Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

In recent years, Army special-operations forces have demonstrated their usefulness and flexibility in a variety of operations and missions. A large part of SOF's success is attributable to highly specialized training.

As we look to the future, we see an environment that may be vastly different from that of the present. Will our training ensure continued success for SOF in that environment? At the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, we are working to ensure an affirmative answer to that question.

Our trainers and training developers are already working on the Special Forces Entry-Level Training Vision, a series of strategies and alternatives for recruiting, assessing and training SF soldiers to fill the A-detachments of the future. The SF detachment of 2010 may be dramatically different from the detachment of today in its missions and organization. The challenge is to develop the techniques and metrics that will be needed to recruit and select soldiers with the potential to serve on SF detachments or in conjunction with other forces in combined, joint or interagency operations. We must be sure that we can provide training that will elevate our soldiers' awareness of technology but that will still provide the interpersonal and communication skills necessary for our soldiers to work with foreign-national counterparts.

In April, we will become one of the first Army commands to implement distance learning, or DL, as part of our training strategy: Students in the 18-week SF ANCOC course will begin taking the first six weeks of the course via computer. The change in ANCOC is the first step in a 10-year program to incorporate DL instruction into our SOF training. By the time the program is fully implemented, around 2010, as much as 50 percent of our resident instruction will be available through DL. What is key is to ensure that we focus DL only on those areas of training that lend themselves to multimedia instruction. Portions of our training will always require the hands-on experience and personal interaction that come with resident instruction.

Our ARSOF War Game, an integral part of the Army After Next process, also offers a vision of the future. Through war-gaming, AAN looks at the strategy, technology, organizations and military art that will be needed in 2010. ARSOF War Game III, held in October, focused on the concept of regional engagement. More than 50 players from various military and government agencies participated, and the resulting lessons-learned will ultimately help integrate the regional-engagement concept into future Army operations.

As General Peter Schoomaker, CINC USSOCOM, has pointed out, a rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change. As we develop our training programs for the future, we must remember to learn from the lessons of history, to study current operations for insight into the future, and to embrace change when it is necessary for improvement.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Special Forces Entry-Level Training: Vision for the Future

by Lieutenant Colonel Manuel A. Diemer and Major Thomas M. Joyce

To ensure that Special Forces units will be ready to meet the challenges of the future, Special Forces must identify, recruit, assess and select quality personnel who possess the desired traits and attributes. These personnel must then receive the specialized training required for them to serve either as entry-level enlisted members of SF detachments or as detachment commanders.

File photo

Within the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, leaders and trainers are focusing on the impact that Special Forces entry-level training, or SFELT, will have on the future capabilities of SF units. The success of the current SFELT is unprecedented in SF history. The need to continue that success has led SWCS to develop the SFELT Vision, which is composed of innovative strategies to be considered and studied by the 1st Special Warfare Training Group and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine. The strategies that make up the vision are not presented as approved training policies; they are intended to stimulate debate within the SF community.

SFELT has two parts: The first part consists of recruiting, assessing and selecting the best-qualified candidates to participate in SF training, which is the second part of SFELT. SWCS is responsible for combining the two parts of the strategy and for providing graduates of the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, who are prepared to serve as entry-level operators in the SF groups.

SFELT Vision is linked to the two SOF "vision" statements, the U.S. Special Operations Command's *SOF Vision 2020* and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's *Army Special Operations Forces Vision 2010*. By providing institutional reinforcement to USSOCOM's professional-development strategy, SFELT Vision is indirectly linked to *SOF Vision 2020*.[1] Of greater significance, however, is SFELT Vision's link to the first and primary theme of the *ARSOF Vision 2010*: "Building on the instruments of success."[2] The theme is

The concepts discussed in this document are drawn from a combination of sources, including commissioned, warrant and noncommissioned officers currently or previously assigned to the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. These concepts are not currently endorsed by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School; they serve merely as a starting point for discussion. — Editor

The SFELT Vision Strategy



subdivided into two ideas that form the foundation of SOF's success now and in the future: quality people, and quality training and education.

Because SFELT Vision supports both of these ideas, it has a major role to play in the development and sustainment of SF capabilities. It is vital that we understand the implications that entry-level training has for the future of Special Forces: SF must select, assess and train quality personnel who are capable of operating in isolated, ambiguous situations with less-than-optimum information. Even the most advanced technological capabilities will be ineffectual if placed in the hands of personnel who lack training, good judgment and prudent reasoning.

Recruiting

If the current decline in the military population continues as expected, future Special Forces will be forced to recruit from a smaller pool of candidates and to compete more strongly with other services, other Army branches and other military occupational specialties. SFELT Vision outlines two strategies — "best qualified" recruiting and "sister service" recruiting — that could help SF compete effectively for future candidates.

Best-qualified. The first recruiting strategy is best-qualified recruiting. This strategy would focus on the critical attributes and traits that indicate potential success in both SFAS and SFQC. The Special Warfare Center and School currently identifies and certifies the same relevant success factors[3] upon which this strategy would be based. Under the best-qualified strategy, SWCS would enter information on all SFAS volunteers into a centralized database in order to establish an order-of-merit list, or OML. SFAS classes would then be filled by the candidates who possess the highest balance of success factors. By recruiting only the best-qualified soldiers, SF could significantly increase its SFAS selection rate and the quality of the soldiers being assessed. This strategy would also encourage soldiers to improve certain factors in order to move up on the OML.

SF must select, assess and train quality personnel who are capable of operating in isolated, ambiguous situations with less-than-optimum information. Even the most advanced technological capabilities will be ineffectual if placed in the hands of personnel who lack training, good judgment and prudent reasoning.

The best-qualified recruiting strategy would be a radical departure from SF's current "minimum qualified" strategy. For

The SFELT Recruiting Strategies

BEST-QUALIFIED

- Best-qualified vs. existing minimum-qualified.
- Applicants are rated and ranked based on desirable qualities and traits.
- Candidates possessing those factors that indicate the greatest potential for success would be selected.
- Would permit qualified PFCs to attend SFAS directly or possibly fill out classes with vacancies. Upon promotion to E-4, candidates would attend SFQC.

SISTER-SERVICE

- Personnel recently separated from any of the other services could provide SF with an invaluable source of candidates with military experience.

example, under the current strategy, the Army Physical Fitness Test, or APFT, is used as a factor for SFAS attendance. To attend SFAS, a volunteer must score at least 206 points on the APFT (with 60 or more points in each event).

Statistical research by the Army Research Institute shows that only 19 percent of the candidates who score lower than 227 on the APFT are later selected to attend the SFQC.[4] Under the best-qualified strategy, volunteers with APFT scores below 227 would be rated low on the OML. They would therefore not be scheduled to attend SFAS as long as higher-rated candidates were available.

To expand the pool of potential SF candidates, the best-qualified strategy might extend to recruiting active-duty privates-first-class. The recruitment of best-qualified PFCs could include a delayed-service option: PFCs would be allowed to attend SFAS, but if they were selected for SFQC, they would not be allowed to attend until they were promoted to E4. Another possibility in the PFC option would be that recruiters would fill vacancies in SFAS with best-qualified PFCs if there was a shortfall of qualified soldiers in grades E4-E6.

Sister-service. The second recruiting strategy is sister-service recruiting. A significant number of the personnel who have been released from the Navy, Air Force and Marines would welcome the challenges and opportunities presented by Special Forces. Identifying these individuals and maximizing their personal and professional experiences might benefit Special Forces units.

Assessment and selection

The current SFAS assesses and selects soldiers based on desirable qualities developed in the 1980s — these qualities may not be appropriate for the future SF force. Given the missions and requirements projected in *SOF Vision 2020* and *ARSOF XXI, Operational Concept for the 21st Century*, SFAS will have to remain physically demanding and gradually increase its standards for the assessment of certain desired, but intangible, qualities sometimes referred to as "soft skills."

To develop a complete assessment-and-selection process for the future, we must

critically review our current list of core qualities (attributes and traits) that are desired in entry-level SF personnel and validate that list against future battlefield conditions. After completing the validation, we must determine the optimum combination of physical and mental evaluations. As we evaluate a candidate's mental attributes, we should also assess his character: As General Hugh Shelton has stated, "Ultimately our SOF operators are defined by their character."[5]

The assessment-and-selection equation of assessing desired qualities[6] by evaluating physical and mental abilities and team or group interaction is sound, but SWCS needs to identify ways of achieving a balance between mental and physical assessments.

The current SFAS process focuses on an individual's physical aspects. If an SF candidate's performance is considered marginal, it is usually because he experienced problems with the APFT, the obstacle course, endurance runs, rucksack marches, land navigation or the physical aspects of situational-reaction events. This physical focus actually runs contrary to the historical evidence regarding individual mental attributes that Special Forces soldiers should possess.

One reason that mental evaluations are not a significant part of the current assessment-and-selection process is that evaluating desired mental attributes is a complex process. Tests that assess one's tolerance for ambiguity and one's mental agility and flexibility are difficult to develop and costly to administer. The evaluation of mental and character attributes is therefore typically accomplished in the assessment of the mental and physical stamina required in completing the course. While it is true that physical endurance and determination are indicative of mental toughness, these qualities say little about an individual's accountability, maturity, stability, intelligence, trustworthiness, and ability to operate in ambiguous environments.

The individual assessment of character and mental attributes is also hindered by the personnel strength of the current SFAS cadre. The student-to-cadre ratio of 15:1 does not allow the cadre to perform comprehensive individual student evaluations. Safety considerations and the emphasis on the proper execution of events take precedence over individual evaluations.

SFELT Vision provides two strategies for a future assessment-and-selection process: "pre-phase" training, and "civilianized" training.

Pre-phase training. The first strategy would include an additional phase — pre-phase — prior to the current Phase I of the SFQC. This pre-phase would include a longer version of the current SFAS in order to give SF candidates additional training.

The evaluation of mental and character attributes is therefore typically accomplished in the assessment of the mental and physical stamina required in completing the course. While it is true that physical endurance and determination are indicative of mental toughness, these qualities say little about an individual's accountability, maturity, stability, intelligence, trustworthiness, and ability to operate in ambiguous environments.

The first portion of pre-phase would consist of current SFAS individual events, such as rucksack marches, runs, and the obstacle course, as well as extensive training in land navigation. Near the end of the first portion, candidates would be assessed by means of a long-range navigation exercise. The exercise would test the candidates' ability to overcome both physical and mental stress. At each navigation point, candidates would have to complete a series of individual events before they could receive the coordinates for the next navigation point. The individual events would evaluate an individual's ingenuity; ability to work in small groups; ability to communicate through an inter-

preter; mental agility and flexibility; tolerance for ambiguity; ability to think clearly and to make quality decisions; and situational awareness.

The second portion of pre-phase would evaluate candidates' team- or group-interaction abilities, and it would offer two assessment options. Under the first option, assessors would continue to use traditional, nonmilitary mechanisms for evaluation; i.e., situational-reaction events. Under the second option, assessors would use military mechanisms, such as small-unit tactics, for evaluation. The advantage in using a military mechanism for evaluating group interaction is that individuals not selected to attend SFQC would still have participated in training that elevated their abilities and that indirectly improved the readiness of the unit to which they would return.

Another advantage in using small-unit tactics as the assessing mechanism is that individuals who *are* selected for continuation into SFQC will be better prepared to conduct tactical training during Phase I, which emphasizes small-unit tactics.

An improved selection-and-assessment process would provide two advantages for the SF training portion of SFELT: It would allow the SFQC to focus primarily on training; and by providing additional military training and by selecting better-qualified candidates to attend the SFQC, it would help lower SFQC attrition.

Civilianized training. The second training strategy would "civilianize" the assessment-and-selection process. Individual physical abilities might be assessed using long-range movement events or triathlon-like affairs. Mental abilities, leadership, and team or group interaction might be assessed by psychologists, behavior scientists, or trained assessors.

These assessors could perform psychological evaluations or use civilian scenarios to evaluate candidates. For example, a scenario might require a group of personnel to form a corporation. During the exercise, assessors could observe emergent leaders and assess candidates' interpersonal skills during conflict. Assessors could also conduct individual interviews, focusing on metrics that are indicative of the desired attributes, traits and characteristics for SF.

The missions, organization and equipment of the SF A-detachment in 2005 or 2010 may be significantly different from those of today. The SF community must ensure that SFAS selects soldiers who

The SFELT Assessment and Selection Strategies

PRE-PHASE

- Current SFAS to be incorporated into SFQC as a pre-phase, with increased training time a result.
- The first part of pre-phase includes typical individual events (rucksack marches, runs, obstacle course, etc.) and extensive training in land navigation. A long-range navigation exercise would test basic land-navigation skills and provide a means of measuring other abilities required of SF.
- The second part of pre-phase consists of team or group training, with evaluation by military or nonmilitary methods.

CIVILIANIZED

- Physical skills and abilities to be evaluated through triathlon-like events or something similar.
- Psychological testing administered by civilian professionals would measure an individual's mental and intellectual aptitude.

have the potential to be trained for the force of the future. Unless SF alters its current assessment-and-selection program so that it will meet the needs of the Army After Next, future SF units may be capable of addressing only the antiquated battlefield requirements of the 1990s.

Training

The SFQC produces an entry-level SF soldier who is prepared to operate independently or in conjunction with other forces in Army, joint, combined or interagency operations. Operational flexibility will become increasingly important in the future.

Also important to future operations will be the joint operational concept of information dominance. Future soldiers, SF included, will need to be capable of conducting offensive information operations. New technologies will enable SF soldiers to quickly understand the operational environment and to leverage available combat power in a timely manner.

General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently highlighted the need for a future information capability: "The SOF operator of the 21st century, just as the civilian worker of the 21st century, will most likely require greater math, computer and language skills."[7]

To acquire that capability, SF soldiers of the future must receive entry-level training that elevates their awareness of technology. The SFQC will require a computer-based curriculum that includes realistic simulations.

Four training concepts — distance-learning and multimedia technology; self-paced programs of instruction, or POIs; pre-testing; and expansion of the scope of SF basic skills — provide the foundation for future SF training included in SFELT Vision.

Technological advances in both distance learning and multimedia instruction will allow SF to increase the use of self-paced POIs during individual training. *ARSOF XXI* points out that SF soldiers must possess the capability of "training themselves and their subordinates."[8] Self-paced POIs would also give soldiers an opportunity to accelerate the completion of the individual-training portions of the SFQC.

Pre-test screening could also be effective in shortening the SF training pipeline. With an institutionalized pre-testing system, students who demonstrate that they are proficient in Phase I tasks would be accelerated into Phase II, where a self-paced POI would allow them to catch up with the class that began before their own. Thus, some students could begin Phase III earlier and complete the SFQC in a shorter time than normally required. The time they save could be spent in other training courses, used for extended language training, or used to give soldiers earlier reporting dates to SF groups.

