Special Warfare

QUALITY PEOPLE

From the Commandant

As the new commandant and commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, I am honored to command an organization that trains approximately 10,000 students per year in more than 60 different courses. As we develop doctrine, training, leader development and proponency for Army special-operations forces, we are building the force of the future today.

Because future warfare will demand that we fight as part of a team, SWCS is also involved in major events that will determine how the future Army will operate. The Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting Army After Next, a series of war games that simulate the challenges the Army will face during the years 2020 to 2025. During the FY 1998 war games, conducted in April at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., SWCS furnished players to portray the ARSOF perspectives.

In preparation for the AAN, SWCS conducted an ARSOF war game in February. The war game incorporated players from non-government agencies and from government agencies such as the Department of State.

To identify current critical battlefield deficiencies, the Army relies on focused rotations at the combined training centers. The most recent rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La., featured the first-ever deployment of an entire Special Forces group. The 7th SF Group set up its headquarters at Fort Polk and established an SF operational base, an intermediate staging base, and forward operating bases at different locations inside and outside CONUS. A team from SWCS traveled to the various locations to collect lessons learned.

This rotation also marked the beginning of a SOF advanced war-fighting experiment that will assess the concept of a layered headquarters, determine the augmentation requirements of the SFOB, determine requirements for the development of future maneuver-control systems, and identify the implications of emerging operational techniques.

ARSOF representation continues to increase in Prairie Warrior, the end-of-course exercise conducted by students in the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The Army Special Operations Command and SWCS now provide ARSOF officer and NCO participants to the exercise to ensure that it correctly incorporates SOF's numerous roles and missions.

War games and exercises allow us to stay attuned to the Army's future requirements, and they give us an opportunity to interact with other members of the Army team and to demonstrate capabilities that SOF can bring to a variety of operations. SOF are and will be the "global scouts" for our theater CINCs.

As we plan for the future, our challenges are numerous, but the following are paramount: To glimpse the future and develop a feasible plan; to perceive current problems and gain insight into future requirements and structure; to make necessary changes without nostalgia, grief or sense of loss; to be patient with transitions; to check our vision and adjust it as necessary; to make a commitment; and to learn from history.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

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Quality People: Selecting and Developing Members of U.S. SOF

by General Henry H. Shelton

U.S. special operations forces, or SOF, have a long and proud history of serving America in peace and in war. SOF are made up of versatile and adaptable small teams that are composed of mature, highly skilled volunteers who conduct operations ranging from surgically precise military attacks to humanitarian assistance. SOF's mission effectiveness is derived in large part from the qualities of SOF personnel — individuals of character, trained for the nation's tough missions, and imbued with unique skills, flexibility, adaptability and a capacity for independent action.

Importance of quality

SOF are globally engaged in support of taskings from the National Command Authorities, the geographic commanders in chief, or CINCs, and our American ambassadors. Forward-based and rotationally deployed SOF — with their regional focus, peacetime-engagement role, and ability to transition quickly to war-fighting — provide unique military capabilities, an array of expanded options for decision-makers, and strategic economy of force. Consequently, SOF have become the CINCs' force of choice and usually represent the "First Force," or the first application of the mili-

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This article was written while General Shelton was commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command . — Editor

tary in support of U.S. policy objectives.

During Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, SOF units were poised to attack key targets in Port-au-Prince and then expand operations throughout Haiti. These soldiers, sailors and airmen were psychologically and physically prepared for combat. However, the imminent threat of military force, in support of diplomatic efforts, convinced the Haitian regime to accept U.S. forces in a spirit of "cooperation and coordination." This change occurred just hours before the planned intervention — with SOF units already en route on aircraft and ships. SOF units reacted quickly, transitioning from a combat role to a peacekeeping role with no loss of momentum.

Such a rapid adjustment requires an individual of character — someone who is tough enough to close with and destroy the enemy, and yet someone who, on a moment's notice, is disciplined and adaptable enough to provide care for noncombatants. While rigorous training and technologically superior equipment are essential to success, so is the recruitment of potential SOF operators. Individuals who are recruited for SOF must have not only a war-fighting ethos, but also a genuine respect for human dignity.

Ultimately, our SOF operators are defined by their character. But values come first. Values form the bedrock for a character of excellence. The values required by SOF — honor, courage, selfless service, integrity,

Navy SEALs exit an MH-53J Pave Low helicopter during training in Norway. Rigorous training, sophisticated equipment and quality personnel are critical to SOF.

Photo by Dave Nolan

loyalty, duty and respect — reflect and build upon traditional American values.

It is important to understand that these basic values have a subtle but far-reaching effect on all SOF operations. SOF will often have to operate in ambiguous situations in which the good guys and the bad guys may differ only marginally, and in which neither friend nor foe will have read our Bill of Rights or follow accepted rules of armed conflict. When force is necessary to accomplish a mission, SOF are expected to employ it with precision and proportionality. Like all U.S. military forces, SOF are proscribed from resorting to methods that violate American moral and legal principles. Moreover, as mature military professionals, SOF are attuned to the sanctity of human life, the long-term effects of unnecessary or excessive violence, and the need to bring conflict to a rapid and reasonable conclusion. Therefore, SOF must recruit people who possess special skills and attributes, and who have extraordinary strength of character and will.

Assessment and selection

SOF recruit from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and from the general American population. Certain SOF units — Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force special-tactics teams (combat controllers and pararescuemen), and classified special-mission units — then use a comprehensive assessment-and-selection process to ensure that the right person is finally chosen. Assessment and selection varies by unit and evolves to keep pace with the emerging needs for mission skills. SOF assessment and selection, a combination of art and science, currently averages a 79-percent attrition rate — an expensive yet necessary process to ensure that the right person is selected for a specific job.

Major General D. L. Owen, one of the commanders of the British Long Range Desert Group, or LRDG, in World War II, provided a full description of the ideal candidate:

The primary role of gaining information of what was going on behind enemy lines was one which required men of resource, of initiative, of intelligence and of infinite patience ... men who can suffer the tedium of boredom, the disappointment of failure and not be turned by success; men who can live together pleasantly without getting on each other's nerves as a result of the strain and tension. ... They are not toughs in the accepted sense of the word. But they were

the very ordinary and decent type of man with a high sense of responsibility and duty; with a rather higher than average standard of intelligence and, therefore, a wider range of interests.

Selection for the LRDG was by interview. Today's SOF assessment-and-selection programs are much more rigorous and typically consist of three sequential, overlapping phases: initial screening, structured assessment and selection, and qualification training.

Screening. Screening is conducted to ensure potential candidates can meet the minimum requirements for acceptance into SOF. The overall process begins with an analysis of current and future mission requirements. The next step is to identify the attributes that SOF operators must

In any given week, approximately 4,000-plus SOF operators are deployed to 60-70 countries around the world. The end product of this process is quality people who are experienced, self-reliant warrior-diplomats.

have to perform their missions successfully. SOF trainers then develop, tailor and validate screening tools that can determine whether the individual possesses the critical attributes.

Screening tools include educational requirements, medical examination, swim test, the Defense Language Aptitude Battery test, the General Technical Composite test of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, physical-fitness tests, and spatial-relations tests. These screening tools are used to eliminate unqualified candidates, and they can also determine good candidates by highlighting the hidden potential of otherwise unexceptional individuals. Candidates who meet the initial entry requirements, satisfy a background check, and meet specific psychological prerequisites are then eligible to attend a structured assessment-and-selection course in which they undergo additional screening.

Assessment and selection. Assessment-and-selection courses vary by purpose, duration and intensity among SOF units. Each course is tailored to identify individuals who possess the specific critical attributes desired by the units. All SOF assessment-and-selection courses use a comprehensive battery of physical, psychological and academic tests — in conjunction with demanding performance and situational tests — deliberately to place extreme physical and mental stress on candidates and to eliminate those who cannot meet objective performance standards. Candidates who do not meet standards are returned to their units without prejudice or recrimination.

Each candidate's performance is constantly measured to gain a specific assessment of his potential for selection to a SOF unit. Objective evaluations, as well as subjective feedback from cadre, are used to gauge student progression and motivation. All performance evaluation is directly related to the critical attributes identified in the front-end mission analysis.

Each candidate is also subjected to peer evaluations, which provide reliable and valid assessments of individual characteristics and potential. In fact, peer evaluations are often better predictors of future performance than supervisor assessments are. Peer evaluations can also better assess important personality and interpersonal traits that are difficult to measure, yet are critical to success in special operations.

Along the way, candidates must demonstrate more than just the ability to endure and succeed. Cadre also look for candidates who understand and apply the values desired in a SOF operator. Over time, candidates are expected to internalize fully these values and accept them as their own. Ultimately, they will be expected to lead others through the same process by role-modeling, teaching, counseling, coaching, and building an ethical organizational climate and culture.

Qualification. This phase — lasting many months — includes the Army Special Forces Qualification Course, Navy SEAL Tactical Training, and the Air Force Combat Controller and Pararescue train-

Students in the Special Forces Qualification Course give instruction to members of a mock guerrilla force during the Robin Sage field-training exercise.

File photo

ing pipeline. The qualification phase teaches and develops the skills necessary for an individual SOF operator to function effectively in a forward-deployed SOF unit. Instruction is focused on key mission skills (e.g., small-unit tactics, combat swimming, air traffic control) and extensive technical instruction in a SOF operator's specialty. Additional mission-oriented situational and performance-based tests are used to assess the candidates' ability to perform under stress.

For example, Army Special Forces students conclude their qualification process by participating in "Robin Sage," a 19-day field training exercise that takes place in the fictional country of Pineland. During this exercise, the Special Forces students are required to apply the lessons learned from months of previous training. Students are formed into A-detachments and are then evaluated on their conduct of an unconventional-warfare mission to train, advise and assist a guerrilla force, enabling the guerrillas to begin the process of liberating Pineland from oppression. During Robin Sage, students are also placed in situations in which they are required to demonstrate their leadership, tactical and technical skills, and ability to work in adverse and austere conditions.

Upon assignment to a SOF unit, individuals refine the basic skills learned during the qualification process while assimilating more advanced techniques, tactics and procedures. SOF units also require individuals to develop critical regional expertise — cultural, linguistic and political — through experience gained from multiple deployments to countries in each region. Indeed, in any given week, approximately 4,000-plus SOF operators are deployed to 60-70 countries around the world. The end product of this process is quality people who are experienced, self-reliant warrior-diplomats.

21st-century implications

Recruiting and retaining high-quality people is the key to our future success. The process, however, is becoming increasingly difficult, given the attractiveness of civilian careers in an improving economy, the perceived decline in military benefits, the demanding pace of military operations, and the shrinking pool of service candidates. Nevertheless, we must continue to recruit, assess and select new members

while retaining highly qualified and experienced SOF operators. Our major rival in this process will be corporate America — since everyone wants the best and the brightest. This is especially true, given that the individual SOF operator of the 21st century, just as the civilian worker of the 21st century, will most likely require greater math, computer and language skills.

Increased investment in recruiting is required now to ensure that enough people with sufficient physical, mental and moral strength will be available to meet SOF personnel requirements in the future. We must ascertain which skills will be resident in our recruiting pool and which skills we must develop with our scarce SOF resources.

Moreover, we must refine and focus our recruitment-and-accession practices, finding people who already have certain aptitudes and skills — rather than having to train them. We must also improve our recruiting to take advantage of the full diversity of America.

Concurrently, and perhaps most importantly, we must ensure that our core values are taught, nourished and reinforced in all SOF operators — beginning early in the assessment-and-selection process. We must embrace and accelerate character development — even though we cannot measure, predict, or control it — as the traditional influences of family, church, school and neighborhood will hold far less sway. Character development is not an "add on" subject for our leaders and trainers to teach. Instead, it is an integral part of life in special operations and is expressed as discipline, honesty, respect for others, and accountability.

SOF assessment and selection has clearly produced extraordinary results — SOF operators with the character, skills and drive to accomplish difficult missions in a complex, dynamic environment. The impact and the contributions made by SOF operators are particularly impressive when we consider that SOF cost less than two percent of DoD's budget and consist of less than two percent of DoD's personnel. Maintaining our investment in quality people ensures that we will continue to have the best special-operations force in the world — a force that is ready, responsive and relevant across the operational continuum and that is equal to the challenges of the 21st century. ✄

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Vital Interests vs. Budget Constraints: Planning the Force Structure of the Future

by Major Adrian Erckenbrack

Throughout the strategic environment, countries and regions are struggling to determine their military, political and cultural relationships with one another. Actual and potential conflicts among these competing states are keeping U.S. military forces actively employed worldwide, intervening where directed to ensure that U.S. interests are protected.

Decisions of where and when to intervene in the future will be exacerbated by the continuing evolution of the strategic landscape, with once-powerful states on the decline and other states ascending to greater levels of power and influence. In its assessment of the varying worldwide threat, the U.S. will have to determine its vital interests and decide what force structure would provide the best support for U.S. policy. The Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, will serve as the means of forming the U.S. military force of the future, based upon the threat and budget constraints. In fact, with the end of the Cold War and with the disappearance of any near-term peer military threat, the process of defining future defense requirements has become problematic.

Conventional wisdom suggests that without a peer military threat, the pressure to balance the budget and to garner a peace dividend will take political precedence over maintaining our military force structure. The administration intends to achieve those two goals through the QDR. The QDR will serve as the mechanism for reducing the active-duty Army force structure by approximately 15,000 personnel.[1] The result will be a smaller active-duty force, engaged throughout the world, performing as many or more missions, and attempting to maintain a level of performance that the nation has come to expect.

Given the diverse commitment facing the Army and the reductions brought about by the QDR, it is crucial that we do four things: explore the nature of the future strategic environment; discuss a framework for determining national interests; evaluate our reliance upon technology as compensation for any force-structure cuts associated with the QDR; and promote the dependence on quality people as a hedge against an uncertain future.

Future environment

The Greek historian Thucydides theorized that people go to war out of fear, interest and honor.[2] Today, these reasons could include fear of the consequences of losing regional or global economic influence, interest in an ideology or a territory that provides an operational or strategic advantage, and honor associated with being a regional or global leader.

The end of the Cold War between Russia and the U.S. signaled the end of one conflict, but it may have heralded the beginning of

another. Ideological loyalties to either communism or democracy have been replaced by ethnic loyalties, creating conflicts like the ones seen in Bosnia and in the Republic of the Congo.[3] The future is likely to hold many more of these types of conflicts. They may be further exacerbated by the mass movement of people from economically depressed states to states less depressed, or by environmental conditions brought on by the depletion of natural resources, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the transfer of weapons technology, resurgent terrorism, and organized crime. All these factors will increase social, political and military tensions, setting the stage for social or political radicalism that may require U.S. intervention.

With an expected rise in the number of conflicts brought on by ethnic and historical animosities, the U.S. is facing many decisions: how to balance domestic and international policy issues; how to maintain our position as the world's leader without attempting to respond to every global crisis that may arise; and how to best apply a dwindling pool of resources when intervention is required. One thing, however, is certain: There is a need for the U.S. to remain engaged politically, economically and militarily in order to reduce the friction that will arise around the globe as other international states either expand or contract in power and influence. To provide effective world leadership and to maintain a superpower status, the U.S. must first determine what its vital interests are.

U.S. vital interests

The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement emphasizes worldwide engagement and enlargement of the community of free-market democracies.[4] The strategy calls for flexible and selective engagement involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment.[5] As the post-Cold War global environment becomes more complex and more unpredictable, the number of military operations needed to support the National Security Strategy continues to grow.

Potential tasks associated with a flexible and selective engagement strategy include overseas presence, humanitarian assistance, evacuation assistance, arms control and counterterrorism.[6] But as missions have

A Blackhawk helicopter from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment flies over burning oil fields in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. Access to resources such as oil could be deemed a vital national interest.

Photo courtesy 160th SOAR

increased, military personnel and budget resources have declined. The U.S. military can expect an ever-expanding demand upon its resources; therefore, we should re-evaluate what constitutes a vital U.S. interest, not only to ensure that there are adequate means available to meet policy requirements, but also to ensure military readiness.

Donald E. Nuechterlein advocates one framework for defining national interests. According to Nuechterlein, four enduring national interests have conditioned the way U.S. policy-makers view the international arena: defense of the homeland, enhancement of the nation's economic well-being, creation of a favorable world order, and promotion of democratic values. Nuechterlein has developed four categories that indicate the intensity of interest: survival, vital, major and peripheral.[7] While this framework may not be all-inclusive, it does serve as a point of embarkation as we attempt to further define situations that may require military intervention.

Few would disagree that defense of the homeland is of vital U.S. interest and ultimately a matter of sovereign survival. As one moves further away from this homeland-defense absolute, however, determining U.S. interests and the requirement to deploy the military becomes more complex and more difficult.

Issues involving the promotion of values are more difficult to place on the scale of vital U.S. interests. When television images evoke public emotion over human suffering that frequently accompanies crisis or conflict, definitions of "vital interests" may become clouded. U.S. vital interests must be rationally determined, even when human emotions fan the flames for action. A framework that provides a mechanism for rational debate and that helps to focus our energies during a crisis would be beneficial.

