# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School


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# From the Commandant



As the new commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, I look forward to the opportunity of commanding the soldiers and the civilians who develop the doctrine and the training for our Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces. We face a challenging task in developing a special-operations force for the future.

As we work together to develop that force, we should remember that despite changes in the strategies and in the tools we use to wage wars, the soldier will always be of paramount importance in winning them.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, several articles emphasize the importance of the human element of warfare. Lieutenant Colonel William Jacobs describes how Ardant du Picq's 19th-century theories of the human aspect of war apply to the dilemma faced by Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, and how these theories can help us to train for operations on the modern battlefield and to deal with the timeless factors of fear and loneliness.

Major Sam Young's history of SF selection and assessment shows that our current SF selection techniques stem from those developed by the OSS during World War II. In assessing and selecting individuals for unconventional assignments, we still adhere to the basic principles used by the OSS. Colonel Thomas Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders explain how SOF assessment-and selection-techniques might be applied Armywide as a means of selecting soldiers for the various components of Force XXI.

In his assessment of conflict situations that the United States is likely to face in the 21st century, Brian Sullivan predicts that special-operations forces will be our most valuable resource in dealing with those challenges. Major General William Garrison and Colonel Hayward Florer also discuss the use of SOF in our current and future security environments and propose a structure for a new special-operations brigade to deal with the nontraditional missions that we will surely encounter.

SOF's usefulness in a variety of operations comes in large part from the qualities of SOF soldiers — their interpersonal skills, their flexibility, their adaptability, and their capacity for independent action. These qualities have served us well in the past, and they will be essential to our success and survival on the confusing and isolated battlefields of the future.

William P. Tangney

**Major General William P. Tangney**

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


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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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## Features



## Departments

# Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: The Joint Strategic Perspective

*by Brian R. Sullivan*

While it has become something of a cliché that the United States will not become involved in a major conventional war within the next 15 years, there are good reasons to believe it. The powerful impression created by U.S. military might during the Gulf War, the high level of American defense spending relative to that of other states, the preeminence of the U.S. in a wide range of military technologies, and the frequently demonstrated competence of the U.S. armed forces seem likely to deter an attack on American interests by regular armed forces in the foreseeable future.

But that cliché can create a dangerous sense of complacency, for it is precisely because of our powerful image that unconventional and irregular military challenges to U.S. interests are quite likely to occur. Its position as a global leader makes the U.S. an obstacle to those who wish to upset the international or the regional status quo. When such antagonists seek to remove the American barrier by violent means, the only practical methods available to them are insurgency, terrorism or assassination.

Furthermore, it seems likely that in the coming years our government will place U.S. armed forces in harm's way. The recent interventions in northern Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia have demonstrated that violent anarchy or widespread suffering and bloodshed can trigger American military intervention. Evidence suggests that worsening demographic and economic conditions may increase the chaos in the poorer sections of the world. As a consequence, threats to U.S. interests or the pressure generated by American public opinion may lead to our armed involvement in a number of low-intensity conflicts.

Finally, international organized crime is posing a serious danger to the security of the U.S. and to the stability of the international order. Despite the growing severity of illegal activities, the responsibility for combating them remains primarily with law-enforcement agencies. In a small number of instances, however, effective response may require the intervention of the U.S. military. For example, some small, impoverished states may be overtaken by criminal gangs and become modern versions of the buccaneer states of the 17th-century Caribbean or the pirate states of 19th-century North Africa. Destroying outlaw regimes may require armed invasion, with heavy reliance on our special-operations forces.

The increasing disparity between the living standards of economically developed regions and those of economically underdeveloped regions often provokes warnings of future North-South conflict. In fact, the relative wealth of Australia and New Zealand, the growing prosperity of Chile and Argentina, and the possibility that South Africa and parts of Southeast Asia may develop into econom-

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*This article is an expanded and revised version of a paper presented by the author at the American Defense Preparedness Association conference held in Washington, D.C., in December 1995. It examines possible roles that SOF could fill in dealing with the problems the U.S. may encounter in the 21st century. In the next issue of* Special Warfare, *a second article by Dr. Sullivan will examine future revolutions in military affairs. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States government. — Editor.*

ic successes suggest a different geographic reality. Global misery and disorder are deepening not so much in the southern parts of the globe but rather in a broad regional strip centered on the equator. Already, a number of failing states have appeared in that wide portion of the planet.

There is reasonable hope that some countries in that belt – Mexico, Peru, Morocco, Ghana, Angola, and even India and Bangladesh – may escape their present low standard of living. But other countries in what was once called the Third World almost certainly will suffer a horrid fate in coming years, sinking into a condition of degradation almost too awful to imagine.

Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren may live in a far happier world, thanks to the anticipated mid-21st-century easing of demographic pressures and to the continued advances of technology. But the next several decades are likely to witness human misery on a scale unprecedented in history. Famine, pestilence and death, three of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, probably will ravage hundreds of millions — perhaps billions — of human beings. And the fourth horseman is war.

Food and water shortages may prompt desperate invasions by people seeking escape from hunger and thirst. Deadly plagues may prompt mass flight across even well-guarded borders. Crime may appeal to many as the only relief from poverty, leading entire societies away from the rule of the law to the law of the jungle. Cities in the impoverished world may become the scene of huge riots directed by demagogues whose aim is to topple governments. Religious fanatics may turn against the adherents of other religions, claiming divine sanction as an excuse for plunder, rape and murder. Weakened by economic decline, many central governments may be unable to control long-festering ethnic and regional hatreds, with large-scale slaughter as a result. Massive illegal immigration into the developed world could take on similar aspects of the tribal invasions that toppled the Roman and Chinese empires. A desire either for vengeance or for extortion could generate widespread terrorism by the poor against the rich.

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These catastrophes may not occur, but even if they do, they may not threaten the prosperous portions of the human race. Technology and wealth may allow the West to build a wall against the suffering that exists outside its borders. But will none of these dreadful possibilities trouble the U.S. or its allies? The term "global interdependence" is more than a buzzword. The American economy's growing reliance on exports, our need to import raw materials, the rapid spread of infectious disease in an age of jet travel, the instant access to worldwide communications, the unitary nature of the world ecological system, and the demonstrated vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorist attack are reasons why Americans cannot ignore the troubles that will afflict the poor majority of mankind.

## New challenges

In dealing with those troubles, the U.S. will find that the most efficient and cost-effective option is the use of its special-operations forces. Special-operations personnel possess the required language skills and the knowledge of foreign cultures and geography to function effectively among non-Western peoples. U.S. intervention in chaotic or failed states probably will involve a combination of military and nonmilitary activities. Such a range of difficult and delicate activities represents the forte of special-operations forces. Those who take part in such operations will require certain personal qualities: daring, imagination, initiative, hardiness, inventiveness, persistence and flexibility. These are traits for which members of the special-operations forces are chosen and which their training further enhances. SOF individual and small-unit skills in combat, medicine, communica-

tions, teaching, mechanics, field engineering, demolitions, navigation and survival are vital in complex circumstances.

Despite their present readiness, special-operations forces still require enhancement and restructuring to deal more effectively with likely future challenges. In preparation for operations at the least violent end of the spectrum, we will need to increase the number of our Civil Affairs units. While it appears unlikely that the U.S. will intervene in every crisis throughout the world for the purpose of restoring a collapsed government, it seems equally unlikely that Washington would tolerate widespread disorder in Latin America, Africa or Asia.

Certain sea-lanes, maritime choke points and canals would have to be kept free from piracy, sunken ships, mines and terrorism. When anarchic states spill chaos across their borders, we might best protect our allies by returning those anarchic states to the rule of law. In the wake of conventional military action in these failed states, Civil Affairs forces would be required to reimpose order on the disrupted societies, if only for operational reasons. The demands of restoring government and essential services on a wide scale would be far beyond our present CA capacity.

## Epidemics

The immediate future may present other daunting challenges to Civil Affairs units. Because of complicated social and cultural reasons, AIDS already infects a high proportion of the military and civilian officials of Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and other central African countries. In some or all of these countries, government establishments may collapse in the next 10-15 years. If this pattern is repeated in other areas where AIDS is spreading at an alarming rate, then civil rule may also erode or break down in parts of North Africa, the Middle East, India and Southeast Asia. It is estimated that AIDS will ultimately claim at least one million victims in the U.S. One can only imagine the number of victims it will claim in far less medically advanced societies. Moreover, a number of scientists worry that AIDS may be only a precursor to other, more deadly plagues.

Epidemics might totally destabilize certain portions of the Eastern Hemisphere. The U. S. would probably be unwilling to tolerate a total lack of government in a region where the interests of the major powers converge – a region that includes both the Suez Canal and the chief source of the world's petroleum. Nor is it likely that the U.S. would stand by while governments collapsed in countries immediately to the south of China, to the east of India and to the north of Indonesia. American interests would not be served if India, China, Indonesia and Vietnam were allowed to collide in an effort by each to impose its rule on the ruins of the Bangladeshi, Burmese, Thai, Cambodian or Laotian states. The U.S. might therefore intervene to prevent war and to provide order in these heavily populated areas.

The area of the globe likely to suffer the greatest deprivation over the next few decades – North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of Southern Asia – is also the center of the Muslim world. True, some countries with a substantial or a majority Islamic population — for example, Morocco, Turkey, Lebanon, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia — may enjoy a substantial rise in their living standards. But the majority of the world's Muslims may be especially hard-hit by economic misery.

## Muslim resentment

Already, for psychologically and historically understandable reasons, the imbalance of wealth has created severe Muslim resentment toward Christians and the West. As a result, some Muslims have turned to violent religious fanaticism. It is possible that many more will join them as social and economic conditions further deteriorate in parts of the Islamic world.

Consequently, any future American military intervention in countries with large Muslim populations is certain to fuel negative sentiments. Civil Affairs and PSYOP units would face a special challenge in these areas. Although Americans are uncomfortable mixing religion and politics in the conduct of foreign and security affairs, PSYOP units must be prepared to ameliorate anti-Western religious attitudes in certain Islamic countries if U.S. forces have to deploy to those areas.

## Cultural domination

The U.S. victory in the Cold War has not been followed by an effort to control the world in a political or military sense. But consider the tremendous impact of American culture and entertainment on the rest of mankind over the past decade alone. Anyone who has recently traveled in Latin America, Africa or Asia has witnessed the growing availability in those areas of televisions, satellite dishes, radios, tape players and compact-disc players, personal computers and videocassette recorders. These entertainment and information sources are dominated to an extraordinary degree by the transmission of American popular culture. That domination seems certain to

become even more widespread as the entertainment industries assume an increasingly important role in the American economy.

Unfortunately, the images of American society projected by our popular culture are often more representative of our nightmares and fantasies than of our realities. This is not always clear, however, to poorly educated foreign audiences, and they often form a distorted opinion of Americans.

Even when American reality *is* portrayed accurately, to know us is not necessarily to love us. Such concepts as multi-party democracy, religious freedom, individual freedom to choose a marriage partner, freedom of artistic expression, and the right of adults to disobey their parents are genuine American values, protected by our laws and cherished in our culture. But in societies functioning according to contrary beliefs and customs, the positive portrayal of these values can provoke violently negative reactions.

To many living in traditional societies, Americans appear to be trying to dominate humanity with our notions about sex, religion, politics, child-rearing and other intimate or personal matters. PSYOP and CA units will have to work together to convince large numbers of misinformed or highly suspicious people that a temporary U.S. military intervention is not an attempt to impose U.S. values on them.

The educated among our opponents may present us with additional problems. Members of foreign elites typically have much more knowledge about the U.S. than most Americans have about foreign countries. The English language is understood by increasingly larger numbers of people. Because of international broadcasting and widespread travel by foreigners in the U.S., detailed knowledge of American society, culture and politics is being spread to every part of the globe. Our graduate schools are educating large numbers of foreign students. As we already know, some Middle Easterners and Latin Americans who have graduated from American universities are inevitably joining the ranks of our enemies. Unless the U.S. armed forces are prepared to operate under great intelligence disadvantages, our military personnel must know far more about foreign societies than they do now.

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Nor will it be sufficient to be knowledgeable only about certain parts of the world, as it was during the Cold War. Given the changes in the international system over the past five years, it is impossible to rule out American military intervention anywhere. It is equally impossible to know where such operations are most likely to occur. Consequently, the need for universal knowledge of the world and of its peoples presents a particular problem for special-operations forces. To a large extent, the responsibility of providing universal knowledge rests with the American educational system. But should the system fail to inculcate such knowledge among young Americans before they volunteer for military service, the armed forces will have to educate their own personnel.

The American military must also stress counterintelligence and security measures far more than it has done in the past. The U.S. Marines paid a high price in Lebanon for their lack of emphasis on these concerns. Recent news from Bosnia suggests that the enemies of the U. S. continue to envision terrorist attacks as a prime weapon against our armed forces. Although our military's technical intelligence is superb, our human intelligence is often poor. U.S. forces, in general, and SOF, in particular, must address intelligence and security deficiencies to ensure successful operations in the poorer regions of the world.

## Urban warfare

Since their inception, Special Forces have operated mainly in rural areas. But the populations in impoverished areas of the world are becoming increasingly urbanized. A few cities already contain populations in the tens of millions. In the next decade, the central regions of the world will contain dozens of cities populated by multimillions of inhabitants. Mexico City, Cairo and Calcutta have already established a pattern of enormous urban squalor. In coming decades, this pattern will be repeated in scores of other cities around the globe. Consequently, it seems almost certain that Special Forces will be involved in urban warfare. Recent operations in

Panama and Mogadishu provide a foretaste of such combat.

