Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Coalition Warfare

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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

One of the great success stories of Operation Desert Storm was the performance of our Special Forces in coalition warfare. According to Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, they were the glue that held the coalition together. Working with the military forces of the Arab countries and with those as varied as France, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia and Senegal, Special Forces made a vital contribution to the overall effort.

Later, during Hurricane Andrew relief efforts, the nation-assistance skills of U.S. SOF allowed them to contribute to disaster-relief efforts in Florida. In both instances, SOF were able to adapt their skills to assume and succeed in a mission for which they were not specifically trained.

Their success in supporting the coalition came not from the fact that Special Forces are trained for coalition warfare, but because the strengths needed — language proficiency, cultural awareness and the ability to work as trainers and advisers — were similar to those of one of their primary missions, foreign internal defense.

Nor are language and cultural skills the exclusive property of Special Forces. Civil Affairs used the same strengths during Desert Storm to assist them in coordinating host-nation support and to aid dislocated civilians. PSYOP forces used the same skills to produce effective leaflets and radio broadcasts which influenced enemy soldiers to surrender.

Desert Storm and Hurricane Andrew point to two widely separate mission areas in which our special-operations forces can be successful. Seemingly at opposite ends of the spectrum, these combat and humanitarian-assistance missions illustrate the diversity of the roles SOF can fill.

As we identify military functions and as new missions emerge in the future, this diversity promises to make SOF more likely to assume

non-traditional roles which require a variety of skills. With strengths in numerous fields, SOF provide a versatile and flexible capability to respond to a number of challenges and to fill or contribute to a number of military roles and functions.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

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

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Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Five Imperatives of Coalition Warfare

by Capt. John Fenzel III

In this new era of "peacetime engagement," and in the wake of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, coalition warfare has rapidly become popularized as the future for military endeavors worldwide. Indeed, in recent years we have seen the renewal of the United Nations as a primary vehicle in forming and guiding global coalitions through the full continuum of military operations.

Despite its apparent novelty, coalition warfare is deeply rooted in ancient and contemporary history. In 1775, the Continental Congress selected General George Washington to lead a tenuous coalition of colonies and nations during the Revolutionary War. His leadership was vital in employing American and French troops to collectively defeat the British at Yorktown.

Abroad, Carl Von Clausewitz wrote of "coalition formation" in 18th- and 19th-century Europe. During that era, Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo with his European allies. Yet not all coalitions of the time were successful. During the Seven Years' War (1756-63), for instance, Frederick the Great found himself on a battlefield vastly outnumbered by the coalition armies of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony — whom he soundly defeated.

In the 20th century, coalition warfare has been practiced extensively in both world wars, Korea and Vietnam. In each of these campaigns, allied coalitions were formed, composed of the joint forces at each member nation's disposal.

Whether they are classified as a "peacekeeping force" or as actual allied combatants, unified multinational military forces define coalition warfare. By design, coalitions and alliances are formed by strategic planners with a dual purpose: to enhance combat power, and to demonstrate global or forming coalitions, as seen during World War II with the allied "Grand Alliance" between the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union — then referred to euphemistically as the "Strange Alliance." This classic case points directly to a significant characteristic of coalitions: their unique power to unite political antagonists for a common cause.

Coalition warfare also has a tactical realm, which remains just as intricate and challenging for its participants. Here, coalition warfare encompasses the widest variety of conventional and special-operations missions. It is important therefore, at the outset, not to characterize coalition warfare as a type of mission, but as an environment in which to operate.

What separates coalition warfare from other forms of warfare? Its many different characteristics seem to defy any single answer. And yet, further analysis reveals one overwhelming consideration that stands out above the rest, a principle of

war both universal and essential in its application to coalition warfare.

Sixth principle of war

Depending on the national identity of the forces involved, the degree of difficulty in employing a nationally integrated force varies. In virtually all cases and at all operational levels of coalition warfare, the nine principles of war are particularly cogent. At the strategic and operational levels, the most vital of these is the sixth: unity of command. In 1942, Gen. George C. Marshall, then Army chief of staff, described unity of command as a "dominating factor" facing the Allies in those days of crisis:

Of all the military lessons which could have been learned from [World War I], the question of unity of command is probably the most outstanding. Personally, I learned my lesson in observing the problems of General Pershing in France and the reluctance of our allies to meet the issue until almost overwhelmed by the great German offensive of March 1918.[1]

In a coalition of political antagonists, unity of command may be achievable in name alone. Even Clausewitz recognized the inherent complex, fragile nature of coalitions, pointing to the "independent interest in and independent force with which (each state) prosecutes the war."[2]

This characteristic was further demonstrated by another 18th-century warrior, Napoleon Bonaparte, whose distrust of coalitions was a matter of public record: "Give me allies as an enemy," he would say defiantly, "so I can defeat them one by one."[3] Today such Napoleonic zeal is quite likely an anachronism. Yet, however intemperate, it is nonetheless characteristic of the widely divergent, independent interests which commonly exist between coalition allies.

Depending on the circumstances and politics involved, one commander may very well not have absolute control over all coalition partners. In this environment, the principle of unity of command must therefore be reduced to its most important defining component: unity of effort.

In a politically charged arena, unity of effort is a virtual prerequisite to the other principles of war. Implicit within this tenet is the notion that when unity of command is not achievable in its purest form, unity of effort is created on a strong foundation of close liaison and cooperation between counterparts; with unified planning and execution as its cornerstones.

For leaders at all levels, the lessons of history are clear: waging coalition warfare successfully centers not around the martial skills espoused by Clausewitz, but on the ideological and non-tangible fundamentals which address each coalition partner's social, cultural and doctrinal differences. When these differences are effectively reconciled through intensive dialogue and training, doctrinal and "instinctive" martial skills then become decisive forces on the battlefield. Without a reconciliation of this type, however, combat power is all but irrelevant.

One of the continuing challenges faced by commanders operating within a coalition force is to effectively manage the countless threats to effective, unified effort. They are often regarded as distractions and challenges by those who are accustomed to them — obstacles to be overcome.

The immediate challenges are normally those which present themselves upon stepping foot in country: language and culture. Because they are the first challenges confronted, their importance cannot be overstated. Adept handling of linguistic and cultural disparities form a vital first impression with multinational counterparts and set the tone for future interaction.

As time progresses, other diversions inevitably emerge: hidden or conflicting agendas, limited

Photo by Dean Wagner

As the commander of USCENTCOM, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf led the coalition force in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Success in coalition operations demands skill not only military operations, but also in addressing social, cultural and doctrinal differences within the coalition.

resources, low confidence and trust, doctrinal differences, lack of organization, political dissension, power struggles, lack of clear objective and personality clashes. If left alone, any one of these could well become a "show-stopper."

Five imperatives

U.S. military doctrine embraces five combat imperatives, or methods to defeat an enemy. While they are proven, invaluable battlefield tenets, none seem to adequately address the issues unique to coalition warfare. At the outset of this type of campaign, questions of how to deal with the enemy are peripheral to the manner in which allies interact. Addressing that issue requires an entirely different set of working guidelines, or "imperatives," to be applied well before any battle plans are executed.

- Cultivate intense political and cultural awareness.
- Develop rapport between participants.
- Synchronize the force.
- Maximize doctrine and innovation to overcome obstacles.
- Simplify the plan.

Cultivate intense political and cultural awareness. The phenomenon of coalition formation has its origins with the Achaean and Aetolean city leagues of ancient Greece and the Hanseatic and Swabian Leagues in Europe. It was also attempted in the 1920s by Woodrow Wilson in his failed League of Nations. These, and other supranational alliances since, were developed primarily to counter common threats and to further shared goals. However ancient the trend, most coalitions in history have been relatively short-lived; the causes are normally found at that point when established associations evaporated into shared socio-political differences.

From the city leagues of ancient Greece to today's United Nations, cultural and political ideologies have been indelibly interwoven into the fabric of coalitions and alliances. The evolution of a coalition is literally as complex as the cultures and political systems which comprise it. Understanding the role which these two factors play in forming coalitions is vital to their function and largely determines their ultimate success or failure.

On a somewhat less grand scale, yet equally as important, is the foundation of any alliance — people. Because multinational coalitions consist of populations with different cultural backgrounds, the challenges and "distractions" to unified effort are often predestined.

Culture is the single most dominating influence on people, and therefore, on coalitions. In nearly all cases where alliances have failed, the cause can ultimately be traced to basic ignorance of the other's cultural values. Conversely, successful coalitions are bred through empathic communication and through a profound understanding of socio-political environments.

In his book *Green Berets at War*, Shelby Stanton describes SF relationships with the Montagnards during the Vietnam War, clearly illustrating the importance of cultural awareness:

The Special Forces found the Montagnard aborigines incredibly simplistic and superstitious. To gain their allegiance, the Special Forces soldiers carefully learned tribal customs and studied the local dialects, ate the tribal food, endured the cold, mixed indigenous garb with their uniforms, and participated in the rituals and ceremonies. ... Montagnards accepted only those who shared their lifestyles and dangers.[4]

Coalition warfare demands nothing less than a thorough, in-depth understanding of the operational area and its people. Limited awareness of an area's culture can be gained through area analysis and language studies. Detailed understanding, however, can be achieved only through actual, intensive personal interaction with coalition counterparts. It is here that knowledge of cultural subtleties is gained, and true partnerships are formed. No grand strategy or technological advantage can be substituted for intensive personal awareness of a counterpart's politics and culture.

Develop rapport between participants. While developing rapport among coalition members may not be entirely possible at the strategic

Photo by John Fenzel

U.S. soldiers from the 5th SF Group and Kuwaiti units prepare to cross into Kuwait from Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm.

level of war, it is vital in performing tactical operations. Rapport is defined by Webster's as a "relation marked by harmony, conformity, accord, or affinity."[5] On the battlefield, rapport extends beyond the textbook definitions and translates to mutual understanding, trust and confidence between participants.

In the most ideal circumstances, synchronized effort is an elusive equation at best. Within an alliance or coalition, however, it is accomplished through the cultivation of partnership. A common goal or purpose, alone, is not sufficient. Interpersonal skills and linguistic ability communicate perceptions and go far in promoting a shared sense of partnership.

Rapport is often hard-won among coalition counterparts when cultural and political differences far outweigh any similarities. An enduring observation from our Desert Shield and Desert Storm experience supports this claim: Rapport-building is often exhausting, tedious work. It requires the active employment of interpersonal skills which may or may not be normally forthcoming. It also requires overcoming endemic personal prejudices that would otherwise serve as barriers to effective interaction.

The issue of rapport is a familiar one found throughout American military history. A virtual case study of successful interaction can be found during World War II, in Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's encounters with British Field Marshal Montgomery and French General DeGaulle. His dealings with these and other allies were frequently distressing to the allied commander, but he remained cordial nonetheless. His disagreements with Churchill in planning the invasion of Europe are well-documented. Through his own experiences, he developed an acute awareness of the need for interpersonal skills in dealing with his allied counterparts:

Allied commands depend on mutual confidence. How is mutual confidence developed? You don't command it. ... By development of common understanding of the problems, by approaching these things on the widest possible basis with respect to each other's opinions, and above all, through the development of friendships, this confidence is gained in families and in Allied Staffs.[6]

Photo by Thomas Witham

A U.S. Navy SEAL trains Saudi Special Forces troops in the use of C-4 explosives. Building rapport is important to a sense of coalition partnership.

The mutual respect and understanding gained during such interaction is invaluable in reconciling agendas, calming fears, reducing ethnocentrism and planning for events to come. It is important to re-emphasize that rapport-building is often painstaking. It frequently involves a seemingly endless search for compromise, long hours spent coordinating training events in a social setting, and perseverance in the face of rejection. While enjoying the process is desirable, it is certainly not always possible, nor is it easy.

Perhaps most important to rapport development, and indeed, to the effectiveness of any coalition effort, is commitment. At the tactical level, American co-combatants or advisers must be able to assure their coalition counterparts that they are committed to their cause.

Presence alone, however, cannot assure commitment. At the strategic and operational levels, commitment is largely measured by historic example. For 30 years, the tragic examples of the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam cast doubt on our ability as a nation to fully commit ourselves to a just cause. Those examples did not go unnoticed in the global arena. Desert Shield and Desert Storm have since healed these wounds and reinforced the United Nations' role as a viable global peacekeeping organization.

In 1990, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd welcomed the U.S. deployment on his nation's soil based on that sentiment of trust and commitment: "I trust the United States of America. I know that when you say you will be committed, you are in fact committed."[7]

In the tactical arena, American forces, whether they are conventional or SOF, must be assured of their ability to permanently commit themselves to their assigned coalition counterparts. Once committed in their roles as advisers or co-combatants, those units must remain together until the mission is accomplished. They should not

be detached for other missions, nor should they be subject to administrative restrictions which apply to other non-affiliated forces. Once the mission is completed, our units should depart on schedule, as promised. Credibility and trust — the two basic ingredients to rapport — hinge on unwaiverable, honest commitment.

Synchronize the force. Synchronization is a common operational concept which pervades U.S. military doctrine. It is also a published tenet of our AirLand Battle Doctrine. Similarly, the goal of joint warfare is expressed by our JCS doctrine as the *sequenced and synchronized employment of resources*.[8] In coalition warfare, however, synchronization advances from its status as a tenet and a goal to that of an imperative. The requirement for coordinated planning and execution is critical in a diverse multinational alliance. When compared to recent unitary national efforts such as Grenada, Panama and the Falkland Islands, the challenges of synchronization assume a different shape and a far greater degree of difficulty.

Developing a synergistic effort among multinationals, at any level, necessitates common, steadfast focus. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 5th Special Forces Group advisers, assigned foreign-internal-defense missions with each of the Arab coalition armies, discovered that to be an exhausting, and frequently frustrating endeavor. Hidden agendas, conflicting doctrine and decidedly different sets of priorities were commonplace and posed formidable barriers to synchronized effort. The methods SF advisers used to better align their counterpart units were often tailored to fit situations as they arose. The methods which they found to be most effective were numerous and form a compendium of doctrinal lessons taught in basic service schools. Many, in fact, would seem manifest in their simplicity:

- Observe and evaluate.
- Begin with the basics. Set achievable standards and objectives.
- Task-organize to fit the mission and the capabilities of the force.
- Ensure the existence of a good communications plan.
- Coordinate the plan and maintain focus through close liaison.
- Conduct extensive, realistic training and rehearsals with coalition counterparts.
- Train during the day and at night.

5th Group's success in applying these tools with coalition partners translated into dramatically increased unit cohesion and soldier confidence with their Arab counterparts. Ultimately, as they discovered, the psychological benefits of this approach proved to be the most powerful synchronizing force of all.

Maximize doctrine and innovation to overcome obstacles. Throughout the course of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, coalition partners faced numerous obstacles, ranging from the tactical employment of nationally diverse units to POW management. Many of those obstacles were directly related to a general lack of needed materials to accomplish resource-intensive tasks. Yet in every instance, those problems were resolved, either through sheer force of will or through resourcefulness and creative thought.

Perhaps the strongest and most recognized quality of American soldiers is their ability to adapt and innovate to solve problems. Innovation is, in fact, part and parcel of U.S. military tradition. "American ingenuity" has been ingrained into our national mindset and is part of what Russell Weigley has called the "American way of war." Indeed, in the absence of adequate knowledge or resources, Americans habitually adapt, innovate and overcome.

Innovation, however, should not be perceived as a substitute for doctrine, but rather as a supplement to

Photo by John Fenzel

Advisers from the 5th SF Group train Kuwaiti soldiers in the use of the MG-3 machine gun. Good language and communications skills, combined with realistic training and rehearsals, allowed SF soldiers to develop unit cohesion and soldier confidence within the coalition units.

it. One common, historic tendency among the U.S. military is our failure or unwillingness to apply a doctrinal approach to the problems we face. In an almost traditional way, the first piece of baggage most frequently thrown overboard in the heat of battle is doctrine. Invariably then, it is common to see unfocused innovation take over, confusing not only the enemy, but ourselves, in the process.

Nor should doctrine be held as a strict set of rules or preconceived ideas on the conduct of war. This view is not only seriously flawed, but potentially fatal for those who practice it. The belief that doctrine is nothing more than a rule book lends itself to predictability and certain gridlock on the battlefield. A handbook entitled *Infantry in Battle*, prepared in 1929 by then-Col. George Marshall, goes to great lengths in warning against that misperception:

Every situation encountered in war is likely to be exceptional. The schematic solution will seldom fit. ... Those who seek to fight by rote, who memorize an assortment of standard solutions with the idea of applying the most appropriate when confronted by actual, walk with disaster. Rather, it is essential that all leaders — from subaltern to commanding general — familiarize themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking.[9]

Doctrine must be realized as a fundamental base of knowledge to draw upon in the search for new and innovative solutions. Once established, that foundation is useful in allowing leaders to cope with unexpected situations as they arise.

It is often tempting to adopt different or "hybrid" doctrinal solutions when working with a foreign army. The assumption that a British or German technique would work better is often fallacious when U.S. doctrine is not only just as efficient, but far more detailed and available in our own publications and experience. Moreover, U.S. military doctrine is a proven quantity,

Photo by Joel Torres

A U.S. soldier processes EPWs captured during Desert Storm. Management of enemy prisoners was one of the obstacles to be overcome by the coalition.

and a "common denominator" among sister services and allies alike, which ensures the critical elements of continuity, interoperability and accuracy. Used properly and consistently, our own doctrine is a key contributor to unity of effort.

A certain degree of flexibility, however, should always be maintained. The infamous "buy American" approach is one destined for failure. Without question, there are times when allied partners disagree and will choose to maintain their own doctrinal approach. The immediate challenge, then, for U.S. advisers or co-combatants should not be to change their allies' minds (as instinct would dictate), but to determine whether that approach is tactically sound, and whether or not it conflicts with the coalition's concept of the operation. It is here where a discussion of "task, conditions and standards" is often most productive for both parties.

There are occasions, in fact, when methods espoused by coalition partners fill our own doctrinal voids. Sadly, the concept of learning from counterparts is frequently overlooked or ignored. Additionally, there may be occasions when U.S. doctrine is found to be in conflict with a host nation's cultural mores. Some Arab, Eastern and African armies, for instance, do not train or fight at night for fear of nocturnal predators, superstition or religious reasons. Attempts to change that logic often prove futile.

Simplify the plan. Another principle of war which is especially relevant to coalition warfare is simplicity. This principle states that simplicity plays an important role in providing direction, focus and accuracy to the battle: "Other things being equal, the simplest plan is held to be the best plan."[10]

This dictum has been extensively tested with the "strange alliances" which are now becoming more commonplace. Language barriers, conflicting doctrinal methods and interoperability problems make a simple, easily understood plan essential to success on an already complex, chaotic battlefield. The more complex a plan is, the more time must be allocated in training forces to standard, and in maintaining the plan's focus and intent.

