Special Warfare

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PSYOP in Somalia

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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

On Aug. 4, 1994, a colorful ceremony was conducted at Fort Bragg's JFK Plaza — the change of command of the JFK Special Warfare Center from myself to Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison.

The ceremony was all about change, the only permanent thing in life. As the assumption-of-command letter was read and the organizational colors were passed, the JFK Center and School came under new management.

For the outgoing commander this is a bittersweet occasion — he is sad to leave, but he enjoys all the compliments the speakers and the guests tend to shower on him. Still, I could not help being reminded of the lines by an unknown poet concerning the fact that no one is indispensable:

> Sometime when you feel that
> your going,
> Would leave an unfillable hole,
> Just follow this simple instruction,
> And see how it humbles your soul.
> Take a bucket and fill it with water,
> Put your hand in it, up to the wrist,
> Pull it out, and the hole that's
> remaining,
> Is a measure of how you'll be missed.

Unwritten protocol dictates that the new commander's remarks be short and positive, and Bill Garrison lived up to that standard — his acceptance remarks totaled two sentences.

Those of us who know Bill Garrison know him as a calm, extremely intelligent, visionary, experienced general officer. His military credentials are impressive, and his frame of reference is experience, not theory. He has held a variety of command positions, most recently as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. His other assignments include service as deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and deputy commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Security Agency of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

General Garrison has extensive experience in combat arms. As a junior officer he was a battalion senior adviser with the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam and company commander of both A Company, 1st Battalion and B Company, 2nd Battalion in the 509th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division in West Germany. He was a provincial-reconnaissance-unit team leader with the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam and commander of the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Bill Garrison is extremely well-suited for his new command, and I wish him the very best as he carries his responsibilities to new heights of achievement.

Retired Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

PB 80–94–4

Contents

October 1994 Special Warfare Vol. 7, No. 4



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Features

Departments

PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope

by Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini and Mari Borstelmann

Psychological operations saved tens of thousands of lives during the Gulf War, and during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, PSYOP proved to have remarkable adaptability to peacetime operations as well.

Operation Restore Hope began in early December 1992, when President George Bush announced that the U.S. would lead a "coalition of the willing" in committing a significant military force to help ensure the delivery of much-needed humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

A U.S. soldier oversees the delivery of supplies in Somalia.

From the outset, PSYOP was integrated into all plans and operations. Almost immediately after the president's announcement, PSYOP staff planners from the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, N.C., were dispatched to the U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Their mission was to integrate PSYOP into the plans of both the U.S.-led Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, and its components from 22 countries.

During the five-month period prior to the May 4, 1993, change of command from UNITAF to the United Nations Operations in Somalia, or UNOSOM II, the main focus of psychological operations was to facilitate the flow of information between Somalis and the organizations responsible for implementing the humanitarian mission of Operation Restore Hope.

To ensure that PSYOP would be consistently applied and that PSYOP assets could respond to a broad spectrum of operational requirements, UNITAF formed a joint PSYOP task force, which worked directly for the UNITAF commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston. The JPOTF's mission was to provide advice, to analyze PSYOP-relevant intelligence and produce all printed products (leaflets, handbills, posters), including a Somali-language newspaper, and to transmit radio broadcasts via AM, FM and shortwave programming.

According to Johnston, "Having understood the potential impact of PSYOP, I was extremely interested in having PSYOP up front for this operation, because I thought the most useful part of PSYOP would be that it would prevent armed conflict."

Composed of 125 soldiers and civilians from the U.S. Army's 4th PSYOP Group, one U.S. Navy sailor and a dozen Somali linguists, the JPOTF worked with coalition forces, senior U.S. and U.N. civilians, and nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations. Throughout the course of Restore Hope, the JPOTF designed, produced and disseminated large numbers of

more than a dozen different handbills and posters; issued 116 editions of a Somali-language newspaper; transmitted radio broadcasts twice daily; produced and disseminated more than seven million leaflets; deployed tactical PSYOP teams with the coalition forces; and provided advice to the U.S. special envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff.

Tactical operations

The first PSYOP soldiers deployed from Fort Bragg to Mombasa, Kenya, where they joined the U.S. 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the USS Tripoli. They accompanied the initial Marine landing at Mogadishu on Dec. 9. Over the next several weeks, eight tactical PSYOP teams accompanied UNITAF ground forces as they deployed throughout central and southern Somalia to secure relief convoys and to promote stability.

From the initial landing on the beach at Mogadishu to the May 1993 transition to UNOSOM II, the eight tactical PSYOP teams participating in Operation Restore Hope faced many challenges. Using their loudspeakers, teams broadcast numerous messages to the Somalis, including surrender appeals, procedures to follow during weapons sweeps and at roadblocks, and announcements to organize crowds at feeding sites. Tactical PSYOP teams also distributed the UNITAF newspaper *Rajo* in many of the major towns and villages in each humanitarian-relief sector.

In Mogadishu, Marine maneuver commanders integrated tactical PSYOP teams into complex security operations that targeted the local arms markets. In mid-January 1993, for example, a Marine operation directed against an area of the city known as the Argentine Arms Market used tactical PSYOP teams to inform local residents of the operation and to request their support and noninterference. Heliborne PSYOP personnel thanked the crowds as Marines cleared the area and dropped leaflets informing the people of Mogadishu that the objective of the operation was to improve security in the city.

Maj. Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, commander of U.S. Marine Forces in Somalia, described the tactical PSYOP teams as "a combat subtractor ... they reduced the amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."

Acting as the "scout platoon" of the JPOTF, tactical PSYOP teams used face-to-face communication to assess the security environment and to collect PSYOP-relevant information. This was also the most effective means for PSYOP soldiers

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

A tactical PSYOP team informs Somali citizens of an upcoming military operation.

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

U.S. soldiers distribute copies of the Rajo *newspaper to Somali children.*

to assist the humanitarian-relief-sector maneuver commanders in understanding the perceptions, attitudes and concerns of the Somali people. Tactical PSYOP teams met directly with village elders and religious leaders to reinforce UNITAF messages presented in the *Rajo* newspaper and in radio broadcasts.

In addition to using traditional PSYOP methods of communicating with the local population, tactical PSYOP teams found unique ways of using their interpersonal skills. While waiting for officers to return from a community meeting, one team attracted a crowd of several hundred curious children. After many attempts to disperse the children, one soldier thought that they might be distracted by playing a game. Once he explained the rules and started the game, the children joined in enthusiastically, and the remaining soldiers were able to return to their mission.

Rajo newspaper

On Dec. 20, four days after the arrival of the main contingent of forces in Mogadishu, the JPOTF began publishing a daily newspaper and broadcasting a daily radio program — both called "Rajo," which is Somali for "hope." *Rajo*, the Somali-language newspaper, of which more than 27,000 copies were published daily, was eventually distributed to every town and village where UNITAF forces were deployed.

At the beginning of operations, the *Rajo* publishing and editorial staff included 4th PSYOP Group soldiers and civilian specialists as well as Somali linguists from the U.S. *Rajo* articles covered a number of relevant issues but generally focused on military operations to secure Mogadishu and each of the major towns, humanitarian relief provided to the famine areas, redevelopment efforts, hope for the future and analyses of the reconciliation and national-unity process.

Regular features included interviews with relief-agency staff, public-health information on treating common childhood diseases, the status of security in each humanitarian-relief sector, reports on rebuilding the educational system and judicial institutions, and forming local police forces and security councils.

As a complement to the newspaper, the JPOTF established Radio Rajo, a 45-minute, Somali-language program transmitted twice daily on AM/medium wave, FM and shortwave. The program included readings from the Koran, *Rajo* newspaper articles, selections of Somali poetry and short stories, news about Africa, significant events throughout the world and Somali music. The programs broadcast over shortwave eventually reached every city and town in Somalia where UNITAF forces were located.

Guided by a broadcast journalist from the 4th PSYOP Group, a team of Somali staff members, PSYOP specialists and

civilian analysts worked together to develop articles that incorporated a number of themes encouraging Somali clans to put aside their differences and rebuild their country. Themes included the following:

- Fairness of UNITAF rules of engagement.
- Impartiality of UNITAF.
- The need for Somalis to resolve Somalia's problems.
- Inability of UNITAF and relief agencies to do more than assist in the resolution process.
- Roles and capabilities of the 22 nations participating in UNITAF.
- Redevelopment and re-establishment of Somalia's infrastructure.
- Agreements made by faction leaders and the consequences of violating those agreements.
- Disarmament progress in each humanitarian-assistance sector.

The process of collecting information required routine research efforts beyond Mogadishu. In January 1993, for example, JPOTF staff members traveled to the town of Marka, where they interviewed President Aadan 'Abdullah' Usmaan, Somalia's first head of state and an important symbol of national unity. Excerpts from this interview were published in the newspaper and broadcast over Radio Rajo as well.

One of the most popular features of the newspaper was a cartoon devoted to the comments and the observations of a Somali man named Celmi (after the U.S. Navy sailor who was born in Somalia and served as a linguist for the JPOTF) and his wise friend, the camel Mandeeq. The dialogue between these two characters reinforced

Photo by Terry Mitchell

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

(Above) A soldier from the joint PSYOP task force produces material for broadcast over Radio Rajo.

(Left) A U.S. Marine hands out copies of the Rajo newspaper to waiting Somalis.

various PSYOP themes and described specific aspects of the UNITAF mission.

A consistent propaganda theme broadcast by one of the local warlords over his radio station and published in his faction's newspaper was that UNITAF — U.S. forces in particular — was exploiting Somalia's precious natural resources. PSYOP countered this propaganda by broadcasting and publishing stories in the *Rajo* describing the true nature of engineering activities throughout Somalia.

In an effort to encourage national unity and to revitalize Somali traditional culture, *Rajo* sponsored a poetry contest and published the six winning entries in a special edition of the paper. Commenting on the importance of *Rajo* to the success of the operation, Ambassador Robert Oakley said, "We are using *Rajo* to get the correct information into the hands of the Somali population and to correct distortions. ... The faction leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every once in a while Aideed or Ali Mahdi ... draws my attention to something that appeared in the newspaper. So they're very, very sensitive to it and they know its power."

Leaflet operations

The initial landing of U.S. forces in Mogadishu on Dec. 9 was preceded by a drop of approximately 220,000 leaflets from a U.S. Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter. This operation used two kinds of leaflets to announce the arrival of U.S. forces and to alert inhabitants of the need for convoy-security missions. The "handshake" leaflet communicated the basic message that the intent of the mission was to assist, not harm Somalis; the convoy-security leaflet stressed that coalition

U.S. Marines control crowds of Somalis waiting to receive medical treatment. PSYOP leaflets stressed that U.S. forces came to help, not harm, the Somalis.

Photo by Terry Mitchell

troops would use force to protect the relief shipments. These three-by-six-inch leaflets had been printed at Fort Bragg by the 4th PSYOP Group.

Throughout the operation, PSYOP teams, using U.S. C-130s, U.S. Marine CH-53s, U.S. Army UH-60s and UH-1s, and a Canadian C-130, continued to drop the two leaflets along major supply routes. The handshake leaflets were dropped two or three days prior to the arrival of UNITAF forces in each town; the convoy leaflets were dropped two or three days afterward. During one operation, PSYOP teams used U.S. Navy S-3 Viking fixed-wing aircraft to jettison 60 canisters, each carrying 2,500 leaflets, over the target area. With the gradual redeployment of U.S. C-130s, leaflet missions were also conducted from New Zealand Andovers, a small version of the DC-3.

The handshake and convoy-security leaflets were only two of 37 different leaflets eventually produced during Restore Hope. Even after the establishment of the newspaper and the radio program, UNITAF continued to use leaflets, designed and printed by the JPOTF in Somalia, to support military operations. Leaflets announced rules prohibiting specific categories of weapons and behavior and informed local communities that coalition troops were authorized to use force if they were threatened. While the rules for each major town were roughly the same, they reflected local conditions and were modified as the security environment changed. Tactical PSYOP teams attached to Army and Marine forces in each humanitarian-relief sector requested leaflets with themes based on the specific situation confronting each maneuver commander. Leaflet concepts were coordinated with the UNITAF director of operations and then designed, printed and dropped over the target areas. Announcements published in the *Rajo* reinforced leaflet messages.

Photo by Mark Dwyer

U.S. forces deploy leaflet bundles over Somalia.

Leaflets, handbills and posters supported several engineering projects as well. In December and again in March, engineers cleared Mogadishu's streets of abandoned and destroyed vehicles, downed telephone poles, sand, debris and other objects that blocked the flow of traffic along major roads and near market areas. Later in the operation, Army engineers and Navy Seabees repaired or constructed more than 1,200 miles of roads, drilled 14 wells, and erected a Bailey bridge across the Juba River near the town of Jilib. Leaflets, handbills and posters complemented each effort by informing the Somali people of the upcoming operation and asking them to cooperate by staying clear of hazardous engineering equipment. These products

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

A civilian relief worker helps distribute supplies to Somali citizens during Operation Restore Hope.

also requested that Somalis report mine locations.

PSYOP also supported several humanitarian-relief operations conducted by nongovernmental organizations. A major problem facing Somalia is the large number of displaced persons and refugees who were forced to leave their homes during the civil war. With no reliable source of food or medical care, these groups have become totally dependent on relief provided by the NGOs.

The "pastoral scene" leaflet supported programs encouraging displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes when it was safe to do so, in order to harvest their crops and to begin planting for the next growing season. The goal of this leaflet, and of articles written for *Rajo* describing specific NGO resettlement programs, was to help break the cycle of dependency and to encourage self-sufficiency.

Mine-awareness

Like many nations around the world, Somalia has a serious problem with mines. During Operation Restore Hope, mine explosions killed or injured several UNITAF personnel as well as many Somalis. PSYOP specialists produced several different posters and published articles in the *Rajo* newspaper advising Somalis to be aware of mine hazards.

Toward the end of the operation, PSYOP also produced coloring books detailing the first-aid requirements for victims of mine-related accidents; handbills explaining how to exit a mine field safely; and posters illustrating the most common mines found in Somalia. The underlying message was the same: "Report, don't touch, mines." Copies of the products were also distributed to other members of the UNITAF coalition.

Contingency operations

At the end of February 1993, on the first day of Ramadan, violent demonstrations took place in the area of Mogadishu controlled by Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader of the Somali National Alliance. Following the demonstrations, children began carrying toy handguns, which they pointed at UNITAF forces. By the end of Ramadan, toy guns were prevalent throughout the city, and there were several incidents in which UNITAF forces came close to shooting children, thinking the guns were real. The JPOTF initiated a campaign to address the problem in the *Rajo* newspaper, over the radio and in leaflets. The Rajo radio program included an interview with a prominent representative of a Somali women's group who spoke in very strong terms about the dangers of the children's behavior. Fortunately, there were no accidents, and the number of incidents eventually decreased.

PSYOP also responded quickly to the repeated crises in Kismayo. After Hersi Morgan took Kismayo in late February,

Johnston and Ambassador Oakley issued an ultimatum for him to withdraw his forces to a town on the Kenya border. The JPOTF produced and dropped leaflets informing Morgan's supporters, as well as the people of Kismayo and other major towns in the lower Juba valley, of the situation.

PSYOP was a key battlefield operating system and contributed significantly to the success of Operation Restore Hope. As Johnston later said, "PSYOP really worked well to convince (Somalis) that we were there with the military capability to take care of the factions, and that we were going to provide support and safety. I think that was the (unique) dimension of PSYOP."

Operation Restore Hope focused international attention on the challenges that military forces face as they apply their combat talents and training in support of difficult humanitarian objectives. The soldiers of the 4th PSYOP Group who served in the JPOTF readily adapted to the challenge. Having witnessed PSYOP's direct contribution to Somalia's first steps toward peace and reconstruction, these soldiers are now even better prepared to participate in future peacekeeping operations.

Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support in Washington, D.C. During his military career he has served in a variety of command and staff assignments as a Military Police officer. A former commander of the 8th PSYOP Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group, Lt. Col. Borchini served as commander of the joint PSYOP task force during Operation Restore Hope. He is a 1994 graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

Mari Borstelmann is a civilian analyst and a Horn of Africa area specialist assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group. She deployed with U.S. PSYOP forces to Somalia as the civilian analyst. She holds bachelor's and master's degrees from Boston University and has completed dissertation research for a Ph.D. in African history.

Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations

by Col. Mark D. Boyatt

The term "special-operations forces" is used to describe a broad array of diverse forces and organizations. The essence of SOF, the elements that contribute most significantly over the long term to the U.S. national security strategy *in terms of the numbers of active missions and their effect on national security* objectives, is its unconventional-operations forces. But current doctrine does not identify specific unconventional-operations forces, nor is there a definition of unconventional operations in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*

Unconventional operations, or UO, are low-visibility, economy-of-force and economy-of-resource operations. They are unique in that relatively small operational elements work in a combined environment *by, through or with indigenous counterparts*. The UO environment is usually politically sensitive, frequently requiring close cooperation with the Department of State and other non-DoD agencies in remote locations and across the operational continuum.

During peacetime, UO consist primarily of operations with nations important to the U.S. national-security strategy. Some examples are foreign-internal-defense operations, humanitarian-assistance operations, nation-building operations, counterdrug assistance and security-assistance programs. During conflict or war, UO are primarily unconventional-warfare operations. Examples are guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature.[1] The above-mentioned peacetime operations may also continue during conflict as economy-of-force efforts, either within the operational and strategic areas of operation or in other areas. An example of this synergistic effect was demonstrated during the Gulf War: While some U.S. Army Special Forces contributed to the effectiveness of coalition warfare in the area of operations, other Special Forces elements conducted missions in Turkey, Africa, South and Central America, the Pacific and Asia.

Unconventional operations provide a low-risk political option with a high potential for political return. Conducted without fanfare, UO usually attract little, if any, media coverage.

UO forces

Unconventional-operations forces are those U.S. special-operations forces who have unique capabilities to conduct a wide range of UO, as opposed to those

Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect policies of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

SOF elements whose missions are more specialized.

Unconventional-operations forces concentrate primarily on teaching, training, and organizing military, paramilitary or other indigenous forces in the conduct of FID operations, unconventional warfare, humanitarian assistance, nation building and counterdrug assistance. Best defined as forces principally organized and trained to accomplish their missions *with, through or by counterpart relationships with indigenous personnel,* UO forces are unique. The only SOF specifically organized, trained and equipped to conduct missions in this manner are the numbered Army Special Forces groups.

Roles and missions

According to Joint Test Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,* SOF have five principal missions and six collateral special-operations activities.

Principal missions
- Unconventional warfare
- Direct action
- Special reconnaissance
- Foreign internal defense
- Counterterrorism

Collateral activities
- Security assistance
- Humanitarian assistance
- Antiterrorism and other security activities
- Counternarcotics
- Personnel recovery
- Special activities

Several of these missions are, in reality, subsets of others. By introducing the concept of unconventional operations, we can combine several of these missions, shrinking the principal ones to three, with several subsets. These proposed changes better organize and clarify SOF missions into functional areas.

Principal missions
- Unconventional operations
  - Unconventional warfare
  - Foreign internal defense
  - Security assistance
  - Humanitarian assistance
  - Counternarcotics
- Direct action[2]
  - Counterterrorism
  - Personnel recovery
- Special reconnaissance

Collateral activities
- Special activities
- Antiterrorism and other security activities

The proposed changes would categorize UW and FID as the primary elements of UO. Security assistance, humanitarian assistance and counternarcotics would become subsets of FID. Counterterrorism and personnel recovery would become subsets of DA. Such a realignment of mission categories would simplify the training focus for units.

U.S. Army photo

A Special Forces NCO instructs Salvadoran soldiers in small-unit tactics.

The chart on page 12 shows the SOF elements and their primary missions under current doctrine.[3]

By doctrine, Special Forces have five primary missions — unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action and counterterrorism. Much of the attention SF receives focuses on only three missions: counterterrorism, direct action and special-reconnaissance operations.

Five missions are too many and result in a dilution of effort and resources, especially when considering direct-action, special-reconnaissance and counterterrorism missions. Units usually approach these as stand-alone missions and train to execute them in a unilateral manner. Each mission then receives repetitive training time, consuming significant resources. Additionally, other SOF or general-purpose forces include direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism among their missions. Some of these units are actually better-trained, better-organized and better-resourced for those missions than are the Special Forces groups. This is duplication we can ill afford in these times of shrinking budgets.[4]

The probability that counterterrorism forces will be needed may have increased with the uncertainty facing the changing world.[5] Counterterrorism must keep its high priority because of political sensitivity, but as a subset of direct action. Since other elements focus on counterterrorist missions, Special Forces groups should not be so tasked.[6]

Unilateral direct action and special reconnaissance are high-visibility operations and have always received disproportionate attention as SF missions. Special Forces groups can and do conduct these operations, but only by sacrificing expertise and competence in unconventional operations. The capability to conduct a mission does not equate with competence. As with CT, other units and some general-purpose-force elements receive specific resourcing to train, equip and organize for DA and SR.[7] SF soldiers are better able to conduct these missions through coalition operations with indigenous assets. For unilateral DA and SR, Special Forces assets should be considered only when other SOF units or general-purpose forces are inappropriate or

SOF Primary Missions

Army		
	Special Forces	UW, DA, SR, FID, CT
	Rangers	DA, CT
	SO Aviation	DA, SR, support for all operations
Navy*		
	SEALs	UW**, DA, SR, FID, CT
	Special Boat Units	Support for all operations
	SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams	Support for all operations
Air Force		
	Fixed-wing	Support for all operations
	Rotary-wing	Support for all operations
	SO Weather	Support for all operations
	SO CCT/PJ	Support for all operations
Special-Mission Units		
		UW, DA, SR, FID, CT

* The USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (special-operations capable) is not listed because it is not a core SOF element.
** Although the SEALs have unconventional warfare as a mission, their definition of UW is more like the definition of direct action. They see UW as strikes and raids behind enemy lines, unlike Army Special Forces. Army SF practice UW in the traditional sense of working with indigenous elements in a denied area.

unavailable.

The second chart shows SOF elements and their *proposed* primary missions. The introduction of unconventional operations as a mission category, along with direct action and special reconnaissance, focuses the missions functionally.

The ability of Army Special Forces to conduct the broad range of unconventional operations is unique in the U.S. military. Certainly, other SOF elements and, on occasion, elements of the general-purpose forces execute portions of unconventional operations. However, only the Special Forces groups, by virtue of their organization, training, equipment and orientation, are capable of covering the complete UO spectrum.

Unconventional operations have unique cultural aspects that are important whether we are teaching or conducting military operations. Conducting effective UO requires a detailed knowledge and understanding of the host nation's culture. Intercultural communication, which includes language training and regional studies, is a basic element of the training of a Special Forces group. Unfortunately, when Special Forces units focus on a non-UO mission in response to a tasking, the cultural aspects are the first to suffer. Achieving adequate proficiency in cultural aspects requires regional focus and intensive training. Conducting unconventional-warfare or foreign-internal-defense missions requires an integrated proficiency in direct action and special reconnaissance, but with a different training focus. In UO, these missions will be executed in a combined environment *by, through or with foreign counterparts.*

Why focus the SF mission on UO? Why not leave the missions as now assigned: UW, DA, SR, FID and CT? The reason is resources, with the primary resource being time. Currently, many SF units

Proposed SOF Primary Missions

Army	
Special Forces	UO
Rangers	DA
SO Aviation	DA, SR, support for all operations
Navy*	
SEALs	DA, SR
Special Boat Units	Support for all operations
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams	Support for all operations
Air Force*	
Fixed-wing	Support for all operations
Rotary-wing	Support for all operations
SO Weather	Support for all operations
SO CCT/PJ	Support for all operations
Special-Mission Units*	
	DA, SR

* Elements of these SOF organizations, on occasion, conduct FID, a portion of UO.

U. S. Navy photo

U.S. Navy SEALs deploy from a combat rubber raiding craft. These Navy forces are well-suited for DA and SR missions.

focus strictly on DA, SR or CT.[8] Accordingly, most of their training time is spent perfecting their unilateral capabilities in these areas, degrading their ability to be truly effective in the more complex activities of unconventional operations. They cannot make the transition without significant effort and time. Likewise, units effectively trained in UO will not be able to make a rapid transition to effective unilateral DA, SR or CT missions. These, too, are complicated missions requiring intensive training.

With regard to the capability of the overall force, critics can point out a shortfall resulting from the proposal to delete special reconnaissance as a unilateral SF mission. This shortfall is in human intelligence, or HUMINT, forward of the corps fire-coordination line. Many commanders expect Special Forces to fill this role, and if there are no other options, Special Forces may have to. But we should not assume that Special Forces will act unilaterally. If UO forces are permitted to conduct peacetime, preconflict missions in their assigned regions, a secondary benefit may be the availability of indigenous assets. An effective and efficient way of collecting HUMINT is through indigenous assets trained by UO forces. Indigenous assets might conduct missions unilaterally, or they might be organized, trained, equipped and led by UO forces. Unilateral collection by SF is the method of last choice.

Unfortunately, we seem fixated on CT, DA and SR missions. As a result, these highly visible missions receive most of the attention and resourcing — unconventional-operations missions don't receive equal attention. It is these routine and not-so-glamorous unconventional operations, however, which contribute most to U.S. national-security strategy in terms of the numbers of missions conducted and their effect on national-security objectives.[9]

Recommendations

First, we need to codify in doctrine the terms "unconventional operations" and "unconventional-operations forces." We need to recognize UO forces as a distinct element of SOF and as key players in implementing national-security strategy.

Secondly, unconventional operations must be the primary mission for active-component Army Special Forces groups. Eliminate DA, SR and CT missions or clearly state that they are duplicative subordinate missions of SF. Clearly indicate that other SOF or general-purpose-force elements are more appropriately tasked to undertake these missions. Unconventional operations require intense focus. Diversion of training time and resources to missions that can be performed by other elements is an unjustifiable duplication.

Finally, and most important, Special Forces units must become actively involved outside the United States to gain more insight into the various regions and to assist with regional stability. This involvement would require some change to the current structure, funding and employment of SF battalions. The strength of Special Forces is in their cultural focus, and we must capitalize upon this strength.

To accomplish these goals, we must significantly increase funding and priority for unconventional operations. Ensure regional orientation and funding for the UO forces to operate as much as possible in their respective regions. Give the 15 active Special Forces battalions clear areas or regions of responsibility that will remain

fixed. It takes a long time, sometimes years, to cultivate an area and to inculcate regional expertise in a unit. A UO force cannot change its regional and language orientation every few years and be expected to develop a significant degree of expertise or cultural understanding.

Carefully select these areas of responsibility based on world dynamics, not on current force structure. We need to identify the regions and allocate the SF battalions; then determine the headquarters structure at SF group level. This may mean that one theater has seven battalions oriented on subregional areas and ethnic groups, while another may require five battalions, and a third may require only three battalions. At the same time, make the SF battalions more organizationally independent, even at the expense of the SF group support structure.

The current structure of the SF group headquarters will require modification. Most of the structure should be moved to the battalions. Another consideration is to move the group headquarters into the theaters and designate them as the Army-component headquarters for the regional commander in chief's special-operations commands. The focus of UO-force activity will be the SF battalion, not the group.

By emphasizing the unconventional operations role of Special Forces, the United States gains regional experts with on-the-ground experience. Additionally, mutual trust and understanding, cultivated through personal and sustained contact with regional personalities, may be the most important outcome of the long-term regional orientation. In most developing nations, personal relationships are key to trust and understanding. Who you are personally is more important than what you represent. UO forces can develop these relationships and facilitate the critical interface between coalition forces in a conflict, as they did in Desert Storm. If sufficiently resourced, UO forces can maintain a forward presence that could reassure nervous nations and increase regional stability. Furthermore, in the event of an incident or conflict, these elements would provide a ready source of first-hand regional expertise.

Conclusion

President George Bush stated in the January 1993 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, "Through a strategy of engagement and leadership, we seek global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress. To this end, we have four mutually supportive goals that guide our overall national security efforts. These are protecting the United States and its citizens from attack; honoring, strengthening, and extending our historic, treaty and collective defense arrangements; ensuring that no hostile power is able to dominate or control a region critical to our interests; and working to avoid conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and violence, limiting the proliferation of advanced military technology and weapons of mass destruction, and strengthening civil-military institutions while reducing the economic burdens of military spending."[10]

Unconventional-operations forces have a significant, if not leading, role to play in implementing these national security efforts. Indications are that the world of the 1990s, and likely beyond, will be more unstable than the world of the 1980s. The control and the relatively enforced stability of the bipolar world of the 1970s and 1980s have given way to a

U.S. Air Force SOF, such as this combat control team, are capable of supporting all types of SOF operations.

U. S. Air Force photo

growing concern by numerous nations about their national security.[11] The role that the U.S. is to play in this unstable environment is unclear. One means that is available, though in need of attention, is unconventional operations. UO, prudently and judiciously executed, can provide regional stability through a low-level U.S. presence that acts as a brake on regional ambitions.

Nations that see or benefit from these unconventional operations may become more convinced and assured of U.S. interest and concern for a given region. The presence of UO forces can foster diplomacy, whereas their absence may foster conflict. Nations or regions that perceive themselves as outside the sphere of concern of the world's only superpower may feel compelled to pursue their own independent means of national security. This can lead to regional arms races, possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional instability.

U.S. foreign policy is in transition. It is unclear what vision will emerge, and it is difficult to anticipate world and regional events. Samuel Huntington describes it thus: "All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities."[12]

Unconventional operations can provide a window through which this "jungle-like world" can be viewed with greater clarity. This is the arena, the regionally focused arena, within which unconventional operations forces thrive and, if properly and timely employed, can provide a unique option in executing the U.S. national security strategy.

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Notes:

[1] Unconventional warfare (DoD) [Joint Pub 1-02]: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace.

[2] Direct-action missions may be conducted as part of unconventional operations, such as unconventional warfare and counternarcotics, but the desire is that these missions be combined operations if possible.

[3] Joint Test Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 90).

[4] The Rangers are an excellent direct-action unit. They prefer not to be employed in less than battalion-size elements, although in some cases they will execute company-size operations. The Navy SEAL teams are excellent at small direct-action and reconnaissance operations but are limited to coastal and riverine areas. Special-mission units are specifically trained to conduct all missions: CT, DA, SR and limited FID and UW. The general-purpose force has reconnaissance units that conduct tactical reconnaissance missions.

[5] Walter Laqueur, first in his monumental works *Guerrilla*, 1976, and *Terrorism*, 1977, and in *The Age of Terrorism*, 1987, makes the point that terrorism is a tactic to effect political change and has been used over the centuries by disaffected and politically impotent segments of society. Terrorism is a tactic closely associated with insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. As political phenomena, they are not mutually exclusive of each other. The future, reflected in the post-Cold War realities, suggests that insurgency and terrorism will occur with increasing regularity.

[6] CT proficiency requires intense effort to become truly surgical. However, the CT mission given to SF is an in-extremis mission. If honestly approached in this manner, and not as a de facto duplication of the principal CT forces, then this is only a DA mission. Obviously, the degree of risk increases.

[7] Some examples are the special-mission units, the special-support units, the Rangers, divisional and corps reconnaissance units, and the SEALs. None of these units focus on UO.

[8] The 7th SF Group is probably an exception to this generality. Of all the Special Forces groups, the 7th is most oriented to UO.