## New burdens

Urban warfare will impose new burdens on U.S. Special Forces. For example, making maps of huge slum cities will not be an easy task. But in order to perform effectively, our SF soldiers must have accurate maps and other crucial information. This need creates a major responsibility for U.S. intelligence agencies, since reliable maps of such areas, with their twisting alleys and slapdash buildings, are unlikely to be available from conventional sources. Satellite imagery and computer-generated maps will have to be created and carefully studied if Special Forces are to perform successful operations in sprawling slums.

The trend in 20th-century warfare has been toward ever-increasing civilian losses. Moreover, U.S. Special Forces command the evermore-awesome ability to inflict heavy casualties. Given the nature of their operations, Special Forces may be forced to engage conventional enemy troops many times their number. To ensure the survival of their units, Special Forces must be able to call in supporting firepower, especially from artillery and aircraft.

But we may have to rethink our traditional tactics and devise alternate methods. Future urban warfare in flimsily constructed, densely populated slums could mean that U.S. Special Forces would inflict enormous numbers of civilian deaths. For obvious ethical and political reasons, such bloodshed would be unacceptable, except in the case of dire circumstances. Special Forces cannot engage in the callous use of firepower as the Russians have done in Grozny and in Chechnya. The harm done would not only lose the support of the American people, it would also provoke international outrage. Although it may be unfair, the fact remains that American forces are held to a much higher standard of conduct than most foreign militaries are.

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On the other hand, attempts to develop truly non-lethal weapons for the U.S. military may be somewhat unrealistic. Certainly we would prefer to conduct crowd control or border-security operations with a minimum of violence. But the idea of a bloodless war is a dangerous fantasy: It is precisely the destruction inflicted on the foe that forces him to seek peace.

Nevertheless, Special Forces should develop methods of minimizing fatalities in certain urban-warfare situations. U.S. forces must also be prepared to treat potentially huge numbers of both enemy and civilian casualties. By necessity, our opponents will be forced to develop a plan to offset the high quality of U.S. Special Forces. To achieve this, they may increase the number of their forces or use civilian populations as shields. There will be times when U.S. forces will have no choice but to shoot to kill, an action that is certain to result in large numbers of wounded and dead. In turn, Special Forces medical personnel may be called upon to provide assistance to survivors, who could number in the tens of thousands.

Urban operations will also bring about widespread destruction, along with the need for Civil Affairs units to provide shelter and food for many displaced persons.

Many situations involving future special operations will also pertain to low-intensity conflict conducted by conventional U.S. forces. But the use of the qualifier "low" should not lead to false expectations: Low-intensity conflict in the urban environment will still produce heavy enemy and civilian losses and a great deal of destruction.

In thinking back to the urban operations in Algiers and Oran during the Algerian War and to the operations in Hue, Saigon and Cholon during the Vietnam War, we may derive a general idea of what to expect in the future. The human scale, however, will be far larger. The population of Algeria has nearly tripled in the past 35 years; the population of Vietnam has more than doubled in the past 25. Throughout the rest of the underdeveloped world, the population has also greatly increased. It continues to grow at an alarming

rate and is overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas.

## Question of strategy

U.S. special-operations units intervening in the poorer areas of the world may encounter a population scale and a density of crowding that is difficult for most Americans to imagine. Somalia and Bosnia are relatively empty compared to other areas where the U.S. government might consider intervention. Future operations may be more like mega-Rwandas or mega-Haitis. U.S. leaders should carefully consider the ends and the means before embarking on so-called low-intensity conflict in such regions. Even a very low level of violence on an individual scale, when multiplied by tens of millions, could result in a conflict of high intensity in terms of the effort and the resources necessary for U.S. forces to wage it.

This last point raises the final and essential question of strategy: matching available means to the chosen ends. The U.S. has passed through the isolationist and containment phases of its national history. We are now on the edge of a new period. But we have neither reached a national bipartisan consensus on a new national security policy nor have we developed a strategy for achieving it. Only after such a fundamental national decision has been reached will it be possible to evaluate wisely where the U.S. should commit its forces. On that decision much depends, including the future of U.S. special-operations forces.

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# A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces in the Current and Future Security Environments

*by Major General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army (ret.) and Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr.*

 *This article is taken from MG Garrison's presentation at the December 1995 conference of the American Defense Preparedness Association. Continuing the discussion of SOF's role in future conflicts, it proposes a new force structure for dealing with nontraditional missions — Editor.*

Much has been said and written about the current security environment, and many speakers and writers agree that the primary event shaping the world today is the end of the Cold War. What has not been so thoroughly analyzed are the two dramatically different effects produced by that event, and the ways in which those effects are relevant to special-operations forces.

The first effect brought on by the end of the Cold War has been the increase in turmoil: Deep ethnic, national and religious rivalries and hatreds have been unlocked throughout the old Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. This era has also generated an enormous increase in crime and criminal cartels. In some places, our world looks like the world of the 1920s. In fact, the post-Cold War problems are similar to those that occurred after World War I. The consequences of this unleashed turmoil are playing out in unforeseen ways. Predicting


and anticipating today's security requirements remains an enormous challenge to our national leadership.

The second effect of the end of the Cold War has been a resurgence in democracy and globalization. In sharp contrast to the divisive power unleashed by the first effect, we are now witnessing a trend that is moving politics toward more self-determination, and economics toward freer markets.

The old, centrally planned, closed economies of the Soviet Union and its Marxist surrogates are opening rapidly to both capitalism and the international marketplace. Even though the authoritarian leaders of China, Vietnam and other Asian nations continue to resist democracy, they have initiated some forms of capitalism. As history shows, these nations will learn that capitalism's premium on individual initiative undercuts the authoritarian rulers' grip on power and increases the demands for democratic reforms. Elsewhere, the ideas of democracy have taken root, especially in Latin America and in parts of Eastern Europe. Francis Fukyama, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, predicts a dramatic decrease in conflict as new democracies learn to settle disputes peacefully.[1]

In response to the trend toward globalization, powerful non-national actors, whether they are drug cartels or international business conglomerates, have arrived on the operational security scene. These actors, with their self-interests and narrow constituencies, have no national mandates for action. Third World nations that have weak institutions must struggle with them to maintain their sovereignty and their responsibility to their citizens. In some nations, these actors supplant the institutions in an effort to acquire money and to increase their power. Our National Security Strategy commits the United States to strengthening and supporting the democratic institutions in their attempt to limit the power of non-national actors.[2]

As a result of the two broad trends that have emerged from the end of the Cold War, our nation's military forces are facing new challenges. In preparing to meet these, we are reminded of General Omar Bradley's statement, "Our compelling need ... (is) not for air power, sea power, or land power — but for American military power commensurate with our tasks in the world."[3] Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are part of a joint team that is




designed to be deeply integrated into General Bradley's idea of American military power.

The security environment of today is ill-defined and unpredictable. Nevertheless, SF, CA and PSYOP forces can provide ground truth in this amorphous environment because of their current worldwide deployments to carry out the engagement-and-enlargement mandate from the current National Security Strategy.[4] In fact, SOF may be the only U.S. forces who have been on the ground and know the leaders in dangerous areas in which only five years ago we would never have predicted we would have an interest.

Today's SF, CA and PSYOP are also structured and trained to meet the challenges of enlarging and strengthening democratization. SOF have access to military leaders and can often influence them with American values regarding human rights and democracy. In some countries, CA forces have brought military and civic leaders together for the first time, thus increasing the leaders' trust in new democratic institutions. The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade conducts a series of seminars in Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Paraguay and Belize. There, American officers use their skills to bring together local military officers and local civilian officials to discuss issues such as disaster preparedness and environmental protection. The program works because the CA officers gain the trust of all the participants and help them to focus on local needs and concerns.

Another element of today's operational environment is the integration of technology at all levels. SF, CA and PSYOP forces stay connected with the Army and with other services in this high-tech arena as the Army prepares to fight and win in major regional contingencies anywhere in the world. SOF's leadership in technology is exemplified by our MH-60K and MH-47E helicopters, our tactical use of satellite-communications radios, and our development of highly secure high-frequency radios. All the developments in information operations, command-and-control warfare, battlefield awareness, and an order-of-magnitude improvement in the accuracy of smart weapons, as described in JCS *Vision 2010*, include ARSOF participation.[5]

Over the next 10 years, these developments will help make the joint-force com-

mander, or JFC, decisively successful. The complementary technological improvements and the total integration of ARSOF doctrine into joint and Army doctrine will ensure that SF, CA and PSYOP forces remain on the joint team today and in the future.

Because of their core capabilities and values, SF, CA and PSYOP forces are called on by the geographical commanders in chief, or CINCs, to execute missions in ill-defined and high-risk environments. The entire force is culturally and geographically oriented and sensitized. Language proficiency is only part of the power of this capability. SF, CA and PSYOP forces train and practice the arts of persuasion, negotiation and cross-cultural communication for all regions of the globe. Special Forces add the cutting edge of tough combat skills and survivability. Although SF can execute commando-style operations, their real skill is in teaching, advising, assisting and assessing other nations' forces. They adapt particularly well to the needs of coalition-support operations. As stated by General Norman Schwarzkopf, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm they provided the glue that held the coalition together.[6] More recently, they have been critical to the coordination and synchronization of operations with our NATO and European partners in Balkan operations.

PSYOP forces develop and deliver appropriate themes and products that are designed to influence all levels of foreign audiences. CA forces bring the skills of civil administration and civil-military coordination to the joint force. The PSYOP and CA capabilities give the joint-force commanders great flexibility and multiple options in accomplishing their military objectives. Haiti represents a classic example: SF, CA and PSYOP teams deployed to the countryside, allowing the general-purpose forces to focus on the center of gravity in Port-au-Prince.

So far, we have discussed today's operational environment. Now we will focus on the future and what it means for SF, CA and PSYOP. The trends described earlier will continue to bring a more unpredictable world. We will see an era of fewer nation-state wars. But on the other hand, we will see more violence, along with simmering conflicts that flare up and then cool down once the antagonists have exhausted their resources. These will be unwinnable wars whose end state and military objective may

be difficult to ascertain.

Poorly trained but fully politicized paramilitary groups will continue to commit genocide and ethnic cleansing; narcotraffickers will place our future generations at risk; criminal cartels will undermine our economic and personal security; and terrorists will attempt to destroy our institutions. Any of these elements may use weapons of mass destruction as a tool for extortion, profit or actual destruction.

Dealing with an enemy who thumbs his nose at a military force that can fly, shoot and sail with unmatched speed and accuracy will require us to answer the question, "How do we use a high-tech force against a low-tech enemy?" To begin, we must provide a 21st-century soldier – one who is comfortable with technology, is culturally aware, is a good information processor, is capable of adapting, is tenacious under stress, is intelligent, is discerning, is a good thinker, and is able to demonstrate sound judgment. This model soldier and his leaders must be capable of dealing simultaneously with all levels of war, networked by technology. In short, the Cold War norms of hierarchical and sequential decisions and operations are gone. Tactical decisions will have larger political implications than in the past. An example of this was seen in Somalia, where a tactical decision had long-lasting negative political implications, even though it resulted in a successful combat operation.

Army Major Ralph Peters has written two important articles in *Parameters* within the last year that aptly and dramatically describe a potential future. He describes a "new warrior class" that does not follow what he calls the highly stylized and ritualized customs and forms of warfare that the Euro-American soldier follows.

The U.S. military must still be prepared to meet and to fight organized militaries, but it may often have to deal with warriors from this new class as well. To defeat them, the U.S. needs a two-pronged approach: an active campaign to win the support of the populace, coupled with an overwhelming and violent attack against the warriors and their leaders. As Peters says, "You cannot teach them a lesson ... you either win or lose. This kind of warfare is a zero-sum game. And it takes guts to play."[7] Or as Admiral Owens has said, "Identify [the] crown






jewels of [your] adversary and destroy them."[8] Dr. P.J. Berenson, scientific adviser to the commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, writes about the difficulty of deterrence against these future actors in the security environment. He states that selective, violent action by Special Forces, to destroy what an adversary most highly values, may be necessary.[9]

SF, CA and PSYOP will play an important role as high-tech combatants on a highly lethal joint team. This team will be able to hit the new warrior class where it lives. Yet, just as they are doing today, SF, CA and PSYOP teams will be the primary element executing a low-tech campaign to gain the support of the population in the old-fashioned, people-to-people method that President John F. Kennedy envisioned in 1961.[10] Simultaneous operation in the high-tech, highly synchronized environment of joint operations and in low-tech operations with indigenous armies and populations will be the trademark of SF, CA and PSYOP in the future.

U.S. interagency cooperation and integration must become the norm in the future, just as joint operations have become the norm today. The mix of humanitarian, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and nation-building objectives requires all the elements of power of the U.S. And while the complicated objectives will not be clearly military, their consequences will be highly political. Therefore, the intense interest of the National Command Authority will require tight interagency cooperation.

Again, SF, CA and PSYOP forces can operate easily in this kind of environment, particularly where selective and politically sensitive military operations support specific U.S. policy goals. Whether the mission is a sensitive effort to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or a long-term effort to promote democracy and human rights, the initial elements on the ground are usually SF, CA and PSYOP.

New thinking about organizations may provide a solution to help us accomplish such a mission. In the past, we have used traditional structures such as an armored division to handle high-intensity-combat command and control. In today's environment, we need a headquarters and a




structure that are prepared to deal with non-traditional missions on a full-time basis.

