Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

As we face the ambiguity and uncertainty of future operations, the commander's intent gains increasing importance. Vital to success in all operations, it is particularly key to success in contingency deployments and missions. Unfortunately, commander's intent is often neither well understood nor effectively used.

When used correctly, the commander's intent funnels an organization's collective activities to achieve the commander's envisioned end result. It is the central goal and stand-alone reference.

In the past, our attention centered on achieving the present mission at the tactical level. However, in evolving to a more strategic orientation and refining the ability to conduct operational-level activities, we have discovered that a narrow mission focus is dysfunctionally limiting. Often, a mission focus brings success at the tactical level at the cost of resources which, from an operational-level perspective, must be conserved.

Commander's intent has certain features which are pivotal to transforming intent into subordinate-unit actions:

• Commander's intent must stand alone as guidance should no other directives be received. Its clear and concise wording enables subordinates to quickly grasp the successful end-state and their part in achieving it.

• Commander's intent provides unity and harmony of effort across the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Each statement of commander's intent must form the basis for subordinate commanders' intents.

• Understanding the operational-level intent prevents subordinates from doing things which make tactical sense but are operationally wrong.

• Each commander must ensure his intent is understood two levels down. Subordinates must understand the next higher commander's intent to understand their mission and their part in the concept of the operation.

• Commander's intent outlines the "why" of a mission, the results to be achieved, and how those results affect future operations. Thus, commander's intent addresses the longer term to ensure harmony of effort over time.

• Commander's intent unleashes rather than restricts subordinates. It states only an operation's outer boundaries, leaving individual maneuver schemes to subordinate commanders.

• Commander's intent is the basis for the concept of operations, not a synopsis of it. Commanders must understand their superiors' intents and form their own intents before planning begins.

• When possible, the commander should relate his intent to subordinates face-to-face. Further, commanders should tailor the intent statement to the recipients' experience level. Finally, commanders should personally write the intent statement to reduce or prevent any loss of vision.

• Commander's intent will be documented in paragraph 3 of the OPLAN/OPORD, just prior to subparagraph 3a. While intent normally will not change over an operation's course, if change becomes necessary, it must be personally transmitted from senior to subordinate commanders and then documented in a fragmentary order.

Commander's intent is the commander's vision of an operation, defining its purpose, the desired result, and, briefly, how to achieve the result. It is the measure from which all subordinates' actions evolve. Commanders and leaders who make decisions guided by their commander's intent ensure the success of the force as a whole.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

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

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Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

The Blue Helmets: A History of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

by Sgt. Maj. Steve Burback

Since its creation in 1945, the United Nations has had a long and distinguished history of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. From Cyprus and Lebanon to Cambodia and Croatia, the U.N.'s blue helmet has become a symbol of hope.

Since the close of the Cold War era, U.N. peacekeeping operations have multiplied in number and complexity. In 1990, fewer than 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers were deployed. Today, almost 80,000 U.N. troops are involved in 17 peacekeeping operations around the world. In fact, the Blue Helmets are so popular that demands for their services increase by the day.

Before 1988, the U.N. had created 13 peacekeeping operations. Since 1988, 20 operations have been mounted; 12 of those are in effect today — in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Kuwait-Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia, Western Sahara, the former Yugoslavia, Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Georgia and Haiti. Five of the pre-1988 U.N. operations are still active — three in the Middle East, one in India and Pakistan, and one in Cyprus.

In 1993, the U.N. spent $3.7 billion on peacekeeping, nearly five times what it spent for peacekeeping in 1991. Peacekeeping operations are normally financed from their own separate accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all member states, with the United States' share being 31.74 percent of all U.N. peacekeeping costs.

U.S. military involvement in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian activities has also expanded in recent years. More than 3,600 U.S. military troops are now serving in six U.N. peacekeeping operations.

U.N. system

The U.N. system includes six principal organs: the Secretariat, General Assembly, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice and the Security Council, and nearly 30 major programs or agencies.

The Security Council is the focal point for efforts to organize the U.N. collective security system and is vested with exclusive authority to address matters of international peace and security. Peacekeeping operations are approved by the Security Council and fall under its authority. While the other five organs of the U.N. system may make recommendations to member states, the Security Council has the power to make decisions which member governments must carry out under the U.N. charter.

The Security Council consists of 15 members, of which five are permanent — the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France and China. The 10 non-permanent members are selected from regional groups and serve for two-year staggered terms. Presidency of the council is rotated among the 15 members, with each president holding office for one month.

A proposal to establish a U.N. peacekeeping operation is first

brought to the Security Council by a member state, the U.N. secretary-general, or a party to a dispute through another member state or the secretary-general. In order for the 15-member Security Council to adopt a proposal, there have to be at least nine votes in favor and no negative vote, or veto, from any of the five permanent members.

U.N. charter

Under its charter, the first of the purposes of the United Nations is "To maintain international peace and security."

Chapters VI and VII of the charter spell out concrete measures which the U.N. Security Council — the principal organ vested with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security — can take to achieve this purpose. The charter also recommends that states first make every effort to settle their disputes peacefully, either bilaterally or through regional organizations.

Under Chapter VI of the charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. The council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment if it determines that the recommendations are not binding on U.N. members.

Under Chapter VII of the charter, the council has broader power to decide what measures need to be taken in situations involving threats to peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. In such situations, the council is not limited to recommendations but may take actions, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security. This was the basis for U.N. armed action in Korea in 1950 and the use of coalition forces to expel the Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait in 1991. It was also the basis for deploying a U.S.-led Unified Task Force to Somalia in December 1992 to establish a secure environment for humanitarian-relief operations.

Peacekeeping development

The inability of the U.N. Security Council to play an effective role in maintaining peace and security after the start of the Cold War led the U.N. to turn to peacekeeping in default. Although peacekeeping is not prescribed for in the U.N. charter, the conduct of such operations has evolved over four decades as a way for controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. These operations have traditionally involved the practice of inserting unarmed military observers or a lightly armed force between two warring parties, after receiving the parties' consent, to monitor a cease-fire at the end of a war and create conditions needed for peace negotiations.

There is even disagreement as to when the "first" peacekeeping operation was established. Most think that it was the group of military observers, known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, who were sent out during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 to supervise a cease-fire and then to implement the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Thereafter, peacekeeping evolved steadily. In 1949, the U.N. deployed military observers to supervise a cease-fire between India and Pakistan, in the states of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1956 the first peacekeeping force was set up in the Middle East after the Suez crisis to act as a buffer between the Egyptians and Israelis. In 1960, the U.N. launched its operation in the Congo to verify the withdrawal of Belgian forces, prevent civil war, and maintain the country's integrity and political independence.

In 1962, U.N. peacekeepers assumed responsibility for the administration and internal security of West Irian, pending transfer from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesia. In 1964 the U.N. again became involved in an internal conflict when it established a force to control intercommunal fighting in the Republic of Cyprus. In 1973, the U.N. deployed a peacekeeping force to the Sinai, and in 1974, an observ-

United Nations photo

The U.N. Security Council in session. The 15-member council has exclusive authority over matters of international peace and security.



Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Worldwide

er group was sent to the Golan Heights. Later, in 1978, the U.N. deployed a peacekeeping force to southern Lebanon.

Peacekeeping's ability to evolve in this way was greatly helped by the fact that the U.N. charter did not define it. This omission enabled statesmen and the U.N. secretary-general to develop a flexible instrument which has been adapted to a variety of uses. This approach partly compensated for the Security Council's limited ability to operate during the Cold War.

The new era

In the past few years, the new political climate emerging from the end of the Cold War and the increased cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council have contributed to a dramatic expansion in U.N. peacekeeping operations. These developments have also led to an important change in the character of such operations. They are no longer primarily military in composition and purpose. They are taking on new tasks and often go far beyond traditional activities of monitoring cease-fires. They may now protect relief shipments, respond to refugee needs, enforce embargoes, remove mines and seek to disarm warring parties.

Many U.N. operations now include large civilian components which carry out essential political, humanitarian and administrative functions, including election monitoring, human-rights verification, humanitarian relief, institution-building and the restoration of infrastructure and services.

Recent operations have taken U.N. peacekeepers into uncharted territory — into areas where there are no agreements, where governments do not exist or have limited effective authority and where the consent and cooperation of the parties cannot be relied upon. All too frequently, their work is obstructed by well-armed irregular groups and warlords who defy both their national authorities, where these exist, and the international community.

Some examples of the new multidimensional peacekeeping operations that have been set-up in recent years include:

El Salvador: The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, ONUSAL, deployed in July 1991 and has been involved not only with monitoring a cease-fire and related measures but also with reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues. ONUSAL'S mandate was enlarged in May 1993 to include the observation of the electoral process due to

conclude with the general election in El Salvador in March 1994.

Cambodia: In March 1992, the U.N. deployed one of the most complicated and ambitious operations ever undertaken. The cost of the U.N.-sponsored peace mission in Cambodia was staggering by any standard — $1.7 billion over the course of 20 months, to support more than 22,000 civilian and military personnel sent to administer the peace plan.

The U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC, was involved with supervising the administration of the entire country, verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, demobilizing more than 150,000 troops, repatriating and resettling some 350,000 displaced Cambodians in camps on the Thai border, disposing of literally millions of mines left planted throughout the country, human-rights monitoring, and organizing and supervising a national election. The U.N.-organized election was conducted successfully in May 1993, with 90 percent of registered voters taking part in the election in a peaceful atmosphere. UNTAC's mandate ended on Nov. 15, 1993.

Somalia: On May 4, 1993, the U.S.-led Unified Task Force in Somalia ceased operations, and an expanded U.N. Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, replaced it. UNOSOM II has deployed more than 26,000 troops from 28 countries, including 2,700 U.S. logistics troops and 47 staff officers, to continue the restoration of peace, stability, and law and order; to provide security and assistance in the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons; to assist in the re-establishment of the Somalia police force, in development of a program for the removal of mines, and in provision of humanitarian relief; to assist in rebuilding Somalia's government, political institutions and economy; and to monitor the arms embargo and facilitate disarmament efforts.

Unlike a traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM II was established under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which authorizes troops to use force to disarm the warlords who refuse to surrender their weapons and to ensure that relief supplies reach needy people. This marked the first time the U.N. has taken overall control of a peacekeeping force under Chapter VII.

Mozambique: In December 1992, the Security Council established a peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, to assist the nation in establishing peace. ONUMOZ is charged with coordinating several aspects of the transition to peace, including monitoring of the cease-fire, demobilization of combatants, preparation for and monitoring of elections, and the crucial humanitarian-assistance effort. Despite some early administrative and logistical problems, ONUMOZ is now fully operational, with more than 6,000 Blue Helmet forces deployed from two dozen countries.

Former Yugoslavia: The upheaval in the former Yugoslavia illustrates how the closing of the Cold War opened a Pandora's box of ethnic conflicts that had been kept down by the ideological struggle of that era.

In response to the crisis, a U.N. peacekeeping force of 14,700 troops was deployed to three areas in Croatia in the spring of 1992. Known as the U.N. Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, it was sent to promote and maintain peace, pending a final settlement. Later, however, the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the Security Council to expand the UNPROFOR mandate to include security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, protection of humanitarian convoys and convoys of released civilian detainees, monitoring of compliance with the ban on military flights in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and protection of "safe areas." Also, in the first preventive operation in the history of U.N. peacekeeping, UNPROFOR was deployed to Mace-

United Nations photo

Khmer Rouge soldiers in a zone controlled by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia supervised the demobilization of more than 150,000 troops.

United Nations photo

U.N. ambulances drive through an area of heavy fighting in the former Yugoslavia. More than 25,000 U.N. troops are currently deployed there.

donia to monitor borders with Albania and Yugoslavia.

The peacekeeping challenge in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has proved to be formidable and has illustrated the difficulties the U.N. faces in its new brand of mission. U.N. troops have been attacked, U.N. headquarters shelled and U.N. relief convoys blocked. More than 25,000 U.N. troops are now deployed, including a U.S. Air Force surgical hospital unit of 138 persons in Zagreb and a reinforced infantry company of 313 U.S. troops in Macedonia.

Past and present

U.N. peacekeeping has brought a degree of stability to a number of areas of the world over the years, having achieved important goals in places as diverse as the Middle East, Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Cambodia.

However, some of the 32 operations launched since 1948 have fallen short of their goals. Blue-helmeted peacekeeping forces were first sent to patrol the mountains of Kashmir in 1949, and they are still in place. So is the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which arrived in the Middle East in 1948 at the end of the first Arab-Israeli War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force has been on the Golan Heights since 1974. The United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon has been in place since 1978, striving to prevent hostilities and to protect civilians caught in the fighting. The U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus has been in place for almost 29 years now, with no political settlement in sight.

Many of the new U.N. operations are facing difficulties at the same time. In some cases the lack of resources and poor diplomacy appear to be the reason, but often the explanation lies in an underestimation of the animosity that lies behind these conflicts. In particular, recent difficulties of the U.N. operations in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti clearly demonstrate that traditional approaches are not adequate where government and civil society have broken down or where one or more of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict.

Over the years, U.N. peacekeepers have received uniformly positive publicity for their service to the cause of peace. They all share the honor of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded the U.N. in 1988. But peacekeeping has become a risky job involving peacemaking, peace enforcement and nation-building. Some 1,020 men and women from more than 40 countries, including 32 from the United States, have died while in the service of U.N. peacekeeping forces.

The future

The post-Cold War world remains a dangerous one. Warning signs of new crises loom across the globe. Demand for U.N. peacekeeping services are certain to grow. It is not always clear whether the U.N. should intervene in a particular situation, nor is it always certain if it can intervene effectively. In any event, if the U.N. is to play a greater role in keeping the peace, it must strengthen its capacity to plan, organize, lead and service increasingly complex peacekeeping operations.

Sgt. Maj. Steve Burback currently serves as Special Assistant to the Military Adviser to the Ambassador, U.S. Mission to the United Nations. His prior assignments include two tours on the Army staff as well as with the NATO Headquarters LANDSOUTHEAST in Izmir, Turkey. He has extensive experience in administering security-assistance programs, having been assigned to security-assistance organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. He earned a bachelor's degree in management from Park College in 1985 and is a graduate of the Army Sergeants Major Academy, the Security Assistance Management Course, and the U.S. Marine Corps Advanced Logistics Officer Course.

Cold-Weather Operations

by Maj. Carl W. Riester

In his short story, "To Build a Fire," Jack London describes his character's failure to appreciate the dangers of cold weather:

Fifty degrees below zero meant 80-odd degrees of frost. Such fact impressed him as being cold and uncomfortable, and that was all. It did not lead him to meditate upon his frailty as a creature of temperature, and upon man's frailty in general, able only to live within certain narrow limits of heat and cold.

London's description aptly points out the considerations of operations in extreme cold, and while technology has enabled man to better survive in extreme climates, the environment is still a factor to be reckoned with.

Some readers may quickly discard this subject because their area of orientation is directed toward warmer climates. But in recent contingency operations such as Desert Storm and Provide Hope, forces were augmented by soldiers from other units, and no one special-operations unit had exclusive rights to its area of operations. These augmentees were subjected to unaccustomed weather, and units should consider the possibility of conducting training and operations in an extreme cold environment.

Training plan

If a unit does not habitually conduct cold-weather operations, the training plan must be simple, follow a logical progression, be resourced at an acceptable level, and be able to prepare an unacclimated novice to fight, survive and win.

A robust physical-training program must be established well in advance of the training. While this should be an integral part of any special-operations unit, the fact is we sometimes find ourselves in situations preventing a regular pattern, particularly during field exercises, block leaves or support cycles. Ensure a minimum of 3-4 weeks of sustained training prior to the beginning of the plan. Make sure prior cold weather injuries are identified — they will be most susceptible to further injury.

The actual training plan should be conducted in three phases: instructor training, beginner/novice preparation, and whole-unit training. Training should begin with an intense instructor-training program. A 10-12 day plan should suffice and should include preparation and rehearsals of all programs of instruction. Subjects for the POI will be driven by the culminating event, e.g., FTX, ARTEP, JCS exercise.

Each enabling task for the event must be identified and included in the POI. The cadre needs to represent the unit's best trainers in these specialized tasks. Ensure each primary instructor has a prepared assistant instructor. Safety and cold-weather-injury prevention must be constantly reinforced throughout the POI.

The next step is the beginner/novice train-up. Plan on a 2-3-week time span and conduct training at

the closest facility with adequate conditions. This portion, based on the number of beginners, requires only the cadre and trainees and not the unit as a whole. The intent is to establish an acceptable level of individual experience prior to the entire-unit participation, and training should be geared toward building confidence in the individual's equipment and survivability.

At this point the unit should be prepared for deployment to its training site. Although conditions are at best slightly predictable, the selected training site should offer the highest likelihood of having the desired environment. Our most recent experience demonstrated that Utah, Colorado and Canada proved excellent training areas. The bottom line is that you have to go where the weather supports your plan, and training must be coordinated and budgeted well in advance.

Initial training focuses on individual skills, movement in particular. As a minimum, Nordic, alpine and snowshoe training should be covered. Be sure to incorporate other individual skills, such as weapons fire and communications exercises, into the program. A solid three weeks should be dedicated to these subjects. A sample plan is given below:

• Day 1-3 - Individual Nordic training. Begin with essential equipment (skis, individual kit) and, based on the level of training, move toward movement with rucksacks and sleds.

• Day 4 - Transition day. May be used to cover climatic subjects such as avalanche safety, cold-weather health considerations, weapons fire, etc.

• Day 5 - Alpine diagnostic exam: Under the supervision of instructor cadre, all participants negotiate a course. Ability groups are designated and given a dedicated instructor who not only teaches but maintains status of progress.

• Day 6 - Rest. Mandatory for recuperation and preparation for upcoming training.

• Day 7-11 - Ability-group skiing. Groups should be subjected to a variety of conditions.

• Day 12 - Rest.

• Day 13-14 - Ability-group skiing. Should end with a re-evaluation of each skier and perhaps include team-building events such as the slalom or downhill racing.

• Day 15-17 - Unit (team, squad, section) skiing. This portion focuses on each subunit exercising newly learned skills and working as an organization.

• Day 18 - Rest.

• Day 19-22 - This is optional based on time, weather or resource constraints. During this time units can continue alpine or Nordic skiing, or focus on snowshoeing (the latter not requiring much finesse, just exertion). Additional topics can be advanced individual or group weapons fire, use of the Mobile Over Snow Transport, skijoring, communications, cold-weather mountaineering or land navigation.

