Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–95–3 July 1995 Vol. 8, No. 3

From the Commandant

Doctrine is a subject that is much talked about but often misunderstood.

Opinions regarding doctrine and its value are at times diametrically opposed. Some say doctrine is the engine of change; others say it is the transmission of change. Some say technology drives doctrine; others say doctrine drives technology. Some say doctrine should be proscriptive; others say it should provide a common framework within which operators are free to make decisions.

Regardless of the side of the doctrine argument we are on, it is important, as we build the special-operations forces of the future, that we get our doctrine as nearly right as possible. Doctrine profoundly affects the way in which SOF will train, fight and operate.

In our efforts to get doctrine right, we must be careful to keep a fresh perspective as we consider future operations and evolving technology. General Pershing, when he first viewed the airplane, remarked that it would revolutionize getting hay to the horses. During the period between the world wars, the French developed the most effective doctrine ever seen. To their detriment, however, it was designed to win World War I. In that same period, the Germans developed their doctrine for the blitzkrieg.

Doctrine should be authoritative, but it is not inflexible — it is only "nearly" right. We must constantly fine-tune it by examining it against the changing operational environment.

In this issue, the article "Civil Affairs: A Function of Command" is the first of a series of doctrinal white papers written at the JFK Center and School. The need to understand, plan for and coordinate civil-military operations has never been greater, and the article suggests doctrinal changes that could make CA equal to other functions of command.

Also in this issue, Lt. Col. James Dunn and Maj. Jon Custer examine the experiences of the XVIII Airborne Corps special-operations coordination element during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. In assessing those experiences, they suggest ways in which joint doctrine can more clearly address the role of the SOCOORD at the JTF level.

Doctrine establishes operating principles, lays the groundwork for force structure and provides a basis for training, and it can help to integrate SOF and conventional forces. Christopher Lamb points out in his article on emerging SOF roles that by defining unique SOF characteristics, joint SOF doctrine can ensure that SOF retain their niche in U.S. military capabilities. By holding firmly to that niche, we may be able to prevent SOF being used, like Pershing's aircraft, in "getting hay to the horses," and make certain that our forces receive only the missions for which they are uniquely qualified.

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

PB 80–95–3

Contents

July 1995 | Special Warfare | Vol. 8, No. 3



Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -5341. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
Joel B. Hudson
Acting Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

00313

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Features

Departments

Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions

by Christopher Lamb

Anyone who works with special-operations forces cannot help being impressed with their skills and dedication. Nevertheless, an enthusiastic appreciation for SOF capabilities can actually create a problem in some circumstances.

A great appreciation for SOF capabilities may incline decision-makers to give any tough mission to SOF whether or not the mission actually qualifies as a special operation. Such a tendency may also be reinforced by our changing security environment. Our future is uncertain, the problems we face are complex, and political-military operations short of war tax the capabilities of our conventional forces. "So," some say in response, "special-operations forces are flexible, sophisticated and accustomed to nontraditional missions; why not assign more of these evolving post-Cold War missions to them?" While there is a lot of good sense in this line of reasoning, it can also lead us astray.

What follows is an attempt to examine the strategic significance of special operations and to provide a more detailed look at how we should assess future SOF roles and missions. We will review the criteria for judging roles and missions, discuss appropriate SOF roles, look at some emerging missions and review some rules of thumb that could be useful as the SOF community evaluates each prospective mission individually. The intent is not to provide the definitive statement of roles and missions for SOF, but to establish some general principles and to help define the terms of debate as the special-operations community evaluates new and evolving missions.

Three factors must be taken into account when assessing new roles and missions for SOF:

• *The nature of the threats and the security environment we anticipate in the future.* We must prepare to meet the missions that will actually be required of our armed forces.

• *The national security strategy that the United States is adopting to deal with the post-Cold War security environment.* Different strategies may require different missions and capabilities.

• *The nature of the forces themselves.* If special-operations forces are asked to conduct missions contrary to their current nature, they will eventually evolve into different types of forces. The risk inherent in such change is that SOF will duplicate the capabilities of conventional forces and

---

This article was originally presented at a 1994 conference co-hosted by Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War.

will be unable to effectively conduct traditional special-operations missions.

Nature of SOF

We can begin by reviewing the essential characteristics of special-operations forces. This process not only helps define the traditional roles that SOF have played in American military strategy but also serves as a baseline against which we can judge their alternative roles. The simple definition of SOF is that they are what conventional forces are not. Special operations are those military operations that conventional forces cannot accomplish or undertake without unacceptable levels of both risk and expense of resources. Special operations have at least three, if not all, of the following four characteristics:

• *Unorthodox approaches.* Special operations require tactics, techniques and procedures that cannot be employed efficiently or effectively by conventional forces. This does not mean that special operations negate the traditional principles of war, but rather that they put a different emphasis on the combination or ranking of those principles. For example, in special operations, surprise achieved by speed, stealth, audacity, deception, and new tactics and techniques is far more important than mass. Special-operations forces can target a conventional enemy's weaknesses through unorthodox approaches, or they can counter unconventional adversaries on the adversaries' own unorthodox terms.

• *Unconventional training and equipment.* All military training and equipment, from basic training to an Abrams tank to the cockpit of a B-1 bomber, is special to some extent. Moreover, what is defined as "unconventional" changes over time. SOF have pioneered operations with night-vision devices and deep-precision strike capabilities, but such operations are no longer considered unconventional. At any given time, however, there are mission requirements that must be defined as unconventional in comparison to existing conventional capabilities. The fact that special operations use a broad range of specialized skills and are often conducted at great distances from support facilities, beyond the limits of conventional military forces, means that they often require special training and equipment compared to that of their conventional counterparts.

• *Political context and implications.* Army Special Forces doctrine rightly identifies recognizing political implications as a special-operations imperative. Political considerations define the general parameters of almost all military operations, but a special-operations mission is often conducted in a politically sensitive context that constrains virtually every aspect of the operation. Local mores may dictate methods, and more general political considerations may require clandestine, covert or low-visibility techniques as well as oversight at the national level.

Political considerations define the general parameters of almost all military operations, but a special-operations mission is often conducted in a politically sensitive context that constrains virtually every aspect of the operation.

• *Special intelligence requirements.* Special operations require special intelligence. As a result, it is sometimes necessary to collect fine-grained intelligence about a difficult target; other times, it may be necessary to collect in-depth information on political, social and cultural issues. In certain instances the intelligence picture not only helps design the special operation, it may in fact determine its very feasibility.

Whether we are talking about Civil Affairs, hostage rescue, counterinsurgency training, unconventional warfare or any other traditional, primary special-operations mission, it will manifest at least three of the four SOF characteristics. Understanding the nature of special operations in reference to these critical characteristics provides a workable, although not perfect, approach. Such an approach still requires an element of judgment, but it is preferable to the circular definition that one often hears: "Special-operations missions are missions con-

U.S. Army photo

A PSYOP soldier hands out leaflets to civilians in Haiti, an example of the unconventional-warrior role of SOF.

ducted by SOF, and SOF are the forces that conduct special operations."

Traditional roles

The strategic value of special-operations forces is derived from the ways they can serve as a force multiplier in a major regional conflict or expand the range of options available in crises and conflicts short of war. In carrying out strategic functions, American special-operations forces have traditionally undertaken two broad, enduring roles, which for lack of better alternatives we can call the unconventional-warrior role and the commando role.

Special-operations forces execute the role of the unconventional warrior when they influence, advise, train and conduct operations with foreign forces and populations. Unconventional-warfare missions and foreign-internal-defense missions, such as training and advising counterinsurgency forces, emphasize the indirect approach through host-government or indigenous forces. We can include Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in the unconventional-warrior role because they also influence foreign forces and populations. The unconventional-warrior role places a premium on language skills and political sensitivity. It tends to involve missions that require a patient, long-term commitment in order to achieve national objectives.

Special-operations forces in the commando role use stealth, speed and audacity to undertake precision penetration and strike operations in limited, specialized contingencies across the conflict spectrum. Such commando-style operations are short, self-contained, direct-action missions that stress unorthodoxy, special training and unique intelligence.

It would be a mistake to consider the commando role only as a function of warfighting and the unconventional-warrior role only as a function of operations other than war. SOF undertake both roles during war and operations other than war. It would be a further mistake to identify the two roles exclusively with specific branches of special-operations forces. Our most proficient special-operations forces for commando-type missions must also be able to undertake foreign training, and some of our most proficient forces for unconventional-warrior missions must be prepared to conduct direct-action, commando-type missions. The distinction is not between war and OOTW, or between

one category of SOF and another, but between the commando role and the unconventional-warrior role.

Identifying these two traditional, generic roles for special-operations forces is important for several reasons. First, the focus on these roles highlights the particular functions that only special-operations forces are trained to perform. Conventional forces cannot undertake these roles without essentially transforming themselves into forces that are capable of special operations, thus duplicating SOF capabilities.

Similarly, since all SOF missions traditionally fall predominantly into one of the two categories, the roles serve as a helpful reference in the evaluation of evolving and emerging SOF missions. If a proposed mission does not fit into either role, it should be examined especially closely. Odds are that the mission will not properly constitute a special operation. If the concept of special operations must be stretched to include the new mission, we may be duplicating the capabilities of conventional forces while compromising our preparedness for traditional SOF roles.

Finally, not every special operator need be, first and foremost, a commando. Since both the unconventional-warrior and commando roles equally support the strategic SOF functions, they should receive equal emphasis by the special-operations community. It is important to keep in mind that the two roles may require some tradeoffs between different competencies. For example, the cutting-edge physical and technical requirements demanded of the commando differ from the linguistic, cultural and political skills required of the unconventional warrior. SOF must balance force structure, training, mission assignment and public-education efforts to ensure preparedness for both roles.

Suggested roles

It is occasionally suggested that in addition to unconventional-warrior and commando roles, SOF should be responsible for performing all covert paramilitary operations and for providing support to domestic authorities. Reportedly, the commissions established by Congress to review the future of the Central Intelligence Agency and the roles and missions of the Department of Defense are considering the merits of turning over all covert paramilitary operations to the DoD and SOF. While we cannot prejudge the findings of these commissions, we can identify several concerns.

Given the sensitive political nature of covert paramilitary operations, the elaborate legal and oversight requirements that they entail and, most importantly, the additional specialized tradecraft that they require, SOF would have to significantly expand their portfolio of capabilities in order to successfully execute such responsibilities. Since no new resources appear to be forthcoming, this process would most likely demand a reduction in the resources that support traditional SOF missions. Can such a reduction be justified?

Since both the unconventional-warrior and commando roles equally support the strategic SOF functions, they should receive equal emphasis by the special-operations community.

The passing of the Cold War and the increased media exposure that all military operations can expect in the future will substantially diminish the necessity and the likelihood of such sensitive special operations. At the same time, the need for SOF to execute missions emanating from the unconventional-warrior and commando roles will most likely grow. It seems questionable whether a major new role for SOF in the covert paramilitary area and the required associated resources could be justified. At a minimum, we must remember that assuming these responsibilities, which would constitute accepting a major new role for SOF, should be viewed with caution.

Another major role sometimes suggested for SOF is that they support domestic authorities — aiding local law-enforcement, disaster-relief and development programs. Some argue, often with the disaster in Waco, Texas, in mind, that SOF could assist, or assume responsibility

from, local and national law-enforcement agencies in dealing with hostage or barricade situations. It is further argued that the SOF skills that proved so relevant to the humanitarian mission to the Kurds in northern Iraq could be used to similar effect during domestic emergencies; e.g., the catastrophic damage to south Florida caused by Hurricane Andrew. There have even been suggestions that SOF could use their training and language skills to good effect by teaching foreign languages in inner cities.

First of all, the relevance of SOF skills to these kinds of domestic missions is questionable and would be open to debate on a case-by-case basis. More fundamentally, however, there is no good reason to exempt SOF from the general reluctance of the American people to solve civil problems with military means. It is a fundamental principle of democracy that the military is generally excluded from civilian affairs, to be called upon only in a limited fashion and in extraordinary circumstances. Routine military involvement in civilian duties can also be questioned on the grounds of readiness and efficiency.

While the military in general can bring formidable capabilities to bear on nonmilitary problems — martial efficiency, effective organization and training, massive and sometimes unique assets — tackling domestic problems routinely would require the military to become more like its civilian counterparts and would blunt the very characteristics that make the military efficient at waging war. If martial efficiency and military organization and training are relevant to domestic problems, the preferred solution should be to transplant these characteristics to the civilian agencies normally tasked with such problems. When these characteristics cannot be transplanted, it is because the civilian environment imposes more constraints than does the military. Transferring these constraints to the military through the assignment of civilian missions, either on a routine basis or for an extended period, would reduce the military's effectiveness in fighting wars. Any military organization, including SOF, that assumes a major role in support of domestic authorities risks its readiness to participate in other missions. Such a role also has the potential of duplicating the capabilities of civilian agencies charged with primary responsibility for the mission area.

Changed environment

Nothing we can ascertain about our future security environment seems to challenge the continued viability of the traditional SOF unconventional-warrior and commando roles. Nevertheless, some tough questions should be raised about old, new and emerging SOF missions. The new security environment contains new problems that argue for rethinking classic

Special Forces soldiers provide medical assistance to victims of Hurricane Andrew in Florida.

Photo by Keith Butler

missions of unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and combating terrorism. These problems may require a higher profile for those collateral missions usually defined as security assistance, humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism, counterdrugs, personnel recovery, special activities and coalition warfare. The future may also bring new emerging missions such as counterproliferation and combat search and rescue. The Secretary of Defense has refused to rule out pre-emption as a counterproliferation option, and potential SOF missions in a pre-emption scenario would be most demanding.

Hostage rescue is rightly still a primary mission for SOF. Classic terrorist-barricade situations are still a distinct possibility, but we should also consider personnel-recovery missions in the context of peace operations, where the environment might be more complicated and less permissive.

The unconventional-warfare mission is more problematic. Training friendly nations in popular defense may be a more likely unconventional-warfare mission than the extended, classic unconventional warfare/guerrilla warfare mission. Critical components of a successful popular-defense movement — unity of effort, popular support, will to resist, leadership, intelligence, propaganda and outside assistance — are more easily initiated if planned in advance. The deterrence value of such planning and training for small countries with larger, more powerful neighbors is not insignificant, as the Swiss experience attests. In any case, the unconventional-warrior mission merits continued attention since so many bedrock skills emanate from it: training, language, cross-cultural communication, small-unit tactics behind the lines, and familiarity with guerrilla warfare.

Peace operations will require SOF to undertake coalition-support missions that draw upon linguistic, cross-cultural, negotiation and training skills. Peace operations and other contingency operations may also require SOF to assist in rudimentary training for indigenous national police forces. With limited means available for security assistance, we may have to rely to a greater extent on small mobile training teams in support of the foreign-internal-defense mission. Indeed, we have seen an upswing in the number of MTT deployments in recent years.

United Nations photo

Members of a United Nations force train a host-country soldier in demining operations.

SOF also can expect more humanitarian-assistance missions such as providing training in mine awareness and demining, and assisting with camp organization in disaster-relief efforts. Humanitarian assistance should remain a collateral mission, however, since the capabilities required are subsumed by other primary SOF missions.

Changes in the military-technical environment as well as in the political-military environment will force us to reconsider some SOF missions. For example, we need to assess the impact of long-range, precision-guided weapons on the direct-action mission and the implications of the increasing reliability and endurance of unmanned aerial vehicles for the special-reconnaissance mission. Advanced robotics may affect both mission areas. The risks associated with putting men on the ground may be justified only when on-

scene human judgment is required in fast-evolving situations, or when humans or material substances must be secured and retrieved. Finally, the advent of new nonlethal technologies appears relevant to a number of SOF missions and should be integrated into the SOF capabilities portfolio. Nonlethal capabilities may help transform the direct-action mission in particular. When one considers that SOF direct action is often a viable option partly because SOF can minimize collateral damage and unintended casualties, the value of nonlethal capabilities is manifest.