The SF community must ensure that SFAS selects soldiers who have the potential to be trained for the force of the future. Unless SF alters its current assessment-and-selection program so that it will meet the needs of the Army After Next, future SF units may be capable of addressing only the antiquated battlefield requirements of the 1990s.

The future entry-level SF soldier will require a greater number of basic skills. The basic skills now taught in the SFQC will need to be expanded to include infiltration and exfiltration techniques; survival skills; and escape and recovery. Cross-cultural and nonverbal communications skills, conflict-resolution techniques and negotiation skills are critical to the SF soldier who must establish and develop rapport with his foreign-national counterparts.

Basic skills in advanced special-operations techniques and close-quarters battle, as well as the tactics, techniques and procedures of force-protection, would also provide SF soldiers with a much-needed capability. Entry-level training might also include the use of nonlethal weapons systems, coupled with a tactical orientation that would bal-

Team Training Stategy: 1st SWTB Structure



ance traditional rural scenarios with the ever-more-likely urban ones.

The SFELT Vision provides three strategies for future SF training: "team," "Phase 12," and "individual/collective." Each of the three strategies includes the four training concepts mentioned above.

Team strategy. The team strategy envisions the majority of the SFQC being taught using the small-group instruction, or SGI, method. Candidates, organized into student A-detachments, would be taught by the same cadre throughout the course. The team strategy would require a major restructuring of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group's 1st Battalion.

The restructured battalion would include three student companies whose cadre would be responsible for training, mentoring and developing the candidates. The remaining five companies would consist of the cadre for both SFAS and MOS-specific training, as well as the cadre required to maintain the Phase I and Phase III operational areas.

Each of the student training companies, or B-detachments, would consist of six student A-detachments. Each detachment would have three cadre team sergeants, or CTSs: an 18B, an 18C, and an 18E. Each student detachment would contain 10-15 students: two or three each from 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D, and 18E. (18Ds would participate with their teams only during Phases I and III.) The B-detachment headquarters would contain three personnel — an 18A, a 180A, and an 18Z — who would provide training management and support to the student detachments and act as small-group instructors for the 18A students during Phase II.

During Phase I, CTSs would provide all training in land navigation, Army and SF common skills, and small-unit tactics. Phase II would be organized into blocks of MOS-specific training, interspersed with mission-planning exercises on special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and direct action. Members of the student detachments would split into MOS groups for MOS-specific training and then reassemble as teams for the mission-planning exercises. During the exercises, CTSs and B-detachment-headquarters person-

nel would serve as mentors and would teach the students mission-planning and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This concept would increase the students' exposure to isolation procedures and mission-planning, and allow them to receive more individual instruction from the CTSs. Cadre from Company A would assist the SGIs in Phase II of the officer-student training.

To increase their knowledge of conventional operations, Phase II students might also take part in conventional-unit rotations at one of the Army's combat training centers. Incorporating the observer/controller "shadow" program into the SFQC would allow students to work alongside conventional units at appropriate levels: SF officers at the infantry-battalion level, 18Bs at the infantry-company level, 18Cs at the engineer-company/platoon level, and 18Es at the signal-detachment level.

During Phase III, the CTSs would continue to provide small-group instruction to their designated student detachments and to mentor students during the Robin Sage FTX. During the Robin Sage FTX, Company F would assign one CTS to the operational area of each student A-detachment in order to maintain the area complex, build the auxiliary force, select targets, provide safe houses and develop agreements for the use of civilian land. Company F would provide command, control and intelligence for the guerrilla force, opposing forces, and civilian auxiliary or underground. It would also assist in isolating, launching and recovering student A-detachments.

Phase 12 strategy. The second training strategy, Phase 12, would employ a two-phase SFQC. Phase I, taught by the MOS cadre, would combine the current Phase I — training in SF common tasks, land navigation and small-unit tactics — with the current Phase II — MOS-specific training and additional SF-mission training. The second phase of the Phase 12 strategy would con-

File photo

Land navigation, a critical skill in Special Forces, is a consistent factor in the various strategies of the SFELT Vision.

Phase 12 Training Strategy



NOTE: The "Individual/Collective" training strategy is similar in that it also organizes training into two phases. Phase I concentrates on individual skills, Phase II stresses collective tasks.

sist of a field-training exercise similar to the current Robin Sage FTX, but with a greater emphasis on interpersonal and cross-cultural skills.

Individual/collective strategy. The individual/collective strategy would also divide the SFQC into two phases. Phase I would focus on Army and SF individual skills such as land navigation; SF common skills (including interpersonal techniques); and MOS-specific skills. Phase II would emphasize the collective tasks required in SF entry-level training: small-unit tactics, mission planning, infiltration and exfiltration techniques, mission fundamentals and planning skills. Phase II would include field-training exercises and culminate with the Robin Sage FTX.

Conclusion

In a recent article in *Special Warfare*, General Peter Schoomaker, commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, stated, "A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change."[9] The mandate of the SF community is not only to anticipate the capabilities that will be required in dealing with future transnational and asymmetrical threats, but also to modify SF entry-level training in order to prepare for those threats. Failure to anticipate future needs and adjust SF training accordingly may invite catastrophe. SFELT Vision provides a starting point for discussion and analysis of our future requirements and the ways SF training might evolve to address the challenges in the future.

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officer to the International Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol School in Germany. His special-operations assignments include commander, SFOD-As 053 and 044, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group; company commander and operations officer in the 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; group operations officer and executive officer, 10th SF Group; and chief, Readiness Section, Special Operations Division, U.S. Special Operations Command. Lieutenant Colonel Diemer holds a bachelor's degree in history from Chapman College and a master's degree in public administration from Troy State University. He is a graduate of both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Major Thomas M. Joyce is the Battalion S3 for 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. A Special Forces officer, he has served in assignments in the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 10th SF Group. Major Joyce is a 1998 graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer's Course. He received a bachelor's degree from St. Mary's University in 1987 and a master's degree in business administration from Syracuse University in 1997.

Notes:

[1] U.S. Special Operations Command, *SOF Vision 2020*, May 1996, p. 3.

[2] U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *Army Special Operations Forces Vision 2010*, April 1996, p. 2.

[3] The Army Research Institute has commissioned numerous studies to determine and confirm the profiles of individuals who have an increased likelihood for success in SFAS, in the SFQC, and on SF A-detachments. The relevant factors are critical attributes and traits.

[4] "Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces," a briefing delivered at Fort Bragg, N.C., in June 1995 by Dr. Martha Lappin Teplitzky of the Army Research Institute, slide 22.

[5] General Hugh H. Shelton, "Quality People: Selecting and Developing Members of U.S. SOF," *Special Warfare*, Spring 1998, p. 2.

[6] Desirable qualities are SF desirable individual attributes and leadership traits.

[7] Shelton, p. 6.

[8] U.S. Department of Defense, *ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century* (Fort Bragg, N.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1997), p. 3-2.

[9] General Peter J. Schoomaker, "U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead," *Special Warfare*, Winter 1998, p. 7.

ARSOF War Game III: Highlighting the Regional-Engagement Concept

by Charles C. Faulkner III

In October 1998, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, acting as the executive agent for the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and for the Army Special Operations Command, conducted Army Special Operations Forces War Game III.

An integral part of the Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army After Next, or AAN, project, ARSOF War Game III extended the analysis of relevant issues from previous ARSOF and TRADOC war games and provided information that will be incorporated into future AAN war games.

The ARSOF War Game III supports the Army's force-mix imperative by more fully integrating future ARSOF development with that of future Army light and heavy forces.

TRADOC initiated the AAN project at Fort Monroe, Va., in February 1996 to guide the Army's thinking into the mid- and long-range future. AAN is designed to take a conceptual look beyond Force XXI at the strategy, technology, organizations and military art that might influence national defense and the Army beyond the year 2010. AAN's mission is not to provide answers, but to identify issues of national strategy and operational art, including the role of SOF in the future Army, that can be further explored by the senior Army leadership and TRADOC.

The 50 players who attended ARSOF War Game III represented various military and government agencies, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; the Army Special Operations Command; the Department of the Air Force; TRADOC; Army SOF; Air Force SOF; Navy SOF; the Department of State; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Agency for International Development; and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The scenario of ARSOF War Game III focused on intrastate conflict circa 2020-2025 and was designed to study the concept of regional engagement (*Special Warfare*, Fall 1998). Post-game assessments by the players characterized the regional-engagement concept as both viable and valuable. From those same assessments emerged two dominant lessons-learned: First, in order to synchronize and optimize all regional-engagement activities in a given theater, it will be critical to have a single manager for all theater regional-engagement activities. Second, deployed regional-engagement forces will provide the regional commander in chief with a valuable assessment tool — global scouts.

These global scouts will provide the information needed to decide sound courses of theater action or to influence national policy decisions.

In addition to red and blue teams, ARSOF War Game III included a "gray team," made up of personnel assigned to staff elements of USASOC and to agencies responsible for resolving issues related to future doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldiers. Members of the gray team observed war-game activities and developed lists of issues that are relevant to their specific areas of responsibility. Their observations will be beneficial to current and future efforts in resolving issues pertaining to research and development, force development, and the program objective memorandum. Sample issues were presented during the war game's senior-leaders' seminar. A complete list of issues will be included in the ARSOF War Game III Integrated Analysis Report, to be published early in 1999.

Lessons and issues from ARSOF War Game III will also contribute to future AAN war games, including the February 1999 force-projection war game, which will integrate the regional-engagement concept in order to examine the challenges of deploying war-fighting forces from CONUS to the area of operations. The lessons of that exercise will be incorporated into the upcoming AAN Spring 1999 War Game.

The ARSOF War Game III supports the Army's force-mix imperative by more fully integrating future ARSOF development with that of future Army light and heavy forces. The integration of the regional-engagement concept into the AAN war games highlights the regional-engagement force's roles as strategic shapers and global scouts for the theater commander in chief. It also emphasizes the role of combat outposts in transitioning peacetime-engagement operations into war-fighting operations once combat forces arrive. ARSOF participation in the AAN Spring 1999 War Game will more precisely define the ARSOF force structure, clarify ARSOF activities that will shape the future, improve ARSOF support to conventional forces, and facilitate development of a more clearly articulated exit strategy.

Charles C. Faulkner III has served as the concept-integration officer in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Concept Development since 1996. After retiring from the Army as an Infantry officer in 1984, he served in the Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, at SWCS until October 1992. From October 1992 until June 1995, he was chief of the Concepts and Studies Branch, Concepts and Plans Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. From June 1995 until June 1996, Faulkner served as chief of the Plans, Assessment and Requirements Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration, USASOC.

Special Forces Core Purpose: A Second Opinion

by Colonel J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.)

In his excellent but far-too-short article in the Summer 1998 edition of *Special Warfare*, Colonel Mark D. Boyatt outlined the nature of a core ideology and its components: core values and core purpose. He proposed a set of Special Forces core values and a core purpose and invited comment. While I admire Colonel Boyatt's article and believe he did SF a good service by illuminating the subject, I must admit that I think that his suggested core values are incomplete, and I disagree rather extensively with the core purpose. Availing myself of his invitation to comment, I will explain these exceptions.

Core values

The suggested core values — unconventionalism, strength of character, doing what is right, and making a difference — are excellent. They are certainly values with which SF personnel of any era can identify. This list, however, lacks an important core value.

Unfortunately, I have no single word or short phrase to convey the thought, but I recommend adding a value that reflects the "team-ism" of SF. This should be a term that reflects more than cohesion or the "One for all" motto of the Three Musketeers. Specifically, the term should convey the dedication and the collective strength of SF. The internal bond is as central and as important to what SF is as the cited values are.

While the internal bond seldom influences *what* SF does, it often influences *how* it does it. Without the inclusion of this value and the bond it indicates, the proposed core values can be read as individual values instead of organizational ones. Including this value would bring an element of collective identity, common activity and shared acceptance that is SF reality, but that is not projected by the other values.

The most well-known and most visible manifestation of this value can be found in the SF A-detachment. Looking out for the team and its members beyond personal concerns is the standard. The old saw, "There is no 'I' in team" expresses it well. Although the A-detachment is the most visible example, the value has a broader application. There are numerous examples, ranging from the mundane to the heroic. One of the latter examples was the 1968 effort by the Studies and Observation Group's SF personnel at Khe Sanh to rescue the SF soldiers trapped in the besieged Lang Vei CIDG camp.

Whether the team-ism value is rooted in modern experience or whether it is a vestigial remnant from the time when SF had few outside friends is immaterial. It exists. Choosing the term or the phrase to express this central value is the difficulty. I know of no term or phrase that expresses it. "Com-



File photo

radeship" and "mutual dedication" encompass much of the thought, but both concepts lack breadth. Possibly some reader can suggest a term.

Two of the core values — unconventionalism and doing what is right — seem to beg for an old SF operator's comments. With regard to unconventionalism, there is a haunting fear among some veteran SF soldiers that in the modern environment of Army acceptance, Army-oriented missions, reasonable funding, and repeated officer SF assignments without the concomitant hazard of career extinction, the value of the unconventional may have become lost.

The attitudes that prevail in an Army that intends to win its conflicts by overwhelming power may have been absorbed unthinkingly by those whose greatest contribution may be in helping the nation meet its unsymmetrical challenges. These soldiers must win their battles in the minds of the populace and of the enemy.

Unconventionalism is not a mere matter of style or panache. It is an element of SF essence. It is often the element that permits small, lightly armed forces to succeed when a rational weighing of the opponents' relative powers would indicate against success. The understanding of the place of the unconventional, its importance, and its impact in unstructured, undefined and ambiguous situations should be ingrained.

Doing what is right seems basic and obvious. Certainly it is, or at least should be, part of an individual's moral upbringing. But it has another important aspect, and that is the disproportionate organizational price of *failing* to do what is right. Some units with gallant histories have had their reputations destroyed in a short time by a few individuals who either did not recognize the importance of this value, or knowing, did not care sufficiently to adhere to it.

In American public memory, a couple of morning hours at My Lai will be remembered after the Americal Division's years of valor in the Pacific during World War II have been forgotten. The same is true for the infantry battalion at My Lai whose Regular Army honors date back to the Civil War. I doubt if either of these units will ever again appear in the Army's order of battle.

The courage, tenacity and dedication of the French parachute battalions in the Indochina and Algeria Wars were legendary. But their brief resort to torture in Algeria under admittedly trying conditions besmirched their reputation — not only in France, but also internationally. In more recent times, Canadian politicians who were looking for fiscal economies, but who were fearful of attacking the older entrenched regiments, disbanded the Canadian Parachute Regiment because of the misconduct of a few regiment members. Does anyone believe that in similar

circumstances SF would fare any better? Doing what is right is important organizationally as well as personally.[1]

Core purpose

I have difficulty accepting Colonel Boyatt's suggested core purpose, "Accomplish SF missions through, by and with indigenous populations." The first cavil is an extremely minor one of possible ambiguity. The author undoubtedly meant "those missions assigned to SF," but the phrase could be read by those who have an unkind cast of mind as implying that SF has its own self-serving missions. SF, having long been accused of being "separate" (untrue) as well as "different" (true), should not leave even small-bore ammunition where the ill-intended can find it.