• Day 23-25 - Shakeout STX/FTX. This exposes units to operational considerations in cold weather. The focus should be on basic skills such as shooting, moving and communicating, and on living conditions. Personnel will learn dynamics of equipment and surviving in the environment.

• Day 26-28 - Recovery, maintenance, rest and preparation for the culminating exercise.

• Day 29-Completion - Culminating exercise. If designing your own FTX, 10-14 days of field time will challenge all. Otherwise, duration will be dictated by whatever exercise you are participating in.

This plan is recommended given ideal, unconstrained resources (budget, weather, time). It can be tailored to address mission-essential tasks for whatever the end state is.

Photo by Carl Reister

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group take a break during a shake-out field training exercise in Colorado. Note depth of fire in snow.

Considerations

Cold-weather operations place considerable and peculiar demands on personnel and equipment. Soldiers are required to carry heavier loads for survival equipment, the properties of materials change, weather becomes a major factor not just for conducting operations, but also for survival, and although the demands will be greater, logistical support will also be affected by the

weather conditions.

History is replete with examples of remarkable successes and disastrous failures in extreme cold environments. The difference was adequate training, adequate clothing, knowledge of the environment and counteractions, and a planned logistical base to support operations. The following considerations focus on how to beat the weather in a typical special-operations mission, assuming that small units will deploy with what they can carry, that they are conducting deep operations, and that they will be divorced from a conventional logistics base which can respond immediately.

Equipment

The typical winter soldier will be required to carry an inordinate amount of gear even for basic survival. The available space in a rucksack is quickly consumed with sleeping gear, long undergarments, extra socks, gloves, shelter and other clothing items. Even the latest technology in winter kit takes up considerable room.

This is not an area for shortcuts — soldiers must have adequate protection against the elements. Leaders must supervise and check to make sure subordinates not only adhere to the packing list, but also don't exceed the required items — one simply doesn't have the luxury.

Using survival equipment as a base, determine the days of supply for food, water, batteries, PLL and fuel each soldier can realistically carry. A shakeout FTX is critical. It will provide a good rule of consumption rates for supplies and what items of equipment tend to break easily.

Review alternatives to hauling everything on your back. Consider and experiment with different transport systems such as deer sleds or ahkio sleds. Both allow transport of additional gear but require some training in use and physical stamina. Caching supplies is another alternative. Ensure cached items

Photo by Carl Reister

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group conduct an above-timberline ski after being dropped off by helicopter.

are not degraded by the elements (especially batteries). Automatic or on-call resupply should be a prerequisite for winter operations. Remember, however, that the delivery systems will be subject to the same weather constraints.

Clothing

Units should use whatever equipment they have available, whether it is the latest high-speed technology or 50s-style issue equipment. Both work. The latest breakthroughs are all right if your budget can afford them; however, the old arctic equipment such as parkas, arctic mittens and wool shirts are time-tested and provide the required protection.

No discussion of winter operations would be complete without mentioning the key word COLD. Suffice it to say that the principles must be adhered to no matter how you are equipped. Particular attention must be paid to body extremities, as they are most susceptible to cold-weather injury.

Footgear is a critical item. Even vapor-barrier boots can lose their abilities in extremes. If possible, pack two types of footgear. The first is that which is required to support movement. Boots to fit skis or snowshoes should be flexible for movement but tend to be inadequate for static operations. For those periods of stationary ops, our recent experiences demonstrated a mukluk-type boot the best.

Another technique is to wear a quilted bootie inside of rubber overshoes. Semi-daily foot checks are mandatory. This is a leadership responsibility and cannot be ignored. Leaders should conduct foot inspections with qualified medics. The onset of cold-weather injury can be instantaneous. All need to recognize preventative measures, symptoms and emergency treatment.

Another mandatory item should be an instant heat source carried by each man. One item we have used is the Norwegian heater. This is basically a case which burns solid fuel, providing an excellent quick means of providing warmth. They can also be used to heat IV solutions. There are several types of commercial heat packets such as hand and toe warmers which can provide short-

term heat to extremities. Use these items sparingly and save them for real emergencies.

Several types of headgear are available to protect the ears and face. If you are required to operate in sub-zero conditions, a face mask is best. This provides protection for ears and nose and allows vapor to escape. Even a wool scarf can be configured to cover exposed areas and is adequate when combined with a watch cap or pile cap.

For hands, mittens should be mandatory for all. Gloves tend to constrict circulation needed to keep fingers warm. The old arctic mitten ensemble is very reliable, and soldiers should pack an extra set of liners.

Shelter

Special-operations missions will probably preclude hauling an arctic tent with a Yukon stove. Selected shelter should provide protection against wind and snow, ventilation and a floor to reduce conduction (absorption of cold by contact with the ground). Additional items such as sleeping pads and ponchos should be laid to provide additional barriers. For site selection, based on METT-T, select a position out of the wind. Avoid low-lying areas where cold air settles at night, the lee side of cliffs where snow can drift, or potential avalanche or rock-slide areas. Avoid using flame inside sleeping shelters. The hazards are obvious, but humans tend to be lazy in this area, and it requires constant reinforcement.

Water

Even in cold weather, individuals will need at least a liter of water per day to replace normal loss. The plastic canteen is virtually worthless in sub-zero weather. However, if you are required to carry them, consider storing and carrying them upside down. The bottoms will freeze first, allowing access at the openings. Metal canteens are better because they can be heated directly on stoves. Even the arctic canteen will freeze if exposed for extended times. Store these upside down, as well.

You can keep canteens in your sleeping bag at night to reduce freezing, just ensure they are tightly sealed. One mission-essential item should be a thermos per man. When on the move, everyone should carry a full thermos of heated water. This not only provides a quick source for warm beverages, but it could be critical in an emergency situation.

If required to procure water, look for available sources (creeks, lakes) before attempting to melt snow or ice. If using an available source, use a tie-down to toss the canteen or bottle into the water, thereby avoiding getting hands and clothing wet. Melting should be used as a last resort. If required to melt snow or ice, choose ice first, as it will provide more liquid. The cubic-inch ratio of uncompacted snow to water yield is 17:1.

Navigation

The difficulty of navigation in an arctic environment is compounded by limited daylight and magnetic deviations the closer one operates to the poles. If a global positioning system is available, take it along. The liquid display may freeze, so take preventive measures such as carrying it inside clothing. Make sure you consider batteries in your load planning. In a survival situation, field-expedient methods such as using stars at night will at least provide cardinal direction.

Weapons

Prior to deployment, ensure you have proper lubricants. During arctic operations, strip weapons completely and clean with a dry-cleaning solvent. Apply cold-weather lubricants once all other lubricants and rust-prevention compounds are removed. Cold weather will put considerable demands on weapons through normal firing. Consider packing a small PLL to replace those items susceptible to breakage. When bivouacking, leave weapons (under guard) outside shelters. This will keep the weapon from "sweating." If you can't leave them outside, they will continue to sweat for about an hour. Before taking

Photo by Carl Reister

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group being inserted into a cold-weather training area by helicopter.

weapons into cold weather again, remove all condensation and clean them.

One hazard during normal operations is blockage of the barrel by snow, ice or other debris. A good idea is to cover the muzzle before movement. Use an item that can easily be removed by frozen fingers or that will blow off with the first rounds you fire.

Rations

As important as water is the caloric intake of each individual during extended operations. The optimum choice should be arctic rations. These are much like the long-range-patrol food packets. Each contains a main dehydrated meal, granola-like bars, candy and a variety of beverages. The only drawback is that the main meal requires about a half-canteen to rehydrate. If using regular MREs or canned food, take caution to prevent spoiling. Keep food frozen until ready to eat. If storing outside shelters, take precautions against foraging animals.

Stoves are a necessity during cold-weather operations. Heat tabs or other solid fuels are not efficient during extreme weather. There are several adequate commercial and military stoves available. It is not necessary that everyone carry a stove. Stoves and fuel should be cross-loaded through the unit. Take extra precautions when handling fuel. Contact with exposed skin can cause instantaneous frostbite. Use stoves outside as much as possible. Make sure they are sheltered from wind and other elements.

Conclusion

Operating in cold weather is an inescapable fact in much of the world. It doesn't have to be a debilitating factor and, given proper preparation, will give units an edge in surviving and winning. Almost any contingency during extreme cold-weather operations can be war-gamed prior to execution. Establish a reading list from historical examples (Russo-Finnish War, World War II) to mentally prepare leaders. Pre-mission FTXs in similar conditions will identify strengths and weaknesses for final execution. Leaders need to think through all aspects of the operation. With a logical and thorough approach, any unit can be equipped and trained to deal with the cold-weather environment.

Maj. Carl W. Riester is currently the operations and training officer for the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group and was formerly commander of Company B, 2nd/10th. In addition to the Special Forces Qualification Course, his military education includes the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and the Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor's degree from Westminster College. In writing this article, Major Riester consulted numerous after-action reports and conducted personal interviews with members of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group.

Cobra Gold '93: SOF Units Work with Thai Counterparts

by SSgt. Keith Butler

U.S. special-operations forces joined their counterparts in the Royal Thailand Army to perform a variety of SOF missions during exercise Cobra Gold in April and May of 1993.

Special Forces soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, Wash., after jumping into the combined joint exercise, worked with the Thai 4th Regiment, 2nd Special Forces Division. Missions included unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, and for the first time, personnel recovery and coalition warfare.

"For the first time, we're attaching a team member to a conventional unit commander," said Lt. Col. Lynn E. Lanzoni, 3rd Battalion commander. "We have the linguists who can talk to the Thai units. They assist in the integration of U.S. combat power into the maneuver of coalition forces." About 30 percent of the 3rd Battalion's soldiers speak Thai, while 50 percent speak other languages of Southeast Asia.

Other firsts for Cobra Gold were the 3rd Battalion's operating a special-operations command-and-control element, or SOCCE, at the Combined Army Forces headquarters. "They provide the ground truth to the CARFOR commander," Lanzoni added.

A-detachments on the ground practiced recovering "downed" pilots with the Thai soldiers and training guerrilla forces in escape and evasion. "The teams stay together the entire time to train for their peculiar missions," said Maj. Kirk A. Moeller, operations officer for the 3rd Battalion, who served as the deputy training officer of the Combined Special Forces Operational Base. "All of the teams do live-fire exercises during rehearsals for their missions. They're using MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) gear out there."

The added realism of the Special Forces training was expected to catch the attention of conventional-force commanders as well. "Cobra Gold is not just for the Royal Thailand military. Our added focus is to teach the Joint Task Force and components about our interoperability and what we can really do for them," Moeller said.

The combined Special Forces teams worked with guerrilla forces and "auxiliaries" — locals and noncombatants who support Special Forces in an unconventional-warfare environment — through rice paddies, dense vegetation and mountain areas scattered throughout central Thailand. The auxiliaries assisted Special Forces in acquiring supplies and helped store them at scattered cache sites.

The teams watched "targets" for 24 hours or more while on special-reconnaissance missions. They attacked "enemy" positions during simulated direct-action hits under the cover of darkness after ruck marching 10-20 miles following an airborne insertion. Special Forces also used mules provided by the Thai army to make clandestine resupply treks across mountainous terrain.

Preparation is key in all Special Forces operations, said WO 1 Dan Farmer, an A-Team technician and acting team commander. "We've been getting ready for our missions for a couple of days now. We're pumped and ready to go," said Farmer. While in isolation, the team packed rucksacks with gear, then camouflaged their packs and load-bearing equipment with rope twists.

They used isolation to reiterate mission objectives, practice for a jump the following day and sharpen night movement with a seven-mile rucksack march. "ISO is the place to fine-tune missions. The A-teams plan and prepare. They designate who'll carry what and who'll do what," said SFC Fritz W. Saddle-

mann, an engineer sergeant who served as a member of an area specialist team on the exercise.

Rangers

Also jumping during the exercise were 145 Rangers from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Ga., who trained with the 2nd Thailand Ranger Company throughout May.

The two nations' Rangers began the month with survival classes focusing on Thailand's terrain and wildlife, weapons demonstrations and mission-essential tasks — conducting raids, ambushes and movement to contact with enemy forces. "We did combined training every day — did the same things at the same places," said 1st Lt. Steven F. Hanagan, assistant intelligence officer for the 3rd Ranger Battalion "We learned from their leaders and they learned from ours."

During movement-to-contact sessions, the American and Thai Rangers practiced striking targets both day and at night, first with blanks, then with live rounds. "Live-fire training is critical. It's the closest thing to combat," Hanagan said.

"We have to keep our edge as the most highly skilled, light-infantry unit in the world," said SSgt. David R. Isbell, a weapons squad leader in B Company. "We stay combat-ready through intense training because we could be called on for a real-world mission any time. We can't get that kind of training just at Fort Benning."

"The terrain here is unique. The ground is flat and sparsely vegetated now. Thai hilly areas are very steep," said Sgt. Lindsay L. Bunch, a rifle squad leader in B Company. "The Thais have enemy all around them. Many of their Rangers have seen combat."

After a month of combined training and two parachute jumps, the American and Thai Rangers took part in a mass tactical airborne operation which began a three-day field training exercise.

For some of the U.S. Rangers, the training in Thailand brought more than expected. Similarities in intensity, methods and personal dedication surprised anti-tank squad-leader SSgt. David Wilson. "They (Thai Rangers) hit the wire, busted through and assaulted a bunker really fast. It all went down simultaneously with our guys. I was impressed," he said. "The Thais are also willing to learn. They are a little smaller than us, but they hauled the anti-tank system (M-3 Carl Gustov). It weighs about 22 pounds. Each guy carries about five rounds that each weigh about nine pounds."

"I always knew the American Rangers are very disciplined. I was so surprised that they were so friendly," said Royal Thai Army Master Sgt. Suntad Kligklai, operations NCO. "I hope we continue this training every year. Maybe next time we could go to the U.S. to train with them."

PSYOP

American soldiers from the 4th PSYOP Group and PSYOP Army Reservists joined their Thai counterparts in spreading the word about medical and engineering civic-action projects being conducted by teams throughout Thailand for Cobra Gold.

Live shows are part of the standard mission for Thai PSYOP units, who visit farming communities to disseminate public service, health and safety news. Two American PSYOP soldiers, Specs. Shawn R. Hugo and David R. Pettijohn, were cast into the spotlight when, teamed with the Royal Thailand Army's PSYOP Battalion, they brought a crowd of more than 500 villagers to their feet with comic skits, singing and dancing routines.

"This was the best way to learn about what they do. We have been able to totally immerse ourselves in Thai culture — we ate, slept, played soccer during our down time and shared the same living space 24 hours a day," Hugo said. "Everyone in Thailand's PSYOP units is Ranger-, Special Forces- and airborne-qualified. In addition, they all know how to play an instrument or sing. They work hard but have a good time."

"I see they are very patriotic," Pettijohn said. "As a standard they

Photo by Keith Butler

U.S. Rangers from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment prepare to train with their counterparts from the 2nd Thailand Ranger Company.

sing their national anthem twice a day."

Thai and American PSYOP paratroopers also developed, designed and produced public-service-information handouts for distribution to villages throughout the exercise. The PSYOP Task Force created and distributed more than 20,000 copies of a coloring book for children, written in Thai, which reinforced messages about personal hygiene. The PSYOP Task Force also helped inform local populaces of combined-arms, live-fire exercises to help ensure their safety.

"In developing an informational product, we first decide the specific message we want to accurately convey to the populace, and then we brainstorm the entire issue," said Spec. Jeffrey A. Hood, a 4th POG illustrator. "It starts as a pencil sketch, then it's scanned into a computer and later enhanced and colorized. I produce my drafts in standard sketchbook size, then shrink them to the size needed for the specific task assigned."

Once approved, sketches are matched with appropriate language text. This comes easily to members of Company B, 8th Battalion, 4th POG, since about 75 percent of them speak Asian languages. "We're another asset in the task force's rucksack," said Maj. Paul J. Mullin, commander of the 8th Battalion's 2nd Operational Detachment.

"The combination of our soldiers' abilities, talents and imagination make it possible to support civic-action projects by providing media and information to improve the quality of life for people," said SFC Larry D. Wright, NCOIC of the 2nd OPDET for Southeast Asia. "The rest of the Army is geared toward completing missions using force. Our soldiers introduce alternative dimensions to conventional warfare."

Cobra Gold '93 was another opportunity for American PSYOP soldiers to train, said Maj. Gary L. Nichols, CJPTF commander. "Most importantly, we're building rapport."

There are gains for the Thai PSYOP units as well. "American PSYOP units move around a lot, while our soldiers stay in one area for up to 10 years," said Capt. Sunya Nimnoul, commander of the Royal Thailand Army's 3rd Company, PSYOP Battalion. "We provide ideas on the mind-set of our people. The American soldiers have exchanged ideas on things like their computer equipment."

Photo by Keith Butler

A team of American and Thai PSYOP soldiers uses a portable loudspeaker to inform a rural village of a medical civic-action program during Cobra Gold '93.

"It's been a two-way street," said Spec. Michael J. Davenport, who worked side-by-side with Thai counterparts in developing computer-generated products. "The Thais are really friendly. We've built a professional and personal relationship."

Civil Affairs

While PSYOP units provided information on the medical and civic-action projects, those projects themselves were the job of the Combined/Joint Civil Affairs Task Force, working at 12 remote sites throughout Thailand.

More than 1,400 Thai farmers, their children and animals swelled into lines awaiting the arrival of the 32 soldiers, sailors and airmen. The team, assisted by the Royal Thailand military, plunged into a 12-hour bustle of treating ailments ranging from headaches to intestinal infections. All of the villagers in line were examined by doctors and, if necessary, given medicines at the pharmacy set up in a wood-plank school.

"There's more than 300 different types of medicines there on the table — everything from aspirin to drugs for worming," said Capt. Lynne B. Westlake, a reservist from the 322nd CA Brigade, Fort DeRussy, Hawaii. The pharmacists filled more than 500 prescriptions in one day.

Around back, dentists extracted decayed teeth from more than 400 villagers, and physical therapists instructed villagers complaining of a variety of aches on how to alleviate pain. Most of the villagers are farmers who lead strenuous lives tilling their fields. "The physical therapist told them how to squat and use their legs for lifting," said Maj. John C. Lewis, a reservist from Portland, Ore.

In another Cobra Gold first, optometrists and a Navy optician technician rounded out the crew of

medical personnel.