One criterion for assessing vital interests might be whether the interests are worth the hardship and the risk of life to U.S. military forces. This criterion may be less cogent for our current policy-makers: Only 34 percent of the members of the 103rd Congress are veterans of active military duty.[8] With the passage of time, fewer and fewer of our policy-makers will have served in the armed forces, and policy-makers of the future will have had little personal experience of the hardship and sacrifice associated with dangerous deployments. With this fact in mind, having a framework that will enable policy-makers and senior military officers to determine issues of national interest becomes even more important.

It is not the author's intent to suggest that we establish a framework to be used as a foundation for disengaging the U.S. from the world scene, or for refraining from using the military until a crisis becomes manifest. Instead, the framework would be used as a means of determining national interest; as a forum for political and military leaders to reconcile policy requirements with the military means available to accomplish them; and as a tool for maintaining a degree of continuity in our foreign policy despite changes in presidential administrations. Knowing what constitutes a vital U.S. national interest will be critical as we implement the QDR and as a smaller military attempts to sustain or to increase its missions.

The technology panacea

The QDR is a congressionally mandated study that evaluates force size and structure, readiness, modernization and infrastructure within the framework of budget resources. Under the congressional order contained in the 1997 Defense Authorization Act, DoD re-examined near- and long-term threats to national security and developed a defense plan capable of responding to those threats, within the limits of acceptable risks.[9]

In an era of constrained resources, the absence of a peer military threat makes it difficult to maintain military force structure. Structuring the U.S. military to meet lesser threat scenarios increases the level of risk the U.S. faces in the future, especially if it should be called upon to respond to two simultaneous major regional conflicts — the Middle East, Korea and Bosnia come to mind as possible scenarios. To counter that risk, planners must develop an advantage that will

compensate for personnel shortages.

During the Gulf War, America was deluged with television images of precision-guided munitions and reports of reconnaissance systems capable of seeing anywhere on the battlefield. Some theorists suggest that the Persian Gulf War demonstrated that superior technology may offset force-structure losses. They believe that superior technology will serve as a panacea into the 21st century.

As defense officials review their force-structure options, they must address these questions: How much force structure can we sacrifice, based upon the threat? What risks are we willing to take in relying on technology to overcome any personnel shortfalls as we move into the 21st century?

The Joint Strategy Review, or JSR, assumes that the U.S. need not worry about a peer military threat in the near future. The JSR has projected that potential enemies cannot hope to challenge U.S. forces in a head-to-head engagement. Therefore, enemies will opt to attack potential U.S. vulnerabilities, such as our vast information infrastructure, or they will engage in acts of terrorism and develop chemical and biological weapons with long-range delivery systems.[10] The JSR predicts that most combat will be fought in urban areas where the advantages and the effectiveness of U.S. technology will be reduced.[11]

The assumption appears to be that technology will nearly always work to our country's advantage. However, it may be more accurate to say that technology provides an advantage only as long as it operates as designed; as long as it functions in an environment conducive to its use; and as long as it is not offset by asymmetrical threats. Technology should be considered a double-edged sword: Increased dependence upon technology can create new vulnerabilities, and America must be aware of these vulnerabilities if technology's leverage is to be maintained.

One vulnerability that could be created is a decision-making process that becomes elevated and centralized to the point that the line between strategic and tactical decisions is blurred. Should the U.S. obtain near total dominance of the informational battlefield in the future, the military may be tempted to direct operations from hundreds or thousands of miles away. While such long-distance control is a possibility, it might cause decision-makers to overlook the effects of battlefield environment, terrain, soldier morale, and other operational factors that they would not experience via long distance.

Another vulnerability that could be created by technology is technological arrogance: adopting the attitude that as long as we maintain a technological advantage over our adversaries, we do not have to maintain symmetric capabilities. Such arrogance would be very dangerous, especially in an environment in which an adversary could obtain or produce a number of small nuclear weapons capable of disabling many of our sophisticated surveillance and weapons systems. The loss of that technology could force the U.S. to face an adversary on equal footing — i.e., without its advantages. If the damage were severe enough, if the adversary were cunning or lucky enough, and if time were short enough that redundant systems could not be brought to bear, the adversary might prevail.

A final vulnerability that might be created by a reliance on technology, and the one most deserving of attention, is that of an asymmetrical threat. An asymmetrical threat offers potential adversaries the capability to create the most damage and to negate the U.S. superiority in combat power. As the JSR noted, few potential adversaries would confront the U.S. force-on-force. But information-warfare scenarios, for example, would enable adversaries to confront the U.S. without direct conflict; these scenarios might require only a few capable people operating powerful computers. Because computers are the nerve centers of the world's information and communication systems, these information-warfare scenarios have catastrophic possibilities.

Information-warfare targets that might produce significant damage include the electronic switching that handles all federal funds and transactions; electronic switching systems that manage all telephony, worldwide military command-and-control systems, the Air Force satellite-control network; and the National Photographic Interpretation Center.[12] The amount of havoc that could be created by a

SSG Faith Morris, 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, hands out coloring books and crayons to Bosnian children. MOOTW requires soldiers who are culturally aware and who are proficient in the region's language.

Photo by Andrew McGalliard

significant penetration of the Federal Reserve System or of the Department of Defense is cause for concern. A recent Wall Street Journal article reported that security experts attempted to "hack" into 12,000 DoD computer systems connected to the Internet. The results were astounding: The experts hacked their way into 88 percent of the systems, and 4 percent of the attacks went undetected.[13] In another incident, a 22-year-old Argentine hacker obtained the necessary passwords to enter the computers of DoD, NASA and other agencies.[14]

As the military increasingly turns to off-the-shelf commercially developed technologies because of budget constraints or streamlined acquisition processes, the vulnerability to computer penetration may increase. Military systems are usually designed for security and survivability; however, because of the costs involved, civilian systems are not.[15] The penetration of computer systems that control electrical grids along the East and West coasts would not only throw civilian infrastructure into confusion, it would also significantly affect the U.S. strategic response capability.

If an asymmetrical attack were made on military or civilian technology at the same time that Bosnia, Korea or the Middle East were to erupt into a shooting conflict, the U.S. might find it difficult to respond to those regional conflicts in a timely and efficient manner.

The damage that could be produced by asymmetrical action against the U.S. brings up an interesting question: What asymmetrical acts constitute acts of war against the U.S. or require a military response? Disabling the switching that controls Federal Reserve transactions or the electrical grids of the East or West coasts, while not producing the destruction associated with an overt act of war, could have far more devastating effects. This question is further complicated because asymmetrical action either negates U.S. military capabilities or does not provide a readily identifiable target for the U.S. to focus against. Should the U.S. be able to identify the aggressor, it would still be diffi-

cult to determine an appropriate response. Can the U.S. deploy military forces against a terrorist organization? Can we levy economic sanctions on it? Can we isolate it politically? While a variety of actions would be possible, all might not be feasible. Terrorist penetration of commercial or defense computer systems could cause tremendous immediate and long-term damage. It is difficult to imagine that a price commensurate with such damage could be extracted from a terrorist organization.

In the end, we must strike a balance between the need to reduce force structure, based upon the conventional definition of threat, and the need to maintain a force capable of responding to a broad spectrum of policy requirements and crises in an uncertain future.

Vision of the future

The ultimate question for force-structure planners will be, "Have we sufficiently provided for the protection and security of the people and interests of the United States?" In some instances, answering this question in the affirmative will mean that we are willing to sacrifice the status quo, that we will break old paradigms, and that we will attempt to align policy with the remaining force structure.

Out of necessity, we must base our near-term force structure upon a strategic environment characterized by MOOTW-type operations. Our near-term force structure must be capable of performing the diversified, multifaceted and complex operations that MOOTW often presents. Operations may be characterized by nondeadly force and its associated technology; an increase in the need to comply with joint-operations doctrine; an increase in the demand for special-operations forces; an increase in the number of active-duty Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces; a decrease in the demand for armor assets; an increased dependence on intelligence to shape the environment; and the need for soldiers to make quick decisions based on the situation at hand. All forces must be flexible enough in their command-and-control structure to respond to the wide range of operations and complexity that MOOTW operations offer.

The MOOTW environment may not require the deployment of an infantry division, but rather the deployment of a brigade of infantry or a company of Special Forces, or SF. The deployed unit may be task-organized with other forces, such as PSYOP units, that serve as the nucleus of the mission force. The size and the structure of both the infantry brigade and the SF company allow maximum flexibility to the force planner responsible for developing packages best suited for the mid- and low-level operations often found in MOOTW. The infantry brigade and the SF company also offer the structural basis and the command and control from which to add other elements on an "as needed" basis. The command-and-control capacity of a package of organizations from various U.S. military services, nongovernmental organizations, international governmental organizations, and allies must be routinely exercised at joint-task-force and combatant-CINC levels to adequately prepare for MOOTW-type operations. The culmination of this effort may be routine rotations at the National Training Center.

The complexity of the future MOOTW environment will require soldiers who resemble the SF soldiers of today. Because there are not sufficient numbers of SF-trained personnel available for all MOOTW operations, and because SF personnel cannot be quickly produced, we must develop an effective alternative. Soldiers who are highly trained in their individual military skills and who are also culturally aware and proficient in a foreign language may represent the best alternative. These soldiers would have to be capable of quickly integrating themselves into an operation. To train them, we would need to develop a block of instruction or to begin a biannual combat-training-center rotation with IGOs, NGOs and other organizations that would be found in the area of operations, or AOR, to which the soldiers would be deployed. The intent of the training program should be to focus the soldier, prior to deployment, on the language, history, culture and operational aspects of his or her

intended AOR. That awareness would improve the soldier's ability to make solid decisions on the ground.

In addition to developing a force structure for the near term, we must plan to transition the force to meet a potential peer military threat that may emerge by 2025. The bedrock of our force structure in 2025 must be quality people. This nation's victory in the Persian Gulf was not based upon technology alone. Victory was also based upon highly trained, motivated and professional personnel who manned those high-tech weapon systems. The billions of dollars we invest in technology will be wasted if we cannot properly employ that technology because we have not invested the effort and the resources needed to attract and maintain quality people.

The greatest challenge to force-structure planners lies at the front end of the QDR process: Decisions made then will determine the organizational structure that will remain after the QDR. Decisions that will follow will delineate vital U.S. interests so that the limited force structure will be able to operate within its capabilities. Determining the level of risk the U.S. is willing to assume, based upon the capabilities that technology provides, should be prudently weighed so that catastrophic failure is not built into our technological dependence. Greatest among all factors throughout the next 20 to 25 years will be the decisions governing how we attract, train and retain quality people. These decisions will play a crucial part in determining whether or not the U.S. will be able to maintain its position as a global superpower. The decisions must be made correctly to ensure that this nation will not pay a heavy price should it be thrown into the crucible of war in the 21st century. ✂

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Notes:
[1] News release from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), May 1997.
[2] Donald Kagen, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), p. 8.
[3] Howard French, "In Brazzaville, a Triumphant Rebel Mocks His Ousted Enemy," New York Times, 17 October 1997.
[4] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), Executive Summary.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Donald M. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Reconstructed World (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1991).
[8] Retired Officers Association, "Veterans in Congress — An Endangered Species?" VFW Magazine, November 1994.
[9] Rick Maze, "New Weapons May Cost Programs, Jobs," Army Times, 23 December 1996.
[10] Robert Holzer, "QDR's High-Tech Focus Bothers Officials," Army Times, 7 April 1997.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Arsenio T. Gumahad, "The Profession of Arms in the Information Age," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, p. 18.
[13] Senator John Kyl, The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995 (Washington, D.C., 1995).
[14] Deborah Schreibner, "Computer Combat, Warfare in the Information Age," Defense Media Review On-Line, October 1997.
[15] Gumahad, p. 18.

Working with NGOs: What Every SOF Soldier Should Know

by Lieutenant Colonel Dana P. Eyre

Complex humanitarian emergencies increasingly feature a large number of nonmilitary[1] organizations operating in the same environment as military forces. These include international governmental organizations (such as the Organization of American States); nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs (such as Catholic Relief Services); and a variety of corporations, social-movement organizations and political parties.

All these organizations make vital contributions to efforts to mitigate suffering and establish peace on battlefields from Mozambique to Cambodia to Nicaragua. But they also bring organizational needs and personal biases, and they pose unique problems for the military organizations that work with them.

Because working with these diverse organizations is increasingly at the heart of the role of U.S. special-operations forces, SOF personnel must have an in-depth understanding of them. This article introduces the nonmilitary organizations found within military areas of responsibility, or AORs.

A small number of civilian organizations have operated on battlefields since the middle of the 19th century (e.g., the International Commission of the Red Cross, or ICRC), but in recent years we have seen a proliferation of international organizations. International governmental organizations (e.g., the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, or UNHCR) have increased fourfold, from 142 in 1951 to an estimated 450 today.[2] International nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations have also proliferated, growing from fewer than 1,000 in 1951 to an estimated 14,500 today.[3]

These statistics do not include the similarly increasing number of grassroots organizations that are based in, and are supporting, a single country. While not all of these grassroots organizations conduct relief, reconstruction or development operations, their activities reflect a growth area in the NGO community. In October 1994, the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, registered 419 such organizations based in the U.S. and receiving U.S. government funding.

Today, U.S. military forces, whether engaged on the battlefield or conducting humanitarian-assistance operations, are likely to encounter a bewildering array of NGOs.[4] Developing countries may routinely receive assistance from a large number of agencies or organizations prior to a complex emergency, and after an emergency develops, the number of organizations in an area may grow even larger. Some organizations will leave; others will remain and

grow; still others may rush in, in response to the emergency.

Indeed, a host of organizations has evolved in recent years that specialize both in "following pain" and in generating TV coverage. During the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC, more than 200 organizations worked with the U.N. effort. In Rwanda, the number of organizations providing disaster aid rapidly grew to more than 140; the Implementation Force NGO registry in Bosnia included more than 300 NGOs, and by the end of the third rotation of Civil Affairs forces in Haiti, more than 750 such organizations were in-country.[5]

Unfortunately, not every NGO is competent, politically acceptable, or useful to U.S. military forces. In Rwanda, for example, more than 40 organizations were asked by the Rwandan government to cease operations and to leave the country because of their incompetent or inappropriate operations.[6] Other operations have reported similar problems with some of the nonmilitary organizations on the battlefield. SOF soldiers must cast a critical eye on these "other forces in the AOR" and, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, rapidly assess the intent and the professional skills of the NGOs involved in a combined operation.

The following is an example of problems that can be caused by less-than-ideal NGOs: During the middle stages of the conflict in Bosnia (before U.S. involvement on the ground, but after deployment of the United Nations Protection Force, or UNPROFOR), an apparently well-meaning NGO representative was marketing a proposal for refugee camps in Bosnia. On the surface, the proposal, which was being worked simultaneously in Bosnia and in Washington, appeared to be reasonable: A series of multiethnic refugee camps would be established as close as possible to the locations from which the refugees had fled, thereby making their later return easier, according to the advocate.

It was only after background information about the representative was reviewed, and after a study of the the proposed locations of the camps was made, that the political significance of the pro-

File photo

A Civil Affairs soldier talks with a Haitian woman. Soldiers involved in humanitarian-relief operations work not only with local inhabitants but also with an increasing number of nongovernmental organizations.

posal became clear. The apparently disinterested advocate was in fact a Bosnian partisan, and the majority of the camps would have been situated in a corridor that the Bosnian government was attempting to establish between its region and the Adriatic. A putatively honest effort to help the refugees was in fact an effort to advance the political agenda of one of the parties in the conflict.

A more subtle set of problems is posed by organizations such as the Balkan Peace Team-International, or BPT-I. BPT-I fields teams of volunteers who monitor human rights, develop nonviolent efforts for conflict resolution at the local level, and work toward developing people-to-people understanding. BPT-I and other teams are committed to maintaining a clear separation from traditional security organizations and local governments. Such efforts are clearly important for the long-term success of a peace operation, yet the difficulty in working with an organization that has a strong desire to remain separate from the military is obvious.

The foregoing examples are not meant to suggest that all NGOs are incompetent, or that all serve as surreptitious partisans or as inadvertent accomplices. The majority of NGOs are competent, dedicated and worthy of support and admiration. But SOF soldiers should maintain a certain wariness. Even when organizations are competent and nonpartisan, we must always

remember that they are not part of the military; they do not necessarily have similar organizational objectives; and they are not responsible for the achievement of U.S. military or political goals.

In the short run, SOF soldiers may focus on meeting the needs of NGOs, but in the long run, SOF soldiers must ensure that U.S. military cooperation with NGOs achieves U.S. political and military goals. To do this, SOF soldiers must fully understand the organization's relationship to its environment (its funding sources, mandate and involvement in politics) and its internal organizational processes (its structure, skills and culture).