The second concern is more substantial. It would seem that the purpose should focus broadly on *what* SF does, rather than on with whom it does it (that is, "through, by and with indigenous populations"). Admittedly, SF usually, but not always, works with indigenous populations. But, as written, this phrase has a number of traps: First, it can be read as "*any* indigenous population," thereby encouraging some future commander to decide that SF is appropriate to cadre the class-B units needed to repair roads, stevedore the ports, secure rear areas, etc. (ad nauseam).

More important, if the proposed core purpose were closely applied, it would eliminate all missions not involving indigenous participation. Admittedly, such missions would likely be few, but they probably would be important. Past military operations have repeatedly included discrete missions of such sensitivity, difficulty, or immediacy that the senior commander felt it desirable to send only Americans of known capability and reliability: Special Forces. These missions have been highly varied and have included such disparate activities as conducting a covert border watch, investigating alleged atrocities, performing deep reconnaissance, and conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation. Similar requirements will undoubtedly arise in the future. We should not reduce the options of senior commanders by fencing off such missions through the "with indigenous" caveat.

A final concern with the proposed core purpose is that it is not peculiar to SF. That same purpose could be attributed to Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, interpreter, intelligence, and prisoner-of-war-handling units, as well as to the U.S. Agency for International Development and some nongovernment private volunteer organizations.

Having taken a number of shots at the target Colonel Boyatt so generously erected, I must, in fairness, present one for him or others to shoot at. My nomination for the core purpose of SF is as follows:

"Serve the nation by accomplishing missions assigned by the National Command Authorities and by the regional commanders in chief, in enemy, denied, or sensitive areas, or in areas where the use of other forces is inappropriate."

This proposed core purpose provides three distinct elements: do what; at whose direction; and where. Although this is not quite as complete as the newsman's classic elements, "who, what, when, where and how," it does contain enough elements to outline the essence of the SF purpose.

This proposed core purpose admittedly has a strong joint cast, and so it should. SF began as an unconventional-warfare force that was designed to work for the European Command in the Soviet rear areas in the event of World War III. As SF expanded, the newly raised units were allocated to other regional commands to provide them with similar and expanded capabilities. SF was the joint commanders' force for employment in tasks at the strategic level (and as Army doctrine changed, in tasks at the strategic and operational levels). SF was so tasked in national, combined, unified and subunified command plans. By mission, allocation, plans, operational direction and, sometimes, command, SF became joint forces. In this "jointness," SF was far ahead of military organizational fashion and, for this reason, paid a stiff price in terms of service disinterest and occasional hostility.[2]

The proposed core purpose deliberately

Photo by Richard M. Heileman

Soldiers from the 10th SF Group help to process evacuees from Monrovia, Liberia, during Operation Assured Response. SF are frequently called upon to address the CINCs' immediate problems.

does not list, describe or define specific missions to be accomplished. The lexicon of primary and corollary missions that appears in current SF doctrine can be considered a starting point or a guide, but while useful, it catalogs an ephemeral part of the reality. SF missions have been evolving as long as SF has existed. In every national conflict as far back as the Korean War, senior commanders (joint or combined) have assigned SF missions that were not to be found in the approved SF doctrine of the day. After each conflict, doctrine writers on Smoke Bomb Hill incorporated those missions into successive editions of the SF field manuals. Some of those missions have survived as modern doctrinal missions; most were subsumed under more general doctrinal missions' titles; and some were considered to be the product of unique conditions and were largely forgotten.[3]

Not only have SF missions varied by time, they have varied geographically because the requirements in each theater were different. The long succession of varied missions directed by senior commanders therefore did much to determine the character of SF. Over the years, SF evolved into the Army's broad-spectrum, special-operations organization: the maid-of-all-special-operations-tasks, the organization frequently called upon to address the current problems of the theater commanders in chief.[4]

The broad, general, varied, and frequently changing scope of SF operations contrasts dramatically with the scope of other Army special-operations organizations that are functional- or mission-specialized. Prime examples of functional-specialized organizations are the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. Special-mission units are examples of mission-specialized organizations. Because of the criticality and national importance of their tasks, SMUs are specialized in one or two closely related missions.[5] Their focused training, generous funding and specialized equipment are deemed necessary in accomplishing these missions.[6]

The "where" element included in the proposed SF purpose has a double intent: to preclude any misunderstanding that could result in SF employment with indigenous forces in friendly rear areas; and, by alluding to hostile areas, to indicate the appropriate operational environment. The locale

also implies the general nature of the missions to be assigned and addressed.

If, in compliance with the posited definitions, the core values are added to the core purpose, the ideology emerges. It is an ideology of dedication, loyalty and service to country and comrades, and of accomplishing challenging, frequently changing missions under demanding conditions.

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Notes:

[1] Those who recall the so-called "Green Beret Scandal" of the Vietnam era should note that the participants in the alleged execution of a double agent were all members of an intelligence unit operating under SF cover. When its reputation is involved, SF should be careful whom it lets into the tent.

[2] During the early 1980s, a commander of U. S. Army Europe, who was a friend and supporter of SF, told the author, "Special Forces is never going to go anywhere. You always want to work for the CINC, and the power is in the service." That statement was accurate then, but as a result of legislation and organizational change, it is somewhat less accurate now.

[3] Even while the first SF unit, the 10th SF Group, was undergoing its initial organization and training, SF officers were in combat, engaged in the thoroughly nondoctrinal mission of leading Korean irregulars in an amphibious raiding program.

[4] One of the few formal documents to address this broad mission aspect of SF was a classified, limited-distribution study written at the direction of the Secretary of the Army: *A Multipurpose Force*, R. A. Mountel, et al. (Fort Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army JFK Center for Military Assistance, 1976). The study's essence was well-expressed by Colonel John T. Little, one of SF's all-time most cerebral and most flinty members. When the question arose whether a particular mission was properly SF's, he said, "If it's in the enemy's rear area and the CINC wants it done, it's a Special Forces mission. If SF doesn't do it, others will, and they'll get the assets to survive."

[5] There is an interesting conundrum here. As an SF unit becomes more narrowly specialized, it is of less utility in supporting the CINCs' broad and often changing requirements. As an SMU wanders from its raison-d'être specialty into other "want to do" mission areas, it becomes less focused and less capable.

[6] When the first SMU was organized, there was a strong feeling among many SF officers that the new unit's mission should remain on the SF list, where it had recently been added, and that the mission should be allocated to an SF group. In the intervening years, it has become evident that the degree of specialization inherent in the mission would have created a totally different, narrowly focused, specialized SF unit. In retrospect, it appears that establishing the SMU as a separate Army unit was beneficial to both the SMU and SF.

Special Forces Core Purpose: 'What' vs. 'How'

by Colonel Mark D. Boyatt

In the article, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?" (*Special Warfare*, Summer 1998), I discussed SF's core ideology: its core purpose and its core values. I proposed that SF's core purpose is to accomplish our missions *through, with or by indigenous populations* and that our core values are *unconventionalism, strength of character, doing what is right*, and *making a difference*.

Retired Colonel J.H. Crerar's excellent article offers a second opinion (*pp. 14-18 of this issue*). While it appears that we have a basic agreement on the core values, we diverge on the concept of core purpose, which may be the salient issue in the discussion.

Colonel Crerar proposes that SF's core purpose should answer the questions, Do what? At whose direction? Where? I propose that the heart of the SF purpose is to work "through, with or by indigenous populations." Thus, our debate focuses on "what" vs. "how."

What SF does, where we do it, and at whose direction are all important. However, *how* we do the *what* sets us apart from other military organizations of the past, the present and certainly the future.

Other SOF organizations already have the specific mission of conducting unilateral operations. Other SOF components, such as Civil Affairs, also work with indigenous populations, but not to accomplish combat tasks. Working through, with, and by indigenous populations in order to accomplish the five core missions of UW, FID, SR, DA and CT is unique to Special Forces.

Through its Army After Next initiatives and concepts, the Army is planning to become more SOF-like. In other words, the Army intends to do the "what/where" that is now unique to SOF. Arguably, the Army may never achieve as finely tuned a level of agility, speed or precision as SOF's, simply because of the quality of SOF people.

But the fact remains that in the not-too-distant future, conventional forces will achieve the capability of conducting unilateral DA, SR and CT missions — the *what* — anywhere; and with agility, speed and precision. Only the *how* — accomplishing these missions through, with or by indigenous populations — will remain unique to SF.

Trying to maintain the *what* of these missions instead of the *how* could have a high price for SF, not only in terms of funding, but primarily in terms of focus.

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Is American Military Professionalism Declining?

by Thomas E. Ricks

I want to talk today about what I fear may be a decline in American military professionalism. But I want to begin by talking about a dog I saw when I was writing my book about the Marine Corps.

I was in Hartsville, S.C., visiting a former Marine. The guy had been an artillery officer for a few years during the Vietnam War, but had been out for 20 years. I walked into his house and he said, "Mr. Ricks, meet my dog, Brittany." I said, "Hi, Brittany." He said, "Brittany, tell Mr. Ricks, would you rather be in the Army or be dead?" And the dog rolls over and puts his four paws in the air. I thought to myself, "Now that's one powerful culture that the Marine Corps has. Not only is the guy thinking like a Marine after 20 years out, his dog is thinking like a Marine."

I want to focus today on how to preserve the warrior culture, and on the threats to it. Specifically, I want to focus on what I consider to be an internal threat to the warrior culture. By that, I mean the decline of American military professionalism, to borrow a phrase I first heard from Richard Kohn, a military historian at the University of North Carolina.

The argument I want to make is that, partly as a result of the attacks on military culture in recent years, the officer corps has become less professional in its outlook and behavior. In reaction to those attacks, we have seen a creeping politicization of the officer corps. This rightward movement is, I believe, an inappropriate response. A much more powerful and appropriate response would be to return to the long-standing U.S. military tradition of nonpartisanship.

Let me tell you up front here that I have no military experience. I speak as a largely admiring outsider who spends a lot of time around the U.S. military. I hope you will listen to me, but I hope you will also listen to the views of people with far more experience than I, such as Admiral Stan Arthur, who argues that there is an increasingly large and worrisome gap between the military and American society.

What do I see changing in American military professionalism?

First, I see a sense of separation between this military and this society. This is not a thought original with me. I think Admiral Arthur put it best in his essay, published by the Army War College, in which he worried that the U.S. military thinks it has become better than the society that it protects. In the same vein, I see a tendency in some military commentary these days to dwell on the weaknesses of American soci-

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Reprinted from Proceedings *with permission. Copyright 1998, U.S. Naval Institute. Thomas E. Ricks delivered this address to several hundred active-duty and retired military professionals April 23, 1998, at the U.S. Naval Academy. His speech was a highlight of the Naval Institute's 124th Annual Meeting and Eighth Annapolis Seminar. — Editor*

ety without seeing the strengths of our society. This is a bit ironic, because today, for the first time in 25 years, we have an economy that is the envy of the world.

There was a small story deep in the foreign pages of the *Wall Street Journal* this week that said the United States has replaced Japan as the most competitive nation in the world economy. We now enjoy the lowest peacetime unemployment rate since Eisenhower was president — and it is occurring even as we enact a free-trade agreement that some predicted would suck jobs out of this country. Over the last 25 years, since the oil shock of 1973, this society has made a dynamic transition from having an industrial-based economy to having an information-based economy. The rest of the world is struggling to keep up with that change.

I think that many in the U.S. military fail to appreciate the immensity of that transformation. I sometimes wonder if we actually have moved to a maneuver-warfare society, yet still have an attrition-oriented military. The writer Ralph Peters commented recently that we have a military that all too often talks Sherman but acts McClellan. I agree. Who do you think knows more about maneuver warfare, the information warriors at Microsoft, or the Army officers who talk expeditionary, but want to upgrade a 70-ton tank? Anybody who has read my book knows that I am an admirer of Marine Corps culture. It is a healthy culture, one that works. It is flexible and adaptive. It is more intellectually supple than the other services. Even so, every other Marine captain I meet seems to believe that American society is troubled, even collapsing. Yes, this society does face major problems. We need especially to do a better job of educating our youth intellectually and morally. But I do not think, as some have argued in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in recent years, that the next war that the U.S. military fights will be on American soil.

The second trend I see is the politicization of the officer corps. Until recently, this was purely anecdotal — the cracks we've all heard, when we are in official or semi-official settings, about President Clinton. But lately, statistical evidence has emerged to support this anecdotal evidence. Duke University Professor Ole R. Holsti last summer released data that confirm that not only has the American military grown more conservative over the last 20 years, but also more partisan.

It turns out that every four years since 1976, Professor Holsti, who is a specialist in foreign policy and public opinion, had polled 4,000 Americans listed in *Who's Who* on their views on foreign policy and politics. He also had polled people attending the National War College, and senior officers at the Pentagon. But not being a specialist in military affairs, he never had separated out his data on the views of military officers. When he did, the results were startling. In 1976, one-third of senior military officers interviewed said that they were Republicans. In 1996, that share had doubled to two-thirds. The ratio of conservatives to liberals in the military went from about 4:1 in 1976, which is about where I would expect a culturally conservative, hierarchical institution like the U.S. military to be, to 23:1 in 1996. This came even as you have more women and minorities in the senior officer corps — which indicates to me that a big chunk of the white male officer corps is marching toward Rush Limbaugh territory. For the purposes of comparison, this rightward swing came as there was a much smaller shift toward conservatism in civilians polled by Professor Holsti. They were 25 percent Republican in 1976 and 34 percent in 1996.

Partly as a result of the attacks on military culture in recent years, the officer corps has become less professional in its outlook and behavior. In reaction to those attacks, we have seen a creeping politicization of the officer corps.

But the most worrisome trend that Professor Holsti detected was a sharp decline in nonpartisanship. This used to be the single largest category in the U.S. officer

Photo by Jeff Wright

U.S. military officers may be increasingly political. During the 1992 presidential campaign, General Colin Powell published an op-ed piece opposing candidate Bill Clinton's view on Bosnia.

corps: independent, nonpolitical, or no identification. In 1976, more than half of officers polled said that they were independent or nonpartisan. Now, only a quarter say they are.

Evidence from the field suggests that these numbers are accurate. When I was in California in December, for example, a Marine told me that his commander routinely played the commentaries of Rush Limbaugh over the loudspeakers, so, the commander explained, everyone can enjoy it while they work. Whether or not you like Rush Limbaugh, to play that sort of commentary for your unit during duty hours strikes me as unprofessional.