"We've been making 50 pairs of glasses a day," said Petty Officer 1st Class Edwin R. Greene, who deployed from Yorktown, Va. The team filled eyeglass prescriptions on the spot — Greene ground lenses to eye doctors' specifications and popped the glass into frames provided by the Thai government. "Some of the villagers have had bad eyesight for years. They thought they would just have to live with it."

The CJCATF also treated animals, which are essential to the villagers' livelihood. Reservist veterinarians Col. Thelton McCorcle, 478th CA Battalion, from Miami, and Maj. George A. Jacoby, 445th CA Battalion, from Oakland, Calif., examined and treated chickens, pigs, dogs, cats and livestock, giving shots for rabies, distemper and worms.

Lewis and Maj. George Otte, sanitation engineers and members of the 351st CA Command, Mountain View, Calif., checked village water supplies. The two tested wells, nearby streams and "klongs," caches which Thai villagers use to catch rain water, for pesticides, bacteria and excessive minerals. Though drinking untreated rain water is not ideal, drinking water from the klongs is even worse, Otte said. The klongs are normally set against buildings and catch rain dripping off the metal roofs.

"We're testing the water for lead and zinc to prevent poisoning," Otte said. "We're also educating the villagers in prevention. Until they get a central piping system, one of the simplest things they can do is boil any water they ingest for up to 15 minutes."

"We've got an interesting mix of very anxious people from the medical and engineering fields who are jumping into a 'good Samaritan' role," said Army Lt. Col. Robert M. Steadman, deputy commander of the U.S. Combined/Joint Civil Affairs Task Force headquartered at Tak. Steadman, who works as a fire captain in civilian life, commands the 426th CA Battalion in Upland, Calif. "The Thai military support is excellent, as well. They assess the areas where we're needed most and help us get care to those people."

The Civil Affairs team also joined with troops from the 84th Engineer Battalion out of Hawaii and Royal Thai military to construct a 1,650-square-foot, brick community center, one of six projects, including a new school, constructed during the exercise.

"The whole thing is going to take about 17 days," said SFC Ronald Harris, ENCAP platoon sergeant, amid the bustle of drilling, sawing and pounding at the school site. "The Thai military started before we arrived. Now we're on the plumbing. They do things differently, so we're getting a chance to learn and exchange information about building."

"These villages are far away from the city," said Col. Somchai Klaiyaitong, CJCATF commander from the Royal Thailand Army. Klaiyaitong added that the MEDCAPs and engineering civic-action projects were excellent tools for bringing additional medicine and construction know-how to rural villages and fostering an exchange of each nation's ways of providing medical care and building.

Throughout their stay, the Civil Affairs team lived under Spartan conditions. "We're not here for all of the 'cushies,' " said SFC Scott B. Olsen, MEDCAP NCOIC from Fort Bragg's 96th CA Battalion. "We're working long days, but no one seems to mind."

When the day was done, the Civil Affairs team returned to their quarters in Tak — an open-bay barracks with no television and a few fans working overtime to cool the place down. "We're drowned in patients, but we can all get a good night's sleep knowing we're making a difference out here," Olsen added.

Photo by Keith Butler

Col. Thelton McCorcle, 478th CA Battalion, Miami, Fla., gives shots to villagers' cattle during Cobra Gold '93.

SSgt. Keith Butler is a journalist assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The Rapid Support Unit: Special Forces Support to Joint Task Force - Six

by Maj. Eric W. Buckland

"Alpha Two-Three, this is Romeo Five-Niner, over."

"This is Alpha Two-Three, over."

"One-niner, I say again, one-niner personnel moving past our position. All males, first two are armed with automatic weapons. First one also appears to be wearing some type of night-vision equipment. Second one appears to be using a hand-held radio. Next one-five have large bags or rucks. Last two in formation are also armed. Over."

"Roger. Will move to Red One One for interdiction, over."

"Roger, Red One One. Out."

This type of radio transmission, in this case fictional, frequently occurs along the southwest border of the United States. In this scenario, four Special Forces soldiers, members of the Rapid Support Unit, are conducting special-reconnaissance training and have just reported real suspected drug-trafficking activity to a joint U.S. Border Patrol/Arizona Department of Public Safety reaction team located two kilometers to the rear of the Special Forces personnel's observation site.

The soldiers have passed some important information to the law officers. A few minutes later, the civilian law-enforcement-agency reaction team moves to a location where they surprise and stop the suspects. Based on their questioning of the suspects and the physical evidence, the reaction team makes several arrests and seizes the drugs.

At the same time, the Special Forces soldiers continue their mission, avoiding direct involvement in the law-enforcement activities. After the drugs have been seized, the good news is passed to the RSU members:

"Romeo Five-Niner, this is Alpha Two-Three, over."

"This is Romeo Five-Niner, over."

"Good bust on this end. Looks like we got about 200 kilos of cocaine here. You were right: they were carrying automatic weapons. Four almost-new AK-47s. A set of PVS-7s and a Sabre radio, too. Thanks for the help. Out."

This kind of help is provided by the RSU to law-enforcement agencies daily. The opportunity to apply special skills in real and challenging situations is one reason why many soldiers join Special Forces. Participating in a Rapid Support Unit deployment gives the SF soldiers an opportunity to contribute directly to the well-being of their country while engaging in realistic training.

In the past few years, Special Forces units have quietly and successfully helped fight the war on drugs by conducting military training exercises within the southwest-border region of the United States.

Their training missions have been under the tactical control of Joint Task Force - Six, located at Fort Bliss, Texas. The command coordinates Department of Defense support to civilian law-enforcement counterdrug efforts. While under

the tactical control of JTF-6, SF has directly supported the various local, state and federal law-enforcement agencies within the southwest-border region, including Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and Southern California.

Agencies request the assistance of DoD assets through their representatives working at Operation Alliance, or OPALL, an organization of some 25 state and federal law-enforcement agencies which develops strategies focusing on interdiction, intelligence and investigation of smugglers and drug-trafficking organizations and methods. OPALL is also located at Fort Bliss, and it passes the requests to JTF-6 for execution.

Requests for support are normally executed as what JTF-6 refers to as "deliberate missions." A deliberate mission generally requires 1-6 months of preliminary coordination and planning. These have been conducted by active and reserve-component Army and Marine Corps assets ranging in size from a battalion to an SF A-detachment. In fact, during the last three years, SF personnel have conducted many of these missions, earning praise from law-enforcement agencies for their professionalism and dedication.

But Special Forces' most significant contribution within the region has been their performance in the rapid-support-unit mission. The RSU is designed to provide rapid, on-call support to law enforcement with information or actionable intelligence on imminent drug-trafficking activities. OPALL and JTF-6 recognize that an agency operating with perishable information needs DoD support which a deliberate mission cannot provide. Some mechanism was necessary to provide a faster response, and the RSU concept was quickly developed, coordinated and fielded.

Built from the assets of a Special Forces company, the RSU deploys into the JTF-6 area of responsibility for 90 days. Along with the company headquarters and six A-detachments, the RSU is normally augmented by vehicle mechanics, riggers and communications personnel from the company's higher headquarters. Other personnel and limited logistical and administrative support from JTF-6 allow the company to be virtually self-sufficient. The SF company establishes an advanced operational base which simultaneously controls final mission preparation, limited sustainment and post-mission activities, and the communications of all six A-detachments. Normally, two or three missions run simultaneously, and the RSU will accomplish about 20 missions in a 90-day period.

Since the primary focus of the RSU is to provide rapid intelligence to law-enforcement agencies, special-reconnaissance missions constitute the majority of the assistance rendered. These missions increase the "eyes-on" intelligence capability of law enforcement by placing SF personnel along confirmed or suspected drug-trafficking routes. Monitoring all movement within their area, the SF soldiers report all activity to the law-enforcement agencies.

If the information sent by the sol-

SF-Related Mission Tasks Accomplished

ODB

- TASK ORGANIZE
- DEPLOY
- ESTABLISH/OPERATE ISOLATION FACILITY
- ESTABLISH/OPERATE ADVANCED OPERATIONAL BASE
- PLAN/CONDUCT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
- SUSTAIN
- LAUNCH A-DETACHMENTS
- RECOVER, CONDUCT AFTER-ACTION OPERATIONS
- REDEPLOY

ODA *Strategic Reconnaissance*

- CONDUCT MISSION PREPARATION
- CONDUCT PRE-INFILTRATION ACTIVITIES
- INFILTRATE OPERATIONAL AREA
- CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE
- AREA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
- EXFILTRATE OPERATIONAL AREA
- POST-MISSION ACTIVITIES

ODA *Foreign Internal Defense*

- CONDUCT MISSION PREPARATION
- DEPLOY
- TRAIN HOST NATION FORCES
- PROVIDE C^3I/CS/CSS (FID OPERATIONS)
- REDEPLOY

Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

diers fits the typical method of operation for drug smuggling, the agency will react to it. Often there is little to report, but even this information can be helpful: Confirmed lack of activity in one spot allows agencies to concentrate their efforts somewhere else. One recent mission reported information that enabled law-enforcement agents to seize more than $5 million worth of marijuana.

In the past few months, the RSU has begun to conduct more ground-reconnaissance operations. Looking for hidden cannabis-cultivation sites, the SF soldiers have worked in several different national forests, where they have encountered mountainous and thickly wooded terrain. These efforts, too, have been rewarded: One A-detachment discovered more than 1,600 marijuana plants valued at more than $6 million.

Even if they provide no narco-trafficking detections, the special-reconnaissance missions offer outstanding training for SF soldiers assigned to the RSU. They have to plan their communications and resupply procedures meticulously, and templating their operational areas to fix likely locations of drug manufacturing and drug movement hones their skills in intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The environment includes a real-world threat and contains no artificial "exercise" limitations. Nothing can be taken for granted.

In addition to SR, the RSU conducts mobile-training-team missions. On recent MTTs, soldiers have instructed various local, state and federal law-enforcement agencies in advanced marksmanship, small-unit tactics, land navigation, trauma medicine, troop-leading procedures, airmobile operations and rappelling.

Besides increasing the abilities of the students, the MTTs also improve the skills of SF personnel by refining their abilities as instructors. Even though the students and instructors speak the same language, their personal experiences and backgrounds are remarkably dissimilar, and the MTTs are a challenge to cross-cultural communication.

The SF soldier usually learns more about the southwest-border region during a two-week MTT than he has learned in all his former schooling. The training allows the SF operator to gain invaluable experience in conducting operations very similar to what could be expected during a foreign-internal-defense mission.

While RSU missions allow detachments to train for many individual and collective tasks, the entire JTF-6 area offers numerous and varied chances for non-RSU mission training. In the last year, detachments have conducted dive operations in the Gulf of Mexico along the Texas coast, Elephant Butte Lake in New Mexico, and along the California coast near San Diego. Other detachments have taken advantage of the many mountain ranges in the region and improved their mountaineering skills, and the RSU has made extensive use of Fort Bliss' MacGregor Range Complex.

The Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss has allowed several SF soldiers to attend courses to improve their skill with man-portable air-defense systems. Realistic training scenarios and opportunities are limited only by the imagination and innovation of the SF leaders.

Currently, the RSU is coordinating an FY 94 deployment to conduct long-range desert movement with their vehicles. Another deployment would provide pack-animal and riding skills to one or two detachments before deploying them on a 100-mile cross-country patrol.

The RSU mission is a unique and valuable experience for both SF detachments and companies. During a period when operational requirements are increasing and SF soldiers have to supply their skills throughout the world, RSU deployments enable SF soldiers to hone their skills prior to commitment in support of theater commanders-in-chief. For that reason alone, the RSU mission is important, but in supporting counterdrug activities, the RSU has a direct and positive impact on the people of the United States and truly provides a service to the nation.

Maj. Eric W. Buckland is the Rapid Support Unit Coordinator, J-3 Ops, Joint Task Force - Six, at Fort Bliss, Texas. His previous assignments include serving as a detachment commander, company executive officer and group assistant S-3 in the 7th SF Group, serving as a company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division, and serving in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group as S-3 of the 1st Battalion and commander of Company B, 3rd Battalion.

Military Psychological Operations in the 1990s

by Retired Col. Thomas A. Timmes

During this era of defense reductions and changing national and military strategies, what can be done to maintain a strong, viable DoD PSYOP capability? Three actions available to us are to increase the tempo of peacetime operations, nurture functional area 39B, and clarify terminology.

Our best answer lies with an active program of peacetime psychological operations as an integral component of the emerging defense strategy of the 1990s. Peacetime PSYOP is a highly visible program among key personnel within DoD and a clear demonstration of our community's support to both national-security objectives and commanders-in-chief.

This kind of utility is absolutely critical to the survival of PSYOP in the future force structure. PSYOP can do many useful things, but if it does not clearly demonstrate to decision makers a capability to provide peacetime support to the CINCS and national-security strategy, it can offer little justification to continue its current level of force structure. The alternative may be significant unit and personnel reductions — reductions which the current modest PSYOP force structure cannot accept.

Despite the numerous successes of tactical and operational PSYOP during Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, there is no guarantee that adequate PSYOP units and personnel will be available to take on the challenging peacetime activities conducted by combatant commands.

PSYOP and PSYOP effect

A second consideration that affects the future of PSYOP, and one that affects PSYOP planning and employment, is our own understanding of what we actually do. There is currently no common understanding of what psychological operations are and what they are not. It appears that we do not clearly understand the difference between the conduct of military PSYOP as a unique operation and other activities that have a PSYOP effect whether intended or not. As things now stand, almost anything can be called a psychological operation.

In policy documents, articles and conversation, there is a lack of distinction between military psychological operations which are planned and conducted for their PSYOP effect and other operations which have a non-PSYOP purpose but also have a psychological effect.

The consequence of this lack of distinction is that DoD PSYOP policy documents do not clearly define what types of activities are embraced by the term "military psychological operations." Consequently, since we do not clearly articulate what PSYOP soldiers do in peacetime, we can hardly expect decision-makers to understand PSYOP and continue to resource a viable PSYOP force structure.

PSYOP publications often leave an impression that such activities

as troop reductions, ship port visits, air shows, freedom-of-navigation operations and official visits are psychological operations. These type activities *do* send a message and may be designed to influence attitudes and behavior, but are they military psychological operations? Should joint PSYOP doctrine, Annex D to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or the DoD PSYOP Master Plan, and others, imply (or state!) that these types of activities are military psychological operations? The question is, where do we want to draw the line on what is a psychological operation?

After reading the documents that frame PSYOP, it is easy to see how the two concepts become blurred. However, if a peacetime activity is not conducted under the authority of the governing DoD directive for PSYOP, designed as part of a CINC's annual program, and approved by Office of the Secretary of Defense, it is not an approved PSYOP program but rather a program with a psychological effect.

The bombing of Libya, for example, had a successful psychological impact, but since it was not conducted under the authority of the governing DoD directive, it was an operation with a psychological effect and not a psychological operation. The difference may be minimal, but it may help frame a common understanding.

This does not restrict the utility of PSYOP expertise. PSYOPers at all levels of command and staff are expected to provide their PSYOP expertise to enhance the psychological impact of overseas air shows, ship visits and exercises. Providing PSYOP advice on the conduct of an air show, however, does not constitute a PSYOP program. It means the commander has considered the informational aspects of the activity and the PSYOPer has performed a very important part of his job — providing advice on the informational component of military activities abroad.

Similarly, advising the commander on when and how to conduct an exercise or how to improve relations with local base workers is not a psychological operation, but rather a valid task for the PSYOPer and a great benefit to the commander.

If we use the DoD directive criteria to define peacetime military psychological operations, use of the term "PSYOP" will be less ambiguous and foster greater understanding within DoD and other agencies as well.

Importance of FA 39B

A third consideration for maintaining a strong, viable PSYOP capability resides in the health of Army's functional area 39B (PSYOP). A well-trained and motivated cadre of PSYOP officers is critical to the future growth and well-being of both the FA and PSYOP itself. A 39B officer has a vested interest in PSYOP. After all, his or her career will depend significantly on how well PSYOP performs in peace and war and how its performance is perceived by decision makers. These officers must be motivated to fight for resources, missions and a chance to tell the PSYOP story.

To attract and retain this cadre of motivated PSYOP officers, the Army should be able to offer them a reasonable chance of attaining the grade of lieutenant colonel and the possibility of colonel while serving in FA 39 billets. If we cannot offer them that, we have little chance of attracting and retaining solid and dedicated PSYOP officers.

Currently, the number of active-duty lieutenant-colonel and colonel-level 39B billets within DoD is limited. Among those authorized, a number are filled by Air Force, USAR and non-39B personnel. Additionally, not all of the major commands have 39B officers on their staffs.

It is time to take a hard look at all our existing lieutenant-colonel and colonel PSYOP billets to ensure that active-duty Army officers can carve out a successful "39" career path while maintaining the proper mix of USAF and USAR representation. (The importance of reserve-component representation cannot be overstated, since they currently account for more than 70 percent of PSYOP personnel.)

Photo by Michael W. Toney

PFC James LaSpino, 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, talks with children in a Kurdish refugee camp during Operation Provide Comfort.

The issue of 39B billets and who occupies them needs to be resolved. In this regard, the 1990 DoD PSYOP master plan asks for a study on the FA39 career field. This study should address these issues and chart a course for their resolution.

Strategic operations

The final issue that needs to be addressed is the role of DoD PSYOP in strategic operations. This role has become as blurred as the issue of PSYOP and psychological effect. Our documents are replete with implications that DoD PSYOP plays a far greater role in "strategic" PSYOP than it actually does or will in the near future.

Currently, the State Department and U.S. Information Agency are the lead U.S. government agents for public-diplomacy activities. They have both the charter and the means to execute those responsibilities. During the Persian Gulf War, for example, USIA and State employed VOA, Worldnet, the Wireless File, opinion polls, briefing teams and a diplomatic presence in the region (and around the world) to explain U.S. policy. DoD PSYOP was not offered an active role in this strategic public-diplomacy effort just as it was not during Operations Just Cause or Urgent Fury. Currently, we lack the means and the charter.

Desert Storm, on the other hand, proved beyond a shadow of a doubt our ability to successfully execute tactical and operational PSYOP. We have that charter, the means, the experience and the expertise. We are the recognized experts, and we employed our skills during Desert Storm with measurable effect.

