

Special Warfare

MARCH - APRIL 2010
VOLUME 23 ISSUE 2

EFFECTIVE USE OF FID EXPANDS SF INFLUENCE

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

ON THE COVER
U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers and the governor of Najaf award diplomas to soldiers who completed training to become members of the An Najaf SWAT.

DEPARTMENTS

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Editor, *Special Warfare*;
Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; USAJFKSWCS;
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or e-mail them to steelman@soc.mil.
For additional information:
Contact: *Special Warfare*
Commercial: (910) 432-5703
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Commander & Commandant
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

Editor
Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor
Janice Burton

Graphics & Design
Jennifer Martin

Webmaster
Eva Herrera

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By order of the Secretary of the Army:
George W. Casey Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1001303

Headquarters, Department of the Army

In April, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the Army Special Forces Command will host the Special Forces Symposium, our annual conference that gives us a chance to honor our lineage, to hear from the leaders of the force, to brief those leaders on the current status of training and discuss where we are headed in the future.

The theme of this year's symposium will be "Training the SF Soldier." Although we have been doing that for nearly 60 years, the training is never static. The current program of SF training is an evolutionary result of refining our longstanding program to produce Soldiers with the capabilities, as well as the language and culture skills, that are required in our current operations. We are constantly reviewing lessons learned to identify areas that require new or additional emphasis, as well as to retain training that maintains its value year after year. As we look ahead, our vision for SWCS is that we will use a variety of methods to identify future challenges, to describe the force that will be needed to defeat them and to ensure that our doctrine and training will always produce Soldiers who will be more than equal to any of the ever-increasing number of threats they may encounter.

The Symposium also gives us a chance to discuss changes in doctrine. SF doctrine is also constantly evolving, and it has also gone through a number of changes over the years. In this issue, Colonel David Witty examines the debate over the definition of unconventional warfare and the various views of UW during the years since SF was founded. He identifies the various schools of UW thought, compares them and discusses their rise to prominence and their decline based on lessons learned from operations and the consensus of thought among SF Soldiers.

Also in this issue are the names of the newest inductees to an elite group, the distinguished members of the SF Regiment. Future issues of *Special Warfare* will contain announcements of other DMRs, and the magazine's Web page will soon contain biographies of more than 40 DMRs who have been honored previously. In a regiment in which excellence is a prerequisite, the DMRs are outstanding for their experience, dedication and valor. As we honor their contributions, we also show new members of the Regiment an example of what success in special operations looks like, and we put a human face on the SF Values.

If our selection and training are truly successful, members of the Regiment will see that face not only in the Hall of Heroes but also in the mirror. Throughout changes in training, doctrine and operations since 1952, one constant has been the quality of the personnel in SF and their commitment to the mission and to the SF brotherhood.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

3RD SF GROUP SOLDIERS AWARDED SILVER STAR MEDALS

Soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group gathered to recognize the valor and sacrifice of 40 of their own during a valor award ceremony held Dec. 16, 2009, in the John F. Kennedy Auditorium.

Staff Sergeant Linsey Clarke, who serves as a medical sergeant for Operational Detachment-Alpha 3123, Company B, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group and Master Sergeant Anthony Siriwardene, an operations sergeant of ODA 3236, Co. C, 2nd Bn., 3rd SF Group, were each awarded the Silver Star Medal for acts of valor during battles in Afghanistan.

"'Strength and honor' was the motto given to Task Force Dagger," said Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., who presented the awards. "Strength and honor is exactly what you heard exemplified here today in the combat actions of our Silver Star Medal recipients."

A daily patrol

On Feb. 20, 2009, the sky was clear, the air had a bite to it, but for Afghanistan, it was a beautiful day, according to Clarke.

Clarke was the driver of the second of four vehicles that came under ambush while conducting a joint-operations patrol with members of the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Czech special-operation forces in Khordi, a village in southern Afghanistan.

The third vehicle in the convoy was struck by an improvised explosive device, and the lead vehicle was engaged by rocket-propelled grenades, while small-arms fire rained down.

Clarke immediately backed up his vehicle to assist those who had been struck by the roadside bomb. He dismounted and ran through a volley of fire to discover that three of the men inside had been killed instantly. Two of his remaining teammates were alive, but both were badly wounded.

Clarke found Staff Sergeant Eric Englehardt first. Both of his legs were broken, and he was bleeding heavily, so Clarke quickly and calmly applied a tourniquet to his right leg and dragged him from the burning vehicle. With no cover and enemy fire on both sides,

^ **BATTLE LEADER** Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland Jr., commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, pins a Silver Star Medal on Master Sgt. Anthony Siriwardene during a 3rd SF Group Awards Ceremony at Kennedy Hall. *U.S. Army photo.*

Clarke returned to the destroyed vehicle to help Master Sergeant David Hurt. He again dragged his comrade to safety.

With the team's other medic tending to the wounded, Clarke volunteered to stay in the firefight to secure the remains of the fallen Soldiers.

Clarke still doesn't believe he is a hero.

"It's something any one of those guys would've done for me. There wasn't a second thought," he said.

Siriwardene directs the fight

In August 2005, Siriwardene and his teammates had battled for 56 hours through seven enemy engagements in Zabol Province, Afghanistan.

Working alongside the Afghan National Army, or ANA, Siriwardene's team came under heavy enemy fire while on patrol in the Buka Ghar Valley, an insurgent stronghold.

During the second engagement, Siriwardene repeatedly left the safety of his vehicle to reposition an element of ANA soldiers, said Captain Blayne Smith, Siriwardene's team leader.

"The enemy forces would have taken advantage of the ANA element and would have destroyed their unit if Master Sergeant Siriwardene had not directed them into the right positions," said Smith.

As the battle raged on, the insurgents called for reinforcements and regrouped into stronger units in order to attack again.

The sixth engagement found the team taking extraordinary volumes of machine-gun fire and a vicious onslaught of rocket-propelled grenades. Siriwardene again risked his life by sprinting to the last truck, which was taking the brunt of the attack.

As the turret burst into flames, Siriwardene pulled the gunner to safety, and then, using the cover of a vehicle, he began to gather up ANA soldiers who had been pinned down by enemy fire.

The following morning, Siriwardene's team was joined by a quick-reaction-force element, and in the fiercest of the seven battles, was able to crush the enemy forces.

"We had pinpointed and fixed the enemy," said Siriwardene. "Now, we basically controlled the tempo of the battle."

When the fighting was over, the team was able to confirm 65 enemy kills.

Like Clarke, Siriwardene doesn't believe he did anything to deserve recognition over his teammates.

"The way the guys in the detachment performed — it was amazing," he said. "This is what we do."

"It's not without sacrifice. It's not without loss. But, victory is the end state achieved by these men," said Mulholland.

Along with the two Silver Star Medals, Mulholland presented nine Bronze Star Medals with Valor Devices, six Purple Hearts and 25 Army Commendation Medals with Valor Device, all to Soldiers of the 3rd SF Group.

— *USASOC PAO*

SWCS INDUCTS DISTINGUISHED

On Jan. 13 and Feb. 18, the members of the Special Forces Regiment honored two of their own as Distinguished Members of the Regiment. Distinguished Members of the Regiment are appointed to supplement the ceremonial duties of the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment. Persons appointed may be active-duty or retired officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel or civilians who served on active duty in the regiment.

