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CONTEXT AND CAPABILITIES IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

Cover Story

ARTICLES

DEPARTMENTS

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School

MISSION: Recruit, assess, select, train and educate the U.S. Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers by providing superior training and education, relevant doctrine, effective career management and an integrated force-development capability.

VISION: As a world-class special-operations training center and school, we will build a well-educated and professionally trained force with the intuitive abilities to work through or with indigenous partner forces. We will develop innovative, relevant doctrine, informed by insightful future concepts, to produce an agile, adaptive force. We will ensure that our country has a full-spectrum special-operations force prepared to address the diverse range of threats posed by an uncertain 21st-century environment.

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Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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FROM THE COMMANDANT

The future of our regiments is predicated upon our ability to produce adaptive special-operations-forces leaders who have leadership qualities based upon humility, critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity, acceptance of prudent but calculated risks and the ability to make rapid adjustments based upon a continuous assessment of the situation. These leaders must be highly trained in warrior skills and highly educated.

It is our job at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School to train Soldiers to those demanding standards. As the new commander of SWCS, I intend to ensure that we never lose sight of our vision of building a well-educated and professionally trained force that can work through and with our partner nations.

There are several priorities for achieving that vision: First, and most important, we must professionalize the force by providing quality instruction, enhancing the capabilities of regional studies and education and developing advanced programs that allow members of the force to function as master practitioners. We must be proactive in curriculum design, integrating training developers and battle-tested instructors to ensure that we maintain the relevance of our instruction. We must develop new courses, including assessment and selection courses for Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations. We must develop capabilities for the future, including modernizing the force structure, developing new doctrine and building an updated structure for SWCS that reflects where we need to be in the future. We need to better synchronize our efforts, using knowledge-management techniques to speed up collaboration and eliminate redundancy and overlapping efforts.

These priorities are not ideals that merely sound good on a briefing slide, but a roadmap to guide our efforts, and we are already achieving some of them. In the area of professionalizing the force, for example, we are already taking steps to allow our students to receive college degrees as they progress through their training. As the article in this issue of *Special Warfare* shows, students in our qualification courses will soon be able to earn credit toward an associate's degree. That degree can then be applied toward a bachelor's degree that they can pursue while continuing to serve their normal assignments, which will ultimately qualify them for a master's-degree program to be offered through collaboration between SWCS and the National Defense University. (The first SWCS-sponsored NDU master's program will begin Sept. 10.)

We have also begun our intermediate language-training program to increase students' proficiency in language and give them a more in-depth, greater understanding of the region and culture they will encounter. The intermediate program now covers four languages; in January we are scheduled to add three more, and the program will eventually cover all 17 core languages.

The success of our force will depend not only upon our ability to select and qualify Soldiers in ARSOF specialties but also to give them the education and training in advanced skills, language and culture that will give them the flexibility and adaptability that are the hallmarks of special operations.

Brigadier General Bennet S. Sacolick

Combat-proven Special Forces Soldiers Receive Medals for Valor

Fifty-eight Soldiers of the 7th Special Forces Group were honored in an awards ceremony at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School July 16 for valorous actions during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Major General Michael Repass, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, presented 19 Bronze Star Medals for valor, 24 Army Commendations Medals for valor, and 18 Purple Hearts at a formation viewed by fellow Soldiers, family members and friends.

"They may not tell you about their exploits, but these are humble men of uncommon valor," said Repass. "Each Soldier in front of us, in addition to those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, has distinguished himself as a true hero, unquestionably deserving of our nation's gratitude."

In Afghanistan, 7th SF Group Soldiers were integrated into the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan to conduct operations during Operation Enduring Freedom.

"No one here considers themselves to be better than one another," said Sgt. 1st Class Matthew Acosta, a 2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group SF medic, who was awarded the Bronze Star with "V" device for actions in support of his fellow Soldiers and against the enemy in Oruzgan, Afghanistan. "Medals we receive in the homeland reflect our actions as a whole in troubled parts of the world." — *7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Public Affairs Office.*

Bronze Star with "V" Device

SSG Michael Anderson	SSG Emmanuel Lenau*	SSG Michael Eynon
MSG David Armstrong*	SSG Hans Peterson	SSG Michael Jones
SFC Keith Batchelder	SSG Jacob Wilson	CPT Ryan Kortze
MAJ Christopher Cole	SSG Matthew Acosta*	MSG Richard Rodriguez
SSG Martin Fields*	SFC Jason Connors	SSG Joshua Wathen
SFC Steven Hill	SSG Anthony Dechristopher	*Also received Purple Heart
SFC Joseph Kenkel	SFC Spencer Evans	

10th SF Group Officer Wins MacArthur Leadership Award

The U.S. Army recently selected Captain Erhan Bedestani of the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, headquartered at Panzer Kaserne, Germany, as one of 13 active-duty commissioned company-grade officers to receive the 2009 MacArthur Award. With more than 22,000 captains in the active-duty force, the selection places him among the most elite who demonstrate the ideals for which General MacArthur stood: duty, honor and country.

The award promotes and sustains effective junior officer leadership within the Army, but what does it take to earn it? The answer is unparalleled leadership, and the secret to leadership, according to Bedestani, involves treating people with respect, not being afraid to ask questions and trusting in NCOs to lead and make a decision.

"Leaders are created as the by-product of the time, effort and energy NCOs put into their development," said Bedestani when asked about what it takes to be a great leader. "It's pretty tough not to be a successful leader when you have a team of all-stars."

Following the SF Qualification Course, the Army sent Bedestani to Germany with the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, where he currently commands the battalion's Headquarters and Support Company.

Prior to his current command, Bedestani deployed three times to Africa and then twice to Afghanistan during his 30 months as a detachment commander.

SWCS Expands and Intensifies Foreign Language Program

To better provide Army special-operations Soldiers with advanced language and cultural skills, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, launched the initial class of its intermediate language program Feb. 22.

The new language training is an intensive 28-week program designed to bring Soldiers from a language-proficiency level of 1/1(listening/speaking) to a level of 2/2, based on the two-skill oral-proficiency interview developed by the Interagency Language Roundtable. The program features classroom-based language instruction as well as 220 contact hours of training designed to give students a more comprehensive understanding of the culture and the region in which the language is spoken. As it further develops the curriculum for each course, SWCS will incorporate military-performance tasks that require language proficiency. Students will also be required to apply their language and cultural competency during isolation-immersion events that use role-players in real-world scenarios.

The pilot class, which graduated Aug. 27, consists of 40 students being trained in Pashto, Persian-Dari, Urdu and Arabic-Iraqi. The second class began July 6 and consists of 39 selected graduates of recent Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses. Students in that class are scheduled to graduate Jan. 21.

The program will add three languages in January: Persian-Farsi, Chinese-Mandarin and Russian, to expand its scope and to encompass additional geographic regions. Based upon the needs of the force, SWCS will continue to add languages until all the 17 core languages taught in the SWCS initial acquisition program have been included. To complete the spectrum of language proficiency, SWCS is also planning to build upon the intermediate program to develop advanced language courses.

Developed in accordance with guidance from the commanders of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, the intermediate language program is projected to train 160 Soldiers annually. That projection will be assessed regularly and adjusted based on the needs and priorities of USASOC's subordinate commands and units. Soldiers' requests for enrollment may be supported based on coordination with those units. Interested personnel will be able to apply through the Army Training Request and Reservations System once course validation has been completed. — *By Terry L. Schnurr, SWCS Directorate of Regional Studies and Education.*

Sacolick takes command of SWCS

Brigadier General Bennet S. Sacolick, the new commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, did not mince words in his change of command ceremony on Tuesday, Aug. 17 at Fort Bragg's John F. Kennedy Plaza.

"It may not be evident in the brevity of my speech, but I'd like to assure all of you that I have a profound appreciation for this organization's mission and purpose," he said during the ceremony to an audience of Soldiers and distinguished guests.

"I'm humbled and honored to lead this organization predicated on providing quality education, with quality instructors, to every single member of our three regiments," he said.

At 54-years-old, Sacolick has commanded the Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta and served with the CIA as a senior service college fellow.

While he attended high school in Cincinnati, Ohio, he said he has spent most of his adult life in Fayetteville, N.C., which he now considers his home. Sacolick said his priorities as the SWCS Commanding General will be professionalizing and educating the Army's special operations force.

"We have expertly trained Soldiers, but we are lacking in education," he said, noting the difference between tactical and operational training, and academic education. His goal, he said, is to establish SWCS students' reputations as master practitioners in special operations.

Sacolick, who has spent the last two years as the SWCS Deputy Commanding General, assumed command from Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, who is retiring from military service after 36 years of service.

"This is going to be an exceptional non-transition," said Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. "For the first time in my life, I have the opportunity to see a seamless transition in a critical organization."

Mulholland said SWCS will continue to run at full capacity, without slowing down to allow time for a new commander to settle in.

CHANGEOVER Brigadier General Bennet S. Sacolick accepts the USAJFK-SWCS colors from Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, during the change of command ceremony. *U.S. Army photo.*

He credited this to the fact that Sacolick has been actively engaged in each of the organization's major initiatives over the last two years.

"This command will continue to create the world's best special-operations Soldiers," he said. "SWCS is, arguably, the central organizing entity for all Army special operations."

"The man who leads this organization is a critical asset to our force," Mulholland said, referring to both the incoming and outgoing SWCS commanders. — *by Dave Chace, SWCS Public Affairs Office.*

New commander takes the helm of the Special Warfare Medical Group

Colonel Robert H. Lutz assumed command of the 1st Special Warfare Medical Group June 17 during a ceremony on Fort Bragg's John F. Kennedy Plaza. While guests, VIPs and key staff members attended to see Lutz receive the group's colors from outgoing commander Colonel Jeffrey L. Kingsbury, the majority of the group's students and instructors could not be pulled away from the courses taught year-round at the SWMG.

"Graduates of these courses are the finest medical specialists in the military, and they continue to save lives every day," said Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

"Rob's a great officer, and he brings a wealth of experience and proven leadership to this command," Csrnko said.

Lutz comes to the SWMG from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, where he served as the deputy command surgeon. He is a graduate of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences and Bethesda, Md., and earned his bachelor of science degree from Davidson College in Davidson, N.C. No stranger to Fort Bragg, Lutz's first position following medical school was at Womack Army Medical Center as a staff emergency physician. He later returned to Womack as the chief of the Department of Emergency Medicine.

"Close examination of data at USASOC shows that no special-operations Soldier killed in action died of preventable injuries," he said. "This tells me that our medics have been basically 100-percent successful, and they've been doing it under fire, in the dark, surrounded by bullets and explosions."

Kingsbury, who was introduced to special operations in 1995 during a three-year tour as the 7th SF Group surgeon, took command of the SWMG the same day the unit gained permanent status as its own subordinate command under SWCS.

Kingsbury will resume his role as Womack's chief of preventive medicine, a job he held from 2002 to 2005.

"Colonel Kingsbury is a true master in not only his medical skills, but also his ability to teach and lead students," Csrnko said.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is the Army's special-operations university, responsible for special-operations training, leader development and doctrine for America's Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers. The center and school conducts more than 100 different courses and trains more than 14,000 students annually. — *by Dave Chace, USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office.*

Reeder takes the reigns of USASFC

Soldiers from all seven Special Forces groups welcomed a familiar face during the U.S. Army Special Forces Command change of command ceremony on Fort Bragg's Meadows Field, July 21.

