Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–98–4 Fall 1998 Vol. 11, No. 4

From the Commandant

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy said, "There is another type of warfare — new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him … It preys on unrest."

Thirty-six years later, the kind of warfare Kennedy described still challenges us. *Joint Vision 2010* and the visions of the various service components, including *ARSOF Vision 2010*, recognize that while war-fighting will remain the central mission of the United States' armed forces, operations other than war will be increasingly important. OOTW figure prominently in the U.S. strategy of peacetime engagement, an interagency effort to shape the strategic environment. The military's role in the effort is regional engagement.

The joint operational concept of regional engagement presented in this issue of *Special Warfare* offers the U.S. an efficient way of resolving future threats with our increasingly constrained resources. Regional engagement is only one aspect of a military strategy that includes war-fighting and defense of the homeland. Taken together, the three activities encompass all military missions, from peace through conflict to war.

The regional-engagement concept proposes a core group of "engagement professionals" who would form the basis for, and provide command and control of, regional-engagement activities. These soldiers would possess skills and attributes that can be described as "SOF-like." Using existing SOF to form the basis of both the core group of engagement professionals and the engagement force structures presents the most efficient means of implementing the regional-engagement concept.

The structure suggested for a typical regional-engagement force, or REF, is a standing joint headquarters formed around a nucleus from the CINC's special-operations command. Core forces assigned to the REF would be SOF, augmented by dedicated conventional forces from various service components.

Regional-engagement operations consist of three functions: *Situational awareness*, performed by regional-engagement forces serving as global scouts, permits early identification of potential crises. *War avoidance*, performed by regional-engagement forces serving as strategic shapers, consists of actions taken with indigenous forces to resolve potential crises before they escalate to crisis. *Battlespace preparation*, performed by regional-engagement forces serving as operational combat outposts, consists of actions taken to create favorable conditions for the forced entry of U.S. combat forces.

Regional engagement, in combination with war-fighting and homeland defense, will allow us to take a comprehensive approach to future military operations. Regional engagement will minimize risks, maximize the use of our constrained resources, and ensure our operational and strategic flexibility in meeting future symmetric and asymmetric threats to the United States.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

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Fall 1998 Special Warfare Vol. 11, No. 4

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Special Warfare* is also available on the Worldwide Web (www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag.htm).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Dennis J. Reimer
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
Joel B. Hudson
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

04972

Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Regional Engagement: An ARSOF Approach to Future Theater Operations

by Major General Kenneth R. Bowra and Colonel William H. Harris Jr.

Joint Vision 2010 recognizes that war and war-fighting are central to the mission of the armed forces of the United States. It also expresses the importance of the military's role in operations other than war:

To protect our vital national interests we will require strong armed forces, which are organized, trained, and equipped to fight and win against any adversary at any level of conflict. Concurrently, we must also be able to employ these forces in operations other than war to assist in the pursuit of other important interests.[1]

Other "futures" documents take a similar viewpoint. In *Army Vision 2010*, the U.S. Army lists three principal missions for the Army: to fight and win the nation's wars; to provide a range of military options short of war; and to deter aggression.[2] *AV 2010* also refers to the role of land forces in the U.S. strategy of preventive defense, stating, "Through peacetime engagement, land forces are active and dominant players in preventive defense activities." *AV 2010* refers to the totality of peacetime-engagement activities as a dimension of influence that serves to strengthen the nation's position.[3]

The imperative of engagement resonates throughout the *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, which stresses the need for enhancing our security through innovative, effective and integrated approaches that will allow the nation to shape the international environment.

As these three publications make clear, there is a general recognition that war-fighting, while it will remain the central focus of military activity, will not be the only function expected of our forces in the future. Following the 1998 spring war game of the Army After Next, or AAN, war-game participants proposed a paradigm that uses three overlapping operational concepts — war-fighting, regional engagement and homeland defense[4] — to encompass the uses of military power. This article will focus on regional engagement, referring to war-fighting and homeland defense only to provide context to the discussion.

Peacetime engagement

Neither the imperative of engagement nor the responsibility for the national security of the U.S. rests solely with the military. Engagement intended to enhance U.S.

Regional engagement is planned as a major topic of discussion during the 1999 Special Forces Branch Conference, to be held in April. Readers are encouraged to provide comments to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-CD, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5200; or fax them to (910) 432-2117 or DSN 239-2117 — Editor.

national security is often referred to as "peacetime engagement." Although the term is commonly used, it lacks a formal definition. For the purposes of this article, peacetime engagement is defined as:

Activities of the U.S. government, undertaken unilaterally or in cooperation with other national or non-nation-state entities, to influence international conditions in such a manner as to protect or advance U.S. national interests abroad.

Peacetime engagement may therefore be considered an interagency operational concept for implementing U.S. national-security strategy. There are other ways by which the interagency community implements U.S. national-security strategy, but peacetime engagement is the aspect that leads to regional engagement.

Peacetime engagement is conducted within a global strategic environment characterized by a number of actors. These include nation-states; international organizations; transnational businesses; criminal organizations; humanitarian-relief organizations; regional-security organizations; and religious, ethnic and cultural groups.

Peacetime engagement provides the vehicle and the context for the military's strategy of preventive defense — proactive efforts to shape the strategic environment and to create conditions favorable to U.S. national interests.[5]

Regional engagement

Regional engagement is a military operational concept for implementing the strategy of preventive defense. Regional engagement is defined as:

Regionally oriented military information-gathering activities and proactive measures taken to influence international conditions in such a manner as to protect or advance U.S. national interests abroad.

This definition emphasizes two significant aspects of regional engagement: its regional orientation and its proactive nature. Regional orientation means that the military recognizes that each region or subregion has distinct requirements; military forces organize their structure and conduct their operations accordingly.

The proactive nature results from the fact that regional-engagement actions are part of a plan that is sequenced and

A Holistic Paradigm for Military Operations



Context of Regional Engagement

resourced to achieve the theater-strategic objectives of the regional commanders in chief, or CINCs. These objectives and their implementing plans are developed and executed in coordination with other government agencies, or OGAs, in support of the national-strategic objectives for the region.

Operational dynamics

Like its complementary operational concepts of war-fighting and homeland defense, regional engagement is applicable in all environments.

War-fighting employs coercion, applying military power directly to compel an adversary to accede to the will of the U.S. Regional engagement, however, employs influence, applying military power indirectly and discriminately to influence adversaries, allies or neutrals to act in a manner consistent with U.S. national interests.

While coercion may characterize aspects of U.S. foreign policy in any environment, it is the predominant dynamic in war. Similarly, influence, which may characterize certain aspects of operations in any environment, is the predominant dynamic in peace. The balance between the two dynamics varies as situations escalate from peace through conflict to war. Homeland defense is an integrated and interdependent concept throughout.

It is important to note that war-fighting, regional engagement and homeland defense are not mutually exclusive. A single situation or area of operations may employ all three concepts simultaneously.

The regional-engagement concept represents a radical shift in the military approach to non-war-fighting tasks. The combination of war-fighting, homeland defense and regional engagement produces a holistic approach that recognizes the continuity and interdependence of activities performed across the continuum of military operations.

Four aspects of regional engagement can enhance the ability of the U.S. to meet future global challenges and symmetric and asymmetric threats:

First, regional engagement is part of a comprehensive approach to operational art. This approach establishes the idea that the military's non-war-fighting activities are not merely a means of employing an otherwise idle asset, but are valid uses

of the military element of national power. The regional-engagement concept recognizes that the military is continuously on an operational footing. Regional engagement may provide identification, warning and understanding of impending threats to national security. It can provide a means either of early warning to contain emerging crises or, if containment fails, of shaping the battlespace to facilitate war-fighting. By warning of external threats and by containing those threats, regional engagement becomes part of homeland-defense activities.

Second, in concert with the deterrent effect of a credible war-fighting capability, regional engagement helps manage the global situation in order to avoid war. The ability of the military to influence conflict conditions has been demonstrated throughout history.

Third, regional engagement provides a professional force for dealing with operations other than war. Regional engagement is a distinct requirement, not a lesser-included case. While our force structures can be sufficiently versatile to serve in multiple roles, there are aspects of regional engagement that require dedicated assets and specific doctrine, training, leader development, organizations and materiel. Professional war fighters may provide a pool of talented and capable resources, but they cannot be fully prepared for the unique requirements of regional engagement. Shifting their focus from war-fighting would have a negative impact on their combat readiness. If the U.S. is to become as dominant in regional engagement as it is in war-fighting, U.S. military forces will require specific capabilities centered on a core of professionals with an engagement focus similar to the war fighter's battle focus. Ideally, such

Operational Environments and Dynamics



engagement professionals would be drawn from forces with unique war-fighting roles and missions closely paralleling those required for regional engagement.

Fourth, regional engagement, war-fighting and homeland defense may be conducted concurrently. The AAN war games, as well as recent operational experiences, have shown that it is neither politically acceptable nor operationally wise to halt regional-engagement activities in order to reallocate their assets to a regional contingency operation or major theater war, or MTW. The requirement for regional-engagement activities is significant in its own right. Even though a crisis may arise, necessitating a contingency operation, the regional-engagement requirements remain. Moreover, failing to remain engaged may give rise to a second escalating crisis. The multinational character of modern war, combined with increasing pressures to limit collateral damage, to maintain limited but achievable goals for the involvement of U.S. combat troops, and to extract U.S. combat elements as early as possible, indicates that regional engagement is likely to continue simultaneously with war-fighting activities, even in the crisis area of operations, or AO.

Regional-engagement concept

Regional engagement comprises three mutually supportive functions: situational awareness, war avoidance and battlespace preparation. Forces conducting regional-engagement hand-off operations perform three corresponding roles — global scouts, strategic shapers and operational combat outposts. The functions and roles may be performed concurrently and by the same forces.

Situational awareness. Performing as global scouts, regional-engagement forces provide a military capability for collecting human-intelligence, or HUMINT (observing and interpreting conditions, attitudes, and actions); and for providing ground truth to commanders and to other interested parties. Another function of the global scout is to identify threats and exploitable opportunities.

While future technological developments will undoubtedly enhance our technical-intelligence capabilities, HUMINT remains the only platform capable of placing human judgment at the point of collection. The ability to gather impressions, discern intentions, and convey them to persons removed from the AO is indispensable both in developing plans and in implementing actions designed to influence conditions and third-party actions. HUMINT also provides context and background for interpreting data gathered by technical means.

Global scouts provide a HUMINT capability that is sensitive to the military-related nuances of situations, attitudes and conditions in areas of national interest. They supplement, but do not replace, other HUMINT assets. Their effectiveness and value to the information-gathering apparatus are rooted in two advantages:

First, global scouts are part of the armed forces' war-fighting culture. They perceive and report information from a military perspective. No other HUMINT asset is as well-prepared to support the information needs of military commanders. Second, global scouts have access. In the U.S., the uniformed services are, by law, subordinate to the civil leadership of the government. In many lesser-developed nations and in a number of developed nations, the military is involved in the political, social and economic aspects of government and society. The global scouts' association with a host nation's military gives them access to activities, institutions and thought processes that are usually unavailable to other sources.

The global scout's mission may not always be intelligence-collection. The global scout may be forward-deployed to conduct multinational exercises, to establish military-to-military-contacts, to provide training assistance, or to conduct any of a myriad of peacetime military activities. On such missions, the global scout's information-gathering activities will be passive in nature and incidental to the mission.

Critical to effective regional engagement is the continuous presence of global scouts throughout the geographic CINC's area of responsibility, or AOR, even where concerns are minimal. This is because access

Regional Engagement Functions and Roles



and region- or country-specific orientation is neither automatic nor rapidly generated.

War avoidance. Using the situational awareness provided by global scouts, the CINC will develop plans to defuse potential crises and to exploit opportunities to advance national interests. All actions taken under these plans must be carefully synchronized with, and supportive of, the objectives of interagency activity.

The regional-engagement concept calls for core regional-engagement professionals, supported by designated war-fighting forces, to act as strategic shapers to execute these plans. Strategic shapers are the experts in applying *military* capabilities to conditions that may represent either a threat or an opportunity to advance U.S. national interests. Critical to the concept is the strategic shaper's ability to act as a force multiplier, working with foreign military, paramilitary and civilian counterparts, to achieve results disproportionately large in comparison to the investment in resources.

The value of the *strategic shapers*, like that of the global scouts, is rooted in their military background and in their links to the war-fighting force. Their expertise permits strategic shapers to identify functions and activities that are best performed by military forces and to avoid those that are best performed by other organizations. Effective employment of strategic shapers permits the geographic CINC to influence his theater during peacetime engagement to avoid crises and to conserve his war-fighting capabilities.

Battlespace preparation. Not all wars are avoidable. When influence fails to achieve circumstances acceptable to the U.S. political leadership, the coercive war-fighting capability must be applied. Regional engagement provides a forward presence that the geographic CINC can use in shaping the battlespace to provide favorable conditions for his initial combat forces and actions. In this function, regional-engagement professionals and their supporting forces perform the role of operational combat outposts.

Fundamental to the concept of regional engagement is the concurrent performance of all three roles (global scout, strategic shaper and operational combat outpost) and all three functions (situational awareness, war avoidance and battlespace preparation). The *operational combat outposts* integrate the roles of global scout, strategic

shaper and war fighter. They also provide ground truth and a means of influencing conditions in the AO before and during the arrival of deploying combat forces.

Some battlespace preparation must begin early, before conditions escalate to a crisis requiring war-fighting capabilities. An early application of battlespace preparation involves stripping away adversary capabilities. By establishing clear objectives for regional-engagement forces, the geographic CINC can target certain capabilities of potential adversaries for elimination prior to escalation to war. Thus battlespace-preparation tasks are not reserved until war avoidance has failed, but may actually be performed concurrently with the tasks of strategic shapers.

The operational combat outposts serve as the eyes and ears of both the geographic CINC and the operational-level combat commander. … In this capacity, regional-engagement forces serve as the 'tip of the spear' for war-fighting forces.