Retaining focus

As mentioned at the outset, our objective is not to chart the specific direction for each SOF mission area, but rather to establish some general principles. Clearly, old missions should be re-evaluated in light of the political-military and military-technical aspects of the evolving security environment. Proposed new missions should be evaluated in light of the intrinsic nature of special-operations forces and the roles they can perform. In that evaluation, we should consider the following:

Because the overall resources available to SOF will at best remain constant through the remainder of the 1990s, every new program or mission of a conventional nature will come about at the expense of other capabilities.

• Does the mission have as a necessary condition for success the requirement that commandos/unconventional warriors undertake it? If so, it should be considered a primary SOF mission.

• Will the odds for mission success significantly increase if SOF perform or participate in the mission? If so, their involvement might constitute a collateral mission. Some important points to remember are:

— It is often a characteristic of collateral missions that SOF cannot accomplish them alone.

— Collateral missions are often derivatives of primary SOF missions.

— Many, although not all, so-called emerging missions fall into the collateral-mission category.

• Will the mission be only marginally better performed by SOF? If so, it probably is not a SOF mission unless there are special circumstances. As a general rule, such a mission should not be formally assigned to SOF, and the theater commander in chief should make the call on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand.

• If SOF do not perform the mission as well as or better than conventional forces, the mission obviously is inappropriate for SOF.

Risks

If we ignore these general guidelines and assign inappropriate missions to SOF, we run the following risks:

• *Inefficient use of specialized assets for conventional missions*. This would encroach on conventional-force capabilities and waste scarce resources. Over time, SOF probably would become increasingly more guilty of the old criticism that they rob general-purpose forces of talent needed throughout the military at the small-unit level.

• *Loss of an unconventional mentality*. Forcing SOF to build up expertise in conventional missions will inevitably take a toll on unconventional thinking. Also, because the overall resources available to SOF will at best remain constant through the remainder of the 1990s, every new program or mission of a conventional nature will come about at the expense of other capabilities more appropriate to special operations.

• *Threat of reabsorption*. If SOF are increasingly undertaking missions that one may reasonably argue could be performed by conventional forces, some invariably will ask why SOF should not be divided up and redistributed back to the services. Obviously this is not the intent of those who saw to the creation of USSOCOM in the first place.

If, on the other hand, SOF assume

responsibility only for missions that are appropriately understood to be special operations, we retain our focus on what makes SOF special:

• *Relevance.* By constantly re-evaluating existing SOF missions and capabilities for relevance to the security environment, SOF can keep current with the nation's security needs.

• *Retain forward outlook.* By constantly re-evaluating existing SOF missions and capabilities to ensure that they are consistent with the nature of SOF, we allow SOF to pass on to conventional forces those activities which no longer merit classification as special operations. Meanwhile, this frees resources for necessary new missions and maintains SOF's dynamic, forward-looking, unconventional qualities.

• *Unique capability/value.* A broad consensus on how SOF differ from conventional forces will increase the likelihood that they will be used appropriately — SOF will neither be assigned missions that rightly belong to conventional forces nor will they be denied missions that they ought to undertake.

By retaining this focus on what makes SOF special, we can maintain their relevance and their special place in the nation's armory of military capabilities. Such a focus will ensure that SOF will continue to fulfill a unique niche in our military — supporting, not threatening, the conventional forces as well as the national command authorities.

Conclusion

The traditional roles that SOF have played in the national military strategy still seem appropriate. The roles of unconventional warrior and commando do not duplicate the roles filled by conventional forces, and they have continuing relevance for the post-Cold War security environment. In considering new and emerging SOF missions, several points are worth noting:

• With regard to a new mission, the issue is not how important the mission is, but rather who should perform it. The fact that the mission must be carried out does not produce a convincing argument that SOF should take responsibility for it.

• Any new mission should fit the general characteristics required of a SOF mission: unconventional approaches, special training and equipment, political awareness and special intelligence. If so, the new mission will contribute to and reinforce SOF's core roles and competencies.

• For a collateral mission, we should ask whether it is a lesser-included case; i.e., a derivative from competencies required for primary missions. If not, we must ask what mission capabilities will be displaced, because, at best, SOF resources will remain roughly constant in real terms.

• Finally, with respect to a collateral mission in particular, if it is a special-operations mission only in very special circumstances, SOF probably should not assume responsibility for the entire mission.

The element of restraint expressed here is not to be misinterpreted as lack of enthusiasm for or confidence in SOF. On the contrary, SOF will be increasingly relevant to our problems of the future. For this reason, it is important that we remain focused on what makes special operations special. The guidelines we have mentioned are not rules to be applied mechanically. There are too many other factors, such as politics and budgets, that could influence the assignment of roles and missions. They are, however, good rules of thumb for helping us keep SOF on course in the 21st century, for ensuring SOF's relevance as a strategic asset, for ensuring SOF's best possible integration with conventional forces, and for ensuring SOF will be used appropriately and to maximum advantage.

Christopher Lamb is the director of policy planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Perspective

by Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, U.S. Army (ret.)

If the thoughts expressed in Christopher Lamb's article, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," reflect accurately those that guide current policy with regard to roles, missions, tactics and strategy for special-operations forces, there is some cause for concern.

The author sets the tone for much of his thesis by giving his version of the nature of special-operations forces as follows:

The simple definition of SOF is that they are what conventional forces are not. Special operations are those military operations that conventional forces cannot accomplish or undertake without unacceptable levels of both risk and expense of resources.

Part of the problem with the above definition is that it is inaccurate. Only the U.S. Army's Special Forces are capable of performing missions "that conventional forces cannot accomplish," and even that statement is open to compromise when we consider the technical support that must come from sources other than SOF, especially in connection with foreign-internal-defense missions.

Moreover, in submerging the identity of the U.S. Army's Special Forces within the general category of special-operations forces, the unique characteristics of the former that permit them to operate in foreign environments and that require language and area skills of a particularly high order seem to have been either downgraded or overlooked.

Other SOF components are heavily dependent upon advanced technology and hardware to carry out their missions. On the other hand, Special Forces are a "human weapons system" with skills that allow them to accomplish an amazing array of tasks that range from persuasion by example to actual fire and movement using indigenous, captured or even improvised equipment.

Within a SOF community overwhelmingly oriented toward the mechanics of direct action, the subtle sophistication that Special Forces can add to our national strategic arsenal could be overlooked.

Other than Special Forces, there is no element of the U.S. armed services that is capable of performing across the entire spectrum of what is labeled, for want of a better term, "low-intensity conflict."

When the article addresses the question of "inefficient use of specialized assets for conventional missions," a related caution might well be that of counseling against the use of the highly honed Special Forces in direct-action roles. The exception would be when such missions involve cooperation with foreign underground, auxiliary or other forces and call for language and area training and the cross-training peculiar to the U.S. Army's Special Forces. Special Forces can perform as Rangers and SEALs, but the reverse is true only in a very limited sense.

The presumption that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are, per se, special operations should be examined closely. Civil Affairs are properly the concern of any combat commander prior to, during or following battle. To professional military officers, Napoleon's LXX Maxim means that attention to the imperatives of Civil Affairs must be part of the exercise of high command. It is not a "special operation" practiced only by special-operations forces.

Military psychological operations carried out by special-operations forces should, except in occasional tactical situations, be products of policy-specific guidance and direction from the National Command Authority. The fact that this has not always been the case should be of particular interest to the Director of Policy Planning. The interrelationship and modus operandi that would require the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency and the PSYOP mechanisms of the U.S. Army to coordinate and combine in pursuit of various national PSYOP strategies should be goals that are constantly sought by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The article's observation that special operations "are often conducted at great distances from support facilities, beyond the limits of conventional military forces," omits an equally valid note that the logistics capabilities of conventional forces may be essential elements of the overall teamwork necessary to place and keep the special-operations forces on target. The differences between special-operations forces and conventional forces stem from their assigned missions, not from any deficiency in imagination, innovation or daring on the part of conventional soldiers and their leaders.

Some unfamiliarity with the fundamentals of the unchanging art of war is implicit in the paper's statement:

For example, in special operations, surprise achieved by speed, stealth, audacity, deception, and new tactics and techniques is far more important than mass.

It is certainly one criterion of military professionalism to consider tactical and strategic surprise, as compared to mass, to be of extraordinary importance in any military operation against a hostile opponent. Surprise has historically been looked upon as one of the major principles of war.

Final decisions as to which of America's strategic interests are of such value that our nation will commit its armed forces to safeguard them are not made by the military. In a perfect world, professional military advice would be an important factor in shaping the overall national strategy.

The admittedly complex international situation during the post-Cold War presents challenges to which the U.S. military can respond in a variety of ways. However, unless these responses are carefully considered, coordinated elements of an overall politico-military strategy, the results will be counterproductive.

American academic analysis of the special-operations phenomenon dates back more than a quarter of a century. SOF theory has been examined and discussed from every conceivable angle. What is needed now is practical, pragmatic application of the accepted principles that have emerged from the volumes of philosophical conjecture.

Within the corporate body of the armed forces of the United States — both the active and reserve components — there are superb resources with which to supplement, complement and occasionally replace the civil elements of the national mechanism for projecting American power and influence. For any segment of the armed forces of the United States to accomplish missions that fall within the "unorthodox" or "special" category, there are basic requirements that must be met. Among these, the first and most important is a clear statement of the goals to be achieved, the resources to be provided and the chain of command to be assigned for every aspect of the overall enterprise.

The latter is especially important inas-

much as special operations frequently involve, include or impinge upon areas normally the responsibility and the "turf" of nonmilitary elements of the national power structure. Instead of being preoccupied at the Defense Department level with the presumed differences between special-operations forces and those of the conventional military establishment, it would be most helpful and appropriate to pursue questions involving national-level interagency coordination.

As Lamb confronts the complex and sometimes abstract nature of special operations, he brings to mind the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Some of his observations and sensings are accurate, but his overall assessment of special-operations forces, especially their roles and missions, projects a picture with some extremely fuzzy outlines.

American academic analysis of the special-operations phenomenon dates back more than a quarter of a century. SOF theory has been examined and discussed from every conceivable angle. What is needed now is practical, pragmatic application of the accepted principles that have emerged from the volumes of philosophical conjecture.

Immediately following his retirement from the U.S. Army in 1971 after 36 years of service, Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough undertook a top-secret project for the Department of the Army that involved preparation of an operational concept and plan for the conduct of irregular warfare in certain areas of Southeast Asia. His other post-retirement activities include serving as a consultant to the Hudson Institute; Braddock, Dunn and McDonald; and the BETAC Corporation of Arlington, Va. He has also served as a member of the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group, reporting to the Secretary of Defense. He is an honorary member of the editorial board of Parabellum, *the Hungarian international magazine of special warfare and elite forces. His published works relating to the special-operations area include "Terrorism — The Past as an Indication of the Future," included in* International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, *Greenwood Press, 1978; "Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Role" (Chapter 8) in* Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency, *D.C. Heath, 1984; the sections "Low-Intensity Conflict," "Guerrilla Warfare" and "Special Operations" in* Brassey's International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, *1993; and the section "Psychological Operations" in the* Encyclopedia of the American Military, *Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. He is listed in* Who's Who in America *and* Who's Who in the World.

Waterborne Infiltration Training: Maintaining a Battle Focus

by Maj. David E. Johnson

A Special Forces combat-dive detachment leader and his team sergeant have developed a concept for dive training that costs next to nothing, includes training with the Navy, is in the perfect location and is incredibly challenging. However, after briefing their battalion commander, they are in full retreat. What happened?

Although the training they recommended was "high-speed," the team leader and team sergeant failed to tie their dive-training concept to the detachment mission-essential task list, or METL. The battalion commander justly pointed out that the team's valuable training time would be better spent on battle-focused training.

The existing war plans of the theater commander drive the selection of the METL through mission letters. Once targets have been identified and assigned to specific teams, the teams generate plans of execution for inclusion in their special-operations mission-planning folders. The theater special-operations command uses these plans to write the group mission letter. Mission letters do not include specific means of infiltration unless they are called for in the plans of execution.

Units must be careful to focus their training on the most likely tasks. This is especially true for waterborne infiltration. All theaters of operation have the potential for surface waterborne infiltration, either coastal or inland. But given the Special Forces mission profile, rotary-wing



Photo by Al Petersen

technology, and the existence of other units specifically designed for high-risk water entry, a reasonable Special Forces mission-letter analysis should identify only a limited number of waterborne-infiltration tasks.

Any waterborne infiltration should be trained as only a part of the mission cycle and attached to a land infiltration and an objective. Training should be prioritized, with actions on the objective taking precedence over infiltration. Ideally, training should focus on high-payoff tasks common to most mission profiles. For example, most Special Forces missions include the task "conduct preinfiltration activities." The amount of time spent preparing for

SF Combat Diver Qualification Course emphasizes waterborne infiltration

The Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course has recently changed its program of instruction to place more emphasis on techniques of waterborne infiltration.

During the four-week course, held at Key West, Fla., students receive training in physical conditioning, equipment orientation, basic scuba, dive physics, underwater search techniques, dangerous marine life, dive tables, open-circuit diving, submarine operations, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Students and instructors are challenged by 12- to 16-hour days, five days a week.

The new program of instruction, which began with Class 02-95 in March, eliminated the closed-circuit-diving portion of the SFCDQC and replaced it with training in waterborne-infiltration techniques. The change affects an eight-day block of instruction, according to Maj. Jose Olivero, commander of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, which teaches the SFCDQC.

Waterborne-infiltration techniques are designed to improve the infiltration and exfiltration capabilities of SOF in over-the-horizon operations. Students study topics such as beach-landing-site procedures; nautical chart reading; effects of tides, currents and weather on small craft; navigation procedures; and dead-reckoning procedures. They also learn to operate and maintain small craft, including kayaks and Zodiac boats. Students are required to perform waterborne-infiltration tasks during day and night, in all weather conditions, from distances as far as 25 miles offshore.

"The waterborne-infiltration techniques taught here are very mentally demanding, as opposed to the physical demands required of the closed-circuit portion of the CDQC," said SFC Eddie Licon, an instructor with Company C.

The SFCDQC trains Army Special Forces and Rangers, Air Force Parachute Rescue and Combat Air Traffic Controllers, Marines and military forces from other nations. Company C also conducts the Diving Medical Technician Course and the Combat Diving Supervisor Course. — *Paul D. Nelson, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command*

this task is doubly invested: Regardless of which training scenario is involved, the training will prepare the team for other operations at the same time. The most common, and most complex, phase of all waterborne infiltrations is the transition of personnel and equipment to land infiltration. High-payoff waterborne-infiltration tasks are common to missions that require coastal or inland-waterway penetration, regardless of the delivery system.

Training on a scenario-dependent delivery system that is only one of a myriad of possibilities is an inefficient use of resources. For instance, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the proponent for maritime operations, envisions the doctrinal use of closed-circuit rebreather equipment in a scenario with underwater infiltration, an underwater target and underwater exfiltration.

In closed-circuit diving, a diver rebreathes his own air. The rebreathing unit recycles the diver's breath, cleansing it of carbon dioxide and mixing it with oxygen. The rebreather produces no air bubbles, allowing the diver to operate undetected.

Other specific tactical scenarios may call for a detachment to lock out of a sub-

marine, to conduct a deliberate water jump using a special operations combat-equipment platform, or to helocast. Some of these scenarios are more likely to occur than others. Infrequent training involving every possible delivery system can serve only as a means of familiarization and does little to prepare the detachment for a combat mission. Training on the use of unique delivery systems such as closed-circuit diving gear or submarines should be part of the preparation for a specific operation or deployment.

Diving is not a Special Forces mission. For Special Forces, diving is a subset of waterborne infiltration, which is, itself, a subset of infiltration. Other units in DoD are tasked with beach reconnaissance and targets close to the water. Special Forces units are trained to infiltrate unobserved, undefended shores to conduct operations inland. Any number of airborne, surface or submarine systems can deliver a detachment and its equipment to the transit point in the water.

In view of the need for battle focus, the JFK Center and School's Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course has recently modified its program of instruction. Training on the closed-circuit rebreather has been replaced by waterborne-infiltration tasks and practical exercises in an effort to help future combat-dive and maritime-operations teams become more proficient at transitioning from water to land. Of particular utility are the blocks of instruction on beach-landing-site operations, use of combat rubber raiding craft and kayaks, and waterproofing of equipment.