## Proposed 'exceptional force'

An "exceptional force" is any element of the combined-arms team or service that dominates a given operation and plays the decisive role. A task-organized Army special-operations brigade could be such an exceptional force for the future. It would consist of SF, CA and PSYOP, as well as elements of infantry, aviation, combat support and combat service support to fit a particular mission. An operation should be built around the dominant element, and the exceptional-force headquarters should serve as the headquarters for the operation which it dominates, using joint and coalition operations to complement and reinforce it.

In combining the capabilities of SF, CA and PSYOP with the capabilities of these other elements, we produce the nucleus of a dynamic team that provides the theater CINC with a tool that can be used to lead, support or advise the joint and interagency team efforts.

The dynamic team provides command and control so that the JFC does not have to form ad hoc organizations. The team also provides its own minimum security for force protection, with the innate ability to determine when more help is needed. It provides a sophisticated headquarters for continued assessments of a country or a region amid the confusion of the future operational environment described earlier. It is an ideal element from which to base joint and interagency operations of the future.

It is conceivable that an SF, CA and PSYOP team could be advising and assisting a foreign nation in peacetime when a contingency requirement would compel it to perform special reconnaissance or direct action or to facilitate other joint-force actions. Once the joint contingency operations were over, the original team would revert back to its engagement mission. The Army special-operations task force will ease the transition through these phases of the operation for the joint force commander. It should be the exceptional force in future peacetime operations when political factors, interagency cooperation, intercultural communication, and human-intelligence collection are dominant elements of an operation.

We have seen how the SF, CA and PSYOP team fits in today's operational environment as a critical member of the joint team and as executor of the U.S. national security policy. We have also explained ways in which the unpredictable future environment will need SF, CA and PSYOP to play an important role in the increasingly frequent interagency operations, while they remain a part of joint and coalition operations. We are but one element of General Bradley's American military power that is "commensurate with our tasks in the world."

In closing, we should remember that the main thing is to keep the main thing the *main* thing. The main thing is stated best by General Dennis Reimer, our Army Chief of Staff:

*The idea of war in the information age will conjure up images of bloodless conflict, more like a computer game than the bloody wars we've known in the past. Nothing could be further from the truth. Warfare may change – its impact on nations, armies and soldiers will not. The fates of nations and armies will still be decided by war, perhaps more rapidly than in the past. Losers may still spend generations recovering from the consequences of defeat. Soldiers will always be the key to victory. Technology and the ability to handle it may be increasingly important, but soldiers will always win or lose wars. The battlefield will always be a dangerous, frightening and lonely place. Only soldiers of character and courage, well-trained, ably led, and properly equipped will survive there and win – tomorrow, as they have in the past.*[11]

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*Major General William F. Garrison retired from the Army in May 1996 as commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In previous assignments, he served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, as deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and as deputy commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Security Agency of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.*

*Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr. is director of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A former Infantry officer and Africa foreign area officer, he has held Special Forces assignments from the A-detachment to the battalion level. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort. Colonel Florer is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the Army Command and General Staff College. He is also a War College graduate from the Advanced Operational Studies fellowship at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and holds a master's degree in history from the University of Kansas.*

Notes:

[1] Francis Fukuyama, *Have We Reached the End of History?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1989); and *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

[2] *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, The White House, February 1995, pp. 1-5.

[3] General Omar Bradley, quote used by Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5, to guide the attitude of the Joint Staff.

[4] *A National Security Strategy*, pp. 7-24.

[5] Discussion paper attached to *Warfighting Vision 2010: A Framework for Change*, 11 September 1995 (Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division, Fort Monroe, Va.).

[6] Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 224.

[7] Major Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 16-26.

[8] As stated by Dr. Paul J. Berenson, *Thoughts on Deterrence*, 6 October 1995, quoted with permission of the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 November 1995.

[9] Berenson, *Thoughts on Deterrence*.

[10] James J. Schneider, "Ambushing the Future," *Special Warfare*, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 2-10.

[11] General Dennis Reimer's speech prepared for the Fletcher School of Law symposium, "War In the Information Age," 16 November 1995, Cambridge, Mass.

# Soldier of the Future: Assessment and Selection of Force XXI

*by Colonel Thomas M. Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders*

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

*This article is an outgrowth of a briefing conducted in 1994 for the Army's leadership. The briefing, initiated by General Wayne Downing, Lieutenant General J.T. Scott and Major General William Garrison, proposed a process by which the Army might man Force XXI. The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Colonel Greg Pulley in the development of the original briefing and, thus, in the development of this article. The authors also emphasize that the SOF leadership in general is interested in hearing soldiers' ideas on ways to enhance or improve current SOF assessment-and-selection programs. Readers are encouraged to use* Special Warfare *as a forum for the expression of those ideas. — Editor.*

As the Army prepares to meet the challenges of the 21st century, changes in doctrine, in tactics and in U.S. demographics will require us to tailor the manning process that the Army uses to fill the force.

The manning process and the indicators the Army uses to identify who should fill each slot in the force — the job-soldier match — are critical to the future of Force XXI.

According to Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, *AirLand Operations*, "Quality soldiers, trained and led by competent and caring leaders, will remain a key to success on future battlefields. Soldiers in the 21st century will be faced with a wide variety of challenges in preparing for and executing missions in full-dimensional operations. … Increased flexibility and adaptability will be required at all levels, along with increased responsibility at much lower ranks."

For the past 20 years, the Army has orchestrated a quiet revolution in one of its manning processes — the assessment and selection of personnel for special-operations forces, or SOF. SOF assessment and selection, which has been an evolutionary process, has produced revolutionary results. The lessons learned could have a similar revolutionary impact on the way the Army mans Force XXI.

The SOF community has always placed an emphasis on people. One of its primary goals has been to develop a cost-effective process

for manning the force and for placing the right soldier in the right job. Through mission analysis, SOF have determined that their soldiers will be more successful if they have the following attributes:

- Organizational skills.
- Trainability.
- Situational awareness.
- Ability to make complex discriminations and decisions.
- Personal adaptability.
- Resistance to stress.
- Dependability, determination and stability.
- Physical endurance and specialized military skills.

SOF must select soldiers who can remain "mentally alive" while experiencing deep fatigue and personal discomfort. SOF soldiers must also be capable of performing their duties while on solo missions in sensitive environments. Ultimately, each SOF soldier must demonstrate the stability, dependability and adaptability required to operate independently in fluid and challenging situations.

The SOF community developed its initial assessment-and-selection program in 1976 for one of its classified units. In developing the program, SOF reviewed and incorporated elements from similar programs, including those of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, or OSS; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the British 22nd Special Air Service, or SAS. The OSS's selection process often failed to match a person to the job he or she would perform in the field. A later review indicated that this ineffective job match was the primary reason for failure in the OSS operational environment.[1] Likewise, the SAS had developed an assessment-and-selection process because a large number of its men had been proven unsuitable for their jobs. That mismatch resulted in a substantial waste of resources.[2]

In 1987, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School began developing a selection program to use in screening candidates for Special Forces training. The first SF assessment and selection began in June 1988.

SOF assessment-and-selection programs

## General Model for Assessment and Selection



have continued to evolve and to expand. Today they are also used to screen candidates for the Rangers and for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Assessment and selection is a sequential process designed to screen out, as early as possible, soldiers who do not possess the attributes required for mission success. The overall process (shown on page 17) begins with a review of current and future mission requirements. The next step is to identify the attributes soldiers must have to perform their missions successfully. Trainers then develop or adapt screening tools that can determine whether the soldiers possess the critical attributes. Once the tools have been validated, they are used in the assessment programs. Included in the screening tools are the General Technical Composite, or GT, of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB; physical-fitness tests; and spatial-relations tests.

The figure below shows the sequential SOF assessment-and-selection process. While the numbers vary slightly among the assessment-and-selection programs of the various SOF units, the statistics are representative of all those programs. The overall assessment-and-selection process typically begins with an initial screening based on a soldier's GT test score from the ASVAB. Only 35 percent of all soldiers achieve the required score of 110. The second screening is based on the soldier's PT test score — only 59 percent of those who take this test meet the requirements. Soldiers who pass the first two screenings, satisfy a background check and meet specific psychological requirements are eligible to attend a structured assessment-and-selection program, where they undergo additional psychological and performance screening.

There is a great deal of truth in the adage, "The best predictor of future performance is past performance." However, individuals mature with experience, so the best predictor of one's future performance is his recent performance on similar tasks. The screening process enables the Army to select those soldiers who are likely to meet performance standards. Assessment continues into the training phase, where sol-

## Sequential SOF Assessment and Selection Process



diers undergo situational testing.

Soldiers selected during the assessment-and-selection process have a high probability of success during operational training and assignment. SOF have achieved 95 percent success in training and more than 99 percent success during operational assignments. Research proves that the overall monetary savings resulting from the selection-and-assessment process have far outweighed the initial investment.

Some of the key lessons learned during the 20 years of SOF assessment and selection are as follows:

- The assessment-and-selection process enables the Army to select the right soldier for a specific job.
- The assessment-and-selection process is cost-effective and enhances individual and unit effectiveness.
- Candidates should be screened early.
- Screening should continue through job-related situational and performance tests.
- Performance evaluation during the assessment-and-selection process should relate to the critical attributes identified in the mission analysis.
- Objective performance standards should be established for assessment, selection and initial training.

In applying SOF assessment-and-selection methods to other career-management fields, the Army could identify tests and measures that are predictive of the desired mission performance. These could be used at military entrance and processing stations, or MEPS, and incorporated into basic military training, or BMT. For instance, the ASVAB could be augmented with additional tests and measures to assess the soldier's ability to perform a specific requirement, such as learning a second language.

Programs should be developed to maximize the use of the Army's training centers and schools as primary sites for performing screening and assessment. Early testing could identify those candidates who do not possess specific aptitudes and skills, and it could also identify those whose skills and interests match profiles of particular jobs within a career-management field. In the field of aircraft maintenance, for example, spatial-relations tests could help identify soldiers who have the potential to read and use complex wiring diagrams and schematics of mechanical linkages. These tests could also identify soldiers with particular skills and interests in a specific series of aircraft such as attack helicopters. (Assigning maintenance personnel into different mission tracks, after having considered their skills, abilities and interests, is consistent with the Army Aviation Center's past approach to the assignment of aviators.)

The technological advances in information-age computing could make it easier to develop a means of testing a soldier at each stage of his or her career. Individual soldier performance in realistic simulations, exercises and operational assignments could be objectively recorded into databases. The information could be retrieved as needed, and considered in assignment decisions.

The figure on page 20 depicts a hypothetical example in which institutional training and assessment data, along with evaluations from operational assignments (efficiency reports), could be used to support the selection of new commanders. The key attributes required for success in the new command position might be those listed to the left of the figure. Scores for various officers' performance on tasks related to the key attributes would be recorded. For example, Officer A has the scores 9, 3, 8 and 5; Officer B has the scores 7, 2, 5 and 2. The prediction model would combine each officer's scores, placing emphasis on the variables that represent the predictors of success for that particular job. As a result, the selection board would have an objective analysis — a rank-ordering of candidates — to support its selection decisions.

It is important that the selection process address only the needs identified by the mission analysis. A thorough mission analysis and the validation process adhere to the principle that "perfect" is the enemy of "good enough." The screen that the candidates must pass through should be only as fine as the mission analysis dictates.

It is also critical to note that the board phase of the assessment-and-selection process is indispensable. While the assess-

## Assessment Model for Commanders (O-6 and below)




* SCORES BASED ON INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING & ASSESSMENT, OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT (OERs)

ment process is strongly dependent upon empirical data, assessment is an art, not a science. Paper-and-pencil drills, by themselves, cannot substitute for the judgment of leaders who are trained and experienced in the operational environment.[3]

One final point to consider is that assessment and selection is a dynamic process that requires continual validation. The SOF community maintains the closest possible relationship with the Army Research Institute, or ARI, in order to gain assistance for the continual validation of SOF's various assessment-and-selection processes. In the past 12 years, ARI has conducted several research projects that support these processes. On SOF's behalf, ARI has surveyed various populations and provided insight into such issues as SOF retention, officer assessment and selection, minority recruiting, and periodic reassessment of the force.

Despite the emphasis on technology and information warfare for Force XXI, we must not neglect the importance of the human component. The Army must maximize the potential of its human resources by using methods that have proven to be effective in measuring aptitude and potential, in determining compatibility, and in placing each soldier into the job that is compatible with the individual's abilities. Soldier assessment and job selection, if continued throughout the soldier's life cycle of professional development, should result in increased retention and mission effectiveness. In order to leverage our human resources, we must select the right personnel for the force and make every effort to retain them.

A study of SOF's successful assessment-and-selection processes has led to the following conclusions:

- A front-end analysis to determine mission requirements and the required soldier attributes should be the first step in assessment and selection.
- Processes of assessment and selection should be tailored to address the critical elements necessary for mission success.
- Force XXI soldier assessment should build on successful approaches that have evolved over the years.
- Force XXI assessment-and-selection

programs should use information-age computer technology to produce a better job-soldier match.
- The application of appropriate assessment-and-selection procedures reduces attrition, increases job satisfaction and enhances mission performance.

Greater use of assessment-and-selection techniques should be strongly considered for Force XXI. To support future demands, training centers should evolve into training-and-assessment centers. The wise use of assessment-and-selection techniques will improve the job-soldier match, increase retention throughout the soldier's life cycle, increase job satisfaction and enhance mission performance. The challenges associated with the changes we have proposed are considerable, but they are consistent with other changes anticipated as the Army continually evolves toward a force for the 21st century.