The operational combat outposts serve as the eyes and ears of both the geographic CINC and the operational-level combat commander. In support of the operational and tactical plans of the combat commander, the operational combat outposts act in concert with indigenous forces to facilitate the entry and the operations of combat forces. In this capacity, regional-engagement forces serve as the "tip of the spear" for war-fighting forces.

Most future scenarios posit a continuing decline in the size of forward-based combat forces and a reduction in the number of available overseas bases in which to position these forces. Regional engagement provides a means of maintaining a low-cost forward presence, sustainable in terms of resources and political considerations, that will facilitate continued access to foreign bases in the event of contingencies.

The war-avoidance aspects of regional engagement, particularly those actions to exploit opportunities to advance U.S. interests, provide the justification for this forward presence. The forward presence of nonescalatory capabilities provides politically nonthreatening and unique military assets that OGAs and nongovernment organizations, or NGOs, cannot replicate. From the viewpoint of the host nations, the regional-engagement professionals and their supporting forces provide a wealth of expertise, resources and capabilities that the host nations do not possess. Key to host-nation acceptance is the establishment of professional trust and confidence and the maintenance of a perception of mutual benefit between the host nation and the U.S.

A final aspect of forward presence is that it visibly demonstrates U.S. commitment. Forces conducting regional-engagement operations provide tangible symbols of U.S. commitment to the host nation and to the region.

Regional engagement and homeland defense. Regional engagement is linked to homeland defense in much the same way that it is linked to war-fighting. Global scouts can provide warnings and indications from outside the continental U.S., or OCONUS, required for effective defensive operations at home. They can also provide insights into the culture, intentions, methods and capabilities of OCONUS threats that may attempt to operate in or against the U.S. Strategic shapers may be able to influence or intercept a potential threat, acting unilaterally or through foreign forces. In some cases, resolving the underlying causes of the emerging threat may serve the strategic purpose of preventive defense with respect to security of the homeland. Operational combat outposts may be able to identify imminent threats and determine their intentions or their approach. They may be able to strip away certain adversary capabilities that are difficult to attack domestically.

Characteristics

Regional-engagement operations have the following characteristics:

• *Operationally offensive*. Regional-engagement operations are inherently offensive. They are conducted to create conditions favorable to U.S. national interests, rather

than to simply contain an action by a potential adversary. This offensive mindset is crucial to the overall concept. Geographic CINCs undertake regional-engagement activities to seize the initiative before conditions escalate to war. Because this operationally offensive concept supports a strategically defensive posture, it may include a blend of offensive and defensive tactical actions.

• *Continuous*. Unlike war-fighting, which provides an opportunity for detailed planning supported by battle-focused training, regional engagement must be conducted based on a time-driven, political operational tempo.[6] Planning, control and tactical execution must proceed concurrently and without interruption. As the speed, knowledge and lethality associated with war-fighting increase, and as the typical duration of the combat phases of wars declines,[7] war-fighting staffs will have little time and few resources to devote to regional-engagement operations. Additionally, plans covering regional-engagement operations will evolve as conditions change or as the U.S. redefines its objectives.

• *Synchronized*. Geographic CINCs undertake regional engagement as part of their overall campaign to advance and protect U.S. national interests. Regional engagement must be planned and conducted to optimize the potential gain of its own activities as well as those of war-fighting.

• *Joint*. The various tasks involved in regional engagement and the capabilities required to perform these tasks make regional-engagement efforts inherently joint. Considerations such as distance, infrastructure and sustainability require examination from a joint perspective; specific tasks may also require a blending of service-specific expertise into a joint concept.

• *Multinational*. Because the prevailing dynamic of regional engagement is influence, success is determined as much by the actions and the reactions of allies, neutrals and adversaries as it is by the actions of U.S. forces. Each action requires full consideration of the way it will be perceived and reacted to by all interested parties. While some regional-engagement activities are unilateral, most are accomplished by, through or with surrogates, host nationals or other third parties. Even though the multinational characteristics of regional-engagement activities impose difficult requirements on the core regional-engagement professionals, they result in force-multiplication and economy-of-force effects that make regional engagement operations an efficient and desirable use of limited resources.

• *Interagency*. Regional engagement represents the military's participation in the interagency activity of peacetime engagement, for which the Department of State, or DoS, is normally the lead agency. DoS performs the majority of the diplomatic and political tasks associated with peacetime engagement and is responsible for coordinating all U.S. government activities.

Photo by R.A. Ward

Military, government and nongovernment workers assemble during Operation Noble Response in March 1998. Regional engagement represents the military's participation in the interagency activity of peacetime engagement.

Within DoS, there is no organizational equivalent of the military geographic CINC. The basis of DoS operational structure OCONUS is the country team, a task-organized interagency working group, which is internal to an embassy and under the direct control of an ambassador. Each ambassador is a personal representative of the president of the United States and has a degree of independence unknown in the armed forces. The country team and the ambassador are focused on a specific country, not on the entire region. The power to synchronize the activities of the various country teams and ambassadors within a specific region resides in DoS headquarters and in the interagency process.

There is no doctrinal publication describing how the interagency process works. There is no procedures manual, and there is no single office that is chartered to establish procedures. This is not to say that a process does not exist. In fact, on an issue-by-issue basis, there is usually a designated lead agency. For foreign affairs (and by extension, peacetime engagement) the lead agency is normally DoS. There are also generally accepted procedures for accomplishing tasks. While some are codified in law, in presidential decision directives, or in internal agency policies and procedures, most exist as mutual understandings of workable methods.

In spite of the difficulties in developing military-style plans to support such an unstructured approach, effective regional engagement requires precisely such plans. Regional-engagement plans and activities must be synchronized with the operations of OGAs. These plans and activities must also support the plans, objectives and intentions of the lead agency. This presents challenges for those charged with creating and maintaining regional-engagement plans and for those charged with implementing them.

• *Access-dependent*. Regional-engagement operations are characterized by an unusual degree of access to host-nation institutions and locations.

• *Human-factors-dominated*. Most futures documents postulate that a revolution in military affairs, or RMA, either has occurred, is occurring, or remains imminent. The theory is that this RMA is the result of advances in technology — in particular, information technology. Regional-engagement activities represent an exception to this postulate. While advanced technologies will undoubtedly enhance certain regional-engagement capabilities and increase certain vulnerabilities, human factors and the human dimensions of conflict will continue to dominate. The exception to this statement would be situations involving weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. The increasing availability of WMD and their enhanced means of delivery have introduced new dynamics into these types of operations.[8] The potential prevalence of WMD, however, actually serves to increase the criticality of regional-engagement operations, particularly as a complementary concept to homeland defense.

• *Economical*. Because regional engagement is largely conducted by, through or with indigenous or surrogate forces, it requires a smaller quantity of U.S. military human resources.

Requirements

The characteristics of regional-engagement activities dictate certain requirements for future change if the U.S. is to ensure the existence of a force that is optimally configured and fully prepared. These requirements generate issues for future armed forces in the areas of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldiers, or DTLOMS. Training, leader development and soldiers (selection of appropriate military personnel) are of particular importance because they deal with human factors, the predominant dimension of military operations in regional engagement.

While the DTLOMS solutions are interdependent, it is not feasible to sequence them so that we complete one before working on the next. It isn't possible to wait until doctrine has been developed to begin leader development and training — these functions may require decades for full implementation. The Army battalion commander of 2010 is already a mid-grade captain and

will soon attend the Command and Staff College. It is therefore reasonable to begin advancing in all areas concurrently, particularly in the long-term areas of doctrine and organization, making adjustments as related areas are developed.

Doctrine. While all aspects of the regional-engagement concept require refinement and expansion in doctrine, several issues need to be incorporated into joint and service doctrine in order to effectively implement the concept:

• A dedicated core of regional-engagement professionals must be identified and assigned to perform the three roles[9] and the three integral functions[10] of regional engagement.

• Geographic CINCs require operational control, or OPCON, or a similar tasking authority, over organizations containing the core regional-engagement professionals oriented to the CINCs' AORs.

• Doctrine must stress the continuous and long-term nature of regional-engagement operations. It must develop and incorporate provisions for sustaining regional engagement. Doctrine should simplify, consolidate and modify tasks, missions and programs in order to enhance the geographic CINC's ability to conduct such operations. Doctrinal changes may entail attendant structural changes.

• The military must promulgate clear doctrinal guidance for the conduct of and the exploitation of information-gathering activities, ensuring an understanding of, and compliance with, limits imposed by law and policy. Most of this doctrine exists in fragmented form, but it is spread throughout various classified and unclassified doctrinal and policy documents.

• The services must establish and promulgate procedures and guidance for the conduct of regional-engagement campaign planning. This could be done by adapting current warfighting operations-planning procedures to regional engagement.

Training. Training and leader development often overlap, particularly in regional engagement, which, owing to the nature of its operations, its dispersion and the distances involved, will require small elements or individual soldiers who can operate relatively independently. The following are core regional-engagement training considerations:

• Frequent immersion in the AOR.

• Regional orientation of individuals and units.

• Regular exercises with designated supporting forces, to form habitual relationships.

• Training programs that emphasize language proficiency, and cross-cultural and interpersonal communications skills.

• Training that incorporates techniques for sustained operations in austere environments and in unusual climatic conditions. Techniques should include the ability to operate with little or no contact with other U.S. forces or personnel, including OGAs.

Photo by Theodore Warren

A U.S. Special Forces captain advises a Hungarian platoon leader how to perform map-route reconnaissance during an exercise at Fort Polk, La. Training with other countries requires language, cross-cultural and interpersonal skills.

• Regular training in interagency activities; roles and functions of OGAs; capabilities and limitations of NGOs and international security organizations; and ways by which to interface with these organizations.

• Extensive training in nontraditional military skills necessary in negotiating with, establishing rapport with, and working effectively with indigenous forces and populations. These nontraditional skills include advanced medical capabilities; engineer topics, such as sanitary systems and minor construction; and civil administration.

• Training in U.S. war-fighting skills, tactics and doctrine.

• Training in AOR-specific skills.

Leader development. In addition to training requirements, there are requirements for leader development. These are critical for core regional-engagement professionals assigned to higher-level headquarters:

• A thorough understanding of the interagency process and interagency environment. One of the suggestions from ARSOF War Game 2 was that the U.S. needs an interagency university on the level of the National Defense University. The interagency university would be attended by service members designated as regional-engagement professionals, among others.[11]

• Thorough schooling in joint-staff procedures; joint war-fighting doctrine; and applicable service doctrine, procedures and capabilities, especially for regional-engagement leaders and staff officers.

• Regional-orientation assignments and schooling, with appropriate dispensations granted when those conflict with service-unique advancement requirements.

• Modification of traditional career patterns to accommodate the operational demands of regional engagement.

Organization. Planning for, and resourcing of, regional-engagement organizations

Engagement Focus and Battle Focus



will require extensive study by a multidisciplined group to ensure optimal design of the force structure. Listed below are some of the organizational imperatives that must be observed:

• Each geographic CINC requires a dedicated standing headquarters to perform continuous planning and to control regional-engagement operations. The commander and key staff of this headquarters should be core regional-engagement professionals. These headquarters should be joint and should include senior interagency representatives from OGAs.[12]

• Forces of core regional-engagement professionals should be organized and assigned doctrinal regional-engagement roles and missions. They should be trained, equipped and apportioned for such operations.

• Supporting forces from the war-fighting elements of the armed forces should be designated as having habitual relationships with specified regional-engagement forces.

• Forces should be apportioned to the regional CINC based upon the requirements of both regional engagement and war-fighting.

Materiel. Although human factors are dominant in regional engagement, some materiel requirements could increase capabilities:

• Secure, real-time systems for data transfer. These include visual, audio and automated capabilities. These systems would allow global scouts to pass ground truth in real time; they would permit strategic shapers to rapidly access specialized data in response to emerging requirements; and they would facilitate coordination between operational combat outposts and war-fighting forces.

• Communications systems that are fully interoperable with those of war-fighting forces. These are necessary to ensure synchronization.

• AOR-specific equipment, either in-theater or at locations inside the continental U.S., or CONUS. Access to such equipment is required to ensure competence.

Soldiers. Regionally apportioned forces will complement their core war-fighting skills with an appropriate mix of cultural and linguistic skills and should possess the following universal traits:

- Above-average intelligence.
- Language aptitude.
- Acceptance of other cultures.
- Tolerance of ambiguity.
- Problem-solving skills.
- Tolerance for austere living conditions.
- Ability to function in groups and in isolation.
- Emotional and mental stability.
- Tolerance for stress.
- Self-discipline.
- Self-confidence.
- Flexibility.

In ARSOF War Game 2, the term "SOF-like" was used repeatedly by participants from the various services, branches and OGAs to describe the desirable characteristics of forces engaged in regional-engagement operations. Similarly, the desired professional development of leaders of such forces was also described as "SOF-like."[13] The *Special Operations Posture Statement* lists the following characteristics of SOF:[14]

- Maturity and leadership ability.
- Specialized skills, equipment and tactics.
- Regional focus.
- Language skills.
- Political and cultural sensitivity.
- Small, flexible, joint-force structure.

SOF can:

- Be tasked to organize quickly and to deploy rapidly in order to provide tailored responses to many different situations.
- Gain access to hostile or denied areas.
- Provide limited security and medical support for themselves and for those they support.
- Communicate worldwide with unit equipment.
- Live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.
- Survey and assess local situations, and report these assessments rapidly.
- Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.
- Organize indigenous people into working teams to solve local problems.
- Deploy at low cost, with a low profile and with a less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces.

The *SOF Posture Statement* also lists the following principal SOF missions and collateral activities. Note the many correlations to regional-engagement activities.[15]

SOF principal missions:

- Counterproliferation.
- Combating terrorism.
- Foreign internal defense.
- Special reconnaissance.
- Direct action.
- Psychological operations.
- Civil affairs.
- Unconventional warfare.
- Information operations.