This is not to say that our only role is tactical PSYOP. Our peacetime programs, as limited as they now are, are highly successful and definitely not tactical. Regardless of the level of play, we need to clarify terms, to stop addressing desired roles as if they were realities, and while recognizing our limitations, maximize our tactical and operational capabilities. For the furtherance of military PSYOP, the State Department and USIA should view DoD PSYOP as an active partner in the international information arena and continue to increase and institutionalize the level of interaction displayed during Operation Desert Storm.

To this end, we need a high-level policy statement to clarify the role of DoD in the overall U.S. government's international information program. Additionally, the Department of Defense should publish a policy to clearly affix roles and responsibilities for international information activities among PSYOP, public affairs and public diplomacy.

PSYOP is a military treasure that has earned its right to continue. Memories, however, are short. We need to continually demonstrate our value to the defense establishment through professionalism and meaningful service.

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Israel's Approach to Special Operations

by Michael Eisenstadt

Few armed forces have compiled as impressive a record of success in the field of special operations as the Israeli Defense Forces, the IDF.

In Israel's case, necessity has provided the incentive for the development of its special-operations capabilities. Since the birth of the state in 1948, the threat of guerrilla warfare and terrorism waged by regular and irregular Palestinian *fedayeen* (and more recently the guerrillas of the Lebanese Shiite Hizballah organization), and the threat of war with neighboring Arab states have been a pervasive fact of life in Israel.

As a result, every Israeli government has devoted significant attention and resources to fighting terrorism. This high-level interest spurred the development of a sophisticated special-operations capability.

These threats, as well as the security doctrine of the IDF — with its emphasis on pre-emption and prevention, offensive action and retaliation, provided the impetus for the creation of an impressive special-operations capability through the creation of a number of highly capable elite units in the ground and naval forces.

Units

In the IDF, special operations are conducted by a number of elite units capable of both conventional and special operations. These units can perform direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions, as well as more traditional counterterrorist missions such as hostage rescues. In addition, these elite units receive high-level support from Israel's civilian and military leadership and priority access to resources, including quality personnel, equipment and intelligence support. This is a major factor in their success.

The IDF's elite units trace their origin to Unit 101, founded in August 1953 to carry out reprisal raids against Arab states harboring Palestinian *fedayeen* and infiltrators. Its commander was Lt. Col. Ariel Sharon, a battalion commander in the reserves. Although Unit 101 never numbered more than 45 men and carried out no more than a few dozen missions prior to its merger with the 890th Paratroop Battalion in January 1954, its legacy has influenced generations of IDF soldiers.

Unit 101 demonstrated that a small, elite unit could achieve impressive results on the battlefield and set the standards for the performance of the entire armed forces. Moreover, Unit 101's informal atmosphere, unique sense of esprit de corps and standards of combat leadership became norms for the IDF and part of the combat lore on which generations of IDF officers and enlisted men have been raised. Through the successors to Unit 101 its spirit has been perpetuated in the IDF.

Primary responsibility in the IDF for special operations is currently

shared by five elite units: *Sayeret Matkal,* the general-staff reconnaissance unit; *Sayeret Tzanchanim,* the reconnaissance company of the 35th Paratroop Brigade; *Sayeret Golani,* the reconnaissance company of the 1st *(Golani)* Infantry Brigade, *Sayeret Giv'ati,* the reconnaissance company of the 84th *(Giv'ati)* Infantry Brigade, and *Kommando Yami,* the IDF's naval special-warfare unit. The IDF may also possess a number of smaller and highly specialized units for specific types of missions.[1]

• *Sayeret Matkal* is the IDF's premier special-operations and counterterrorist unit. It is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and consists of about 200 men (including staff and support personnel) organized into teams of 12-16. It is subordinate to the director of military intelligence and is generally tasked with the most sensitive, dangerous and demanding missions, including direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions, as well as hostage rescues. Personnel have also reportedly been seconded to the *Mossad* to conduct assasinations. It is capable of insertion by sea, air or land.[2]

• *Sayeret Tzanchanim, Sayeret Golani,* and *Sayeret Giv'ati* are the reconnaissance companies of the IDF's three premier active infantry brigades. Each is commanded by a junior major or senior captain, and consists of about 200 men (including staff and support personnel) organized into a number of 12-16-man teams, and is capable of conducting conventional infantry and special-operations missions independently or in conjunction with its respective parent brigade, and can be inserted by sea, air or land.[3]

• *Kommando Yami is* the IDF's naval special-warfare unit. It is commanded by a naval captain and consists of about 300 naval commandos (including staff and support personnel). The unit is often tasked to conduct direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions against coastal targets, and at-sea counterterrorist missions. Naval commando personnel also conduct beach reconnaissance and security tasks for paratroop and infantry-reconnaissance units during seaborne insertions. Principal means of insertion employed by the naval commandos include armed speedboats, inflatable rubber rafts, swimmer-delivery vehicles, submarine lock-out, and swimming (surface and subsurface). Naval commando personnel are also capable of airborne insertion.[4]

These units are among the finest within the IDF. Within the ground and naval forces, they act as centers of excellence that attract the finest soldiers and provide them with intensive training and extensive operational experience, creating a skilled and experienced leadership cadre. The IDF general staff is dominated by former paratroop and infantry officers, many of whom have served in one of these units at some point in their careers and thus have some special-operations experience.

While this reliance on multipurpose units has generally served the IDF well, its principal drawback is that the elite paratroop and infantry units involved in special operations in peacetime are usually employed as conventional infantry in wartime. As a result, these units suffer the heavy casualty rates typically incurred by infantry. For instance, during both the 1973 and 1982 wars, the *Golani* Brigade suffered heavy losses. Out of a total strength of about 2,500 personnel, it lost in 1973 130 dead and 310 wounded, including the brigade's deputy commander, two battalion commanders, and the commander of *Sayeret Golani.* In 1982, it lost 46 dead, including the commander of *Sayeret Golani,* and 10 other *Sayeret* personnel.[5] As a result, the capabilities of these units have generally been degraded by major wars, impairing their ability to fulfill their special-operations role after the fighting.

Organization

While these units can conduct special operations independently with little or no augmentation, the IDF will usually form, on a mission-specific basis, task forces comprised of ad hoc mission groups drawn from these units. Task forces are generally rank-heavy, and the size

IDF photo

Members of Unit 101, the elite Israeli unit founded in 1953 to carry out reprisal raids against Palestinian fedayeen *and infiltrators.*

and configuration of a task force and its constituent mission groups, which consist of hand-picked NCOs and officers, is mission-dependent.[6] Task forces are also sometimes augmented by personnel with specialized skills such as intelligence, communications and demolitions, from elsewhere in the IDF, to create a mix of skills and capabilities not found in any single unit.

Assessment and selection

The personnel-selection process for the IDF's elite units is key factor in their success. Selection commences prior to induction and continues through the initial phase of a soldier's compulsory service. The IDF attempts to identify potential candidates for its elite units at the earliest date possible. It employs a sophisticated array of screening physicals, psychological tests and interviews, aptitude tests and questionaires. These are administered in the year preceding conscription and during the first week of active service to identify personnel possessing the requisite physical, psychological and motivational attributes, leadership abilities and special skills required by these units. Personal referrals from unit members may also play a role in selection.[7]

Candidates who score well on the pre-conscription tests are invited to volunteer for the IDF's most selective elite units, such as *Sayeret Matkal* or the naval commandos, and attend a mandatory pre-conscription assessment, known as a *gibush*, or trials week, which lasts five days and which tests their leadership skills, physical strength and endurance, and performance under stress. Subjective evaluations by unit personnel, in combination with objective test scores, serve as the basis for selection. Only about 10 percent of the candidates pass the *Sayeret Matkal gibush*, while about 30 percent pass the naval commando *gibush*. Those who pass are offered the option of serving in these units upon conscription.[8]

IDF photo

Members of Sayeret Tzanchanim*, the 35th Paratroop Brigade's reconnaissance company, take part in an operation in March of 1968.*

By contrast, the 35th Paratroop, *Golani*, and *Giv'ati* infantry brigades do not conduct pre-conscription recruiting. The 35th Paratroop Brigade draws exclusively from volunteers at *bakum*, the IDF's absorption and assignment base at Tel HaShomer, near Tel Aviv, during the first week of service.

Volunteers for the paratroops undergo a mini-gibush *(gibushon)* at *bakum* lasting half a day, and only about 25 percent of all volunteers are accepted into the brigade, while the most promising candidates are offered the opportunity to volunteer for *Sayeret Tzanchanim*. They must pass a *gibush sayeret*, lasting three days and held at the Wingate Institute in Herzliyya, which consists of road marches, physical tests and trials, and leadership-reaction drills. Only about 40 percent pass the *gibush sayeret*, and the best of these are selected for training as reconnaissance paratroopers.

The remainder report for paratroop basic training and will eventually serve in one of the line battalions of the 35th Paratroop Brigade. Volunteers for *Sayeret Golani* and *Sayeret Giv'ati* attend similar *gibushim* during their basic training.[9]

Some personnel are identified on the basis of combat performance, peer ratings and the recommendations of their commanders during the early operational phase of their compulsory service. They may then transfer to one of these units as an NCO or officer.

A mix of overt and latent incentives and pressures ensure that a high-quality pool of applicants volunteer for service in elite units. The status and prestige accorded members of these units within the IDF and Israeli society at large is sufficient incentive for many to volunteer. In addition, service in elite units is considered career-enhancing. Civilian-employment opportunities may be more favorable for veterans of elite units, while service in an elite unit is perceived as a fast track to the top for those planning a career in the military.

Training

Training for *Sayeret Matkal*, *Sayeret Tzanchanim* and the naval commandos commences with para-

troop basic training, which lasts six months, followed by airborne qualification. During the first weeks of basic training, conscripts are formed into teams consisting of up to 20 candidates. Each team member is assigned a specific role or functional specialization, such as rifleman, machine-gunner, grenadier, sniper, radioman or medic, and receives specialized training, although emphasis is also placed on cross-training within the team.

Training of team personnel is conducted by the unit chain of command — the team leader (a lieutenant), and team sergeant. As a result of this arrangement, individual and collective training occur simultaneously, concurrently building individual and unit proficiency.

Following paratroop basic training, candidates for *Sayeret Matkal, Sayeret Tzanchanim,* and the naval commandos continue with specialized training conducted by their parent units at various locations, within the team framework. Training emphasizes land navigation, combat marksmanship, demolitions, communications, observing and reporting, camouflage and concealment, hand-to-hand combat, evasive driving, and infiltration and exfiltration techniques (including military-free-fall parachuting). In addition, naval commando training emphasizes seamanship, underwater navigation and scuba training. Attendance at an NCO course is an integral part of qualification training for all these units in order to hone the tactical and leadership skills of candidates.

Because of these requirements, the basic-qualification courses for these units are very long. For instance, qualification of reconnaissance paratroopers in *Sayeret Tzanchanim* takes 20 months, while qualification for the naval commandos takes 24 months. By the time a team finishes qualification training and commences operational service, its members have spent 20-24 months training together, and through attrition, its numbers have been significantly reduced. The product, however, is a tight-knit, well-trained unit.

Nearly all officers in the IDF are selected from the ranks, and qualified reconnaissance and naval commando NCOs may attend an officer's candidate course (this entails an additional commitment of a year or more, depending on the unit). While some newly commissioned second lieutenants return to their parent unit to train and lead teams of their own, others might be sent to fulfill positions elsewhere and thereby help to raise professional standards throughout the IDF. Those returning to their parent unit can expect to fulfill various command or staff positions and to receive rapid advancement.

IDF photo

Members of Sayeret Golani *board a helicopter which will take them on a reconnaissance mission.*

Mission planning

Because of the politically sensitive nature of special operations, planning is generally conducted at the general-staff level. The process is characterized by the involvement of the most senior, capable and experienced personnel in the IDF in all facets of the operation, and close coordination between planners, intelligence personnel and operators.

This ensures the most effective use of available skills, experience and time, minimizes bureaucratic obstacles to effective communication and coordination, and ensures that intelligence is tailored to the requirements of the operators. The plans group is formed on an ad hoc basis and usually includes the chief paratroop and infantry officer and his staff, the commanders of the assault force, the chief of the operations branch of the general staff and his chief of current operations, and the director of military intelligence.

For joint operations, the commanders of the Israeli Air Force, or IAF, and Israeli Naval Force, or INF, and their key staff personnel, and key members of air and sea crews are also included. In addition, the chief communications and electronics officer, or the chief combat engineer officer may be included when special communications, electronic warfare or engineering support is required.

The chief paratroop and infantry officer holds overall responsibility

for planning and executing special operations involving paratroop or infantry forces. He is also responsible for selecting units to participate in special operations, and for designating the assault-force commander. The commander of the naval commandos plays a similar role in planning and executing special operations in which his units play the leading role. The chief of staff generally provides only guidance and advice, although he may occasionally intervene to resolve interservice conflicts or other disagreements between planners.

While the involvement of the most senior and capable military personnel in the planning and execution of special operations is a strength of the Israeli system, it may, in certain circumstances, have drawbacks.

One notable example of this occurred in September 1973, prior to the 1973 war, when Palestinian terrorists belonging to the Syrian-supported Al-Sa'iqa organization hijacked a train in Austria carrying Soviet Jewish emigrés. As a result of this action, Austria closed the principal transit facility for Soviet Jewish emigrés at Schonau castle. In the aftermath of this event, senior Israeli politicians were preoccupied with the political crisis with Austria sparked by this incident, while the attention of senior military personnel and the intelligence community was directed toward the overseas terrorist threat, and not the emerging threat on Israel's borders, contributing to the success of the Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack several days later.

Intelligence support

Detailed, accurate and timely intelligence is vital to the success of special operations. The direct involvement of the director of military intelligence and other senior intelligence personnel in the planning process ensures that special-operations task forces receive priority support from Israel's national-level intelligence organizations.

Moreover, intelligence-support coordination lines are short and direct. The director of military intelligence or his deputy is a direct participant in the planning process and manages and coordinates the intelligence-collection effort, thereby assuring unity of effort within the intelligence community. The close coordination between intelligence and operations personnel, including members of the assault force itself, ensures that the intelligence-collection effort and intelligence products are tailored to the needs of the consumers.

IDF photo

Members of Sayeret Giv'ati *deploy along Natzanim Beach near Tel Aviv in pursuit of a Palestinian terrorist squad in May 1990.*

Responsiveness

The IDF believes that because of the inherent limitations and perishable nature of intelligence, it must be able to plan, prepare and execute special operations rapidly. Special-operations personnel must be capable of improvising to react and adapt to the unexpected to accomplish the mission. For instance, the Entebbe hostage rescue was planned, prepared and executed within 48 hours. Speed and flexibility is enhanced by:

- The IDF's willingness to allocate or divert resources and personnel from throughout the armed forces on a priority basis, in support of an impending operation.
- The maintenance of mission folders for nearly every type of contingency, and trained units capable of implementing them.
- Concurrent, parallel planning by all elements to make optimal use of available time.

In addition, the small size of Israel and the location of key units and facilities near the center of the country facilitates rapid planning and coordination.

Detailed rehearsals

When feasible, troops conduct rehearsals on mock-ups or models of the objective, or at locations in Israel that resemble it. For instance, rehearsals for the storming of a hijacked Sabena Boeing 707 at Lydda International Airport in May 1972 were conducted on-site on a Boeing 707 located in a nearby hanger. Similarly, rehearsals for the raid into Beirut in April 1973 to assassinate three senior PLO officials and destroy a PDFLP headquarters were conducted at an unoccupied residen-

IDF photo

Operators from Kommando Yami *in action. The naval unit conducts direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions against coastal targets.*

tial apartment complex in north Tel Aviv that was thought to resemble parts of Beirut.

Rehearsals test the validity of the concept of the operation, identify problems in execution, hone special procedures, and improve the integration of the various elements involved in the mission. Plans are constantly refined and updated in accordance with insights gained during rehearsals and new intelligence information, until the execution. Like various aspects of the planning process, rehearsals are conducted concurrently by the various elements of the task force, prior to a final rehearsal involving as many elements of the task force as are feasible.

Command lines

Under Israeli law, cabinet approval is required for all military operations. However, special operations generally attract particularly high-level interest and involvement due to the politically sensitive nature of these operations and the military risks involved. The defense minister will often monitor the progress of an operation with the chief of staff, the chief of the operations branch, and other general-staff officers, at the general-staff operations center at IDF general-staff headquarters in Tel Aviv. However, once an operation commences, operational control is retained by the military. The mission commander retains overall operational responsibility and decision-making authority. Command authority is usually limited to two principal echelons, and command lines are clear, short and direct:

- The mission commander is usually the chief paratroop and infantry officer. He reports to the chief of staff and holds overall responsibility for the planning and execution of the operation. He is usually located as close to the area of operations as possible.
- The task-force commander has operational control over all mission assets and is the commander best able to assess and influence the situation. Several different individuals may successively fulfill this role during various phases of an operation, including the mission commander, the assault-force commander, or the commander of air or naval assets transporting the assault force to or from the objective. However, the assault-force commander usually fulfills this role during the assault phase of an operation.

This system preserves unity of command while maximizing the operational autonomy and flexibility of the force commander and shortening the decision cycle, enabling him to rapidly adjust plans in the event of unforeseen developments. This is vital, since operations must sometimes be based on incomplete intelligence.

Points left uncovered during planning can be resolved only at the discretion of the commander on the spot during execution. In addition, the system minimizes confusion over command relationships and simplifies communications to reduce net traffic, diminishing the likelihood of a communications-security breach.

Insertion

Israel's elite units are capable of insertion by sea, air and land. For raids against objectives close to its border, overland approaches of 10-15 kilometers are preferred, with extraction usually accomplished by helicopter.

For reaching more distant inland objectives, the IDF has traditionally preferred the CH-53 heavy transport helicopter for the insertion of forces, due to its range, capacity and reliability. During helicopter-supported operations, forces employ low-altitude flight profiles and terrain masking to minimize the possibility of visual or radar detection. Helicopters insert the assault force out of noise range of the objective (4-7 kilometers, depending on weather and terrain), and the force approaches the objective on foot, using terrain and stealth to mask its approach until the commencement of the assault.

Finally, the Mediterranean coastal region offers particularly advantageous conditions for seaborne infiltration. While the cluttered maritime environment in the Mediter-

ranean hinders the identification and tracking of hostile surface-ship movements, thermal stratification and high ambient noise levels permit submarines to operate largely undetected throughout much of the area.