What all this indicates, I think, is a major change, largely unreviewed, in the nature of the U.S. military professional. In *The Soldier and the State*, the classic text on the U.S. civil-military relations, Professor Samuel Huntington said that nonpartisanship is a pillar of U.S. military tradition. It appears to me that over the last 20 years, that pillar has begun to crumble. Yes, there are historical reasons for this to occur — it is explainable. The Vietnam War destroyed the hawkish wing of the Democratic Party associated with Henry "Scoop" Jackson. After that war, many people who were pro-defense no longer felt there was a home for them in the Democratic Party. At the same time, white southerners as a class moved toward open identification with the Republican Party. But explainable is not the same thing as excusable.

Why should this trend be worrisome? For many reasons, most of them obvious, about the relationship between our military and our democracy. But one important reason may not be so obvious: It can hurt military effectiveness. Historically, politicization of the officer corps has led to military ineffectiveness. When people are promoted for their political views, rather than their combat leadership or management skills, military effectiveness suffers. Take it far enough and you get a banana-republic military, one that by definition is better at politics than at fighting.

Combine these two overarching trends — a separation from society and a politicization — and you move toward having what Harvard political scientist Michael Desch has called a "semiautonomous military." It is, I think, a military that is not always responsive to civilian control, one that in some ways is beginning to act as its own

interest group. I worry sometimes that the traditional rivalries among the services are now being extended to other Washington players, so that the way the Army, Navy and Air Force used to jostle each other is now being applied to their interactions with the White House and the Congress. This can lead to trouble. When you start acting like an interest group, when you start playing in politics, you're going up against the heavy hitters in their game, not yours. I think we got a whiff of this with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's demands to the Navy last year over shipbuilding contracts for his home state. One of his aides sent a note to the Navy with the title, "How To Make an Unhappy Man Happy." It read like a multibillion-dollar ransom note: Nice Navy you got there, terrible if something were to happen to it. This is the same Trent Lott, who in the middle of the Kelly Flinn mess, told the Air Force to "get real."

What is happening here? This is, I think, the U.S. military being treated like an interest group by people who say, "Okay, you want to play politics, let's play politics." I think we got another whiff of this from 1992 to 1995 on Bosnia policy, with a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a U.S. military in Europe determined not to go into Bosnia and doing their best to undercut explicit national policy on Bosnia. This begins with General Colin Powell running an op-ed piece in the middle of the 1992 presidential campaign opposing candidate Bill Clinton's view on Bosnia, which was the single largest foreign-policy issue in that campaign. We subsequently saw a variety of actions by the U.S. military in Europe as it split with the Clinton administration's policy that the Bosnians were the victims of Serb aggression. I wonder if that opposition interfered with the Army's planning for Bosnia. I remember standing in December 1995 on the Bosnia end of that blown-up bridge over the Sava River that leads from Croatia down into Tuzla and talking to an engineer from the 1st Armored Division. I said, "Didn't you guys realize you'd have to do this?" He said, "Sir, until five weeks ago, we never thought we were coming here." This was a guy who, it seems to me, had been misled by his superiors about the likelihood of a U.S. intervention in Bosnia.

I'm not saying that there should not be military dissent. In fact, I think the great tradition of loyal dissent in the military needs to be revived. It is clearly the obligation of the military professional to give his or her best opinion, most especially when the superiors are perceived to be moving in the wrong direction. But I think thought needs to be given to the proper mode of dissent. As Eliot Cohen has observed, think of how difficult it would have been for President Roosevelt back in World War II, when he overruled the advice of his senior military leaders and decided to invade North Africa. Think of how much more difficult his job would have been if he had to consider what that dispute would look like two days later when it was pasted all over the front pages of the *Washington Post,* the *New York Times,* and the *Wall Street Journal*. There is a lot to be said for arguing the policy until the point of decision, and then moving out smartly and executing that decision with all your might.

It is clearly the obligation of the military professional to give his or her best opinion, most especially when the superiors are perceived to be moving in the wrong direction. … There is a lot to be said for arguing the policy until the point of decision, and then moving out smartly and executing that decision with all your might.

I want to leave you with two broad questions and a few thoughts about remedies.

My first question has to do with the kind of puritanical swing I see going on in parts of the U.S. military these days. In the Marines especially, I frequently encounter an open religiosity, wearing one's religion on one's sleeve, that I think has unintended side effects. It can encourage hypocrisy, for example: A Marine officer told me recently that he thought his colonel was becoming more openly religious the closer

the promotion board got. It's not just the Marines, though. An officer at the Air Force Academy told me that if you don't attend the Monday morning Bible meeting in his department, you are out of the loop for the week. Is it appropriate to begin a lunch meeting at the Pentagon with an open prayer to Jesus Christ? Is it appropriate on the Army's new Officer Efficiency Report to ask for the judgment on the morality of the officer in question? What happens if the person making that judgment believes that abortion is immoral, and the officer being rated recently had a perfectly legal abortion, perhaps to ensure that she could deploy to the Gulf to fly her attack helicopter? Could the great and colorful leaders of the past, the Chesty Pullers, the George Pattons, pass the sort of tests we see nowadays?

The other question may prove the most significant. This is one first posed by Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel who now teaches at Boston University. What, he asked, will happen to a politicized and conservative U.S. military when it finds out that congressional conservatives are not necessarily pro-military? We got a hint of this with Senator Lott's comments about Lieutenant Flinn a year ago. I doubt it will be the Democrats who take the defense budget down $20 billion to $50 billion annually. They are too vulnerable in that area — they resemble the schoolboy nervously whistling past the school bully, saying to the Pentagon, "Look, we'll give you $250 billion dollars a year as long as you promise not to beat us up." A Republican in the White House will not have that problem. If a deficit hawk such as John Kasich lives in the White House in a few years, he might look at the Social Security problem and decide to solve it by trimming the defense budget — the domestic equivalent of Nixon going to China. What then happens to a politicized military? Would the toothpaste crawl back in the tube? Or would it become more alienated, more distrustful of the political system?

I think anyone who points to problems is obliged also to try to offer solutions. What can be done?

First, I think we need to reflect on what it means to be a professional military officer nowadays. There are a lot of assumptions out there, not all of them correct. Today's junior officer seems to assume that to be an officer is to be a Republican. You see this in surveys out of the Naval Academy and out of West Point. Also, Lieutenant Flinn, a junior officer, seemed to assume that it is okay to disobey orders if you really, really dislike them. I think that the conservative "Lieutenant Limbaugh" and that the insubordinate Lieutenant Flinn are both wrong, and in the same way: Both have fallen away from military traditionalism.

As part of that reflection, we need to think about reviving the tradition of loyal

Photo by Alejandro Cabello

A U.S. soldier directs traffic across the pontoon bridge between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many soldiers believed that U.S. involvement in Bosnia was unlikely.

dissent, to think about the proper channels for military dissent.

Second, we need to think about ways to narrow the gap between the American military and society. I would love to see the draft reinstated, but I don't think that is going to happen. There are other things that can be done short of that. Expand ROTC at elite institutions, such as the Ivy League. Expand Navy and Marine ROTC at historically black colleges. If the Navy says it can't find the engineers it needs, the Marines can go it alone — they need an awful lot of grunts who don't need to know anything about engineering. The Army has 10,000 black officers. Why? Because for decades it has had a very strong presence in historically black colleges. There were, the last time I looked, about 1,000 black officers in the Marine Corps. You need to go ask.

Related to this gap, you might also shorten the service requirement attached to attending Annapolis and other academies, so that you get more people cycling back out into society. There are a declining number of veterans in Congress. If you're not going to have people who understand the military in Congress, you're going to have trouble. For the same reason, send officers needing graduate work, whenever possible, to civilian institutions.

Use the reserves more creatively. From my perspective, the reserves have been abused in recent years, almost cavalierly. In 1995 I hitched a ride to central Haiti to spend some time with a Special Forces A-team. The guy who drove me up was a reservist who was the manager of a Federal Express office in Atlanta, yet they assigned him to six months of driving a Humvee. Who do you think knew more about "just-in-time" logistics, the guy driving the Humvee, or the colonel in charge of logistics? Another example: Everybody these days loves to talk about information warfare, but is there a reserve unit of information warriors in Silicon Valley? The reserves could be a real bridge to American society.

Finally, on the enlisted side, Admiral Arthur has suggested that we need to think about prep schools for the enlisted, just as you have for the academies. Expensive, yes, but if you want to build a bridge to American society, it's a good thing to think about.

In conclusion, I think that the answer to attacks on the warrior culture is not to become politically conservative. That sort of reaction, I think, is part of the problem, not part of the solution. It compounds the problem by further warping military culture. I think the answer is to reassert military traditionalism. Of course, saying that is the easy part. The hard part is how to do it in the environment of the 1990s. How does military traditionalism fit into a gender-integrated military? Answering that question is difficult. I think you begin by enforcing standards, which aren't political. How you answer the question may be one of the most significant acts the younger people here perform in their military careers. Good luck with it. ✂

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ARSOF Vision 2010 and ARSOF XXI: An Alternative Viewpoint

by Major Christopher Tone

The Fall 1997 issue of *Special Warfare* presented *Army Special Operations Forces Vision 2010* and *ARSOF XXI* as the United States Army Special Operations Command's vision of the future and the role that its forces will play in that future.

In the issue's introductory article by Charles Faulkner and Edward Sayre, the authors clearly establish that the two Army special-operations forces vision statements are designed to fit ARSOF into the visions of the conventional Army. For example, "*ARSOF XXI* provides an azimuth to guide ARSOF in aligning their current missions with those of the conventional Army and in adapting to the new strategic environment so that they will remain relevant in time, space and circumstance.[1]"

Unfortunately, by not offering alternative views of the future security situation, these vision statements imply that the special-operations community agrees with the assessments made by the Joint Staff in *Joint Vision 2010* and by the Army Staff in *Army Vision 2010*. This author believes that these conventional visions of the future are flawed; that we in the special-operations community have confronted the flaws in the conventional logic during our recent and current operations around the world; and that it is our responsibility to present our concerns before we are committed to support a doctrine that we know to *be* flawed.

The year 1997 also saw the completion of both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Report of the National Defense Panel. Although both reports recognized the likelihood of asymmetrical threats to the U.S. interests at home and abroad, the military establishment continues to focus on preparations for the symmetrical threat: a high-tech war with a peer competitor. The challenge for the unconventional warriors is to look up from the demands of their busy operational tempo and to voice alternative views.

ARSOF Vision 2010

Instead of providing future vision to the force of special operators, *ARSOF Vision 2010* appears to be trying to fit ARSOF into the visions presented by *AV 2010* and *JV 2010*. These two documents adequately describe the future security challenges and their implications. However, they follow the conventional assessments that "more of the same" will be the best method of facing these challenges.

Major Tone's article was written in the spring of 1998. It is presented in Special Warfare in order to stimulate thought and discussion. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position or policy of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or the U.S. Army. — Editor

JV 2010 makes much of its five joint operational concepts: information dominance; dominant maneuver; precision engagement; full-dimensional protection; and focused logistics. These concepts look like the time-tested combat fundamentals (move, shoot, communicate, sustain and protect) of yesterday's Army, after someone has liberally applied a dictionary and a thesaurus.

AV 2010 follows suit: Its "yesterday, today, and tomorrow" theme emphasizes continuity, not change. The challenge for ARSOF futurists should be to do more than march in step with general-purpose forces. The ARSOF vision should have validity for the soldiers and leaders of the special-operations force, based on their experiences. It should provide guidance for modernization and the supporting doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldier skills needed to prepare SOF for the future that *we* believe to be most likely.

The operational patterns and the tenets of *ARSOF Vision 2010* are those of conventional writers. According to *ARSOF Vision 2010*, the future security environment will be dominated by economic power, by the consequences of the information revolution and by dramatically different demographics. Recent historical experience does not support this focus on economic power as an instrument of security policy. The vast economic power advantage that the U.S. enjoys over countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Yugoslavia has not forced these countries to modify their behavior as we demand. Economic sanctions against poor Haiti only further impoverished the masses; Raoul Cedras was not forced to leave the country until military power was brought to bear directly. Our economic ties to the likes of Nigeria and China appear to be as much of a liability as an asset.

Also, the information revolution's consequences regarding security and warfare are not at all clear. All the Force XXI technology currently available does not, with confidence, provide the checkpoint guards in Brcko with advanced warning of the next hostile act directed at them by local Serbs or Muslims. Information technology can deliver only that which is available for collection; the user must still make some sense of it before planning a course of action. It is easy to imagine that some

According to* ARSOF Vision 2010, *the future security environment will be dominated by economic power, by the consequences of the information revolution and by dramatically different demographics. Recent historical experience does not support this focus on economic power as an instrument of security policy.

Photo by Jeffrey T. Brady

General Raoul Cedras greets an unidentified U.S. Army officer at the Port-au-Prince airport. Cedras ruled Haiti until the arrival of U.S. military power forced him to resign.

important information is not available for collection from high-tech platforms. It is also easy to imagine that operators may be overloaded with information, or that an essential bit of information may be lost in cyberspace.

If the purpose of *ARSOF Vision 2010* is to provide a future vision to our force, then it falls short. *ARSOF Vision 2010* takes the operational continuum of peace-deterrence-conflict-war and the five joint operational concepts, and it plugs in the SOF players and missions of today. It describes a future that special operators know to be unrealistic, and it damages the credibility of our doctrine writers. The special-operations community is already dealing with a number of doctrinal issues, including: combating weapons of mass destruction; conducting offensive information operations; integrating Civil Affairs, civil-military operations and Psychological Operations into conventional forces; assessing the future relevance of unconventional warfare; employing special reconnaissance vs. long-range surveillance detachments; ensuring the relevance of counternarcotics missions; determining the future of combat search and rescue; and assessing the validity of humanitarian demining operations as a SOF mission. What about these issues in 2010 and beyond?

***It is difficult to envision that shaping the battlespace, gaining information dominance, or achieving sustainment through total asset visibility and just-in-time logistics will have relevance in the complex, asymmetrical-threat environment described in the beginning of* ARSOF XXI.**

ARSOF XXI

ARSOF XXI, a far better effort, describes a future operational environment similar to the one we face today: Conventional war will be unlikely, and asymmetrical challenges to U.S. power at home and abroad will predominate. The battlefield will be complicated by vague mission objectives and vague success criteria; a lack of clear distinctions between combatants and noncombatants and between friend and foe; complicated political and physical environments; omnipresent international media; and allies that have competing and sometimes contradictory goals. This battlefield should be familiar to any Ranger who has patrolled through Mogadishu looking for the bad guys, to any Joint Commission Observer who has tried to make sense of Bosnia, or to any Special Forces sergeant who has trained local military units to fight the *narcotraficantes* in the Amazon Basin or in the "Golden Triangle."