SOF collateral activities:

- Coalition support.
- Combat search and rescue.
- Counterdrug activities.
- Humanitarian demining activities.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Peace operations.
- Security assistance.
- Special activities.

In his *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1998*, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen points out that the missions and collateral activities of SOF reflect a dual heritage composed of their roles as "key penetration and strike forces" and "warrior-diplomats capable of influencing, advising, training, and conducting operations with foreign forces, officials, and populations." He cites the complementary nature of these dual missions, pointing out, "One of these two generic SOF roles is at the heart of each of … the … special-operations core missions." Cohen's remarks reflect his conclusion that SOF "are the forces of choice in situations requiring regional orientation and cultural and political sensitivity."[16]

The report's conclusion, taken with an examination of SOF's missions, characteristics and capabilities, make clear that SOF provide the logical basis for developing the regional-engagement force, or REF. The similarity of SOF's war-fighting roles and missions permits them to develop an engagement focus while retaining the capability to perform their specialized wartime missions.

Reserve-component issues. The role of the reserve components, or RC, in regional engagement is complex. On the positive side, the RC bring capabilities and skills that traditionally are not found in the active components, or AC, but that are of great value in regional-engagement operations. On the negative side, public law limits the accessibility of RC units for the multiple deployments and extended time frames that characterize regional-engagement operations.

RC units with appropriate supporting capabilities (predominantly combat support/combat-service support) should have directed habitual affiliations with specified REFs. The value of such an arrangement is limited by the difficulties in accessing such units for extended periods. Unless structural changes, including legislative relief, can be enacted, RC units must be considered supplements, not alternatives, to designated AC units.

RC units can be apportioned to REFs, provided there is sufficient redundancy to ensure their availability. For example, if a geographic CINC has a standing requirement for an Army engineer company, it may be necessary to apportion a full battalion (or larger unit) to meet the nonmobilization requirements of regional engagement. This approach is similar to the way in which the Navy apportions SEAL platoons on a basis of three to one, allowing for continuous employment of a portion of the forces, while concurrently conducting training and other required activities with the remainder of the force. Although in some situations RC units could be mobilized for regional-engagement activities, this would likely be the exception rather than the rule.

Regional-engagement force

The REF is a task-organized element unique to each theater, but it has certain standardized aspects. It is composed of a dedicated standing joint headquarters with designated SOF and conventional forces. REFs are organized around core regional-engagement professionals, with supporting assets assigned or attached as required. REFs are organized on the basis of one per theater.

The REF serves as the geographic

The Regional Engagement Organization



CINC's headquarters for planning, control and execution of the regional-engagement supporting plan to the CINC's theater campaign plan. Given the gray area that distinguishes the transitions between peace, conflict and war, forces need a rule of thumb for distinguishing when command authority will pass from the REF to another joint task force, or JTF. A proposed rule of thumb is as follows: Whenever activities require less than an Army corps headquarters or its equivalent, the REF will retain command and control. For major contingencies and major theater war, or MTW (defined herein as corps and corps-equivalent in scope), command and control will pass to a specially constituted JTF.

Structures

The typical geographic CINC's REF is a standing JTF. The size and the composition of the headquarters and its subordinate components, both service and functional, will depend upon the situation. The REF must be sufficiently robust, even in its supporting infrastructure, to perform the required functions on a continuous basis.

Service components are assigned to the REF on the basis of the mission. These assignments should not normally be ad hoc: It is important to establish a standing-force list of units that will be habitually assigned to the REF. While other forces may be added to the REF in response to emerging requirements, assigned forces will perform the bulk of the regional-engagement missions. Regular exercises will allow the REF and its assigned units to form habitual relationships. The geographic CINC should also have CONUS forces apportioned specifically for regional engagement, *and he should have tasking authority over them*.

SOC

The REF must maintain a theater-wide perspective, and it may establish subordinate JTFs for specific missions, based upon the size, command-and-control requirements, and complexity of the specific operation or activity. A typical REF should be capable of forming three or four such subordinate headquarters. By creating a subordinate REF, the theater special-operations command, or SOC, can remain engaged in the CINC's war-planning process and war-fighting activities while per-

Theater SOF Organization



NOTE: Forces are assigned, OPCON, or under similar command arrangements, with the JTF (REF) commander holding mission tasking authority.

forming regional-engagement activities.

The REF headquarters, usually located with the geographic CINC, will not normally deploy from its forward-deployed location. Instead, it will rely on its subordinate headquarters to exercise the required functions of forward tactical control.

The SOC, a subunified command that serves as each geographic CINC's functional component for special operations, provides the nucleus for, and exercises OPCON of, the REF. Similarly, the psychological-operations task force, or POTF, and the joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF,[17] provide the nucleus of core regional-engagement professionals and forces who are OPCON to the JTF and who perform regional-engagement activities as global scouts, strategic shapers and operational combat outposts.

Some forces committed to the REF may be reallocated during war or major contingencies, but more commonly the REF commander will act as a supporting commander, performing missions in support of the MTW or major contingency. The REF commander will retain OPCON of his forces, passing tactical control, or TACON, if required. The SOC, as the functional component for SO, will normally provide a separate JSOTF to the JTF commander for the MTW or major contingency.

Theater SOF organization

Under the REF, a theater-SOF structure would be organized into the JSOTF. The JSOTF comprises a joint special-operations air component, or JSOAC; a naval special-operations component, or NAVSOC; a joint support element; a headquarters; and an Army component (the Army Special Operations Forces Task Force, or ARSOTF). Ideally, these forces would be assigned to the JSOTF, but as a minimum, they must be OPCON or have a similar command relationship that permits direct mission tasking, regardless of the forces' geographical location.

The POTF is the forward-deployed element of the global force structure for Psychological Operations, or PSYOP. This element is relatively small, relying on its ability to "reach back" to the strategic PSYOP group in CONUS for much of its capability. Tactical PSYOP detachments are embedded in the SOF service components.

The permanently assigned forces of a

typical ARSOTF consist of a number of battalions of Special Forces, or SF, with an embedded capability for Civil Affairs, or CA, and PSYOP. Other Army conventional forces are OPCON as required. Depending upon the apportionment and the mission analysis, forces OPCON to the ARSOTF may be a mix of elements from the AC and RC.

Supporting forces from the Army's conventional force structure may include the following:

- Aviation, both special-operations and general-support.
- Infantry.
- Engineer.
- Medical.
- Service and transportation.
- Military Police.
- Signal.
- Military Intelligence.

The precise mix of these forces will be determined by the mission. In the case of AC forces, the geographic CINC should have OPCON, or an equivalent command relationship, to permit direct mission tasking.

The organization of the ARSOTF reflects two principles: First, the bulk of the core regional-engagement forces are forward-deployed Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF. As with joint SOF, ARSOF reflect the capabilities and the characteristics desired in regional engagement. *ARSOF Vision 2010* lists the following traits of ARSOF:[18]

- Above-average intelligence.
- Ability to deal with complex issues and situations.
- Ability to tolerate ambiguity.
- Emotional stability.
- High tolerance for stress.
- Flexibility.
- Self-discipline.
- Self-confidence.

Within ARSOF, regionally oriented and specifically tasked SF, PSYOP and CA personnel have primary missions and collateral activities that prepare them for regional engagement.

The second principle is that ARSOF can provide the core of regional-engagement professionals who will perform the regional-engagement roles and who will exercise command and control of the supporting conventional forces. This principle reflects the vision of General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army: "To me, small

Psychological Operations Task Force



NOTE: In-theater PSYOP assets have "reach back" capabilities that allow them to draw upon CONUS-based strategic PSYOP assets.

Army Special Operations Forces Task Force



ARSOF units … could serve as the nucleus of a command-and-control element for Army After Next. They could well be the Army element of a standing joint task force and could serve as a command and control platform upon which we could hang capabilities we need."[19]

Supporting forces should have a habitual relationship with the ARSOTF, based on a careful mission analysis. The habitual relationship is critical to effective regional-engagement operations; it should be reinforced by regular exercises.

Transition to war

There are four ways by which the REF will participate in and support the transition to war:

- By providing operational combat outposts that perform battlespace preparation (tip of the spear).
- By supporting war-fighting.
- By transitioning its forces to war-fighting roles.
- By providing operational and strategic force protection.

These activities are fully synchronized with the geographic CINC's war plans and integrated into the CINC's overall military-operations campaign.

The REF functions as the command-and-control headquarters for engaged forces in a geographic CINC's AOR during the period prior to escalation of a crisis to a major contingency or an MTW.[20] In this role, the REF commander is the *supported* commander. In a major contingency or MTW, command-and-control responsibility for war-fighting would normally pass to a JTF commander or a CJTF commander.

When the war-fighting JTF/CJTF deploys in-theater or establishes his headquarters, the war-fighting commander becomes the *supported* commander and the REF commander becomes a *supporting* commander. The point at which this transfer of authority takes place should be predicated upon conditions specified in theater war plans, and the REF should therefore be fully integrated into the war-planning process.

Depending on the size and the scope of the crisis, the REF commander may organize his command-and-control arrangements in different ways. If war encompasses the entire AOR, the REF commander and all of his forces will normally be subordinated (OPCON) to the war-fighting JTF.

If the contingency is of significant proportions but does not encompass the entire AOR, the REF commander may be OPCON to the war-fighting commander in the affected AO, but retain his previous relationship to the geographic CINC in all other areas.

Operational combat outposts

The first way regional-engagement forces support the transition to war is by providing operational combat outposts that perform battlespace preparation. Battlespace-preparation activities establish the conditions that enable or facilitate the entry of the supported war-fighting commander and his subsequent combat operations. Key to this portion of the regional-engagement concept is the idea that, even if the shift in roles between supporting and supported commander has not yet occurred, the REF commander must tailor his operations to facilitate the execution of war plans created to deal with possible contingencies. As the transition between commanders occurs, and as strike forces flow into theater, deployed elements of the REF increasingly focus on facilitating initial forced-entry operations.

During this transition, the deployed REF elements can provide the war-fighting commander with reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition functions; direct-action or unconventional-warfare/coalition activities to strip away specified enemy capabilities; coalition-enabling to ensure early integration of a multinational force; and advanced weapons control. This latter support provides discriminating target-selection, terminal guidance, and engagement decision-making at the point of impact.

As advances in technology increase the range at which lethality can be precisely applied, the difficulty in ensuring that fleeting targets are identified and engaged will increase. The presence of trained and competent war fighters at the point of

Photo by Thomas Witham

REF elements engaged in multinational training, FID or security assistance may be able to transition to the combat role of coalition support.

information-collection, coupled with an integrated global system of secure communications and fire control, will permit war-fighting commanders to begin engaging targets while still in the initial stages of deployment.

The forward presence of trained war fighters empowered to detect, decide and deliver extended-range munitions will permit the war-fighting commander to apply coercive power even before closing with the enemy. The presence of these supporting operational REF elements will ensure that war-fighting commanders at all levels will receive ground-truth intelligence in real time. The result will be a combat force optimally positioned and prepared at the earliest point possible.

Support of war-fighting

The second way regional-engagement forces support the transition to war is through their support of war-fighting. There are two reasons why regional-engagement activities do not cease with the transition to war. First, regional-engagement activities enable U.S. war fighters to hand off responsibility for post-combat operations to indigenous forces at the earliest possible time. Second, in the information-dominated environment of the present and of the future, the commander's legal and moral obligations to the affected civilian population take on even more significance.

As the level of violence escalates and as the threat to persons operating in the combat zone increases, the presence and efforts of OGAs and NGOs will decline. The military assets of the war-fighting commander will provide the only mechanism for addressing the shortfall. The presence of a supporting REF will enable the war-fighting commander to deal with the civilian population without disrupting his combat focus.

Transition to war-fighting roles

The third way regional-engagement forces support the transition to war is through their transition to war-fighting roles. REF operational elements will accomplish the transition from engagement activities to war-fighting roles in two ways: By diverting forces for more immediate combat requirements; and by performing engagement activities that can evolve into combat roles.

Diversion of forces is feasible in the area of combat operations because, while region-

al-engagement activities may reasonably be expected to continue during war, the scale of regional-engagement activities will probably decline. Diversion frees regional-engagement forces to perform their war-fighting missions. Supporting elements participating in regional-engagement activities may find that their experience prepares them for war-fighting missions as well. For example, a medical unit's familiarity with region-specific medical concerns or an engineer unit's knowledge of indigenous transportation systems can enhance combat operations.

Certain regional-engagement activities may also evolve into war-fighting roles. Elements engaged in multinational training, FID or security assistance may be able to provide coalition support. A survey team that had previously been granted access to areas that are denied or threatened may find that its mission has evolved into an SR mission. An element engaged in infrastructure construction may see its mission evolve into a DA mission to destroy or neutralize what it was building.

Operational force protection

The fourth way the REF supports the war-fighting commander is by screening and protecting the commander's operational flanks. Force-protection is largely an economy-of-force mission, but it includes an element of reconnaissance, since it provides warnings and indications of potential threats outside the area of combat operations. These outside threats may have direct implications for the war-fighting commander, or they may be independent of his particular crisis.

As global scouts, REF operational elements can provide warning of emerging or impending threats to the war-fighting forces in the area of combat operations. On a strategic level, global scouts employed outside the area of combat operations can provide warning of emerging threats that may or may not be escalating. This warning permits early reaction, avoids surprise, and may avoid unnecessary diversion of assets. At a minimum, it increases the situational awareness of the war-fighting commander with respect to conditions that may affect the availability of forces.

As strategic shapers, REF elements may protect the flanks in an operational equivalent of the tactical "guard" mission. They accomplish this mission by containing crises and by halting escalation. On a strategic level, control of potential crisis situations not directly related to the major contingency or the MTW avoids diversion of committed assets or reserves. Crisis-containment is an economy-of-force measure, permitting a concentrated effort in the existing crisis area.

As operational combat outposts, REF elements can protect the force by detecting, delaying and shaping imminent threats from the operational flanks or rear. They allow the war-fighting commander to react and to gain and maintain the initiative.