[9] Special Forces elements have been training with their counterparts in nations around the globe for many years. Through their presence in these countries, relationships and contacts have been established that have had far-reaching effects. In many of these countries, the military counterparts with whom Special Forces have worked have eventually risen to various positions of power — in some cases even heads of state. These relationships have led to regional stability in some cases and to access to critical facilities in others. In almost all cases, SF are viewed in these countries as informal ambassadors of the U.S. and as positive examples of democracy. The leverage gained in negotiations with foreign governments over our national security goals and objectives often staggers the imagination of the casual observer. For example, if one accepts that one of our goals in Liberia was to gain and maintain the trust and the confidence of its leader, President Doe, then the efforts of a single Special Forces sergeant met and exceeded expectations. There are other operations, usually classified, in which the accomplishments of Special Forces soldiers far exceeded anything thought possible in terms of the long-term positive impact on U.S./allied relations.

[10] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1993), p. 3.

[11] During the Cold War, these countries enjoyed relative national security because of the competition between the USSR and the U.S. Neither superpower would permit tangible threats to its respective satellites, surrogates or friends. Without superpower influence, these nations may now pursue regional ambitions or threats from their now-unconstrained neighbors.

[12] Samuel Huntington is an Eaton professor of the Science of Government and is the director of the John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Town

by Maj. Douglas E. Nash

During the Gulf War, U.S. Army Civil Affairs units performed a variety of tasks, including liaison duties with the host-nation government, humanitarian-relief activities, planning for noncombatant evacuation operations and educating U.S. units about Saudi Arabian culture. These are missions for which all CA units train regularly.

A task that is rarely practiced, however, is the administration of an occupied town or city in enemy territory. The Army gained considerable experience in this task during World War II and the Korean War, but it has had little opportunity to engage in it since. During Operation Desert Storm, Company B of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion had the mission of administering the town of As Salman after its seizure by the French 6th Light Armored Division.

A Civil Affairs officer evaluates a desert well in Saudi Arabia for suitability of use by American forces.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

Employment

Company B's mission during Operation Desert Shield/Storm was to support the XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units with Civil Affairs teams. From the beginning of Desert Shield in August 1990 until reserve-component CA units were activated and deployed in December 1990, Co. B was the only CA unit supporting the entire corps. Its first teams arrived in Saudi Arabia with the lead elements of the 82nd Airborne and 24th Infantry divisions. During this five-month period, Co.B located water wells and negotiated contracts for their use, assessed and evaluated potential sources of labor, produced bilingual instruction cards for guard personnel, established liaison with local officials to minimize the impact of incidents between U.S. forces and the Saudi populace, and provided assistance to the corps staff judge advocate and Saudi officials on

claims against the U.S. government. The company also developed and coordinated plans for the evacuation of civilians in the eastern province, and developed and coordinated a noncombatant-evacuation-operation plan for U.S. and third-country nationals.

Authorized 36 personnel, Co. B had only 22 personnel present for duty when Desert Shield began. Soldiers from other companies of the 96th CA Battalion were attached to the company, giving it a peak strength of 34 personnel in November 1990.

Attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the company assigned teams to each of the corps' major subordinate commands — the 1st Cavalry, the 24th Mechanized Infantry, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airmobile divisions, the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, the 1st Corps Support Command, the 16th MP Brigade, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Teams varied in size from two to four personnel. Their equipment was limited to trucks, radio sets and individual weapons, and they were completely dependent upon the units to which they were attached for support.

Support to French forces

Early in January 1991, the company was notified by the XVIII Airborne Corps G-5 that it would be attached to the French 6th Light Armored Division for the liberation of Kuwait. Co. B began movement on Jan. 17 to the 6th LAD's tactical assembly area north of the village of Rafha. En route, some of the company's teams also supported the convoy movement of the corps. By Jan. 29, these teams had rejoined the company, which was then busily engaged in supporting the French forces in the Rafha area, providing much the same operational and planning support as it had for the XVIII Airborne Corps units.

Company B was somewhat of an oddity to the French, who had no Civil Affairs capability in their force structure. After an initial adjustment period, curious French soldiers who wanted to meet "les Américains" and trade for highly prized souvenirs sought out members of the company. Other French soldiers were more curious about what a Civil Affairs unit could do for them.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

A Civil Affairs officer meets with a Saudi emir to discuss matters affecting the deployment of American forces.

The XVIII Airborne Corps had requested that the company be attached to the 6th LAD because the division would have the task of seizing and administering the only sizable Iraqi town in the area — As Salman. Although other Civil Affairs units were available, they had only recently deployed into the theater. Company B had the most experienced and best-trained CA assets, and a number of its officers and NCOs spoke French.

Before the ground-attack phase of Desert Storm began, Co. B became acquainted with its new division and the area around Rafha. The company conducted area surveys and assessments and established working relationships with the emir of Rafha and other local authorities. These relationships proved invaluable to the 6th LAD and the XVIII Airborne Corps in dealing with the inevitable friction involved in massing thousands of soldiers and vehicles in a civilian community.

Mission

While the air war continued, the company received an updated mission statement from the French division commander, General Michel Roquejeoffre. The mission directed that Co. B conduct civil-military

operations to reduce civilian interference with military operations, identify and acquire local resources, fulfill legal obligations and moral considerations in accordance with international law and agreements, and terminate hostilities with conditions favorable to the long-term national interest of the allied coalition. Implicit in this mission was that the company would assume responsibility for the administration of the town of As Salman. As conditions permitted, it would receive administrative and logistics support from the French to carry out its mission.

Since the 6th LAD had no staff position equivalent to a G-5, the Co. B commander wrote the Civil Affairs annex to the 6th LAD operations plan. The company's two French linguists translated the document, and it was published as part of the division's plan. The concept of operations for Co. B was that during preparation for the ground campaign, the unit would update area studies, refine CA plans, identify stockpiles of humanitarian-relief supplies and pre-position them as far forward as possible. During the ground campaign itself, the company would concentrate on population control to minimize civilian interference with military operations. Unit personnel would also conduct early assessments of the attitudes and basic needs of Iraqi civilians.

Once As Salman was seized, tasks would be prioritized as follows:

- Coordinate and execute a civil-information program to create a favorable image with the Iraqi civilian population.
- Locate local resources and assist in their acquisition for use by allied forces and the civilian population.
- Conduct displaced-civilian operations.
- Alleviate human suffering among civilians in accordance with Article 56 of the Geneva Convention.
- Assist French commanders in fulfilling their obligations under international law.
- Conduct civil administration of occupied areas, including the re-establishment of essential services.
- Plan for the transfer of civil-military-operations functions to follow-on elements of the 360th CA Brigade.

Task Organization for Administrative Mission



To accomplish these tasks, the unit developed an approach best described as "civil affairs triage." Similar to categorizing wounded personnel, the process enabled the company's teams to decide what could be fixed quickly and placed back into operation, what could be fixed in the long-term, and what could not be fixed.

To carry out its mission, the company reorganized along functional lines and established five teams. The public-works team would locate and assess Iraqi government facilities; the public-services team would assess the civilian population's requirements for survival; the law-and-order team would handle population control and enforcement of directives targeted at the Iraqi populace; the civil-information team would coordinate psychological operations targeted toward the Iraqi populace; and the public-health-and-housing team would determine health and medical requirements and the condition of civilian housing.

Each team consisted of an officer, an NCO, an operations specialist (usually a military policeman), and a volunteer Kuwaiti translator. The volunteers, militiamen from a training camp north of Dhahran, added a much-needed Arabic-language capability.

Objective: As Salman

One of the most difficult tasks the unit had before the ground war started was to acquire reliable information about As Salman. Unit members made acquaintances with local merchants, police, Bedouins and administrators and, through these sources, gathered enough information to generate a detailed picture of As Salman and the entire French sector.

Using its area study and the application of 14 political-military analytical factors taught in the Regional Studies Course at Fort Bragg's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the company developed a plan to administer As Salman once it had been seized by the French.

Founded approximately 1,800 years ago, As Salman was home to 4,500 people, many of whom were nomadic Bedouins who lived there only during the winter. Located about 70 miles north of the Saudi Arabian-Iraqi border, the town had served as a watering hole for caravans along the "Darb' al Hadj," the historic pilgrimage route from Baghdad to Mecca. This route, recently paved, had been renamed major supply route "Texas" by the XVIII Airborne Corps. It became one of the major avenues of approach to the Euphrates valley.

With the coming of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime, As Salman became a major governmental "corporate" town. In addition to housing a border police battalion in a fortress two miles east of the town, As Salman also housed a military garrison, a military school and a local Ba'ath party headquarters. It boasted a modern health clinic, running water, several schools, a weather station and many other amenities not common to Iraqi towns in the region.

Once the air war began, large numbers of the town's residents fled north to avoid the bombing. An Iraqi reserve division, the 45th (composed mostly of Kurds), was moved to As Salman and ordered to defend the Iraqi far right flank while it continued to incorporate large numbers of reservists into its force structure.

Typical Team Organization



PERSONNEL:
1 – TEAM LEADER - O-3/CPT
1 – TEAM NCOIC - E-7/SFC
1 – OPNS SPECIALIST - E-4/SPC
1 – TRANSLATOR - KUWAITI

EQUIPMENT:
1 – M-1009 3/4 -TON TRUCK
1 – AN/VRC-46
1 – BULLHORN

Soldiers from Co. B would not enter As Salman until it had been secured by the French division's 3rd Colonial Marine Infantry Regiment, the 3rd RIMA. On the morning of Feb. 26, the company commander was told to link up immediately with the 3rd RIMA for the attack on As Salman. Fortunately, the unit had planned for this contingency, and its teams were prepared. After a hasty conference, one CA team was attached to each of the four French infantry companies to deal with civilians and EPWs encountered during the attack. One remaining team would move with the French battalion trains to receive displaced civilians and EPWs from the forward teams and hold them at a collection point for interrogation by French military-intelligence personnel.

When the armored vehicles of the 3rd RIMA reached the edge of As Salman, the troops dismounted and began clearing the town house by house. The Iraqis did not defend As Salman, and all that allied troops had to show for their efforts were 17 Iraqi prisoners and 13 civilians. The EPWs were shipped to Rafha, but the civilians were allowed to remain. After interrogation by the unit's Kuwaiti interpreters, each civilian was escorted back to his home by a CA team and told not to leave the dwelling.

Civil affairs triage

Once As Salman had been searched and secured, Co. B quickly moved its command post and displaced-civilian collection point to the center of town. A quick survey of the town disclosed that damage was minimal. The 3rd RIMA commander established his command post in the muhktarate, the Iraqi mayor's office, since it was centrally located and was the most modern building with enough room for communications equipment. Company B established its command post in a nearby boys' school.

On Feb. 27, the company's teams fanned out across the town to assess infrastructure damage, the availability of food supplies and the condition of the medical clinic. As Salman had been designated by the Iraqis as both a divisional headquarters site and a mobilization point. Tons of abandoned equipment, weapons, and vehicles were scattered throughout the town. Teams also located large amounts of food,

U.S. Civil Affairs soldiers issue food rations to Iraqi villagers in As Salman.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

medicine, bottled water and ammunition.

While sappers of the French Foreign Legion removed and destroyed arms and ammunition, the public-service team moved hundreds of bags of flour, rice and beans, as well as stores of cooking oil and salt, to a food-issue point at the boys' school. The public-health-and-housing team evaluated the clinic that Iraqi troops had used as a field hospital. Despite its recent use, the clinic was well-stocked and equipped. Although badly in need of cleaning, it could soon be placed back into operation for the returning civilian population.

The public-works team assessed the condition of the town's utilities, communications and roads. The town telephone exchange had been removed by the Iraqis. The power plant, though capable of being restored, lacked a trained engineer to operate it. Allied bombing had destroyed the waterworks on the northern edge of the town, and the only reliable sources of water were private wells. If the town's inhabitants did return, the several hundred bottles of water discovered by Co. B would not last long.

The law-and-order team searched the town police station, which had been hit by a 500-pound bomb. Despite the damage, team members were able to retrieve the town's police files, which would help identify potentially disruptive elements once the townspeople began returning. The team also made identity cards for each of the town's inhabitants and was prepared to issue them should the villagers return. The team leader met daily with his French military-police counterpart to coordinate local security tasks and exchange information. All local security, except for Co. B's compound, was the responsibility of the French.

The civil-information team was also fully occupied during the first several days after the town was seized. After questioning all of the Iraqi civilians in the town, the team discovered that the secular mayor, who held an Iraqi civil-service position, had fled, as had all members of the Ba'ath party political structure. However, the traditional tribal leader of the town, the muhktar, had remained.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

Civil Affairs soldiers and Kuwaiti volunteers assist the muhktar of As Salman (center, with glasses) at the food-issue point.

The company commander decided that the allies should formally recognize the muhktar as the sole legitimate civilian leader of As Salman, and the French garrison commander concurred. The civil-information team was given the mission of enhancing the muhktar's legitimacy and using him to channel information about the town's new "administrators" to its inhabitants.

Since the muhktarate was being used by the French, Co. B's commander set up the muhktar's new office in an unused room in the boys' school, near the company command post. The civil-information team also arranged daily town-council meetings with the muhktar and various tribal and family heads, in which details of the administration of the town were worked out. The muhktar was also briefed on directives issued by the French area commander that would affect the town's population. Important information, such as the need to boil drinking water and the dangers posed by unexploded munitions, was regularly disseminated during the meetings. The meetings were also a forum for grievances. The fact that there were no instances of rebellion or outbreaks of hostility during the town's administration is indicative of the success of the meetings.

Every evening, team leaders met with the company commander to share information and to update the As Salman area assessment. To keep both the 6th LAD

and the Corps G-5 informed of its activities, the company submitted daily situation reports that detailed its activities and provided estimates of supplies required for the town's population.

The French, for their part, did not intrude into this process. They remained satisfied with the company's performance as long as the town did not demand too much in terms of security or logistics support and did not interfere with military operations. However, the French commander stipulated that only prewar residents of As Salman would be allowed to return. All others were to be turned away.

Population returns

By Mar. 5, 1991, the teams had completed their inventories. All foodstuffs had been moved to a storage site in the company's compound. Military equipment had been removed from most of the residential areas of the town. Tons of gear, ammunition and weapons had been collected by French Foreign Legion sappers and destroyed north of the town.

Several wells had been placed back into operation, and the town clinic had been cleaned in preparation for the daily sick call that would begin when the population returned. Company B's mechanic had repaired a garbage truck and two water trucks, making them operational. All these services would be badly needed when the estimated 2,500 townspeople returned.

Villagers of As Salman receive bulk issues of rations at the food-issue point.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

An estimated 500 townspeople were camping in the desert. Although they were notified by the muhktar that it was safe to return to their homes, they did not trust the Americans at first — Iraqi propaganda had painted the allies as barbarians. The villagers sent representatives to As Salman to see for themselves. If the Americans were telling the truth, the villagers would return. Word was also passed along by Bedouins to those townspeople who had fled north that it was safe to return home. These groups also sent representatives to see what the Americans and the French were up to.

By Mar. 9, the trickle of returnees had become a flood. To establish control of the returning townspeople, the law-and-order team set up a checkpoint at the northern entrance to the town. All other routes into the town were sealed off by the French. At the checkpoint, all returning traffic was stopped and vehicles and personnel were searched for weapons and other contraband. Because of Islamic customs regarding the treatment of women, the unit's sole female soldier was joined by three other female soldiers from the Corps G-5 and the CA Brigade to assist with searches of women.

The law-and-order team quickly discovered that most Iraqis had no identity documents. Many had had their identity cards confiscated by the Iraqi secret police; others had thrown them away to hide their identity. The lack of identity cards made screening the legitimate inhabitants of the town difficult, but the Kuwaiti translators were adept at ferreting out the required information. For example, they could tell by an Iraqi's dialect whether he was a local Bedouin or a resident of Baghdad. Questionable cases were checked against the captured police files.