Outgoing commander Major General Michael S. Repass said an emotional farewell to the Soldiers he has led for the last two years as he passed command of the regiment to Fayetteville native Brigadier General Edward M. Reeder Jr. Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, served as the reviewing officer for the event.

"It's a wonderful but bittersweet moment, as we say farewell to an extraordinary command team and then welcome another one," Mulholland said. "[Repass] has provided extraordinary leadership defined by absolute commitment and passion, and the willingness to take on the toughest challenges. We cannot thank you enough for the great work you have done. As well as it has been done in the past, no one has done it better."

Reflecting back on his tenure as the commander of all Army Green Berets, Repass had parting words of respect and admiration for those "Quiet Professionals" he led.

"Your success daily in places both famous and obscure continually amazes all of us who know what you are up to," he said. "Your nation has relied on you heavily in times of peril, and you've delivered results time and time again."

Repass is slated to take command of the U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe, in Stuttgart, Germany.

Mulholland spoke with high regard for his old friend Reeder, who comes to USASFC after serving as the commander of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan.

"To Ed and Adrian, welcome home," Mulholland said. "A local boy done good. I've had the pleasure of serving alongside and knowing Ed for many years, and I will tell you without hesitation, there's not a better man for this job than Ed Reeder. There's no one better or more experienced to help continue to shape this great regiment."

SWITCH Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, passes the colors of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command to Brigadier General Edward M. Reeder during the change of command ceremony. *U.S. Army photo.*

Closing the ceremony, Reeder remarked how honored he is to be given the opportunity to command. "As a member of this honored regiment … as a son of this great city, it's also great to be home," he said. "I'd like to thank General Mulholland for the opportunity to serve this great regiment once again. I was present at the ceremony casing the colors of 1st SOCOM and activating the U.S. Army Special Forces Command as a young captain, and I would have never in my wildest imagination thought I would be standing here one day receiving the colors of this magnificent command." — *by Sgt. Tony Hawkins, USASOC PAO.*

95th CA Brigade welcomes new commander

Colonel Michael J. Warmack relinquished command of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade to Colonel James "Jay" Wolff Friday, July 9 at Fort Bragg's Meadows Field.

Warmack, only the second commander of the brigade since it was reactivated, was the lead architect in the design of the unit, both as commander of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from 2002 to 2004, and as a primary staff officer at USASOC.

Hosting the change of command was Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

"It is always a bit of a bittersweet moment as we say farewell to a command team while welcoming another," Mulholland said. "The mark of a successful command is the state in which that command is transferred from one to another. Mike and Laura Warmack have done that in an extraordinary manner and have left this command in its highest state of readiness, capability and growth that it has ever enjoyed."

Since taking command of the brigade in August 2008, Warmack has led the brigade's continued expansion from one battalion of 290 Soldiers to 1,100 Soldiers in four battalions. Wolff, the brigade's new commander, was also present at its reactivation, having served as the commander of the 96th CA Battalion in 2004 and later as the brigade commander while it was in provisional status in 2006. He led the transition from a single battalion to a brigade with two battalions until Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry assumed command as the first centrally selected commander. Wolff then served as its deputy commander.

Wolff next attended the National War College at Fort McNair, D.C., with a follow-on assignment to the U.S. Special Operations Command, with duty at the U.S. Agency for International Development, before returning to assume command of the brigade.

In closing, Warmack said of the brigade's new commander, "I hand this brigade off (to Wolff), knowing there is nobody else more capable of leading the brigade into the future."

In his first speech to his troops in formation, Wolff began by acknowledging their achievements over the past two years, "I am humbled to be standing before this formation and the unit it represents – the officers, NCOs, Soldiers, civilians and families of the 95th. It is an honor and privilege to serve with you again.

"Now let's get to work on improving upon an already great unit," Wolff concluded. – *by Les Ozawa, 95th CA Battalion PAO.*

DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF

Brigadier General Joseph S. Stringham
Inducted July 8, 2010

Brigadier General Joseph S. Stringham served more than 31 years in the U.S. Army, commanding from platoon through brigade levels with general-purpose forces, the Ranger Regiment and Special Forces.

Commissioned as an Infantry officer from the U.S. Military Academy in 1961, 2nd Lieutenant Stringham volunteered for duty in Korea, serving as executive officer and later commander of the 7th Infantry Division's Extended Ground Reconnaissance Detachment and as commander of Co. B, 1st Bn., 17th Infantry.

Volunteering for duty with SF, Stringham was assigned to Co. A, 7th SF Group, in April 1963. While attending the Unconventional Warfare/Staff Officer Course, he was granted an early release from school and assigned to Detachment A -725, which was training for deployment to South Vietnam. The detachment arrived there in December 1963 and deployed to the central highlands as part of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, to work with the Montagnards.

Returning to Fort Bragg in 1964, Stringham was assigned to an SF detachment of the 5th SF Group that was preparing to deploy to South Vietnam. In December 1964, Captain Stringham assumed command of Detachment A-301 at Ben Cat, which was under heavy pressure from insurgent forces. On May 22, 1965, A-301 and its CIDG strike force were neutralized by a large insurgent attack, with only part of the detachment and one of the original three companies of the strike force surviving. Stringham was then given the mission of recruiting, training and deploying a special-mission mercenary force, code-named Mike Force, and a special-reconnaissance force, code-named Apache Force, that would be under the control of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. On July 20, 1965, Stringham and the Mike Force relieved two CIDG camps, Bu Dop and Bu Ghia Mop, under siege by a large North Vietnamese force. The operation would later be featured in the movie The Green Berets.

In 1966, Stringham was again assigned to South Vietnam, to the 196th Infantry Brigade. Rotating out of Vietnam in 1968, he served as a tactical officer at the Royal Military Academy in the United Kingdom and later as an exchange officer at the Brazilian Army Staff College.

In 1975, Major Stringham assumed command of the 2nd Bn., 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division. In 1978, Lieutenant Colonel Stringham assumed command of the 1st Bn., 75th Infantry (Ranger). In 1981, he was assigned to the Department of Army Staff, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Latin America. In 1983, Colonel Stringham assumed command of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador. He later commanded J3, Joint Special Operations Command. In 1985, he took command of the recently activated 75th Ranger Regiment. In 1987, he was assigned to the 1st Special Operations Command, where he planned and coordinated the 1st SOCOM response to the crisis in Panama. At the end of his tour at 1st SOCOM, he was promoted to brigadier general and became the first deputy commander the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

In 1989, Stringham was selected to be the Senior Defense Representative to Brazil and in 1991 was given the same responsibilities in Mexico. Although Stringham retired from active duty in 1992, he continues to support the special-operations community. He is a senior fellow and guest lecturer at the Joint Special Operations University and is a member of Chapter 92, Special Forces Association, and the 75th Ranger Regiment Association. He and his wife, Sandy, reside on their farm in northeastern Alabama.

Command Sergeant Major Morris G. Worley
Inducted July 8, 2010

Command Sergeant Major Morris G. Worley was born in Louisville, Ky., in 1938. In high school he belonged to the junior ROTC, graduating as a cadet first lieutenant. He joined the U.S. Army in June 1956, served his first assignment with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Knox and was reassigned to Germany with duty on the Czechoslovakian border. While in Germany, he was selected to attend the Seventh U.S. Army NCO Academy and was promoted to sergeant upon return to his unit. Worley then left the Army and attended Bellarmine College in Louisville.

Worley rejoined the Army in 1960 as a private and was assigned to the 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, with duty in the demilitarized zone. During this assignment, he volunteered to clear a safe lane through an active mine field. As a result, he was appointed the division's Soldier of the month, promoted to sergeant and appointed as NCO in charge of an arming party establishing a barrier mine field. He was next assigned to the U.S. Army Training Center at Fort Knox and assigned to co-write the book on hand-to-hand combat, to train instructors and to initiate instruction. Volunteering to return to Germany, Staff Sergeant Worley was reassigned to the 11th ACR and later returned to Fort Knox for duty as a drill instructor. In 1964, Worley volunteered for SF duty, attended Airborne School and reported to the Special Forces Training Group. He graduated with the 11F MOS in June 1965 and was assigned to Co. C, 6th SF Group.

In May 1966, then-Sergeant 1st Class Worley was assigned to Headquarters, 5th SF Group, Republic of Vietnam. He was one of the original 33 Soldiers assigned to duty with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, Forward Operating Base 2, Kontum. He helped build a separate compound for a Montagnard company and recruited, trained, equipped and led the company. While interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos as a member of RT Nevada, Worley became involved in an engagement that earned him the Distinguished Service Cross. Wounded during the engagement, he was evacuated and hospitalized. In December 1967, he was assigned to the Special Forces Training Group as an instructor and later assisted in building the first SF training facility at Camp Mackall. Worley was again assigned to the 5th SF Group with duty in MACVSOG. At the end of that tour, he returned to Fort Knox as provost sergeant major and then transferred to LaSalle College, Pa., where he taught ROTC and attended classes.

In May 1973, Worley attended the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and in July 1976 was assigned to the 14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Command Sergeant Major Worley retired in October 1977 with 21 years of service. He returned to North Carolina and taught junior ROTC for 14 years, two of those as a senior Army instructor. He transferred to the University of North Carolina School of Dentistry, where he designed computer software in support of periodontal research. Worley is a longstanding member of the SF Association and a member of the Special Operations Association. He resides in Chapel Hill, N.C., with Pamela, his wife of 38 years.

Colonel Joseph G. Cincotti
Inducted Aug. 19, 2010

Colonel Joseph G. Cincotti was born in New York City in 1937. After graduation from St. Francis Xavier Military Academy, he attended Auburn University in Alabama, the University of Dayton in Ohio and the University of Scranton in Pennsylvania, where he graduated with a bachelor's in psychology. In 1959, he played football with the Philadelphia Eagles.

Cincotti was commissioned as an Armor officer through ROTC at the University of Scranton. He served as a platoon leader with the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, at Fulda, Germany, and volunteered for duty in Vietnam, where he saw action with I Corps, II Corps and III Corps from 1962-1963. He then completed foreign-area-officer training in Monterey, Calif., and in early 1964, he took command of Company C, 2/50th Infantry (Mechanized), 2nd Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. He returned to Vietnam in 1965 with the 5th SF Group and commanded A-detachments 502 and 412, and served with the IV Corps Mike Force. Upon his graduation from the Armor Officer Advanced Course in 1967, he was assigned to the Special Forces Activity Branch of the Combat Development Command at Fort Bragg, N.C.

In 1968, he served his third tour in Vietnam as S3, 1/505th Infantry Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division. He was seriously wounded by an exploding rocket during the Battle of the Lazy W and was awarded the Silver Star Medal for bravery. In 1969, he served as adviser to the Thai Army and was instrumental in establishing airborne training for the Royal Thai Army. After completing the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., he assumed command of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group from 1972 to 1974. From 1974 to 1976, he served as chief of the Small Unit Tactics Division at Fort Knox, Ky. Cincotti commanded the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, from 1977 to 1978 and was deputy commander of the 7th SF Group from 1978 to 1980. He was the first ground-force commander of Blue Light, the first SF counterterrorism unit.

Cincotti concluded 27 years of distinguished service as director the Special Forces Department at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School from 1983 to 1985, where he formally synchronized the training in Phases I, II and III of the Special Forces Qualification Course. His efforts brought together all SF occupational specialty-skilled Soldiers to conduct full-spectrum SF team operations during the six-week Robin Sage exercise.