The enhanced battle focus of the SFCDQC will provide detachments that are better trained in those skills required by the warfighting commanders. Operationally, only a few adjustments will be required. Pre-scuba and SFCDQC will continue to produce well-trained soldiers for the combat-dive and maritime-operations detachments. Open-circuit diving will continue, providing special-operations forces the capability to serve as safety divers for maritime operations, to conduct subsurface search and recovery and hydrographic survey, and to adapt quickly when more advanced training is required.

Support and logistics requirements will remain almost unchanged. Dive locker and maritime-operations support-maintenance facilities will continue to be inspected. Equipment will continue to be maintained under the Navy Material Maintenance Management System.

The late Vince Lombardi, coach of the championship Green Bay Packers, began each season by telling his players, "Gentlemen, this is a football." In our excitement over the infinite number of tactics, techniques and procedures available, we should not lose sight of the basics. The Special Forces soldier is a jack-of-all-trades. We must help him as much as possible by designing battle-focused training and by limiting the number of skills in which he must be an expert. With a more solid battle focus, the force as a whole will become more efficient in meeting the stated needs of the unified commanders. In this period of diminishing resources, our detachments should be spending valuable training time, money and energy on high-payoff tasks with a go-to-war applicability.

Maj. David E. Johnson is assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, as the dive officer. He was formerly commander of ODA 565 (combat dive) in the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group. During Operation Desert Storm, he served as commander of ODA 552; during Operation Restore Hope, he served as the J-3 for the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia. Johnson is a 1984 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

A USSOCOM View of Doctrine

by Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

The United States Special Operations Command's view of doctrine mirrors that of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is that doctrine must do four things:

- Define the way we will train, fight and operate.
- Be authoritative and universally practiced.
- Be authored by our senior leadership and by the best and brightest, operationally proficient action officers.
- Be accurate and easily understood, and taught as well as used by operational commanders.

With that in mind, we will examine three points: USSOCOM's unique role in developing doctrine; what doctrine is and what it does; and possibly most important, what doctrine is not.

The principal role of USSOCOM is to serve as a force provider to the regional warfighting commanders in chief. The legislation that created USSOCOM assigned a number of service-like authorities and responsibilities to this unified or combatant command. The most widely recognized of these is the budgetary authority related to Major Force Program 11. Less widely recognized, but in the long run possibly as significant, is the legislatively mandated authority and responsibility for developing joint special-operations doctrine.

This authority, coupled with the strengthening of joint doctrine and its influence over service doctrine (once again by legislation, and by the interest and directives of past and current chairmen of the JCS), places a powerful tool in the hands of the USSOCOM commander. The two means by which we strengthen joint doctrine are by mandating that service doctrine conform to joint doctrine and by placing increased pressure on joint-force commanders to adhere to published joint doctrine.

The first of our three points is that unlike other combatant commanders, the USCINCSOC owns a piece of joint doctrine — specifically, joint special-operations doctrine. He therefore controls service special-operations doctrine and strongly influences the conduct of operations by the regional combatant commands. The importance of this authority becomes apparent as we examine the second point, what doctrine is and what it does.

Engine of change

Doctrine is an engine of change. As such, it can serve as a tool for developing complementary and widely understood force struc-

---

This article was originally presented at a 1994 conference co-hosted by Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War.

tures and operational procedures for the SOF of all services. Doctrine is, and should be, the principal instrument in effecting deliberate, evolutionary change. In general, "today" belongs to the operators, and "tomorrow" is in the hands of the trainers and training institutions. But the long-term future of the force depends on the doctrine-development process. This is not meant to imply that doctrine has, or should have, no influence on operations and training. On the contrary, doctrine provides a basis for training as well as tools for the operator. The intent here is to describe how doctrine drives the force into evolving rationally in order to meet future challenges.

Doctrine comprises several elements. It includes a distillation of past experience into fundamental operating principles. These are supplemented by tested and proven tactics, techniques and procedures. These historically derived portions of doctrine are combined with actual and anticipated technological advances and our best guess of what future requirements and operational environments will be. The result is a description of how we see the force operating in the future. This concept of how and under what conditions we will be operating is used to define organizational and materiel requirements. Doctrine, then, delineates our future capabilities and operational concepts.

As mentioned previously, doctrine is the instrument of slow, deliberate change. Simply describing what we want the force to be and to do does not cause significant things to happen. Doctrine must be implemented through changes in organization, training, materiel and leader development. Evolutionary change, as described in doctrine, is instituted by developing new force structures that embody doctrinal capabilities, appropriate equipment for those structures, institutional and unit training programs that support new concepts and procedures, and leader-development programs that enable commanders to effectively employ their forces. This clearly takes time.

Implicit in all of this is that doctrine is not responsive enough to be the preferred method of implementing minor changes or fine-tuning the force. As we said, tomorrow belongs to the trainers. While fundamental change is driven by doctrine, fine-tuning and relatively minor changes are produced in the infinitely more responsive realm of training. Trainers must build upon the base provided by doctrine.

Revolutionary change

Since doctrinal change requires time in order to be effectively implemented, it is evident that the ability to accurately forecast future requirements is a necessity for good doctrine. Occasionally, because of unanticipated technological advances, dramatic changes in the strategic environment or other sudden changes affecting military requirements and capabilities, *revolutionary*, not evolutionary, change is required. Doctrine must accommodate such change. In such a situation, doctrine is no longer the proactive engine of change, but rather a reactive force attempting to fit change into a workable framework.

In general, "today" belongs to the operators, and "tomorrow" is in the hands of the trainers and training institutions. But the long-term future of the force depends on the doctrine-development process.

The reaction to sudden, massive changes rarely produces comprehensive, totally coherent doctrine. Implementation of such changes is also hampered by a force structure that may not be totally appropriate, by the lack of institutional and unit training to support the new concepts, by inadequate or unfamiliar equipment, and by leaders who are not comfortable with, or ready to implement, the new doctrine. The force requires adequate time to fully accept and implement this kind of landmark change. As the new concepts mature and become more widely accepted and thoroughly implemented, we can achieve a return to orderly, disciplined, evolutionary progress.

The legislation that produced USSOCOM and revitalized our special-operations capabilities illustrates such a change.[1] Whether

the impending change was unpredicted, ignored, or some combination of the two is irrelevant. In the past few years, there have been radical changes in SOF mission requirements; force structure; materiel; operational concepts; and command, control, communications and intelligence, or C4I. Only now are we beginning to see the new body of SOF doctrine begin to mature and to be implemented and accepted.

We now stand at a critical point. It is time to transition from a period of revolutionary change, in which SOF doctrine has been reacting to drastic change, to a period in which change is once again anticipated and accommodated by evolutionary development driven by well-thought-out and systematically implemented doctrine. This conversion to systematic progress will eliminate, or at least vastly reduce, the time lags and inefficiencies inherent in reacting to unanticipated, externally imposed change. The importance of making this conversion was clearly articulated by Air Marshall Giulio Douhet of Italy, who, referring to the advent of air power as a force on the battlefield, stated, "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves until after those changes occur."[2]

Doctrine is not a substitute for judgment, mission analysis and good leadership. It is not a comprehensive checklist or a template that can be mechanically applied to any situation. In itself, doctrine does not win wars or solve the operational problems of today.

Complementary capabilities

The function of doctrine as an engine of change can be illustrated by its overall effectiveness in rationalizing the roles, missions, structure and operational procedures throughout the joint SOF community; and in integrating SOF with general-purpose forces. The days are past of redundant capabilities and service autonomy during operations. Escalating costs of modern militaries, coupled with the reduction in resources available, make it simply unacceptable to duplicate capabilities or to fail to obtain optimal impact from the total joint force through synchronization of complementary capabilities.

USSOCOM inherited a diverse set of forces from the various services. Each force came with its own charter, history and traditions derived from the requirements the services had placed upon them. Before the creation of USSOCOM, not only was there no mechanism for eliminating redundancy and ensuring mutually complementary capabilities, standard equipment and operating procedures, there was no real motivation to do so. The USSOCOM charter to develop joint special-operations doctrine provides the mechanism for articulating the USCINCSOC's concept of the roles and missions of the SOF service components.

Rationalizing the force structure and defining who does what has been a lengthy and painful process. But driven by resource constraints and increasing operational requirements, this process of definition will continue. Joint SOF doctrine will evolve and more precisely define the extent and the limits of each component force's functions and contribution to the total joint force. As these definitions are translated into service doctrine and subsequently into organization, equipment and training, we will eliminate redundancy and meet emerging mission requirements.

Similarly, joint special-operations doctrine will define concepts of employment, C4I relationships and planning procedures. These embody the capabilities and the limitations of the force, telling joint staffs what they can and cannot expect of SOF. They also tell joint staffs what is required of them in order to receive the full value of SOF as part of the total joint force. Equally important, it tells SOF units what they can reasonably expect in the way of mission taskings, planning guidance and support. In the absence of coherent joint special-operations doctrine,

joint headquarters cannot be expected to accommodate different procedures and doctrine for each of the SOF components, and SOF are likely to be omitted or misused. As joint special-operations doctrine becomes better-known and practiced, rational and effective special operations can be expected to contribute increasingly to overall efforts.

No template

The third point deals with the limitations of doctrine. Doctrine is not a substitute for judgment, mission analysis and good leadership. It is not a comprehensive checklist or a template that can be mechanically applied to any situation. In itself, doctrine does not win wars or solve the operational problems of today.

Operators, as stated earlier, own the present. Remember that doctrine is based upon an anticipated requirement or situation. The specifics of any operational mission or situation are bound to vary from what was anticipated. Michael Howard, the noted British military historian and strategist, stated, "I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong."[3]

Does this make doctrine irrelevant or a sterile effort? Of course not. The real purpose of doctrine is to come close enough in anticipating the future to provide the capabilities that will enable the operator to adapt to any situation. Doctrine should provide the standard procedures, C4I and support mechanisms that will allow the operator to focus on the unexpected requirements of the situation and not expend creative energies on the routine. Michael Howard continues, "I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives."[4]

If the doctrine developers have done their jobs, the operator will have all the tools — organization, materiel, training and procedures — to accomplish his. And the tools will be better than those of his opponent. From that point forward, it is up to the operator.

The authority granted USSOCOM to develop joint special-operations doctrine is key to the long-term success of special operations. As the command matures, doctrine will provide the impetus and the focus for evolutionary change and progress. And joint special-operations doctrine, if properly developed, will allow us to field a capable, well-trained and well-equipped force prepared to meet the challenges of the future.

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison is commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In previous assignments, he served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, as deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and as deputy commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Security Agency of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Notes:

[1] The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.

[2] Giulio Douhet as quoted in *Contrails; The Air Force Cadet Handbook* 23 (1977-78) : 147.

[3] Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," speech given 3 October 1973 at the Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture. As quoted in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, March 1974, pp. 3-9.

[4] *Ibid.*

Civil Affairs: A Function of Command

In war as well as in military operations other than war, soldiers and leaders at all levels will be forced to deal with unique situations requiring interface with individuals and groups outside the normal scope of traditional military operations.

Activities in Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield/Storm, Provide Comfort, Continue/Restore Hope, and Uphold/Maintain Democracy have served to convince the service chiefs that today's maneuver commander must deal with civilians, either as belligerents or as noncombatants. Whichever case applies, some knowledge of Civil Affairs operations is of paramount importance if U.S. commanders are to discharge their responsibilities toward civilians within the scope of U.S. national intent and international agreements.

In planning for future operations and assessing their ability to influence or interact with civilians in their area of responsibility,[1] commanders should consider the following assumptions:

• Noncombatants[2] have a significant influence on military operations.

• The number and the tempo of operations other than war will increase in the future. With these unique missions come requirements to conduct military operations in spite of, or in concert with, civilian populations and agencies.[3]

• Because of the character of these missions, military leaders at all levels must be able to understand and to exploit cultural and infrastructure peculiarities of the target population.

• A fourth spectrum of conflict,[4] so-called "information war," will require U.S. forces to be especially sensitive to actions which could be negatively interpreted or represented by the media.

• With the adoption of the concept of force projection, it is essential that commanders exploit host-nation and target-country capabilities which facilitate or support military operations.

• The number of combined or coalition operations is likely to increase.

• Humanitarian and civic-assistance operations, in concert with United Nations peacekeeping operations, will also increase.

Functions of command

Given these assumptions, it is time for the services to aggressively pursue doctrinal and policy changes that will help to ensure success in missions involving civilians. Although doctrine writers have con-

---

This is the first of a series of white papers to be published by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The series is intended to stimulate thought and discussion on SOF doctrinal issues.

U.S. Air Force photo

A soldier from the 82nd Airborne Division watches a group of Grenadians near Point Salines Airfield during Operation Urgent Fury in 1983.

ceived new military terms for emerging types of warfare and operations other than war, the principles of war have remained constant. The many recent contingency operations have differed from anything the U.S. has undertaken in the past, yet no new principles of war have emerged from them.

Like the principles of war, another set of standards has evolved through the years to delineate the major tasks for which commanders bear sole responsibility. These standards are the functions of command. They include personnel management, intelligence and security, operations and training, administration, logistics, communications, and Civil Affairs.[5]

CA Directive

Secretary of Defense William Perry has recently issued the first definitive Civil Affairs directive, DoD Directive 2000.13, a much-needed first step in correcting Civil Affairs planning and execution deficiencies throughout the Department of Defense. It establishes policy and assigns responsibilities under various DoD directives for conducting DoD-wide Civil Affairs activities. The directive applies to "The Office of Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments (including the U.S. Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant Commanders, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities, ... Non-DoD organizations that are participating in DoD civil affairs activities or are requesting DoD civil affairs capabilities."

Secretary Perry establishes the DoD policy that "The DoD shall maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout the range of military operations." He further directs that the Secretary of the Army, "in conjunction with USCINCSOC, recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize, and sustain Army civil affairs forces."

The first step in preparing units and leaders to conduct military operations involving noncombatants is to recognize that Civil Affairs is a function of com-

Soldiers of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command provide medical treatment to a Thai woman during a medical civic-action project.

Photo by Keith Butler

mand, not merely an arcane specialty relegated to the role of an afterthought in the planning cycle. U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, states:

Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions ... International law and the Law of Land Warfare specify the commander's ethical responsibility in military operations and for the ***indigenous population*** *in an area of operation. ... Command and control is the process through which the activities of military forces are directed, coordinated, and controlled to accomplish the mission. This process encompasses the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures necessary to gather and analyze information, to plan for what is to be done, to issue instructions, and to supervise the execution of operations.*[6]

Commanders routinely plan for fire support, air defense and other components of the battlefield operating systems. Planning for military contact with host-nation and target-country civilians and for separate civil-military operations should also be routine for all battalion-sized and larger units. As an example, even if a maneuver commander is not provided nonorganic fire-support assets, he will certainly plan for the employment of his organic assets in a fire-support role. Planning for Civil Affairs is no different. While conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the commander should identify such things as:

- Large concentrations of civilian populations,
- Likely refugee and migrant escape routes,
- Potential camp sites for dislocated civilians,
- Potential civilian and host-nation sources of supply,
- Specific groups or concentrations of third-country nationals, nongovernmental organizations, or private voluntary organizations, and
- Impacts of all the above on the operation.

Planning for noncombatants

Commanders at all levels must learn to anticipate and plan for the effects of noncombatants on the battlefield. Often when units do not receive Civil Affairs augmentation, noncombatants are given minimal or no consideration. This has been recognized by the Army's senior leadership. Recent rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center have incorporated significant civilian play into the exercise scenarios. Commanders who experience the frustration and difficulties of dealing with

noncombatants in these exercises learn firsthand the value of treating Civil Affairs as a function of command.

Despite these lessons from the field, the services and the professional-military-education system have been slow to bring doctrine and force structure up to date with reality. Civil Affairs is given little, if any, mention in combat-arms officer basic and advanced courses, and the students receive no formal instruction in this vital, emerging requirement. In fact, the only Civil Affairs involvement that students experience in the Command and General Staff Officer's Course at Fort Leavenworth is relegated to an elective, which few students choose to attend, and minimal play in a battle simulation. This in spite of the fact that the most likely operational scenarios for the immediate future (military involvement in Korea, Haiti, the Former Republics of Yugoslavia, and Somalia-style humanitarian assistance) either center around or involve significant play of refugees and noncombatants.

