Special Warfare

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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

Current peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Cambodia highlight a mission in which U.S. forces may likely find themselves increasingly involved.

New Army doctrinal manuals anticipate that role. The recently released FM 100-5, *Operations*, includes a chapter which, for the first time, focuses on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. FM 100-23, being written at TRADOC, will concentrate on peacekeeping operations.

The impact of all this is significant, because these types of operations will occur in more complex politico-military environments. Those who carry them out will have to be correspondingly more sophisticated. Two aspects of this sophistication stand out.

The first is that peacekeepers/enforcers must understand that even minor tactical or humanitarian actions may have enormous strategic and political implications. Who is separated, how they are separated and where the separation occurs can affect local balances of power, create perceptions and implicitly align the peacekeeper/enforcer with one side or the other. One can produce undesirable outcomes without realizing what he or she is doing. In these types of operations, everything is strategic.

The second is intercultural communications. In a place like Bosnia, for example, where three separate languages are spoken, competing religious groups, historical grudges and complex cultural differences make effective communication a major challenge.

All of this has implications for special-operations forces. As our deployments for Operation Provide Comfort, Restore Hope and Hurricane Andrew have shown, our SOF are able to perform effectively across this spectrum of non-traditional missions. They have unique skills in language, intercultural communications, regional and cultural orientation, restoring government services, and communicating information to the population. The level of seniority and maturity is also a significant factor. They are capable of operating in small groups tailored for the situation and of working as part of a joint force.

But while we are qualified by past experience and training to perform these missions, the future

holds much to learn and the prospect for change. In many respects these are not traditional doctrinal missions, and they may require us to adapt.

Peacekeeping is not peaceful. It is a dangerous, complex and increasingly violent mission. The traditional separation between peacekeepers and combat soldiers is becoming less distinct, and this change, as well as the fact that we may be operating as part of a UN force, may require new rules of engagement.

We may also find that the missions of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief become intertwined in this new environment, with each one requiring some aspects of the others. In all cases, our intercultural-communication skills and ability to understand the local political situation will be extremely important.

The decision to involve U.S. forces in peacekeeping operations is up to the national command authorities. As soldiers, we cannot make those decisions, but we must anticipate the demands those decisions will place upon us and ensure that whenever these missions occur and wherever they will take us, our training, doctrine and modernization will allow us to react quickly, effectively and successfully.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

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SOF in Peace-Support Operations

by Lt. Col. Thomas K. Adams

In February 1993, Marine Gunnery Sgt. Harry Conde was on patrol in the strife-torn streets of Mogadishu. He was on a mission of mercy, bringing food to the starving and order out of anarchy as part of Operation Restore Hope. Suddenly a figure darted out from between two buildings and lunged at Conde's face. Reacting quickly, he shot the intruder with a round of buckshot from his M-79.

In April, a court-martial convicted Conde of aggravated assault. The intruder had not been a terrorist or one of the local bandits; instead, the blast wounded Ahmed Abdi Omar, a 13-year-old street thief who claimed to have been reaching for Conde's sunglasses.[1] Presumption of innocence is not a part of infantry doctrine, but that may have to change.

We may also have to change our views of peace-support operations — including peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance — which are no longer as peaceful as they used to be. Soldiers of 32 nations, including the United States, have been deployed for more than a year in the former Yugoslavia as part of the United Nations Protection Force. To date, at least 27 Protection Force members have been killed and more than 380 wounded. According to Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs and former NATO supreme allied commander in Europe, "The days of pristine peacekeeping as we understood it for years are probably over. Prudence dictates that in our planning we take that aspect of combat into account."[2]

Modern peacekeeping is a complex and convoluted environment where the old rules — such as "soldiers kill people and break things," and "peacekeepers fight only in self-defense" — may not apply.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new state of international affairs has arisen. Usually characterized as a "new world order," it might better be termed the "new world disorder." Whatever its name, this new state creates new problems for the military peacekeeper.

Even a casual look at the headlines featuring Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, the former Warsaw Pact and the Middle East brings home the fact that disorder is a primary characteristic of the new order. A second glance underlines the importance of various peace-related activities by the United Nations, increasingly with large-scale U.S. involvement. The U.N. is now involved in 13 peace-related operations with a significant military component, far more than at any previous time.

U.N. intervention has commonly taken place under the authority of the various articles of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Except in clear cases of cross-border aggression (as in Korea and Kuwait) intervention has generally been limited to peacekeeping and to imposition of various sanctions short of force.

Traditionally, international peacekeeping, both under U.N. auspices and otherwise, has been established around three core principles, a sort of doctrine by consensus:

- Consent by all contending parties, including an explicit invitation from the country(ies) where peacekeepers will be located
- Impartiality of the peacekeeping force and
- Use of force only in self-defense.

The clear purpose of this intervention was to guarantee the sovereignty of the nation-states involved, usually by deterring or redressing aggressive behavior.

The prospect of a much greater role for the U.N. and greater use of coercion, including military force, was raised when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the U.N. secretary general, authored *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping,* in December 1992.

In this document, Boutros-Ghali implies new rules for U.N. intervention. The most significant of these is

that the U.N. may now intervene without the consent of all parties. The rationale for this stems from his position that individuals and groups have "international rights," essentially basic guarantees, such as freedom from genocide, based on the U.N.'s charter of human rights. By extension, the U.N. has a right to intervene in cases where these international rights are violated, such as the anarchy and starvation in Somalia. Some U.S. policy makers have argued as well that "under certain conditions the United Nations has the right to prevent genocide from occurring."[3]

Agenda for Peace also proposes "preventive peacekeeping," in which relatively small U.N. forces would deploy to threatened areas signaling international disapproval of any anticipated aggression. This was the intention when the U.N. security council agreed to send several hundred observers to Macedonia to deter attacks from Serbia.[4] With these new peace-support activities, the rules of impartiality and force-only-for-self-defense go away.

Not surprisingly, personnel in U.S. special-operations forces have been and will continue to be involved in these difficult and demanding activities. When U.S. conventional forces landed near Mogadishu in December 1992, SOF were already there, setting the stage for Operation Restore Hope. As the United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement for 1993 makes clear, Army special-operations units, including Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP, can expect increasing employment in these areas.[5]

This is made all the more likely by the current administration's view of appropriate intervention. In President's Clinton's inaugural address, he pledged American action whenever "the will and conscience of the international community is defied." In the words of Clinton's U.N. ambassador Madeleine Albright, "If there is one overriding principle that will guide me in this job, it will be the inescapable responsibility ... to build a peaceful world and to terminate the abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization."[6] The same position was underlined by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Colin Powell, when he warned that U.S. forces can expect such future missions "as a given."[7]

Peacekeeping problems

This raises some interesting problems for the "new peacekeeping." One is the very universal quality of the "abominable injustices" that are to be corrected. These conditions occur in numerous places on a daily basis, and often on a wide scale. Another obvious problem is that, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there may be significant military forces willing to contest this intervention. In the former Yugoslavia there are at least seven major armed factions that amount to ethnic or territorially based armies equipped with armor and artillery. The smallest of these numbers about 15,000, while the largest has a strength of more than 130,000. Somalia is an even more complex situation. There, dozens of contending factions with constantly shifting allegiances seek to co-opt the U.N. forces and exploit their presence.

This last point raises the basic doctrinal issue of impartiality, one of the core principles of the old peacekeeping. "Impartiality is the sine qua non for whatever effectiveness, authority and leverage peacekeepers have, and perhaps more that anything else, it makes peacekeeping a distinctive kind of conflict control activity, one that has worked where partisan control measures would have failed."[8]

The U.S. Army has a special interest in the peacekeeping problem as the likely provider of such forces and the designated executive agent for peacekeeping within the Department of Defense. However,

United Nations photo

A member of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force keeps watch on a street in Bosnia.

doctrine for these activities is still forthcoming, notably a new FM 100-23 on peacekeeping, now under development by the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

What does exist is a general consensus among planners that there are three separate forms of peace-related activities: humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping (under the traditional rules) and peace-enforcement (more or less a conventional military operation). Although humanitarian assistance is treated as a separate type of operation, experience in Somalia suggests that it is likely to have a peace-enforcement component. Desert Storm and the accompanying Operation Provide Comfort indicate that, likewise, peace-enforcement is likely to include humanitarian assistance.

The new FM 100-5, *Operations*, supports this view with its treatment of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement as forms of "operations other than war." Peacekeeping is defined as American forces in support of diplomatic efforts to maintain peace, while peace enforcement is seen as U.S. forces acting to restore peace through military operations or the threat of such operations.[9]

In short, peacekeeping enforces a cease-fire, while peace enforcement sets out to create one. But, as noted earlier, "peace support" is not a category characterized by clean definitions, and these activities may not occur in isolation. Most likely they will include a humanitarian-assistance effort, providing relief to countries where there is massive suffering from anarchy, disease or starvation.

Non-U.N. peace support

Not all peacekeeping/peace-support takes place within the structure of the U.N. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, is a U.S.-sponsored peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula policing the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace. The MFO was created in August 1981 after the U.N. security council was unable to agree on a peacekeeping force to undertake the mission. The organization, however, is explicitly modeled after successful U.N. peacekeeping operations.[10]

United Nations photo

A member of the United Nations Temporary Authority in Cambodia inspects a soldier's weapon.

In March 1993 the United States began Operation Provide Promise, a well-publicized series of relief flights to air-drop supplies to the beleaguered Muslims in eastern Bosnia. This is also a unilateral American operation.

Under U.N. auspices

Commonly, although not necessarily, peace-support operations would occur under U.N. auspices and as part of a combined force. As envisioned by Boutros-Ghali, the security council would have under its direct control a sort of standing "peace force" composed of battalion- and regiment-sized components drawn from various member nations. The troops would be under the operational command and control of the security council, as are the current 13 U.N. peacekeeping operations.[11]

The Bush administration rejected this proposal, and the current U.S. Congress has not been supportive of such a standing force. Lacking such a force, U.N. operations are carried out under a variety of ad hoc arrangements. The U.S. Army participates in several of these operations in various ways. For example, the Army provides individual observers to the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, which performs a more-or-less traditional peacekeeper's role by monitoring the buffer zone between the Gulf War combatants. Other Army soldiers are part of the United Nations Temporary Authority in Cambodia. In this case, the U.N. is attempting an ambitious program to supervise the government, hold elections, disarm guerrilla factions and assist economic development. On the other side of the planet, a 350-man Army hospital unit, Task Force 212, is supporting the U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia.

U.N. control of these activities (as opposed to mere sponsorship, which, in effect, grants permission) presents a basic problem in that there is no United Nations military headquarters per se. The U.N. office responsible is the Office of Peace-

keeping Operations, headed by an undersecretary general. This office has only a small multinational coordinating staff to advise the secretary general. It is not structured for the command and control of military peace-support operations. Furthermore, there is no provision for intelligence and communications functions to be accomplished by the U.N. In American military parlance there is very little C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) structure. Furthermore, there is no U.N. peacekeeping doctrine to help structure these functions and little expertise for ad hoc operations.

However, Article 41, Chapter 7(2) of the U.N. charter does allow the security council to invite a lead or framework nation to act on behalf of the U.N. as the United States did during the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War. Strategic direction is provided by the security council and the secretary general, while operational control lies with the force commander. What follows is that the C4I functions will be performed or at least managed by the lead nation, presumably the U.S.

In Operation Desert Storm, SOF personnel with special language skills and training in cultural and political sensitivity formed 109 coordination-and-training teams to operate communications and information-processing equipment for each national command element. These teams also provided command-control-and-intelligence information to the host command to ensure coherent, unified action. This capability has an obvious application in multinational peace-support operations.

U.S. special-operations forces have demonstrated a real capacity for these missions and continue to gain valuable experience as part of the ongoing Operation Provide Comfort in Iran-Iraq and Turkey since 1991. SOF personnel there have demonstrated a range of capabilities from aerial delivery of emergency supplies to mass-communica-

New manual to address peace support

With unrest rampant in the world today, the need for support to peace operations is becoming an ever-increasing requirement. The support of U.N. operations throughout the world by U.S. military forces is essential and expanding. Although this is a new environment for the use of our forces, it is not a new mission. The roles and functions of the military are well-suited for this kind of operation. The understanding of the operational environment is critical for success, however, and for that reason, the Army is developing a new field manual to address support to peace operations, FM 100-23.

Special-operations forces are no stranger to this type of operation and have proven to be a unique and valuable asset to peace-support operations. The five principal missions of SOF: unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, direct action and counterterrorism, provide a strong training base for SOF support to PSO. Three SOF organizations especially suited for PSO are: Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

SF assets are prepared to deploy rapidly into denied or hostile areas to provide initial assessments or begin operations when and where it is not operationally prudent to use conventional forces. They can provide initial engineering, medical, security and intelligence assessments. With their language and area orientation, they can be invaluable as liaisons with host-nation assets, coalition forces, other military organizations and nonmilitary agencies. They are prepared to assist in training and organizing host-nation security forces to establish and maintain order. They may also improve coalition interoperability by cross-training with coalition forces.

PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and influence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of its audience. PSYOP aims to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. PSYOP can play an important role in facilitating cooperation between the belligerents and the peace-support forces. Tactically, PSYOP forces can assist through persuasion rather than intimidation. Through the use of local information programs such as radio or television broadcasts and leaflet distribution, PSYOP elements can help ensure that the operational objectives and efforts are fully supported and understood by the target audience.

CA assets provide the supported commander with activities that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities and the civil population in order to assist military operations and consolidate operational objectives. CA may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. They can make assessments of the needs of civil activities, assist in the development of these programs, act as the interface between civil authorities and the military supporting agency, serve as a liaison with the civil populace, develop population-and-resource control measures and coordinate with international support agencies.

The role of SOF in peace-support operations is well-founded and will continue to be a valuable asset. With their area orientation and training, the ability to deploy rapidly and work in austere conditions, SOF will continue to be a key player in PSO. — *Maj. Robert Snyder, Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS*

tions support provided by the 4th PSYOP Group. Army Special Forces personnel proved their value by locating suitable sites for refugee camps and then helping local leaders organize and train for greater self-sufficiency. SF medics took part in joint SOF medical aid and training teams that were credited with dramatically reducing the daily death rate among the refugees. In Eastern Europe and the former USSR, SOF survey teams have conducted regional assessments, and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, worked with local militaries, including Russian *spetsnaz*, to distribute relief supplies.

Planning

Despite the fact that the expertise, experience and flexibility of special-operations forces gives them a real advantage in undertaking peace-support operations, they will find that like other military planners, they face at least three general problems in planning for peace-support operations.

Lack of focus. Given the very general nature of the peace-support mission, it is very difficult to predict with any confidence where the next mission may occur. Africa, for example, has never been a central issue for American policy makers and military planners. Nevertheless, in Africa alone there are at least six countries in which a single misstep could easily lead to Somali-like chaos: Angola, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe. To make the situation worse, three of these, Angola, Liberia and Sudan, have active civil wars, while a fourth, Mozambique, has a guerrilla insurgency.

Peace support in locations like these is unlikely to be peaceful. Army Special Forces groups and Civil Affairs units have a unique advantage with their specific geographic orientation and linguistic capabilities.

Nothing ever happens where we expect it to. Peace-support operations seem to occur where there are the fewest resources, either in terms of existing forces, intelligence or other required materials. This capacity for austere operations in underdeveloped areas and their relatively self-sufficient nature make SOF units exceptionally appropriate to this environment. Their ability to conduct reconnaissance missions could also help to overcome shortfalls in intelligence information.

Everything is strategic. In peace enforcement, the tactical level of operations almost disappears. As pointed out by Donald M. Snow, even the most "tactical" of actions can have vastly wider implications. "Who is separated, how they are separated and where separation occurs in, say, a neighborhood, a town or even a street can affect local balances of power, and can implicitly align the peace enforcer with one side or another."[12]

It is hard to imagine any action that will not benefit one side more than another. What this suggests is an interminable series of actions aimed at balancing and counterbalancing benefits in the name of fairness and neutrality. In Somalia, U.S. forces managed to avoid serious missteps and, more important-

Operation	Description
U.N. Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 1988-89	Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
U.N. Iran-Iraq Observer Group (UNIIMOG), 1988-91	Monitor cease-fire in Iran-Iraq War.
U.N. Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), 1988-91	Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 1989-90	Supervise Namibia's transition to independence.
U.N. Mission in Central America (ONUCA), 1989-91	Monitor compliance with peace accords; demobilize Contras.
U.N. Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 1991-present	Monitor cease-fire and creation of new army.
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), 1991-present	Monitor buffer zone after Gulf War.
U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 1991-present	Conduct referendum on independence in Morocco.
U.N. Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 1991-present	Monitor human rights elections, national reconcilation.
U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), 1991-92 U.N. Temporary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-present	Supervise government, run elections; demobilize armed factions.
U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), 1992-present	Replace Yugoslav forces in Serbian areas of Croatia. Humanitarian relief escort units in Bosnia.
U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II), 1992, 1993 U.N. International Task Force (UNITAF), 1992-93	Security for humanitarian aid shipments. U.S.-led from December 1992 through spring 1993.
U.N. Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), 1993-present	Implement peace settlement in civil war.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 1985-1992

United Nations photo

Soldiers of the peacekeeping force in Somalia reflect its multinational character.

ly, to avoid being pulled into local quarrels. The Somalia case, moreover, benefited from the fact that there were no important foreign interests involved. In the case of Cambodia, where both Thailand and China have important concerns, things are more difficult.

The maturity, selectivity, regional expertise and high state of training of special operators make them nearly ideal to operate in such a demanding environment.

In summary, special-operations forces have an important and increasing role in peace-support operations. Of the seven traditional SOF missions — unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, psychological operations and civil affairs — three (foreign internal defense, psychological operations and civil affairs) may be seen to have immediate application to peace support. Experience in operations such as Provide Comfort have shown that SOF can be effective in these roles.

The most important quality, however, is the demonstrated capability to operate in politically sensitive environments. Special-operations missions are characterized by their politically sensitive context and the restraints that imposes. SOF personnel are expected to apply force only when required to accomplish a mission, and then with prudence. According to the SOF Posture Statement, "As mature military professionals, SOF is attuned to the sanctity of human life, the long-term effects of unnecessary or excessive violence and the need to bring conflict to a rapid and reasonable conclusion."[13]

As we attempt to deal with the disorder of the new world order, it will become increasingly necessary for the U.N. to apply force in quelling disturbances and guaranteeing human rights. U.S. forces will probably play a significant role in this activity, either as part of a larger force or as the lead nation acting on the U.N.'s behalf.

Among U.S. forces, SOF, with their versatility, language and cultural skills, regional orientation and familiarity with the missions of FID, PSYOP and Civil Affairs, are best suited to provide humanitarian assistance and deal with the political sensitivities of peacekeeping and peace support. ✂

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Notes:

[1] Jim Hogland, "Prepared for Non-Combat," *The Washington Post*, 15 April 1993, p. A5.

[2] Ian Kemp, "Peacekeeping," *Janes' Defence Weekly*, 13 March 1993, p. 26.

[3] Rep. Alan Wheat, quoted by Jake Thompson in "Where Next and Why?" *Kansas City Star*, 14 December 1992, p. A-5.

[4] William J. Durch, *The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College) 1993, p. 13.

[5] U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 1993, pp. 2, 33.

[6] As quoted in *Time* magazine, 17 May 1993, p. 74.

[7] Gen. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/93, p. 36.

[8] Ramesh Thakur, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Mutinational Force* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 153.

[9] U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Final Draft, 19 January 1993), pp. 8-9 and 8-11. See also Field Manual 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, 1990, p. 4-10.

[10] Lt. Col. Steven J. Argersinger, *Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and the United States* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College), May 1991, p. 8.

[11] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Setting an Agenda for the United Nations," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1993, p. 293.

[12] Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement: the U.S. Role in the New International Order* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), February 1993, p. 34.)

[13] SOF Posture Statement, p. 4.

The Army's 218th Birthday: Continuity, Change, Growth

by Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan

On June 14, the Army celebrated its 218th birthday — an anniversary that deserves the attention of those in and out of uniform. It marks another year of selfless service dedicated to ensuring that America remains strong and free. In a world filled with fledgling democracies and armies searching for an identity, we can take great pride in our uniquely American institution and our role in the Republic.