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*Colonel Thomas M. Carlin is commander of the 5th Special Forces Group. He entered the Army in December 1973. Since December 1975, his special-operations assignments have included command of special-operations elements at the captain, major and lieutenant-colonel levels. He has served as a deputy commanding officer and on a joint special-operations staff. He holds master's degrees in international relations and in security management. From January 1989 until June 1991, Carlin commanded an assessment-and-training detachment that was, in part, responsible for the administration of one of SOF's assessment-and-selection processes.*

*Dr. Mike Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, his research continued on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment, and retention. Dr. Sanders also served as the ARI field unit chief at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unit performed research on training technology enhancements for Signal soldiers. He holds a master's and a doctorate in experimental psychology, with an emphasis on human factors.*

Notes:

[1] Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff, *Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 14, 18-20 and 459.

[2] From personal correspondence between Colonel Thomas M. Carlin and Lieutenant Colonel John M. Woodhouse, RA (ret.), commanding officer of the 22 SAS from 1962 to 1965. Woodhouse served in Malaya with the Malayan Scouts (SAS), the post-World War II predecessor of the 22 SAS. Then a major, he was personally responsible for establishing the SAS's assessment, selection and training process in 1952 at the direction of the commander of the newly created 22 SAS.

[3] OSS Assessment Staff, p. 459.

# A Short History of SF Assessment and Selection

*by Major Sam Young*

Throughout U.S. history, soldiers have volunteered for duty that was different and more dangerous than conventional assignments. This was true for those who served with Robert Rogers' Rangers during the French and Indian War; with Francis Marion, "The Swamp Fox," during the Revolutionary War; and with Colonel John Mosby, the Confederate cavalry leader, during the American Civil War. Each of these units used tactics and techniques that were considered unconventional, and each unit required soldiers who could adapt to unique demands.

There was no formal selection process for these units. The heat of battle weeded out those who were physically, mentally or morally unsuited. If a soldier did not have the special skills and abilities that the unit required, or if he did not have the aptitude to learn quickly, he was soon either transferred, wounded or killed.

The lack of selection procedures was not restricted to special-mission units. In George Washington's day, the only prerequisite for joining the Army was that the candidate be a male U.S. citizen.[1] The proviso of citizenship was intended more to motivate citizens into doing their duty than to screen possible candidates.

It was not until 1917 that selection procedures were used for U.S. soldiers. On March 28 of that year, President Woodrow Wilson formally approved the use of a draft to man the Army.[2] The Army began screening inductees, 21-30 years old, using two procedures: a physical examination and a newly developed intelligence-quotient test. These procedures revealed widespread illiteracy and physical disabilities among the ranks of the inductees.[3]

Until the early 1940s, selection for special-mission units remained basically the same as in Robert Rogers' time: Soldiers "migrated" to those units and were assessed while on the job. With the coming of World War II, the newly created Office of Strategic Services made great progress in the selection of personnel for unconventional units.

## OSS

The OSS's mission included infiltrating personnel into Axis-occupied territories, organizing guerrilla armies, and conducting sabotage and subversion missions. Seeking the best-qualified personnel for these demanding missions, the U.S. War Department tasked psychiatrists and psychologists to screen and select candidates for positions throughout the OSS organization.

The assessment team modeled its process on the work of Fred Taylor, an early management theorist who conducted studies on efficiency, task construction and worker productivity. Taylor's studies suggested that in order to achieve the best results on a specific task, managers should observe the "best" worker's method of

Courtesy National Archives

*Members of the OSS Jedburghs climb an obstacle during training.*

accomplishing the task, and have all other workers imitate that method.[4]

The assessment team researched two approaches to assessment: organismic and elementalistic. The organismic approach assesses an individual's performance on an assigned task or in a difficult situation.[5] For example, an individual is given an ax and a set of climbing spurs and is instructed to retrieve an object from a tree. The way the individual accomplishes the task reveals much about his personality and behavior.

While the organismic approach requires assessors to develop situations that will allow them to evaluate behavior, the elementalistic approach, which was in its infancy during the early 1940s, identifies personality traits through written tests. For example, a series of questions can reveal behavioral or personality traits about an individual when he answers in a particular fashion or pattern.

Believing that a combination approach would better capture a candidate's capabilities and predict his performance, the assessment team incorporated the organismic and elementalistic approaches into the process.

Once the proper approach had been determined, the team had to identify the desired end state of the candidates — the foundation of any assessment or selection process. To obtain information about the full range of tasks that soldiers might encounter, the team approached OSS staff members who were developing deployment plans. Unfortunately, because of the uniqueness and the newness of the OSS organization, no institutional knowledge existed.[6] The team knew only that the common-task missions included conducting sabotage, organizing resistance groups, and developing propaganda campaigns. Beyond that, no one could assist the team in identifying personality traits consistent with mission success.

Once the traits had been defined, the team also had to develop the most effective method of assessing those traits in candidates. An assessment program should have a certain degree of flexibility so that it will

not overlook skills that could be put to use in other areas of the organization. In assessing personnel for combat and hazardous situations, the OSS assessment team also considered those who might be qualified for administrative positions and intelligence-gathering and processing positions. There was also flexibility in the OSS hiring process: While the assessment team provided an assessment and a recommendation based on a candidate's qualifications, the OSS board was the final authority. In rare cases, the board selected an individual who had been rated "not recommended" or "unsuited."[7]

## Special Forces

At the close of World War II, the OSS was disbanded. However, with the beginning of the Cold War era and with the growing threat of communism, members of the U.S. War Department's Psychological Warfare Department saw the urgent need for a unique force capable of conducting unconventional-warfare missions similar to those which had been conducted by the OSS. In 1952, to develop that unique force, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Center and activated the 10th Special Forces Group – both organizations were based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The 10th Group's selection process was different from the one which had been used by the OSS. To volunteer for Special Forces, soldiers had to satisfy the following criteria:

- Meet the physical qualifications for parachute duty.
- Score a minimum of 200 on the physical-fitness test.
- Not be over age 36, with exceptions granted.
- Have completed 10 weeks of basic training.
- Be airborne-qualified or volunteer for airborne training.[8]

Once accepted into the 10th Group, soldiers were evaluated, often during field-training exercises,[9] on their job performance. Limited SF training courses were conducted at the PSYWAR Center,[10] but the authority to award SF qualification was restricted to the group commander. Thus for a period of time, Special Forces assessment and selection was very much organismic.

In 1954 the PSYWAR Center contracted researchers from George Washington University to determine specific personality factors or traits that would be most likely to ensure a soldier's success in Special Forces. To accomplish this task, the researchers used innovative techniques.[11] For example, they asked 10th SF Group soldiers to place their colleagues into one of three categories – superior, inferior or in-between – regarding their probable success in combat. Combining the data collected from these evaluations, researchers placed soldiers into one of the three categories. They then distributed questionnaires and administered psychological tests to selected soldiers in the superior and inferior categories in order to identify the personality traits, attitudes and personal histories predictive of success in Special Forces.

The elementalistic approach to assessment began to re-emerge in 1961, when the basis for Special Forces selection and training changed. Admission into Special Forces, which by this time consisted of the 10th, 7th and 1st SF groups, became more difficult. In addition to implementing a resident training course,[12] the Army Special Warfare School began administering the Special Forces Selection Battery to screen out volunteers who were not likely to succeed in SF training.

The selection battery consisted of four tests: the Special Forces Suitability Inventory — to measure personality aspects suitable for Special Forces activity; the Critical Decisions Test — to measure a soldier's risk- or chance-taking tendencies; the Locations Test — to measure a soldier's ability to perceive terrain features by reading a map; and the Infantry Aptitude Area — to measure soldiers' potential for developing infantry skills. On Aug. 21, 1961, the Department of the Army also revised the regulation governing Special Forces entrance criteria, adding the following prerequisites to the ones established in the 1952 regulation:

- Have an interim secret security clearance.
- Be able to swim.

- Pass the Special Forces Selection Battery.[13]

Just over a year later, on Aug. 29, 1962, the Department of the Army again revised the Special Forces entrance criteria, adding the following:

- Achieve a score of 100 or higher on the Infantry Aptitude Area.
- Achieve a score of 380 or higher on the Special Forces Selection Battery regardless of score on the Critical Decisions Test or,
- Achieve a score of 370-379 on the Special Forces Selection Battery, and score 50 or higher on the Critical Decisions Test.

Despite the changes in selection criteria and training, the authority to award SF qualification remained exclusively with SF group commanders until the early 1970s.[14] Afterward, SF commanders and the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance shared qualification authority. This arrangement continued until 1977, when completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course became, with limited exceptions, the sole avenue to SF qualification.

Although the training and qualification courses have varied, they have typically consisted of three or four phases devoted to SF common skills, SF MOS training, and field training exercises. Until 1988, soldiers were also observed and assessed during the first phase in an effort to determine their suitability for Special Forces. They were subjected to harsh conditions, such as stress, sleep deprivation, time constraints and physical exertion, which were designed to test their motivation and commitment to complete the training.

## SFAS

In the mid-1980s, the Special Warfare Center and School, in an attempt to save training time and resources, began designing a program in which soldiers could be assessed *before* they attended the SF Qualification Course. In 1987, project officers from SWCS began working with the Army Research Institute to define desirable personality traits and effective methods of



Courtesy National Archives

*The OSS selected candidates based on their ability to overcome difficult situations. Here, members of the Jedburghs climb a tower during their training.*

Courtesy National Archives

*OSS soldiers, such as these Jedburghs attending a demolitions class, received extensive psychological testing to determine their behavioral traits.*

assessing human behavior. In June 1988, SWCS conducted the first Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS.

The selection process that had been developed for the OSS became one of the foundations of SFAS.[15] Assessors in SFAS still observe candidates for positive and negative displays associated with the behavioral traits that have been determined best for the organization. A board then selects soldiers who have demonstrated the desired behavior.

During SFAS, soldiers are tested during times of stress. For example, soldiers suffering from sleep deprivation may be required to march long distances while carrying 45-pound field packs. The concept of SFAS evaluation and assessment is based on the "whole man" theory.[16] Evaluators assess a soldier's physical and psychological abilities to accomplish a task. Soldiers are not coerced into completing arduous tasks — in fact, they are given every opportunity to quit. They must have the will and the desire to perform each assigned task, and they must complete the program through their own desire and motivation. As they experience periods of limited sleep and increasing stress, soldiers are evaluated on cognitive reasoning, teamwork and leadership through events modeled on those used by the OSS.[17]

The OSS used extensive psychological and situational testing to determine the personality and behavioral traits of candidates. SFAS, however, does not use psychological testing to determine a soldier's suitability to begin or to remain in the program.[18] It *is* used to determine any inclinations toward extreme deviations from the norm. These findings are then reported to the selection board. Soldiers may also demonstrate abnormal behavioral patterns while undergoing physical and psychological stress during SFAS.[19] If so, course evaluators also submit that information to the selection board.

More than 50 years ago, the authors of the OSS program stated, "It is easy to predict precisely the outcome of the meeting of one known chemical with another known chemical in an immaculate test tube. But where is

the chemist who can predict what will happen to a known chemical if it meets an unknown chemical in an unknown vessel?"[20] Since that time, assessment and selection of candidates for Special Forces, using the OSS program as a basis, has advanced to a sophisticated process using mission-oriented tasks and psychological testing. Yet despite these advances, evaluators still grapple with the challenge that OSS researchers faced in the early 1940s: anticipating and predicting human performance.

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Notes:

[1] John W. Chambers, *To Raise an Army* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 21-230.

[2] Chambers.

[3] Chambers.

[4] Author's notes from a lecture by Dr. Robert Greenwood during a management history course at Central Michigan University, 1993.

[5] Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff, *Assessment of Men* (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1948).

[6] OSS Assessment Staff.

[7] OSS Assessment Staff.

[8] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Regulation 600-160-10, April, 1952.

[9] Telephone interview with Fred Funk (Fort Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 28 January 1994).

[10] The institution responsible for training Special Forces and other elements of SOF has a history of its own. Over the years, it has been named the Psychological Warfare Center (1952), the U.S. Army Special Warfare School (1956), the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (1964), the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (1969), and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (1983). It took on its current name, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in 1986.

[11] Herbert Abelson, *Factors Related to the Effectiveness of Special Forces Personnel* (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, August 1954), pp. 18-24.

[12] Rudolph Berkhouse, *Research on Selection and Special Forces Manpower Problems – Status Report* (Behavioral Evaluation Research Laboratory, Army Project OJ95-60-001, Study 63-2).

[13] Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1963.

[14] From the records of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

[15] Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills, Walton, *Human Resource Management: A General Manager's Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 339.

[16] Personal interview with John Galland, former commander of the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course, 1993.

[17] Galland interview.

[18] Telephone interview with Dr. Morgan Banks, staff psychologist for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, December 1993.

[19] Banks interview.

[20] OSS Assessment Staff.

# The Role Technology Can't Fill

*by Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie*

Recent articles in *Special Warfare* and in other publications suggest that technology will provide solutions to problems encountered by United States military forces engaged in difficult missions such as counterinsurgency, peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Some military experts have even predicted that Special Forces missions may eventually be performed by computers and precision weapons systems. There has also been a suggestion that because of technological advances, SF could become a relic of the past, replaced by the "new warriors" — presumably, computer wizards.

While we are being inundated with predictions about what technology can do to solve our problems, we might consider our not-so-distant history as a lesson in what technology *can't* do.