The INF maintains various assets which can be used for the insertion of special-operations forces. Its two Sa'ar 4.5 missile-patrol boats can each accommodate two attack or medium transport helicopters, while its Reshef and Sa'ar III- and II-class missile-patrol boats are capable of carrying armed speedboats on side-mounted davits, as well as inflatable rubber rafts. The INF's three Type 206 Gal-class submarines can insert personnel by lock-out. Prior to a seaborne assault, naval commandos will generally be inserted under cover of darkness by a missile-patrol boat offshore to reconnoiter and secure the landing site, followed by the assault force in rafts. Exfiltration is usually by raft or helicopter.

The range and flexibility of the INF's missile-patrol boats was demonstrated by their role in the assassination of PLO leader Khalil al-Wazir in Tunis, in April 1988. Two Sa'ar 4.5 and two Reshef-class boats reportedly transported the *Sayeret Matkal* assault force and a *Kommando Yami* security element to Tunis. Two AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters were reportedly aboard one of the Sa'ar 4.5s that participated in the assassination of Wazir, to provide fire support to the assault force if necessary. An AB-206 was reportedly aboard the second Sa'ar 4.5 to provide on-call medevac support.[10]

Surprise

The IDF conducts nearly all special operations at night, under cover of darkness, to maximize the likelihood of surprise and to exploit its proficiency in night operations.

The IDF's operations security is generally excellent, due to the elevation of secrecy to the level of an institutional norm in the IDF, through compartmentation and dissemination of information on a strict need-to-know basis, and through the implementation of specific operations-security measures, such as:

- The employment of dedicated OPSEC officers to monitor the OPSEC posture of units earmarked for an operation.
- The maintenance of routine ground and air activity to mask preparations for an operation.
- The observation of radio silence during the operation, except to provide specific instructions to the assault force in the event of unforeseen developments and to relay situation reports.
- Strict censorship of military news reporting prior to, during and after the operation.

The practice of investing the commander on the spot with responsibility for operational decisions. Using the command net primarily for reporting also limits the volume of radio traffic, improving communications security. Finally, the short planning time available for most operations minimizes the likelihood of an OPSEC breach.

The IDF also employs a variety of deception techniques, including:

- Visual deception measures, including the use of civilian clothes, foreign military uniforms, and foreign equipment and weapons by assault-force personnel.
- Passive and active electronic-deception techniques such as radar masking (shadowing civilian air and maritime traffic en route to an objective), and jamming of hostile radars to mask the presence or the identity of IDF air or naval forces.
- Diversionary actions, such as air and artillery strikes, in the vicinity of an objective to distract enemy radar operators and mask the sounds of helicopters used to insert the assault force near the object.

Audacity

The IDF believes that there is a direct relationship between audacity and success in special operations. The deeper one strikes into hostile territory, the greater the likelihood of achieving surprise, and the greater the psychological effect on the enemy. In the words of former chief paratroop and infantry officer Emmanuel Shaked, who played a central role in the emergence of Israel's approach to special operations, "I always believed ... that an operation 200km from the border is less dangerous than an operation near the border, since surprise is assured."[11] As a result, the IDF has tended to favor hitting the enemy deep in his own territory and has developed a sophisticated capability for long-range operations.

Over the years, however, many of the IDF's finest soldiers have been killed in special operations, and consequently, the IDF has been reluctant in recent years to employ these units in high-risk operations which could be accomplished by the air force or by other means. This point was underscored by Maj. Gen. Matan Vilnai, a former chief paratroop and infantry officer, commander of the 35th Paratroop Brigade and *Sayeret Tzanchanim*, in a 1988 interview. Discussing a daring heliborne reprisal raid into upper Egypt that he led in 1968, he stated:

Today, our reconnaissance units have attained a degree of proficiency we did not have back then — yet we have not conducted an operation like this one since. As a matter of fact, our capabilities today are much greater. The problem is — the audacity to take such a decision. ... Today we see things differently. One must remember that in the intervening period we had the Yom Kippur war. The IDF of today is an army that has more than once failed, and it has learned to live with this. But this fact has its consequences. Today we know that we may fail. Back then, we didn't realize this.[12]

After-action reviews

After-action reviews are held immediately after every operation

and are used to evaluate the planning and preparation for the operation, its execution and the efficacy of friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment in order to derive lessons-learned.

Participants include members of the general staff and the task force. Participants are expected to be direct and honest in their reporting, without deference to rank, and the informality which characterizes relations between ranks in the IDF generally encourages candor. These are followed by more thorough and detailed after-action reports based on internal post-mission debriefs conducted at the various levels of command of all elements involved in the operation.

Conclusions

For a variety of reasons the IDF's efforts to create a first-rate special-operations capability has received high-level support. Manifestations of this include the fact that a disproportionate number of general-staff officers have extensive special-operations experience (service in elite special-operations-capable units is career-enhancing, not a liability), the most senior and experienced officers in the armed forces are intimately engaged in all aspects of the planning of special operations, and special-operations-capable units enjoy priority access to resources and personnel — these are major factors in the IDF's successes in this area.

The strength of the Israeli system, however, is also its weakness. In past wars, the senior personnel who would be involved in the planning of special operations were generally engaged in planning and fighting the crucial conventional land battles of the war and had little time to address special operations. Consequently, special-operations-capable units were often employed as elite infantry in wartime. The lack of an independent special-operations organization — with the ability to plan and execute operations on its own — thus limits the IDF's ability to conduct special operations in wartime. As a result, most of the IDF's special-operations successes have occurred in peacetime, in the war against terrorism, when the IDF could mobilize all its resources in support of a specific operation.

Senior IDF personnel recognize that no single military operation or success will provide a solution to the problem of terrorism. Many believe, however, that within the context of a protracted struggle with guerrilla and terrorist organizations, special operations may yield important benefits — degrading the offensive military capabilities and disrupting communications, destroying military facilities and equipment, and forcing the opponent to allocate additional resources to self-defense and security.

In this light, the IDF has succeeded in creating responsive and flexible organizational arrangements and highly capable units for conducting special operations which, despite some failures, have more often than not succeeded in accomplishing the objectives set by Israel's political and military leadership. ✂

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Notes:

[1] The Israel Border Guard also has a special counterterrorist unit, *Yamam (Yechida Neged Michablim)* which has competed with the various military units for recognition and a greater role in the counterterrorist effort. Established in May 1974, the unit has reportedly provided support to the *Shin Bet* (Israel's civilian internal security intelligence service) during cordon-and-search operations in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and South Lebanon. In its first major operation, it rescued a busload of Israelis taken hostage by Palestinian guerrillas near Dimona, Israel, in March 1988. Leroy Thompson, *The Rescuers: The World's Top Anti-Terrorist Units,* (Boulder, 1986), pp. 131-132; Topaz Carmi, "We Proved Our Worth," *Bamahane,* 22 September 1988, p. 9. In addition, since 1988, the IDF has established a number of snatch squads, reportedly composed of personnel who speak Arabic and dress as locals and operate in the West Bank and Gaza to identify and apprehend leaders of the Palestinian uprising. Two of these units — code-named "Samson" *(Shimshon)* and "Cherry" *(Duvdevan)* — achieved a certain degree of international notoriety following accusations in the Western press that they were engaged in the assassination of Palestinian activists. Jon D. Hull, "Code Name 'Cherry,'" *Time,* 7 November 1988, p. 41.

[2] Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *Counterattack: The West's Battle Against the Terrorists,* (New York, 1982), pp. 77-93; Uri Milstein, *History of the Paratroops: Spring of Youth* (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp. 1545-1550.

[3] Rami Carmel, "To Be a Sayeret Trooper," *Soldier of Fortune,* April 1989, p. 43.

[4] Milstein, *op cit.,* pp. 1421-1463; Haim Ravia and Emanuel Rosen, *So You've Been Drafted!* (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: 1989), pp. 147-148.

[5] Casualty figures for the 1973 war are from Avi Bettelheim, *Golani: The Fighting Family* (Hebrew), (Golani Brigade Command, July 1980), p. 166. Casualty figures for the 1982 war cover only the period June 6-26, 1982, and are from Avi Bettelheim, *Golani in Peace For Galilee* (Hebrew), (Golani Brigade Command, October 1982), pp. 62-63.

[6] Mission groups from *Sayeret Tzanchanim, Golani,* or *Giv'ati* are often augmented by personnel from the line battalions and combat engineer company of their respective parent brigades.

[7] For additional details, see Reuven Gal, A *Portrait of the Israeli Soldier,* (New York, 1986), pp.76-96; Ravia and Rosen, *op. cit.,* pp. 11-74.

[8] The naval commandos also conduct a pre-conscription *gadna* (paramilitary youth) scuba course during summer vacation. Those who pass the course are offered the option of serving in the unit. Ra'anan Tchervinsky, *Mommy, or the Commandos* (Hebrew), *Ben Galim,* December 1986, pp. 36-38; Ravia and Rosen, *op. cit.,* pp. 20-21.

[9] Ravia and Rosen, *op. cit.,* pp. 98-99; Dor'am Gunt, "Everyone Wants Sayeret" (Hebrew), *Bamahane,* 22 March 1989, pp. 19-20.

[10] David Halevy and Neil C. Livingstone, "The Killing of Abu Jihad," *The Washingtonian,* June 1988, p. 166.

[11] Milstein, *op. cit.,* p. 1604.

[12] Yosef Argamon, "Operation Shock" (Hebrew), *Bamahane,* 2 November 1988, p. 49.

The SOF Warfighting Center: Answering the Challenge of SOF Simulation Support

by John Wood, Ken Benway and Sherry Barnes

Current world conditions demand that U.S. special-operations forces be prepared for employment in a variety of contingencies. Commanders and their staffs must develop training strategies to prepare their soldiers to deal with drug trafficking, natural or manmade disasters, regional conflicts, civil wars and hostile insurgencies.

One means of preparing soldiers is through the use of computer simulations, which can bring the realism of the battlefield to the classroom. Battle simulations have been supporting military training for more than eight years and have proven to be useful for staff planning and course-of-action development. They have replaced many field exercises, providing a considerable savings for the Department of Defense.

For SOF, simulations offer a means of applying basic principles of war to a variety of SOF mission profiles. They allow the SOF soldier to "think through" planning and preparation requirements before actual mission execution, while exposing the liabilities of potential courses of action.

As an enhancement to existing training, simulations provide the commander with the ability to train and evaluate his staff's ability to execute its mission requirements. Simulations also assist in the development and implementation of emerging SOF doctrine.

Warfighting Center

The Army Special Operations Forces Warfighting Center was established at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in February 1993. Its mission is to provide computer-simulations support to the academic programs at the SWCS and to support operational units of the Army Special Operations Command. The Warfighting Center's staff consists of military, Army civilian and civilian-contract personnel.

Simulations in the Warfighting Center provide a high-tech graphics environment and the capability to archive the effects of student staff planning and coordination and leader decisions on the simulated battlefield.

The Warfighting Center is currently using two simulation programs: the Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation, or BBS, and Janus, a high-resolution model that supports the individual soldier with respect to movement and individual weapons employment. Both simulations are designed to train the synchronization of battle staffs and small-unit leaders, and they have been adopted by the Warfighting Center for training in SOF-unique missions.

BBS focuses on battle-staff training and mission-planning requirements, from low- to high-intensity warfare. It allows brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs to practice decision-making in a

realistic, time-stressed, combat environment. Players must be able to develop and assess large amounts of tactical and logistical data to formulate situation estimates and make decisions. BBS comprises 10 workstations: one higher-control workstation, four maneuver workstations, an artillery-control workstation, an air-operations and air-defense workstation, a personnel-and-logistics workstation and two threat workstations. Each station controls a number of units.

BBS allows controllers to determine terrain and weather under which units will operate, and it allows the simulation of various aspects such as operational states, rates of movement, effects of direct and indirect fire, obstacles, equipment damage, casualties and problems of resupply.

Janus is a two-sided, interactive ground-combat simulation which portrays two opposing forces directed and controlled by two sets of players. Each player directs, monitors and redirects actions of the simulated units under his control, without a complete knowledge of the disposition of the opposing force. JANUS focuses mainly on military systems which participate in maneuver and artillery operations on land. It, too, allows simulation of movement speeds, obstacles and the effects of direct and indirect fire.

There are currently 10 BBS workstations and 16 Janus workstations fully operational at the Warfighting Center. In October, the Warfighting Center began testing the application of computer simulation in the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Course. In January, the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course and the Special Forces Officer Qualification Course also began test-bed activities.

Early in 1994, the Warfighting Center is scheduled to become a regular part of these courses and to offer battle-simulation exercises to operational SOF units, as well. Both BBS and JANUS models will be available to SWCS and operational units.

Computer simulation

Battle-simulation software such as that used in the Warfighting Center is designed to hide its sophistication behind easy-to-use media. Trainers employ full-color maps that incorporate the positions of both friendly and enemy units, computer terminals, color monitors and specialized software. A real-time mission scenario is presented to the soldier, with data delivered under similar conditions to those of an actual mission.

Simulations allow the soldier to evaluate his skills via a fully automated, user-friendly system. A succession of easy-to-understand menus allows users to make selections in order to find or enter data. Menu selections are made by pressing an “up” or “down” arrow, and then a “select” key. There are no codes or commands to memorize, nor do users need extensive training or experience to use any of the simulation systems available. They are required only to think as soldiers — not as computer experts. The trainer can create a realistic mission environment by selecting terrain, season, weather conditions, mission, opposing forces and SOF task organization.

Instruction

During a block of instruction focusing on SOF advisory requirements, for example, students might be presented with a tactical concept for the defense of a light-infantry battalion sector. Operations and Intelligence Course students might plan and analyze courses of action using the simulation to display battle positions and to compare and contrast their relative strengths and weaknesses.

Students in the SF Engineer Course might use a simulation to develop a barrier, mine and obstacle plan to support the defensive concept. That plan might then be



U.S. Army photo

A student in the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Course mans a BBS workstation during a student command-post exercise.

Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation



Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

applied to the computer as a screen-generated engineer overlay. The instructor leads the students in a seminar format to address the strengths and weaknesses of the plan.

Meanwhile, over in the SF Weapons Sergeant Course, the students could be building a fire-support plan for mortars and artillery which would tie in with the engineer sergeants' barrier plan. Medics could develop estimates for the management and evacuation of casualties in the context of the integrated battalion planning effort. All the planning and analysis comes together in the command-post exercise.

The illustration above shows the functional layout of the Warfighting Center and how its parts interact with the training audience. The level of realism experienced by the target audience is the measure of success for any simulation. In the case of a student command-post exercise, for instance, the student battalion commander and his staff would operate within a typical tactical-operations-center environment, while communications are ongoing with subordinate units.

It is important to understand that the student battalion staff only "sees" what is reported by simulation controllers. These reports constitute the *effects* of battalion staffing and the commander's decisions. Those decisions, in the form of battalion orders, are passed to the control cells (manned by the using unit, and representing the subordinate units of the battalion) where they are entered in the computer in the form of tactical orders.

The simulation then calculates real-time rates of movement over chosen routes, assesses casualties when engagements occur among friendly and enemy units, and computes consumption rates for the various classes of supply based on the tempo of operations.

These calculations generate subordinate-unit situation reports that are passed via wire or radio to the battalion TOC for further staffing and decision-making by the commander. The battalion staff and commander receive reports on the *effects* of their decisions, thus generating more decisions and feedback — providing the interactive aspect of the simulation.

Operational use

Operational units may take advantage of the same capabilities. Units scheduled for deployment OCONUS or to a combined training center may employ simulations beforehand to refine staff SOPs, "spin up" new staff and commanders prior to employment, and to assess training needs. The data bases for both BBS and Janus are sophisticated enough to allow the replication of foreign doctrine, for-

eign equipment and weapons systems — an ideal medium in which to prepare for FID/advisory-related missions.

A unit might use BBS as one of several phases in a training strategy leading to an operational or exercise employment. Given the premium put on time faced by all operational units, the simulation might be used to exercise individual phases of an operational concept, with interim periods used to "fix" training needs.

Conceptually, a unit might choose to exercise movement planning from a port of entry overland to an assembly area in Phase I of the simulation. The archiving capability of the simulation then permits a seamless continuation into Phase II, perhaps movement to contact, at some later date. Over time, the unit could fight its way through its battle plan, with staff training interspersed as appropriate. This strategy is particularly useful for reserve-component units whose training opportunities are concentrated in discrete, dispersed training periods.

In war, SOF soldiers will fight as effectively or as poorly as their commanders have trained them. Today, SOF soldiers must be able to train for multiple contingencies as part of a joint and combined team. The emergence of simulations give SOF commanders an advantage in maximizing their training capabilities, while optimizing scarce training resources.

Simulations are as flexible and as adaptive to training as the commander is imaginative. Coupled with innovative training concepts developed by the commander and his staff, they will prepare the SOF soldier to meet the complexities of the modern battlefield.

While simulations may never capture all of the human aspects of the tactical environment, they can allow us to exercise concepts in a near no-cost, no-risk environment. The SOF Warfighting Center allows SOF soldiers to learn from their mistakes on the screen, instead of on the battlefield.

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Why Civic Actions and Security Cannot Be Separated

by Capt. Kevin Dougherty

In "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in LIC,"[1] Regina Gaillard recommends the creation of what she calls a U.S. Development Corps as a new military unified command. Her stated goal is to delink civic action and humanitarian and civic assistance from counterinsurgency and LIC, and Gaillard criticizes current LIC doctrine for failing to adequately distinguish "between such diverse activities as humanitarian assistance, nation building, counterinsurgency and civic action."

Latin America is the focus of Gaillard's concept, and she argues that low-intensity conflict can no longer serve as a blanket term for all applications of U.S. military power in the region. In fact, she concludes that "any civic action proposed by the Army for Latin America must emphasize humanitarian development and be completely divorced from 'security,' counterinsurgency and LIC."[2]

Gaillard's remarks should concern professional soldiers on two accounts. First, establishing a system whereby the military could be routinely committed overseas to humanitarian efforts that require no traditional military security operations would dangerously dilute the military's war-fighting focus.

Second, by advancing the notion that civic action and security can be separated, Gaillard is ignoring the lessons of Vietnam. Although Gaillard directs most of her remarks toward a Latin American scenario in which she sees diminishing superpower competition, she ignores the fact that insurgencies often have nothing to do with superpower competition.