MAJOR GEORGE PETRIE

On Jan. 13, Major George Petrie was named a Distinguished Member of the Regiment. Petrie entered the U.S. Army as a private on June 22, 1958, and attended Basic Infantry Combat Training and Advanced Infantry Combat Training at Fort Jackson, S.C. He then received basic airborne training at Fort Bragg, N.C.

From December 1958 to May 1962, he served in the 82nd Airborne Division, with a brief stint in Korea. Petrie's first assignment was with the 319th Airborne Field Artillery, 82nd Abn. Div., where he spent the greater portion of his junior enlisted service.

In 1962, Petrie graduated fom the Special Forces Communications Course as the honor graduate. After graduation, he was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group as a senior radio supervisor. Between 1962 and 1965, he completed the Scuba and Underwater Demolitions School and Spanish Language School, all while serving as a radio supervisor with the 8th SF Group at Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone.

In 1967, Petrie returned to the 5th SF Group to serve in Vietnam as a team sergeant and company commander of a mobile guerilla force. He received numerous awards for his service in Vietnam.

In 1968, Petrie moved to the 3rd SF Group to be a team sergeant and first sergeant, followed by a move in 1969 to the 6th SF Group, where he served as a team sergeant. During this time, he graduated from the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Course and the Special Forces Intelligence Analyst Course.

In 1970, Petrie received a direct commission to first lieutenant. After completion of the Infantry Officers Basic Course at Fort Benning, Ga., he returned to Vietnam as part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Contingency Task Group and led an assault team, "Blue Boy." He was the first raider to hit the ground during the assault on the prison camp at Son Tay.

Petrie returned to the 5th SF Group in 1971 to work as an assistant operations officer, and he later became commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, known as the "George Dickel Gang." After completion of the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, he returned to Southeast Asia as a team leader at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand. His next assignment was in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, as an operations officer, field investigator and corps desk officer, and in 1975 he became an action officer in the U.S. Embassy Defense Attaché Office. While serving with the special planning group for the evacuation of Saigon with the U.S. Embassy Defense Attaché Office, Petrie helped evacuate Saigon.

From late 1975 to 1976, Petrie was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, as the S3, and then as assistant operations officer for training.

Between 1976 and 1980, he returned to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, located in Hawaii, as operations officer and executive officer, with additional duty as the Special Operations Division escape-and-evasion officer, in the U.S. Pacific Command. He served in that capacity in Korea, as well, before retiring from active duty on May 31, 1980.

Major Petrie's numerous awards include: the Silver Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device and OLC, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart with OLC, Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device and three OLCs, Joint Service Commendation Medal with three award devices, Navy Commendation Medal with three award devices, Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V" Device, Army Good Conduct Medal with three award devices, National Defense Service Medal with bronze service star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze service stars, Vietnam Service Medal with arrowhead devices (one Silver Star and one Bronze Star), Korean Defense Service Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal with #3, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, Army Overseas Service Ribbon with #6, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with gold star, silver star and bronze star, Vietnam Honor Medal First Class, Vietnam Wound Medal, Vietnam Civic Action Medal (First Class), Vietnam Campaign Medal with "60" device, Inter-American Peace Force Medal, Presidential Unit Citation, Valorous Unit Citation, Meritorious Unit Citation with OLC, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation, Vietnam Civic Action Unit Citation, RVN Civil Action First Class with Palm, RVN Staff Service Medal First Class, RVN Civil Action Unit Citation with palm and RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation with palm. His badges include: Combat Infantryman's Badge, Jungle Warfare Expert Patch, Master Parachutist Badge with combat jump star, Pathfinder Badge, Scuba Badge, Special Forces Tab, RVN Master Parachute Badge, Republic of Korea Master Parachute Badge, Thailand Master Parachute Badge with fourragère and the Gold Order of St. Phillip Neri.

In retirement, Petrie is a volunteer and community leader for several organizations. He has been president of the Special

MEMBERS OF THE SF REGIMENT

Forces Association, Chapter 31, for the past 18 years and has worked with Vet-to-Vet, Operation "Safe Refuge" and the Jimmy Dean Scholarship Fund.

MAJOR CAESAR J. CIVITELLA

Major Caesar J. Civitella was inducted as a DMOR on Feb. 18. He joined the U.S. Army in February 1943 as an enlisted Soldier. He completed basic training and was initially assigned to the Amphibious Engineers at Cape Cod. He then volunteered for and attended basic airborne training at Fort Benning, Ga., and was assigned to duty at Camp Mackall, N.C. Within a week of this assignment, he was ordered to appear before a screening board for testing of his Italian language fluency and was thoroughly questioned about his background. Thus began his career with the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS.

In 1943, after intense training in Bethesda, Md., Civitella, along with 12 other enlisted men and two officers, was assigned to a 15-man operational group, or OG, and continued training. In early 1944, he shipped out to North Africa for further training and preparation.

On Aug. 15, 1944, Civitella's OG initially supported Operation Dragoon — the allied invasion of southern France. As a member of Team Lafayette, he made his first operational jump behind enemy lines. Team Lafayette, along with two other OGs, captured nearly 4,000 Axis soldiers by employing psychological warfare against the finance section of a Nazi division in France. Following their mission in southern France, Civitella and his OG were sent to Italy. There he participated in 21 air operations as a "bundle kicker."

In April 1945, Civitella conducted a second operational jump as a member of Team Sewanee. Operating along the Swiss border in the Alps, the team reported on German activity, assisted downed airmen and prevented German "scorched-earth" activities. The team was also tasked with the mission of capturing Benito Mussolini. Despite much planning and hard work, the team did not get to carry out the mission, because Italian partisans killed Mussolini.

In 1946, Civitella was discharged from the Army and attended the University of Pennsylvania, re-enlisting in 1947. Following his re-enlistment, he received counterintelligence training and was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division as an intelligence NCO. In 1951, while assigned to the 82nd, Civitella applied for and received a direct commission.

In 1952, 2nd Lieutenant Civitella was among the first recruited into the new Special Forces program. His initial assignment was at the Psychological Warfare Center, where he assisted in the development of doctrine, lesson plans and training aids. Civitella was one of the original instructors to teach guerrilla warfare and air operations to the first two Special Forces classes (officer and enlisted). His follow-on assignment was at the newly established 77th SF Group, the precursor of today's 7th SF Group.

In 1955, Civitella was assigned to the 10th SF Group in Bad Toelz, Germany. In that assignment, he continued to teach and refresh personnel on guerrilla warfare and Special Forces doctrine.

In 1958, Civitella returned from Europe and was assigned to the Combat Development Office of the Special Warfare Center and School, where he was involved in the development of Special Forces doctrine, equipment and techniques.

In January 1961, he began the first of three tours in Vietnam. During this time, he also worked on different insertion and extraction methods, including Scuba, HALO and the Fulton "Skyhook" extraction system. Eighteen days before his retirement, he was successfully "snatched-up" by a Caribou airplane using the Fulton Skyhook. On Aug. 31, 1964, Major Civitella retired from the U.S. Army. Following a 24-hour retirement, he joined the CIA and was assigned to the agency's Air Branch to support clandestine-service air requirements. Between 1967 and 1969, he served in Vietnam as the senior province officer in charge for Kien Phong Province, supervising special-operations forces and Vietnamese personnel.