During the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forces were successful in pitched battles with North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong units. However, our forces became weary of the frustrations, uncertainties and hazards of combating the VC's unconventional-warfare tactics. Although our Special Forces had effective countering techniques, our conventional forces did not have the special training or equipment to use them.

The military's response was characteristically American: Believing that miraculous inventions would help expedite a decisive victory for the U.S., the Army developed its own technology to help eliminate the ambiguities and frustrations it was experiencing in Vietnam. As the conflict progressed, the flow of newly designed gadgets turned into a flood.

For those within the defense establishment, faith in technology became the new religion: American technology could solve any problem, anytime, anywhere. High-ranking officials in Washington placed their faith in gadgets, and numbers replaced reality. Our leaders overlooked or ignored the fundamental truths about fighting a strange war in a far-off place, where rules did not apply and state-of-the-art war machines were ineffective.

Some of the newly developed gadgets were tiny, such as the micro-gravel mines. There were also huge undertakings, including the massive spraying of both herbicides and defoliants on thousands of acres of jungle. Some devices, such as infrared warning transmitters and "starlight scopes," worked well. Others, such as "people sniffers," which were designed to detect humans by the ammonia in their perspiration, were abject failures.

One device that might have helped our forces was never developed: a truth detector capable of quickly and accurately identifying a person as friend or foe. Distinguishing friend from foe is a problem encountered in all environments, but during ambiguous operations, such as counterinsurgency and operations other than war, the problem is amplified.

Insurgent forces have learned to use the cover of the local populace to hide their activities. They conceal their loyalties; they

organize, train and plan; and at the most advantageous time for their cause, they strike. In some countries, participation by U.S. or coalition forces is desired by some factions and opposed by others. Factions may seek to use peacekeeping forces as a buffer or as a screen for their activities. Still others may simply wish to be rid of all foreigners, and they plan actions designed to weaken U.S. resolve and support. When conducting these actions, the irregular force attacks our weakest points.

Although we have information-gathering platforms that can detect a small vehicle moving in darkness hundreds of miles away, can we determine whether the vehicle's occupants are hostile? Satellites can photograph a group of people standing in the center of a village, but can we determine whether there are insurgents among the group? Can remote, high-tech devices locate key threat individuals in a given country? Can machines and technology establish rapport and build trust with the local populace?

Even with our advanced technology, it is unlikely that we will ever be able to invent a device that can read and analyze a human mind or determine a person's intentions. Perhaps the most effective way of determining a person's loyalty or his whereabouts is to seek out members of the local populace and ask them. Since only they know the true orientations of their countrymen, they are the best sources of information.

Military planners and foreign-policy strategists seem to agree that in the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will most likely be used in small, ambiguous brush-fire wars. The value and the utility of SF in these confusing environments have already been demonstrated. Decision-makers who are not well acquainted with special operations should understand that the ability to perform precision-strike operations is but one capability of SF – and one that is perhaps over-emphasized. Other SF capabilities, derived from our core mission of unconventional warfare, allow SF to operate and succeed in ambiguous situations. Language abilities and interpersonal-communications skills, combined with cultural awareness and area orientation, enable SF to gather information from sources and through methods inaccessible to high-tech devices.

Large operations such as Desert Storm demonstrate the stupidity of engaging in a set-piece battle with a technologically superior force. Our enemies, no doubt, will study Desert Storm and choose a more indirect route. We face great danger in assuming that future enemies will have mission capabilities equal to ours and that they will use the same fighting techniques that we use. They might instead trump our strong suit and strike us in a manner for which we are unprepared, just as the Viet Cong did nearly 30 years ago. Should this occur, the need for SF will become more urgent rather than diminish.

SF may be at a ideological crossroads. Should we become computer gurus, teaching foreign personnel the techniques of waging war through cyberspace, or should we continue to teach basic and advanced military skills? The multiskilled operators in SF are too valuable a resource to lose by narrowing the mission focus of SF. Certainly we should evaluate and adopt any new technology that enhances our mission capabilities, but we need not become members of the "software of the month club."

If we blindly chase computer technology, we risk becoming an organization that is no more effective at conducting unconventional warfare than IBM is. Regardless of how badly the "new warriors" would like to wage bloodless computer conflicts, wars are still won by seizing and holding ground, and force will continue to be the ultimate solution in most conflicts. ✂

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# How to Succeed in Foreign Internal Defense

*by Colonel J.S. Ranger Roach, U.S. Army (ret.)*

There seems to be a consensus among the senior leadership of Army special-operations forces that foreign internal defense, or FID, will continue to be the primary mission of Special Forces.

The FID mission is clearly in keeping with the operations of SF's forerunners — the World War II Jedburgh teams who supported the French Resistance in its fight against the Nazi occupation force. The unconventional-warfare tradition established by the Jedburghs continues in Special Forces today, and our UW skills are extremely well-suited to the FID environment. Given more information on how to succeed in FID, our soldiers can become even more effective.

Experience has taught us that FID and conventional military missions have different operational environments:

- Conventional military missions focus on destroying enemy units; FID focuses on building friendly military institutions.
- Conventional military operations are normally conducted in weeks or months; FID may persist for decades.
- Conventional military missions emphasize high-technology weapons and overwhelming force. FID missions provide support to Third World nations that can neither afford high technology nor maintain an overwhelming force.
- United States military leaders are trained to focus on the synchronization of overwhelming military force. Third World military leaders do not control overwhelming force; they have to develop mission-analysis strategies that will enable them to gain a tactical advantage.
- U.S. leaders focus solely on the military element of national power, but our Third World counterparts must play legitimate roles in the other three elements of national power: economic, political and informational.
- Our military doctrine stresses the importance of synchronization, but Third World military leaders must approach their mission of internal defense and development from a perspective that emphasizes agility and initiative.

We have also learned that FID presents some distinct challenges:

- In our attempts to help Third World armies improve their agility and initiative, one of our greatest challenges has been convincing host-country officials to accept our ideas and recommendations. We represent change, and change is almost always resisted. Therefore, we must be prepared to seize any opportunity that a receptive host-nation commander presents. Host-country units have their own standards, and we should be sensitive to how much and how quickly they are willing to change.
- Conventional military operations focus on operational-security measures. But in FID, part of the fight for the support of the population takes place in the open press. Anti-government forces, notably the narcos in South America, use the press to spread disinformation that undermines their government and any cooperation it has with the U.S. government. Simply put, this is an example of information warfare. Real-time, worldwide news reporting deeply influences the public. If we treat the news media as the enemy, we forfeit an important opportunity to counter disinformation.
- The paradigm for conventional military operations is "move, shoot, and communicate." While we should teach our counterparts to apply that paradigm, we

should also expand our perspective. In FID we are a catalyst for change; therefore, we must maintain a *presence* in order to effectively influence our counterparts. We must be *patient* and understand that our counterparts will not change as quickly as we would like, and we must be *persistent* and continue working the important issues in a manner that does not offend our counterparts. We must *teach* "move, shoot and communicate," but we must *live* "presence, patience and persistence."

- In a FID mission, the critical implied task is that we help a host-country force to adapt to necessary change and to evolve into a more effective organization. Institutional change takes place over a period of time; therefore, we must realize that short-term deployments are but one step in a long journey.

## Customers

In the U.S., the organizations involved in the planning of a FID mission include Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Army, Department of State, International Narcotics Matters, Agency for International Development, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and the applicable Special Forces group and battalion headquarters. Each has important responsibilities in resourcing, training, certifying, coordinating and deploying teams for FID missions.

A theater-command headquarters is responsible for all military operations conducted in theater. One level down is the theater special-operations command, responsible for all operations conducted in theater by special-operations forces. The theater-command headquarters and the theater special-operations command are the operational chain of command for SOF. But in FID, their primary responsibility is to determine the needs of the countries and to prioritize our efforts between these countries. Because those headquarters are not in a position to directly supervise the execution of training programs, they rely on the Military Group, or MILGROUP, which is part of the U.S. Embassy country team.

The embassy country team is responsible for all U.S. activity within its respective country. Each country team has developed a strategy for influencing the host-country's government. A FID mission must fit into a particular country team's strategy, but this rarely creates a problem, since FID missions normally begin in the MILGROUP. The MILGROUP commander is an important member of the embassy country team and serves as the primary military adviser to the ambassador. He also serves as the personal representative of the regional commander in chief, or CINC, and ensures that the CINC's concerns are addressed in the country team's strategy.

***In FID we are a catalyst for change; therefore, we must maintain a* presence *in order to effectively influence our counterparts. We must be* patient *and understand that our counterparts will not change as quickly as we would like, and we must be* persistent *and continue working the important issues in a manner that does not offend our counterparts.***

## Product

When discussing the FID mission, we often focus on the training presented to the host country, but the training is only the end product of a complex process. Prior to deploying on a FID mission, soldiers receive their deployment orders through the formal tasking channel. But once they are in country, soldiers often receive additional taskings from the MILGROUP and the host country's military. Soldiers then tailor a program of instruction that will satisfy the MILGROUP, the host-country's military, and the requirements set forth in their deployment orders.

The reality of a FID mission is that it requires not only skilled instructors but also skilled systems analysts, curriculum developers and negotiators, all of whom must have the ability to ensure that the training program is acceptable to the myriad personalities and organizations involved. Many aspects of a FID mission evolve according to the needs of the organization involved; therefore, patience is a virtue in working through the planning and execution phases. Soldiers who lose their patience and composure also lose their effectiveness.

## Interpersonal skills

In a FID mission, SF soldiers typically work with personnel in each level of the host-country force, from the brigade commander to the common soldiers. Host-country senior officers may have as much

civilian and military education as the U.S. senior officers. We should not approach any host-country forces with the attitude that we are going to "train" them. This kind of attitude is classic "ugly American," and it is not realistic.

Normally, we can develop rapport in four phases:

- *Training preparation*. We should plan a training program that is appropriate for the host country's requirements. During the site survey, ask the local commander to define his priorities. Allowing the host-country commander to participate in the development of the training program validates his ownership and ensures his support for the training-execution phase.
- *Training execution*. Although we are responsible for executing the training program, we must be flexible enough to modify it in accordance with the guidance provided by the host-country commander. The program may also have to be changed if the host-country forces are not prepared for the level of training planned. This is always a sensitive issue – and one that is magnified by national pride. No one wants to be reminded that he needs more work on the basics; however, if soldiers haven't mastered the basics, focusing on more advanced topics would waste our time and theirs.
- *Garrison management*. This is perhaps the most important of the four phases. We should do whatever we can to help the local commander solve his "housekeeping" problems. In the past, 7th SF Group soldiers have voluntarily repaired plumbing, performed maintenance on vehicles, and reorganized arms rooms and dispensaries. Although volunteer assistance cannot eclipse the training program we have contracted with the host-country commander, we should offer our services whenever we have the opportunity.
- *Organizational consulting*. This is the ultimate phase. We may be invited to perform this role if we have completed the first three phases in a manner that demonstrates our support for the local commander. We are most effective in this phase when working indirectly. Once our host-country counterparts have recommended a course of action, we should reinforce their ideas rather than seeking a solution of our own.

***Although the host-country soldiers may be dedicated, strong, intelligent and brave, ... because of their lack of classroom experience, their knowledge base is limited and their learning skills are impaired.***

In dealing with host-country soldiers, we should adjust our pace to theirs. The rifles they carry may represent the highest level of technology that they have ever experienced. A task that U.S. Army recruits can learn in one day may well take two or three days for Third World soldiers to master. Although the host-country soldiers may be dedicated, strong, intelligent and brave, the majority of them may also be functionally illiterate. These soldiers have a great desire to do well in training, but because of their lack of classroom experience, their knowledge base is limited and their learning skills are impaired. We must explain and demonstrate supervised practical exercises and then allow the soldiers to practice them. We should also request feedback from the soldiers. Because of their strong desire to please us, host-country soldiers will rarely admit any difficulty in understanding material covered in a formal presentation. Require them to demonstrate their proficiency, and drill them repeatedly. Continue this process until they can successfully execute the tasks and can critique one another's performance. Performance-oriented training, rather than classroom instruction, is crucial.

## Presence

No matter which level of the host-country organization you're dealing with, your presence, both on-duty and off-duty, is key to long-term success. A Salvadoran colonel once made an unsolicited but interesting comment on the difference he saw between U.S. Special Forces soldiers and U.S. conventional soldiers: "When any other Army officer or NCO arrived to work a project with my Salvadoran brigade, they would have a short meeting with the brigade commander and perhaps the brigade executive officer, but then it was lunch time, and they would leave to go eat a hamburger at a local restaurant. They would return to visit once a week for updates on the project.

"On the other hand, when Special Forces soldiers arrived, they not only talked to the brigade commander and executive officer, but also to all the members of the brigade staff. When it was lunch time, they stayed and ate tortillas, rice and beans with us. After lunch, they went down and talked to the battalion commanders, company commanders and anyone else who was in the area. The Special Forces soldiers spent the time and came to

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

*Performance-oriented training, rather than classroom instruction, is critical in FID missions.*

understand our organizations and our problems as well as we did."

These observations perfectly match the author's experience: To understand the people with whom you are working, to be accepted by them, and to be effective, you must invest your time. Informal contacts are extremely important in winning the confidence of your counterparts.

Regarding personal comfort, we must be willing to live in the same primitive conditions that the host-country soldiers endure. We are there to help the leader solve his problems, not to create additional ones for him by demanding support that he doesn't have and can't provide. If we demonstrate respect and competence and communicate a desire to help the leader solve his problems, we will be accepted and, perhaps, so will our recommendations.