A major effort in Vietnam was "pacification," which has been defined as "a specific strategy or program to bring security and political and economic stability to the countryside."[3] This linkage of security with other measures is critical. In *Summons of the Trumpet,* Brig. Gen. Dave Palmer notes:

The initial tendency to separate pacification from purely military actions ... was an error. They are at most two sides of the same coin. There is no]"other." Against an insurgency movement, pacification can never succeed without military security, while military operations are a waste unless they lead to pacification.[4]

Statements like Palmer's are a common theme in Vietnam literature. Robert Komer, the first director of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, wrote in 1970, "There can be no civil progress without constant real security."[5]

Still Gaillard insists that "developmental and economic assistance should not be tied to security." She claims the benefit of such a demarcation would be the avoidance of "political pitfalls" and perceptions of "a hidden LIC agenda." This latter comment in particular ignores the concept of insurgency as a three-phased entity[6] and the idea that "emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insur-

gent activities."[7] As the insurgency intensifies, priorities on civic action and military operations will naturally require adjusting.

Steve Metz confirms this observation in his article "Airland Battle and Counterinsurgency."[8] He cites four functional areas — economic, political, social and military — which must support one another and gives an example in which economic development is the main effort and all other initiatives act in its support.

Gaillard's argument for separation does not accommodate an intensifying insurgency like Metz's model does, and she cannot guarantee the stability of Latin America. On Dec. 12, 1992, the Inter-American Dialogue, including such panelists as former President Jimmy Carter, identified problems such as poverty, social inequalities, inadequate diet and inflation as being prevalent in Latin America.[9] Such conditions create the vulnerable population essential to an insurgency. Peru, Columbia and Ecuador are potential hot spots, and the recent coup attempt in Venezuela is indicative of the instability in the region.

Close to 90 percent of Latin Americans may now be ruled by civilian governments, but as Gabriel Marcella notes, "appurtenance of civilian government (is not) equal to democracy."[10] Marcella identifies a new type of revolutionary in Latin America; one that has "chosen a strategy of protracted warfare to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of Latin American societies and the inconsistencies and discontinuities of the principal external support element, i.e., U.S. policy."[11] The fact that observers such as Gaillard and Marcella can reach different conclusions about the degree of the insurgent threat in Latin America is indicative of the ambiguity of the LIC environment and probably the best argument for not separating civic action and security.

Gaillard does not address how the U.S. should safeguard its civic-action progress as an insurgency intensifies, resurfaces or develops. It took the United States some time to learn this lesson in Vietnam, and a brief discussion of the Strategic Hamlet and Combined Action Platoon programs provides a counter to Gaillard's claim that civic action should be separated from security.

In February 1962, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem launched the Strategic Hamlet Program. Inspired by the successful British action in Malaya, the program was designed to resettle peasants in semi-fortified communities where they would be provided with comprehensive social services and protection from the Viet Cong. There were numerous problems with the Strategic Hamlet Program which will only be highlighted here.

The successful resettlement program in Malaya was undertaken amid very different social and political conditions which would not be duplicated in Vietnam. In Vietnam, most of the peasants were forced into compliance and bitterly resented leaving their ancestral homes and fields. To make matters worse, widespread corruption prevented many of the promised social services from ever materializing.[12]

With the fall of the Diem regime, the term "strategic" hamlet was replaced by "new life" hamlet; the latter program intending to eliminate the earlier oppressive and authoritarian nature of the action.[13] These programs failed for a variety of reasons, but the one that must be noted in light of Gaillard's article is the lack of security.

In 1963, the official statistics listed more than 10,000,000, or approximately 70 percent, of the 14,400,000 inhabitants of South Vietnam as living in nearly 9,000 strategic hamlets or in urban centers. Verification of the statistics after Diem's overthrow in November showed that only 10 percent of the hamlets were really defensible[14] The program was grossly overextended and "fell apart when there were no longer sufficient intervention forces available for repelling sizeable Viet Cong attacks against the hamlets."[15]

But the problem was more than just attacks from outside the hamlet. Viet Cong infiltrators lived within the supposedly secure fortifications, and, as American officials observed

Photo by Mike Edrington

Heavy equipment of a U.S. Army engineer unit stands in sharp contrast to a local ox cart during a road-building operation in Latin America.

later, "Two Viet Cong in a hamlet can still undo most of what we've accomplished."[16] Thus the strategic or new-life hamlets represented a sizeable government presence in the lives of the peasants. With this government presence came the expectations of services such as justice, health programs, welfare activities, road maintenance, electricity and agricultural assistance.

But as Lt. Col. John Cleland noted in 1966, these services "cannot be brought into an area until pacification has been provided to the population." With this in mind, he concluded, "The military objective in Vietnam must be to provide protection to the population."[17]

Recognizing this reality, the Marine Corps proposed a plan for "Combined Action Platoons." The plan called for placing a Marine rifle squad with a company of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces (the local militia) to form the CAP. The CAPs would provide security in order to allow pacification efforts in the areas of health, education, economic development and land reform to win over the peasants.

The Marines had more historical experience with pacification than the Army did, having been exposed to similar situations in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Panama. Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak commented, "The Vietnamese people are the prize," and it was the CAPs that would provide the security they needed.[18]

The CAP plan recognized that "The Vietnamese who is persuaded to cooperate with his government against the communist element assumes a tremendous risk." While there were benefits to cooperation such as clothing, food, education and medical assistance, the threat of Viet Cong violence often outweighed these positive aspects. Therefore, local security was "a mutual goal" for the Marines and the Vietnamese. The CAP offered a solution to the dilemma the Vietnamese faced between cooperation and potential violence.[19]

U.S. Army photo

An American adviser discusses troop development with a Vietnamese Civilian Defense Force commander in 1969.

Gen. William Westmoreland, however, favored a purely military solution won through big-unit engagements. Therefore, the United States rejected the strategy of protecting the population as being unduly defensive.[20] With the military focusing on the shooting war, civic action took a back seat. Under these conditions, pacification achieved little, and "The fundamental problem was a lack of security."[21]

One must be careful when drawing conclusions from history. Latin America, the focus of Gaillard's recommendation, is a different situation from Vietnam, but, if one accepts the Army's doctrine of a three-phased insurgency, not to mention the obvious lack of complete stability in Latin America, it seems inevitable that security will eventually become a critical issue.

Gaillard's notion of delinking civic action from counterinsurgency and LIC does not recognize the lesson learned in Vietnam that "Civic action is a weapon of war and, to be effective, it requires the same accuracy, coordination and support given any other weapon."[22]

Interestingly, Latin America has already benefitted from the hard lessons of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In Guatemala, the Polos de Desarrollo (Development Center) has been a highly successful resettlement program. Military civic-action teams live in the village to support extensive civilian-development efforts. What ensures the survival of the program is that each new village is trained to defend itself with a civil-defense force composed of nearly all the village's men. Lt. Col. John Fishel and Maj. Edmund Cowan cite this security as "a central factor of the war for moral legitimacy in Latin America."[23]

Recent events provide another example of a situation requiring security and civic action to be linked. While Operation Restore Hope could not be classified as an insurgency situation, it did provide lessons-learned concerning civic action and security. In Somalia, civic action by itself obviously failed, and Marines and soldiers were needed to protect the humanitarian effort. One former Somalian policeman astutely observed, "If

5th SF Group Provides Security for Provide Relief

When the United States formed Joint Task Force Provide Relief to commit DoD aircraft to deliver food-relief shipments to Somalia and Northern Kenya, one of the JTF commander's main concerns was the security and safety of the relief-aircraft crews.

Warring Somali factions constantly impeded the efforts of relief agencies to supply food to starving Somalis, and loosely organized security arrangements at the airfields presented an inherent danger. The commander's concerns were reinforced by accidental discharges from the weapons in the hands of Somali airfield guards, fire fights near the airfields and two incidents of bullets hitting U.S. airplanes.

The intention to use U.S. forces was announced Aug. 13, 1992; the 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Ky., was alerted on Aug. 15 to provide security for U.S. personnel and equipment during the food-delivery flights into Somalia. The commander of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group accompanied the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team from U.S. Central Command on its initial assessment. The remainder of the company joined him on Aug. 22 at Moi International Airport at Mombasa, Kenya, site of the JTF headquarters. The company consisted of one Special Forces B-detachment, which provided command and control to five 12-man SF A-detachments.

The concept of the operation was to station an eight-man reaction force, the Airborne Security Augmentation Team, or ASAT, aboard an Air Force C-130. The ASAT would fly routinely near the Somali airfields and land during an emergency. Contingency plans for medical or maintenance emergencies, search and rescue or airfield evacuation were ready for execution from the aircraft.

Each ASAT consisted of one officer and seven NCOs and was required to have at least one SF medical NCO and one SF communications NCO. Two desert-modified vehicular systems, with mounted crew-served weapons, were center-loaded aboard the aircraft. Each contained sufficient fuel, ammunition and survival, communications and navigation equipment for three days of desert operations.

Once committed to an emergency, the ASAT was capable of responding to a variety of situations and could rapidly organize into a dismounted or mounted role. Teams were ready to shoot, move, communicate and survive, but every effort would be exercised to avoid provoking a confrontation.

On the ground, Air Force Combat Control Teams provided air traffic control and weather data for each flight. Each CCT element was augmented with an SF medic and an SF observer who provided "eyes-on-target" information. Each SF soldier was rotated into airfield observer duty so that he would be familiar with the terrain and situation at each field.

Operation Provide Relief lasted from Aug. 21-Dec.1, 1992. U.S. forces flew more than 1,400 sorties into Somalia and delivered more than 250,000 tons of rice, beans, cooking oil and other food staples. Although the ASATs were never called upon to respond to an emergency, they flew an average of 30 missions, each logging more than 300 flight hours per team. In fact, the SF soldiers had more flight hours than any other U.S. forces in the area of operations.

— CWO Bruce Watts, 5th SF Group

there is no security, there is no food."[24] Thus, experiences in Vietnam, and more recently in Somalia, provide a good argument against separating civic action and security in any arena involving the military.

This essay emphasizes Gaillard's idea of separating security and civic action, but she is actually advocating "a new, separate 'peacekeeping' doctrine" to delink HCA from LIC/counterinsurgency. This HCA/peacekeeping specialty would be devoted to "development construction and medical, managerial and conservation civic assistance." Although she calls the concept "non-warfighting," Gaillard argues that "the institutional experience of the services makes the military the most capable organization for such a mission."[25]

Gaillard has great vision for her proposed Development Corps, seeing it as a rejuvenated Civilian Conservation Corps which would "help retain force structure and facilities in the United States and contribute to alleviating joblessness and lack of skills both in the Third World and in the United States."[26]

This is a curious mission for the military and exactly the sort of thing Lt. Col. Charles Dunlap cautions against in "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."[27] The gist of Dunlap's article is that such factors as the end of the Cold War, public confidence in the military borne of the convincing Gulf War victory, and exasperation with the government's apparent inability to solve the nation's problems lead to the military's being tasked "with a variety of new, non-traditional missions, and vastly escalating its commitment to formerly ancillary duties."

Dunlap believes the military could be easily lured into such a condition because, as one journalist observed, "winning a share of the budget war ... require(s) that the military find new missions for a post-Cold War world that is devoid of clear military threats." Non-traditional roles represent one means of budget-justification.[28]

The drawback that Dunlap notes

United Nations photo

Somali children wait for food in Mogadishu. Operation Restore Hope provided lessons on the need for security in humanitarian-assistance missions.

is that "each moment spent performing a non-traditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military exercises." He argues that "militaries ought to 'prepare for war' and leave the 'peace waging' to those agencies of the government whose mission is just that."

Military analyst Col. Harry Summers supports these observations by citing the pre-World War II Canadian military in which "instead of using the peacetime interregnum to hone their military skills, senior Canadian military officials sought out civilian missions to justify their existence. When war came they were woefully unprepared."[29]

Thus there is a danger to war-fighting readiness in Gaillard's proposed Development Corps. If, as she claims, there is no need for security in civic actions in Latin America, then what is the role (or need) of our military there? Such actions fall within the realm of other agencies. If, on the other hand, a true LIC situation, complete with the probability of an intensifying insurgency exists, then the military must heed the lessons of Vietnam and insist that security and civic action be consistently linked. ✂

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Notes:

[1] Regina Gaillard, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in LIC," *Military Review*, June 1991, p. 30. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 replaces the term LIC with "operations other than war." To remain consistent with Gaillard's terminology, I will continue to use "LIC" in this essay.

[2] Gaillard, p. 39.

[3] Thomas Boetlcher, *Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1985), p. 301.

[4] David R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 221.

[5] Robert Komer, "Clear, Hold, and Rebuild," in *Army*, May 1970, p. 19.

[6] FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 19 October 1992), p. 2-5.

[7] FM 7-98, p. D-7.

[8] Steve Metz, "Airland Battle and Counterinsurgency," in *Military Review*, January 1990, p. 36.

[9] "Panel calls for effort to help the poor in Latin America," in Columbus, Ga., *Ledger-Enquirer*, 13 December 1992, p. B-8.

[10] Gabriel Marcella, "The Latin American Military, Low Intensity Conflict, and Democracy," in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, p. 45.

[11] Marcella, p. 52.

[12] John Lewis and George Kahin, *The United States in Vietnam* (New York: The Dial Press, 1967), p. 140.

[13] Wesley Fishel, *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict* (Peacock Publishers, 1968), p. 372.

[14] Fishel, p. 569.

[15] Fishel, p. 381.

[16] George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: Newberry Award Records, Inc., 1979), p. 228.

[17] Lt. Col. John Cleland, "The Objective and Vietnam," in *Military Review*, July 1966, pp. 85-86.

[18] James S. Olson and Randy Robert, *Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945 to 1990* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 144.

[19] Capt. R.E. Williamson, "A Briefing for Combined Action," in *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1968, p. 41-43.

[20] Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 86.

[21] Herring, p. 159.

[22] Lt. Col. Hoyt Livingston and Lt. Col. Francis Watson Jr., "Civic Action: Purpose and Pitfalls," in *Military Review*, December 1967, p. 22.

[23] Edmund Cowan and John Fishel, "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America," in *Military Review*, January 1988, p. 41.

[24] "U.S. frees Somali capital," in Columbus, Ga., *Ledger-Enquirer*, 10 December 1992, p. A-10.

[25] Gaillard, p. 39-40.

[26] Gaillard, pp. 40-41.

[27] Charles Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," in *Parameters*, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 2-20.

[28] Dunlap, p. 10.

[29] Dunlap, p. 13.

Special Forces Mission Analysis by the Operational Detachment

by Lt. Col. Henry Watson III

There is no more critical asset to a Special Forces operational detachment conducting mission planning and preparation than *time*. There is simply not enough time during isolation to accomplish everything that the detachment would like to do prior to deployment.

This article presents an operational technique which helps to ensure complete mission analysis by the isolated detachment prior to its mission planning. The focus here is on the first 2-4 hours, immediately following the mission briefing, of the 96-120-hour mission-planning cycle.

Although mission-planning consumes less than five percent of mission-preparation time, there is no more important increment in the process. Without a complete understanding of the mission, preparation for and execution of the mission become a matter of chance. Complete understanding is the result of a systematic and thorough mission analysis. The first few hours are thus a great determinant of success or failure.

This is not another checklist for an ODA or ODB to follow while in isolation. The author is a firm adherent to the adage, "Don't tell a man how to suck eggs," and use of this technique makes it more likely that the FOB commander will *not* have to tell the detachment commander how to do his job when he presents an unworkable or overly complicated plan at the detachment mission-concept briefing.

This techniques is not new: something like this process is followed by the ODA/ODB in analyzing its mission, and most FOB commanders and staffs will receive some detachment feedback in at least one in-progress review between the mission briefing and the detachment MICON briefing. What is different is the formalized approach to mission analysis which leaves no gaps and guarantees that time will not be wasted on mission planning in the wrong direction. The technique employs the most important troop-leading procedure — supervision.

The technique is usable in both the deliberate and time-sensitive mission-planning processes as set forth in FM 31-20. It is not meant to replace the mission-briefing process or the "give-and-take" between the detachment and the FOB staff sections in isolation. Rather, it provides a more systematic structure to what usually follows the formal mission briefing in IPRs on a less formal basis. It also saves the time of the FOB commander and his staff.

The entire detachment should participate in the commander's mission analysis; however, it is best briefed one-on-one by the ODA or ODB commander to the FOB commander, or in his absence, to the operations-center director. An alternative is the detachment commander and senior NCO briefing the FOB commander and senior NCO.

My practice was to give the detachment commander the option

of whom he wanted present. The battalion command sergeant major and I usually took the mission analysis briefing in the isolation-facility team room, as the team is available for input if needed.

The only training aids necessary for this process are an easel with a pad of butcher paper and large felt-tip markers. Detachments have long followed the practice of writing out various aspects of their missions on butcher paper and posting them to the walls of their isolation areas, and this technique adopts this usual practice. Writing out the material reinforces it in the writer, and posting it to the walls reinforces it throughout the whole team.

Mission analysis

On successive sheets of butcher paper, write out in their entirety:

1. *SFOD Mission Statement (exactly as given).*
2. *Commanders' intents:*
   A. Headquarters two levels higher (exactly as given).
   B. Higher headquarters (exactly as given).
3. *Specified mission tasks in chronological order:*
   A.
   B.
   C.
4. *Implied mission tasks in chronological order:*
   A.
   B.
   C.
5. *Mission-essential tasks starred (*) in #3 and #4.*
6. *Constraints/limitations on execution of mission:*
   A. Command-imposed.
   B. Environmental.
   C. Threat-imposed.
7. *SFOD's restated mission.*
8. *SFOD commander's intent (commander's view of mission execution on perfect battlefield).*
9. *Necessary personnel, equipment and training.*
10. *Mission-essential personnel, equipment and training starred in #9.*
11. *Valid SFOD mission? (why or why not?)*
12. *Within SFOD'S mission capabilities? (why or why not?)*
13. *Define success criteria (be prepared to support).*
14. *Assess risk (be prepared to support).*
15. *Commander's planning guidance to SFOD.*
16. *Additional comments, issues, warstoppers.*

To be briefed to FOB commander not sooner than two and not later than four hours following mission briefing.

The first item is a given — the mission of the detachment exactly as received. The next two items are extremely important: the commander's intent as received from the SOC, JSOTF or SFOB, as well as that from the FOB, exactly as received. Even a quick-and-dirty analysis should assure the detachment commander that these first three items have clear relevance to each other.

Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 comprise the center of mass of the mission-analysis process. Step 5 requires going back through the specified and implied mission tasks, respectively, and noting with an asterisk those which are mission-essential. Command-imposed constraints and limitations may include rules of engagement, dictated infiltration and exfiltration methods, time-on-target windows, etc. Environmental constraints and limitations include weather, terrain, light conditions, etc. Threat-imposed constraints and limitations are self-explanatory.

These steps require the considered systematic analysis of every member of the detachment. Everyone needs to understand all specified and implied tasks and their respective roles in each, from mission planning to debriefing. Each soldier should also understand the role of a team member he may be called upon to replace during execution of the mission. Finally, the constraints must be factored into the formulation of any plan of execution.

A detachment which correctly completes these four steps, to the degree of real understanding by each team member, has enough information with which to devise a plan of execution with a high probability of success. Complete understanding of the mission by all detachment members also improves mission execution in the thickest fog of battle.

Steps 7 and 8 are commander-to-commander, first-line supervisor, "operator head space" checks. The FOB commander cannot be confident in deploying an SFOD unless that detachment commander can articulate how he sees execution of his detachment's mission given a perfect battlefield. There can be no compromise on the necessity that the FOB commander be convinced that the detachment commander and his detachment have a realistic goal and that it is the same goal as the FOB's.

Steps 9 and 10 give the FOB commander a hint of how the detachment commander intends to accomplish his mission prior to the detachment's MICON briefing, which consists of the detachment commander's estimate with courses of action and analysis of the enemy courses of action.

These steps also begin to rough out an isolation training schedule, as well as to identify potential necessary training areas, rehearsal aids, etc., which the detachment feels necessary for its mission preparation. Finally, by starring mission-essential personnel, equipment and training, it establishes preliminary abort criteria in these areas.

Steps 11 and 12 are rather subjective, but they do relate to the ability of the particular detachment to accomplish the mission. Neither is meant to become a detailed discussion of special-operations forces' missions and capabilities, but if the ODA or ODB commander indicates that his mission is neither SOF-valid

nor within his detachment's capabilities, it identifies a serious problem which must be resolved by the FOB prior to that detachment beginning its detailed mission planning.

Steps 13 and 14, while also subjective, do contain elements of objectivity. Again, these serve as tests of "operator head space" within the detachment. Supporting reasons for Steps 11-14 do not have to be fully written out, but should contain key words.

The FOB commander should be very interested in the mission-planning guidance that the detachment commander has or is going to provide to his ODA or ODB upon completion of the mission-analysis briefing. As time has been identified as the critical factor in mission preparation, the FOB commander can feel confident that the detachment is headed in the right direction if mission-planning guidance from the detachment commander to his unit places emphasis on the critical nodes.

Step 16 reiterates and emphasizes points raised above, especially in the areas of any issues requiring resolution and any war-stoppers identified by the ODA or ODB commander.

The requirement that the mission analysis be briefed by the detachment commander not sooner than two and not later than four hours following mission briefing ensures the best use of limited time. Two hours is minimal in order to do an adequate mission analysis. If the detachment is unable to accomplish the analysis within four hours, (assuming this is not the first time the team has used the process), then something is amiss in the FOB's or detachment's approach to mission analysis, or in the mission briefing by the FOB. In no event should the detachment be given time to sleep on the problem — it should brief the FOB commander prior to rest.

It should be pointed out that the process followed by the ODA or ODB is duplicated in the FOB, at least as contained in the first eight steps. Items 7 and 8 by the FOB become items 1 and 2B, as briefed to the detachment.

Steps 9 and 10 give the FOB command sergeant major information on which to base a warning order to the operations sergeant major and the ISOFAC sergeant major to plan for and coordinate training areas, rehearsals, coordination of drawing of equipment, any additional weapons training, etc. This allows the senior NCO leadership at every level to focus efforts on providing what is critical in isolation to ensure mission accomplishment.

"Detachments have long followed the practice of writing out various aspects of their missions on butcher paper and posting them to the walls of their isolation areas, and this technique adopts this usual practice. Writing out the material reinforces it in the writer, and posting it to the walls reinforces it throughout the whole team."

To that end, a primary function of the battalion command sergeant major should be observation of rehearsals by the detachment. Experience shows isolation time is better spent in rehearsals than on briefbacks. Injecting the FOB CSM into the rehearsal loop raises the importance of the practice, especially if mission-deployment approval is contingent upon a successful rehearsal of a mission-essential task.

The best-case scenario places a personal computer and a competent operator in each detachment isolation team room. If possible, the mission-analysis briefing should be placed on a computer disk or printed out for distribution to the FOB staff and the ISOFAC, so that they can begin to play their supporting roles to the deploying detachment. The AST NCO is integral to successful mission planning and must also be included in coordinating required support.

This mission-analysis process is neither set in cement nor exhaustive for all circumstances. Adapt it to fit your needs. Whatever you develop should be an annex to the FOB SOP. If understood and followed at ODA and ODB levels, it will not be perceived as telling soldiers how to do their jobs , but exactly the opposite. Detachments will like the process, some sooner than others, and leaders and team members will find themselves referring back to Steps 3, 4, 5 and 6 many times during their mission-planning cycle. ✂

Lt. Col. Henry Watson III is currently attending the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University as an Army War College fellow. He has served in a variety of airborne and light-infantry, Military Intelligence, Special Forces and other special-operations assignments, including service as commander of a reserve-component Special Forces MI company and the 2nd Battalion, 11th SF Group. His active duty was as an Infantry officer in the 2nd Battalion, 509th Infantry in Germany and the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry in Vietnam. He holds BA and JD degrees from the University of Kentucky and practices law in Cynthiana, Ky.

Commander's Intent: Providing the Focus for Operations

by Maj. Kevin Benson

As a concise expression of the purpose of an operation, the commander's intent is important in providing a focus for subordinates.

Many biographies, monographs and essays describe the importance of a clear commander's intent, and examples from history clearly display the importance of a clear understanding of the higher commander's intent.

In October 1917, Lt. Erwin Rommel was serving with the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion in the Italian Alps. Key to the Italian defenses were the fortifications around Mount Matajur, the highest point in the region. Over a period of days, Rommel led attacks that reached the slopes of the mountain, and he was on the verge of breaking through the Italian defenses, which would completely unhinge the entire front.

Flushed with success, Rommel was preparing to continue the attack when he received an order from his battalion commander: "The Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion withdraws."[1] The battalion commander, on a mountain peak behind Rommel, formed the impression that Mount Matajur had been taken and was ordering a reorganization of the battalion for the defense. Rommel was faced with a dilemma: continue the attack or comply with orders.

The bulk of the battalion began to withdraw, except the forces with Rommel. Rommel asked himself, "Should I break off the engagement and return to Mount Cragonza (The site of the battalion commander)? ... No!"[2] Rommel reasoned that the order was based on incorrect knowledge of the situation and the opportunity that existed. Rommel wrote, "Unfinished business remained ... and the terrain favored the plan of attack."[3] Rommel was successful, broke through the Italian defense and seized Mount Matajur. He did not follow orders because he knew that the corps commander's intent was unfulfilled.

A similar incident occurred during the Battle of the Bulge when Creighton Abrams understood the intent of the Army commander — "relieve Bastogne." Bastogne was encircled; the 4th Armored Division was ordered to relieve it. Abrams, commanding the 37th Tank Battalion, led the vanguard of the Reserve Combat Command, or CCR. The plan was to attack through the town of Remichampagne, to Clochimont, then to Sibret, and finally into Bastogne.[4] Abrams led from the front in his own tank, Thunderbolt.

The battle for Remichampagne went well, especially since a flight of Air Force P-47s arrived unexpectedly to bomb and strafe the German defenses. By mid-afternoon Abrams' battalion was down to 20 tanks and the infantry battalion of CCR was understrength by 200 men. Darkness was falling fast. The orders were to continue to Sibret. Abrams sensed that the enemy was in strength there, but he could break through to Bastogne and begin the relief if he went through the town of

Assenois.[5] Lewis Sorley describes the scene in *Thunderbolt*, his biography of Abrams.

Abrams and Jaques (the infantry battalion commander) stood by the side of the road ... Finally Abrams turned to Jaques: "Let's try a dash through Assenois straight into Bastogne.

Abrams and Jaques didn't check with anyone about this switch in plans. The CCR commander was weak ... and if Abrams had called and asked for the change in mission, he probably would have been denied.[6]

Abrams and the 37th Tank made the dash and linked up with the soldiers of the 101st Airborne holding Bastogne. Abrams, the commander on the spot, knew that the most important thing — relieve Bastogne — took precedence over an order made without current knowledge of the situation. Abrams understood the Army commander's intent.

These historical examples highlight the need to make the intent statement very clear. In both instances, the intent clearly conveyed the guiding purpose of the operation, providing guidance in the absence of other orders or the presence of conflicting orders. Both commanders on the scene understood the intent of the operation and knew that accomplishing the intent and the original mission was more important than following orders with a new mission.

The intent must provide focus for commanders at least two levels below, since operations do not unfold as expected once contact is made. During an operation, decisions must be made with little or no time for contemplation. Assumptions made during the planning process are open to doubt after contact,[7] and as one leader of Armor said, "The fog of war must not begin with the commander's intent."[8]

The Command and General Staff College teaches a format approach to the intent, essentially: purpose, method, and end-state.[9] While the "schoolhouse" standard is an intent of 3-5 sentences, other formats range from 1-2 sentences scribbled on the matrix-format task-force operations order found in FM 71-2, to multi-paragraph intents found in GDP plans and formal, deliberate plans at Corps and higher headquarters.

The intent is a key part of the operation plan. Doctrinally, the intent is written as part of the execution paragraph, immediately following the concept of the operation.[10] Its placement implies a tie to the concept. Indeed, since the schoolhouse format includes "method" as a part of the intent, this may be the correct place in the order. But the true tie, as the historical examples show, is not to the concept or method of employment of forces, but to the mission. It is the purpose of the operation and the desired end-state that must guide subordinate commanders once the battle is joined.

"During an operation, decisions must be made with little or no time for contemplation. Assumptions made during the planning process are open to doubt after contact, and as one leader of Armor said, 'The fog of war must not begin with the commander's intent.' "

In fact, an alternate proposal for placement of the commander's intent would be to place it in paragraph 2b. of the field order, as shown below:

1. Situation.
2. a. Mission.
   b. Commander's Intent.
3. Execution.

Placing the intent with the mission would not inhibit any commander from stating what he wants in the intent sub-paragraph, and it would more clearly demonstrate the natural tie between the two.

Wherever its placement, the commander's intent guides the action of subordinate units and leaders when events become wrapped in the fog of war. More than 100 years ago, Clausewitz wrote, "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."[11] The soul of the mission order is stated in the commander's intent, the simple thing that must be accomplished and kept in mind throughout the operation.

Maj. Kevin Benson currently serves in the Plans Division of the G-3, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Notes:

[1] Erwin Rommel, *Attacks*, trans. J.R. Driscoll, (Vienna, Va.: Athena Press, 1979), p. 270.

[2] Rommel, p. 271. It must be added that the army commander promised a Pour le Merite (the Imperial German equivalent to the Congressional Medal of Honor) to the officer who captured Matajur (Rommel, p. 273).

[3] Rommel, p. 272.

[4] Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: From the Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 76.

[5] Sorley, p. 69.

[6] Sorley, pp. 75-80.

[7] Carl Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. & trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 101-102.

[8] Taken from conversations with Lt. Col. Doug Tystad during my year of study at the School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991-1992. Tystad commanded a tank battalion with the Tiger Brigade during Desert Storm.

[9] U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. *The Command Estimate Process*, ST 100-9, (USACGSC: [n.p.] July 1992), page 2-5.

[10] Memorandum for record, dated 14 September 1990, Subject Commander's Intent. The memorandum states that the TRADOC commander directs that the intent be written in the operations order immediately preceding paragraph 3.a., Concept of the Operation, e.g.,

3. Execution
   Intent:
   a. Concept of the Operation.

[11] Clausewitz, p. 119.

Interview: Officer Promotion Boards

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow is currently the commanding general, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. During more than 30 years of commissioned service, he has served as a commander or staff officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airmobile, airborne and Special Forces units. He was selected and served as a member of a recent brigadier-general promotion board responsible for selecting 38 officers who would make the greatest contributions to meet the leadership and management needs of the Army. The following questions and answers are based on that experience.

SW: *What are the voting tools you used in selecting these officers?*
Shachnow: This board was very similar to the normal officer-selection boards. The primary tools on which we based our decisions were the photograph, Officer Record Brief, Official Military Personnel File and, in some cases, letters to the president of the board. It was critical that these records were current and properly constituted. Since we were dealing with colonels having approximately 24-25 years of service, their records contained a considerable amount of material.

SW: *How many members were on the board?*
Shachnow: There were 24 general officers. The most senior officer was a four-star, and the most junior a one-star.

SW: *How much time does a member normally spend examining a file?*
Shachnow: That would depend on the individual; however, most would vote a file in approximately three minutes. Since 24 different officers examined the file, a very complete picture emerged.

SW: *What is the purpose of a screen vote?*
Shachnow: Our mission was to select 38 officers out of a total of 1,746. In order to bring the numbers to a manageable proportion, a screen vote was conducted first. The individuals' records were evaluated, and the members voted "yes" if the individual was best-qualified, "no" if not qualified or if qualified but not best-qualified.

SW: *Can you explain what a hard vote is?*
Shachnow: A hard vote is conducted after a screen vote. A hard vote consists of assessing the individual's record and then giving it a subjective score. The scores are as follows:

6 +/- Top candidate
Superior performer
No. 1 choice

5 +/- Clearly above contemporaries
Outstanding performer
Must select

4 +/- Above contemporaries
Very strong in all areas
Should select

3 +/- Fully qualified
Solid performer
Select

2 +/- Qualified
Average performer
Capable of doing the job

1 +/- Needs more experience

SW: *What criteria did you use in evaluating the individuals' records?*
Shachnow: The board received guidance, and the following criteria, which are not all-inclusive, were used:

- Ability to work with diverse groups, such as foreign armies, the joint staff and reserve forces.

"The primary tools on which we based our decisions were the photograph, Officer Record Brief, Official Military Personnel File and, in some cases, letters to the president of the board. It was critical that these records were current and properly constituted."

- Ability to conceptualize, chart strategies and formulate policies, as opposed to merely organizing solutions to problems.
- Ability to provide direction and force that shaped outcomes rather than reacting successfully to a series of events.
- Genuine concern for soldiers, civilian employees and their families.
- Ability to represent the Army effectively and articulate persuasively.
- Selfless performance as an officer.
- Overall manner of performance: scope and variety of tasks, level of responsibility, trends in efficiency.
- Integrity, character and ethical standards.
- Intelligence, creativity and professional knowledge.
- Potential to serve in demanding positions.
- General physical condition.

SW: *Is a spouse's positive contribution to the military community helpful?*
Shachnow: Board members are prohibited from considering the marital status of a military member, or the employment, education or volunteer service of a member's spouse, in the selection process.

SW: *What does it take to be promoted as a general officer?*
Shachnow: Competence, timing and luck.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Policy changes regarding constructive credit for CAOAC

There has been a change of policy for the awarding of constructive credit for the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course:

- Master Policy 4-91, which outlined the criteria for awarding constructive credit for phases of the CAOAC was rescinded effective Sept. 30, 1993.
- Master Policy 93-2, now effective, states that constructive credit for phases of CAOAC will not be granted. The new policy further states that "exempt credit" will be granted for the common-core subcourses contained in the Phase I correspondence course when the requirements of paragraphs 1-17 and 1-31 of DA Pamphlet 351-20, *Army Correspondence Course Program Catalog*, dated April 1, 1993, are met. Simply stated, an officer who has completed the six core subcourses now common to every Army reserve-component advanced course may request exempt credit when applying for enrollment into CAOAC by providing the subcourse completion notices with the DA Form 145 application.

Requests for constructive credit for phases of CAOAC received after Oct. 1, 1993, have been returned to the originating headquarters without action. For more information, contact Maj. Ron Fiegle, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (910) 432-6406/9002.

SF warrant-officer program enters sustainment phase

With the filling of the SF Warrant Officer Program in FY 1994, the program will enter its sustainment phase, which promises to provide better quality, training and utilization for all SF WOs. As accessions decrease, recruitment and selection will become increasingly competitive, and selections for MOS 180A will emphasize, in addition to other prerequisites, applicants' language capability, experience (considered with future service potential), age and special skills. Other 180A sustainment issues will include:

- Revision of AR 611-12, *Manual of Warrant Officer MOSs*, to reflect the new standards of grade and grade coding for all WO assignments. The revision will also provide improved upward and lateral mobility for MOS 180A.
- Development of a chapter on 180A in DA Pamphlet 600-11, *Warrant Officer Professional Development*. This chapter will provide vital career guidance to all SF WOs in the areas of training, education, goals, duties and assignments and will be considered "must" reading. Promotion guidance is normally derived from professional-development publications.
- Evaluation of MOS and duty titles and an MOS title. The term "technician" is at times misleading for SF WOs and bears reconsideration.
- Development of senior and master WO job descriptions. These job descriptions will be a guide for SF WOs serving in authorized grade-coded CW3, CW4 and CW5 positions. These guides will be used to derive individual job descriptions for those WOs serving in staff positions.
- Proposal of mandatory language training for all entry-level WOs not having a current DLPT score of (L) 1+, (R) 1+. This proposal, if implemented, would better prepare entry-level WOs for detachment operations prior to their first assignment. Front-end loading of language

training will take the burden of language training from the unit, while giving units the use of a fully trained warrant officer.

- Evaluation of a policy on age and active federal service for WO applicants. These policies will assist the commandant, JFKSWCS, to better identify the right candidate at the right time in his career. These policies will be essential to the long-term sustainment and growth of a senior warrant force.
- Development of Army Education Requirements System-coded positions for advanced civilian education. These key positions will allow for a fully funded degree program in a given discipline in return for a three-year utilization tour.
- Mandatory initiation of a special background investigation. SBIs will be required under the revised standards of grade in AR 611-112 for all SF WOs not having one. This SBI will increase the information access for all WOs, and it will provide greater assignment latitude for senior and master WOs.
- Establishment of senior WO advisers to commanders. The WO advisers will advise the commanders on all WO issues to be outlined in DA Pamphlet 600-11. Some of the additional duties will include: advising the commander on the correct use, professional development and career progression of warrant officers; providing a focal point for dissemination of warrant-officer information up and down the chain of command; conducting routine warrant-officer professional-development classes, and advising and assisting junior warrant officers.