Cincotti earned a master's in management from Webster University, St. Louis, Mo., and was a graduate of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. At the time of his death on April 28, 1995, he was senior vice president of marketing for C & C Contracting Services, a defense and security consulting firm. He married the former Lourdes Elizarde of San Francisco, Calif., who passed away in 2000. He had two sons and a daughter: Joseph A. Cincotti, an actor and writer in Los Angeles; Kevin D. Cincotti, an executive officer of research and development at Military Wraps, Inc., in Lumberton, N.C.; and Lieutenant Colonel Kim T. Cincotti, a Military Intelligence officer stationed at the Pentagon. He also had two grandchildren.

The Honorable Michael G. Vickers
Inducted Aug. 19, 2010

The Honorable Michael G. Vickers was born in Burbank, Calif., in 1953. He enlisted in the Army under the Special Forces enlistment option in June 1973, completed the Airborne Course in December 1973 and the Special Forces Qualification Course in May 1974. Following graduation from SFQC, he was assigned to the 10th SF Group as a senior weapons sergeant from 1974 to 1976. During that period he completed the Ranger Course, attended the German Army's Advanced Mountain Climbing Course in Mittenwald, Germany, the SF Engineer Sergeant Course, and the Special Atomic Demolitions Course. While with the 10th SF Group, he also served as a combatives instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, deployed on a Flintlock exercise, and received advanced training in urban unconventional warfare and conducted operational missions in support of Detachment A, Berlin Brigade.

In January 1978, following completion of the Czech language course at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif., Vickers was assigned as a senior weapons sergeant in Co. A, 1st Bn., SF Detachment Europe in Bad Tolz, Germany. In June 1978, as a staff sergeant, he completed the British Special Air Service's Counterterrorism Close Battle Course at Hereford, England. He was selected for Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Ga., and was commissioned in Infantry in December 1978. Given his prior SF experience, he was selected for a direct assignment to the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, at Fort Gulick, Panama. He graduated from the Infantry Officer Basic Course, where he was awarded the Expert Infantryman Badge, and the Spanish language course at the Defense Language Institute. In April 1980, Vickers graduated from the Special Forces Officer Course as a distinguished honor graduate and completed the Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course. He was promoted to first lieutenant in December 1980 and to captain in September 1982. In 1981, he was selected to command a classified counterterrorism unit tasked with supporting CONPLAN 0300. During the next two years, Vickers deployed on intelligence missions to several Latin American countries, twice on operational CT missions, and was also a key planner for contingency operations against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Vickers left the Army in June 1983 to pursue a career with the CIA.

During his time with the CIA, Vickers served as an operations officer in the Latin America Division, the International Activities Division and the Near East and South Asia Division. In the aftermath of the Marine Barracks bombing in October 1983, he was selected for a special CT assignment in Lebanon.

In October 1984, Vickers was selected to be the agency's program officer and chief strategist for the Afghanistan Covert Action Program. He played a central role in reshaping U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

In April 2007, President George W. Bush nominated Vickers to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. He is the senior civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on the operational employment and capabilities of SOF, and is also the senior civilian adviser on CT, irregular warfare and special activities.

Vickers received a bachelor's degree, with honors, from the University of Alabama. He also holds a master's in business administration from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Vickers is married to Melana Zyla Vickers and has five daughters.

Training by Degrees

Education Initiatives Enable ARSOF Soldiers to Earn College Degrees

BY DR. DAVID L. BRAND AND COLONEL PAUL BURTON

Recent initiatives by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, are making it possible for Soldiers in Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, to apply their special-operations training toward degrees at the associate's, bachelor's and master's levels.

The new education opportunities are available through three separate degree programs: the Fayetteville Technical Community College Special Operations Qualification Course Associate's Degree Program, the Norwich University Special Operations Bachelor's Degree Program and the National Defense University, College of International Security Affairs, Master of Arts Degree Program.

Associate's degree

Beginning in September, SWCS has implemented a pilot program that could eventually enable Soldiers who volunteer for the program to graduate from the SWCS qualification courses for Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations or Special Forces to earn an associate's degree in general studies, with a concentration in strategic security studies, from Fayetteville Technical Community College, or FTCC. Credit from the qualification course, coupled with the completion of an additional 16 hours of resident instruction at FTCC, will fulfill the requirements for an associate's degree that is regionally accredited, nationally recognized and transferable to four-year bachelor's-degree programs.

Before September, FTCC awarded Soldiers 14 hours of credit for training in basic leadership skills acquired from their basic training through the completion of their qualification course. Through discussion and negotiation with FTCC, the SWCS Directorate of Regional Studies and Education, or DRSE, presented a request for credit that went beyond the 14 hours of academic credit awarded by the American Council on Education. Based on DRSE's demonstration of the learning that Soldiers acquire, FTCC agreed to award an additional 24 semester hours of credit for instruction and learning in the qualification courses. FTCC will award nine to 12 additional hours credit for Soldiers' MOS-specific learning.

Students will earn the required 16 hours of residency from FTCC during the eight weeks recently added to the beginning of

the qualification courses. During those eight weeks, students will attend the six classes shown in Table 1.

English 111 is a prerequisite for English 112. Students attend English 111 for the first four weeks of the term and English 112 for the second four weeks. They attend the other four courses for the entire eight-week period. Classes will be delivered in a variety of formats: traditional on-site, online and a blended format that includes on-site and online. The format for each course was selected to best support the compressed format of the class schedule. Students attend traditional on-site classes at FTCC 18 hours per week, according to the schedule in Table 2.

Soldiers attending the program have no out-of-pocket expenses: They pay for the 16 hours of resident credit using the Army's tuition-assistance program. The total tuition cost for earning the FTCC associate's degree is $800. FTCC has agreed to waive all other fees. DRSE purchases the textbooks, maintains them in a textbook storage facility and signs them out to students for the eight-week term. The program is not a requirement for Soldiers attending the qualification courses; participation is entirely voluntary. To apply, Soldiers should contact the SWCS educational counselors, Ann-Marie Famulari (910-432-9604) or Kristina Noriega (910-643-8620).

Table 1: Required Courses

ACA 115	**Success and Study Skills**	1 Semester Hour
ENG 111	**Expository Writing**	3 Semester Hours
CIS 110	**Introduction to Computers**	3 Semester Hours
ENG 112	**Argument-Based Research**	3 Semester Hours
COM 231	**Public Speaking**	3 Semester Hours
MATH 140	**Math Models**	3 Semester Hours

Table 2: Proposed Daily and Weekly Schedule

Day	Time	Course	Contact Hours	Weeks	Delivery
Monday	0900-1200	ENG 111/112	3	1-4	On-site
Monday	1300-1430	CIS 110	1.5	1-8	Online
Monday	1500-1630	COM 231	1.5	1-8	Blended
Tuesday	1300-1600	MATH 140	3	1-8	On-site
Tuesday	0900-1030	CIS 110	1.5	1-8	Online
Tuesday	1100-1230	COM 231	1.5	1-8	Blended
Wednesday	0900-1200	ENG 111/112	3	1-4	On-site
Wednesday	1300-1430	CIS 110	1.5	1-8	Online
Wednesday	1500-1630	COM 231	1.5	1-8	Blended
Thursday	0900-1200	ENG 111/112	3	1-4	On-site
Thursday	1300-1600	MATH 140	3	1-8	On-site
Friday	0900-1200	ENG 111/112	3	1-4	On-site
Friday	1300-1430	CIS 110	1.5	1-8	Online
Friday	1500-1630	COM 231	1.5	1-8	Blended

Bachelor's degree

Special-operations Soldiers graduating from the ARSOF qualification courses with the FTCC associate's degree can apply their credits toward Norwich University's bachelor of science in strategic studies and defense analysis, or BSSSDA. BSSSDA is designed to build upon the ARSOF Soldier's knowledge in areas such as sociology, anthropology, geography, cultural awareness, regional politics and international conflict, as well as to complete recognized competencies in general education needed for the bachelor's degree. Soldiers should be able to earn the BSSSDA by the time they complete the SWCS NCO Academy's Senior Leadership Course, or SLC.

The general-education classes completed through the FTCC associate's program are fully transferable to the BSSSDA program, and Norwich has agreed to align the BSSSDA curriculum with the curriculum and learning objectives of both the SLC and the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute. Graduates of the qualification courses will start the Norwich program with no less than 60 semester hours of credit toward the requirements for the bachelor's degree.

The BSSSDA was created as a result of conversations and collaboration between SWCS and Norwich early in 2007. Following additional dialogue with the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, Norwich created a bachelor's-degree program that would allow graduates of any of the ARSOF qualification courses to earn a bachelor's degree in as little as two years of full-time attendance. The degree program is open only to active-duty, National Guard and reserve personnel, as well as to veterans, who have been assigned to one of USSOCOM's subordinate commands. All of the courses for the Norwich degree program are available online.

The BSSSDA curriculum is designed to integrate SOF Soldiers' operational and international experiences. Students will apply their course work to initiatives and field exercises related to their deployment area. They will conduct research into a region's conflicts and opportunities and incorporate that research and their field experi-

ences into the classroom work and ideally into the U.S. Army's body of knowledge of that region. Principles of critical thinking, ethical decision-making and leadership are interwoven throughout the curriculum.

BSSSDA structure

The BSSDA's basic block is designed to ensure that students have the foundation of knowledge in areas such as online learning, information literacy, politics and human culture. The basic block introduces students to the science of military technology from an academic perspective. The advanced block builds upon the knowledge acquired during the basic block and prepares the student to apply that knowledge to the real world through subsequent field studies. During the field-studies block, students put their knowledge into practice. They will apply what they learn by building area-study plans based on a specific region's economic, geographic and cultural systems. Students gain hands-on experience in all areas of human interaction and will be prepared to help effect change within a region.

The program culminates with a capstone project, supervised by a faculty member, whose final report will contribute to the Army's body of knowledge of the assigned regions. The regional studies will be based on the students' particular language and unit of assignment (e.g., Soldiers in the 5th SF Group might focus on Iraq).

BSSSDA learning objectives

Students in the BSSSDA program will graduate with the major competencies needed to implement the U.S. military strategy in a specific region of the globe. These competencies include the ability to:

- Identify, describe and explain the geographic features of the region.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the region's history and its relationship to current events.
- Identify various cultures of the region, explain similarities and differences among them and apply that knowledge to developing problem-solving strategies within a range of contexts.
- Identify political figures in the region, analyze their positions on various issues and apply that knowledge to developing effective collaborative relationships or intervention strategies.
- Understand the economics of the region, analyze a range of economic factors and formulate recommendations for economic activities.
- Appraise and articulate the role of the U.S. within the region.
- Appraise and articulate the role of the U.S. military within the region.
- Communicate verbally and in writing in at least one language of the region.

To apply, Soldiers should contact the SWCS educational counselors, Ann-Marie Famulari (910-432-9604) or Kristina Noriega (910-643-8620).

Master's degree

In September, SWCS, in partnership with the National Defense University, or NDU, began offering a fully accredited program for a master of arts in strategic-security studies.