Humor is an important social lubricant, and it is all the more important when we are working in Third World countries. We represent the most powerful military in the world, and our simple presence is sometimes overwhelming for our hosts. Humor, especially the ability to laugh at ourselves, makes us more approachable and more effective. Humor can be misinterpreted, however, and we should exercise great care in making sure that we communicate only the meaning intended.

## Standards

Our Army focuses on the highest of standards. We strive to provide information to individuals and units that will improve their performance. In our attempts to improve, we often overlook the 85 percent of our effort that went well and focus on the 15 percent that didn't. Although this emphasis is necessary if we are to improve, we often forget how effective and sophisticated we have become, until we visit a Third World country and see their performance problems.

For instance, we may worry about the percentage of our soldiers who achieve an expert rifle qualification, whereas host-country soldiers might never have had the ammunition with which to zero their weapons. If we are working on a small-unit training program in the Third World, we might have only 40 rounds of rifle ammunition per soldier for a week of training. Yet we are expected to zero the soldiers' weapons; qualify the soldiers on a range which we have had to construct; and train the soldiers in individual tactical movement, buddy-team movement, fire-team movement, and squad fire and movement. Obviously we will not be able to train these soldiers to the same standards as a Ranger regiment rifle company, but we can improve their operational capability.

Given the obvious differences between our military and the host-country's military, it would be easy to look down on Third World militaries as not being in our league. Frankly, they aren't. If we were to engage in direct combat with them, the U.S. Army no doubt would win decisively. But they don't need the ability to fight in our league – we're not their enemies. They should, however, be able to confront their own country's problems and threats.

It is difficult not to admire these Third World militaries and their accomplishments, considering

their limited resources and sensitive missions. We're there to help them identify problems and to be a catalyst for change; however, we should never miss a chance to exercise positive reinforcement. On a daily basis, seek out a project they have done well or have improved upon, and enthusiastically reinforce their success.

## Equipment

In FID our goal is to help host-country forces seek solutions to their problems. Throughout the process, however, we should encourage them to use their own equipment and resources. If we provide all the materiel for a FID mission, at least two distractions take away from the mission itself:

First, a certain amount of time must be allocated for properly managing the equipment, if only to secure it and to perform routine maintenance on it. In turn, our soldiers have less time to focus on host-country forces.

Second, although Third World armies are fascinated by our "hi-tech" equipment, they can rarely afford to purchase it. Goal displacement becomes common, with many of the host-country forces adopting the idea that, "If only we had that radio, that rifle, or that first-aid kit, we could solve all of our problems." As a general rule, the less equipment there is, the more effective the training program will be. Of course, we do provide essential equipment, and we might also bring along some "high-speed, low-drag" equipment to enhance our chances of opening otherwise closed doors.

## Values

Each FID mission contributes to the professionalism of the host country. The technical tasks of the training are important, but the values that we represent and attempt to reinforce are an even more important part of the professionalization process. The following are some of our most fundamental values:

- *Military subordination to political authority*. It is important to support elected government officials and to understand that the legitimacy of the government comes from the people of the country.
- *Maintaining support of the civilian populace*. Legitimacy of the national government and of the host-country military is crucial to long-term stability. Civic-action programs and psychological programs are important force multipliers in gaining and maintaining the support of the people of the country.
- *Defense of human rights*. Respect for human rights is of pragmatic importance to the military in maintaining the support of the people.
- *Accountability*. It is important to establish and maintain internal discipline and order within the armed forces. The military institution must guard against individual misconduct if it is to maintain faith and confidence among the people. If there is misconduct, the perpetrator must be actively pursued, investigated and appropriately punished. We must convince our counterparts that individual misconduct is not a reflection on the honor of their institution,

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

*Civic-actions programs, such as construction, are important for gaining and maintaining the support of the host-country population.*

but the institution's failure to police itself *is*.

- *Interagency teamwork*. The host-country's military must work with the other branches of government and accept the fact that in internal defense and development, political and economic factors are often more important than military factors. This is critical in a Third World country, since its military organization often is not only the shield of democracy, but also the backbone of democracy. In the U.S., the military fulfills the shield-of-democracy role, but other elements, both from the government and from the private sector, form the backbone. In Third World countries, the military institution is often the only branch of government that functions from the national level down to the local level. The host-government officials often have good ideas to make their branch of government work, but they do not have the necessary resources to implement their ideas. As a result, the host-country military is often drawn into the vacuum and can play important positive roles in the internal development of the country.
- *Selfless service*. The welfare of the country comes before the welfare of the military services or of the officer corps.

We do not teach these values as separate blocks of instruction – they must be integrated into every formal class and woven into the informal conversations we have with our counterparts. We advocate these values because they reflect the ideals of our society, but we must help our brother soldiers recognize the pragmatic reason for adopting them: These values, which all democracies share, promote internal stability and economic growth.

Over the past few years, there has been much discussion about the term "democratization." The author first heard General George Joulwan use the term at the 1993 Low Intensity Conflict Conference sponsored by the Association of the United States Army. General Joulwan's comment was, "Special Forces was the most important factor in the democratization of Latin America." Many of our officials now use the word "democratization" to describe almost any kind of positive influence our government exerts in underdeveloped countries. But the focus of democratization should be not on a scholar's knowledge of our Constitution or Declaration of Independence, but rather on the concern for the practice of social equality at the lowest level.

During World War II, the forerunners of Special Forces, the Jedburgh teams, conducted unconventional warfare to help the French Resistance liberate France from the oppression of a hostile occupation force. Modern Special Forces are conducting FID missions to help friendly countries achieve stability; in the process, they also help liberate the people from the ignorance, poverty and lawlessness that are sapping their national vitality. Over the past decade, Special Forces have achieved significant successes in FID operations. And although FID is truly a politically sensitive, dangerous and fluid environment, it is one in which SF can be an effective catalyst for change.

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*J.S. Ranger Roach retired from the Army in 1995 after having commanded the 7th Special Forces Group. His 29 years of active service included 10 years of overseas duty, with tours in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, Korea and Colombia. Roach recently returned from Serbia after having served there for two months as an international observer. He lives with his family in northern Virginia.*

# The Human Element of Battle: The Theories of Ardant du Picq

*by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jacobs*

Napoleon stated, "In war the moral element is to all others as three is to one."[1] The American way of war asserts the importance of moral forces and how they can be used as both multipliers and debilitators of combat power. Integral to our concepts about the nature and the purpose of war is an appreciation of the human element and its effects on the conduct and the outcome of war.

Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq's *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* is a revolutionary study of the human element on an ever more dispersed and lethal battlefield, with particular regard to the nature of fear and cohesion. Du Picq asserts, "While all other circumstances change with time, the human element remains the same, capable of just so much endurance, sacrifice, effort, and no more."[2] He differentiates between "war" and "battle." While war is accepted by statesmen and soldiers alike as Clausewitz's "extension of policy," du Picq views battle as a distinctly unique dynamic more akin to a "contest of arms and will between tired and terrified men."[3] He opines that the concern of the soldier is not policy or strategy, but the study of battle at the lowest level.

The employment of soldiers as an implement of policy remains key to concentrated and overwhelming combat power. On the modern battlefield, the solitary soldier, although inserted into battle at the tactical level, may have significant operational and strategic implications. Consider, for example, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant. the special-operations aviator who was captured in Somalia. By virtue of his media-portrayed plight, Durant became a tragic figure whose fate was anxiously awaited by millions at home and abroad. He was no longer just another soldier, but a combatant whose capture and negotiated fate had become a major policy issue.

Durant's experience shows how the human element, described by one writer as a "summation of elan, esprit de corps, courage and unit cohesion,"[4] can be transcended into a combat multiplier. Durant's situation invites attention to the study of the human element in war and to the theories of du Picq.

## Soldier

Ardant du Picq was born in 1821 in Perigueux, France. After graduating from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, du Picq fought in the Crimean War. He was taken prisoner by the Russians following the siege at Sevastopol. After his release at the end of the war, du Picq served in campaigns in Syria and in North Africa as an infantry officer at battalion and regiment levels. He won promotion to colonel and was ultimately awarded command of the 10th Infantry of the Line Regiment. Du Picq succumbed to mortal wounds in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Even as he lay



*From his studies of ancient and modern warfare, du Picq concluded that the Romans most clearly appreciated the debilitating effects of fear in battle.*

dying, du Picq expressed concerns about the morale and the welfare of his regiment. In 1903, 32 years after his death, du Picq's writings were published in France. In 1921 they were translated into English and published as *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle.*

For his writings, du Picq relied on three major sources of martial knowledge: personal experience; historical research of the Greeks, Romans and Gauls; and surveys that he fielded to fellow officers to obtain accounts of their battle experiences. The careful, scientific approach du Picq used in conducting the surveys allowed him to collect precise details and to avoid speculation that his work was based on conjecture.

## Theorist

The Industrial Revolution provided technological advances that not only drastically changed warfare but also produced an arena characterized by dispersion and the requirement for autonomous action. Du Picq makes the observation that technologically sophisticated weapons turn the modern battlefield into an increasingly expansive and more lonely place for the soldier. His view is shared by modern-day military theorist James Schneider, who posits that because of the expanded and more lonely battlefield, cohesion is more apt to break down, leading to unit disintegration.[5]

Although du Picq acknowledges the rise of technology, he also states, "The art of war is subject to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. However, there is truly one constant, and that is the heart of man."[6] He remarks, "It is the mind that wins battles, that will always win them, that always has won them throughout the world's history. The spirituality, the moral quality of war has not changed."[7]

Du Picq argues that preserving even a modicum of courage within a force gains an exponential advantage for the force commander and that simultaneously instilling fear into the hearts of the enemy produces inversely proportional deleterious effects on the enemy force.

American doctrine acknowledges that fear is a debilitating factor and that it presents a constant challenge to all who face battle. From a deep understanding of his own experiences, du Picq arrived at the premise that the element of fear is a fundamental battle consideration.[8] He argues that every soldier experiences fear, and that overwhelming fear is the contiguous and pervasive thread common to all combat. Controlling both fear and the powerful instinct for self-preservation requires a deep psychological understanding of the combatants.

Du Picq concludes that although war evolves from the relatively simple to the more complicated and technically advanced, the "ration" of human courage is a finite quality. Men in battle, with their limited capacity to endure, cannot maintain the frenetic pace required in modern warfare, thus reducing the combat power of the individual soldier. Du Picq posits that fear produces acute and chronic effects – effects that draw from a finite reservoir of moral strength. When that reservoir is ultimately depleted, fear produces results disastrous to the overall fighting force.

In du Picq's view, a soldier is more than a manipulable pawn; he is a human, constrained by the frailties of flesh and blood. Du Picq was the first theorist to postulate that there is a direct relationship between the number and the degree of battle-stress casualties and the increased lethality wrought by high-technology firepower. He notes that "absolute bravery is not natural in man,"[9] and that strong men are rare exceptions.[10] In battles of higher intensity and of longer duration, men who experienced in seconds what formerly required hours or days to absorb succumbed as "battle-stress casualties." Du Picq's ideas serve as a precursor to the related studies of S.L.A. Marshall and John Keegan that illustrate how one's morale can be quickly overtaxed by fierce combat.

Du Picq cites many examples of battles, ancient and modern, that attest to the implications of moral issues in warfare. He observes that the Romans, in particular, were the most honest in dealing with fear on the battlefield because they most clearly appreciated its debilitating effects. Discipline emerged as the key concept in exploiting moral issues and in overcoming human frailty under duress. The modern battlefield, replete with highly lethal weapons systems capable of killing soldiers at great distances, exacerbates "the instinct of self-preservation, so powerful that he [the soldier] did not feel disgraced in obeying it."[11] Du Picq cites high morale, leadership and cohesion as means of controlling both fear and the instinct of self-preservation. More important, high morale, leadership and cohesion enhance the combat power of a unit.

One excerpt from *Battle Studies* best distills Ardant du Picq's thesis: "Battle is the final objective of armies, and man is the

*Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant arrives in Germany following his release from Somali captors.*

Photo by Janel Schroeder

fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army — its personnel, organization, discipline, and tactics, things that are connected like the fingers of a hand — without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat."

At a time when Jomini's principles of warfare dominated French military thought, du Picq challenged Jomini's most elementary calculus. And when the bayonet was still the national weapon of France, du Picq identified the timeless principle that man is the fundamental instrument of war.

## Durant case study

Chief Warrant Officer Michael J. Durant found himself in a situation requiring great courage, stamina and discipline. Durant's tragic experience on Oct. 3, 1993, during the Battle of the Black Sea in Mogadishu, encompassed precisely the environment of lethality, loneliness and fear that du Picq had described in his theories more than 100 years earlier.

Durant suffered a fractured spine and a broken femur in the crash of his helicopter. Following a fierce firefight, he was captured by Somalis, subjected to a series of beatings by a mob of civilians, carried through the streets, chained, shot through the arm, and interrogated for 24 hours. To the questions and the demands levied by his captors, Durant responded with answers that allowed him to continue to resist, yet he steadfastly refused to reveal any information that could endanger his comrades or degrade their trust and confidence in him.

Michael Durant not only survived, he acquitted himself well in the face of impending disaster. Mustering his courage and maintaining his decorum as an American fighting man in the international spotlight, Durant overcame what du Picq calls the "pervasive power and overwhelming effect of fear on the battlefield."[12]

Durant embodies du Picq's concept of the individual soldier, the starting point for the analysis of all things military. Durant also epitomizes the soldier whose discipline, high morale and cohesion enable him to overcome abject fear.