American doctrine offers a variety of powerful tools designed specifically to ensure accuracy, coherence

and simplicity:

- The Army Problem Solving Process.
- Troop-leading procedures.
- Backward planning
- Mission analysis
- Operations orders
- Mission-essential-task lists
- Time phasing

Each of these was developed with the principle of simplicity in mind. Their utility, however, is magnified tenfold when they are used in devising joint plans with coalition partners. Albert Einstein's advice perhaps best defines this imperative: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."[11]

Conclusions

These five "imperatives" of coalition warfare were chosen for their critical function and relevance to coalition operations. They have in common an enduring logic used throughout history by diplomats and warriors alike. When used as a systemic approach to the management of coalition warfare, they assist in finding solutions to seemingly impossible problems and in forming lasting partnerships. The results achieved in applying these imperatives are surprising only in retrospect. ✂

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Notes:

[1] George C. Marshall, "Address before the American Academy of Political Science, New York City, November 10, 1942," in *Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall*, ed. Maj. H.A. DeWeerd (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 215.

[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 390.

[3] Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in J. Christopher Herold, *The Mind of Napoleon*, n.p., 1955.

[4] Shelby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), p. 39.

[5] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (1986), s.v. "rapport."

[6] Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in *Joint Pub 1* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), p. 42.

[7] King Fahd, letter to President George Bush, 1990, quoted in *Congressional Quarterly*, October, 1990.

[8] *Joint Pub 1*, p. 47.

[9] George C. Marshall, quoted in Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 215.

[10] Weigley, p. 214.

[11] Albert Einstein, quoted in *The New Webster's Library of Practical Information* (1987), s.v. "simplicity."

Cross-Cultural Communication in Coalition Warfare

by Capt. David E. A. Johnson

Recently a senior American officer visited a Middle Eastern country where a Special Forces team was conducting training in order to coordinate future operations. He was invited to lunch with the host-nation-unit officers and the SF team leader. Offered food, he responded, "No, thank you, I am not hungry," and pulled out a notebook to conduct an American-style luncheon meeting. His hosts responded positively to his coordination efforts, but after he left, they quizzed the embarrassed team leader about his compatriot's manners and gave the impression that the coordination would have to be repeated in an appropriate forum.

What went wrong? The visitor sent a message his hosts were not ready to hear. He was polite, based on American hospitality and business customs, but not based on those of the host nation. His breach of manners, refusing food and interpersonal interaction before working, diminished his authority, and his hosts were not ready to listen to such a low-caste source. To be polite, they responded favorably, but they considered the coordination to be non-binding.

Soldiers in coalition-warfare missions are likely to find themselves in similar situations to that of the visiting officer, and their success will depend on their skill in cross-cultural communication. Cross-cultural communication is the process of transmitting facts, ideas or feelings to someone of different customs, religion, language or social organization, and it is essential to coalition warfare.

Communication seems simple: A sender transmits a message through some medium to a receiver, who then responds in a manner that indicates understanding. With cross-cultural communication, however, there are difficulties with all three components of communication — the sender, the medium and the receiver. During coalition warfare, only effective and efficient communication will enable a coalition force to succeed on a rapidly changing battlefield.

In cross-cultural communication, biases and perceptions affect the message being transmitted. Problems occur in three basic areas: direction and source of the message, expectations of response and need, and social credibility.

Direction and source

In directing a message it is easy for special-operations soldiers to assume that their coalition counterparts have the same responsibilities and decision-making authority they themselves have. During Desert Shield, this was often not the case. It was common for a Special Forces NCO to request that radios or other assets be available for training and receive a positive response from his counterpart, only to find that no equipment arrived. Often the counterpart did not have the authority to commit the resources, and he did not want to upset the American or

admit his own lack of importance.

When communicating to the decision maker through aides, staff officers or interpreters, soldiers should also remember that often the least-essential officer is assigned to escort or deal with foreigners, and he may have difficulty getting anyone to take his message seriously. The solution is to build a closer relationship with the decision maker and to communicate directly, in order to save time and energy spent transmitting in the wrong direction.

Like the message's direction, its source can also affect its reception. Coordination, advice and assistance may be rendered ineffective because the coalition decision maker is unreceptive to the source. In some highly centralized armies, where NCOs have less knowledge or authority, a message sent by a non-officer may be seen as bearing little weight. This may make it difficult for highly qualified special-operations NCOs to do their jobs.

During Operation Desert Shield, a senior Special Forces NCO turned in a coalition ground-to-air radio for repair. Every week for a month, he asked if the radio was fixed. Every week the division communications officer said the radio had been repaired. It had not. Finally the team leader, a captain, went to the brigade commander to ensure the maintenance was completed. The division communications officer, when confronted with the radio itself, insisted he had not been properly asked to perform the maintenance. His attitude was that if the need was important, someone important would have sent the message.

In cultures where women have less authority, an allied officer is less likely to accept a woman's advice or assistance. A female officer assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, purchasing supplies in Saudi Arabia, found shopkeepers and allied officers alike confirming everything through her driver, a junior-enlisted male.

Photo by John Fenzel

Soldiers from the 5th SF Group dine with their coalition counterparts. Social interaction is often important to the accomplishment of military objectives.

Expectation

Another problem area is expectation. The U.S. Army has a high operations tempo even in peacetime. Our soldiers are secondary-school graduates and volunteers, and we have adopted a tactical system which requires initiative at the lowest levels. The coalition force may not have these advantages. It may have adopted another tactical system based on centralized control and rigid formations.

When the special-operations soldier training with a coalition unit is confronted with tactics not performed to American standards, he should realize this does not indicate incompetence. Their tactical and operational systems are based on their needs and experiences and may be more correct than our own. If asked to evaluate a coalition unit, hold them to their own standards. We can give advice, training and demonstrations of our system to improve joint operations, but coalition warfare involves adapting to each other's systems, not changing them.

The receiver's expectations are also important. If our training, advice and assistance have not actually been requested by the host nation, the counterpart may have a low expectation of his need and be confident that his culture and military doctrine are correct. As one coalition officer explained early in Operation Desert Shield, "Our tactics already take the best of American and Soviet systems." This attitude makes it unlikely that the coalition soldier will admit failure or ignorance and may cause him not to ask important questions that could improve interoperability. In these cases, it is best to frame messages in terms of *our* training needs rather than theirs. This will also help to bolster their stature within their peer group.

Credibility

The third problem area is credibility. For the sender, it is important to recognize that the credibility of his messages may be linked to his social credibility. In class-oriented or rigid societies, awareness of social rules of etiquette can define that credibility.

We can establish credibility by building rapport. This may mean eating goat and playing cards in one culture or drinking so-ju in another,

regardless of personal taste. If we desire to receive the respect afforded our counterpart officers, we have to play the part. As always, honesty and tact in even the smallest things are critical. Behaving appropriately when invited to dine can enhance or diminish authority and credibility.

The object of all this social interaction is to accomplish something of military value. During Operation Desert Storm, effective rapport building resulted in one 12-man team receiving the use of armored vehicles, ground-to-air radios, land line, a water trailer and direct access to unit scouts.

For our coalition partners, the need to maintain social credibility can hamper their response. In some environments, no coalition soldier wants to be the one to say "no" or admit they do not have the authority to answer a message. Being assigned to assist the Americans may be seen as a political plum, and the problem for the coalition decision maker may be to keep the Americans happy without seeming to give away resources or make many changes. This is why "maybe" and "soon" are such common responses.

The desire to keep the Americans happy can sometimes result in wasted effort and resources. During Operation Desert Shield, a Special Forces company commander developed a comprehensive training plan, complete with start dates, based on potential coalition needs and his company's capabilities. He presented the list of tasks to the coalition division commander as a suggestion, and amazingly enough, those were exactly the subjects and start dates the coalition unit felt it needed. When the company's detachments later conducted assessments of each brigade, they found the majority of the tasks were neither needed nor battle-focused.

Medium

In addition to problems of transmission and reception, the medium we use to communicate may also distort the message. Even when the coalition relationship is cordial, differences in verbal and body language between cultures can cause misunderstandings.

Although the special-operations soldier may be proficient in the host-nation language, it is difficult to anticipate the impact a word's shades of meaning may have. When trying to fix a land-line connection between the Special Forces company commander's tent and the coalition division commander's tent, soldiers used the Arabic word for "broken" instead of "out of order," resulting in the coalition unit bringing a new telephone instead of trying to find the problem in the line.

One way to overcome this problem is through graphics. Luckily, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course teaches Soviet-threat tactics, doctrine and map symbols, with which Arab forces were also familiar. Once differences in grid-reference systems were resolved during Operation Desert Shield, missions could be briefed and discussed in commonly understood symbols.

Another way the language problem may be addressed is through an interpreter, but we should understand enough to spot-check our interpreters. A translator who does not want to lose face with his subordinates or points with his superiors is unlikely to admit to being unable to translate. One interpreter during Operation Desert Shield, when baffled by the term "brown-out" (obscurity caused by blowing dust and sand), told students that U.S. helicopters used laser beams to land and thus damaged the eyes of the landing-zone control party.

Body language is a large part of our communication, but body codes are not universal. In some cultures, holding hands among men is an acceptable demonstration of friendship and trust. In the American culture it can mean something different. An Arab may stand very close to see our pupils dilating in order to tell if we are being honest; if we are wearing sunglasses or avert our eyes, he may feel that we are trying to hide something.

There are many problems inherent in cross-cultural communication. The sender's choice of where to direct the communication, high expectations of response and lack of social credibility affect the message. The coalition receiver's bias toward the source of the message, low expectation of his own needs and the need to maintain social credibility can impede his response. The medium, verbal or body language, distorts the message. All these factors can combine to create a communication failure that will take time and energy to correct.

Luckily, communication is a two-way street, and our coalition partners face the same difficulties trying to get through to us. Study and awareness of the problem can go a long way toward solution, and with hard work and patience we can accomplish the mission together.

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SOF Support to Hurricane Andrew Recovery

by SSgt. Keith Butler

When Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida in August 1992, Army special-operations forces were among the first on the scene to assist residents in recovering from the damage.

In fact, some were among those struck by the storm. Members of the 478th Civil Affairs Battalion, 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, were stationed near the heart of the hurricane's path.

Reserve Maj. Lee L. Stockdale, a Civil Affairs specialist, turned on the television weather report at midnight on Aug. 23, and watched as the radar showed a green swirl heading toward his area on the map. He woke his family, and together they huddled on the floor in their 4-by-5-foot downstairs bathroom for almost six hours.

"We heard trees smashing off the side of the house and the fences being ripped apart. Then the roof came off," said Stockdale. "The wind sounded like a freight train going through, only it wouldn't stop."

By morning, the hurricane had ripped apart Stockdale's neighborhood and other housing areas throughout Dade County. Pulling together, he and his neighbors began to clean up and rebuild. Stockdale was one of 38 of the unit's soldiers who bore the storm's wrath. In spite of their own personal losses, they immediately pitched in with the relief operation for southern Dade County.

Civil Affairs

Reservists from the Civil Affairs community pulled together as well. The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade called in volunteers from units around the country to ease the strain on the local Reserve soldiers. The CA soldiers, who work in an array of professions in civilian life, from corrections officers and lawyers to governmental employees and engineers, are trained to bring normalcy back to communities.

"Civil Affairs units act as a mediator between civilian government and its military counterpart," said Maj. George M. Waldroup, 478th CA Battalion executive officer. "Civil Affairs expertise is immediately available to provide relief operations. We have a high level of skills in a myriad of jobs."

"We speak 'governmentese' and understand the jargon that opens doors in communities," said Capt. John Orillo of the 414th CA Battalion. Orillo works as an attorney in Utica, N.Y. "Interaction with local authorities is key. We started marrying up the services of the police, water authorities, sewage, engineers, Florida Power and Light and building-code officials to people who needed help the most."

As relief operations continued, mail carriers were used to find out more about damage in the communities and what businesses were coming back on line. Capt. Ronald Post of the 414th CA Battalion learned about the pulse of the Perrine, Fla., community from about 150 mail carriers, who regularly

reported to him.

"Everybody gets mail. Who better can tell you who is staying to rebuild and who is leaving?" said Post, a Vietnam veteran. "I learned a long time ago in Civil Affairs to be innovative."

At first, the Civil Affairs teams assessed damage throughout the city and directed residents to local relief centers and medical facilities. When the relief operation turned into one of recovery, the Civil Affairs practitioners focused on linking customers to reopened local businesses. Building contractors, utilities companies and insurance offices began answering the call through Civil Affairs coordination.

One of the biggest challenges teams faced was getting rid of debris. With help from the local police, Army Corps of Engineers, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps and local contractors, the Civil Affairs teams helped organize a unique garbage-disposal plan. Designed by Army engineers to efficiently burn tons of debris, about 20 trash and refuse collection points as high as 60 feet were set up throughout Dade County. Police were located at busy intersections to direct the nearly 2,500 trucks rolling into each dump site per day.

Civil affairs also assisted with animal rescue. Col. Thelton M.C. McCorcle, a 478th CA Battalion member from Auburn, Ala., treated farm animals and pets. Working from four tents, McCorcle and volunteers from animal-welfare agencies also coordinated a lost-and-found program. The crew took pictures of animals that were brought in and tried to return them to their owners. "We were concerned for the animals for humanity's sake, but they also posed a danger for the people around here. Dogs, particularly, can get nasty when they form packs and are very hungry," said McCorcle, who works as a veterinarian for the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Throughout Dade County, the Civil Affairs work continued for other members of the 361st CA Brigade. Food-distribution relief points were centralized at the heart of the hardest-hit enclaves.

Stockdale, who began tracking down insurance compensation and putting his family life in order right after the hurricane, provided advice to the Reservists who lost homes. The international-relations lawyer for the 478th CA Battalion, Stockdale helped coordinate the county's mobilization of more than 100 lawyers to provide free legal advice to residents for their recovery.

Special Forces

While they were not on-scene at the time of the hurricane, Special Forces soldiers were among the first to arrive. Soldiers from the Army Reserve 11th SF Group deployed immediately after the hurricane hit to provide medical assistance, initial damage assessment and communications link-ups. National Guardsmen from the 20th SF Group also moved in quickly when they got word from the Florida governor to provide 24-hour security against looting of businesses, homes and public buildings left vulnerable after the hurricane.

"Within 24 hours our soldiers became operational with the Homestead police officers," said Capt. Thomas Bradey, operations officer for the 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group during the relief operation. "A lot of sales were going on to the migrant farmers who were afraid or didn't know about relief centers because they didn't speak English."

Soldiers from the 7th SF Group also deployed from Fort Bragg to aid in recovery efforts. Soldiers from all three SF groups targeted southern Florida communities to assess the damage and focus aid to victims of the hurricane. Communities with the most dire needs were pinpointed by roving Special Forces teams. Many accompanied federal-agency personnel to provide food, water, lanterns, heating fuel and medical treatment to beleaguered citizens.

Through the end of August and into September, teams from all three SF groups went door-to-door searching for people trapped in their homes on the outskirts of Dade County, while conducting damage assessment for the Joint Task Force and aid agencies. Their patrols took them as far as the

Photo by Keith Butler

Soldiers from the 20th SF Group help to direct residents into designated lines at the Homestead, Fla., post office following Hurricane Andrew.

Photo by Keith Butler

Capt. Alvin Sanders of the 7th SF Group gives out supplies during Hurricane Andrew relief operations in south Florida.

Everglades.

Soldiers of the 20th SF Group found one family trapped in their home. "A van rolled over and blocked the front door, while a tree covered the back way. The team opened up the house and found an elderly couple," said SFC Daniel Paul, NCOIC of the 3rd/20th's personnel administration center. "They were trapped for days without electricity or water. They were very glad to see the 20th SF Group of Florida."

The determination to help citizens rebuild their lives after the disaster showed no more than with Sgt. Maj. Richard Wolf and another group of 20th Group soldiers. Helping those in the rural sections of the county, they brought out food, water, building materials and children's books. They pitched tents for those whose homes had been destroyed.

"Close your eyes and picture sheer hell. That is what this whole ordeal has been like," said LaVanne Donaldson, an avocado farmer who received assistance from Wolf and his soldiers. "These guys have made it bearable. They are always checking on us even though we live out here in the 'boonies.' I'll never forget what they have done for all of us."

The 7th SFG also teamed up with Civil Affairs soldiers to assess damage on the Miccosukee Indian Reservation and provide assistance coordination for the 10th Mountain Division.

The 75,000-acre Miccosukee Indian Reservation, set along Highway 84 north of the Everglades National Park, showed how brutal nature could be. Trees lay uprooted on their sides; homes were demolished.

"The 10th Mountain Division G-5 told us there were rapport problems between the Miccosukee Indians and various federal agencies. They told us to get our foot in the door to address the problems," said CWO 1 Bruce D. Phelps, commander of ODA 716, A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N.C. "We build rapport all of the time when we go to Latin America. We learn as much as we can about people we are trying to help — customs and their way of life."

To assist in the relief effort, Phelps linked up with Detachment 3, Team 3, of Civil Affairs Task Force 489. Army Reservists Capt. Daniel E. McCabe and Sgt. Anthony deForest, a Cherokee Indian himself, stepped in to help gather research on the Miccosukee Indian customs.

The Miccosukee tribe operates much like a country within a country. They practice customs more than 300 years old and live by laws set forth in their own constitution. They speak their own language, called Mikasuki.

"When you're dealing with the Miccosukee, you're dealing with a sovereign nation," said Phelps, who picked up a little of the language to add to his repertoire of Spanish. "They are people like you and me — after the hurricane, they needed help."

After the first meeting with Miccosukee chairman Billy Cypress, a sort of Indian-soldier pact was formed. The Miccosukee picked deForest to serve as the liaison between the Indians and soldiers. It was also agreed that promised building supplies be delivered right away.

"We established immediate rapport with the Miccosukee as a team, SF and CA, and backed it with action," said McCabe, a landscaper who volunteered to come help in the hurricane-relief effort from his home, Knoxville, Tenn. "The 710th folks (710th Main Support Battalion, 10th Mountain Division) gave us that capability."

Two days after their initial meeting, the Civil Affairs and Special Forces troops were escorting two tractor-trailers to the Miccosukee reservation about 60 miles northwest of Homestead where the Army elements were headquartered.

In a traditional, Miccosukee manner, the leader of the tribe gave his blessing to the soldiers for the relief work they had orchestrated. "We are very satisfied with what you and the Army have done for our people," said Jasper S. Nelson, assistant chairman of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida. Outside the conference room, the third set of trucks carrying roofing material, plywood and ladders was being unloaded. The Miccosukee Indian nation was ready to rebuild.

"The Miccosukee Indian relief effort will be one of the most notable things to come out of this," said Lt. Col. James T. LaRue, commander of the Civil Affairs Task Force 489. "We put this task force together in 24 hours from all over and it jelled into an excellent team. The relationship between all special-operations forces — Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological Operations — has been unparalleled. The devastation here was on a magnitude that we've never dealt with before. This has been a textbook operation in SOF integration and execution."