The program mirrors the master of arts in strategic-security studies, or MASSS, offered by NDU's College of International Security Affairs. The NDU program is designed for students from U.S. departments and agencies, congressional staffs and military and civilian representatives of the international community who operate in the Washington, D.C., area. The SWCS/NDU program is offered to NCOs in grades E7 and above, warrant officers and officers from all special-operations branches who have a bachelor's degree from a regionally accredited institution.

The 10-month curriculum offers a strategic perspective on the global threat environment; the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements; the relationship between political objectives; strategy; all instruments of national power; and the roles of power and ideology. Through seminars, independent study, research and the writing of a thesis, students will develop strategies for working with other agencies and with members of the international coalition. Through a combination of academic and practical learning, the program will prepare professionals to develop and implement national and international security strategies for conditions of peace, crisis and war.

Students who complete the MASSS degree should be able to meet the following learning objectives:

1. Analyze the 21st-century geopolitical environment characterized by the rise of nonstate armed groups and the uneven erosion of state sovereignty;
2. Evaluate the roles of power and ideology, the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements, and the bases for authority and legitimacy;
3. Understand the relationship between political objectives, strategy and all instruments of national power;
4. Develop skills needed for thinking critically and strategically and for differentiating between policy and analysis. Put knowledge into practice in complex circumstances involving collaboration with diverse partners.

The SWCS/NDU master's program is fast-paced and demanding. Students' education backgrounds will vary — some may have completed their undergraduate degree recently, while others may have completed it years ago. To better prepare all students for the academic rigors of the program, the SWCS Education Management Division is coordinating with the Army Center for Enhanced Performance-Fort Bragg to develop an academic-success program tailored to the needs of the students.

The curriculum begins in September each year. Interested Soldiers should submit their application packet to the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency not later than April of the same year in which they wish to begin. Packets should include an application for the NDU College of International Security Affairs (available at http://www.ndu.edu/cisa/index.cfm?pageID=112&type=page), official transcripts from all colleges and universities previously attended, and a letter of release/endorsement from the current unit commander. For additional information, telephone the SWCS education counselor at DSN 239-9604 or commercial (910) 432-9604. SW

Dr. David L. Brand *is the chairman of the Department of Education in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Regional Studies and Education.*

Colonel Paul Burton *is director of the SWCS Directorate of Regional Studies and Education.*

APPLYING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

BY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 WILLIAM D. COTTEN

Donald Rumsfeld once famously described the difference between "known unknowns" and the "unknown unknowns" in a humorous attempt to illustrate the difficulty of dealing with the uncertainty and the problems associated with making good decisions in the absence of clear and incontrovertible information.

In reality, though, special-operations forces, or SOF, are adept at operating when weathered in by the fog of war. Much of the work of military staffs and planners is done to overcome the pitfalls of uncertainty. They analyze potential threat courses of action and wargame them. They carry out operational preparation of the environment. They prepare intelligence briefings, area studies and staff estimates. Overall, the force does a reliable job of dealing with the unknown.

Where we as a force struggle is in dealing well with what we *do* know. There is a critical need to manage situational awareness across the force. Fortunately, there are precedents for developing such systems and processes. Since at least 1991, information and information-technology specialists have been developing systems that manage knowledge across the enterprise. Their work in helping businesses answer such questions as, "What do we, as an enterprise, know?," "Who in the enterprise knows it?," and "How do we get that knowledge where it is needed to make good decisions?," has become known as knowledge-management, and it is as applicable to the military as it is to the business world.

There is no single accepted definition of knowledge management. From the business world, one writer describes it as "the process through which organizations generate value from their intellectual and knowledge-based assets,"[1] while another describes it as "the explicit and systematic management of vital knowledge and its associated processes of creating, gathering, organizing, diffusion, use and exploitation."[2] The Army defines Army knowledge management as, "the Army's strategy to transform itself into a net-centric, knowledge-based force."[3]

As the variety of definitions makes clear, defining knowledge management is at least as difficult as defining knowledge. However, in a practical sense, we can define it as the art and science of designing and implementing systems, procedures and processes that allow us to leverage, as an organization, what individuals already know. Obviously, there are many aspects to a practice with such a broad set of definitions. Knowledge management can mean finding people with a specific skill or expertise. It can mean a implementing a database of best practices. It can mean developing a system for capturing the knowledge implicit in carrying out a specific task. While all of these are valid definitions for knowledge-management, and all of them would add value to SOF, this article focuses on the application of knowledge-management models to battlefield situational awareness: delivering relevant information and, equally important, the context of that information, where and when it is needed to support good decision-making.

Currently, we do well managing our knowledge of the kinetic tactical problem. Technologies such as the FBCB2 digital command-and-control software and Web-based mapping software with constant updating of the location of friendly elements, coupled with robust capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, make it relatively easy to maintain situational awareness of operations in real time. However, move beyond the *what* to the *why*, or even the *what next*, and our ability to share information and, more importantly, context, fails us. We struggle particularly with the intricacies of counterinsurgency warfare. We need information beyond immediate operations, and we need to understand how that information combines with other data to form a coherent whole. Knowledge management is the key to developing and sharing a common operational picture beyond our immediate tactical environment.

We deal with the results of our lack of a common operational picture daily. General-purpose forces and SOF waste time and resources collecting the same information about the same insurgent network. One SOF unit captures a key insurgent leader and causes the rest of his network to go underground, just before another unit has planned to capture them all. One unit replaces another on the battlefield, and within hours of the first unit's departure, a key member of the insurgency walks into the firebase to scope out the new unit, secure in the knowledge that the new unit will not understand who he is. Everyone who has been involved in intelligence or operations over the past nine years has at least one horror story concerning mistakes made or opportunities lost because they did not know what the adjacent unit knew, or what their conventional counterparts knew, or what the unit they replaced knew.

When we do succeed in sharing information effectively, it is often because of the extraordinary efforts of an individual. We as Soldiers work late hours and on weekends, building spreadsheets, teaching themselves the basics of software programs, squirreling away important information that doesn't seem to be readily available anywhere else. And we distribute our updated spreadsheets and databases in whatever ad-hoc way that seems to make sense at the time: we e-mail them to a "distro list," post them to "the portal," or put them on "the shared drive." We build informal networks for information management and sharing because we lack formal systems and procedures for managing information effectively. The lack of a process for effective knowledge management requires extraordinary efforts to achieve ordinary results.

In short, SOF do not do a good job of collecting and sharing what we know. Throughout a military career, Soldiers and commanders spend a great deal of time learning how to maneuver their forces to get them to the right place at the right time and in the right quantity to affect the battle. To positively affect the outcome of today's information-driven operations, the force must learn to dedicate the same effort to getting the right information to the right person at the right time.

We struggle to share situational awareness within the organization and across organizations. Situational awareness degrades as it moves through the enterprise, and the context of knowledge degrades even more quickly. Knowledge that is not captured as it is created degrades temporally as the event that created the information recedes in time. If new information is not connected to the knowledge that already exists,

the perspective of the moment is lost, and we lose sight of why the information was important. That process accelerates every time one unit replaces another. The people who created the knowledge leave and are replaced by people who were not there to internalize its context and importance.

Situational awareness also degrades in other ways. It deteriorates spatially, based on artificial divisions we create for planning or for command and control. Our enemies often fail to respect those artificial boundaries. For example, the implicit knowledge that provides context to a specific piece of information can be lost between units. A report may indicate that a particular insurgent leader is operating in a given area, but without the contextual information about that area and that insurgent, and about what makes him important, the reader of the report will probably not understand the importance of the information. A particular bad actor may appear in reports from several different units, but no individual unit may ever consider him important enough to target. He may become important only when looked at across organizational boundaries. Without better methods for sharing knowledge, that look might never occur.

Organizationally, units and agencies with different missions and different worldviews may develop very different sets of information, may apply information to decision-making in very different ways, and may understand the same information in very different contexts. A unit whose focus is on counterterrorism will understand information concerning an insurgent who is also part of the local power structure in a very different way than will a Civil Affairs team. The way that a State Department liaison to a provincial reconstruction team interprets and understands information will likely differ even more. The amount of background information required to provide context increases as shared mission focus, shared organizational culture and shared points of view decrease. Thus, it is important for us to put systems and processes in place to compensate for the information degradation that occurs across organizational boundaries.

These challenges mean that we, as a community, have to learn to do a better job of managing our common operational picture. We must ensure that the right information reaches the right person at the right time to enable the right decision. And we must ensure that relevant information is not lost in a cacophony of irrelevant data, spreadsheets, briefing slides and search results. We owe it to the force to develop knowledge-management systems and processes that allow us to share situational awareness that goes beyond the immediate tactical level.

We often think of knowledge management as being an aspect of information technology and thus the exclusive province of technologists. That view is incomplete and places the emphasis in the wrong place. Knowledge management is not information technology, although information technology is a key enabler of knowledge management. Information technologists can implement systems that make knowledge-management processes possible, but they lack the subject-matter expertise needed for knowing what knowledge is important or developing the organizational processes to capture and share that knowledge as it is created. Information technology, by itself, cannot deliver an effective knowledge-management program. More important are the techniques, the processes and the procedures put into place to enable the identification and sharing of knowledge. Most important of all is that all levels of command emphasize the critical relevance of knowledge management, ensuring that approved processes are followed and that crucial information is available where and when it is needed.

Certainly, we have made some progress and have implemented some programs that represent a good initial effort. However, these programs

and systems simply do not provide the knowledge-management capabilities we need for fighting in the knowledge-based environment we face. Good decision-making, including a thorough understanding of second- and third-order effects, simply requires more knowledge sharing than our systems enable. The now ubiquitous portals, built on Microsoft's SharePoint™ technology, provide the community with an outstanding system for knowledge-sharing within a small organization but a mediocre one for sharing across organizational boundaries. There is a confusing array of portals within the SOF community. They are typically arranged hierarchically, based on organization, instead of laterally, based on communities of practice. There are few standards concerning the way information is to be organized, and those areas that have been standardized typically support a "ground-up" flow from a subordinate unit to the commander, not lateral, dispersed, information sharing.

Other systems, particularly on SIPR, also provide partial but inadequate solutions. The SIPRNet provides a bewildering variety of tools from which to choose, many with overlapping capabilities, and none provides a holistic view of available information. For example, the integration of Google Maps™ with document repositories provides some capability in searching those repositories based on location — a major advance over keyword searching alone. However, most search tools are limited and provide access to only a subset of available information. Worse, search tools are limited not by the content of the information but by arbitrary characteristics, such as the format used to report information or the database in which the information is stored.

There are more advanced search technologies available that would be useful to the warfighter, and these technologies provide a good illustration of where the community can look to garner improvements in information sharing. For example, there are programs that can read unstructured text messages and identify entities (concepts such as names, organizations and places) and the relationship between them. Such a program can read a sentence such as: "John shot Bob in Dallas and then fled to Austin with Scott," and understand that John, Bob and Scott are people, that Dallas and Austin are places, that John attacked Bob, and that John and Scott fled. In addition, such concepts can be stored

in a database for future searching and can be combined with keyword searches. Going further, we can design databases and data-entry systems so that, as we develop information, we can enter it into them already broken down into entities and relationships. However, our current system forces us to produce information as unstructured text, and successive consumers must break down and extract the needed entities and concepts each time, if they can find it in the first place.