In 1976, Major Civitella was assigned to the CIA's Plans Branch as the liaison officer to the Pentagon for special operations. In this position, he was heavily involved in the development, validation and certification of the first emergency response force — Delta Force. This unit passed its last validation exercise on Nov. 4, 1979, the same day the Iranian hostage crisis began. Major Civitella provided key intelligence support to Operation Eagle Claw.

On Feb. 1, 1981, Major Civitella began his last assignment with the CIA. He was the interagency representative to the U.S. Readiness Command, or US REDCOM, and the newly established Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF, both based at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Civitella coordinated the interagency operational and intelligence training for those two commands. On Jan. 1, 1983, the RDJTF became the U.S. Central Command, and in 1987, USREDCOM was deactivated and replaced by the U.S. Special Operations Command. On Aug. 31, 1983, Major Civitella retired from the CIA. He was awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his work as, "an extremely talented and gifted operations officer."

Major Civitella has authored and co-authored several published articles. On May 19, 2008, he was presented the Bull Simons Award for his outstanding and dedicated service to the special-operations community. In retirement, he continues to be involved in the community as an active member of the OSS Society and the Special Forces Association.

5TH SF GROUP MEDIC NAMED SF MEDIC OF THE YEAR

For the second year in a row, a Soldier from the 5th Special Forces Group has been named the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Special Forces Medic of the Year. Sergeant First Class Owen Wendelin, of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, received the award for actions performed while serving in Afghanistan and at Fort Campbell, Ky.

While on patrol in Helmand Province in northeast Afghanistan, Wendelin's team came under heavy and accurate fire from machine guns, small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Several members of the patrol were injured by small-arms fire.

Wendelin raced to each man, rendering life-saving measures, placing his own life at risk. He gave medical treatment while returning effective fire. Wendelin continued his actions until a helicopter could medevac his injured team members.

"I was just doing my job," Wendelin said, exemplifying the "quiet professional" motto of Special Forces.

Service in combat is not the only consideration for the award. Duty performance while in garrison is also a factor. When not deployed, Wendelin trained other Soldiers in the principles of tactical-combat casualty care.

Wendelin has been serving as an SF medical sergeant for four years and has deployed twice to Iraq and once to Afghanistan.

The USASOC surgeon, Colonel Peter Benson, presented Wendelin the award at the 2009 Special Operations Medical Conference in Tampa, Fla. Benson said the award represents the best of the best among special-operations medical sergeants.

^ **TOP DOC** Colonel Peter Benson, the USASOC surgeon, presents Sergeant 1st Class Owen Wendelin the SF Medic of the Year award at the annual special-operations medical conference. *U.S. Army photo.*

The SF Medic of the Year award is presented annually to a medical sergeant who has exhibited exemplary performance. — *USASOC PAO*

SF Legend, Medal of Honor Recipient Howard dies at age 70

Retired Army Colonel Robert L. Howard, a Medal of Honor recipient, U.S. Army Ranger and Special Forces veteran, died at 70 years of age Dec. 23 at his residence in San Antonio, Texas. He died of natural causes.

Howard, born July 11, 1939, in Opelika, Ala., was known throughout the Army and the military's special-operations community for his courage and leadership in combat. He entered the service on July 20, 1956, and was medically retired on Sept. 30, 1992.

Howard received the Medal of Honor for actions in Vietnam Dec. 30, 1968. He was nominated three times for the award in 13 months; the first was downgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross, and the last was downgraded to a Silver Star Medal. All three nominations came while he served as an NCO in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group.

He received a direct commission from master sergeant to first lieutenant in December 1969 and went on to command several units throughout his career.

His military assignments include time with the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions; the 2nd Ranger Battalion; the 3rd, 5th and 6th Special Forces groups; the 5th Infantry Division; the 7th Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Howard participated in two movies concerning airborne and special-operations missions, both of which featured John Wayne. He made a parachute jump during the filming of *The Longest Day* and appeared as an airborne instructor in *The Green Berets*.

His awards and decorations include the Medal of Honor; Distinguished Service Cross; Silver Star Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal; Legion of Merit (three awards); Bronze Star for Valor (three awards); Purple Heart (eight awards); Meritorious Service Medal (two awards); Air Medal for Valor (two awards); Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal for Valor (three awards); Joint Service Achievement Medal; Army Good Conduct Medal (four awards); National Defense Service Medal; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; Vietnam Service Medal; Armed Forces Reserve Medal; NCO Professional Development Ribbon; Army Service Ribbon; Overseas Service Ribbon; Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with gold, silver and bronze stars; and the Vietnam Wound Medal.

^ **FAREWELL** Sergeant Robert Howard, Jr. accepts the flag that draped the casket of his father, the late Colonel (Ret.) Robert Howard during the funeral and burial held on Monday, Feb. 22, at Arlington National Cemetary, VA.

He was also authorized to wear the Army Presidential Unit Citation; Navy Valorous Unit Citation; Army Meritorious Unit Citation; Vietnamese Gallantry Unit Citation with Palm; Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal (two awards); Vietnam Civil Action Medal (two awards); Republic of Korea Order of National Security Merit (Samil Medal); Combat Infantryman's Badge; Expert Infantryman's Badge; Army Aircrew Badge; Master Parachutist Badge; Pathfinder Badge; Air Assault Badge; Vietnamese Ranger Badge; Special Forces Tab and Army Ranger Tab. — *USASOC PAO*

Un•con•ven•tion•al War•fare: *noun*

Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.

— approved definition June 2009

The Great UW Debate

by Colonel David M. Witty

The Special Forces community has been trying to articulate a definition for unconventional warfare, or UW, for well over 50 years. The pages of previous issues of this magazine are full of articles discussing the definition and scope of UW. The community's failure to clearly state a concise definition of UW to itself, the Army, the joint force, and other government agencies makes it appear that it is at best, doctrinally adrift, or at worst, intellectually lacking. Given the increased emphasis on irregular warfare and the fact that UW is one of the five IW activities,[1] the SF community needs to agree on what UW is or risk losing credibility.

This article will: 1) review previous UW schools of thought; 2) briefly review how the original founders of SF defined UW and the confusion caused by the various doctrinally approved UW definitions; 3) discuss the most current beliefs about UW; 4) describe the results of the UW Definition Working Group held at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, in April 2009; and 5) examine the merits of the new UW definition approved by the commanders of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, in June 2009.

Schools of Thought

A review of articles on UW published in *Special Warfare* reveals that until recently, there were three primary schools of UW thought, named here as the "traditionalist," "methodologist" and "universalist." The traditionalists believed that UW was exclusively either support to indigenous resistance movements aimed at ending foreign occupations or support to indigenous insurgencies aimed at coercing or overthrowing hostile governments.[2] UW could be employed in support of a conventional-force campaign, but it would still have to be conducted through an indigenous resistance movement or insurgency.[3] UW could not be employed against nonstate actors, because they have no overt infrastructure or occupying force to attack.[4] Traditionalists made a clear distinction between UW; foreign internal defense, or FID; and counterinsurgency, or COIN.[5] FID defends a government, while UW coerces or overthrows one.[6] UW should be defined in terms that leave no doubt about what it is.[7] The traditionalist school of thought appears to be closest to what the original founders of SF meant by the term UW.