On a positive note, the Special Warfare Center and School has taken a significant step toward integrating civilian and noncombatant play into exercises and schoolhouse instruction. The SWCS has recommended a modification to the age-old planning tool of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available, or METT-T, into METT-T-C, to include the weighty factor of "civilians" into the commander's planning process. The new term has not, however, been promulgated in service manuals.

Restructuring efforts

To assist commanders in the performance of their duties, the Army has developed branches that support the various functions of command — all are active-component branches except for Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is a branch in the Army Reserve only; it is a functional area in the active component. Since World War II, the rationale for such an active-component void has been that the one active-component battalion would provide a rapid response (if sufficient forces were available) and the remaining requirements would be fielded by the many Civil Affairs units in the USAR.

After-action reports on simulations ranging from command-post exercises to computer-assisted games, as well as reports on combat operations, attest to the fact that commanders have little, if any, knowledge of the Civil Affairs function of command. Delegating that command function to nonorganic active- and reserve-component units is not the commander's best course of action in meeting his responsibility toward civilians. The Special Warfare Center and School is working to increase the number of CA positions in the Army division.

CMO section

Two factors that preclude the effective integration of the civil-military-operations section into unit operations are the physical separation of the CMO section from the intelligence and operations sections and the mindset that Civil Affairs is an issue detached from operational planning.[7]

Unlike the personnel and logistics staff sections, which are generally focused inward toward sustaining unit operations, the CMO section, like the intelligence and operations sections, is focused on the operational area. It exists primarily to plan, facilitate and assist in the ongoing execution of unit missions. To plan and coordinate these missions, the operations section must rely heavily on information provided by the intelligence and CMO sections. Items such as situational and plan-

ning maps, overlays of movement routes for dislocated civilians, sources of host-nation support, national religious and cultural monuments, hospitals and power plants, and most importantly, analysis, provide the operations officer with a wider perspective. It is important that the two sections have access to the operations officer and to the immediate intent and views of the commander.

The present structure of a typical CMO section includes the primary CMO staff officer, staff section assistants (officers and NCOs), and provisions for CA generalists or functional specialists in times of deliberate or crisis-action planning.

The lack of understanding and the unwillingness to give credence to Civil Affairs as a function of command have caused the CMO section to be misused in most cases. In many Army units the position of CMO staff officer has been downgraded to the point that it is one rank lower than the other primary staff officers.

The CMO staff officer at division and corps levels serves as the commander's primary adviser on those aspects of military operations relating to civilians, the impact of civil matters on military operations, and the consequences of military operations on the civilian population.

Although the combat uses of this key staff officer are many, in only a few units has the CMO staff officer been allowed a position in the main command post/tactical operations center — a recognition of Civil Affairs as a full-fledged, viable member of the intelligence/operations/CMO team.

Current doctrine locates the CMO section in the rear command post during deployment. Thus positioned, it cannot fully analyze the impact of noncombatants on the operation and provide the commander and the operations officer with the civil-military operations estimate, which

Members of the U.S. Marine Corps check rosters for names of Haitian refugees coming in to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Photo by M.T. Huff

considers the commander's moral and legal obligations.

The CMO section must be located where it can better monitor the current situation and provide advice to the commander, the operations officer and the intelligence officer. The CMO staff officer can plan, coordinate and provide staff oversight of civil-military issues only through direct coordination with the unit operations officer, who is charged with planning and integrating the overall operational effort.

The current concept of battlefield operating systems provides a superb mission-analysis tool. It includes every aspect of what commanders may encounter on today's battlefield — except civilians. This omission only reinforces the fact that commanders rarely plan and prepare for civilians caught in the chaos of military operations.

If the Army is to seriously address those tasks directed by the Secretary of Defense's Civil Affairs directive, the following three actions must occur:

• Include Civil Affairs instruction in schools when teaching the other functions and responsibilities of command.

• Provide a capable CMO section to execute those duties required within the CA functions of command.

• Position the CMO staff officer in the main command post/TOC, where interface and exposure can occur, not only with current intelligence, situation, plans and situation reports, but also with the commander.

Conclusion

The challenges presented by noncombatants on the battlefield during military operations, both in war and military operations other than war, will remain.

The main command post is the most suitable place from which to monitor the current situation, review all incoming information, develop input for courses of action and maintain the civil-military operations estimate.

The Army needs to properly structure CMO sections at the corps and division levels and change doctrine to reflect that Civil Affairs is an operations function, not a sustainment function. These enhancements will allow commanders to exercise Civil Affairs as a true function of command.

Notes:

[1] Dislocated civilians.

[2] Civilians, displaced persons, refugees and others not openly carrying arms.

[3] Nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations.

[4] The four areas and means of waging conflict, similar to the instruments of national power, being political, economic, military and informational. Informational refers to the advantages gained by an adversary in capitalizing on available media outlets to present the struggle in a favorable light, while simultaneously seeking to discredit the opponent's activities, whether that opponent be an actual military force or simply the political situation within the area at the time U.S. forces participate in such activities.

[5] Per Annex L (Civil Affairs) of the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and the Secretary of Defense's Civil Affairs Directive, dated January 1994.

[6] Para 1-1, page 1-1, FM 101-5, dated 5 May 1984.

[7] CA planning is normally done in isolation, separate from operational planning. Typically, once courses of action have been identified and a concept has been drafted by the S-3/G-3/J-3, a distinct CMO/CA annex is prepared. The cycle remains that the operational concept is conceived, and then the S-5/G-5/J-3-CMO officer develops a plan to support the base plan and intent. USAJFKSWCS contends that integrating the S-5/G-5/J-3-CMO into the operational planning cell would aid in both planning and execution, particularly in military operations other than war.

Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force

by Lt. Col. James L. Dunn and Maj. Jon M. Custer

On the night of Sept. 18, 1994, nearly 100 U.S. Air Force C-141 and C-130 aircraft loaded with paratroopers and heavy-drop equipment were either in the air or preparing to take off from various bases in the United States. Numerous U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Army ships and support vessels were taking their designated positions in the Caribbean. U.S. Marine Corps personnel were boarding amphibious assault vessels or aircraft, and special-operations forces had been launched or were preparing to do so.

As part of Joint Task Force 180, all of these forces shared the same mission: Conduct a forcible entry into Haiti, establish a secure environment, and restore democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was waiting in exile in the United States. A few hours earlier, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps and commander of JTF 180, had received the execute order from U.S. Atlantic Com-

Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and of JTF 180, talks with Haitian military officials during Operation Uphold Democracy.

Photo by Joel Herard

mand, or USACOM, and was aboard the USS Mount Whitney en route to Haiti.

Through the various command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, and information, or C^4I^2, systems on the USS Mount Whitney, Shelton and his staff monitored the progress of JTF 180 and the late-breaking developments in Haiti. Knowing that H-Hour was only five hours away, JTF staff members followed the progress of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and retired Gen. Colin Powell, who were in Haiti's capital city, Port-au-Prince, conducting last-minute negotiations in an effort to solve the crisis without bloodshed. Soon the JTF received an abort message from USACOM — the American delegation and the Haitians had reached an agreement.

Upon the American delegation's departure from Haiti, JTF 180 received new guidance from USACOM: In the early hours of Sept. 19, Shelton and a symbolic force were to make an unopposed entry into Haiti, after which Shelton was to meet with Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras to discuss further JTF 180 deployments. As millions of Americans watched on television the next morning, Operation Uphold Democracy began to unfold.

Though it looked simple, the operation required months of intensive planning and coordination efforts which continued after the operation began. JTF 180's special-operations coordination element, or SOCOORD, played a small but important role in those efforts.

SOCOORD's Army role

The SOCOORD is a relatively new element in the Army, having been conceptualized at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, in the late 1980s. By 1992, a SOCOORD was established in each of the Army's active corps headquarters. Each SOCOORD includes four members: the chief, a Special Forces lieutenant colonel; the SF plans and operations officer, an SF major; the Ranger plans and operations officer, an Infantry captain or major with Ranger Regiment experience; and the SOCOORD sergeant major, an SF sergeant major. The SOCOORD works as a separate and distinct division within the corps G-3 staff.

The SOCOORD concept is simple: to integrate Army SOF, specifically SF and Rangers, into the Army's conventional operations. According to the *SOCOORD Handbook*, published by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the SOCOORD's specific mission is:

To act as the principal adviser to the corps commander and his staff concerning the capabilities and limitations of Army SF and Ranger units. The SOCOORD advises the corps G3 which corps course of action best allows for the optimal utilization of the capabilities of SF and Ranger units and develops target nominations and mission requirements for the corps to forward to the joint force commander (JFC) ,which will result in mission taskings appropriate for SF and Ranger units. If SF or Ranger units are attached or [under operational control] *to the corps (normally on a mission-by-mission basis),* [the SOCOORD will] *act as their focal point on the corps staff for coordination of support (administrative, logistical, or intelligence)* [those units] *will require from the corps and for synchronization of operations.*

Operation Uphold Democracy required months of intensive planning and coordination efforts. JTF 180's special-operations coordination element played a small but important role in those efforts.

The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD accomplishes its mission in numerous ways:

- Works in conjunction with the G-3 plans division to conduct periodic reviews of the corps' war plans and rewrites SOF annexes as required;
- Prepares a SOF estimate and writes a SOF annex for each operation or exercise of the corps;
- Coordinates with USASOC to ensure availability of SF and Ranger units for integration into corps- and division-level exercises;

• Coordinates with USASOC for the assignment of special-operations command-and-control elements, or SOCCEs, at corps or divisional headquarters;

• Serves as the SOCCE's focal point for coordination and integration within the corps staff;

• Participates as a member of the corps battle management cell to ensure optimal use of SF and Ranger units and synchronization with the corps' battlefield operating systems;

• Serves as a member of the corps assault command post;

• Deploys with the corps and establishes a SOCOORD/ SOCCE work site within the corps main command post in proximity to the fire-support element, the G-3 current operations section, and the G-3 plans division;

• Serves as a member of the corps deep operations coordination cell; and

• Attends and provides input for corps targeting board meetings.

How do these actions prepare the SOCOORD to work in a JTF headquarters? For Army personnel, a joint organization can appear complex: the presence of other service components and staff officers creates an unfamiliar environment. The Army emphasizes that its manuals on doctrine and on tactics, techniques and procedures be prepared in consistency with joint publications, but there are still differences that require an understanding of joint terminology, organization, command relationships and planning processes. Nevertheless, since special operations are by nature joint, and SOCOORD members normally have some experience in the joint arena, the SOCOORD is well-suited for the work on a JTF. The following discussion describes how the XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD integrated itself into JTF 180's staff and accomplished its missions.

Complex planning

On Jan. 8, 1994, USACOM, through U.S. Army Forces Command, tasked the XVIII Airborne Corps to begin compartmented development of OPLAN 2370 for a forcible entry into Haiti. The XVIII Airborne Corps, designated JTF 180 for this tasking, formed a small joint planning group, or JPG, with augmentation from various elements within the Department of Defense.

Initially, the XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD was only minimally involved in the development of the OPLAN because of the small size and compartmented nature of the JPG, and because the SOCOORD, not formally recognized in joint publications as part of a JTF, did not have a clearly delineated role at the joint level. The SOCOORD chief therefore attended the early planning sessions primarily to monitor the JPG's progress.

In coordination with USACOM, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, provided a small team of SOF planners to work on the JPG. The SOF planners received guidance from the JPG and worked with their units to develop special-operations concepts to support JTF 180. USACOM's J-34 (special operations) provided guidance through the SOF portions of USACOM's orders.

In the early stages of the planning process, USSOCOM designated a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, which included units from some of USSOCOM's components. The JSOTF's planners, conducting parallel planning in close cooperation with JTF 180's JPG, developed initial concepts for the employment of SOF in direct action, in foreign internal defense and in certain collateral activities. One of the subordinate task forces of the JSOTF was Task Force Raleigh. As the principal force provider for Task Force Raleigh, the 3rd Special Forces Group had its own planning cell that developed and refined the concept for the FID missions. The 3rd Group planning cell coordinated its work with the JSOTF and the JTF 180 planners.

JTF 180 SOCOORD

The expanding number and the multiple levels of SOF planning cells and the growing complexity of the OPLAN made clear that JTF 180 needed SOF planners who would answer directly to the JTF J-3. Such an arrangement would ensure that the JTF commander's guidance and missions for

Operation Uphold Democracy
A Summary of Key Events

- **Jan. 8, 1994:** XVIII Abn. Corps is designated JTF 180 for planning; begins compartmented planning for forcible entry (OPLAN 2370).
- **January-June 1994:** Initial planning and rehearsals; JTF 180 forces and JSOTF designated; OPLAN 2370 essentially completed; fine--tuning and coordination continue.
- **July 1, 1994:** USACOM directs planning for an unopposed entry; JTF 180 staff begins work on OPLAN 2380; staff-estimate process and rough draft of new OPLAN completed; refinements continue on OPLAN 2370.
- **July 29, 1994:** 10th Mountain Division is designated JTF 190 for planning and assumes planning responsibility for OPLAN 2380; JTF 180 staff focuses on refining OPLAN 2370.
- **Sept. 2, 1994:** USACOM directs JTF 180 to maintain OPLANs 2370 and 2380 while merging both into OPLAN 2375; JTF 180 leads planning process; new concept calls for forcible entry by JTF 180 with quick transition to JTF 190.
- **Sept. 10, 1994:** JTF 180 EOC begins 24-hour operations; JTF 180 staff begins crisis-action planning to continue development of OPLAN 2375.
- **Sept. 11, 1994:** JTF 180 staff begins 24-hour operations; continues refinements necessary to merge OPLANs 2370 and 2380 into OPLAN 2375; JTF 180 components involved in loading of equipment, deployment to JOA or ISBs, and final mission preparation.
- **Sept. 18, 1994:** JTF 180 command group and principal staff embark on USS Mount Whitney; components' forces in place to begin forcible entry; U.S. delegation in Port-au-Prince reaches agreement with Haitians; JTF 180 aborts forcible entry; USACOM provides new guidance.
- **Sept. 19, 1994:** Operation Uphold Democracy begins when JTF 180 commander and initial JTF 190 forces go ashore; OPCON of TF Raleigh/ARSOTF Haiti shifts from JSOTF to JTF 190.
- **Oct. 12, 1994:** Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras departs Haiti.
- **Oct. 15, 1994:** President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns to Haiti.
- **Oct. 24, 1994:** JTF 180 relinquishes control of JOA to JTF 190 at 2400 Zulu.
- **Oct. 25, 1994:** JTF 180 commander and staff redeploy to the U.S.

SOF would be "protected"; that boundaries, linkup plans and other control measures between SOF and the 82nd Airborne Division in central and southern Haiti were clear and fully coordinated; and that the interaction between SOF and the special Marine air-ground task force, or SPMAGTF, in northern Haiti was fully coordinated.

Though it is not addressed in joint publications, the SOCOORD was the perfect element to perform such functions. Accordingly, the SOCOORD's SF plans and operations officer took on a full-time planning and coordinating role in May. His primary contacts were at the JSOTF; however, this officer worked closely with all the key planning cells. At the JPG, he continually reviewed the JTF's developing plan, integrated input from the various special-operations planners, and developed two key appendices for the JTF's OPLAN 2370: Appendix 5 (Special Operations) and Appendix 21 (Linkups) to Annex C (Operations). Over the next few months, key-leader rehearsals and continuing coordination allowed the SF plans and operations officer to develop updated versions of both appendices.

Parallel plans

As long as planning efforts were compartmented, the other SOCOORD members were not involved in the planning process. On July 1, however, new guidance from USACOM revised the focus of the planning effort: Develop a plan for an *unopposed* entry into Haiti (OPLAN 2380), while continuing to refine OPLAN 2370. A key assumption in OPLAN 2380 was that political developments, negotiations and United Nations political pressure would cause the de facto Haitian leadership to leave the island, opening the way for Aristide to

"invite" U.S. military intervention; or that the de facto leadership, sensing the futility of its actions, would itself open the door for such an unopposed intervention. The new plan would not be compartmented, so more planners could be involved.