Communications

The "ears" for soldiers of the 7th SF Group deployed for Hurricane Andrew relief operations came from the112th Signal Battalion's special-operations team.

The three-soldier team worked around the clock to keep six teams from the 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group linked to the special operations command-and-control element in Florida and to the 7th Group headquarters at Fort Bragg.

"The 112th team did a superb job keeping us linked to headquarters and our ODAs," said Sgt. Maj. Michael W. Jefferson, SOCCE sergeant major. "This allowed us to perform a difficult mission while keeping our commanders informed here and at Fort Bragg. You have to be informed to support the guys on the ground."

Ready to pack up and move out at all times with any of the Special Forces units, the 112th Signal Battalion loaded up a flat-bed trailer after receiving word to move out for southern Florida.

"We not only support Special Forces, but all special-operations units," said SSgt. Andre L. Topp, net-radio-interface team chief, A Company, 112th Signal Battalion. "We had a four-hour notification to deploy to Florida."

Working hand microphones and an array of knobs and lights, the 112th radio-team members called the confines of a 2-by-4-foot cubicle home for 12-hour shifts throughout the hurricane-relief operation. They monitored UHF satellite nets and HF nets with the ODAs providing damage assessment throughout southern Florida. They were the sole connection between SF troops reporting on Hurricane Andrew's damages and the headquarters directing aid.

"It's always a rush when you get called up for a real-world mission," said Spec. Martin J. Mancuso, senior radio operator from A Company, 112th Signal Battalion. "Most units do a lot of training missions. Most of what we go on is for real. There's a lot of pride in doing the job. You have to be ready to go in a moment's notice and be proficient, because people are depending on you at all times."

PSYOP

Also active in recovery operations were Army Psychological Operations specialists, who steered victims of Hurricane Andrew to relief centers throughout southern Dade County with a three-week blitz of public-service information — via print products, radio and loudspeaker teams.

The Psychological Operations Task Force, comprised of active-duty soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, and Army Reservists from 5th PSYOP Group, plugged the hole in public-information services left by the hurricane.

Telephones, radio stations, newspapers and television had been wiped away, leaving local citizens with no means of receiving the word about relief centers and aid available.

"There was a tremendous requirement when we arrived," said Lt. Col. Paul B. Kappelman, commander of the 1st Battalion, 4th POG, at Fort Bragg, and POTF comman-

Photo by Keith Butler

CWO 1 Bruce Phelps, 7th SF Group (left) and Sgt. Anthony deForest, a Civil Affairs NCO, discuss rebuilding with members of the Miccosukee Indian tribe.

der in Florida. "Our services were useful for people's survival initially and for recovery later. We helped them get back on their feet. The operation was a success. Our soldiers performed an essential service in a professional manner."

Because of PSYOP's ability to get the word out quickly and efficiently, they were called on to spread the word, initially from a 400-watt, mobile radio station. A second 1,000-watt transmitter was then set up to broadcast public-service announcements from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., seven days a week, on "Recovery Radio."

"The radio went on the air strictly to broadcast public-service announcements — such as the opening of disaster-relief centers and to inform the public about health facilities and disaster-relief-application centers," said Capt. John L. Wesson, the assistant operations officer for the 1st Battalion, 4th POG, who served as the liaison officer to the XVIII Airborne Corps throughout relief effort.

"From what we got by talking to the people, they were getting necessary information about humanitarian aid being performed by military and civilian organizations," said SSgt. Thomas R. Ayers, the NCOIC of Recovery Radio.

Content for the public-service announcements, which were broadcast live and on tape, was compiled by the Product Development Center, perhaps the heart of POTF. Scripts were written for airing on the radio along with an assortment of printed products. Fliers, posters, instructional wallet-sized cards, maps to relief centers and a newsletter were crafted by teams working around the clock.

"Newspaper boys weren't throwing newspapers on people's front porches, because they didn't have front porches anymore," said Maj. Robert E. Armstrong, officer in charge of the PDC. Armstrong, an Army Reservist from the 5th POG, put aside his work as a self-employed crop scientist to help.

"PDC developed all the products that were disseminated. We placed a priority on information that had to go out immediately — then decided on how to get it out quickly through radio, print and loudspeakers," added Armstrong. Posters and fliers placed throughout Dade County gave phone numbers and locations for aid agencies, including food-distribution points, inoculation centers and insurance offices.

In all, 400 different products were designed at the PDC, which also informed citizens about safety precautions, preventive medicine, debris clearing, schools and church functions. More than 500,000 copies of materials were printed by PSYOP members. The printed public-service information was posted at camps, on telephone poles and throughout neighborhoods across Dade County.

While PDC soldiers worked at their headquarters, eight loudspeaker teams hit the streets as a sort of an electric town crier, broadcasting public-service news similar to the radio and print teams, but reaching people whose radios and televisions were destroyed.

Because of the diverse blend of cultures there, the PSYOP team used its Spanish-speaking ability to get the word out to Hispanic areas. It also broadcast in Creole for Haitian communities and Kanjobal, a dialect spoken by Guatemalans.

"We tried to draw people out of their homes to travel to relief centers. I felt real strong about going to help these people; it looked like a huge mess," said Sgt. Jon E. Walsh, NCOIC of 4th POG's roving Humanitarian Information Support Teams. "My parents were in the San Francisco earthquake. I was proud that we had a chance to use our knowledge and skills to help out."

Using the LSS-40, a 3-by-2-foot box-like contraption which can be mounted on a soldier's back with a

Photo by Keith Butler

PFC Shelen B. Ayling, 112th Signal Battalion, provides communication between 7th SF Group teams and headquarters elements during the relief operation.

battery pack or mounted on a Humvee roof, the HISTs covered more than 50 square miles of urban and rural areas throughout the county, broadcasting public-service information. They also operated static loudspeaker systems at relief centers to explain how residents could get further assistance.

As relief turned into recovery, the pace slowed. Newspapers and radio and television stations continued to come on-line. "We are working ourselves out of a job," said 1st Lt. Elizabeth C. McClure, the HIST officer-in-charge and a Reservist from the 5th POG out of Washington, D.C. "When we got here, people had no way to get information. Our soldiers hit the ground and took off." ✂

SSgt. Keith Butler is a journalist assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Photo by Keith Butler

PSYOP soldiers prepare folders in the Product Development Center. The Center designed 400 products to inform residents about a variety of topics.

PSYOP Task Force to JTF Andrew:

A Case Study in Support to Disaster-Recovery Operations

by Lt. Col. Paul B. Kappelman & Maj. Robert E. Armstrong

The PSYOP task force formed to support relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew was unique in several aspects, and a review of its organization and function provides a number of valuable lessons learned for the PSYOP community.

Initially, the only PSYOP troops deployed were loudspeaker teams accompanying the 82nd Airborne Division. Within days of their deployment, as the extent of the damage became more evident, the need for additional PSYOP assets became obvious. Within less than a week, the POTF had been established.

Any POTF uses assets from the entire 4th PSYOP Group. The Andrew POTF was unique because it included Reserve forces. Reservists held positions at every level within the POTF, from the staff down to the loudspeaker teams.

Organization

As in any military operation, the role of the POTF required a clear mission statement, as well as an articulation of the commander's intent and a concept of the operation. The following were developed to state the POTF's role as precisely as possible:

Mission: Provide coordinated information programs in support of the joint-task-force relief operations.

Commander's intent:

- Supply immediate relief information through radio, loudspeaker, print and face-to-face contact.
- Identify key communicators and appropriate language balance to provide greatest impact.
- Assess the adequacy of recovery communications infrastructure and effectiveness of relief information.
- Synchronize emerging information programs oriented at recovery operations using mass media (radio).
- Keep the information program ahead of events to inform and prepare the population for restoration of its former communication and information network.

Concept of operation:

- Immediately establish radio operations in the vicinity of Homestead City and provide for the greatest "footprint" in the affected area.
- Provide immediate survival information from command, public affairs office and press releases.
- Provide loudspeaker teams to supplement the communication mix and provide personal, face-to-face contact.
- Stress themes of survival and basic needs.
- As a daily routine is formed, apply PSYOP assets so that information remains ahead of events to elevate behavior beyond survival to recovery and sustainment.

The most useful tool developed by the staff was an operational continuum that showed the concept of the operation in a longitudinal manner. Any POTF involved in a military operation supports a commander directing his troops in the execution of a specified mission. The POTF can envision its mission as a succession of stages, tied to the overall task-force mission and mirroring the task-force commander's concept.

In a disaster-recovery operation, troops assist in the recovery, but they cannot cause it to happen in the same sense that they can complete a tactical mission. The POTF's role is to provide information to assist the population in recovery. Regardless of how the task-force commander may phase the overall operation, transition from one phase to the next depends on the population's response, and that is largely dependent upon its ability to obtain accurate information on where to go and what to do.

It was critical to know at all times where the POTF was in the continuum, to be able to shift the emphasis of work in the Product Development Cell and to allow adequate time for development and preparation of timely materials. Accurate information on how the recovery was progressing was as crucial as if the POTF had been supporting a combat operation.

Operating within the United States raised two major issues for the Andrew POTF: the product-approval process and use of the word "PSYOP."

The JTF commander reported to a civilian agency — the Federal Emergency Management Agency — which in turn reported to the Secretary of Transportation, the overall director of the effort. While the POTF's role was solely to provide information, its products still required approval from those within the chain. In general, the final approval authority for the POTF's products was at the JTF level. In a classic PSYOP campaign in an overseas theater, the theater commander-in-chief or the JTF commander is, by doctrine, the approval authority. There is no doctrine covering approval for products in a U.S.-based organization.

To some segments of society, a misunderstanding persists with respect to PSYOP and its various capabilities. The very use of the word conjures up images of "brainwashing." To avoid a misinterpretation of its role, the POTF was referred to as the Humanitarian Assistance Information Element, and the troops making daily contact with the civilians were referred to as humanitarian information support teams.

Lessons learned

To say that the soldiers assigned to the POTF performed well is an understatement. In the best traditions of military operations, things did not always go as planned, and, in the best traditions of the U.S. soldier, the troops always found a way to fix whatever was broken.

We learned numerous lessons at the unit level, and the lessons offered here are for planners, commanders and staff of the next POTF organized to assist in a U.S.-based disaster. Even before we redeployed from Florida, a warning order was issued to form another POTF to go to Hawaii and assist in the recovery from Hurricane Iniki. Although that POTF was not deployed, it illustrates the point that the Andrew mission is unlikely to stand as a singular event.

OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

Information and Communication Network

Relief Operations (Survival Needs)	Recovery Operations (Recovery/Reestablishment)	Reconstitution (Return to Normalcy)	Community End State
• commo network with emergency services (phone, loudspeakers) • location and accountability of people • location of food and water (loudspeaker, radio, print, TV) • location of shelter (loudspeaker, radio, print, TV) • location of emergency medical care (loudspeaker, radio, print, TV) • understanding of emerging public commo systems	• coordinated information program • key communicators inside/outside of community identified • location of government agencies providing assistance and information (radio, print) • changes in sites established in relief stage (radio, loudspeaker, print) • safety, preventive medicine information (print, radio, loudspeaker) • community services (church, debris removal) • education about recovery programs and procedures	• local sources of information able to relay information independently	• pre-Andrew information sources

Photo by Keith Butler

Spec. Michael Parrish (left) and PFC Michael Stork ensure POTF broadcasts are going out over the airwaves during the Hurricane Andrew relief operation.

• *Formation of the POTF*: A PSYOP representative should be deployed at the beginning of a crisis to make an assessment of communication-and-information requirements. If needed, a POTF can be built within 18-72 hours and inserted into the task organization. This is much more effective than providing piecemeal support.

If a POTF is to be deployed, it should be sent within the first 24-36 hours. Not only does this quickly fill the information vacuum, but it also permits the POTF to harness any sources of information still present in the area. The POTF must be deployed as a unit, which will likely require at least one dedicated aircraft. The POTF should also have compatible communications with the supported command.

Augmentation by reserve-component forces is a viable option, particularly in a U.S.-based operation, but the mobilization process may present some delays. Part of the problem lies in the fact that some PSYOP units have mobilization stations other than Fort Bragg — a vestige of the days before the formation of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. To whatever extent possible, PSYOP units should have Fort Bragg as their mobilization site and a standardized procedure developed by USACAPOC to bring the RC soldiers onto active duty.

• *Role of the POTF and the operational continuum*: Stating the POTF's role in the manner used for combat operations helps keep the unit focused. The same language will be used by the JTF. Be prepared for some confusion by civilian agencies: Much of their thinking centers on providing information to the press. Our emphasis must be on information the population needs to keep it moving toward recovery.

To accurately judge your position on the operational continuum requires timely and accurate intelligence. In Andrew, we frequently relied on the local newspapers.

A consolidated information-and-intelligence collection plan should be developed that satisfies the intelligence-collection requirements for the entire JTF, with the emphasis on human intelligence. The task to conduct face-to-face communication and to survey attitudes is an ideal task for Special Forces disaster-assistance relief teams, or DART, and Civil Affairs personnel. DART and CA personnel were deployed in Andrew and will likely be present in any future recovery operation. The intelligence cycle has to feed back into the POTF, to ensure timely products.

The CONUS perspective: The POTF was assigned to the Army forces, presenting several challenges to its successful operation. When product requests came from the JTF or FEMA, they were not necessarily viewed as a priority by the Corps. In addition, having the POTF below the JTF level created a layered approval chain, slowing down the process and in some cases watering down the final product. FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, clearly indicates that the POTF should work directly for the JTF. Just as PSYOP has had to argue its case to be recognized as properly belonging in the G-3/S-3, so, too, must POTF commanders argue their way into the JTF. The POTF commander should work as a special staff officer in the JTF.

The crisis environment requires that many things happen at once, and there is a temptation to decentralize. For information activities, that seems an incorrect approach. Many critiques of the Andrew effort noted the lack of a central approval authority for information release.

Civilian planning does provide for such a central authority. Under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Public Law 93-288, as amended), the Federal Response Plan calls for the establishment of a joint information center. According to "the

Plan," as it is commonly called, the JIC coordinates all information released to the public and the news media.

The JIC, formed at FEMA-level, should serve as the "information CINC." It should hold a daily meeting with all parties involved and direct the themes to be followed. The JTF contingent should consist of representatives from the J-2 (armed with the latest intelligence gathered by the DART and CA teams), PAO, Civil Affairs and PSYOP. On an as-needed basis, consideration should be given to including other staff officers, e.g., staff judge advocate, surgeon and chaplain. Taking the themes determined in the meeting, the POTF should prepare the products and the JTF should act as the approval authority.

While the JIC was formed and served as the focal point for information, as in the Plan, its initial emphasis was on providing information to the press. Although the JIC eventually began focusing on information *to* the population, as opposed to information *about* the population, it continued to have a strong orientation toward its PAO role. The POTF commander must stay alert to the PAO orientation of many of the other players in the information arena and educate them on the capabilities and role of PSYOP assets.

At the outset, the POTF commander should ensure that the dissemination of information by military forces is centralized. A JTF directive should state the JTF commander's policies and guidelines. With the advent of personal computers, laser printers and graphics programs, it is all too easy for a "mini-POTF" to spring up and start printing its own leaflets. There were a couple of instances of this in Florida, and while the efforts were well-intentioned, they did not support the overall JTF mission, nor were they designed by PSYOP-trained soldiers.

Finally, use of the word "PSYOP" warrants some discussion. There have been a number of valid arguments put forth over the years, calling for a change in our designation. That change, however, would play into the hands of those who already misunderstand our role, providing them even further "proof" if they felt we were deliberately trying to conceal our true identity. Particularly in the wake of Desert Storm, the U.S. public is reasonably well-informed about the U.S. military — including PSYOP — and holds it in high regard. When the opportunity presents itself, we should try to educate that portion of the public still ill-informed about the versatility of the PSYOP soldier.

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Maj. Robert E. Armstrong is the civil-military operations officer for the 5th PSYOP Group, Washington, D.C. He served in the Andrew POTF as officer-in-charge of the Product Development Cell. An Army Reserve officer, he has held various command and staff positions in the Army Reserve and National Guard and served in Vietnam with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and 5th Special Forces Group.

Roles and Functions of U.S. Special Operations Forces

by John M. Collins

Congress specifies broad roles for each U.S. military service and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Secretary of Defense, with presidential approval, assigns functions that amplify those responsibilities. The President and Secretary of Defense prescribe operational missions for each unified and specified command. Some assignments are clean cut, others unavoidably interlock and overlap.

Title 10, United States Code, as amended by Congress in 1986, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review roles and functions not less than once every three years. Re-evaluation is required to determine whether redundancies foster flexibility or raise costs without increasing capabilities; to ensure that responsibilities are properly distributed among U.S. military services and USSOCOM; and to fill gaps that encourage interservice competition for scarce resources.

Several special-operations roles and functions might benefit from reviews that could help Congress and the Secretary of Defense determine what additions to, subtractions from and other adjustments would be appropriate.

Inconsistent instructions

Title 10, Section 167, lists 10 "activities" equivalent to statutory roles and missions for special operations: direct action; strategic reconnaissance; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism; theater search and rescue; psychological operations; civil affairs; humanitarian assistance; and "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense."

DoD instructions differ from *Title 10* in important respects. *Directive 5100.1* tells the Army, Navy and Air Force "to organize, train, equip and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations," but specifies no functions for USSOCOM.

Special-operations doctrine downgrades humanitarian assistance from a statutory obligation to a collateral mission, with the attendant admonition that SOF "commanders should exercise care in allocating forces against non-primary missions to preclude overcommitment." These inconsistent instructions require revision. The following observations might make useful starting points.

Direct action

DoD officially defines direct action as a "specified act involving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine or low visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power's special operations forces in hostile or denied areas."

That description invites disparate interpretations. SO doctrine, for example, asserts that "units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace munitions and other devices; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage." Direct action also includes efforts to locate and capture or recover personnel and materiel; neutralize, seize, or destroy critical facilities; and even help stem the spread of mass-destruction weapons.

Some SOF are explicitly organized, equipped and trained to undertake DA operations. The Joint Special Operations Command, a secret, triservice organization that concentrates on counterterrorism, emphasizes "surgical" strikes that conventional forces seldom could engage successfully. The Navy's SEAL teams undertake DA operations in maritime and riverine environments. Specially armed Army helicopters and Air Force fixed-wing gunships able to operate at night and in adverse weather also qualify.

Rangers, in contrast, are primarily superb parachute infantry that unified commanders normally employ in battalion or greater

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This article is taken from the 1993 Roles and Functions of U.S. Combat Forces, *prepared by John M. Collins for the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service.*

strength to accomplish conventional missions, as they did during Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause. Their combat-diving and scout-swimming teams possess capabilities comparable to those of the SEALs.