The methodologist school believed that UW was defined by its means of working by, with or through indigenous forces.[8] In many cases, anything that was not an SF unilateral mission was considered UW, including FID and COIN.[9] The term "unconventional operations," or UO, although never accepted in doctrine, was coined to describe working through indigenous counterparts; UO supported FID during peace and UW during war.[10] In other writings, methodologists said that SF's core purpose was to conduct UW; FID; special reconnaissance, or SR; direct action, or DA; and counterterrorism, or CT, through indigenous populations.[11] Finally, methodologists believed that by using indigenous forces, UW could be employed against nonstate actors or insurgents inside sovereign regimes that the U.S. supported.[12] A varia-

tion of the methodologist school gained considerable influence during the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when its viewpoint was codified into doctrine.

The universalist school believed that UW was everything and that the definition of UW needed to change to ensure its applicability. UW was SF's primary task, and everything else was a subset of it, including DA, SR and FID.[13] They held that UW was applicable in every operational environment.[14] Even before the attacks of 9/11, universalists believed, SF was involved daily in UW in scores of countries.[15] Because UW was the core purpose of SF,[16] its definition and scope needed to be greatly broadened to make it relevant for the 21st century.[17] In fact, linking UW to guerrilla warfare and insurgency made it irrelevant, because the U.S. would never support a resistance movement or insurgency in the future.[18] UW needed to be redefined so that SF could conduct UW unilaterally without indigenous or surrogate forces.[19] The universalist school had much influence at the turn of this century, and in the summer of 2001, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, adopted UW as an all-encompassing term for everything that SF conducts,[20] although that was never accepted into doctrine. The universalist school has faded in recent years, likely because of the success of UW campaigns employing resistance movements in Afghanistan in 2001 and in northern Iraq in 2003, thus proving the continuing relevance of the traditionalist school.[21]

Original Concept, Definitions

When the founders of SF, Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann, defined their term for UW, special forces operations, or SFO,[22] it was support to resistance movements, based on their experiences during World War II.[23] SFO were defined as "the organization of resistance movements and operation of their component networks, conduct of guerrilla warfare, field intelligence gathering, espionage, sabotage, subversion and escape and evasion activities."[24] Bank believed that a resistance movement had to have external support in order to gain liberation from a foreign occupation or freedom from a hostile regime.[25]

However, through the years, the original scope and definition of UW was poorly defined in doctrine, although doctrine still had to serve (as it does today) as the basis for any UW discussions. Doctrine provides a common language of understanding and a body of thought on how to operate. It is intended to serve as a general guide, not as a fixed set of rules that must be rigidly applied in every situation. FM 3-0, *Operations* (February 2008), states that doctrine provides "an authoritative guide for leaders and Soldiers but requires original applications that adapt it to circumstances."[26] Doctrine also drives training and resource allocation, and it is agreed-upon by all concerned parties. But from the inception of SF, doctrinal confusion always existed about its roles and missions,[27] and even Bank expressed concern about the misuse of terms concerning UW.[28]

As of June 2009, there have been 10 different doctrinally approved UW definitions,[29] many of which have been vague or confusing. Although amplifying paragraphs in doctrinal publications following the definitions of UW usually tied it to resistance movements and insurgencies,[30] the definitions themselves were often created with ambiguity. The first doctrinal definition, found in FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare* (May 1955), states, "UW operations are conducted in time of war behind enemy lines by predominantly indigenous personnel responsible in varying degrees to friendly control or direction in the furtherance of military and political objectives. It consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance)."[31]

In February 1969, FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, stated "UW consists of the military, political, psychological or economic actions of a covert, clandestine or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and avoid formal military confrontation."[32] This definition introduces the concept of unilateral UW.

In December 1974, FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, defined UW as "a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy, enemy-held, enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory. UW includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct action missions and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of UW may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace."[33]

FM 31-21A, *Special Forces Operations* (December 1974) (Secret), the classified portion of FM 31-21, expanded on the above definition by stating, "UW operations may be conducted against the external sponsor of an insurgent movement in a host country, or against insurgent movement in a host country, or against insurgent activities in a third country which either willingly or unwillingly accepts the use of its territory by the insurgents for bases, movement, or sanctuary. Their purpose is to support or complement IDAD (internal defense and development) in the host country."[34] The ambiguity of the 1974 definition is evident.

In 2007, there were two doctrinally approved definitions of UW,

one in joint doctrine and the other in Army/Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, doctrine. The joint definition of UW found in JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (December 2003), defined UW as "a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and unconventional assisted recovery."[35] This definition is also ambiguous, because it contains words and phrases that provide no specificity, such as "a broad spectrum," "normally of a long duration," "predominantly," "in varying degrees" and "includes, but is not limited to."

At the same time, the ARSOF definition approved by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, commander in January 2007[36] and found in FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (September 2007) (Secret) and FM 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare* (September 2008), defined UW as "operations conducted by, with or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency or conventional military operations."[37] Irregular forces are defined as "armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces."[38]

Doctrine developers believed that the new ARSOF definition would end confusion about the scope of UW by clearly defining its purpose as support to resistance movements, insurgencies or conventional military operations. Stating that UW could support conventional military operations demonstrated UW's relevance to the Army and the joint force. Including "by, with or through irregular forces" was meant to end confusion of UW with FID or other coalition activities that use regular forces.[39] FM 3-05.130 (September 2008) also states that UW can be used against nonstate actors, increasing its relevance to the Global War on Terrorism while recognizing that nonstate actors do not have the same centers of gravity or infrastructures that have been critical in the past to traditional uses of UW. It also says that UW campaigns can be conducted "within or behind the laws of nonbelligerent states with which the United States is not at war."[40]

USSOCOM non-concurred with the new ARSOF definition and recommended that it be redefined to support current and future applications of UW. However, the real problem with the 2007 ARSOF definition was that it stated that UW can be used to support "conventional military operations," eliminating the requirement for UW to be tied to a resistance movement or an insurgency. The use of any irregular force to support conventional military operations, be they militias, gangs, mercenaries or criminal networks, constituted UW. Defining UW as operations by, with or through irregular forces also makes UW a methodology rather than a operation that has a specific purpose, such as to coerce, disrupt or defeat a hostile government. In addition, UW could be used not only against state and nonstate actors but also against insurgents or terrorists in states that the U.S. supports.

The existence of two doctrinally approved but different definitions — the joint definition and the ARSOF definition — caused more confusion, because the term UW could be applied to many things. SF units were said to be conducting UW when in fact they were conducting what others would classify as advising and training foreign security forces, creating intelligence networks, conducting DA and SR, or performing other tasks in support of FID and COIN.[41]

"The community's failure to clearly state a concise definition of UW to itself, the Army, the joint force and other government agencies makes it appear that it is at best, doctrinally adrift, or at worst, intellectually lacking."