Although the 82nd Airborne Division was the principal Army force for OPLAN 2370, the 10th Mountain Division took on the role under OPLAN 2380 (the SPMAGTF's basic role would not change). The unopposed nature of OPLAN 2380 also negated the need for SOF DA missions envisioned under the forcible-entry option.

On July 5, the new SOCOORD chief began reviewing and supervising the SOCOORD planning efforts. As the former executive officer for the 3rd SF Group, he was already familiar with the concepts of operation for the 3rd Group and the JSOTF under OPLAN 2370.

A key assumption in OPLAN 2380 was that political developments, negotiations and United Nations political pressure would cause the de facto Haitian leadership to leave the island, opening the way for Aristide to 'invite' U.S. military intervention.

Since overall planning now involved the parallel development of two separate OPLANs, the SOCOORD chief had the SF plans and operations officer continue to work primarily on OPLAN 2370 while the Ranger plans and operations officer and the SOCOORD sergeant major worked on OPLAN 2380. The SOCOORD's normal business also continued as the corps staff began to focus on the upcoming Corps Warfighter exercise (part of the Battle Command Training Program, or BCTP) scheduled for December 1994.

JTF 190

As work progressed on OPLAN 2380, no one knew whether the unopposed-entry option would be feasible. Indications from Haiti in July were that the de facto government appeared to be more entrenched and hostile than ever, and JTF 180's staff felt it should put a more intensive effort into OPLAN 2370, since the forcible-entry plan was more complex and required fine-tuning of countless details. Therefore, with many key members of the corps staff involved in both OPLAN working groups, and with preparation for the Corps Warfighter still ahead, Shelton recommended to FORSCOM and USACOM that the 10th Mountain Division, as JTF 190, assume responsibility for the planning of OPLAN 2380. The recommendation was approved, and on July 29, JTF 180 transferred OPLAN 2380 to JTF 190's planners.

Since JTF 190 was based on an Army division and not a corps, it had no SOCOORD. But OPLAN 2380 involved extensive SOF roles, and JTF 190's staff needed dedicated SOF planners. JTF 180's SOCOORD was committed to OPLAN 2370 and to the preparation for Corps Warfighter. Therefore, during the SOF portion of the hand-off briefs to JTF 190's planners, the XVIII Corps SOCOORD recommended that JTF 190 seek long-term augmentation from USACOM's Special Operations Command-Atlantic, or SOCLANT, and USSOCOM. The SOCOORD also offered to send one or two of its members to the 10th Division headquarters at Fort Drum as a short-term fix.

Because of the 3rd SF Group's extensive FID role in OPLAN 2380, JTF 190 opted to accept 3rd Group's offer to provide a temporary planning team. This solution worked in the short term, but it left the JTF with no long-term dedicated SOF planning and coordination cell. A full-time cell could assist with initial planning and deploy with the JTF to continue working on SOF issues.

Third OPLAN

As the political and economic situations in Haiti worsened, USACOM provided new OPLAN guidance on Sept. 2: Continue to refine OPLANs 2370 and 2380, while merging them into a third OPLAN that would envision a forcible entry by JTF 180, quickly followed by

the deployment of, and the transition to, JTF 190. JTF 180's staff called this new version OPLAN 2375.

In conjunction with the JTF 180 staff, the SOCOORD reviewed OPLANs 2370 and 2380 in an effort to bridge gaps between the two. The most significant challenge was to ensure that SOF command-and-control channels remained clear during and after the transition between JTF 180 and JTF 190. In preparing OPLAN 2375's synchronization matrix, the SOCOORD set a relatively firm schedule for the transfer of operational control of TF Raleigh from the JSOTF to JTF 190 on or about D+4, after which TF Raleigh would become Army Special Operations Task Force Haiti, or ARSOTF Haiti.

On Sept. 8, after receiving guidance from USACOM, JTF 180 activated its emergency operations center and placed its personnel on a four-hour recall. Because the synchronization matrix included numerous time-sensitive actions (including force deployments) that had to be accomplished, the EOC began 24-hour operations Sept. 10.

In the meantime, the JTF battle-management cell, directed by the J-5, began daily sessions to complete OPLAN 2375. SOCOORD members participated in all these sessions, which produced a warning order and the completed synchronization matrix.

On Sept. 11 (D-9), the JTF 180 staff began 24-hour operations in the corps' battle-simulation center. The JSOTF team of liaison officers collocated with the SOCOORD the same day. Additional joint augmentees and numerous teams of LNOs arrived during the next few days.

During the next week, the SOCOORD and the JSOTF LNO team participated in the JTF staff's crisis-action planning. Once the JTF's components began their final preparations and the forces began deploying to their designated maritime locations and intermediate staging bases, the bridging between OPLANs 2370 and 2380 was essentially complete.

The SOCOORD monitored the progress of SOF deployments and conducted final reviews and the coordination of critical issues that could affect the operation. For example, the SOCOORD reviewed the boundaries between SOF and the other JTF forces to ensure complete understanding by all parties; it confirmed linkup procedures through discussions with the 82nd Airborne Division staff and the JSOTF LNOs; and it updated the final changes to execution checklists.

Additionally, the SOCOORD and the JSOTF LNOs, in conjunction with the J-3 chief of operations, prepared for their deployment with the JTF staff. Working under the assumption that the JTF 180 commander would embark on D-1 aboard the USS Mount Whitney, the SOCOORD agreed that its chief should do the same. The SOCOORD further agreed that the JSOTF LNO currently with the JTF staff would jump with the JTF's assault command post on D-Day, and that the SOCOORD's SF and Ranger plans and operations officers would airland with the JTF main CP on both D-Day and D+1. The SOCOORD sergeant major would remain at Fort Bragg with the JTF rear CP; he would be joined by a one-man JSOTF LNO and an augmentation officer from the Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, in order to maintain 24-hour operations.

During this period, USACOM pushed the countdown ahead one day. Consequently, Sept. 15 became D-4. Having completed all coordination, the JTF staff began the final stages of its own deployment on Sept. 18 (now D-1). The SOCOORD chief embarked on the USS Mount Whitney, and the SF and Ranger plans and operations officers prepared for their own deployments.

By 1700 Zulu on D-1, the JTF's command group and principal staff, the LNO teams, the Navy forces staff, and the joint rescue coordination center were aboard the USS Mount Whitney, which was steaming toward its designated position near Port-au-Prince. It would arrive in position around H-

Hour, D-Day, designated as 0400 Zulu, Sept. 19.

Fourth plan

After receiving the abort message and new guidance from USACOM, JTF 180's staff realized it had less than 12 hours to execute a variation of the three OPLANs. The JTF was no longer conducting a forcible entry into a hostile environment, but it could not assume entry into a permissive environment. Accordingly, the staff recommended and received approval for an unopposed entry into an uncertain environment, with JTF 190 as the main effort. The staff called this the 2380(+) option, since it involved more aspects of OPLAN 2380 than of the other two OPLANs.

Within the special-operations realm, the JTF needed to involve SOF in the new plan as quickly as possible, since TF Raleigh's primary role was to establish security in the outlying areas of the country through its presence and through close contact with and monitoring of the Haitian military. Transfer of the operational control of TF Raleigh from the JSOTF to JTF 190 was scheduled for D+4, after which TF Raleigh would become the Army Special Operations Task Force. However, JTF 180 decided to transfer TF Raleigh's operational control on D-Day, after JTF 190 had established initial security positions in the Port-au-Prince area. The JSOTF would retain responsibility for the ARSOTF's insertions into Haiti.

The early transfer of control caused gaps in the information flow for the following reasons:

• JTF 190 did not have a SOCOORD or a special-operations cell that could monitor and plan for ARSOTF Haiti's operations.

• During the first few days, JTF 190 focused on its buildup of conventional forces and on the establishment of a secure environment in the Port-au-Prince area. It was not prepared to monitor or influence efforts to expand into the outlying areas.

• ARSOTF Haiti had a significant LNO package with the JSOTF, ensuring an effective command, control and communications link; it had no similar arrangement with JTF 190. By D+1, the ARSOTF did have a one-man LNO at JTF 190, but a one-man shop cannot conduct 24-hour operations.

• JTF 180's SOCOORD chief was a one-man SOCOORD who was aboard the USS Mount Whitney.

Plan execution

Commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard Potter, ARSOTF Haiti began its initial insertions into the Port-au-Prince area on D+1, followed by subsequent insertions into a few of the outlying areas on D+2 and D+5. JTF 180, however, did not have a clear report of the ARSOTF's progress.

The SOCOORD chief worked closely with the JSOTF LNO over the next few days to follow ARSOTF Haiti's progress. The two worked through ARSOTF Haiti's LNOs at the JSOTF headquarters to establish indirect communications with the ARSOTF. During the same period, JTF 180's J-3 repeatedly emphasized to JTF 190's J-3 the importance of monitoring and reporting ARSOTF Haiti's progress. By D+1, the SOCOORD chief had also established limited communications with the ARSOTF's one-man LNO at JTF 190; however, this communications link remained sporadic and generally unusable until D+6.

After JTF 180's assault and main CPs arrived in Haiti on D+1 and D+2, their personnel (along with the SOCOORD's SF and Ranger plans and operations officers) assisted JTF 190 in establishing barracks and staff worksites near the airfield in Port-au-Prince. Most of the JTF 180 command-post personnel who had been ashore were redeployed to the U.S. by D+4; the two SOCOORD officers were among them.

On Sept. 24 (D+5), the SOCOORD chief went ashore for 24 hours to visit the ARSOTF Haiti staff and its LNO at JTF 190. They discussed methods for improving the information flow and clarified questions concerning the JTF 180 commander's intent for SOF. Convinced that the problems concerning the information

Photo by Brian Gavin

Brig. Gen. Richard Potter meets with the Haitian base commander in Port-au-Prince. Potter, the commander of ARSOTF Haiti, was in constant coordination with the senior Haitian military staff.

flow had been resolved, the SOCOORD chief returned to the USS Mount Whitney on Sept. 25.

Potter, supporting efforts to expand outward as quickly as the security situation allowed, was aggressively involved in daily meetings and constant coordination with the senior Haitian military staff. Shelton met with Cedras each morning, and Potter met with Cedras' principal staff members each afternoon to make sure they understood what they had to accomplish to improve the security posture.

Meanwhile, the ARSOTF staff was planning and issuing orders for an aggressive expansion. Special Forces forward operating bases, B-detachments and A-detachments, accompanied by Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations specialists, would move into more than 20 towns countrywide.

Over the next few weeks, JTF 180 continued its on-shore buildup of conventional forces and SOF. With an improved information flow, the SOCOORD closely monitored ARSOTF Haiti's expansion, contacts with military and civic leaders in the outlying areas, and efforts to restore basic services to the populace. Working closely with the J-5 and the JSOTF LNO, and coordinating with ARSOTF Haiti's LNO at JTF 190, the SOCOORD also continued to review the developing JTF 180 taskings in order to coordinate SOF operations with those of other forces. The SOCOORD chief came ashore three more times to keep coordination channels open with the ARSOTF and its LNO at JTF 190.

During the same period, the SOCOORD worked on or monitored several other issues related to ARSOTF Haiti. Periodic coordination with the joint-force fires coordinator helped ensure that the ARSOTF had support from AC-130 gunships during insertions. Discussions with the JTF engineer helped ensure that the JTF efforts to provide power to outlying areas complemented the ARSOTF's similar efforts. The SOCOORD worked in conjunction with the J-4 to monitor and recommend changes to the time-phased force deployment data as it related to ARSOTF Haiti's deployments. Finally, the SOCOORD initiated coordination with the J-6 to identify conventional communications support, such as mobile subscriber equipment, for the ARSOTF.

After the establishment of the interim

public-security force, and with the departure of Cedras on Oct. 12 and the return of Aristide on Oct. 15, JTF 180 prepared to transition control of the joint operations area, or JOA, to JTF 190. The SOCOORD made a series of final checks with the JSOTF LNOs and ARSOTF Haiti's LNO at JTF 190 to ensure a seamless hand-off of any working SOF issues.

At 2400 Zulu on Oct. 24, 1994 (D+35), JTF 180 relinquished control of the JOA to JTF 190. The following day, Shelton and his staff, having completed their missions in Operation Uphold Democracy, returned to the U.S.

Lessons learned

The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD learned the following lessons in preparing for and conducting Operation Uphold Democracy:

• To ensure that the joint-force commander has the information necessary for timely decision-making, SOF must establish and maintain well-understood, flexible and responsive command-and-control

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide salutes Haitian troops in Port-au-Prince during his return to Haiti Oct. 15, 1994. Ten days later, the commander and the staff of JTF 180 returned to the U.S.

Photo by Alejandro Cabello

relationships. Before transferring operational or tactical control of significant forces, such as an ARSOTF, we should ensure that the receiving headquarters is prepared to provide command and control and to handle monitoring and reporting requirements.

• By not clearly identifying the need for SOF-specific planners on a JTF staff, joint doctrine leaves room for oversights in the planning process. Because JTF 180 was based on an Army corps, it had a SOCOORD. JTF 190, on the other hand, never had full-time SOF planning and coordination support. Using SOF planners or LNOs from a JTF's subordinate special-operations units is an option, but it does not give the JTF its own SOF planning staff. SOF planners who are part of the JTF staff will have the JTF commander's guidance in mind as they prepare the JTF's SOF annex and work SOF issues; planners from a subordinate unit will probably have their own commander's guidance in mind. During Operation Uphold Democracy, the various planning staffs worked well together, but JTF 190 could have profited from having its own SOF planners.

• The SOCOORD can make significant contributions to SOF planning and coordination if it is involved early on. From the start, it should aggressively pursue involvement in the planning process of any operation that anticipates a need for SOF.

• With only four men, a SOCOORD is hard-pressed to support 24-hour operations at more than one location. During a critical period at the beginning of Operation Uphold Democracy, the SOCOORD's four men were at three different locations. Throughout JTF 180's involvement, the SOCOORD chief was the only SOCOORD representative aboard the USS Mount Whitney because of the ship's berthing limits. This shortage of personnel was a particular problem during the first week, when the major SOF transitions occurred. The JSOTF LNOs aboard the USS Mount Whitney and those ashore in Port-au-Prince provided excellent communications and coordination assistance, and USASFC provided augmentation for JTF 180's SOCOORD at the rear CP at Fort Bragg. Nevertheless, the SOCOORD was stretched thin. For future operations that might involve staggered deployments or the need for multiple headquarters locations with SOCOORD support, the SOCOORD will need augmentation, and it should strive to have at least two men at any one location.

• Close cooperation between the SOCOORD, the JSOTF and the ARSOTF proved beneficial. To foster such cooperation, SOCOORD members must develop effective working relationships with the JTF's subordinate special-operations units. Its members must understand the SOF supporting plans, and they must work closely and effectively with the SOF LNOs. By fostering cooperation, SOCOORD members open doors to the sharing of ideas and to a mutual understanding of perspectives.

• Nothing is more effective than face-to-face contact for coordination and information flow. During the planning process, SOCOORD's daily meetings with JSOTF and 3rd Group planners proved invaluable. During the operation, the SOCOORD chief was able to exchange more information in each of his short visits ashore than in any other two or three days on the ship.

• SOCOORDs are well-suited to work in the JTF environment. Though their contributions may be small compared to the overall size of the operation, they provide an important service in planning, coordinating and monitoring special operations.

Unanswered questions

Integration of the SOCOORD into the JTF 180 staff went smoothly because of the SOCOORD's daily working relationship with the corps staff. The corps staff understood the SOCOORD and knew how it fit into the staff processes. As the XVIII Airborne Corps staff transitioned into the JTF 180 staff, the SOCOORD performed its normal functions.

But some questions remain. With the steadily growing emphasis on joint operations, and with the proven value of SOCOORDs at Army corps level, shouldn't joint doctrine and publications address SOCO-

ORD-like functions and responsibilities at the JTF level? If not, who conducts SOF planning and coordination for a JTF headquarters not formed from an Army corps headquarters? Who takes on that role for a JTF formed by a Marine Expeditionary Force or by an Army division? Finally, if we recognize the need for a SOCOORD at the JTF level, how should it be manned in order to integrate joint SOF with other operations?