To understand an NGO, one must understand the three major influences specific to that organization: its funding stream, its organizational mandate, and its pattern of political and media involvement. While NGOs almost always publicly claim to be

Photo by Perry Heimer

Members of the U.S. Congress (foreground) talk with staff members of a medical facility during a humanitarian-relief operation. Political issues may be important in NGO-military relationships.

apolitical and independent of the desires of their fund sources, in reality nearly all organizations are influenced by those fund sources. Organizations may be funded by membership contributions, by a small number of large individual contributors or, despite their label as nongovernmental organizations, by governments. Indeed, some NGOs might be better labeled "GON-GOs" — government-organized nongovernmental organizations.[7] U.S. and international NGOs receive substantial portions of

their funding from national governments and international governmental organizations such as UNICEF. For U.S. NGOs, the percentage of organizational funds received from the U.S. government may be as much as 80 percent.[8] NGOs operating as "implementing partners" of U.N. lead agencies in specific operations may be entirely dependent on funding from those agencies.

While some organizations may be closely linked to governments, others may be more influenced by the need to attract the attention of individual private or corporate donors. Private fund-raising may come from a relatively small pool of committed donors or from a larger pool of individual donors. At any rate, NGOs are critically aware of the need to maintain their funding sources, and NGO management is critically aware of the need to maintain their relationships with funders and to fulfill funder expectations.

Organizations typically vary in their mandates or charters. Some organizations have narrow, highly specific mandates, while others have only the broadest and most general charters. Some organizations are explicitly chartered for relatively narrow purposes (e.g., Books for Africa) or to support specific groups (e.g., the Armenian Relief Society Incorporated), while others are chartered for broad purposes or to enact general religious or political beliefs (e.g., the American Jewish World Service). Mandates may be issued to NGOs by other organizations (as is the case of many NGOs chartered by religious denominations), or NGOs may be independent, writing their own charters and requiring only the validation of their supporters. (Some 5,000-6,000 of the more than 14,000 international NGOs are independent membership-based organizations.[9])

Depending upon their mandates, NGOs may be competent in a broad range of operations or they may specialize in a relatively narrow set of skills. Some focus on a single country or region and develop substantial regional expertise. Others focus on a specific skill or on part of the relief-reconstruction-development continuum. Mandates most commonly serve as a general control measure that individual represen-

tatives may breach only at potential peril to their organizational survival.

From their beginnings, NGOs have been linked to politics. Perhaps the first modern NGO was the explicitly political British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, established in 1838. The contemporary, more politically active NGO movement may be dated from the founding of Amnesty International in 1961. Since then, NGOs have increasingly emerged as politically significant players in local and global arenas. Overall, NGOs provide more than $8 billion in aid to the developing world, representing about 13 percent of development assistance worldwide, a sum that gives them considerable political clout in many developing states.[10] Increasingly, NGOs are being recognized as participants in international politics: more than 1,400 were accredited to the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development. Organizationally, NGOs have a unique ability to gather information, assess situations, produce and distribute policy analysis, and advocate for policy actions through lobbying and public campaigns. With easy access to the media, to politicians and to bureaucrats in national governments and international agencies, NGOs may wield considerable political influence.

NGOs have substantial political clout within the U.S. In fact, the U.S. involvement in Somalia and in Rwanda was at least as much the product of organized NGO-influenced efforts as of the much-heralded "CNN effect." The presidential decision to intervene in both operations was preceded by explicit and vigorous NGO lobbying for U.S. efforts in these emergencies. While large membership-based organizations have proportionate influence, some small organizations may also carry a great deal of clout. Operation USA, for example, was founded by, and is currently funded by, members of the entertainment industry. Despite its small size (only 10 permanent staff members and a small membership base), Operation USA participated in a meeting with 14 other NGOs advocating U.S. involvement in Rwanda to President Clinton.[11]

Politics do not end at the borders of the U.S., however. The dynamics of funding, mandate and politics interact in ways that significantly shape the relationship between NGOs and the military in the AOR. NGOs exist in a highly political environment at home, and they can carry their political skills and attitudes with them when they travel overseas. Three political issues must be of concern to SOF soldiers: the politics of NGO-military relations; the politics of intra-NGO relations; and the political impact of NGO assistance on the operational situation.

The relationship between NGOs and the military is clearly a political one, although lower-level operatives may not always act

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with political intent. NGOs are political actors. Depending upon the organization and the situation, an NGO may employ political skills in ways that strike military officers as "unfair" or "inappropriate." An incident involving a Civil Affairs officer in Haiti serves as an example: After a sector-level meeting in which the NGO representative did not receive the support he felt he was due from the U.S. military, the NGO representative told the CA officer that he had "contacts in DC" and that the officer could expect to hear from them. Three days later, the officer received a call from a senior USAID official inquiring about the officer's decision and requesting greater cooperation with the NGO. NGOs may also "leak" stories to the media, or they may complain publicly about military decisions or actions. Such strategies usually are not employed in military staff work, but they are the everyday tools of organizational politics.

Politics goes beyond NGO-military relations, however. NGOs also exist in a highly

politicized interorganizational environment, in which the prestige of the organization is always a concern. Organizations are aware of the competition for publicity, reputation and the funds that follow. For example, they know that breaking a story on the front page of the New York Times may be worth $50,000 to $100,000 in additional contributions.[12] Rivalries in Haiti interfered with cooperation among NGOs. At food-issue points, for example, NGO representatives insisted that precisely equal amounts of food be issued to each organization. NGO willingness to cooperate and to subordinate organizational interest to the larger humanitarian goal is clearly shaped by these rivalries.

Most NGOs claim to provide assistance without regard to local politics; however, NGO assistance has political consequences regardless of organizational intent. Indeed, organizations may become de facto participants in a conflict, either because of their mandates or because of their political agendas.

NGO actions may also have an impact on the political relationship between the belligerent parties. Most NGOs claim to provide assistance without regard to local politics; however, NGO assistance has political consequences regardless of organizational intent. Indeed, organizations may become de facto participants in a conflict, either because of their mandates or because of their political agendas. In Bosnia, for example, some Muslim leaders wanted Muslim refugees to remain in Germany in order to ensure a flow of funds from the refugees into Bosnia. To delay the return of the refugees, the Muslim leaders organized demonstrations and media events to show that Muslims were unable to move freely within Bosnia. The Muslim leaders were aided by the Society for the Protection of Threatened Peoples, a German NGO registered with and supported by UNICEF. While the mandate of the NGO did not favor any side in the conflict, the NGO became a de facto publicity agent for some of the more extreme leaders of the Muslim faction. The Canadian civil affairs officer in the region modified the NGO's undesirable behavior by gaining the cooperation of the NGO's funder. When its funding was threatened, the NGO changed its behavior.[13]

Some NGO actions strive for neutrality, yet because of the dynamics of the situation, they inevitably have political consequences. Even large, established organizations may fall victim to this problem, and some critics argue that providing aid in complex humanitarian emergencies can never be apolitical.[14] That argument, while astute and sensitive to the political dynamics of complex emergencies, is not popular with NGOs. Only one NGO, Human Rights Watch-Africa, has publicly acknowledged the difficulty of managing the political consequences of apolitical aid.[15] SOF soldiers must be able to anticipate the political and military consequences of NGO actions.

In addition to politics, other NGO considerations include funding. Despite their awareness of the need for a long-term perspective, NGOs are also aware that the length and scope of a project will be dictated as much by funding realities as by the situation on the ground. At their worst, funding problems may result in projects being declared "over" whenever the dollars run out.

The idea that NGOs will be on the ground before the military gets there and will be there after the military leaves may be true, but it may also be incomplete. Some NGOs may have longevity and a depth of knowledge and understanding; other NGOs may arrive with a specific project in mind; others may arrive after the emergency begins, seeking only the opportunity to participate in order to garner publicity. In general, even the best NGOs are unable to plan or resource their operations as systematically or as completely as the military is able to.

SOF involvement in Haiti was occasionally marked by requests for U.S. military assistance from NGOs who had started a project without adequate funding or with-

out an adequate plan for transferring the project to the local population. Because of the uncertainties of long-term funding, and because of the need to shift funding as priorities change, even the best NGOs face this problem. Recently, the NGO and IGO communities have begun to address the problem through the development of the lead agency/implementing partner relationship. However, soldiers must still evaluate NGOs with regard to their ability to undertake and complete long-term projects — a critical factor in the development and implementation of a successful exit strategy.

Another consideration is that NGOs sometimes pursue their own mandates or political agendas in spite of the inappropriateness of their actions. One CA officer in Haiti encountered a small, membership-based NGO from the southeastern U.S. that did not normally operate internationally. The organization had decided to build a health clinic and to stock it with medicines that would be distributed free. Despite questions by other NGOs and CA officers concerning the long-term sustainability of the project, and despite the NGOs' and CA officer's suggestions for alternative approaches, the organization continued its endeavor in accordance with its original plan. The representative of the NGO stated that he felt compelled to carry out the expectations of his membership base, even though the initial plan may not have been appropriate.

While funding, mandate and politics affect NGO actions at the strategic and operational levels, other factors may shape NGO behavior at the operational and tactical levels. Organizational structure and culture shape the day-to-day activities of NGOs in the field. The typical NGO has a permanent central headquarters staff and a large number of short-term contract personnel who are hired for specific operations.[16] NGOs are thus able to readily adapt to the needs of a given operation. But their rate of adaptation, as well as the quality of their performance, is highly dependent on the personnel whom they hire for a specific operation. Some NGO operatives may have extensive field experience; others may be nothing more than "disaster junkies" who

have hired on for the experience.[17] Sometimes, individuals whose ideological or political agenda is a powerful motivator find their way into NGO ranks. While the major NGOs make extensive efforts to avoid hiring unqualified people, even the best NGOs may occasionally have more motivation than competent management, and NGO participants may have more enthusiasm than experience.

The NGO "adhocracy" has obvious advantages in terms of the organization's ability to react, but it lacks continuity and the ability to plan — the strengths of a more permanently structured organization. NGOs seldom develop a clear doctrine or strong standard operating procedures. To compensate, NGOs develop a more personally based mode of operation. Offices and formal titles are less significant than personal relationships and connections developed during prior operations. NGO culture frequently touts this personal mode of operation as an advantage, but the more reasonable view is that it is merely a different mode of organizational action. It also means that the state of interpersonal relationships is critical to organizational performance. At its best, this mode of work-


Photo by Charles M. Reger

General Ronald Fogelman, commander in chief of the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command, meets with civilian relief workers in Somalia to see how well relief supplies are being delivered.

Photo by R.J. Oriez

A member of the U.S. Air Force watches as workers unload food sacks during a food delivery in Somalia. Accountability of supplies is an important consideration in humanitarian operations.

ing allows tremendous flexibility. At its worst, it allows rivalries, career concerns, personal slights and friendship patterns to influence operations as much as the needs of the victims.

Even in the absence of interpersonal problems, the combination of weak organizational structures and routines, and a dependence upon temporary hires, means that every disaster generates a new organization, even if the new organization is sponsored by an existing NGO. For example, the organization put together by a given NGO to deal with an operation in Haiti may have little or nothing in common with a similar organization established by the same NGO at a different time and in a different location. The fielded organizations may have diverse combinations of personal agendas, backgrounds and experiences. In Haiti, a well-known and long-standing relief organization experienced significant problems with its field office in Port-au-Prince. Food that was supposed to have been delivered to a rural sector was instead diverted to the black market in the capital, with obvious consequences for both accountability and mission accomplishment.

A critical aspect of NGO organizational culture is its strong advocacy for the powerless. At its best, the NGO culture possesses tremendous levels of devotion and service.

In Haiti, for example, U.S. Civil Affairs forces encountered a Baptist missionary who had been drilling wells in small Haitian villages for almost 15 years. Such dedication does not come from weak or easily compromised beliefs. It is not surprising, therefore, that even if their organizational structures are weak, most NGOs operating in the relief area will have strong beliefs about the way operations should be conducted.[18] While there is substantial debate and re-examination of many of these tenets[19] (NGOs are undergoing a period of transition as significant as that faced by the American military), they are still strong within most NGO cultures. The following, while not a formal statement by any single organization, typifies this very general cultural code[20]:

Relief Code of Conduct

1) Saving lives is the paramount goal; political and other considerations are secondary.
2) Aid will be delivered based on need and need alone.
3) Aid will not further political goals: maintain strict neutrality.
4) NGOs will not serve as instruments of government foreign policy.
5) Respect local culture and customs.
6) Build local capacities and reduce future vulnerabilities: integrate beneficiaries in the aid-management process.
7) Be accountable both to beneficiaries and to those from whom we access resources.
8) Treat disaster survivors as dignified humans, not as hopeless objects.

This creed is not at odds with the typical SOF approach; indeed, the SOF community has much to learn from its NGO counterparts. However, acknowledging the differences between the two cultures is important. The military culture is focused on the achievement of political and military goals; the NGO culture is focused on humanitarian service. While the two are not mutually contradictory, they may conflict, particularly in complex situations. Even when the two cultures are united by a common operational goal, cultural differences may lead them to see the same situation differently and to react in different ways.[21]

Cultural differences are particularly

Getting to Know an NGO: Basic Questions

The questions listed below can be a useful guide for learning about nonmilitary organizations with which Civil Affairs forces work. The questions are designed to focus attention on important issues; they are by no means a complete guide. Some of the questions may be politically sensitive and their answers may be difficult to find. U.S. government officials may provide valuable assistance in gathering information about the nonmilitary organizations in a given operation.

How is the organization funded?
- What percentage of the funding comes from governments? Which governments?
- What percentage comes from major private donors (e.g., foundations or individuals)?
- What percentage is raised from public donations?
- Is the organization a membership organization? Who are its members?

What is the organization's formal mandate?
- Who wrote it?
- Are there informal mandates or agendas?
- What are the policy goals of the funders?
- Does the organization have a strong religious or ideological identification?

How is the organization involved in politics?
- Is it involved in international, national or regional politics?
- Is it involved in interorganizational politics?
- Who are the organization's rivals and competitors?
- What is the organization's media profile?

What is the structure of the organization?
- What is the size of the organization?
- What is the size of its headquarters staff?
- What is the size of the overseas staff, both in the theater of operations and outside?
- What is the organization's specialization and skill set?

Who are the organization's personnel?
- What experience do organizational personnel have? What is the breadth of their experience (range of activities undertaken)? The depth (amount of experience in single operation)? Is their experience in-country or in the region?
- Where are personnel hired from?
- Are they locals? From what social group?
- Are they internationals? From what country(ies)?
- What are the relationships between personnel in the NGO and other NGOs?
- Do any of the actors have a personal agenda?
- With whom have they worked previously?
- Where does this assignment fit in the organizational career of the person you are working with? What does he need to do in order to be a "success"?

What is the NGO's organizational culture?
- How do members approach the problems of assistance and peacekeeping?
- What values do the members believe in?
- What is the image of the military in the organization?

important when the issues of cooperation and organizational independence are raised. Sometimes a strictly neutral and independent position is critical to NGO operations, and NGOs put substantial organizational effort into maintaining their independence. This is particularly true for the ICRC and many other NGOs that operate without military security. But much of the effort to maintain independence is rooted in organizational culture and traditions. Part of the desire for independence is also due to the belief that nongovernmental efforts are inherently better than governmental efforts. Finally, we must remember the impact of the fundraising process on the NGO's desire for independence. We cannot discount the NGO's need to maintain an independent public profile in order to maintain the funding stream.[22]

However, NGOs make claims about their functional need for autonomy more frequently than such claims are justified, and these claims are not without critics within the NGO community. One of the strongest proponents of the autonomous NGO organizational culture is Médecins Sans Frontières — Doctors Without Borders. However, autonomy was not part of the organization's original mandate; it evolved as the organization developed. Indeed, after disagreements over the extreme stance taken by MSF regarding the issue of cooperation with governments and intervening militaries,[23] the founder of MSF left it to found a similar organization, Médecins du Monde.

In summary, SOF soldiers pursuing U.S. political and military goals must understand the needs of NGOs in order to work effectively with these organizations. NGOs operate in a unique organizational environment. They have widely varying mandates that indirectly, but powerfully, guide their efforts. And NGOs are ultimately, even if reluctantly, political players in the theater of operation, and at the national and international levels. NGOs have developed organizational structures and organizational cultures that are the product of their environment and that shape the work of their personnel in the field.

NGOs play a critical role in the provision of humanitarian assistance, in the resolution of conflict, in the development of civil society, and in the establishment of a functional, representative government. They are vital to the victims of complex humanitarian emergencies. Because they serve as implementing partners and as service deliverers, NGOs are ultimately vital to the achievement of U.S. political and military goals.