On our anniversaries, it is appropriate to reflect on our institution's purpose and heritage — and on our own character and duty. While each year contains many successes and frustrations for us personally, we must remember that continued success of the Army in executing its sacred trust is a personal success that reflects on each of us. That knowledge strengthens us as we reflect on the past, serve today in a trained and ready Army, and prepare for the challenges of the 21st century.

Our Army's journey of service paralleled the development of our democratic institutions — from the "First Muster" in Massachusetts Bay Colony through Concord Bridge and Lexington Common — to today. In that sense the Army holds no special claim on its members — we are all citizens. The idea that fragile democracy can flourish only in a secure environment was clear to the Founding Fathers. They recognized that freedom comes with a price.

Through all the early attempts to develop and achieve a stable political system — the Articles of Confederation — the various rebellions — culminating in the Constitution — the American debate over how to best field a credible, capable Army demonstrates our critical role in service to the nation. That debate has continued through to today in many trials — the Civil War — the opening of the West — efforts at nation building at home and abroad — and the emergence in this century of our nation to international pre-eminence. The people that have worn the uniform — in whatever state of organization or preparedness — have always been there for the country.

That legacy of selfless service — both institutional and personal — connects us to our past and to each other. It is continuity — strength — our purpose and our anchor in turbulent times. History has taught us two things. First, we have withstood the buffet of change before. Second, while the spirit of selfless service has cushioned the buffet of change — the swings in our American defense debate and the dynamic international responsibilities of our country have constantly taught us the perils of unpreparedness.

Turbulent times are upon us again. Our task is to respond appropriately to provide for the security of the nation. We are doing that. This anniversary marks a different Army in relation to its times than the Army that celebrated the 200th, 175th or 150th birthdays. Reflect on the Army of 1975, 1950 or 1925.

While our history gives us continuity of purpose, the world we live in today requires a different Army than any of us have ever known. We are well on the way to transforming our Army into the power-projection, crisis-response force that America needs.

We achieved victory in the Cold War — a victory no less important because there will be no streamer on the Army flag to symbolize the decades of perseverance in a forward-deployed Army. We have accomplished much, in the face of historical and present pressures to which we could have easily succumbed in many areas. As I have told many of you on my visits — whenever I see another accomplishment in transforming the Army while staying trained and ready on a daily basis — I am strengthened to see continuous forward movement in the face of hundreds of reasons why progress should not occur.

We have made the cuts in force structure while treating our people with dignity and respect. We have released more than a quarter of a million soldiers and civilians from the active component and reduced our European-deployed force by more than half — to a little more than 100,000.

We have maintained the high level of training and readiness required to answer the nation's call in a wide range of unpredictable missions. Many of these missions are new to soldiers who were products of a forward-deployed Cold War Army — but those missions are not new to your Army. We have increased the operational deployments of Army forces by about 100 percent in the last two years — to more than 20,000 troops in over 60 countries as a steady-state operational requirement above and beyond the forward-presence forces.

We have built on the successes of our joint efforts in Panama, the Gulf, and elsewhere around the nation — and around the world — to improve the seamless web of capabilities available to the national command authorities. Decisive land combat power, the Army contribution to the simultaneous application of unique and complementary capabilities, provides the nation the wide range of capabilities upon which it relies heavily — in Macedonia, Somalia, in Los Angeles, Homestead, Cambodia, the Sinai and countless other areas and missions.

We have accommodated the physical requirements of change — reshaping while operating all over the world. But more importantly, we have not relinquished the key intellectual initiative to the forces of change that confront us. FM 100-5 has provided the substance and process to examine the world in which we will live and successfully accomplish the missions that the future will bring.

"While our history gives us continuity of purpose, the world we live in today requires a different Army than any of us have ever known. We are well on the way to transforming our Army into the power-projection, crisis-response force that America needs."

Our intellectual focus has created opportunities to innovate and adapt through simulators, simulations and application of off-the-shelf technology in every aspect of our daily operations and future preparations. Louisiana Maneuvers has produced intellectual ferment at the cutting edge of war and warfare — focusing and controlling change to benefit the Army in every facet of its operations — from the Department to the foxhole. Battle Labs have opened new paths to efficiency in the Concept Based Requirements System — integrating the combat developers from the Army and industry just as technology integrates the battlefield.

Our modernization strategy focuses our limited resources to link the most promising and needed technologies with our highly skilled and intelligent human talent to create weapons systems that can dominate any potential adversary. The power of the microprocessor has touched the way each of us accomplishes our tasks — from the combat-arms soldier maneuvering with alacrity and precision and delivering lethal fires; to the logistician tracking needed supplies; to the medical officer providing remote, global consultation; to the Army civilian conducting analysis in the lab.

We have made remarkable strides in using the power of information technology to structure our decisions about the future — while remaining trained and ready today. I am convinced that we are on the right track — and just as importantly, that we are neither too far out in front, nor lagging behind.

Throughout all this activity, it would be easy to lose sight of the human element in our mission. The Army, more than any other service, remains a people-based institution. As Creighton Abrams said, "People aren't *in* the Army, people *are* the Army." Decisive land combat power requires the best young American men and women that this great nation can provide, because only talented people with intelligence can man and maintain our equipment. Only people of strength and stamina can endure the sacrifice. And only soldiers of character can accomplish the complicated and dangerous missions we anticipate for the future.

As I have traveled around our global-focused Army, I have seen — in the eyes and the actions of our soldiers — the qualities that produce victory. The soldiers from Fort Polk headed back to Kuwait a second time for Intrinsic Action — before moving to Fort Hood, the

understanding of service and sacrifice. The young infantryman in Panama — a veteran of Just Cause and Desert Storm in the 82nd and a recipient of the Combat Infantryman Badge — who understands training so well that he is competing for the Expert Infantryman Badge. The medical specialist in Florida, Croatia, Somalia — who cares for his fellow man and lives both the Army and the Hippocratic oath. The helicopter pilot in Somalia, Desert Storm, Wiesbaden, Bale Dogle — she knows that American interests demand the best. The Guardsmen and Reservists in Central America — who take the role of citizen soldier so professionally, and instill in other nations the principles of duty, honor and country. The brand new PFC on the range at Graf, "It means more responsibility, sir." The young WO 1 at Fort Rucker, "It's been all I expected and more." The member of the OPFOR at Hohenfels who replies to "Who's in charge?," with, "I am, sir!"

I see this spirit and dedication to excellence everywhere I go. These soldiers are not wringing their hands. They are rolling up their sleeves.

The continuous maturation of the force — new methods, thinking, techniques and capabilities merged with the timeless and essential principles of human endeavor and organization — produces an Army that is constantly growing. America's Army grows every day in sophistication, in capability, in versatility and precision. That it does so is a tribute to our soldiers, their families, our junior leaders and to our civilian component. It is also a tribute to our senior leadership.

Today and tomorrow there will be much to do, and I need your constant support — your counsel and your service. I do not know precisely what the future will bring, and there are many reasons to be pessimistic, but I am confident that the outcome will never be in doubt. America's Army will continue to be a trained and ready force of all components, serving the nation at home and abroad in a wide range of missions. America's Army, reshaping for the future, is and will be a strategic force, providing decisive land combat power as the essential ingredient required for decisive victory.

Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan is currently the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

The Customer Guide to Airpower

by Lt. Col. Richard Schaller

Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force has made many changes. It's not the same old "TAC, SAC and MAC" Air Force. Now there are new major commands with broader responsibilities.

These changes were made with the customer in mind, whether that customer is the national command authority or a Special Forces A-detachment. New commands mean new relationships and new ways of doing business, and an understanding of the new relationships will help users to strengthen their partnership with airpower.

Vital to developing that partnership are the liaison personnel the Air Force places with its many customers. The primary objective of liaison work is team building. Liaisons assist their host commanders in organizing interservice teams which are the building blocks of joint operational effectiveness. To build winning interservice teams, leaders keep their troops in frequent contact with their service counterparts through a variety of operational, staff and educational forums. This contact develops mutual understanding of each others' capabilities and operational requirements and highlights those things we have in common. These common areas form the interservice agenda and determine where liaison personnel will focus their efforts.

The many Air Force people who link airpower to customers provide specialized expertise and training to help customers use airpower effectively. These include air liaison officers, theater airlift liaison officers, special-operations liaison officers, staff weather officers, enlisted terminal air controllers, combat-control teams, pararescue, and a variety of exchange officers in operational, staff and logistics positions. Even though they come from different technical and operational backgrounds, they all have something in common — they link airpower to the customer.

These liaisons also link their parent Air Force organizations to their host units. Each Air Force major command participates in or hosts a national forum for scheduling air assets. Liaison elements assist their hosts in acquiring these air assets for training by helping them prepare for these scheduling forums.

Definition

Simply stated, airpower is the use of aircraft to accomplish a mission. It comes in many forms: an unconventional aircraft delivering a medical team to a village in an underdeveloped country, a stealth fighter striking targets deep in Iraq, or an AWACS conducting surveillance over Bosnia.

In planning the use of airpower, it helps to understand its characteristics. Traditionally, these have been speed, range and flexibility, but our experience in the Gulf War also highlighted the evolving characteristics of stealth and precision. Customers should plan their use of

airpower to take advantage of all these characteristics.

'Absolute' airpower

Also helpful in understanding airpower is the distinction between "absolute" and "relative" airpower. The Air Force motto, "Global Reach, Global Power," symbolizes its status as an absolute airpower organization. Organized, trained and equipped to conduct air operations in direct support of national-security objectives, it can reach any place on earth rapidly and deliver combat power with stealth and precision. But even though its capabilities are designed to exploit the leading edge of technology and meet the needs of the national command authority, they may not always be best-suited for each of its service counterparts.

Relative airpower organizations have capabilities tailored to meet the needs of their parent services. Army aviation is an example of a relative airpower organization whose abundant capabilities are optimized for combined operations with Army units.

Recently, Sen. Sam Nunn's concern that we are one nation with four Air Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) seemed to indicate redundancy in airpower. In fact, there is only one absolute Air Force, complemented by three relative airpower organizations who, with their comprehensive capabilities, are tailored to provide their parent services with organic air support. The redundancy which does exist is the overlap necessary to bind the services in a mutually-supportive, interoperable and cohesive force ready to achieve any national-security objective.

Three commands

To practice its absolute airpower, the Air Force is now organized into three commands, the Air Combat Command, the Air Mobility Command and the Air Force Special Operations Command.

The *Air Combat Command* is headquartered at Langley Air Force Base, Va. It includes all fighter, bomber and battle-management aircraft, such as AWACS and JSTARS, stateside. The Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Air Forces-Europe are theater components.

ACC also includes some tanker and airlift aircraft and the Air Rescue Service. ACC hosts a joint action steering committee, or JASC, which includes general-officer participation by ACC, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center.

The JASC identifies its interservice agenda by focusing on operational areas of common interest. Agenda items are then coordinated through an interservice staff agency with Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force representatives called the Air Land Sea Applications Center. The ALSA Center is directed alternately by an Army or Air Force colonel who synchronizes ACC, TRADOC, LANTFLT, and MCCDC staff actions supportive of the JASC's interservice agenda. The results are multi-service procedures published in a variety of multi-service pamphlets and taught formally to students from all services at the USAF Air Ground Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Fla.

The school teaches a variety of joint-battle-management and fire-control courses and includes an eight-member Army staff element to ensure that the curriculum is responsive to Army capabilities and requirements. It is the formal school for USAF tactical air control parties who place these procedures into practice at their host Army units. From JASC to the tactical air control parties, there is customer input at every level in developing the air-land-sea team.

The *Air Mobility Command* is headquartered at Scott AFB, Ill. This command combines airlift and tanker aircraft with global command-and-control and logistics infrastructures to satisfy the mobility needs of all customers. AMC also hosts a JASC with TRADOC participation to ensure customer input at the executive level. The Advanced Concepts and Requirements Agency is the interservice staff agency

Customer Guide to Airpower

	ACC/TRADOC	ACC/TRADOC	ACC/TRADOC
EXECUTIVE	JASC	JASC	
STAFF	ALSA Center	ACRA	LNO's
SCHOOL	USAFAGOS	USAFAMS	USAFSOS
UNIT	TACP/ALO	ALCS/TALO	1 SOW Joint Element

responsible for coordinating AMC and TRADOC staff actions to support the agenda established by the JASC. The ACRA also staffs and publishes multi-service procedures for air mobility.

These procedures and the Joint Deployment System are taught at the USAF Air Mobility School, also at Scott AFB. Procedures are put into practice at the unit level by the many airlift-control squadrons resident to Air Force wings and the theater airlift liaison officers resident with customers.

The AMC commander also sponsors the Airlift Affiliation Program, open to all customers of air mobility. The affiliation program links customers directly to their local airlift-control squadrons, who provide routine support and the Airlift Load Planners Course. This course teaches customers the practical aspects of air mobility planning, preparation and procedures. TALOs reside with their host units and assist in planning and executing airborne operations.

The *Air Force Special Operations Command* is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Fla. It includes MC-130, HC-130, AC-130, MH-53 and MH-60 aircraft. It is the air component of the U.S. Special Operations Command and responds directly to the USSOCOM commander's direction and guidance. A liaison-officer exchange program synchronizes interservice staff actions and communications between AFSOC and its service counterpart, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The AFSOC commander sponsors a special-operations affiliation program which enables Army and Air Force commanders at the wing and group level to develop and maintain routine and frequent contact to remain current on each others' capabilities and requirements. The 1st Special Operations Wing, or 1 SOW, also at Hurlburt Field, hosts a joint training element which includes four Special Forces soldiers and a Navy SEAL master chief petty officer who coordinate training for visiting members of their services with the 1 SOW.

The USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt instructs students from all services on the history, capabilities and requirements of Air Force special operations. Together, these organizations develop and maintain the interservice relations critical to the unconventional air-land-sea team.

National security is accomplished through teamwork. In building the interservice team, the Air Force has designated liaison personnel as airpower advocates who provide their hosts with skills for training, coordinating, planning and mission execution. To use airpower effectively, customers should know its characteristics and be able to blend absolute and relative airpower for mission effectiveness.

Liaisons ensure that service counterparts communicate and remain current on each other's capabilities and requirements and are valuable in solving airpower problems. Interservice mechanisms, including elements at executive, staff, school and operational levels, drive joint doctrine development and implement air-land-sea operations. These elements develop the interservice building blocks of jointness. They are team-building functions and ensure that its customers and partners in national security will always benefit from the Air Force's vision of "Global Reach, Global Power."

Lt. Col. Richard Schaller is currently chief of the Special Operations Division of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Fla. His previous assignments include service as liaison to the Army Special Operations Command and instructor at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and as commander of Detachment 6, Special Operations Combat Operations Staff, at Pope AFB, N.C. He is a command pilot with more than 4,500 hours experience including C-141s, CASA 212s and DC-3s. He holds a bachelor's degree from the Air Force Academy and a master's degree from Webster University.

The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS

by James R. Ward

Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services was the first unit in U.S. military history created specifically for the purpose of conducting unconventional warfare operations behind enemy lines. It was formed on April 14, 1942 to perform espionage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and escape and evasion operations in support of U.S. military objectives in China.

The strategic situation developing in the Far East at the beginning of World War II seemed to indicate that unconventional-warfare operations could be very useful in China or Burma. The war in the Far East began in 1931, when Japan invaded and annexed Manchuria. In 1937 the Japanese navy gained command of the sea approaches to China by controlling the coastline, and the Japanese army occupied China's key port cities. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government fled from the Japanese invaders to Chungking, deep in the interior of China.

Having lost his ports and access to the sea, Chiang needed a supply route to the rest of the world, so he ordered a road built from Kunming, China, to Lashio in Burma. The 681-mile road was built by tens of thousands of Chinese laborers in a year and a half and was opened to traffic in mid-1939. Supplies for Chiang's government and troops were shipped by sea to Rangoon, by rail to Lashio, and then by road to Kunming. It was called the Burma Road, and it was Nationalist China's main source of supply from the outside world for two and a half years — from mid-1939 to early 1942.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, their strategic objective was to knock out the U.S. Navy so that it could not interfere with Japan's plans to conquer Asia. From bases in French Indochina and Thailand the Japanese knifed down the Malay Peninsula to defeat the British in Singapore, took the Philippines away from the Americans, and captured the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. They did this with bewildering speed.

Japanese aircraft first bombed Rangoon, Burma, on Dec. 23, 1941. Three weeks later two Japanese army divisions invaded southern Burma from Thailand. It was obvious to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top military advisers that the Japanese would soon cut the Burma Road. The need to keep China in the war became a major strategic objective of the United States. Chiang Kai-shek had 346 divisions, totaling almost 4 million men, which were poorly supplied, inadequately trained and badly led, but they tied down a large number of Japanese divisions. Despite other priorities, the United States would do what it could to supply Nationalist China and keep it in the war.

In January 1942, while the

Japanese were moving into Burma, Gen. George Marshall appointed Maj. Gen. Joseph Stilwell to be commander of all U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater as well as chief of staff of Allied forces in China under Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell had spent 13 years of his Army career in China and spoke fluent Mandarin.

Stilwell faced many problems. He was about to get his third star, but he had no American ground combat forces under his command, and there was no likelihood that he would get any American units for at least another year. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was badly damaged at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese navy had complete command of the western Pacific, and the Japanese army was in the process of conquering and occupying all of the Far Eastern countries rimming the Pacific Ocean. Also, the European and Pacific theaters had higher priorities than the China-Burma-India theater. The only ground forces Stilwell would have under his command for the next year or two would be Chinese, but the Japanese were moving fast to close the Burma Road, the only supply line Stilwell had for those Chinese troops.

So in those dark days of late January 1942, when Stilwell received a staff study proposing that a small detachment of American officers and men be sent to his command to conduct intelligence and unconventional-warfare operations behind Japanese lines in China or Burma, he accepted it. The study had been sent to Stilwell by Col. Preston Goodfellow of the Coordinator of Information, later to become the OSS.

Stilwell welcomed the proposal that Detachment 101 be created, but he refused to accept the Army officer initially proposed as its commander. Stilwell said the unit would need a leader who would not be deterred by the difficulty of the mission. When Goodfellow asked Stilwell to recommend someone, Stilwell proposed Carl Eifler, who had previously served as a lieutenant in a reserve unit Stilwell once commanded. Eifler had been called to active duty and was serving as an infantry captain in Hawaii. In mid-February 1942, even before Stilwell arrived in China to take over his new command, Capt. Eifler was recruited as the first member and commanding officer of Detachment 101.

Eifler was a good choice. His first task was to cut through the red tape and bureaucratic delays that had to be cleared for the original contingent of Detachment 101 to be selected, recruited, trained, equipped and transported halfway around the world to the China-Burma-India theater. Eifler needed to find good men with a variety of military skills at a time when America's military forces were expanding faster than ever before, when everyone with any military skills whatsoever was in great demand.

Detachment 101 needed men with knowledge of the languages and cultures of the Far East, and skills in logistics, military science and tactics, engineering, communications, medicine, photography, explosives, parachuting and flying airplanes.

Eifler was given authority to pick anyone he wanted for his new unit. First, he selected Capt. John Coughlin, a West Point graduate, to be his deputy. Coughlin, in turn, recruited Capt. William R. Peers. Within a few months, these three men selected, recruited, trained and equipped the original contingent of Detachment 101 personnel.

It took the Japanese slightly more than three months to capture all of Burma, a country about the size of Texas. The Japanese had excellent intelligence on the strong and weak points of the British defenses in Burma. They bypassed the strong points and broke through the weak points with quick thrusts. The Japanese army was effective in the use of jungle-warfare tactics. They used deep-penetration strike forces to set up roadblocks and ambush the British troops behind their own lines. The British forces were road-bound. They became demoralized and incapable of stopping the Japanese.

Months before the war began,

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Maj. Gen. Joseph Stilwell (center), commander of U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater, approved the creation of Det 101 in 1942.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Capt. William R. Peers (short sleeves) escorts Maj. Gen. William Donovan on a tour of Det 101 headquarters in Burma.

Japan had recruited and exfiltrated 30 young Burmese, mostly students from Rangoon University, who were very eager to rid the country of British colonialism. When these young men returned, they led the Japanese armed forces into Burma, conducted subversive tactics among the Burmese people, and provided the Japanese with intelligence. The effectiveness of these "30 Comrades" on behalf of the Japanese later made it very difficult for OSS agents to operate in territory occupied by ethnic Burmese.