Justification

In a time of constrained resources, any new concept requiring commitment of resources must be justifiable either in terms of cost-and-resource savings or in terms of value-added. The regional-engagement concept is justified in both areas, as a summary of its advantages will show.

• *Low-cost forward presence.* While forward presence has long been part of the U.S. approach to military operations, resource constraints and political considerations are causing a reduction in the number of forward-based units. Regional engagement maintains a forward presence at a cost lower than that of forward-basing large conventional units.

• *Global strategic economy of force.* Implementing a proactive concept of regional engagement would permit the U.S. to manage and contain potential crises at relatively low levels in other regions while war-fighting forces are engaged in a specific MTW or major contingency. Managing those crises would reduce the probability that the U.S. would have to fight a two-front war.

• *Force multiplication*. By maximizing the effect of coalitions and surrogate forces, and by increasing the capabilities of other countries to solve their own problems, the U.S. would reduce demands on its force structure.

• *Early crisis-identification and crisis-resolution*. The proactive nature of regional engagement permits the U.S. to resolve conflict at a stage when the resources required are relatively minimal.

• *Maximum use of force versatility*. The U.S. would need to dedicate only a small percentage of its force structure to an engagement focus. The bulk of the military assets involved in regional-engagement would be conventional forces performing their traditional functions in a regional-engagement context.

• *Decreased probability of war*. By proactively engaging emerging threats, the regional-engagement concept decreases the threat of MTW, making it possible for the U.S. to achieve the smaller war-fighting force structure dictated by our limited resources.

The regional-engagement concept is not a proposal that America's armed forces should be optimized exclusively for regional-engagement operations. As the Quadrennial Defense Review points out, the U.S. needs a military force with a full set of operational capabilities to execute our national-security strategy.

• *Unity of effort*. The regional-engagement concept and its supporting structures provide a mechanism for coherent management of the multiple efforts and programs associated with peacetime engagement, eliminating duplication and achieving a synergistic effect through the synchronization of military, government and non-government activities.

• *Human intelligence*. Global scouts provide geographic CINCs with a ground truth HUMINT asset that has a war-fighting perspective.

• *Battlespace shaping*. Through battlespace-preparation operations, combat forces enter an MTW or a major contingency on a battlespace that has been shaped to facilitate their operations.

• *Appropriate response*. Regional engagement provides an appropriate response to many asymmetric threats that cannot be effectively or efficiently countered with large-scale, war-fighting capabilities.

• *Asymmetric threat*. Regional engagement creates an asymmetric threat to adversaries and potential adversaries.

• *Enhanced war-fighting*. Regional engagement enhances war-fighting during the conduct of MTW and major contingencies.

Conclusion

The regional-engagement concept is not a proposal that America's armed forces should be optimized exclusively for regional-engagement operations. As the Quadrennial Defense Review points out, the U.S. needs a military force with a full set of operational capabilities to execute our national-security strategy. Although some would argue that "the most likely use of military forces in the next five to 10 years will be in the 'nontraditional' category or 'unconventional combat,' "[21] we cannot afford to optimize the U.S. armed forces for only one band of strategic requirements. Experience has shown that a "prevent and deter" capability has no meaning unless it is balanced by a "deter and fight" capability. Neither is the regional-engagement concept an argument for a bifurcated force: one part that fights wars and one part that executes OOTW. The regional-engagement concept is an argument for a force structure that recognizes the interdependence of operations across the continuum.

Regional engagement provides policymakers and commanders with the capabilities to meet the challenges of the future. Developing regional-engagement forces is a critical step in implementing the concept. Tapping existing SOF to form the basis of a core of regional-engagement professionals is the most efficient and the most expeditious method for implementing the concept. Long lead times, particularly for leader development and training, dictate that implementation should begin as soon as possible.

The concept of regional engagement, in combination with the concepts of war-

fighting and homeland defense, presents a holistic approach to future military operations. This approach will minimize future risks, employ constrained resources most efficiently and maximize our operational and strategic flexibility in meeting symmetric and asymmetric threats.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra is commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In previous assignments, he served as commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command; as deputy commanding general and chief of staff, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; and as commanding general, U. S. Special Operations Command-South. He has commanded Special Forces units from the A-detachment level to the battalion and group levels. Major General Bowra is a graduate of the Army War College. He holds a bachelor's degree from the Citadel and a master's degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Colonel William H. Harris Jr. is the Director of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include SF-detachment commander, 3/7th SF Group; operational detachment commander, 1/4th PSYOP Group; company commander, 1/508th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division; commander, Group Support Company, and battalion S3, 10th SF Group; chief, Ground Plans Branch, SOJ5, Special Operations Command-Pacific; commander, 9th PSYOP Battalion; chief, Joint and Army Doctrine Division, DOTD, JFKSWCS; and G3, U.S. Army CA and PSYOP Command. Colonel Harris is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College for Joint Professional Military Education, and of the U.S. Army War College. He holds a bachelor's degree from Appalachian State University and a master's degree from the Army Command and General Staff College.

Notes:

1 *Joint Vision 2010*, p. 4.

2 Taken from the section headings on pp. 2 and 3 of the "Introduction" to *Army Vision 2010*.

3 *Army Vision 2010*, p. 3.

4 See 1998 Army After Next spring war game plenary session, briefing slides.

5 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, "Chapter 1," *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1998*, p. 6.

6 *Chairman's Peace Operations Seminar and Game, 1997 Executive Report* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Peacekeeping Institute).

7 "Futures" games in the Army and in other services indicate that the pace of war will be accelerated by evolving technologies, particularly increased lethality.

8 See the integrated analysis reports for ARSOF War Game 1 and ARSOF War Game 2 and insights from Colonel Glenn Harned, green-team leader for the 1997 AAN summer war game.

9 Global scouts, strategic shapers and operational combat outposts.

10 Situational awareness, war avoidance and battlespace preparation.

11 See ARSOF War Game 2 integrated analysis report.

12 This recommendation is drawn from "Senior Seminar Emerging Impressions," from ARSOF War Game 2, as cited in the integrated analysis report.

13 See the ARSOF War Game 2 integrated analysis report.

14 *Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1998*, p. 2.

15 *Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1998*, pp. 3, 4.

16 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the Congress, 1998*, Chapter 4, p. 1.

17 The SOTF is a joint headquarters. Special-operations forces, or SOF, are assumed to be joint unless otherwise specified. This reflects the unique role of the U.S. Special Operations Command as a joint-force provider with service-like responsibilities for SOF. Civil Affairs functions are performed by structures and personnel integral to the Army component of the SOTF.

18 *ARSOF Vision 2010*, p. 2.

19 From an e-mail response dated 10 Jan 98 to a Pre-command Course question relating to the future of ARSOF.

20 Recall that for purposes of this article, a major contingency or MTW is one requiring forces of Army-corps size (or its equivalent from other services).

21 James M. Bubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure"; *Landpower Essays Series*, No. 97-1, February 1997.

Protecting U.S. National Interests: The Role of the Ambassador and the Country Team

by Jon Gundersen

The mission of the United States Special Operations Command is to "prepare special-operations forces to successfully conduct worldwide special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations in peace and war in support of the National Command Authorities, regional combat commanders, and American ambassadors and their country teams." The command's first goal is "to meet the needs of the National Command Authorities, the regional combat commanders, and the American ambassadors and their country teams."

In other words, special-operations forces, or SOF, answer to only three customers: the president of the U.S.; the regional commanders in chief, or CINCs; and the American ambassadors. SOF operators, prompted by instinct and training, understand the first two lines of authority. As U.S. citizens and as members of the armed services, SOF operators have taken an oath of allegiance to defend the U.S. Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. In this capacity, they are sworn to follow the orders of the president of the U.S. and the National Command Authorities. When assigned overseas, soldiers, sailors and airmen report to and support the regional CINCs.

It is the third customer — the American ambassador — who is perhaps least understood by the SOF community. This article addresses the role of the ambassadors and their country teams: how the ambassadors fit into the national chain of command, how the Department of Defense and the Department of State chains of command work together, how the American Embassies and the country teams work, and how SOF operators fit into the picture.

The national-chain-of-command chart shows the organizational structure of the ambassadors and the regional CINCs and how they fit into the national chain of command.

There are two distinct chains of command: the foreign-policy chain of command and the military chain of command. The foreign-policy chain of command flows from the president (in his role as the nation's commander in chief), to the secretary of state, to the ambassador (the President's representative in each country where the U.S. has diplomatic representation). At this time, the U.S. has a representative in at least 162 nations.

The military chain of command flows from the president to the secretary of defense to the CINCs. While both the secretary of state and the secretary of defense are charged with promoting and defending U.S. national-security interests, particularly overseas, there is perhaps a natural tension between their respective departments. Understanding the assigned roles of the ambassadors and the CINCs may require a little digression about the approaches of DoD and DoS, particularly regarding the use of force in U.S. foreign policy.

Use of force

America's armed forces do not view the use of force as an abstract concept; to them, it means putting young Americans in harm's way. And when the use of force does not achieve the stated objectives, the military often bears the brunt of both burden and criticism for a failed national policy, as the Pentagon became painfully aware during the Vietnam era. After an agonizing post-Vietnam doctrinal debate, the military-security community concluded that Washington should commit U.S. military assets only when there is a national consensus and

National Chain of Command



when the use of force is overwhelming (the so-called Weinberger Doctrine, as later amended by Colin Powell).

Many in the military contend that policy-makers in the White House and in the State Department are too eager to commit American forces around the world. In the Pentagon's view, these policy-makers apply too literally Clausewitz's dictum that war is "politics carried out by other means."

On the other hand, the State Department argues that most conflicts in the post-Cold War world require a more nuanced understanding of the extent and the limits of U.S. engagement, military and otherwise. American policy-makers must have more options than committing overwhelming force or doing nothing. This is particularly true when an objective is well-defined: for example, feeding the hungry or preventing a refugee flow. And when there is a clear exit strategy, the introduction of American military forces in situations short of war is necessary to support U.S. national objectives. Finally, the U.S., as the remaining world superpower with unchallenged military capabilities, has a special responsibility to lead. When Washington fails to assume this responsibility, as it did during the initial stages of the civil war in Yugoslavia and during the massacres in Rwanda, the world becomes paralyzed, and millions of innocents suffer.

Pessimists and optimists

The Pentagon and the State Department have fundamentally and perhaps necessarily different conceptual approaches to the world. The core mission of America's armed forces is to fight and win military conflicts. Our armed forces must prepare for uncertainty and worst-case scenarios when diplomacy has failed. SOF must train for everything from hostage situations to noncombat evacuation operations, or NEOs. In other

words, military personnel are paid to be pessimists.

State Department personnel, on the other hand, are paid to be optimists. They are expected to resolve conflicts and to promote national interests without recourse to the use of force. When war threatens (as it did prior to Desert Storm) or when conflicts escalate (as they did prior to the Dayton Peace agreement), the president invariably sends in the secretary of state to adjudicate disputes or to negotiate agreements. Thus, a good diplomat is paid to keep hope alive.

The foregoing discussion should not be perceived as advocacy of either position. Clearly, both the DoD and the DoS must learn how to operate in a new multipolar strategic environment. They must find a realistic middle ground between undue optimism and self-fulfilling pessimism. And, generally, DoS and DoD have been able to reconcile any differences of approach on the use of force. Reconciliation efforts, of course, occur at the higher levels. Often the troops on the ground, whether they are junior officers at U.S. Embassies or on A-detachments in the field, are the last to know.

CINCs and ambassadors

The need to reconcile differences of approach is also imperative at the next level of the chain of command: the regional CINCs and the American ambassadors. Regional CINCs and American ambassadors coordinate, sometimes on a daily basis, everything from missions of foreign internal defense, or FID, to potential NEOs, and they do it quietly and effectively. As with any two powerful institutions and players, even those serving the same commander in chief, there are natural points of tension.

An American ambassador is the president's representative to a given country. In that capacity, the ambassador exercises "full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government personnel," including DoD personnel, under his authority. Furthermore, the ambassador's sole responsibility is to promote and protect U.S. interests in a single nation.

Regional CINCs, on the other hand, are responsible for anywhere from 19 countries (CENTCOM) to 83 countries (EUCOM). The CINCs assess competing priorities before assigning in-country missions to SOF operators. They do this through, inter alia, a yearly planning conference in which all embassies are invited to submit their country plans for military deployments.

Sometimes, an ambassador's and a CINC's priorities will initially differ. For example, in Sri Lanka in 1997, after receiving threats to U.S. military personnel made by the Tamil Tigers (the local guerrilla movement), USCINCPAC postponed future joint-combined-exercise-training events, or JCETs, pending a review of the security situation. Furthermore, in light of the Khobar Towers bombing, SOCPAC recommended that all deployed personnel in selected countries, including Sri Lanka, be allowed to carry weapons. The CINC believed that the safety of his troops warranted such a step.

The ambassador, on the other hand, argued that the security situation had not changed, that the rebellion was localized, i.e., it was not near U.S.-Sri Lankan exercises, and that other U.S. personnel (diplomats, among others) did not carry side arms. Furthermore, the overriding national interest was for Washington to work quietly with the Sri Lankan government, including continuing low-keyed military-to-military programs, to achieve a peaceful solution to the Tamil Tigers' rebellion. If policymakers were to unilaterally (and unnecessarily, according to the ambassador) change the rules of engagement or cancel all future exercises, larger American interests would be jeopardized.

In the case above, both the regional CINC and the ambassador had a responsibility to make a tough judgment call and to arrive at a decision both could live with. The ambassador and the CINC negotiated a compromise: U.S. exercises would be allowed to continue after a delay, and SOF operators would be allowed to deploy without weapons. In Cambodia, on the other hand, USCINCPAC and the ambassador agreed to allow weapons in-country to be stored at a central facility and to be issued with the approval of the ambassador. Local authorities concurred with both arrangements.

