# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School




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# From the Commandant

**Special Warfare**

During a conference earlier this month, the Special Warfare Center and School celebrated the eighth birthday of the Special Forces Branch. Participants in the conference presented papers that not only examined the Branch's current state but also looked at the future of special-operations forces.

One of the papers, presented by Dr. Robert Wright of the Army Center for Military History, was titled "Future Roles and Missions: Lessons from America's Past." At first, the title may sound odd — some would argue that to prepare for the future we must look forward, not back. But as we prepare for the operations we are most likely to encounter in the years ahead, we must be careful not to ignore the lessons learned from previous operations.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Dr. Joseph Fischer examines the origins of Special Forces. His analysis begins with World War II and goes through the mid-1950s. This period marked the beginnings of our modern-day special-operations forces, but even before the early SOF units were created, U.S. forces participated in operations similar to those we now call special operations. Amid current discussions about peacekeeping and the accelerating pace of ethnic, nationalist and separatist conflicts throughout the world, we may forget that our own Civil War was a nationalist-separatist conflict; that during Reconstruction our Army performed peacekeeping, nation-building and humanitarian-assistance missions; and that our Indian wars were a long-running ethnic conflict. Likewise, the partisan-warfare, coalition-warfare and peace-enforcement operations we are concerned about today had forerunners in the small wars that U.S. forces fought early in this century — operations that were detailed in the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* of 1940.

The lessons of history need not come from the analysis of battles and campaigns long past. In this issue we have lessons learned from a unit's most recent exercise, from events during Desert Storm, and from an examination of the foreign policies of past administrations.

We cannot find all of our answers by looking at historical lessons: to do so would be like preparing for the last battle. But in this issue, Dr. James Schneider makes the point, "To learn from the past, we must anticipate the future." As our perception of the future changes, so does our perception of the past and the ways by which we will interpret its lessons.

**Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison**

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


*Special Warfare* is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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## Features



## Departments

# Ambushing the Future

*by James J. Schneider*

Despite the current proliferation of books and articles on the subject of the future, there is no unique set of credentials that makes anyone an expert. At best, one can only provoke thought and spur interest in the belief that the future matters, and for a military institution, nothing matters more.

In thinking about the future of one particular military institution, U.S. Army Special Forces, we should consider the following provocations:

First, the future has little to do with the linear, mechanical passage of time. We do not await the future as we await a birthday, a dinner appointment or a wake-up call. The future is already before us, hidden in a fog. It is like a living thing that we must seek out, discover and ambush.

Second, the U.S. Army of the future will face its greatest challenge since the end of the American Civil War.

Third, the future will be dominated by a resurgent force that will change the nature of both the nation-state and the national security system.

Fourth, in the future, nations will no longer wage war. They will wage peace.

Fifth, Special Forces, as distinguished from special-operations forces, will become the hinge upon which the rest of the Army turns and moves into the future. Furthermore, Special Forces will be the premium we pay to ensure the unit integrity, coherence and cohesion of our conventional forces. Failing to make this leveraged investment could lead to the erosion of our conventional capability.

Sixth, the future will require an expansible Special Forces group capable of conventional augmentation. An augmented SF group structure would provide Special Forces with an independent operational and even strategic presence.

Finally, the best vision for the future of Special Forces was given by President John F. Kennedy.

## Confronting the future

The future personified is cunning, unforgiving, deceptive, elusive and even seductive. It performs a kind of striptease, revealing a shoulder here, an ankle there, but always remaining hidden, wrapped in uncertainty.

For our part, we sit in innocence, tending to our immediate concerns, not recognizing that we may already be six years into the 21st century. Historian John Lukacs and others have suggested that the 20th century began in 1914 with World War I and ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their argument suggests that the future moves upon us not simply with the linear passage of time but with the movement of a rapidly changing world *through* time. Indeed, whatever makes the future *new* in any meaningful way is the novelty of our

thinking and understanding as we confront the changing world around us. The challenge of the future, then, if it is a confrontation with new ideas, is fundamentally an intellectual struggle.

Gen. George S. Patton had something similar in mind when he asserted that war is the most complex form of human endeavor. We can extend his assertion to include operations other than war. Every military institution recognizes war as an essential, defining challenge. It is paradoxical that when armies fail most catastrophically, the source of the collapse is found in peacetime and in the armies' failure to confront the future.

Armies are not only instruments of policy, as Karl von Clausewitz reminds us — they are also social institutions that train and evolve during peacetime. Armies as peacetime institutions are thus susceptible to the same forces that influence nations and societies as a whole. And of all the factors that influence the future of a nation and its security system, the most dramatic is sudden and unexpected geopolitical change.

We now stand square in the middle of such change. We have yet to divine the full implications of the revolution in geopolitics euphemistically called the new world order. But in scope and influence, the dramatic transformation of the Soviet Union is arguably the greatest geopolitical event since the disintegration of the Roman Empire more than 1,500 years ago. Moved by these same events, the U.S. Army is already embarking on a revolution of its own, but unlike the Soviet Union and its security system, the U.S. Army must not fail.

A few years ago Eliot Cohen and John Gooch wrote *Military Misfortunes*, a book on why military institutions fail. The authors cited three causes of catastrophic military failure: failure to learn from past experiences, failure to anticipate the future and failure to adapt to the future.

According to Cohen and Gooch, armies develop a kind of collective amnesia. Who, for example, remembers Col. Lewis Merrill? Merrill, a West Point graduate (class of '55), was the commander of an elite Army unit that had been operating in a semitropical region for nearly two years. In one memorable operation, the colonel deployed part of his unit in 12-man detachments. Their mission was to chase and destroy armed units of a clan that had been terrorizing the local populace and

National Archives photo

*War damage to southern cities such as Charleston, S.C., posed a challenge to the U.S. Army during Reconstruction.*

threatening the peace and stability throughout the region.

On one particular day in March, Merrill placed two detachments under his best officers: Lts. B.H. Hodgson and Donald McIntosh. The two detachments, each taking along a local law-enforcement officer who knew the region thoroughly, moved swiftly through the damp spring morning to trap and crush the last remnants of the clan. Shortly after their successful encounter, Merrill and his unit were reassigned to other, more conventional operations. The place where Merrill operated wasn't Somalia or even Vietnam — it was South Carolina, in the year 1873. The unit was the 7th U.S. Cavalry, and the clan that Merrill's troops took down was the Ku Klux Klan.

## Reconstruction

Historically, the operations in which Merrill and his troops took part were known as the period of Reconstruction. Lasting from 1865 to 1877, the period represented, from a military standpoint, the darkest days in the history of the Army.

During Reconstruction, the Army contributed extensively to the greatest social, economic and political restoration in its history as it labored to help maintain order and rebuild the devastated states of the former Confederacy. Swift demobilization, peacekeeping operations in the South and political implementation of civil-rights legislation created unprecedented circumstances for the Army and its leaders. Most, like William T. Sherman, rejected the Army's new role in operations other than war. Sherman's position was simple: The Army should go back to the prewar tasks of guarding the nation's frontiers against foreign and domestic enemies. On the other side of the issue, Sherman's longtime friend, Ulysses S. Grant, argued that although the Union had won the war, it could still lose the peace envisioned by Abraham Lincoln.

A close study of the operations of units like Merrill's 7th Cavalry reveals that the functional and conceptual roots of special operations, in terms of peace operations, go back 130 years. Reconstruction was, all at once, an effort in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, nation-building and, with the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, counterterrorism. The Reconstruction activities of Army units were unprecedented in their time, and they sound remarkably familiar today.

For the Army, and for Special Forces, the future will be a period of *global* reconstruction. It is beginning to dawn on many of our world leaders that although the West has won the Cold War, it can still lose the peace. The stage is being set for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations on a truly massive scale, and more than 100,000 troops of all nations are already involved in these activities.

But there is another aspect of Reconstruction that anticipates the future — the Army's unique relationship to the U.S. Constitution. The newly revised Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, states, "The United States Army exists to support and defend the Constitution." Grant's employment of the Army during Reconstruction supported the Constitution and its newly promulgated civil-rights amendments. The U.S. armed forces, alone among the major security forces of the world, swear allegiance to our Constitution. This act of faith toward the ideals of freedom lends moral authority to our position as a world leader. For better or worse, during this time of global reconstruction, the rest of the world will continue to turn to the U.S. in the name of freedom.

## Resurgent force

As an Army we are fortunate to have such a rich historical tradition. But our experience is of little use if it cannot be interpreted in light of future operations. In other words, to learn from the past, we must anticipate the future. And the future will be dominated by a single overwhelming presence — the United Nations.

The resurgence and the growing influence of the U.N. will not only affect our soldiers but may change the very structure of the nation-state. As the modern state evolved, it developed a legal struc-


United Nations photo

*Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations of the U.N. often function as safety valves to dissipate hostilities.*

ture that acted as a kind of genetic code. One of the key legal strands was the right of the state to declare and wage war. The growing power of the U.N. is beginning slowly to erode this defining characteristic of the nation-state and increasingly call into question the use of war as a legitimate instrument of national policy. In the future, war and peace will be re-established on a new conceptual footing, and the idea of the soldier will be redefined. Increasingly, national armed forces will resemble U.S. Army Special Forces.

The U.N. was chartered June 26, 1945, to ensure for all nations "the maintenance of international peace and security." In their quest for global security, nations entered into a kind of Faustian pact with the U.N.: To be more secure, nations would have to relinquish some of their sovereignty. Initially, the Cold War and nuclear deterrence hid the full implications of this new global arrangement. Not until the Korean War did we get a glimpse of war fought for the enforcement of peace.

When Gen. Douglas MacArthur uttered his now-famous words, "There is no substitute for victory," he meant *total* victory. His statement was backed by thousands of years of history. Even before the existence of the nation-state, the highest act of sovereignty was to wage war and to freely set its limits, which often included the total overthrow of the enemy. Those limits defined victory for the soldier; in fact, the idea of total victory defined the fundamental values of the military profession. In the past, when nations and empires decided to fight for *limited* objectives, their decisions were self-determined and were expressions of their own sovereignty. Now, the U.N. has begun to define victory on *its* own terms.

The U.N. redefinition of victory has also set the stage for redefining the purpose of a nation's armed forces. Before the Korean War a state's armed forces existed to deter war and, if necessary, to wage war to the extreme. The emergence of the United Nations has created a new formula: Under the new U.N. arrangement of collective security, nations will strive primarily to compel peace. For the first time in the history of warfare, the deterrence of war and the dominance of war-fighting is being supplanted by a new concept of security focused on peace compelling, peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

Ironically, these peace operations do not guarantee peace. Instead, the U.N. has

attempted to create a new precondition for conflict by establishing peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, which often function as safety valves to dissipate hostilities. When the pressure is too great, peace operations typically fail. Conceptually, the U.N. has added an ambiguous but necessary threshold of compelling that is often violated, leading to armed conflict. The Korean Conflict and the Gulf War are examples of situations in which the threshold was breached, but in which, nevertheless, the U.N. limited the scope of hostilities. It is the U.N.'s imposition of this threshold that makes peacekeeping and peace enforcement not war, but like war.

The U.N.'s central role in shaping the future during global reconstruction will persist, and its geopolitical influence will likely increase for at least five reasons:

• Fundamental changes in the global threat environment;

• The evolving role of the world media;

• The increasing extension, complexity and vulnerability of the global economy;

• The fact that peace costs less than war; and

• The growing ideology of peace.

The first reason for the increase in the U.N.'s global role is the dramatic changes in the world threat environment. During the Cold War, assessments were based on conflict arising between states or between blocs of state coalitions. In the future, conflict will arise as a consequence of four new factors. Foremost is the emerging power of the individual or small-group terrorist. Thanks to the proliferation and accessibility of weapons of mass lethality, the individual terrorist, especially, is potentially a *strategic agent*, a techno-terrorist capable of any level of destruction. The second factor is the emergence of "messianic statism." The term refers to a form of statecraft dominated by religious fundamentalism and is best represented by such Islamic states as Iran and Sudan. The central threat of the individual strategic agent and the messianic state to world peace is that neither is subject to the rationality of deterrence, since each is motivated primarily by irrational factors. This deterrent void will be filled by the U.N. The third factor is the impending collapse of Africa, and the fourth is the rise of ethnic violence.

The role of a global media will create a second reason for an increasing U.N. role. Today the media knows no national boundaries — it is international. The


*Through its global extension, universal presence and speed-of-light technology, today's media can change world opinion in a matter of hours.*

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

media is a powerful lever of public opinion. Through its global extension, universal presence and speed-of-light technology, today's media can change world opinion in a matter of hours. As a consequence, local issues become laden almost immediately with global implications and therefore become U.N. problems.

The third reason for a future U.N. presence concerns the vulnerability and complexity of the global economy. Former Secretary of State James Baker wasn't far wrong when he said we went to war in the Persian Gulf because of jobs — jobs sustained by an oil-fueled world economy. One can readily imagine the consequences had Iraq seized the Saudi oil fields along with nearly two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. The world's need for oil demands that the old Cold War strategy of containment be replaced by a new strategy of accessibility: free access to energy markets under the protection of some kind of global security arrangement like the U.N.

The cost of war constitutes a fourth reason for a resurgent U.N. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, most nations follow a democratic form of government. The one problem with democracies, as Winston Churchill once pointed out, is that they are generally inefficient at waging war. The structure of a relatively free democratic market economy tends to collapse under the weight of protracted war. As the number of democracies increases, simple economies of scale will drive countries toward a global security organization under the aegis of the U.N. Even now we can anticipate the transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (under the Partnership for Peace Program) from a regional security arrangement to a future role as the U.N.'s military arm.

## Waging peace

The final reason that suggests a dominant U.N. influence in the future is the most difficult to articulate. An ideology of peace is alien to the Western concept of war, in which peace is seen simply as the relative absence of war. One emerging global view is that peace is the natural state of man and is worthy of securing in its own right. The yearning for a time of innocence can best be explained by citing the profound cultural despair felt throughout the world as a consequence of the long Cold War, famine, crime, disease, overpopulation and a general sense of social disintegration. It is thus within the realm of possibility that the old ideology of state nationalism will be supplanted by an ideology of peace. It would be extremely naive to believe that such a blissful state of existence could actually be attained. What concerns us is the U.N. belief that such a state might be possible and is therefore worth striving for.

Cohen and Gooch have also pointed out that armies can fail because of their inability to adapt, both functionally and organizationally, to the future. The U.S. armed forces are only slowly adapting to a future dominated by a resurgent globalism and an increasing commitment to operations other than war. The 1993 "Bottom-up Review" gave only a token genuflection to OOTW, placing its greatest emphasis on major regional conflict. The report acknowledged that as many as 50,000 troops would be allocated to OOTW. However, these, mostly Army troops, while constituting three percent of the total DoD armed strength, have been allocated $3 million, just 1/800,000 of FY 94's DoD budget. Dollar shortfalls like this must be made up from other accounts such as training and readiness. One could argue, at least from a budgetary standpoint, that DoD is not fully adapting to the future of global reconstruction.

For its part, the Army follows DoD in its general orientation toward major regional conflict. The revised FM 100-5 affirms the Army's purpose as one of war deterrence and war-fighting. The doctrinal emphasis on deterrence and war-fighting is a natural and justified reflection of a classical theory of war dating as far back as the time of Napoleon. For the future, the Army will need a doctrine based more firmly on a theory of peace and on a new definition of victory. President Bill Clinton expressed as much in his address to the

graduating class at West Point in 1993: "You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic army and still ... to win our wars." The president might just as easily have spoken these words to Army Special Forces. They are the Army's "hinge" between waging peace and winning wars, a hinge that will turn the Army into the future.

## Kennedy's vision

President John F. Kennedy envisioned a broad role for Special Forces that extended beyond unconventional warfare. For Kennedy, the green beret signified more than an elite unit — it symbolized a fundamental break with the past, necessitated by the Cold War. Kennedy saw the Cold War as a war of ideas. In the Cold War the objective would become the hearts and minds of the people. To wage this struggle successfully, the U.S. needed a capability of dealing with other nations on a people-to-people basis. In only the second national security action memorandum of his presidency, Kennedy implemented this vision by establishing what became essentially the civil arm of Special Forces, the Peace Corps. Together, Special Forces and the Peace Corps would deploy and fight on an ideological battlefield.

The Special Forces characteristics that Kennedy found so valuable during the ideological struggle of the Cold War are precisely the same as those required in tomorrow's struggle for peace. For Kennedy, five essentials made Special Forces the preeminent global, people-to-people organization. First, they possessed a unique language capability. Second, they possessed a burning interest in every aspect of their profession. Third, they had the mental discipline and the perseverance to follow a course of action that would achieve results only in the long term and under conditions of great chaos and ambiguity. Fourth, they demonstrated a trustworthiness and dependability under minimal command guidance. Finally, Kennedy believed that highly intelligent and motivated soldiers who were competent in the language and culture of a given country gave Special Forces the unique capability of operating with a wide range of peoples. These essential Special Forces characteristics also constitute unique solutions to the problems of the future.

## Insurance policy

During global reconstruction, the pattern of operations will most nearly resemble operations such as Restore Hope, Restore Democracy and Provide Comfort. In these operations, Special Forces played a key peacekeeping and peace-enforcement role that prevented the escalation of violence to full-blown war and the later need for a massive conventional troop commitment. The essential function of Special Forces is to provide a kind of investment or insurance policy *against* the commitment of conventional forces at a later date.