Iraqis who were not returnees were turned away. Many were found to be Iraqi Army deserters, and when their numbers began to pose a threat to security at the checkpoint, they were taken to the EPW cage in Rafha. Returnees who had been screened were in-processed and issued an

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

French and American soldiers talk with villagers of As Salman.

American-made identity card and four days' rations. All returnees were briefed by the muhktar on the allied administration and its rules. They were also told that they would have to go through the muhktar with questions or complaints — they were not allowed to deal directly with the allies. This helped establish the muhktar as the legitimate Iraqi leader in the town.

Challenge of 'military government'

By Mar. 24, the company had processed 2,768 returnees, most of whom chose to return to their homes. Others, mostly Bedouins, returned to their pastures in the surrounding area. Most of the unit's personnel were heavily involved in the day-to-day duties required to administer a town of more than 2,000 inhabitants; only the law-and-order team remained at the checkpoint north of town, where it continued to screen and in-process the few remaining returnees.

Realizing that the unit was not large enough to adequately administer the town, the company commander decided to transfer as many duties as possible to the muhktar once he was able to handle them. For example, the civil-service team had initially staffed the food distribution point and had managed the issuing of rations. The muhktar was directed to pick a staff to run the food-issue point. One of the company's operations specialists would supervise the operation.

Soldiers from Co. B had initially driven the water trucks and the garbage truck, but an Egyptian national later volunteered to perform this duty. He "hired" several local assistants, who were usually paid with extra rations of food. By the end of Co. B's stay, water distribution and trash hauling were civilian responsibilities.

As food stocks were exhausted, the French Army provided military rations for issue to the townspeople. Although the allies could have flooded the town with food, the company commander believed that it would not be in the Iraqis' best interests to raise their standard of living higher than it had been before the war. They received what was adequate to sustain their day-to-day needs, and local merchants slowly began to fill in the gaps.

The public-health team administered

sick call at the town clinic. Since all Iraqi public-health personnel had fled north, the French Army medical personnel performed this vital service, often seeing more than 100 patients each day. Care provided at the clinic played a major role in developing favorable attitudes toward the allies in general and the Americans in particular. As a result, the Iraqis cooperated with their American administrators, even going so far as to compel their neighbors to follow the allies' rules and regulations.

By Mar. 20, the town was virtually self-sustaining except for food and medical supplies. On Mar. 23, the company moved from the boy's school to an abandoned border-police fortress on the northern edge of town. This move was necessary because the town council had decided to reopen the schools, probably the most conclusive evidence that normalcy had returned to As Salman and that the unit's mission had been successful. That same day, the company commander met with the commander of the 354th CA Command from VII Corps to discuss the hand-off of responsibility for As Salman. The following day, the company was relieved by VII Corps units and began its redeployment to CONUS.

Conclusion

During Operation Desert Storm, Co. B was able to execute a classic Civil Affairs mission — the administration of an occupied town in enemy territory. With little prior experience in performing such a task, a small unit was able to complete its mission with a minimum diversion of allied resources. A combination of factors contributed to the unit's success: planning, experience, service support, training, initiative, PSYOP, and cultural and language training.

Planning was crucial to the success of the mission. Not only was a solid operations plan important, but also constant rehearsals, updated area studies, and coordination with supported and supporting units. The operations plan was adjusted constantly during the administration of As Salman, ensuring that the company was flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. Area assessments were important because they were used as tools to teach company members about the village they would soon be administering. Soldiers knew each street, each building, and the ethnic makeup of the town before they ever saw it.

Experience was another crucial factor. Although all the members of Co. B had received some formal Civil Affairs training, six months in the theater — working with the inhabitants and dealing with real problems — gave the unit experience in locating local resources, dealing with local officials and operating in a desert environment.

The unit's success could not have been achieved without administrative and logistics support from the XVIII Airborne Corps G-5 and the 6th LAD. The company learned to live without support from ARCENT or CENTCOM: these organizations were too remote. Although As Salman was administered in an austere logistical environment, the town's needs were largely met by energizing the considerable assets of the corps. Fortunately, the rapid cessation of hostilities enabled the 6th LAD to divert a larger amount of resources for the Iraqi populace than it ordinarily would have.

Company B trained throughout the air campaign to conduct its mission. Team members were fully aware of their individual roles and of the general concept of the operation. Teams conducted rehearsals of their assigned missions, and when the ground war began, each soldier was ready.

The importance of collective and individual initiative was also reinforced. All things *do not* come to those who wait. Unit members must often aggressively seek information and gather resources without waiting for help. This is especially important on the modern battlefield, where Civil Affairs units compete with other services for the same limited assets.

Another lesson learned was the need for Civil Affairs and PSYOP to work closely together. Each must have a working knowledge of the other's job. Because both specialties are in short supply on the bat-

tlefield, CA and PSYOP soldiers may have to fill in for each other. This was the case in As Salman. Because PSYOP support was unavailable, Co. B improvised loudspeakers, leaflets and other media. All indications showed that these attempts, although crude, were successful, in part because several of the unit's members had attended formal blocks of instruction on PSYOP or had worked closely enough with PSYOP units to gain an understanding of the fundamentals.

Finally, cultural and language expertise proved to be the company's most crucial advantage. The knowledge of Arabic culture gained after six months of dealing with indigenous peoples on a daily basis enabled the unit to approach its mission with the required degree of sensitivity. The Americans showed respect for Islamic culture and gained the trust of the local leadership, and the people of As Salman were receptive to American administration. Cultural sensitivity is the most difficult skill to learn and the most perishable, but it is one of the crucial factors that make SOF an effective combat multiplier.

As the Army and other services prepare for a future characterized by operations other than war, episodes such as the administration of As Salman may become commonplace. Commanders may find themselves responsible for the safety and well-being of thousands of enemy citizens within their area of operations. While in many respects As Salman was an ideal laboratory for revalidating CA concepts and principles, all units can benefit from the lessons learned from Co. B's operations.

Lessons learned

• PSYOP should be incorporated into all aspects of planning for humanitarian missions.

• Language and intercultural skills are crucial to success.

• CA units cannot provide security for towns — that is an MP mission.

• U.S. forces should be prepared to work with allied and international forces.

• Political-military factors taught in the Regional Studies Course are excellent analytical tools for Civil Affairs and PSYOP units.

• Infantry skills are necessary in preparing for combat operations. CA units may have to accompany the ground-assault force.

• Flexibility and ingenuity are crucial — don't wait for detailed guidance or try to fit the doctrinal template to real-world situations.

• METT-T applies to the planning process for CA and PSYOP units too.

• JRTC must continue to emphasize the administration of occupied population centers during its exercise play.

• CA units should view an administrative mission as a temporary one. If they become indispensable, they may remain indispensable. Reactivate the indigenous leadership as soon as possible.

• Use local resources as much as possible — don't be a distractor for the maneuver commander.

• All members of CA units are workers — the only way to get an administration mission moving is to practice hands-on leadership. ✂

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SOF Planning for Coalition Operations

by Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis

During Operation Desert Storm, special-operations forces from the U.S., Great Britain, France and the Arab coalition partners cooperated in executing a variety of SOF missions. Their combined efforts provided a prototype of coalition special warfare.

Future military operations are likely to see an increasing use of coalition special operations, and SOF planners must learn to integrate available elements into a true coalition force.

Three dynamics are at work to make coalition special warfare a norm in the future. First, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's "Bottom-Up Review" defines multiple tasks for America's armed forces, including operations other than war such as peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance. The U.S. commitment to these tasks will require the use of all available force multipliers, including indigenous and coalition forces.

The second dynamic is the drawdown of American forces. Cuts in the conventional forces of all the services make it more likely that those constrained resources will be husbanded to respond to major regional contingencies. Military requirements such as operations other than war may rely on the capabilities of regionally aligned SOF, indigenous forces and coalition contributions to serve as stopgaps for conventional shortfalls.

Finally, the national military strategy makes it clear that the United States will fight future wars as part of a coalition. The current administration has embraced the concept of multilateralism, and SOF will be employed to maximize these coalition efforts.

Dilemma

Today, active-component Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP units find themselves heavily employed, conducting operations in foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counternarcotics and other activities. These missions are important to the United States and to the stability of the regions in which they take place. Calls by the current administration for increased international activism could result in increased SOF deployments, especially with the reduction of forward-based U.S. conventional forces. The resulting dilemma is, "Will sufficient SOF be available to respond to the requirements of a regional crisis short of war?"

If not, the national command authority may not choose to redeploy an already-engaged SOF unit to fulfill a requirement in another theater. The solution might be to employ allied SOF in consonance with

apportioned U.S. SOF to fulfill the theater commander's requirement.

Allied SOF contributions

Using allied SOF would offer three distinct advantages:

• Unique cultural attributes: SOF from nations within or bordering the theater's area of responsibility, or AOR, will likely include soldiers who share a common language, ethnic and cultural traits and religious beliefs with military personnel and civilians in the AOR. These soldiers will be more easily assimilated and hidden within the area of operations.

• No stigma of American intervention: The U.S. government or its allies may develop a requirement for SOF in an AOR, but political considerations might preclude the employment of U.S. SOF. Under such conditions, SOF from a nonthreatening ally might better meet the requirement.

• Operational experience in the AOR: Allied SOF from within the crisis region have previously developed the operational techniques, personnel and equipment issues for successful employment. As a result, these forces may be more easily employed than U.S. forces who have not worked in the area.

Each nation's SOF has its own capabilities and its own limitations. Considerations such as command and control, intelligence, infiltration and exfiltration, and communications are common across the spectrum of mission profiles, but no other nation has structured its forces with the myriad capabilities of U.S. SOF. Allied forces may need the U.S. to provide some kind of support.

SOF analysis

U.S. regional special-operations commands, or SOCs, can be tasked to assume operational control of allied SOF, or a SOC may be integrated into an allied command. From either position, U.S. SOF planners could be expected to project the most effective employment of special forces from different nations, using some kind of evaluation process. During assignment to the headquarters of Allied Forces Northern Europe, the author had the opportunity to work in a combined, joint headquarters that conducted planning for SOF from several nations. Planners had to allow for the employment of SOF from as many as six different countries, and they evaluated each of the forces against seven criteria. Discussion of the evaluation will assume that allied forces have been allocated to the SOC, which serves as a coalition headquarters.

SOF Analysis

1. What purpose does the force serve?
2. What type of force is it?
3. What is the force structure?
4. What are the capabilities/limitations of the force?
5. Can allied capabilities eliminate limitations?
6. What are the likely mission profiles?
7. Can combined SOF operations be undertaken?

What purpose does the force serve? — A nation creates and maintains SOF for three primary purposes. In many Third World nations, SOF is designed as an agency of state security or "palace guard." In such cases, the purpose of the force is not war fighting, but internal security for the government against the indigenous population. Under such circumstances, the force provides no tangible advantages and two important liabilities. First, the central government is very unlikely to release this force for war fighting. Second, this force is probably unpopular with the native population, so its usefulness in FID or in unconventional warfare is poor.

Other nations design their SOF as a function of their intelligence services. These are primarily stay-behind military forces, or SBMF, designed to operate for extended periods in enemy rear areas. The three doctrinal missions performed by SBMF are strategic reconnaissance, direct action and unconventional warfare. Their strengths lie in the extensive systems of contacts and caches established in likely

Photo by Thomas Witham

A U.S. Navy SEAL trains a Saudi Special Forces soldier on the use of diving equipment during Operation Desert Storm.

areas of conflict. SBMF also have two liabilities. First, their intelligence services desire information of national strategic value, not operational value. As a result, regional SOCs should not expect these forces to be released to them. Second, the nature of stay-behind means that these elements will remain dormant as the fighting occurs around them. They will activate only when the forward edge of the battle area is well past them.

Many other allied SOF are organized to perform special reconnaissance and direct action. Their roles are similar to those of American Special Forces or Rangers. These forces may be employed by the SOC if released.

What type of force is it? — Two issues are relevant to this question — terms of service and command relationships. Throughout the world, countries raise both professional and conscripted forces. Obviously, long-service professional special forces receive additional training to perfect their doctrine, structure and technology, which enables them to undertake complex SOF missions. These forces are also retained as cohesive formations for long periods. Conscript forces do not have these luxuries. They have less time to train and are constantly retraining on the same tasks because of personnel turnovers.

Command relationships concerning allied forces can also be confusing. A concrete principle is that a nation will always retain command of its forces. This command may be exercised in a simple one-time approval of tasking authority to an American SOC, or it may require that every action directed by the American SOC be approved by national authorities. Normally, communications and sustainment will remain national responsibilities. However, certain countries will seek substantial logistics support as a prerequisite to participation in a coalition.

What is the particular unit's force structure? — Few nations organize their forces to perform the multitude of tasks conducted by American SOF. Generally, allied forces are structured to execute one or two doctrinal tasks, such as special reconnaissance and direct action, because they lack the personnel and equipment to conduct other tasks. Structure must be examined in terms of the teams/patrols, command and control, intelligence, communications and sustainment. The SOF planner must be careful to employ a force only within its capabilities.

What are the force's capabilities and limitations? — To determine the specific capabilities and limitations that will affect a force's employment, the planner must evaluate each force in the following areas: operational time frame, means of infiltration and exfiltration, communications, technological level and caches.

• Operational time frame: This is the length of time a force can be employed. Short operational time frames limit a SOF element to specific missions such as direct action. Forces capable of longer employment times can undertake deeper and more complex missions. By defining the operational time frame, the planner can sequence the infiltration and exfiltration of U.S. and coalition SOF teams at appropriate points throughout the operation. Further, the time frames will define the tasks that each national SOF can undertake.

• Means of infiltration and exfiltration: Each nation trains its SOF units in different methods of infil and exfil. Techniques vary from intentional stay-behind operations, to overland marches, to airborne, airland or seaborne infiltrations. Planners should attempt to employ each nation's

SOF element using the methods its soldiers know best. Initially, infil and exfil planning for allied SOF should be limited to the employment of national means.

• Communications: The planner examines communications with regard to range, sustainability, speed and security. This is done from two aspects — the capabilities of the SOF element to relay reports from the team/patrol to its base station, and the capabilities of each ally to process these reports into a usable product and to communicate the data into the coalition command structure. Of particular importance are the liaison requirements for each nation within the coalition headquarters or the SOC.

• Technological level: The planner must examine the technologies that an allied force can employ in its missions. Two primary areas to consider are special reconnaissance and direct action. Technology will define the parameters of the special reconnaissance mission and should be evaluated in terms of observation ranges, night-vision capabilities and all-weather capabilities. Direct-action technology will define the type and complexity of the target system that the SOF element can undertake. Very few nations have acquired the capability to provide terminal guidance (laser target designation and transponders).

• Caches: Many allies have alleviated shortfalls in robustness and technology by establishing well-developed cache systems throughout their nations. The caches are inspected and updated on a routine basis. This form of sustainment is especially popular among nations that rely on large-scale, stay-behind warfare. Of concern to regional SOCs are three issues. First, what is in the caches and are these resources compatible with American or other allied SOF? If possible, planners should pursue standardization of ammunition, communications and batteries. Second, can SOF other than the host nation's gain access to these caches? Finally, will the host nation allow U.S. elements or other forces to build their own caches in-country?

Operational planning

Using their analyses, SOC planners can overlay the available U.S. and allied forces on the battlefield. In addition to the consideration of each force's capabilities and limitations, three additional factors must

U.S. Air Force photo

U.S. SOF deploy with a rubber boat from a helicopter. Few allies will have the infiltration and exfiltration capabilities of U.S. forces.

be considered.

First, areas of operation must be restricted to a single nation. Egyptian commandos, for example, should not share an AO with the British SAS. This precaution reduces the chance of allied SOF elements compromising one another. A technique that can be employed is the use of operational bands, with each band providing the AO for a nation's SOF. The defining principle of these bands is primarily the infil and exfil capabilities of each nation. An example of this technique is shown in the chart below.