ARSOF XXI is on target when it identifies its foundation: the "SOF truths;" the ARSOF core capabilities; and the seven fundamentals of future ARSOF employment. These truths, capabilities and fundamentals are not new concepts; they have been validated by past and present experience, and they appear likely to be valid in the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, *ARSOF XXI* then plugs itself into the operational concept that is being sold by the conventional Army as Army XXI and Force XXI. Perhaps the reason can be found in one of the five tenets of the ARSOF XXI operational concept — "Ensures ARSOF remain relevant to the Army."[2] It is difficult to envision that shaping the battlespace, gaining information dominance, or achieving sustainment through total asset visibility and just-in-time logistics will have relevance in the complex, asymmetrical-threat environment described in the beginning of *ARSOF XXI*.

As they have done in the past and are doing now, SOF will handle the asymmetrical threats to our national security in the future. Special Forces and Rangers have been our practitioners of asymmetrical (or unconventional) warfare in the recent past. At times, the Army has turned to SOF as an economy-of-force measure. At other times, political restraints or enemy capabilities have prevented the Army's use of conventional forces. In any case, *ARSOF XXI* should go beyond addressing how SOF can

File photo

Emphasis on ultra-capable platforms, "systems of systems," and information technology can obscure the importance of the human element of conflict.

support the Army in the unlikely event that the Army is asked to fight a war as described in the Army XXI/Force XXI literature. *ARSOF XXI* needs to address the likely asymmetrical scenarios and our operational concepts for handling them.

Strategic vision

In order to examine U.S. military strategy for the future, this article will focus on four questions: Why have we discounted the human element of war? Why have we not incorporated recent and current threats into our calculations? Why do we think we can make the rules by which our future enemies will play? Why are we ignoring the lessons of history?

Why have we discounted the human element of war? The emphasis on the military-technical element of war has obscured the importance of the human or moral element. Hatred and desire, fear and courage, genius and ambition: these are all moral factors that play important roles in any conflict, whether it is two individuals in a fight or two nations in a war. Clausewitz wrote, "Military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated."[3] Our "futures" doctrines all pay lip-service to the importance of people and the human elements of armed conflict. But that importance is quickly lost in the milieu of ultra-capable platforms executing dominant maneuver, as "systems of systems" destroy enemy forces with arcade-game precision. These actions occur while leading-edge information technology gives us a fog-free "relevant common picture" and controls our efforts.

Joint Vision 2010 states: "Technologically superior equipment has been critical to the success of our forces in combat. This first-rate equipment, when combined with top-quality forces, has been a key element of our continuing operational successes. We must continue to ensure our soldiers are fully capable of fulfilling their required tasks with equipment that is engineered to provide superior mission performance as well as safety and reliability."[4] This passage comes at the conclusion of the section extolling the importance of quality soldiers. At best, the message is mixed. At worst, it places technology above personnel in importance and in focus.

One need not look far to find historical examples of armies that were soundly defeated despite their overwhelming advantage in technology and equipment. The past 50 years have seen the Israelis achieve independence, the Chinese fight a U.N. coalition to a draw, the Vietnamese defeat the French and the U.S., the Afghans defeat the Soviets, the Armenians defeat the Azeris, and the Chechens defeat the Russians. We cannot afford to rely solely on more and better equipment to beat our next opponent.

Why have we not incorporated recent and current threats into our calculations? The new strategy is not grounded in any real threat. Inventing a possible peer competitor, against whom we plan to fight sometime around 2025, may be interesting and useful as an intellectual exercise. But basing the development of the armed forces of the world's only superpower on only one of many possible futures, and excluding current threats and priorities from the equation, seems irresponsible.

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters may have been correct in describing our current national-security problems as related more to 'innovative behaviors' than to military-technical competition. The contemporary emergence of terrorism, fundamentalist jihad, criminal cartels, and failed states represents a greater threat to U.S. interests than the threat of conventional war with a peer competitor.

We are comfortable with the idea of confronting an enemy who has tanks, planes, uniforms, a forward-edge-of-the-battle area, and lines of communication. We are comfortable with a clean battlefield where good guys are distinguishable from bad guys, where combatants are separate from noncombatants, and where political restraints do not interfere with our ability to generate and apply combat power. We are comfortable with the apparent superiority of our technology, and we believe in that technology's applicability on tomorrow's battlefield.

We are not comfortable fighting children armed with rifles. We are not comfortable fighting in cities and jungles where our tanks, aircraft and intelligence-collection assets do not work. We are not prepared to attack an enemy that hides behind his own civilian population. We are not prepared for terrorist attacks that would use chemical and biological weapons against our units or our civilian population.

Because we do not have an opponent against whom we can fight a war using our revolution-in-military-affairs technology, we invent one. We create a world-class opposing force and worry about peer competitors who may emerge from the mist. We fight the world-class OPFOR on the plains of Fort Hood and Fort Irwin, and then we congratulate ourselves on how successful we are.

No modern army except Israel's has been involved in a mechanized air-land war since the end of the Second World War, if we set aside the notably recent exception of Desert Storm. Russia has been embroiled in Afghanistan and Chechnya; France in Indochina and Algeria; Great Britain in Malaysia, Aden, Northern Ireland and the Falkland Islands. Even Israel's experience in Lebanon would suggest that the Israeli days of air-land maneuver may be over.

When viewed as part of the events of the past five decades, Desert Storm stands out as an aberration. Yet we appear to have used this aberration as the validation for our past and present doctrine and as our recipe for future success.

The author does not mean to advocate that we disregard future threats, only that we do not disregard present ones. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters may have been correct in describing our current national-security problems as related more to "innovative behaviors" than to military-technical competition.[5] The contemporary emergence of terrorism, fundamentalist jihad, criminal cartels, and failed states represents a greater threat to U.S. interests than the threat of conventional war with a peer competitor.

Why do we think we can make the rules by which our future enemies will play? We seem to have a culturally obtuse idea that our opponents – present and future – will agree to play the game by our rules and with our toys, or at least with inferior copies of our toys. This flawed mirror-imaging led us astray in Vietnam and in Somalia, and it promises to do so again in the not-so-distant future. If our opponent recognizes that he cannot win by playing our game, he will play a different game, with his own rules if possible; and he will try to force us to play along.

Willing to sacrifice thousands, the North Vietnamese launched the Tet offensive to kill American soldiers and to shock our quiescent public — winning the field did not matter in the long run. Sadaam Hussein protects his assets with his own civilians — Tomahawk missiles do not distinguish combatants from noncombatants. These and other asymmetrical approaches toward war with the U.S. could potentially negate our technological advantages and expose as folly any discussion of peer and near-peer competitors.

It is ironic that our nation won its independence a little more than two centuries ago by practicing similar forms of asymmetrical warfare. General Burgoyne and Lord Cornwallis arrived in the colonies with the world's finest navy and a handful of world-class regiments of foot. The numerous engagements with the British in set battles, as was the practice, led to predictable defeats for the inexperienced colonists. But by drawing the arrogant British far from their bases, forcing them to divide their forces and to search for forage, and by harassing their supply lines and forage parties, the colonists at Saratoga and at Guilford Courthouse were able to fight a tired, harried British army that was at the end of its supplies in a hostile wilderness.

The fact that the British won the field at Guilford Courthouse or that they lost at Saratoga was not the determining factor — in both cases, once their offensives culminated, the British had to withdraw or suffer extinction. Burgoyne's retreat was cut off by the timely arrival of 1,100 colonists from the Hampshire Grants, so he surrendered. Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington and to the protection of his navy. Nathaniel Greene is said to have boasted that he drove the British from the Carolinas with-

Photo by Joe Coleman

Destroyed Iraqi vehicles line the highway between Kuwait City and Basra. In future conflicts, U.S. forces may not enjoy the overwhelming success they achieved in Desert Storm.

Soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment learn the techniques of military operations in urban terrain. Such training will be increasingly important in the future.

Photo by Daniel L. Savolskis

out winning a single battle. The North Vietnamese could also have boasted that they achieved victory without winning a battle. Who will be next with a similar boast?

Why are we ignoring the lessons of history? Our current doctrinal approaches are blatantly ahistorical. Military history provides pertinent lessons that have not been given adequate attention — several of these have already been used to highlight earlier points.

If history serves, a military-technical innovation is good for only one or two victories before it is either copied or negated by strategic or tactical innovations. Napoleon demonstrated the decisiveness of artillery and heavy cavalry in breaking infantry squares. But in 1866, the Austrians arrived in Koeniggratz with the most modern artillery and the finest heavy cavalry in the world. The Prussian foot soldiers, lying on the ground with their breech-loading *Dreyse* rifles, made the Austrian advantages irrelevant to the battle's outcome. In a more modern example, Egypt recognized the superiority of air and tank forces following their devastating defeat by the Israelis in 1967. That recognition led Egypt to employ surface-to-air missiles and antitank guided missiles with deadly effect only six years later.

The point is not in any way to discredit the advantages that can be provided by technological advances. But we must recognize that these advantages are marginal, expensive and fleeting. The question to be asked is not whether new weapons could be useful, but whether we are willing to commit significant resources to new defense procurements every year for some marginal degree of increased security that, short of war, cannot be verified against a possible adversary.

History also demonstrates that developing weapons and technology is only part of the equation for success on the battlefield. The doctrine and the organization to employ them effectively is equally important. The English of the 14th century did not invent the longbow, and the Germans of the Third Reich did not invent the tank, the airplane or wireless communication. Nevertheless, England and Germany employed their weapons effectively and achieved stunning victories — the English at Crécy in 1346, and the Germans in France in 1940.

With free trade and worldwide connectivity, we cannot guarantee that the advanced-technology weapons we develop today will not be employed more effectively by a visionary opponent tomorrow. Americans have naively assumed that the

RMA will favor technologically advanced societies. We have failed to consider all the avenues that new technology opens to our opponents.

The contemporary hypothesis that technology can eliminate the fog and the friction of war is also contrary to historical precedent. Hannibal's elephants never required new circuit cards for their turret distribution boxes. Napoleon never had radio communication; but neither did he have to worry that his young TOC officer might run the batteries dead prior to a dawn attack. New technology brings new problems. Information operations, designed to target an opponent's information systems while protecting our own, are a growth industry in today's Army. But confusion and paralysis on the future battlefield could as easily stem from information overload as from a key system malfunctioning.

In short, we cannot ignore history and current threats; we cannot expect our adversaries to play by our rules; and we cannot underrate the importance of the human element of war.

A modest proposal

In developing a military strategy for the future, our doctrine writers should consider four axioms or tenets:

Keep the human element in focus. War is the ultimate human struggle. Machines do not fight each other (at least not yet). Clausewitz said, "One might say that the physical [forces] seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."[6] Understanding the will, the motivation and the intelligence of the contestants and their supporters is critical. Will our individual opponents contemplate surrender or are they committed to death in battle? In the U.S., this human element has three components: the combatants — soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines; the public; and the civilian authorities — the policy-makers.

The morale of the individual soldier and the cohesion of the small unit in which he fights are often overlooked in our training. The performance of our own forces in combat will continue to be subjected to the same moral dynamics described by Ardant du Picq in the last century and by S.L.A. Marshall only 50 years ago. The integration of individuals into a tight team that faces the challenges of combat with confidence in themselves and in their immediate leadership is the key for success in a firefight. Confidence and cohesion cannot be taken for granted. They must be forged in the crucible of tough and realistic training, and once soldiers and leaders have passed through this crucible, we must maintain cohesion by keeping them together.

The morale of the individual soldier and the cohesion of the small unit in which he fights are often overlooked in our training. The performance of our own forces in combat will continue to be subjected to the same moral dynamics described by Ardant du Picq in the last century and by S.L.A. Marshall only 50 years ago.

Personnel policies that focus on advancing peacetime careers, combined with a drawdown and a high deployment tempo, will continue to hurt morale, cohesion and readiness. Instead of giving our soldiers some new gadget, give them confidence in themselves, in their comrades and in their leadership. Make them part of teams that are bound by the shared experiences of having met tough training challenges. In the melee of close combat, where fog and friction will persist despite our technology, the investments we make in soldier morale and in small-unit cohesion will pay off.

Public support is also a moral/human element not to be ignored in representative democracies with a free press. Although the U.S. had a huge advantage in technology and materiel in the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese recognized that this advantage was irrelevant in the long-term because the American public was opposed to continuing the war effort. Will the U.S. public and its representation in Washing-

Photo by Lee Bosco

Cheering spectators welcome returning veterans of Desert Storm. Would the U.S. public continue to support military interventions in the face of high casualties?

ton continue to support military intervention abroad if casualties mount and if the gruesome reality of combat and the abuse of our POWs is broadcast into their living rooms? Several authors suggest that they will not. We must identify this possibility and take measures to ensure that our public supports the policies that will expose our sons and daughters to danger.

Because the military effort is subordinated to policy, our policy-makers must support the effort. Policy-makers have their own hopes and fears, and they are also greatly concerned with the political consequences of a policy that meets with public condemnation. Recent history has shown that most political leaders in Washington are unwilling to assume the great risk inherent in a military venture. As a sad consequence, military commanders are sometimes instructed that the loss of U.S. life equates to mission failure. If success in battle is, as Napoleon said, determined by audacity, why are we sending our military leaders into battle with orders to be timid? Clearly some lines need to be drawn at home before we commit to using the military instrument of power.

Equip the man; do not man the equipment. *JV 2010* makes much of the quality of the U.S. soldier and of the need to keep this quality high. Unfortunately, the Joint Staff's emphasis is skewed. They want quality recruits to man and employ the sophisticated equipment being fielded. This approach puts the cart before the horse. If we can agree that the next conflict is more likely to be in the slums of Mogadishu or in the triple-canopy jungles along the Amazon or Congo river basins rather than on the open expanses of the Kuwaiti desert or the Fulda Gap, then better tanks, faster aircraft and improved space-based collection platforms will provide no improvement in our ability to accomplish our military missions.

By focusing our efforts on supporting the man instead of supporting the system or the platform, we will affect far more than our acquisition strategy. Our acquisition strategy should focus on making the individual soldier faster, stronger, more lethal and better protected. Our training efforts must focus on giving the soldier and the tactical decision-maker the skills, knowledge and support to function effectively on a rapidly changing battlefield that will likely require human compassion, discretion, judgment, ethics and sound values.

Increasing "percentage kill" and decreasing "sensor-to-shooter time" will not help our soldiers operate in the collapsing cities or the steaming jungles of our next military intervention.

It is not difficult to identify systems that would assist our soldiers on any future battlefield. New body armor that increases protection without hopelessly encumbering the wearer would provide a real advantage to the Ranger patrolling the streets of the next Mogadishu. Providing soldiers with nonlethal options at the touch of a selector switch would greatly enhance our ability to operate on battlefields with noncombatants, as well as greatly improve our ability to conduct peace-support operations. The Marine at the next Beirut airport would not have to fire into the back of the terrorist van passed him while he was loading his weapon. New body armor and nonlethal options are only two of many examples that come to mind — new tanks, new fighter planes, new aircraft carriers and new satellite-communication systems are not among them.