But NGOs are not perfect organizations, and Civil Affairs soldiers should critically compare organizational claims with organizational performance. The identification of problems in working with NGOs is not meant to imply that all, or even most, NGOs are in pursuit of organizational glory, or that any type of organization is unique in these problems, or that all NGOs are either politically naive or activist. But the existence of these problems should serve as a warning. We need to identify the incompetent and the purely ideological NGOs in order to avoid them. And we need to understand the dedicated and the competent NGOs in order to recognize and resolve our differences, and to work more closely with them. By understanding the organizational environment in which NGOs operate, their needs, and the demands placed on them, we can take the first step in establishing a successful relationship with them and in ensuring that U.S. political and military goals are achieved. ✂

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Notes:

[1] Any discussion of the range of post-Cold War military operations must deal with the problem of terminology. The proliferation of labels for operations, and for participants in those operations, has been remarkable. For example, the term nongovernmental organization, or NGO, is commonly used. A related term also used, particularly in the U.S., for NGOs is private voluntary organization, or PVO. PVOs, in U.S. government usage, are a subset of NGOs: a private voluntary organization is by definition nongovernmental, but a nongovernmental organization might not be private or voluntary. The distinction is neither consistently applied nor useful. A modestly more useful distinction is the one between NGOs and international organizations, or IOs, such as the International Commission of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, or ICRC. The ICRC does not generally refer to itself as an NGO, but because of its unique international legal status (it is recognized in the Geneva Conventions and in their additional protocols), it prefers to be called an IO. Its claims to independence and its reluctance to cooperate with militaries participating in peacekeeping operations are more than artifacts of organizational culture. The ICRC, while part of the "Red Cross Movement," is organizationally separate from both the National Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies, and the Federation of the Red Cross. Whatever the label applied to an organization, however, the task of the CA officer remains the same: to understand it in order to develop an appropriate working relationship and to ensure that U.S. military cooperation with the organization achieves U.S. policy goals.

[2] Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, International Organizations: A Comparative Approach (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1988).

[3] See Peter J. Spiro, "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, 18:1, pp. 45-56) for a discussion of the history and role of NGOs in international politics.

[4] While the usual histories of Civil Affairs date the existence of organized Civil Affairs efforts in the U.S. Army from the occupation of Germany, either after the First or Second World War, the real roots of U.S. Army Civil Affairs activities might better be traced to the Reconstruction after the Civil War. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877; and Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction for thorough discussions of the Reconstruction and the Freedman's Bureau.

[5] The number of organizations participating in an operation varies over the course of the operation. The estimates presented here are drawn from interviews with participants of these operations and are cross-checked with U.S. or U.N. data.

[6] Interview by author with U.S. government official, November 1996.

[7] Spiro, op. cit.

[8] Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs: Report of American Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and Development Registered with the U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C., 1995.

[9] Spiro, op. cit.

[10] Spiro, op. cit.

[11] Operation USA promotional material and interview by author with Richard Walden, president, Operation USA, September 1996.

[12] Interview by author with NGO chief executive officer, 1996.

[13] Interview by author with Major David Last, Canadian Army, November 1996.

[14] For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Anthony D. Marley, "Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: International Intervention in Liberia," paper presented at the African Studies Association 1996 annual meeting.

[15] Indeed, some organizations continue to blame the unavoidable political consequences of humanitarian aid on the military. Military forces affect the political situation; that is the reason for employing them. That humanitarian efforts similarly affect the situation is a lesson that remains to be learned.

[16] This hiring pattern may also hold for international governmental organizations such as UNICEF or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In these organizations, the permanent staff can be highly attuned to the bureaucratic concerns of higher headquarters. This can produce a focus on accountability and accounting that significantly interferes with efforts to achieve mission objectives.

[17] NGOs are increasingly willing to hire ex-military personnel with extensive political and operational experience. While this practice reduces the problem, it does not eliminate it, particularly in the case of small, new, or ideologically based organizations.

[18] See, for example, Françius Jean, ed., Life, Death and Aid: the Médecins Sans Frontières Report on World Crisis Intervention (New York: Routledge, 1993) for an extensive discussion of MSF's position on appropriate and inappropriate approaches to humanitarian assistance.

[19] See Marley, op. cit.; Colin Scott, Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, "Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia 1989-1994," Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Security Studies Occasional Paper #20, 1995.

[20] This is one version of the NGO "relief code of conduct;" it is drawn from instructional material used at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

[21] While it is always important to examine organizational culture, we cannot make over-simplified assumptions about the nature of the organizations we are dealing with. See "Privatizing Relief Aid" in World Press Review, January 1997, p. 32.

[22] For a discussion of the impact of funding considerations on NGO activity that is even harsher than that presented in this paper, see Michael Maren's recently published The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New York: Free Press, 1997).

[23] Interview by author with Major Jean Morin, Canadian Army, February 1996.

The Power of Persuasion: Some Historical Vignettes

by Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, U.S. Army (ret.)

Psychological operations, or PSYOP, attempted by amateurs succeed only by chance. The game of PSYOP is for experts, and experts do not grow on trees. As Professor Paul Linebarger pointed out in his classic, Psychological Warfare, "There is no perfect psychological warrior." Linebarger noted that anyone claiming to meet all of the qualifications for the perfect psychological warrior is either a liar or a genius, or both.

One individual who came close to answering Linebarger's description of the "perfect psychological warrior" was Adolf Hitler. Enough time has passed since the terrible events of Hitler's reign over Nazi Germany to allow us to look dispassionately at some of the mechanisms by which he seized and held such complete power over so many.

Rereading Mein Kampf brings back the specter of the German nation psychologically mobilized for total war, with a dedication that was nearly unbelievable. The mad genius who had brought about this tragedy lays bare his entire personality in Mein Kampf. In Chapter VI, "War Propaganda," Hitler attributes the surrender of the German armies in World War I to the skill of British propaganda and to the almost complete lack of German sophistication in psychological operations.

According to Hitler's own account, it was while he was lying in a German army hospital recovering from a British gas attack at Ypres that he made some hard decisions concerning his future and that of the fatherland. He decided to become a politician, and his rise to power would lie predominantly through the psychological route.

The lessons from Britain's skillful use of propaganda during World War I were not lost on Hitler. He perceived that the great propaganda offensive aimed at Germany had started in 1915 and had grown steadily, reaching a crescendo in 1918, when the German army was finally persuaded to think the way the allies wished it to.

Hitler wept over the lot of the magnificent front-line German soldiers, who were still physically equipped to fight but who were psychologically worn out by citizen capitulation to enemy propaganda inside the fatherland. Hitler believed that the great munitions strike in Berlin in February 1918, the mutiny of the German navy and, finally, the open revolution during the latter part of the same year, had been carried out by men whose slogans had been fashioned in London. In Hitler's view, these German revolutionaries had been led by so-called "democratic" propaganda to believe that the war was being fought for the nobles and the rich. With that German experience as a base, Hitler set about formulating his own rules for a doctrine that would be devastating in its effectiveness.

In the beginning, he asked himself "To whom must propaganda appeal?" His answer was "To the masses," not to the intelligentsia. He rejected as a waste of time what he called "high brow" propaganda, going instead for the gut feelings of the multitude. His strategy was to aim or adapt his propaganda appeal to the lowest common denominator and to avoid aesthetics and high spiritual themes.

Noting that the perceptive powers of the masses were small and that their forgetfulness was great, Hitler insisted on adherence to the principles of simplicity and persistency in propaganda themes.

This statement appears in Chapter VI of Mein Kampf: "All effective propaganda has to limit itself to only a few points and to use them

National Archives photo

German troops advance in Russia in 1941. The allies prepared their forces to fight the Germans by portraying the German soldier as a fierce competitor who would be difficult to defeat.

like slogans until even the very last man is able to imagine what is intended by such a word. As soon as one sacrifices this basic principle and tries to become versatile, the effect will fritter away, as the masses are neither able to digest the material offered nor to retain it."

Hitler had little good to say of intellectuals and their effect upon a psychological campaign. This was because he believed that those with the most inventive and inquiring minds would find the constant repetition of simple propaganda themes stupid, out of date, hackneyed and in need of change, even though persistency and consistency are the two major principles to which successful propaganda actions are anchored.

Intellectuals, according to Adolf Hitler, too frequently seek to insert innovative and brilliant changes into a psychological-operations program to relieve what they perceive as the heavy monotony of the repetition of simple themes. They are not willing to wait for the cumulative impact of simple words to make their permanent impression upon the targeted masses.

In Animal Farm, George Orwell's brilliant satire on communism, barnyard animals led by the pigs decide to throw off the human yoke of oppression, and one of the first requirements for their revolutionary success lies in the psychological field. "Snowball," a pig revolutionary leader, recognizing that the philosophy of the new political, social and economic order is too deep for all of the animals to understand, reduces it to seven commandments:

1. Whatever goes upon two legs is an enemy.
2. Whatever goes upon four legs, or has wings, is a friend.
3. No animal shall wear clothes.
4. No animal shall sleep in a bed.
5. No animal shall drink alcohol.
6. No animal shall kill any other animal.
7. All animals are equal.

These commandments were inscribed on the barn wall and were then held to be unalterable laws for all animals.

Unfortunately, even condensing the whole revolutionary philosophy to just seven commandments did not simplify it enough for all to grasp, so Snowball went back to

the drafting board and came up with a single maxim that he felt contained the essence of the entire principle of "animalism." This compressed version read: "Four legs good, two legs bad." Snowball told the assembled animals that to be safe from human influence, they needed only to have a firm grasp of the slogan.

Orwell records that:

The birds at first objected, since it seemed to them that they also had two legs, but Snowball proved to them that this was not so.

"A bird's wing, comrades," he said, "is an organ of propulsion and not of manipulation. It should therefore be regarded as a leg. The distinguishing mark of man is a hand, the instrument with which he does all his mischief."

The birds did not understand Snowball's long words, but they accepted his explanation, and all the humbler animals set to work to learn the new maxim by heart. Four Legs Good, Two Legs Bad, was inscribed on the end wall of the barn, above the Seven Commandments and in bigger letters. When they had once got it by heart, the sheep developed a great liking for this maxim, and often as they lay in the field they would all start bleating "Four legs good, two legs bad! Four legs good, two legs bad!" and keep it up for hours on end, never growing tired of it.

Hitler would probably have agreed with Snowball's formula. It was mindless and easy to repeat, like the chant of the Vietnam War draft evader: "Hell no, we won't go! Hell no, we won't go!"

Hitler believed that from a psychological point of view, it was an error to ridicule the enemy. He recalled the clumsy attempts by Austrian and German propagandists to draw comic-book pictures of their adversaries. German soldiers soon found out that the buffoon

image did not in any way fit the enemy when the battle lines were drawn. The result was a loss of faith in the judgment of the government that had sponsored and produced such naive materials.

On the other hand, the British and the Americans had given the title of "Hun" to the German soldier, describing him as a fierce, relentless fanatic who would be conquered only through the exercise of great military skill and to the tune of hardship, sacrifice and courage. The allied soldier was thus more prepared mentally to meet the rigors and realities of war than if he had been taught to believe that the German soldier was a comic pushover.

Hitler was convinced that if a nation's propaganda themes admitted even a remote chance that there was anything right or just in the enemy's cause, the psychological campaign became bankrupt. If the enemy was doing anything right that could be admitted publicly, this opened the way to doubt one's own cause.

Hitler's impact upon his contemporary world was both ominous and awesome. Sometimes it seemed that the devil himself had appeared in the flesh for the purpose of testing faith in the Judeo-Christian principles in which so many of us believed.

German PSYOP

My own taste of Hitler's psychological-warfare poison came in 1942. It was the month of July, and I was aboard a troop ship headed for England, where I was to become the airborne planner on General Mark Clark's staff. A few weeks before, I had helped prepare the first American parachute battalion for overseas shipment. It was to be the first U.S. unit to land in North Africa as the prelude to the mili-

tary operation that would mark the initial entry of U.S. ground troops into action against the axis powers.

We had gone to great pains to hide the identity of the parachute battalion upon which so much was to depend. Prior to sailing, we had removed all insignia from our uniforms and equipment. Mail was impounded and was to be held until some time after the move was complete. Every feasible precaution had been taken to ensure that the enemy would not know that an

As dawn came, the stillness was shattered by the booming tones of our prisoner's voice pouring from the loudspeaker toward a startled enemy. After a reasonable time, … their answer came back: first with mortars, then with artillery. … Even low-level tactical psychological operations are not for amateurs.

elite unit with a strategic mission was moving into a launch area.

For the officers and men of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry, being greeted from Berlin by the radio voices of "Axis Sally" and "Lord Haw Haw" upon landing in Scotland came as a sobering shock. Not only did the Nazi radio announce the correct unit designation of the battalion, it also named Lieutenant Colonel Edson D. Raff as the battalion commander and ticked off the names of company commanders and even of some of

the sergeants, corporals and privates. The extraordinarily high morale of the battalion was not seriously damaged by this turn of events, but the warnings we had received concerning the efficiency of German intelligence now took on a new meaning. There was a feeling that the eyes and the ears of the enemy were everywhere.

The god of battles was on our side, and through a remarkable chain of lucky circumstances our parachute battalion, together with an untried and inexperienced American expeditionary force, found itself ashore in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia some five months later. It was there that I would have my next experience with axis psychological warfare. As our citizen soldiers labored to build lines of communications for the support of our burgeoning combat units, skillfully planted rumors of German paratroops and glider-borne troops operating behind our lines created wide consternation. Security forces that could be spared only at the sacrifice of other missions were deployed to cope with threats that proved to be purely imaginary — a product of axis propaganda.

As World War II ground on, I found myself commanding a parachute battalion that was attached to Darby's Rangers in the Italian Mountains near a village called Venafro. It was as miserable a sector as one could imagine. The Rangers and my battalion, attacking uphill at a 45-degree angle, had succeeded in capturing a ridge line stretching between two mountains called Croce and Cornu. For the honor of having taken the ridge, we were allowed to occupy and hold it for a month's time, during which the Germans tried daily to get it back. Our casualties, like those of the Germans, mounted steadily as the freezing rain alternated with sleet and snow.

Late one afternoon we spotted a

German soldier as he came from behind some boulders on the enemy side. The man held his hands in the air in the universal gesture of surrender and began to walk cautiously toward our lines. We held our fire, and a half hour later, the soldier was warming his hands before the coal stove in the battalion command post. The soldier turned out to be an Austrian who had already had more than enough combat. His war was over. Allied leaflets showing our battle successes had played a part in the soldier's decision to surrender, and the surrender leaflet that he had shown at our outpost was, to him, a ticket to safety. The Austrian assured us that there was widespread discontent among the troops that faced us along the Croce-Cornu line and that with a little urging, more would desert and come to us.

Amateur PSYOP

This was great news. I decided that we would undertake, on our own, some psychological operations to induce mass defection in the enemy unit that had been giving us such a rough time for so many weeks.

Our parachute signalmen produced a loudspeaker, a microphone, and 100 yards of wire. Under cover of darkness, a patrol moved forward among the icy rocks to the edge of enemy country and emplaced the speaker, camouflaging it as best they could. The wire was strung to a covered position in the rear where the microphone was attached.

The plan was to have our Austrian captive address his buddies in the enemy position. He was to tell them first that he was well, safe and being treated correctly. The script called for him then to suggest that they all follow his example — that the war with its miseries would be over for them and that they would thus be able to see their homes and loved ones again.

As dawn came, the stillness was shattered by the booming tones of our prisoner's voice pouring from the loudspeaker toward a startled enemy. After a reasonable time, during which our German adversaries recovered their composure, their answer came back: first with mortars, then with artillery. The fragments of the loudspeaker were not worth salvaging, and our war in the Italian mountains continued in all of its misery. Even low-level tactical psychological operations are not for amateurs. Intuition is not enough.

'Bring the boys home'

During the period immediately following the surrender, United States forces in Europe had begun to come apart at the seams. For a combination of reasons, the cries of "Bring the boys home" drowned out wiser counsel which had sought an orderly drawdown of our overseas military strength. Even though it was obvious to our political and military strategists that the overall goals for which we had fought could be seriously jeopardized by quitting the scenes of our military victories too soon, emotion prevailed.

The world was treated to the spectacle of U.S. officers and men parading through Paris waving placards and clenched fists and demanding to be brought home at once. The malady grew by leaps and bounds. The protesters and their backers at home ignored the fact that shipping was an inadequate means of executing a mass withdrawal all at once. The files and records that would determine veterans' benefits, pay and travel allowances seemed of minor importance to those who had been infected with the "bring the boys home" virus.

Overseas stockpiles of U.S. war materials worth millions went down the drain as the custodial and logistic forces melted away. It would be stupid to believe that the Soviet Union did not take great

National Archives photo

U.S. soldiers in Paris celebrate the end of World War II. Immediately following the war, cries of "Bring the boys home" prevented an orderly U.S. drawdown in Europe.

comfort from this chaotic situation. In the Kremlin, the plans for Europe's future could not accommodate the kind of interference that an orderly drawdown of our American forces would have constituted. There was reason to believe that some of the attitudes of our soldiers, sailors and airmen had been tampered with by forces that had not originated inside the American system. It was in connection with an official concern regarding the trend of troop attitudes and morale that I was ordered from Vienna, Austria, to Carlisle Barracks, Pa., in 1947.

As an infantry officer with recent military police experience in the international environment of occupied Austria, I was mystified as to why I had been assigned as director of Troop Information and Education, or I&E, at what was then called the Army Information School.