In October 1961 when President Kennedy was confronted with a series of options concerning Vietnam, he saw the initial employment of Special Forces as the payment of an insurance premium that would ensure the integrity of his conventional force structure in Europe. In Vietnam, the cost of the premium escalated so fast that additional conventional ground troops had to be spent to ensure the integrity of the conventional forces in Europe. If the insurance analogy is correct, then conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, suggest a major commitment of Special Forces *before* a large deployment of U.S. conventional forces. The leveraged payment of a Special Forces "premium" initially ensures the integrity and the coherence of our conventional forces in the event of major hostilities later.

The insurance analogy suggests a further implication for the future: the U.S. armed forces are woefully underinsured. History suggests that during periods of major geopolitical transformation, the expenditure of one unit trained in OOTW ensures the integrity and the coherence of three conventional units. Throughout our

own Reconstruction, roughly one-third of the U.S. Army was deployed in the South. This figure represents about 20,000 officers and men who were organized into 10 to 12 regiments. If history is any guide, we can expect that in the future, at least one-third of our forces will be involved in peace operations at any given time, and we should be paying a premium in Special Forces strength at a rate of one-third of our overall ground strength. In other words, we need approximately one Special Forces group for every Army and Marine division.

## Implications

The central challenge of the future for Special Forces is to become the insurance agent of the Army, and perhaps even of the armed forces. From a practical standpoint, this suggests several implications for Special Forces and for the rest of the Army. First, Special Forces are ideally suited to conduct peacekeeping operations under Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter. Such operations include observer missions, cease-fire monitoring, support activities, war-zone stabilization, light border monitoring, supervision of cease-fires between irregular forces, maintenance of law and order, protection of humanitarian-relief agencies, and the guarantee and denial of the right of passage. Assumption of these or similar Chapter 6 peacekeeping missions by Special Forces would preserve the conventional integrity of our regular forces.

Second, the Army needs additional Special Forces, probably as many as four more groups. In the future, the Army and DoD will be confronted by a fundamental dilemma: Either continue to invest in the substantial overhead of a heavy conventional force that will have its designed capability increasingly eroded as it assumes more and more peace operations; or reduce the conventional overhead in favor of Special Forces tailored for peace operations, while preserving a lethal core conventional capability. Special Forces groups must exploit their versatility, expandability and augmentation potential. A conventionally augmented Special Forces group would then be postured to conduct the more lethal operations of a peace-enforcement environment. Such augmentation could include light armor, light infantry and light artillery, as well as engineer and attack helicopters. When properly augmented, the SF group can generate a major operational and even strategic presence. The tremendous leveraging capability of augmented Special Forces means that a small, initial investment of troops could reap a huge payoff in operational and strategic effect later.

Third, Special Forces must more clearly define themselves as the Army's premier people-to-people service branch. The Army at large seems to view Special Forces as primarily another direct-action component of special-operations forces, but Special Forces' rich lineage and tradition suggest a much broader capability. All of the armed forces must be made fully aware of the significant contribution Special Forces make in operations other than war.

Fourth, Special Forces must develop a strategic-deception capability. With the

U.S. Army photo

*Augmentation such as attack helicopters would allow Special Forces groups to increase their operational and strategic presence.*

signals technology now available, a Special Forces group can simulate the signals footprint of a much larger conventional force. The simulated force can have a major deterrent effect during peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, as well as during wartime. When confronting a technologically inferior opponent, the influence of strategic deception alone can be decisive.

Fifth, Special Forces must exploit the emerging technology of nonlethal weaponry, including lasers, microwaves, sound waves, light waves, electromagnetic impulses, microbes, chemicals and even computer viruses. One can readily imagine an SF soldier typing away at a computer keyboard, when with the punch of a key, he takes down the entire energy grid or banking structure of an enemy country.

Sixth, the Army must foster a greater Special Forces staff presence, especially in J-3 and J-5 positions. Special Forces should have proponency for the J-5 position during peace operations. It is wholly conceivable that the J-5 of a joint task force deployed on peacekeeping missions could become the U-3 of a superior U.N. command headquarters. The nature of peace operations clearly requires a different staff perspective and perhaps even procedures different from those of conventional warfare.

Finally, the intellectual focal point of President Kennedy's vision for Special Forces must be preserved and further sharpened. Kennedy envisioned the SF soldier as a modern ninja who would use his mind as a lever to concentrate the power of his weapons. During this time of global reconstruction, Special Forces will become the fulcrum of the Army.

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# Civil Affairs
# Information Collection in Kuwait City

*by Lt. Col. Michael J. Cleary*

During the Persian Gulf War, some critics chided the intelligence community for not delivering timely, accurate and reliable information to the appropriate decision-makers.

This was not the case with Task Force Freedom in Kuwait City. Although their intelligence resources were limited, the elements of the task force coordinated their activities and were able to collect, analyze and disseminate Civil Affairs information. The task-force commander used this information to support his decision-making process.

In December 1990, the author's Army Reserve unit, the 304th Civil Affairs Group of Philadelphia, Pa., mobilized for Desert Storm. By February 1991, the unit was assigned to Civil Affairs Task Force-Kuwait. The CATF was part of Task Force Freedom, whose mission was to assist Kuwait City in restoring its essential services destroyed during the Iraqi occupation.

## Networking

The intelligence section, or G-2, of the Civil Affairs Task Force was charged with monitoring the equitable distribution of food and with monitoring reported human-rights violations. To accomplish these tasks, the G-2 section networked with intelligence assets of Task Force Freedom, such as the 513th MI Brigade, and with intelligence assets of other military units in the area, including the 8th Marine Regiment and the 3rd and 5th Special Forces Groups. The G-2 also cross-checked information gathered from task-force CA assessment teams with information that the other assets received through their contacts with the populace.

The CA Task Force disseminated its collection and analysis information at a daily briefing for all the participants of Task Force Freedom. This briefing provided much-needed information that was not readily available elsewhere. The audience included the medical and engineer commands that were conducting assessments of the viability of Kuwait City's essential services.

CA information relates to a specific area in which military forces are operating and to the civilian populace in that area. The G-2 section of the Civil Affairs Task Force acted as a collection point for CA information — its staff debriefed the various CA teams returning from their assessments and gleaned information from the teams' situation reports. This information, in turn, was consolidated into the G-2 portion of the CA Task Force situation report and was distributed vertically (to U.S. Army Forces-Central Command) and horizontally (to the other components of Task Force Freedom).

## Neighborhood reports

As a result of collating the information received from its CA assessment teams

and conducting daily staff meetings, the G-2 section of the Civil Affairs Task Force generated a daily neighborhood assessment report regarding the threat situation in the various neighborhoods of Kuwait City. Each neighborhood was assigned a red, amber or green code to indicate its particular threat condition. Because the Civil Affairs Task Force and its collateral agencies were constantly venturing into the city, they needed to know which neighborhoods were safe (green) and which ones weren't. Again, the daily briefing became the vehicle by which this threat information was disseminated to the task force. The agencies in the audience were thus able to provide their respective units with timely, accurate and reliable information. In fact, the information was processed from collector to decision-maker in about 12 hours, cutting the normal cycle in half.

The following example illustrates how information reached the decision-maker in a timely manner: The Kuwaiti government planned to conduct a "sweep" for weapons in the Palestinian neighborhood of Hawalli. The CATF, acting on information received from the assessment teams, reported to the government that the sweep would probably be met by armed resistance and advised against it. Influenced by this information, the Kuwaiti government called off the sweep.

FM 41-10 states that a collection plan is to be used as a means of prioritizing information needed for processing. The neighborhood assessment report also designated certain priority intelligence requirements, or PIRs:

1. What is the status of available food and water supplies throughout the city?
2. Will there be a general increase in criminal activity as a result of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait?
3. What hazards do assessment teams face? What are the locations of equipment, weapons caches and ordnance?

As assessment teams spread throughout the city, the populace disclosed valuable information to them. The teams immediately plugged that information into the collection plan in an effort to answer the questions posed by the PIRs.

Iraqi equipment and documents discovered by one assessment team were inventoried and turned over to the 513th MI Brigade, where they could be exploited for their intelligence value. Another team discovered a piece of Iraqi communications

*Essential Kuwaiti services such as this desalinization plant in Kuwait City suffered extensive damages during the Gulf War.*

DoD photo

equipment at a Kuwait City bank. The team reported the find to the G-2, which inventoried the item and transferred it to the 513th MI Brigade.

## Coordination

Collection and dissemination of CA information call for close coordination between Civil Affairs and military intelligence assets. The intel assets of Task Force Freedom successfully integrated their limited resources. The G-2 coordinated with the 513th MI Brigade, the 8th Marine Regiment and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Command. The AFMIC assessed the viability of Kuwait City's hospitals and medical clinics. The G-2 section also interfaced throughout Kuwait City with teams from the 3rd and 5th Special Forces Groups, to verify and exchange information. Coordination proved useful in verifying information and helped minimize miscommunication, dissemination of conflicting data and competition between activities.

A successful coordination effort developed between an officer from the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Command and personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group. The AFMIC officer "piggybacked" with medical teams while they were performing their missions. On one occasion, the medical team and the AFMIC officer discovered that the Iraqis had used city hospitals to store military equipment of no medical value. They promptly reported the information to the CA legal team, which determined that the use of medical facilities was inappropriate and possibly a human-rights violation.

## Conclusion

During Desert Storm, the G-2 section of the Civil Affairs Task Force coordinated its limited resources in order to maximize its information-gathering capability. During the process, the G-2 learned a number of lessons:

• Intelligence assets from several agencies can be pooled to collect information, although their missions differ.

• Civil Affairs information is *people* information. When mingling with the populace, CA teams, by their very nature, passively collect data that conventional intelligence resources would otherwise not consider essential.

• CA information must be disseminated in a timely manner for it to be useful to its consumers. Hence, a mechanism must be put into place to collate specifically CA information and to disseminate the information to those agencies within and outside the special-operations community where it will be useful.

• To collect CA-unique information, the CA teams must develop a working relationship with other agencies within the task force. CA teams must also interface with their special-operations counterparts, especially the Special Forces groups deployed in the same areas as the CA teams.

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# Intervention Decision-making During the Bush Administration: Deciding Where to Go In and When to Get Out

*by Arnold Kanter*

During the Bush administration, the United States was forced to address numerous conflicts in other nations and to decide whether to intervene, when to intervene, and how to intervene with military forces.

What follows is an attempt to describe this decision-making process from the perspective of a participant-observer and to record observations that can be treated as hypotheses for future research.[1] It is limited to the consideration of post-Cold War ethnic, nationalist and separatist conflicts, or EN&SC, from around 1991 to January 1993.[2] The essay includes cases of "dogs that didn't bark"; e.g., conflicts in Sudan, Moldova and Tajikistan, in which intervention was a theoretical possibility but never a serious option. It also attempts to account for the strikingly low number of cases about intervention termination.

## Conflicts

The most obvious, yet central, characteristic of post-Cold War conflicts is that they do not take place in the context of superpower competition. The twin implications of this fact are paradoxical. On the one hand, absent a Cold War calculus, U.S. interests perceived to be at stake in a given EN&SC typically are seen to be lower than they might have been during the Cold War: As the connection between strife in far-off places and U.S. national security or other vital interests has become more problematic, the case for U.S. intervention in any given situation has become less compelling. One need only contrast Angola and Afghanistan with Liberia and Tajikistan. On the other hand, absent a superpower competitor, the perceived risks of intervention likewise seem to be lower: We no longer have to worry about confronting Soviet surrogates and the possibility that U.S. intervention could escalate into a superpower confrontation and conflict.[3] This combination of lower stakes and lower risks tends to make intervention decisions more idiosyncratic and even less predictable than they were during the Cold War.

Another consequence of the end of the Cold War is that classic cases of interstate aggression are being supplanted by ethnic, nationalist and separatist conflicts.[4] As previously mentioned, the U.S. interests at stake in such conflicts are more ambiguous. Additionally, the political and legal grounds for intervention in such conflicts are unfamiliar and controversial. Traditionally, there has been a strong presumption in U.S. foreign policy against "interference in the internal affairs of others." This presumption is reinforced by objections from governments whose political support we increasingly require, governments that may be worried about establishing precedents which might affect *them* in the future. Finally,

DoD photo

*Members of the forward component of Operation Provide Comfort move through a valley in northern Iraq under the protection of the no-fly zone.*

the basis in international law for intervening in EN&SC often is problematic. That is important, because countries whose political support we seek often will insist on a solid international legal rationale for the proposed course of action.

Such political and legal considerations loom large in U.S. decision-making about whether to intervene and how to intervene in EN&SC precisely because the end of the Cold War increased the political need for support from other countries and eliminated our strongest claim on that support. For evidence of the importance that the U.S. attaches to multinational support for intervention and of the price paid in the coin of constraints on U.S. action, one can examine the negotiations with our allies to establish "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq and to respond militarily to Iraqi defiance of U.N. inspection teams.

## Paradox

Plowing the unfamiliar ground of EN&SC also gives rise to what might be called the "paradox of policy principles." There is considerable value, if not a clear necessity, in articulating *some* principles to guide intervention decisions. These principles are necessary for furnishing internal guidance to the bureaucracy and providing public rationales that explain the intervention decisions taken or not taken. During this early stage of the post-Cold War world, it has been difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a set of principles that the United States is prepared to apply and invoke consistently. Nevertheless, decisions have to be made, explained and defended.

For example, if we are prepared to uphold (or restore) democracy in Haiti, why will we not do so in Angola, much less in Georgia? If we are prepared to intervene in Somalia in an attempt to end the starvation, why are we not willing to do the same in Sudan or in Burundi? If we support the principle of self-determination, why do we oppose the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester, etc., from the entities that emerged out of the breakup of the Soviet Union? How do we reconcile our support for the principle of self-determination with our own Civil War? (This is a question Russian officials are delighted to ask.)

This "paradox of policy principles" probably is explainable by reference to the novelty of dealing with EN&SC in the post-Cold War world and the ambiguity of U.S. interests at stake in any such conflict. Whatever the reasons, the paradox imposes both internal and external costs. Internally, the absence of a relatively consistent set of decision guidelines adds to the confusion and controversy surrounding

any intervention issue. Externally, the absence of a stable set of principles that can be invoked contributes to accusations of inconsistency and hypocrisy.

The central features of the post-Cold War world have made the decision-making process related to intervention issues more complicated and less orderly. While there always has been some finite probability that a decision about whether or not to intervene could have gone the other way, today that uncertainty has substantially increased and has potentially significant implications regarding our ability to deter EN&SC.

## Characteristics

If the uncharted territory of the post-Cold War world provided the context within which intervention issues were considered by the Bush administration, perhaps it is not surprising that the decision-making process itself was somewhat less than orderly and well-structured. The following characteristics of that process can serve as hypotheses for future research.

1. *The manner by which "candidates" for intervention are added to the decision agenda is relatively idiosyncratic and unpredictable.* As the contrasting responses to the seemingly similar Somalia and Sudan cases suggest, media coverage can have a significant impact and helps put the issue on the agenda of senior decision-makers. Moreover, intensive media coverage all but compels senior-level decision-makers to address the issue. As the Bosnia case illustrates, however, media coverage can substantially increase the chances of an issue appearing on the decision agenda, but it does not necessarily lead to a decision to intervene.

Ad hoc, self-generated assessments by officials about "what is at stake" are another way in which candidates for intervention are selected and rise to the top of the decision agenda. For example, the ebb and flow in U.S. policy toward the conflict in the former Yugoslavia can be explained in part by the issue being variously defined as a humanitarian tragedy, a test of NATO in the post-Cold War world, a test of the European Community's ability to act, a test of U.S. leadership, a risk of spillover and escalation, an important precedent for dealing with EN&SC in the post-Cold War world, and a clear signal to Russia about the constraints on its actions toward breakaway republics. The process


*A member of a U.N. peacekeeping force stops to talk to two children. Images portrayed in the media can have a significant impact on public perception and can force decision-makers to address a situation.*

United Nations photo

of defining issues also depends on factors such as who has access to senior-level decision-makers, who reads what, who talks with whom, and even the sequence in which seemingly diverse issues are addressed.

2. *Although the identity of the participants is fairly stable and predictable, the decision-making process itself is fairly ad hoc.* To some extent, this feature is simply a reflection of the decision-making process with respect to any important issue, particularly intervention decisions that are nonroutine and often take place in a crisis atmosphere. It also is a reflection of the still-developing intervention policy. We are still adapting to a new world order in the post-Cold War world, and there are central questions about how various U.S. interests are engaged and how we should try to protect or advance them. We are now in an inductive, learning-from-experience mode, with little precedent, much less policy, to serve as a guide to action.

It is important to add that learning almost certainly is taking place. Not only is there a growing body of precedent as we face more and more intervention decisions, but the criteria and checklists — the questions that must be asked and answered with respect to potential interventions — are becoming increasingly standardized.

3. *The decision-making process with respect to intervention issues frequently begins at relatively senior levels and works up from there.* During the Bush administration, issues related to the basic policy decisions about whether or not to intervene with U.S. forces often were *initially* addressed by the Deputies Committee. Frequently, these senior-level interagency deliberations were not supported by substantial staffing or written analyses because of several factors, including time constraints and a fear of leaks.