Tailor the stick to the opponent. It is ironic that we, a nation of immigrants, have not historically displayed much cultural savvy when employing military force abroad. Convinced of the superiority of our culture, values and ideology, we err by expecting our opponent to recognize that superiority and to see, understand and react as we do. If we are going to employ the military instrument of power, we must do it in such a way as to hurt the target on his terms, not ours. It will not serve our interests to construct punishments that we would consider egregious and then expect our opponent to respond to the threat of those punishments as we would.

Tailoring the stick requires a thorough understanding of our adversaries — an understanding that goes far beyond downloading order-of-battle data from satellite imagery and giving a quick nod to Sun Tsu. Imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, and measurement-and-signature intelligence may all interface well with our high-tech digital systems; however, these intelligence-gathering devices will not tell us the intentions, motivations and fears of the opposing leaders and their soldiers.

Shortcomings in our human-intelligence collection and integration can also cause blunders. Consider two recent failures caused by mirror-imaging: The 1996 launching of Tomahawk land-attack missiles against surface-to-air missile sites in order to "punish Sadaam" ignored Iraqi leadership dynamics and the opinion of the Muslim world. A great survivor, Sadaam Hussein demonstrated to the world that he can still tweak the tiger's nose and receive only a slap on the wrist. If we are going to employ a stick, it must hurt — badly. Only after we have identified a threat that our opponent fears and have established our will and our capability to employ that threat can we consider deterrence. In a similar vein, an economic embargo appears to be of limited value against a ruling clique that is insulated from the hardships of its populace. The long embargo against Haiti had little, if any, effect on General Cedras and his henchmen; it did cause much suffering among the Haitian population. A tailored tool need not be such a blunt instrument.

Our training efforts must focus on giving the soldier and the tactical decision-maker the skills, knowledge and support to function effectively on a rapidly changing battlefield that will likely require human compassion, discretion, judgment, ethics and sound values.

Expect to get it wrong. This sounds at first like a fatalistic recipe for failure. It is not. The arrogance of much of the RMA debate is disturbing. According to our current mythology, the U.S. is ahead of everyone else in this revolution, and we will undoubtedly make the correct decisions to maximize the opportunities and minimize the vulnerabilities. Expecting to get it wrong will temper this dangerous arrogance and provide us with the agility of mind and action to recognize when someone else has "got it right" and to adapt

quickly. We are hopeful of getting far more right than wrong, but it is dangerous to base our plan for the future on the assumption that we will always be right.

The special-operations community has spent the last decade trying to convince the conventional community that we are team players and that we belong to the Army as much as any other soldiers. There were good reasons for this course, and it has paid dividends. But we have a substantially different perspective, based on our historic and current operational experience. We know that hiding behind walls and wire in Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince and Tuzla is not the solution to today's problems. Yet these are the types of missions we face today, and they are likely to be the missions of tomorrow. As ARSOF and the Army debate how to prepare for the next century, the practitioners of unconventional warfare must participate in the discourse. We should not be afraid to raise a dissenting opinion. If we remain silent, then should the Army's futurists and doctrine writers take us down the wrong road, we will have only ourselves to blame.

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Notes:

[1] Charles C. Faulkner III and Edward C. Sayre, "Focusing on the Future: ARSOF XXI and ARSOF Vision 2010," *Special Warfare*, Fall 1997, p. 2.

[2] "ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century," *Special Warfare*, Fall 1997, see chart on p. 7.

[3] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 137.

[4] *Joint Vision 2010*, from web site http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv2010 (1997), pp. 7-8.

[5] Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution," *Parameters*, Summer 1995, p. 7.

[6] Clausewitz, p.185.

The Multidimensional Schoolhouse: SWCS to Incorporate Distance Learning

by Lieutenant Colonel Curt F. Weimer

In April 1999, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School will incorporate distance learning into its Special Forces Advanced NCO Course, thereby becoming one of the first commands in the Army to initiate the Army Distance-Learning Program, and taking the first in a series of steps toward multimedia training.

Today, the average soldier wears a wristwatch with more computing power than existed in the entire world prior to the early 1950s. Notebook computers that accompany SF teams to the field have a computing power equivalent or superior to that of the large mainframe systems of the 1960s. Younger soldiers have grown up in an environment inundated with information from a multitude of sources, and they are comfortable using information technologies to find and to use the data they want or need.

Recognizing these facts and the rapid pace of change that they represent, the United States Army and SWCS are taking action to ensure the continued relevance and effectiveness of their training programs. The Army Distance-Learning Plan, or ADLP, was created in 1996 to gain consensus for distance-learning, or DL, programs; to obtain funding for them; and to identify DL requirements and objectives. By leveraging DL methods and practices, and by exploiting the growing power of computer-based systems and the Internet, SWCS is evolving toward a multidimensional schoolhouse: one with the ability to provide what the ADLP Master Plan calls, "the delivery of standardized individual, collective, and self-development training to soldiers and units at the right place and at the right time through the application of multiple means and technologies."

Behind that high-sounding statement, what does distance learning really mean to the SOF soldier? First, it means an extraordinary opportunity to train and to grow in the skills and knowledge required by the critically important missions assigned to our soldiers and their units. It means the ability to use diagnostic-driven, self-paced DL modules either in state-of-the-art DL facilities, at the job site, at home, or on the ramp of an aircraft in a distant land during the downtime of a mission. It means being able to participate with subject-matter experts in virtual seminars. It means having access to high-quality courseware that will enable soldiers to enhance their professional development. As the DL program nears full implementation, it will mean col-

DL programs allow students to access lessons at the click of a mouse and to learn at their own pace. Soldiers may return to lessons with which they have difficulty, or skip lessons with which they are familiar.

laborative simulations and virtual-reality capabilities that will be imbedded into the courseware. Finally, it means that soldiers will be able to complete required training and still be able to spend time with their families.

DL programs allow students to access lessons at the click of a mouse and to learn at their own pace. Soldiers may return to lessons with which they have difficulty, or skip lessons with which they are familiar. Lessons include all the information the student needs, including text, pictures, sound and interactive exercises to keep students involved. During a lesson on SF photography, for instance, a photo of a bridge appears on the screen. Underneath the photo is the question, "What information can you get from this picture?" As the student moves the cursor over the photo, various details that the student should have noticed appear on the screen. When students are ready to be tested on the lesson, they contact the instructor for the end-of-course exam.

It is important to emphasize that the DL program has no intention of replacing all forms of SWCS resident institutional training. In some instances there is no substitute for training in a residential environment: Some instruction will always require students to put their hands on the equipment or to send live rounds down range.

In the operations-and-intelligence portion of the SF ANCOC, 23 lessons have been converted into the DL format. Beginning in April, the traditionally 18-week resident course will be taught in two blocks: Soldiers will first participate in six weeks of DL training, followed by 12 weeks of resident instruction. During the six-week phase, the students will have access to DL facilities for dedicated study time. They will be able to phone, fax or e-mail their instructors at the NCO Academy for assistance. Course developers will incorporate lessons-learned from the initial iterations of the DL SF ANCOC into follow-on DL courses. Initially, SF ANCOC students will be assigned to SWCS for the entire 18 weeks, but future course iterations will allow students to take the first six weeks via computers at their duty stations.

After SF ANCOC, the next DL classes to be offered will be PSYOP- and CA-specific training. Currently, DL courseware for 37F PSYOP and 38A Civil Affairs training is being developed, with fielding scheduled for FY 2000. In all, 73 SWCS courses are scheduled for DL conversion, a project that will take 10 years. By the time the SWCS DL program is fully implemented, around 2010, as much as 50 percent of the Center's resident instruction could be taught through distance learning.

It is important to emphasize that the DL program has no intention of replacing all forms of SWCS resident institutional training. In some instances there is no substitute for training in a residential environment: Some instruction will always require students to put their hands on the equipment or to send live rounds down range. Other training objectives require that we have people interacting with one another in a collective environment — teaching the SF core values to SF soldiers is one such example.

The SWCS distance-learning program is in the first of three phases. During Phase I, which will continue through 1999, course materials will be transferred to CD-ROM. Not all of the computers will be linked, so students will communicate with instructors through regular mail, e-mail and fax.

During Phase II, scheduled to last from 2000 to 2005, soldiers will be able to access courses from any computer that has access to the Worldwide Web. They will be able to register for courses, keep records and take tests online; view video clips of task demonstrations; and have easier access to instructors and to other students. Soldiers will need authorization to take Army courses for credit, but they will be able to access any course for personal knowledge or professional development.

During Phase III, scheduled to begin in 2006 and last until 2010, students will be able to work together on simulated prob-

lems and to fully rehearse operations from the time they receive mission-planning guidance all the way through mission-execution and recovery from the operation. By the time Phase III begins, the Army plans to have constructed 745 distance-learning classrooms worldwide.

Developing distance-learning courseware and the infrastructure needed to support it requires significant up-front funding. The Army has programmed more than $1 billion toward the DL effort, and SWCS will require more than $45 million to convert its 73 courses into a DL format. But over time, through a reduction in travel expenses, temporary-duty costs, and other institutional expenses, SWCS and the Army will actually save money as a result of the DL program. The savings are expected not only to compensate for the up-front development costs, but also to provide funds that could be applied to sustaining high-quality courseware and other critical programs.

Both the Army and SWCS are entering a period of exciting and rapid change. When the first SF ANCOC classes begin in April, we will get a glimpse of the future. As DL courseware is fielded, SOF soldiers will continue in their quest to excel. They will recognize possibilities and opportunities; they will embrace the DL program and improve it; they will find ways of adapting the program to their unique mission requirements. But more important, they will lead the Army in new directions.

Lieutenant Colonel Curt F. Weimer is director of the Program Integration Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The office is the lead agency for implementing distance learning in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. His special-operations assignments include chief of the Military Operations Other Than War Branch, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; battalion commander and staff operations officer, USSOCOM J3-T; executive officer, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group; and commander, Company C, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group. Lieutenant Colonel Weimer is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor's degree in anthropology from the Ohio State University.

The Millennium Bug: Y2K Problem Demands Everyone's Help

by General Peter J. Schoomaker

The Year 2000 Millennium Bug, also known as Y2K, is a critical issue. This monstrous problem could have a grave impact on the information-technology systems within the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and could affect each employee's daily activities in general.

The Y2K problem is relatively simple to understand. It was created years ago when, in an effort to conserve limited and costly computer memory space, programmers designed date-processing algorithms with two-digit year fields rather than with the more accurate, but more costly, four-digit year fields. While the programmers satisfied the immediate requirement of conserving memory, they neglected to consider the long-term implications. We are now facing the possibility that many computers may fail, shut down or operate improperly as they attempt to make calculations against the year "00."

Widespread problem

Before we discuss the impact of Y2K on the military, we should look at our environment and the items we use on a daily basis — cars, phones, TVs, VCRs, microwave ovens, sprinkler systems, alarm systems and ATM machines. All of these items process dates and are potentially at risk.

Banks, credit unions and other financial institutions have a major Y2K problem.

Our workplace increasingly relies upon computer software, computer processors and automation networks that depend upon dates to process, store, retrieve and share data.

Photo by James E. Lotz

Unless the problem is resolved, the impact on financial markets may be catastrophic. Imagine how you would feel if your savings-account balance went to $0 on Jan. 1, 2000. If your bank's computer software does not recognize Jan. 1, 2000, as an actual date, your direct deposit could be rejected or misrouted.

Y2K may have its largest single effect on the medical community. Hospitals have more than 100,000 items of computer-based equipment in 1,700 categories. Such technology monitors and maintains electronic records as well as the functions of the human body. The potential for error exists in MRI machines, pacemakers, intensive-care monitors and dialysis machines, to name just a few.

Now, let's look at the potential impact on special-operations forces, or SOF. Take a visual inventory of your work environment. Each of us could identify a number of items that may be affected by the Y2K problem. As you enter your workplace, you run your security badge through the card swipe. In your work area, the telephones, copiers, facsimiles, computer processors and printers are all influenced by dates. The local area network, or LAN, relies on applications and operating systems that could be affected before, during and after the millennium. Software applications, which rely on the correct exchange of dates and times, process and send data between work centers over the LAN server.

What is dangerous is that we can end up focusing our Y2K "fix" effort on these office-centric areas and pay less attention to our combat systems. For instance, at the beginning of a flight mission for an MH-60K helicopter, the crew enters the date, time and mission data to set up the flight plan and synchronize with the global positioning system. If the MH-60 helicopter system is not Y2K-compliant, it won't accept the data. The mission won't be flown.

Similarly, the rendezvous and docking system on our SEAL delivery vehicles allows navigation to a precise location undersea, at night, to rendezvous with a mother submarine at the end of a long, demanding mission. If the system is not Y2K-compliant, the probability of successful full-mission profile will be greatly reduced, as we would have to revert to older rendezvous methods.

Photo by Andy McKaskle

If the rendezvous and docking systems on SEAL delivery vehicles are not Y2K-compliant, the probability of mission success will be greatly reduced.

USSOCOM's top priority

The Y2K problem is a readiness issue that threatens the ability of SOF to perform their core functions. SOF is one of the most demanding users of information technology. Everyone at every level must become involved to ensure that our critical systems are identified and evaluated. As you move around your work space and employ your platform and equipment, ask the question, "What is the plan for Y2K fix on this thing?" If no one has the answer, seek the help of your command Y2K coordinator.

We must be aggressive and relentless in our attack on this problem. Thus far, USSOCOM personnel have identified more than 800 items that have a potential Y2K problem. More than $20 million has been obligated toward renovating our weapons, automated information systems, and devices. Nonetheless, I foresee that the problem will continue to grow as we identify all our systems. And the Y2K problem won't end on Jan. 1, 2000. Industry predicts a 10-year period of Y2K failures as we energize little-used lines of code deep within the software of our systems.

Failure not an option

All hardware, software, internal and external interfaces, applications, and devices must be checked, fixed, and tested, and then the fixes must be installed in every similar device throughout the force.

We must also ensure that our systems continue to work together as we integrate them with other renovated systems. Each system and functional area must also have an effective operational contingency plan (a work-around vs. a technical plan) in case of operational failure or corruption of data as a result of Y2K-related issues.

The tip of the Y2K spear does not stop with our SOF systems, of course. We must continue to work with other government and nonmilitary agencies, such as power and water companies, to ensure that those critical systems we require are functional during the next millennium. I ask you again to aggressively pursue identification of these systems and to check them out. Plan to participate in SOCOM-specific and Department of Defense-wide exercises to test our critical systems' interface with non-USSOCOM systems.

Help needed

I remain concerned that something may have been overlooked — particularly in our critical systems. Unequivocally, we cannot afford for any system, component or interface to experience a Y2K failure. Success depends upon everyone's involvement. I know this campaign is not as interesting as jumping, diving, shooting or flying, but it is one that we cannot afford to lose. I consider each of our 47,000 men and women a member of the Y2K task force. Thus, I encourage each of you to stay abreast of this vital national-security issue by regularly visiting our Y2K home page at http://www.socom.smil.mil/y2k/y2koversight.htm. And ask your supervisor today: "What is on the Y2K list?"