Troop I&E

The activity over which I was to preside for the next three years soon began to provide some of the answers. I learned that Troop I&E had come into being during the early part of America's mobilization for war. As has been our custom too many times, recruits had been sent to training camps, sometimes even before basic equipment essential to training was available. Furthermore, regular Army leadership cadres had been stretched to microscopic thinness, and it was not unusual for large groups of citizen-soldiers either to spend nonproductive time while awaiting the start of training or to receive training that was repetitive, boring and seemingly irrelevant to the tasks that lay ahead.

A confluence of these unfortunate circumstances had led to a rising AWOL and desertion rate. The slogan "OHIO," which stood for "Over

the hill in October," was heard frequently in the Army training camps. Responsible elements of the civilian public began to feel uneasy over what appeared to be incipient mass defection from the Army. It was while this sentiment was at its height that the New York Times took on the task of visiting a number of Army camps to try to get to the bottom of the trouble. The reasons behind the problem became more and more clear as the Times' investigative team dug deeper and deeper.

In simple terms, the Army had been guilty of neglecting one of the principles that Baron Von Steuben had discovered about American troops more than a century and a half before — Americans had not been adequately told why they were in uniform!

Following the rediscovery of the "Von Steuben principle," events moved rapidly to compensate for the omission. A series of attitude surveys was conducted, resulting in a publication called What the Soldier Thinks. The studies revealed, among other things, the intense thirst for knowledge of current events on the part of the citizen-soldier. The soldier wanted to know why our nation was at war: what the issues were, and what the goals and objectives of our national actions were supposed to be. He was anxious to do the right thing while in the Army; however, the Army's view of discipline, chain of command and organization were not understood at the soldier's level.

Some Army leaders, outraged at soldier-opinion polls, declared that they did not give a damn what the soldier thought — they would do the thinking for their men. The wiser military leaders, however, recognized that some knowledge of the opinions held by their men was, in fact, of overriding impor-

tance to the successful exercise of command.

Army Talks

The What the Soldier Thinks studies resulted in the publication of a series of pamphlets called Army Talks. These pamphlets were designed to be presented as factual and authoritative answers to the questions most on the minds of the troops. Army Talks covered a wide range of topics, from questions about U.S. policy to questions about organization, roles, missions and customs within the Army itself.

The Army's promulgation of the philosophy that had produced Army Talks called for an extensive and highly organized system for making certain that their message was put across. Discussion leaders were needed to ensure that every soldier participated to some degree. Techniques for correcting erroneous ideas based upon faulty facts had to be taught to the cadre of discussion leaders.

It was necessary also to arm every discussion leader with the ability to counter disruption by radical elements of his group and to elicit questions and responses from individuals who normally said little.

One of the principal missions of the Army Information School was to turn out discussion leaders who were proficient in guiding even diverse groups along the lines of truth without embarrassment to any individual and without inhibiting freedom of thought. This was a big order, but it was substantially accomplished.

In line with fulfilling the soldiers' appetites, as revealed by soldier-attitude surveys, the Army Information School also trained soldier newspaper editors, radio programmers and announcers. The school was deeply

committed to the application of the means of modern mass communication to the problems of soldier morale and motivation.

During my three years at the Army Information School, I witnessed the rise of a magnificent psychological instrument. The Armed Forces Information Program represented defensive propaganda of a very high order. Nothing was promulgated in the way of information that was not truth. Army Talks and later Armed Forces Talks bore the stamp of approval of every public or private office or activity to which their contents referred. Furthermore, the information these pamphlets provided was in response to the questions and interests of the consumers themselves.

I shall not go into the series of developments that ultimately resulted in the decline and fall of the troop information program, other than to say that there was something about it that seemed vaguely un-American. The requirement for every serviceman to attend weekly discussion sessions on subjects chosen by "the Establishment" struck a discordant note among many inside and outside the service. It was OK to prescribe what kind of food and exercise a soldier's body should have, but to attempt to shape his opinions concerning the justice of national policy or his attitudes toward the government smacked too much of the "political commissar" system of the totalitarian world. The seeds of its own destruction had been borne within the American Troop Information Program.

At the time I left it, the American Troop Information Program was still in full swing. The Armed Forces Radio Network, Stars and Stripes, and scores of unit newspapers supplemented and complemented the work being done by thousands of weekly discussion sessions led by trained information specialists. The central thrust of the informational materials that flowed to American servicemen worldwide through the troop-information program's vast mass-communication system was loyalty to the U.S. and pride of service in uniform.

Again, the American system, which has traditionally demanded that the news media give comparable time to good and evil, gradually worked to modify the military information media to the point that the military media became almost

It was OK to prescribe what kind of food and exercise a soldier's body should have, but to attempt to shape his opinions concerning the justice of national policy or his attitudes toward the government smacked too much of the 'political commissar' system of the totalitarian world.

indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts.

When the Cuban missile crisis arose in 1962, I was commander of the JFK Center for Special Warfare at Fort Bragg, and my psywarriors received their first taste of reality. While I was busy organizing a joint unconventional-warfare task force for possible operations with Cuban resistance movements, an emissary arrived from Washington with some top-secret material. It was the layout and the texts for a series of leaflets that would be dropped over Cuba to explain the U.S. reasons for invading, if in fact it came to that.

The practical problems of producing these highly sensitive materials and loading them into delivery units put our organization to the test. I had not anticipated the requirement that every pressman, photographer, platemaker and container-stuffer had to be cleared for top secret. The necessity to have the printing shops under 24-hour guard came as an additional burden.

Most significant of all, an in-depth look at the background materials our PSYWAR teams held on Cuba produced a real shock. A sophisticated psychological approach, based upon a deep understanding of the psychological target, was just not possible with our limited resources.

I believe that our military psychological system will always suffer from this deficiency, which can be solved only by maintaining the widest possible supporting structure among civilian experts. The magnificent military mechanical and technical organizational framework can be a catapult by which the intangible weapons of psychological operations can be projected toward its targets. The ammunition must be conceived and fashioned by those whose familiarity with the target environment is not a "sometime" thing.

North Korea

Listening to psychological-operations lectures and reading the views of experts concerning the manipulation of attitudes can be fascinating. The same can be said of listening to stories about parachute jumping, but until you actually look over the edge of an open airplane door, feel the slipstream and see the hard ground passing by 1,500 feet below, the full impact of parachuting does not begin to hit home.

National Archives photo

U.S. and North Korean negotiators face each other across the conference table in Panmunjom. North Korean negotiators habitually assaulted the U.S. social system and political posture.

In 1965 I was selected to serve as the senior member of the U.N. Military Armistice Commission-Korea. As I landed by helicopter at Panmunjom and headed for my first encounter with the communist North Koreans and representatives of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, I could feel the psychological slipstream strong against my face.

After talking to our American ambassador in Seoul, but prior to my first meeting with the communists, I had resolved to try to bring about a new atmosphere of understanding and cooperation at Panmunjom. I was soon to learn that the armistice table was not the place for peaceful and dispassionate resolution of differences. Whereas the American attitude toward the meetings had been predominantly honest, straightforward and naive, the communists had consistently used the meetings for spreading the most virulent and unabashed anti-West propaganda.

I left my first meeting with my ears still burning. My opposite number on the communist side, Major General Pak Chung Kuk, had torn a strip off me in public. He began by castigating my predecessors, calling them base and insincere men who had had no desire to negotiate but who had indulged in all kinds of slander against the communist side. He warned me not to follow in the footsteps of the other American senior members; otherwise, I would suffer the consequences.

At the end of the meeting, Pak Chung Kuk stood up, and while I stood with my hand extended to shake his, he turned his back to me. He had set the tone and had signaled clearly what his philosophy was to be.

It is difficult to express adequately the nature of the psychological burden I felt during seven months of encounters with Marxist-trained propagandists.

The guidance I had received to govern my performance consisted of the following:
1. Do not indulge in ad hominum attacks.
2. Admit all real violations.
3. Investigate and report on all allegations.
4. Remain dignified and correct in your negotiations.

This was classical advice that would have been effective for dealing with gentlemen or diplomats. My communist opposite members were neither.

From the national level, there appeared to be little American interest in psychological exploitation of the Panmunjom window into North Korea and communist China. I was substantially left to my own devices. The cruel and unusual psychological punishment I was forced to endure in public was apparently my own concern to cope with, and I decided to do so in the following way:
1. If the communists called a meeting purely for propaganda purposes, I would counterattack in the areas of their own psychological vulnerability.
2. I would use ridicule and humor to take the sting and impact from their diatribes.
3. I would be alert to errors in their applications of communist doctrine, playing Mao Tse Tung's views against those of the Kremlin, with Kim Il Sung in the middle.
4. I would try to drive a wedge between the Chinese element on Pak Chung Kuk's staff and the North Koreans.
5. I would show unlimited patience and willingness to remain in session as long as the communists wanted to stay.
6. I would let the American soldiers and our Korean allies hear some "outgoing psychological artillery" instead of always hearing only the communists' attacks.

In preparation for my encounters, I waded through reams of transcripts of former meetings, and I discovered trends that repeated themselves over and over. I learned that the communist vocabulary of invective was limited and that it could be anticipated and thus pre-empted.

Most of all, the statistics that emerged from my study of the files showed absolutely no inclination on the part of the communists to negotiate in any normal sense, regardless of the issue or of the "diplomacy" shown by the American member of the Armistice Commission.

It was in this latter knowledge that I had resolved to try to make them pay a price for misusing the armistice table as they had over the years. While accusing the United Nations command of using the Armistice Commission as a forum for propaganda, the communists habitually assaulted our social system, our political posture and our personal lives. We had laid ourselves open to many of the attacks by providing, through our free press, all kinds of ammunition about social turmoil, crime in our streets, economic woes and political scandals.

Expert psychological analysts will look with some contempt upon my record at Panmunjom, and I have only the defense that I have just outlined. I can say that it always made me a little nauseated to have to engage in the kinds of exchange that marked my meetings with the communists. For me, it was a descent into a hell of a low level for a formerly respectable Army officer.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to address in detail the overwhelming part played by psychological operations in the Vietnam War. Such an analysis, however, will show that the U.S. failure to win the Vietnam War was due to predominantly psychological reasons. The odds, as far as ordnance, manpower and supplies, were overwhelmingly on the side of the American forces. Disintegration of the will to win began on the home front and quite naturally spread to the forces in the field. Whether this powerful and widespread opposition to the war was a product of the skillful application of enemy psychological instruments or whether it arose spontaneously as a result of the historical antipathy Americans feel for war, will be studied by generations of psychologists, sociologists, historians and politicians. My own belief is that it was a combination of the two.

Even a small amount of sophisticated technical organizational help can change a low-level national malaise into a purposeful opposition. In a free and open society, the legal restraints against feeding the appetites of incipient protest are few. Indeed, one of the most widely held views among citizens of truly democratic states is that their governments should not engage in the "dirty" business of propaganda or counterpropaganda, even though those very governments themselves may be the targets. There is a paradox here, and its solution is unclear. ✂

Following his retirement from the U.S. Army in 1971, after 36 years of service, Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough immediately undertook a top-secret project for the Department of the Army that involved preparation of an operational concept and plan for the conduct of irregular warfare in certain areas of Southeast Asia. His other post-retirement activities include serving as a consultant to the Hud-son Institute; to Braddock, Dunn and McDonald; and to the BETAC Corporation of Arlington, Va. He has also served as a member of the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group, reporting to the Secretary of Defense. His published works relating to special-operations include "Terrorism — The Past as an Indication of the Future," included in International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Greenwood Press, 1978; "Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Role" (Chapter 8) in Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency, D.C. Heath, 1984; the sections "Low-Intensity Conflict," "Guerrilla Warfare" and "Special Operations" in Brassey's International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, 1993; and the section "Psychological Operations" in the Encyclopedia of the American Military, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. He is listed in Who's Who in America and in Who's Who in the World.

Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations

by Larry Cable

Peace operations, regardless of the artificial distinctions unfortunately so beloved by decision-makers and doctrine writers alike, are identical in nature, character and substance. Peace operations may be called by many different names, such as internal defense and development, or IDAD; foreign internal defense support, or FIDS; counterinsurgency, or COIN; support of insurgency (or as it is usually confusingly and inaccurately termed, unconventional warfare); peace imposition (a term more accurate than either peace-enforcement or peacemaking); peacekeeping; humanitarian relief operations; operations other than war, or OOTW (as described in Joint Pub 3-07). Peace operations may also include certain aspects of counterterrorism and counterdrug opera-

tions. All these categories of operations represent interventionary actions undertaken in environments experiencing severe, domestic political turbulence in which there is an armed component.

More simply, all such activities, whether carried forward by unilateral or collective action or whether implemented by conventional or special-operations forces, constitute external attempts to impose, induce, facilitate or maintain social and political stability in societies or polities experiencing insurgency. The term "insurgency" denotes the existence of an armed expression of internal, organic political disaffiliation within a given nation state. There are two kinds of insurgency: offensive and defensive. An offensive insurgency is one involving a revolutionary movement. A defensive insurgency is one in which an ethno-linguistic, religious or cultural group inhabiting a specific geographic region seeks autonomy, separation or independence from the status quo power. Insurgencies provide the social-political context in which efforts at intervention become most likely.

In developing an appropriate politico-military decision-making process, it is important to under-

stand the nature of insurgency and the specific inducements and constraints placed upon any interventionary power. This knowledge will also help in creating relevant and effective doctrine and force postures that can be used either to support useful intervention or to limit the potential for intervention in situations where success is unlikely. Whether intervention is undertaken unilaterally or collectively, whether it employs joint or single-service assets, or whether it is conducted through direct or indirect mechanisms, the same predicates are relevant. Recognizing these environmental consistencies, or uniformities, that underlie specific missions will greatly assist effective decision-making, policy formulation and policy execution.

Primacy of contestants

The first uniformity is the primacy of the internal contestants in establishing political goals, definitions of success and failure, and theories of success or victory. Interveners must tailor their politico-military goals to those established by the indigenous belligerents or contestants, lest the very irrelevance of the interveners' goals ren-

der intervention efforts ineffectual and undermine critical support within the interveners' own domestic publics. Further, the interveners' definitions of success and politico-military goals must match so that progress toward or away from those goals can be measured. The interveners' definitions must also take account of, and capitalize upon, the indigenous definitions of victory and defeat. Finally, interveners must employ a theory of victory that is consistent with their own goals and definitions of victory and that agrees with the theories already developed and implemented by the indigenous contestants. As shown by the U.S. experience in Vietnam, holding dissimilar theories of victory is tantamount to our playing American football while our friends and enemies are playing soccer.

The second uniformity is that all contests in insurgent environments focus upon the first part of that hyphenated term, "politico-military": The real battle is between the political wills of two or more clashing entities. Military operations, lethal or otherwise, are important only insofar as they directly and materially affect the political wills of the competitors. As a result, the terrain upon which the operation is conducted is constituted not so much by the physical geography as by the human topography represented by the minds of the contending entities and of the vast uncommitted population.

The first two uniformities combine to underscore a third: All competitors, including the government, the insurgents and the interveners, have the same two tools at their disposal.

Legitimacy

The first and arguably more important tool is the mechanisms designed to enhance popular perceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy may be defined as the conceded right to exercise authority over and on behalf of a population. While there are two types of perceived legitimacy, existential and functional, only the second type is relevant to the policy calculations of the intervener. Functional legitimacy is the perceived ability to understand the hopes, fears, needs and aspirations of a population or of a major constituency of that population. The emphasis here is upon perceptions. In short, appearances are more critical than realities. All players, indigenous and interventionary, must recognize that in the contest to mobilize popular support, enhancing perceived legitimacy is a zero-sum game. The intervener wishes to assure that his own legitimacy is recognized and enlarged in the short term, and that it can ultimately be redirected or attached to the permanent indigenous government, assuming that the intervener does not wish to leave behind the same domestic political turbulence that existed before his entrance.

The nature of coercion

The second tool is the credible capacity to coerce. Two important caveats exist with respect to the employment of this tool: First, coercion is defined by the recipient, never by the inflicter. Second, actions meant to be coercive might, if improperly defined, be either ineffectual or flatly provocative. Historically, the most effective coercive mechanisms have been careful to constrain lethality; they have focused upon the progressive reduction of the enemy's political will to continue resistance.

The goal of these two tools is to achieve authority over a population. The sum of the two tools is constant: As mechanisms intended to enhance popular perceptions of legitimacy become more effective, reliance upon the credible capacity to coerce can be reduced. It is possible for the combined effectiveness of the tools to drop below a critical

Photo by Helene C. Stikkel

In developing our foreign policy for interventionary operations, we must remember the importance of political objectives and make military means subordinate to political ends.

threshold, with failure being the inevitable result. It is difficult, but not impossible, to determine this critical threshold in advance. The threshold is crucial for the intervener in the formulation and execution of policy and in the maintenance of his own political will.

Together, these fundamental uniformities indicate specific requirements for successful intervention in insurgent environments. The first requirement is to establish a correct, comprehensive and consensually accepted understanding of the term "political-military." Policy formulators and executors must understand not only the correct relationship between political goals and military means within the arena of peace operations and low-intensity conflict, or LIC, but also the very real limitations upon the efficacy of military operations, particularly lethal military operations.