The issues then were referred to cabinet-level officials for consideration before being presented to the president for decision. Decisions that emerged often seemed to be surprising, abrupt changes in policy. The decision to send a 30,000 man force to Somalia is a vivid case in point.

4. *The process by which the military frames the issue and formulates its assessment and advice is a "black box" to most participants outside the Pentagon.* The civilian leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense may not be much better informed. Although the Joint Staff routinely tasks the relevant command(s) for assessments, recommendations and plans, it is not clear how much — or what kind of — guidance and context is provided with that tasking. It likewise is unclear how much and what kinds of informal communications between the field and Washington take place in service and other military channels.

5. *There are relatively stable and distinguishable "agency perspectives" on issues related to intervention.* Despite the pitfalls of generalizations, it nevertheless is possible to characterize broadly the positions which the key organizations tend to adopt.

The State Department tends to be more willing than the other participants to threaten and to deploy and employ military forces. The State Department also tends to be more willing to take risks than the other participants do. In part, this is a corollary to the observation that the State Department does not pay the price of military interventions, be they successful or unsuccessful. But it probably also is a reflection of a bureaucratic tactic to make intervention options more attractive by reducing their apparent force requirements.[5]

Both civilian and military members of the Pentagon tend to be much more conservative on use-of-force issues.[6] This is particularly true of the JCS representatives.[7] They typically insist that military forces should be deployed only if the president is ready actually to use force. In contrast to the State Department, which views the threat and the use of force as a complement to other foreign-policy instruments, the Pentagon is more likely to view the use of force as a last resort; i.e., when diplomacy and other policy instruments have been tried and have failed.

In addition, JCS representatives typically argue that if the U.S. is going to commit military forces, it should be prepared to

bring overwhelming force to bear.[8] In part, this position reflects a thoroughly understandable desire to ensure victory. It probably also reflects an effort to minimize casualties by intimidating would-be opponents and discouraging engagements. Finally, JCS representatives clearly understand that intervention options entailing large force requirements have the practical political effect of virtually ruling out military intervention.[9]

6. *Personalities matter*. If the foregoing reflects the truism of bureaucratic behavior that "Where you stand depends on where you sit," there is a related truism that the higher you go in an organization, the less you can predict positions on issues from a knowledge of organizational membership. Given the decision-making process described above, however, the personal beliefs, experiences and perceptions of the participants played an unusually large role in the decisions that emerged.

In understanding U.S. policy toward Bosnia, for example, one needs to give full weight to the lessons learned by Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger, from their respective tours of duty in Yugoslavia,[10] to Gen. Colin Powell's views on the use of force and the commitment of forces, and to President Bush's determination not to put U.S. ground forces into Bosnia under virtually any circumstances. President Bush was strongly inclined to accept military recommendations regarding the forces required to accomplish the mission he had given them and to grant broad operational latitude in the conduct of that mission. Powell brought not only his forceful personality to the process but also the healthy discipline of regularly insisting on an answer to the question: "What is the military objective we are trying to accomplish?"

7. *"Slippery slopes" are a frequent source of concern, in part because they really exist*. One of the arguments regularly invoked in interagency debates to oppose U.S. military involvement in an EN&SC is that our role, however modest initially, will start us down an uncontrollable "slippery slope" to growing political responsibility for the outcomes that emerge and for the increasing military intervention to ensure satisfactory outcomes. Put differently, there is concern that we will lose control of our stakes and therefore of our involvement. An important corollary is that it becomes increasingly difficult to terminate U.S. military involvement short of having achieved success or having set an arbitrary deadline for withdrawal.

Although these slippery-slope arguments may be invoked by bureaucratic participants who are opposed to U.S. intervention for other reasons, there is enough real-world experience to preclude simply dismissing such objections out of hand. Somalia provides a good illustration. The U.S. airlift of relief supplies to a handful of Somali airfields seemed to be a relatively modest operation with clear limits, but it paved the way for the U.S.-led United Nations International Task Force, or UNITAF. Given the overwhelming U.S. role in and responsibility for UNITAF, it proved to be virtually impossible politically to do a clean hand-off to the United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNISOM.

It is easy to imagine how the U.S. could have found itself on an analogous slippery slope in Bosnia. In early 1992, the U.S. and several of its NATO allies reached a consensus to initiate an airlift of relief supplies to Sarajevo. Such an airlift required that the Sarajevo airport be reopened, which, in turn, necessitated the deployment of air controllers, other technicians and experts, and a security force to protect them; i.e., a contingent totaling several hundred military personnel. The U.S. was prepared to provide this on-the-ground capability, but the French preempted the U.S. deployment with a contingent of their own.[11]

8. *Concerns about slippery slopes notwithstanding, planning, paradoxically, is often shortsighted*. Lack of foresight may be due in part to a tendency to discount slippery-slope objections to intervention as being little more than ways of covering for other, often unstated, objections. Thus, if a decision is made to intervene, the worries, concerns and risks expressed by those who have been overruled tend to be forgotten or ignored.

DoD photo

*A U.S. Air Force crew unloads a shipment of food supplies during relief operations in Somalia.*

9. *Decision-making is probabilistic and context-dependent*. It was argued above that the combination of the lower risks and the reduced stakes that characterize U.S. intervention options in the post-Cold War world makes it increasingly difficult to predict what the United States will decide and how it will respond in any given instance. Most of the characteristics of the decision-making process described here add to that uncertainty. The decision to intervene in Somalia in late 1992 with nearly 30,000 American troops surprised most people, inside as well as outside the government. It is likely that even the decision to take military action to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait was neither certain nor obvious to most people outside President Bush's inner circle before it was announced. The net result of such unpredictability — reinforced by a long list of cases in which we did not intervene, e.g., Sudan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia — is that it undermines the deterrent effect of our threats to intervene.

## Guidelines for decision

No set of formal policy guidelines for intervention decisions existed during the Bush administration.[12] Nevertheless, it is possible to infer from the record several informal rules of thumb that the administration used to structure the issues it faced and to inform the choices it made.

1. *Do not intervene — especially on the ground — absent high confidence that the intervention will be relatively brief and inexpensive and that it will cause minimal casualties and collateral damage.* This guideline reflects the intersection of ambiguous (but clearly less-than-vital) stakes and uncertain domestic political support for intervention. Quick, clean and cheap interventions are more likely to be commensurate with the stakes and are unlikely to generate significant domestic political problems. Conversely, the prospects for sustaining domestic political support over an extended period of time — especially as things go wrong, setbacks occur and costs mount — usually appear foreboding.

2. *Do not intervene unless there is a high probability of success.* This guideline adds another condition to the ones listed above: namely, if we intervene, we need to win or otherwise succeed. The implication of this added condition is that we should not

intervene simply to raise the price of aggression or to send a message to would-be aggressors. An important corollary is that the perceived cost of a failed intervention always is seen to exceed the cost of inaction, both at home and with respect to deterrence of future EN&SC. This perspective creates a strong presumption that it is better to take no action than to launch an intervention that risks failure. Finally, the application of this guideline tends to equate the conditions for terminating the intervention with success; i.e., the intervention typically must continue until we win. A distant second choice is to set a fixed, but essentially arbitrary, deadline for withdrawal.

3. *Avoid congressional involvement in the decision-making process*. The reluctance in involving — as contrasted with informing — Congress stems in part from a view about the respective roles of the executive and legislative branches in foreign policy.[13] It also is the result of a pragmatic calculation that to involve Congress is to impose the requirement that Congress support, rather than merely acquiesce in, the proposed intervention.[14] At best, congressional support will result in a loss of presidential flexibility. Of course, Congress could well impose other conditions. Taken together, these prospects tend to discourage U.S. involvement in contingencies that carry with them a significant probability of congressional involvement.[15]

4. *Minimize the need for political support and the risk of negative political consequences*. This guideline is an extension of the one above and is motivated by many of the same considerations. Paradoxically, the desire to avoid having an intervention issue become fodder for political pundits probably is strengthened as a consequence of the growing importance of domestic political considerations in foreign policy.[16] Put simply, the greater the chances of controversy, the lower the probability that the U.S. will intervene and the higher the premium on keeping the intervention quick, clean and cheap.

5. *Insist that U.S. involvement is qualitatively different in* political *terms*. The public justification for this position is that because the U.S. is the world's only remaining superpower, its participation — especially any casualties it might suffer or inflict — has distinctive implications and consequences. U.S. involvement, therefore, should be the exception rather than the

U.S. Army photo

*Defense Secretary Dick Cheney visits Gen. Maxwell Thurman following Operation Just Cause. Such unilateral operations as Just Cause may become rare exceptions to the rule of operations authorized by the U.N.*

rule, and it is perfectly appropriate for our government to urge and expect others to go where our forces will not. This rationale was invoked to help explain why the United States would not contribute observers on the ground in Bosnia to help monitor the "no-fly zone" established by the U.N. Security Council.[17] Whatever its legitimacy, the result of this perspective is the creation of yet another presumption against U.S. involvement.

6. *Avoid committing U.S. ground forces.* This guideline usually is applied by insisting that U.S. contributions be limited to a situation in which they would be unique. Typically, it has been interpreted to refer to unique American military capabilities, e.g.; strategic lift, intelligence and communications.[18] The clear implication is that the U.S. has no comparative advantage in the ground forces who might be required as part of an intervention force; therefore, it would expect others to contribute these capabilities. The desired effect of this guideline is to increase the chances that the U.S. role, if not the overall intervention, will meet the standards of quick, cheap and clean.

7. *Retain operational control over U.S. combat forces, particularly ground combat forces.* In part, this guideline reflects the increased stakes that result from the commitment of U.S. forces. It also reflects greater confidence in U.S. military leadership, certainly as compared to Third World commanders. Finally, it reflects an appreciation of the fact that the president will be held responsible for American casualties, no matter under whose command they occur. However, the president will likely be more severely criticized if casualties occur while Americans are carrying out the orders of a foreign commander.

This guideline has the potentially perverse consequence of making U.S. military participation tantamount to an all-or-nothing proposition. If the U.S. insists that its forces serve only under U.S. commanders during an intervention, then other potential contributors may expect and, in any event, will argue that the U.S. should contribute the bulk of the forces. Therefore, if, for whatever reason, the U.S. determines that its forces should participate in an intervention, we will be under considerable pressure to play a *substantial* role.

8. *Secure authorization by the U.N. or another international organization.* In the post-Cold War world, in which only less-than-vital interests are militarily threatened, unilateral interventions such as Just Cause may increasingly become rare exceptions to the rule of operations authorized by U.N. Security Council resolutions. In part, this is a requirement imposed by our allies as a condition of their participation (see below). Also, it is a condition imposed by the political rhetoric and realities at home. Whatever its origins, it is a source of additional legal and political constraints on U.S. action.

9. *Obtain multilateral participation.* This dictum might be considered a straightforward corollary to the above guideline, but that should not obscure the fact that it imposes an additional set of constraints. It is one thing for an ally to offer political support, including voting in favor of a U.N. Security Council resolution, but it is another thing for the ally to agree to join with the U.S. in a military operation. The price of participation is likely to be additional conditions and constraints on the operation as well as perhaps "side payments" on other, unrelated issues.

## Conclusions

As should be clear from the foregoing description, there has not been (and probably still is not) an orderly, formal, well-structured decision-making process that culminates in decisions about whether or not to intervene in the contingency at hand. The distinguishing features of the post-Cold War world, which tend to reduce both the stakes and the risks of most interventions, only add to the complications and confusion. It also should be clear that the informal decision-making process that does exist reveals relatively stable characteristics, and that "learning" in the form of convergence on tacit decision guidelines and rules of thumb is occurring.

The picture of the decision-making process which emerges from this examination of the early post-Cold War period is one which is, paradoxically, both very insular and highly constrained by external factors. It also is one which has strong, systemic biases against intervention. Indeed, the question is less *why* the U.S. decides to intervene in any particular instance than *how* it ever manages to overcome these strong, pervasive presumptions against intervention.

The most difficult and controversial issues typically concern the commitment of U.S. ground forces. These decisions are qualitatively different from decisions about the commitment of "unique" U.S. capabilities, such as strategic lift and intelligence. To overstate only slightly, U.S. decision-making about intervention is about decisions concerning the deployment of U.S. ground combat forces. Finally, success is the primary, if not the sole, criterion for deciding when to terminate an intervention. On the one hand, this is a high standard which constitutes yet another obstacle to an intervention decision. On the other hand, it has profound implications for "termination decision-making" by making it very difficult to extricate ourselves from an intervention short of victory.

## Implications

The Army finds itself in a paradoxical situation. The decision-making process described above — informal, ad hoc, high-level, insular — suggests that the Army leadership may have little warning before an intervention decision is made, and a small role in making it. However, it is Army commanders who typically are called upon to implement the most difficult, sensitive decisions to intervene with ground combat forces.

This situation poses two challenges for the Army. The first concerns the capabilities that the Army may be called upon to provide. In intervention contingencies to date, the Army has used existing forces designed to meet evolving Cold War missions. One question facing the Army is whether it should develop *specialized* capabilities tailored to meet the distinctive requirements of post-Cold War EN&SC. Considering the Army's severely constrained resources, the development of such capabilities probably would come at the expense of capabilities to perform other Army missions. Without specialized resources, however, the Army may be ill-equipped for the missions it most likely will be called upon to perform.[19]

The other challenge concerns how the Army supports the senior-level policy-makers who have been, and will continue to be, confronted with intervention choices. As noted above, the Army leadership may not substantially participate in the decision-making process. However, the military options these policy-makers believe are available to them will have a significant impact on the choices they make, and the manner in which their decision is implemented will have a substantial effect on whether U.S. political objectives are achieved. Bearing in mind the characteristics of the decision-making process and the tacit decision guidelines that senior policy-makers are likely to employ, the Army should consider whether it can better provide analysis, options and implementation and how best to anticipate the NCA's political needs, concerns, and sensitivities related to EN&SC. ✂

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*ment, Kanter was a member of the staff of the Brookings Institution and a member of the faculty of Ohio State University and the University of Michigan. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan as well as a master's degree and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University.*

Notes:

[1] Given the limited objectives of this essay, which was drafted in the spring of 1994, no effort was made to conduct interviews or to research primary and secondary source material. That said, there is every reason to believe that observations the essay records probably are generalizable, rather than being peculiar to the Bush administration. Both for that reason, and as a stylistic convenience, it is written in the present tense.

[2] On the one hand, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm falls outside the boundaries of EN&SC. On the other hand, the ODS experience is relevant to an analysis of EN&SC decision-making if only because it is regularly invoked as a successful model and precedent when EN&SC interventions are being considered.

[3] An important residual of Cold War thinking remains. There has been great sensitivity about becoming involved in any conflict which is located on the Russian periphery or presents the likelihood of confronting Russian soldiers. This sensitivity all but ruled out serious consideration of intervening in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. Russian officials did not hesitate to reinforce that sensitivity by drawing analogies between the Monroe Doctrine and Russian "responsibilities" in countries on their periphery; i.e., in the "near-abroad."

[4] The actual number of EN&SC probably has increased with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, but it is also the case that these same factors permit — or in some cases require — the U.S. to pay more attention to EN&SC.

[5] As will be seen below, military participants employ the opposite bureaucratic tactic of overstating the apparent force requirements. The result is mutual suspicion and reciprocal incentives to engage in bureaucratic gaming.

[6] During the Bush administration, OSD and JCS made it a regular practice to arrive at a common position, which they would then jointly present in the interagency process. This practice may have had the collateral consequence of muting any "pro-intervention" proclivities among senior OSD civilians.

[7] In fact, it is very difficult to distinguish between JCS Chairman Powell's approach to "use of force" issues and the positions taken by JCS representatives who participated at lower levels in the decision-making process.

[8] At the same time, JCS representatives often worry aloud about the scarcity of critical force elements and the implications a proposed military operation will have regarding our ability to deal with other contingencies. Likewise, the projected dollar cost of a proposed operation can be a substantial factor in deciding whether or not to proceed. The combination of increasingly tight defense budgets and negligible allocations for "peacekeeping" requires either that other military capabilities — typically readiness — will be shortchanged to cover the costs of an unbudgeted intervention, or that the administration pay the political price of seeking a supplemental appropriation from Congress.

[9] JCS recommendations about force requirements are rarely subject to second-guessing and carry enormous weight in the decision-making process, whatever other participants might suspect about what lay behind those stated requirements.

[10] Eagleburger served as American ambassador in Yugoslavia, and Scowcroft as defense attaché in Belgrade.

[11] The tacit competition between the U.S. and France over which would provide personnel to reopen the Sarajevo airport was a reflection of intra-alliance politics, intramural disputes about the "European security and defense identity" and the respective roles for NATO and the EC in expressing this identity.

[12] As it enters its second year in office, the Clinton administration likewise has yet to issue a "Presidential Decision Directive" with its policy guidelines.

[13] Debates about the "Byrd amendment" on U.S. involvement in Somalia and the "Dole amendment" on U.S. involvement in Haiti are good contemporary examples of this issue.

[14] Its public grumbling notwithstanding, Congress often welcomes the opportunity not to have to take a formal position for or against controversial foreign-policy decisions, including decisions related to intervention.