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*; Joint Pub 3-05.3, *Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures*; and Joint Pub 3-05.5, *Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures*, describe at length the planning roles of theater special-operations commands, joint-force special-operations component commands, and special-operations mission-planning agents. All three publications emphasize the importance of the planning performed by those who will execute the mission. Joint Pub 3-05.3 also details the planning procedures and responsibilities at the theater level while stressing the importance of LNOs in resolving any conflict between special operations and other joint-force operations.

With the steadily growing emphasis on joint operations, and with the proven value of SOCOORDs at Army corps level, shouldn't joint doctrine and publications address SOCOORD-like functions and responsibilities at the JTF level?

None of the publications clearly address the preparation and the coordination of the SOF portions of a JTF's OPLAN. Undoubtedly, the joint-force special-operations component command for a JTF must provide input for the JTF's plan, but should its staff prepare the SOF portions of the JTF's overall plan? They have to prepare their own supporting plan. LNOs, who usually arrive just prior to the execution of an operation, could assist with the coordination of SOF issues, and they could assist with SOF planning, but the deliberate planning conducted prior to the operation would probably be beyond the scope of the LNO. Wouldn't the JTF J-3 be better served by a SOF planning and coordination cell that works for him and can prepare the SOF portions of the JTF plan as well as coordinate SOF issues with the JFSOCC LNOs/staff and the JTF's other component staffs?

Though joint doctrine does not address the need for a SOCOORD-like cell at the JTF level, the experiences in Operation Uphold Democracy justify its existence. The SOCOORD's role during the planning and execution was comparatively small, but it was important. The SOCOORD wrote two appendices for OPLAN 2370 and one for OPLAN 2380, and it contributed to the development of both the warning order and the synchronization matrix for OPLAN 2375. It contributed to the development of OPLAN 2380(+) and continually coordinated JTF-level issues related to ARSOTF Haiti. If the SOCOORD had not performed these functions, who would have?

USSOCOM, as the unified command for all SOF, is in a unique position to influence joint doctrine and publications as they relate to special operations. The command's Joint Special Operations Forces Institute should review the issue of JTF SOCOORDs to determine if, how and where SOCOORDs should be addressed, what their sources should be (e.g., USSOCOM's components, theater SOCs, etc.), and how they should be organized for various types of JTF missions. The JSOFI is reviewing Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*; and Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. As it conducts these reviews, it may be able to determine how SOCOORD-like functions should be addressed at the JTF level.

The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD is taking steps to begin addressing these issues. In an attempt to help standardize some elements of the JTF staff processes, the corps is working with USACOM to develop JTF standing operating procedures. The SOCOORD is contributing to that effort in several ways:

First, it developed a proposed manning document for a joint SOCOORD. In addition to the four positions currently in Army SOCOORDs, the document adds a Naval special warfare plans and operations NCO, a Ranger plans and operations NCO, and an SF plans and operations NCO. The document places the three plans and operations NCOs in augmentation positions. These positions could be activated depending upon the type of joint SOF involved in the JTF's concept of operations.

Second, the SOCOORD requested and received permission to include a SOF annex in the JTF SOP. The completed annex includes a brief list of references, sections on the characteristics of special operations, the mission and the battle tasks of the Joint SOCOORD, duty descriptions of SOCOORD personnel, and brief descriptions of the joint special-operations targeting and mission-planning processes.

Third, as part of an XVIII Airborne Corps effort, the SOCOORD reviewed the first draft of the Joint Task Force Headquarters Mission Training Plan, a proposed joint publication being developed by USACOM for the Joint Staff. This document, similar to the Army's mission training plans, should provide effective guidance for the training, planning and operations of JTF staffs. The review focused on clarifying and highlighting JTF staff responsibilities with respect to SOF. In every case, the responsibilities could be performed by a robust SOCOORD. The draft document did not make clear whose responsibilities they would be in the absence of a JTF SOCOORD.

Fourth, the SOCOORD is rewriting the XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD SOP to incorporate lessons learned from Operation Uphold Democracy and joint-exercises. The purpose of the rewrite is to ensure that procedures are in place to provide the XVIII Airborne Corps with effective SOCOORD support, whether the corps operates as an Army corps or as a JTF.

Operation Uphold Democracy has been successful in its efforts to restore stability and democracy to Haiti. SOF's "quiet professionals," with their unique skills, have played major roles in the operation's successes. The XVIII Airborne Corps' SOCOORD made comparatively small contributions to the overall operation, but its planning, coordination and monitoring efforts were important at the JTF staff level. By realizing that SOCOORDs have a valid and required role in joint operations, incorporating that requirement into joint doctrine, and putting that doctrine into practice, we can help ensure that future JTFs are prepared to integrate SOF more effectively and more efficiently into their operations.

Lt. Col. James L. Dunn is the SOCOORD chief for the XVIII Airborne Corps. In previous assignments, he commanded an SF detachment and a company in the 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; served as a security-assistance staff officer in the African Security Assistance Division of J-4 at Headquarters, U.S. European Command; served in the JFK Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group as commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, and as executive officer for the 3rd Battalion; and served as the executive officer for the 3rd SF Group. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff Officer Course.

Maj. Jon M. Custer is the SOCOORD Special Forces plans and operations officer for the XVIII Airborne Corps. In previous assignments, he commanded several SF detachments and Company A in the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. He served as the civil defense adviser in El Salvador, commanded an SF detachment in Operation Just Cause and served as an SF battalion staff officer during Operation Desert Storm. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff Officer Course and the Army War College Defense Strategy Course.

As I Remember It: Delegation and Decentralization

by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

There is an urgent need in special-operations forces today for leaders with the ability to think and act decisively under the pressures and the complexities of the post-Cold War era.

Only one philosophy adequately describes the organizational requirement of the current operational environment: decentralization. Decentralization requires the confidence that one's associates serving in decentralized positions will have the capacity to make sound decisions in the majority of cases.

Military organizations have traditionally been more left-brained and more authoritarian than civilian corporations or comparable government agencies. This lingering authoritarianism dies hard — one of its invidious legacies is a refusal to delegate and decentralize authority to subordinate levels.

Such confidence starts at the senior level. Decentralization cannot work when responsibility is exacted of the subordinate but the authority to decide has been withheld. When this occurs, the senior commander is at fault, for he has not made a genuine delegation of authority. He shows a lack of confidence by withholding part of the resources that the subordinate needs to get the job done, yet he expects the subordinate to carry out the assigned mission. The senior may pay lip service to an abstraction called "delegation," but when the chips are down, he shows that he does not trust his subordinates.

Some claim that this is one of the penalties of a narrow span of control that seeks to ensure that each "i" is dotted and each "t" is crossed. Others assert that although every military person subscribes to the principle of delegation and decentralization, in practice it is diluted because we are products of our own experiences. Accustomed to being closely supervised throughout our careers, we find it difficult to refrain from looking over a subordinate's shoulder. As years pass, the habit becomes ingrained. When we finally reach the higher echelons, we behave in the pattern we have developed.

At a recent dinner party I was exposed to another possible explanation of this behavior. My dinner partner was a neurologist from Canada. During the course of the meal, he explained to me that the brain is divided into two equal parts — the right and left hemispheres. Each part has unique functions.

The left hemisphere manages language functions and does the linear, analytical deductive thinking. The right hemisphere handles spatial-perceptual matters. It sees

the big picture and engages in integrative, creative thinking.

One can assume that an evenly balanced individual uses the left hemisphere to logically organize step-by-step procedures and to express himself coherently. He uses the right hemisphere to take the overview necessary to understand the meaning of the left-brain details and their relationship to one another. This kind of individual would more readily accept delegation and decentralization.

What happens, however, when one side dominates? It would be reasonable to conclude that a right-hemisphere-dominated person, when confronted with a problem requiring analysis of detail, would either deal in broad generalizations or ignore the details and jump to conclusions impulsively.

A left-hemisphere-dominated person would deal in details and analysis, compulsively making rules and regulations but never seeing the whole picture. He would be immersed in the "process" and never see or understand the meaning of his activity in a larger context. This kind of person would tend to be authoritarian and prefer a centralized organizational environment.

In other words, our approach to problems is preordained; it is all in the head. Training and education have only a limited impact.

One could argue that I rushed to judgment and drew the above conclusion unscientifically. However, the dinner only lasted several hours, and with my left-hemisphere-dominated thinking, that was the best I could do .

The bottom line is that military organizations have traditionally been more left-brained and more authoritarian than civilian corporations or comparable government agencies. This lingering authoritarianism dies hard — one of its invidious legacies is a refusal to delegate and decentralize authority to subordinate levels.

Commanders must recognize that oversupervision will disappear only when those closest to the scene of the action make the operating decisions. This means that staffs must be reduced in size and improved in quality to the point that they can fulfill their proper roles of giving advice and counsel to the commander instead of concerning themselves with the review and approval of operating decisions.

Of course we recognize that neither centralization nor decentralization should be allowed to go too far: an equilibrium is always necessary. Unfortunately, until such time as this equilibrium can be found, the superior's eraser will wear out before his pencil is used up, and it will be the subordinate who develops an ulcer or has a coronary.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow's commissioned service spanned more than 30 years, during which he served as either a commander or a staff officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airmobile, airborne, and Special Forces units. He served as commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, of the Army Special Forces Command and of U.S. Army-Berlin. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska and a master's degree from Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from the Army in August 1994.

The Origin of the Crossed-Arrows Insignia

by Lt. Col. Charles King

Officers and NCOs who wear the crossed-arrows insignia of Special Forces are members of the Army's newest branch, but the crossed arrows themselves have a history that dates back more than 100 years.

Of the first soldiers to wear the crossed arrows, their theater commander said: "Being armed, mounted, supplied, and backed by troops, they cheerfully lead the way into the middle of their enemies. In the late expedition they have done most of the fighting and killing. They have also proven themselves very efficient when acting alone."

The speaker was Gen. Fredrick Steele, commanding general of the Department of the Columbia. The year was 1867, and Steele was describing the Indian members of the Regular Army, or as they were colloquially known, the Indian Scouts.

Indian Scouts

By act of Congress, as implemented by General Order 56 of 1866, 1,000 Native Americans were authorized to be recruited into the Regular Army. Their recruitment was supported by such military leaders of the day as Steele, William T. Sherman, George Crook and Henry Halleck.[1] Although the recruitment of Native Americans was never as extensive as Congress had envisioned, it was a significant force multiplier throughout the Indian Wars of the next 30 years.[2]

The Indian Scouts had four functions: to serve as guides and intelligence-gatherers, to keep order on the reservations, to reinforce military government and to fight. Recruited primarily from Pawnee, Navajo and Seminole tribes, they were employed extensively throughout the west. Maj. Gen. George Crook, perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency fighter of his time, owed his success in capturing Geronimo to his Indian Scouts.[3]

These Indian Scouts were neither auxiliaries nor civilian scouts of the Quartermaster Department; they were duly enlisted members of the military establishment. As such they wore the U.S. Army uniform, were bound by military discipline, and could and did receive military awards — 15 Scouts received the Medal of Honor between 1869 and 1890.[4] No Native Americans ever became officers, however, because of the significant cultural and linguistic barriers that they would have had to cross and because of the racial prejudices of the time.

Recommended by supporters as a means of assimilating the Indian population, the recruitment of Indian Scouts was not warmly greeted by all. Some of the field commanders, specifically Gen. Philip Sheridan, opposed it on the grounds that it was counter to the perceived aims of the Indian campaign, which were subjugation and annihilation, not assimilation.[5] This

resistance precluded the Indian Scouts from ever becoming full strength.[6]

U.S. Scouts

Nonetheless, the idea of Native Americans in the Army persisted. In 1889, Gen. John Schofield, then commanding general of the Army, attempted to institutionalize the Indians within the Army force structure. He added a Scout company, which was to be manned by Indian Scout soldiers and NCOs and led by white officers, to most of the regiments. Army Circular 10 of 1890 laid out detailed uniform and insignia specifications, which included the crossed arrows on lapels, campaign hats and guidons. This was the first official recognition of the crossed-arrows insignia. General Order 28 of 1891 directed that the "L" troop of each cavalry regiment and the "I" company of each infantry regiment be made up of Native Americans to be known officially as U.S. Scouts.

As with the less formally organized Indian Scouts, the U.S. Scouts were never manned anywhere near their authorized levels because of resistance from the field. Various reasons are put forward for this resistance, ranging from the language barrier, to the desire to imitate continental and more conventional armies, to racial prejudice. In any event, the numbers of U.S. Scouts remained small. According to one source, fewer than 200 were ever on active duty at one time.[7]

The last combat seen by the organized U.S. Scouts was with Gen. John J. Pershing in Mexico.[8] During the early 20th century the scouts led a quiet existence on Army posts across the West. On Nov. 30, 1943, the last U.S. Scout detachment was disbanded at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The last three Indian Scouts were retired in 1947.

New requirement

As the Scout units were being disbanded, a new requirement was being raised: In response to the need for an unconventional-warfare force during World War II, the U.S. and Canada established a combined commando force known as the First Special Service Force. In July of 1942, this unit asked the War Department for permission to wear the insignia of the "Indian Scouts ... inasmuch as the entire motif of this force has been set up along Indian lines."[9]

Photo courtesy Nebraska State Historical Society

A member of the U.S. Scouts wears the early crossed-arrows insignia.

By August 1942 the crossed arrows were approved for wear by the officers and men of the force — both U.S. and Canadian. Myth has it that several members of the force made a trip to Fort Huachuca to ask the surviving Indian Scouts for their permission. Whether or not this actually happened, it is certain that the force requested to wear the crossed arrows because they had been the insignia of the Indian Scouts.

Although the First Special Service Force was deactivated in the fall of 1944 after a brief but illustrious life, the arrows lived on. In Canada, they survive as the

insignia worn by the pipes and drums of the First Special Service Force at Canadian Forces Base, Pettawawa. In the U.S. Army, the arrows were revived in 1952 when Col. Aaron Bank activated the first Special Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group, whose guidons and colors bore the crossed arrows.

SF insignia

For the next 30 years, the crossed arrows were unofficially recognized as the insignia of Special Forces, but they were present in its heraldry only on the colors. As the argument for a separate Special Forces combat arm gained support, so did the status of the arrows. In July 1984, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the wearing of the crossed arrows by enlisted members of Special Forces, in recognition of the establishment of a distinct NCO career-management field, CMF 18.[10] In 1986, following the re-establishment of the First Special Forces as a regiment within the Army regimental system, officers affiliated with the regiment who were serving in Special Forces billets were allowed to wear the insignia.[11] Finally, on April 9, 1987, the Secretary of the Army approved the establishment of a new combat arm — the Special Forces Branch.

The insignia that was first worn in combat by the Indian Scouts, then worn by the soldiers of the First Special Service Force, and worn unofficially by the officers and men of Special Forces since its inception, was approved as the insignia of the Army Special Forces Branch on May 22, 1987.[12]

The war-fighting role of Special Forces in today's Army is not dissimilar to the role played by the Indian Scouts. We still grapple with the intellectual and physical tasks necessary for overcoming insurgencies and small wars. The Indian Scouts were an unconventional solution to unconventional problems, as was the Devil's Brigade, as is Special Forces. The unsettled relationship that existed between the Indian Scouts, their supporters and the Army establishment was not altogether different from that which existed between Special Forces and the rest of the Army.

One of the goals of today's Special Forces community is to become better integrated into the mainstream Army, both doctrinally and professionally. Although much has been accomplished toward that goal, much remains. Understanding the lineage of Special Forces, as embodied in its insignia, will assist soldiers in understanding that Special Forces has a legitimate history and tradition as a part of the Regular Army.

Lt. Col. Charles King is commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous Special Forces assignments include the 10th SF Group, where he served as a company commander, an operations officer and the group executive officer; the 5th SF Group, where he served as a detachment commander; and the Special Forces Branch, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, where he served as a branch assignments officer.

Notes:

[1] Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy 1865-1903* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 128.

[2] *Ibid*., p 140.

[3] Fairfax Downey and Jacques N. Jacobsen, *The Red-Bluecoats* (Fort Collins, Colo.: The Old Army Press, 1973), p. 104.