The USSOCOM Global Synchronization Conference of October 2008, attended by staff officers from USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC, SWCS, the Naval Special Warfare Command and the theater special-operations commands, identified a lack of understanding of UW throughout the Department of Defense and within the special-operations community. The lack of understanding of UW was attributed to the joint definition's ambiguity and the ARSOF definition's narrow scope. In reality, the 2007 ARSOF definition was problematic because it was not specific enough and was open to a broad interpretation. Following the conference, USSOCOM tasked USASOC to examine the definition and provide a recommended solution to the problem.

STATEMENTS	ASO			UWDWG		
	Agree	Disagree	Unsure	Agree	Disagree	Unsure
The use of irregulars (such as militias, tribes or clans) in support of COIN or FID operations can be considered UW.	79	29		10	80	
The mission of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, in Vietnam was a UW operation. [43]	30	26	43	15	70	
The CIDG mission of Vietnam was a FID/COIN operation.	59	3	38	70	15	
UW can be conducted against insurgent groups or terrorist networks.	87	10		30	50	
The use of irregular forces exclusively for the purpose of conducting DA/SR or intelligence-collections can be considered IW.	70	23		20	65	
The SF community has a problem articulating what UW is.	77	17		90	0	
The Army and DoD do not understand what we mean by UW.	90	3		85	5	

In order to determine the extent of the misunderstanding of UW, SWCS developed a 75-question UW survey to solicit the community's thoughts on the scope, purpose and definition of UW. The survey was taken by two groups, one at the Advanced Special Operations, or ASO, Conference in March 2009 and one at the UW Definition Working Group, or UWDWG, in April 2009.[42] The results showed that there was little consensus on some fundamental issues concerning UW, particularly when it came to making a distinction between UW, FID, COIN and CT. See the above chart for some statements from the survey and the groups' responses.

Another example that demonstrated the confusion over UW was an excerpt from a Combined Forces Land Component Command OPLAN previously used at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: "2nd Battalion/10th SF remains responsible for FID in Georgia and conducts unconventional warfare (counterinsurgency) in conjunction with the Georgian SOF company to interdict ... insurgents."[44]

Current UW Schools of Thought

Based upon the results of the UW survey and numerous discussions within the SF community, SWCS determined that there are two current schools of thought, the irregular forces methodologist school (a variation of the methodologist school described earlier in this article), and the broad traditionalist school (a slight expansion of the original traditionalist school).

According to the irregular forces methodologist school, UW is an umbrella concept that encompasses a wide variety of activities conducted by irregular forces. The concept includes support to resistance movements and insurgencies, but it also includes other operations conducted by irregular forces. This concept distinguishes UW from other operations by the methodology of employing irregular forces: Any use of irregular forces would be considered UW operations. In this context, strikes, raids or sabotage missions conducted by SF and irregular forces are UW. The missions could be conducted against a state, terrorist organization or nonstate actor. The SF missions of DA, SR and CT are denoted as being exclusively unilateral or as actions taken with the recognized security forces of a state and not involving irregular forces.

The advantage of this school of thought is that it demonstrates that UW is relevant today and can be used against the United States' principal enemy, al-Qaeda, a nonstate actor. However, if UW operations to end a foreign occupation or overthrow a hostile government employ irregular forces, such as militias, gangs, mercenaries, warlords, tribes, criminal networks or opportunists, who are not based in a resistance movement or insurgency that has the support of the civilian population, success is less likely.

In fact, using those types of irregular forces and attempting to manufacture resistance or insurgent movements that lack the support of a state's population can lead to failure. Mao Zedong considered the employment of those types of irregular forces a "corrupt phenomena" that should be eradicated because they are dissociated from the people and unorganized.[45] Examples include U.S. efforts in Albania and Latvia from 1951 to 1955, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, North Vietnam from 1961

to 1964, and Nicaragua from 1980 to 1988.[46] Developing a guerrilla element without first developing a sufficient base of support is an unsustainable and doomed practice. As Mao stated, any resistance movement that is not firmly grounded with the popular support of the population "must fail."[47]

Another drawback to the irregular forces methodologist school is that irregular forces are increasingly being employed on the battlefield by conventional forces, and by this school's line of thought, they are conducting UW, which endangers UW's status as a task conducted predominantly by SF. An excellent example is the Sunni Awakening Movement in Anbar Province in Iraq, also known as Concerned Local Citizens, and later as the Sons of Iraq, or SOI. Many of the SOI were indigenous Sunni tribal insurgents who had fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq against the coalition and Iraqi security forces, but they later defected from al-Qaeda because of its brutality.

As irregular tribal militias, they began to assist coalition forces — who paid, organized, equipped and employed them to provide local security — and the movement later spread throughout Iraq. Although the coalition forces wanted to incorporate the SOI into the Iraqi security forces, the Shia-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was mistrustful of the SOI, and Iraqi security forces conducted raids against them and arrested their leaders.[48] Clearly, the SOI were not part of the regular security forces of Iraq and could only be labeled irregular forces. Conventional forces from the U.S. Army played a significant role in the organization and employment of the SOI.[49]

The other current school, the broad traditionalist school, is slightly more encompassing than the original traditionalist school. According to this school, UW is a specific type of special operation that enables resistance movements and insurgencies. According to the broad traditionalists, UW can involve numerous activities not exclusive to UW. These activities predominantly include guerrilla warfare, subversion and, to a lesser degree, escape and evasion using an indigenous network, sabotage and intelligence-collection. They could also include SR, DA, CT, advanced special operations, preparation of the environment and other activities employed in support of UW but not exclusive to it.

In this school's view, while the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with working with the components of resistance movements and insurgencies, i.e., guerrilla forces, undergrounds and auxiliaries, greatly enable SF to perform a wide array of other special operations, such as SR, DA, CT and FID, the use of irregular forces during the conduct of operations does not make them UW.

The broad traditionalist school categorizes operations by what they aim to achieve rather than the type of force that conducts them. Within that scope, the target of UW must be vulnerable to the effects of resistance and insurgency. The adversary must have some overt infrastructure that is susceptible to physical or psychological attacks. The adversary does not necessarily have to be a state government, but it does have to possess state-like characteristics, e.g., a de-facto government or an occupying military force exercising authority. Groups and networks that are strictly underground or clandestine in nature have different vulnerabilities and represent different challenges; these challenges require different skill sets and approaches. In other words, UW cannot be employed against nonstate actors unless they take on significant state-like characteristics.

An advantage of this school of thought is that it makes it considerably easier to identify what is and what is not UW. However, critics of this school argue that UW would seldom be employed, and it could be seen as largely irrelevant, because the U.S. might lack the political will to support resistance movements or insurgencies in the future. Another criticism is that according to the broad traditionalist definition, UW could not be employed against nonstate actors, al-Qaeda in particular, until they have reached a point where they become de-facto states with overt ruling authority and infrastructure.