[15] Indeed, presidents sometimes establish congressional approval as a condition for U.S. intervention in order to avoid pressure from allies to become involved. Many analysts believe that Eisenhower employed this tactic to deflect a French request for assistance in Indochina. Some observers see the same tactic at play in the administration's insistence on congressional approval of any deployment of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia.

[16] As the Bosnia case demonstrates, inaction by the U.S. also can become a source of political controversy and grist for editorial writers.

[17] Undoubtedly, there were several other reservations about U.S. participation, including "slippery slope" concerns.

[18] There is another sense in which U.S. capabilities can be unique: namely, when American participation is *politically* indispensable.

[19] There also is the interesting question of whether the availability of specialized capabilities tailored to the distinctive requirements of EN&SC would affect decisions about whether to intervene and when to exit by changing the cost-benefit calculations of senior decision-makers.

# SF Direct Action and Targeting: Appropriate Force and Customer Satisfaction

*by Lt. Col. Ed Phillips*

Given the modern battle calculus, the classic Special Forces direct-action mission — using detachments against generic point targets — seems to make little sense. Air Force aircraft are capable of penetrating deeper and packing a more lethal load than the hardiest SF detachment. Aircraft strike with stunning accuracy, and, in the case of cruise missiles, with no operator risk. Manned aircraft carry a more sophisticated, effective array of designators and sensors than Army Special Forces could ever hope to employ. And, as the Gulf War demonstrated, if aerial platforms can find the target, they will probably kill it.

So where does this reality leave Special Forces? Are we out of the unilateral destruction business?

Recent SF experience in the Battle Command Training Program, or BCTP, suggests not. Our understanding of the direct-action mission, however, especially in what we decide to attempt, must come on line with reality and the needs of the supported general-purpose force, or GPF.

## Background

From January through March 1994, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, supported the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division during ramp-up command-post exercises and the BCTP war-fighter CPX. While the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center focus on field-training exercises with battalion task forces and sometimes brigades, the BCTP trains corps and division staffs. Army SF regularly provide special-operations command-and-control elements, or SOCCEs, to player GPFs in BCTP exercises.

Normally, one SF company is tasked to provide a SOCCE. However, for this particular war-fighter CPX, the 2/7th expanded its participation and provided two SOCCEs, the operations center and signal center of the forward operational base, and the SOF player cell at the battle simulation center. Because of the 2/7th's involvement at every level in the simulation (division close fight to corps deep battle, corps main to brigade tactical operations centers, joint special operations task force to FOB), the battalion staff had to confront the DA-targeting dilemma head-on.

The BCTP scenario postulated a contingency operation in which elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps — 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and 10th Division (Light) — secured a lodgment such as an airhead or a seaport and subsequently attacked to protect the lodgment. The enemy was an artillery-heavy force organized along former Warsaw Pact lines (in other words, it had enough artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems to create a moonscape).

In the ramp-up CPXs, the SF players performed special reconnaissance in great depth to provide early "decision point" warning for the corps. SR teams "computer identified" enemy artillery but had no capability to interdict it. In both CPXs, the 82nd's units suffered heavy casualties from that same artillery. (During the second CPX, two brigades each suffered more than 50-percent casualties.) Close air support and MLRS counterbattery fire didn't help — the systems could not detect the mobile artillery, which scurried into ravines and valleys after delivering devastating fire. This counterfire phenomenon was not unlike the problem with mobile SCUDs that the coalition experienced during Desert Storm.

## Mission criteria

During the after-action review for the ramp-up CPX, the FOB staff and the SOCCE commanders asked the logical questions: What can we do to help the GPF? What is the GPF commander's biggest problem? SF units had only one clearly specified task in the corps operations plan: to provide early warning. Clearly, early warning was not enough. SF player units had to find a better way of supporting the GPF.

To do this, the FOB reviewed the CPX in terms of the SOF Mission Criteria:

- Appropriate SOF mission
- Supports campaign plan
- Operationally feasible
- Resources available
- Outcome justifies risk

The FOB focused on enemy artillery as the GPF's biggest concern, at least through D+5. The CPX review indicated that given some early air assets, SF special-reconnaissance and unconventional-warfare player units could help the GPF.

• First, terminal-guidance operations, or TGOs, as a form of DA are certainly appropriate SOF missions, especially when air platforms can't locate a target on their own, a situation common with mobile or nonlinear targets. Indeed, it could be argued that the only appropriate DA mission for the A-detachment is standoff strike, employing aircraft or long-range weapons when other systems can't find a critical target (SCUDS in the desert or mobile artillery in rough terrain in the BTCP scenario). Locating an opposing force's mobile theater ballistic missiles or other delivery systems that are capable of


DoD photo

*Although modern aerial platforms strike with stunning accuracy, SOF special-reconnaissance and unconventional-warfare assets may sometimes do a better job of finding the target.*

employing nuclear, biological and chemical munitions may become extremely appropriate (and more important) in the post-Cold War world. National policy-makers are voicing increasing concerns with the threat such systems represent.

• Second, interdiction of the artillery in the BCTP scenario clearly supported the campaign plan. The 82nd Airborne Division could not survive unless the enemy artillery was damaged or destroyed early. And if the 82nd failed, so would the campaign plan.

• Third, the use of aerial interdiction was certainly feasible. The SF detachments were already on the ground, and the U.S. enjoyed air superiority in the scenario.

• Fourth, each ODA had all the resources needed to interdict artillery, assuming that such action had been coordinated before their infiltration. Laser designators were unnecessary.

• Finally, the ODAs were at no greater risk than if they had performed only SR and UW missions. Artillery systems were thick on the battlefield and easy to spot from ground level.

Acting on this analysis and on discussions with staff elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps, the FOB developed a series of implied tasks. One was artillery attrition. The SOCCEs convinced the battle simulation center, which portrayed the theater targeting board, of the need for artillery targeting. From D-2 to D+2, SF directed platforms against the enemy artillery, causing a 30-percent attrition prior to the 82nd's arrival. By D+4, the division had secured its objectives with minimal casualties, a vast improvement over the results of the ramp-up CPX. A decisive force multiplier for both the division and corps commanders, SF earned their pay on the computer battlefield, much more so than if they had provided early warning only.

In the BCTP simulation, the FOB aggressively pursued targets as systems and in so doing directly assisted the XVIII Airborne Corps in accomplishing its mission. On paper, the damage to enemy artillery probably saved 2,000 U.S. lives. The GPFs were satisfied because SF detachments located systems no other forces could find. SF survivability was high (all computer casualties occurred during infiltration), because the threat was engaged discriminately and indirectly.

DoD photo

*Air Force personnel study imagery products to develop a target list. To be a viable part of the campaign plan, SF must be aggressively involved in the targeting process.*

## Lessons learned

There are many disconnects between BCTP and reality: no joint task force, no dedicated theater-targeting board, and limited air-interdiction resources. The correlation between the BCTP and reality is the subject of another article, but the 2/7th learned valuable lessons that will be of good use in all theaters.

*Lesson one: Systems vs. grid coordinates* — To be a viable part of the campaign plan, SF must be aggressive in the targeting process. Most theater-targeting boards are, understandably, strike-aircraft-driven. We are a high-tech military. Air Force technicians studying an array of imagery products develop the ubiquitous grid-coordinate target list. Imagery identifies fixed or linear targets, and the targeting board assigns resources against the targets based on the priorities of the

joint task force or the theater commander in chief. The air tasking order allocates sorties, and bombs fall with computer logic and businesslike efficiency.

While all of this fits neatly from an Air Force perspective, from an Army perspective anyone knows that employment of ground forces is never business as usual. What happens to the moving targets, which may be key but cannot be located by satellites or other technology? Even if that high tech succeeds in finding a mobile target, the discovery is only a snapshot in time — five minutes later, the target may be out of range.

Grid-coordinate targeting does not address the mobile-SCUD problem that the coalition experienced during Desert Storm or the mobile-artillery problem that the XVIII Airborne Corps experienced in the BCTP. These problems must be looked upon as systems, not as locations. In the planning process, SF operational bases and FOBs must ask the following: What systems concern the JTF commander or the CINC? Which can we logically affect? How do we sell it?

Failure to focus on key systems represents failure to use Army SF to their fullest potential as a battlefield operating system. Moreover, failure to offer SF employment ideas can result in inappropriate employment concepts from an overworked JTF.

*Lesson two: SOF-appropriate DA missions, engaging the threat discriminately* — JTF headquarters are busy places. A JTF commander and his staff have hundreds of "slice" elements to synchronize. Unless SF logically present employment alternatives, detachments may receive "afterthought" mission taskings based on the targeting-board grid-coordinate list. This "Brooklyn Bridge" syndrome usually occurs during Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises: An SF detachment receives a mission such as "Take out the bridge at coordinate X." Often, the target in question is so low in priority that the JTF runs out of airplanes before it can service it, and often the target is as difficult to take down as the Brooklyn Bridge. Now, that bridge (or any similar fixed target) is not going anywhere soon. It's easy to find. The Air Force could knock it out easily, but the SF detachment can't get to it with enough demolitions to do the job.

The feasibility of such a DA mission, given the associated risk to the detachment, is questionable, especially when the Air Force can do a better job with less risk. It makes little sense to squander SF detachments on targets that could be better destroyed by other BOSs. Better to identify the niche where Army SF can provide a service that other BOSs cannot. Again, aggressive involvement in the targeting and employment process is the way to ensure optimal SF use and battlefield synergy. Given the technologies available, Army SF should focus on standoff techniques in order to engage the threat discriminately.

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# Cut from a Different Cloth: The Origins of U.S. Army Special Forces

*by Joseph R. Fischer*

"War," wrote the 19th-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, "is merely the continuation of politics by other means." The assumption that war exists as a normal part of the political process of nations lies at the heart of this quotation. During Clausewitz's time, war served as a dialectic, carried on primarily by armies and navies rather than by diplomats. Military establishments existed for two reasons: either to wage war or to deter war.

Much of what Clausewitz said about war is relevant today. Events of the last 40 years, however, have forced increased attention to a chapter in his book *On War* entitled "The People in Arms," in which he expounded on the role of the partisan. Drawing on Napoleon's experiences in Spain and Russia, Clausewitz reminded his readers that although partisans lacked the ability to effect a decision in war, their ability to "nibble at the shell and around the edges" of an opponent had frequently helped set the stage for his subsequent defeat.[1] In the 20th century, Mao Tse-tung incorporated Clausewitz's ideas about partisans into his own guerrilla-war theory. Since the Chinese Revolution, various cultural, religious and political factions have adopted guerrilla tactics in their own struggles against their perceived enemies. Frequently, these groups fight from the shadows of society, selecting targets designed to undermine civilian morale.

This threat has forced the U.S. Army to rethink its doctrine and to broaden its response in meeting contingency demands that do not fit the traditional definition of war between nation-states. FM 100-5, *Operations*, addresses the commitment of military forces in three distinct environments: war, conflict and peacetime.[2] Whereas our conventional armed forces center on military objectives during war, circumstances peculiar to conflict and peacetime employments frequently require that political, economic and social goals take precedence over military considerations. The U.S. Army's problem is that its structure is configured toward conducting war-environment operations. Conventional infantry, armor and artillery units do two things well in war: they control terrain, and they destroy the enemy's ground forces through firepower and mobility. In less lethal environments their utility is more circumspect. Our ability to operate in environments short of war rests largely with a group of Army soldiers known as Special Forces.

## Counterinsurgency

Special Forces had existed for years within the Army force structure before the Vietnam War brought them public recognition. They were depicted as our answer

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to communist-sponsored wars of national liberation. Their portrayal as counterinsurgency experts represented a reversal from their original role:

*To infiltrate ... to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and to organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasi-military or a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air forces.*[3]

This original SF mission focused on conducting guerrilla war in support of conventional operations. The employment of Special Forces in Vietnam indicated a widening of mission responsibilities that continues today as the Army adjusts to a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Expertise both in the culture and in the language of their assigned geographic areas make SF soldiers invaluable assets in pursuing U.S. policy in the developing world. Although assigned a combat role during war, Special Forces have made their most significant contributions during conflict and in peacetime environments.

Special Forces' new-found respectability is a relatively recent occurrence. At the beginning of World War II, we possessed nothing that could remotely be termed an unconventional-warfare capability.[4] What little experience our military had gained in this field was in opposing unconventional-warfare efforts directed against U.S. interests. Soldiers or Marines had crushed indigenous tribes and put down a guerrilla uprising in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War, and they conducted numerous military operations in Central America and the Caribbean in defense of American political and economic interests. Military officers believed themselves to be experts in counterinsurgency but had long forgotten that guerrilla operations were once a part of America's strategic approach to war.[5]

## OSS formation

The beginning of World War II caught the U.S. unprepared. Much of the Pacific Fleet rested in ruins in the silt of Pearl Harbor. In Europe, France had fallen, and only the approach of winter had stopped Hitler's panzers from reaching Moscow. Britain was still holding out against the Luftwaffe, but German U-boats were taking a terrible toll of British shipping. Facing a bleak strategic situation, President

Photo by Don Brown

*A Special Forces adviser in Vietnam plans an operation with his South Vietnamese counterpart.*

Franklin D. Roosevelt was open to suggestions. Even before Pearl Harbor, William J. Donovan, a successful Wall Street lawyer who had earned the Medal of Honor during World War I, argued for a government organization dedicated to collecting strategic intelligence. Roosevelt, against the advice of his service chiefs and J. Edgar Hoover, bought the idea. After an inauspicious beginning, Donovan's organization became known as the Office of Strategic Services. Not content to limit his organization's activity to gathering intelligence, Donovan expanded the OSS's scope to encompass "special operations," a term that eventually became synonymous with unconventional warfare. Under this heading, Donovan included sabotage, subversion, propaganda and guerrilla warfare.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

*Brig. Gen. William Donovan (right) confers with the British Lord Mounbatten (center) during World War II.*

Donovan envisioned high-risk endeavors for his special-operations people. When military thinkers were increasingly seeing technological sophistication as the prerequisite for success in war, Donovan was holding almost antiquated beliefs concerning the importance of the individual. He intended to create an organization from carefully screened volunteers who possessed initiative, intelligence, drive and physical stamina. Competency in Norwegian, French, Italian, Greek and Slavic languages was also emphasized because these languages were common to the areas in which he expected his people to operate.

## European theater

The OSS fielded a number of special-operations organizations. In the European theater, two distinct groups of operatives deployed into Nazi-occupied France. One group was the Jedburghs, named after a town along the Scottish-English border. A Jed team typically consisted of two officers and an enlisted radio operator. Great Britain, France and the U.S. provided most of the personnel for the 96 Jedburgh teams that were eventually fielded and deployed to Europe.[6] Donovan believed that resistance groups existing throughout much of Nazi-occupied Europe could create chaos in the German rear areas by disrupting road and rail traffic and conducting other acts of sabotage. To maximize their effectiveness, however, they had to be linked into the operational plans of the Allied armies gathering for the invasion of France. Donovan wanted the Jedburgh teams to be the link between the partisans and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

SHAEF's next question about the Jedburghs concerned the timing of their deployment. If the Jeds deployed too early, Germany would realize the invasion was imminent. Another concern was how Germany would react to increased guerrilla activity. These considerations overrode arguments to insert the Jeds early: The first teams to deploy to France did so only hours before the landings. The majority of deployments occurred after the establishment of the beachhead.

Jed teams contacted French partisans and waged an energetic war against their German adversaries. The effectiveness of the campaign, however, remains questionable. In northeastern France, the Jed teams that were most advantageously positioned to support the landings received almost no mention in official reports of units driving inland from Normandy.[7] Many problems plagued the Jedburghs, especially the inexperience and the skepticism of conventional Army staffs with

regard to employing this new asset. Gen. George Patton's diary entry for Sept. 2, 1944, reveals the thinking characteristic of one of the Army's best ground commanders. "General 'Wild Bill' Donovan was in camp when I got back and was most complimentary," noted Patton. "While I think the efforts of his cohorts (Office of Strategic Services) are futile, I personally like and admire him a lot. I will now get set for the next move." Most general-staff officers viewed the Jedburghs as audacious but largely irrelevant, an attitude that ensured underemployment for the Jeds.

## Operational Groups

The second organization formed by the OSS, the Operational Groups, suffered the same kinds of problems that plagued the Jeds. The OGs' impact on the war was greater than that of the Jeds because the OGs were organized for a much wider range of missions and were deployed over a larger area.

In the original configuration, each OG consisted of 30 enlisted soldiers and four officers. Subsequent training exercises, however, convinced the OSS that the 34-man OG was too large for easy deployment.[8] Hence, most OGs deployed in 15-man teams.[9] Language skills, good physical condition and a willingness to perform hazardous duty topped the list of characteristics that OSS recruiters sought.[10] Most volunteers came from Army units and possessed expertise in at least one of the following: light and heavy weapons, engineering, medicine or communications. Intended for deployment deep behind enemy lines, the teams would have to be as self-sufficient as possible. Like the Jedburghs, the OGs were capable of organizing and directing guerrillas. OGs could also conduct direct sabotage, rescue downed pilots and collect intelligence.