Marine Expeditionary Units designated "special operations capable," like Rangers, are essentially conventional forces. They are organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations that include maritime special-purpose missions, but they are not SOF and have never come under USSOCOM control. Congress and the Secretary of Defense might use that precedent to revamp current roles and functions so that USSOCOM would retain primary responsibility only for direct actions that truly require special talent. They should resolve the future purpose and assignment of the Ranger Regiment, however, before they opt for change. At least three options are open:

• The Ranger Regiment could greatly expand its direct-action capabilities at little cost by adapting the best features of *spetsnaz* brigades that once served the Soviet Union and now belong to various independent republics. Ranger companies, if required, could then quickly form many small, uniquely-tailored teams organized, equipped and trained to neutralize scattered, high-value, heavily guarded targets. Rangers in such event would become SOF in every sense of the word and function much more effectively as members of USSOCOM, provided they could supplement infantry skills with area-oriented direct-action specialties.

• The Ranger Regiment might move from USSOCOM to Army jurisdiction. Careful consideration should precede any decision to do so, because few Army generals fully appreciate Ranger capabilities and limitations. Their predecessors briefly lionized Rangers for daring deeds early in World War II, later misused and destroyed two battalions at Cisterna, Italy, reduced the remainder to separate companies during the Korean conflict, then erased all Rangers from active rolls from September 1951 until 1974. Returning Rangers to Army control consequently would be wise only if senior Army leaders welcomed the move.

• The Ranger Regiment might remain under continued USSOCOM control, even though the missions it performs are mainly conventional. Current arrangements clearly are welcome.

Strategic reconnaissance

Title 10 identifies *strategic reconnaissance* as a special-operations activity. SO doctrine instead addresses *special reconnaissance*, intended to collect specific, well-defined and time-sensitive information of national or theater-level significance.

SR often depends primarily on human-intelligence agents in hostile or politically touchy territory when technological systems are less satisfactory or infeasible. Typical tasks include contact with insurgent or resistance factions to ascertain whether they deserve U.S. support; topographic, meteorological, hydrographic and demographic explorations; forays to find worrisome enemy weapons; investigations to confirm the strength, location and movement of major enemy forces; and battle-damage-assessment probes.

SEALS concentrate their strategic-reconnaissance capabilities along continental shelves and coasts. Special-operations aircraft perform unique missions aloft. Army Special Forces conduct strategic recon inland. Whether SF should continue to do so is debatable:

• Special Forces teams, composed mainly of seasoned, professional NCOs, are fully qualified to perform strategic-reconnaissance missions. Their employment, however, risks hard-to-replace personnel who spend years acquiring language pro-

U.S. Army photo

Army Rangers are superb parachute infantry that have performed well in Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause. Although they are often used in conventional missions, few conventional commanders fully understand their limitations or capabilities.

ficiency and cross-cultural understanding applicable to a particular geographic area. One option would be to consider SR a collateral rather than primary function for Army Special Forces.

• Rangers, in response to any such decision, might fold strategic reconnaissance and surveillance into their repertoire. That would capitalize on professed abilities of Ranger companies and battalions to infiltrate and exfiltrate hostile territory, survive in all types of weather and terrain under adverse conditions, and perform short-duration tactical reconnaissance. Individual Rangers and small intelligence-collection teams thus could excel at SR if given proper training and retention policies that stabilize assignments.

• USSOCOM, at additional cost in terms of personnel, time and money, could activate the necessary number of specialized SR units. Rangers and Special Forces then could concentrate on other important responsibilities.

Unconventional warfare

Unconventional warfare, which may replace, complement or supplement conventional military operations, involves strategically offensive covert, clandestine or low-profile assistance for insurgents, secessionists or resistance movements in foreign countries.

U.S. SOF, primarily Army Special Forces, help organize, train and advise indigenous undergrounds and guerrillas. They furnish intelligence, communications, psychological operations and medical support, and establish evasion-and-escape networks that allow safe movement by individuals and small groups to and from enemy-held areas.

Raids, sabotage, deception and survival techniques are UW stocks in trade. Success depends in large part on professional SOF steeped in local cultures and proficient in local languages. UW professionals further require the acumen, maturity and temperament needed to influence local leaders, whom they normally must persuade instead of command.

The U.S. conducted three notable UW operations during World War II, in the Philippines, Burma and France. The succeeding half-century has seen none on a comparable scale.

U.S. Army photo

The primary purpose of U.S. SOF in foreign internal defense is to train and advise host nations to develop forces able to maintain internal security.

Anticommunism and containment policies, which inspired most if not all U.S. unconventional warfare during the Cold War, no longer seem in prospect. A counterrevolution in Russia that adversely affected U.S. security conceivably could revive interest, but not necessarily — decision makers in Washington were reluctant to launch large UW operations against the Soviet Union or Red China when both were *bona fide* threats.

• Congress therefore might weigh the advisability of discarding unconventional warfare as a statutory role. *DoD Directive 5100.1*, in response, could designate UW a collateral function. USSOCOM then could devote full attention to foreign internal defense, which requires Army Special Forces to emphasize quite different skills.

• Alternatively, it might be wise to retain unconventional warfare as a statutory role. UW was the original function of Army Special Forces. It still contributes to their mystique, and pride in related capabilities remains an immeasurable morale builder. Financial costs would be minuscule.

Foreign internal defense

Foreign internal defense, a unique form of collective security, is the strategically defensive counterpart of unconventional warfare. It involves protracted interagency and multidisciplinary efforts by U.S. civilian specialists and armed forces to forestall or defeat selected insurgencies, resistance movements and lawlessness.

The primary purpose of U.S. SOF is to train, advise and otherwise help host nations develop military and paramilitary forces fully able to maintain internal security. Some UW and FID skills, such as appreciation for local culture and language proficiency, are interchangeable, but different organizations and equipment are required.

As a result, Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs are not equally adept at foreign internal defense and

unconventional warfare, although U.S. policy makers currently expect equal competence at both.

The need to fix the relative importance of UW and FID seems pressing, because FID is becoming ever more complex in the post-Cold War world. Multinational operations may become the norm. Successful FID, moreover, might promote U.S. interests in global stability at less cost and risk than most known means. Alternatives listed below therefore might prove advantageous:

• *Title 10* designates foreign internal defense *and* humanitarian assistance as special-operations activities. Humanitarian assistance, however, is a subset of civil-military operations which, in turn, contribute to FID. No harm therefore would be done if *Title 10* discarded humanitarian assistance as a discrete role for SOF. USSOCOM then could legally consider foreign internal defense as an entity and freely determine which aspects to emphasize.

• *DoD Directive 5100.1* does not tell USSOCOM whether unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense should take precedence. That document might helpfully assign the primary function.

Paramilitary operations

Guerrillas and other armed irregular forces that employ quasimilitary tactics and techniques are offensive paramilitary forces. Defensive paramilitary forces help regular armed forces and law-enforcement agencies retain or regain internal security.

The Office of Strategic Services conducted U.S. paramilitary operations during World War II. The CIA, its successor, thereafter assumed paramilitary responsibilities. Diversified endeavors during the 1950s occurred in China, Korea, the Philippines, Guatemala, Indonesia and Tibet.

CIA retains primary responsibility for paramilitary operations, but the Drug Enforcement Agency now conducts or controls small-scale actions in Andean states. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters has received legal permission to arm its own air wing of 60 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters for such purposes. Consolidation rather than proliferation of paramilitary responsibilities, however, seems worth consideration. Accordingly:

• Congress might amend *Title 10* to identify USSOCOM as the lead agency for all U.S. paramilitary operations. It might simultaneously amend *Title 50,* Section 403(d)(5) to exclude participation by the CIA, which the present text implicitly permits with these words: "perform such other [unspecified] functions ... as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." *DoD Directive 5100.1* and joint special-operations doctrine thereafter could contain specific instructions related to paramilitary functions, missions and interdepartmental and interagency relationships.

• CIA might retain primary responsibilities if, after careful review, policy makers decided that it is best qualified to plan and conduct paramilitary operations.

Anti/counterterrorism

Terrorism is public, repetitive violence or threats of violence intended to achieve socio-political objectives by intimidating innocent people and severely disrupting community routines. Domestic terrorism, which originates within and is directed against one country or factions therein, is a favorite tool of some insurgents. Transnational terrorism, instigated by groups that renegade governments may sponsor and support, emanates from foreign bases.

U.S. programs to combat terrorism comprise two basic roles. Antiterrorism emphasizes passive protection for personnel and installations. Counterterrorism may attack terrorists before they can strike or be reactive. Timely, accurate intelligence is essential to both.

Title 10 designates *counterterrorism,* but not *antiterrorism,* as a special-operations activity. *DoD Directive 5100.1* assigns neither function to USSOCOM or any military service. Joint special-operations doctrine, in the absence of contrary instructions, considers counterterrorism a primary activity and calls antiterrorism collateral.

Distinctions between antiterrorism and counterterrorism are sharp; they demand different skills. Steps to discourage terrorists before they strike and to mitigate damage embrace individual-protection programs to reduce risks, public education to increase awareness and installation-protection programs.

Active countermeasures, in contrast, require unique reconnaissance and surveillance techniques. With rare exceptions, such as the 1986 air attack against Libya, they require intricately choreographed SOF actions as well. Flexibility and a flair for improvisation often are imperative. Hostage-rescue units that expect the unexpected, for example, must maintain a mind-boggling array of special skills on standby, because they cannot predict the nature of any future emergency.

Antiterrorism and counterterrorism nevertheless are closely linked, because they are flip sides of the same coin. Roles and functions that disregard antiterrorism therefore are apt to be flawed. Amendments to *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* accordingly may prove appropriate:

• Members of JSOC, all intimately familiar with terrorist tactics, are eminently qualified to help the State Department and FBI educate and train antiterrorists. *Title 10* could encourage them to do so by adding antiterrorism to other special-operations activities.

• *DoD Directive 5100.1,* in response, could assign antiterrorism to USSOCOM as a primary responsibility without degrading JSOC's counterterrorism capabilities in the slightest.

Theater search and rescue

Search-and-rescue forces must be properly organized, equipped, trained and controlled to recover personnel

in distress on land or at sea under trying conditions. They remain on constant call, ready to pick up downed aircrews and passengers in peacetime. Combat-search-and-rescue operations under fire during minor contingencies and major wars are even more demanding.

Title 10, Section 167, designates theater SAR as a special-operations responsibility. *DoD Directive 5100.1* tells the Coast Guard to provide maritime search-and-rescue forces in wartime, but otherwise snubs SAR. Joint doctrines differentiate SAR from CSAR: Every sovereign country conducts SAR within its own boundaries. U.S. military services and SOF assist in accord with existing agreements. Each U.S. unified commander, however, regularly conducts CSAR operations in support of U.S. forces within his area of responsibility.

CSAR forces received due attention throughout the Vietnam war, but units dedicated to that purpose inexplicably disappeared thereafter. Only the Air Force currently maintains full-time CSAR assets. Other service contributions are *ad hoc*. Only USSOCOM has fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft able to penetrate deeply into enemy airspace, pick up evaders and recover high-priority cargo and return surreptitiously.

As a result, USSOCOM has become the *de facto* force of choice for providing theaterwide CSAR. Continued reliance at current intensities reportedly would degrade abilities to satisfy a host of other SO requirements unless USSOCOM received extra aircraft, personnel and funds.

Some redistribution of search-and-rescue roles and functions thus might be appropriate. Various proponents propose several options:

• Congress might begin by revising *Title 10* requirements for *theater* search and rescue to read *combat* search and rescue, since theater-wide SAR operations in peacetime are basically a host-country responsibility.

• *DoD Directive 5100.1* might subdivide CSAR functions among the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, USSOCOM and the Air Force. Such action would require all but USAF to designate full-time CSAR assets, since no other service currently does so. A Joint Rescue Center could coordinate all combat-search-and-rescue forces in wartime. Decision makers might consider theater-wide peacetime SAR a collateral function if they take this tack.

• Option three, the consolidation of all CSAR units under USSOCOM, would be consistent with the current emphasis on streamlined functions. Centralized control could foster efficiency and effectiveness in peacetime as well as war. USSOCOM, however, would need substantial augmentation, as noted above.

• A compromise that assigned primary covert or clandestine CSAR functions to USSOCOM and all other combat search and rescue to military services under joint control might register useful improvements with minimum disruption. USSOCOM then could concentrate on SO-related CSAR, even if it received conventional CSAR as a collateral function.

U.S. Air Force photo

Search-and-rescue forces recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. They must remain constantly ready to pick up downed aircrews and passengers.

Psychological operations

Psychological operations, as practiced by the U.S. military establishment, constitute the purposeful use of information and actions to influence the emotions, attitudes and behavior of target audiences in ways that expedite the achievement of security objectives in peacetime and war.

PSYOP targets are idiosyncratic. Subtle themes that work well against timid souls seldom faze tough adversaries such as Saddam Hussein or Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic. Leaflets are useless if printed in improper dialects or in colors that recipients consider unlucky. PSYOP specialists who hope to manipulate key individuals or groups consistently must therefore be conversant with local idioms, customs and predispositions.

PSYOP often involves interagency coordination. Most U.S. military capabilities reside in the Army, which maintains an active-duty four-battalion PSYOP group. Three more groups are reserve components. Air Force aircraft deliver leaflets and provide platforms for loudspeakers.

A "shotgun marriage" between PSYOP and special operations took place at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1952 when the first Special Forces group joined a newly-formed Psychological Warfare Center to soften resistance by Army, Air Force and CIA officials who then opposed all efforts to create military SOF formations. Those largely artificial relationships have long since ceased to exist. The former *Psychological* Warfare Center currently is called the John F. Kennedy *Special* Warfare Center.

Perhaps 90 percent of all PSYOP output supports conventional operations. Critics accordingly question whether psychological roles and functions are properly assigned:

• *Title 10* specifies that only so much of PSYOP as relates to special operations is legitimately a SO activity. Retired Gen. Richard G. Stillwell, bearing that fact in mind, stated to the Secretary of the Army that "the only thing 'special' about psychological operations is their extraordinary importance." Congress consequently could consider shifting PSYOP to Army control, especially since it normally supports conventional operations. *DoD Directive 5100.1* would pass primary PSYOP functions to the Army vs. USSOCOM in such event.

• Others prefer present arrangements, partly because PSYOP forces, like Rangers, might atrophy if returned to Army jurisdiction. They nevertheless recommend that *DoD Directive 5100.1* formally designate PSYOP assets as SOF. As it stands, fuzzy relationships reportedly frustrate USSOCOM efforts to command, control, administer and budgetarily support PSYOP forces as congressional legislation intends.

Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs specialists facilitate civil-military cooperation between U.S. armed forces and allied governments. They operate at national and local levels before, during and after hostilities or other emergencies, in accord with international law and bilateral or multilateral agreements. They may also exercise executive, legislative and judicial authority in occupied territory. Fundamental functions are to identify and coordinate the acquisition of indigenous resources and facilities; minimize civilian interference with U.S. military activities; assist military commanders in meeting legal and moral responsibilities to the populace; advise U.S. and host-country authorities on civic action; and train allied counterparts.

Title 10 identifies CA as a special-operations activity insofar as it relates to SO. Perhaps 90 percent of assigned CA missions, however, assist conventional commanders. Most U.S. Civil Affairs forces reside in the Army, which maintains one active battalion under USSOCOM control. Ninety-seven percent are reserve components subject to call as required. Two Marine Corps Reserve CA groups support Marine air-ground task forces. Neither is assigned to USSOCOM.

Civil Affairs operations, like PSYOP, frequently require interagency and multiservice coordination. Like PSYOP, they support assorted U.S. military programs in peacetime and at every conflict level. Even more than PSYOP, the merger of Civil Affairs with special operations was a marriage of administrative convenience. Critics seldom question the value of Civil Affairs, but they do debate whether CA roles and functions are properly assigned. Arguments for and against change are virtually identical with those previously described for psychological operations:

• Congress might amend *Title 10* to relieve USSOCOM of Civil Affairs roles, since only a small fraction of all CA efforts support special operations. *DoD Directive 5100.1* then could order the Army to organize, equip and train CA forces as a primary function.

• Civil Affairs might suffer as a "stepchild" under Army control if *Title* 10 remains unchanged. *DoD Directive 6100.1,* however, reportedly would have to formally designate Civil Affairs forces as SOF before USSOCOM could command, control, administer and budgetarily support CA as congressional legislation intends.

Title 10 and *DoD Directive 5100.1* tell the services and USSOCOM what roles and functions each must perform to ensure well-balanced armed forces with capabilities the U.S. combatant commands need to accomplish their assigned missions. Every change creates a ripple effect. Decision makers consequently should strive to determine beforehand whether any given amendment would increase cost effectiveness or deprive U.S. combat forces of desirable flexibility.

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Cameroon:

CA Unit Conducts Joint Medical Exercise

by Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck

Crowds came from miles around, primarily on foot, forming long lines and standing for hours under a relentless sun which generated temperatures up to 120 degrees. They were waiting to see a doctor.

The second joint Civil Affairs and military medical exercise between soldiers from the armies of the United States and Cameroon was under way, with uniformed doctors and nurses conducting a 10-day medical program that left many citizens of Cameroon happier and healthier.

More than 5,000 residents of the central-African country's extreme north province poured into 12 towns and villages to see two teams of American and Cameroonian doctors and nurses, who diagnosed and treated a variety of ailments, many unheard of in the United States.

Most of the exercise took place in the Mayo-Tsanaga district, an area near the site of the first bilateral exercise in 1991. That campaign focused on immunization against meningitis, which had struck the region severely. Early in 1992, another severe outbreak of the disease struck the province, but with relatively modest impact on those vaccinated in 1991.The success of the 1991 mission, coupled with a desire to expand training for Americans and Cameroonians, led to an emphasis on general medical treatment in 1992.

The mission involved a team of 12 reservists from six Civil Affairs units throughout the U.S. Since only three of the 12 had prior tours in Cameroon, there were inevitable adjustments in terms of environment, language, culture and local medical problems and practices.

Most of the deploying Americans did research about Cameroon before travelling, and they received additional briefings upon their arrival from embassy personnel and military physicians of the Cameroon Army on the health-care system, area diseases and common treatments.

Within a few days the citizen-soldiers were working long hours in tiny towns and villages whose names they had never heard of. Usually split into two teams, they plied their Civil Affairs and medical craft side-by-side with their Cameroonian counterparts — more often than not with the aid of military or civilian volunteer interpreters.

Capt. Mary Ellen Robbins primarily performed triage, the sorting and screening of patients, during the exercise. A member of the 443rd Civil Affairs Company, West Warwick, R.I., she recalls how language barriers constituted one of the biggest challenges. "At practically every site we visited, there had to be translation from a local or tribal dialect into French and then into English for us to work," she said.

Despite this trilingual method of health-care delivery, there was success. "To a degree, I was unsure of what we would encounter in terms of patient load, severity of illness, etc. So imagine our collective thrill and pride in possibly saving three

lives and delivering a baby girl as well," said Col. Charles Kilhenny, senior medical member of the team. Assigned to the 411th Civil Affairs Company, West Hartford, Conn., the 64-year-old radiologist also relished the opportunity to see how "my military-medical counterparts function without much of the equipment that is available to the American medical profession."