When Rangoon fell on March 8, 1942, the Burma Road was closed. Two more Japanese divisions were landed in Rangoon. Stilwell flew into Burma to command the two Chinese divisions that had been committed in support of the British. The Chinese forces were no more effective in stopping the Japanese than the British forces had been, but the better-trained of the two Chinese divisions performed reasonably well before it ran out of supplies, proving Stilwell's contention that the Chinese could fight well if properly trained, led and equipped. By May 5, all of Burma was in Japanese hands except the tiny British outpost of Fort Hertz at Putao, close to the northern tip of Burma where the frontiers of Tibet, India and China almost converge.

Stilwell refused to fly to safety. He walked out of Burma to India, where he announced to the world that he had taken a hell of a beating and was humiliated by it, but that he wanted to return and retake Burma.

While Stilwell was in Burma retreating with his Chinese divisions, Detachment 101 was being formed. It was activated in mid-April 1942. Less than three months later, Eifler, Coughlin, Peers and the first group of 21 members of Detachment 101 were at the China-Burma-India Headquarters in New Delhi, India.

When Stilwell arrived, he met with all the officers and men of Detachment 101. He urged them to set up a base in northern India and begin operations into Burma as soon as possible. He said he wanted the officers and men of Detachment 101 to learn to survive and live in the jungles, and to consider themselves as pioneers in blazing the way back into Burma. Stilwell wanted information, and he also wanted sabotage operations aimed at reducing the effectiveness of the Japanese air base in Myitkyina. Japanese aircraft flying out of the Myitkyina air base were shooting down U.S. planes flying with supplies for China over "the Hump," the Himalayan mountain range between Burma and China. Stilwell ordered Detachment 101 to blow up road and railroad bridges leading to Myitkyina from the south. He said he wanted "to hear lots of booms coming out of Burma." In addition, he asked Detachment 101 to maintain liaison with the British so that the colonial government would have no complaint about Detachment 101's activities.

The remainder of 1942 was devoted to setting up Detachment 101's base and training camps at Nazira in northern Assam; establishing communications with Washington; recruiting and training Burmese nationals to serve as intelligence agents, radio operators and saboteurs; and devising and making lightweight portable radios that could transmit messages over mountains from positions in Burma 500 miles away. The British were cooperative in making available potential agents found among the Burmese nationals in the Indian Army. Other potential agents were found in refugee camps.

It was obvious from the beginning that Caucasian Americans could not pass themselves off as natives of Burma. Detachment 101 did not drop operational groups, or OGs, of Americans by parachute for reconnaissance, sabotage or other specific operational purposes deep behind enemy lines in Burma as the OSS did in Europe.

Later in the war, Detachment 101 did deploy American OG units on reconnaissance operations along the Arakan Coast of Burma in support of British 14th Army operations. Detachment 101's Maritime Unit was also used in coastal reconnaissance operations searching for

potential agent and troop-landing areas, as well as probing for underwater minefields and Japanese beach defenses. For the most part, however, the military mission in Burma entailed training, deploying and supporting native agents in intelligence-collection operations and in organizing, supporting and leading native guerrilla forces in combat to maximize the potential military effectiveness of these native forces against the Japanese.

The sign at the entrance to Detachment 101's base camp in northern Assam stated that it was "The U.S. Army Experimental Station." That excellent cover name was sufficiently innocuous to lead some of the local people to conclude that it was a research facility for the study of tropical diseases, a fact which deterred the curious from prying into what was going on at the base camp. It was also an appropriate name because much of what Detachment 101 did initially was experimental. Its members learned their lessons through trial and error and on-the-job training. A great deal was learned about surviving and fighting in the jungles from natives, especially the Kachin hill tribesmen, some of whom came from such remote and primitive mountainous areas that they had never seen a wheel until they first saw them on airplanes.



At the end of 1942, when Detachment 101 attempted its first infiltration operation, there were six Japanese divisions scattered throughout Burma. The mission of the first infiltration unit, known as A-Group, an eight-man team composed of Burmese natives and two Burma-domiciled Englishmen, was to attack and sabotage the roads and railroad used for bringing supplies from the south into Myitkyina, where the Japanese 18th Division headquarters was based.

Detachment 101 had not yet acquired an air-drop capability, so the initial plan called for A-Group to infiltrate overland from Fort Hertz, where British officers commanded a battalion of mountain tribesmen called the Northern Kachin Levies. It soon became apparent that the terrain was so formidable and dangerous and the distance to the target area — 250 miles — was so far that they could not complete the mission and return to Fort Hertz before the monsoon began in May.

They decided to abort the overland mission and infiltrate by parachute. A deal was made with the Air Transport Command, which was losing pilots and planes on the Hump run. The ATC would furnish the planes, parachutes and parachute-instructor personnel, and Detachment 101 would develop an air-crew-rescue program and help train air crews in jungle-survival skills.

With the help of the ATC, A-Group was parachuted into the Kaukkwee Valley, where they established a base camp. They sent their first message to 101 Headquarters in India, and then headed over the mountains to the railroad. On the first night after reaching the

railroad, they split into two teams and blew the railroad in 30 places using variable time-delay fuses. On the second night, one of the teams blew up a railroad bridge, dropping two spans of the bridge into a river.

At the same time in January 1943, an American major was leading a team down from Fort Hertz to Ngumla, north of Myitkyina, to establish an intelligence base and train guerrilla forces to conduct sabotage and harassment operations. Detachment 101 was finally in business.

These early operations were relatively insignificant compared with what Detachment 101 was to accomplish later, but they were the beginning. A great deal was learned from those early missions about infiltration techniques into Burma and supporting men in the field by air.

By the end of 1943, Detachment 101 had six intelligence bases that were staffed by Americans operating in northern Burma. Each of these bases ran intelligence-collection operations and had Kachin guerrilla forces that were able to defend the approaches to the bases and conduct sabotage and harassment operations. In addition, even deeper behind Japanese lines, 101 had agent/radio operator teams scattered along the main transportation arteries leading to Northern Burma. All of these communicated by radio with the main base in Nazira, India.

In late 1943, a 40-foot speedboat arrived to facilitate sea infiltration operations along the Burma coast. While planning other uses for this boat, Eifler was informed that an American B-24 had been shot down and crash-landed in the Bay of Bengal west of Rangoon. Eifler immediately led the crew of his new boat 450 miles deep into enemy waters in a successful rescue of the B-24's nine-man crew. Shortly after this, Eifler was badly injured during a sea-infiltration operation in which he brought two rubber rafts back from the beach to the launch boat waiting 600 yards out.

When Maj. Gen. William Donovan, head of the OSS, visited 101 Headquarters in December 1943, he placed Peers in command of Detachment 101, put Coughlin in charge of OSS strategic operations in the China-Burma-India theater, and transferred Eifler back to the United States to brief authorities in Washington and for reassignment to other duties.

Detachment 101 continued to expand slowly but steadily until the beginning of 1944, when Stilwell told Peers he wanted Detachment 101 to expand its guerrilla forces rapidly to 3,000 men. Stilwell wanted 101 to assist Merrill's Marauders and the Chinese troops in their drive down the Hukawng Valley. He said that if the guerrillas were really effective, 101 would be authorized to expand its guerrilla forces to 10,000 men.

Stilwell then provided Detachment 101 with eight additional officers, some arms and ammunition, and six aircraft from the Troop Carrier Command for air-supply purposes. More of everything, including personnel, was also ordered from OSS headquarters in the United States. During 1944 and early 1945, Detachment 101 greatly expanded its guerrilla force to a peak of about 10,800 in March 1945.

Detachment 101 was fortunate. Its members had more than a year to build an intelligence base before they were required to conduct guerrilla warfare. That was a tremendous advantage, because with this intelligence base they always knew more about the enemy than the enemy did about them. When Detachment 101 did commit its guerrilla units, it was initially in support of conventional military forces, Merrill's Marauders, the Mars Task Force, and the Chinese and British troops. Detachment 101 provided them with intelligence, at times scouted for them on the march, patrolled their flanks and occasionally served to screen their movements so that the Japanese would think that only a guerrilla force was on the move in their area.

Guerrillas generally controlled the jungles on the flanks and to the front of these conventional forces so that the Japanese were confined to the main north-and-south corridors — the roads, the railroad and the

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

1st Lt. Wallace Welch of Det 101 and a group of Kachins plan an ambush operation in northern Burma early in 1945.

Irrawaddy River — where conventional forces and the 10th Air Force could attack them. Detachment 101 harassed the Japanese supply lines and rear bases, thereby forcing them to devote more of their combat forces to cover their flanks and rear.

For the most part, Detachment 101 guerrilla forces that fought in close support of allied military units were organized in formations no larger than the size of a company. They were generally deployed widely in small groups conducting reconnaissance, ambushes and hit-and-run harassment operations. They were highly mobile, supplied almost entirely by air, and tended to rely more on dispersion than entrenched positions for defense. They were more effective when close to the fighting forces than when deployed deep behind Japanese army lines, because the continuing pressure of our conventional forces on the Japanese prevented the latter from disengaging and attacking the guerrilla forces with enough strength to cut them off and destroy them.

Detachment 101 guerrilla forces operating in northern Burma west of the main north-south road, river and rail corridors, however, were not close to the main fighting forces, and they had to fight independently against the more widely dispersed Japanese army units near the China border.

These guerrilla forces consisted of battalion-size formations that had the mission of clearing the Japanese from their tactical area. They often engaged Japanese army units in sustained offensive and defensive combat. Their success in clearing their tactical areas even after they had moved south of the Kachin Hills into the Shan states where the native population was not initially friendly convinced higher authorities later in the war that Detachment 101 could broaden its mission.

The war in northern Burma was fought in three phases. The first phase began in November 1943 and ended in late August 1944 with the capture of Myitkyina and the securing of flights over the Hump to China from disruption by the Japanese air force. The second phase ended with the capture of Lashio, Maymyo and Mandalay in March 1945. The third phase ended in July 1945 with all of the old Burma Road from Rangoon to Lashio and Xunming back under Allied control.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

The author (left) as a member of Detachment 101 in Burma.

During the first two phases, Detachment 101 played an important role both as a supplier of intelligence and as a guerrilla force in support of American and Allied conventional military forces. During the third phase, however, Detachment 101 was assigned the conventional military mission of clearing the enemy from an area of about 10,000 square miles in the Shan states in order to secure the Burma Road. For its success in accomplishing that mission, Detachment 101 was awarded the Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation.

Although it won the citation for its success in completing a conventional military mission, Detachment 101 had been created to perform unconventional tasks such as espionage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, propaganda and escape-and-evasion missions.

In the performance of its espionage task, Detachment 101 provided 75 percent of all the intelligence from which the 10th Air Force chose its targets and 85 percent of all the intelligence received by Stilwell's Northern Combat Area Command. In addition to a number of American-staffed intelligence bases established in Burma, Detachment 101 infiltrated 162 native agent/radio teams into Burma by air, by sea or over land.

Detachment 101 sabotage agents and guerrillas demolished 57 bridges, derailed nine trains, destroyed or captured 272 trucks or other vehicles and destroyed 15,000 tons of Japanese supplies. These

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Kachin forces watch for possible movement of Japanese forces along a trail in Burma.

sabotage operations also had the effect of forcing the Japanese to deploy additional troops to protect their rear-echelon bases and lines of communication.

Detachment 101's greatest effectiveness was in the field of guerrilla warfare. The unit's members pioneered the use of air and radio communications to support and coordinate guerrilla-warfare activities. They recruited, organized, trained, equipped and led more than 10,800 guerrillas in effective support of conventional military operations. Detachment 101's guerrilla forces killed 5,428 members of the Japanese army, wounded an estimated 10,000 and captured 78 Japanese prisoners. Their own losses were 27 Americans, 338 native guerrillas and 40 espionage agents killed.

Reports on the success of the escape-and-evasion operations vary from a total of 232 to 425 allied airmen rescued. The Detachment built trails and cache sites along the Hump run, and the higher figure may include those who parachuted to the ground and used these trails and cache sites to escape. It may also include airmen who were brought to safety by Kachins who were influenced to help by 101 but were not directly under the control of Detachment 101 personnel. The lower figure, 232, was taken from the Northern Combat Area Command's historical account of the northern and central Burma campaigns, and it does not include those who may have been rescued during the last four months of the war in Burma.

The success of the propaganda and psychological-warfare efforts was difficult to measure. It was impossible to judge how effective Detachment 101's efforts were in demoralizing the Japanese army in Burma. The members knew from intelligence reports that Allied military victories had a very demoralizing effect upon the Japanese army, but the unit was not successful in persuading individual Japanese soldiers to surrender through its propaganda.

It was also difficult to determine the value of propaganda in helping to win the loyalty of the Kachins and even some of the Shans. It was even more difficult to evaluate the impact of propaganda on the Burmese people, but when the "30 Comrades," the Burmese nationalists who aided the Japanese entry into Burma, decided to switch their allegiance to the Allies because they were disillusioned with Japan's empty promises of independence, Detachment 101 helped them to do so. A Detachment 101 agent called "Mac" led a representative of Gen. Aung San, a man named Thakin Pe Tint, to a secret airstrip built by the OSS specifically for the purpose of exfiltrating him. He was flown to British 14th Army headquarters, where General Slim made arrangements for the Burma National Army to switch sides on March 26, 1945. But that was more of a secret political coup engineered by the British with Detachment 101's help than a propaganda achievement.

Detachment 101 was fortunate for many reasons. Its members had time to experiment, to learn through trial and error and to build an intelligence base before having to undertake guerrilla-warfare activities. By early 1944, they had built a very efficient support organization, without which they would not have been able to support by air the guerrilla force they had created.

Detachment 101 was also lucky that the people living in the areas they first had to infiltrate were Kachins and that the American and Irish missionaries who worked with them had won their loyalties to the extent that they did. The unit had none of the political problems that would have plagued it if the members had to operate in countries such as China or Vietnam.

The Kachins were not by nature inclined to engage in conventional assault and defensive combat, but they were outstandingly effective in the use of guerrilla tactics in mountainous jungle terrain to surprise, deceive and confuse the Japanese.

Detachment 101 made mistakes, but it also learned a great deal from these mistakes and tried not to repeat them. Unfortunately, the Detachment was instructed to keep

no records while behind enemy lines because of a fear at OSS headquarters that such records might be used by the Japanese to justify torture in the event Detachment 101 members were captured. As a result, they wrote no after-action reports covering their guerrilla-warfare operations. Such reports would have been invaluable in recording for historical purposes the lessons they learned through trial and error.

Detachment 101's contribution to the Allied war effort in Burma was very valuable, but it cost very little. Only about 120 Americans served in the field at any one time, directing and supporting a guerrilla force that grew to more than 10,000 natives. Detachment 101's casualty rate was exceptionally low for the number of men fielded and the damage inflicted on the enemy.

The veterans of Detachment 101 are unanimously proud of their unit's accomplishments, and they all concur that much of its success was attributable to the leadership provided by Colonels Eifler and Peers. Although very different in personality and temperament, they were both men of extraordinary integrity, courage and dedication to the successful accomplishment of Detachment 101's mission. Each seemed to be the right person at the right time in command of Detachment 101. It was reassuring to the men in the jungles in close proximity to the enemy to know that when they needed it, they could count on the timely delivery of an emergency ammunition drop, a piece of vital intelligence, an air strike, or medical support and evacuation. Eifler and Peers made Detachment 101 a well-integrated, efficient team that responded effectively to the demands of the theater commander.

Although OSS Detachment 101 clearly functioned under and responded to the military chain of command in the China-Burma-India theater, its OSS support structure provided it with vitally needed flexibility that it would not have had if it had been fully integrated into and totally dependent on the U.S. military support structure that existed at that time. Detachment 101 was able to draw much of what it needed from the military support structure, but it was also able to rely on its OSS resources when the military was not able to support it as swiftly as requirements demanded.

The OSS contributed to the overall Allied war effort in World War II by providing useful tactical and strategic intelligence and by promoting and supporting the resistance potential of the people in enemy-occupied territory in the entire spectrum of unconventional warfare. It is probable, however, that the greatest contribution of the OSS in the long run was to prove for the historical record that the United States needed a centralized intelligence agency and that the armed forces of the United States have much to gain by developing and retaining a permanent unconventional-warfare capability such as exists today in the United States Special Operations Command.

In World War II, James R. Ward was recruited from the parachute infantry by the OSS because of his proficiency in foreign languages. The OSS assigned him to Detachment 101 in Burma, where he commanded Kachin and other ethnic guerrilla forces in combat for more than 13 months. Later, as a reserve officer, he had active-duty tours with the 10th, 7th, 3rd and 6th Special Forces Groups, which he claims would have killed him if he were not in good physical shape. Staying in shape since has enabled him to win national and world triathlon championships in his age group and become, at age 75, the oldest finisher of the Ironman Triathlon in Hawaii.

Remaining Engaged in Africa: An Army SOF Strategy

by Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph, Jr.

U.S. Army special-operations forces have proven their utility in the environment called low-intensity conflict. Peacetime engagement strategy, as suggested by James Locher III, former assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, puts SOF at the forefront of America's attempt to foster democracy and stability around the globe.

Nowhere is a SOF strategy potentially more beneficial than on the continent of Africa. Unlike Europe and Asia, Africa is not a major industrial power. It does not produce many finished goods for Americans to consume, nor is it a major trading partner like Germany or Japan. Yet Africa is important to the United States for reasons of pragmatic self-interest and on moral grounds. A SOF strategy in Africa looking into the next century can pay America significant dividends at relatively little cost.

The majority of nations in Africa were still under colonial rule in 1950, but decolonization came rapidly after, and by 1967 most of the former colonies had achieved independence. Unfortunately, many of the new African nations did not possess even rudimentary governmental infrastructures. The competing ideologies of democratic capitalism and Marxism-Leninism vied for influence and in some cases fueled domestic tribal animosities that can be seen today.

In some cases, lacking trained and educated populations, economic and governmental structures, and saddled with national borders imposed by former European rulers, African nations found the post-colonial period tumultuous. A great deal of political discord continues. Much of the African continent remains plagued with population problems — over-population in some regions and under-population in others. Disease is common in the central region, predominantly sleeping sickness and AIDS, and famine remains a life-threatening problem for millions, particularly in the northeast. Radical Islam is currently making rulers of the Arabized north and east African countries uncomfortable, and the state of South Africa continues on the road toward potential racial warfare.

Despite its enormous problems, Africa remains an important region. According to a Department of State discussion paper, for the United States, Africa represents:

- The political forces of the world's largest regional bloc;
- A rich source of natural resources;
- The ancestral home of 25 million Americans;
- A growing market for American exports;
- An opportunity to demonstrate, through private enterprise and government-to-government aid, that democratic institutions and individual initiative provide a better solution to the problems of the Third World than do totalitarianism and economic regimentation; and
- Possibilities for our adversaries to exploit regional tensions and foster insecurity through the indiscriminate provision of arms and support for violent solution of local conflicts.[1]

Pragmatic argument

There are both pragmatic and moral reasons for being engaged in Africa, but for the moment, let us concentrate on matters of national self-interest. The African continent is more than three times the size of the United States and possesses tremendous natural mineral resources. These mineral resources constitute much of the "grist" upon which modern societies depend. Diamonds, oil, chromium and platinum are just a few of the mineral resources critical to an industrial and ever-more-technical nation such as America. From a purely self-interested perspective, the United States must remain engaged on the continent.

Africa contains a veritable treasure house of the known world reserves of the following: chromium — 97 percent, cobalt — 69 percent, diamonds — 92 percent, manganese — 59 percent, platinum — 78 percent, tantalum — 69 percent, and vanadium — 49 percent. Annual U.S. mineral needs equal 10 trillion pounds a year — nearly two tons of metals for each citizen. Mineral imports account for approximately $25-$30 billion of imports every year. The U.S. is more than 50-percent dependent for 23 of 40 essential minerals.[2]

According to Kenneth Kessel's book, *Strategic Minerals: U.S. Alternatives*, chromium, manganese, cobalt and platinum are strategically essential. Cobalt is essential in the manufacture of jet engines; steel cannot be made without manganese; and chromium makes the creation of stainless steel possible. "These four have few or no good substitutes, are essential to the production of important weapons or key industrial processes, and are located primarily in countries of questionable supply reliability — southern Africa and the former USSR."[3]

U.S. dependence is such that Congress passed the Strategic Minerals Stockpiling Act in 1979. The act was precipitated by a congressional finding that stated: "Domestic resources for some materials cannot support military, industrial, and essential civilian needs for national defense."[4] The act "Provides that strategic and critical materials be stockpiled in the interest of national defense to preclude costly and dangerous dependence upon foreign sources of supply in times of national emergency."[5]

A March 31, 1989, review of the status of American stockpiling efforts under the legislation revealed significant shortages in many of the minerals plentiful in Africa. Further growth in technology-oriented weaponry can be expected, increasing American dependence on African mineral resources. According to L. Harold Bullis and James E. Mielke, "It seems reasonable to require that U.S. foreign policy reflect the importance of maintaining the independence and freedom of action of major U.S. supplier nations, as well as the importance of continued U.S. access to key strategic and critical raw materials, whatever their source."[6]

U.S. Army photo

Although not a major industrial power, Africa offers to pay significant dividends to U.S. involvement into the next century.