American ambassadors

All American ambassadors receive a letter of instruction from the president outlining their roles and responsibilities. Among the numerous points of instruction, the most pertinent are that the letter:

- Charges the chief of mission, or COM, with exercising full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S. government personnel under the COM's authority.
- States the crucial importance of ensuring the security and protection of the mission and its personnel.
- Instructs the COM to review regularly and, if necessary, to adjust programs, personnel and funding levels; and to ensure that all agencies attached to the mission do likewise.
- Specifies that agencies must obtain the COM's approval for changes in the size, composition or

Photo by Paul R. Caron

The U.S. Ambassador to Mali, David Rawson (center), talks with Captain Berry Duplantis of the 3rd SF Group. The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for all U.S. government personnel in the country who are not under the command of a U.S. area military commander.

mandate of their elements in the mission.

• Affirms the COM's right to see communications to or from all mission elements, except those specifically exempted by law or executive order.

• States that the only authorized channel for instructions to the COM is through the secretary of state or directly from the president

First and foremost, the ambassador is the president's representative in a given country. This titular role can be compared to a combination of roles: captain of a ship and governor of a state. In the role of captain, the ambassador is responsible for all U.S. government personnel in the country except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander. The ambassador's authority thus extends to all DoD personnel on the embassy's staff, and to others not directly under the CINC's command. These personnel report to the ambassador, as well as to their normal chain of command. The ambassador is required to know what everyone on the ship is doing. If something goes wrong during the ambassador's watch, it will be the ambassador who is called to task. If the ship goes down, e.g., if the embassy must be evacuated, the ambassador will probably be the one who carries the American flag into that last helicopter.

In the role of governor, the ambassador represents the U.S. at countless diplomatic events, from trade shows to ship visits to openings of traveling Broadway shows. The ambassador takes care of endless visitors, from congressional delegations to the inspector general (DoS's internal audit on the operation of the embassy).

Ambassadors must also be aware that their most important constituent is the average American citizen. The embassy is reminded of this on a daily basis, usually after hours, by callers who begin their conversation with the line: "I am an American taxpayer and I've lost my passport/I have no money/I've been (unfairly) thrown in jail/I'm a good friend of Senator so-and-so/My husband got lost. What are you gonna do about it?" And like a good governor, a good ambassador can ill afford to ignore the comments or complaints of any of his constituents. Many of those constituents, in fact, may well *be* good friends of Senator so-and-so.

Approximately two-thirds of all ambassadors are career foreign-service officers, or FSOs. In other words, they have probably worked for the government for more than 25 years, and like good soldiers, they have worked their way up the chain of command, from stamping visas as a new vice counsel to managing an embassy as the deputy chief of mission, or DCM. In areas where SOF are likely to be deployed (for example, the Third World), almost all ambassadors are career FSOs.

Country team

The ambassador-and-country-team chart depicts the ambassador and the country team at a typical embassy:

The country team consists of the ranking representatives from the embassy sections and from other U.S. government agencies operating in the country. The country team meets regularly to review current developments and to advise the ambassador on what steps the embassy is taking, or should be taking, to promote U.S. interests in the country. The ambassador or the DCM chairs those meetings.

As a rule, the country team operates as just that — a team with common interests and objectives. However, as could be expected from any team with strong-willed players representing powerful agencies, differences do occur regarding how best to promote U.S. national interests. Country-team meetings, under the ambassador's direction, are the

way those differences are resolved.

The DCM is a key player on the country team. Generally a senior FSO (flag rank), the DCM is second in the embassy's chain of command and is charged with standing in for the ambassador during his or her absences. As temporary chief of mission, the DCM is designated the chargé d'affaires, with all the rights and responsibilities of the ambassador. In everyday operation, the DCM, under the ambassador's direction, manages the embassy. In addition to fulfilling his other obligations, the DCM prepares the mission program plan, coordinates the emergency-action plan, and reconciles the sometimes different and differing agendas of the various embassy sections.

The other sections of the embassy carry out functions somewhat analogous to the military J1, J2, etc. The four state sections — administrative, consular, economic and political — are headed by career foreign-service officers, usually counselors of the embassy (equivalent to an O6).

The *administrative section* consists of a personnel office, a financial-management office; a general-services office, or GSO; an information-systems office; a medical office; and a security office, or RSO. SOF warriors, who justifiably pride themselves on their self-sufficiency and who normally report through a military chain of command, normally do not work directly with the embassy's administrative section. However, in extremis, SOF operators may wish to coordinate with the GSO on transportation matters, with the medical office on medical emergencies, and with the RSO on physical-security or force-protection issues.

The *consular section* is often the first contact that a foreign national or an American citizen has with the embassy. The manner in which consular officers relate to embassy visitors often leaves the visitors with their most enduring impression of how the U.S. government operates. The consular section issues both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. A consular officer, in effect, determines whether a family can immigrate, or whether a student can study in the U.S. Consular officers also handle American-citizen services, from issuing passports, to visiting American citizens in jail, to contacting next of kin and shipping the remains of Americans who have died overseas.

SOF operators should contact this section if they lose their passports or if they experience an emergency while in-country. The responsibilities handled by the consular section can be daunting, and the person who oversees them must demonstrate sound judgment. Most consular officers are relatively junior officers (comparable to O1 through O3 in the military), who work long hours at these sometimes thankless tasks.

The *economic section* is charged with advancing U.S. economic and commercial interests and reporting on the host nation's economic developments that affect those interests. Promoting American goods and services is becoming an increasing priority. For example, the economic section works to ensure that any local tariffs or other restrictions are fair and consistent with international laws. In other words, the economic section ensures that American businesses can operate on a level playing field. The economic section also deals with bilateral and multilateral environmental, science, and technology issues.

The *political section* reports on local political issues and represents American views on a wide range of issues, from security to human rights. In some embassies, a priority of this section may be building or maintaining alliances; e.g., promoting NATO enlargement or U.S. base rights in Japan. In other embassies, the priority might be promoting democracy and human rights in the former Soviet Union, Nigeria or Haiti; or countering narcotics in Columbia. SOF teams conducting JCETs, for example, should be briefed by the political section, so that they understand local conditions and personalities.

The U.S. Foreign Service includes personnel from four other agencies related to the State Department:

• The U.S. Information Agency/ U.S. Information Service: USIA/ USIS handles information, cultural affairs and libraries. The public-affairs officer will have expertise in dealing with the local press.

• The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID: Administers the U.S. foreign-aid program.

• The Foreign Commercial Service, or FCS: Supports American exports.

• The Foreign Agricultural Service, or FAS: Supports exports of American food products.

Most embassies have at least some U.S. military representation:

• The defense attaché's office, or DAO: The ranking officer of the DAO is either an O5, O6 or O7 (from any service). He reports through Defense Intelligence Agency channels about the host country's military capability and military leaders. Given its experience and expertise, the DAO is an important source of background knowledge for the SOF operator.

• The military mission (called the military assistance advisory group, or MAAG; the joint United States military advisory group, or JUSMAG; or the security-assistance organization, or SAO): Pro-

The Ambassador and Country Team



vides military aid and facilitates military sales.

• The U.S. Marines provide security at most U.S. Embassies.

Other agencies, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Central Intelligence Agency, can also be represented at various posts. The Justice Department, which oversees all law-enforcement agencies, is the fourth largest presence at U.S. Embassies after DoS, DoD, and USAID. SOF operators, especially those who deal with counternarcotics, may wish to coordinate with local law-enforcement representatives at the embassy.

Finally, often more than half of all employees at any U.S. Embassy are foreign-service nationals, or FSNs. Because of their long-term experience, local expertise and language capability, FSNs are a unique asset for the embassy. SOF operators should work through U.S. Embassy personnel before working directly with local FSNs.

SOF's role

As noted above, often the first stop that SOF make after arriving in-country is at the U.S. Embassy. This experience may prove to be as much of a cultural clash for the SOF soldier as encountering indigenous people.

On one hand, some military personnel may consider State Department officers as Ivy League dilettantes who have no military experience and who have more interest in abstract human rights than in real-life security issues. On the other hand, some foreign-service officers still perceive the military as latter-day Rambos, or as short-term interlopers who have little understanding of local conditions or of long-term American interests. The reality, of course, is that both the military and State Department personnel serve the same National Command Authorities, and both are charged with the mission of protecting and promoting American interests. The more the SOF warrior and the State Department diplomat understand each other's missions, methods of operations, and even culture, the better their working relationships will be. The first step should be to establish close and continual contact between the SOF unit and the appropriate embassy section.

In a time of need, whether it be a hostage situation or an NEO, a SOF presence will always be welcome. After all, SOF's role may be key in resolving a most delicate and high-profile diplomatic crisis or even in preventing the loss of American lives. The ambassador will most likely welcome SOF and take a personal hand in coordinating their activities. The ambassa-

dor is in command until an actual operation starts, and he or she resumes command as soon as the operation is over.

SOF programs — from JCETS to civil affairs and psychological operations — often constitute the backbone of bilateral military-to-military cooperation. They promote long-term national-security interests and establish a legitimate American presence in- country. Nevertheless, these programs sometimes touch on delicate issues involving national sovereignty and local politics. It is therefore important to coordinate activities with the appropriate embassy representative(s), most likely in the political section or the military section of the embassy.

Both the military and State Department personnel serve the same National Command Authorities, and both are charged with the mission of protecting and promoting American interests. The more the SOF warrior and the State Department diplomat understand each other's missions, methods of operations, and even culture, the better their working relationships will be.

How are SOF doing?

Recently, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, conducted a diplomatic-customer survey of 65 key American ambassadors. The survey requested feedback from the ambassadors regarding the quality of SOF support for their respective embassies. The responses were overwhelmingly positive and reflected satisfaction with SOF at all levels. Special emphasis was placed upon SOF's regionally oriented cultural sensitivities, flexibility, low-profile presence and exceptional professionalism. Listed below are comments from the ambassadors, which succinctly express why SOF is often the "force of choice" in many regions of the world.

- Panama: "The (U.S.) Special Forces are true professionals in every sense of the word … truly one of our country's great resources."
- Ecuador: "I'm proud of the display of dedication and professionalism exhibited by members of the special-operations community … truly the cream of the crop of our military."
- Indonesia: "It is difficult to exaggerate the success and importance of USSOCOM training activities in the support of national and DoD goals in Indonesia."
- Hungary: "They (SOF) epitomize the ideals that we hold so dear in our military."
- Morocco: "I am pleased to inform you that the USSOCOM forces have performed superbly and have fully supported our efforts to enhance military-to-military relations with Morocco."

Naturally, some responses contained constructive criticism. Most of those recommended more exercises or better coordination and communication. USSOCOM is working with the regional CINCs and the ambassadors, and through them, with the local military command authority, to respond to those comments.

Lessons learned

A number of recommendations have emerged as a result of the diplomatic-customer survey, discussions at USSOCOM, and after-action comments from SOF operators:

Cross-training. Everyone connected with the SOF community, from the regional CINCs to the SOF warriors in the field, should have a full understanding of the role of both the ambassador and the country team. Much of this information is covered in the ambassador's orientations and in ad hoc briefings. However, the message needs to be made more systemic and consistent. Therefore, a standardized briefing about the role of the ambassador and the country team should be integrated into SOF-operator, pre-command, and senior-service courses, as well as into briefings for newcomers and briefings for the regional CINCs. The responses from the diplomatic-customer surveys should be integrated into USSOCOM's public-outreach programs to Congress, to the State Department, and to other interested and affected agencies. Finally, through an enhanced ambassador's orientation program, U.S. ambassadors and their country teams could be made more aware of the role of SOF and the way SOF support the missions of the embassies.

In-briefs and back-briefs in-country. One of the most useful cross-training tools is the requirement for SOF teams to visit their relevant embassies before and after undertaking their in-country activities. Upon entering a new country, the team will benefit greatly from an embassy briefing about local conditions, whether it be a briefing by the DAO on the state of the local military, or an assessment by the politi-

cal counselor of the presence of ethnic tensions.

Upon leaving the country, SOF can provide the embassy with up-to-date insights on local military and political conditions. Both DoS and DoD personnel will benefit from the relationships that can be forged through this iterative process. Of course, SOF teams must be cleared by the ambassador before their in-country mission begins; most SOF teams check with the embassy before they go to the field, and some SOF teams back-brief the embassy before they depart; however, the practice of briefing is still more episodic than regular.

Briefs before going to the field. Although this article is intended to highlight the role of both the ambassador and the country team, it can be used as a basis for briefing everyone from ambassadors to regional CINCs to the SOF warriors in the field. The relationship between DoD and DoS should be symbiotic: Each group should benefit from the other. Just as SOF operate as a force multiplier for the regional CINCs, they also should operate as a force multiplier for the local ambassadors, projecting American influence, protecting American values and increasing American options in-country. Of course, the regional CINCs control, as they should, the actual operations and priorities of SOF in the field. Nevertheless, all key players, from the CINCs to the ambassadors to the A-detachments, share a mutual interest in assuring that both DoD and DoS personnel are fully oriented regarding the relationship between SOF and the country team.

We're all on one team. As should be clear from this article, all of us, whether it be CINCs, ambassadors and their country teams, or SOF diplomat-warriors in the field, are interested in protecting U.S. national-security policy. Our methods may sometimes differ. In such cases, we should coordinate on a constant and consistent basis. However, if we keep in mind that we are all on the same team, we should have no trouble fulfilling our common objective: to promote and protect U.S. national interests.

Jon Gundersen, a member of the senior foreign service, is deputy chief of mission in the American Embassy in Oslo, Norway. He was formerly political adviser to the commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command. Gundersen's diplomatic assignments include coordinator for Bosnian affairs in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in Washington, D.C.; chargé d'affaires in Tallinn, Estonia, and in Reykjavik, Iceland; and deputy director for policy in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. A graduate of the National War College, Gundersen holds a BA in international affairs from George Washington University and an MA in soviet affairs from Stanford University. He has also attended the University of Oslo in Norway. Gundersen served in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1970 and saw service in Vietnam, where he was awarded the Bronze Star. He speaks Russian, Norwegian, Swedish, German and Vietnamese and has published articles on a wide range of topics, including arms control, Russian affairs and national service.