Strong motivators provided the incentive Durant needed to survive – thoughts of his wife and small son, thoughts of the comrades whom he had inserted into the battlefield, thoughts of his aircrew — all dead — and thoughts of the two Special Forces soldiers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart, who had fought so valiantly and died to save his life.

Durant, who at the time of his capture was a member of a highly specialized unit, benefited from the camaraderie and the cohesion that come from mutual trust and confidence. Cohesion is not synonymous with esprit; it is more than the good feelings that a soldier and his leader have toward each other. Cohesion is a prerequisite to a soldier's fighting spirit. It imparts a strong loyalty and dedication to support comrades in danger; it partially compensates for the effects of fear; and it serves as an antidote to the effects of dispersion.

Cohesion is also the product of shared tough training. Today, Durant extols the virtues of combat training he received as an aviator in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, particularly the Army's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course. Throughout his ordeal, Durant performed exactly as he had been trained to do.

Michael Durant's experience provides us with a valuable learning opportunity. Not only did he prevail, he emerged as a champion who overcame a seemingly inextricable predicament. Durant's display of courage and dignity under austere conditions will serve as an inspiration to others. Durant's experience also serves as a reminder that the moral quality of war has not changed and that du Picq's theories concerning the human element in war remain as appropriate as if he had penned them yesterday.

## Du Picq and future battles

In *War in the Modern World*, Professor Theodore Ropp refers to du Picq as "an obscure French colonel."[13] Far from obscure,

du Picq is a relevant theorist whose work deserves a place of honor beside that of others — Clausewitz, de Saxe, Jomini, Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu — who are cited as prime sources for the development of American military doctrine.

Avoiding mathematical principles that failed to consider human dynamics, du Picq studied the human spirit in war. He recognized that battle casualties often result merely from the lack of small-unit leadership, morale and cohesion, and that when these factors *are* present, they work in concert to produce moral supremacy.

The need for extraordinary courage in the face of danger is truly the aspect that makes the military profession unique. The American fighting man continues to risk danger at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Our goal of behavioral development for combat is to help soldiers overcome fear and to control the natural instinct to preserve life and limb. In pursuit of that goal, we must understand war at the human level.

The farsighted theories of Ardant du Picq provide a view of warfare with a special emphasis on the human element. Against the currently prevailing technological sentiment, *Battle Studies* remains a poignant treatise on military morale — one that our political and military leaders should consider as they ponder the nature, the purpose, and the conduct of war. From beyond the horizon, du Picq implores our military leaders and policy-makers to ask themselves: "Among those who would contemplate war, how many would risk their own lives?"[14] While war may be politics by other means, the human dynamics of combat are more than an extension of policy.

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*Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jacobs is assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. His previous assignments include deputy commanding officer for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Ky.; director of plans, policy and strategy/J5 and executive officer to the commanding general, Task Force Black/Raleigh in Haiti; and Regiment S3 for the 160 SOAR. His overseas assignments include tours in Berlin, Graffenwhoer and Garlstedt, Germany; Honduras; and El Salvador. Jacobs is a recent graduate of the National War College, National Defense University, where he received a master's degree in national security policy and strategy. He also has earned master's degrees from Boston University and from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.*

Notes:

[1] Frank H. Simonds, Preface to *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle,* by Charles Ardant du Picq (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921), p. vii.

[2] Charles Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921), p. vii.

[3] Mitchell M. Zais, "Ardant du Picq: Unsung Giant of Military Theory," *Army,* April 1985, p. 58.

[4] Zais, p. 56.

[5] James J. Schneider, "The Theory of Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Command and General Staff College, March 1988).

[6] Du Picq, p. 135.

[7] Zais, p. 58.

[8] Zais, p. 57.

[9] Zais, p. 59.

[10] Zais, p. 59.

[11] Du Picq, p. 72.

[12] Zais, p. 58.

[13] Zais, p. 57.

[14] Du Picq, p. 118.

# Enlisted Career Notes

**Special Warfare**

## E8 promotions for SOF exceed Army average

The results of the 1996 master sergeant promotion board results have been released, and once again promotions for special-operations soldiers have exceeded the Army average. The overall Army select rate was 8.2 percent; CMF 18 achieved 12.1 percent and CMF 37 achieved 26.7 percent. Future SOF promotions to master sergeant should continue in these ranges, but eventually they will be more in line with the Army average. The MOS breakdown is as follows:

| | Primary Zone | | Secondary Zone | | Total | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Elig. | Sel. | Elig. | Sel. | Elig. | Sel. | % |
| 18B | 156 | 26 | 57 | 2 | 213 | 28 | 13.1 |
| 18C | 96 | 20 | 114 | 4 | 210 | 24 | 11.4 |
| 18D | 154 | 29 | 62 | 1 | 216 | 30 | 13.9 |
| 18E | 79 | 3 | 147 | 4 | 226 | 7 | 3.1 |
| 18F | 345 | 58 | 45 | 5 | 390 | 63 | 16.2 |
| 37F | 3 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 15 | 4 | 26.7 |

## PERSCOM points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| MAJ Adrian Erckenbrack | SF Enlisted Branch chief |
| MSG R.B. Gardner | Senior career adviser |
| SFC Todd Young | CMF 18 career adviser; reclassifications |
| SFC Stewart Marin | CMF 37F career adviser |
| Mrs. Faye Matheny | 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; ROTC and JRTC assignments |
| Ms. Franca Lockard | 3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC; SATMO; 96th CA Battalion |
| Ms. Dyna Amey | SFQC student manager |

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager; career-development questions should be directed to the senior career adviser. Students enrolled in the SF Qualification Course who have questions about assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should first be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The SF branch phone number is DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

# Officer Career Notes

**Special Warfare**

## Advanced education for SF field-grade officers

In addition to the Command and General Staff Officers Course, or CGSOC, there are five sources of advanced education for SF field-grade officers:

• *CGSOC SF Advanced Studies Program*. This program is mandatory for SF students who are attending the resident CGSOC. It is the only SF-specific field-grade institutional training for SF officers. The CGSOC administers the program in coordination with the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; instructors are chosen from all areas of the joint SOF community. SF CGSOC. The program, which trains officers to perform Special Forces group and joint duties as SF majors, culminates with an exercise integrating Army SOF into a JTF campaign plan. JFKSWCS is developing a parallel course for non-resident SF CGSOC students and for SF students who attend sister-service command-and-staff colleges. The non-resident CGSOC will consist of a distant-learning phase and a resident phase.

• *Naval Post Graduate School SO/LIC Program*. This is a voluntary advanced-degree program for senior SOF captains and junior majors. For each course, PERSCOM selects 10 SOF officers (six 18A54 officers, two 18A39 officers, one Ranger Regiment officer, and one SOF aviation officer), all of whose records must reflect above-average performance. The academic program lasts 18 months, followed by a three-year utilization assignment. Utilization positions are joint billets in theater special-operations commands. Interested officers should send a completed DA Form 1618R to Commander; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414. For more information, contact Captain Roger Carstens at the SF Officer Branch.

• *Advanced Military Studies Program*. This is a highly competitive advanced-degree program for selected resident CGSOC students. The program is conducted at the Fort Leavenworth School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS. All SF CGSOC attendees may volunteer and compete for this professional-development opportunity, and the Special Warfare Center and School strongly encourages them to do so. The AMSP has three phases: Phase one is the resident CGSOC. Phase two is an additional year of study at SAMS. (Resident Army students who are attending either the Marine Corps or the Air Force command-and-staff college may complete phases one and two at their respective institution.) Phase three comprises the utilization and branch-qualification assignments. Utilization assignments are with a corps or division staff. The corps commander may approve the officer's branch-qualification assignment before the officer performs the conventional-unit utilization assignment. Following the utilization period, PERSCOM will assign the officer to a functional-area or branch assignment at the highest level possible. For more information, contact Major Ray Helton at the SF Officer Branch.

• *Olmstead Scholarship*. This highly competitive program, administered by the civilian Olmstead Foundation, accepts four captains, Armywide, per year to attend foreign universities. The foundation considers the country preference of each applicant. Participants gain language proficiency and learn about a foreign culture. Programs of study are diverse, including such fields as political science, regional studies and even music. Studies last two years, and there is no requirement for a utilization assignment. If course credits fall short of U.S. college and university requirements, some students may not be awarded a master's degree. However, the Army will subsequently afford those students an opportunity to complete master's-degree requirements fully funded. To apply, contact Captain Roger Carstens.

• *Harvard/DCSOPS Fellowship*. This highly competitive one-year program, administered by PERSCOM, accepts only two captains, Armywide, per year. Participants attend Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and earn a master's in public administration. A two-year utilization assignment in DA DCSOPS follows. To apply, contact Captain Roger Carstens.

All these programs complement the officer's professional development achieved during SF operational assignments, and they are viewed favorably by promotion boards and by command-selection boards. Interested officers should plan to attend one of the voluntary programs as senior captains or as junior majors. Contact Major Ray Helton or Captain Roger Carstens at the SF Officer Branch, phone DSN 221-3175/3178 or commercial (703) 325-3175/3178.

## VI status no longer automatic with promotion to CW2

In a permanent change to AR 135-215, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel approved the reimplementation of voluntary indefinite status-selection boards for warrant officers. As of Jan. 1, 1996, warrant officers are no longer automatically granted VI status upon promotion to CW2. Warrant officers appointed prior to Jan. 1, 1994, will not be affected by the new policy. The first DA centralized VI board will convene during FY98 to consider warrant officers who were appointed after Jan. 1, 1994, and have obligated volunteer dates of Jan. 1, 1998, to Sept. 30, 1998. Those who are rated most qualified will be selected to fill the force at the CW2 grade. Warrant officers selected for VI status may continue to serve past their initial six years of active duty, in accordance with AR 600-8-24, or they may revert back to their previously held enlisted rank. For more information, contact CW3 Wayne Searcy, 180A manager in the SWCS Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-3175/3178.

# Foreign SOF



## Bosnian 'Black Swans' aggressive commando unit

The Bosnian Muslim army unit known as the "Black Swans" is considered one of the most motivated and professional indigenous units in the Bosnian force structure. More accurately described as commandos than as special-operations forces, the Black Swans, currently 800 men, perform missions ranging from spearheading tactical infantry attacks to providing security support for senior political officials. Soldiers are often equipped with French- or American-made assault rifles and rocket launchers. Initially comprised of refugees and formed near the central Bosnian town of Konjic under the operational control of the Bosnian 4th Corps, the unit quickly developed a reputation for aggressive action. It soon became directly subordinate to the Bosnian Supreme Command and transferred its headquarters to Kakanj. From this location, the unit began performing combat missions in all sectors along the confrontation lines existing prior to the Dayton Accords. Recruits for the Black Swans must be Muslim, must be under 21, must have prior military experience and must have been wounded at least twice in battle. They must also agree to abide by specific Islamic strictures. The commander of the Black Swans claims that Islamic fundamentalism does not necessarily provide inspiration to all of his troops; but he insists that obligatory prayers, religious education, and attendance at Friday mosque services aid in solidifying unit identity.

## Russian general charged with weapons diversion

By all accounts, Russia has inherited from the USSR the largest chemical weapons arsenal in the world — about 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, resident in bombs, missile warheads, artillery shells, other munitions, and canisters. According to the Russians, 32,300 mt of these include paralyzing nerve gases, such as sarin, soman, and VX, while the remainder comprise older agents, such as lewisite and yperite. The size of the chemical-weapons stocks continues to be challenged by internal Russian critics, with some charging that 100,000 mt of chemical agents are being maintained in Russia. Whatever the full size, the stocks, under the purview of the Russian Federation Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, are reportedly poorly accounted for, improperly maintained, and inadequately secured. Against this backdrop, in October 1995, the Russian Federal Security Service charged former Lieutenant General of Chemical Troops Anatoliy Kuntsevich with both the delivery of about 800 kg of chemicals in 1993 to Middle East buyers and the subsequent attempted smuggling of an additional 5.5 tons in 1994. The chemicals reportedly could be used for civil applications or for the creation of chemical weapons. It is worth recalling that Kuntsevich was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1991 (along with his fellow team members), for the development of Soviet binary nerve agents. It was revealed retrospectively that in April 1994, Boris Yeltsin removed Kuntsevich from a presidential advisory post on chemical and biological issues for "gross violation of his duties," but Kuntsevich remained affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. Distinguishing truth from mere assertion in

the shadowy world of Russian "weapons of mass destruction" is always difficult, but the dissension and the disarray in the military chemical structure suggest that the diversion of the materials or the technologies associated with chemical weapons is a continuing danger.

## Russian counterterrorist group hanging on

Russia's premier counterterrorist group, "Alpha," is under the control of the Russian Federal Security Service, a successor organization to the KGB, after changes in subordination and status following Alpha's ambiguous role in the failed August 1991 Soviet coup. Reportedly, Alpha comprises a main group of 250 personnel as well as smaller detachments in Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar and Khabarovsk. The unit's morale and its capabilities may be declining, however. Alpha's mid-June 1995 attempt to storm the Budennovsk hospital and free hundreds of hostages seized by Chechen guerrillas ended unsuccessfully. Chechen rebels were later granted safe passage home. Meanwhile, a strong Alpha veterans association has been formed, which claims that it "can exert a real influence on Alpha activities." Other former Alpha members also have joined or created private security firms and entered other private ventures based on their Alpha affiliations and experience.