The UW Definition Working Group

In an attempt to end the debate about the definition and scope of UW, SWCS convened the UW Definition Working Group, April 7-9, 2009, composed of key stakeholders in the SF community, to develop a consensus on the definition of UW. The UWDWG comprised 25 representatives selected from USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC, SWCS, the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS, the Joint Special Operations University, or JSOU, and the SOF Cell from the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The methodology of the working group was: 1) present a series of briefings on doctrine, the operational environment and the history of the UW definition; 2) divide into three groups to develop three proposed definitions; 3) present each group's definition for discussion and debate; and 4) reach agreement, either through consensus or vote, on one definition. USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC, NPS and JSOU had one vote each; SWCS served as the facilitator. The only stipulations placed on the definition were that it adhere to doctrine (i.e., non-doctrinal terms could not be used in the definition), that it adhere to Army standards for the content of doctrinal definitions, and that it be based on classic theories of warfare that are still valid.[50]

At the conclusion of the UWDWG, the members agreed on the following definition of UW: "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupy-

ing power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area."

Every word in this definition was thoroughly debated. UW was described as "activities" instead of "operations" because "activities" denote actions that could be nonmilitary, while "operations" are military-centric.[51] "Resistance movement and insurgency" were included to connect UW to its historical context. "To coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power" was included to define UW by its purpose rather than by its methodology of working with indigenous or irregular forces. "Underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force" were included because they are considered to be the three common components of insurgencies.[52] "Denied area" was included so that a support element far from the operational area would be described as "supporting UW" rather than "conducting UW." Nonstate actor was not included in the definition because it has no overt infrastructure to attack and was not deemed vulnerable to UW.

The commanders of USSOCOM and USASOC approved the definition in June 2009, stating that it was immediately the only approved definition for SOF and will be proposed for inclusion in all doctrine. They directed SWCS to rescind the existing UW publications, FM 3-05.201 (September 2007) (Secret) and FM 3-05.130 (September 2008), and publish new doctrine.[53] SWCS is currently developing a new publication, TC 31-20, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, which incorporates the new definition. The new definition is being included in all new doctrine.

Merits of the new definition

Critics of the new definition will argue that it is so narrow that UW will seldom be conducted, if at all — the United States will not have the political will to support resistance movements or insurgencies in the future. However, the decision to make war utilizing UW is for policymakers, not for those responsible for developing doctrine and training to maintain capabilities.[54] The United States has not employed nuclear warfare since August 1945; however, it did not attempt to redefine it to make it relevant. The fact that the United States possessed a nuclear capability was invaluable during the Cold War by deterring a Soviet attack. Today, the use of UW is at least as likely as the clash of regular armies in open warfare. In addition, it is conceivable that UW could be used in support of a FID or CT campaign. If a hostile government were to support an insurgency in a country where the United States is conducting FID to enable a host nation's COIN efforts, the United States could employ UW against the hostile government.

Another argument against the new definition is that it does not allow UW to be used against nonstate actors. UW is designed for use against a government or occupying power; a nonstate actor is neither. However, the fact that UW cannot be used against nonstate actors does not mean that those actors cannot be attacked — they could still be targeted using FID, DA, CT or SR. UW would be appropriate against al-Qaeda if the group accomplished its goal of establishing a new Islamic caliphate.[55] If there was a need to develop clandestine surrogate networks in a country without its knowledge for the purposes of targeting terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, that would be CT, not UW.

> **"The new definition provides clarity on what UW is, and while it might not be perfect, it does reduce confusion. In defining UW by what it is meant to achieve rather than by the methodology employed, we can ensure that we are training to achieve the required skills and capabilities."**

By maintaining the historical concept of UW as supporting a resistance movement or insurgency, the new definition makes evident that only SF are trained and equipped to conduct UW within the U.S. military and have specific supporting doctrine. Although other forces may be knowledgeable of techniques for employing irregular forces, that does not mean that they know how to advise or enable a resistance movement or insurgency. By defining UW as strictly support to resistance movements and insurgencies, we can ensure that we develop and maintain the skills needed to enable them. That will prevent what occurred in some previous UW attempts when planners demonstrated a lack of expertise in supporting resistance movements and insurgencies. In some U.S. efforts, planning started late or overly focused on the purely military aspects of creating units that were more like commandos

than guerrilla units, with supporting clandestine elements with indigenous support. Supported forces were disconnected from the population and appeared to be manufactured by the United States.[56]

The new definition is also easily understood and is applicable to what an adversary does against U.S. interests. For instance, Iran has supplied weapons and advisers to multiple resistance movements in Iraq;[57] we can now clearly define that the Iranians were conducting a UW campaign in Iraq and conceptually respond to it.

In the course of attempting to redefine UW as a methodology for employing irregular forces, we changed doctrine to describe FID as not employing irregular forces, only the recognized forces of a host nation. We characterized UW as using irregular forces that are not part of a state's recognized security forces.[58] As noted already, if that were the case, conventional forces would have been categorized as having conducted UW in Iraq through the Sons of Iraq, who were not organized by or approved of by the Iraqi government. Furthermore, previous doctrine stated that the employment of irregular forces is an aspect of FID.[59] That is more doctrinally correct, as FID is actions taken to protect a government,[60] while UW is now clearly used for coercing or defeating one. The Sons of Iraq and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group of South Vietnam were employed to conduct COIN in support of FID, not UW. The employment of irregular forces that are not a part of the host nation's recognized security forces is still for the purpose of accomplishing the host nation's goals or U.S. goals for the host nation.

The most important aspect of the new definition is that it makes a clear distinction between UW and FID. That is vital, because the lines of effort in UW and FID are opposite. A line of effort "links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose — cause and effect — to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions."[61] It is often the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions and end states, especially in activities involving nonmilitary factors,[62] such as UW and FID. Lines of effort in FID could include developing security forces, conducting combat operations, securing the population, developing governance, establishing essential services and promoting economic growth.[63] However, in UW, the lines of effort could include organizing insurgent infrastructure, gaining popular support, conducting armed conflict to de-legitimize a government and conducting subversion to undermine a government.[64] Thus, if one believes he is conducting UW and is in reality conducting FID, the wrong lines of effort could be applied. For example, following the overthrow of a hostile regime by a successful UW campaign, SF might not rapidly transition to FID lines of effort to protect the newly established government and instead remain focused on the UW line of effort of capturing former regime members who would then have little power or influence. That would allow other segments of discontent within a state the breathing space needed for them to establish insurgent undergrounds and transition to guerrilla warfare.[65] We would commit what Clausewitz considered the most grievous error in war: not determining the "kind of war" that we were conducting and instead turning it into something that is "alien to its nature."[66]

Ending the debate

The definition and scope of UW have always been an emotional issue for the SF community. Perhaps because UW was the original, and for a time, only SF task, the community feels a need to be able to apply the term at any time. However, by calling something UW that is not, we endanger the capability of actually supporting resistance movements and insurgencies and following the correct lines of effort. We also continue to confuse ourselves. Should we continue to redefine the meaning of a term just because it might not be immediately relevant? Probably not, but that is what we have done with UW. We should accept the new definition, end the debate and execute the numerous tasks at hand rather than periodically dividing into schools of thought to debate the true meaning of UW. The new definition provides clarity on what UW is, and while it might not be perfect, it does reduce confusion. In defining UW by what it is meant to achieve rather than by the methodology employed, we can ensure that we are training to achieve the required skills and capabilities.[67] We hope the debate is over. ***SW***

Notes:

[1] Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, 1 December 2008, 2.