At each location, the team set up four stations: registration, triage, treatment and pharmacy. The American soldiers worked closely with Cameroonians, military and civilian, to deliver hope and health care to a region that has been very vulnerable to illness in the past.

The team treated more than 5,000 Cameroonians. An analysis of patient data disclosed 13 fairly common conditions that prevailed, with one of every six patients afflicted with malaria. One of every eight patients suffered from respiratory infections or schistosomiasis, a variety of tropical diseases caused by parasites in the bloodstream.

"Considering some of the geographical and sociological challenges that are part of an African mission, the operation's success was simply overwhelming," said Col. Albert P. Grupper, 353rd Civil Affairs Command, mission commander for the American contingent.

Lt. Col. Patricia Heringa, a member of the 308th Civil Affairs Group, Homewood, Ill., and a registered nurse in civilian life, recalls the severity of the work environment. "This was my first trip outside of the U.S., let alone Africa, and I was almost overwhelmed by the heat. With one exception, the 14 hospitals or clinics in which we worked had no running water or electricity. Water for washing or drinking would come from a nearby well. ... It was simply an extraordinary experience, but one in which I am glad I had a chance to play a role."

As a physician, Lt. Col. Eugene White of the 413th Civil Affairs Company, Lubbock, Texas, said he learned about new cultures, diseases and how to deal with them. The gynecologist also cited the unique opportunity to "teach and learn from our Cameroonian fellow physicians in the spirit of comrades-in-arms. ... I went home with a strong sense of satisfaction about our accomplishments in so short a period."

The U.S. ambassador to Cameroon, the Honorable Frances D. Cook, visited the exercise and encouraged the team to persevere in spite of the austere conditions. She thanked them for helping to better cement the ties of cooperation for the United States in the "Hinge of Africa" and expressed hope that she would see the soldiers in future exercises.

Col. Carol A. Miller served as the exercise's public health team chief. Deputy commander of the 308th CA Group and a registered nurse in civilian life, Miller said that the mission to Cameroon "was the ultimate in Civil Affairs training. We're all a lot smarter in terms of cultural impact and in our language and communications skills. We worked with elements of a foreign military in concert with representatives of a U.S. country team. Our understanding of how the population's health is affected by customs, traditions, politics and egomaniacs is greatly improved, and I learned about medical treatment in Africa."

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, former commander of the 353rd and currently commander of the Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command, is eager to see the unit's role in the development of Cameroon grow. "The training the Army Reserve gets is beyond compare, as are the benefits to the indigenous population. I hope to see this relationship continue and flourish."

Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck is currently commander of the 353rd CA Command, Bronx, N.Y.

Photo by Raymond Barrager

Lt. Col. Pat Heringa discusses medication with a Cameroonian Army officer as U.S. ambassador Frances Cook looks on.

Future Trends in Terrorist Targeting and Tactics

by Bruce Hoffman

Although terrorists killed more people during the 1980s than in the previous two decades combined, they did so without having to resort to the exotic or esoteric weapons popularized by both fictional thrillers and pseudo-scholarly, headline-grabbing analyses.

Bombings continue to account for roughly half of all terrorist attacks annually — as they have since 1968. Few skills are required to manufacture a crude bomb, surreptitiously plant it and then be miles away when it explodes. Bombings, therefore, do not require the same organizational expertise, logistics and knowledge required of more complicated or sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, assassination and assaults against defended targets.

Indeed, the frequency of various types of terrorist attacks decreases in direct proportion to the complexity or sophistication required. Attacks on installations are the second most common tactic, accounting for fewer than 20 percent of all operations, followed by assassinations and shooting, kidnapping, hijacking, barricade and hostage situations. Significant threats account for the small number of remaining incidents.

The fact that these percentages have remained largely unchanged for the past 25 years provides compelling evidence that the vast majority of terrorist organizations are not tactically innovative. Radical in their politics, these groups appear to be conservative in their operations, adhering largely to the same limited operational repertoire year after year. What innovation does occur is mostly in the methods used to conceal and detonate explosive devices, not in their tactics or their use of non-conventional weapons.

In this respect, despite its popularity as a fictional theme, terrorists have in fact rarely attempted the infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties. Of more than 8,000 incidents recorded in the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism since 1968, for example, only 52 evidence any indication of terrorists plotting such attacks or attempting to use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Most terrorist activity throughout the world is primarily "symbolic," designed to call attention to the terrorists and their causes. Attacks tend to be directed not against people, but against "things" — embassies, consulates, government offices, businesses, airlines and military installations — that have symbolic connotations. Thus, diplomatic targets have historically been the focus of most terrorist attacks, followed by business, airline, military, and civilian targets — with attacks on energy, maritime, transportation and communications targets comparatively rare.

Only 20 percent of the terrorist incidents during the 1980s, in fact, killed anyone, but those operations that did kill tended to kill more people than before. The reasons for this

trend — the terrorists' apparent belief that lethality attracts attention; improved effectiveness of terrorist organizations over generations; the resurgence of religious terrorism; the fact that terrorists themselves are more adept at killing; and increased state-sponsorship of terrorism — also shed light on terrorist capabilities, targeting, tactics and decision making.

Increasing lethality

The most obvious explanation for international terrorism's increasing lethality is that public attention is not as readily aroused as it was in the past. The general proliferation of terrorist movements and the increase in terrorist incidents have created problems for both old and new groups who now must compete for a wider audience share. Terrorists have therefore been forced to undertake spectacular and bloody deeds in order to achieve the same effect a small action would have had 10 years ago.

Other terrorist acts are not only driven by the desire for publicity but are explicitly coercive as well, threatening dire consequences unless specific demands are met. The wave of bombings that shook Paris during 1986 — beginning in February with an explosion in a shopping center that killed eight persons and culminating the following September with a nine-day terrorist rampage that killed another eight persons and wounded more than 150 others — is an example of this symbiosis of objectives. Following the first incident, a group calling itself the Committee of Solidarity with the Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners claimed credit for the bombing and demanded the release of three terrorists imprisoned in France. After the French government refused, three more bombings occurred in February, two more the following month, and five in September.

Still other terrorist operations are carried out in reprisal for a particular government's actions. In this category is the September 1986 attack on an Istanbul synagogue that claimed the lives of 22 people and wounded three others. A spokesman in Beirut later claimed that the operation had been staged in retaliation for a recent Israeli raid on a guerrilla base in southern Lebanon.

An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection also seems to affect terrorist groups, so that each new generation learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter, tougher and more difficult to capture. For terrorists, intelligence is essential not only as a prerequisite for success, but for survival. Successor generations, therefore, routinely study the "lessons" from mistakes made by former comrades who have been killed or apprehended. Surviving group members cull and absorb information on security-force tactics from press accounts, courtroom testimony and trial transcripts.

"The proliferation of terrorist movements and the increase in incidents have created problems for both old and new groups who now must compete for a wider audience share. Terrorists have been forced to undertake spectacular and bloody deeds in order to achieve the same effect a small action would have had 10 years ago."

Successor generations also tend to be more ruthless and less idealistic than their predecessors. For some, violence becomes almost an end in itself rather than the means to a political end embraced by previous generations. A dedicated, "hard core" of some 20 to 30 terrorists today, for example, composes a third generation of Germany's Red Army Faction. In contrast to the group's first generation, who more than 20 years ago embarked on an anti-establishment campaign of non-lethal bombings and arson attacks, the present generation — at least until recently — has pursued a strategy of cold-blooded assassination.

During the past five years, the Red Army Faction has murdered six prominent Germans. The last victim was Detlev Rohwedder, a wealthy industrialist and chairman of the government agency charged with overseeing the economic transition of eastern Germany. A shot fired from a high-powered rifle killed Rohwedder in April 1991 while he sat in his study. In December 1989, financier and Deutsche Bank president Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated when a remote-control bomb, concealed in a parked bicycle and triggered by a light-beam, was detonated just as his car passed. A similar device was used the following July in an attempt to assassinate Germany's top government counterterrorist official, Hans Neusel.

Almost as disturbing as the assassinations themselves is the fact that the perpetrators and their fellow conspirators have eluded what is perhaps the most sophisticated anti-terrorist machinery in the world. "The 'Third Generation' learnt a lot from the mistakes of its predecessors — and about how the police works," a spokesperson for the *Bundeskriminalamt* recently lamented, "they now know how to operate very carefully." Indeed, according to a former member of the organization, Peter-Juergen Brock, currently serving the seventh year of a life sentence for murder, the group has reached maximum efficiency.

Another key reason for terrorism's increased lethality is the growing incidence of violence motivated by a religious, as well as a nationalist or separatist imperative. Certainly, the relationship between terrorism and

religion is not new. In fact, as David C. Rapoport points out in his seminal study of what he terms "holy terror," until the 19th century, "Religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror." This form of terrorism has occurred throughout history, although in recent decades it has largely been overshadowed by nationalist/separatist or ideologically motivated terrorism.

The record of terrorist acts by Shi'a Islamic groups reinforces, for example, the causal link between religion-motivated terrorism and terrorism's growing lethality. Although these groups have committed only eight percent of all international terrorist incidents since 1982, they are responsible for 30 percent of the total number of deaths.

Contrary to its depiction and discussion in Western news accounts, terrorism motivated by religion is by no means a phenomenon restricted to Islamic terrorist groups. Many of the characteristics — the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of alienation, the existence of a terrorist movement in which the activists are the constituents, and preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of "enemies" — are also apparent among militant Christian white supremacists in the United States and in at least some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel. Both groups view violence as morally justified and an expedient toward the attainment of the religious and racial "purification" of their respective countries.

That terrorists motivated by a religious imperative can contemplate massive acts of death is a reflection of their belief that violence is a sacramental act or a divine duty. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are unconstrained by the political, moral or practical constraints that affect other terrorists.

Religious and secular terrorists also differ in their constituencies. Religious terrorists are at once activists and constituents engaged in what they regard as a "total war." They perform their terrorist acts for no audience but themselves. Thus the restraints on violence that are imposed on secular terrorists by the desire to appeal to an uncommitted constituency are not relevant to the religious terrorist.

Finally, religious and secular terrorists have different perceptions of themselves and their violent acts. Secular terrorists regard violence as a way of correcting a system that is basically good or to foment the creation of a new system. Religious terrorists regard themselves as "outsiders," seeking vast changes in the existing order. This sense of alienation enables them to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of operations than secular terrorists and to embrace a far more open-ended category of "enemies" for attack.

Terrorism's trend toward increasing lethality is also a reflection of the fact that terrorists themselves are more adept at killing. Not only are their weapons becoming smaller, more sophisticated, and deadlier, but terrorists have greater access to these weapons through their alliances with foreign governments.

In addition to their standard arsenal of small arms and ordinary explosives, "state-sponsored" terrorists used a truck carrying some 12,000 pounds of high explosives, whose destructive power was enhanced by canisters of flammable gases, to kill 241 U.S. Marines in what has been described as the "largest non-nuclear blast ever detonated on the face of the earth." Other groups deployed nearly 200 sophisticated, multifused, Soviet-manufactured acoustic mines to disrupt shipping entering the Suez Canal from the Red Sea and fabricated the device that exploded aboard Pan Am Flight 103, killing all 259 on board and 11 others on the ground. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that state-sponsored terrorist incidents are, on average, eight times more lethal than those carried out by groups acting on their own.

Admittedly, diminishing communist-bloc support and training of various international terrorist organizations will make it more difficult for those groups to operate. However, recent reports that during the past decade Czechoslovakia shipped more than 1,000 *tons* of Semtex plastic explosive (the same type used against Pan Am 103) to Libya ensure that at least those terrorist organizations still favored by Colonel Khadafy will have ample supplies of that explosive for years to come.

Czechoslovakia is also thought to have exported some 40,000 tons of Semtex to Syria, North Korea, Iran and Iraq — countries long cited by the U.S. Department of State as sponsors of international terrorist activity. Irrespective of communist-bloc action, terrorists now are assured an almost inexhaustible international stockpile of plastic explosives on which to draw for future operations.

Technology

The availability of these weapons, coupled with the terrorists' own ingenuity, has enabled at least some groups to stay constantly ahead of the counterterrorist technology curve and repeatedly frustrate or defeat the security measures placed in their path.

Relying on unconventional adaptations or modifications to conventional explosive devices, these organizations have developed innovative and effective means to conceal, deliver and detonate all kinds of bombs. The devices used in the assassination of Alfred Herrhausen and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 are two examples of terrorists using specially or cleverly modified "off-the-shelf" technology to strike at well-defended targets.

A 1/8-inch thick, four-inch wide, and 10-inch long bomb, constructed of 300 grams of Semtex and trig-

gered by a combination electronic timer and barometric sensor, was placed under the seat cushion of a TWA flight en route from Cairo to Athens via Rome and exploded, killing four persons and injuring nine others in April 1986.

Liquid explosive concealed in a generic half-gallon whiskey bottle was placed in an overhead bin during a Korean Air flight in November 1987. It was detonated nine hours later by 12 ounces of C-4 plastic explosive wired to a timing device hidden in a transistor radio placed in the seat pocket below, killing all 115 persons on board. These are chilling examples of terrorist creativity and adaptation.

The PIRA's relentless quest to pierce the armor protecting both the security forces in Northern Ireland and the most senior government officials in England illustrates the dynamics of the struggle for technological superiority. The first generation of early 1970s PIRA devices were often little more than crude anti-personnel bombs, consisting of a handful of roofing nails wrapped around a lump of plastic explosive, that were detonated simply by lighting a fuse.

Time bombs from the same era were hardly more sophisticated. They typically were constructed from a few sticks of dynamite and commercial detonators stolen from construction sites or rock quarries attached to ordinary battery-powered alarm clocks. Neither device was terribly reliable and often put the bomber at considerable risk.

In hopes of reducing that risk, the PIRA's bomb makers invented a means of detonating bombs from a safe distance using the radio controls for model aircraft purchased at hobby shops. Scientists and engineers working in the British Ministry of Defence's scientific research and development division in turn developed a system of electronic countermeasures and jamming techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted this means of attack.

Rather than abandon this tactic completely, the PIRA began to search for a solution. In contrast to the state-of-the art laboratories, huge budgets and academic credentials of their government counterparts, PIRA's own "R&D" department toiled in cellars beneath cross-border safehouses and back rooms of urban tenements for five years before devising a network of sophisticated electronic switches for their bombs that would ignore or bypass the Army' s electronic countermeasures.

Once again, the Ministry of Defence scientists developed a new system of electronic scanners to detect radio emissions just tenths of seconds before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal. The almost infinitesimal window of time provided by this "early warning" of impending attack is just sufficient to allow Army technicians to activate additional electronic measures to neutralize the transmission signal.

"Although the technological mastery employed by the PIRA is arguably unique among terrorist organizations, experience has demonstrated repeatedly that, when confronted by new security measures, terrorists will seek to identify and exploit new vulnerabilities, adjusting their means of attack accordingly."

For a time, this countermeasure proved effective. But within the past year, the PIRA has discovered a means to outwit even this countermeasure. The group's bomb makers fabricated a detonating system triggered by the same type of handheld radar gun used by police to catch speeding motorists. Since the radar gun can be aimed before being switched on, and its signal is nearly instantaneous, no practical means currently exists to detect or intercept the transmission signal in time.

Even attacks that are not successful in conventionally understood military terms can still be a success for the terrorists, provided that they are technologically daring enough to garner media and public attention. Indeed, the terrorist group's fundamental organizational imperative to act also drives this persistent search for new ways to overcome, circumvent or defeat governmental security and countermeasures.

Thus, while the PIRA failed to kill then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party's 1984 conference in Brighton, the technological ingenuity involving the bomb's placement at the conference site weeks before the event and its detonation timing device powered by a computer microchip succeeded in capturing headlines and provided the PIRA with a propaganda platform.

Similarly, although the remote-control mortar attack staged by the PIRA on No. 10 Downing Street — as Prime Minister John Major and his cabinet met at the height of the 1991 Gulf War — failed to hit its intended target, it elbowed the war out of the limelight and shone renewed media attention on the terrorists, their cause and their impressive ability to strike at the nerve center of the British government even at a time of heightened security.

Although the technological mastery employed by the PIRA is arguably unique among terrorist organizations, experience has demonstrated repeatedly that, when confronted by new security measures, terrorists will seek to identify and exploit new vulnerabilities, adjusting their means of attack accordingly.

This point is especially pertinent

to the threat posed by terrorists to commercial aviation. During the late 1960s, for example, hijacking of passenger aircraft was among terrorists' favored tactics, accounting for 33 percent of all incidents. However, as security at airports improved, as metal detectors and x-ray machines were installed at boarding areas, and as passenger profiling and other countermeasures were adopted, the incidence of airline hijackings declined appreciably to just 7 percent of all incidents in the 1970s and only 4 percent in the 1980s.

While these measures were successful in reducing airline hijackings, they did not stop terrorist attacks on commercial airlines altogether. Prevented from smuggling weapons on board to hijack aircraft, terrorists merely continued to attack them by means of bombs hidden in carry-on or checked baggage.

A new generation of sophisticated bomb-detection devices — able to detect even plastic explosives — is currently being installed at airports throughout the world, while a successor generation involving other techniques is already being tested.

These machines will doubtlessly make it more difficult for terrorists to place bombs on board aircraft much the same as the metal detectors and x-ray machines made hijacking more difficult. But if past experience is any guide, as airport security and bomb-detection technology closes off this avenue of attack, terrorists will merely find another.

They are likely to turn to readily available shoulder-fired, precision-guided surface-to-air missiles as the only practical means to attack commercial aircraft. A single terrorist, trained in the use of this weapon, could position himself at the edge of any airport's runway and fire at incoming or departing passenger planes with devastating results.

Black-nationalist guerrillas downed two Rhodesian passenger jets with SAM-7s in 1978 and 1979, killing 107 persons. Sudanese rebels used a SAM-7 in 1986 to shoot down a Sudan Airways commercial jet, killing all 60 persons on board. Polisario Front guerrillas in Morocco downed an American DC-7 weather plane in 1988 with a Soviet missile, killing its five-man crew.

The effectiveness of such weapons has reportedly led the British Army to respond to alleged PIRA possession of Libyan-supplied SAM-7s by equipping its helicopters in Northern Ireland with infrared defensive systems to thwart missile attacks.

"Bombing continues to account for the majority of terrorist operations, and most of the bombs are not particularly innovative. Most are made of commercially purchased or stolen dynamite or from plastic explosives from military stockpiles. Even in those instances involving comparatively more sophisticated, state-sponsored terrorists, the weapons used have been exclusively conventional."

Given the fact that the arsenals of some 80 countries throughout the world now contain SAM-7s or their equivalents, that countries as diverse as Egypt, China, Brazil, South Africa and Sweden are at various stages of producing their own man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and that such weapons can reportedly be purchased on the international arms "black market" for as little as $80,000, terrorist and guerrilla use of these weapons is likely to increase in the future.