The OSS formed OGs for deployment in France, Germany, Norway, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia. Except for the German group that deployed into northern Italy, the OGs saw action in their assigned areas. The teams organized and directed Italian partisans in disrupting enemy supply lines and forcing the Germans to divert combat units to rear-area security. They performed similar operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. Here their purpose was to convince the German high command that the Allies intended to mount an offensive through the Balkans.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

*An OSS operative (second from left) poses with partisans in a French village.*

Photo courtesy National Archives

*Soldiers from OSS Detachment 101 teach members of the native resistance to use automatic weapons in their fight against the Japanese.*

In the process, OGs killed or wounded several thousand German soldiers and destroyed key rail and highway bridges and extensive sections of railroad track. In Norway, one OG tied down significant numbers of German soldiers in hit-and-run strikes and destroyed the Tangen railway bridge, a key conduit for German iron-ore shipments from neutral Sweden. OGs deployed into France at approximately the same time as the Jedburghs and played a key role in the invasion of southern France. Assisted by the French resistance, the groups caused more than 1,000 German casualties, captured 10,000 prisoners and destroyed 32 bridges. As German resistance began to crumble, the OGs prevented the German army from destroying transportation facilities crucial for the Allied advance.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the Jedburghs and the OGs remains a difficult task. The extensive list of targets hit and casualties produced suggests that the OSS conducted a successful war against the Germans in occupied Europe. OSS supporters took great satisfaction in Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's statement on the importance of partisan operations:

*I consider the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of German road moves and increasing strain placed on the German ... internal security services throughout occupied Europe by the organized forces of resistance, played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory.*

Eisenhower's praise only indirectly touched on the Jedburghs and the OGs. The records of the field armies deployed to Europe do not indicate that much thought was given to guerrilla war. Many high-ranking officers considered it a waste of both manpower and materiel. Often, the driving force behind deployments of special units was the OSS's own staff officers serving in the field armies. Vague mission statements, a rapidly changing tactical situation and inadequate communications equipment limited the effectiveness of the Jedburghs

and the OGs once they were deployed. Furthermore, few of the targets they destroyed proved to be beyond the capabilities of German engineers to repair. The OSS people were considered minor players in the outcome of the European war.

## Pacific theater

In the war against Japan, guerrilla-war advocates found a better environment in which to test their SOF ideas. Again, Donovan took the lead. With American forces being largely swept from the Pacific early in the war, few places offered much opportunity for a small group of soldiers to make a significant contribution. But the China-Burma-India theater appeared to be one such place. The air- and ground-transportation routes through the area provided the only hope of keeping Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army in the field against the Japanese. So long as the Nationalists remained in the war, the Japanese would have to keep significant numbers of their armed forces in China and away from the invasion routes planned by Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Chester Nimitz for their drives through the southwest and central Pacific.

By mid-1942, Japanese ground forces had closed the Burma Road, the last ground link to China, and were threatening a campaign into India. Donovan lobbied to have a group of OSS operatives sent to support operations in China. Skeptical of the OSS and pressured by Chiang Kai-shek's intelligence chief to deny Donovan's people access to China, Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell refused to commit himself.[11] Nonetheless, Donovan made plans to recruit a unit for the theater. Eventually, the two reached a compromise: Stilwell accepted the OSS detachment; Donovan permitted Stilwell to name its commander. The new detachment's operations would also be limited, for the time, to Burma.[12]

## Detachment 101

Stilwell appointed Maj. Carl Eifler to command the new unit. Using the same selection criteria as for other OSS organizations, Eifler built an organization at training camps in Canada and in the Catochin Mountains near Camp David, Md. Eifler and 20 other soldiers deployed to the CBI theater in the spring of 1942. Their mission was to collect intelligence and foment a guerrilla war against the Japanese. "All I want to hear from you," Stilwell told Eifler, "are booms coming from the Burma jungle."[13] Woefully short of manpower and unable to retake the initiative in the area, Stilwell had to buy time by keeping the Japanese off balance. If Detachment 101 were successful, it could help achieve his objective. Should the unit fail, the loss of a handful of American soldiers would not affect the operational situation.

Eifler's first attempt to infiltrate ground forces into Burma was unsuccessful. Only after he worked out an agreement with Brig. Gen. Edward H. Alexander, chief of the Air Transport Command, to parachute agents into Burma in exchange for organizing an evasion-and-escape network for pilots shot down over the Himalayas did the situation begin to change. Detachment 101 soldiers found many of the local tribes, particularly the Kachins, willing to assist the Allies against the Japanese.

Under Detachment 101's direction, the Kachins became critically important to Stilwell. The dense terrain made it difficult to spot targets for Allied bombers. Kachin guerrillas found nearly 80 percent of the targets that had been selected for bombardment and conducted bomb-damage assessments following the strikes.[14] The pilot-recovery network boosted pilot morale. Detachment 101 eventually directed 10,800 soldiers from the indigenous tribes of northern Burma in a successful guerrilla war against the Japanese.

The OSS served as the key player in the unconventional-warfare campaign waged in every theater commanded by an Army general officer, except for Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command. MacArthur prevented the OSS from working within his command, although Philippine guerrillas operating on a number of the islands caused considerable trouble for the Japanese. They also provided invaluable intelligence concerning Japanese

army and navy units stationed among the islands. American officers who had escaped capture on Bataan helped and frequently commanded the resistance effort.

Two Americans, Col. Wendell W. Fertig and Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, proved particularly troublesome for the Japanese. Neither man had received any special training for his role. Fertig's efforts were assisted by MacArthur's early decision to support the guerrillas with weapons and ammunition. Volckmann had elected to forgo life in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp by fleeing into the jungle when his unit received orders to surrender.[15] After spending several months making his way into the mountains of northern Luzon, he began building a guerrilla organization. The harshness of Japanese occupation methods made recruiting fairly easy. For three years, Volckmann directed the guerrilla campaign in his area, receiving only a modicum of guidance and supplies from MacArthur's headquarters.[16] Nonetheless, when American troops landed on Luzon, Volckmann produced five regiments of Philippine guerrillas (nearly 20,000 soldiers) to assist in retaking the island.

## OSS deactivation

In the European and the Pacific theaters of the war, American soldiers had successfully conducted UW against their opponents. The question facing the military establishment with the coming of peace was what to do with this new American capability. Roosevelt believed it would be necessary to maintain a government organization dedicated to gathering strategic intelligence and responsible solely to the president. Donovan, in a memorandum to Roosevelt, outlined his ideas for the organization. Opponents of the idea leaked the memorandum to *The Chicago Times*, which described the proposed organization as a "Super Spy System for the New Deal."[17] The unwanted publicity forced Roosevelt to postpone his decision on the issue. Roosevelt's death in April 1945 brought Harry Truman to the White House. Truman supported neither the OSS nor Donovan's proposal for a new postwar intelligence agency. On Oct. 1, 1945, Truman ordered the OSS disbanded immediately.[18]

Truman's decision should not have come as a surprise. In the postwar rush to demobilize, the OSS's contribution to the overall war effort constituted only a small part of the whole. None of the unconventional-warfare efforts had been in and of themselves decisive. All had depended on conventional military forces to deliver the *coup de grâce*. Inside the military, the OSS was an organization without a constituency. The perception existed that unconventional warfare did not fit within the American way of war.

Throughout most of our history, American military thinkers have concentrated on developing the means to wage war according to a strategy of annihilation. In turn, the U.S. has dedicated impressive economic resources toward producing machines of war that make possible the combination of firepower and mobility critical to the American military. Guerrilla war represents a different approach to strategy. Focusing on the importance of the individual, guerrilla fighters aim at achieving their objectives through the gradual wearing away of the enemy's capability and will to fight. Whereas a successful strategy of annihilation depends on the ability of the military to project power over space, attrition assumes the need to project power over time. The American public has never seen war as a normal state of affairs and tolerates it reluctantly, pressing the government to finish the matter quickly and at little cost in terms of lives and fortune. This philosophical framework alone ensures that the military will not find it necessary to retain a UW capability in a postwar environment of declining military budgets.

The postwar years of increasing tensions with the Soviet Union brought a reevaluation of the need to collect strategic intelligence. The National Security Act of 1947 authorized the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency to fill the void left by the deactivation of the OSS. Later, National Security Council 10/2 named the CIA responsible for covert paramilitary activities during peacetime.[19]

The Army expressed interest in developing a UW capability, but proponents were unclear about how the organization would look. The most commonly broached idea called for the creation of airborne Ranger units that could "organize and conduct overt and covert operations behind enemy lines."[20] Little came of the proposal, and the interest in unconventional warfare waned until the Korean conflict.

## Korean conflict

North Korea's invasion of South Korea caught American commanders in the Far East by surprise. Unprepared for conventional operations, the U.S. Army possessed absolutely no capability to conduct unconventional warfare. It had neither forces prepared for such a mission nor a doctrine to guide the effort. Opportunities did exist to mobilize a partisan movement in some areas of North Korea where cultural ties linked the inhabitants more closely to the South than to the North, particularly the Koreans living near the 38th parallel in North Korea's Hwanghae Province. Realizing where the province's loyalties lay, Kim Il Sung instituted a harsh policy of incorporation following the division of the country in 1945. The program produced dissent and forced many Hwanghaese to migrate south of the 38th parallel.

The first suggestion that United Nations forces should undertake partisan warfare came in 1950. It met with little support, particularly as U.N. forces flanked the North Korean army at Inchon and drove it northward toward the Yalu. In January 1951, with China's entry into the war and the prospect for a quick end to the conflict gone, Col. John McGee in the 8th Army Headquarters resurrected the partisan-warfare idea and secured its approval. After gaining access to weapons, ammunition and other supplies, McGee gathered a small cadre of officers and men to train the partisan forces he expected to recruit. With the exception of a few individuals who had served in the OSS or as guerrillas in the Philippines, none of the cadre had any UW experience.

McGee managed to put partisan units in combat by March 1951. During the war McGee and Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool built up the force to the strength of five regiments, which were eventually designated the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea, or UNPFK. Partisans received training in all facets of UW, and their trainers labored diligently to prepare them for their role. Partisan leaders received the following advice:

*Initiative and aggressiveness tempered by calm judgment will be encouraged. Avoid trying to win the war by yourself; pace the attack in accordance with your advantage; when the advantage has passed, get away to fight another day. Hit and run; these are the guerrilla's tactics. The planning of such an operation should include an escape route and a rally point. Substitute speed and surprise for mass.*[21]

Most guerrilla operations occurred along North Korea's eastern and western coasts, but the operations in the west proved far more effective.[22] Some operations conducted by McGee's partisans demonstrated considerable audacity and produced exceptional results. In one such operation, partisans cut the Wonsan-Koson railroad, used to supply Chinese and North Korean forces. Previous attempts to cut the railroad

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

*A soldier holds a banner from the U.N. Partisan Forces Korea.*

through aerial bombardment had been only partially successful because communist repair teams were masters at fixing the damage. To keep the railroad closed, the tracks would have to be cut at a point where repair crews could not easily get to the damage. Derailing a train inside a railroad tunnel seemed the best way to accomplish this. After a suitable tunnel was located, a small band of partisans parachuted into the area, placed explosives under the rails inside the tunnel and then waited for a supply train to arrive. The explosion derailed the locomotive, and a number of railcars piled up inside the tunnel.

## Damage estimates

Partisan operations continued throughout the war. By 1953, UNPFK included 22,227 partisans. Measuring the effectiveness of the partisan operations is difficult. Official estimates claimed by UNPFK included the killing of 69,000 enemy soldiers and the destruction of 80 bridges and more than 2,700 vehicles, at minimal cost to UNPFK. Even American officers who directed UNPFK doubted these numbers.

In fairness, UNPFK's figures probably were inflated. During World War II, studies showed that American units regularly inflated their estimates by 7-9 times. Assuming UNPFK did no worse than match the U.S. Army's inaccuracy, the partisans could still take credit for killing 7,700-10,000 North Korean and Chinese soldiers. Regardless of which figures one accepts, the overall assessment is that UNPFK represented a bargain for the Army.

Army support for unconventional operations increased during the Korean conflict. UNPFK's record only partially explains the turnaround—the situation in Europe better accounts for the change. President Truman was hopeful that the American lead in atomic weapons would deter war, but if it did not, military leaders were expecting a war with the Soviet Union to be protracted. The Soviet Union enjoyed a much better strategic position in Europe than did the United States. The Red Army's numerical superiority and forward basing would permit a rapid thrust into West Germany if war came. U.S. military planners faced the prospect of having to blunt the Red Army's blitzkrieg, then having to find a way to mass enough combat power to destroy the invader. This phase of the fighting was expected to approximate World War II combat. Any angle that might increase NATO's chances was considered worthwhile.

Inside the Pentagon, a small group of unconventional-warfare advocates had established a foothold and were energetically pushing the idea that UW could help break the deadlock in NATO's favor. Led by Brig. Gen. Robert McClure, chief of psychological warfare at the Pentagon, staff officers argued that partisan units operating against the Red Army's line of supply in Eastern Europe could make a valuable contribution to NATO's defense and counterattack.[23] Working under the assumption that the Soviet Union's heavy-handed seizure of Eastern Europe following World War II had created feelings of animosity necessary to motivate partisans, all that was necessary, so the argument went, was for the U.S. to organize, equip and direct this new army.[24] The proposal was vintage Donovan, updated to deal with a new enemy.

McClure became the leading advocate for the creation of an Army organization dedicated to UW. Volckmann, now McClure's subordinate, had performed much of the preparatory work for making the concept a reality. Realizing that involvement in UW would encounter a reluctant audience, he worked to fit the new doctrine into the larger strategic picture. At a conference attended by Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff, Volckmann explained why UW was necessary.

*We may visualize the world today as being divided into two major layers of individuals that cover the earth unrestricted by national boundaries. These layers, one red and one blue, are held together by common ideologies. Any future war may well be regarded as an international civil war waged by these opposing layers. The full exploitation of our sympathetic blue layers within the enemy's sphere of influence is basically the mission of special-*

*forces operations. It is from the blue layer within the enemy's sphere of influence that we must foster resistance movements, organize guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis, conduct sabotage and subversion, effect evasion and escape.*[25]

After McClure gained enough support to create the new unit, the next problem was to find personnel authorizations to fill it. Volckmann again took the lead, battling the Army's bureaucracy for a year over the matter.[26] Working a deal with an old West Point classmate, Volckmann finally secured 3,000 personnel spaces from Army units that had been or were being deactivated.[27]

## 10th SF Group

On June 19, 1952, the Army formed the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N.C. Commanded by Col. Aaron Bank, a veteran of the OSS Jedburghs, the 10th SF Group began with only a handful of soldiers. An extensive campaign to fill the group's ranks soon followed. Recruiters focused on soldiers with OSS or Ranger experience.[28] Airborne units also proved to be a good source for the kinds of soldiers the 10th SFG's officers desired. Volunteers knew little about the unit except that the duty would be hazardous.

The architects of the 10th SF Group built it along the lines of their own experiences in World War II. The 15-man OSS OG became the pattern for the SF A-detachment, the smallest deployable component of the group. Training also mirrored that received by OSS operators during the war. Bank arrived at Fort Bragg with a trunkful of OSS documents and lesson plans.[29] These provided the framework for training the new unit. The minimum goal was for each enlisted soldier to possess expertise in at least one of five military skills, including weapons, communications, medical, engineering, or operations and intelligence. With each team targeted for a particular region behind the Iron Curtain, language skills received considerable attention. Thanks largely to the Lodge Bill, SF recruiters were able to bring large numbers of displaced foreign nationals from Eastern Europe into the 10th SF Group. Screened closely to ensure their anti-communist pedigree, these soldiers provided a level of language proficiency never again equaled in Special Forces.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

*Members of an early Special Forces detachment take time out from mountain-warfare training.*

In 1953 when Red Army tanks rolled into the streets of East Berlin to crush a German anti-communist uprising, the 10th had begun to reach the standards set by Bank. Fearing the possibility of another European war, the Army deployed half of the 10th to Bad Tölz in the Federal Republic of Germany. The remaining soldiers formed the basis for the Army's second Special Forces group, designated the 77th Special Forces Group. To hide the 10th's deployment, the Army provided a cover story that depicted the unit as the 10th Airborne Reconnaissance Group, but the effort fooled no one.[30]

Throughout much of the rest of the decade, soldiers of the 10th, 77th and later the 1st Special Forces Group prepared for unconventional warfare aimed at the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. War plans varied for each group. The 10th, for example, intended to commit 50 detachments to operations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself should war break out. The Army, along with the CIA, developed a network of agents in Eastern Europe to use as contacts for the detachments once they deployed. The agents would provide places in which the teams could hide and prepare themselves

for combat. The teams would then begin raising, training and directing partisan bands to operate against targets of opportunity. Bank believed it possible to raise 50 battalions of partisans for use against the Red Army. To secure the Red Army's supply lines, Russian commanders would have to pull 18 divisions from the front to control the partisan threat. The only problem with the concept, as Bank was to find out, was that the commanding general of United States Army-Europe had little, if any, knowledge of the 10th SF Group's requirements or capabilities. No plans existed to support the logistics requirements of 50 battalions of partisans.[31]

In a time of tight budgets, SF opponents saw the new units as the least critical to the Army. With "massive retaliation" being the words commonly used to summarize the official defense policy of the U.S. in the 1950s, the three SF groups appeared extraneous. Also, many Army officers still saw unconventional warfare as, at best, ineffective and, at worst, illegal and unethical. Special Forces supporters doubted the organization would survive.