For additional information, call Captain G. L. Thompson, USN, director of the USSOCOM Y2K task force, at (813) 828-8189. His unclassified e-mail address is thompsg@socom.mil. You may also telephone Major Rod Sylvester, Y2K systems coordinator, at (813) 828-7489 or DSN 968-7489. His unclassified e-mail address is sylvesr@socom.mil.

General Peter J. Schoomaker is commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill AFB, Fla. Prior to this assignment, he commanded the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. His other special-operations assignments include command at the Special Forces detachment, company, battalion and group levels; and command of the Joint Special Operations Command. In other general-officer assignments, General Schoomaker served as assistant division commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and as deputy director for operations, readiness and mobilization, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and General Staff College and the National War College.

Letters

Core ideology can be found in SF history

In the Summer 1998 edition of *Special Warfare*, Colonel Mark Boyatt acknowledged what we SF soldiers at the operational level have known for years — we do not know our core ideology. Colonel Boyatt is right about why we do not have this grasp, but is his proposed core ideology for Special Forces valid?

Special Forces was created to serve as a cadre for World War II-style partisan forces operating in an area occupied by a conventional opponent. This never happened and, short of total anarchy, will never happen.

Unfortunately, Special Forces has moved away from the direction that was first established and then maintained for almost two decades: unconventional warfare, or UW. UW is defined as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature.

UW takes in a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations: long-duration, indirect activities including guerrilla warfare and other low-visibility or clandestine offensive operations; and operations mostly conducted by indigenous forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by special-operations forces.

To look for a purpose we need only to look at the history of our force. The core purpose of Special Forces is to conduct UW — period. This is our stake in the ground. Our purpose is not, as Colonel Boyatt stated, "to accomplish Special Forces missions through, with or by indigenous populations."

Because we train to operate deep behind enemy lines, and because of the degree to which we must have linguistic ability and cross-cultural consciousness to survive, we are best suited to work with indigenous populations. However, if we are to work *solely* with indigenous populations, we will evolve into something that will not be recognized as a fighting force.

The core values that SF has espoused from the beginning and that should be considered of high value today are good judgment, self-discipline, responsibility, independence of mind, stamina, patience, a sense of humor, spiritual toughness, maturity, ability to work unsupervised, and a love for what we do.

The SF core ideology has always been there; the problem is that we have moved away from the "guiding light" Colonel Boyatt talked about — we got lost. When you get lost, you go back to your last known position and get your fix. We should do the same with our core ideology.

MSG Brian J. Duffy
3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

WO advanced course uses distance learning

On Oct. 1, 1998, the Action Officer Development Course, ST 7000, became a distance-learning training resource for the prerequisite-studies phase of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or WOAC. Completion of ST 7000 is mandatory prior to attendance in the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course. Soldiers must enroll in ST 7000 after their promotion to CW2 in order to qualify for WOAC prerequisite-studies credit. They may choose to enroll anytime between their 24th and 48th month of warrant-officer service. The course must be completed within one year of enrollment. ST 7000 focuses on the professional-development needs of warrant officers in grade CW2 or higher. Topics include management techniques, communication skills, preparing and staffing documents, meetings and interviews, problem-solving, writing, coordinating, briefings and ethics. The course is available via the Internet (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/accp/st7000/top.htm), and taking the course on-line is the preferred method. Soldiers who wish to enroll for the traditional hard-copy version should submit DA Form 145 to the Army Institute for Professional Development. For more information about ST 7000 enrollment, telephone Katha Nickerson, WOCC Distributive Education Office, at DSN 558-3697 or commercial (334) 255-3696.

Board selects 108 FA 39 officers for major

Officers in FA 39 were again successful during the FY 1998 major's promotion-selection board. The board considered 304 FA 39 officers (30-AZ, 133-PZ and 141-BZ), and selected 108 (1-AZ, 98-PZ and 9-BZ). The quality of FA 39 is increasing as the number of fully trained majors increases. Fifty-seven of the FA 39 officers selected are fully trained — an increase of four officers over FY 1997.

OPMS XXI update

OERs. Early in 1999, Change 2 to AR 623-105 will provide guidance on the recommendation of career fields by raters (block Vc) and senior raters (block VIId). MILPER message 98-194 provides interim guidance: All OERs with a "thru" date of Jan. 1, 1999, or later must include a recommendation for a career field and branch or a career field and functional area. This guidance applies only to OERs written for captains, majors and lieutenant colonels in the Army-competitive category.

Career-field designation. Officers in year-groups 1980, 1986 and 1989 who have not yet received their preference sheets for career-field designation, or CFD, and Internet-access personal identification number should contact the PERSCOM CFD officer, CPT Dan Shrimpton, DSN 221-1560 (e-mail: shrimptond@hoffman.army.mil). The first CFD board will consider officers in YGs 80 and 86 (and officers of later YGs who have been promoted below the zone.) The Officer Personnel Management Division has begun posting a "straw poll" of officers' preferences on the Internet, to show the numbers of officers requesting various career fields and functional areas, along with the target numbers. The posting also allows officers to make changes and adjust-

ments. Officers in YGs 80 and 86 can change CFD preferences as often as they like until Feb. 16. Their CFD board will convene Mar. 16; results will be announced in mid-May by a MILPER message. YG 89 will be the next group considered: May 1 will be the deadline for YG 89 preference changes; the board will convene June 1. CFD board results will be announced with the results of the promotion board.

Functional-area designation. Functional-area designation, or FAD, affects captains in their fifth year, and at this time is for YG 93 officers only. All officers must have a functional area assigned. Officers who are in the SF training pipeline, but who have not yet rebranched to SF, must still be designated. Approximately 30 percent of YG 93 officers have indicated an FA preference. Officers who fail to indicate a preference will be assigned an FA, and the FA must be one of an officer's three choices for CFD. For more information, telephone CPT Les Brown at DSN 221-3178, commercial (703) 325-3178, or send e-mail to brownl@hoffman.army.mil.

SF promotions to major exceed Army average

The selection rate among Special Forces officers during the FY 1998 major's promotion-selection board was 87 percent, vs. 85 percent for the Army overall. These statistics show an improvement over the FY 1997 results. According to PERSCOM's OPMS XXI model, the SF Branch needs to maintain an operating inventory of 206 majors; it now has 248.

Branch explains selection for command and staff college

A DA selection board, not an officer's branch, decides which officers will attend foreign command-and-staff colleges. The branch and the Combat Arms Division decide who will attend Navy and Air Force CSC, the main criterion being whether an officer is branch-qualified. If an officer is not branch-qualified as a major, the Army's CGSC is the most appropriate CSC. Selection for the Marine Corps CSC is made by the commanding general of PERSCOM, with input from the officer's branch. Only 10 Army officers are selected to attend Marine Corps CSC each year. Assignment to the School of the Americas is determined by an officer's combat-arm skills and language qualification. The School of the Americas is not a program solely for foreign-area officers, or FAOs; many SF officers who are not FAOs have attended the school and have done well.

Branch lists assignment opportunities

The SF Branch has the following assignment opportunities:

Rank	Position	Location	Beginning date
LTC	Operations officer	Fort Leavenworth, Kan.	9906
LTC	Joint-operations officer	Japan	9906
LTC	Special-operations officer	Puerto Rico	9906
MAJ	Operations officer	Fort Benning, Ga.	9905
MAJ	Operations officer	Fort Bliss, Texas	9905
MAJ	ROTC	South Dakota	9905
CPT	Operations officer	Fort Leavenworth	9905
CPT	USAREC	Ogden, Utah	9905
CPT	USAREC	Houston, Texas	9905
CPT	ROTC	Boulder, Colo.	9905
CPT	Lancero instructor	Colombia	0001
CPT	Operations officer	Colombia	0001

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SWCS seeks 97Es to serve as SERE instructors

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is seeking soldiers in grades E5-E7 who are members of MOS 97E, interrogator, to serve as training instructors in the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course taught at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Volunteers must be physically fit, highly motivated, airborne-qualified (or willing to attend airborne school) and SERE school-qualified (or willing to attend SERE training). To apply or to obtain more information, telephone SGM Steven Fowler, USASOC DCSINT, at DSN 239-6207 or commercial (910) 432-6207 (or send e-mail to: fowlers@soc.mil). Soldiers may also telephone the SERE school operations NCOIC, SSG Rainer Steinbauer, at DSN 236-6270/8389 or commercial (910) 432-6270/8389; or the 97E Military Intelligence Branch Manager, SFC Parmalee, at DSN 221-4991 (or send e-mail to: parmeleg@hoffman.army.mil).

SRB increased for E5s, E6s in MOS 37F

According to MILPER Message 99-032, the selective re-enlistment-bonus level for MOS 37F mid-career sergeants and staff sergeants has been increased from 0/0 to 1B/1B. The amount of the SRB award will be computed by multiplying a soldier's monthly basic pay by his years (or fractions of a year) of additional obligated service and by his SRB multiplier. For more information, telephone SFC Timothy Prescott, PERSCOM CMF 37 career adviser, at DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395.

E8 RCP to change from 24 to 26 years of service

Beginning Jan. 1, 1999, the master-sergeant retention control point, or RCP, will be changed from 24 to 26 years of service, and all master sergeants will be managed according to the new RCP. Master sergeants who have applied for retirement and who have not moved their dependents or shipped household goods and privately owned vehicles will be allowed to request withdrawal of their retirement. The new RCP will not be considered grounds for requesting a standby-advisory-board reconsideration for the last SGM/CSM board.

Foreign SOF

Chechens may recruit volunteers for Kosovo

Russian media reporting in mid-November 1998 suggested that official Chechen elements are undertaking support for the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA. The support, preparations for which may have begun in September, focuses on the recruitment of Chechen mercenaries to fight alongside KLA forces challenging Serbian rule in a "Muslim people's Holy War in Kosovo." According to the Russian reporting, the Chechen military's Organization and Mobilization Directorate — responsible for the manning and deployment of the Chechen armed forces — issued an order to subordinate departments and districts to begin organizing propaganda work and signing up mujahedin volunteers for Kosovo combat duty. Chechen volunteers have been active in a number of the Caucasus conflicts over the last decade. It has also been postulated that recruiting for a Muslim cause abroad may defuse militant internal critics of the Chechen government and reduce the disruptive activities (e.g., kidnapings and clashes with rival groups) of armed Chechen groups. Many armed Chechen elements were left without missions and focus after the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. Directing the energies of these forces to a Muslim cause in Europe may be seen as contributing to the consolidation of the current regime of Chechen President Maskhadov. In the meantime, the Belarus Justice Ministry has warned leaders of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Belarus to cease the recruitment of Belarusian citizens for duty in the former Yugoslavia. The party is trying to build a force of former special-forces officers who have combat experience "to be sent to areas of possible combat operations in Yugoslavia." They, along with other Slavic mercenaries from various parts of the former Soviet Union, would be tasked to operate on behalf of Serbian forces. This exporting of conflict participants threatens to further complicate conflict in the area and to draw the support of distant players.

Peru's Sendero Luminoso still has teeth

Until a few years ago, Peru's Sendero Luminoso, or SL, was considered by many to be one of the most dangerous and violent terrorist organizations in the world. Although it is now greatly reduced in capability and in reputation, SL nevertheless remains capable of inflicting trademark acts of violence. Five years after the capture of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman, Oscar Ramirez Durand (aka "Comrade Feliciano") has been able to maintain the armed struggle despite efforts by Peru's Special Command of the Antiterrorist Police to destroy the residual nucleus of the Sendero leadership. As yet, the Peruvian army has been unable to capture Feliciano either in the deep forest of the Apurimac Valley, in the heights of Razhuillca, or in the mountains of the Ene River Valley. In the last 18 months, SL has stepped up its attacks: In 1997, it attacked San Miguel, the capital of La Mar province, three times — during the last attack, at least 180 *senderistas* participated in the action. According to Peruvian government sources, the *senderistas* who attacked San Miguel were between the ages of 14 and 16, and those in command were between 20 and 24. Sendero continues to finance its operations

through robberies and other crimes, and through the "war tax" that it extracts from local businesses and individuals. Cooperation between the SL faction "Sendero Rojo" and drug-traffickers operating in the Huallaga valley may also be providing a source of revenue.

Afghan guerrillas plan actions in Kashmir

There are numerous reports that Afghan Taleban guerrillas operating in the Indian state of Kashmir are intensifying what the guerrillas hope will be a protracted Muslim insurgency there. Some Indian reports indicate that there are as many as 28 secret Taleban training camps in Kashmir that are being used to train Kasmiri Muslim fighters. The Taleban presence is thought by Indian commentators to number in the hundreds and to include veterans of the successful 1979-88 mujahedin insurgent war against the Soviet invasion force. Dozens of Afghan fighters have been reported killed by Indian security forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. In the view of one Taleban commander now operating in the province, Afghan guerrillas will substantially strengthen the local Muslim guerrilla framework there.

Polish Counterterrorist Force may target organized-crime groups

The Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration recently honored two "commandos" from the special-operations unit of the Operational Maneuver Reaction Group, or GROM, for unspecified operations to save lives. The unit, which by a 1994 Ministry of Defense decree received the honorific name "Cichociemni — AK Paratroopers" in reference to a World War II Polish commando unit, is the premier counterterrorist unit in Poland. It has missions to support of Polish police and security forces as well as missions beyond Polish borders. Falling under the Interior and Administration Ministry — with links to the Defense Ministry — its operations and control will be refined under new legislation scheduled to be put into effect in the summer of 1999. GROM may soon target especially dangerous international organized-crime groups operating on Polish territory. General Slawomir Petelicki, the commander of GROM, recently revealed the plan and discussed other aspects of the force. According to the general, GROM was established in 1990 with the assistance of U.S. and British specialists. The general said that he received training in the U.S. prior to setting up GROM. Notable international actions cited for GROM include VIP protection in Haiti and the arrest of a war criminal in Slavonia: Slavko Dokmanovic, "the butcher of Vukovar," who was wanted for the murder of 260 Croatians. According to the Polish media, GROM members have begun training for the covert insertion of GROM counterterrorist elements by high-altitude parachuting. Equipped with oxygen and jumping from heights of more than eight kilometers, GROM parachutists are said to be capable of covering a "horizontal distance of 30-60 kilometers" before landing.