Moral argument

Possibly just as important as the self-interest motive are the moral imperatives which should drive future U.S. interests in Africa. America, like many of Africa's former colonial rulers, suffers from a history pockmarked by racial prejudice. The American Civil War after 1863, with President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, was fought over the issue of black slavery. The United States is still trying to attain the goal of a color-blind society. Additionally, 25 million Americans have ethnic roots in Africa. As the world's "moral leader" after the fall of the Soviet Union, can the United States afford to ignore future African economic, governmental and social development?

America also has historical ties with a number of African nations. Morocco was the first nation to recognize the independence of the United States from Great Britain and has maintained a close and mutually beneficial relationship ever since. Liberia was founded by freed American slaves. Its capital, Monrovia, was named for former U.S. president James Monroe. Egypt, although not always a friend to America, now receives more U.S. economic and military aid than all other countries except Israel. Egypt was also a staunch ally in America's recent war with Iraq. America has maintained generally friendly relations with Zaire, as well as other non-democratic African counties. And Africa's newest nation, Namibia, was founded with the support of the U.S. working through the United Nations.

America also has an interest in the growth and perpetuation of human rights. The United Nations "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," of which the United States is not only a signatory, but one of the primary authors, reads remark-

U.S. Army photo

Person-to-person contacts such as this medical training exercise give U.S. forces the chance to establish rapport with local populations.

ably like the American Constitution. The Declaration recognizes "the inherent dignity and ... equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family... (and) as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."[7]

Americans might do well to remember that without support from France, America might never have succeeded in its revolution. Although difficult to imagine now, the 13 colonies could have lost their war with the English had not the French fleet blockaded British shipping and French troops assisted General George Washington. The most revolutionary words ever put to paper can be found in America's Declaration of Independence. Freedom, justice and the inherent dignity of the individual are words that echo back to us from the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and Asia, as well as Africa. American support to democracy in the Third World is a moral imperative.

SOF strategy in Africa

From the perspective of this article, the larger question may be, "What is the strategic rationale for a SOF presence in Africa?" It is obvious that the continent is still suffering from the throes of decolonization and the after-effects of the Cold War. Ethiopia, Angola and Somalia have been a few of the African pawns in the "great game" between the U.S. and USSR. Military support provided to Ethiopia by the USSR turned that country into an armed camp and allowed it to prosecute wars in Eritrea and the Ogaden.

Some former colonial powers are still engaged on the continent. According to one source, "France has maintained a major military presence in Africa ... It has been the continent's second largest supplier of arms, providing some 9 percent of North Africa's and 30 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's requirements"[8] But France is hardly the only player. Great Britain "crushed mutinies which almost overthrew the established governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania ... It maintains small military training teams in a number of Commonwealth African countries"[9]

The point in mentioning the two countries above is to demonstrate that other Western nations have interests and obligations in Africa, and that there is little America might do there that will not involve other actors — possibly in coalition toward the attainment of mutual goals.

The recent success of coalition forces in Iraq leads to the question whether similar coalitions might be possible in future political and military activities. SOF, because of their language abilities and cross-cultural-communications training, have extraordinary capability when used in coalition with other nations' forces. In fact, SF detachments were attached to Arab battalions in the Persian Gulf War for just this reason.

The question of forward-deployed forces is a thorny one in American politics. Whether or not the U.S. will continue to maintain significant military forces overseas into the 21st century remains to be determined. But a SOF presence in Africa, either forward-deployed or on a temporary and intermittent basis, may be in the long-term interests of America. It should be clear that ARSOF are generally the best trained forces available to operate on the continent of Africa as well as the remainder of the Third World.

The kinds of wars that have been fought across the African continent also support the use of SOF. A majority of armed conflicts in Africa since decolonization have been guerrilla-type wars. These have been primarily low-technology insurgencies which are the "bread and butter" of SOF. Whether in support of a fledgling democracy or a democratic insurgent movement, SOF are the best troops available to help either achieve their goals.

The new opportunities are significant. Not the least of these is the opportunity to set an example for African military establishments. By their mere presence in a Third World environment, large conven-

tional American armed forces often have negative effects. One need not look any farther than the Philippines for an example — the population of the Philippines has often been politically polarized over the conventional American military presence in their land.

Circumstances have changed. That polarization was against the backdrop of super-power competition. With the fall of the Soviet Union, democracy is the only successful political paradigm left which African nations might come to emulate. According to Edward J. Perkins, the move toward democracy in Africa is well under way:

The new Africa is moving away from the view that the state can solve all ills — toward recognition of the important role of the individual and the community in generating and sustaining growth. Rulers of the new Africa are coming to realize that political stability is won by establishing participatory governments which respect the rights of individuals.[10]

Even with some African democratic movements well under way, SOF, either permanently forward-deployed or on temporary duty, can train, advise and assist African militaries without many of the political ramifications that attend the employment of large conventional forces. Additionally, it is oftentimes the military in Third World nations that hold the real keys to power. SOF military-to-military contact can provide an example for other democratically minded military establishments.

Unlike the American political-military experience with sharp divisions between power blocs, it is common in Africa for the military to play a much larger role in domestic politics. This circumstance need not necessarily be bad. An African army which has been trained in total, or in part, by American SOF could eventually come to accept greater civilian political dominance. This is no easy task, but the example set by America's military can come to be *the* model to emulate.

Also, because of the nature of many African and other Third World cultures, person-to-person contact is the most valued and long-lasting. The American notion that a one-time deployment of troops can solve the security problems of a fledgling democracy is absurd. Only long-term and consistent American policies which encourage democracy in foreign militaries and populaces can be expected to bear fruit. SOF's regional expertise, linguistic abilities and maturity make them the obvious choice to maintain many of these military-to-military contacts.

Philosophically, it must be accepted that the United States may sometimes fail in these attempts. There are no absolute answers and no guarantees of success. Where human beings are concerned, it is difficult, if not impossible, for American policy makers to determine a Third World leader's commitment to democratic principles. For both pragmatic and moral reasons, the attempt should be made; and as columnist George Will suggested concerning the people of the Third Word, "The business of America is justice and securing the blessings of liberty."[11]

The time for African democracy may be here. According to Robert Fatton Jr. in the *Political Science Quarterly*:

Too many times they (Africans) have seen and suffered the consequences of broken promises; too many times they have experienced a politics of coups and countercoups that alters nothing except the faces of embezzlers; too many times they have been devoured by causes and leaders they have supported and embraced.[12]

Democracy, supported by the United States, may be many African nations' best hope for a stable and just future. There are solid pragmatic and moral reasons for the United States to remain engaged, and Army special-operations forces have a unique role to play in helping to bring democratic freedoms to the African continent in the next century. ✂

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Notes:

[1] U.S. Department of State, "Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1985), p. 1.

[2] Data extracted from a briefing given by the U.S. Army Base Engineering Activity, Rock Island, Ill., to the Department of Joint and Combined Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March 1985, (hereafter called Rock Island Brief).

[3] Kenneth A. Kessel, *Strategic Minerals: U.S. Alternatives* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), p. 21.

[4] Rock Island Brief.

[5] Rock Island Brief.

[6] L. Harold Bullis and James E. Mielke, *Strategic and Critical Minerals* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 270-271.

[7] "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Basic Documents on Human Rights*, ed. Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 21-22.

[8] "Africa South of the Sahara," *Europe Publications Limited*, 17th Edition (London: 1987), p. 51.

[9] *Ibid*.

[10] Edward J. Perkins, "The Seedlings of Hope: U.S. Policy in Africa," Current Policy, No. 1183, Address before Africare, Washington, D.C., June 11, 1989, U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 2.

[11] George F. Will, "A Land Fit for Heroes," *Newsweek*, 11 March 1991, p. 78.

[12] Robert Fatton Jr., "Liberal Democracy in Africa," *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1990, p. 470.

Sniper Training in the 10th Special Forces Group

by CWO 2 Brent A. Delorier

As early as 1984, the 10th Special Forces Group ran pre-sniper training to prepare its soldiers for formal sniper training at the JFK Special Warfare Center. This pre-training continued until 1987, when the commander of the 1st Special Operations Command directed the 10th Group to expand and upgrade its Special Operations Target Interdiction Course to a Category II sniper course.

This upgrade accomplished three objectives: It allowed the unit to train its own snipers, easing the load on the Special Warfare Center; it allowed sniper-trained soldiers to retain their highly perishable skills; and it served as an excellent preparatory course for soldiers who were accepted at the Special Warfare Center SOTIC.

The 10th Group used SOCOM Regulation 350-1 as the course outline and paralleled as many of the Special Warfare Center's lesson outlines as possible. Current differences between the two courses are minute.

The SOTIC committee has also undergone changes over the last several years. Initially, it was composed of soldiers selected from the unit, with little regard to equal representation from sub-units. Next, the committee was an actual A-detachment. This proved to be a tremendous overload for the ODA: it was expected to perform both its team duties and the necessary SOTIC committee duties.

Taking advantage of previous lessons learned, a third committee was selected with one sniper-qualified soldier from each line company of the Group's 2nd and 3rd battalions. To retain balanced representation, the officer-in-charge and three NCOs were taken from the 2nd battalion, while the 3rd battalion provided the NCOIC and 3 NCOs. Besides the OIC and NCOIC, the remaining six NCOs hold the positions of S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5, armorer and range NCO.

The eight-man committee may be deployed by the commander in any of three ways: as an eight-man, MOS cross-trained, sniper/counter-sniper detachment; as two four-man sniper teams working with their original battalions; or as eight individuals returned to their original ODAs or ODBs, since they are carried by paragraph and line number

with their units and are special-duty attachments to the headquarters service company.

Members of the committee maintain certification standards in PT, weapons qualification, MOS proficiency, language, HALO/SCUBA (if qualified), and professional development.

The 10th Group SOTIC committee is fortunate to have its own range facility, Curry Range, named in honor of Capt. Joseph P. Curry, who was killed over Lockerbe, Scotland, in 1988. Range limits do exist, but they allow for silhouette target engagement slightly beyond 900 yards.

The range consists of five firing lanes from each of the hundred-meter berms. Besides the main berm, which handles the various-sized bulls-eyes, moving targets and snap targets, the length of the range is dotted with steel silhouettes. The steel targets are 19 1/2 inches by 39 inches (E-type), 24 inches by 39 inches, or an 8-inch head exposure only. These variable-sized targets greatly assist students in learning to use the Mil-Dot reticle of the M-3 Ultra scope, which is mounted to the M-24 sniper weapon system.

The course, five weeks long, is limited to 10 sniper students per class. At least four instructors are required to maintain an acceptable student-instructor ratio. Before attending the course, each student must pass a PT test, qualify expert with an M-16, have vision correctable to 20/20 and pass a Minnesota Multifacet Personality Inventory, an in-depth personality battery.

The first day of the course consists of an M-16 diagnostic shoot to ensure that each student is capable of acquiring 38 of 40 targets. After a course introduction and brief history of sniping, the students spend the entire first week working with the M-24 iron sights (globe front, micrometer peep rear) on an NRA position shoot. During this time the students are introduced to the finer points of ballistics and environmental factors and their relation to elevation and windage sight settings.

Once the iron sights have been mastered, the students move to the telescopic sight, the M-3 Ultra. They must apply everything they have learned about elevation and windage to the scope, while adding in the range-determination capabilities of the Mil-Dot scope reticle. Students are initiated to the use of the scope with known-distance targets. Grouping exercises are an important part of this phase, stressing five-round, one-minute-of-angle groups. This means placing five consecutive rounds inside a one-inch circle at 100 yards. Students then move to acquiring targets at unknown distances.

Camouflage and concealment play an important part in the course. Each student is required to construct his own ghillie suit for the stalking phase. Imagination, originality and practicality are stressed in the construction of the sniper suit. Stalks vary in length, as the students attempt to evade detection by the instructors using 20-power spotting scopes, while still moving to within 200 meters of designated targets. Students also learn to reload their own ammunition to increase the accuracy of their assigned sniper systems.

To pass the course, students must score at least 70 percent for each shooting event. The committee's job is to produce snipers for their ODAs and their commanders, and 10th Group SOTIC instructors will spend the necessary time to retrain students, giving additional time to those having difficulties. In the past two courses (since the current committee was assembled), all 20 sniper students have completed the course.

The SOTIC committee, in conjunction with the Group headquarters, is currently attempting to procure .50-cal. Barrett heavy sniper rifles as well as some foreign sniper rifles. The course currently provides familiarization with the M-1D, M-21 and the M-14NM rifles. A desire to incorporate SVD familiarization is being addressed, pending procurement. The committee is also planning to purchase 300 Winchester magnum rifles and SIMRAD scopes.

The 10th Group SOTIC commit-

Photo by Brent Delorier

Course facilities provide tower, rooftop parapet and window positions for use in urban training scenarios in the 10th SF Group Sniper Course.

tee is also responsible for five-day sustainment training for each company's snipers, a five-day validation program, and a five-day advanced marksmanship program for non-snipers. The SOTIC committee is coordinating with the Battalion S-3s to run four SOTIC classes per fiscal year in addition to the validation, sustainment and advanced marksmanship programs.

The 10th Group SOTIC also has its own repair facility within the committee building, where it performs match-grade repairs and upgrades. Two members of the committee have attended a one-week repair training course offered by a commercial arms manufacturer. The committee hopes to send more instructors to the course, as well as to the Match Armorers Course at Fort Benning, Ga. By providing access to these courses, the Group will reap the benefits of in-house repairs for all its sniper weapons systems, no matter where they are deployed.

Photo by Brent Delorier

A student fires his M-24 sniper rifle from inside the building of the 10th Group sniper training facility.

CWO 2 Brent A. Delorier is currently the officer in charge of the 10th SF Group's Special Operations Target Interdiction Course. His previous assignments with the 10th SF Group include serving as a team leader, detachment technician and intelligence sergeant in the 2nd Battalion and serving as a weapons sergeant in the 3rd Battalion. In addition to the SF Qualification Course, he has completed the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course and the Defense Language Institute course in German.

PSYOP In The Early 1980s: The Way We Were

by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.

Prior to the 1985 DoD Master Plan, the Army psychological-operations community faced a number of challenges which demanded planning, commitment and hard work to overcome.

This account focuses on the period of the author's command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group, from November 1979 to May 1982. While this is principally a personal perspective, the period is representative of the conditions faced by the PSYOP community in the early 1980s.

During the height of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the Army had PSYOP units at Fort Bragg, N.C., in Germany, Panama and Okinawa, in addition to a group in the Republic of Vietnam. With post-Vietnam reductions, however, by the mid-1970s the only active PSYOP unit remaining was the 4th Group at Fort Bragg.

By the early 1980s, Cold War tensions began to intensify. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian hostage situation and increased concerns by the U.S. for its interests in Central America and Southwest Asia signalled heightened rivalry between the two superpowers.

In January 1980, the 4th PSYOP Group conducted a PSYOP capabilities assessment in preparation for the visit of a team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In fact, during 1980 and 1981, the 4th POG produced four such assessments for OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Army Forces Command. The theme of all these assessments was the same: As requirements for PSYOP support were increasing, there were no commensurate increases in the capabilities of the group. There was a significant requirements/capabilities mismatch.

To address the deficiencies revealed by our initial capabilities assessments, we developed nine long-range goals to guide the activities of the 4th Group. Our first goal was to *enhance understanding and appreciation of PSYOP within the Army*. Improvement in this area had to occur in order to achieve any progress toward our other goals. Too few commanders and staff officers had sufficient knowledge concerning the value of the psychological dimension.

There were three main reasons for this lack of awareness. First, PSYOP instruction had virtually disappeared from the curricula of our service schools. Second, few PSYOP officer slots in headquarters levels above the 4th Group — the "supporting superstructure" — were filled by PSYOP-qualified officers. Third, there was a general failure to integrate PSYOP with operational planning.

These three problem areas were interrelated. If a senior commander or staff officer had not been introduced to PSYOP through his formal schooling and did not have a competent PSYOP officer on his staff, what motivation did he have to integrate PSYOP effectively into his operational planning? And if he did not recognize the value of PSYOP to his unit's operational readiness, what motivation did he have to fight for adequate resourcing of PSYOP units?

We addressed this challenge in several ways. First, we used our PSYOP capabilities assessments as the basis for briefings that we presented to any senior personnel who would listen. Some of these efforts had favorable outcomes: The PSYOP assessment prepared for FORSCOM formed the basis for a "PSYOP enhancement action" which the Department of the Army approved in 1982.

This same example also demonstrates the difference a qualified PSYOP staff officer can make. Until mid-1981, there had been no full-time PSYOP officer on the DA staff

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for several years. With the support of our higher command, we were successful in convincing the Army deputy chief of staff for operations that this situation was not in the best interests of the Army. Asked to nominate an officer for this position, we suggested Col. Tom Timmes, who arrived at DCSOPS just in time to play a key role in successfully staffing our PSYOP enhancement action through DA.

We also showcased some of our research products in tailored presentations. One study, "The Soviet Psychological Operations Threat," elicited considerable interest as a result of numerous presentations in the U.S. and for the unified commands.

Finally, both the 4th POG and its reserve-component PSYOP colleagues devoted considerable effort toward educating conventional-unit commanders and their staffs through the process of operational planning and participation in exercises. The emergence of the CAPSTONE program was particularly helpful in this endeavor.

It is important to emphasize the adverse impact that the lack of a PSYOP supporting superstructure had on the 4th Group. In far too many cases, if action on doctrine, planning or materiel development was required, the 4th Group had to provide both the impetus and the personnel needed to accomplish the task. We did so because we wanted to get things done, but it added tremendously to the strain on our limited resources. The lack of a PSYOP supporting superstructure and the absence of PSYOP instruction in service-school curricula were beyond the 4th Group's direct ability to control, but we believed they were glaring long-term deficiencies that had to be addressed if PSYOP were to be institutionalized as a viable weapons system.

The second goal, *bring the 4th Group up to comparable strength of other groups within the JFK Center for Military Assistance,* addressed our most glaring deficiency — personnel shortages. At the time of our recommended PSYOP enhancement action in mid-1981, the group was at 73-percent fill. Specialty Code 48 (Foreign Area Officer) and 35 (Intelligence) represented the group's core of officer skills. We had 41-percent fill in SC 35, and 33-percent fill in SC 48.

Within the enlisted grades, the intelligence MOSs 96B and 96C provided the skills essential to our business. The group was short 73 percent of authorized E-6s and E-7s in MOS 96B and assigned only 46 percent of authorized E-6s and E-7s in MOS 96C. At the same time, junior-enlisted personnel were overrepresented — the group had assigned 195 percent of authorized E-3s. Compounding the problem was the fact that the Army had no enlisted MOS dedicated to PSYOP.

After 2 1/2 years of reporting shortages on monthly readiness reports, completion of several PSYOP capabilities assessments and numerous command letters detailing our critical shortages, the 4th PSYOP Group's personnel status continued to lag behind the Special Forces groups. Our requirements vs. capabilities dilemma had not been resolved — at least not for the short term.

On the positive side, however, the foundation for improvement over the longer term was laid as a result of the 1982 PSYOP enhancement action, which raised the group's personnel priority, provided it with an additional 332 spaces, and approved the creation of an enlisted MOS for PSYOP. In the spring of 1982, in response to a directive from the Army Chief of Staff, we conducted an analysis to determine requirements for PSYOP units in the 1980s and to define missions, capabilities, organizations and command-and-control structures necessary to support their training and operations. Based on this analysis, the Department of the Army subsequently approved 168 personnel spaces for the group, in addition to the 332 spaces previously obtained — a total of 500 new spaces.