Second, planners should determine whether assets can be shared by more than one nation's forces; for example, whether American aircraft could be used to infiltrate and exfiltrate forces of other nations. The U.S. Air Force's special-operations wings bring the most developed capability, but there may be small numbers of U.S. aircraft available. The SOC should also be prepared to request assistance from allies as the situation demands. Conditions requiring extensive contact with the local population or use of a conveniently located cache, for example, may determine that a specific mission can best be accomplished by an allied SOF team.

Finally, certain missions could be assigned to SOF teams composed of individuals and elements from two nations. Combined teams should be employed only if each contributing force brings a specific capability required by the mission; for example, the combination of allied and U.S. forces to conduct laser-target-designation operations. Extensive contact with the local population would favor the use of a national team, but the target might be sufficiently complex to require a laser-marking capability that the allies might not have. A national patrol with an attached U.S. two-man lasing team would be the solution.

Operations

In the arena of coalition SOF operations, the author's experience has shown that the allied command's activities will fall into three areas: liaison between national SOF and the command, coordination of SOF and conventional operations and response to operational emergencies.

As an allied headquarters, the SOC will receive liaison cells from each SOF ele-

SOF Areas of Operation



ment it employs. These liaison cells have three functions:

• Provide the SOC with expertise concerning tactics, doctrine and employment of national SOF elements.

• Process and coordinate commands and information between the SOC and their national teams.

• Coordinate and deconflict missions and mission changes between the SOC and the national command.

The SOC must provide resources to the liaison cells. They will require a secure place to work and access to sufficient communication nodes to conduct their coordination. The SOC will be required to integrate the liaison cells' national communications gear into its array.

One of the primary purposes of the SOC is to coordinate the activities of SOF with conventional operations. These operations may involve ground forces from one nation and SOF from another; the SOC, with its liaison cells, must ensure a coordinated effort. Coordination is especially important in the synchronization of direct-action targets, in the deconfliction of operations and in the linkup with conventional forces. Targets selected for direct action are designed to provide a large payoff for future operations. An example would be a series of simultaneous SOF attacks on air-defense systems to generate a blind spot through which deep-attack aircraft could fly undetected.

The SOC will also deconflict SOF with conventional operations. Infils and exfils using each nation's SOF aircraft, submarines and other means must be coordinated with friendly air-defense arrays, fire-support systems and front-line units. Routes of ingress and egress will have to be shared with conventional force planners. Further, conventional deep attacks (air, missile and artillery) must be deconflicted with the movements of employed SOF teams. SOC personnel will be required to attend most of the conventional maneuver and interdiction planning meetings.

Linkup operations between advancing conventional forces and employed SOF are challenging in the coalition world. Such linkups will require personnel from the SOC and the national SOF liaison cell to join the advancing unit to effect linkup. Linkup should be planned prior to infiltration; however, battlefield uncertainties may cause linkup to be performed ad hoc.

Conclusion

In the future, American armed forces are less likely to "go it alone." They may operate as part of a multinational coalition, and the shrinking U.S. force structure may also lead to a greater U.S. dependence on the contributions of allied forces. The existing command, control, communications and intelligence structure of the U.S. regional SOCs is capable of employing coalition assets, but SOF planners must be prepared to plan the employment and integration of allied units. An analysis such as the one presented here will allow planners to evaluate allied forces' capabilities and limitations in order to employ each force to its best advantage.

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Tanks and Helicopters: Factors Influencing the Rate of Innovation

by Guy M. Hicks and George E. Pickett Jr.

Innovation has always been an essential, indeed critical, element of effective military forces and peacetime deterrence. The Soviet Union was defeated in part by U.S. innovations in technology, weapons, doctrine, etc., which raised questions in the minds of Soviet leaders as to whether they could wage war or compete in peacetime effectively. Crises such as Desert Storm have been resolved in the United States' favor, with less loss of life, in part because of our innovations in technology and operations (e.g., long-range tank fires and day/night operations).

Innovation will continue to be important. New technologies, e.g., information; old technologies used in new ways, e.g., ballistic missiles; and new operational concepts, e.g., precision strike, provide opportunities for the U.S. and other states to change the way combat occurs. With the global spread of technology and knowledge, the U.S. can no longer remain confident that it will be the only power to adopt these. Meanwhile the understandable decline in the defense budget requires more innovative use of remaining resources to enable the U.S. to respond to the variety of situations that may develop.

How innovation occurs in the military and in large organizations in general is not thoroughly understood. The military innovations of the 1920s and 1930s show that great advances are possible, even in periods of austerity such as the one DoD is now entering. Budgets influence, but do not dictate, the rates of innovation. And despite the enthusiasm of technologists, history suggests that it is not the invention of new science or devices that constitutes innovation. Invention provides new systems, but systems have little utility until the accompanying doctrine is developed, the operational practices are ingrained into soldiers and their leaders, the accompanying strategy is developed and the invention is deployed so that political and military leaders alike become convinced it will work.

If innovation involves more than the mere appearance of an invention, then attempts to foment or accelerate the rates of innovation require more than just funding science. Moreover, understanding what causes innovation should suggest actions that military organizations and people of all ranks could use to effect change. In an attempt to understand what these factors might be, the authors have examined the steps and missteps taken in acquiring and incorporating into the Army two major weapons of this century: the tank and the helicopter.

Main battle tanks

From World War I through the Korean War — a span of almost 40 years — the U.S. Army struggled not only with the

development of the tank but also with its integration into the Army force structure. In contrast, by World War II several other nations had embraced the tank as a major innovation and an important battlefield weapon. What are some of the reasons for this difference between the U.S. and other nations?

U.S. tank experience on the battlefield, in exercises, in training, and through experimentation was limited during the first several decades of the tank's existence. In early 1918, the U.S. Tank Corps was established in France as part of the American Expeditionary Force, but it saw limited combat in the closing days of the war. By contrast, the British and the French armies had used tanks for several years.

This lack of experience with the tank not only limited direct observation and experimentation under combat conditions but also led to an absence of a persuasive body of knowledge from which to launch an aggressive research-and-development effort and tactical evolution after the war. A major postwar evaluation of artillery resulted in 50 pages of detailed guidelines for changes to artillery pieces and munitions. Guidelines for postwar tank development consisted of two pages of general statements.[1]

During the years following the war, few opportunities existed for developing additional experience using the tank. Experiments by George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower in 1919 and 1920 were clandestinely conducted and terminated. An experimental unit formed in 1928 was disbanded after three months; another one formed in 1930 was disbanded after seven months. In 1935 a test unit finally achieved permanence. Between 1919 and 1939, no tank was approved as a standardized weapon, and until 1931, no experimental model could be used in maneuvers.

Bureaucratic infighting among Army branches delayed the formation of an armor organization. Competition for the tank and over its role emerged quickly after World War I. Dwight Eisenhower described in his memoirs the covert manner in which he, George Patton, and others went about experimenting with tanks at Camp Meade in 1919 and 1920. Over the course of a year, Eisenhower and Patton, both tank company commanders, conducted daily field experiments in tactics, followed by evening discussions of the theories of armor deployment. Their findings, which were based on their field trials, were accepted for publication in several military journals. The reaction was swift. Eisenhower was called before the Chief of Infantry and was told that his ideas were not only wrong but dangerous, and that henceforth he would keep them to himself. Particularly, he was not to publish anything incompatible with solid infantry doctrine. If he did, he would be hauled before a court-martial.[2]

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Various study boards unanimously recommended that "tanks should be recognized as infantry-supporting and infantry-accompanying weapons and be organized for association with, and for combat as part of, an infantry command."[3] Congress then abolished the Tank Corps through the National Defense Act of 1920 and formally assigned tanks to the infantry.

Conflict between the infantry and the cavalry continued throughout the 1920s. Both branches vied for control of the system, insisting that the tank's primary responsibility was to support their respective views of mechanized warfare. The cavalry was interested in making the tank light and swift and adapting it to standard horse cavalry tactics. The infantry was interested in designing a tank that would support infantrymen on foot. It would have to be slow-moving and equipped with

heavy armor.[4]

Senior leadership in the Army did not provide consistent support for the development of armor. At the close of World War I, Secretary of War Newton Baker and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peyton March sought independent status for a tank corps. John J. Pershing, commanding general of the American Expeditionary Force, vigorously opposed this move and argued that tanks should become an adjunct to the infantry. To bolster his position, Pershing organized a number of review boards to evaluate the lessons of the war and to make specific recommendations that the tank be assigned to the infantry.

In 1927 Dwight Davis, secretary of war, observed field maneuvers conducted by the British Experimental Mechanized Force. Impressed with the demonstration of mobility and firepower, Davis brought about the creation of a small but similar force in 1928 to conduct tests. To encourage experimentation, he ordered the commander of the newly formed tank unit to ignore all regulations prescribing organization, armament and equipment. The unit, however, was disbanded after a three-month test.

In contrast to 40 years of tank evolution, the Army's use of helicopters progressed in about 15 years from a small effort involving a few highly specialized units to an essential weapon system incorporated into all major combat units.

Davis then appointed a planning board to review long-range mechanization options. In late 1928, the board released its report, which called for an invigorated mechanization program and the establishment of a separate tank corps. The report brought immediate resistance from the Army chief of staff, who argued that establishing a tank corps would retard development of the tank for its intended mission as "an auxiliary to the infantryman."

Another experimental mechanized force was established in November 1930. But after only seven months, it was disbanded by the new chief of staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, because of decreasing funding for Army weapons and President Hoover's intention to propose a ban on all offensive weapons.

Budget constraints caused by demobilization and shrinking defense funds hampered the tank's development. Congress abolished the Tank Corps in 1920 partly on the basis of cost. During hearings on the measure, several congressmen voiced strong opposition to the creation of another branch because of the large fixed costs and the overhead associated with any organization. Throughout the interwar period, from 1920 to 1940, budget priority was given to maintaining the numbers of personnel in the force. Research and development typically received less than two percent of the total Army budget.

The ordnance budget, from which the tank was funded during the period, was subdivided into 21 separate categories. The amount spent on artillery was 10 times greater than that allocated to tanks; even small arms received more funds than armor. R&D levels fell consistently through the 1930s, affecting all weapons systems, especially tanks. From 1925 to 1939, the average annual budget for tank development was $60,000, barely enough to purchase and test one tank prototype a year.[5]

Research and development seem to have been hampered less by technology than by other factors. Technology-related challenges obstructed tank design from 1920 to 1940. User-established requirements conflicted with the state of technology — objectives for armor thickness and calibers of guns could not be met within the established weight limit, for example. Specific performance requirements for subsystems, e.g., suspension, power plants and track design, also required significant technical advances.

In developing new tanks, the Army's design organization — the Ordnance Corps — complied with requirements stated by the infantry and (during World War II) by Army ground and armor forces. Attempts to diverge from stated requirements and to pursue more innovative

designs were limited and unsuccessful. For example, in the early 1920s the official stated requirement for a light (five-ton) and a medium (15-ton) tank led the Ordnance Corps to terminate its development of a heavier tank.

Even during World War II, as the U.S. faced losses from better-armed and better-protected German tanks, the introduction of more powerful tanks was delayed by Army policies. At that time, the Army was committed to standardizing the M-4 Sherman tank, even though that tank lacked the caliber of gun and the thickness of armor to combat newer German tanks. This commitment was based upon strong sentiments that a standard tank was more important because of the intercontinental distances separating the European battlefield from maintenance facilities in the U.S. and because of Army acquisition policies that new designs not be provided to combat units until after they had been rigorously evaluated and standardized. Heavier tanks, which were ready to be sent to overseas Army units in 1942, were held back. Not until early 1945 did combat units begin receiving the stronger M-26 Pershing.[6]

The technical challenges do not appear to have hampered the Army's adoption of armor warfare as much as Army acquisition policies, mercurial top-level support and conflicts between branches.

Helicopters

In contrast to 40 years of tank evolution, the Army's use of helicopters progressed in about 15 years from a small effort involving a few highly specialized units to an essential weapon system incorporated into all major combat units. In 1950, the Army had only several hundred aircraft of all types (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft). By 1960, it had several thousand helicopters and had begun reorganizing its combat units to incorporate them. By 1964, it had begun to build the 1st Air Cavalry Division entirely around airmobility.

This transition was one of the most revolutionary changes in the Army's approach to conventional war during the 40 years following World War II. It added a third physical dimension to the battlefield, changed the notion of time and distance for unit commanders, affected most, if not all, of the Army's branches and affected the allocation of funds within the Army by adding a new category of systems. These changes took place not only in the face of potentially divisive internal disagreements, but also in the face of substantial resistance from the Air Force. How was this accomplished?

Opportunities occurred for the helicopter's utility to be unambiguously observed. The value of helicopters was seen clearly during the Korean War. Small helicopters for use in liaison and medical evacuation arrived in December 1950. The Marines were the first to use the helicopter to transport combat troops into an attack, and they demonstrated its utility in resupplying units under fire.[7] Impressed by the Marines' use, Gen. Matthew Ridgway requested in November 1951 that the Army provide four helicopter transport battalions, each with 28 helicopters. He also recommended that six more battalions be added later.

The Army was committed to airmobility even before a proven troop-carrying helicopter was in production. The helicopter's advantage in medical evacuation, aerial observation, general transportation, and command and control also supported the principal roles of the various Army branches. In Korea, helicopters airlifted more than 15,000 of the 23,000 medevac casualties.[8]

Technical problems that could have slowed the adoption of helicopters were solved. The helicopter was used briefly near the end of World War II, but technical limitations constrained its utility. In the 1950s, as new uses for the helicopter were being identified, technology was delivering the performance increases needed for evolving missions. Moreover, technological improvements were easing the challenge of training pilots and were improving safety records.

For example, the turbine engine provided increased power-to-weight ratios and

eliminated the need for a heavy clutch, thereby improving payloads, rates of climb, and service ceilings. Complex mechanical systems were replaced by sophisticated power and servo-control systems that eased the pilot's load and made the helicopter safer to fly. Advances in rotor head design and rotor RPM controls increasingly lifted the pilot's burden of having to delicately maintain constant rotor speed through different flight regimes. Finally, early helicopters had rotor blades that were specifically matched as a pair to each helicopter; if one was damaged, both had to be replaced. Design and manufacturing standards eventually made blades interchangeable.[9]

Top-level support was given to the Army's adoption of helicopters. In 1950-1951, the secretary and the undersecretary of the Army saw the potential in helicopter aviation. The Army staff formed a small special-staff component to oversee helicopter development. The principal activists on this staff worked directly for general officers who believed in air mobility and could influence others. The activists worked throughout most of the 1950s to strengthen helicopter aviation. In 1962 they were instrumental in forming the Howze Board, which provided the basis for a major expansion in Army aviation.

Resistance tends to be closely related to the degree to which a new idea 'threatens' the basic, historical orientation of a suborganization or poses new tasks that are difficult to accommodate within a branch's structure.

Selection and training of junior and senior officers was far-sighted. During the early 1950s, senior officers realized that a successful Army aviation program would require general-officer support in the immediate future and both junior- and general-officer support in the long term. To place top officers with aviation experience into the senior ranks, two special flight-training classes for lieutenant colonels and colonels were arranged in 1955-1956. Officers Armywide were encouraged to apply for the 24 slots. A major percentage of those who graduated advanced to the rank of general. In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, additional promising colonels and generals were sent to pilot training.

To ensure that the aviation program did not founder because of the absence of good young officers, Army policies were altered to encourage their participation. In the early 1950s, personnel policies prevented West Pointers and ROTC graduates from applying for flight school until after they had completed several years of unit assignments. Often, these officers were then too old to attend flight school. Because of resistance from the Army's chief of personnel, helicopter advocates went directly to the vice chief of staff for the creation of a regulation enabling young officers to select flight school upon graduation from college.