Military subordinated

Compared to the long-term political task of providing a conflict-resolution and peace-building process, the military option offers the seductive prospect of issuing orders to be carried out immediately by organizations having a "can do" attitude. But subordination of military means to political ends is necessary to prevent U.S. policy from becoming, as it did in South Vietnam between 1962 and 1965, a prisoner of war. The necessary predicate for the correct subordination of the military option is an effective definition of the politico-military concept as it applies to OOTW missions in the LIC environment or in the peacekeeping aftermath of a major regional war. Such a definition is needed to establish the proper relationship between the two tools; to appropriately orient U.S. joint doctrine and service-specific doctrine; to assure that U.S. intelligence

organizations are sensitive to "consumer" needs; and to assure that the capacity exists to formulate goals, define victory or success, and develop relevant theories of victory or success. In addition, understanding the term will allow us to plan backward from the desired end state. It will also enable decision-makers to appreciate the ambiguity that normally constitutes the end state of interventionary operations:

U.S. military forces do not have nearly as wide a culture gap to cross with respect to NGOs and PVOs. … Both the U.S. military and the private civilian aid, relief and human-rights organizations are goal-orientated, highly motivated and dedicated, and they often share the same imperatives.

a fog of peace as real and as inevitable as the fog of war correctly described by Clausewitz. Finally, a clear definition of the root term for all interventions will help guard against mission creep, improper militarization of policy, and counterproductive substitution of direct action for indirect action or conventional forces for unconventional-warfare forces.

Cultural communication

Cross-cultural communication is the second requirement. This vital element has three aspects. The first

aspect is the ability to apprehend the nature, character, institutions, structures and definers of the society and of the polity in which intervention is contemplated or undertaken, and to cross the cultural gap separating that society from our own. Crossing, or at least straddling, the culture gap is critical on at least four levels. It helps produce accurate and relevant intelligence regarding crucial matters including legitimacy and coercion, popular allegiances, and means of manipulating perceptions and allegiances. It smooths the path of those undertaking psychological operations to enhance perceived legitimacy and coercion. It assures effective relations between U.S. military personnel and indigenous forces or population groups, and it allows us to use indirect-action capacities as a force multiplier.

Regulars vs. irregulars

The second aspect of cross-cultural communication is the all-too-often-ignored relationship between regular military forces and irregular forces, be they hostile guerrillas, friendly irregular units or even the national forces of new or developing states. Americans, particularly members of U.S. military services, have developed specific criteria by which they define and measure regular military forces. These are applied to counterparts, friends and enemies alike. Chief among these criteria is the rigorously non-political nature of military forces. Regular forces are, by this standard, presumed to be apolitical policy implementers who have limited responsibilities in either the formulation or the evaluation of policy. Irregular forces, including the national services of new or developing states, are first and foremost political in nature; their direct military utility comes in as second or

third priority.

The second criterion applied by U.S. personnel is the rigid, immutable chain of command and control, with carefully delineated areas of authority, responsibility and accountability. Irregular forces are noted for the fluid nature of their chains of command, which are liable to change depending upon the external political considerations and the internal political dynamics of the organization.

The third criterion applied by American and most other Western forces is the existence of a well-established code of conduct that is enforceable by legal mechanisms intrinsic and extrinsic to the military service. In comparison, irregulars rarely have an established code of conduct; if one exists, it is usually enforceable only by mechanisms intrinsic to the force, and thus enforcement depends upon the vagaries of political dynamics and personalities.

The fourth criterion is that regular forces accept the risks of combat. Irregular forces are highly risk-averse, as befits their basically political nature.

Applying these criteria to irregular forces creates a cultural gap between irregular forces and U.S. military forces. Unless decision-making, doctrine, training and operational implementation take proper account of this gap, great difficulties loom.

Military forces and NGOs

A third aspect of cross-cultural communication is the relationship between U.S. military forces and the various domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and private voluntary organizations, or PVOs, that might be operating contemporaneously with U.S. military and civilian services. Despite their different goals, moti-

vations, operational foci and other similar superficials, U.S. military forces do not have nearly as wide a culture gap to cross with respect to NGOs and PVOs as they do with irregular military entities. Both the U.S. military and the private civilian aid, relief and human-rights organizations are goal-orientated, highly motivated and dedicated, and they often share the same imperatives. Thus, military forces, NGOs and PVOs more closely represent a community of interest than they do groups in conflict. Cooperation may be facilitated if military planners and commanders understand that NGO and PVO assets, like their governmental equivalents represented by the U.S. Agency for International Development, consti-

A Bosnian child receives a stuffed animal from workers of Samaritan's Purse, a civilian relief group that worked with U.S. civil-military affairs forces to distribute the toys.

Photo by Blaze E. Lipowski

tute a potent force multiplier that can be directed toward a variety of perceived legitimacy-enhancement tasks. The key to successful employment of these assets is to be found in doctrine and command attitudes that will prepare U.S. forces to understand the language, structures and decision-making loops of NGOs and PVOs even before the planning for a particular intervention begins.

Intelligence requirements

The third requirement for successful intervention in insurgent environments is intelligence. As shown by the U.S. FIDS effort in the Philippines during 1949-54, by the U.S. peacekeeping effort in

Lebanon in 1958, by the U.S.-orchestrated peace imposition and peacekeeping operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and by the British COIN successes in Malaya and Kenya, two well-defined categories of intelligence products are required for effective intervention: basic cultural, political, social, historical and intellectual assessments; and detailed, police-type combat information and operational intelligence (derived from sources of human intelligence, or HUMINT) regarding organizations, activities and leadership personalities and relationships.

Basic intelligence must go well beyond the simple assessment of the agendas, goals, operational capacities and force strengths or dispositions of the various belligerent groups. It must provide effective, timely and useful understandings of the cultural, social, political and historical conditioning that define legitimacy and coercion. Further, the human terrain of friendly, neutral and hostile population constituencies and the mechanisms of both persuasion and perception-manipulation require a proper emphasis on basic intelligence. Similarly, intelligence assessments regarding the nature and the character of effective physical and psychological coercion must be developed and disseminated. So important are these culturally conditioned matters to legitimacy enhancement and to credible coercion, and to the psychological-operations magnification of both, that a corps of cultural advisers should be available to those commanders charged with preparing for or executing interventionary operations. This corps should provide cultural advice beyond what the U.S. State Department political adviser or intelligence briefer can contribute.

Detailed, police-type combat

information and operational intelligence have been shown repeatedly to be prerequisites for effective interventions. Specifically, precise information is required regarding the organizational structure, relations and leadership of hostile entities so that these might be disrupted efficaciously with minimum use of lethal force. Obviously, the best intelligence is collected from human sources, although this category of catch might be enhanced and extended through the use of communications and other intelligence derived through technical-collection means. If correct understandings are achieved regarding the relations and the rivalries among leaders, or if good information concerning vulnerabilities is built up, then the use of standard counterespionage techniques can result in the wholesale compromise of hostile political and military units. Finally, a sound understanding of leaders' motivation and commitment can help to refine our psychological operations and to identify those leaders who need to be

captured or otherwise neutralized. Similar intelligence concerning neutral and friendly organizations will facilitate mechanisms designed to enhance perceived legitimacy or to undercut the perceived legitimacy of the opponent. The outcome of well-directed operational-intelligence efforts will be a gradual expansion of socio-political stability.

Doctrine

The first three requirements — intelligence, cross-cultural communications capacities, and an effective understanding of the politico-military nature of interventionary operations — are effective only if the intervener has an appropriate and realistic doctrine regarding the use of air and ground military forces. Unfortunately, the contemporary U.S. doctrinal thrust smacks entirely too much of the basic AirLand concept, scaled down in size to meet the probable threat force's firepower, maneuver and personnel capacities.

A U.S. Army doctor examines a young Haitian boy during a humanitarian-relief operation. U.S. doctrine for interventionary operations must emphasize the importance of medical assistance.

Doctrine do's. According to historical experience in successful interventionary operations, joint doctrine and service-specific doctrine for all levels — strategic, operational and tactical — must emphasize the following:

- Medical assistance.
- The use of engineering and communications assets to support infrastructure development.
- Conventional use of nonlethal military capabilities, intelligence (particularly HUMINT) collection and processing, and psychological operations.
- Carefully controlled and directed air- and ground-combat operations designed to enervate the enemy.

Doctrine don'ts. Doctrine must assure that at least five pitfalls are avoided:

- The use of high firepower.
- High-mobility, search-and-destroy sweeps.
- The heavy-handed use of forces in security roles that require roadblocks, cordon-and-search operations, identity checks, and related population-movement or resource-control actions.
- Activities that could undercut perceived impartiality or political neutrality, such as the use of combat power on behalf of one faction or element at the expense of all others.
- Actions that could represent to constituencies within the population that U.S. forces are being politicized; for example, any actions that might undercut the U.S. capacity to provide physical security and insulation from the surrounding turbulence.

The foregoing summaries of the positive and negative lessons of history imply that our doctrinal precepts for insurgent interventions and the peacekeeping stage of major regional conflicts must be separate from our doctrinal precepts for con-

ventional interstate war. A further implication is obvious: The longstanding U.S. belief that there exists a single, general-purpose air- and ground-combat force is and has been incorrect and, as demonstrated by the American experience in Vietnam, is dangerously counterproductive in application.

The successful employment of combat forces to exhibit a credible coercive capacity, while largely dependent upon the specific cultural and historical context within the

The longstanding U.S. belief that there exists a single, general-purpose air- and ground-combat force is and has been incorrect and, as demonstrated by the American experience in Vietnam, is dangerously counterproductive in application.

area of operations, must be predicated upon a fundamental reality: One cannot kill one's way to victory in an insurgency. While the American belief "firepower kills" is correct, the historical record depicts a more important reality: Killing does not bring victory.

This does not mean that air- and ground-combat forces do not play a critical role in interventionary peace operations, or that killing must be avoided at all costs, but rather that killing and the employment of lethal military assets are governed by rules, limitations and constraints not found in conventional interstate war. In U.S. doctrine for conventional interstate

war against a peer opponent, emphasis is placed upon high-firepower, high-mobility operations coordinated by sophisticated command-control-and-communications systems. This is necessary so that mechanized and armored ground forces can be tactically and operationally meshed with an air campaign that concentrates upon interdiction and deep-strike missions. This "shoot, move and communicate" emphasis is absolutely wrong for interventionary operations in insurgent environments.

Presence, persistence

Instead, our emphasis must be shifted to presence, persistence and patience. There is no substitute for presence on the ground and in the air over critical portions of the area of operations, for only presence can provide the necessary domination of friendly, uncommitted or hostile human terrain. Persistence means that the presence must be extended over time. A further benefit of presence-oriented operations conducted in a persistent fashion is that U.S. forces will gain perceived legitimacy from the demonstrated capacity to protect and insulate the uncommitted population from armed turbulence. U.S. forces will also be able to address other needs and fears of the population and to gain vastly increased human intelligence, effectively refining combat and psychological operations and providing the basis for evaluating progress toward success.

Doctrine must recognize that presence and persistence must be extended not so much over the physical area of operations as over the collective human terrain. This implies the primacy of psychological operations and perception manipulation. Usually, psychological operations are clearly subordi-

nate to combat operations, but the realities of interventionary missions reverse this relationship. The primary considerations in the planning and execution of every air- and ground-combat mission must be the psychological and political impacts, both short-term and long-term. Proper consideration must also be taken of the nature of the irregular forces; in particular, their fundamentally political orientation and their reluctance to take military risks.

Regarding the nature of the battlefield, the concept of patience must be included in our doctrine. The minds of supporters, uncommitted groups and hostile personnel do not contain phase lines delineating the success or the failure of an operation or an operational concept. Without a doctrinal recognition that indicators will be hazy and that results will be ambiguous and slow in coming, commanders and decision-makers will cast about for ways to convince themselves and the American political culture that U.S. forces are succeeding.

During the Vietnam War, the absence of a working concept of patience left U.S. leaders in a quandary: How do we know that our efforts and sacrifices are bringing success, and how can we demonstrate our success to a restive public? Consequently, we focused upon irrelevant and dangerously misleading indicators of success, typified by the justly infamous body count. Doctrine must contain a uniquely un-American attribute: the ability to accept not only a wide range of outcomes but also complete uncertainty as to the operational duration and the short-term effectiveness of our actions.

U.S. doctrine for interventionary operations faces three other tasks: defining the relationship between special-operations forces and conventional-operations forces; under-

Photo by Mark D. Oliva

U.S. citizens await transportation out of Albania by members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Doctrine should recognize that the interventionary force of choice will vary with the situation.

standing the utility of joint operations; and understanding the nature of coalitions. To fulfill these tasks, U.S. doctrine must have a high degree of flexibility and must recognize that the constitution of the forces employed in support of policy has to be dictated not only by the political goal of the intervention and the nature of the mission, but also by cultural, historical, intellectual, social and political factors.

As indicated previously, an understanding of the concept "politico-military" is a necessary prerequisite for assessing the political goal of the intervention and the nature of the mission. This understanding, along with an appreciation of the human terrain upon which operations will be conducted, will allow us to decide some key issues:

• Indirect action vs. direct action.
• Conventional operations vs. unconventional operations.
• Operational duration.
• Size and visibility of U.S. forces.
• Unilateral vs. collective mechanisms.
The decisions on these issues

will in large measure dictate not only the specific U.S. assets to be employed, but also the identity of the lead service and the relationship between American forces and their coalition partners.

Suitable forces

In FIDS/IDAD and in some aspects of peacekeeping and nation-building, the most pressing need of the host government may be for the development of infrastructure to enhance the perception of legitimacy. In this case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with its reservoir of engineering and management talent, represents a relevant, low-visibility, long-duration special-operations force. In other environments, indirect action utilizing indigenous politico-military forces may represent the best approach for U.S. policy implementation. As a consequence, Army Special Forces and Air Force special-operations aviation units may represent the most effective assets, whether they are used jointly or individually. Of

course, this presupposes that these SOF possess the correct doctrine, training methods and appropriate personnel. The U.S. Marine Corps has capacities that historically have allowed it to function quite effectively in FIDS, COIN and peace-imposition missions; it has a broad spectrum of utility.

While U.S. Army armor and mechanized divisions generally are completely inappropriate for interventionary operations, they might be the force of choice for selected peacekeeping missions, such as those that might occur on the Golan Heights. Doctrine must recognize that some specific forces, including many but not all of those normally denominated as SOF, have a broad capacity to operate within the context defined by presence, persistence and patience and could represent the forces of choice for interventionary employment.

Conventional forces, particularly those used for combat support and combat-service support, can and must be effectively integrated into a mission package. Under the correct conditions, they may even become the lead forces. However, the employment of conventional forces generally does not lend itself to success in interventionary operations, if for no other reason than that their higher visibility and the increased risk of casualties will quickly weaken the political will of the U.S. public.

Joint operations

The concept of joint operations must be closely and critically examined in the formulation of doctrine and in the tailoring of force packages assigned to interventionary operations. Correctly employed, joint doctrine allows the orchestration of complementary capacities from the various forces under a unitary chain of command.

Improperly employed, it allows all forces to participate and to be rewarded, regardless of their effectiveness — in other words, the policy equivalent of the Special Olympics. Jointness should not become a totem before which all genuflect because of budgetary or other imperatives exogenous to the favorable outcome of the intervention. The U.S. should closely examine the concept of a lead service that would have the authority to

Without a doctrinal recognition that indicators will be hazy and that results will be ambiguous and slow in coming, commanders and decision-makers will cast about for ways to convince themselves and the American political culture that U.S. forces are succeeding.

call upon the assets of other services to fill complementary or support roles. We should also examine the role that the country team plays in determining the force structure to be deployed.

In determining that force structure, we should also examine the relationship between U.S. military forces and the forces of other countries. Americans have never been comfortable with the idea of the U.S. pursuing its national interests in a unilateral way. Consequently, administrations have always been eager to assume the cover of a collective mandate. When done well,

as in the year-long peacekeeping and nation-building operation in the Dominican Republic (1965-66), collective actions can have a positive outcome. When done poorly, as in Somalia (1992-94), they can have an outcome that is unpleasant in the extreme. There can be any number of reasons — culture, history or competence — that render a country's forces inappropriate for employment in a collective intervention.

The U.S. should possess a politico-military doctrine that effectively discriminates between suitable interventionary partners and those whose presence would be, at best, ineffectual and, at worst, counterproductive. The doctrine must also provide the basis for operating upon this discriminatory capacity. Diplomatic concerns should not dictate or allow the employment of an unsuitable national force as a co-intervener with the U.S.

U.S. resources

The U.S. has at least four resources that can be brought to bear upon the growing problem of insurgency. The first is our status as the only great power in the world today. While many in the U.S. are uncomfortable concerning this reality and would like to see a resignation from that status, the fact remains that while a country may lose its great-power status, the world will not allow it to resign from it. We tried that during the post-World War I period, with bleak and unpleasant results. Thus, great-power status remains, not as a liability but as an exploitable resource, given a relevant theory of success and an appropriate intellectual framework for defining interventionary goals.