Academic Preparation: Sharpening the Tip of the MOOTW Spear

by Captain Paul Shemella, U.S. Navy (ret.)

"If you want peace," a wise Roman once said, "prepare for war." The special-operations community has mastered that paradox. A more contemporary piece of sage advice tells us to be careful what we wish for. We wished for peace. We prepared for war. We got peace. Now what?

Foreign-internal defense, or FID, has become the bread-and-butter mission for special-operations forces, or SOF. And military operations other than war, or MOOTW, have become SOF's most common battlefield. The paradox that the SOF community has not mastered is this: War is the most important thing we do — but it is the least likely. Unfortunately, we cannot lock ourselves in a glass case and hang a hammer next to it with a sign that reads, "In case of war, break glass." To do so would be programmatic suicide. How, then, do we maintain our preparedness to wage war while waging peace?

FID — especially in its broadest sense — is a major part of the answer. Every time SOF units work with military personnel from other nations, we are bridging the gap between peace and war. FID in the Middle East led us to coalition support teams, or CSTs — the glue that held the Desert Storm coalition together. FID also led our Special Forces, or SF, soldiers to more effective special reconnaissance in Iraq, and to a brief return to their unconventional-warfare roots in Kuwait. FID in Latin America has prepared SOF — including SEALs and Air Commandos — to take on offensive roles in the drug war, should the policy of the United States change.

We are learning to operate at the margins of war, but we must do a better job of forecasting where SOF skills might be needed in the future. Think, for instance, how much better prepared SF and SEAL personnel would have been for operations in Bosnia if FID programs in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had been initiated right after independence. When SOF finally arrived in Bosnia, SOCEUR could field only a handful of Serbo-Croatian speakers, none of whom were truly fluent. Like war, operations other than war are a come-as-you-are affair. How many of our officers understand what is happening in the Caucasus? In Colombia? In Indonesia? In Algeria? It's a long list. What impacts do these situations have on the planners and the shooters of the SOF community? We must be able to anticipate those impacts so that we can prepare for them.

Field work is only part of the preparation process. Every day, we recite the mantra, "SOF are regionally oriented, language-trained, and culturally attuned." Our personnel do not come to us that way; they must be trained over a long period of time. If our officers and troops are to become all of those things — in addition to being warriors — SOF leaders will have to triage the community's excess commit-

ments, specialize units to a greater degree, and focus more thought on the world's geopolitical future. The tip of the MOOTW spear must be just as sharp as the tip of the wartime spear. Much of that sharpening, however, places our people where they least want to be: in the classroom.

Language training is difficult and is becoming more difficult. We have many excuses, but we do not have enough legitimate speakers of most languages. The language of war is ordnance; the language of peace is persuasion. It is a lot easier to shoot than to talk, but language is the sine qua non of peacetime SOF. In the absence of war, language is often what distinguishes us from other troops with whom we have shared many of our tactics, techniques and procedures. Regional orientation and cultural awareness cannot be mastered until a target language has been mastered — and then practiced. But, increasingly, SOF unit commanders are relying on host-nation interpreters.

SOF classrooms, whether they belong to the Joint Special Operations Institute or to unit commanders themselves, offer the training material necessary for basic regional orientation and cultural awareness. Courses are continually reviewed and updated to ensure that the most relevant information is available to the operator. But the operator is deployed so frequently that he is often not available to attend such courses. When the operator is in the field, he tries to conduct FID. Too often, leaders assume that the legendary SOF warrior can learn FID while he is in the field, but this is simply not the case. There is much the operator must have learned before he goes to the field.

Language, regional orientation and cultural awareness can be learned in a classroom-training environment, but there is a fourth component of the peacetime-preparation equation that cannot. Critical thinking is an absolute requirement for SOF officers who must choose courses of action from the civil-military swamps in which we now operate. Critical thinking is the skill that allows our forces to be guided by doctrine without becoming doctrinaire. Critical thinking cannot be taught at a war college where the emphasis is on learning to fight. It is best taught at universities where the emphasis is on learning to think. We must give our officers ample time to attend both military and civilian institutions. General Wayne A. Downing used to say, "Who thinks, wins." Classroom training gives our officers a chance to learn. But where do we send them to learn to think?

The strategy of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, for master's-level education has centered around dedicated programs at two universities — the Naval Postgraduate School and Troy State University. The Naval Postgraduate School administers a curriculum designed

File photo

Some leaders assume that SOF operators can learn everything they need to know in the field, but there is much they must learn before they go to the field.

for all SOF, while Troy State attempts to meet the needs of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers stationed at Fort Bragg. Occasionally, a young officer has an opportunity to attend one of the nation's other universities. Too often, however, such an opportunity is driven by service policies and individual pleading rather than by a SOF strategy for higher education. A well-conceived plan would include all three options, but USSOCOM should seek new developments in academia that can help SOF thrive in its unique position at the confluence of civilian and military activities.

U.S. Air Force photo

In the equivalent of a SOF war college, students might learn the art of special operations without learning to understand the environment in which those operations take place.

If FID is now SOF's bread-and-butter mission, we should ask ourselves which academic program best prepares our officers to plan and conduct it. Once identified, that university program could be considered SOF's bread-and-butter master's curriculum. In fact, the Naval Postgraduate School's curriculum for special operations and low-intensity conflict, or SO/LIC, was designed to fill just such a role. This curriculum was conceived as a framework for providing SOF officers with the area studies and the government framework that enable them to think their way through real-world, politico-military problems. Coupled with the language training at the Defense Language Institute, the SO/LIC curriculum was destined to become SOF's master's curriculum of choice.

But the SO/LIC program risks being overtaken by events. The special-operations officer who is fortunate enough to be selected for study in Monterey does most of his or her critical thinking in the language of mathematics, attending classes largely populated by other SOF officers. The students of SO/LIC are neither required nor encouraged to attend classes pertaining to area studies and government. Graduation bestows upon them a master's of *science* in defense analysis. The SO/LIC curriculum is evolving into a quantitatively weighty SOF war college. At best, students will learn the art of special operations without understanding the geopolitical environment within which those operations take place. At worst, they will learn to think only in terms of what is best for SOF.

Troy State offers the classes in area studies and government that the SO/LIC program does not. Approximately 40 Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers are selected each year to attend Troy State. And, for the least cost, Troy State appears to address the legitimate needs of CA and PSYOP. Coupled with the language training available at Fort Bragg, Troy State is a good package for the majority of CA and PSYOP officers. But that is true only if those officers are allowed to concentrate on their studies exclusively, if they are able to mingle with their civilian peers, and if they are allowed sufficient time for language training.

But Troy State is not the only package available to CA and PSYOP officers. As the operational environment changes, we should not limit the possibilities for SOF higher education.

American and foreign colleges and universities are brimming with programs that give our officers the opportunity to consider why military activities must be understood by civilian officials, why military operations have been subordinated to interagency and multinational imperatives, and why military personnel must understand the political impact of their operations. SOF officers who understand what they need (usually those fortunate enough to have been stationed overseas early in their careers) are requesting enrollment in political-science programs

at civilian colleges and universities. These excellent programs are disadvantaged, however, because they are outside the curricular control of USSOCOM.

The missed opportunity for SOF officers is not just the study of political culture. It is the classroom connection with civilian students and military officers from other countries. Because the majority of today's American civilian officials have had no military experience, military officers are challenged almost daily in the struggle for sound political decisions regarding the use of force, rules of engagement, public-affairs guidance, and exit strategies for contingency operations. Our officers must understand how their civilian masters and other-agency counterparts think — and what they think about the military.

But what about foreign military students? Shouldn't there be a master's program that mixes American military officers with their counterparts from around the world? The Naval Postgraduate School has developed a master's degree program called Civil-Military Relations and International Security. This 15-month curriculum, which is based upon area studies and government, emphasizes civil-military relationships within democratic systems. The program provides a forum in which students from all regions of the world are able to explore the ways that civilian and military organizations can combine their efforts to prevent or resolve conflict — either by negotiation, or with combined military force.

Currently, there are 20 officers and two civilians from 17 countries enrolled in the Civil-Military Relations and International Security program.

SOF leaders should see the advantages of enrolling a number of PSYOP and CA officers in the new curriculum. Those special operators are often at the tip of the MOOTW spear. They would learn — along with officers and civilians from such countries as Bosnia, Ukraine, Malaysia and Colombia — to think their way through peacetime security problems they are destined to help solve. This academic program is a crucible for critical thought about the issues that affect our field activities around the world.

Whichever higher-education options USSOCOM chooses to pursue, the fact remains that academic programs are, and will continue to be, an essential element in the preparation of SOF personnel for peace, war and everything in between. If we do not acquire the capability to understand the people, governments and foreign countries more thoroughly than other military forces do, SOF personnel will become something less than special. We must constantly seek new opportunities for developing special-operations officers who can forecast where our soldiers will be sent in the future and the specific capabilities these soldiers will need. Identifying a master's program for SOF personnel is a policy decision based upon a long list of requirements. The study of what Clausewitz called the "trinity" of people, armies and governments should be near the top of that list.

Captain Paul Shemella is an adjunct professor of civil-military relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. A Navy SEAL for more than 20 years, Shemella served in a number of Navy special-warfare assignments, including platoon commander and department head in both UDT-21 and SEAL Team Two; instructor in the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL department; executive officer, Special Boat Unit Eleven; and commander, Naval Special Warfare Unit Eight in Panama. He also served as the chief of policy for the U.S. Special Operations Command and as chief of staff for Special Operations Command-Europe. Shemella holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Naval Academy and a master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. From 1986 to 1987, he attended the National Security Fellowship Program at Harvard University. He retired from the Navy in November 1996.

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'Tailwind' affair had silver lining

(This letter was written by GEN Shelton to Harold Jacobson, president of the Special Forces Association. — Editor)

Now that some of the dust has settled, I'd like to thank the Special Forces Association for its superb efforts in knocking down the terribly inaccurate reports by CNN and *Time* magazine about Operation Tailwind. As you know, no one was more concerned than I about the unfounded accusations these news organizations made about our Special Operations Group soldiers in Vietnam.

Please let the members of the Special Forces Association know that I am very proud of their professional conduct, forthrightness and quick response in countering the irresponsible allegations. The actions taken by the Special Forces Association to get the facts in front of the American public greatly supported my own efforts to set the record straight, as well as those of my public affairs office and other DoD spokesmen.

Over the years, members of Army Special Forces and all military special-operations forces have risked their lives in defense of our great nation and its global interests. Often these stories must remain untold, as was the case with the details of Operation Tailwind. The only "silver lining" in this otherwise sorry affair is that many Americans now have a much more complete picture of the heroic efforts of Colonel McCarley's team, and the contributions of SOG in general. You should also be justifiably proud of the Association's role in making that possible.

GEN Henry H. Shelton
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

AIMC incorporated into SFQC

Advanced International Morse Code, or AIMC, is no longer being taught as a separate course for Special Forces communications sergeants, or 18Es. AIMC will be incorporated into the 18E curriculum of the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, beginning with SFQC 1-99, which starts Oct. 14, 1998. The consolidation of AIMC into the SFQC is expected to maximize training resources and to improve the success rate of 18E students. The change will extend the MOS phase of the 18E curriculum from 13 to 22 weeks. Under the new arrangement, an 18E student will begin the SFQC in one class but will attend Phase III and graduate with the following class (e.g., 18Es beginning in SFQC 1-99 will graduate with SFQC 2-99).

Army raises MOS 18E re-enlistment bonus for FY 99

The selective re-enlistment bonus, or SRB, for MOS 18E is being raised from 1A/1B to 2A/2B for FY 1999. This action places MOS 18E on the same re-enlistment-bonus level as MOS 18D. MOSs 18B and 18C will continue to receive 1A/1B SRBs.

New SF soldiers must serve 36 months in CMF 18

Soldiers who complete the Special Forces Qualification Course and language training must now serve 36 months in a CMF-18 duty assignment before they will be eligible for other Army career programs. These soldiers will be able to apply for other Army career programs (e.g., commissioned officer, warrant officer or physician's assistant) after 24 months, but they will not be released from CMF 18 duty nor scheduled for training prior to the end of the 36 months. The change was effective June 1, 1998, and it applies only to soldiers who apply for SF after that date.

CMF 18 SFC-selection rate exceeds Army average

The CMF 18 selection rate for the 1998 sergeant-first-class board was 40.8 percent, vs. the Army average of 26.6 percent. Of 571 CMF 18 soldiers in the primary zone, 309 were selected. Of 226 CMF 18 soldiers in the secondary zone, 16 were selected. CMF 18 soldiers selected for promotion to SFC were generally younger and had less time in service than the Army average.

More soldiers complete SFQC in FY 98

As a result of proponent management initiatives and the efforts of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, 377 soldiers completed the Special Forces Qualification Course during FY 1998. That number represents a significant increase over the 241 soldiers who completed SFQC in FY 1997. The projection for SFQC graduates during FY 1999 is 420. Also significant is the fact that there are 177 active-component students in the training pipeline for the Special Forces medical sergeant. While not all of these trainees will graduate, the number of trainees is encouraging because it represents 23 percent of the force's authorizations for SF medical sergeants.

SWCS tour lengthened to 48 months

The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has approved lengthening the tour of duty for CMF 18 soldiers assigned to SWCS from 36 to 48 months. The intent of the new policy is to provide the 1st Special Warfare Training Group with greater personnel utilization and to minimize personnel turbulence. The SF Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM is implementing the policy; exceptions are being considered on a case-by-case basis.