Aggressive and bureaucratically skillful advocates overcame organizational obstacles. As new doctrinal and operational concepts for helicopters were being developed, enthusiastic officers attempted to ensure that each major branch in the Army received a part of the action. In the late 1950s, helicopters were assigned to combat units belonging to many branches. In a division, artillery received aircraft to conduct fire adjustment; armor received a cavalry unit of attack helicopters; infantry received troop helicopters; and all commanders received helicopters to use in command and control. In selecting officers for flight school, the Army made efforts to ensure that key branches were represented in order to achieve support for Army aviation throughout the service.

Opportunities were exploited. General officers and key lower-ranking officers used opportunities to improve support for Army aviation. During the 1940s and 1950s, for example, bitter disagreements erupted between the Army and the newly formed Air Force over their respective aviation roles. Their positions bordered on the extreme. One event that crystal-

lized the dispute occurred in a peacetime training incident in the early 1960s. An Army helicopter landed and loaded the casualty; then an Air Force helicopter landed, and its pilot ordered the casualty transferred to the Air Force helicopter. Within a week this story had reached Robert McNamara, who then convened a meeting between the chiefs and the secretaries of both services. After three hours they emerged with notes on general agreements, which Army and Air Force action officers pressed into final form over a week's time.

Analysis

The innovations of tanks and helicopters are very different events, occurring at different times in the 20th century. The Army that adopted the helicopter during the 1950s was a larger, more experienced, and probably broader, intellectual institution than it was in the 1920s and 1930s. Hardware and technology were much more a part of its portfolio, and its potential opponents and conflict arenas were more distinguishable. The helicopter benefited from this and from its inherent lack of threat to the core competencies of the combat branches.

On the other hand, the histories of these two systems appear to share common threads in the roles of leaders, followers, organizations, resources and technology. These similarities, in turn, suggest some notions about the actions that influence the rate at which an innovation is implemented. Although these conclusions are listed below in an Army context, they appear to have a broad application to other organizations.

• *Top-level support is important to the rate of progress.* Indeed, depending upon the degree of resistance, top-level support may have to be quite active to ensure that an innovation is not slowed or halted by opposition, benign neglect or strict adherence to old bureaucratic procedures.

• *The support of internal organizations, such as the different branches of the Army, must be gained.* Resistance tends to be closely related to the degree to which a new idea "threatens" the basic, historical orientation of a suborganization (e.g., the cavalry's focus on horses) or poses new tasks that are difficult to accommodate within a branch's structure (e.g., ordnance at one time did not adequately support helicopter maintenance because it had no appropriate organization to which to assign the function).

• *An aggressive set of advocates — "change agents" — must perform effectively.* Advocates provide the energy for developing new operational concepts, for locating resources, for overcoming bureaucratic resistance and for providing the long-term health of the innovation. They fight the day-to-day struggle for an innovation, which top-level leaders usually cannot do, and may even have to act in conflict with rules and regulations.

• *An adequate number of capable personnel must be provided for the near and the long term.* In the near term, the top ranks must be "inoculated" in order to protect and enhance the innovation. Lower-ranking personnel must be trained to execute the changes needed, to ensure that the innovation performs well in its first appearances and to provide the core for future senior leaders.

• *The rate of innovation will be directly affected by the speed with which the new system, concept or idea is placed with operating personnel and units.* Early experimentation on an innovation placed with operational units provides several critical inputs to the advancement of that innovation. First, it engenders new concepts for employment. Second, it provides practical feedback that can be used to affect system design. Third, it foments thinking and enthusiasm among people who will later be in positions to influence the pace and the nature of the innovation.

• *The rate of progress in technology has to be sufficient to keep pace with the evolution of conceptual thinking and organization, but it will not necessarily cause the innovation to move faster.* Technology can act as a catalyst in the development of a major innovation. If technology provides answers to technical problems faster than the organization, the people,

and the doctrine are prepared to absorb, then the pace of innovation will not be accelerated. However, if technology fails to advance rapidly enough to keep pace with these other factors, it can slow progress.

• *The creation or the use of opportunities is important in testing innovations, developing support for them and overcoming obstacles.* Crises, combat missions and exercises provide opportunities to gather data, to develop ideas, and to test concepts and systems. In some circumstances, a crisis is essential in providing unambiguous data high enough in the organization to overcome existing and substantial bureaucratic resistance. When opportunities do not occur, advocates may try to create them. Recognizing the importance of opportunities and exploiting them when they occur may be a key difference between slower and faster adoption of innovations.

• *Establishment of operational units and high-level staff organizations is important in preserving an innovation.* Staffs provide a place for advocates who can use their charter as the basis for skillfully maneuvering an organization into accepting an innovation. Operational units — even if experimental — provide the means by which to test and develop the innovation, to create opportunities for demonstrating the change, and to build a cadre of enthusiasts. Moreover, units require bases, logistics support, personnel assignments, special regulations and training. Many of these functions are centrally controlled within the Army, and having to respond to the needs of an experimental unit may bring about implicit support for its existence.

• *Budgets, like improvements in the underlying technology, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful innovation.* The presence of funds cannot necessarily overcome technical obstacles that only time-consuming and diverse actions of research and development will alleviate. Nor can funds overcome bureaucratic barriers that have not been overcome by advocates, practical exposure and other factors. Indeed, one might contend that the critical constraint in innovation is neither money nor technology. It is time — as expressed in reducing barriers internally, waiting for or creating opportunities and providing the right people to apply the innovation.

The examples of the tank and the helicopter demonstrate that a major risk to successful innovation lies in simple views about what is essential to success. Technology is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Limited budgets will not necessarily terminate an effort. Although top-level leadership is critical, its presence does not guarantee success. The key issue is not the presence or the absence of each of the above nine items, but rather their mix and context. Organizations that employ more of the above factors will probably move more rapidly in adopting changes than those which do not.

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George E. Pickett Jr. is currently director of the Northrop Grumman Corporation Analysis Center in Arlington, Va. A graduate of Yale University and the Harvard Business School, he served in the U.S. Army for 12 years in various command and intelligence positions. He was assigned to the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Net Assessment Office in the early 1970s and has published several articles on net assessment, competitive strategies and long-term defense policy. In the mid-1970s he was the senior staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee responsible for the budgets of tactical and certain national-intelligence programs. For the past 14 years he has held various positions in private industry as a systems engineer and systems planner. At the Northrop Grumman Corporation, his principal responsibilities are in threat analysis, defense planning and industry strategy.

Notes:

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[2]Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 173.

[3]G.F. Hofmann, "The Demise of the U.S. Tank Corps and Medium Tank Development Program," *Military Affairs* (February 1973):20.

[4]Arthur J. Alexander, *Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, at the request of the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1976), p. 67.

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[6]Green, pp. 278-87.

[7]Bill Siuru, *The Huey and Huey Cobra* (Pennsylvania: Tab Books, 1987), pp. 5-8.

[8]Michael J. Taylor, *History of Helicopters* (New York: Hamlyn Publishers, 1984), p. 111.

[9]Siuru, pp. 9-16.

MQS Evolves Into Officer Foundation Standards

by Lt. Col. Thomas G. Sterner and Carol M. Bushong

Army leadership doctrine is defined in FM 100-5, *Operations*: "The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. ... No peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession, understanding the human dimension of leadership, becoming tactically and technically proficient and preparing for war."

This doctrine is the foundation upon which the Army's leader-development effort was established. For the past 15 years, the Army has used its Military Qualification Standards program to capture the essence of what is critical to an officer's career development and to integrate it into the officer corps. The MQS concept recognized the value of preserving the wisdom and the experience of the current generation, presenting it to emerging leaders early in their development, and providing junior officers with the essentials for career progression.

Now MQS is changing to Officer Foundation Standards. More a redesign than a revision, the change is the first step toward eventual improvement. We have challenged our assumptions and have discovered that although what we are doing is right, we must improve the methods and the techniques by which we do it.

Based on Col. Sterner's MQS article that originally appeared in the Summer 1994 issue of Army Trainer.

MQS history

MQS resulted from a 1978 study, the Review of Education and Training for Officers, which determined that officers required a standard set of military skills, knowledge and education in order to be successful in the military. The study also outlined three MQS levels: MQS I for precommissioning, MQS II for lieutenants and MQS III for captains.

During the next six years, the Army Training and Doctrine Command developed and fielded MQS I for commissioning candidates. Two more years were required for TRADOC to develop common-core subjects for officer basic and advanced courses. Both OBC and OAC common cores served as foundations upon which the MQS II Common Manual was developed. The OAC common core also served as the foundation of the MQS III Common Manual for captains.

In 1987, the deputy commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College conducted the Leader Development Study, the results of which became the Army's Leader Development Action Plan. Under this plan, MQS was further defined as a system to qualify officers for branch-

required duties at particular grades and to integrate the training and educational efforts of officers, unit commanders and the Army's education system. It also modified the MQS levels, combining lieutenants and captains into MQS II and recommending that MQS III include majors and lieutenant colonels.

Under the plan, MQS had two components, the military-task-and-knowledge component to identify battle-focused tasks, and the professional-military-education component to set standards for professional development. The military-task-and-knowledge component for MQS II includes common manuals for company-grade officer critical tasks and branch manuals for branch qualification. Two branch manuals, Special Forces and Civil Affairs, are relevant to Army SOF.

The SF branch manual describes both SF and Infantry tasks critical in planning and executing SF missions. It complements the training in officer advanced courses and in the SF Qualification Course. Originally distributed in 1991, the SF branch manual will begin its revision process in May 1995. Revision will be completed in September 1996.

The Civil Affairs branch manual describes those tasks critical for CA captains and complements the CA Officer Advanced Course. Because CA units support general-purpose forces across the operational continuum, CA captains must know SOF tasks and retain the conventional skills of their accession branch. The CA branch manual is scheduled for completion in May 1995 and distribution in June 1995.

By 1990, MQS responsibilities had shifted from the Combined Arms Command Training Activity to the Center for Army Leadership. TRADOC Regulation 351-12, *Military Qualifications Standards System Products, Policy, and Procedures* (August 1991) designated the Center for Army Leadership as the executive agent for MQS.

In August 1993, the MQS III manual for majors and lieutenant colonels was published. Unlike MQS I and II, MQS III does not contain tasks; it describes broad knowledge areas required of majors and lieutenant colonels, based on the curricula of courses at the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

But even as the MQS III manual was being edited for publication, the Army's senior leadership expressed concerns that unlike ARTEP mission-training plans, the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, and the family of how-to-fight manuals, MQS did not seem to be making a difference to individual officers and unit commanders. They directed a thorough study to determine whether the Army should continue MQS.

MQS study

Once the study was directed in June 1993, the Center for Army Leadership began an internal evaluation of the MQS and developed an action plan to carry out and complete the study.

During the relook, 3,171 officers, from lieutenants to lieutenant colonels, participated in an MQS survey. The survey examined their understanding of MQS; their perceptions of its usefulness; and their opinions about the quality of MQS products, the importance of MQS and MQS tasks, and the availability of manuals.

The last element of the study was a conference to examine what worked and what didn't work about MQS and to make recommendations to the Army chief of staff. Attending the conference were representatives from 19 service schools, the four commissioning sources, DA, TRADOC, the Army Training Support Center, CAL, the Warrant Officer Career Center and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy.

The group recommended that the Army update MQS I and revise MQS II. It also advised keeping the MQS II branch products, but allowing each branch commandant to determine their content and when they should be revised. MQS III was too new to evaluate. Next, the group recommended that MQS verification testing be eliminated and that a new purpose statement describe MQS as "A system that

standardizes officer common institutional training and provides a tool for use in operational assignments and self-development. It supports officer training and leader development."

The group also recommended a fundamental shift of MQS's equal emphasis on the three pillars of leader development — institutional, operational and self-development — to the institutional pillar alone. The group determined that MQS could be useful in assisting the other two pillars.

CAL added two additional proposals to the recommendations on MQS: that the Army use an electronic medium, such as CD ROM, to publish the next MQS product, and that the Army change the name "military qualification standards" to "officer foundation standards." The first recommendation would offer reduced cost and electronic linkage with other training products; the second recommendation would more clearly identify the officer audience and better describe the program's intention to provide "foundation" studies.

OFS

OFS will be more than simply made-over MQS. Besides focusing on institutional leader development, OFS will manage all common training within the officer education system, combining the former MQS common-core and the military common training into a consolidated common core.

Programs of instruction for all officer basic and advanced courses comprise several major subject groups, including common-core tasks and professional-knowledge areas described in the MQS II Common Manual; branch subjects defined by each branch commandant; subjects common to two or more service schools (shared tasks); and other subjects which do not fall into any of these categories. These subjects are collectively known as common military training.

During the March 1993 TRADOC Commanders Conference, service schools expressed concern about the management of common military training. With the addition of new topics such as Army family-team building and equal opportunity/sexual harassment, the number of required subjects for training had increased, yet there was no single list of required subjects or a means of managing them.

With these concerns in mind, TRADOC decided to use the MQS/OFS revision and redesign effort as an opportunity to reorganize under one system all of the common military training.

The TRADOC OFS plan calls for developing a single common-core list within the officer education system and designating the CGSC as executive agent. The Warrant Officer Career Center and the Army Sergeants Major Academy will serve as executive agents for their educational systems.

TRADOC Regulation 351-10, *Institutional Leader Education and Training*, will define each executive agent's responsibilities. Until this regulation is published, scheduled for fiscal year 1995, the executive agents will be required to accomplish the following:

- Conduct a task-site selection board to review and validate the TRADOC-proposed common-core task list.
- Identify subjects on the list that are not being trained.
- Recommend common-core changes.
- Assess the quality of training-support products developed by TRADOC-appointed proponents and provide approval recommendations to TRADOC headquarters.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has waited for an opportune time to integrate Army special-operations forces into conventional Army schools. This is being accomplished by making ARSOF integration part of common-core training for all officer advanced courses in TRADOC schools. A training support package is being developed to explain SOF missions, concepts of operation, and command-and-control relationships, both in war and in operations other than war. This training-support package, along with a videotape, will be sent to all officer advanced courses for inclusion into their common-core curriculum. Active and

National Guard ARSOF components will receive an information copy of the video.

Challenges

The challenges awaiting OFS are considerable, but not unmanageable. The first task is to foster Armywide understanding of the change from MQS to OFS. The message should be continuously circulated through many sources, beginning with the Army's senior leadership.

Changing any system is tough, but the MQS-to-OFS transformation will be even tougher in a downsized TDA Army. While the TOE Army was methodically downsized with a goal of not creating hollow units, the TDA Army of TRADOC is still basically organized as it was when budgets and staffing matched authorization documents. Yet many organizations are more than 50 percent smaller than they were when most existing training products were developed.

Another concern is that DA civilian training developers have been virtually eliminated from many service schools. The training-development mission, along with the mission of writing doctrine, is now the responsibility of military subject-matter-expert instructors. These circumstances have forced TRADOC to take advantage of every standardization and economy measure available in developing and managing training. After all, it requires as much work to develop a training product to teach 500,000 soldiers as it does to teach 785,000.

As tasks are derived from subjects and as task lists are developed and approved, the resulting training products must be relevant, useful and high-quality.

OFS products must be developed for compatibility with, and for use by, the Automated Systems Approach to Training. This electronic, relational data base allows training products to be accessed by a variety of users. More importantly, ASAT takes advantage of information-age technology and moves our Army's training methods into the 21st century. For information on ASAT, contact the project manager, Maria R. Santillan, at DSN 927-4881 or commercial (804) 878-4881.

OFS will provide TRADOC school commandants with a central manager for all common-core tasks in the officer education system. This should eliminate confusion concerning what to teach without interfering with a commandant's prerogative to determine *how* to teach. Subject-matter experts will provide economical, standard training material to the schools.

By publishing OFS products in an electronic format, TRADOC can distribute and revise them at a fraction of the current cost in time and money. Finally, as the Army enters the information age, its training products will be readily available both to units and to individual officers.