The second resource is our intelligence community. It should be noted in this context that there has

never been a bolt-out-of-the-blue insurgency. All insurgency, whether offensive or defensive, has been preceded by a lengthy period of political and social preparation that moves through several well-defined and well-articulated evolutionary stages. As a result, the several U.S. intelligence services, given proper tasking by policy-formulators, can readily detect emerging insurgent entities and allow sufficient time for intervention, thereby avoiding a crisis.

The third resource is our rich experience with insurgency and successful counterinsurgency. History is an extremely potent intellectual force-multiplier, providing the experience needed to formulate appropriate doctrine, develop effective plans and implement successful operations.

The fourth resource is that the U.S., given appropriate doctrine, relevant training and a capability for effective orchestration of complementary capacities, has a diverse and fundamentally homogeneous mix of military and civilian assets for interventions.

U.S. weaknesses

The U.S. has at least three weaknesses that can significantly undercut its effectiveness in interventions. The first weakness is that the domestic political culture, including Congress, the administration and the molders of public opinion, has little patience with the notion of limited use of force in support of policy, with ambiguity of outcome, or with operations of long duration. The second weakness is the general American belief that every life is precious and that the loss of a life for any purpose other than for the direct protection of the U.S. or its vital core interests is unacceptable and unjustifiable. The third weakness is that unless

the moral, crusade-defining mythology of the domestic political culture can be invoked, that culture will have great difficulty developing, let alone maintaining, political will regarding something as arcane as policy.

New technologies in communication appear to further magnify all three weaknesses. The net result is a popular culture of caution in which the buzz phrase "No more Vietnams" is interpreted in either of two ways: to denounce the use of overwhelming force in pursuit of a political objective, even if its achievement is clearly and unmistakably supported by the vast majority of the American public; or, conversely, to support the belief that we should hunker down in a new version of Fortress America, sallying forth only against a peer opponent who threatens our national survival. Neither position is rational or tenable.

The correct interpretation of the no-more-Vietnams position is to be found in the several resources we can employ. To find ourselves in the fog rather than being irremediably lost in the fog of Somalias, Haitis, Bosnias and other venues soon to intrude upon our consciousness, the U.S. and its military must look to the past. By using our experience effectively, we can develop the charts and the instruments by which we can navigate through the fog and find the narrow but deep passage to success as a great power. ✂

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Foreign SOF

Ukrainian mercenaries serve in many conflict areas

Continued economic and organizational disarray in Ukraine has created a substantial pool of disaffected active and former military and security personnel. According to Ukrainian estimates, several hundred former servicemen have agreed to serve as mercenaries in the Caucasus and in other areas of the former USSR, as well as in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Africa. Often recruited by foreign "commercial" representatives in Ukraine, the mercenaries, using Ukrainian passports, deploy to conflict areas under the pretense of being tourists, workers or specialists. They serve in regular military units as well as in illegal irregular or paramilitary formations. In any case, such service is contrary to Ukrainian law, and mercenaries face lengthy prison sentences if they are caught and convicted. Mercenary activity in Ukraine has also been associated with the country's widespread arms trafficking. Recently, Ukrainian security services reportedly detected an intensified effort to recruit Ukrainian officers for mercenary service in Algeria. Leaflets are also being distributed in an effort to win recruits for an "expedition corps in the Caucasus."

Colombia forms new counterinsurgency force

Colombia has announced the creation of a 5,000-man counterinsurgency task force to deal with the increasing threat posed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. In early March 1998, the Colombian 3rd Mobile Brigade lost 70 troops killed in a clash with the FARC. The task force, under the command of a major general, will be composed of Army troops supported by Air Force and Marine elements. Officers with strong counterinsurgency experience will occupy key positions. The force will operate in Caguan, the most important area of the Caqueta Department in southern Colombia. As Colombia mobilizes its forces to deal with the FARC threat, there have been Colombian media reports that FARC plans to target foreign advisers, including law-enforcement and military personnel, who are assisting Colombian counterdrug efforts. The FARC and another major Colombian guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army, are heavily involved in the Colombian cocaine trade.

Indian Army reorganization may shape internal-security roles

The Indian army's counterinsurgency efforts against Muslim militant groups in Kashmir have generated huge costs for India. By some estimates, these costs now exceed one million U.S. dollars per day, and counterinsurgency requires large deployments of regular and specialized troops. In 1993, the Indian army expanded its role in the Kashmir Valley when it deployed the "Rashtriya Rifles." The 36-battalion formation, a light, elite counterinsurgency force, was formed specifically to compensate for weak and untrustworthy local police and increasingly well-armed insurgents in Kashmir. By 1996, however, as guerrilla problems grew, tens of thousands of regular army units joined the Rashtriya Rifles in the valley, further supplemented by a police counterinsurgency "special task force" composed principally of non-Muslim personnel not from the local area. Faced with internal security challenges in Kashmir and elsewhere,

the Indian army is interested in reducing its overall strength and using available revenue for force modernization. Some Indian spokesmen have suggested that increasing the use of light army forces, such as the Rashtriya Rifles, to fulfill missions in Kashmir and elsewhere could reduce the need for regular army forces in an internal-security role and help realize cuts. Such a move, it is argued, would better correspond to the real security issues with which India must deal. Others have suggested that the Rashtriya Rifles battalions be re-examined in light of their predominant internal-security duties and gendarme-like character. This is likely to remain a topic of close consideration and debate within the army and the government in the months ahead, as India re-evaluates its national-security requirements, its force-modernization priorities, and its approaches to internal security.

Chechen 'special forces' deployment threatened

A variety of tensions, armed clashes and assassination attempts continue to threaten a broader conflict throughout the Caucasus region. In March 1998, a spokesman for Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov threatened retaliation if Russia continues to violate the bilateral agreements that in 1996 ended — up to now at least — Russia's badly failed military efforts to forcibly end Chechen independence claims. According to the presidential spokesmen, Chechnya will consider cutting the transport of oil through the Baku-Groznyy-Novorossiysk pipeline. The consequences of this action would be a major loss of revenue for Russia: a serious economic blow to Moscow. The Chechen spokesman also claimed that the Russian GRU — the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff — was planning to assassinate Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev. Chechen Vice President Vakha Arsanov echoed this charge and asserted that Chechnya was prepared to deploy "several special-forces battalions" to the Azeri capital Baku to protect the Azeri president. The interaction of Muslim armed groups and mercenaries around the region has become a feature of Caucasus clashes.

Bolivian 'Blue Devils' undertake counterdrug duties

Emphasizing that the struggle against drugs is a national responsibility, the commander of the Bolivian armed forces, General Carlos Bejar, recently announced that the Bolivian Navy special-forces unit "Blue Devils" would soon be participating directly in counterdrug operations on Bolivia's rivers and lakes. Interdicting drugs and precursor chemicals that increasingly move along Bolivia's riverine routes constitutes a new role for the unit. The force is said to possess 33 speedboats and patrol boats capable of carrying out interdiction missions on the Amazon, its tributaries and lakes. Two other Bolivian military units — the army's "Green Devils" and the air force's "Red Devils" — will continue to provide logistics support to the police — notably the Special Antinarcotics Force and the Mobile Police Unit for Rural Patrol.

Russia tries new approach to border security

On a section of the Russian border with Kazakhstan, a new style of Russian "border watch" is being used to stop drug traffickers, contraband smugglers, and illegal immigrants from China, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The so-called "nonmilitary" method of guarding border areas depends on support from local volunteer people's militias, Cossack groups and local government bodies. The approach is also being tried in the Transbaikal region. If successful there, it will be used more widely throughout Russia. Plans have also been announced for a revitalized maritime Border Guard fleet to be created

over the next decade. The enhanced force is to have ships similar to those of the U.S. Coast Guard. The force will patrol some 46,000 km of ocean, river and lake frontiers. Currently, maritime border forces have 250 ships and 671 cutters, numbers which are considered far too few. Nevertheless, Russia's extreme economic problems make the acquisition of new border vessels problematic, and the precipitous, unaddressed decline of the regular Russian navy adds another dimension of conflict over scarce resources.

Slovenian military police have counter-PSYOP role

Military police, or VP, now constitute an important part of the Slovenian army. In peacetime, the VP are responsible for maintaining military order and discipline, controlling military traffic, and providing security for defense sites and facilities. Their work is carried out in cooperation with the Slovenian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Defense Ministry's Intelligence-Security Service, the military's criminal police. VP units are manned entirely by long-term service personnel, with units assigned to every regional command. In addition, an independent VP battalion established in 1998 plays a central role in Slovenian-army training. In wartime, VP units are tasked to protect the security of mobilizing units and to facilitate the deployment of those units. The force will also play a key role in rear-area protection and security, to include eliminating enemy sabotage-diversionary teams, identifying other infiltrators, guarding POWs and preventing enemy psychological-warfare operations.

Letters

SR not part of 'direct special operations'

The articles in the Fall 1997 issue of Special Warfare present powerful views of what Army special-operations forces are and where they are going. These articles should be read by everyone who has a professional interest in the force. Not every reader will agree with everything that is said, but he should receive some good subjects for serious thoughts.

I find one minor aspect confusing: On page 22 in "ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century," direct special operations are defined as "those missions in which ARSOF directly engage an adversary quickly in a single action to attain a specific strategic or operational objective." (Emphasis mine.) The paragraph and a longer subsequent paragraph go on to include special reconnaissance in this category.

I have difficulty in seeing any serious reconnaissance, particularly that which is conducted at the strategic and operational levels, as either "quick" or "single actions." The Vietnam-era reconnaissance operations of SOG, conducted primarily by Army SOF, would now be described as "operational," although the term was not in American military use at that time. Because the operations were conducted for about eight years, it would be difficult to categorize them as either "quick" or "single actions."

The reconnaissance missions planned in the early 1980s in the event of a Soviet invasion of western Europe envisioned recovery in terms of months. The 5th Special Forces Group's SR operations in the Gulf War, described to illustrate the paragraph cited above, indicate a mission of "many months." The operations conducted by other Army SO units later in the war to locate Iraqi SCUDs were also of extended duration. In none of these examples do "quick" or "single action" seem to apply. (One also might question whether SR has ever or ever can "thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust war-fighting capabilities" as described in the paragraph. In fact, possession of these capabilities seems to be a disqualification for reconnaissance.)

It is evident that SR does not belong in direct special operations, as this term is currently defined. A more fundamental question is whether Army SOF doctrine even needs a direct-special-operations category. Given the marked differences between each of its component activities, the category appears to be a contrived collective, the utility of which is not evident.

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U.S. Army (ret.)
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Awards recognize sacrifices in El Salvador

Seventeen years after the Salvadoran Civil War began, and six years after it ended, the U.S. Army granted combat awards to the soldiers who served there (Army press release, Feb. 5, 1998). Most notably, Sergeant First Class Greg Fronius has posthumously been awarded the Silver Star for his heroism at El Paraiso in 1987.

The campaign to ensure this recognition is a story of perseverance and dedication on the part of literally hundreds of supporters whose collective labors were critical to its final success. Several did exceptional service in this regard, and at the risk of overlooking some who are equally deserving of credit, their names are offered here:

Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R.-Ca.); Rep. David Dreier (R.-Ca.); Rep. Bob Dornan (R.-Ca.); House Staffer Al Santoli; Brian Sheridan, Deputy to the AS-SO/LIC; retired Lieutenant General J. Terry Scott; retired Major General Sid Shachnow; Major General Ken Bowra; Brigadier General Freddie Valenzuela; Andy Messing, president of the National Defense Council Foundation; Rick Neumann of U.S. News & World Report; Tom Bowman of the Baltimore Sun; Ed Bradley, George Crile and Abby Pogrebin of CBS' "60 Minutes"; and Greg Walker, freelance journalist.

Orchestrating and integrating this campaign for the past six years, Colonel John McMullen never gave up hope that our Army would eventually "do the right thing" for the soldiers it sent in harm's way in El Salvador.

All this, of course, was only an extension of the work done in the war itself — not for a reward, but for a cause; not for profit, but for justice. For the memory of the 21 who did not return, and for their

families, all those who knew the truth could do no less.

LTC Kalev I. Sepp
Army After Next Project
Fort Monroe, Va.

Information operations valid CA mission

I read the article in the Spring 1997 issue of Special Warfare titled "Information Operations: The Role of Civil Military Operations and Civil Affairs" with great interest because, at the time, I was working with the Infantry Division as the CMS planner and chief of information. During the Division Army Warfighting Experiment, we were working to develop information operations, or IO, at the divisional level.

After spending seven months working with the Division and with numerous subject-matter experts, I find that I agree with some of the article; however, there are some points with which I take issue. I agree that it is important that CA forces remain honest brokers and that we must continue to maintain credibility with the civilian population, NGOs PVOs, and international organizations. I also agree that there is no need to develop new procedures to address the role of CMS and CA in IO. We can support IO by doing CA as it is currently written in doctrine.

I do not agree that CMS/CA must avoid any link to information operations and that their role in assisting IO must be entirely passive. The article states that there are two major components of IO: information warfare, or IW, and command and control warfare, or C^{2}W. FM 100-6, Information Operations, lists three components of IO: information systems, relevant information and intelligence, and operations. Operations is further broken down into three parts — C^{2}W, CA and public affairs — each playing its own role in gaining information dominance. CA's role may differ across the spectrum of conflict, but we should continue to have the active role of interfacing with the local civilians, NGOs, PVOs and local authorities influencing the global information environment.

CA personnel must continue to be aggressive in their role of collecting information during their interaction with civilians. We also must create an information exchange, developing a positive perception of our military activities. CMS and CA must continue to be included during the intelligence and the operational-planning cycles. The development of an IO cell allows CA, PSYOP, and PAO the opportunity to deconflict the messages they are putting out.

I feel that we do not need to rewrite CA doctrine to support IO; however, we need to be actively involved in the planning and execution of the IO plan at all levels. IO is more than just information warfare: IO takes place before, during and after the actual period of conflict, and Civil Affairs is, and should continue to be, a major active player in it.

MAJ Scot Keefer
CMS Planner∕
Chief of Information Operations
Fort Hood, Texas

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Enlisted Career Notes

SF warrant-officer program seeks high-quality NCOs

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Program is seeking NCOs who are quality performers and who are willing to assume more responsibility as SF warrant officers. Ideal qualifications are:

- SFC or SSG(P) with less than 12 years of active service.
- ANCOC graduate after October 1994; or graduate of SF O&I.
- Minimum of three years of highly successful performance on an SFODA.
- DLPT of 1+/1+ or a DLAB of 85 or above.
- GT score of 110.
- Letters of recommendation from all commanders (company to group) and from a senior warrant officer.
- Pattern of high performance and achievement.
- Willingness to accept increased responsibilities.

For more information, phone CW4 Shaun Driscoll at DSN 239-2415/9002, or your unit senior warrant-officer adviser.

SF accesses soldiers with prior experience

The SF Prior Service Accession Program is open to CMF 18-qualified NCOs who have previous active- or reserve-component service and who are willing to volunteer for service in active-component Special Forces. Those eligible to apply include SF-qualified, prior-service personnel; SF reserve-component personnel; and active-duty, SF-qualified personnel who are not serving in a CMF 18 skill and position. Personnel volunteering under this program will require screening, assessment and revalidation prior to their acceptance.

Enlisted Personnel Accession Process. Volunteers will be assessed under a conditional contract in accordance with the policy of the Army Recruiting Command. Conditions of the contract will specify that upon successful completion of screening, assessment and review-board appearance, soldiers will serve on active duty in CMF 18. Soldiers who do not meet SF assessment prerequisites or board criteria will be reclassified into another MOS (as directed by PERSCOM) in accordance with the needs of the Army. Assessment of the soldier's military records, including performance evaluations, academic evaluations, and administrative actions, will be conducted by the USASOC commander through a review board chaired by the USASOC command sergeant major. Prior-service soldiers accepted into CMF 18 will be assigned to active-duty groups in order to expand the groups' operating inventory and to improve operational readiness.

Screening and evaluation process. An evaluation of the soldier's physical ability, duty performance, psychological stability and security clearance will be conducted by USAJFKSWCS prior to the soldier's board appearance. Screening and evaluation will be conducted by the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group. The CMF 18 manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office is the executive agent for the screening and

evaluation process. Standards are as follows:

- Complete physical examination.
- APFT (minimum score of 240 points for age group).
- Psychological testing and evaluation.
- 12-mile road march (with 55-lb. rucksack and weapon) in 4.5 hours.
- Participation in a training event conducted by the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group.
- USASOC assessment and review board.