We were also successful in validating 32 O-4 positions as AERB slots (those requiring graduate degrees), and increasing our civilian-employee spaces from 28 to 55. Altogether, these measures provided the potential for enhancing

U.S. Army photo

PSYOP soldiers use a jeep-mounted loudspeaker system during the 1980s. Much of PSYOP's equipment was in need of replacement or modernization.

administrative, operational and analytical capabilities and in later years would effectively double the group's size.

Our third goal, to *bring PSYOP into pace with the modern Army in doctrine and equipment,* illustrated our next pressing need. Simply stated, we had antiquated PSYOP-peculiar equipment, desperately in need of replacement and modernization. Our AN/TRT-22 radio transmitter was old and immobile, and there were only four such systems available in the Army. We had obsolete printing equipment, no television capability, and no leaflet round for the Army's 155mm artillery. We had practically no tactical dissemination capability, and there was little expertise and support among the other services for aerial dissemination of leaflets. In one area, public address sets, we had critical shortages — only 20 sets were available to support a requirement for 380 systems in active and reserve-component PSYOP units.

Notwithstanding the deficiencies in our equipment, we experienced demands for its use to support other agencies in peacetime activities. For an extended period of time we provided an AN/TRT-22 radio, and the personnel to operate it, for a United States Information Agency mission. In 1980 the group was extensively involved in the Cuban refugee resettlement program. Officers of the group served as principal assistants to the commanders of task forces operating in Key West, Miami, Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort McCoy. Support to each camp included staff advice and assistance, editing and producing camp newspapers, providing linguist support, operating direct audio-visual communications media, and, at selected camps, operating radio stations.

To get started on modernization, we launched an extensive equipment-improvement program in 1980, working closely with the Institute for Military Assistance and other headquarters. Our association with the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force helped increase the priority for our efforts, and DA approval of the PSYOP enhancement action in 1982 provided a boost.

With regard to doctrine, our capability to respond to mission demands was constrained by the existing planning systems and staff-proponency relationships. PSYOP planners had to deal with three separate planning systems: the Joint Operations Planning System, or JOPS; the Army Doctrinal Planning System, outlined in FM 101-5 and FM 33-1; and the NATO Planning Systems, prescribed by standardization agreements. Each system prescribed a different format and provided for different proponency for PSYOP planning.

In both the JOPS and NATO systems, proponency for PSYOP planning fell under the J-3/G-3 area; in the Army Doctrinal System, PSYOP was included under the CMO/G-5. We believed that staff proponency for PSYOP in the Army system should be under the G-3, and we provided our recommendations to IMA for this doctrinal change. TRADOC approved the change in the spring of 1981, and thereafter we provided input through IMA for the draft FM 100-5, *Operations*, to reflect the change in staff proponency.

Another shortcoming at this time was the lack of joint PSYOP doctrine. In order to properly support the newly created RDJTF, we developed an operational concept that both XVIII Airborne Corps and the commander of the RDJTF approved. We tested the concept during two RDJTF command-post exercises and submitted a concept paper on PSYOP support of a joint task force to IMA for eventual inclusion in Army doctrine.

The fourth goal, *improve tactical PSYOP training and operational readiness*, reflected our concern over our ability to accomplish PSYOP-specific tasks. We needed to eliminate, if possible, training time devoted to activities not related to the development and dissemination of propaganda. Through internal command-post exercises and field-training exercises, we improved our staff and propaganda-development procedures and placed increased emphasis on PSYOP-peculiar requirements and training for printing personnel. We made less progress, however, in dissemination-training techniques, and this remained a major shortfall.

Our fifth goal, *improve quality of strategic PSYOP studies and assessments,* addressed the requirement to ask ourselves constantly whether our scheduled studies, the basic PSYOP studies and special PSYOP studies, were PSYOP-specific. Too often, we fell into the more comfortable routine of producing primarily area studies. To combat this tendency, we sent as many of our civilian analysts as possible through PSYOP courses at IMA and the Air Force's Special Operations School. When possible, we also included civilian analysts as participants in field and command-post exercises. Finally, we instituted a review process which included the participation of the group and battalion commanders.

The increase in unscheduled studies and assessments during the early 1980s constituted a real challenge. In 1980 alone, we had 18 unscheduled special PSYOP assessments and four national strategic PSYOP plans which addressed international hot spots, compared to two such requirements in 1979. The high-level attention these assessments and plans received in the interagency arena enhanced the group's stature and gave us additional justification for an increase in personnel. At the same time, however, these efforts to provide quality products, often under short suspenses, affected our ability to respond to other mission requirements.

In addition to improving the quality of our research, we made a real effort toward our sixth goal, *integrate strategic studies and tactical PSYOP training.* Essentially, a military PSYOP unit engages in two

U.S. Army photo

Resettlement of Cuban refugees was only one of the many demands placed upon U.S. PSYOP forces in the early 1980s.

activities: research and analysis, and operations. In theory, a PSYOP unit in peacetime conducts research and analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiences, develops plans to support conventional and special-operations units, and participates in field exercises that employ these plans.

Execution, however, was quite difficult for us to accomplish. One of the problems we faced was that taskings for studies, planning support and exercise participation came from multiple channels. The same was true of taskings for unscheduled assessments and plans. Unfortunately, the area experts responsible for development of these time-sensitive products were the same personnel required for the production of scheduled studies and operational plans to support rapid-deployment and contingency missions. Here again our shortage of key officer and civilian personnel was a hindrance, forcing us to continually set and reset priorities to allocate resources from a small core of expert personnel.

But we also were faced with a management and coordination problem at higher command and staff levels. We made a conscious effort to get unified commands to request studies, in priority, which supported their most important contingency plans. We also began to resist participation in those exercises which did not provide realistic strategic scenarios.

Ultimately we proposed a three-year integrated approach to PSYOP planning and production requirements which was accepted by OJCS and the unified commands. These steps, in combination with quarterly planning and coordination meetings with OJCS and the Army Readiness Command, enabled us to show considerable progress in aligning PSYOP battalions, studies, operational planning and exercise participation — which resulted in improvements in PSYOP staff procedures, campaign planning and propaganda development.

In all of our capabilities assessments in the early 1980s, we noted the lack of a national-level coordinating mechanism for PSYOP. As a result, we believed, PSYOP policy upon which unified-command PSYOP plans were based was ill-defined. Strategic-level PSYOP plans frequently require the assets of, or coordination with, other U.S. agencies, and in our view, the lack of an interagency coordinating mechanism resulted in time-consuming and incomplete coordination of theater PSYOP requirements and plans. This also applied to multi-agency peacetime activities.

Our seventh goal, to *achieve a closer relationship with the unified commands,* illuminated another glaring weakness. In early 1980, the 4th Group had only undertaken detailed contingency planning efforts with one unified command, U.S. European Command, and much remained to be done in that area. We put a lot of effort into correcting this weakness, and by the spring of 1982 we had briefed and delivered PSYOP supporting plans for approval to EUCOM/USAREUR, PACOM/KOREA, RDJTF, and SOUTHCOM/LANTCOM. This, with concurrent implementation of CAPSTONE planning and participation in unified-command exercises, was the focal point of our operational efforts. The absence of qualified full-time PSYOP staff officers in the unified commands, however, placed a great deal of responsibility on the 4th Group for impetus and planning.

Hand-in-hand with the 4th Group's need to achieve a closer relationship with unified commands was our responsibility to *improve the relationship between active and reserve-component PSYOP units,* our eighth goal. There were some pragmatic reasons for establishing this as a separate goal.

In the first place, 80 percent of our mobilization capability came from the reserve component — 34 of the 38 units in the Army's total PSYOP force. Second was the coming of age of the CAPSTONE program during the early 1980s. This proved to be an invaluable vehicle for bringing the Army's PSYOP community closer together.

As FORSCOM's planning agent for CAPSTONE PSYOP actions, the

4th Group developed alignment of planning and training associations for all 38 PSYOP units and provided an implementing plan for FORSCOM approval. We hosted separate meetings with each of the three RC PSYOP groups to coordinate these actions, and conducted a larger two-week conference with all RC units to develop a theater field standard operating procedure for EUCOM.

The 4th Group developed and submitted to FORSCOM a five-year program for CONUS and OCONUS exercise participation by all PSYOP units. We coordinated exercise participation of RC PSYOP units in numerous CONUS and OCONUS exercises and sent mobile training teams to RC PSYOP units to assist in planning and training activities. We coordinated and directed planning activities of the PSYOP community for operational planning support of the unified commands.

Active and reserve group and battalion commanders and their staffs came to know their counterparts on a first-name basis and developed mutual respect and appreciation. The relationships we developed in the PSYOP community provided a model for how the CAPSTONE program was supposed to function.

Our final goal, *improve long-term planning in all staff areas*, indicated the need for staff officers and commanders to look beyond their individual tours in accomplishing their responsibilities. If the goals we established and the work that we did were to provide a framework for programs that subsequent group commanders could build upon and bring to fruition, we should have a vision of what needed to be done over the long term.

Lt. Gen. Glenn Otis, then the DA DSCOPS, once introduced a presentation we were giving to the Army staff council with these words: "The 4th Psychological Operations Group is the most overcommitted and under-resourced O-6 command in the Army."

Why were we able to accomplish as much as we did with limited resources? Because we had a core of talented, hard-working and conscientious officers, civilians and enlisted personnel in both the 4th Group and the reserve component. All of us were proud of what we had accomplished together, despite the frustrations. We were believers in PSYOP. ✂

Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr., completed a 31-year Army career as a colonel in October 1988. His military career included command and staff assignments in Korea, Laos, Okinawa, Vietnam and the U.S. He served three combat tours with SF units in Southeast Asia. Among his varied assignments, he was an instructor in strategic studies at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; served in the Politico-Military Division of the DA Staff in Washington, D.C.; commanded the 6th PSYOP Battalion and the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg; was the military member of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; and completed his service as the Director for PSYOP, Office of the Secretary of Defense. A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, he earned his B.A. degree in political science from Park College and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Duke University.

Interview: Special Forces in El Salvador

Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert
Lt. Col. Frank Pedrozo
Col. J.S. Roach

Lt. Col. Geoffrey C. Lambert was the plans officer for the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group at the time of the Oct. 15, 1979 coup that led to U.S. involvement in El Salvador. He has been actively involved in the Latin American theater for almost two decades. His most recent assignments were with the 7th SF Group as commander of the 1st Battalion and as deputy group commander. He is currently a student at the Army War College.

Lt. Col. Frank Pedrozo served in El Salvador as the adviser to the 5th Brigade in San Vicente from June 1985-June 1986 and as the operations adviser and U.S. Milgroup training and operations officer from 1989-1992. He has served in various positions in the 7th SF Group and has extensive experience in Latin America. He is currently chief of unit training and operations, U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Col. J.S. Roach served in El Salvador as a member of an operational planning and training team, or OPATT, from March 1984-March 1986. He has also served in SOUTHCOM Headquarters from 1983-1984 and as the Defense Attaché in Bogota, Colombia from 1990-1992. He assumed command of the 7th Special Forces Group in June 1993.

SW: *How did the 7th Special Forces Group become a player in the development of the policy for El Salvador?*
Lambert: Prior to the creation of the theater special-operations commands, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group in Panama informally wore the hat of the UW advisor to the CinC SOUTH. With the deactivation of the 8th Special Forces Group, the commander of the 3rd of the 7th,at that time Lt. Col. Chuck Fry, inherited that role, and it was necessary for him to advise the CinC. I guess to put it into context, we have to realize that not only did we not have theater SOCs, we had no USASOC, we had no USACAPOC, we had no USSOCOM, and with the post-Vietnam restructuring, we had lost our CA and PSYOP outfits, so he was carrying quite a large rucksack full of knowledge, and he was the only man in-theater who had it.

SW: *How was the CinC staff structured, and how well-prepared was it for the crisis in El Salvador?*
Lambert: Actually, they weren't prepared at all. The priority of effort at that time had been on the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty, and Col. Curt Ebitz was the sole desk officer in the J-5 LATAM office responsible for El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. He was not a theater expert, but he was extremely perceptive. He worked about 18-20 hours a day, and that is not an exaggeration, to keep up with the events in his domain. The CinC trusted him completely, and he, in turn, trusted the 7th Group to provide conceptual assistance because he needed the help and couldn't find anyone else.

SW: *What were the early SF missions?*
Lambert: Some initial ones were one-man MTTs to El Salvador to augment the MILGROUP. These were necessary because Ambassador Bob White in El Salvador remained unconvinced that the left was a problem. He felt that no external support was required for the government of El Salvador, he did not acknowledge the external communist support for the guerrillas, and he refused to allow the CinC SOUTH, Lt. Gen. Wallace Nutting, into country. So the CinC used selected 7th Group soldiers and officers to go TDY to augment the MILGROUP in El Salvador to do situational assessments and try to come up with some sort of plan. I think the initial formal deployment was a civil-disturbance MTT approved during the Carter administration to prepare the military for the Jan. 23, 1980 demonstration by 250,000 leftist sympathizers in the capital city. Previously filmed demonstrations captured the military firing on marchers, shooting many of them in the back, and this awoke us to the severity of the problem and the importance of our task.

The MTT was put together quickly and spent a considerable portion of the instructional block in-country on human-rights considerations, in addition to non-violent crowd-control techniques. Although the demonstration was the largest in Salvadoran history, and many of the demonstrators came with rifles wrapped in their banners and ready to fight, the Salvadoran security forces used what we had taught them and behaved professionally, and there was no violence. This initial small step forward in humanizing the conflict remains a proud memory for those of us involved in the beginning of Special Forces participation in the war.

SW: *What was the 55-man trainer concept and how did it evolve?*
Lambert: Political decisions were a major factor in the 55-man concept. The Oct. 15, 1979 coup really signified the end of the oligarchy in El Salvador, but the CinC SOUTH felt that although the military's connection with the far right endangered progress toward democracy, the most serious threat to democracy in El Salvador was from the left. The Reagan transition team accepted the need for continuity with President Carter's policy of supporting agrarian and banking reform, which robbed the radical left of much of its recruiting base. The principal focus of policy was to support military institutions and civilian politicians of the democratic parties in order to restore a sense of authority and direction to the government. General Nutting sought to provide a modest network of personnel that could pull intelligence, operations, communications and logistical assets together to execute a cohesive policy. So in January or February of 1980, the 3rd of the 7th was called on a weekend to put together in one day a presentation to the CinC SOUTH staff of an advisory concept to El Salvador. We did a quick cut-and-paste drill and came up with a phased program for an initial 55-man trainer and assistance team to meet General Nutting's intent, to be followed by a 250-man contingent of advisers, down to at least company level. Our assessment was that the war would be satisfactorily terminated in about 3-5 years with the full package. The SOUTHCOM staff assembled, and after a briefing from two 3rd of the 7th officers, wrote a message on yellow legal pad for the CinC's signature and transmission to JCS. The CinC planners, though, stated that only the 55-man portion should be addressed — they believed that the follow-on advisory concept, the 250-man contingent, would have no political viability or support. To our surprise, the CinC chopped immediately on the message, and 7th Group was on its way.

Lambert: "*We solved problems piecemeal until we got organized. We turned the hose on the fire with small training teams at the unit level ...*"

SW: *As a co-author of the concept, what do you think could have been done better?*
Lambert: First of all, considering that U.S. support would be reliant on the Salvadoran national will, and that advisory assistance was such a politically sensitive subject in the U.S. so soon after Vietnam, we shouldn't have proposed such a large package. Had we been sensitive to this, we probably would have proposed a 100-man package, and it probably would have done a lot more things. We had no idea that the 55-man limit would somehow become a ceiling, but it did. We were absolutely amazed that it got approved.

Secondly, at the start, we solved problems piecemeal until we got organized. We turned the hose on the fire with small training teams at the unit level, and then trained the staffs how to use the folks that we had trained. We didn't use the multi-echelon training approach, we just kind of jumped into things and sent training teams here and there. We were busy trying to plug the gaps,

but really, there was no effective overall policy to guide our participation. When, in 1982, Gen. Fred Woerner, the deputy CinC SOUTH, was tasked to lead a team to assist the government of El Salvador in developing a political strategy with an accompanying economic and military strategy, things improved greatly. It's sad that this couldn't have been done at the start.

Finally, we should have weighted the development of national PSYOP and Civil Affairs campaigns much heavier in our initial concept. But there were no PSYOP or Civil Affairs units on active duty, the restructuring from Vietnam had virtually wiped them out. We could have really used PSYOP and CA plans to support Duarte, the president elected in 1984, and this would have facilitated the overall effort by spreading the human-rights message at the onset of our involvement.

Roach: Let me say something about the multi-echelon concept of training and one of the problems that we had when we were there as trainers. We found that there was no obligation for the Salvadoran brigade commander to follow what the national army headquarters had put out as the training program. It was taken as advice — if the brigade could do it, they would, but they didn't have to. For that reason, I'm not sure that we could have imposed multi-echelon training. The way that the OPATTs succeeded was by going into the brigade and helping the brigade commander accomplish his agenda. I don't know that we could have imposed an outside solution, no matter how logical, integrated and good it was, because the brigade commanders wouldn't have accepted it. The program had to come from the ground up.

Pedrozo: I think one point needs to be made about the 55-man limit. It was never congressionally mandated — it was a deal struck between the executive branch and Congress, where the executive branch said, "Don't put a limit on how many guys we can put in-country, because we don't know what's going to happen. We'll keep the number at — how many guys do we have there today? Fifty-five? Great, we'll keep the number at 55, and we won't count these guys — medics, helicopter pilots, guards at the embassy, that type of thing — and you guys don't put a ceiling on it. The 55-man limit probably became the most-watched figure in the entire war, and I can tell you, because at the end of it, I was the guy counting 55-man bodies, that we never exceeded it.

Roach: "*The way that the OPATTs succeeded was by going into the brigade and helping the brigade commander accomplish his agenda.*"

Lambert: They never were advisers, either, they were trainers. They never were legally authorized to advise.

Roach: The U.S. trainers carried weapons, but were only allowed to go into training areas. Sometimes you ended up advising the brigade commander, if you gained his confidence, through your training activities. He would accept advice and ask you questions, but that was within the *cuartel*, or close-in training areas, not out in the field.

Pedrozo: I think an important point to make about Special Forces participation was the quality of the individual. The selection process for trainers was very rigorous. The trainers had to meet certain criteria, and I think that one of the reasons that we didn't have more people killed in El Salvador was the quality of the guy that we sent down there. The fact that we were able to do as much as we did is a good reflection on the training that we received in Special Forces.

Roach: Let me give you an example. We talked earlier about the fact that you only influenced people based on how effective you were at solving their problems. When I got there, the CinC SOUTH was really concerned about intelligence within the brigades, and there was a program to put a U.S. military-intelligence officer in each brigade. The first group of MI captains was there for six months TDY, but then the U.S. Army couldn't come up with six Spanish-speaking replacements. So the Milgroup thrashed around trying to figure out an alternative and finally decided to bring six O&I-qualified Special Forces NCOs to take the MI captains' positions. At first the Salvadorans didn't like it very much, because in their society, officers and NCOs are tremendously different. But after six months, the Salvadoran commanders didn't want to give up the O&I-qualified SF NCOs.

Although these NCOs reported in to be intelligence specialists, in very short order they proved that they could also give training — sniper training, mortar training, infantry training, staff training — and if the Salvadoran brigade commander had a problem, the SF NCO could and would be part of the solution.

SW: *What were SF's greatest contributions to the war in El Salvador?*
Pedrozo: I think that quality of training was one of the greatest contributions that we made. We took a constabulary force of about 12,000 guys, and over a period of 12 years, turned it into a 60,000-man army, with a 55-man adviser limit. If you think about it, that's quite an accomplishment, and it's something that I think Special Forces can be really proud of. Another contribution was what Colonel Lambert was talking about — lessening the level of violence. Human-rights training was one thing that we did throughout, and if you wanted to look for a thread of continuity in the war, it was the human-rights issue.

Roach: Human rights wasn't a separate one-hour block at the beginning of the day. You had to find a way to couch it in the training so that it wasn't just a moralistic approach. It was not an issue that the Salvadorans were confused about. The Salvadoran military understood they weren't supposed to violate human rights, but they believed they were driven to extreme measures by extreme circumstances. When you could convince them in an operational context why human rights made sense, you started to get their attention. When the Salvadorans started to see, "that if we don't shoot the civilians, we'll get their support, and therefore be able to rout out the guerrillas," then they saw human rights from a pragmatic perspective.