[4] *The Congressional Medal of Honor* (Forest Ranch, Calif.: Sharp and Dunnigan, 1984).

[5] Wooster, p. 51.

[6] Wooster, pp. 35, 128.

[7] Edward M.Coffman, *The Old Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 259.

[8] Downey, p. 155.

[9] Memo, HQ FSSF, Subject: Request for Authorization of Insignia, 26 July 1942.

[10] Memo, DCSPER, Subject: Collar Insignia for CMF 18, 26 June 1984.

[11] Memo, CG, USAJFKSWCS, Subject: Request for Wear of Crossed Arrow Insignia, 15 September 1986.

[12] Memo, CG, USAJFKSWCS, 2nd End, Subject: Request for Wear of Crossed Arrows, 22 May 1987.

Letters

SF soldiers provided stability to Haitians

The following letter was written to the commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command by a missionary in Haiti. — Editor

I am writing you concerning the men of (ODA 363) C Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, who were stationed in Leogonne, Haiti, until late February. They came to our community during a very uncertain period just following the peaceful intervention in October. They gave to us, the missionaries, and to the local Haitian people, a sense of security and stability at a time when Haiti had no law enforcement to speak of.

The reason I am personally writing is to share with you the superb conduct these men exemplified to all while they were here. Their ability to be firm and compassionate portrayed Americans well. It was my pleasure to be around these men and watch the reaction of the local citizens.

After the devastating hurricane, it was these men and the missionaries who came to the rescue of many people. The Haitian government still has done little to aid these desperately poor people. Actually, this government seems to be in worse shape now than before. The future looks dim.

I had never before been around the U.S. military, so I only had preconceived ideas of their behavior. How pleasantly surprised I was to find such courteous and helpful men! Please relay to them just what a void they left here. I commend you for any role you may have had in their training. May God bless you and them and America!

Kathy Land
Christianville Foundation, Inc.
Port-au-Prince, Haiti

SF needs warfighting emphasis

During my time in Special Forces, I have seen a new orientation of thought and action that concerns me. This concern is the shift from SF being a warfighting unit to becoming a Civil Affairs component.

Each issue of *Special Warfare* testifies to the fact that we are ever evolving into a weapon-toting Peace Corps. The thoughts expressed in the magazine the majority of the time are not combat-oriented articles. We attach new names that mask our true mission, such as an unconventional operations or unconventional warfare, to a mission that consists of handing out food. Feeding Kurds or feeding Haitians is a CA mission. This is not our primary mission, as FM 31-20 clearly states.

It is our actions that speak louder than our words. When we spend six months vegetating in a town in Haiti, years going in and out of Turkey, or wasting away in a camp in Panama or Guantanamo, our combat skills are diminishing at an incredible rate, and they cannot be retrieved at a moment's notice. Our students in the SF Qualification Course are already being taught the new direction. With two or three days remaining at the end of Robin Sage, they now pack it in and go cut wood or paint fences. Running another patrol would be more appropriate.

A captain comes to Special Forces with certain combat skills: He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and often Ranger-qualified and from a combat-arms branch. In addition to those skills, he must ultimately be capable of maneuvering a battalion. But what about the SF warrant officer? Should not the warrant officer, who must be ready to take command of an ODA, possess the same warfighting capabilities as the captain? These are the actions that depict our new direction.

My ODA, as with most in Special Forces, is made up mostly of soldiers from Infantry and other combat-arms MOSs who came to this unit to advance their knowledge in an international realm, whether in peace or war. Handing out cupcakes is not what anyone I know came to do. If we continue the way we are going, we will have very little in common with the men who first earned the Green Beret.

SFC (P) Brian Duffy
3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The two preceding letters are timely in that they highlight current discussions about the relevance and applicability of Special Forces in today's world. While they are based on completely different points of view, each letter is "on the money." The two letters illustrate the vastly different roles that Special Forces

play in the spectrum of conflict and the way that we see ourselves fitting into that spectrum.

SFC(P) Duffy's frustration in not being able to focus at least the majority of his training efforts on preparation for conflict is understandable. The image of the Special Forces soldier in the commando role is one that is prevalent in many people's thinking. This view, however, fails to account for the full value and utility of Special Forces. Why does our national and military leadership decide to commit a Special Forces unit to a task which does not involve the application of violence? Is it because we have become so adept at "handing out cupcakes" that we are viewed as the best to accomplish this role? Or is it that our reputation of being able to accomplish violence gives us the instant credibility to accomplish these other missions successfully?

Our ability to fulfill the commando role, as well as other SF unique attributes such as language and cultural awareness, give us the credibility required to work successfully in a myriad of activities. Numerous recent examples illustrate this point of view: A Special Forces team is able to walk into a Kurdish camp and immediately begin to organize and focus the people of the camp. More recently, Special Forces soldiers provided assistance to Cuban refugees during Operation Safe Haven. Each of these examples points out the utility of Special Forces and their ability to establish instant credibility.

The second point of view revolves around the question of why Special Forces are chosen to execute these missions. Some people argue that there are other forces who perhaps are better trained to accomplish missions of this type. While this is true in some instances, soldiers from Special Forces are often chosen because they possess the operational awareness to accomplish the mission as well as the political aptitude and maturity to accomplish missions with minimum attention. A recent article in the magazine of the Center for Army Lessons Learned contained an article on how an infantry unit prepared to conduct operations in Haiti. Included were some very revealing comments: "This isn't war. Respect the nationals. … The command directs that soldiers stop every 20 to 30 minutes during patrols and speak to the people on the street. If soldiers do not do this, they quickly lose perspective and regard for the people."

Special Forces soldiers do not need such reminders. The very attitudes which conventional forces must teach their soldiers are the natural modes of operation for Special Forces. This is one reason why SF has drawn positive comments from our national leadership.

Ultimately we return to the source of SFC Duffy's frustration: the lack of time required for him to keep his team highly trained and capable of conducting combat operations. As long as there are sensitive missions requiring soldiers of unique skills, SF soldiers will find themselves fighting to find the most valuable resource of all — time.

(This response was prepared by the staff of the Special Forces Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS — Editor.)

CSM has role in tactical operations

As my battalion prepared for its rotation to the National Training Center, I asked myself "What does the command sergeant major do during tactical operations?"

The Army charges the CSM with overseeing the individual training program and the professional development of the NCO Corps, and with taking care of soldiers and their families. The CSM role during tactical operations is not as well-defined.

The CSM is one of the most experienced members of the SF battalion. It is therefore only natural that he participate in the tactical decision-making process, or TDMP. The CSM has unlimited access to every section in the forward operations base, or FOB, allowing him to identify problems and to influence corrective action without involving the commander.

Thanks to his relationship with the commander, the CSM knows the commander's intent better than anyone in the unit. This knowledge is invaluable when an operational detachment or staff section has a question about the commander's guidance.

Before our NTC rotation, the battalion conducted a two-week desert-training program and one week of full mission profiles. Six detachments were given a mission, isolated and launched on a short 24- to 48-hour FTX. It is obligatory that the CSM spend time with these detachments. The company sergeants major can provide information to the commander during pre-mission activities concerning detachment strengths and weaknesses, but when the operation starts, they perform duties in the isolation facility, special-operations command-and-control element, and advanced operations base, thus restricting their input. By concentrating on the "players," the CSM can provide information the commander would normally get from the company's leadership. By attending staff mission briefs and briefbacks, by studying the enemy and friendly situation, by reading all incoming and outgoing messages and by sitting in on the commander's update briefing, the CSM accumulates a tremendous amount of information and can keep the commander informed on the whole operation.

During tactical operations, the

CSM is the commander's troubleshooter. Experienced as a Special Forces operator and leader, the CSM can contribute to the success of the mission through his mentoring, problem-solving and maintaining the momentum of the battalion's efforts.

CSM Michael W. Jefferson
3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Publication needs ideas from SF thinkers

I was heartened to see the article "Ambushing the Future" by Dr. James J. Schneider in the April 1995 issue of *Special Warfare*. For a long time, I have felt that the Special Forces community should be as concerned about where we are going as about where we have been.

Many of his points were thought-provoking and do deserve comment. For example, I find it hard to envision a Special Forces group being augmented by conventional armor, infantry and artillery. Running an SFOB is enough work for a group staff. However, that mix could be handled by a joint special-operations task force. It would be interesting to let a JSOTF take on that job down at the JRTC in a peacekeeping/peace-enforcement scenario.

I would like to see more articles like Dr. Schneider's, but coming from our own community's thinkers. I have always been impressed that the British Special Air Service cultivated thinkers as well as operators in their community. On one hand, their post-WWII rebirth had been operator-driven with their ability to quickly and ingeniously respond to a requirement for deep-penetration operations during the Malaysian Insurgency, followed by similar employment in Borneo and Oman. However, their ability to respond to the Princess Gate hostage crisis was thinker-driven as a result of a strategic repositioning set in motion years before in anticipation of the threat of terrorism.

We in Special Forces have also been able to take advantage of opportunities and, because of the superb quality of our operators, perform marvelously. The CIDG and recon programs in Vietnam, the work of the 5th Group on MTTs and the work of the 7th Group in Latin America in the 70s and 80s that played a large part in our own rebirth, the coalition-support teams of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and the 10th Group's work on Provide Comfort are just a few cases that come to mind. All have been precedent-setting demonstrations of Special Forces' unique abilities, and, I would argue, all have been operator-driven.

On the other hand, the only roles we could fashion against our major Cold War threat were special reconnaissance and direct action on main supply routes. We didn't really have any thinker-driven alternatives that could meaningfully employ the full range of Special Forces capabilities.

If Dr. Schneider could be so conceptually innovative, why can't some of our own SF operators? The real issue now is one of strategic positioning, and it's a job for our thinkers. The thinkers in the SAS solved it in time for Princess Gate. We need to start solving it as well, and one of the best places to start is by advancing creative ideas in our own professional journal.

Col. Page Duffy
U.S. Army Reserve (ret.)
Andover, Mass.

Tofflers missed importance of nonlethal weapons

The review essay of "War and Anti-War" by Charles Swett that appeared in the January edition of *Special Warfare* was outstanding.

The single most important point made by Mr. Swett is that of the importance of nonlethal weapons. Perhaps more than any other new technology, effective nonlethal weapons can transform special operations as we currently know them. Mr. Swett correctly points out that the Tofflers missed "the critically important issue of how (nonlethal weapons) can help ease domestic political constraints against intervention overseas."

Domestic political constraints are the collective wisdom of our people and political leaders that acts as a brake against precipitous military action. However, situations involving weapons of mass destruction may demand early action. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among extremist states is growing every day, and there is a very real danger of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. In certain cases, early action, taken before a political consensus can be developed, may be required. In those few cases, effective nonlethal weapons may make early intervention a politically viable option.

Currently, the Dismounted Battle Lab at Fort Benning is the proponent for the development of these weapons for the Army. USASOC is providing input; however, its influence is limited. The requirements of the Infantry and Military Police will dominate and will probably not overlap perfectly with those of special operations. USSOCOM will have to take the lead, to ensure that our special requirements are addressed.

Lt. Col. Robert Brady
USASOC
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

FA qualification important for SF officers

The Total Army Personnel Command recently completed functional-area designations for officers in year group 1989. As the proponent for the Special Forces branch, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School makes an annual recommendation to PERSCOM for the FA breakout of each year group during its fifth year of service. SWCS bases its recommendation on projected long-term branch FA requirements. The proponent FA model envisions the following percentages of SF officers in each FA by the year 2010:

FA39 (PSYOP/CA)	9 percent
FA41 (Personnel Programs Management)	14 percent
FA45 (Comptroller)	15 percent
FA46 (Public Affairs)	10 percent
FA48 (Foreign Area Officer)	6 percent
FA49 (ORSA)	8 percent
FA53 (Automation)	2 percent
FA54 (Operations, Plans and Training)	36 percent

SF officers, in coordination with the SF Branch at PERSCOM, should strive for FA qualification as soon as possible after completing ODA command. FA training and assignments not only provide rewarding opportunities for service to the SOF community, they also support the integration of the SF Branch throughout the Army and joint community. Depending on the specific FA, FA qualification can also provide enhanced opportunities for advanced civil schooling, command (FA 39) and promotion.

SWCS to publish guide for SF warrant officers

• *The Special Forces Warrant Officer Professional Guide* is scheduled to be published Oct. 1, 1995. The guide will provide approved career guidance, doctrinal duties, job descriptions and principal duty titles and will assist commanders and their senior warrant advisers in establishing unit professional-development programs. During the review process, copies will be furnished to all Special Forces groups for comment. Comments will be reviewed during the Warrant Officer Advanced Course in August 1995.

• Special Forces-qualified officers in National Guard units who are interested in a direct appointment into MOS 180A should apply through their chain of command. Training requirements may vary; all officers must have a successful performance history and a minimum of three years on a Special Forces A-detachment.

• Commanders are encouraged to interview all MOS 180A applicants as part of their unit recruiting program. To enhance the quality of the interviews, the unit senior warrant-officer adviser and the command sergeant major may be invited to attend.

• The point of contact on MOS 180A issues is CWO3 Shaun Driscoll or the incoming manager, CWO3 Wayne Searcy, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Authorizations increase for CMF 18 drill sergeants, detailed recruiters

As part of the initiative to obtain more personnel authorizations, CMF 18 has secured 50 drill-sergeant and detailed-recruiter positions. Twenty SFC detailed-recruiter authorizations and 30 drill-sergeant authorizations (staff-sergeant and sergeant-first-class) will be available to CMF 18 soldiers who currently hold an 18B, 18C, 18E or 18F primary MOS. The Special Forces Branch has already received and screened several packets for both programs. These packets have been sent to the PERSCOM Recruiting and Retention Team and the drill-sergeant program manager for consideration. The majority of these authorizations will be filled by the end of FY 95. Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, commander of the Special Warfare Center and School, has approved the acquisition of 30 more drill-sergeant and 10 more detailed-recruiter authorizations. These additional authorizations will most likely be filled in FY 96.

SF medics assigned to the Ranger Regiment

The commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command has directed that 12 SF medical sergeants (18D) be assigned to the Ranger Regiment. The addition of SF medics will enhance the regiment's trauma-management capabilities and give selected 18Ds a unique opportunity to work with another unit of the Army Special Operations Command.

PERSCOM points of contact

The following is a list of the staff of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command:

Capt. Adrian Erckenbrack	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSgt. Terry Palmore	Senior career adviser
SFC Stewart Marin	37F career adviser, CMF 18/37F NCOES manager
Mrs. Faye Matheny	1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th SF groups, JFKSWCS, USASOC, SF Command, SATMO, 96th CA, ROTC assignments, and JRTC assignments
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFQC student manager

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager and career-development questions to the senior career adviser. Students attending the SF Qualification Course who have questions on assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should first be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The branch phone number is DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

Foreign SOF

Mujahedin intensify operations in Bosnia

Mujahedin units, possibly supported by Iranian SOF, have once again intensified their activities in central Bosnia now that the weather has become conducive to offensive combat operations. Their increasing influence on both the Muslim government in Sarajevo and the three army corps located west of the city has alienated much of the local populace and has developed into another source of irritation for the U.N. peacekeeping forces there. Detachments of Mujahedin have assisted in the training of selected Bosnian army elements for the past two years, but last summer they also began to spearhead many of the tactical-level attacks against Bosnian Serb forces. The potential for the Mujahedin to escalate their activities remains high and will further threaten regional stability in the republic's hinterland.

Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and by various other Islamic states that have an interest in expanding extremism into the European theater. Additionally, international radical groups, such as Hizbollah, have been added to the suspected list of sponsors. Bosnian government sources have grudgingly admitted the presence of the Mujahedin, but they publicly intimate that they have accepted the Mujahedin presence as a "necessary evil" to maintain the flow of aid from international Islamic contributors. Aid has been distributed in forms ranging from hard currency to clandestine arms shipments.

Although the numbers of Mujahedin currently operating in Bosnia remain a matter of speculation, most credible estimates indicate approximately 2,500 members. However, "professional holy warriors" constitute only a minority among them. Many of the others are indigenous Bosnian Muslims who demonstrate appropriate religious zeal and allegiance to the organization. In the near term, the Mujahedin are expected to continue to focus on local military operations and on the most effective means of establishing their influence with the Bosnian Muslim government. In time, they will likely surpass these original objectives and divert their attention to politicizing the Muslim population and attempting to establish an Islamic republic obedient to fundamentalist doctrine.