In 1959, the CIA sought the Army's assistance in countering a growing threat from communist guerrillas against the Laotian government. The Army turned to the 77th SF Group to conduct the mission. Most of the training that Special Forces soldiers had received centered around conducting guerrilla operations. It seemed logical that any group of soldiers trained to foment a guerrilla war possessed the qualifications to defeat one. When the first teams deployed to Laos from Fort Bragg in 1959 in an operation eventually codenamed White Star, they started Special Forces down a new path. The Army's foremost experts in insurgency became masters of counterinsurgency. President John F. Kennedy particularly liked the idea of using Special Forces as low-visibility point men for the military in the battle against what was perceived to be Soviet-sponsored guerrilla wars. SF advocates found renewed support in high places. With considerable prodding from the White House, the Army reluctantly authorized an active-duty strength of seven groups, with additional groups formed in the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The growth of and the use of Special Forces during the 1960s represented an evolutionary step for the Army. War had not broken out on the plains of Europe as planners had envisioned. An Army that was built for conventional battle found itself unprepared to meet the challenges of a conflict that did not meet the traditional definition of war. Special Forces provided the only force capable of an immediate response to the Army's needs. For 35 years, Special Forces have provided the Army with its best capability of meeting contingencies below the threshold of war.

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Notes:

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 480-81.

[2] A number of factors differentiate the three environments, the most important being the level of hostilities present. In war, the weapons available for use may range from nuclear to conventional munitions. Normally the goals are clear and are stated in military terms (e.g., "Invade the Continent of Europe," or "Evict Iraqi Forces from Kuwait"). Armed combat is assumed necessary. Under a conflict environment, the goal is frequently to deter escalation to war and

resolve the conflict. Combat is possible, but the weapons are limited to conventional munitions, with strict rules of engagement to limit unnecessary damage. Recent U.S. operations in Somalia provide the best example of this kind of operating environment. Finally, military operations in a peacetime environment have as their goal the further continuation of peace. The use of force is considered undesirable. See FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-1.

[3] Alfred Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 149.

[4] The term "unconventional warfare" refers to sabotage, escape and evasion, and guerrilla warfare (insurgency).

[5] Most colonial powers had experience with counterguerrilla warfare, but the U.S. may well have been the most successful at it. The U.S. Marine Corps eventually compiled a handbook on its experiences with counterinsurgency that remains exceptionally current in spite of its 1940 copyright. See FAWMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940). We also employed guerrilla units during the American Revolution and the Civil War.

[6] Dutch, Belgian, French Canadian, South African and New Zealand soldiers were also in the Jedburghs, though in small numbers. See Jedburgh Team Listing, Jedburgh Papers, USASOC History and Archives, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[7] S. J. Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, 1991), p. 60.

[8] John W. Shaver III, "Office of the Strategic Services: Operational Groups in France During World War II, July-October 1944" (Master's dissertation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), p. 3.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Miscellaneous Records of Operational Group A, OSS-OG After Action Report-Italy, OSS Records, USASOC History and Archives, Fort Bragg, N.C., p. 2.

[11] Stilwell's reaction to the initial offer of OSS support was anything but encouraging. He was on record as claiming that guerrillas operated outside the legal framework of war and that they were capable of doing little more than "shadow boxing" with the enemy. See Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, p. 32.

[12] The OSS did eventually establish a presence in China, training thousands of guerrillas for operations against the Japanese and, at times, Chinese communists. Organized into "columns" of 1,000 men, these units, along with their American advisers, struck targets from the Chinese coast to the Mongolian border. See Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p. 462.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 464.

[14] David W. Hogan Jr., *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II* (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, 1992), p. 110.

[15] Both Volckmann and Donald Blackburn were assigned to the 11th Division when word reached them that their unit was to surrender. Volckmann requested permission from his division commander, Brig. Gen. William Brougher, to ignore the order and escape through enemy lines with the intention of establishing a resistance movement in the enemy's rear. Brougher agreed to list the two men as missing in action when the division surrendered. See Russell W. Volkmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1954), pp. 40-41.

[16] Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, ed., *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines* (Tokyo: U.S. Army Forces Pacific, 1948), 2:44.

[17] Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, p. 30.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, p. 71.

[21] Headquarters, Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Unit, Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1953, by Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC Guerrilla Division, 22 January 1953, filed with Staff Visit of Col. Bradford Butler Jr., March 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives as quoted in Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, p. 102.

[22] Many of the partisans working along the west coast were natives of Hwanghaese and therefore were very familiar with the area.

[23] McClure was well-positioned to make such an argument. In 1951, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace had appointed him as the ranking officer in a newly created special staff department at Pentagon level, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. This office had proponency not only for psychological operations but also for unconventional operations.

[24] Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 16; and interview with retired MSgt. John Dolin conducted 21 December 1993, USASOC History and Archives, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[25] Headquarters, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., Memorandum to the Commanding General, Infantry Center, subject: Analysis and Suggested re Gen. J. Lawton Collins' Conference, 5 April 1951, from Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 9 April 1951, filed with Psy War 337 (16 April 1951). Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box 12, National Archives.

[26] Russell W. Volckmann to Beverly E. Lindsey, 21 March 1969, in Volckmann Papers, USASOC Archives, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[27] All of the 3,000 positions Volckmann secured came from the Ranger companies the Army had activated for the Korean conflict.

[28] Interview with retired MSgt. John Dolin.

[29] Interview with Caesar J. Civitella, 20 October 1988, USSOCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

[30] Interview with retired MSgt. John Dolin.

[31] *Ibid.*

# A Special Breed of Officer: The Special Forces Warrant Officer

*by CWO3 Shaun Driscoll*

In 1983, the commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center presented a proposal to the Department of the Army for the creation of a new warrant-officer specialty for Special Forces. In June 1984, the first group of 40 SF warrant officers was appointed at Fort Bragg.

The 11 years since then have seen the creation and development of an elite corps of officers unique to SF — warrant officers who go beyond the original role of "officer technician" to lead, train and advise in the demanding environment of special operations.

Warrant officers, unlike other officers, are single-track specialists who have no functional area or secondary occupational specialty. The Army's traditional definition of a warrant officer is "An officer appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army based upon a sound level of technical and tactical competence. The warrant officer is a highly specialized expert and trainer who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates maintains, administers, and manages the Army's equipment, support activities, or technical systems for an entire career."

Although part of the traditional definition accommodates Special Forces warrant officers, they are distinct not only because of their combat role — they are the Army's only warrant officers with a direct ground-combat role and are eligible for the Combat Infantryman's Badge — but also because of their training, qualifications and mission.

## Continuity

Originally called special-operations technicians, Special Forces warrant officers were conceived, based on a doctrinal decision, as a replacement for the SF detachment executive officer, a first lieutenant, to provide officer continuity and expertise. The XO's role was essentially to manage administration and logistics; the SF warrant officer had more to offer. He was designed to be the tactical and technical expert, regional authority, primary adviser to the detachment commander, and the detachment chief of staff. The warrant officer was ideally suited to replace the XO, because, unlike the other officers, he came from the ranks of the SF detachment and was frequently one of the most experienced soldiers on the team.

In addition to SF-related schooling, the warrant officer possesses regional abilities and a language capability. During the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course, he receives further training in advanced special-operations techniques; staff organization and procedures; combined tactics to brigade level; regional studies; training management; computer skills; survival, evasion, resistance and escape; Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

The warrant officer assigned to the A-

detachment provides officer continuity. He remains on the team much longer than other officers and many of the NCOs. It is this continuity that makes the warrant, now called the assistant detachment commander, the person best-qualified to advise the detachment commander and to manage the mid- and long-range training plans of the detachment. The assistant detachment commander doesn't devote himself to administration and logistics as did the XO. He focuses on those skill areas unique to his MOS, including Special Forces operations and intelligence — the cornerstone of his training.

## Growth problems

Like many successful new programs, the Special Forces warrant-officer program encountered problems during its growth. The program's own entry-level prerequisites created hurdles for those aspirants who wanted to take the career challenge. Initial prerequisites included three CMF 18 MOSs, a 2/2 language rating and four years of Special Forces experience. Although the force seemed to have sufficient applicants during the first two years of accessions, the response soon slowed dramatically.

The decrease in applicants can probably be attributed to the 180A program's having exhausted the force's supply of soldiers qualified by the original prerequisites — MOS 180A demanded too much of the force. The Special Operations Proponency Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School re-evaluated the program's prerequisites and concluded that they were not a sound representation of what the force could offer.

For example, SOPO found that the average length of "team time" in Special Forces (in grades E-6 through E-9) was four years. This average detachment time holds true today — many soldiers serve their second SF assignment in SWCS, not on a detachment. Another unrealistic requirement was the need for three MOSs. This requirement was met more often by applicants from Fort Bragg-based SF groups than by those from other groups. Although all the SF groups conducted cross-training, the groups based at Fort Bragg could better afford to send their NCOs to the MOS-producing courses there.

Another problem was the lack of unit command emphasis on the 180A program. Change is not always easy, and effective change seldom occurs quickly. Some com-

U.S. Army photo

*The Special Forces warrant officer provides continuity of team leadership and focuses on skill areas unique to his specialty, including SF operations and intelligence.*

manders and their senior enlisted advisers were reluctant to embrace the new warrant-officer concept — they perceived it as a threat to the professional development of aspiring detachment commanders since it eliminated the XO position, and as a burden on the NCO corps because it lured away potential SF team sergeants. Others thought that a warrant officer's duties would conflict with or even usurp the team sergeant's role. These perceptions were largely based upon lack of knowledge about the program; they later proved to be untrue. Ultimately, the senior leadership of the SF community provided the emphasis necessary for the reluctant few to recognize the doctrinal difference and the enhancing quality of the SF warrant officer.

## Profile

Current 180A prerequisites call for staff sergeants and above, a CMF 18 MOS, a minimum of three years' time on an A-detachment, a score of 85 or better on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery, completion of the SF ANCOC after Oct. 3, 1994 or SF O&I qualification, and letters of recommendation from commanders at the detachment, company, battalion and group levels.

Recent MOS 180A applicants selected for candidacy were SFCs who averaged 11.6 years of active federal service and 4.9 years of detachment time (four years is the average for the entire CMF) and were graduates of the SF Advanced NCO Course. Typical candidates have language ratings (many exceeding the entry-level 1+/1+), high aptitude scores and high scores on the Army Physical Readiness Test (under the grading criteria of the 17-21 age group), and a demonstrated history of high achievement.

This history normally demonstrates a pattern of graduation honors from Army service schools including Ranger School, the SF Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant Course and SF ANCOC. Other typical attributes include high-quality "troop" or conventional time as squad and section leaders in a Ranger battalion, the 82nd Airborne Division, or other infantry assignments demonstrating soldiers' experience and potential as small-unit leaders. On the average these candidates have more than 14 years of education.

Another common denominator among NCOs selected for candidacy is their desire to lead as officers and to make a qualitative difference on the A-detachment. Power, wealth and status are not the common motives among SF warrant officers — job satisfaction is probably their number-one motive.

A recent example of the desired MOS 180A candidate with a balance of experience and potential is WO1 Robert Buderus. Buderus had eight years of active federal service when he applied, was a sergeant first class and an ANCOC graduate. His SF experience included more than four years of team time as an 18D and 18B in the 7th SF Group. His conventional service included a tour in Korea as an infantryman and a tour in the 82nd Airborne Division as a rifle team leader in the 3rd Battalion, 505th Regiment.

In addition to his other military training, Buderus possessed a 2/2 Spanish rating and was qualified as a Ranger and as a military-free-fall jumpmaster. With his previous record of high achievement in other service schools, it was no surprise that Buderus was named the distinguished honor graduate of both his SF O&I class and his class in the Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Rucker, Ala. Typically, SF WO candidates, like Buderus, take many of the top honors at the WOCS.

## Three hurdles

The stress of WOCS is the first hurdle the SF warrant-officer candidate must overcome. Six weeks and four days long, the course has turned back many candidates who lacked the commitment. This is the purpose of the course — simply to find out who's serious and who's not. Those who quit are not penalized; they resume their NCO careers. Those who do complete WOCS are conditionally appointed as WO1s, by warrant, by the Secretary of the Army.

The next hurdle for the newly appointed warrant officer is the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course, which provides the myriad of subjects unique to MOS 180A. This 18-week course is taught by senior SF warrant officers and further enhances the tactical and technical abilities of its students. Graduates of SF WOBC are awarded MOS 180A — a contingency to formalize their conditional appointments. Many of the new 180As will go on to language training or other specialty training prior to their first assignments. In some cases the complete training period, including a tour at the Defense Language Institute at Monterey, Calif., can be as long as 24 months. In terms of dollars and time, this initial training investment exceeds, on average, all other fields. Because of this initial front-end-loaded investment, the SF warrant officer becomes a significant asset to his commander and the commanders to follow.

The third hurdle is the challenge to the new warrant officer to complete his transition from NCO to officer. This hurdle is open-ended; for most 180As, the transition is a growing experience that allows them to adapt to increased responsibilities, authority and expectations. After 24 months of successful warrant-officer service, the WO1 is not only promoted to CWO2 but also commissioned. Under current timelines, SF warrant officers can expect to be promoted to CWO3 as regular Army officers with about seven years of warrant service (five years after CWO2), to CWO4 with 12 years, and to CWO5 with 17 years of warrant service. For the young sergeant first class with 8-10 years of active federal service, 12 years to CWO4 is an attractive opportunity. Promotion opportunities for each grade in the Army warrant-officer corps are as follows: 80 percent for CWO3; 76 percent for CWO4; and 44 percent for CWO5. MOS 180A has consistently exceeded the DA averages for promotion to CWO3 and CWO4 — a record indicative of the quality of soldiers in this specialty.

## Assignments

Today, SF warrant officers serve in all SF groups, primarily on detachments, then later in company-, battalion- and group-headquarters positions. Most have commanded detachments, some in combat, and continue to command while assigned to the detachment level. Sometimes as many as 50 percent of these officers are in command at any given time.

All warrant officers may command (preferably as a CWO2 or after at least one successful rating period as a WO1), and commissioned warrant officers (CWO2s and above) have the same authority granted to all other officers. Most SF warrant officers will command A-detachments at some point during their careers. Some 180As have commanded during more of their team time than not, including combat. SF warrant officers should serve as assistant detachment commanders (or detachment commanders when appropriate) at the detachment level for a minimum of five years, but they may serve



U.S. Army photo

*Graduates of the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course receive the MOS 180A and face the challenge of the transition from SF NCO to SF warrant officer.*

up to 14 years on detachments if required. This detachment-level assignment should be considered "branch-qualifying."

These time parameters are created to provide maximum utilization and continuity for WO1s, CWO2s and CWO3s on detachments (two of the six WO detachment slots are grade-coded for CWO3s). Other professional-development guidance will be addressed in the MOS 180A chapter of DA Pamphlet 600-11, *Warrant Officer Professional Development*, that is now being staffed through Army channels.

Beyond the A-detachment, SF warrant officers serve as operations and intelligence officers in Special Forces companies, battalions, groups and, recently, in theater SOCs. SF warrants are primarily operators, and about 95 percent of their assignments are in the SF groups. Small numbers of senior warrant officers will also serve in the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, the SWCS and the Joint Readiness Training Center.

## Job descriptions

To accommodate the growth and doctrinal presence of MOS 180A, job descriptions for senior and master warrant officers have recently been written based on the basic MOS 180A job description. The basic MOS 180A job description is tailored to the detachment level:

*Commands in the absence of the detachment commander; serves as technical and tactical authority in all aspects of Special Forces operations; supervises all staff activities; is the PSYOP and Civil Affairs authority; has cultural, regional, and linguistic abilities; manages the mid-term and long-term training.*

The senior and master warrant-officer job descriptions expand the basic role of the SF warrant officer to encompass the staff duties of SF warrants in company operations, battalion operations, group intelligence and group-operations sections. As an additional duty, all senior and master warrant officers serve as senior warrant advisers to the commander. In this role, the senior 180A at company, battalion and group levels will advise the commander on all warrant-officer matters. All job descriptions (basic, senior and master) allow for the command role of the SF warrant officer. Because of the dynamics of the operational environment, a commander may elect to have a warrant officer (any grade) command a separate task-organized element. The 180A is fully capable of both assuming this role and commanding the mission.

## Growth dynamics

Because of their abilities, SF warrant officers are much in demand throughout the Army SOF and joint communities. The field is continually identifying upward and lateral areas for growth, but because of manpower constraints, the current strategy for growth is to fill the need, validate or "grow into" the position and then seek authorization for the billet.

For example, the theater special-operations commands, or SOCs, have 180As serving in operations/plans and intelligence/targeting staff roles. With their unique expertise and regional skills, SF WOs enhance the SOC's planning and operational abilities. These jobs in the SOCs are operationally significant and logical for growth. Unfortunately, the majority of these positions have no permanent authorizations or billets to support the permanent assignment of 180As. All billets require a billpayer; as a result, WO slots have to be taken "out of hide" from the SF groups, creating shortages there.

Acquiring increased authorizations requires the full support of the SOC and the theater commander in chief, and the slots may develop slowly because of current manpower constraints. In our current zero-sum situation, in order for 180A to gain billets, other warrant-officer fields must lose them.