GRAPO continues to worry Spanish authorities

Reports of terrorism in Spain have focused largely on the activities of the group Basque Fatherland and Liberty, which has ongoing discussions with the Spanish government and may be on its way to reconciliation. A second organization, the First of October Antifascist Resistance Groups — known by the acronym GRAPO — is thought by Spanish security forces to constitute only a single command. GRAPO periodically emerges for public view with some form of terrorist activity. Recently, it has become more visible by dispatching two waves of letters to Spanish businessmen, demanding payment of a substantial "revolutionary tax." Early in 1998, some 200 indi-

viduals received these extortion letters, and 50 "reminder" letters arrived in October and November. According to GRAPO's demands, the revolutionary-tax money would constitute repayment for exploiting the working classes. These demands were punctuated by a bomb explosion in mid-November at Madrid's Institute for Safety and Hygiene in the Workplace. Police credited the bombing to GRAPO. As a consequence of the letters and of the bombing, the Spanish Interior Ministry has set up protection for about 150 businessmen.

Elite Russian military forces continue to decline

While evidence of the general dissolution of the Russian armed forces abounds, the expectation that elite units would somehow retain a high measure of cohesiveness and effectiveness is being dashed as well. For example, morale of the Airborne Troops, or VDV, is reportedly low and is dropping, with special venom sometimes directed toward the VDV commander, General Shpak. Referred to by some as the "VDV grave digger," General Shpak has overseen troop reductions of 30 percent. In addition, he made the unpopular decision to support criminal charges against VDV intelligence officers accused of assassinating a prominent journalist. His support for those charges was seen as disloyalty to fellow airborne soldiers. At the same time, the Ryazan Airborne Troops Academy — with origins stretching to the earliest days of Soviet power — celebrated 80 years of service as a Soviet and then Russian military school. In its VDV and special-operations training role, Ryazan graduated thousands of officers and many famous Soviet soldiers, including Russian presidential aspirant (and former VDV general), Aleksandr Lebed. Airborne graduates won numerous Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Russia designations — the highest military award offered. As of November 1998, however, heat had been shut off to the buildings of Ryazan because of budget shortfalls. The intake of new 1998 students had been reduced, the curriculum has been shortened, and no new inductees are planned for 1999. This is a consequence of the falling requirement for VDV officers in the wake of cutbacks and resource constraints. In the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, which is also celebrating its 80th anniversary, budget cuts, delays in salaries, and troop drawdowns have affected operations as well. Numerous officers have left service for commercial security positions and other "business" opportunities. In particular, the GRU Spetsnaz units, reported to have numbered 16 brigades at the height of the Soviet era, are now said to have been reduced to six brigades. While specific statistics and numbers need to be examined critically, it is clear from all reporting that the support and the status of elite Russian military forces are declining markedly, as they are for the rest of the Russian armed forces.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Gerard Gato of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

PSYOP regiment activated at Fort Bragg

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Psychological Operations element formed its three groups into a regiment during an activation ceremony at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Plaza Nov. 18.

With the activation, the 2nd PSYOP Group (U.S. Army Reserve), the 4th PSYOP Group and the 7th PSYOP Group (U.S. Army Reserve) became the Psychological Operations Regiment. The three PSYOP groups continue to be a part of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

Although the function of the regiment is mostly symbolic, the activation is nevertheless significant. "This is a historic occasion in that, for the first time, all PSYOP groups are put together under one umbrella as one PSYOP organization," said Colonel Charles P. Borchini, commander of the 4th PSYOP Group. "This regimental affiliation uniquely distinguishes PSYOP soldiers and officers from everyone else in the Army and gives us a flag to rally around."

The PSYOP Regiment boasts its own crest and colors. Retired Colonel Alfred H. Paddock Jr. is the regiment's honorary commander; retired Sergeant Major Rudy Whittaker is its honorary sergeant major.

The PSYOP Regiment contains approximately 4,000 soldiers, including 1,400 from the 2nd PSYOP Group in Cleveland, Ohio; 1,400 from the 7th PSYOP Group at Moffet Federal Airfield, Calif.; and 1,200 from the 4th PSYOP Group. — *SGT Nelson Mumma Jr., USASOC PAO*

Photo by Nelson Mumma Jr.

MG Kenneth Bowra, commander of the SWCS, and Chad Spawr, president of the PSYOP Veterans Association, lay a wreath during the PSYOP Regimental activation ceremony to honor PSYOP soldiers who have died in combat.

SWCS to host SF Conference in April

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will host the 1999 Special Forces Conference and Exhibition in Fayetteville, N.C., April 19-22.

The conference is being organized as a cooperative effort by the SWCS; the Army Special Forces Command; the Army Special Operations Command's deputy chief of staff for personnel; the National Defense Industrial Association, or NDIA; and the Special Forces Association. The theme for this year's conference is "Regional Engagement and the Future."

The conference agenda will include three symposia intended to outline and examine selected topics that will ultimately influence the direction of the Special Forces Branch: "Special Forces Ideology" will prepare the principal statement of the force; "Army Special Operations Task Force/Regional Engagement Force" will outline future concepts for the employment of SF units; and "Special Forces Assessment and Selection/Special Forces Qualification Course" will examine future accession and training of SF soldiers.

The symposia are primarily intended for senior SF soldiers, including command and staff sergeants major, chief warrant officers 4, lieutenant colonels, colonels and general officers.

A variety of workshops are planned for junior and mid-grade SF soldiers. The workshops will examine contemporary issues in order to generate recommendations for continued resolution or ratification.

The NDIA will host an exposition of contemporary and future equipment, weapons systems and technologies that are directly related to the SF mission area. The exposition will include systems that are currently available, those that are currently in production, and those that are currently in prototype.

The annual Family Readiness Conference will reinforce the link between families and SOF readiness. The conference will update unit family-advocacy representatives about Army training materials designed to help families become better able to cope with the stresses associated with special operations.

Other conference activities will include a golf tournament, an airborne operation, a hosted social, an informal conference dinner, a dedication to fallen comrades, a picnic

sponsored by the SF Association, and the annual SF Ball.

For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Phil Provencher at DSN 239-7510 or commercial (910) 432-7510; or send e-mail to provencp@soc.mil.

CAOC students face new requirement

Beginning March 1, 1999, students who are enrolled in Phase 1 of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (Subcourse CA0004) must complete the Phase I written requirement (the CMO estimate) and receive a Phase I completion certificate before they can attend Phase II, the resident phase.

In the past, students were allowed to complete the written requirement during Phase II. Under the new rule, students who have not completed the CMO estimate will neither receive Phase I completion certificates nor be awarded retirement-year-ending credit hours for Subcourse CA0004. For more information, telephone Sergeant First Class Reeves at DSN 239-3822 or commercial (910) 432-3822.

SWCS now DoD proponent for UAR

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is conducting an assessment of Army special-operations forces' operational requirements and capabilities for personnel recovery, or PR.

In February 1998, Department of Defense Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*, designated SWCS as the proponent for unconventional assisted recovery, or UAR.

UAR includes actions taken unilaterally, with indigenous assets, or in conjunction with other government agencies to recover designated personnel. Joint SOF develop and execute UAR across the spectrum of conflict.

The SWCS assessment will identify any PR deficiencies in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers. It will define a coordinated approach for ARSOF PR to support DoD goals and objectives. The assessment will focus on the integration of Army, joint and theater-unique requirements into a comprehensive PR training-and-doctrine architecture.

SWCS Pub 525-5-14 (Draft), *Unconventional Assisted Recovery*, provides a conceptual framework for UAR operations. It describes UAR and the role that ARSOF play. The publication promotes an understanding of UAR's unique contributions to PR. It also explains mission tasks, capabilities, limitations and employment techniques.

For more information, telephone Staff Sergeant Michael McCrann at DSN 239-9018 or commercial (919) 432-9018.

Regional Studies Course open to SOF community

The Regional Studies Course, offered by the 3rd Battalion of the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group, provides students with the knowledge to conduct political-military analysis of the operational environment.

The 16-week course includes intensive regional orientation and common-core classes in cross-cultural communications, U.S. foreign policy, political economy, ideology, and international relations.

Students are assigned to one of five seminars — Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America or the Middle East — where they focus on obtaining an in-depth knowledge of that region. The director of each seminar is a regional expert who has spent considerable time living in and studying that region. Students spend one week studying each of the other four regions.

A particular strength of the course is its adjunct-faculty program. Guest lecturers, including retired U.S. ambassadors, retired general officers, and university professors, discuss contemporary issues and teach selected common-core classes.

The course includes a one-week trip to Washington, D.C., for an interagency orientation. Students learn about various agencies' roles in foreign-policy development, discuss relevant issues with the agencies' regional analysts, and visit one or more embassies.

The course ends with an international-affairs symposium that features regional experts from private, government and academic organizations.

Two courses are offered each year: One begins in mid-March, the other begins in early September. Priority is given to officers assigned to Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs), but seats are available for other members of the SOF community. For more information, telephone the course director at DSN 239-5608 or commercial (910) 432-5608.

20th SF Group seeks volunteers

Company C of the 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group, is seeking volunteers to serve as reserve-component SF soldiers.

The company has vacancies for 18-series-qualified lieutenants, warrant officers and enlisted soldiers. Volunteers who are not 18-series qualified must be:

- In exceptional physical condition in order to attend SF training.
- Airborne-qualified or willing to attend airborne training.
- Able to obtain proper security clearances.
- Willing to conduct overseas deployments.

The unit, located in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., is part of the Florida National Guard. Its recent missions include deployments to both Central and South America.

For more information, telephone 1st Lieutenant Mark Ayoob at (305) 590-4496.

Book Reviews

Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations. *By Pascale Combelles Siegel. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998. ISBN 1-57906-008-0, 199 pages.*

In *Target Bosnia*, Pascale Combelles Siegel presents an overview of the role of information in peace-support operations designed to accomplish the NATO mission mandated by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Her monograph reviews the role of public information, or PI, and psychological operations, or PSYOP, as executed in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December of 1995 into 1997.

The book provides background information about NATO-led operations, followed by analyses of PI, PSYOP, and civil-military cooperation, as "pillars" of the supporting information campaign. Siegel also analyzes the way those efforts were integrated within the peace-implementation and peace-stabilization forces, or IFOR/SFOR, and studies the coordination and cooperation needed to synchronize the overall effort of the international community. Finally, Siegel provides an assessment of the effectiveness of NATO information activities and lessons (positive and negative) to be used in achieving greater effectiveness when conducting information activities in support of peace operations.

Target Bosnia judges the information campaign and its associated information activities as critical to the ultimate success of the NATO effort, both in terms of national and international support



for the operation and in terms of achieving the objectives of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Siegel asserts, "Successful information activities were all the more important since propaganda had played a leading role in forging the war and justifying atrocities and crimes throughout the four-year conflict."

There are two distinct limitations to Siegel's effort. The first is that the book has a fixed beginning and a fixed end: December 1995-1997. Still, the book provides excellent comparisons and contrasts in the evolution of the information campaign during that period. In fact, the limitations, challenges, assessments and lessons documented in *Target Bosnia* are in consonance with several official and unofficial assessments of the information campaign. Siegel's book is an outstanding in-progress review.

The second limitation is the book's lack of depth in understanding the background complexities and the reasoning that led to the limitations and the ineffectiveness of certain aspects of the information campaign. Missing from the book's discourse is any mention either of the political pressure to reduce the resources committed to the PKO, or of that reduction's impact on the information campaign.

Politics and competing demands for time and resources brought about complex decisions and actions that are only superficially addressed in the book. On several points, the author makes sterile assessments of the situation without considering cause-and-effect relationships. For example, Siegel points out that during the transition between IFOR and SFOR, "internal integration between PI, PSYOP, and the SFOR Command Group diminished, limiting their contribution to successful mission accomplishment."

Despite these limitations, *Target Bosnia* is still a well-organized and helpful reference for understanding the importance and challenges of managing and executing operations in the information age. The book's value is not limited to the Bosnia experience or to peacekeeping operations. Siegel's assessments and lessons are concise and are based on primary sources. This book is "must reading" for public affairs, PSYOP and information-operations officers, especially those who are serving, or who may soon be serving, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The lessons of *Target Bosnia* are

important for all operations officers and commanders who will plan, coordinate or execute operations at the brigade level or higher in the 21st century.

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Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong. *By Mark Moyar. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ISBN 1-55750-593-4. 464 pages. $29.95.*



Phoenix and the Birds of Prey is a well-researched and concisely written account of the Central Intelligence Agency's Phoenix Program, conducted during the Vietnam War. The much-maligned program, which sought to neutralize the effectiveness of the Viet Cong civil infrastructure in South Vietnam in the late 1960s, is treated in a well-balanced and mature manner.

Moyar's work is welcome. The Phoenix Program was not the great bugaboo that antiwar activists of the time thought it was. Nor was it designed as a cover for assassination. The real purpose of Phoenix was to coordinate intelligence between the various U.S. collection agencies (civilian and military) and the South Vietnamese government.

Those who have backgrounds in intelligence will already know that fusion is one of the most difficult tasks associated with intelligence. The CIA seldom shared its sources because it did not trust others to protect them adequately. Moreover, sharing intelligence means sharing credit. Intelligence professionals, military and civilian, are rated according to their individual efforts to satisfy the goals of their organization — not the goals of a war effort.

The problem of fusion was magnified when the wild card of South Vietnamese intelligence was added to the game. American intelligence didn't trust its own people; it certainly placed little faith in the Vietnamese. Despite these difficulties, Phoenix succeeded in eliminating many in the Viet Cong "shadow government."

Phoenix intelligence-coordination centers were active in all South Vietnamese provinces. Each province had Provincial Reconnaissance Forces, or PRU, who normally worked directly for Saigon-appointed province chiefs. The PRU were the military organizations that acted on Phoenix intelligence. Using that intelligence, the PRU were able to track down, kill and capture many VC.

In most cases, these VC did not wear uniforms, in contravention of the Geneva Accords. The VC chose to live among the South Vietnamese people, using them as human shields. It is regrettable that innocents died as a result.

It was the VC who often set up their bases close to populated areas in order to protect their operations from American air bombardment. It was the VC who conducted kangaroo courts and then either gutted those who disagreed with them or cut off their heads. If one seeks to assign blame for the brutality of the war, one need look no farther than the VC.

It is probably true that some corrupt province chiefs used the PRU to settle old scores. It is also true that the PRU were highly effective and in many provinces all but eliminated VC activities. Moyar rightly points out that the "kills" usually outnumbered the "captured" in PRU combat operations, but civil wars are inherently brutal.

In all of his research, Moyar was unable to find even one CIA agent or U.S. military adviser who engaged in assassination. In fact, Moyar systematically debunks the stories of every person who claimed otherwise — and some of those persons testified under oath before Congress. The fact is that through the Phoenix Program, the CIA and U.S. military intelligence, along with South Vietnamese intelligence, effectively coordinated a great deal of local provincial intelligence that led to a great many successful military operations. Success in this context meant the death or capture of VC soldiers and the destruction of their supporting infrastructure.

As an impartial, credible observer, Mark Moyar deserves a laurel for bringing the facts of the Phoenix Program to light. His book is recommended reading for all soldiers, but particularly for those interested in a greater understanding of the Vietnam conflict and the intelligence functions conducted during the war.

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Special Warfare

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