Pedrozo: By the fact that we were in the brigades, we became the conscience of the Salvadoran army. Toward the end of the war, Salvadoran officers were saying things about human rights that you would never have heard at the beginning of the war. They created a human-rights office in the military to investigate, internally, human-rights abuses and allegations. They had really come a long way.

Roach: One of the things can happen, in this type of situation, is that our government may say, "Honor civil rights." And there is great motivation for the Salvadoran government to say, "Good, we honor civil rights." But the U.S. didn't have a way to check that, and for that matter, neither did the Salvadoran government, because they didn't have firm control over their entire country. One of the things the trainers in the brigades did was to provide a double-check as to what was really going on. And when the national-level government would say, "We're doing whatever you want us to do," our embassy could say, "Well, we know that isn't true." I don't know how many times that happened, but it happened, and the Salvadorans had the feeling that they were being watched at the lower level.

Pedrozo: I don't know if "watched" is a good word. You were integrated. Brigade commanders told you things that you probably had no business knowing, and they knew that you were going to tell people back at the embassy, but they told you anyhow, because they trusted you. It's a real strange relationship, and it's one of the things that makes FID unique. The President of the United States says, "This is our policy in Central America," and the ambassador says, "This is our plan for the country," but when you're down in the brigade or below that level, you *are* foreign policy, because everything you do is American foreign policy.

SW: *What was the evolution of the training?*
Pedrozo: When we first went down there, we were, like Colonel Lambert said, just plugging holes. We were the trainers. If the gringos didn't do it, it didn't get done. Eventually, it got to the point where we had trained a base of people that spoke the same language, training-wise and operationally, and we became trainers for the trainers. At the end of the war, we were overseeing what was going on and getting into more of the multi-echelon-type training. Our focus shifted from training squads, platoons and companies to training battalions, to looking at the reorganization of the Salvadoran army as a whole, creating new institutions to move them into the next century. We're doing things right now that are going to effect the Salvadoran military for the next 50 or 100 years.

Lambert: One of their brigade commanders came up to Fort Bragg to visit us recently. We sat down and had a debate on how to implement the red-, green- and amber-cycle training out of FM 25-100, and about doctrinal issues and their TRADOC headquarters. He got it all from our folks about a year ago, and we had a great rapport in talking about modernization and perspective and allocation of resources. It's absolutely amazing to see the progress they have made in a little over a decade.

SW: *A good question is why did we win?*
Lambert: I think there were three factors. One was our resources and trainers. The second is that the other side lost its resources and its ideological model. And finally, I think it was that the Salvadoran army and the civilian government identified the population as the center of gravity for victory.

SW: *Did we make that happen or did it evolve?*
Lambert: We made it happen.

Pedrozo: I think we influenced it.

Roach: "Influenced" might be too weak a word, but "made it happen" might be too strong; it's somewhere in between. I think that we played a very important part in making it happen, but I don't think we can say that we did it by ourselves.

Pedrozo: The Salvadorans, at the end of the war, had a very sophisticated PSYOP and Civil Affairs capability. We gave them the initial

national plan and they did regional plans, where a lot more CA and PSYOP guys came down and advised them, etc., and they went out and actually did these things. They did humanitarian civic action, they did psychological operations, the whole nine yards, as far as that went, with the object of the people being the center of gravity. When I went there in 1985 there were a lot of people fence-sitting. Ten percent were strongly for the government, 4 percent were probably strongly anti-government and everybody else said, "Let's see how this thing is going to end up." But when I went there in 1989-1990, it was completely different — I would say 90 percent of the people were firmly in the government's camp at that point.

Roach: Let me give you an example of how we contributed. There were two programs that we were trying to implement in 1985 that weren't working separately, but Lt. Col. Al Adami, the 5th Brigade OPATT, found a way to make them work together. The first of the two programs was civil defense — traditionally two or three men were hired by each village, but since they were paid as civil defenders, they tended to either already be the town drunks or to quickly become the town drunks. Since they had the only weapons in the village, they tended to be involved in abuses. These "professional civil defenders" didn't have the support of the people, and the system was a total disaster.

The second program was rural re-electrification, which had a lot to do with economic vitality. But the Salvadoran government found that as they went along putting in Segment A, Segment B and Segment C, they wouldn't get further than Segment C before the guerrillas would knock down Segment A, and they kept going back through this frustrating cycle.

Colonel Adami came up with a solution that made the two programs work together. First, he had to convince USAID that we should only put in electrification where the villagers would support the civil-defense program. Then he convinced the Salvadoran brigade commander that the civil-defense program had to be reformed and used as a carrot for the re-electrification program. The Salvadoran brigade commander then had to sell the program to the people. He talked to the local civilians and said, "If you want electrification, you've got to form a civil defense, but a new form of civil defense, like a volunteer fire department. We'll train 120 people in the town, and every day 15 will take their turn being the civil-defense patrol."

Pedrozo: "*The guerrillas said, at the end of the war, ... that the most damaging thing that occurred in the war was putting American trainers in the brigades.*"

This new civil-defense program created a social balance of power, where everyone is involved in civil defense, not just the three town drunks. Since everyone was involved, it created an internal system of checks and balances that discouraged abuses. So with the interplay between these two projects, you've got re-electrification in high gear, and a civil-defense program to protect the project. There was a reason for the local people to support the civil defense, because they were getting electricity. People support their government because the government provides for them, and that was the problem in El Salvador before: the government wasn't providing, and therefore the people weren't supporting. This is what Colonel Lambert was talking about earlier — the government came to see the Salvadoran people as the center of gravity.

SW: *What was SF's role in the peace process?*

Pedrozo: The effectiveness of what we did in El Salvador I think is underlined by two things, the first thing was that the guerrillas said, at the end of the war, in a conversation with a national-level guerrilla leader that I was privy to, that the most damaging thing that occurred in the war was putting American trainers in the brigades. The reason was because as the Army became more professional, they had fewer human-rights abuses, and when they had fewer human-rights abuses, the guerrillas lost a lot of their propaganda value and a lot of their recruiting capability, simply because the Americans were changing things.

The other thing that gauges our effectiveness was that when the peace process was going on, the guerrillas were very concerned that after the war, sufficient military aid would continue through El Salvador to keep the advisers in the brigades. The advisers, in the FMLN's eyes, were the fair brokers, they were the guys that were going to make sure that things got done right and that there were not any more abuses. When the guerrillas said all these things at the end of the war, it just indicated that we did it right this time.

Operation Guantanamo: Civil Affairs in Action

by 1st Lt. William A. Woods

In the autumn of 1991, the fall of its democratically elected president caused a massive exodus of political and economic refugees from Haiti. President George Bush directed that these Haitians be processed through camps set up at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and by June 1992, nearly 45,000 such refugees had passed through the camps.

Army Civil Affairs soldiers were called to serve in the camps, their mission being to manage the camps and provide humanitarian assistance to camp residents. This article offers a view of a typical day in one of the camps to highlight the responsibilities of Civil Affairs soldiers and show how their efforts affected both the quality of life and U.S. democratization attempts among the Haitian refugees.

Each morning at approximately 3 o'clock, the Civil Affairs camp staff escorted 20-30 migrant cooks to the combined cooking area just outside the camp perimeter. These cooks prepared the morning meal for the thousands of migrants residing in the camps.

At 6 a.m., the Haitian-selected camp leader, referred to by his constituency as "camp general," would make a good-morning broadcast over the camp loudspeaker system and inform the subordinate camp leadership of work details for the day. Camp generals were senior Haitian leaders often selected by general migrant consensus; each was responsible for one camp.

Camp leadership was hierarchically structured by tent-block leaders and further subdivided into tent leaders. The camp general was responsible through the Civil Affairs staff for camp cleanliness and order, and for heading weekly town meetings. These meetings gave migrant leaders an opportunity to meet formally with the Civil Affairs camp commander (a major or higher) and U.S. civilian agency on-site managers.

Breakfast was served from 7-8 a.m. Civil Affairs soldiers organized three serving lines consisting of men, single women and women with children. This ensured that women with small children received priority attention during mealtime, and it reduced waiting time. In several camps, the Civil Affairs staff used large cargo parachutes, placed over flagpoles and tied down at the ends, to make field-expedient shaded eating areas.

After breakfast, mess crews cleaned the dining area and the day's activities began. Anyone too ill to attend breakfast would report to the medical tent, staffed by U.S. Navy medics and Haitian migrant interpreters, to receive appropriate medical treatment.

Following breakfast, Civil Affairs personnel reported to the camp command tent for the daily staff meeting. At this meeting, chaplains, military linguists and military-police liaison personnel, along with the Civil Affairs camp staff, discussed and resolved problems,

learned of significant events and made plans for the following day.

By 9 a.m., various migrant crews had already begun carrying out duties such as litter pickup, raising tent flaps and watering the soccer field to eliminate dust in the arid encampment. Other teams of Haitians were deployed by the camp general to assist in joint camp projects such as setting up of church and schoolhouse tents under the direction of Civil Affairs personnel. Simultaneously, Civil Affairs supply teams distributed clothing, household products, baby food and linen.

School-aged Haitian children had the opportunity to attend classes taught by U.S. military linguists. Math, English as a second language and American history were three of the topics taught in Creole, their native tongue. Adult migrants were periodically offered lessons in democracy and American history. These lessons were taught by joint-task-force military linguists and Civil Affairs solders.

Throughout the day, Civil Affairs team members were responsible for the location and continued movement of groups of migrants selected from various in-processing functions. These in-processing needs of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Public Health Service included blood tests, X-rays, dental examinations, medical follow-ups, immigration interviews and U.S.-sponsor location meetings. Civil Affairs personnel also moved throughout the camps, stopping at tents to gauge migrant temperament, encourage better hygiene and proper water-usage practices and assist migrants in problem-solving. This contact also helped to reduce the likelihood of any intimidation caused by the presence of uniformed soldiers.

At about 3 p.m. a camp-wide loudspeaker broadcast announced the commencement of dinner. The evening meal generally consisted of rice and beans along with shredded beef, chicken or pasta with meat. With dinner and clean-up completed, many of the migrants visited the camp command tent. The Civil Affairs camp management had an open-door policy, and migrants came to discuss domestic and family problems and health concerns, and to gain knowledge about the United States from the Civil Affairs camp staff.

An element of the 4th Psychological Operations Group from Fort Bragg, N.C., produced a bilingual daily newspaper originally titled "Sa'k Pase" (Creole for "What's going on"), and later renamed "Na' Boule" (Creole for "We're cooking!"). This paper helped educate the migrant population, and because of the remote nature of the Guantanamo Bay naval station, kept U.S. military personnel informed on current world events. The Civil Affairs staff ensured that the daily was distributed to more than 12,000 Haitian camp residents and military personnel.

Evening intercamp soccer games and tournaments were frequent and were encouraged by Civil Affairs and military-linguist personnel. This competitive sporting activity, perhaps more than any other military-Haitian migrant interplay, fostered camaraderie. Though the camps were not without disharmony and occasional small pockets of civil unrest, these soccer games went a long way toward maintaining a basic camp calm. Each camp general recruited his own all-Haitian team, and both the Civil Affairs staff and the military linguists fielded teams. The Civil Affairs staff acquired goal posts, soccer balls and sneakers for the migrant players.

On-site chaplains organized evening services in specially designated areas and occasionally held Roman Catholic confessional and communion activities. Working with the chaplains and military supply teams, the Civil Affairs camp staff was able to offer canned shrimp creole to the Haitian migrants for Easter Sunday dinner. This not only broke the monotony of rice and beans, but also reinforced in the minds of the migrants the U.S. military's sincere desire to recognize and encourage free religious practice.

At 8 each evening, an eager team of Haitian youths between 10 and 16 would enter the command tent,

U.S. Army photo

One of the camps established to house Haitian refugees at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

pick up a 16mm movie projector and the evening movie reels, and set up for the evening's film. After learning to run the projector from the Civil Affairs staff, these boys took great pride and pleasure in running "le cinema." Most migrants would bring their cots to an open field with a plywood screen for two hours of entertainment.

After the movie, most Civil Affairs camp personnel left the camp, and a small overnight team manned the command tent to handle emergencies. Periodic walking patrols, run in coordination with the military police, helped increase the migrants' sense of safety at night.

Operation Guantanamo was a real-world opportunity to apply Civil Affairs doctrine and procedure in a peacetime environment. The humanitarian needs and interests of the Haitians were served, allowing civilian-agency professionals to process nearly 45,000 Haitian boat people through the Guantanamo Bay camps. With the current uncertainty of the world and the growth of refugees in every hemisphere, the humanitarian-assistance mission is one which active and reserve Civil Affairs soldiers are likely to be called upon to perform again in the near future.

1st Lt. William A. Woods is an Army Reserve officer assigned to the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Bronx, N.Y. During Operation Guantanamo, he was the operations officer in the largest refugee camp, managing more than 3,000 Haitian migrants. In his civilian profession, Lieutenant Woods is a marketing manager with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's New York City Transit Authority.

Grabbing the Brass Ring: Making the Most of Overseas Training

by Maj. John F. Mulholland

When properly planned and executed, the deployment-for-training program provides unparalleled "live environment" training opportunities for Special Forces teams and personnel that measurably improve their ability to execute foreign internal defense and other SF missions.

But the coordination path that a proposed DFT must follow is laced with bureaucratic booby-traps that can delay and distort the original mission concept and timing of a DFT. By law, the explicit purpose of a DFT must be for the training of U.S. forces. Therefore, the training concept is specifically focused on U.S. training needs. Any training benefits that accrue to the host nation are incidental.

Nonetheless, any potential host nation that is going to sponsor a foreign military element on its national territory is going to have its own opinion of what that incidental training might be. This inevitably affects the original training MICON. The theater special operations command, too, reviews the concept and makes changes based on the CINC's guidance regarding his regional strategy. Factor in the resident U.S. military group's views on what should and should not be trained, and it is not hard to see how a training proposal can easily fall victim to circumstances.

These potential "Murphy" factors argue strongly for a well-analyzed and planned MICON based on an honest evaluation of a detachment's training shortcomings and objectives. Such a MICON serves as a solid point of departure for achieving the fundamental requirement of the program — training of the U.S. element. With this training plan the team can respond to political and situational realities that affect the original MICON with alternatives that continue to support detachment training needs.

All too often, however, detachments enter into the DFT coordination process with only the vaguest concept of what they want to do. Details are left to be worked out on the site survey with the host nation. This leaves the detachment vulnerable to virtually everyone in the coordination chain and surrenders the initiative in the training agenda. Given the resource constraints that are now, and will continue to be, a fact of life for the U.S. Army, this is unacceptable. Special Forces, founded on the ability to train others, cannot just deploy into theater, throw together a training concept during the pre-deployment site survey, execute, and deem that "good training."

Concept development for an OCONUS DFT should be the result of properly applied Army training doctrine. Throughout its training cycles, every detachment should assess its ability to execute required individual and collective tasks that support the detachment's mission-essential-task list. This is done concurrently with training through both informal and formal after-action reviews and in deliberate review processes such as the detachment's battle-focus analysis.

The assessment phase also incorporates evaluations from external sources and results of mandatory training requirements outlined in Army Special Forces Command Regulation 350-1. The end product should be a coldly honest and professional evaluation of the current state of detachment readiness and capability to perform its assigned mission. An inaccurate or self-deceiving assessment lays the foundation for failure and waste. Identified weaknesses must be broken down into their component collective and individual tasks in preparation for the next phase of the training-management cycle.

After identifying tasks and requirements requiring training attention, the detachment enters the critical planning phase with the components necessary to plot its training strategy. These components must be coherently ordered and sequenced toward the desired

capability. This road map prioritizes training and resource requirements determined essential to accomplishing training goals and objectives — the map's destination. It is in this phase that the detachment must decide the role of the DFT in the training plan.

Team planners must bear in mind that DFTs represent a major training activity that requires the dedication of dollars, airlift and time, to name but three constant factors. The detachment leadership is accountable, then, to obtain maximum benefit from the treasure committed to its deployment.

Properly structured DFTs provide the mechanism for superb multi-echelon training. A detachment can easily plan and conduct a full-profile mission in accordance with its applicable Special Forces Mission Training Plan. Whether it is seen as the culmination exercise of the detachment training plan or as a full-blown rehearsal for a follow-on MTT, the outstanding training potential of a DFT, combined with its associated high-resource commitment, absolutely demand that it claim a priority position in team training strategy.

The ultimate product of the DFT assessment and planning phases is the MICON. The preparatory homework outlined above bears fruit in the MICON-development and site-survey stages of a DFT. First of all, the detachment's MICON should clearly articulate the training goals and objectives, as well as the desired mission profile, that the detachment has determined to be essential to accomplish its training strategy. Next, the MICON should propose a sequence or mission outline that satisfies this end-state and identifies potential incidental benefits to the host nation. After all, the package must be "sellable" to a potential host nation. Since our seminal missions in Special Forces stem from the requirement to train indigenous forces, this packaging is complementary.

The real benefits of preliminary planning are twofold. First, it allows the detachment leadership to prioritize its training objectives should the proposed MICON, transmitted by message traffic, not meet with total approval from any of the many players discussed earlier.

For instance, a detachment with the primary mission of FID and a secondary mission of special reconnaissance may have proposed a MICON that calls for training with an indigenous infantry company on light-infantry operations in a jungle environment for four weeks, followed by two weeks of unilateral SR training, with host-nation target support. If, however, there is an existing agenda in-country to support humanitarian civic-action projects that is essential for DFT approval, then the detachment is prepared to adjust to the situation with a a counterproposal of light-infantry training and HCA support, accommodating both parties' primary requirements.

The second benefit of the preparation is the foundation it gives the pre-deployment site-survey team when negotiating with their host-nation counterparts for acceptance of the U.S. proposal. The give and take of these negotiations is inevitable. In fact, they should be seen as an excellent training opportunity to practice the art of selling a program to a potential partner, as we may be called upon to do someday in support of our own national interests. The foundation afforded by proper assessment and planning allows for the sacrifice of secondary or tertiary training objectives to accommodate host-nation requirements while preserving the primary.

In execution, DFTs differ little from any other important OCONUS exercise. The same requirements for professionalism and leadership exist with the awareness that one is a guest in another land, with all the implications and requirements associated with that fact. Indeed, these environmental considerations, impossible to mimic in CONUS, are the crucial characteristics that make this training event so valuable for Special Forces detachments.

The real value of the DFT will not be realized without a post-mission assessment. If the DFT played the dominant role in a detachment's training strategy that it should have, the detachment leadership will be able to evaluate precisely the team's ability to accomplish its METL. If detachments cannot make this determination at the end of the DFT, it was inadequately planned and structured.

The process outlined here is not limited to DFT coordination and preparation. It is precisely the point that the application of standard Army training doctrine should apply to the SF DFT process.

Accurate and detailed mission preparation is critical to the success of this incredible training opportunity that allows Special Forces detachments to conduct full-profile mission training in their assigned areas, languages and culture. The detachment leadership must fully assess and outline the team training plan. The chain of command and the operations and training staffs at battalion and group levels must also assist detachments in the process and support the satisfactory achievement of their training goals.

Maj. John F. Mulholland is a former battalion executive officer for the 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group.

Downsizing: Personnel Manager Offers a Glimpse of the Future

Army personnel officials at the Pentagon have recently expressed concern that well-publicized accounts of military downsizing may lead many soldiers to question the viability of an Army career.

Despite being caught up in the steepest drawdown since the end of the Vietnam War, the Army's top personnel official predicts that promotion and schooling opportunities will be comparable to those of the past or better.

As the ranking manager of Army force levels, Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Carney seeks to eliminate the anxiety soldiers may experience in regard to the drawdown. He feels the best way to do this is by keeping them tuned to what he calls "fast, factual and focused" information as the restructuring process unfolds.

"We're going through a period of turbulence that naturally causes some uncertainty among our soldiers," Carney said, but he adds, "The major reductions appear to be behind us.

"We are committed to maintaining a quality force. Personnel programs will continue to be focused on maintaining readiness, while caring for soldiers and families. As we downsize today and in the future, we must remember the Army remains a great institution in which to serve. Education, training, family programs and job satisfaction still figure high in our work to restructure the Army," Carney said.