There is no doubt that we face substantial technological and organizational challenges in enhancing our knowledge-management program. One of the most challenging technical issues we face is the distribution of data storage across the enterprise. Despite the efforts of our technologists to consolidate data storage, technical and cultural challenges have led users to store data haphazardly across our networks and on standalone computers. Lack of storage space on network file systems, especially deployed systems, leads users to attach local disks for storage. ("Oh, sorry, that information is on the brick in the J-35 office.") The best operational picture for a particular village may reside on the computers that belong to the SF detachment working there, and those computers may have limited or no connectivity with a larger network. Our inability to associate information with context can lead some users not to share because they fear that another unit will misuse their hard-won knowledge. ("If we post this, they'll just hit the target, and that will ruin what we're trying to do here.") Our efforts to secure information from our enemies can also work to keep it out of the hands of people with appropriate clearances and a valid need to know. ("He could have been read in to it if he had known about the program.")



So how do we create an effective knowledge-management program, one that will meet our requirement for delivering relevant information to the right decision-maker at the right time? First, we as a community and as a command have to take responsibility for knowledge-management and acknowledge that the information technologists cannot solve the problem without our leadership and expertise. An effective knowledge-management program will be more about people and processes than about software and hardware. In fact, we could make substantial gains in information sharing even in the absence of new information systems. Solutions as simple as implementing a U.S. Special Operations Command-wide standard for preparing relief-in-place briefing books at the detachment, company and battalion level could greatly improve the exchange of knowledge. Codifying the knowledge that we need to share with our replacements, and reaching a community-wide consensus of what knowledge is important to the team that follows us will focus our collective efforts on ensuring that we capture that information in a way that we can easily share. This approach has an additional advantage: Once we, as the subject-matter experts, decide what information is important, and how we want to see it structured, then using information technology to automate the process will be much easier.

The Civil Affairs, or CA, community provides an excellent example of how that can work. Due to the nature of their work, CA Soldiers developed an early understanding of the importance of information. Knowing everything from the local political structure to the location of key components of the electrical grid is vital to accomplishing the CA mission. Every good CA Soldier maintained a "black book" of critical information and turned that book over to his relief. Over time, the CA community began to standardize and then to automate that book, and today it has implemented an exceptional knowledge-sharing system.

Using CA projects as a guide, we can build SOF-wide knowledge-management systems based on a partnership between information technologists and warfighters, with the warfighters in the lead. The ideal team would include a recent SOTF S3 (or CJSOTF J3) as project manager, with an information technologist who has expertise in knowledge management as his deputy. Other team members should include personnel such as a recent SF detachment commander, recent S2 and other personnel with recent experience in future ops and planning. Backed by appropriate levels of command support and resources, such a team could form the nucleus of a truly transformative knowledge-management program.

A successful knowledge-management effort will require a combination of approaches that builds on current successes, that learns from our mistakes and that simultaneously applies new systems and new processes to the problems at hand. An approach driven by a slavish adherence to a single technology platform will probably fail, as will an attempt to build a complete system on the first attempt. To be sustainable, however, it is equally important that all of our knowledge-management tools be based on a common standard, with an architecture that allows easy integration, upgrades and replacements.

Knowledge management is not about knowing where the IT folks have decided to store our data. It is about recognizing what we know, sharing that knowledge with others, and getting relevant information to the warfighter when he needs it to make good decisions. If we can agree as a community to focus on that goal, we truly can begin to operate as a "knowledge-based, net-centric" enterprise. That, in turn, will make us more effective at the only thing that really matters: accomplishing the missions that the people of the United States expect us to execute successfully on their behalf. ***SW***

Chief Warrant Officer 2 William D. Cotten is assigned to Company A, 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group. He wrote this article while a student in the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course.

Notes:

1 Meridith Levinson, 2005. "Knowledge Management Definition and Solutions" (CIO, 2007) http://www.cio.com/article/40343/Knowledge_Management_Definition_and_Solutions (accessed 10 June 2010).

2 David J Styrme, Insights No. 22 (David Styrme Associates, 2003).

3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 25-1, Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008).

COVER STORY

CONTEXT AND CAPABILITIES IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

BY ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSEN

Irregular warfare, or IW, is a concept highlighted in contemporary military thinking, but it encompasses a perspective that has long been the core of America's special operations forces, or SOF.

The United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, created by Congress more than 22 years ago, implemented its original charter and Title 10 authorities primarily as a resourcing headquarters, providing ready and relevant SOF for episodic engagements against threats to the nation and its vital interests. Since the attacks of 9/11, and during eight years of protracted war, USSOCOM has become a proactive, global and strategically focused headquarters encompassing a two-fold purpose and mission. As a functional command, USSOCOM serves as proponent for U.S. SOF and for the development of equivalent unit and headquarters functions among allied and partner nations. As a combatant command, USSOCOM synchronizes Department of Defense, or DoD, operational planning for global operations against violent extremist organizations, and it is prepared to employ SOF worldwide when directed by the president or secretary of defense. Put simply, in fighting our nation's wars, USSOCOM decides how SOF should be prepared and recommends where, when and how to use SOF and other forces in support of U.S. defense policy.

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The operational commitments of the American military have led to an increase in demand for SOF. America's SOF are popularly prescribed as the "pinch hitters" of national security, called upon to succeed where others would fail, to solve crises by working through and with others rather than by unilaterally committing American lives. Although there are elements of truth in this perception, it is flawed for two reasons. First, by their very nature, SOF are limited in size and scope and inherently cannot form the mainstay of our large-scale military commitments abroad. Second, while the ability to work with partners and allies, be they other nations' fielded forces or militias of local tribesmen, may be a core SOF capability, today's conflicts require other elements of our military to embrace such capabilities. In that context, this article outlines what makes SOF "special" in the operational environment, and it explains how USSOCOM and SOF fit into the integrated whole of military forces tasked to defend U.S. and partner interests.

Contemporary context

Civil war, religious conflict and competition between peoples rather than states have dominated human history. Despite the recent popularity of the term irregular warfare, such warfare is "irregular" only in comparison to the preceding century or so of state-on-state opposition. Two world wars and four decades of Cold War conflict overshadowed what has historically been the defined norm in warfare: population-centric conflict based on competing social identities and comparatively scarce resources. Examining the contemporary environment serves first to illustrate why SOF are increasingly in demand, and then introduces implications for the way our overall defense posture must be oriented and resourced to defend U.S. national security.

Defining the current operating environment requires an appreciation of the complex world in which we live. The current population of 307 million Americans is less than 5 percent of the world total, which by almost any statistical metric would indicate that events will generally occur whether or not this nation wants them to. Furthermore, terms such as uni- or multipolar are inherently misleading, in that they overly rely on states' territorial sovereignty as a definition of social identity or a measure of power in the global system. Sovereignty is simply not what it used to be, and even a cursory review of the past 1,000 years of civilized history suggests that "patria rarely designated the polity."[1]

Although territorial sovereignty can be defined and defended, cultural, economic and informational sovereignty cannot. Globalization creates stresses on developing and underdeveloped nations and societies, which in turn create regional instability and political tensions. Thomas Friedman similarly described these trends as a "flattening" of the world, in which traditional hierarchies are being superseded by globalizing effects that connect us in ways for which state-centric institutions are poorly postured.[2]

This new realm of sovereignty is defined not by geographic boundaries but by population trends. Crime, migration, extremism and competition for resources drive populations and foment conflict. As a result of this environment and the changing practical definition of what it means to be sovereign, war also does not mean what it used to. Traditionally defined forms of warfare such as counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare are being lumped under umbrella terms, such as irregular warfare or hybrid warfare, in attempts to better describe military actions in this "new" environment. The concept of war itself often means something else when translated into other, especially non-Western, languages. It is a common and perhaps naïve misconception to believe that peace is a norm from which wars deviate, or that war itself is a temporary problem with a presupposed military solution. In many parts of the world, that is simply not so. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates captured this notion well when he wrote: "What is dubbed the war on terrorism, in grim reality, is a prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign — a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation."[3]

Regardless of how wars are defined, one constant remains: Current and potential antagonists are unlikely to directly oppose America's conventionally postured military forces. This means that the U.S. is most likely to get hit, as occurred on 9/11, in ways for which the preponderance of its military is least prepared. No longer can a massed military presence be relied upon to secure solutions to what are inherently political conflicts, as physical presence without popular value will ultimately be perceived as occupation. Proactively engaging in these conflicts requires a lengthy commitment before the fighting even starts. As proud as America may be of its ability to run quickly to the sound of the guns, the surest means of winning against an irregular enemy is to defeat him before the shooting starts. Achieving consensus must be favored over coercion, and the ability to do so proactively requires a holistic approach to warfare aimed at both eliminating adversaries and eroding the conditions that foment and foster their behavior.

DoD defines irregular warfare as a "violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)."[4] IW is then inherently both political in purpose and local in character. The focus is on populations and effective governance rather than on territories and material dominance. This has distinct implications for the way irregular wars must be fought and for the forces that fight them.

U.S. special operations

USSOCOM was activated April 16, 1987, at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. DoD created the new unified command in response to congressional action in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987. Congress mandated that a new four-star command be activated to prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions and, if so directed, to plan for and conduct special operations. In addition to the military department-like authorities of developing training and monitoring readiness, Congress gave USSOCOM its own budgetary authorities and responsibilities through a specific major force program in the DoD budget. Additionally, USSOCOM was granted its own acquisition authorities, enabling it to develop and procure equipment, supplies or services peculiar to special operations.

USSOCOM now has approximately 54,000 active-duty, reserve and National Guard Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and civilians assigned to its headquarters, four service components, and one subunified command. USSOCOM's components are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command and the

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. The Joint Special Operations Command is a USSOCOM subunified command. Headquarters, USSOCOM, through its component and subunified commands, prepares and fields SOF to conduct the core activities listed below:

- **Direct action (DA):** seizing, destroying, capturing or recovering through short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions in denied areas.
- **Special reconnaissance (SR):** acquiring information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an enemy.
- **Unconventional warfare (UW):** conducting operations through and with surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by external forces.
- **Foreign internal defense (FID):** providing training and other assistance to foreign governments and their militaries to enable the foreign government to provide for its national security.
- **Civil Affairs (CA) operations:** establishing, maintaining or influencing relations between U.S. forces and foreign civil authorities and civilian populations to facilitate U.S. military operations.
- **Counterterrorism (CT):** preventing, deterring and responding to terrorism.
- **Military information-support operations (MISO):** providing truthful information to foreign audiences that influences behavior in support of U.S. military operations.
- **Information operations (IO):** achieving information superiority by adversely affecting enemy information and systems while protecting U.S. information and systems.
- **Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction:** either locating, seizing, destroying such weapons or capturing, recovering and rendering them safe.
- **Security-force assistance (SA):** sustaining and assisting host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority through the unified action of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational communities.
- **Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations:** defeating insurgency through military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions.
- **Other activities** specified by the president or secretary of defense.

STORYTELLER A Special Forces Soldier spends time with Afghan children while conducting missions in Afghanistan. *U.S. Army photo.*

The varied range of special operations, both as historically executed and conceptually outlined above, presents challenges to the very definition of what constitutes a special operation and to what must characterize the forces that undertake these missions. According to joint doctrine, special operations are conducted to "achieve military, diplomatic, informational and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement." Furthermore, special operations "are applicable across the range of military operations" and "differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets."[5] While the definition effectively (if not succinctly) outlines the manner in which special operations and SOF differ from conventional forces and missions, it offers little regarding their operational integration within an overall campaign plan and IW context.