For additional information, contact Lt. Col. Thomas Sterner at DSN 552-2127/2164 or commercial (913) 684-2127/2164.

Lt. Col. Thomas G. Sterner is chief of the Leader Education and Training Development Division at the Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. His previous assignments include service as an instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College, as a brigade operations officer, as the G-3 and executive officer in the Berlin Brigade, as an Infantry company commander with the 3rd U.S. Infantry (The Old Guard) and as a platoon leader with the 25th Infantry Division. A graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, he holds a bachelor's degree from Old Dominion University and a master's degree from Springfield College, Springfield, Mass.

Carol M. Bushong is an education specialist with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Interview:

H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

H. Allen Holmes was sworn in on Nov. 18, 1993, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. He had previously served as the Ambassador at Large for Burdensharing, responsible to the president for a more balanced sharing of security responsibilities and costs by NATO members, Japan, the Republic of Korea and other countries allied to the United States. He also served as Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from June 1985 to August 1989. His foreign assignments include service as a political officer in Rome from 1963 to 1967, as counselor for political affairs in Paris from 1972 to 1974, as deputy chief of mission in Rome from 1977 to 1979 and as the U.S. ambassador to Portugal from 1982 to 1985. Born in Bucharest of American parents, he received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University and did graduate work at the Institut d'Études Politiques of the University of Paris. He served as an infantry officer in the Marine Corps from 1954 to 1957.

SW: *What are your top priorities for the office of the ASD-SO/LIC?*
Holmes: I think the number-one priority from the standpoint of my office is to ensure that this extremely valuable resource for our country, the SOF community, is properly used in the pursuit of our national foreign-policy and security-policy objectives in the new global environment. From the point of view of someone who has spent most of his career in the Foreign Service, but working with the State Department and the Defense Department, I can say that the talents and potential contributions of the SOF community have not been well-understood in the past. That's beginning to change. I think that people throughout our foreign-policy community now understand that in this new global environment, special-operations forces are not only force multipliers in the military sense, but are also diplomacy multipliers. It is important that we make the community well-understood as a national resource for modern, forward-looking diplomacy and that we ensure SOF are properly employed. We must also make people understand the limitations of special-operations forces. Secondly, it's extremely important that the special-operations community have the resources to maintain the high state of readiness and the talents that it now brings to the national-security arena. SOF must have sufficient resources to modernize their platforms, their equipment, their weapons and the training for their warrior-diplomat missions. Here, I would place a strong emphasis on cultural-area training and language

training. Language training is very expensive, but given the requirement for Special Forces, Psychological Operations forces and Civil Affairs forces to operate in foreign environments, I don't think you can overemphasize the importance of language training.

SW: *Do you think we need more language and cultural training?*
Holmes: I would like to see more. I realize that in an era of shrinking resources, we don't have much slack. But to the extent possible, I would like to see a shift in resources to increase the trend we have already started and to give special operators increased training in language and area studies.

SW: *Do you have other priorities?*
Holmes: I think another priority, in terms of the policy responsibilities of our office, is to fully integrate the two new mission areas for which we have proponency. The first area is counterdrug policy and operations, which is basically the Defense Department's contribution to the president's national counterdrug strategy. The second is humanitarian and refugee affairs. We now have responsibility for humanitarian and civic assistance, refugees, disaster relief and law-of-war issues. Once the new mission areas have been fully integrated, we must ensure that SOF missions conducted in those areas are fully congruent with the policy.

SW: *Do you think that in the future we'll see any variations in the way SOF are used in humanitarian-assistance missions?*
Holmes: Yes, there's one critically important humanitarian mission that already has a high profile, and that's mine awareness and demining operations. Various countries are moving from a period of intense civil warfare to a more stable kind of society — and I'm thinking of places like Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mozambique. These countries have been engaged in civil warfare for well over a generation, and they are now groping to establish a national identity and goals of economic development and education for their people. But they're finding it difficult to accomplish this, with so much of their arable land littered with dangerous antipersonnel land mines. It's estimated that as many as 100 million land mines are scattered across the earth's surface; they kill or maim an estimated 1,200 people per month, mostly civilians. This is one of the most fundamental humanitarian missions that the United States can be involved in, and special-operations forces are already showing that they have a role to play. Psychological Operations forces, with policy direction and oversight from my office, are conducting mine-awareness programs in several countries, and I think this is an area where a handful of very dedicated and skilled SOF people can have a multiplier effect. They can train trainers in these countries who can then fan out to the villages and schools and the countryside to teach their people how to clear those fields and transform them from killing fields into planting fields.

SW: *Our troops would not actually perform the demining operations?*
Holmes: No, our people would not be involved in the demining operations. They would be there to train in two phases: First, they would train local trainers to conduct mine-awareness programs. Then they would train these trainers to conduct demining programs. I think the demining phase is an example of how SOF would combine with conventional forces — they would probably need some explosive-ordnance-disposal people from our regular armed forces to assist in that training.

SW: *What do you see as our greatest challenge in conducting operations other than war?*
Holmes: Certainly one of the major challenges to this administration is peacekeeping operations. With the end of the Cold War and the growth of regional conflicts based on religious and ethnic differences and territorial disputes, the world is witnessing an increase in civil-military conflict. The United States is the remaining superpower, but a superpower with finite resources cannot be the court of last resort for every problem that comes before the world community. We must work with the United Nations and other regional organizations, both to try to cope with the outbursts of regional strife and to allow the United States to be selective in those conflicts that we intervene in, either on our own or in combination with other countries and the United Nations. We are already seeing the results of regional conflict in places such as Somalia and Bosnia, and there will be many, many opportunities for the United States to intervene. We have to be very selective in how we intervene, and we've got to be smart about working with the United Nations and other regional organizations to share the burden of trying to establish regional stability.

SW: *Do you see a possibility for increased use of combined SOF and conventional forces during operations other than war?*
Holmes: Absolutely. A primary strategic function of SOF is to expand the range of options available to decision-makers confronting crises and conflicts below the threshold of war. SOF can sel-

dom perform these missions without close cooperation with conventional forces. In fact, larger operations short of war, such as the humanitarian and peace operations that have dominated headlines of late, are primarily handled by conventional forces supported by SOF. I think the indispensable SOF role in these operations is better appreciated now than ever before. The succinct comment by a senior Marine commander about the value of PSYOP in Somalia is a good example. "Don't leave home without them," he said.

Not only are SOF operations increasingly "joint," they are also increasingly "interagency." Operations other than war require a unified national effort to ensure success; they must be intimately and carefully coordinated with a variety of U.S. government agencies. So in addition to an increasing appreciation for the necessity of close cooperation between SOF and conventional forces in operations other than war, I see an increasing requirement for SOF to be especially attuned to and adept at interagency coordination and cooperation.

SW: *You mentioned that one priority is to make sure we have the right resources for equipment and training. Do you think SOF will face significant budget issues over the next few years?*

Holmes: Yes, I think we will. So far, the special-operations forces have done relatively well in terms of maintaining the budgetary resources needed, but increasingly, as domestic claims on our national budget increase, we will have to be very careful in the way we use our resources. The number-one requirement, of course, is to maintain readiness. It's also important to maintain the force structure that we need in order to accomplish the missions that we're assigned. The third requirement is the investment strategy for the future. Unless we maintain a technological edge in the equipment our forces use, we will not be in a position in future years to maintain the readiness we have today. It's a balance that has to be constructed between readiness, force structure and modernization, and it is sometimes difficult to effect the right balance. But we have to struggle with it and come up with the correct balance, so that we are fully equipped for the future and so that our forces have the skills that are required and the protection they need to accomplish their missions.

"Unless we maintain a technological edge in the equipment our forces use, we will not be in a position in future years to maintain the readiness we have today."

SW: *Have you changed your perception or your evaluation of special-operations forces since you came to the office of the ASD-SO/LIC?*

Holmes: Well, I've learned a lot more about them. I already knew about the commando side of the special-operations forces and the superb training, dedication and attitude of the special operators. But what I've been most impressed by, what I've learned most about, is the maturity of the Special Forces, PSYOP and Civil Affairs people. They represent a most impressive array of field experience and training that makes them very valuable to the nation. As I said earlier, they are what I call diplomacy multipliers. It's because of the talent, the experience and the maturity of these individuals that I think they will be called upon more and more to help in the conduct of our foreign relations.

SW: *Is there a message or a particular point you'd like to communicate to the people of the SOF community?*

Holmes: I wouldn't be so arrogant as to advise them. I would just comment on how fortunate we are as a nation to have the people of the SOF community and to be able to call on their skills and their dedication. I'm constantly impressed by the spirit of teamwork and the camaraderie that motivates this community and by the selflessness and the dedication of its people. They represent a model, I believe, of behavior and attitude toward each other and toward their country that is really exemplary.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Acquisition Corps offers education, advancement

Each year a small number of Special Forces captains can be accessed into the Army Acquisition Corps, which conducts activities associated with the acquisition of new weapons systems and related items. SF Branch nominees are reviewed by an Army selection board. Those selected receive fully funded civil schooling in fields such as business administration, computer science and engineering. AAC members are assigned one of three functional areas — research, development and acquisition; automation; or contracting. Following advanced civil schooling, they serve in repetitive acquisition assignments. The AAC career path includes opportunities for selection as product manager (battalion-command equivalent) and project manager (brigade-command equivalent). AAC officers can expect favorable promotion and command-selection rates. The AAC goal is for its SF branch officers to work on SOF-support projects such as the acquisition of new SF equipment. Officers selected will not return to operational SOF assignments. The payoff of being selected into the AAC is advanced civil schooling, excellent promotion and command opportunities and a challenging career vital to national defense and the SOF community. Interested officers should contact Capt. Ernie Benner, SF Branch, at DSN 239-3175/8.

Warrant officer MOS, duty titles separate

Special Forces warrant officers should check their next officer evaluation report to ensure that their principal duty title is correct. Principal duty titles are “assistant detachment commander,” “company operations warrant officer,” “battalion operations warrant officer,” “group intelligence warrant officer” and “group operations warrant officer.” The correct MOS title is “Special Forces Warrant Officer.” The word “technician” is no longer used because of its confusing connotations in foreign and joint environments. MOS 180A is also the only warrant MOS in the Army that is a direct ground-combat role. This role is not traditional for a “technician.”

SF warrant officers needed in National Guard

A recent Army functional review showed a lack of growth in MOS 180A in National Guard SF groups. The SF proponent encourages commanders in these units to select and recommend NCOs with the potential, experience and leadership ability for this challenging field. Prerequisites include the SF Operations and Intelligence Course and a minimum of three years' A-detachment experience. Applicants must not be older than 42 (36 after November 1995). The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office is developing policies for National Guard recruitment, growth and sustainment of MOS 180A. It will assist warrant-officer aspirants and their commanders in their efforts to build a strong MOS inventory in the Guard. The point of contact in SOPO is the MOS 180A manager, CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, phone DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002. For National Guard warrant-officer recruiting information, call 1-800-638-7600, ext. 40.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Target interdiction ASI approved; tactical air ASI pending

Additional skill identifier W3, special-operations target-interdiction operations, has been approved, effective Oct. 1, 1994. To be awarded the W3 ASI, soldiers must be graduates of the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course and hold an 18B3 or 18C3 slot on an SF A-detachment or one of several coded instructor positions in the SWCS. Local personnel and administration centers can award the ASI with an approved DA Form 4187 and a copy of the soldier's course diploma. Soldiers with MOSs other than 18B and 18C may still attend the SOTIC course. Approval for ASI Q8, tactical air operations, is currently pending at the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. To be awarded the ASI Q8 if it is approved, soldiers must be graduates of the Joint Firepower Control Course conducted at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and be slotted in an 18B or 18E position at the A-detachment level. An exception to policy has already been approved by PERSCOM to permit CMF 18 soldiers to attend the course; the Army Special Operations Command currently has several school allocations for fiscal year 1995.

Civil Affairs SQI approved for RC soldiers

The Total Army Personnel Command has approved a change to Army Regulation 611-201, which authorizes the award of skill-qualification identifier "D," Civil Affairs, to soldiers in the reserve components. The SQI requires completion of the Civil Affairs Operations Course and is restricted to soldiers assigned to Civil Affairs units in positions coded with MOSs other than 38000, Civil Affairs specialist. The change will be published in the October 1994 edition of Military Occupational Classification and Structure, Update 12-5. The next publication of unit authorization documents will reflect positions requiring SQI "D" training. For more information contact Maj. Ron Fiegle, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

SF enlisted chief explains promotion outlook

The chief of the SF Enlisted Branch, Capt. Adrian A. Erckenbrack, is concerned that SF enlisted soldiers understand the need to be increasingly competitive for promotion. "Since the Special Forces Branch was established in 1984, it has experienced rapid growth and taken on many responsibilities worldwide," he said. "Its growth was governed by the branch personnel manning and authorization document, or PMAD, that established limits on the number of SF soldiers allowed in the Army. Since 1984, soldiers in Special Forces Career Management Field 18 have enjoyed more rapid promotions because CMF 18 has had an operating strength less than that authorized under the PMAD. In short, there were more positions authorized than there were qualified 18-series soldiers to fill them." Because of this situation, the DA-select objective (the number of CMF 18-series soldiers to be promoted by rank and MOS) for promo-

tions into most grades has been faster than for most of the other series in the Army. CMF 18 usually far exceeded the Army's promotion average in ranks E-6 through E-9 during its growth years. Master-sergeant promotion-board results released in April 1994 show how soldiers in CMF 18 compared to those in CMF 11 (Infantry):

	CMF 11	CMF 18
Education (Avg)	12.8 years	13.3 years
Time in service (Avg)	16.6 years	14.2 years
Time in grade (Avg)	5.0 years	4.5 years
Age (Avg)	36.1 years	33.8 years

"From these results," Erckenbrack said, "we can conclude that the CMF 18 soldier selected for master sergeant is better educated, has less time in service and grade and is younger than his CMF 11 counterpart. That same trend was established in most 18-series MOSs throughout the SF growth period." Now that growth period has ended. In most cases, SF strength matches authorizations, and there are more soldiers in each MOS and grade competing for promotion. "This will make future promotion selection rates more in line with the Army average, and selection for career-enhancing jobs such as the Joint Readiness Training Center, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and staff assignments more competitive," he said. "The bottom line is that the Special Forces branch is full of the best soldiers that the Army has to offer, and to compete for promotions, soldiers must do their best every day. Quality time on an ODA and other competitive assignments all add up to a well-rounded soldier in front of the promotion board."

Army updating DA Pamphlet 600-25

DA Pamphlet 600-25, *Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*, is being staffed by the Combined Arms Command for minor revisions to maintain uniformity with both officer and warrant-officer professional-development guides. Chapters 13, 14 and 15 of the pamphlet specifically discuss Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, respectively. The pamphlet is scheduled to be fielded by the end of calendar year 1994.

Foreign SOF

Indian security challenged by narcoterrorists

Indian Prime Minister Narashimha Rao, concerned that instabilities created by ethnic, religious and criminal violence were threatening India's economic reform programs, has called for the establishment of modernized state police forces that are less dependent on the central security forces for support. While cautioning in his July 1994 remarks that security forces had to respect human rights and avoid excessive measures, he stressed that the national integrity of India was threatened by a variety of subversive forces. In particular, he noted the need to break the linkage between "narcoterrorism and the mafia," which has contributed substantially to the country's instability. Prime Minister Rao was probably referring to the penchant of a number of separatist and terrorist groups in India and around the periphery to use funds generated by drug trafficking to support their various agendas and infrastructure. India continues to be a challenge for internal-security approaches and practices because of its location near heavily productive and active drug-trafficking centers in southwest and southeast Asia; the diverse mix of ethno-national-religious groups in the region; a host of separatist aspirations; and the internal Indian drug cultivation, processing and trafficking activities.