Voluntary separation incentives and offers of early retirement will continue to be the primary means by which the Army will achieve its end-strength goals; these are expected to continue through fiscal year 1996.

Personnel officials offer the following by-rank look-ahead into the next two years based on the most current information, with some speculation regarding force structure and budget reductions that may occur within that period.

Colonels

- Selective Early Retirement Boards will continue if voluntary retirements remain at projected rates. Fiscal year 1994 will be the last year in which colonels will have multiple SERB reviews (i.e., if a file is reviewed by the fiscal 1994 board, it will not be reviewed again). The FY 1995 board will review those colonels who complete two years in grade that year.
- Joint-duty assignments will remain high priority for qualified officers.
- There is now a significant pay-longevity increase for colonels with 24 years' service.
- Waivers to retire with two years in grade are still available.

Lieutenant colonels

- SERBs will be conducted throughout the drawdown period, with a significantly lower select rate —about 5-10 percent.
- Promotion rates to colonel have increased to 50-percent opportunity and should remain stable at that level.
- "Pin-on" point to colonel will remain about 22 years, eight months.
- Selection for battalion-level command will remain competitive at historic rates.
- Senior service college should not change from its present selection rate of about seven percent and will remain extremely competitive.
- As with colonels, waivers to retire with two years in grade are still available.

Majors

- The Army is replacing reduction-in-force procedures and the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program for field-grade officers by implementing the Early Retirement Program — also known as the "15-year retirement."
- The Early Retirement Program

will be used to size and shape the field-grade force.

- The first priority is to offer early retirement to senior majors in overage skills, and generally those non-selected for promotion. Early retirement will be used to properly size "promotion COHORTS" prior to consideration for lieutenant colonel.

- There are no plans to offer early retirement to critically short specialties.

• Promotion selection rate to lieutenant colonel will remain at about 70 percent.

• "Pin-on" point average to lieutenant colonel has decreased from 17 years, four months to 16 years, 10 months. It will decrease further to 16 years, six months.

• Competition for resident Command and General Staff College will remain keen. Completion of resident or non-resident CGSC remains necessary to be competitive for promotion. Resident selection rates will increase from 50 percent to 60 percent.

• More majors will be assigned joint-duty and reserve-component positions in the future.

• Majors twice non-selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel will be selectively continued until retirement-eligible, but the period of continuation may be curtailed prior to 20 years' service. Early retirement will then be offered.

Captains

• An FY 1994 RIF board is scheduled for February. It will consider officers in year group 1985 for early separation. However, if enough Voluntary Separation Incentive and Special Separation Benefit applications are received, the board will be canceled. A similar board will be scheduled in fiscal 1995 to consider year groups 1986 and 1987.

• Promotion rate to major will remain at 80 percent opportunity throughout the drawdown period and beyond.

• "Pin-on" point average to major is averaging 11 years, 10 months. It should decline to about 11 years, five months, with an objective of reaching 11 years.

• The VSI/SSB will be offered to officers in the RIF zone and to those who are once non-selected for promotion to major. One-time non-selects with more than 15 years' service will be offered early retirement.

Lieutenants

• The Army will gain 3,700 active-duty lieutenants in fiscal 1993 and will probably continue that number throughout the remainder of the drawdown period.

• The Voluntary Early Release/ Retirement Program will be offered. A pilot program in FY 1994 will be offered to a limited number of lieutenants with 2-3 years' active duty, provided they transition to reserve-component units for the remainder of their service obligation.

• The fiscal 1994 Captain, Army, Promotion/Lieutenant Retention Board is projected for October. The fiscal 1993 captain selection rate was 92 percent after retention losses were removed. This compares to 92 percent over the last five years and should remain in the 92-percent range during the remainder of the drawdown.

Warrant officers

• Promotion consideration is projected to 80-, 76- and 44-percent opportunity to chief warrant officers 3, 4 and 5, respectively.

• Warrant officers can expect to be considered for promotion every six years after selection to CWO 2.

• The Selective Retirement Board for warrants will continue in fiscal 1994 and possibly through the drawdown period.

• The Army is seeking legislative approval to conduct a regular Army warrant RIF. When approved, a RIF board will be conducted in fiscal 1994 and possibly through the remainder of the drawdown period.

• Early retirement and VSI/SSB will be offered to selected warrant officer grades and specialties based on requirements. A RIF may be precluded if sufficient voluntary separation applications are submitted.

Sergeants major

• No anticipated Selective Early Release Board/Senior Enlisted Release Board will be held if voluntary retirements remain at projected rates.

• No change is anticipated in the 30-year retention control point.

• Retention beyond 30 years' service will continue for nominative positions.

Master sergeants

• Promotions to sergeant major will sustained at a rate of 300-400 yearly.

• "Pin-on" point average for promotion to sergeant major will hold steady at 20.9 years.

• Master sergeants will be considered for promotion to sergeant major about six times during their career. Nearly one of three will be promoted. However, if a master sergeant has not been selected during the first four selection boards for which eligible, the likelihood for promotion decreases to less than one in 25.

• Sergeant Major Course attendance will continue at about 700 resident and 300 non-resident seats in 1994. When the course converts to nine months in length, attendance will be about 600 residents and 25 non-residents yearly.

• Non-commissioned Officer Education System linkage to promotion will be completed by Oct. 1, when all master sergeants selected for promotion will be required to complete the SMC prior to promotion. NCOs without SMC who are selected for promotion will receive first priority for attendance at the resident course.

• Master sergeants will not be considered for early retirement.

• There will be no change to the retention control point of 24 years.

• A longevity pay increase has been added for 24 years of service,

and is received for retirement purposes by the master sergeants and promotable sergeants first class who reach their retention control point.

Sergeants first class

• Anticipate promotions to master sergeant to be sustained between 1,500-2,100 per year (compared to 2,333 in fiscal 1992).

• "Pin-on" point average to master sergeant will hold steady at 17.9 years.

• Sergeants first class may be considered for promotion on an average of eight times during their careers. Nearly one in four will be promoted. However, if a sergeant first class has not been selected during the first four selection boards for which eligible, the likelihood for promotion drops to less than one in 30.

• Early retirement may be offered in select overage specialties as published by U.S. Total Army Personnel Command.

• There will be no change to the retention control point of 22 years.

Staff sergeants

• Anticipate promotions to sergeant first class to be sustained between 5,600-7,000 per year (compared to 5,473 in fiscal 1992).

• "Pin-on" point average to sergeant first class will hold steady at 13.7 years.

• Staff sergeants may be considered for promotion more than 10 times during their careers. Nearly two out of three staff sergeants will be promoted to sergeant first class. However, if a staff sergeant has not been selected during the first four boards in which eligible, the likelihood decreases to less than one in 15.

• Beginning Oct. 1, staff sergeants selected for promotion must complete the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course before promotion can take effect. Promotion selectees who haven't completed ANCOC will receive priority placement on the ANCOC list.

• ANCOC attendance will be sustained in proportion to authorizations by specialty at about 7,000 seats in fiscal 1994, projected to about 6,300 seats in fiscal 1995 and 1996.

• Early retirement will be offered in select overage specialties as published by PERSCOM.

• No change will occur in the retention control point of 20 years.

• VSI/SSB will continue to be offered in select specialties for FY 1994.

Sergeants

• Anticipate promotions to staff sergeant to average between 10,000-12,000 per year (compared to about 10,000 in fiscal 1992).

• "Pin-on" point average for promotion to staff sergeant will hold steady at 7.6 years.

• Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course will be in proportion to the drop in authorizations by specialty to about 18,000 seats in fiscal 1995 and 1996.

• NCOES linkage to promotion was complete Oct. 1, 1992. All sergeants selected for promotion are required to complete BNCOC prior to promotion.

• Beginning Oct. 1, the retention control point for promotable sergeants will be 15 years' service. Early retirement will be offered to this group of soldiers in fiscal 1994 at 15 years, 29 days' service.

Corporals/specialists

• Expect 23,000-25,000 promotions a year to sergeant (compared to 26,700 in fiscal 1992), with slightly lower time-in-service average upon promotion.

• "Pin-on" point average for promotion to sergeant will hold steady at 3.9 years.

• Promotable corporals and specialists must complete the Primary Leadership Development Course prior to promotion.

• The retention control point will remain at eight years' service.

Privates first class

• Promotions to specialist are not projected to change.

• "Pin-on" point average for promotion to specialist will hold steady at less than two years.

• Soldiers not promoted to specialist by the end of their first term of enlistment must separate from service.

This information was provided by the Army News Service.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army to implement 9-month Sergeants Major Course

In support of the recent Army decision to implement the nine-month Sergeants Major Course beginning in August 1995, the following changes were in effect for the August 1993 selection board for command sergeants major, sergeants major and the Sergeants Major Course:

- The selection board did not consider NCOs for SMC resident, non-resident and sister-service attendance. NCOs selected for promotion to sergeant major by the board and not previously selected for SMC will attend the course in July 1994.
- Master sergeants previously selected for SMC must attend the resident course by January 1995 and will attend Classes 44 or 45. Class 45 will be the last six-month class.
- NCOs previously selected to attend the non-resident course and sister-service academies will attend as scheduled.
- NCOs to attend Class 46, the first nine-month class, will be selected by the calendar-year 1994 CSM/SGM selection board.

For more information, contact SFC R.B. Gardner or SFC Murray in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-9002/8423, commercial (919) 432-9002/8423.

Re-enlistment bonuses decrease for Special Forces

Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Program multipliers were decreased for Special Forces soldiers effective September 30. The chart below shows current multipliers and zones.

MOS	From	To
18B, weapons	3A, 3B	None
18C, engineer	3A, 2B	1A, 1B
18D, medical	3A, 3B	2A, 2B
18E, communications	3A, 3B	None
18F, intelligence	3A, 3B	1A, 1B

Re-enlistment Zones:
A: Re-enlistments between 21 months and six years of active-duty service.
B: Re-enlistments between six and 10 years of active-duty service.

A limit of $20,000 in SRB entitlements and a three-year minimum term are requirements of the program. CMF 18 is now authorized two-, three-, four-, five- and six-year re-enlistment terms. Eligibility windows are:

- Any time no earlier than eight months before estimated termination of service and no later than three months before ETS.
- Any time eight months before ETS when a service-remaining requirement is imposed by DA that cannot be met on the current enlistment or an extended enlistment. Soldiers selecting this option are ineligible for accrued-leave, cash payments.
- A soldier may cancel an extension if the cancellation will place him in the eight-month window before ETS. When an SRB is calculated, extensions will be counted as previously obligated service.

Soldiers who apply for the Bonus Extension and Retention Program will be approved for a specific zone. A soldier must be one year from ETS to apply.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Fully funded schooling available for FA 39 officers

FA 39 officers interested in advanced civil schooling should be aware of two fully funded master's-degree programs. The first, offered at Fort Bragg, is a 12-month program which accepts 40 students per year and awards a master's degree in international relations. The second, offered by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., is an 18-month program for five 18/39 students per year and awards a master's degree in national security affairs. Applications for attendance in either program should be received by Maj. Morales, FA 39 assignments officer, no later than Sept. 30, 1993. Packets may be accepted after the suspense date if quotas are still available. Applications consist of DA Form 1618-R, Application for Detail as Student Officer, a current Graduate Record Examination and a copy of the applicant's undergraduate transcript. PERSCOM convenes a board in November to evaluate and recommend officers for ACS. Applicants are reviewed regarding overall qualifications, not prior academic aptitude only. Officers who graduate from either program will be required to serve in an Army Education Requirement System position to repay their master's degree. For more information, contact Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (919) 432-6406/9002.

FY 93 promotion rates high for SF warrant officers

The FY 93 promotion list for CW3 and CW4 shows high selection rates for SF warrant officers. The primary-zone selection rate was 87.5 percent for CW3 and 100 percent for CW4. Army primary-zone selection rates were 78.9 percent for CW3 and 74.9 percent for CW4.

Actions under way to update WO regulations

Several actions are currently under way to update regulations and guidance related to Army warrant officers:

• AR 611-112, *Manual of Warrant Officer MOSs*, is being revised to mandate and improve mobility in MOS 180A by including the new grade of CW5. It will also update SF qualifications, duties by grade and rank-coding tables.

• DA Pamphlet 600-11, *Warrant Officer Professional Development*, is being revised to encompass a chapter on each warrant-officer MOS. The revision will include information on duties and responsibilities of the SF warrant officer and the life-cycle model for MOS 180A, which will outline training, assignments and self-development by grades and years of service.

• AR 621-1 is being revised to give WOs greater accessibility to partially funded degree-completion programs. CW2s will be eligible for associate's-level, and CW3s for baccalaureate-level training.

• The Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan has a stated goal of associate's degrees for CW2s and bachelor's degrees for CW3s considered for promotion to CW4; consequently, education means success in promotion. For more information on the warrant-officer program or professional development, contact CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 4322-2415/9002.

Check prerequisites for CA Advanced Course

Officers planning to attend Phase IV of the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course should remember that they must meet all prerequisites before they can be accepted into the class. These include height and weight requirements, completion of Phases I, II and III, and grade of O-2 and above. Of those officers currently enrolled in the two-phase officer advanced course, only those who enrolled in and have completed the pilot Phase I are eligible to attend Phase IV in lieu of the new Phase II. All other officers currently enrolled in the new two-phase officer advanced program must first complete Phase I and then request enrollment in the new Phase II, which begins in FY 94. Officers who wish to attend Phase IV must also ensure that they have an assigned seat for the course. Those who arrive for training without an assigned seat, even though they may have valid orders, will not be admitted and will be returned to their home station. For more information, contact Maj. Romano, Co. B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at DSN 236-5377, commercial (919) 396-5377.

WO applicants may be ineligible by years of service

Current Army policy mandates a 5-8-year accession goal for all warrant officers. The policy allows the service proponent to waive as much as 12 years of active federal service for applicants. MOS 180A now has 314 of its authorized 364 warrant officers, and the program will be filled by the end of FY 94. Commanders should encourage their best-qualified NCOs to consider this program before they become ineligible by years of service. Applicants exceeding 12 years of active federal service may still apply and will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Qualified CA reserve officers should transfer to CA Branch

Qualified Civil Affairs reserve officers who do not transfer to the Civil Affairs Branch are being unfair to their units, according to Capt. R. Alan King, of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command G-1. “The unit manning report does not recognize reserve Civil Affairs officers as qualified if the officers are not currently in the Civil Affairs Branch,” King said. The misrepresentation gains greater significance considering that other reports, such as the unit status report, used to judge a unit’s readiness, incorporate data from the unit manning report. Authorized 1,455 Civil Affairs officers, USACAPOC has only 301 officers in the CA Branch. There are currently 380 reserve officers qualified for the CA Branch who have not submitted branch-transfer requests, King said. Officers should branch transfer requests through their unit personnel administrative center.

Foreign SOF

Crime linked to various ethnic conflicts

Linkages between crime and a number of ethnic conflicts, insurgencies and civil wars increasingly present a spectrum of complex problems for law-enforcement and security forces. In the former Yugoslavia, one of the by-products of conflict has been further development of a brisk trade in drugs and arms. Local "mafias" in every former province cut out territory for their criminal activities and have developed international ties, as well. A feature of these groups is their ethnic composition, with numerous charges and countercharges exchanged over alleged drugs-for-arms deals and other criminal activities. State sponsorship of narcotics and arms trafficking has been alleged, as well. The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where a small number of U.S. troops have been deployed for some months, has been the target of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity, from Serbia and Greece in particular. The president of Macedonia, for example, has been accused of being a heroin trafficker and using the proceeds to buy weapons. Defenders, however, say that the charges are fabrications of the Serbs and Greeks, with the "real" heroin traffickers found in the Yugoslav (Serbian) security establishment, including the Serbian Armed Forces Special Operations component formed in May 1992. According to the Macedonian media, the presence of heroin and "ecstasy" laboratories on Macedonian territory is attributed to these kinds of schemes and is not associated with the Macedonian government. Members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity terrorist organization are also said to be involved in drug trafficking with a Macedonian-Albanian drug mafia and Serbian traffickers. Thus, Macedonian smugglers, who with some frequency transport heroin into the former Yugoslavia, may be affiliated with any of several different political or profit-motivated agendas. Macedonia is well-situated to traffic in Turkish heroin but is an opium-poppy cultivator, as well. In Macedonia, opium-poppy cultivation is legal, and, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management, some 1,609 hectares are state-controlled, while 786 hectares are in the private sector. Even assuming that clandestine crops did not exist, the opportunities for illegal diversion of opium products would be substantial. Overall, the security environment in Macedonia, former Yugoslavia and other parts of Eastern Europe have acquired complexities that, aside from their law-enforcement dimensions, constitute planning considerations for military forces operating in the area and region.

Reports say Russian security-service personnel free-lancing

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union's centralized security and military establishments, reports of Russian and other officers participating in private paramilitary or criminal enterprises have proliferated. Russian organized crime groups, for example, are reported to include former KGB personnel and veterans of the war in Afghanistan, while military or paramilitary volunteers have been employed as provisional armed groups in civil conflicts in areas of the former USSR, in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East. In the latter region, the use of former Soviet KGB personnel to train pro-Iranian Hizbollah terrorists has been reported. Early in 1993, the bodies of four well-armed Russians dead from gunshot wounds were discovered near the

Beirut airport. They were reported to be former members of a Ministry of Internal Affairs counterterrorist unit disbanded after the August 1991 Soviet coup. They had reportedly contracted to train Hizbollah personnel, though the possibility that they were working for a "state" organization was left open, as well. While numerous details and rumors regarding the incident were examined, the clearest concern was expressed in the form of a question: had former military and security-service personnel "been transformed from real heroes into undesirable rabble, and had (they) become a mortal danger to the society that raised them?"

Russian SOF possibly used in counterdrug operations

The Russian military newspaper *Red Star* recently discussed a new Russian documentary film, "Black Shark," that deals in part with the war in Afghanistan and features footage of the KA-50 multi-role combat helicopter (NATO code name HOKUM) and other then-top-secret equipment items tested or employed in the conflict. The film was also said to reveal another "secret" — that military intelligence participated in counterdrug operations in the "Golden Crescent," which includes the high-volume drug-producing states of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Precise activities and locations were not given, but personnel involved were said to involve "active and present-day officers of the 15th Independent Brigade of Special Designation (*Spetsnaz*)." Over the last year in particular, Russian spokesmen have expressed growing concern about the smuggling of drugs and weapons from Afghanistan to the former Soviet central Asian republics and on to Russia. The recent revelation of military *spetsnaz* actions against narcotics trafficking may presage increased actions against a problem recognized as a national security threat.

Guatemalan peace talks may end guerrilla warfare

The on-again, off-again peace talks between the Guatemalan government and the communist guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, the URNG, could lead to a formal end of armed activities by that revolutionary organization. Even if an accord can be reached with the top guerrilla echelon, however, Guatemalans have reason to doubt that it would end guerrilla warfare in their country. The URNG high command does not always display complete control over its subordinates in the field. Some of the apparent lack of discipline may well be planned, allowing the URNG *jefes* to deny their responsibility. Guerrilla combat strength has diminished to perhaps as low as 800, but continuing use of Mexican sanctuaries puts total victory by the Guatemalan Army out of reach. Mexican attitudes have been a largely unmentioned factor in the determination of the war. In the opinion of some specialists, the Mexican government has generally turned a blind eye to the presence of Guatemalan guerrillas on Mexican soil, even though URNG leadership openly bases its public operations out of Mexico City. However, it seems that the Mexican government recently decided to distance itself from the URNG. This spring, when a cottage munitions plant belonging to the Guatemalan guerrillas blew up in Chiapas, the Mexican government recognized the illegal guerrilla presence. Guatemalan and Mexican officials have generally identified with distinctly different ideological colors, and many observers in Guatemala feel that subordinate leaders in the URNG will continue to find favor among elements of the Mexican government. According to them, if this pro-guerrilla sympathy remains, it will help the Guatemalan guerrillas continue armed pressure against the Guatemalan state indefinitely.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lt. Col. Geoffrey Demarest of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Plans unveiled for SOF medical training center

The Army Corps of Engineers recently unveiled plans for the Special Operations Medical Training Center to be built at Fort Bragg as part of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Ground breaking for the $15-$18 million project is scheduled in late February or March 1994, said Marion Harrison, design branch chief for the Corps of Engineers' Savannah district. Completion is projected for 1996, with the first class starting in July of that year.

