01:15:06.049 --> 01:15:08.160
Yes , thank you gentlemen . Uh , this

01:15:08.160 --> 01:15:10.959
is my 12th year in the Senate , all 12

01:15:10.959 --> 01:15:12.737
years I've served served on the

01:15:12.737 --> 01:15:14.626
emerging threats and capabilities

01:15:14.626 --> 01:15:17.689
Subcommittee , and as I close out this

01:15:17.689 --> 01:15:19.745
year in my time in the United States

01:15:19.745 --> 01:15:21.911
Senate , I just wanna say thank you so

01:15:21.911 --> 01:15:25.049
much . Um , I have served , uh , as a

01:15:25.049 --> 01:15:27.330
member of the Senate alongside some of

01:15:27.330 --> 01:15:30.049
the most incredible leaders that SOCOM .

01:15:30.430 --> 01:15:34.060
Has offered up to our nation and truly

01:15:34.060 --> 01:15:36.759
appreciate each one of you , uh , to

01:15:36.759 --> 01:15:39.149
your senior enlisted members , to all

01:15:39.149 --> 01:15:40.982
of your teammates , your support

01:15:40.982 --> 01:15:43.029
personnel , the civilians that work

01:15:43.029 --> 01:15:45.589
across the force , you know , our , our

01:15:45.589 --> 01:15:48.790
deepest thanks to all of them we often

01:15:48.790 --> 01:15:51.660
think in terms of , uh , actions in

01:15:51.660 --> 01:15:53.716
conflict , you know , how many enemy

01:15:53.716 --> 01:15:56.053
killed and so forth , but . I would

01:15:56.053 --> 01:15:58.533
love to know someday the statistic on

01:15:58.533 --> 01:16:01.893
how many lives have been saved through

01:16:01.893 --> 01:16:04.393
the actions of SOCOM and your members

01:16:04.732 --> 01:16:06.788
because we truly don't focus on that

01:16:06.788 --> 01:16:10.413
enough we ask a lot of you and

01:16:10.413 --> 01:16:14.333
uh God willing you always produce and

01:16:14.333 --> 01:16:16.500
thank you so much uh for your time and

01:16:16.500 --> 01:16:19.353
service uh for being here with us today

01:16:19.612 --> 01:16:22.996
and it has been . Such a privilege uh

01:16:22.996 --> 01:16:25.636
to be with all of you and if I can ask

01:16:25.636 --> 01:16:27.715
of a chairman's favor , it is a

01:16:27.715 --> 01:16:30.496
tradition that we take a photo , um ,

01:16:30.516 --> 01:16:33.116
with all of our commanders and SOCOM as

01:16:33.116 --> 01:16:35.338
well as their senior enlisted members .

01:16:35.338 --> 01:16:37.505
If you brought chiefs , if you brought

01:16:37.505 --> 01:16:39.616
whoever with you , uh , let's include

01:16:39.616 --> 01:16:41.727
them in a final photo as well but God

01:16:41.727 --> 01:16:43.894
bless you all and to your entire teams

01:16:43.894 --> 01:16:45.894
we truly appreciate you thank you .

01:16:49.330 --> 01:16:51.330
And that concludes the subcommittee

01:16:51.330 --> 01:16:51.600
hearing .