Future tactics

Most analyses of the possibility of chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism have tended to discount it because few terrorists know anything about the technical intricacies of developing or dispersing such weapons. Political, moral and practical considerations also affect terrorist decision making.

There are few realistic demands that terrorists could make by threatening the use of such indiscriminate weapons. More important, as Brian Jenkins notes, "Terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary. They find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes." Terrorists have demonstrated repeatedly that their goals and objectives can be accomplished by using the same tactics and "off-the-shelf weapons" that they have traditionally relied upon.

These arguments are supported by the general pattern of worldwide terrorism. Bombing continues to account for the majority of terrorist operations, and most of the bombs are not particularly innovative. Most are made of commercially purchased or stolen dynamite or from plastic explosives from military stockpiles. Even in those instances involving comparatively more sophisticated, state-sponsored terrorists, the weapons used have been exclusively conventional.

If, however, terrorist lethality continues to increase and the constraints, self-imposed and otherwise imposed, on terrorists in the commission of mass murder erode further, actions involving chemical, biological or nuclear weapons could become more attractive to some groups. In this respect it should be emphasized that terrorists have yet to reach their killing potential using even "off-the-shelf" weapons. They have generally kept their threats "realistic," in the sense that they can and will carry them out if denied their objectives, and approximately commensurate with the

demands made. Any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons could result in unprecedented numbers of casualties and damage, with attendant undesired (by the terrorists) implications for public opinion and government reaction.

Today, however, when old empires and countries are crumbling and new ones are being built, the possession of a nuclear bomb or the development of a chemical or biological-warfare capability may become increasingly attractive either to new nations seeking to preserve their sovereignty or to would-be nations seeking to attain their independence. In both instances, terrorists may find new roles for their skills and expertise.

Ethnic and religious fanaticism could more easily allow terrorists to overcome the psychological barriers to mass murder than could a radical political agenda. A terrorist group of religious zealots, with state support, in a context of ongoing violence, could see the acquisition and use of a chemical, biological or nuclear capability as a viable option. State sponsorship, in particular, could provide terrorists with the incentives and resources they previously lacked for undertaking an ambitious operation in any of these domains. Combined with intense ethnic enmity or a strong religious imperative, this could prove deadly.

One final observation seems in order: while the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, one enduring feature is that Americans remain favored targets of terrorists abroad. Since 1968, the United States has annually headed the list of countries whose nationals and property are most frequently attacked by terrorists. This is a phenomenon attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of America's overseas commercial interests and the large number of its military bases on foreign soil as to the United States' stature as a superpower and leader of the free world.

Terrorists, therefore, are attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of the plethora of readily available targets; the terrorists' perceived difficulty of operating and striking targets in the United States itself; the symbolic value inherent in any blow struck against U.S. "expansionism," "imperialism," or "economic exploitation," and, not least, because of the unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity from perhaps the world's most extensive news media that any attack on an American target assures.

These reasons suggest that, despite the end of both the Cold War and the ideological polarization that divided the world, the United States will nonetheless remain an attractive target for terrorists seeking to attract attention to themselves and their causes. As the only superpower, the United States may likely be blamed for more of the world's ills and therefore could be the focus of more terrorist attacks than before. ✂

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The Self-Development Test: What's In It for Me?

by MSgt. Kirk Thomas

The old Skill Qualification Test is gone. Now we have something called a Self-Development Test. Is it the same thing with a different name? What impact will it have on soldiers' careers?

One of the jobs of the Individual Training Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is to develop the MOS portion of the SDT for CMF 18. In that capacity, we can answer these questions and explain some of the whys and wherefores of the SDT.

Is the SDT the same thing as the SQT with a different name? No. There are similarities, and even some of the same questions could be used, but there are major differences. Each SDT will have 20 leadership questions, 20 training questions and 60 MOS-knowledge questions. The old SQT always had several questions for each task; the SDT might have only one, but it will be one important for the task. The old SQT notice had more tasks listed than were actually tested; with the SDT, there is no more guesswork — if it's in the notice, it will be tested. Another difference is that preparation for the SDT is now on your own time; duty time will not be scheduled for SDT train-up.

What impact will it have on soldiers' careers? Starting in FY 94, it will have a major impact. While the SDT was under development, test results were sent only to the soldier. With the FY 94 SDT, however, test results will be used for personnel-management decisions about promotions, selection for schools and re-enlistment. Your rater can also comment about your SDT score on your NCOER. The FY 94 SDT is the first one that will count for real.

Who makes these tests up, anyway? The Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., develops the leadership questions. The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas, develops the training questions. The Army Training and Doctrine Command school which is the MOS proponent writes the MOS questions for that SDT. For the MOS portion of the Special Forces SDT, the SF Development Branch of the Individual Training Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the SWCS is responsible for assembling the questions, administering and evaluating the validation test, and for putting the final version of the test together.

The last time I took one of those tests, I found some mistakes; what can I do about that? The validation part of the development process is designed to identify testing errors, bad questions, etc. Despite our best efforts and intentions, however, mistakes still get into the final version of the test. But if you find what you believe to be an error in a test question or the answer choices, submit an inquiry. After finishing the test and turning in the answer sheet, ask to see the testing standards officer and tell him you want to fill out an inquiry sheet for that

test. This inquiry will be sent to the SDT developers in our office, who will evaluate the comment and send an answer back to the TSO. On several occasions, we have even called the soldier on the phone to discuss his comment. If there was an error in the way the question was written or in the answer choices, the inquiry may result in the SDT being rescored without that question being counted. Every inquiry will be read, evaluated for validity, and if it would result in a change in the way the test was scored, the test is rescored accordingly.

Overview

The SDT replaces the old SQT on the recommendation of senior command sergeants major during a conference in October 1989. They felt the NCO Corps had outgrown the SQT and believed the Army needed an evaluation tool to measure and guide the growth of NCOs as they continue to develop as leaders. The Army leadership agreed, and the Chief of Staff of the Army announced the SDT on July 3, 1990.

Units will not schedule SDT train-up time. It is the individual soldier's responsibility to study during off-duty time. To prepare for the leadership questions, study FMs 22-100, -101, and -102. To prepare for the training questions, study FM 25-101. To prepare for the MOS-knowledge portion, study your MOS-specific soldier's manual and supporting technical references identified in your SDT notice. By now you should have received a set of the SDT publications from your unit. If not, ask your unit publications clerk to order FMs you need using normal publication-ordering procedures.

SF units having trouble obtaining publications may need to establish or modify publications accounts. Since Jan. 1, 1990, the Army Publications Distribution Center in Baltimore no longer sends publications to units on an automatic basis. Instead, units must establish publications accounts to tell the Army what they need.

To establish an account, the unit publications officer should prepare a DA Form 12, *Requirements for Publications*. To request initial distribution of new or revised publications, units must also complete DA 12-series forms to identify the titles and quantities of publications they will need. These should be forwarded to Commander, USAAGPC; Attn: New Account Processing; 2800 Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD 21220. See DA Pam 310-10, *The Standard Publication System Users Guide*, for further information.

After taking the SDT, you will receive two reports showing your results. The first, an initial Individual Soldier's Report, will be sent within 30 days after your test. The ISR will show the number of correct answers for each part of the SDT. The second report, or final ISR, will be sent about 2 1/2 months after the close of the test period. This report will show the SDT score and a comparison with other NCOs in your MOS and skill level. It will also reflect changes in the scoring resulting from testing errors identified during the testing period.

SDT development

SDT development begins with task selection. All tasks in the soldier training publication for each MOS are subject to be tested, though not all are tested every year. Usually the most important of the subject areas are tested every year, while the less-important areas are rotated through so they all will be tested in a 3-5-year period. A similar rationale is applied to the selection of tasks within a subject area.

Once the tasks are selected, the next step is to collect questions for each task. We like to have several questions for each task, but it is permissible to have only one, as long as it is a question vital for that task. We do not question trivia; all questions must concern something truly significant for the task. It is also important to remember that we do not write the questions ourselves. Questions for a task come from the school that has proponency for that task; the Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, the Signal School at Fort Gordon, etc. Those tasks for which SWCS is proponent are written by the company in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group having proponency for that task.

The validation test is composed of more than enough questions to make up the final version for the official SDT. This is done to leave room to eliminate questions that are not suitable (poorly written, not relevant to the task, etc.). We task the Army Special Forces Command to provide contacts in each SF group to coordinate and schedule troops, times and locations for validation testing. Testing is done in August and September of each year. Validation testing gives the soldier in the unit an opportunity to affect what is tested in his MOS, how the questions are written, and what kind of answer choices are given. The validation test given in FY 93 will be for the FY 94 SDT, the first one to be used for personnel-management decisions.

Soldiers taking this and later validation tests will have an advance look at what might be on the following year's SDT. Several things come out of the validation phase:

- We find out how long it takes to answer the questions so we can be sure the final version stays within time limits.
- We find out which questions need revising. Soldiers taking the test have the opportunity to comment on each question, and they are encouraged to be specific about why they think a question is wrong or poorly written and how they would fix it. What we want to know is:

Are the questions relevant to the MOS and the job as performed in the field? Are there any bad or poorly written questions? Are there any ambiguous questions? Is there more than one right answer? Is there no right answer? Is the answer given away in the question? Is there anything else that would make this a

better test, a better measure of a soldier's ability to do the job? We do pay attention to comments and use them in correcting the test.

Soldiers taking the validation test can be assured that the results of validation testing do not leave our office; the team sergeant or sergeant major will never know whether they passed the SDT validation test or not. As a matter of fact, scoring is done on a task-by-task basis, rather than scoring the entire test as a whole. Our tabulated data shows, for example, how many soldiers got a particular question right, not what "Staff Sergeant Smith's" score was.

Once all the validations have been done and the results tabulated, selection for the final version of the test can proceed. The final version will come in its entirety from the validation test administered to the field, but not all the questions will be used. Some questions will be eliminated as too hard, too easy, not relevant, etc., others will be rewritten according to comments from the field and our own review.

We want to do a good job and make this the best test we can, but we need your help. If you are selected to take the validation test, make your time count for something. Take the test with an open mind and think hard about all those questions placed before you. This is your chance to have an impact on the way the test is written; your comment, however trivial you might think it is, can make a difference.

MSgt. Kirk Thomas is NCOIC of the Individual Training Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. With more than 20 years' experience in Special Forces, his military schooling includes the Special Forces Qualification Course, Korean and Spanish language courses, Intelligence Analyst Course, Static Line Jumpmaster Course and the SF Operations and Intelligence Course. He holds a bachelor of arts degree from Francis Marion University in Florence, S.C., and is a candidate for a master's degree from Webster University.

Military Qualification Standards System: Army Framework for Leader Development

by Carol M. Bushong

To develop its officers as leaders, the Army has established a system to give officers, school commandants and unit commanders a common framework for leader development.

The Military Qualification Standards System identifies common and branch-specific training requirements for officers. It has two components: The military-task-and-knowledge component identifies critical battle-focused tasks, skills and knowledge, and the professional-military-education component establishes responsibilities and standards for professional development and education.

MQS covers officer training from precommissioning to promotion to colonel and is organized into three stages. MQS I establishes minimum skills for branch qualification and is taught at the commissioning sources: the U.S. Military Academy, Reserve Officers Training Corps and Officer Candidate School. MQS II covers company-grade officer training and includes officer basic and advanced courses, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School and operational assignments. MQS III applies to field-grade officers and is being formulated by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Leader development under MQS is a product of three factors: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development.

- Institutional — School commandants identify officer-performance requirements and train students to perform those duties.
- Operational — Unit commanders establish leader-development programs to complement unit training programs. MQS does not require them to train tasks not on their mission-essential task list. Commanders must tailor their MQS training and professional reading program to METL-based unit training plans.
- Self-development — Self-development involves individual officers in their development as leaders.

MQS II

MQS II applies to company-grade officers in the active and reserve components. It prepares them to accomplish wartime tasks, provides the basis for promotion and attendance at command-and-staff-college-level schools, and prepares them for greater responsibilities.

The military-task-and-knowledge component consists of company-grade common and branch-specific tasks. The professional-military-education component consists of a reading program and, in some cases, advanced civil schooling.

Common and branch manuals support MQS II training. Common manuals concentrate on company-grade-officer critical tasks; branch manuals on branch qualification. Two branch manuals, Special Forces and Civil Affairs, are relevant to Army SOF.

The Special Forces branch manual describes tasks critical for captains planning and executing the five SF missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. It complements instruction in the officer advanced course and SF Qualification Course. It contains SF branch tasks, organized by battlefield operating system, and Infantry branch tasks essential to SF.

The CA branch manual describes tasks critical for CA captains and complements the CA Officer Advanced Course. Because CA units support general-purpose forces throughout the operational continuum, CA captains must know their SOF tasks and retain the conventional skills of their accession branch. The CA branch manual is scheduled for completion in September 1994.

MQS III

MQS III charts the development of field-grade officers through lieutenant colonel, preparing them for greater responsibility, for command and service on Army and joint staffs, and for senior service colleges. Unlike MQS I and MQS II, it is not a task-based program — it describes broad areas of knowledge. Two publications support MQS III: DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, and the MQS III leader-development manual.

The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine made initial distribution of the MQS II SF branch manual to ensure that each officer received a copy. That will continue with the MQS II Civil Affairs branch manual and the MQS III leader-development manual. After initial distribution, unit publications officers will have to establish unit requirements and order the manuals from the Baltimore AG Publications Center using DA Form 4569. For more information on MQS, contact Carol Bushong, DSN 239-9802, commercial (919) 432-9802. ✂

Carol M. Bushong is an education specialist in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Interview:

Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee, commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee is currently commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Ky. During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he served as the operations and training officer for the 5th SF Group. Other assignments during his career include serving as the operations and training officer and executive officer in the 1/5th SF Group, as a Middle Eastern foreign-area officer serving in the embassies in Amman and Cairo, as a company commander in the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, as a detachment commander in the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, and as a platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division.

SW: *How important was coalition warfare to the success of Desert Storm*?
Brownlee: It was critical to the success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Obviously, the United States and the major NATO allies like France or Britain could have put enough combat power on the ground to have accomplished the mission to liberate Kuwait, but in order to legitimize our effort over there, it was critical that all of the Islamic coalition allies be integrated into the defensive and offensive phases of the operation. If there had not been an effort to organize and integrate all the various countries into the coalition, I don't think we could have been successful.

SW: *Did it contribute to our success from a military standpoint*?
Brownlee: It did contribute to the military success, and I will tell you from my perspective, having worked with all the allied countries, down to the smallest contributor, that it wasn't so much what they contributed to combat power as it was that they were integrated, so that we could maximize their contributions and minimize the limitations they might have. The extent to which we could integrate the forces increased our chances of success on the battlefield, even though their combat power did not sway the balance. It's not like General Schwarzkopf said "OK, we finally got the 2nd Egyptian Division and now we are ready to go on the offensive." The 2nd Egyptian Division was there, and they had a corps headquarters, they were more a contributing partner, and it brought the ratio of forces into a more legitimate balance, but did it increase the overall combat power or the ability to conduct a offensive? Only to a limited extent.

SW: *How many countries were in the coalition*?
Brownlee: The primary contributors were Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, obviously Kuwait, and then to a lesser extent, the peninsula shield

forces — Oman, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain — and then we had small forces from Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, Niger and Afghanistan, so there were many countries who contributed. You can also say that within the coalition, even though we were traditional allies used to operating together, you had the French and the British.

SW: *Did Special Forces soldiers work with all those countries*?
Brownlee: Yes, they worked with every country I mentioned, some to a greater extent than others. With the French and the British, for instance, our role was usually more in a liaison mode, but with the Kuwaitis we basically fell in as the shadow chain of command in the brigades as they built them.

SW: *What roles did Special Forces perform in coalition warfare*?
Brownlee: We started out with two primary functions. The first was to assess the capability of the various non-European coalition allies to survive and conduct battlefield operations in an NBC environment. That was the key issue because NBC posed a serious threat from Iraq. Our job was to assess the capability and then, to the extent we could, raise that level. In some cases we found entire brigades which had no NBC equipment, no training and no capability. That's a good piece of information, because you know what ground zero is. Some units had all the equipment sitting in a building and didn't know what to do with it. You get them to issue that equipment and train them to use it and then they can survive as individuals and operate as a unit. Some of the more sophisticated units had the equipment and the rudimentary training, and you bring them up a little bit to where you can start talking about decontamination.

Our second role was in the close-air-support arena. During Desert Shield, there were tremendous theater aviation assets available to support the battlefield, especially in the initial days in the defense, but except for the French, the British and the U.S., the coalition allies had no way, either by communications or training or language, to become customers of that system. At the same time, they were the ones most forward arrayed, so they had the biggest need for close air support.

We tried to get as far forward as we could, to provide ground-air communication, coordinating instructions and the means to link into the system, so we could bring air support to bear against a threat if it came across the border. In the early days the coalition was not organized to conduct a defense. All they would be able to do if the Iraqis came across in numbers would be to report and then attempt to disengage. We could say to the Syrians or the Egyptians, "I'm here and I've got a radio, and I can talk to AWACS and I can call air strikes on the threats out there," and they would say, "You're the kind of guy we want, stick very close to me." Our two main entrées were close air support and NBC, because the allies knew they needed those two things and that's what we were ready to do when we got on the ground. That was truly what we're now calling support to the coalition.

We later took on the role to assess unit capabilities: could they maneuver, did they have fire support, what was their mobility and countermobility capability, what were their intelligence capabilities, what was their command and control, what were their air-defense capabilities — the conventional battlefield operating systems. We could provide assessment reports on a given Saudi brigade so that a brigade commander in the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division could look at that assessment and understand it.

We would assess them to be either green, amber, red or black — we had to come up with a new category because in many cases, the coalition allies had no capability that was appropriate. For instance, the Egyptian divisions came in with no mobility/countermobility capability; they hadn't brought any equipment with them, so when that battlefield operating system was lost, we rated them as black. Later on, when we were able to get them mine detection and breaching equipment, we were able to raise them up to red. When we talked to a 24th Division guy and said the unit was raised into red, to him that would mean "no capability," but when you consider they had nothing, and then they had a rudimentary capability, that was an improvement. We would provide these assessments and update them every two weeks for every unit in theater, so when General Schwarzkopf and his senior counterparts developed an operational plan, they knew what they had to work with.

Another area in which we made particular contributions was in their operational planning. Their idea of conducting operations was to move to a line and sit. We would say, "What are your alternate, supplementary positions? What are your passage lines? What are your coordinating points? Do you have an order? Do people know what to do? Have you rehearsed it? Do you know who the unit is behind you? Do you know what their actions would be if you moved back through?"

These are basic questions when you're in the defense, but their planning was not at a sophisticated level; their attitude was, "If they want us to leave the field, we will turn around and drive south." That's not good when you've got the 101st and the 24th Mech behind the line — it's a prescription for disaster. We helped them develop and coordinate plans so that if there was an Iraqi offensive operation, they would have a series of things they would do next, and some units actually rehearsed it.