Army Special Forces medical-sergeant candidates, as well as students from other services, will train in the 73,739 square-foot complex. The center will have 10 classrooms, ranging from 20- to 200-student capacity, and a 1,000-book medical library, said Maj. Robert Jones, executive officer for the SOMTC. The complex's clinical area will include 10 operating rooms and radiology, anatomy, laboratory and pharmacy rooms.

Approximately 500 future SF medics will train in five classes to be conducted simultaneously in the center, Jones said. The SOMTC will be built in the wooded area behind Fort Bragg's Main NCO Club. — *Carol Jones, USASOC PAO*

5th SF Group receives Valorous Unit Award

The 5th Special Forces Group added the Valorous Unit Award streamer to its colors in a ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky., June 11.

Approved by the Secretary of the Army Dec. 23, 1992, the award recognizes members of the 5th Group for extraordinary heroism in military operations against an armed enemy during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and Kuwait.

The Special Operations Medical Training Center

All soldiers assigned or attached to the 5th Group between Jan. 17 and Feb. 28, 1991, are authorized to wear the Valorous Unit Award ribbon.

Document to introduce SOF to conventional Army

A document scheduled for release in January will formally introduce special operations to the conventional Army.

The training support package for FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, is intended to be an overview of special-operations doctrine to show how SOF fit into the total combat picture. The package will be sent to all Army schools and is intended as the primary vehicle for instructing the conventional Army about SOF, according to Jim Pritchert, one of the package's developers in the SWCS 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

"Old hands in the special-operations community will not notice any new material in this publication," Pritchert said. The manual is intended to help future conventional-force commanders use SOF to their fullest extent.

Members of the SOF community who would like to review the package and make comments or suggestions should contact Jim Pritchert; Attn: AOJK-GP-A-SA; USAJFK-SWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307. Phone DSN 239-5121, commercial (919) 432-5121.

New SF MTPs address various levels of command

The first of a series of new Special Forces mission training plans is scheduled to be mailed to field units for comment in November 1993.

ARTEP 31-805-MTP, *SF Group/Battalion*, is one of four MTPs projected to replace existing single-volume SF mission-specific ARTEP documents produced between 1988 and 1990. The new series will provide a separate MTP for each echelon of command within the SF group.

ARTEP 31-805 will be distributed as a coordinating draft in November to every SF group for appropriate staffing and comment. User feedback will help to ensure that the MTP is an effective tool for SF units and staffs and provides a logical method for training to combat standards.

Coordinating drafts for the other manuals in the series are scheduled as follows: ARTEP 31-807-MTP, *SF Company* (April 1994); ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP, *SF Operational*

Detachment "A" (July 1994); and ARTEP 31-807-34, *SF Selective Tasks* (U) (October 1994).

The MTPs will provide SF units with a menu of training events and programs and suggested training methods for achieving critical missions.

11th SF Group seeks applicants for MI slots

The Army Reserve's 1st Battalion, 11th Special Forces Group in Louisville, Ky., has opportunities for qualified soldiers to provide military-intelligence special operations support.

Positions are available in grades of private first class to master sergeant in MOSs 96B, 96D, 98C, 98G, 98H, 98K and 31C. Ranger- and SF-qualified soldiers willing to transition to 98G and 98H, as well as linguists in European languages, are also encouraged to apply. For more information contact SSgt. Thomas Haynes at (317) 283-9894.

USASOC names NCO, soldier of the year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command recently announced the winners in its NCO and Soldier of the Year competition.

Winners were SSgt. James D. Pippin, a 75th Ranger Regiment instructor from Fort Benning, Ga., and Spec. Clare L. O'Shaughnessy, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Both received Army Certificates of Achievement from Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. They also received Class-A and dress-blue uniforms and $1,000 savings bonds.

Runners-up were SSgt. Byron R. Shrader, JFKSWCS, and Spec. Marshall Brooks, U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Other competitors were SSgt. Robert Abernethy, USSFC; SSgt. Douglas Hiwiller, USACAPOC; Sgt. Keith R. Salo, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; Spec. Kenneth M. Decoursey, 160th SOAR; Spec. Scott Johnson, JFKSWCS; and Spec. James D. Seley, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Memorial stone honors World War II Rangers

Members of the Army Special Operations Command dedicated a memorial stone in the JFK Plaza July 9 to the Rangers of the Second World War.

Present-day Rangers from the Ranger Regiment's three battalions: the 1st, Fort Stewart, Ga.; 2nd, Fort Lewis, Wash.; and 3rd, Fort Benning, Ga., stood in formation to honor their guests, who included members of the World War II Ranger Battalions' Association.

Lt. Gen. J. T. Scott, USASOC commander, assured the veterans they had left behind a powerful and living legacy. "You, along with your comrades of the OSS, the 1st Special Service Force, the 5307th Composite Unit and the Alamo Scouts, are responsible for reviving a tradition in the United States military. The tradition of a special kind of warrior — one whose skills, courage and willingness to sacrifice know no equal."

Training videos hold audience attention

You're in charge of training your detachment in infiltration and exfiltration planning, but how can you make your class more interesting?

Training videos are effective training aids that hold audience attention and teach through visual and audio means. They provide the unit with recognized experts on the subject matter and up-to-date doctrinal changes.

The nearest training support center has a list of available training videos and can also search for a particular subject on the Defense Automated Visual Information System. DAVIS will produce a printout of all related training videos within DoD. Videos can be ordered by their title and production identification number, or PIN.

Some SOF videos currently available are: Edible Wild Plants Survival Series (PIN 708290 and 709852), Terrorism Series (PIN 702280, 702281, 702282, and 702283), and Army Civil Affairs and the Country Team (PIN 71460).

Other SOF videos are in production: Special Forces Tabletop Base Station Series (PIN 710038 and 710105), Infiltration and Exfiltration Planning Series (PIN 710093, 710098, and 710109), and PSYOP — The Invisible Sword (PIN 709472).

If there isn't a training video on the subject you want, request one be produced. It takes about 12 months from the time funding is requested until the video is completed. Instructions for requesting video production can be found in Annex R of USASOC Reg 25-2. For further information, call Diana L. Beebe, audiovisual program officer, at DSN 239-8853/9959, commercial (919) 432-8853/9959. — *Diana L. Beebe, JFKSWCS*

SWCS employees selected for leadership program

Two civilian employees of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School were selected in July for the 1993 Women's Executive Leadership Program.

Martha Levister, an instructional systems specialist in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, and Doe Ann Keane, a statistician in the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, have been selected for the 12-month program. WELP consists of core training in subjects such as management and leadership, followed by 30- and 60-day developmental assignments with other agencies and a one-week shadowing assignment to allow participants to observe successful senior employees at work.

WELP was created in 1984 to provide employees with managerial experience early in their careers. It is open to male and female civilians in grades GS-11 and -12.

Book Reviews

Godwin's Saga: A Commando Epic. *By Kenneth Macksey. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987. ISBN: 0-08-034742-8. 149 pages. $18.*

Retired British Army major Kenneth Macksey's dramatic account of young John Godwin and the fated Checkmate commando mission into the fjords of German-occupied Norway during World War II makes a fascinating and a bit depressing reading. *Godwin's Saga* deserves a place on the reading list of special-operations soldiers, especially those involved in small-boat amphibious operations.

Macksey tells an interesting tale. He traces the life of John Godwin from his native Argentina (he was of English parents) to his enlistment in the Royal Navy, and then on to his role as a naval commando officer in combined operations targeted against Norway. The author details his assignment to Operation Checkmate, in which he and five other commandos would be dropped off the Norwegian coast in a smaller boat by a fast motor-torpedo boat, or MTB, set up a mission-support site on an uninhibited shore and move from there in canoes to raid local enemy installations with limpet mines and other devices.

Unfortunately, as Macksey relates, the mission began to fall apart almost as soon as the team was launched into Norwegian waters. Although they managed to sink one small German vessel, Godwin and his teammates were quickly captured, imprisoned in Norway and then transported to German concentration camps, where they died just weeks before Allied forces liberated the camps.

The book's value is found at several levels. On the surface, it illustrates the value of planning, preparation, training and correcting of deficiencies noted during rehearsal. During a rehearsal for the operation, Godwin and his team had trouble with overheated bearings in the boat that was to take them into the fjords. The problem occurred because the MTB towed their boat at 20 knots, when their boat was designed for a maximum speed of 7 knots.



Godwin and his colleagues essentially wished away the problem, and their boat was unable to move under its own power just a few miles from its drop-off point in Norwegian waters. This inhibited their mobility, decreased the planned targeting window, forced them to have contact with civilians (which was prohibited), caused the team to split, forced them into an evasive situation for which they were not prepared and ultimately led to their capture by German troops. When the one party, positioned at the mission-support site, went into evasion, they failed to destroy their boat, maps and other critical documents, all of which fell into German hands. There was no established rat line for this party to use to get to Sweden, and they were betrayed by a Norwegian whom they had asked for directions. The other party was captured when a German sea patrol noticed them moving around an abandoned house on a island that was to be their rendezvous with the MTB a few days hence.

The author also illuminates the tension between military planners (the British) who want to carry out destructive raids in occupied territory to throw their enemy off balance and representatives of the government in exile (the Norwegians) who fear enemy retaliation and other hardships visited upon their countrymen as a result of such raiding. He also explores the raiding-for-the sake-of-raiding mentality versus the notion of raiding for defined purposes only. On a slightly different level, Macksey does a good job of illustrating the consequences of failure for special-operations forces, as he describes the torments of Godwin and his party, first in German custody in Norway and then in the hell of Sachsenhausen and other Nazi concentration camps. Macksey describes, for example, their being forced to march 48 kilometers per day, in a malnourished state, at Sachsenhausen to test shoes for the German military.

Godwin's Saga is a brief and unadorned injection of realism into a body of literature dominated by rosy success stories. Appreciating risk and learning from failure are important survival traits for special-operations

personnel, and Macksey's book is a good addition to the library of the serious student of special operations.

Maj. William H. Burgess III
USSOCOM
MacDilll AFB, Fla.

Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. *By David W. Hogan Jr. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992. ISBN: 0-313-26803-7. 296 pages. $47.95.*

In this especially well-researched book, David Hogan presents the dilemma unique to Ranger units: Are they special-operations forces or highly trained infantry? Hogan details the struggle between these positions from World War II to Grenada. He highlights the debate with both historic example and accounts of leading personalities from the battalion level to the theater headquarters and within the halls of the Pentagon. Each of these leaders has his own view as to the purpose of a Ranger unit, its employment and its position within the context of a mass-produced, egalitarian Army. The author's position as an historian in the U.S. Army Center of Military History gives him unique insight to this continuous problem.

Hogan contends that the Rangers were developed primarily from the frustration of Allied defeats in World War II. This frustration caused the American Army's senior leadership to attempt to develop a capability along the lines of the British commandos. This effort had two purposes: to demonstrate an offensive capability to the American public and to gain a core of combat experience to provide leavening to the mass-developed forces. The Army's senior leadership did not consider the Rangers as SOF.

Based on this ad hoc start, the early Ranger leaders could not establish a specialized doctrine, a C2 system nor a force structure to support their units. Instead the Rangers were forced to rely on the imagination and benevolence of the theater commanders to provide employment. This lack of top-down support led to the Rangers' being held in a state of limbo. When a real special operation, such as Pointe du Hoc, was required in a theater, the Ranger forces were trained and resourced. Conversely, when no operation loomed on the horizon, the Rangers were employed as very good line infantry or disbanded. In either case, the core of experience was lost to the Army.

This book is especially valuable to those SOF soldiers who are force developers or members of unified headquarters. It provides a series of



issues which we must address to the conventional Army to ensure that today's SOF are properly integrated into the battlefield. Hogan's choice of historical examples clearly demonstrates errors that the community has made in the past.

The first of these issues is articulation of a clear purpose for a special-operations force. An example is provided in which force developers attempting to retain Ranger structure suggested that the force could be used in paramilitary operations like Special Forces. This suggestion was accepted; however, the force retained was ill-equipped to accomplish the task. This failure caused the conventional Army to once again question the relevance of this special force.

Following closely on this issue is the question of SOF doctrine. Hogan repeatedly demonstrates that the Rangers' lack of an Army-accepted doctrine left their operations at the whim of the senior conventional commanders. This lack of doctrinal underpinning has caused Ranger-like units to be continuously reinvented, employed and disbanded during the last five decades.

Hogan's final issue is that of adequate organization. Ranger developers, in an effort not only to "sell their product" at the least cost, but also to reduce the battalion's operational tail, repeatedly under-resourced C2, liaison and sustainment functions. Under-resourcing led to liaison officers of company-grade rank attempting to compete with general-officer liaisons for the theater commander's ear. Further, lean sustainment required the battalions to consume resources from conventional units. This parasitic relationship further alienated conventional commanders.

The book is an excellent read and provides the SOF professional with perspective on developing and maintaining our forces. In these times of shrinking budgets and demands for measurable capabilities, Hogan provides a road map on how not to articulate our message.

Maj. Robert D. Lewis
ODCSOPS, HQDA
Washington, D.C.

Swords of Lightning: Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare. *By Terry White. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992. ISBN: 0-08-040976-8 (hardcover). 292 pages.* $25.

You're leaving tomorrow for a 30-day deployment and you need something to read. So there you are in the bookstore, up to the eyeballs in special-operations wanna-be books, time running out, when suddenly, a slick, glossy, full-color dust jacket catches your eye. Looking closer, you see

what could almost be a recruiting poster, with several SEALS rising from the depths looking for trouble, the book's title boldly emblazoned with the Special Forces' shoulder patch. It looks impressive. Convinced that your mission has been successful, you snatch the book from the shelf and, hesitating only slightly to pay the required $25, dash out the store.

Later, long after the aging C-141 has hurled itself into the sky, you pull out your new book and settle in for some in-flight reading. Before long, though, a terrible feeling creeps over you — originating from the wallet area. You realize that something is horribly wrong.

Could this happen to you? It could if you like your facts straight about U.S. special operations and buy *Swords of Lightning*. This book is advertised as a "the first complete account of the evolution and deployment of Special Forces." It is definitely not.

Although containing interesting and informative portions, *Swords of Lightning* ultimately falls far short of its billing as either a history or complete assessment of special operations for several reasons. The main reason is that the author's research concerning U.S. special operations is all too often simply wrong, and his assessments of those missions are flawed, prejudiced and uninformed.

There are other reasons, as well. The historical sketches that the author uses to illustrate aspects of special-operations capabilities are too shallow to really capture the historical relevance or context of the operation. Next, the book's scope is limited to essentially U.S. and British special operations, with some cursory discussion of other special-operations forces. From the introduction on, the book lacks a clear methodology that outlines the author's purpose and how he intends to achieve it.

The book's terminology is often confusing. The term "Special Forces," for example, is used repeatedly, both generically and in reference to U.S. Special Forces. There are no established criteria used objectively throughout by the author for assessing the special operations discussed within the book, defeating any claim to real analytical contribution. Readers familiar with the articulation of U.S. Army special-operations forces' roles and missions as outlined in FM 100-25 will be disappointed at the author's lack of precision and distinction in his dissection of special-operations missions. In fact, the author never makes a clear distinction between special-operations forces and contingency forces, which he labels "quick-reaction forces."

The strongest portions of the book are those with which the author is clearly most familiar, British special operations. White's accounts essentially match those primary and secondary sources from which his examples are drawn. However, it is apparent that the author has chosen to highlight the successes of British efforts while glossing over, or ignoring, problems that they, like all forces, have encountered.

Not so when dealing with U.S. special operations. Indeed, White is not at all reluctant to catalogue real or inaccurately assessed mistakes from our experience. His listed research sources include virtually none of those publications that have become standard references for U.S. special-operations history and analysis, e.g., Stanton's *Green Berets at War*.

White simply gets it wrong too many times when dealing with the history of U.S. special-operations forces and events. These errors range from the irritating, sloppy type to more serious misjudgments that reflect an incomplete understanding of the application of U.S. special-operations forces. Need examples? Well, certainly a "complete account" should get the regional orientation of U.S. SF groups right, the leadership development role of the U.S. Army Ranger School straight, the fact that the 75th Rangers don't do "LRRP," and that the 82nd Airborne Division is decidedly part of the U.S. Army's conventional force structure, not ARSOF.

The more serious mistakes, however, revolve around the author's inaccurate and unjustified negative conclusions regarding U.S. special-operations from the Vietnam era forward. U.S. counterinsurgency successes, often lost within the overall context of the failed Vietnam effort, are discounted by White. The success of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, as first applied a classic application of population-and-terrain denial to an insurgent, is not only unacknowledged, but derided.

This trend toward generalizations and fault-finding on U.S. special operations continues throughout. His section on Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, which highlights the well-known mistakes that accompanied that experience, concludes with the unattributed observation that it was "nothing less than a military disaster." A career Special Forces sergeant-major who was closely involved with the operation made the opposing observation that with Governor Scoon and family successfully secured, all American citizens secured, and minimal U.S. casualties, it is hard to look at the operation as a military disaster.

White's facts regarding Just Cause are just as biased and laced with errors, particularly concerning actions around Torrijos-Tocumen airport. It was, of course, Special Forces soldiers from the 7th SF Group, supported by AC-130s, who defended and denied the Pacora River bridge to the Panamanian Defense Force, not Task Force Pacific. Nor was "much of the fighting" at Torrijos airport conducted in the lounges as White records. It was the 82nd Airborne Division that liberated the Renancer prison near Gamboa, and 28 C-141s were absolutely *not* parachuted into the bogs surrounding the Panamanian airports (hopefully an editing error).

So if you, too, are tired of reading "definitive major works" that turn out to be laced with bogus information, do yourself a favor and skip this one. If you're interested in the British experience with special operations, consider borrowing it from your buddy when he gets back from the deployment. Since this appears to have been White's first book, maybe he would've been better advised to have taken a smaller bite and stayed with material with which he was presumably more familiar — British SOF and their experiences.

Maj. John F. Mulholland
Fort Bragg, N.C.

War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century. *By Colin S. Gray. New York: Touchstone Books (Simon & Schuster), 1990. ISBN 0-671-60695-6; 0-671-74029-6 (paper); 442 pages. $12.95.*

Colin S. Gray, one of America's deans of diplomacy and strategy, has succeeded where others have failed. In a book which is destined to become a classic, Gray performs a masterful job in exploring and explaining why nations do what they do in modern times. By way of his comparisons and analyses, he highlights today's international events and projects them into a possible American future. Through the use of historical analogy, the author draws parallels between modern nation-states and those of yesteryear. In so doing, he highlights cogent events and trends for further analysis and examination.

Be forewarned, this is not a book for those with only a passing interest in the arts of statecraft, war and diplomacy. If your depth of concern for international events begins and ends with CNN news or your daily newspaper, this book may not be for you. The issues that Gray examines are complex. His analyses go deep to the heart of issues seldom well-examined by the American media. In



other words, the book is not written for neophytes.

This book is of particular value to senior officers because it examines war, and the role of war, from a national perspective. Gray uses the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Luttwak, Mahan and other strategic thinkers as starting points for the comparison of differing historical American strategies in the international forum. This methodology works. Gray's effort seems to be aimed predominantly at graduate-level international-affairs students and policy makers.

Gray's approach to his subject reflects a more holistic, and therefore more easily comprehensible approach than this reviewer has seen used previously. Most scholars tend to specificity at the cost of overall understanding. Too much detail tends to obscure the larger, and often more important picture. Gray does not fall into this trap, and he is to be applauded for making this departure from the norm. By taking this approach to his subject, he is free to theorize concerning the interrelationships of culture, geography and strategy. What he says makes sense.

Although the entire book has value, Gray's chapters on technology and war, coalition warfighting and national security policy are particularly trenchant. America's recent conflict with Iraq, in coalition with other nation-states, and the advent of the emerging "New World Order," make his observations especially topical and interesting. Gray seems to validate the U.S. Army's emphasis on the care and training of its soldiers when he states that, "All of military history shows that superior military method applied by dedicated warriors is more important than technological advantage — all other factors being tolerably equal." From this perspective it is clear that technology was not our greatest advantage during the Gulf War. Our greatest asset continues to be well-trained and motivated soldiers.

This is a book that will not grow dusty on my bookshelf at home. I expect to be referring to it often for years to come.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
Joint Special Operations Cmd.
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Special Warfare

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