America's SOF are organized, equipped, trained and deployed by USSOCOM to meet the unique demands of regional combatant commanders around the world. The first part of the command's mission is to "provide fully capable special-operations forces to de-

PAYING RESPECTS Special Forces Soldiers listen as a village elder talks about the needs of his people and their village. *U.S. Army photo.*

fend the United States and its interests." USSOCOM is a force provider in a large sense, much like a military service. The second part of the USSOCOM mission is to "synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist networks." This defines a combatant command authority codified in the Unified Command Plan, which states that the USSOCOM commander "is responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks, and will do so in coordination with other commands, the services, and, as directed, U.S. government agencies."[6] USSOCOM synchronizes the prescribed plans for operations, then reviews, coordinates and prioritizes them, to make recommendations to the joint staff and secretary of defense on how resources should be allocated to match the ever-present demands of global operations.

The most comprehensive element of USSOCOM's synchronization effort is the global collaborative planning process. This effort draws on other combatant command capabilities and expertise to develop the DoD war-on-terror campaign plan, which, coupled with the combatant commands' regional war-on-terror campaign plans, is dynamic and under continuous review. USSOCOM and the DoD global synchronization community have developed structured processes for evaluating and prioritizing the many capabilities, operations, activities, resources and forces required for DoD efforts to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorism. The primary forum is the semiannual Global Synchronization Conference, an event that brings stakeholders into a single, cooperative venue that sets the stage for much of the collaboration to occur in the following six months. This synchronization is intertwined with USSOCOM's role as a resource provider.

It is a common misperception that USSOCOM plans and executes operations globally. Except for rare occasions, USSOCOM does not synchronize or command specific operations: That is the role of the operational commanders who maintain the authority to position and utilize their allocated SOF. Connecting operational authority to proper utilization is of the utmost importance in correctly employing SOF assets that are, by definition, in limited supply. For example, establishing continuity among disparate efforts is a distinct concern in Afghanistan, where the dynamic nature of tribal structures, physical terrain and civil-military activities combines to challenge traditional military hierarchies.

The creation of Combined Forces Special Operations Component–Afghanistan in early 2009 was instrumental in extending SOF reach from the tribal level to the national level while remaining integrated within the overall military campaign and with continuing efforts to transition Afghan forces from a military to a civil security-enforcement role. That transition itself is critical to executing a comprehensive civilian-military plan that will integrate the security, governance, development and strategic-communications dimensions of supporting the Afghan government, ongoing interagency efforts and international partners.

Taken in sum, USSOCOM builds SOF and then reviews the manner and recommends the places in which those forces will be used. USSOCOM prioritizes material resources, both in terms of what equipment SOF needs and how to get it, and operational resources, in terms of where the threat is and how best to engage it. That product is then provided to combatant commands to apply operationally, while USSOCOM retains a mutually reinforcing relationship with each theater special-operations command as the crucial tie between force provision and operational applica-

tion. This, then, broadly encompasses USSOCOM's role within the national-security strategy: to decide how SOF should be prepared and to help decide where and when to use them. That role can then be further expanded into SOF's roles in irregular warfare.

Irregular capabilities and capacities

In employing indirect operations to gain asymmetric advantage over adversaries, irregular warfare is not a new mission area for SOF. UW, COIN, CA, MISO and FID are all traditional IW activities and core activities for SOF. With the emergence of IW as a focus area for broader participation across DoD, it increasingly describes activities that both SOF and general-purpose forces will employ in their operational approaches. These approaches must reflect a certain focus, where the "new high ground for operational forces will be to capture the perceptions of populations, not to seize terrain."[7] Furthermore, participation by U.S. operational forces in total should imply an integrated set of activities that compose the whole of an IW campaign; conventional and special operations must be coordinated rather than simply deconflicted. This inherently requires the development of appropriate mechanisms to mesh IW activities within DoD, with the diplomatic and development efforts of our interagency partners, and in accordance with mutually supporting interests of the U.S. and partner nations.

These priorities underscore the USSOCOM mission to ensure that SOF are highly trained, properly equipped and deployed to the right places at the right times for the right missions. SOF personnel must be capable of planning and leading a wide range of lethal and nonlethal special-operations missions in complex, ambiguous environments. Too often, special operations are thought of as unilateral, high-risk, one-shot deals. There are, of course, times when that is the case, but what is truly special about special operations is the ability of SOF to work through and with others in pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes to unusually complex situations. Put simply, a "special operation is above all a powerful exercise of mind; muscle and even disciplined response are essential but secondary."[8] Gaining the right perspective is paramount — only then can the right processes follow. It is important to be able to accurately predict the effects of our decisions and actions within the specific operational context of a microregion.

The complexity of the present strategic environment requires that SOF operators maintain not only the highest levels of warfighting expertise but also cultural knowledge and diplomacy skills. These "3D operators" are members of a multidimensional force prepared to lay the groundwork in the myriad diplomatic, development and defense activities that contribute to the U.S. government's pursuit of vital national interests. Fundamental to this effort is the recognition that humans are more important than hardware and that quality is more important than quantity.

Investments in weapons platforms and technologies are incomplete without the right people to employ those systems.

The focus is to first select and nurture the extraordinary operators and then to provide them the most operationally relevant equipment. Language skills and regional knowledge continue to be key to establishing effective relations with the foreign forces, organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact.

The 1st Special Forces Group language-training program was recognized by the Army and DoD as the best of its kind in 2007, but even though language-training programs have been enhanced in recent years, SOF remain underqualified in many key languages and dialects. USSOCOM will continue to expand these programs, stressing the need for a few individuals to be thoroughly steeped in select languages and cultures. We have termed these programs Project Lawrence, intended to produce individual regional expertise in support of a persistent-presence approach. Yet unlike the career path of their namesake, T.E. Lawrence of Arabia, these initiatives include an exploration of innovative options to permit specialization without sacrificing promotion opportunities, for which the proactive support of the services is required.

One of USSOCOM's priority initiatives is the increase of regional expertise through recruitment of native heritage speakers. As of August 2009, approximately 350 legal, nonpermanent residents with special language skills and abilities joined the Army under a pilot program. Called Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest, or MAVNI, the program embraces the multifaceted cultural heritage of this country by allowing for the quick inclusion of ethnic diversity into the military force over the long term. While it is a new program, MAVNI is not without precedent. The Lodge-Philbin Act of June 30, 1950, allowed for recruiting foreign nationals into the U.S. military and provided members to the U.S. Army Special Forces. MAVNI fulfills a similar critical need today, and the overall educational quality of MAVNI recruits is phenomenally higher than non-MAVNI recruits: 87 percent of recruits are enrolled in college or have a college degree, and 29 percent hold master's or higher degrees. By comparison, the top recruiting battalion in the nation enlisted 13.7 percent with college degrees.[9]

To meet more immediate tactical needs, USSOCOM has initiated steps to dedicate in-service translators and interpreters to its Army component for joint use. Individual development aimed at correctly aligning language testing, career management and incentives remains important to the overall capability, requiring strengthened institutional programs at the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine component levels. We are already behind, and there is a long way to go in recognizing and incentivizing such expertise before it will become possible to develop and sustain real experts in specific key regions around the world.

Resourcing IW

SOF cannot grow more than 3 to 5 percent per year in those key units and capabilities that must be developed within the SOF organizational structures and training pipelines. This growth rate will not meet the already obvious appetite for the effects of SOF in forward operating areas. The solution, beyond the necessary continued, steady and disciplined growth of specific special-operations capabilities, is to mitigate the demand on SOF by developing and sustaining supporting capabilities within the services that are beyond their organic needs and can therefore be used in direct support of special-operations commanders. That will enhance the impact of forward-deployed SOF without placing unfeasible additional demand on SOF's own limited enabling units.

The enabling capabilities that must be provided in greater number by the services include mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close-air-support specialists, security forces and others that permit

SOF operators to focus more directly on their missions. Assigned at the unit or detachment level to support joint SOF commanders away from main bases, such a combined force will have the effect of remaining integrated within an overall campaign effort while having an immediate impact on local conditions where they are employed.

The goal is a two-fold balance: first, to have sufficient organic, SOF-peculiar enablers to permit rapid response to operational crises; and second, to have enabling capabilities assigned in direct support of SOF for longer-term sustainment and expansion of the operation. SOF are and will remain dependent on the services for key force enablers. The nonavailability of these force enablers has become the most vexing issue in the current operational environment, especially in view of the responsible general-purpose forces drawdown in Iraq. SOF cannot fully provide for their own needs over the long term, and the provision of such support is a mandate of the general-purpose forces: "Services and/or executive agents should be prepared to support special operations as soon as possible but not later than 15 days after SOF are employed."[10]

In addition to an appropriate baseline budget, SOF readiness requires investment in the rapid fielding of both existing solutions and cutting-edge technologies, even when relatively small purchase quantities do not optimize production costs. Here the authority to direct funds is actually more important than the amount of funding itself; policy-and-planning decisions must objectively project future needs and anticipate any new or expanded authorities required to meet those needs.[11] USSOCOM's aggressive use of its acquisition authority is a key factor in providing wide-ranging, time-sensitive capabilities to widely dispersed and often isolated forces. Because this budget authority is limited to SOF-peculiar equipment and modifications, USSOCOM also depends heavily on service acquisition programs that develop and procure service-common mobility platforms, weapons, ammunition and other equipment that is then modified to meet SOF's mission needs.

While federal acquisition regulations uniformly apply to DoD, USSOCOM strives to take advantage of flexibilities inherent in those regulations to expeditiously provide materiel solutions for SOF operators. That is accomplished in cooperation with the three military departments, as those departments fund, develop, acquire and provide the basic service-common vehicles, aircraft, boats, weapons, ammunition and other equipment to USSOCOM, which are then modified to SOF-specific platforms, systems and equipment. When a SOF requirement cannot be met using a service-common solution, USSOCOM uses its authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment or modify the service-common equipment to meet SOF needs. In those instances, the USSOCOM acquisition culture stresses assertive risk management and process efficiencies to steward a system that is arguably more tailorable, responsive and agile than elsewhere in DoD.

While some capabilities are truly SOF-peculiar and reside within USSOCOM's processes, most special-operations capabilities are based on service-provided systems. It is therefore important that DoD collectively transition from a platform-based acquisition cycle to one that is capabilities-based, wherein capabilities such as intelligence-, surveillance- and reconnaissance-collection suites or specific weapons packages can be modularly employed on a variety of ground, maritime and air platforms to increase their tactical and operational reach. Doing so would allow USSOCOM to buy, try and modify capabilities without being constrained by service-platform considerations and would also allow USSOCOM to upgrade modular capabilities at the pace of technology advancement. In return, the rapid development of SOF-peculiar and modular systems is likely to expand a catalogue of systems through which to appropriately fit and equip portions of the conventional force for the IW fight.

Commitment to success

The problems SOF and DoD must be prepared to address include the inability of nation-states to deal with increasingly complex challenges or to meet the needs and expectations of their populations. These challenges are exacerbated by the growing number of nonstate actors who have strategic effects in a networked and interconnected world. In the vacuum created by weak or failed governments, nonstate actors have achieved greater influence over benign populations by addressing their basic needs and grievances, and by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing them into submission. When governments fail to address the needs of the population, they become irrelevant, and people will make choices shaped by their own immediate needs for survival.