RC soldiers who have graduated from the SFQC within the last year will be exempt from the APFT and the 12-mile road march provided they can furnish documentation of having completed those events during the SFQC. For more information, telephone MSG George Bennett, SOPO CMF 18 manager, at DSN 239-8423/9002 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

MOS 37F to adopt new training sequence

The sequence of initial-entry training for soldiers in MOS 37F, Psychological Operations, will change during the first quarter of fiscal year 1999. The current sequence is basic training; airborne school at Fort Benning, Ga.; advanced individual training, or AIT; and language school. In the new training sequence, soldiers will attend AIT immediately after completing basic training. Following AIT, soldiers will attend airborne training; then they will receive 4-6 months of language training before being assigned to the 4th Psychological Operations Group. The new path will allow soldiers additional time to achieve higher levels of fitness prior to attending airborne school. For more information, telephone MSG Julius Storch, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002 or commercial (910) 432-6406/9002.

Officer Career Notes

CA officer development divided into three areas

The development of Civil Affairs officers, which is outlined in Chapter 20, DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, can be divided into three areas: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. Institutional training provides core competencies for officers to use in CA assignments. Operational assignments provide officers the opportunity to use the knowledge they have acquired through the formal education process. Operational assignments also prepare officers to lead and to train soldiers, both in the field and in garrison. Self-development not only benefits the individual and the military but may also improve an individual's versatility following military service. Unfortunately, self-development is the area most often neglected by officers. Typical self-development goals that can be achieved by first lieutenants and captains are as follows:

- Develop a foreign-language proficiency that will allow you to read, write and speak at the 1/1/1 level.
- Obtain PSYOP qualification by completing the PSYOP Officer Course.
- Complete Army Correspondence Course Program subcourses in one or more of the following subjects: personnel management, command and control, leadership/counseling/management, maintenance, operations (general), operations other than war, supply, or training/instruction.
- Achieve MQS II standards.
- Meet SOF validation requirements.

Typical self-development goals that can be achieved by majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels are as follows:

- Improve language proficiency.
- Complete the Logistics Executive Development Course or the Defense Strategy Course.
- Complete Army Correspondence Course Program subcourses in one or more of the subjects listed above for first lieutenants and captains.
- Complete a master's degree in one of the Civil Affairs disciplines.
- Complete continuing civilian education programs.
- Enhance regional knowledge and expertise.
- Achieve MQS III standards.
- Meet SOF validation requirements.

For more information, telephone MAJ Jim Berenz, SOPO Civil Affairs branch manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

SWCS to produce SOF update for DA PAM 600-3

The Army is updating DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, as part of the new officer personnel-management system – OPMS XXI. DA PAM 600-3 includes a separate chapter for each branch and functional area. Chapters cover branch/FA training prerequisites, branch/FA qualifying assignments and command-selection criteria. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is rewriting the chapters for the SF Branch, the CA branch, and FA 39. In February 1998, SWCS sent its first drafts to PERS-COM. The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office will continue to devel-

op these chapters in coordination with PERSCOM. The new chapters are scheduled for publication in FY 98. SOPO welcomes suggestions for the new SOF chapters:

- Special Forces Branch (AC and RC) – LTC Dan Adelstein, DSN 239-2415/9002, e-mail: adelsted@soc.mil.
- Functional Area 39 (AC and RC) – Jeanne Schiller, DSN 239-6406/9002, e-mail: schillej@soc.mil.
- Civil Affairs Branch (RC) – MAJ Jim Berenz, DSN 239-6406/9002, e-mail: berenzj@soc.mil.

Zones of consideration to change for SF CW3, CW4 and CW5

The Department of the Army has approved a change in the zones of consideration for promotion to CW3, CW4 and CW5, from 12 months to 18 months. The decision was based on the need to increase the inventories of senior warrant officers. The change, which will be in effect for the remainder of FY 1998 and all of FY 1999, will encompass all nonaviation warrant-officer specialties. Many SF warrant officers will be affected by these changes, and warrant-officers should be proactive in updating their official military personnel files and in obtaining new DA photographs. For more information, contact CW4 Shaun Driscoll, DSN 239-2415/9002, e-mail: driscols@soc.mil; or CW4 Walt Edwards, DSN 239-5721/3377, e-mail: edwardsw@soc.mil.

FA 39 to integrate into OPMS XXI in October

The Army will begin integrating FA 39 into OPMS XXI in October 1998. Officers will continue to be accessed into FA 39 in their fifth year of commissioned service. Following the majors' promotion-selection board, officers will be career-field designated. FA 39 is in the Operations Career Field. If designated into the Operations Career Field, officers will track either in their basic branch or in their functional area. Officers who track in FA 39 will serve in FA 39 or in branch-immaterial positions for the remainder of their careers. FA 39 plans to designate 25 majors per year group. The Special Operations Proponency Office projects designation of approximately 25 promotable FA 39 captains into the Operations Career Field yearly. For more information, telephone Jeanne Schiller at (910) 432-6406 or DSN 239-6406.

RC colonel-selection board selects 13 from CA Branch

The 1997 Army reserve-component colonel-selection board considered 3,495 RC lieutenant colonels for promotion. The board used the "best qualified" method to select officers for promotion. Board statistics are as follows:

	Cons.	Qual.	Sel.	%
CA Branch	151	145	13	9
Army	3495	3367	366	11

Eight of the 13 CA officers selected had served as battalion commanders. Eight had either a Ph.D. or a master's degree. All had completed the Command and General Staff College, and five were graduates of or enrolled in the Army War College. For more information, contact MAJ Jim Berenz, SOPO Civil Affairs Branch manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406 (e-mail: berenzj@soc.mil).

Update

SOF units get new commanders

Lieutenant General William P. Tangney was named commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command March 2.

Tangney, formerly the commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, had served as acting commander of USASOC since November, when General Peter J. Schoomaker, the former USASOC commander, became commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

Tangney has served in a variety of positions, including instructor and assistant professor, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point; commander, 10th Special Forces Group, Fort Devens, Mass.; and commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Fort Bragg.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra took command of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School March 3.

Bowra was formerly commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. In other assignments, he served as the deputy commanding general and chief of staff, Army Special Operations Command; commanding general, Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command; and commander, 5th Special Forces Group.

Brigadier General William G. Boykin took command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command April 1 from Brigadier General John R. Scales, who had been interim commander since March 3.

Boykin was previously assigned

Photo by T. Anthony Bell

LTG William P. Tangney presents the colors of the Army SF Command to BG William G. Boykin.

to the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He has also served as chief of the Special Operations Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and as deputy director of special activities in the Military and Special Programs Division of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SWCS announces recent SF publications

The SWCS Special Forces Training and Doctrine Division has announced recent publication of the following:

GTA Air Operations; GTA Detachment Planning guide; TC 31-32, Special Operations Sniper Training and Employment; TC 31-34, Demining Operations; and STP 31-18-SM-TG, Special Forces Basic Tasks.

Several SF field manuals are in various stages of production, including: FM 31-24, ARSOF Air Operations; FM 31-23, SF Mounted Operations; FM 31-27, Pack Animals; FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations; and FM 31-19, Military Freefall.

For more information, telephone MSG Scott Forman at DSN 239-7690 or commercial (910) 432-7690.

PSYOP concepts to support Army After Next

At the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, a process-action team is developing PSYOP concepts in support of Army After Next. The team will focus on PSYOP doctrine, training equipment and organization, as well as the synchronization of the PSYOP effort with information operations.

Other PSYOP projects include:

FM 33-1, Psychological Operations. FM 33-1 is undergoing revision and is scheduled for completion in early 1999. Anyone who has suggestions on, or corrections to, the current FM should telephone the SWCS PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division, at DSN 239-5000/3539 or commercial (910) 432-5000/3539.

Prairie Warrior 98. The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division is working with the SWCS Analysis and Evaluation Division to support Prairie Warrior, the capstone exercise conducted during the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The PSYOP Division has provided a mentor to the CGSC student joint-PSYOP task force and

has also provided scripting and simulations support.

Purple Dragon. During Fort Bragg's recent Purple Dragon exercise, a representative from the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division participated with the other members of the PSYOP Task Force. The exercise not only fostered coordination between PSYOP and the other members of the joint task force, it also offered a field test for the revised ARTEP 33-725-60-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Psychological Operations Task Force, scheduled for publication during the third quarter of FY 1998.

Innovations improve SF training

The 1st Battalion of the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group continues to integrate innovations into the Special Forces Qualification Course.

The battalion is organized into five training companies and a headquarters and headquarters company.

Company A conducts the SF Detachment Officer Qualification Course. This course focuses on mission planning and the leadership of the SF detachment. Company A will reorganize in the near future in order to present instruction in a small-group-instruction mode.

Company B conducts the SF Weapons Sergeant Course and the SF Engineer Sergeant Course. The weapons detachment will soon add light-infantry squad and platoon tactics to its curriculum in order to place more emphasis on tactical training and weapons-system employment. The tactical training will include a live-fire exercise and several force-on-force missions using the multiple integrated laser engagement system. The engineer detachment has introduced training on various pieces of equipment,

including the modernized demolitions initiator, the time-delay firing device, and selectable lightweight attack munitions. The detachment has also modified its mine-warfare training to emphasize demining operations.

Company E conducts the SF Communications Sergeant Course. In FY 1999, Company E plans to integrate the Advanced International Morse Code Course into the SF Communications Sergeants Course. Company E also conducts a joint course on the Special Mission Radio System.

Company F conducts Phase I (land navigation and small-unit tactics) and Phase III of the SF Qualification Course. An additional 12 days of training have been incorporated into Phase I, so that all of the students can be trained to a uniform level of proficiency in common tasks, patrolling, fieldcraft, survival and hand-to-hand combat.

Phase III training consists of air operations; special operations; mission planning; direct-action premission training; and an unconventional-warfare field-training exercise, Robin Sage. Robin Sage has been designated as a CINCSOC-directed event. The exercise has seen significant improvements as a result of the integration of students from the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course. In addition, there has been an increased development of the local auxiliary, which has enhanced the effectiveness of the exercise.

Company G conducts the 24-day Special Forces Assessment and Selection phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course. SFAS is the process through which personnel are selected to attend the SFQC. Company G works with agencies such as the Army Research Institute to improve SFAS testing and selection procedures.

For more information, telephone the 1st Battalion S3 at DSN 239-4343/

5619 or commercial (910) 432-4343/5619, fax -6260; or visit the 1st Battalion on the World Wide Web at www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/tng/1/index.htm.

Archives document SOF heritage

An archive at Fort Bragg holds a wealth of information about the history of U.S. special operations.

The archive, maintained by the Army Special Operations Command's History and Archives Directorate, contains materials related to the history of Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, as well as SOF antecedents, such as Francis Marion's Revolutionary War partisans and World War II's Office of Strategic Services. "It's one of the most complete SOF archives in the world — some quarter of a million items," said Dr. Stanley Sandler, an assistant command historian.

The archive maintains a collection of recorded interviews with SOF troops and veterans, including former members of World War II's Detachment 101. The archive also contains photographs dating back to World War II. Archivists are in the process of digitizing the facility's print and picture holdings.

Archive records also document the history of USASOC's subordinate commands. New material is regularly added from ongoing SOF missions. The archive is located in Fort Bragg's Special Operations Academic Facility, Room 355. Hours of operation are 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday. For more information, telephone Dr. Stanley Sandler at (910) 432-5794.

Book Reviews

Breaking The Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century. By Douglas A. Macgregor. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997. ISBN: 0-275-95793-4. 283 pages.

In Breaking the Phalanx, Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor has written the best book to date concerning what the U.S. Army must do if it is to be successful in war-fighting into the next century.

Written while Macgregor was a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., the book takes the position that today's Army is like the Macedonian army prior to its defeat at the hands of the Romans.

The Macedonian phalanx was considered unbreakable in its time. An elongated rectangle of heavily armed soldiers that stood 16 ranks deep and was composed of up to 10,000 men, the phalanx overwhelmed enemies by brute force. Phalanxes would run directly at the weak point of an enemy formation to break the formation and defeat the enemy.

But at Thessaly in 200 B.C., smaller, faster and more agile Roman legions, averaging 5,000 soldiers each, outmaneuvered the Macedonians and defeated them. The defeat compelled the Macedonians to surrender their control of Greece and the Aegean Sea. By breaking the phalanx, the Romans precipitated a revolution in military affairs.

Macgregor's observations are trenchant: We need to be less like the Macedonians and more like the Romans. Our current primary war-fighting formation — the division — is a dinosaur of sorts. The division

is too large, requires too much logistical support, is too slow in making decisions in the "Information Age" and, with the singular exception of the 82nd Airborne Division, takes too long to deploy to trouble spots around the globe.

Our Army, through its division structure, is largely a brute-force organization. Massed firepower has always been its calling card. But today, massed firepower has distinctly less utility than it had in years gone by. Desert Storm cannot be used as a model for the way future U.S. battles will be fought. Most military analysts agree that future battles will be won by forces who can capitalize on new technologies, weapons, organizations, and tactics in the new war-fighting environment created by near-real-time intelligence and subsequent rapidity in the decision-making cycle.

Dispensing with the division structure would be difficult for our Army —

perhaps impossible. The division structure has been in use since the time of Napoleon. The U.S. Army has used it in various forms since the Civil War. Yet, if we are to defeat the most likely threats of the 21st century, Macgregor says, the division must go.

Macgregor proposes standing-down the divisions to create lighter, faster, independent, self-supporting regimental combat teams, or combat groups, based on the brigade task-force model.

His recommended organization would mirror what has occurred in many American corporations: Supervisory chains have been flattened. Decision-making authority has been given to lower-level managers, encouraging innovation and risk-taking.

Brigadier generals would command the combat groups. Colonels would serve as their chiefs of staff and as their deputy commanders. Lieutenant colonels would serve as staff heads in personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations. With its excellent tooth-to-tail ratio, such an organization is designed for fighting. Because the organization's command structure is flattened, decisions can be made rapidly in order to gain and maintain the initiative in a battle.

Divisional staffs could be maintained in the unlikely event of a general war on the scale of World War II. Army corps would be formed as joint task forces and manned jointly by all the services, further enhancing interoperability and interservice cooperation. Macgregor does not discuss special-operations forces at length, but in some of his analyses, it is inherent that SOF would figure prominently.

"In practice, the contemporary Army still treats warfare as an activity that can be carefully orchestrated," Macgregor says. That thinking, if permitted to continue, may sound the death knell of American pre-eminence around the globe. Macgregor offers the reader an organization that is faster, more agile, and better-suited to the modern war-fighting process.

Macgregor's book is a must-read for those interested and involved in military affairs and in national-security issues. If you read no other book this year, read Breaking the Phalanx.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.
U.S. Army (ret.)
Fayetteville, N.C

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies. By Andrew S. Natsios. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997. ISBN: 0-275-95921-X (paper). 192 pages. $15.95.

Andrew S. Natsios has all the credentials needed to provide complete, insightful coverage of complex humanitarian emergencies, or CHEs.

Natsios is vice president of World Vision U.S., a key faith-based nongovernmental organization, or NGO. As a high-ranking official of the Bush Administration from 1989 through 1993, Natsios navigated the depths and straits of several U.S., foreign and international bureaucracies on a daily basis. As director of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, he worked with theater strategic- and operational-level U.S. military leaders on a number of humanitarian operations. As an Army Reserve Civil Affairs officer, he helped lead the recovery effort in Kuwait City after the Gulf War cease-fire. His diverse roles and experiences have served him well. There is something in this book for almost everyone, from the policy wonk to the warrior in BDUs.

In the future, we may expect the scale of U.S. military support to CHEs and lesser relief efforts to vary based on political, social and military factors. One certainty is that America's armed forces will remain engaged in humanitarian work. Military officers need to understand the anatomy of a CHE, and Natsios provides a good dissection. Chapter 2, "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and the U.S. National Interest," will appeal to officers interested in policy. Chapter 3, "The Bureaucratic Politics of Disasters," explains why coordination of U.S. interagency effort can be so problematic. Chapter 4, "Nongovernmental Organizations," contains descriptions of NGOs that are essential for Civil Affairs and Special Forces professionals who are likely to work with those organizations.

Natsios discusses the military strengths and weaknesses in relief efforts and provides seven principles that should be required reading for civil-military planners at all levels. The book contains important recommendations for establishing objectives, gaining consensus, leveraging assets and improving timeliness and the impact of intervention.

Comprehensive and incisive, the book is not beyond improvement. Natsios extols the virtues of the U.N. for achieving international consensus and for taking collective action in CHEs, but he does not fully discuss the merits of NATO, which may become the U.S. instrument of choice for military support of CHEs in Europe and in parts of Africa. Natsios also predicts that CHEs will subside in 10 to 15 years as the new world order begins to stabilize. Few analysts share his optimistic view. They assert that demographics, cultural dynamics, economic impacts and environmental problems will create near-constant conflict well into the 21st century, with no letup in U.S. involvement. Ironically, if they are right, Natsios' book is even more important.

Natsios asks for balance between moral precepts, political-military imperatives and bureaucratic realities. He calls for strong U.S. leadership as part of a comprehensive strategy to change the course of conflict for the better. He asserts that, without the leadership of the world's only superpower, even the best structure and process will fail to make a serious difference. A review of AARs from Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia strongly suggests that he is right.

LTC Kenneth H. Pritchard
Policy and Strategy Division
USSOCOM

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