We also tried to raise individual soldier skills, especially rifle marksmanship, rudimentary patrolling skills and general collective operational skills, as far as we could. With

individual skills, it doesn't take long to determine what their level is. For instance, if you go into a unit and talk to soldiers and find out they have never fired their M-16s, you know they've never fired on a qualification range, so you can approach the commander with a training schedule and say, "Here are the things we can help with to raise the level of your soldiers' individual skills." In some cases they would be happy to do it, and in other cases they would resent it. That's where the interpersonal skills and negotiation come in. With something like tank gunnery, obviously, our capability to assess is limited. What we could do, if we were with an M-60A3 company in the Saudi Brigade that really needed some help in their gunnery, would be to look across the entire 5th Group and find the guys with that expertise and bring them over to work with them.

Another important contribution that we made was in integration. You've got a Saudi brigade sitting here, you've got an Egyptian brigade sitting here and you've got a Syrian brigade sitting here. You've got brigade and battalion boundaries, and on a map it looks real nice. In truth, the Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians had no communication or contact between each other. The first thing we would do is go to the right and the left, see who's there, establish contact, develop control measures and coordination. That was the *last* thing that they would do. They would talk only to the people in Riyadh, to their liaison elements, and in most cases they didn't know who was on their right and left and didn't care, but if you're going to conduct a defense and later move to an offensive operation, that has to be coordinated.

On the 13th of January, there was great consternation — the airborne platforms and the other moving-target indicators determined that there was a tremendous amount of Iraqi mechanized traffic moving down toward the tri-border area. They were concerned about it, because they were getting ready to start the air campaign, and they were afraid the Iraqis were going to cross and disrupt all the preparations. They ordered the 1st Cav Division to move to establish a defense, to block whatever it was. This was at 1800, and we got a call from ARCENT through the headquarters saying "Get with the Syrians and ensure that the Cav can move through there unhindered and without incident."

It is no small matter to coordinate a night movement. Even among

"Coalition warfare was a logical extension of our FID capability, so we were prepared to conduct these operations when we hit the ground."

American units, it would take tremendous coordination, but we're going to move through an edgy coalition Arab ally who has similar equipment to the Iraqis, and we have a possible movement to contact, and everybody has ammunition. We were able to accomplish it, but we had to put a lot of resources and assets on the ground in that Syrian division, which they didn't like, to ensure that the U.S. forces could move through there safely, and it was done by sunup the next day. It was transparent from the outside, but when you consider what the negative ramifications would have been, if a Syrian had fired a main-gun round at some tank from the 1st Cav ... Undoubtedly the 1st Cav would have engaged every T-62 they saw, because they would have been sure it was the Iraqis, and you can imagine how perilous that would have been for the whole coalition. So that was one of the most significant contributions we made — to prevent those things from happening.

SW: *How well prepared were the SF soldiers for the CW mission*?
Brownlee: We were well-prepared to provide support to the coalition because the 5th SF Group's primary mission is foreign internal defense for the CINC, USCENTCOM. If you look in the doctrinal manual, it will tell you one of the key components is to be prepared to provide training, advice and assistance, and organization, and to be prepared to conduct combat operations with the people you're providing this to. The conduct of coalition warfare was just a logical extension of our FID capability, so we were prepared to conduct these operations when we hit the ground. You have to make adjustments depending on the coalition ally. When we had a team that fell in with the French, they didn't have to advise and assist them, but they did provide the link in the close-air-support system and did provide them certain NBC capabilities. When we fell in with one of the Saudi or Kuwaiti units, we had to advise, assist, train, equip and integrate, so it was just a logical extension of what we were already prepared to do.

SW: *Did we identify any shortcomings or were there any lessons learned*?
Brownlee: It's not so much that we learned lessons as that we validated what we believed was true in the

CENTCOM area of operations. We validated that in order to be able to conduct FID or support a coalition, our personnel have to be at least as mobile as our allies. We've known this all along, but we weren't ready to go to the extreme, which was to mount every detachment. We have determined that it is valid and we've gone in to mount all of our detachments with at least a Humvee-type vehicle. You can't support the coalition if you don't have that capability. After we had been with them long enough, our guys were riding in the Saudi tanks, the Kuwaiti BMP's and the Egyptian 577s — that's the goal you want to get to, but until you do, you've got to be able to drive to where they are and move with them.

We found that we had some shortcomings in the communications area: We are well-equipped with communications equipment to support FID, to do DA and SR and the other primary SF collateral missions, but in order to provide support to a coalition like we had in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, you've got to be able to replicate all the communications you find in a conventional operating force. We don't have that, so we had to draw those communications assets and integrate them into our system.

Now, it doesn't make sense for us to be equipped with all the communications you need in a division, and to have all this equipment sitting in a warehouse at Fort Campbell in case we're required to go to that level. What makes sense is for us to identify that equipment and to understand that in certain support-to-coalition situations, the Army may have to supply us with that capability.

We also validated that in our theater, our soldiers have to be competent in armor and mechanized tactics, at least through the battalion level, because when you go to the CENTCOM area of responsibility, that's how our counterpart coalition allies are equipped. In SOUTHCOM, the typical unit might be light infantry, but our typical counterpart unit is a tank or mechanized-infantry battalion. It's not sufficient for our guys to go to the light leader's course at Fort Benning; they have to attend armor and mechanized courses so they're competent in those tactics and in the equipment. We have to be competent to fall in on a counterpart brigade, and we have to understand their requirements and capabilities for indirect fire, air defense and engineer countermobility/mobility. We have to be able to get that competency down to the lowest possible level. There's a tremendous time and money requirement to make every operational attachment competent in all those skills, but that is the goal. Our soldiers are more mature and very smart, and they bring a lot of skills when they come to SF. If a guy has been a platoon leader in the 24th Mech, he automatically becomes one of the subject-matter experts in 5th SF Group on anti-armor operations, and the entire group takes advantage of his skills.

SW: *How well-suited are conventional forces to conduct coalition warfare*?
Brownlee: I would say that their role is more logically *combined* warfare, that's where they've been working with the NATO allies. You can get a brigade from the 82nd to a British division and they could operate on the battlefield, but they're conducting combined operations. What could a brigade or a battalion from the 82nd contribute to a battalion in the Kuwaiti army? The Kuwaiti army doesn't have the capability to operate with them in a combined fashion. Could a battalion in the 82nd fall in on a brigade in the Kuwaiti army and make them a competent fighting brigade able to conduct a combined operation? In theory, I would say yes, but is that their primary mission and their role? I would argue that that's not a good utilization for the 82nd — their job is to be prepared to fight, not to train. They have to be personally trained to do their job. It's not their job to transpose that capability to another element. I would say the same thing for the Marine Corps; it needs to be able to operate in a combined fashion, not train other people to operate as it does.

We've got the senior, mature, experienced NCOs and officers who have the interpersonal skills and the negotiation capabilities. We cultivate those skills, we train our guys to be able to make that coalition unit capable of conducting an operation. I don't believe the conventional forces would want to spend the resources, because everything they would have to do to support a coalition would detract from their capability to operate. I don't believe they would have the staying power, I don't believe they have the maturity and the experience and the interpersonal skills to be successful in providing support for a coalition. They have the job to participate in a coalition, but not to provide support to the coalition, and I think that's the difference between the conventional Army and the Marine Corps and Army special-operations forces.

SW: *Coalition warfare is now seen as a collateral activity for SF. Should we place more emphasis on it as a full-fledged mission*?
Brownlee: I would say that it is perfectly appropriate for the 5th SF Group to place more emphasis on it as a collateral activity, because the way we operate in the CENTCOM AOR and the way CENTCOM operates, it is the most likely activity we will be asked to conduct in support of the CINC, USCENTCOM. We need to emphasize the areas that will enable us to provide better support in a coalition, because that is the most likely collateral activity under the FID umbrella that we will be asked to do. That's become very evident, and that's why we put tremendous emphasis on it in the 5th Group. We look at the full FID spectrum, from the perspective of how our training in mission-essential tasks enhances our capability to conduct support to a coalition. That's

where we put our emphasis. So it's something we need to identify, not as a full-fledged mission, but as the most likely collateral activity we will be asked to do in the CENTCOM AOR.

SW: *How do you identify these areas and plan for your requirements*?
Brownlee: We analyze the potential coalition counterparts for their equipment and missions, then we orient individual companies and teams on specific brigades and specific armies, down to the point that we identify what kind of tanks they have, what kind of tracks they have, what their combat-service support is, what their air-defense capabilities are, what their engineering assets are. Each team, then, in its mission-area analysis and its area study, emphasizes its ability to provide coalition support to a unit that's configured like that. If they have M-60A3s, T-62s or AMX-10 French tanks, our guys oriented toward that brigade will learn about that tank, will study the preventive maintenance checks and services, the gunnery and how it's used.

SW: *How does coalition warfare differ from FID*?
Brownlee: We've had a lot of theoretical discussions in the 5th Group about coalition warfare, and personally, I am much more comfortable calling it "support to a coalition." When you say "coalition warfare," that's limiting, but when you say "support to a coalition," that allows you to do many things. That allows you to do what we did with Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it allows you to do what we did in Somalia, it allows you to conduct joint exercises with other coalition allies in support of U.S. operational war plans. It's transparent to the people you're working with, but everything you're doing while you're exercising with them is enhancing their ability. You're supporting the coalition by enhancing their capabilities, and getting to know their capabilities and limitations by conducting assessments. That all supports coalition activities in the future. If we had to go to war in country X tomorrow as part of a coalition force, and the U.S. had conducted a joint readiness exercise with these countries, we would already be able to say, "Here's what you can expect to find on the ground, here are the capabilities and limitations, here's how they can best be integrated," and that's what we do on a continuous basis. Foreign internal defense

"If we are going to do anything in the CENTCOM AOR, it is going to be conducted under the aegis of a coalition. It's a proven commodity."

is when we help them help themselves. When we go to Jordan and do a joint readiness exercise under the FID umbrella, we're helping the Jordanians become a better army. When we do coalition warfare, we are helping them help us. By helping them, by increasing their capabilities, by making them a better player in the U.S. coalition, we help us. The U.S. has a national objective, and to the extent we can make those guys better, they help us achieve it. That's the only distinction that I will make between FID and support-to-coalition activities.

SW: *Do you expect to see more emphasis on support to coalitions in the future*?
Brownlee: In the CENTCOM AOR, it's absolutely essential. There are no forward-deployed forces in CENTCOM. If the national command authorities decide to participate in an operation, i.e., Somalia, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, if we are going to do anything in the CENTCOM AOR, it is going to be conducted under the aegis of a coalition. Only in the most extreme circumstances, none of which I can even envision, would there be unilateral U.S. operations in the CENTCOM AOR. Anything that we do over there is going to be part of a coalition. It's a proven commodity, it's been successful, and our allies there are comfortable operating with the United States in a coalition. It allows them the breathing space and the legitimacy to be an equal participating partner, rather than a subordinate element to a U.S. operation. Saudi Arabia and the other coalition allies were willing to liberate Kuwait as part of a coalition; they would not have been willing to as subordinate military elements of a U.S. operation. It will be the primary collateral activity for us in the future. We consider that to be completely complementary to FID, the primary mission which we've been given by the ASOC. It's not a new mission, it's not something that requires us to reinvent the wheel. We are already doing it, have been doing it, and will continue to do it.

Fire-Support Planning at the ODA Level

by Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert

Having completed a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center and a recent battalion-level OCONUS exercise, and having had the opportunity to isolate active- and reserve-component Special Forces detachments from four SF groups and SEAL elements for direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions, I am not convinced that we are doing our job teaching subordinate leaders that fire support is an essential element of combat power.

If recent contingency operations are any guide to the potential modern battlefield, it is likely that SF will be operating in the proximity of friendly light or heavy forces. Our soldiers can be brought on-board to plan for this significant battlefield operating system if we, as leaders, do a few simple things:

- Define fire support.
- Teach fire-support planning and coordination.
- Demand overlays.
- Use the special operations command-and-control element, the SOCCE.
- Ensure that the joint task force is informed.

Define fire support. Fire support includes mortars, field artillery, naval gunfire, Army or SOF aviation, and air-delivered weapons, as well as non-lethal electronic warfare, illumination or smoke. Failure to recognize all the fire-support systems that can affect ODA operations may leave our units less than adequately concerned about planning communications, targets or control measures.

Teach fire-support planning and coordination. Officer-professional-development and NCO-professional-development classes addressing the battlefield coordination element, or BCE, at echelons above corps and the fire-support element, the FSE, at corps, division, brigade and battalion will make it apparent to our soldiers that air support, field artillery, naval gunfire, aviation and even air defense artillery (if used as fire support) are effectively synchronized and managed — and that ODA requirements will be considered in the system.

Demand overlays. ODAs in isolation should be required to provide fire-support overlays complete with proposed restrictive measures. These restrictive fire-control measures could protect ODA mission-support sites, selected portions of operational areas, and routes and corridors. Overlays should also provide proposed targets in case fire support becomes available. The ODA should also brief its annotated overlay to the area specialist team, including the proposed communication plan and overall concept for fire support. This will establish a starting point, and the forward operational base or SOCCE can provide coordinating information if the ODA falls within range of fire-support systems.

Use the SOCCE. Since SF units have no fire-support officers, the SOCCE is the best way to enter the fire-support system. On Solid Shield '88, ODA no-fire areas received acknowledgment at the CINCLANT level when data was provided to the XVIII Airborne Corps FSE by the 7th SF Group's SOCCE. If no SOCCE is available, the air component of the joint special-operations task force may have to fill the bill. Early coordination between the Army special-operations task force and joint fire planners should align the effort.

Ensure the JTF Is informed. It is imperative that our planners ensure proper fire-support visibility. Unless a unique command-and-control arrangement exists, the only complete coordination level in our most likely scenario is the joint task force BCE or FSE. Most delicate could be the coordination of fires for compartmented operations. They must be planned and carefully coordinated at the JTF level within the guidance issued by the JSOTF. To coordinate fires only within the SOF community could be a fatal mistake.

The existing fire-support system works, it is responsive, and it is manned by fire-support coordinators trained to provide flexibility and to anticipate future contingencies. Our charter should be to train our detachments to tap into the system and fully put this essential element of combat power into the Special Forces arsenal. ✂

Lt. Col. Geoffrey C. Lambert is currently attending the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. His previous assignments include duty as the deputy commander, 7th Special Forces Group and commander, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SMA required for promotion to sergeant major

The Special Operations Proponency Office reminds soldiers that effective Oct. 1, 1993, promotion to sergeant major will be restricted to graduates of the Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. The SMA currently conducts two classes per year, beginning in January and July, whose average size is 450 students. In March, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved a recommendation to conduct one nine-month class per year beginning in August 1995. Average size of the nine-month class is projected to be 700 students. Soldiers are chosen to attend the SMA by an annual Army selection board. Others may qualify for a nonresident SMA course to be taken by correspondence. Qualifications for nonresident training are outlined in an annual MILPO message normally released in August or September. For more information contact SFC R.B. Gardner, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-9002, commercial (919) 432-9002.

SF NCOs may apply for 18D cross-training

Since the establishment of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch in 1983, the Branch has been trying to fill the force, recruiting more than 2,500 soldiers each year until 1993, according to Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie of the Special Operations Proponency Office. With the exception of 18D, medical NCO, which is currently at 80 percent, the fill has been accomplished, with MOSs 18B, weapons NCO; 18C, engineer NCO; and 18E, communications NCO; currently at more than 100 percent. Soldiers in these MOSs in grades of sergeant and staff sergeant may currently apply for cross-training into 18D by submitting a DA Form 4187 through normal channels. The current waiting period for 18D training is approximately seven months, and the next available class will begin Nov. 24, 1993. For more information, contact Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie at DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002, or Donna Wheeler in the Special Forces Recruiting Office, DSN 239-1818, commercial (919) 432-1818.

Credit for 38A MOS switch ends soon

Time is running out for soldiers wishing to change their military occupational specialty to 38A (Civil Affairs) by completing the two-week Civil Affairs Operations Course. After September, the CAOC cannot be applied toward an MOS change to 38A, said MSgt. Michael J. Rupert of the Special Operations Proponency Office. Currently, soldiers working in a 38A position who have completed the CAOC and meet the specifications listed in AR 611-201 are eligible to change their MOS to 38A. Soldiers who want credit for the CAOC in order to change MOSs need to submit their packets to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, deputy chief of staff for personnel office, this year, Rupert added. For more information contact MSgt. Michael J. Rupert, DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Warrants accessed up to 12 years

Current Army policy calls for the accession of warrant officers from enlisted soldiers with 5-8 years of active federal service. Proponents of the various branches have the authority to vary this service requirement, up to 12 years. According to CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll of the Special Operations Proponency Office, Special Forces is currently accessing soldiers with more than 12 years in order to fill its warrant-officer vacancies, but this may become more difficult as SF nears its goals. For more information, contact CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll at DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002.

Board selects RC officers to return to active duty

A PERSCOM selection board convened Mar. 31, 1993 to select reserve-component captains and first lieutenants to be returned to active duty in Branch 18, Special Forces, and Functional Area 39C, Civil Affairs. According to Maj. Ron Fiegle of the Special Operations Proponency Office, the board selected officers who were fully qualified and able to compete for promotion and retention with their active-component counterparts, to fill critical shortages within the personnel inventory. Selection was based on the quality of the individual's file, advanced-course completion, language capability, experience and demonstrated potential. Officers selected will incur a four-year obligation. During their third year on active duty, they will be eligible to compete for voluntary indefinite or conditional voluntary indefinite status. Selected FA 39C officers will be accessed in their basic branch but will single track as FA 39. The first of these officers should be returning to active status before the end of fiscal-year 1993.

Experience earns credit for FA 39 courses

Increasing numbers of officers are getting credit for Functional Area 39 courses because of their experiences. Records of the Special Operations Proponency Office reveal that about half of the officers requesting constructive credit for the Regional Studies Course, the Psychological Operations Course and the Civil Affairs Course qualify, according to Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager. Multiple deployments of significant duration to various areas in the same geographic region will earn constructive credit for the Regional Studies Course if officers had the opportunity to learn of the culture, religion, government, economics and military aspects during those deployments. Constructive credit for PSYOP or CA courses requires extensive PSYOP or CA experience. That experience must have been for a significant amount of time and at a level where the training parallels the curriculum of the courses. A review of all FA 39 officer records indicated that many officers would probably receive constructive credit for the PSYOP Officer Course or the Civil Affairs Course; fewer officers would qualify for the Regional Studies Course. Officers interested in applying for constructive credit should contact Jeanne Schiller, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (919) 432-6406/9002.

