WEBVTT

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When I was serving in Southwest Asia ,

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I received a call that said I was going

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to be coming over to UsurPAC to

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stand up the 311 Theater Signal Command

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here as UsurPAC expanded its capacity

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to serve the PECOM commander . So

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I left my assignment there , came over

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here , uh , I actually came to Fort

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Meade , Maryland , which is where the

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311th was originally situated , and was

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told that we're going to bring the unit

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over here . So myself and several of

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the soldiers from the 311th there in

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Fort Meade came over to do our recon ,

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find out what life is going to be like

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for us over here . And then made plans

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to to not only close the unit out but

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to bring the unit over here and is to

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be a multi-compo unit so we went from

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being a total reserve unit to being a

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multi-compo unit serving the usur PAC

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commander .

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It was really exciting here at Fort

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Shafter because nobody really knew how

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things were going to go . It was really

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a pickup game for us . There wasn't any

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plans , uh , any quarters or office

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space that had been dedicated because

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we hadn't been planned on at the outset

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of when Fort Shafter was constructed ,

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but we went ahead and got a small

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office space . There was only basically

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about 5 or 6 of us that were here at

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the time , and you can imagine . Going

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from 5 or 6 people to standing up a

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full theater signal command was going

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to be quite a challenge , but we're

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signal soldiers and we're up for the

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challenge for anything . So with the

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hard work , creativity , and

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entrepreneurialism of the people that

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had already been assigned to the unit .

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We came here and UsurPAC opened its

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doors for us when we first got here

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because there were no quarters , we

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stayed in the caves , the World War II

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caves , the bunker caves that were here .

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We stayed there for about 3 weeks until

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they could get some temporary quarters

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available for us because of my status

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at the time , um . I was not authorized

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to live in the quarters there on Palm

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Circle , so I was living in temporary

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quarters both at Trippler and here at

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Fort Shafter . Uh , in the two years

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that I served here , I moved 12 times ,

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but , uh , it keeps you humble , uh ,

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and you're focused on your business

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when you're trying to stand up a unit

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of that size . As a unit , we didn't

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have any communications equipment

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assigned to us . The only

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communications we had were cell phones

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and telephones . Our subordinate units

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were the ones that had the equipment .

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We had the 307 Signal Battalion , uh ,

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from Schofield Barracks . We had units ,

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of course , out in the Pacific over in

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Japan and Korea . So first of all it

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was where are all the units and going

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and introducing ourselves to the units ,

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meeting the commanders , learning about

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what the challenges were that each of

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our signal units had in the various

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areas around the Pacific , and coming

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back and starting on plans , war

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plans for the different regional ,

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the different regions , and as you all

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know . Uh , every one of these regions

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that we support is different whether

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it's cultural , geographic , political ,

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economic , so all of those factors had

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to be taken into consideration when we

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went to try to expand the network .

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There was no theater operations network

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here for us at the time . NETCOM and

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Department of the Army civilians came

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to help us get an operational network

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architecture designed . That was a big ,

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big lift for us , and we also were

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participants in the exercises in Japan ,

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Korea , here on the island with FEMA .

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Um , that was wonderful , wonderful

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experience both for the members of the

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reserve unit that were assigned to the

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311th , but also our active duty

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soldiers that were there . We blended

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into a competent operational unit that

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I think . Earned respect from uh our

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our customers uh because .

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That was , that's the main purpose is

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to make sure that our customers can ,

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can communicate effectively and

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reliably . There were new pieces of

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equipment , new signal systems that

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were brought into theater that we had a

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chance to go ahead and implement , uh ,

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throughout the exercises and to improve

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the capability and readiness of user

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PAC as a whole by making a more robust

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signal uh infrastructure here for the

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Pacific .

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Command Sergeant Major Capps was my

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right arm . Um , there was not much

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daylight in between us . He did an

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excellent job , uh , mentoring younger

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soldiers and bringing the sergeants ,

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um , senior NCOs along . There was , uh ,

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I think , good loyalty and respect up

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and down the chain , uh , with our

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enlisted soldiers and NCOs with

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Sergeant Major Caps , and I very much

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appreciate the fact that he was willing

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to stand up and take a heavy , heavy

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load in one of the last years of his .

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His career .

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Personally for me it's all about the

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soldiers and the most rewarding moments

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are when you get to go and meet the

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soldiers where they live , where they

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work , and you see the fantastic

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creativity and the dedication to the

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mission no matter whether we gave them

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a good place to be or it was some place

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that they had to just make the best out

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of it . There was never any complaints .

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They were happy to show me what it is

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they were able to do . I enjoyed

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sitting down and having meals with them ,

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learning about what was going on with

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their families , what school they were

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going to , what they would like their

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next duty assignment to be , so that's

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where my heart is , it's with the

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soldiers and because the soldiers .

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made sure that Our mission was

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accomplished . I was able to focus

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upward to the usur PAC commander and

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also to the needs of the Paycom , uh ,

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the Paycom J-6 .

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I'm sure this is going to sound

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egotistical , but , um , I remember a

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quote on , I don't think I can quote it

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correctly from , uh , General

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Eisenhower , which is that Congress can

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make a man a general , but

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communications makes him a commander ,

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and so you can have all the equipment ,

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you can have the network . Uh , but if

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you don't have someone who knows how to

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install it , operate it , maintain it ,

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and fight for it when it's under duress ,

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then you're not going to have any

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command and control whatsoever . So for

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me , even though I know combat arms are ,

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uh , the top of the , the top of the

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list usually in terms of how the army

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thinks about its combat power , there's

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no combat power without the

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communicators . So signal all the way

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pro patria vigilance .

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I'd like to take this time to think .

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The staff members of the 311 Theater

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Signal Command , in particular Colonel

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Edrick Kirkman , Colonel Michelle

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Bollinger , Colonel Tom Cole , Colonel

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Frank Stewart , and all the senior NCOs

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and soldiers that made the 311 Theater

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Signal Command , that fantastic ,

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robust communications organization that

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it is now , and I know that it is a

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respected , revered component of the

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USSARC , uh , excuse me , the UAPPAC ,

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uh , team .