## Peruvian subversives now on Internet

The Peruvian subversive organization Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, has been severely reduced in strength, cohesiveness and effectiveness over the last few years. Its leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured in September 1992 by the Peruvian National Police's National Counterterrorism Directorate, or DINCOTE; DINCOTE chief General Carlos Dominguez continues to dismantle the Sendero leadership and structure; and Sendero has suffered defeats in the field by the Peruvian armed forces. Nevertheless, remaining Sendero elements continue their efforts to reorganize, and they have carried out periodic terrorist acts in urban and rural areas as a reminder that they have not completely vanished. Another reminder, aimed primarily at foreign audiences, is found on a Worldwide Web site designated, "The People's War in Peru: Information About the Peruvian Communist Party" (http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/). The site is replete with portraits of Marx, Lenin, Mao and Abimael Guzman. It includes Guzman speeches, Sendero documents and position papers, and 29 "frequently asked questions."Although the site purports to represent the Peruvian Communist Party, or PCP, it is unclear whether information posted on the site reflects the positions of the Sendero/PCP leadership or those of foreign sympathizers who have for years been active in Europe and in the U.S. The site does note, in accordance with current orthodoxy, that the PCP continues to make preparations to "seize power nationwide in a final insurrection against the old State."

*Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.*

# Update



## Shelton takes command of USSOCOM

Army General Henry H. Shelton took command of the U.S. Special Operations Command Feb. 29, 1996, in a ceremony held at MacDill AFB, Fla.

Shelton was previously the commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, N.C. He has also served as commander of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg and as assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky. Earlier in his career, Shelton served as commander of Detachment A-104, 5th Special Forces Group, in Vietnam. During Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Shelton served as commander of the joint task force.

Shelton replaced General Wayne A. Downing, who retired from the Army following the transfer of command. Downing had been commander of USSOCOM since May 1993.

## USASOC soldiers receive Soldier's Medal

Five soldiers from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command have received the Soldier's Medal for their heroic efforts in three separate incidents that occurred during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

Staff Sergeant Bart R. Bryant, Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 3rd SF Group; Sergeant James E. Hall, C Co., 1st Bn., 3rd SF Group; Sergeant First Class Joseph E. Register Jr., B Co., 2nd Bn., 3rd SF Group; Specialist Daryl Thomas, B Co., 528th Support Battalion; and Sergeant First Class Bruce A. Ward,

DoD photo

*General Wayne Downing (left) transfers the USSOCOM flag. General Henry Shelton stands at far right.*

A Co., 1st Bn., 3rd SF Group, received the medals in a ceremony held on Fort Bragg Feb. 8.

The Soldier's Medal is the highest medal awarded during peacetime.

Following Hurricane Gordon in November 1994, Ward and a group of soldiers and Haitians performed life-saving efforts to save a family of six from drowning. Using a fire hose as a safety line, Ward and the team pulled five children and an elderly woman from a cinder-block house that was moments from being swept away by torrential floodwaters.

Bryant, Hall and Thomas saved a drowning man on Dec. 19, 1994, at Jeremie, Haiti. Hall and Thomas dived into murky water and swam 150 feet to reach the man. Each made several dives attempting to recover the man. On Hall's third attempt, he grabbed the man's shirt and brought him to the surface. Thomas then noticed that a small boy who had dived in to help them was also in trouble and rescued him. Bryant, who saw the difficulty each soldier was having, dived in to assist them. All five swimmers returned to shore safely.

On Oct. 11, 1994, Register witnessed a mob of 300 angry Haitians beating a man in Port-au-Prince. Register made his way through the mob to shield the man and administer first aid. He was alone until other soldiers arrived to load the victim into Register's vehicle. En route to the Port-au-Prince General Hospital, Register was stopped by another mob, which began to beat the man through windows of the vehicle. Register shielded the man until he could get the vehicle moving again. According to Major George P. Clements, battalion executive officer, 2nd Bn., 3rd SF Group, "Without Register's actions, the mob would have continued to beat the man until he was dead." — *Sergeant First Class Mike Brantley, USASOC PAO*

## Special Operations Medical Training Battalion activated

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School activated the Special Operations Medical Training Battalion (Provisional) Nov. 1, 1995, in preparation for the opening of the Special Operations Medical Training Center, scheduled to take place in July.

"The Special Operations Medical Training Battalion will be responsible for training all Special Forces medical sergeants, and for the Special Operations Medical Course,

designed to train all medics in the Army Special Operations Command, Navy Special Warfare Command and the Air Force Special Operations Command," said Colonel Lance E. Booth III, commander of SWCS's 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

According to Lieutenant Colonel John R. Chambers, commander of the Special Operations Medical Training Battalion, the $18 million Special Operations Medical Training Center will feature automated computer training aids, closed-circuit television access throughout the facility, and operating rooms and laboratories. "The improved curriculum and facilities will far exceed the scope of training the Special Forces medics were receiving at Fort Sam Houston, Texas," he said.

## SWCS dedicates free-fall simulator

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School dedicated its military free-fall training facility to the late Sergeant Major Santos A. Matos on April 29.

Born in Vista Allegre, Panama, on Nov. 22, 1942, Matos joined the Army in 1965. He served 26 years and completed Airborne, Ranger, Pathfinder, Special Forces, Jumpmaster and Military Free-Fall schools. Matos died in a free-fall parachuting accident in November 1993.

The $5 million military free-fall facility, which opened in 1992, contains a vertical wind tunnel that offers a safe training environment for military free-fall students.

## Prerequisites change for CDQC, MFFPC

In response to the decrease in SF dive and free-fall teams to one team per battalion, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has changed the prerequisites for the Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course and the Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course.

Special Forces soldiers are no longer required to be en route or on orders to an SF dive detachment or SF free-fall detachment in order to attend either of the courses. Prerequisites for all other MOSs remain the same for both courses. For more information, contact Captain Stephen R. Lasse, S3 Operations, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at DSN 239-4387/5473 or commercial (910) 432-4387/5473.

## PERSCOM establishes Worldwide Web site

The U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, or PERSCOM, has established PERSCOM Online, a homepage on the Worldwide Web, to provide information about Army personnel issues and programs.

PERSCOM Online is linked to the Army homepage "Army Link"; it can also be found under the uniform resource locator http://www-PERSCOM.army.mil. For more information about PERSCOM Online, contact the PERSCOM Public Affairs Office by phone at (703) 325-8857, DSN 221-8857, or e-mail at TAPCPAO@Hoffman-emh1.Army.mil.

## SWCS updates CA course

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has made changes to the Civil Affairs Course in support of the expanded role of Civil Affairs in nontraditional operations.

The four-week course trains active- and reserve-component officers for duty in Civil Affairs positions.

Civil Affairs Course 1-96, which began in January 1996, incorporated 18 hours of formal negotiations training, according to Major Gerald Thomas, operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Four hours of the new block were formal instruction; students spent the remaining 14 hours in individual and team negotiations supervised by the instructor.

The scenario in Class 1-96 involved business negotiations. In Class 3-96, the negotiations block will involve a peacekeeping scenario including nongovernmental organizations, military commanders and local civilian officials, Thomas said.

The CAC also incorporates briefings from Civil Affairs personnel returning from operational deployments. The intent is to continually update the course to ensure that it is realistic, doctrinally based and engages the interest and participation of the students, Thomas said. For additional information, contact Major Gerald Thomas at DSN 239-6504/3427 or commercial (910) 432-6504/3427.

## SWCS, Army SF Command get new commanders

Major General William P. Tangney took command of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School May 29.

Tangney had been commander of the Army Special Forces Command since May 1, 1995. His other assignments include deputy commanding general and chief of staff, Army Special Operations Command; commanding general, Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command; and commander, 10th Special Forces Group.

Tangney replaced Major General William F. Garrison, who retired from the Army. Garrison had commanded SWCS since August 1994.

Brigadier General Kenneth R. Bowra took command of the Army Special Forces Command May 21.

Bowra was previously deputy commanding general and chief of staff with the Army Special Operations Command. His other assignments include commanding general, Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command; and commander, 5th Special Forces Group.

# Book Reviews

## Special Warfare

**Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success**. *Edited by Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, Inc., 1996. ISBN: 0-8133-8969-0. 269 pages. $49.95 (cloth).*

Today's military professionals, especially those in the special-operations community, must have an understanding of two areas: the concepts, constraints, direction and technology progression of Force XXI; and the political views and trends that can lead to the deployment of military forces to execute the foreign policies of our government.

Foreign policy is a dynamic instrument. With growing national-security requirements, smaller military forces and shrinking budgets, our foreign-policy makers require a more systematic process for identifying the goals and the steps necessary for success. *Managing Contemporary Conflict* provides sound ideas for the ingredients of a strong foreign policy: identifiable and supportable ends, sufficient means and a clear purpose.

*Managing Contemporary Conflict* is structured in terms of three pillars — a sound theory of engagement, development and use of appropriate instruments of national power, and an appropriate management structure to implement the theory of engagement and to coordinate the instruments of power. The book's contributors cover the spectrum of current regional security studies of the diplomatic, military and intellectual arenas. Professionals such as retired Army General Wayne A. Downing, Ambassador David Passage, Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., Dr. Roy Godson, retired Air Force Colonel Dennis F. Caffrey and Dr. William J. Olson contributed to make this book an intellectual guide through today's international threat climate.




*Managing Contemporary Conflict* provides examples of recent and current conflicts to support its theories. One theory discusses the legitimacy theory of engagement for the post-Cold War period. Another theory discusses a 10-step analytical process in end-state planning, which is much like a doctrine for success in determining what the end-state goals should be in any situation or conflict. Dr. John Fishel writes on the challenge of achieving unity of effort in interagency operations and in coalition warfare. His work includes a look at joint issues, civil-military issues and the challenges of using ad hoc coalitions as tools for managing conflict.

*Managing Contemporary Conflict* offers a strong base for understanding contemporary military problems. It might best be used as a textbook by the military professional who seeks to understand how and why foreign policy will be important to conflict other than war.

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**You're No Good to Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines**. *By Bob Stahl. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. ISBN: 1-55750-793-7. 232 pages. $26.95.*

Like many of his contemporary World War II draftees, Robert E. Stahl was not enamored with the United States Army, but he was determined to do his part in the war. In 1943, after a series of training programs that can be most kindly described as haphazard, he was assigned as a cryptographer, technician 3rd class (roughly the equivalent of today's staff sergeant) with the Allied Intelligence Bureau, or AIB, in Australia. The AIB was an inter-allied organization. It performed for the Southwest Pacific Area, or SWPA, many of the functions that in other theaters were performed by the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. General Douglas MacArthur, who was distrustful of non-subordinate organizations, would not permit the OSS to operate in the SWPA.

Impressed by guerrilla radio traffic and by an officer who had escaped from the Philippines and was preparing to return there, Stahl vol-

unteered to accompany him. Stahl was accepted and with almost no additional training, he deployed with 11 other soldiers via submarine. *You're No Good to Me Dead* recounts Stahl's growth as he survives and operates in the rear areas of a powerful and determined enemy.

The infiltrating teams were told to avoid combat: their mission was to report intelligence. The book's title is, in fact, a quote from General MacArthur's farewell injunction to the teams. Although the introduction of the book states that the story is not a guerrilla-warfare account, the growth of the guerrilla movement around Stahl's location, Stahl's use of the movement, his dependence upon it and, later, his assistance to it make it difficult to identify any real differences between Stahl's actions and those of the Jedburghs in Europe. The length of the operational period is an important distinction: Stahl's deployment was for 15 months. Most Jedburgh deployments lasted two months or less.

This book's introduction, written by Dr. Clayton Laurie of the U. S. Army Center for Military History, contains a rare bonus: an explanation of the evolution and relationships of the Southwest Pacific area's special-operations control organizations.




*You're No Good to Me Dead* is not only very readable, it has potential lessons in the aspects of guerrilla warfare, strategic reconnaissance and psychological operations. The Naval Institute Press is to be commended for adding this book to its Special Warfare Series.

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**PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953**. *By Stephen E. Pease. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1992. ISBN: 0-8117-2592-8. 194 pages. $12.95 (paper).*




Stephen Pease's meticulous research of a virtually undocumented area of the Korean conflict is indicative of his research abilities and erudition. Pease researched official Army, Air Force and Navy records to provide a broad-brush look at PSYWAR efforts during the Korean conflict. Extensive interviews with Korean War PSYWAR operators of all services add color and an "I was there" attribution to his book. It works well — *PSYWAR* is highly readable.

Pease transitions smoothly from background on the history of PSYOP and its strategic context in the Korean conflict, to more singular and extensive chapters on leaflets, propaganda, and Chinese and North Korean PSYWAR efforts. The book's bibliographic references and appendices provide a treasure-trove of successful and unsuccessful PSYOP tactics, techniques and procedures.

Pease's chapter on leaflets is extensive and contains many photographs illustrating the types of leaflets produced. Most significant in this chapter are the ideological and moral questions raised by the use of certain types of leaflets. Pease highlights this problem with numerous examples, including "Operation Moolah," in which a $50,000 reward was offered for the defection of a North Korean, Chinese or Russian pilot with his MiG-15 or -17 aircraft. As Pease points out, President Dwight Eisenhower was opposed to this particular project — he felt that defection should occur for ideological reasons rather than for monetary ones. The subsequent defection of a North Korean pilot was hailed as the greatest PSYWAR operation of the Korean War, because it definitively supported U.S. claims that the Soviets were supplying the North Koreans with hardware, training and technical assistance.

Ultimately, Pease's effort is a good one. He details numerous psychological operations, methods and techniques (some of which are still in use), and he provides illumination of a rather unknown aspect of the "Forgotten War."

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# Special Warfare

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