In the best-case scenario, people will turn to a benevolent nonstate actor, such as a nongovernmental organization, a moderate and tolerant religious group, or a local ethnic or traditional institution. However, populations also turn to extremist or criminal organizations, many of which are sponsored by rogue nation-states. Nonstate groups, such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Jamaah Islamiyah and MS-13, are growing in influence and shaping the choices of populations as nation-states fail to adequately address their needs and grievances. Responding to these challenges requires an approach that is integrated with the long-term work of civilian agencies, especially the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to foster the credibility and influence of legitimate authorities among relevant populations.

Beyond these required changes must also come a change in how the U.S. military organizes and trains units. Everyone must invest in IW capabilities and incentivize the best and brightest to pursue these career fields. Such an investment must be formalized in policy that incentivizes these disciplines as core skills and institutionalizes operator career progression that rewards specialized rather than generalized performance. This investment is already long overdue. If we do not commit a significant portion of our personnel to living abroad in other cultures for extended periods and to specializing rather than generalizing our skill sets, then we will fail to gain the trust, credibility and faith of those nations and partners whom we claim to be fighting alongside.

This is specialized excellence within a full-spectrum capabilities set. Many of the enabling capabilities previously listed are not exclusively military in nature, nor are they restricted to government services. Some are commercial entities that have been constructing things in adverse places for decades. Academic specialties such as anthropology are also included on this list of essential enablers that must exist within a balanced joint force above and beyond the organic needs of the services. Only with such an "excess," as misleading as that word may be, can we ensure that the resident expertise

HOUSE CALL A Civil Affairs Soldier treats a woman who was injured when a bus ran over her. The CA Soldiers are building relationships on the island of Basilan in the Philippines. *U.S. Army photo.*

is available to adapt to any emergent security scenario that may face us in the coming years. These imperatives apply to both SOF and to the larger U.S. defense establishment, which has been tasked to provide "a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict."[12]

The conflicts we are engaged in are bigger than DoD, and they will require a global effort. The U.S. will need to go even beyond a whole-of-government approach to what can be called a whole-of-nations approach: an ability to work through and with others in pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes to unusually complex situations. Doing so requires more than setting an "American" example for others to follow, as neither words nor deeds are sufficient to justify our presence abroad over the long term. Our military forces must be able to live as locals do, and understand and respond to indigenous concerns, if we are ever to expect others to accept our assistance in resolving their crises. There really is nothing special or irregular about it, but it does require wisdom and persistence. Such an approach has historically been a core part of U.S. special operations, and it must remain a mainstay capability of our future military. Tomorrow's victories will be defined by the successes of others, and their defeats will be our failures. The commitment, in either case, remains ours, and we must embrace it now. **SW**

Admiral Eric T. Olson is commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

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INTO HAITI

BY MAJOR PATRICK BLANKENSHIP



Photos by SSG Pedro Lugo, Civil Affairs NCO, CMSE 823, B/98th CAB

On Jan. 12, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, killing as many as 300,000 people and destroying much of the infrastructure of the city and its surrounding areas.

As part of the United States military's response to the earthquake, Operation Unified Response, Civil Affairs forces from the 98th CA Battalion conducted humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief, or HA/DR, operations in Haiti from January through April. The composition of the response force, the positioning of the components and their level of engagement played a critical role in the evolution of Operation Unified Response from the life-saving phase through the life-sustaining phase and into recovery and transition.

HACC

Upon their arrival in Port-au-Prince, elements of the 98th CA Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.T. Stevens, established a humanitarian-assistance coordination center, or HACC, to interface with U.S. interagency partners, the UN and the international humanitarian community. The coordination, communication and facilitation made possible by the HACC among the diverse organizations participating in the HA/DR operation increased the efficiency of the overall effort and proved essential for Joint Task Force-Haiti, or JTF-H, to accomplish its mission.

The 98th CA Battalion deployed its 22-person HACC to augment the disaster-response team, or DART, from the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, and perform liaison with the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA. The CA contingent provided the JTF-H commander, Lieutenant General P.K. Keen, interface with USAID, the UN, the international humanitarian community and specific representatives of the government of Haiti, or GoH. The HACC provided the critical functions of assessing and analyzing civil vulnerabilities, conducting civil-information management and building the humanitarian common operating picture.

Crisis of magnitude

With many GoH officials killed and the presidential palace and ministerial buildings collapsed or damaged, Haiti was at the onset of the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere. To make matters even worse, the UN headquarters in downtown Port-au-Prince had been destroyed during the earthquake, and the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti, or MINUSTAH, had suffered a critical loss with the death of its head of mission, the special representative to the secretariat

general and 100 other UN staff, military personnel and UN police.

The size and scope of the disaster were unprecedented in an urban environment, and the flow of information necessary for making decisions was slow and intermittent. The situational picture was at best unclear, but in reality it was incomplete and would remain so for much longer than anyone would have predicted. Normal communications within the GoH were not functioning, and the country was in a state of paralysis.

According to the GoH special representative for shelter and reconstruction, Charles Clermond, in a speech he gave at the first meeting of the UN Debris Management Task Force in early February, the biggest problem faced by the GoH during the weeks immediately following the earthquake was one of information and communication. Simply put, the GoH could not clearly see the problem and therefore could not effectively formulate and articulate a response to it. The GoH was not the only entity suffering from an inability to see the problem clearly. The UN, the U.S. JTF-H and the international humanitarian community were all in the same boat. Getting timely, accurate information was a problem that slowed the relief effort from the onset.

The UN logistics base

The UN mission to Haiti, which had been an integral part of the stabilization of Haiti since 2004, was the second most influential actor in the humanitarian response after the GoH. After the earthquake destroyed the UN headquarters, the UN logistics base, located at the southeast corner of Port-au-Prince International Airport, became the headquarters for the UN mission to Haiti. Although the U.S. government's portion of the HA/DR operation was directed from the U.S. Embassy and the adjacent headquarters of JTF-Haiti, Stevens, the officer in charge of the HACC, and Brigadier General Nicolas Matern, the JTF-H deputy commanding general for humanitarian assistance, identified a need to forward-position a part of the HACC at the UN logistics base to directly interface with the UN.

The UN logistics base was a critical location for the HACC's forward position because of the presence of key personnel, including the acting head of mission for Haiti; the special representative of the secretariat general, Edmond Mulet; the commanding general for MINUSTAH forces, Major General Peixoto; and other organizations, including the MINUSTAH joint operations center and the newly formed joint operations tasking center, or JOTC. The JOTC served as the primary interface for the various humanitarian actors to request security, logistics, engineering and technical assistance from the military and police involved in the operation. Especially important to the international disaster responders and humanitarian actors, UN OCHA set up its on-site operations coordination center, or OSOCC, at the UN logistics base. The OSOCC serves as the single

point of interface for the UN at the onset of a disaster and coordinates the efforts of international disaster responders and humanitarian organizations.

Creation of the HACC-FWD

The mission of the HACC's 10-person forward element, the HACC-FWD, was to coordinate directly with the relevant organizations involved in HA/DR operations at the logistics base in order to increase the efficiency of the overall HA/DR effort in support of the U.S. whole-of-government response.

To ensure that the HACC-FWD interacted in a manner that would be seen as appropriate by the international humanitarian community (keeping in mind that some humanitarian organizations are extremely sensitive to the perception of working too closely with the military), the HACC-FWD sought and received additional training in civil-military coordination from UN OCHA civilian-military coordination representatives Brian Isbell and Sophie Reck. With knowledge of the goals, roles and expectations of humanitarian actors to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles and an understanding of best practices for military-actor interaction across the phases of a HA/DR operations, HACC-FWD personnel were able to participate with the international humanitarian community in a culturally appropriate manner that was acceptable to all stakeholders. The HACC-FWD was then able to teach, coach and mentor members of the JTF-H on best practices for interaction with humanitarian actors, mitigating the negative effects of inappropriate civil-military interactions which have strategic communications-level impact for the JTF-H and whole-of-government response.

UN emergency cluster system

At the UN logistics base, members of the HACC-FWD participated directly in the UN Emergency Cluster System, which encompasses 11 clusters, or services, to be provided during a humanitarian crisis. The HACC-FWD attended meetings focused on the five clusters of food, water/sanitation/hygiene, shelter, health and camp coordination/camp management. In these cluster meetings, HACC-FWD personnel were able to collaborate with members of international humanitarian organizations, governmental and nongovernmental organizations and gain an understanding of those organizations' capabilities and limitations. In these cluster meetings, cluster members identified and discussed problems in order to find resources to solve those problems. For example, if a cluster member had food in a warehouse but didn't have the capability to move the food to a distribution point, they could raise that issue in the cluster meeting. If another member of the cluster had transportation assets they could allocate to move the food, then the problem could be solved internally. When a problem was too big or exceeded the capability of

SUPPORT SYSTEM The UN logistics base at the Port-au-Prince International Airport was the center for the coordination of international humanitarian relief and emergency response.

the cluster participants, the cluster lead could authorize a request for assistance from the UN JOTC.

One of the functions of the HACC-FWD was to report on the problems and issues coming out of the cluster meetings. Its value to the JTF was that the HACC-FWD was able to identify gaps in the capabilities, capacities and resources of cluster members and recommend ways that the JTF commander could support the humanitarian community in a collaborative manner that would complement the efforts of the humanitarian actors. That type of predictive gap analysis allowed the JTF to collaborate effectively with the humanitarian community, prevented duplication of effort and kept the humanitarians in the lead role, supported by the JTF.

Information management and prioritization

Many organizations participating in the cluster system, while providing a breadth and depth of knowledge within their sector, were either unable or unwilling to cross into sectors outside their expertise. For problems as large and complicated as those presented by the earthquake, the result was an inconsistent, incomplete picture of the situation. With a problem of such magnitude, it quickly became apparent to the HACC-FWD that attention and resources that focused solely on one emergency cluster area were insufficient. Through liaison with the UN OCHA and humanitarian actors, the HACC identified gaps in capability or capacity, reported to the JTF-H the resource needs of those organizations and advised the command on how the JTF-H could best fulfill its supporting role in the HA/DR effort. As the capabilities and capacities of the actors involved in the response increased, the reliance upon JTF personnel and resources diminished, which led to transition. The primary methodology for providing solutions to identified gaps was the "through and with" methodology; utilizing the capabilities and resources available within the host nation, the UN, the humanitarian community, USAID and, as the option of last resort, JTF-Haiti.

Although the HACC's gap analysis on unresourced needs arising from the UN Emergency Response Cluster System was important for matching JTF-H resources with humanitarian requirements, its most important accomplishment may have been helping the widely divergent stakeholders involved in the humanitarian response visualize and prioritize their efforts. The HACC became what Brigadier General Matern described as "the connective tissue" that tied U.S. interagency efforts to those of UN, international, humanitarian and GoH organizations to allow them to act with unity of effort to achieve common goals in support of HA/DR operations in Haiti. **SW**

Major Patrick Blankenship has operational experience in both conventional and irregular warfare, including multiple deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as a brigade staff officer, company commander of an Armor/Mech company team in Salah Dihn Province and as the deputy J9 of a heavy brigade combat team conducting counterinsurgency operations in Diyalah Province, Iraq. Blankenship served as the officer in charge for the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center- Forward in Port-au-Prince in support of Operation Unified Response from Jan. 22 to April 20, 2010. He currently serves as the team leader for the Civil Military Support Element-Central America, operating out of Soto Cano AFB, Honduras, conducting CA operations throughout the seven-country region of Central America.