Mexico forms new counterterrorist group

Reports from Mexico indicate that the forming Grupo Antiterrorista, or GAT, numbers about 300 personnel and draws its members from the Federal Judicial Police, the so-called Zorros (foxes) counterterrorist unit, the Mexican Army and other agencies. The new unit (reported in a Spanish-language periodical to be trained by U.S., Spanish and Argentine specialists) is intended to perform a range of missions dealing with hostage-taking, terrorist and guerrilla violence and associated problems. Given the rash of bomb detonations around the country, GAT is emphasizing training in explosives. GAT members are also trained to infiltrate subversive or guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Workers Party and the Zapatista Liberation Army. Elements of the force may deploy and operate in teams. In a recent operation, elements of GAT were thought to be deployed to the Mexican states of Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Jalisco and Chiapis.

Drug trafficking may fund North Korean regime

While North Korea's economic problems and isolation grow, long-standing charges of official drug trafficking continue to receive attention. In this regard, the North Korean expansion of opium-poppy cultivation reported in late summer of 1993 was believed to be linked to the intensified efforts of the late Kim Il-sung and his son, current North Korean President Kim Chong-il, to acquire hard currency. Some reporting has charged that the establishment of a North Korean opium-processing plant was intended to produce heroin and morphine for sale and distribution by North Korean citizens living abroad, particularly in Japan. Under this scheme, the reports charge, drugs would be transported abroad by North Korean diplomats, official delegations, ship crews, etc., and sold though North

Korean residents of the targeted countries. Other countries thought to be on the receiving end of North Korean drug trafficking include China, France, Indonesia and Sweden. More recently, in June 1994, some North Korean citizens were arrested in the Russian far east while attempting to smuggle eight kilograms of heroin. They were identified as part of a Russian-North Korean "joint venture," which was conducted without official Russian authorization (as a number of North Korean business ventures of this sort have been in the past). The incident suggests that through criminal enterprises, Russia remains a "privatized" source of revenue and support for the North Korean regime.

Belarus forms border troops to combat smuggling

Even before the final disintegration of the USSR, legislation in the fall of 1991 established a border-troop force in the emerging state of Belarus. Since then, the growing but still critically undermanned force has recruited substantial numbers of "professional" troops (vs. conscripts) and has attempted to arm and equip them with high-quality material. Among the principal border problems identified by Lt. Gen. Yawgen Bacharow, the border-troop commander, are drug and arms trafficking. The quantities of drugs, weapons, hard currency, metals, and other contraband seized are increasing rapidly. The border-troop chief expressed the view that Belarus seemed to be changing from a transit area for drugs being moving elsewhere to a drug market itself. He also identified illegal immigration as a particularly important problem. "People smuggling" and other forms of illegal population movements have become a serious concern for a number of former Soviet states.

Armenian operation targets drug trade

An announcement during the summer indicated that counternarcotics operation Poppy 94 had begun in the proclaimed "Republic of Mountainous Karabakh," or RMK, formerly the USSR's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic. Bearing the same name as similar operations in central Asia, Russia and elsewhere, Poppy 94 was said to involve both RMK Internal Ministry and "army" elements. The objective of the operation was to arrest cultivators, processors and sellers of opium products and cannabis. Given the extremely limited resources of the new republic, it is certain that RMK's version of Poppy 94 is quite modest. The republic has been a center of Armenian-Azeri conflict for some years, and it was reported that when Armenian forces pushed Azeri units out of the area, Armenian criminals were quick to restore deserted poppy fields in an effort to re-establish what had been a brisk, lucrative drugs-for-arms trade. Given that opium and other drug sales may constitute a source of revenue and support for some RMK individuals or organizations, the vigor with which the operation was pursued is unclear.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Garrison new commander of SWCS

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison took command of the Special Warfare Center and School during a ceremony at Fort Bragg's JFK Memorial Plaza on Aug. 4.

His predecessor, Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, who commanded SWCS for two years, retired from the Army after 39 years of service.

"Maj. Gen. Shachnow had demonstrated leadership and vision to a degree seldom found," said Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commanding general of the Army Special Operations Command. "All over the world, the soldiers trained to his standard, and sharing his vision, are training and helping allied and friendly nations and people."

Garrison formerly commanded the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. "Maj. Gen. Bill Garrison has major challenges ahead as we continue shaping Army special operations and move into the 21st century," Scott said. "He has demonstrated the ability to think beyond the here-and-now and to move an organization into its future, ensuring its relevance in fast-changing and turbulent times."

Ground broken for SOF Medical Training Center

Leaders of special-operations forces broke ground at Fort Bragg July 7 at the site of what will become the Special Operations Medical Training Center.

Construction of the $17 million Special Operations Medical Training Center, or SOMTC, is scheduled for completion in the summer of 1996. The complex will be located on Kedenburg Street in the Smoke Bomb Hill area.

File photo

The Special Operations Medical Training Center

The SOMTC will provide resident medical instruction for all special-operations forces. Currently Army Special Forces medical sergeants are trained at Fort Bragg and at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Medics from Navy and Air Force special-operations units attend their own courses.

"Resources used for separate (medical) programs can be used for other projects and training. This is a cornerstone of special-operations joint thinking," said Gen. Wayne A. Downing, commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Since the 55-week Special Forces Medical Sergeant Course will no longer be split between two installations, money will be saved in moving costs. "We will save more than $2.5 million (a year) in PCS (permanent change of station) costs," said Col. Richard Sutton, SOMTC's commander and dean.

The 73,738-square-foot facility will contain 10 classrooms with a 20- to 200-student capacity each, a medical library, 10 operating rooms and a 136-room barracks complex. — *SSgt. Keith Butler, USASOC PAO*

SOF reserve units inactivated

Several special-operations units in the Army Reserve have recently been inactivated as part of the downsizing of U.S. military forces.

Two units of the Army Special Forces Command were affected — the 11th SF Group was inactivated Aug. 28, and the 12th SF Group was inactivated Sept. 11.

The Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command had five units inactivated effective Sept. 15 — the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Psychological Operations Group; the 16th PSYOP Company; the 244th PSYOP Company; the 351st PSYOP Company; and the 360th PSYOP Company.

USASOC names NCO, soldier of the year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command recently announced the winners in its NCO and Soldier of the Year competitions.

The NCO of the Year is SSgt. Jaime E. Vazquez of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, a communications and medical

sergeant on an A-detachment in the 5th SF Group at Fort Campbell, Ky. The Soldier of the Year is Spec. Tiffany A. Mapp, an automation logistician in Co. B, Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Runners-up were Sgt. Robert B. Rossow, 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command; and Spec. Virna L. Reynoso, PSYOP Dissemination Battalion, also from the 4th PSYOP Group, USACAPOC.

Other competitors were Sgt. Richard C. Ayala and Spec. James J. Hamlett of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; SSgt. Robert A. Trivino and Spec. William M. Walker of the 75th Ranger Regiment; SSgt. Joseph A. Clark, USAJFKSWCS; and Spec. Joseph J. Gutierrez, USASFC.

SWCS seeks comments on CA manual

The Special Warfare Center and School is looking for comments from the field regarding necessary changes to FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

According to an upcoming change to TRADOC Regulation 25-30, *Preparation, Production and Processing of Armywide Doctrinal and Training Literature*, Army doctrinal publications will be reviewed and revised as needed, according to Capt. Dennis Cahill of the Doctrine Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine. The rewrite of a manual is justified only if a certain percentage of it can be documented as incorrect or outdated.

Since FM 41-10 was published in January 1993, the regional alignment of CA units, the concept of military operations other than war, and lessons learned from operations and exercises have made some portions of the manual outdated, Cahill said.

To justify a rewrite and to ensure that changes incorporate a wide variety of operational experience, the SWCS Doctrine Management Branch is requesting input from field CA units, Cahill said. Input should be submitted on DA Form 2028, *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*.

For more information, contact Capt. Dennis Cahill at DSN 239-6035 or commercial (910) 432-6035.

3rd SF Group receives new commander

Col. Mark D. Boyatt took command of the 3rd Special Forces Group July 22nd, replacing Col. Philip R. Kensinger.

Maj. Gen. Harley C. Davis, commander of the Army Special Forces Command, told Boyatt, previously the chief of staff for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, "You are taking command of a magnificent organization. ... There are no time-outs here. You have to hit the ground running." Davis praised the outgoing Kensinger as a warrior and a scholar. "He forged a reputation as a tireless planner," Davis said.

Conference to examine roles of SOF

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University will sponsor a conference Nov. 15 and 16 on the roles and missions of special-operations forces in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The conference, co-sponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, will be held in Cambridge, Mass. Topics will include sources of instability and conflict, U.S. regional security policy and emerging SOF roles and missions.

For information on registration, contact Freda Kilgallen; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; International Security Studies Program; Medford, MA 02155; phone (617) 628-7010, extension 2736; fax (617) 627-3933.

Review under way for Civil Affairs MTPs

The Special Warfare Center and School has begun the review process necessary to produce a new series of ARTEP Mission Training Plans for Army Civil Affairs units.

The new series will be revised to better meet the needs of CA units, according to Capt. Tamara Musgrave-Cotcher of the ARTEP Branch of the SWCS Unit Training Division.

One major change will be the consolidation of similar units into shared manuals; for example, the subordinate detachments of the CA FID/UW battalion could be combined into one manual, Musgrave-Cotcher said. This will reduce the redundancy of tasks common to all units and will allow each unit to better understand how its mission fits into the CA organizational structure.

Another change will be the inclusion of the CA general-support battalion in the series of manuals, either combined with the FID/UW battalion or in a separate manual. A third change will be the scaling back of the survivability tasks available in the Common Collective Tasks manual.

Revision is expected to take approximately three years, with the first manual scheduled for completion in late 1996. In revising the manuals, UTD will solicit comments from CA field units and other interested users, to refine the MTPs to meet the evolving Civil Affairs missions and environments, Musgrave-Cotcher said.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Eastern Approaches. *By Fitzroy Maclean. London: Penguin Books, 1991. ISBN: 0-14-013271-6 (paper). 543 pages. $13.*

This reprint of the classic 1949 memoir by British foreign-service officer and Special Air Service general Fitzroy Maclean is probably more relevant today than at the time of its original publication. The book depicts the author's experiences as a diplomat in the USSR of the late 1930s, as an SAS officer in North Africa and as Churchill's personal representative in Yugoslavia.

Assigned to the Moscow embassy in early 1937, Maclean repeatedly penetrated the off-limits Central Asian republics. Often in disguise or shadowed by agents of the NKVD (the embryonic KGB), Maclean survived capture and imprisonment through a combination of guile and audacity. His encounters with these Soviet agents are often amusing and always instructive.

Maclean's observations on the relationship between the central government and the various people among whom he traveled do much to explain the subsequent breakup of the USSR and provide an excellent context for the ethnic strife we see today. It is interesting to reflect on the potential dividends an enlightened civil affairs policy would have paid the Germans following Operation Barbarossa.

Leaving the foreign service in 1939 to join his father's regiment, Maclean was commissioned and posted to Egypt where he was



recruited by David Stirling into the then-platoon-sized SAS. He provides an excellent account of desert warfare and operations behind enemy lines, with some interesting insights on the effects of sleep deprivation.

The last third of the book details Maclean's experiences as a liaison officer in Yugoslavia and as a military adviser to Tito. Chapter 8 contains a particularly enlightening thumbnail history of the Balkans, which is highly profitable reading for those interested in understanding present conditions there. Maclean also gives an insider's account of Tito as a guerrilla leader, political organizer and statesman.

Maclean's keen analysis is combined with an astute eye for detail and a flair for description. The book is filled with amusing, sometimes hilarious, anecdotes. *Eastern Approaches* contains much information of value today for soldiers, particularly those in Military Intelligence and special operations.

Maj. (P) Neil R. Porter Jr.
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Point Man: Inside the Toughest and Most Deadly Unit in Vietnam. *By Chief James Watson and Kevin Dockery. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1993. ISBN: 0-688-12212-4. 336 pages. $22.*

Point Man, by retired Chief Petty Officer James Watson and Kevin Dockery, is the personal account of a young man's Navy career and his role in the early history of the Navy's Sea, Air, Land special-operations force. Decisively influenced by the World War II service of a favored uncle in the U.S. Army Rangers, as well as the teamwork and esprit de corps portrayed in the film "The Frogmen," young James Watson leaves New Jersey in 1955 to enlist in the Navy. Determined to become a member of the famous underwater demolition teams, the UDT, Watson persists until he, too, is a frogman.

Watson's earliest naval service is as a young sailor in the fleet, his recognized talent as a bugle player influencing his assignments. Never losing sight of his goal, however, Watson persistently pursues attendance to Underwater Demolition Team Replacement training

until he was accepted in the winter of 1959. In 1960, he completes UDTR as one of 18 graduates (out of an original class of 126) and becomes a member of UDT 21.

The book melds its autobiographical and historical tones at the event of the creation of a force of maritime commandos, the SEALs. Watson is selected to join SEAL Team Two as an original member, along with other well-known SEAL personalities such as Master Chief Rudy Boesch. From that point on, the identity and persona of James Watson, as captured in *Point Man*, becomes essentially synonymous with that of the SEALs. *Who* he is becomes *what* he is, a SEAL operator. We learn almost anecdotally that his first marriage ends in divorce and that later, in the twilight of his career, he remarries. Apart from that, we learn very little about the kind of man James Watson really is. Accurately or otherwise, the result is a one-dimensional picture of the author.

For several chapters, Watson recounts the challenges and difficulties that SEAL Team Two faced in standing up a new unit and preparing it for war. Experimentation with weapon types, training with atomic demolitions and clandestine intelligence-gathering against friendly nations are some of the experiences Watson highlights from those earlier days.

The reader also begins to get a feel for the "attitude" and leadership styles of these early SEALs, at least as remembered by Watson. Consistent throughout the book, this attitude reflects a self-assured cockiness, consequences-be-damned assertiveness that was undoubtedly born of confidence in one's skills and capabilities.

The "good old days" for Chief Watson mixed admirable loyalty to one's primary social/tactical grouping with an unabashedly confrontational attitude toward essentially everyone else. As could be expected, this did little to win friends or to positively influence people. Unfortunately, Watson misses a chance to send a signal to future SEALs on the change in today's professional climate.

More than half of *Point Man* deals with Watson's Vietnam experience in Vietnam as part of Team Two, which included three tours of duty there beginning in 1967. During the course of these tours, Watson participated in most of, if not all of, the various types of operations that SEALs conducted during the Vietnam War. His



experiences ranged from being a member of a SEAL squad conducting riverine special operations, to being an adviser to the South Vietnamese SEAL counterparts, to being a participant with the provincial reconnaissance units in the war against the communist infrastructure. At what would have been the end of his second tour, Watson was severely wounded by the detonation of a recovered Viet Cong water mine. He recovered and returned for his third tour.

An easy read, *Point Man* will probably appeal foremost to those with a background or interest in the SEALs. Although it does not contribute significantly to existing literature of how the SEALs fought in Vietnam, it nonetheless provides another primary perspective on what it was like to be and to fight as a SEAL in the riverine environment. In this vein, *Point Man* dovetails well with other existing books on the SEAL/riverine war in Vietnam.

While Lt. Cdr. Cutler's *Brown Water, Black Berets* provides a strong macro view of the riverine war, it only touches on associated SEAL operations. Lt. Cdr. Bosilijevac's *SEALS; UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam* narrows the focus by detailing those operations. Watson's tale, in turn, joins existing works such as Darryl Young's *The Element of Surprise: Navy SEALS in Vietnam*, which provide those firsthand details, feelings and immediate consequences felt by the SEAL operators and their brown-water Navy counterparts.

Watson is justifiably proud of his membership and association with the SEALs, and of his undoubtedly well-earned reputation as a "hunter," a warrior eager to seek out the enemy and to accomplish the mission regardless of personal cost. *Point Man* is worth reading by any soldier, sailor or airman for an insight into that kind of dedication to duty.

Maj. John F. Mulholland
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Special Warfare

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