Approximately five percent of MOS 180A authorizations are in TDA units such as the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and senior warrant officers are hand-picked for these assignments. The SWCS authorizations will increase in

# SF Warrant Officer Job Descriptions

Key to the success of the Special Forces warrant-officer program has been the development of job descriptions which reflect the leadership and doctrinal responsibilities at each of the three levels. The job descriptions are as follows:

*The Special Forces Warrant Officer* serves as the assistant detachment commander, is second in command and commands in the absence of the detachment commander. Commands half the SFOD "A" during split-team operations. Provides tactical and technical assistance to the detachment for all Special Forces operations, e.g., direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, counterterrorism, advanced special operations techniques, and/or civil-military activities in support of joint, combined or unilateral operations across the operational continuum. Possesses specialized military skills needed to operate in all physical environments and the cultural awareness, regional expertise and linguistic skills for worldwide deployments. Supervises and directs all staff functions to include managing the development of SFOD "A" mid- and long-range training plans.

*The Special Forces Senior Warrant Officer* serves as the company operations warrant officer and as the battalion operations warrant officer with a focus on Special Forces operations and intelligence. The senior warrant officer provides tactical and technical assistance to the commander for all Special Forces operations, e.g., direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, counterterrorism, advanced special operations techniques, and/or civil-military activities in support of joint, combined or unilateral operations across the operational continuum. Possesses specialized military skills needed to operate in all physical environments and the cultural awareness, regional expertise and linguistic skills for worldwide deployments. Advises the commander on all regional considerations pertinent to the operational environment. Commands a task-organized operational element and/or serves on an SFOD "A." Serves as an instructor/writer in an Army service school. Acts as the senior warrant adviser to the commander, advising the commander on all warrant-officer-related issues.

*The Special Forces Master Warrant Officer* serves as the group operations warrant officer or as the group intelligence warrant officer in the Special Forces group, with a focus on Special Forces operations and intelligence. The master warrant officer provides tactical and technical assistance to the commander for all Special Forces operations, e.g., direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, counterterrorism, advanced special operations techniques, and/or civil-military activities in support of joint, combined or unilateral operations across the operational continuum. Possesses specialized military skills needed to operate in all physical environments and the cultural awareness, regional expertise and linguistic skills for worldwide deployments. Advises the commander on all regional considerations pertinent to the operational environment. Commands a task-organized operational element and serves in key staff positions above group level. Acts as the senior warrant adviser to the commander, advising the commander on all warrant-officer-related issues. — *CWO3 Shaun Driscoll*

time to enhance the Center and School's ability to develop doctrine and training and to train entry-level warrant officers and SF soldiers in specialty-skill areas.

## Evolution

Since 1984, the original 40 SF warrant officers have been joined by nearly 350 others in MOS 180A. In bringing their experience as NCOs to the leadership of SF units, these warrant officers have brought an unprecedented change to the SF community. They have been instrumental in the activation of Branch 18 by pulling up the slack and commanding detachments in the absence of captains. Branch 18 would have had a difficult road to health had it not been for MOS 180A.

On the battlefield, MOS 180As have led and served on A-detachments in a direct ground-combat role — in two theaters of operation to date. SF warrants are enmeshed in our day-to-day worldwide operations as key players and are therefore in harm's way every day. The combat accomplishments of MOS 180A alone are a historical precedent.

As a result of identity confusion in both joint and foreign environments, in April of 1994 the commanding general of the SWCS elected to delete the term "technician" from the MOS title of 180A. Divorced from the term "technician," MOS 180A has further refined its identity by changing its principal duty titles and by developing senior- and master-warrant-officer job descriptions that provide a better doctrinal focus. The field has evolved well beyond the ambiguities of the "special operations technician" to the refined relevant role of the Special Forces warrant officer. In our current military structure, MOS 180A is one of a kind. Its evolution is apparent today as SF warrant officers worldwide lead, train, advise and command Special Forces units, meeting the demands of our operational environment worldwide.

*CWO3 Shaun Driscoll is the MOS 180A manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His prior assignments include serving in the 2nd Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry, as a squad leader; and in the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 10th SF Group as an SF weapons sergeant, intelligence sergeant and later as both assistant commander and detachment commander on several A-detachments. He participated in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Provide Comfort and Silver Anvil. He is a graduate of the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course and the Defense Language Institute (German). He holds a bachelor's degree from Western New England College and is a candidate for a master's degree from Campbell University.*

# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### Senior warrant-officers may serve additional duty

The Special Warfare Center and School recommends that commanders of SF units appoint their senior warrant officer the additional duty of senior warrant-officer adviser. The adviser would become the unit focal point for all warrant-officer professional-development information. Interested warrant officers can request an SF warrant-officer professional-development briefing mailout by calling the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

### Officers should branch-qualify before FA39 assignment

Field-grade SF officers with a functional area of 39 should attempt to branch-qualify before their FA39 participation. If an officer is identified to serve an FA39 tour prior to branch qualification, he will serve a maximum of 18 months and then be reassigned to an SF unit to become branch-qualified at the major level. For information contact Jeanne Schiller, FA39 manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

### Important to match WO grade, assignment

DA Pamphlet 600-11, *Warrant Officer Professional Development*, scheduled for release this year, will provide a career road map for warrant officers. The chapter on SF warrant officers will stress the importance of branch-qualifying assignments. Important assignments by grade are assistant detachment commander, WO1-CWO3; company operations warrant officer, CWO3; battalion operations warrant officer, CWO4; group operations warrant officer, CWO5; and group intelligence warrant officer, CWO5. This pattern emphasizes the importance of assigning WO1s and CWO2s to the detachment level. Commanders are encouraged to assign warrant officers commensurate with their rank, their abilities and the guidance in DA Pam 600-11.

### Army to call Reserve SF captains to active duty

During fiscal year 1994, the Army called 22 SF captains to active duty from the Army Reserve to fill shortage year groups. During FY 95 it will call six. These captains will have assigned functional areas and will have the potential to serve full careers in the active component. PERSCOM will manage their career development in their branch and functional-area. To ensure that these officers achieve branch qualification as captains, they should be assigned as detachment commanders as soon as possible. DA selection boards will review each officer's entire file. Those promoted to major before the fourth anniversary of their call will be granted Regular Army status. All others will compete for voluntary indefinite status after the third anniversary of their call. Raters and senior raters should counsel, assess and rate these officers as they do all other captains in their units. For information contact Maj. Dan Adelstein at the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002; or Capt. Steve Whitmarsh at the SF Branch, U.S. Total Army Personnel Center, DSN 221-3175/3178 or commercial (703) 325-3175/3178.

# Enlisted Career Notes

**Special Warfare**

## SOPO addresses questions on 18D

The Special Operations Proponency Office has provided the following information in response to inquiries from the field expressing concern about the health of Military Occupational Specialty 18D:

- As of Sept. 30, 1994, the operating strength of 18D was 92 percent. U.S. Total Army Personnel Command's program guidance is 102 percent. This equates to a shortage of 74 18Ds. More than 220 students are projected to attend 18D training in FY 95. While all other MOS training is being drastically reduced, 18D classes remain full. SOPO and the SF Branch are projecting that MOS 18D will reach PERSCOM program guidance in early FY 96. MOS 18Ds will then have an opportunity to reclassify into MOS 18F and to request duty as drill instructors or as detailed recruiters.
- SF medics were excluded from the early-release programs because 18D is an understrength MOS. Department of the Army policy is that no understrength MOS will participate in the drawdown programs. SF engineers at skill-level 3 could not participate for the same reason.
- Noncommissioned officers in MOS 18D enjoy healthy promotion selection rates. In the last master-sergeant selection board, 18D had the highest selection rate of CMF 18.
- The 18D retention rate is well above the Army average. The initial re-enlistment rate for 18D is 93 percent, as opposed to the Army average of 46 percent. This high re-enlistment rate is partly due to a selective re-enlistment bonus: 18D is the only SF MOS authorized a re-enlistment bonus. Currently the SRB for 18D is 2A, 2B. When MOS 18D reaches PERSCOM's program guidance, the SRB will most likely be terminated.
- The physician's assistant program recently imposed a restriction that applicants not have more than eight years' time in service. This policy has constrained the accession of 18D soldiers into the program. The Special Forces community had nothing to do with effecting this change in the selection criteria. The time-in-service restriction will allow PA candidates to complete the PA training and to retire as commissioned officers with 20 years of service.
- Currently, selected SF medics attend training that certifies them as emergency medical technicians-paramedics (EMT-P). When the SF medical course moves to Fort Bragg, N.C., in FY 96, SF medics will have the opportunity to gain EMT-P certification as part of the Special Forces Qualification Course.

Anyone who has questions pertaining to MOS 18D professional development should contact the Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-9002/8423 or commercial (910) 432-9002; or the SF Branch at DSN 221-8888.

## Green-to-Gold offers scholarships, commissions

Career-minded enlisted soldiers who have the desire to pursue a college degree and future leadership opportunities in the Army are candidates for the Green-to-Gold program. Once they have been approved for the program, active-duty soldiers are released from their service obligation to accept scholarships in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. After completing a degree program and the required ROTC courses and summer camps, scholarship winners earn commissions as second lieutenants.

Scholarship winners receive financial assistance toward college tuition and educational fees up to an annual amount of $12,000 (Tier I), $8,000 (Tier II) or $5,000 (Tier III), based on the scholarship award. Each winner also receives $450 per year for textbooks, supplies and required equipment. A tax-free subsistence allowance of $150 per month for up to 10 months a school year is also part of the financial package.

The tiered scholarship program is new and will permit greater tailoring in the award of funds to eligible applicants. The maximum available scholarship has been increased to $12,000 annually. The tiered award program will be applied beginning with scholarship winners for academic year 1995-96.

Two- and three-year scholarships are available for soldiers who have already started college; four-year scholarships at designated schools are available for those who are just beginning.

Soldiers who accept the scholarships and complete the commissioning program incur an eight-year service obligation, which can be served on active duty or in the Army Reserve or National Guard.

Green-to-Gold winners must be medically qualified to serve as commissioned officers in the U.S. Army, must meet Army height and weight standards, be able to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test, and be no older than 25 upon graduation and commissioning. An age waiver of up to four years may be granted based upon time in service.

Soldiers must also be high-school graduates or the equivalent, must have a minimum GT score of 110 (two- and three-year applicants only), a SAT score of 850 or an ACT score of 19 (three- and four-year applicants only). A letter of acceptance from a degree-producing college or university offering ROTC, and letters of recommendation from company and battalion commanders must be submitted as part of the application packet.

Soldiers should contact their nearest ROTC department for information and assistance in applying for the program. Soldiers overseas should contact their education center or the ROTC department of their school of choice. — *1st ROTC Region PAO*

# Letters



## SF need to be aware of latest developments in fire support

Selected personnel from our SF company recently participated in a command-post exercise with V Corps. During this exercise I had the opportunity to learn about some of the recent developments in fire support and some of the developments planned for the future.

Over the last few years a new missile has been introduced at the corps level. The Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, is very accurate and can be fired from a multi-rocket launcher system. The MRLS can fire two missiles at a time.

The ATACMS are tube-launched, fin-stabilized, inertially guided missiles. They are part of the MTOE for general-support artillery units assigned to corps and divisions. Currently, they are using the JEE missile, which has an unclassified range of 124 kilometers and carries a payload of 950 baseball-sized bomblets called M-74 anti-personnel/anti-materiel munitions. Covered with a titanium shell, they explode on impact and are extremely effective against everything but the thickest armor. The next generation will have even a longer range (248 kilometers unclassified) and will have global-positioning-system guidance, making it even more accurate. Classified data is available. Another future development, which has been named the JTC missile, will have the ability to attack tanks it detects by sound and infrared sensors.

The range of this new technology has made it necessary for corps' deep operations to coordinate the use of airspace with both the Air Force and Army aviation. Current firing systems can process the mission using both universal-transverse-mercator grids and geo coordinates.

Because its range is so great, the ATACMS gives new meaning to the term "area of operations." It would benefit Special Forces to be aware of what this missile can do and how to call it in. TSOF teams in front of the corps' position or outside the recon interdiction phase line can utilize this missile both to interdict targets and to protect themselves. They would have to contact the forward operational base, which, in turn would contact the special-operations command-and-control element, which has a liaison officer inside the corps' deep operations.

SFC Richard P. Milloy Jr.
Co. B, 1/10th SF Group

## Requirements for SOF support SQI should be more stringent

I remember some years ago there was much discussion within the special-operations community about getting the "S" identifier for special-operations support personnel. This would enable these personnel to be identified and assigned within the special-operations community, thereby keeping qualified special-operations soldiers in support jobs. I remember CWO4 Harry D. Rider Jr. burning the midnight oil in his basement office in Flint Kaserne at Bad Tölz to come up with a plan for the 18-series MOS and the "S" identifier for support personnel.

In 1992 I finally saw the "S" identifier go into effect. I looked at the guidelines for obtaining the "S" identifier and realized that the seriousness with which Chief Rider had pursued the issue had somehow been lost.

After the message came out, what I saw was every Tom, Dick and Harry putting in for the SQI. I saw folks requesting the "S" identifier who had been in the unit for less than two years, and in the Army less than three. But based on the guideline of taking part in "exercises," they meet the requirements. It did not matter that these folks had no real concept of special operations (at the company and battalion levels), and had served only briefly at the Special Operations Support Command level, or at the one- to four-star command level (SOCs overseas, USASOC, USSOCOM).

I believe that in order to better provide support, personnel who have the "S" identifier should have some knowledge of how an ODA, ODB and ODC are structured. Many who have the "S" identifier have no such idea, and, sadly, many could not care less. I feel that the intent of Chief Rider, Col. Scot Crerar and others has been lost. Consequently, many complain that the "S" identifier does them no good because each MOS branch gives the identifier little, if any, consideration in assignments.

If the guidelines for obtaining the "S" were more stringent, perhaps the folks of TAPA would take the SQI as seriously as was the original intent.

Sgt. Jerry Green
Special Operations Command Central
MacDill AFB, Fla.

## PT most unforgiving area

Recently I entered my office and found the incoming and outgoing sergeants major fighting over our copy of the January 1995 *Special Warfare*. I asked that when they finished wrestling with it they let me take a look, too. When they brought it in, I asked, "Are there any good articles?" They said, "Yes sir, the one on PT by Ranger Roach."

I was not surprised that two Special Forces sergeants major with almost 50 years of experience between them found the most interesting article in the magazine to be about PT. In my limited 18 years of experience in the infantry and Special Forces, I have found no other area in which the professional soldier is as unforgiving as PT. In all good units, PT is where officers are tested first. All their ability to quote history, expound on the latest doctrine and impress others with their computer skills is destroyed by the first rucksack march or run that they fall out of.

In 1986-1988, Ranger Roach, who was a battalion commander, gave his battalion staff a hard hour of PT every Friday using the continuous-motion exercise. The rest of the week, he visited a different A-team in each company. It was the goal of each A-team in my company to make PT so hard for him that he wouldn't come back, but he always returned for more after he had checked the other teams. Some might call this getting into a company commander's business. I call it leading from the front.

In working at a corps HQ, we have found that conventional forces expect SOF to be in the best of physical condition. A corps needs to know the best way to employ SF, Rangers and PSYOP, but the constant remarks of the officers and NCOs that "Your standards screw up the curve on the APFT," tell me they care about PT as well. Believe me, those conventional guys are watching to see whether you'll go the extra mile. While running the airfield at Fort Lewis one weekend in the rain, I noticed someone waving his encouragement — it was the corps commander.

Our section has set a goal to score 300 on the APFT. Since our average age is 39, some of us have to work harder to attain this goal. Each man draws upon his strengths to push himself and others. As a result, we all improve in our strong and weak areas. There is still plenty of time for those technical skills after 90 minutes of hard PT. After all, Ranger Roach is one of the sharpest officers I have ever known on history, tactics or a computer, but he never was mad if I turned his computer off for an airfield run.

Lt. Col. Ralph E. Saner Jr.
G-3, SOCOORD
I Corps
Fort Lewis, Wash.

## Magazine needs more professional discussion

Since its first publication, I have been a subscriber to *Special Warfare*. Although I have found it to be a good publication, I think it could be improved with the addition of a feature that encourages frank professional commentary, comments and reflections. I know of no pattern for such in Army publications. They tend to be rather dry iterations of the nearest service school's most newly beloved doctrine, frequently pressured from vulnerable faculty.

The naval services, despite their reputation for adherence to traditionalism, are ahead of the Army in the area of professional commentary. The *Marine Corps Gazette* frequently has wide-ranging discussions on doctrinal and tactical matters, and the Naval Institute's *Proceedings* have an excellent forum titled "No One Asked Me, But ..." The contents of these publications often espouse positions that are markedly different from the pronouncements of the higher leadership. Clearly the writers consider their communications to be open and do not fear retribution for thinking and writing heretically. Their hazard appears to be limited to embarrassment if their ideas are seen as too fey by some readers.

I think it would be educational and healthy if *SW* had a similar forum where readers could try out their thoughts, describe their experiences and comment on previous articles — in short, any subject that has any relationship to Special Forces.

Retired Col. Scot Crerar
Vienna, Va.

*We believe the suggestion for a section featuring comments and commentary is a valid one. In fact, in our January issue we published, in the "Letters" section, a solicitation to our readers for more comments, letters and discussion of SOF issues. We hope to create in* Special Warfare *a forum for ideas that will promote thought and discussion.* — Editor.