ACTIVE DUTY

FY 2011 Active Army Selection Board Schedule

The Army has released the projected schedule of promotion-selection boards for fiscal year 2011. Numbers in the MILPER column indicate the MILPER message number. For more information check the Army Human Resources Command at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/menus.asp?cat=boards

BOARD	DATES
LTC MFE CMD	Oct. 4-21
BDE CSL CSM MFE	Oct. 6-14
Active MSG	Oct. 26 - Nov. 18
MAJ Army	Oct. 27 - Nov. 19
BG Army	Nov. 15-23
CPT Army	Dec. 1-14
ARSOF CSM CSL	Dec. 6-10
COL MFE CMD	Jan. 5-13
BN CSL CSM MFE	Jan. 5-23
CW3/4/5	Jan. 19 - Feb. 2
MG Army	Jan. 26-27
Active SFC	Feb. 3-28
LTC Army	Feb. 15 - March 11
SSC	April 5-22
Active SGM/SMC	June 7-27
FD Board	July 12-26
COL Army	Aug. 16-30
ROTC PMS	Aug. 23-24
LTC MFE CMD	Sept. 20 – Oct. 6

OFFICER

Key dates for 2012 LTC CSL

Officers whose records will be considered by the FY 2012 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection List for Maneuver, Fires and Effects should remember three key dates:

July 26 – Sept. 27, 2010:

Check "My Board File" at the following link: https://www.hrc.army.mil/portal/default.aspx?page=active.record.mbf.

Aug. 13 – Sept. 14, 2010:

Submit command preferences and select the "Command Preference Designation" option through the command-preference Web site: https://www.isdrad16.army.mil/ahrc/ospp/home/htdocs.

Sept. 24, 2010:

Last day to submit officer evaluation reports to the Human Resources Command's Evaluations Branch for consideration by the board.

Army projects board release dates

The results of the 2010 Colonel Promotion-Selection Board are tentatively scheduled to be released in October.

The results of the FY 2011 colonel and lieutenant colonel command-selection lists are tentatively scheduled to be released in April or May 2011.

ENLISTED Army approves new CMF 18 PDSI

The Army has approved the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's proposal to establish a new personnel-development skill identifier, or PDSI, for Special Forces enlisted Soldiers. The approval establishes PDSI code D5G for CMF 18 sergeants major who have served at least 12 months as a company sergeant major. Service as a company sergeant major is one of the requirements for selection to command sergeant major, and the new PDSI will help the Army Human Resources Command, or HRC, validate Soldiers' minimum eligibility without manually scanning each candidate's record. It will also help HRC manage the inventory of SF sergeants major by making it easier to identify and place qualified Soldiers into positions that require previous service as a company sergeant major.

WARRANT OFFICER FY 2011 WO promotion board set for January

The FY 2011 Warrant Officer Promotion Selection Board will be conducted from Jan. 19 to Feb. 20, 2011. Official guidance for the board is scheduled for release by MILPER message in early to mid-September. Eligible warrant officers should begin reviewing their records to ensure that they accurately represent the officer's service and include a current DA photo. For additional information, visit https://www.hrc.army.mil or contact the 180A career manager, CWO 4 Terry Baltimore, by sending e-mail to: terry.baltimore@us.army.mil.

AMERICAN GUERRILLA:

The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann

In *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann*, Mike Guardia seeks to demonstrate the contributions of Russell Volckmann and his guerrillas in the successful outcome of the United States campaign to retake the Philippines from the Japanese during World War II; and, secondly, to establish Volckmann as the true father of Army Special Forces — "a title that history has erroneously awarded to Colonel Aaron Bank." He does an adequate job with the first goal, but his second attempt is flawed.

Guardia tells the story of Volckmann's adventures in the Philippines in a workman-like manner, and he deserves plaudits for obtaining his "war diary" from the Volckmann family, as well as for some of his other primary-source research. However, in stating that "the historiography of the guerrilla war in the Philippines is comparatively narrow," he omits some important published sources in his bibliography. These include *Lieutenant Ramsey's War*, by Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, and *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, by Bernard Norling. Norling, a history professor at Notre Dame University for more than 35 years, also co-authored other books on resistance movements in the Philippines. His work on the subject is authoritative.

While Guardia confines his tale to Volckmann's role in northern Luzon, the story of Wendell Fertig's accomplishments in the Japanese-occupied island of Mindano is also impressive. Fertig commanded an army of 35,000 men and headed the civil government on one of the largest islands in the world. His accomplishments are told in a novel-like fashion in John Keats' *They Fought Alone: A True Story of a Modern American Hero*. Both Volckmann and Fertig later would play leading roles in the development of Army Special Forces.

The author's story of Volckmann's years in the Philippines constitutes the bulk of his book. While well-written, it is familiar to those who have read Volckmann's memoir and some of the sources in the author's bibliography. He also overuses entries from Volckmann's war diary, many of which are mundane ("19-24 December 1943. Nothing exciting.")

Guardia claims "Volckmann's most significant contribution may lie in what he accomplished after the war" (reviewer's emphasis). Yet he devotes only eight pages to Chapter 11, which deals primarily with Volckman's experience during the Korean War, and nine pages to Chapter 12, "Special Forces." It is in his seminal chapter on Special Forces that the author goes astray.

Particularly perplexing is Guardia's diminishment of the importance of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure's role in the development of Special Forces. In late August 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Department of Army G3 Major General Charles Bolte requested McClure's assistance in setting up an office for psychological warfare on the Army staff (the term "psychological operations" did not come into general usage until the 1960s). McClure had been responsible for Allied psychological warfare in World War II, first in North Africa, then in the European Theater of Operations under General Dwight Eisenhower. The latter was designated the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, not the "US Army Psychological Warfare Branch in Europe," as stated by Guardia. The difference is significant; McClure's PWD combined both an operational and staff function for the psychological-warfare activities of *all* Allied forces — *not* just the U.S. Army.

In his first staff meeting of what eventually became entitled the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, or OCPW, McClure stated that General Bolte agreed with him that unconventional warfare did not belong in G3 and should be transferred to the OCPW. His association with William Donovan, head of the OSS in World War II, gave him an appreciation for a behind-the-lines capability in the event of war with the Soviet Union. McClure, however, knew that his expertise lay primarily in psychological warfare, so he brought into the OCPW personnel like Volckmann, Aaron Bank and Wendell Fertig, to develop what became known as the Special Forces Concept. In other words, McClure came to his new job convinced that the Army needed an unconventional-warfare capability similar to that of the OSS. It was his leadership and dogged persistence with senior military and civilian Army officials that made it possible for Special Forces to come to fruition.



DETAILS

By Mike Guardia
Havertown, Pa.:
Casemate Publishers, 2010.
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226 pages. $32.95.

Reviewed by:
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U.S. Army, Retired

Guardia overstates the effect of Volckmann's memorandum forwarded to the Army chief of staff following his attendance at a conference at Fort Benning's Infantry School. That memo was indeed important in the chain of events leading up to the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group, but it was done with the knowledge and direction of McClure. In other words, Volckmann did not go "straight to the chief of staff," as Guardia states. Nor was it Volckmann who "ultimately won the blessings of the Army Chief of Staff and secured the establishment of the Army's first special operations unit: the 10th Special Forces Group." The path to the final concept for Special Forces arrived at by Volckmann, his colleagues and McClure was lengthy, tortuous and marked by controversy. It was a considerably more complex process than that described by the author.

And this statement by the author requires rebuttal: "Reviewing Volckmann's contribution to the development of Special Forces, it begs the question of why he receives virtually no recognition for his involvement and why history has given the lion's share of the credit to Aaron Bank." This is inaccurate. If Guardia had carefully read *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, either the 1982 edition — which is included in his bibliography — or the revised 2002 edition, he would have seen that the book gives Volckmann credit as the principal architect in McClure's employ for the development of what eventually became known as the Special Forces Concept. Indeed, his name is cited no fewer than 15 times in the text, which also includes his photo. Over many years, this reviewer and other authors have repeatedly extolled the unconventional-warfare experience of those personnel who served in the Philippines. Volckmann's contributions to the creation of Special Forces are well-known among Special Forces veterans and scholars. He is hardly "unknown," as Guardia claims.

My own research has not revealed the rationale for McClure's decision to choose Aaron Bank from his OCPW staff, rather than Volckmann, as the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group, established concurrently with the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., in mid-1952. One may presume, however, a couple of reasons. First, the Army's primary concern — even while fighting a conflict in Korea — was preparation for a possible war with the Soviet Union in Europe. Thus the 10th SF Group was targeted to support that potential conflict. Second, OSS organizational principles underlay the initial configuration of the group. Bank had served with the OSS in Europe. There is no question that Volckmann's wartime experience and analytical work in guerrilla warfare far exceeded those of Bank, but those qualifications may not have offset the latter's service with the OSS in Europe.

Whatever the reasons for his selection, Bank did an admirable job of organizing and training the 10th SF Group, both at Fort Bragg and after its deployment to Germany. After retirement from the Army, Bank remained active with the SF community, which selected him as its first honorary colonel of the regiment. Then there is the fact that Bank became the "Father of Army Special Forces" by Congressional decree, an omission by the author.

Another inaccuracy is Guardia's description of the table of organization and equipment that Bank created for the 10th Special Forces Group. He states that Bank "suggested a derivative of the Operational Group concept from the OSS." According to Guardia, Bank created a three-tiered Special Forces group organization of A, B and C detachments, with the A-detachment of 12 personnel as the basic operational unit. In fact, the basic unit in the 10th SF Group originally was the 15-man operational detachment, commanded by a captain and configured basically with the same personnel skills as the OSS 15-man Operational Group. The next level up was the operational detachment, district B, commanded by a major; then the operational detachment, district A, commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The A, B and C structure of Special Forces came into being later.

Then there is this particularly egregious proclamation by the author: "It would also not be appropriate to bestow McClure with the title, "Father of Special Forces." I agree; McClure's contributions were much broader in scope and applied to both psychological warfare and Special Forces. Indeed, if during his visit to Fort Bragg, Guardia had ambled over to the headquarters of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, he would have seen this plaque mounted at its entrance: "In memory of MG Robert Alexis McClure, 4 March 1897-1 Jan 1957, The Father of Army Special Warfare, building dedicated." Above the entrance, in large letters, is etched: "MG Robert A. McClure Building," and his portrait is prominently displayed in the headquarters building lobby. Without the vision, dedication and energy of McClure, there would have been no Special Forces and no Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in 1952 — the foundation for today's Army Special Warfare Center and its Special Operations Command.

Further marring Guardia's text is the fact that his endnotes in Chapters 11 and 12 bear no correlation to those in the "Notes" section at the rear of his book. As a further mystery, while he indicates 47 endnotes in his epilogue, they do not appear in the "Notes" section, all of which indicates a woeful lack of careful editing by the author and his publisher.

In sum, while the author's treatment of Volckmann's experience in the Philippines is reasonably well-written, it breaks little new ground. More important, his justification that the title "Father of Special Forces rightly belongs to Russell William Volckmann" is superficial, inaccurate and unprofessionally documented. For these reasons, I do not recommend this book for the general reader, for special-operations personnel or for serious scholars. **SW**

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