[2] MAJ Robert G. Brady, "Mass Strategy: A Different Approach to Unconventional Warfare," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1989, 27; MAJ Kenneth E. Tovo, "Special Forces Mission Focus for the Future," *Special Warfare*, December 1996, 8; COL J.H. Crerar, "Commentary: Some Thoughts on Unconventional Warfare," *Special Warfare*, Winter 2000, 38; and D. Jones, "UW/FID and Why Words Matter," *Special Warfare*, July-August 2006, 26. A resistance movement is defined as "an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability." See Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 19 August 2009), 470. Insurgency is defined as "the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself." See JP 1-02, 268.

[3] Brady, 27; and LTC Mark Grdovic, "Understanding Unconventional Warfare and U.S. Army Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, September-October 2006, 20.

[4] D. Jones, 25-26.

[5] FID is defined as "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government

or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." See JP 1-02, 216. COIN is defined as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." See JP 1-02, 130.

[6] MAJ Mike Skinner, "The Renaissance of Unconventional Warfare as an SF Mission," *Special Warfare*, Winter 2002, 19; D. Jones, 23; and Grdovic, "Understanding UW," 18.

[7] D. Jones, 27; and Grdovic, "Understanding UW," 22.

[8] COL Mark D. Boyatt, "Special Forces: Our Core Purpose," *Special Warfare*, Winter 2001, 8; and CPT Robert Lee Wilson, "Unconventional Warfare: SF's Past, Present and Future," *Special Warfare*, Winter 2001, 27. Today, describing UW as by, with or through indigenous forces would be problematic, since UW would be widely conducted by U.S. conventional forces. For instance, General Raymond T. Ordierno, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, said, "Our forces continue to conduct full-spectrum operations – by, with, and through the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces)." See "An Interview with Raymond T. Odierno," *JFQ*, Issue 55 (4th Quarter 2009), 121.

[9] MAJ Christian M. Karsner, "21st-Century Relevance of Mao's Theory on Popular Support in Guerrilla Warfare," *Special Warfare*, February 2005, 32; and Wilson, 24.

[10] Boyatt, "Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations," *Special Warfare*, October 1994, 10. Note that doctrinally, FID can be conducted during wartime.

[11] Boyatt, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What are We?" *Special Warfare*, Summer 1998, 37; Boyatt, "Special Forces Core Purpose: What vs. How," *Special Warfare*, Winter 1999, 19; and Boyatt, "Special Forces: Our Core Purpose," 8. SR is defined as "reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions." See JP 1-02, 509. DA is defined as "short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. See JP 1-02, 163. CT is defined as "operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism." See JP 1-02, 132.

[12] MAJ Dean S. Newman, "Operation White Star: A UW Operation Against An Insurgency," *Special Warfare*, April 2005, 29, 32-33.

[13] COL Michael R. Kershner, "Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations," *Special Warfare*, Winter 2001, 2-7.

[14] Kershner, 4.

[15] Kershner, 2-3.

[16] COL Gary M. Jones and MAJ Christopher Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, 5.

[17] Gary Jones and Tone, 9, 14.

[18] Gary Jones and Tone, 9.

[19] Gary Jones and Tone, 12-13; and Dr. Keith D. Dickson, "The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, Fall 2001, 18.

[20] D. Jones, 22-23.

[21] A final UW school, although undocumented, is the Ambiguous School. The Ambiguousists desire to keep the definition of UW vague so that SF missions can be labeled as UW as required, for reasons that go beyond doctrinal considerations. In academic circles, UW is generally described as anything that is not conventional warfare, giving it a very loose definition. See Hy S. Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 16.

[22] Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), 152, 156.

[23] Bank, 149-51; and Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, Revised Edition (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 120.

[24] Bank, 163.

[25] Bank, 132.

[26] FM 3-0, *Operations*, February 2008, para D-2.

[27] Paddock, 120.

[28] Bank, 151.

[29] FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare*, May 1955, 2; FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, September 1961, 251; FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, June 1965, 4-5; FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, February 1969, 3-1; FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, December 1974, 3-1; FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*, September 1977 (Confidential), 43; FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, April 1990, 3-1; JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, December 2003, II-7; FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, August 2006, 2-1; and FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, September 2007 (Secret), 1-1.

[30] For instance, see FM 31-20, April 1990, 3-2; FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces*, September 1994, 1-24; FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, 2-1; and JP 3-05, December 2003, II-7.

[31] FM 31-21, May 1955, 2.

[32] FM 31-21, February 1969, 3-1.

[33] FM 31-21, December 1974, 3-1.

[34] FM 31-21A, *Special Forces Operations*, December 1974, (Secret), 3-1. IDAD is defined as "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society." See JP 1-02, 276.

[35] JP 3-05, December 2003, II-7. This definition is also found in the current version of JP 1-02.

[36] CW4 Jeffery L. Hasler, "Defining War: New Doctrinal Definitions of Irregular, Conventional and Unconventional Warfare," *Special Warfare*, April-March 2007, 22.

[37] FM 3-05.201, September 2007, (Secret), 1-1; and FM 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare*, September 2008, para 1-2. Both FM 3-05.201 September 2007, (Secret), and FM 3-05.130, September 2008, have been rescinded.

[38] JP 1-02, 282.

[39] FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 1-11.

[40] FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 3-90.

[41] For instance, see Dr. C.H. Briscoe, "Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1," *Special Warfare*, September 2004, 56, where the 1st Special Forces Group leadership envisioned a UW campaign in the Philippines vs. FID following

the 9/11 attacks; Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley, "Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island," *Special Warfare*, September 2004, 30, where the U.S. would apply a COIN model to UW efforts in the Philippines vs. FID; CSM William Eckert, "Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Philippines," *Special Warfare*, November-December 2006, 18, where the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines is conducting UW in the Philippines vs. FID; and LTC Dave Duffy, "UW Support to Irregular Warfare and the Global War on Terrorism," *Special Warfare*, May-June 2007, 14, where SF is conducting UW in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime vs. FID or COIN.

[42] The ASO Conference occurred March 23-27, 2009, at San Diego, Calif., and was attended predominantly by warrant officers and senior NCOs from USSOCOM, USASOC, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command and the theater special-operations commands. Twenty-five personnel took the ASO Conference UW survey. The UWDG occurred April 7-9, 2009, at Fort Bragg, N.C., and was attended predominantely by senior field-grade and warrant officers, sergeants major and civilians from USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC, SWCS, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Joint Special Operations University and the Combined Arms Center SOF Cell. Twenty personnel took the UWDWG UW survey.

[43] During the CIDG mission in South Vietnam, SF trained irregular forces to conduct pacification in interior regions and border surveillance activities along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to prevent infiltration from North Vietnam. At its height, the CIDG program constituted more than 40,000 irregulars. See Paddock, 158-59.

[44] The OPLAN has not been used since 2007. E-mail exchange with LTC Casey J. Lessard, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 13 January 2010.

[45] *Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 44-45.

[46] Mark Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, SWCS Pub 09-01, November 2009, 32-36.

[47] Mao, 43-44.