For more information, contact CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, SF WO manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-2415, commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

USAREC assumes SF officer recruiting role

Under a memorandum of agreement between the Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, USAREC has assumed the SF officer recruiting mission formerly performed by the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Under the MOA, three SF-branch-qualified captains with extensive ODA experience have been assigned as recruiters in paid parachutist positions of the SWCS table of distribution and allowances. The captains are attached to USAREC for a 24-month tour of duty, with one each assigned for duty at Fort Campbell, Ky., Fort Bragg and Fort Lewis, Wash. Duties will require extensive TDY travel, both CONUS and OCONUS. These officers will play a vital role in the future of the SF Branch by recruiting the best-qualified captains throughout the Army.

FA 39 graduate program grants degrees to 39

The third iteration of the FA 39 graduate course completed its studies during August 1993, with 39 officers receiving master's degrees in international relations. On Sept. 2, 1993, 40 students began in-processing for the 1994 course. Officers interested in applying for the 12-month FA 39 graduate program should contact Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (910) 432-6406/9002.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

New 600-25 to include chapter on Special Forces

DA Pamphlet 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*, is scheduled for fielding by April. Chapter 14 of the pamphlet will relate general guidelines for Career Management Field 18, Special Forces. Qualification standards will include those for fully and exceptionally qualified soldiers, enhancement courses, mandatory requirements and special assignments. Other information will include entry-level requirements and CMF development, including objectives by grade, assignments and schools, additional skill identifiers and skill-qualification identifiers, and self-development initiatives. Included in the chapter will be guidance by the SF proponent, the commanding general of the Special Warfare Center and School, to all promotion boards for selection.

1994 senior enlisted selection board scheduled

The calendar-year 1994 senior enlisted centralized board for MSG and SFC/ANCOC selection is scheduled to meet as follows:

MSG	Feb. 22 - March 26, 1994
SFC/ANCOC	June 7 - July 3, 1994

SF soldiers encouraged to cross-train to 18D

The Special Forces enlisted force is filling rapidly. The list below shows the approximate force fill projected for fiscal year 1994:

MOS	Authorized	Inventory proj.	%
18B	841	1,037	123
18C	704	787	112
18D	746	704	94
18E	925	1,038	112
18F	453	476	105
18Z (8)	692	620	90
18Z (9)	155	158	102
Totals	4,512	4,814	107

The SF proponent has asked commanders of SF units to encourage SF soldiers in MOSs 18B, 18C, and 18E to volunteer for 18D training. Volunteers should be in the rank of staff sergeant, staff sergeant promotable or sergeant (with two years' ODA experience). The 18D MOS is currently experiencing a high promotion rate to SFC and MSG in the primary and secondary zones. Soldiers should apply through their chain of command.

School of the Americas looking for SF NCOs

The U.S. Army School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Ga., currently has several opportunities for Spanish-language-qualified Special Forces NCOs to teach in its Commando Course and Counterdrugs Course. All SF assignments are authorized jump pay, and soldiers have an opportunity to increase their Spanish-language capability. For more information, contact Lt. Col. Wayne Kirkbride, director of special operations and civil-military operations, at DSN 835-1137.

Foreign SOF

Somalis may have ties to Islamic extremists

The Feb. 26, 1993, explosion at New York's World Trade Center highlighted U.S.-based links with Islamic extremist organizations abroad. Many other areas of the world perceive threats from Islamic separatist or terrorist groups, and to the extent that these threatened countries are U.S. allies or constitute areas where U.S. forces may be deployed, the issue of Islamic extremism constitutes an important intelligence collection and planning consideration. Somalia has become a case in point: U.S. humanitarian-assistance and peace-support operations in Somalia which began with Operation Restore Hope acquired dimensions that extended beyond the starvation and civil war that initially prompted U.N. involvement. Of particular note are the numerous reports of Islamic extremist elements providing weapons, training, manpower, planning and other assistance to Somali factions, including most prominently, those of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed's Somali National Alliance. Western and Middle Eastern reporting indicates that "Islamic" assistance from Iranian, Iraqi, Sudanese and other quarters (including Arab veterans of the war in Afghanistan) has been provided to attack U.S. and international forces in Somalia. While the levels of support by these groups vary widely, some Moslem sources judge that the early June 1993 attack by Aideed's forces on Pakistani peacekeepers, which resulted in 25 killed, marked the beginning of a more aggressive posture by Somali forces that had been the recipients of outside aide from Islamic terrorists. Subsequent armed actions by Somali factions and U.S./U.N. forces have seen casualties grow and underscore what appear to be more effective actions by factions that earlier seemed more akin to well-armed street gangs than organized military forces. Whether this effectiveness can be attributed to outside terrorist cadres trained or provided by Islamic extremist groups awaits more authoritative information. Given potential U.S. peacekeeping deployments, security-assistance missions and other roles in African, Middle Eastern, Asian or European areas where Islamic extremist groups perceive interests, their global organization, support infrastructure and tactics have gained new importance.

Somali 'khat' trafficking produces high revenues

From the earliest U.S. deployments to Somalia, the East African tradition of chewing khat leaves and stalks has received widespread attention. Khat trafficking has been identified as a substantial source of revenue for clan factions, and it may have increased as the opportunities to pilfer humanitarian-assistance shipments diminished. Some U.N. peacekeepers have complained about official U.N. indifference to khat trafficking, but it is generally acknowledged that the use of khat is so basic a part of Somali life that its ban would be unthinkable. In any event, the sale of khat is well-established among some East African immigrants abroad, including those in some major U.S. cities. Though its widespread use by other Americans is not anticipated, the drug dimension of the U.S.-Somalia association is the kind of unanticipated development that may characterize U.S. involvement in other regions.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

USASOC, SF Command name top soldiers

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Army Special Forces Command have recently named new top enlisted soldiers.

CSM Henry D. Bone was named the new USASOC command sergeant major in August, replacing CSM Jimmie W. Spencer, who retired. Bone's previous assignment was that of command sergeant major for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

CSM Willie E. Weaver has been named the new command sergeant major for USASFC. Weaver was previously the command sergeant major for the 3rd Special Forces Group.

4th POG gets Gulf War streamer

The 4th Psychological Operations Group received the Meritorious Unit Commendation and campaign streamers for actions in Desert Shield and Desert Storm during a ceremony on Fort Bragg Oct. 7.

Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, affixed the streamers to the group colors and to individual battalion guidons at the ceremony.

Scott credited the soldiers of the 4th POG with saving American lives by inducing many Iraqi soldiers to surrender without a fight.

Members of the 4th POG deployed to Saudi Arabia in August 1990. Joined by reservists and coalition-force soldiers, the PSYOP task force transmitted surrender appeals through video products, broadcasts, leaflets and loudspeakers during the conflict.

Soldiers from the reserve units that participated in the war stood in formation during the ceremony with their active-duty counterparts. They represented the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion, Fort Snelling, Minn.; 18th Psychological Operations Company, St. Louis, Mo.; 19th Psychological Operations Co., Fort Snelling, Minn.; 244th Psychological Operations Co., Abilene, Texas; 245th Psychological Operations Co., Dallas, Texas; and the 362nd Psychological Operations Co., Fayetteville, Ark. — *Gerard Healy, USASOC PAO*

Photo by Keith Butler

Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott attaches the Meritorious Unit Commendation streamer to the 4th POG colors.

5th Battalion, 19th Group looking for soldiers

The 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group of the Colorado Army National Guard currently has openings for soldiers qualified in military intelligence.

The unit needs soldiers in MOSs 96B, 96D, 98C, 98G and 98H, as well as the 18 series. The battalion can provide soldiers the opportunity to attend Airborne and Ranger school, language training and the Special Forces Qualification Course. For more information, contact SFC Mark Smith at DSN 877-1857, commercial (303) 273-1857.

CA, PSYOP students need proper orders

The Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, reports that some soldiers arrive at Fort Bragg for training in Civil Affairs and PSYOP with improper orders.

The 3rd Battalion provides billeting, transportation and rations only for soldiers attending Civil Affairs or PSYOP advanced individual training, according to Maj. Steven Novitske, battalion executive officer. Orders for all other than AIT soldiers must reflect that billeting and rations are not provided.

As of Nov. 1, 1993, the 3rd Battalion has been restructured into four training companies, Novitske said. Company A, an officer training company, teaches the PSYOP Officer Course, the Civil Affairs Course, Reserve Civil Affairs and PSYOP Officer Advanced Courses, the Regional Studies Course and the Special Operations Staff Officer Course. Company B, an enlisted training company, teaches the Civil Affairs and PSYOP AIT courses and the Civil Affairs Operations Course. Company C teaches European, African and Latin American languages, and Company D teaches Asian and Middle Eastern languages.

Requests for attendance in all CA

and PSYOP courses must come through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, Novitske said. Language quotas for SOF personnel should be requested through the Army Special Operations Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

New special texts, diving reg forthcoming

New training products and regulations will soon be available from the Special Warfare Center and School's Advanced Skills/Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Development Branch.

Two new special texts, *Close Quarters Combat* and *Special Operations Target Interdiction Training and Employment*, will be distributed during 1994. These texts will be distributed as working documents to students at the SWCS attending the Special Operations Training Course and the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, respectively.

A new diving regulation, USASOC Regulation 350-20, is currently in final staffing by the Army Special Operations Command. The regulation covers all Army SOF diving operations and issues and explains the inspection and certification process of dive lockers by the Navy Safety Center.

For more information, contact Capt. William L. Morris, AS/SERE Development Branch, at DSN 239-9018, commercial (910) 432-9018.

SOLLMIS revised; ready for distribution

The Special Operations Lessons Learned Management Information System, or SOLLMIS, has been recently revised and is ready to be redistributed.

Current users who have not received an upgrade since February 1993 or all who would like a copy of SOLLMIS should send floppy diskettes (either five 5 1/4-inch or three 3 1/2-inch) to Commander, USAJFKSWCS; AOJK-DE; Attn: SOLLMIS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307.

Lessons-learned may be submitted in writing or entered on the SOLLMIS program and exported on diskette. For more information, contact DOES at DSN 239-1548/5255.

SOF veterans dedicate memorial stones

Two groups of SOF veterans were honored recently during memorial-stone dedications in the JFK Special Warfare Memorial Plaza.

Members of the Operational Groups from World War II's Office of Strategic Services gathered Sept. 10 to commemorate their unit's achievements.

The Operational Groups were recruited by the OSS during World War II to work in small groups with underground and resistance forces in Europe, Burma and China.

Members of the Korean War Era Ranger Infantry Companies dedicated their memorial stone Sept. 28.

Organized in 1950, the Korean War Rangers conducted reconnaissance and combat patrols throughout the Korean peninsula. They fought as lone units and spearheaded conventional forces' advances against North Korean and Chinese communist soldiers. In 1951, the Ranger companies were disbanded.

Delta seeks recruits

The U.S. Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - Delta plans and conducts a broad range of special operations. Its missions require rapid response using a wide variety of skills and the flexibility to maintain the lowest possible profile of U.S. involvement.

Officers and NCOs undergo the same assessment, selection and training. Assignment requires extensive prescreening and completion of a 3-4 week Assessment and Selection Course, followed by the six-month Operator Training Course.

NCOs may serve in staff and leadership positions through the rank of sergeant major. Officers can command at the captain, major and lieutenant-colonel levels and serve as executive and operations officers. There are also a wide variety of staff positions at DoD, JCS, DA, USASOC, USSOCOM.

General prerequisites are that applicants be male; volunteer; be U.S. citizens; pass a modified HALO/scuba physical and eye examination; be airborne-qualified or volunteer for airborne training; pass a background security investigation and have at least a secret clearance; be at least 22; have no history of recurring disciplinary action; pass the five-event physical fitness qualification test (inverted crawl; run, dodge and jump; push-ups; sit-ups; and a two-mile run) and a 100-meter swim, all while wearing BDUs and boots; and have a minimum of two years' active service remaining upon selection.

NCOs must be sergeants through sergeants first class; qualified in their primary MOS; and have a GT score of 110 or higher. Officers must be captains or majors; advanced-course graduates; college graduates; and have at least 12 months' successful command at the captain level.

The 1st SFOD-D conducts worldwide recruiting twice a year: March-July for the fall course, and September-January for the spring course. Call the 1st SFOD-D at DSN 236-0649/0689, commercial (910) 396-0649/0689.

USACAPOC commander receives second star

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, commander of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, was promoted to major general Nov. 8.

In October, President Bill Clinton had nominated Campbell for promotion to major general and Col. Bruce B. Bingham, commander of the 358th CA Brigade, King of Prussia, Pa., for promotion to brigadier general. Senate confirmation of Bingham's nomination is pending.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Prisoner of the Rising Sun. *By William A. Berry, with James E. Alexander. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-2509-8. 241 pages. $24.95.*

This book provides a moving account of the extreme hardships endured by those captured in the Pacific Theater during World War II and the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army. The author, a Navy ensign captured at the fall of Corregidor, accurately describes how miserable captivity can be when faced utterly unprepared, with the torments of hunger, isolation and harsh interrogation. Non-signators to the Geneva Accords, the Japanese government denied those captured humane treatment, even though they held prisoner-of-war status. This clearly illustrates the important distinction between the classification of being held captive as a war prisoner or a criminal.

The author gives an excellent example of the type of dilemma that might be put to the prisoner who is the senior ranking officer, or SRO. The Navy *Bluejacket's Manual*, a basic handbook for all Navy men, explicitly stated that seamen must consider escape if captured. The concentration camp regulations stated, however, that one attempted escape would result in the death of 10 men from the escapees' "blood group." After an escape and weeks of successful evasion, the author and two others were captured and delivered back to an internment camp. Fearful of retaliation, the SRO ordered the escapees to identify themselves to their captors as prior detainees and face possible execution, rather than jeopardize the lives of dozens of fellow prisoners.

The questions are posed: when, if ever, does a servicemember decide to relieve the anguish of starvation while evading capture, forgo that final day of freedom and surrender? Can the SRO legally and morally decide how to meet the needs and welfare of the majority and does that justify the possible sacrifice of a few? As these difficult decisions present themselves, the SRO must be guided by a fundamental principle of leadership: to be responsible for the lives and welfare of those under his command at all times.

Also this: can anyone realistically expect to be completely versed in all the "correct" responses to the potentially life-threatening situations he or she is faced with in captivity? No. Can they prepare themselves to better endure capture? Yes, through attendance at one of the military Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Courses. As illustrated in this book and in events as recent as Desert Storm, capture by enemy forces does not discriminate by military specialty or gender.

As a young reserve intelligence officer in 1941, the author realized how truly unprepared he was for wartime service, let alone the three years he would serve as a Japanese prisoner of war. Fifty years later, the armed forces have made considerable changes in how servicemembers are prepared to fight.

These advancements have been based on victories and defeats on the battlefield. Important lessons have likewise been learned on how soldiers, sailors and airmen prepare to survive captivity while keeping their honor intact. These techniques have been drawn from the experiences of those who endured captivity in World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War. It is through the suffering of men like Lt. Cdr. William A. Berry that the U.S. forces have been able to improve and provide realistic training that emphasizes survival with honor.

CWO 3 Robert McKague
JFKSWCS
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Experience of War. *Edited by Robert Cowley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1992. ISBN: 0-440-50553-4. 574 pages. $14.95.*

Experience of War is an anthology of articles compiled by the editors of the *Quarterly Journal of Military History*. If you are a military-history buff, this anthology is a treasure trove of sometimes little-known stories from historical accounts of wars from as far back as ancient Greece

and up to the Persian Gulf War.

Fifty-one articles make up the anthology, and it would be hard to find better reading material to place on your nightstand. Since the articles are relatively short — each focusing on a specific topic of military historical significance — the volume makes for excellent bedtime reading.

There are too many articles to attempt to recount all in this review, but a few of the more interesting examples should serve to make the point. Essays include "The Origins of War," "Alexander (The Great) in India," "Cannae," "The Masada Myth," "The First Crusade," "The Stonewall Enigma," "Ulysses S. Grant's Final Victory," "Mutiny on The Potemkin," "The Secrets of Overlord" and "The Gulf Crisis and The Rules of War."

These essays' credibility comes from the outstanding array of some of military history's best modern chroniclers. These include David Clay Large, Robert L. O'Connell, Martin van Creveld, David Lamb, Richard M. Ketchum, Paul Fussell, Thaddeus Holt and Stephen E. Ambrose, to name only a few.

Pieces are arranged in historical chronological order — although there are few articles which relate to one another in any meaningful way. Robert Cowley did a very credible job in selecting some of MHQ's finest articles. There is literally something in *Experience of War* for everybody.



It is important to recognize that *Experience of War*, as all MHQ essays, are configured for the general reader. Articles are written in narrative, not academic style — which makes the stories easy for reading and comprehension. In this reviewer's opinion, the anthology loses nothing by its lack of footnotes and other laborious academic trappings.

The bottom line is that *Experience of War* makes for great reading. At $14.95, the book is a bargain for those who have more than a passing interest in the history of warfare.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph, Jr.
Joint Special Operations Cmd.
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II. *Edited by George C. Chalou. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992. ISBN 0-911333-91-6. 392 pages. $25.*

This book is a collection of papers originally presented at a National Archives conference of the same title held in Washington in July 1991. It is a valuable collection of articles which highlight various intelligence and operational aspects of the Office of Strategic Services and how to get into the sources for more information. It is in this latter aspect that the book provides its most valuable service. It is essential reading for any researcher interested in pursuing a topic on the OSS.

The articles presented in this collection cover how the OSS was created, how the various branches evolved, the recruitment of personnel, its relations (not always smooth) with the various British intelligence and special-operations agencies, and some of the OSS's more successful (and unsuccessful) operations around the world.

Of particular value are the articles



on the penetration of Thailand by the OSS, the failure of the McDowell mission to Yugoslavia in 1944 and the discussion of James Angleton and his counterintelligence operation (X-2) in Italy. While the emphasis throughout the book is on intelligence operations (which was, after all, the main reason for the existence of the OSS), an article by James Ward on the justly famous Detachment 101 gives some background on the operational and unconventional-warfare successes of the OSS.

All in all, this is a very useful and interesting book which should be on every SF soldier's reading list. The OSS was filled with a colorful collection of amateurs who make for interesting reading. Along the way, their stories provide valuable lessons learned. For the serious researcher, *The Secrets War* provides an essential synopsis of what is in each of the OSS Record Groups and how to evaluate what one finds. I recommend it to both the operator and the researcher.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart
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Special Warfare

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