Enlisted Branch points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

MAJ Kerry M. Barry	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSG Randy Earp	Senior career adviser
SFC Lance Glover	CMF 18 professional-development NCO; NCOES manager
SFC Timothy Prescott	CMF 37F career adviser; USACAPOC; 4th POG; 96th CA; schools manager; drill sergeants; recruiters
Mrs. Faye Matheny	Career-branch integrator
Mrs. Rhonda Ruano	1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; JRTC; USSOCOM; SFOD-K; SOCPAC; SOCEUR; SOCCENT
Ms. Pam Wilson	3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC; ROTC; JOTB; SOCSOUTH
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFAS; SFQC

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to either the PDNCO or the senior career adviser. SFQC students who have questions about assignments should get in touch with their student PAC, company first sergeant or sergeant major. NCOES questions should be directed to the unit's schools NCO. For telephone inquiries, call DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. The e-mail address is epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil. The SF Enlisted Branch homepage can be accessed through PERSCOM Online (http://www-perscom.army.mil).

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

New policy masks WO1 OERs of CW3s, CW4s

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has signed a memorandum authorizing warrant officers' WO1 OERs to be placed in the restricted portion of their Official Military Personnel File, or OMPF, once those warrant officers have been selected for CW3. WO1 OERs for current CW3s and CW4s will also be placed in the restricted portion of their OMPF. The initiative, similar to the Army's second-lieutenant masking program, is intended to facilitate the development of junior warrant officers. The new policy will be implemented during the first quarter of FY 1999. The PERSCOM commander announced the policy in MILPER message 021405Z Sep 98.

Board selects 24 FA 39 officers for LTC

The FY 1998 lieutenant-colonel promotion-selection board considered 80 FA 39 officers (22 above the zone, or AZ; 29 in the promotion zone, or PZ; and 29 below the zone, or BZ). Twenty-four officers were selected for promotion: five AZ, 18 PZ and one BZ. Fifteen of those selected are FA 39Bs; nine are FA 39Cs. Although the FA 39 PZ selection rate was five percentage points below the Army average, FA 39 exceeded the Army average AZ selection rate and matched the Army average BZ selection rate.

SF LTC selection exceeds Army average

Statistics from the FY 1998 lieutenant-colonel selection board are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	Percent Selected
Above the zone (AZ)			
SF	17	2	11.7
Army	878	53	6.0
Promotion zone (PZ)			
SF	40	30	75.0
Army	1393	945	67.8
Below the zone (BZ)			
SF	35	2	5.7
Army	1476	52	3.5

The overall SF select rate was 85 percent — the sum of 2 AZ, 30 PZ and 2 BZ divided by 40 PZ considered. This was 9.6 points higher than the overall Army select rate of 75.4 percent. An analysis of the board results yielded two important lessons: 1) Whether or not majors serve in TO&E or TDA assignments makes little difference. Five of the 30 PZ officers selected had completed their branch-qualification in TDA assignments. 2) Even though the Branch and USASOC encourage the SF groups to put their majors into two branch-qualifying jobs, on the FY 1998 board, having had only one branch-qualifying job was not a disadvantage. Of the 30 PZ officers selected, eight had only one branch-qualifying job: SF company commander. Other interesting statistics regarding the PZ officers selected are: average branch-qualifying time as a major — 23.8 months; number of majors who commanded an SF company —

24/30; and resident vs. nonresident CSC — 15/15. Under OPMS XXI, the SF Branch requires an operating inventory of 206 lieutenant colonels in order to be fully integrated into the Army and joint communities. With 215 lieutenant colonels, not including promotable majors, the Branch exceeds that requirement. However, because of severe attrition among the year-group officers who will enter the promotion zone in FY 1999, the excess will be reduced.

Programs, positions open to SF officers

The SF Branch is soliciting applications for the following positions and programs for the summer of 1999:

- ROTC: Assistant professor of military science at both the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute.
- Tactical officers: One each at the U.S. Military Academy and at Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga.
- Graduate School: Officers in year-groups 1990 and 1991 should submit their applications for SO/LIC, Olmsted, and Harvard/DCSOPS not later than November 1998. Applicants should include their latest GRE scores and DA Form 1618-R. Applicants should also ensure that the Branch has their undergraduate transcripts on file. For more information, telephone CPT(P) Mark Schwartz at the SF Branch, DSN 221-3175; or e-mail schwartm@hoffman.army.mil.

One-time waiver granted for CAS^3

The Department of the Army has approved a waiver that will give selected officers credit for attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, or CAS^3. The waiver, designed to reduce the current backlog of captains waiting to attend CAS^3, is a one-time measure that will not be granted again. A list of officers who have not been granted the waiver can be accessed through the SF Branch homepage (http://www-perscom.army.mil). CAS^3 is a prerequisite for enrollment in both the resident and nonresident Command and General Staff Officer Course. Captains who are not CAS^3 graduates and have not been granted a waiver should schedule themselves for attendance as soon as possible. Those in year group 1990 must complete CAS^3 during FY 1999, and they will have first priority for attendance. Captains in YG 1991 will also be given priority, and they should make every effort to attend during FY 1999. Captains who have been granted a waiver may still request attendance in resident CAS^3, and commands may direct certain officers to attend. Requests for attendance should be directed through the branch assignments officer or the installation training officer.

CA officers may apply for skill identifiers

Skill identifiers identify specialized occupational areas not normally related to any one particular branch, functional area or area of concentration. They may require significant education and training or experience, but they do not require repetitive tours, nor do they provide progressive career-developmental assignments. Officers may be awarded skill identifiers through one of the following procedures:

- Completion of a required skill-qualification course certified by the school commandant or by the officer's commander.
- Completion of civil schooling.
- Three to five years of work experience.

There are 11 skill identifiers reserved strictly for Civil Affairs officers. They identify functional skills deemed critical by the Army during CA operational deployments. All CA officers should strive to complete the training or to gain the experience necessary to be awarded one of the following skill identifiers:

agricultural officer, 6U; archivist, 6W; civil defense officer, 5Y; cultural affairs officer, 6V; economist, 6C; public education officer, 6D; civil supply officer, 6E; public transportation officer, 6F; public facilities officer, 6G; public safety officer, 6H; or public communications officer, 6R. A description of each title and the qualifications necessary for the awarding of each CA skill identifier are provided in Army Regulation 611-101, *Commissioned Officer Classification System*, with Notice of Future Change, dated November 1995. Interested officers should submit their SI request on DA Form 4187 through their chain of command to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Attn: AOPE-RPD; SSG Lietz; Fort Bragg, NC 28305-5200. Officers must include a copy of their Personnel Qualification Record, a copy of their college degree and proof of their work experience. For more information, telephone MAJ Jim Berenz, Special Operations Proponency Office, Civil Affairs Branch Manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

FA 39 has new field-grade assignments officer

MAJ Jeff Feldman has replaced LTC Tom Knight as the FA 39 field-grade-assignments officer. Feldman can be reached at DSN 221-3115; commercial (703) 325-3115; or e-mail: feldmanj@hoffman.army.mil.

OPMS XXI update

Beginning Oct. 1, 1998, all officers in year groups 1980 through 1991 should request a change of functional area if they have FA 41 or FA 54. Officers should submit the request through their assignments officer, either on a DA Form 4187 or a memorandum. Officers should list more than one of the new or remaining FAs, with a short justification of their qualifications. In determining the new FA, PERSCOM will consider the officer's preference assignment, professional and academic background, rater and senior-rater input on DA Form 67-9, manner of performance, previously designated functional area, training or prior utilization, and the needs of the Army. Officers who have not requested a change by Sept. 30, 1999, will receive a new FA designation in accordance with the needs of the Army.

Officers in YG 1993 will be the first to select from the new list of OPMS XXI functional areas. Officers should submit their functional-area preferences to PERSCOM not later than Nov. 30. The results will be released in April 1999. For information about the new functional areas, officers may access PERSCOM online (www-perscom.army.mil/opmd/faaac.htm). All SF captains must have a FA. All FAs can have an impact on SF. FA designation does not determine the results of career-field designation.

The records of officers in YGs 1980 and 1986 will go before a board for career-field designation, or CFD, March 16-April 2, 1999. YG 1989 will undergo CFD June 1-11, 1999. Officers will submit their preferences electronically through a CFD internet site that will be operational in the fall of 1998.

The FY 1999 board schedule has been published and is available on the Worldwide Web (http://www-perscom.army.mil/).

The revised DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development*, will be available on the Worldwide Web (http://www-perscom.army.mil/) this fall. It should be available in hard copy by December 1998.

Foreign SOF

Russian special-ops unit marks fourth anniversary

A little-known and relatively new special-operations unit that served during Russia's military debacle in the Chechen conflict continues to exist in the post-conflict period. The 8th "Rus" Spetsnaz Detachment of the Separate Division of Special Designation, Ministry of the Interior, or MVD, observed its fourth anniversary in August 1998. The detachment — distinguished by the red berets that characterize some MVD spetsnaz units — served in Chechnya from November 1995 through October 1996. During that period, the detachment participated in special operations in the Chechen capital, Groznyy, as well as in Argun, Bamut and Pervomayskoye. The detachment also provided bodyguards for MVD Internal Troops General Anatoliy Romanov, who served for a time as the Russian commander in Chechnya. In the fall of 1995, Romanov was critically injured by a Chechen-detonated bomb and remains comatose. According to press reports, Rus detachment casualties numbered 14 men killed and 110 wounded during the Chechen hostilities. One soldier was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia. The Rus detachment also served in Nagorno-Karabakh (site of hostilities between Azeris and Armenians). The detachment's fourth-anniversary commemoration was said to have been a somber one.

Colombian Urban Counterterrorist Troops Focus on Capital

As a consequence of strong guerrilla activity in various regions of Colombia, threats of insurgent actions within the capital, Bogota, have risen. For that reason, forces of the Colombian Urban Counterterrorist Command have been tasked to patrol Bogota and its periphery and to conduct surveillance operations. The counterterrorist units can be air-delivered by U.S.-made Blackhawks and by Soviet/Russian-model Mi-17 transport helicopters of the Colombian Army Air Services.

Iranian exercise highlights border tensions

In September 1998, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan conducted a three-day exercise in northeast Iran near the Afghan border. Code-named Ashura-3, and covering some 600 square kilometers of terrain, the exercise involved 70,000 ground and air elements of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps, or IRGC; many hundreds of personnel in the *basiji* (Volunteer Resistance Forces) from other provinces; and 30 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The IRGC commander emphasized the exercise's role in "acquainting commanders with geographical and tactical conditions of the operational area in northeast Iran, and practicing heliborne and airborne operations by paratroop units in the area"; testing new weapons; and practicing rapid force-deployment. Because of Iran's hostility toward Taleban forces across the border in Afghanistan, the exercise has been seen as a possible preparation for actual military engagements. Iranian media specifically linked the exercise to concerns over Taleban, noting that "this is the logic behind the Ashura-3 war games, especially when the situation is tense in Afghanistan, and the Taleban's military operations in northern Afghanistan have disturbed security along the eastern Iranian frontiers."

Kosovo Liberation Army promises independence

Conflict in Kosovo has focused considerable attention on the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK in Albanian), which vows to create an independent Kosovo for the Albanian majority living there. Serbian denunciations of the "terrorist UCK" include detailed assertions that the organization's support and direction are provided by Albanian heroin and arms traffickers, abetted by Croatians. Regardless of the truth of these assertions, the UCK has gained a new prominence in regional-security affairs. A June 1998 interview with UCK representatives gave insight into the way UCK wishes to be perceived. The representatives insisted that because of the continued oppression by Serbs, the UCK was formed as an army of liberation, and that the UCK believes it can never succeed except by force of arms. They described the UCK's armaments as light infantry weapons and quantities of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Tactics were described simply as "getting up close, to within a few meters of the Serbian special forces, opening fire, and then rapidly withdrawing." The UCK claims that its membership is rapidly increasing because of an influx of volunteers, but the representatives did not provide any strength figures. The UCK representatives expressed the hope that the U.S. would intervene, but they do not foresee that happening "until there has been a bloodbath."

Russian helicopter has special-ops potential

The Russian aviation firm Kamov has developed a light-helicopter prototype capable of performing multiple missions. The experimental model — designated the Ka-60 — was exhibited in the summer of 1998 and is expected to take its first test flight in the near future. The Ka-60 is tagged for eventual deployment in Army aviation units, and it may also see service with the Border Troops and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ka-60 is to be used for reconnaissance, for transporting air-assault forces, and for various light-transport missions. With advanced avionics and electronics added, the Ka-60 can also be used for radio-electronic jamming and for special-operations missions, which have the most demanding requirements for navigation and security. The Ka-60 may also operate as part of "mixed strike groups," in conjunction with Ka-50 Black Shark helicopters. The Russians are developing new tactics for the helicopter, which likely will become operational early in the 21st century. The Ka-60 is powered by two 1,300-horsepower engines. It has one four-blade main rotor and an 11-blade tail rotor; a 245 kilometer/hour cruising speed; a 2,100-meter hovering ceiling; and a range of 700 kilometers, which can be extended by adding fuel tanks. Its maximum take-off weight is 6,500 kilograms. Variations for foreign sale are expected.

Reorganization to transform Russia's Internal Troops

As part of a broader restructuring of the Russian security establishment announced in August 1998, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD, will be reorganized over the next few years. As an early step, these internal-security forces, who have been active in most areas of ethno-national conflict in Russia and around its periphery, will no longer be required to guard state buildings or to escort convoys. During the period 2001-2005, the Internal Troops are to be transformed into the Federal Guard, which is characterized as a "Federal internal security police." Federal Guard forces will be assigned to regional commands and directorates that will replace the current MVD districts where Internal Troops are deployed. The force will be manned on a professional basis — personnel will be recruited on a volunteer contract basis rather than being conscripted. It has been suggested that the Federal Guard may also contain forces from the other "internal power departments," though this is far from

clear. In fact, elaborate proposals to transform Internal Troops into a national-guard-type force that could better respond to Russia's domestic security concerns were advanced years ago without result. Given Russia's enduring economic problems and other turmoil, any fundamental change in structure is likely to be more in name than in substance.