"Ninja" violence reported in East Timor

Indonesian military forces have reacted with patrols and greater vigilance in the streets of East Timor's capital of Dili in reaction to attacks on the local population by gangs consisting of 12-15 individuals. Known as "ninjas," because they wear black clothes and masks, these groups roam the city at night terrorizing the population. Typically, their activities include entering private residences and beating and torturing the occupants, assaulting nighttime strollers, and killing pets and poultry. This increased activity, coupled with the killing of six East Timorese by Indonesian military forces earlier in 1995 near Dili, has heightened security concerns in Indonesia's troubled 27th province.

Formerly a Portuguese colony, East Timor was annexed into the Republic

of Indonesia in 1976 following an invasion the year before. Since then, its pro-independence forces have been waging war against Indonesian forces. According to current estimates, there are approximately 200 East Timorese conducting a guerrilla war against approximately 5,000 Indonesian troops. The ninja activity is the most recent twist in the battle for East Timor. Both sides deny ownership of the gangs. Catholic priests in Dili claim that the ninjas are members of Indonesia's special forces, with the specific mission to intimidate opponents of Jakarta's rule. Dissidents in Dili claim that the government is trying to suppress their activities, which include the international embarrassment experienced when 29 East Timorese occupied the U.S. Embassy compound during President Clinton's November 1994 visit to Indonesia.

The Indonesian government claims that the ninjas are gangs of dissident East Timorese youths. It points to the February 1995 arrest of 12 East Timorese who were said to have confessed both to their role in masterminding ninja activity and to their efforts in tarnishing the image of the Indonesian military occupation. However, in the minds of many Timorese, the real identity of the ninjas and their agenda remains an issue that is far from resolved.

Private security groups turn to crime, espionage

Many states around the world face high levels of crime and violence that are beyond the capabilities of their police or military forces to handle. As a result, these states are becoming host to large numbers of "private justice" groups, some of which have turned to vigilantism, crime or subversion. In Central and South America, for example, private security organizations have long existed to deal with the spillover from wars and terrorism as well as violent crime. Their relative merits, spotty performance and clear abuses continue to be debated. Despite concerns, private security organizations are expected to play an important role in helping the South African government cope with high levels of crime and violence as it works to consolidate democratic gains and to reorganize its police and security forces. It is the former USSR and Eastern Europe, however, where crime and turmoil have led to remarkable growth in private security organizations. As of April 1994, 6,605 Russian "private security enterprises and security services" had been officially registered, with some 26,000 individuals — many former military or security-service personnel — acquiring private investigative licenses. A number of these firms and individuals have become involved in organized crime or have turned into small private armies for individuals or organizations. An analogous situation exists in Eastern Europe. Romania, for example, now a crossroads of drug and arms trafficking and other forms of organized and random crime, and a periodic stopover for terrorists, has more than 160 private-detective agencies. A number of these are manned by personnel formerly of the communist military (police), Department of State Security and Ministry of Defense. Technologically, some agencies are well-equipped, and three are reportedly working for "foreign espionage services." These kinds of developments have appeared throughout Eastern Europe, highlighting the need to consider private-security elements as a growing security consideration there and in other areas of the world.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., Lt. Col. John E. Sray and Maj. Thomas E. Sidwell of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Update

Army SF Command gets new commander

Brig. Gen. William P. Tangney took command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Main Post Parade Field May 1.

A native of Worcester, Mass., Tangney was formerly the deputy commanding general and chief of staff of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He has also served as commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command; commander of the 10th SF Group; chief of the SF Officer Branch at the Army Military Personnel Center; and commander of the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group.

Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, praised Tangney's experience at every level in Special Forces. "He has the personal and professional credentials required to lead the command into the 21st century," Scott said.

Tangney replaced Maj. Gen. Harley C. Davis, who is now deputy commanding general of the Fifth Army at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Reserve SOF positions still available

Despite downsizing in the U.S. Army reserve components, there are still numerous reserve-component special-operations forces positions available, according to the chief of strength management for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Positions for Civil Affairs soldiers (38A) and Psychological Operations specialists (37F) are currently available in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, which has units located in 26 states and in Washington, D.C., said Lt. Col. Samuel A. DeRocco. Although there are vacancies in some company-grade officer and E-7 positions in those units, most of the vacancies are for soldiers in the ranks of E-3 through E-6.

Photo by Mike Brantley

Brig. Gen. William P. Tangney receives the colors of the Special Forces Command.

CA soldiers are required to have a skill-technical score of 100 or greater, a high-school diploma and a secret clearance (or eligibility for the clearance). PSYOP soldiers are required to have a skill-technical score of 105 or higher, a high-school diploma, a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 85 or higher for seven specific languages and 89 or higher for all other languages, and a secret clearance (or eligibility for the clearance).

Interested civilians should contact their local Army recruiters; reservists should contact their strength-management office; and soldiers leaving the active Army should contact their unit's transition NCO, DeRocco said. — *Jerry Healy, USASOC PAO*

MFF instructor sets parachuting record

A military free-fall instructor from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has set a new record for the most parachute jumps in a 24-hour period.

CWO3 Jay Stokes, assigned to Company B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, made 331 jumps at the Raeford Municipal Airport, Raeford, N.C., May 30-31.

A-Frame lifts burden for SOF units

A special-operations soldier who invented an A-frame hoist has seen the idea he drew on a paper napkin built and field-tested within a matter of months.

Lt. Col. Richard C. Burmood, commander of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, had been in Haiti just two weeks when he pinpointed a problem with water distribution to Special Forces soldiers in Haiti's hinterlands.

Water was stored in 500-gallon water bags, or blivits, which lie on the ground. Gravity will drain only about 400 gallons from the bags, leaving them too heavy to be lifted except by helicopter or wrecker.

Burmood thought of the idea of using an A-frame to manually lift and drain the blivits, but it was during a briefing that he saw a way

of getting his idea off paper and into the field.

"Bill Chadwick was giving a briefing on combat developments in the pre-command course (at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School)," Burmood said. Lt. Col. William Chadwick is the director of Systems Acquisition, Directorate of Force Integration, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. "I drew it on a paper napkin; he took it and ran."

Burmood's idea was passed to Maj. Todd Wendt, a test coordination officer for Systems Integration. "The napkin showed up here, and I was asked, 'What can you do with this?' " Wendt said. Three months later, the A-frame was fielded.

The 528th surveyed the Army system and the local economy for a device to lift and drain the blivits. "The closest thing on the economy was $240, but it also weighed 3-4 times as much as the A-frame," Wendt said. The next steps were to develop specifications and to find someone to construct the device. Wendt contacted the Airborne and Special Operations Test Directorate at Fort Bragg to develop and build the A-frame. The project took two weeks and cost $850.

The A-frame was engineered to be small enough to fit into a duffle bag but strong enough to lift a half-full blivit completely off the ground. The result was a 60-70 pound, aluminum A-frame, with harness and ratchet straps, that can be easily broken down and reassembled by two or three people.

Combat development usually takes years, Wendt said. "Usually, it is not as simple as this one. We just didn't have to go through the formal system, because it was simple." Even though the informal process was used for the project, Wendt said, standards for safety, engineering and market analysis were thoroughly researched and adhered to during the A-frame's design and construction.

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment has expressed an interest in the A-frame to drain fuel blivits, Wendt said. If SOF units decide to buy the A-frames, the Systems Acquisition Branch will find a contractor to build a number of the devices at a cost much lower than that of the prototype. — *Carol Jones, USASOC PAO*

SODARS helps SOF soldiers in mission planning

Soldiers involved in mission planning for an overseas deployment may not be aware that they can take advantage of lessons learned by other teams that have operated in the same areas.

The Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System, or SODARS, is an automated information system designed to capture special-operations mission debriefing reports, store them and make them available to the SOF community. These reports are to be used to prepare teams/individuals for future OCONUS deployments.

"Through the SODARS program, OCONUS-deploying personnel can provide valuable, mission-specific, operational information which will significantly enhance the mission planning of future OCONUS deployments," said CWO2 Bill Crawford, the USASOC SODARS manager.

USASOC Regulation 381-1 requires the debriefing of Army SOF personnel (active and reserve components) returning from OCONUS deployments. Information obtained from these debriefings is entered into a data base maintained by USSOCOM. This information is accessible to the SOF community via the Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System, or SOCRATES.

To support SOF elements not connected to SOCRATES, USSOCOM has developed a collateral dial-up program that is currently being field-tested. The system, the Collateral Users Bulletin Board, or CUBB, will allow all SOF, active and reserve, to retrieve SODARS reports.

In October 1994, USASOC completed production of the *USASOC SODARS Reference Guide*. This guide contains a checklist outlining each step of the SODARS process. The guide also contains the SODARS annexes which correspond to each type of SOF mission. Each annex is followed by a corresponding debriefing guide designed to assist debriefers in the questioning phase of the debriefing. By closely following the checklists and other recommendations in the guide, users can save hours in the debriefing and reporting process.

"Soldiers' participation is essential in developing a SODARS program that will achieve its goal of being the best and most comprehensive mission-planning tool available to the SOF community," Crawford said.

For more information on SODARS, contact CWO2 Bill Crawford, USASOC SODARS manager, at DSN 239-5754 or commercial (910) 432-5754.

Special Forces increase as Army shrinks

While the Army has decreased in size over the last 10 years, authorizations for Special Forces soldiers have increased.

In fiscal year 1987, according to historical data from the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, there were 4,015 SF soldiers in an Army of 676,745, giving SF 0.59 percent of the Army's authorizations. The projection for FY 97 is 5,802 SF soldiers in an Army of 495,000, giving SF 1.17 percent of the Army authorization.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Leadership and the New Science. *By Margaret J. Wheatley. San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler Publishers, 1992. ISBN 1-881052-01-X. $22. 164 pages.*

It is not often that a book is truly surprising — this one is. Margaret J. Wheatley, Professor of Management at Brigham Young University, has made a unique contribution to our understanding of leadership and its relationship to the newest discoveries in science.

At 164 pages, the book is clear and concise. But watch out for that first step: The new science is not immediately comprehensible to all.

The author makes a convincing argument that 17th-century Newtonian principles have led us collectively down the wrong leadership path. Her thesis is that we have become victims of our own science, and that repeated attempts by a Western, linear and mechanistic culture to reduce humans to quantifiable entities is doomed to failure.

We may all have an aversion to the conduct of human affairs "by the numbers," yet this anti-human methodology has infected CEOs and senior military officers alike. We create questionnaires, take polls and collect data, all in a vain attempt at prediction. Our correct focus should be on the "process" of leadership and the establishment of productive and mutually beneficial relationships with co-workers and subordinates.

Rigidly hierarchical organizations, like the Army, are the very antithesis of Wheatley's conception. Yet even the Army and its soldiers can benefit from the author's



unusual approach to the topic. One of the keys is "informal leadership."

We all have memories of poor leaders who, because they were bright enough to trust in a high-quality senior NCO or subordinate officer, succeeded. Perhaps they weren't so dumb after all. Even loyal subordinates will seek the leadership they need, perhaps outside the chain of command, when the boss is not up to the challenge.

Wheatley recognizes that organizations develop their own kind of consciousness. Soldiers who have been present for the deactivation of a beloved unit know that it is like attending the funeral of an old friend. Our memories and the energies that all former members expended in that unit make it so, creating a very human reality.

The point is that organizational energy is the result of the contributions made by every member, not the leader or CEO alone. The best leaders manage to control their own egos and to develop the collective energies of all to meet organizational ends.

One of the most radical departures taken by Wheatley from conventional wisdom is reflected in this quote, "Growth is found in disequilibrium, not in balance. The things we fear most in organizations — fluctuations, disturbances, imbalances — need not be signs of impending disorder that will destroy us. Instead, fluctuations are the primary source of creativity."

Creative solutions to problems encountered during ARTEPs, for instance, are generally not well-received by evaluators — prescriptions based on doctrine are. In the attempt to measure intangibles like combat readiness, we are compelled to create only those situations which can provide us measurable results, in something like an ARTEP. The result is a skewed perception of reality. Is the unit truly combat-ready or just ARTEP-smart?

Lenin said "Freedom is good, but control is better." Wheatley points out, "If organizations are machines, control makes sense. If organizations are process structures, then seeking to impose control through permanent structure is suicide." Although it is overstated, her assertion contains an underlying truth. Overarching control and the failure to give subordinates decision-making authority can destroy any chance for a positive command climate.

Information, according to the author, is the primary ingredient in creating a successful organization. This comes as no surprise to senior Army leaders, but putting information to work is often problematic.

The senior leader's task is twofold: (1) create a vision of where the unit needs to go (2) articulate that vision so it is understood by every member of the organization.

Those interested in quantum mechanics, nonlinear equations, fractals, chaos theory and self-organizing systems will find this book particularly interesting. Wheatley makes some startling connections between these new sciences and the art of leadership — connections most of us wouldn't look for. Her unconventional approach to the topic, in this reviewer's opinion, possesses extraordinary merit. The book is well worth the price.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
Joint Special Operations Cmnd.
Fort Bragg, N. C.

Bravo Two-Zero. *By Andy McNab. London: Bantam Press, 1993. ISBN: 0-593-03421-X. 374 pages.*

The author, a British Special Air Service NCO, provides a candid first-person account of his patrol's action in the 1991 Gulf War. The eight-man patrol (call-sign Bravo Two-Zero) received two missions: to locate and destroy Iraqi telecommunication land lines which paralleled a main supply route; and to identify and destroy mobile Scud missile launchers. Inserted 100 miles northwest of Baghdad by helicopter five days after the air war began, the dismounted patrol quickly encountered a series of incidents that doomed the mission.

Radio frequencies for the operation were inoperative, causing the patrol to lose communication with its base. Contrary to intelligence reports, 3,000 Iraqi troops were present in the immediate area of operations. The patrol's four survival radio beacons proved incapable of contacting orbiting AWACS aircraft, eliminating any possible close air support or aerial extraction. The hide site was compromised by a young Iraqi goat herder, leading to a firefight and a subsequent escape-and-evasion attempt of 120 kilometers toward the Syrian border.

Three patrol members died. Four were captured and endured captivity and torture in Baghdad for a month before repatriation. Their interrogation, described in brutal detail, provides a classic contemporary case study of resistance to interrogation, reiterating some points taught in our own SERE course. One man successfully evaded capture, completing a 300-kilometer march to arrive at the



British Embassy in Damascus. According to the author, "It was one of the most remarkable E&Es ever recorded by the Regiment."

As the patrol leader, the author gives an honest, often anguished, overview of the mission planning and execution. While some terminology, equipment and tactics might differ from our own, U.S. soldiers will find the concepts and techniques familiar. He is blunt in explaining the circumstances and the rationale for his decisions, providing ideal points for the reader to contemplate, "What would I have done?"

The straightforward narrative dispels some of the popular myths and mystique of the SAS while providing frank observations and insight into the unit. For instance, the author's comments on the essentials of the regiment's professionalism, "It's all very well doing all the exciting things — abseiling, fast-roping, jumping through buildings — but what being Special Forces is mostly about is thoroughness and precision. The real motto of the SAS is not 'Who Dares Wins' but 'Check and Test, Check and Test.' "

The brief discussion of lessons learned and why things went wrong is disappointing, possibly leaving the reader with unanswered questions. With the benefit of hindsight, one can speculate, Was the pre-mission planning thorough enough? Why was intelligence on the area insufficient? What specifically caused the failure of the patrol's communications? Was the combination of direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions excessive for the size and composition of the unit?

Not surprisingly, Bravo Two Zero reportedly became the most decorated patrol in the British Army since the Boer War. The story leaves one staggered by the sheer courage, tenacity and endurance of the participants. It should evoke discussion and introspection from the professional soldier, reminding him that exceptional individuals must always be the foundation of any special-operations organization.

Erik Syvertsen
Waynesville, Mo.

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ▪ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK – DT – PBM
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

THIRD CLASS
U.S. Postage
PAID
Southern, MD
Permit No. 1968

PIN: 073846–000