# Foreign SOF



## Separatist movement grows in East Timor

Discontent with Indonesian rule is escalating among the younger generation of East Timor, particularly those citizens born since the island's annexation during the mid-1970s. East Timor — comprising half of Timor island off northern Australia — was ruled by Portugal until it was invaded by Indonesia in 1975. The invasion followed a period of civil strife brought about by Portugal's withdrawal as colonial administrator. Indonesia formally annexed East Timor the following year, an act still not recognized by the United Nations. While the United States recognizes Indonesia's annexation of the area, long-standing American policy stresses that East Timor must be heard on the issue of its status within the Republic of Indonesia. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, or Fretilin, has routinely conducted guerrilla actions ever since the 1975 invasion. According to current estimates, Fretilin forces are small, numbering less than 200 personnel. However, the growing popular resentment of Indonesia became embarrassingly evident in November 1994 during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting attended by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Some 29 East Timorese scaled a fence surrounding the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and occupied the embassy compound for two weeks. They demanded the release of Timorese resistance leader Zenana Gizmo, jailed for leading an armed uprising, and asked President Clinton to intercede on behalf of the East Timor people. Simultaneous rioting in the East Timor capital of Dili left four dead and saw additional clashes with police. These continuing incidents, the rising separatist sentiment and a clear polarization of East Timor's younger generation characterize the island as a potential hotspot. Indonesia maintains an 800-man combat battalion and six territorial battalions, totaling 4,522 personnel, on the island. While territorial units primarily conduct nation-building activities, they also are expected to support combat operations and counterguerrilla actions.

## South African military, police forces form security task force

Internal and external security problems have increased the importance of military-police cooperation in South Africa. In neighboring Mozambique's general elections in late October 1994, the Mozambique Liberation Front, or Frelimo, won a highly contested election over its archrival, the Mozambique National Resistance, or Renamo, following several years of civil war. Prior to the election, South Africa's concerns caused the country to deploy a combined task force composed of the South African National Defense Force, or SANDF, and South African police elements along its border with Mozambique. The task force increased patrols along the border to deal with refugees and conflict spillover in the event the elections sparked fresh civil war between Frelimo and Renamo. Various SANDF elements have continued their involvement in other law-enforcement and security-force roles, including crime-prevention and border-patrol duties. This shared mission marks continuing joint efforts by military and police personnel to deal with internal-security problems.

## Mexico identifies arms trafficking as major problem

The Mexican Attorney General's Office has identified gunrunning as a growing Mexican problem. The demand for guns by criminal groups and by guerrillas is said to be a major cause of the problem, along with the proximity of the United States, which the attorney general's office calls the "world's largest manufacturer of all types of weapons." It is asserted that the movement of weapons from the U.S. into Mexico is a dimension of the overall problem. The Mexican media has also addressed the existence of financial support for guerrilla groups from American and European church and civic organizations. The Mexican government's February decision to more actively confront EZLN guerrillas in southern Mexico was linked, in part, to the claimed discovery of arms caches.

## Central Eurasian conflict attracts foreign involvement

Continuing armed conflict and turmoil from the Caucasus to Central Asia have attracted outside participants with a sweeping array of affiliations and interests. The variety of combatants illustrates especially well the complexity of ethno-national-religious issues in the region and the many agendas associated with regional instability. Several incidents are notable:

Early in 1994, Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh captured and displayed for public view several "Afghan mujahedin" extremists who had been fighting on behalf of Azeri army forces. As many as 2,500 Afghans have reportedly been serving as mercenaries for Muslim Azeri forces. The Afghan government acknowledges the problem but claims no state involvement.

More recently, a Russian report indicated that three "assault elements" of Afghan mujahedin had been dispatched from Azerbaijan to the Chechen Republic — still considered part of Russia despite its claims to independence. The mujahedin were expected to join the forces of the Chechen president, who is challenging Moscow's authority and is also engaged in an ongoing civil war. This report was of particular concern to Russia, because it marked the first known use of Azeri territory as a staging area for Islamic extremists sent to operate in Russia and in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Azeri-populated Republic of Nakhichevan (inside Armenia and bordering Turkey and Iran) was the site of a September 1994 operation conducted by Turkish and Azeri forces against separatists of the Kurdish Worker's Party, or PKK. About 30 PKK militants were reportedly captured. The PKK, which is heavily involved in drug trafficking as a means of organizational support, is believed to have training camps in Armenia, from which members cross through Nakhichevan into Iran and then into Turkey to carry out operations against the Turkish government.

The Central Asian state of Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan and is the site of a continuing civil war, has attracted numerous foreign militants and trainers with Islamic affiliations. According to Russian Border Troops, who by agreement guard the Afghan-Tajik frontier, captured documents substantiate the presence of militants from Iran, Afghanistan, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In particular, the Border Troops have noted a marked improvement in opposition-force ambush and attack skills since the arrival of "Arab mercenaries."

*Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., Maj. Thomas E. Sidwell and Maj. Mark Mills of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.*

# Update



## USASOC authorizes MFF badges

Special-operations forces qualified in military free-fall are now authorized to wear new, distinctive badges for one of the military's most demanding and hazardous skills.

A U.S. Army Special Operations Command policy outlining applications procedures and wear of the military free-fall, or MFF, parachutist and jumpmaster badges for Army SOF was approved Dec. 9, 1994, by Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, USASOC commanding general. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, approved the badges for MFF parachutists and jumpmasters Oct. 1, 1994.

Active-duty and reserve SOF personnel assigned or attached to USASOC or to one of its subordinate commands or units may wear the MFF badges while assigned to these units, said Capt. Gary L. Forbes, plans officer for the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Personnel may also wear the badges when assigned or attached to USSOCOM headquarters or to one of its component commands. When service members leave a USASOC or USSOCOM unit, they are no longer authorized to wear the badges, Forbes said. The badges may not be worn for official photographs.

Parachutists may wear the badges once they have completed an approved MFF course or have made an MFF combat jump. The jumpmaster badge is worn by those who have completed an approved MFF jumpmaster course.

Soldiers must obtain authorization before wearing the badges, Forbes said. The commanding general of the Special Warfare Center and School is the approving authority for students who graduate from the MFF parachutist and jumpmaster courses after Oct. 1, 1994. The USSOCOM commander is the approving authority for all other applicants.





The new MFF badges: parachutist (top) and jumpmaster.

USASOC major subordinate commands are conducting an ad hoc query to identify soldiers who have earned MFF skill identifiers, Forbes said. After May 1, applications must be submitted directly to the SWCS G-1 for validation.

Army SOF personnel who qualified in MFF before Oct. 1, 1994, must submit written application for authorization to wear the badges, Forbes said. Copies of official jump records and graduation or qualification certificates, along with basic personal information, are required to verify an applicant's eligibility. Once qualification is verified, applications will be sent to USSOCOM for approval.

Placement of the MFF badge is prescribed in AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*. "An important fact we must emphasize to everyone is that the MFF badge is not to be worn in lieu of the parachutist badge, but in conjunction with it," Forbes said. "The MFF badge is considered to be a group-four badge, such as the parachutist and air-assault badges. Recent changes to AR 670-1 allow only five badges to be worn at any one time. Three of the five may be from group four, meaning that a soldier may wear the MFF, parachutist and air-assault badges at the same time."

A winged dagger pointing skyward beneath a deployed square parachute canopy gives the badge design a historical significance and recognizes SOF MFF capabilities. The MFF jumpmaster badge is set apart from the other badge by a five-point star surrounded by a wreath centered above the parachute.

Veterans of combat MFF operations are authorized a bronze star to be worn on their MFF badge. The combat jump must be verified and the bronze service star authorized before the star can be worn. Application must be made through the same procedure as for the basic MFF badge. — *Carol Jones, USASOC PAO*

## Clearinghouse seeks innovative ideas

To help maintain pace with an increasingly complex and changing world, the U.S. Special Operations Command is seeking innovative ideas from anyone who has a better way to do things.

The SOF Clearinghouse was established in January 1994 by Gen. Wayne A. Downing. Its purpose is to provide a means of harnessing, nurturing and disseminating innovative ideas throughout the command. The Clearinghouse seeks suggestions relating to special operations from anyone, whether active-duty, reserve or civilian. Topics may include, but are not limited to, organizational structure, roles and missions, education, training, employment concepts, personnel policies and command relationships.

Contributions need not be submitted in any particular format, nor is it necessary to submit them through the chain of command. The Clearinghouse cannot accept classified material or suggestions related to current operations.

The Clearinghouse will acknowledge and evaluate each submission. It will either accept the idea, help the author to develop the concept further, or explain to the author why the suggestion cannot be accepted. Credit will be given for those suggestions accepted.

Proposals should be mailed to the SOF Clearinghouse, HQ USSOCOM (SOCC-CIG), 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323; or faxed to DSN 299-5109 or commercial (813) 840-5109. For more information, call Lt. Col. Brad Washabaugh, DSN 968-2646 or commercial (813) 828-2646.

## New manual defines peace operations

The Army has published its first field manual defining the principles of peacekeeping operations.

Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, will be used as the basis for training soldiers and leaders in conducting peace operations around the world.

"With this manual, the Army continues the broadening of its post-Cold War doctrine: doctrine that is focused on warfighting, yet accommodates employment across the full range of operations," said Gen. William W. Hartzog, commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

"The discipline, the responsiveness to a chain of command, the type of training that soldiers receive that enables them to fight and win wars apply to peace operations," said Rich Rinaldo, one of the writers of the manual.

In developing FM 100-23, doctrine writers used lessons learned from recent operations such as Restore Hope in Somalia and Provide Comfort in Iraq. Historical cases were also used, including the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China and the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960.

## Soldiers earn DoD medal for Haitian service

Military personnel who served in or directly supported Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti will receive the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.

Army Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, authorized the award in late December. The award's opening date is Sept. 16, 1994, the day initial deployments to Haiti began. No closing date has been set.

The award is limited to Uphold Democracy participants who actually served within a roughly 300-square-mile operations area centered on Haiti. Personnel who were not assigned to deployed units may qualify for the award if they meet at least one specific guideline:

• Served 30 consecutive days or 60 nonconsecutive days in the area of operation;

• Served in combat or hazardous duty during the operation with armed opposition, regardless of time in the area;

• Served as an aircraft crew member flying regular missions in the operation area;

• Received recommendation for the award from the service chief or commander of a unified command.

## SFAS graduates profiled

Information from the SWCS research data base yields the following profiles of typical selectees from the Special Forces Assessment and Selection program:

Enlisted personnel

- Sergeant (E-5)
- 25 years old
- Have one year of college
- Have five years in the Army
- Have a GT score of 118
- Achieve a PT score of 244 (17-year-old standard).

Officers

- Captain (O-3)
- 28 years old
- Ranger-qualified
- Achieve a PT score of 260 (17-year-old standard).

## 4th POG soldiers receive Bronze Stars

Seven members of the 4th PSYOP Group received Bronze Stars in December for exceptionally meritorious service in operations in Somalia in 1993.

In a Fort Bragg ceremony, Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presented the medals to Maj. Gray L. Nichols, Maj. Robert J. Nelson, SSgt. James M. Kalanui, Sgt. Patrick A. McKeever, Spec. Curtis Agee, Spec. Roger Blankenship and Spec. Travis Ernst.

# Book Reviews



**We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young**. *By retired Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway. New York: Harper Perennial, 1993. ISBN 0-06-097576-8. 471 pages, $13.*

This book is, without question, the best volume written to date on infantry combat in Vietnam.

There are a number of features that distinguish this book from the chronicles of others. First and foremost, it was written by two men who were there in November 1965 at Landing Zone X-Ray, in the Ia Drang Valley, for the first major battle between the forces of North Vietnam and the men of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Harold Moore, then a lieutenant colonel in command of the 1/7, and Joe Galloway, a noted war correspondent, provide a blow-by-blow account of one of the most savage battles of the Vietnam War.

The book is gutsy, absolutely realistic and filled with heart-rending and inspiring examples of common men caught in the meat grinder of combat and rising to the occasion through the performance of uncommon acts of bravery and heroism — many of which went unrecognized because so many of the participants did not survive the battle. The book lays open the most horrifying ordeals faced by men in close combat. Moore and Galloway must have spent years conducting interviews with the privates, sergeants, and young officers who fought the battle either as individual or as members of squads, platoons or companies. Moore himself provides insights




into his thinking as the ground commander as events of the battle unfolded. He discusses how he used artillery and close air support to halt the multiple attacks of the North Vietnamese and how he attempted to employ his men in the most desperate of circumstances — inflicting maximum damage on the enemy while conserving his combat power as best he could.

Moore and Galloway returned to Vietnam 25 years after the battle to conduct interviews with the enemy commanders. These interviews provide key insights into the thinking of the Vietnamese commanders and their leadership. The Vietnamese had never faced large numbers of Americans on the battlefield before. Their orders were to win at any cost. The North Vietnamese military leadership felt that their first major battle with the Americans must be a victory — which explains why the fighting at LZ X-Ray was so ferocious and unyielding.

Moore and Galloway also interviewed some of the families who lost sons and husbands at LZ X-Ray. These interviews provide a look at "the other face of war" seldom examined by contemporary military writers — the devastating effects those losses had on American families. The sacrifices made by those left at home are as moving as any acts of heroism accomplished by the soldiers of the 7th Cavalry on the battlefield.

The book discusses only briefly the American political/military strategy in Vietnam; it is not about the failure of the American political system in the conduct of the Vietnam War. The book is about soldiers in combat — up close and personal. If you can read this book without being deeply emotionally affected, you have no heart.

This is not a book to be read quickly. Because so many first-person narratives are included, it is sometimes difficult to follow every soldier's story. This is meant as no criticism of Moore and Galloway's efforts. The first-person narratives of the soldiers who fought the battle add immeasurably to the book's realism. The book accurately reflects, as well as a book can, the terrifyingly tumultuous events of combat — the gut-wrenching fear, bone-numbing fatigue, exhilaration and comradeship that only combat veterans can know. If you read only one book this year, make it this one.

*Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.*
*Joint Special Operations Cmd.*
*Fort Bragg, N.C.*

**The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander**. *By retired Col. James H. Kyle. New York: Orion Books, 1990. ISBN: 0-517-57714-3. 352 pages. $21.95.*

Col. Jim Kyle has written the insider's guide to Desert One. It is by far the most direct and accurate depiction of Operation Eagle Claw, the attempt to rescue the Americans held hostage in Iran in 1980. Other works have sketched the training and planning for what would have been the "takedown" of the sites at which the Americans were held; others have criticized the hand dealt the men who made the attempt; others have discussed the seemingly fatal obsession with OPSEC in the planning and training and the White House view; but none are written from the operational vantage point provided by "Kemo" Kyle.

Kyle's book is written by a special-operations professional who lived the entire experience. His rivetting tale spills forth from the ground-up planning and the give-and-take of forming the joint task force, through the exhaustive and realistic rehearsals (which have since become the standard of such operations), the "go/no-go" decision-making at the highest levels of our government, the euphoric execution, the "abort from hell," and the official and personal after-action review of what must have been gut-wrenching proportions.

As one of the participants so aptly put it at a most propitious point in the operation, this was the "Super Bowl" of U.S. military special operations, and although it did not succeed, the sheer magnitude of the obstacles in the path to success were such that no other nation could even have contemplated mounting such an effort. While it would be left to the Holloway Commission and the U.S. Congress to sort out the aftermath, the British who shared the airport from which some were launched and to which some fewer returned, could have saved much of the effort that followed. They provided the message from which the title is taken, "To you-all from us-all, for having the guts to try," delivered with typical British understatement and aplomb.

Questions may be raised about the relevance of a highly personal work concerning the "pickup ball game" which went terribly awry in the Iranian Desert. After all, should not the Goldwater-Nichols reform,




USSOCOM, Program 11 budgeting, sub-unified command special-operations commands in every theater, AC and RC Special Forces groups, a full Ranger regiment, the best counterterrorism force in the world, Army, Air Force, and Navy special-operations commands, all in some part due to the efforts of professionals like Kyle, have obviated the necessity to study the lessons learned there? Ask that question of the unit members of the 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. For while the operations were as different as night and day, questions concerning the strategic objectives were as relevant in Iran in 1980 as in Somalia in 1993. If we can be said to have "low-tech-ed" Eagle Claw, did we not perhaps "high-tech" Gothic Serpent, and if the results were similar, are there not lessons to be learned from both?

The "new world order," "operations other than war," "coalition warfare" and other current buzzwords seem as new and different today to most special operators as the current SOF superstructure would have seemed to Kyle, King and their compatriots at the time of Operation Eagle Claw. While the specifics may not seem relevant, lessons learned anywhere in the crucible of combat, including macro decisions at echelons above reality, should never have to be relearned by the next generation of soldiers, statesmen or diplomats.

To that end, this book is highly recommended. It can be appreciated and applied by both the novice and the most experienced special-operations professional. While the Holloway Commission report fits the same category, it is not often that a first-person source is available to flesh out the official account. *The Guts to Try* is must reading for those who are heading for joint special-operations billets and for those who count themselves as serious practitioners of the special-operations craft. As those who read the book will know, while Eagle Claw might have been a pickup ball game, it was an all-star pickup ball game. We had no finer military professionals in our inventory than those who strove at Desert One.

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# Special Warfare



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