Serbian Counterterrorist Police grow to 500 personnel

Three years ago, Serbia created the Serbian Police Special Counterterrorist Units, or SAJ, as a component of the much larger Serbian Special Police Forces. Initially thought to number about 200 personnel, the SAJ are now believed to constitute two units (one in Vojvodina and the other in Kosovo), with an estimated strength of 500. Organized into brigade- and battalion-sized components, the two units have helicopter transport available and are expected to operate as paramilitary forces in urban situations that may approach regular combat. One report has estimated the size of the overall Serbian Special Police Forces to be 7,000 personnel; that number could be expanded by drawing personnel from other police formations.

Colombian guerrilla operations affect Venezuela

The continuing spillover of Colombian guerrilla activity into Venezuela led to an early September ambush on an 11-man Venezuelan patrol. The attackers were believed to be combatants of the Colombian National Liberation Army, who, together with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, have raised tensions along the Colombia-Venezuela border. In the ambush, a Venezuelan National Guard transport vehicle was struck by 15 rounds. Even though there were no casualties, the encounter underscored growing Venezuelan concerns about escalating border incursions. The ambush was said to be the third such clash this year. Venezuelan border-protection posts and bases have been reinforced in case the guerrillas plan larger actions. At the same time, the leader of the Colombian Self-Defense Units, or AUC, has asserted that 35 Venezuelan and 25 Ecuadorian paramilitary members were training with the AUC in order to prepare themselves to fight guerrillas in their respective countries. The 35 Venezuelans are said to be patrolling the Colombia-Venezuela border as part of a 70-man force. The Venezuelan government has denied that there are paramilitary forces operating along the border and has stated its intent to deal "rigorously" with any paramilitary activity detected. The Colombian AUC has been particularly forceful in stating its intention to permit no establishment of guerrilla buffer zones or autonomous areas within Colombia, a development sometimes raised as a peace-accord bargaining option.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

USASOC announces NCO, Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has announced the winners of its competition for NCO and Soldier of the Year.

The NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Robert M. Nichols of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist Mark N. Waldenmaier of Company A, 1st Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group.

Runners-up were Staff Sergeant Deardeary R. Sutton of Company C, Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; and Private First Class Ethan Eddy of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Other competitors were Staff Sergeant William M. Langley of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; Staff Sergeant Brian K. Speakman of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group; Sergeant Thilo S. Glander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th PSYOP Group; Sergeant Vasant Hayatuk of Company A, 112th Signal Battalion; Specialist Ricky J. Lawson, Company C, Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; Specialist Robert W. McMahon of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and Specialist Jonathan D. Walker, Group Support Company, 7th Special Forces Group.

Revised CA MTPs to eliminate redundancy

The Civil-Military Operations Division of the Special Warfare Center and School is revamping Civil Affairs mission-training plans, or MTPs, to more accurately reflect the functions being performed throughout the Civil Affairs, or CA, community.

Photo by Barbara Ashley

USASOC CSM Richard Efird (left) presents the USASOC NCO of the Year award to SSG Robert M. Nichols.

There are currently eight MTPs for the various Army CA units, but the tasks actually performed by CA units, even though trained for under different MTPs, are often similar. To minimize the MTP redundancy, the CMO Division has reduced the CA MTPs to three. One MTP covers the headquarters elements and functions of all CA units — from battalion, to brigade, to command. The second MTP covers CA generalists in the brigade and in tactical-support teams. The third MTP covers CA functional-specialty teams.

The first MTP to be produced will be ARTEP 41-701-10-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for a Civil Affairs Brigade Support Team and a Civil Affairs Tactical Support Team*. The MTP is being revised and is scheduled for publication in the second quarter of FY 1999.

New handbook will provide FOB planning procedures

The Joint and Army Doctrine Integration Division of the Special Warfare Center and School is developing a handbook to replace *Special Forces Operational Base Standing Operating Procedures* (ST 31-184, dated January 1976). The handbook will include recent lessons-learned; message procedures; and tactics, techniques and procedures. Procedures detailed in the handbook will complement other SF operational procedures.

The handbook will play an important role in helping SF soldiers plan operations: FOB procedures are the heart of preparing, planning and executing SF missions. In exercises conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center and at the National Training Center, soldiers often demonstrate a lack of knowledge and training in staff procedures; they often have poorly developed or nonexistent SOPs; and they often fail to follow SOPs. For many officers, the battalion level represents their first exposure to branches other than their own, and they must learn to apply basic staff procedures.

Compounding the problem for SF soldiers are SF-peculiar operational techniques, such as isolation; planning at the operational level vs. planning at the tactical level; and planning within joint

and combined environments.

The coordinating draft of the FOB handbook is scheduled to be staffed this fall. For more information, telephone Steven E. Cook or Ed Sayre at DSN 239-8689/5255 or commercial (910) 432-8689/5255.

Revisions planned for PSYOP manuals

The Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently completed a subject-matter-expert review board for the revision of FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*. The board discussed key issues, including proposed changes and recommendations for inclusions into the initial draft.

The PSYOP Division will begin planning for the revision of FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*, during the second quarter of FY 1999. The revision is scheduled for completion by the third quarter of FY 2000. Persons who have corrections or suggestions for revision of FM 33-1-1 should submit them to the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division. For more information, telephone the PSYOP Division at DSN 239-7259/7257 or commercial (910) 432-7259/7257.

SWCS to update SF cornerstone manuals

The Special Forces Training and Doctrine Division of the Special Warfare Center and School is producing new cornerstone manuals for SF doctrine.

Initial drafts of FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*; FM 31-20-2, *Unconventional Warfare*; and FM 31-20-4, *Direct Action*, are scheduled to be released during the fall of 1998.

Also in production, either as initial or final drafts, are FM 31-24, *Special Forces Air Operations*; FM 31-27, *Pack Animals*; FM 31-28, *Close Quarters Battle*; and FM 31-23, *Special Forces Mounted Operations*. Drafts of these manuals are scheduled for publication during FY 1999.

The final draft of FM 31-19, *Military Free Fall*, has been approved by the SWCS commanding general, and the manual is scheduled to be published in December 1998.

The SF Division is also taking the lead in developing the Combined Arms Training Strategy, or CATS, for SWCS. CATS is a relational database that will allow commanders at all levels to plan unit training requirements and to program the necessary resources. CATS is scheduled to be operational by 2004. For more information, telephone Major Gregory J. McMillan at DSN 239-5333 or commercial (910) 432-5333.

SWCS to host SF Conference in April

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will host the 1999 Special Forces Conference in April.

The conference theme is "Special Forces — The Path Ahead." Activities will include three symposia, several working-group sessions, an exposition displaying equipment from the special-operations industrial and technological base, an airborne operation, a family-readiness conference, a golf tournament, a dedication to fallen comrades, socials, and the Special Forces Ball.

For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Phil Provencher at DSN 239-7510 or commercial (910) 432-7510; or send e-mail to provencp@soc.mil.

1st SPWAR Training Group takes SGI initiative

The Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group is using the Small Group Instructor, or SGI, initiative to identify high-quality SF captains to serve as small-group instructors at SWCS.

The SGI concept demands the very best officers, and SGIs will represent the entire SF community, not Fort Bragg only. Experienced senior captains, including captains in the primary zone of consideration for major, will be the main focus of the SGI initiative. Captains selected for SGI duty should be in the top 25 percent — those who are expected to be selected for senior service college on their first or second look. They should have received above-center-of-mass block-checks on their command OER.

These officers will provide a pool of 15 to 20 officers each year from which to select SGI officers. The SWCS commanding general must approve officers recommended for SGI duty.

There are six SGI positions in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group: four in Company A, 1st Battalion; and two in Company F, 1st Battalion. The tour of duty for SGI officers will be 12-24 months. Officers will report three months prior to their start date to complete the SWCS Instructor Training Course, to gain knowledge from the incumbent SGI officer, and to prepare themselves to instruct.

To ensure that officers selected for SGI duty will be recognized by promotion-selection boards, the new DA PAM 600-3, *Officer Professional Development*, will note that SGI duty is a key developmental assignment for SF captains following their branch-qualification.

For more information, telephone Major Mark Lowe at DSN 239-2496/1672 or commercial (910) 432-2496/1672.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Night of the Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei. *By William R. Phillips. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ISBN: 1-55750-691-4. 179 pages. $29.95.*

The history of the Second Indochina (or Vietnam) War was marked by numerous attacks on isolated Special Forces camps. The newspapers of the time often called them "sieges," but this was newsmen's hyperbole. The attacks could be more accurately described as miniature battles.

Because of the enemy's justified fear of American air power, the attacks occurred almost universally at night, although fighting sometimes dragged into the daylight hours. Extended attacks lasting two or three nights were not exceptional. The opponents were most often a multiregimental enemy force. They were pitted against an understrength Special Forces A-detachment and the members of its 200- to 300-man strike force who happened to be present at the time of attack.

The opening event was usually an intense and often accurate mortar attack. The successes of the defense were mixed: Some camps fell, some held without assistance and some barely held until the following day's sun brought effective air support and often reinforcement by the Special Forces-led Mike Force.

Win or lose, the defense of the camps was marked by courage, tenacity and the exemplary leadership needed to hold, control and inspire minority troops who had little stake in the war. Such fights

took place at dozens of camps now forgotten by most, save the participants, including Nam Dong, Kannack, Polei Krong, Dak Seang, Plei Me, and A Shau.

Lang Vei, the camp of 5th Special Forces Group's ODA 101, located in the farthest northwest corner of South Vietnam, was in many respects an exception to the attack pattern. Lang Vei's most notable difference was that, unlike most camps, it was not isolated. It was relatively close — within artillery range — to the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh. In fact, the Marines had coordinated the details of an attack to relieve the camp should it be attacked.

Also near Lang Vei were a Laotian outpost a short distance across the border, and a Studies and Observation Group forward operational base at Khe Sanh. While neither of these organizations had any direct relationship to ODA 101, they did provide some warning intelligence.

Lang Vei's final difference was that, when the attack came, it was spearheaded by Soviet PT 76 tanks: the enemy's first employment of armor in South Vietnam. These differences alone, irrespective of the valor of the defenders, recommend this fight ahead of others as a subject for careful research and a detailed account.

Night of the Silver Stars is not the first account of Lang Vei's travail. An earlier effort was David Stockwell's *Tanks in the Wire,* published in 1989 and incisively reviewed by Bill Burgess in the winter 1990 issue of *Special Warfare.* Unfortunately, *Night of the Silver Stars* has many of the faults of the earlier effort and some that are uniquely its own.

Phillips justifies his retelling of the Lang Vei story by indicating that he addresses the larger picture, while his predecessor limited himself to the camp battle. While there are certainly some major differences in the two efforts, Phillips' contention of greater inclusiveness does not stand up well.

Night of the Silver Stars puts neither the defense of Lang Vei nor the larger defense of Khe Sanh in the context of the war, or even in the context of the campaign in northern South Vietnam. The relationships between the various commands in the area are left largely to the reader's assumptions. Phillips' descriptions are crippled by the absence of a map to show the reader the locations of numerous places that are central to the story: the camp, the

previous camp (old Lang Vei), Khe Sanh, the Laotian border, the Laotian unit's location, roads and the location of the involved forces. The book's only graphic presentation is a sketch of the camp, which is presented next to an aerial photo. The sketch and the photo were apparently made at different times and from different directions. Even after carefully studying the included road patterns and making allowances for later construction, it is impossible to orient the two presentations.

Phillips' account is further disabled by his lack of understanding of the Vietnam-era Special Forces and of the various programs and organizations that they developed and manned. For instance, he makes excessive distinctions between members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Force's camp strike force and its Mike Force, repeatedly characterizing the latter as "mercenaries." The role of the SOG personnel is even further beyond his ken.

In summation, other than some of the individual interviews that it includes, *Night of the Silver Stars* has little to recommend it. Certainly it does not deserve a place in the Special Forces soldier's professional library. Possibly, if read in conjunction with Stockwell's book, John Plaster's *SOG*, and some of the accounts of the Khe Sanh siege, it may assist in forming a better overall picture.

COL J.H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach. *By Archer Jones. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishing, 1996. ISBN: 0-275-95527-3 (paper). 264 pages. $24.95.*

Elements of Military Strategy is well-written — the author is clear and concise in his technique, and from the perspective of strategy, his case studies seem to have been well-chosen.

The author takes care in his preface to tell the reader that the book will address strategy at "an elementary level." This is true. Jones covers strategy with a very light touch, and his focus appears to be mainly explanatory.

Jones also tells us that he will deal "with only some of the elements of military strategy." This is also true. His book jumps from chapter to chapter, held together only by chronology — the early Indian Wars in the United States; World War II submarine warfare in the Atlantic; air warfare over Europe; the Pacific campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur; the Korean Conflict and Vietnam; and the Persian Gulf War.

Essentially, Jones is a storyteller. Other than the fact that all the discussion is generally about American military campaigns, the book appears to have no thread of purpose.

Unfortunately, Jones sometimes blurs the line between tactics, operational art and strategy. He seems far removed from any serious discussion of modern strategy and the use of its nomenclature, using the term "calvary of the air," for instance, to describe modern air forces.



There are bright spots: Jones' chapter on the WW II Pacific campaign is particularly interesting. And in his examination of the Vietnam War, Jones does make some good points about the way the U.S. Marines in the early part of that conflict actually trumped the Viet Cong by using well-organized civic action. Unfortunately, Jones glosses over the contributions made by Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs personnel.

As a professor at the Command and General Staff College, Jones held the Morrison Chair of Military History. *Elements of Strategy* may be a loose collection of some of his lectures, but his effort lacks a central guiding light. Other than the fact that some parts of the book make reasonably good reading, there is little to recommend this volume.

LTC Robert B. Adolph, Jr.
U.S. Army (ret.)
Fayetteville, N.C.

Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special-operations forces. Reviews should be from 300-500 words. We encourage submissions on disk or by e-mail. Include full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably DSN) and mailing address. Mail reviews to: Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000 or e-mail to steelman@soc.mil.

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