Foreign SOF

Colombian cocaine in Russia

In what was characterized as "Humanitarian Assistance: Colombian Style," Russian security officials reported the Feb. 16, 1993, seizure of 1,092 kilograms (1.4 short tons) of cocaine in the city of Vyborg. Concealed in cans labeled "Meat with Potatoes," it had been shipped from Colombia via Finland to Vyborg, a port city about 70 miles northwest of St. Petersburg, the shipment's destination. It would have subsequently been sent on to European markets. The largest-ever cocaine seizure in Russia, it marks the growing involvement of international drug traffickers in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. According to the Russian Ministry of Security, or MB, Russia is "on the eve of a massive offensive by the drug business." In a statement reminiscent of Soviet days, the deputy chief of the MB's Directorate for Countering Smuggling and Corruption added that he could not rule out the possibility that foreign intelligence services were aiding the drug deliveries, though he noted that he had no reliable information to that effect. Russia has also become a frequent transhipment or target area for illegal narcotics from the former Soviet Central Asian republics, the Caucasus, Southwest Asia and other regions. Indigenously-produced synthetic narcotics have also become a substantial problem, with some 70 illegal drug laboratories seized in Russia during 1992. This growing drug-trafficking problem, sometimes linked with arms trafficking and ethno-national conflict, will clearly shape the organization and activities of law-enforcement and security forces in Russia and neighboring states and has the potential of involving military resources as well.

Russian border troops on Tajik-Afghan frontier

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, KGB Border Troops played a central role in border-security operations along the Soviet-Afghan border. During the war, according to Soviet statistics, 515 Border Troops were killed and another 3,000 injured. Prominent among the border units were special-operations forces termed "Assault-Landing Motorized-Maneuver Groups," which conducted heliborne strikes, raids and interdiction actions in defense of the frontier and against mujahedin targets 100 kilometers deep into Afghanistan. Today, in accord with a two-year agreement between Russia and the now-independent state of Tajikistan concluded in 1992, Russian Border Troops under the Russian Ministry of Security are stationed along the 2,000-kilometer border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. By all accounts, the border is at least as active as it was during the war years, with Border Troops engaging in numerous firefights against narcotics and arms traffickers and with armed Islamic groups affiliated with factions in the Tajik civil war. Tajik fighters opposing the government are thought by the Russians to undergo guerrilla training in Afghan camps run by the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Following their training, they cross back into Tajikistan, one of a number of factors that fuels Russia's concerns about Islamic extremism along the southern borders. Some 30 armed clashes with illegal crossers had occurred during the first two months of 1993. As of March 1993, Russian border guards were deployed on territory controlled both by the Tajik government and opposition forces, as well as facing hostile armed groups of various types in Afghanistan. Given recent historical prece-

dent from the war in Afghanistan, and Russia's forcefully stated security interests in the region, the special-operations dimensions of Russian efforts to deal with a dangerous border and the threat of extremist-inspired instability may be particularly instructive in the months ahead.

Terrorism, ethnic conflict threaten stability of eastern Europe

The proliferation of terrorist groups associated with ethno-national conflict in Eastern Europe is directly threatening the stability and development of fragile new states and institutions in the area. Virtually every ethno-national "flashpoint" in the region — of which the former Yugoslavia is the most notable at present — has spawned terrorism and terrorist groups, with growing emigré and refugee populations creating potential support bases for alienated groups using violence as a means to their goals. As with terrorist groups generally, the agenda, size, location and activity level of groups in Eastern Europe are far from precise. A few examples of groups appearing over the last two years illustrate the nature of the problem. Amidst growing conflict in Yugoslavia in 1991, a Pan-Serbian "Chetnik" faction threatened the destruction the Krsko nuclear power plant owned jointly by Croatia and Slovenia, the kind of threatened action that has continued to generate concerns in the region. In the fall of 1992, a Belgrade newspaper reported a smuggling network trying to bring "uranium" into Yugoslav conflict zones, and speculated about linkages to Soviet nuclear warheads rumored to have disappeared. While such rumors seem highly unlikely and often even absurd, the fact that the theft and diversion of nuclear fuels and materials of various types is under way is beyond dispute. In the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, which at the start of 1993 became separate Czech and Slovak states, a 1990 text attributed to the "Slovak Republican Army" — an extremist right-wing organization that identifies its enemies as Hungarians, Czechs, Jews and renegade Slovaks — noted its contacts with the "Irish Republican Army, *Vatra Romanescu* in Romania, Poland's 13 December Independence Group, (and) the PLO." The organization declared its intention to create an apocalypse in central and southeastern Europe through the destruction of nuclear power plants, petroleum and gas pipelines and other facilities, if the "Slovak nation is threatened with extinction." While the division of Czechoslovakia took place peacefully, the potential for this kind of activity remains a concern to security establishments in the region. In Bulgaria, the proliferation of small terrorist groups include the "Resistance National Revolutionary Committee," "Political Rights," "Eagle," "Future Innovation," the "Secret Revolutionary Committee," "Reality," "Warriors of Islam," "Red Pirates," and the "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization," which has the apparent goal of creating a Macedonian state out of Macedonian-populated areas of Bulgaria and the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. The "16 September Commando" in Hungary illustrates the ethnic dimension of terrorism. Claiming a membership of several hundred, the group has promised to murder Slovak law-enforcement officials involved in a so-called anti-Hungarian pogrom in Bratislava in 1992 stemming from a soccer match. Overall, these and other appearing, disappearing and changing terrorist groups in Eastern Europe seem likely to threaten stability in the region. This post-Cold War development has implications for foreign nations and forces providing peacemaking, peacekeeping and security-assistance support to East European states, since these groups have the clear potential for generating terrorist actions locally and abroad.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Scott takes command of USASOC

Maj. Gen. James T. Scott took command of the Army Special Operations Command during ceremonies at Fort Bragg May 20.

Scott, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division since July 1991, replaced Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, now commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Fla.

Scott has formerly served as commander of Special Operations Command - Europe; commander of the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division; and as commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry.

Reserve linguist unit seeks members

The 1st U.S. Army Reserve Linguist Unit is recruiting soldiers who wish to practice their language skills and improve their proficiency.

The unit is a non-pay, reinforcement training unit whose soldiers drill for retirement points. Its recent realignment with the Army special-operations community opens new opportunities to perform duties with Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces units both during training and on actual operations.

The unit headquarters in Washington, D.C., monitors the activities of all its soldiers in CONUS and OCONUS. Subordinate detachments are currently located in San Diego, Calif.; Houston, Texas; Tampa, Fla.; Chicago, Ill.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; New York City and Charlottesville, Va.

Membership is open to all language-qualified soldiers of the Army Reserve and National Guard regardless of rank or MOS. For more information, soldiers should write: 1st USAR Linguist Unit; Attn: A/S-1 (Recruiting); 6601 Baltimore Ave.; Riverdale, MD 20737-1025.

New handbook covers terminal-guidance operations

The Special Warfare Center and School will soon release a new handbook for use by special-operations forces in planning terminal-guidance operations.

Intended primarily for Army SOF, the *Terminal Guidance Handbook* addresses joint operations, covering the operational concept of TGO and giving guidance and checklists for staff planning and coordination. Terminal guidance is a joint direct-action mission — SOF ground forces provide assistance in locating targets to be destroyed by aircraft, missiles, ships or artillery elements.

"The handbook is not designed to provide new doctrine," said Maj. R.L. Snyder, chief of the SWCS Doctrine Development Division. "We have reviewed existing doctrine and procedures and consolidated the information into what we feel is an easily read quick reference."

The handbook describes TGO procedures and provides definitions and checklists for planning. Reference guides allow users to ensure communications compatibility.

For more information on the handbook, contact Maj. R.L. Snyder, DSN 239-5393/8689, commercial (919) 432-5393/8689.

USACAPOC gets new commander

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell took command of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command during ceremonies on Fort Bragg's Sicily Drop Zone May 2.

Campbell, a superior court judge for the state of New Jersey and former commander of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Bronx, N.Y., took command from Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau, who retired from the active reserve component.

USACAPOC is the headquarters for all Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units and consists of 11 separate commands. Approximately 83 percent of its 10,000 soldiers are Army reservists. Two of its units, the 4th PSYOP Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, are active-component and based at Fort Bragg. Its reserve elements are located in 29 states.

New free-fall manual available for issue

FM 31-19, *Military Free-Fall Parachuting Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, is complete and is being issued to field units.

The new manual supersedes TC 31-19, dated Sept. 9, 1988. Units which have established publications accounts should receive the new free-fall manual automatically. Those who do not should check to see if they have established a need for the manual as detailed in DA Pamphlet 310-10, *The Standard Publication System Users Guide.*

National Guard SF unit looking for members

The 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group is currently recruiting soldiers to serve in the unit.

The battalion, assigned to the Florida National Guard, has a number of openings for personnel, including HALO and scuba slots. Soldiers

with an 18-series military occupational specialty or who are willing to volunteer for SF training should contact Capt. John Wright at (904) 533-3550 or Capt. Rick Jones at (904) 533-3419.

Analysis identifies critical PSYOP tasks

An ongoing analysis of critical tasks for PSYOP units will have far-reaching effects on PSYOP doctrine, training and personnel in the future.

The Analysis Branch of the Individual Training Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine began conducting the PSYOP front-end analysis in the second quarter of FY 93 to identify critical collective tasks for PSYOP units, from the group to the team level. The analysis will conclude with the PSYOP Critical Task Selection Board, scheduled for August 1993. Results of the analysis will affect PSYOP doctrine, instruction and training materials, and will serve as a basis for further analysis of individual positions within the PSYOP career-management field.

SOF veterans dedicate memorial stones

Two groups of SOF veterans have recently dedicated memorials to their fallen comrades in the JFK Memorial Plaza at Fort Bragg.

On May 31, members of the Special Forces Association joined soldiers of the 3rd and 7th SF Groups to dedicate a stone to the memory of 606 SF soldiers killed in action and 126 missing in action since 1952. Lt. Gen. James T. Scott, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, challenged his listeners to preserve the memory of those soldiers honored by the stone. "To us, they're more than just a name on a white cross or a memorial stone in a cemetery somewhere," he said.

Veterans of World War II's 1st Special Service Force joined with modern Special Forces soldiers to dedicate a stone in memory of their unit at the Plaza April 2.

Twenty former members of the 1st SSF and soldiers from the 3rd and 7th Special Forces Groups unveiled the stone, dedicated to the unit from which modern Special Forces units trace their lineage.

"There are great similarities between us and those young soldiers out there today," said retired Col. Robert S. Moore, a 1st SSF veteran. "You can see it in their spirit, attitude and confidence. Their dedication is equal to that exhibited by the 1st Special Service Force."

Photo by Keith Butler

1st SSF veterans dedicate memorial stone.

Activated July 9, 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, near Helena, Mont., the combined U.S.-Canadian force of 173 officers and 2,194 enlisted men was formed to conduct hit-and-run raids against German garrisons in Norway and Romania.

Before its training was finished, the unit's original mission was canceled, but its leader, Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick, found new missions. During the Anzio operation, the unit earned the name, "The Devil's Brigade," but its reputation was forged in the taking of Monte La Difensa, a strategic 3,210-foot mountaintop in southern Italy.

On the night of Dec. 3, 1943, 600 men of the 1st SSF's 2nd Regiment climbed the mountain"s 1,000-foot cliffs to approach German defenses from the rear. Under heavy fire, the Americans attacked and fought hand-to-hand to overrun enemy positions. Within hours the 1st SSF secured a victory that Allied generals had estimated would take six days.

The 1st SSF went on to fight near Rome and in southern France. It was inactivated Dec. 5, 1944 near Menton, France. — *Linda Thompson, USASOC PAO*

Roach new commander of 7th SF Group

Col. James S. Roach assumed command of the 7th Special Forces Group in a Fort Bragg ceremony June 8.

Roach, 46, replaced Col. James G. Pulley, now chief of staff for the Army Special Forces Command.

Roach's previous assignments include SF detachment, company and battalion command. He served two tours in Vietnam, was an adviser in El Salvador, and most recently was Director of Training and Doctrine at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

MILES brackets available for foreign weapons

In the May 1993 issue of *Special Warfare*, the article, "Using MILES on Foreign Weapons," described a procedure for adapting the M-16 mounting bracket of the MILES transmitter to an FN FAL rifle.

According to Gene McCarthy of the Collective Training Instrumentation and Engagement Systems Directorate, Combined Arms Command Training at Fort Eustis, Va., MILES mounting brackets for a variety of foreign weapons have already been developed and are available through his directorate or local training and audiovisual support centers. For further information, contact Gene McCarthy, DSN 927-3313/4589, commercial (804) 878-3313/4589.

Book Reviews

Terrorism, Politics and Law. *By Antonio Cassese. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-691-07838-6. 162 pages.*

This compact book by a noted Italian jurist, diplomat and author explores, with clarity and brevity, the impact of terrorism on international law.

The hijacking of the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* provides the author's focal point. He skillfully explains the facts of the hijacking, the precepts of international law applicable to the incident, and the impact of domestic political considerations on the election by those nations involved to respond either with diplomatic initiatives or with armed force.

Cassese begins his book with an overall discussion of terrorism and its effect on international relations. In subsequent chapters, he reviews the details of the *Achille Lauro* incident. Finally, he presents his view of the lessons to be learned from the *Achille Lauro* affair. The actions of all the participants, governmental (the U.S., Italy and Egypt) and quasi-governmental (the PLO and its offshoot, the PLF) are closely scrutinized for compliance with existing standards of international law. There is an abundance of criticism for everyone involved.

Cassese has little use for terrorists and no sympathy for their methods. He does look beyond their criminal acts, however, to the root causes of their aberrant behavior. Although not an advocate of "peace at any price," Cassese favors the diplomatic response. He levels scathing criticism against the U.S. government for its refusal to cooperate with the Italian government's diplomatic initiatives. He condemns the American government's insistence from the very outset of the crisis that it would use a special-operations force deployed immediately to the area even as the Italians were achieving success through their diplomatic initiatives.

He is almost as harsh on the



Egyptians for their duplicity in covering up the death of Leon Klinghoffer during negotiations with the hijackers and offers an explanation for their behavior. He also expresses disappointment at the Egyptian government's failure to comply with a treaty obligation to the United States to extradite the hijackers here for trial. He views this violation as provoking the subsequent diversion by U.S. Navy warplanes of the Egyptian airliner as it carried the hijackers over the Mediterranean — the scene, only days earlier, of their murderous activities.

Although Cassese is generally sympathetic to the approach taken by the Italian government, he similarly condemns its decision not to honor the U.S. government's request to extradite the terrorist Abul Abbas. He explains the lenient treaty-standard for extradition (adopted earlier, ironically, at the urging of the Italian government, which desired to facilitate the extradition from the United States of criminals wanted for offenses in Italy) and how the Italian municipal court's misapplication of stricter standards, resulting in the escape from justice of the principal architect of the hijacking, was probably the result of domestic political considerations.

The author thoroughly researched the material available to him. His review of the court transcripts from the trials and appeals of the hijackers and his use of other sources provides the reader with many interesting facts. He provides some insightful speculation on Abul Abbas' purpose in ordering the hijacking, as well.

The author's stated purpose in writing this book is to demystify international law for the layman. He cites the influential legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel, who wrote in 1758 that, "International law is the law of sovereigns. It is written mainly for them, and for their ministers. In truth, it should interest all men and, in a free Nation, its precepts should be the study of all its citizens."

Cassese feels that international law should not be, and no longer is, solely the province of "sovereigns." He believes that informed and thoughtful citizen action is the best hope for eliminating the problem of terrorism. His interesting and thought-provoking book should be

of particular interest to policy makers and, equally, to those who implement these policies, especially in the area of special operations.

Maj. Neil R. Porter Jr.
Deputy Staff Judge Advocate
USACAPOC
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Clandestine Warfare: Weapons and Equipment of the SOE and OSS. *By James D. Ladd, Keith Melton and Peter Mason. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1988. ISBN: 0-7137-1822-6. 159 pages. $24.95.*

In 1942, William "Wild Bill" Donovan, the director of the Office of Strategic Services, appointed Stanley P. Lovell, a chemist then serving with the Office of Scientific Research and Development's Division 19, as chief of the OSS Research and Development Branch. "I need every subtle device and every underhanded trick to use against the Germans and the Japanese — by our own people — but especially by the underground resistance groups in all occupied countries," he said. "You will have to invent all of them, Lovell, because you're going to be my man."

Stanley Lovell rarely disappointed (Donovan later referred to Lovell as his Professor Moriarty). But he did not invent all the special weapons and devices associated with OSS. Lovell brought some over to OSS R&D from Division 19. The British developed others for their Special Operations Executive, then passed them on to their American allies. The Yanks' abundant funding of military research and development occasionally improved upon these weapons, and the American capacity for mass production made it possible to turn them out in vast numbers.

Among the many special weapons and devices developed, adapted or considered for use by the OSS were Black Joe, an explosive coal that could blow away an enemy blast furnace or steam engine; the Big Joe 6, an OSS crossbow that fired an arrow at the rate of 200 feet per second; the OSS Stinger, a single-shot pistol small enough to conceal in a man's hand; the Lockpicking Knife, an OSS device that would pry open both bolt locks and cylinder locks; and Aunt Jemima, an explosive powder with the appearance and consistency of flour that could be kneaded into dough, baked into bread and then used to destroy an enemy bridge. The OSS had K-tablets to knock out a man, and General Donovan himself sometimes carried the deadly L-tablet, a gelatin capsule coated with rubber



and filled with potassium cyanide, to ensure that he would not be captured alive. *Clandestine Warfare* discusses these and other fearful instruments of subversive warfare in some detail.

To date, it seems that research in the records of the Office of Strategic Services has discovered little or no evidence to show that most of the OSS weapons and devices discussed in *Clandestine Warfare* were ever actually employed in combat or special operations. A few, like the OSS Matchbox Camera and the OSS Silenced Pistol, were widely used. Triggering, demolition and incendiary devices developed by SOE and adopted and modified by OSS also proved highly effective in OSS operations.

Some OSS special weapons did more to inspire confidence and strengthen morale than to affect operations. The OSS Stiletto, an adaptation of the Fairbairn Knife, was issued to most OSS personnel serving overseas, and possession of this weapon is still a point of pride among OSS veterans. In practice, it left much to be desired. Its sheath was awkward, and its razor-sharp edge and needle point made the Stiletto much too brittle and fragile.

James Ladd, who has written well concerning subversive warfare; Keith Melton, the owner of an outstanding collection of OSS and SOE weapons and equipment; and Capt. Peter Mason, who served with the British Special Air Service and the British commandos during World War II, have combined their considerable talents and resources to compose an exciting and interesting book. It is well-illustrated and carefully indexed. It is undocumented, however, and understandably, the authors have not avoided some mistakes in writing about a subject so complex. Certainly *Clandestine Warfare* is not the last word on special weapons and devices. Still, it makes a good read in an endlessly fascinating field of research. Those interested in unorthodox warfare and the weapons and equipment developed for special operations will want to add this book to their library.

Lawrence H. McDonald
National Archives
Washington, D.C.

Special Warfare

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