[48] Leila Fadel, "Key U.S. Iraq Strategy in Danger of Collapse," McClatchy Washington Bureau, August 20, 2008, available at <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/v-print/story/49538.html>; Ned Parker, "Iraq Seeks Breakup of Sunni Fighters: The U.S. backed force faces arrests and could return to insurgency," *Los Angeles Times* – Article Collection, Aug. 23, 2008, available at <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/23/world/fg-sons23>; Ron Synovitz, "Tension Runs Deep Between Iraqi Government and Awakening Councils," Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, April 7, 2009, available at <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1604222.html>; for a good overview of the Sons of Iraq, see William S. McCallister, "Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular War," *Small Wars Journal*, 2008, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jounral/docs-temp/97-mccallister.pd>; and for a good overview of conventional forces employing the Sons of Iraq, see MAJ Andrew W. Koloski and LTC John S. Kolasheski, "Thickening the Lines: Sons of Iraq, A Combat Multiplier," *Military Review*, January-February 2009, 41-53, available at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art007.pdf>.

[49] Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History* (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 197.

[50] It was assumed that the beliefs of the classic theorists of war, such as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Mao, were still valid, because the UWDWG had insufficient time to develop a new theory of warfare in three days.

[51] JP 1-02, 5, 397.

[52] Grdovic, *Leader's Handbook*, 10.

[53] USASOC Message DTG 301341Z, Jun 09, Subject: Unconventional Warfare (UW) Definition.

[54] Brady, 27.

[55] D. Jones, 25-26; and Grdovic, "Understanding UW," 22.

[56] See, for instance, Grdovic, "Understanding UW," 19, for a description of U.S. support to the Contras in Nicaragua.

[56] Kagan, 159.

[57] FM 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense*, February 2007, para A-9.

[58] LTC John Mulbury, "ARSOF, General Purpose Forces and FID: Who Does What, Where and When?" *Special Warfare,* January-February 2008, 19; FM 3-05.137, *Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense*, June 2008, para 1-2; and FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 1-11.

[59] FM 31-20-3, September 1994, 1-19, I-10; and FM 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense*, February 2007, para A-9, F-9.

[60] JP 1-02, 216.

[61] FM 3-0, Glossary-9.

[62] FM 3-0, para 6-66 - 67. Army doctrine makes a distinction between lines of effort and lines of operations. A line of operations is a "line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives." See FM 3-0, para 6-62. A line of operation is space-and-time based, while a line of effort is logic-of-purpose based. In Army doctrine, lines of effort were formerly referred to as logical lines of operations. See FM 3-0, D-6. In joint doctrine, there are two types of lines of operations, physical and logical. Physical lines of operations are used to "connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor." Logical lines of operations are used to "visualize and describe the operation when positional reference to an enemy has little relevance." See JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006, incorporating change 1,13 February 2008, IV 13-14. A line of effort in Army doctrine corresponds to a logical line of operations in joint doctrine.

[63] FM 3-0, Figure 6-6; FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, para 4-19; and D. Jones, 24. Note that D. Jones and FM 3-24 refer to these as logical lines of operations vs. lines of efforts. See endnote 62.

[64] D. Jones, 24; Mark Grdovic, *Leader's Handbook*, 9; and FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 1-27. Note that Grdovic and FM 3-05.130 refer to these as lines of operations vs. lines of effort. See endnote 62.

[65] D. Jones, 25.

[66] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War,* translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 100.

[67] Grdovic, "Understanding UW," 23.

Colonel David M. Witty is the Director of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) at SWCS. For assistance with this article, he would like to thank Stephen D. Childs, George T. Carr and Robert L. Ferguson of DOTD, CW4 Jeffrey L. Hasler of the 3rd SF Group, Major Armin K. Windmueller of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, and Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic of Special Operations Command – Central.



EFFECTIVE USE OF FID EXPANDS SF INFLUENCE

By Captain Stephen C. Flanagan

During the past six years of combat rotations to Iraq, United States Army Special Forces have refined their lines of operation, or LOOs, to meet the ever-evolving challenges presented on the battlefield of counterinsurgency, or COIN.

The LOOs directed by combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs, in Iraq and Afghanistan have varied greatly over time and have included: targeting enemy networks, conducting tribal engagements, conducting information and psychological operations, conducting combined lethal operations and developing networks of influence. However, one LOO that has remained the constant emphasis for the 10th SF Group in shaping the battlefield in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the conduct of foreign internal defense, or FID.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines FID as "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency." The 10th SF Group has prioritized FID, emphasizing military training and combat-advising, to improve the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces, or ISF, and ultimately to protect Iraqi society from insurgency. During OIF V and VI, SF Operational Detachment-Alpha 0324 learned that effective FID not only led to improved employment of ISF but also enabled the ODA to develop strong networks of influence and effectively accomplish the desired effects along their assigned LOOs.

Based in Kirkuk during OIF V, ODA 0324 spent the first half of its deployment conducting FID training with 84 Kurdish soldiers of the 4th Iraqi Army Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance Company. In July 2007, the ODA conducted training in the military decision-making process, or MDMP, reassessing how to more effectively shape the operational environment. The ODA found that multiple friendly elements redundantly focused on insurgents in the Kirkuk City area, collected intelligence from the same sources and partnered with the same Iraqi elements.

Meanwhile, the detachment's intelligence preparation of the battlefield indicated that the greatest threat had shifted to an area outside of Kirkuk City: Diyala Province was teeming with violence between al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, and Jaysh al-Mehdi, or JAM.[1] Intelligence indicated the Hamrin Mountains, running along the Salah ad-Din/Kirkuk provincial boundary, provided an unimpeded supply route into Diyala for AQI.[2] The key AQI node at the northern end of that supply line was the Zaab Triangle, formed by the towns of Bayji, Hawijah and Sharqat, with Zaab Village at its center.

There were virtually no coalition forces, or CF, and few ISF forces in the triangle because it was on the seam between three CF brigades and four provinces: Ninewah, Kirkuk, Irbil and Salah ad-Din. AQI firmly controlled most of the Zaab Triangle. The Hamrin Mountains essentially formed an AQI "supply snake" into Diyala Province, with the Zaab Triangle at its head. The ODA's MDMP concluded that the best way to attack the snake was to cut off its head.

In August 2007, therefore, ODA 0324 constructed a combat outpost in the heart of the Zaab Triangle, co-located with the largely AQI-corrupted 18th Strategic Infrastructure Battalion, or SIB. The ODA established close ties with the commander of the 18th SIB, mitigated his corruption, and initiated intensive FID training with his best platoons. The ODA advised NCOs from the 4th Iraqi Army ISR Company who were training platoons of the 18th SIB Scout and Quick Reaction Force, or QRF. This was a noteworthy accomplishment, persuading the Shiite Kurdish soldiers of the 4th IA to train with and later conduct missions alongside the Sunni soldiers of the 18th SIB. The FID training promoted a healthy competition between the Iraqi units to be the best ISF direct-action force in the area, demonstrating a vast expansion of the ODA's influence.

The QRF platoon leader soon introduced the ODA commander to a retired major general of the Iraqi police. The general commanded the loyalties of the dominant tribe in the area. The timing of the meeting was crucial. AQI had recently killed a tribal member because it believed he had cooperated with U.S. forces. AQI had established the Islamic State of Iraq, or ISI, implementing strict, radical Sunni Sharia law, and it maintained dominance in the general area.

AQI regularly distributed ISI newsletters full of propaganda against the government of Iraq, or GOI, and the U.S. government, and it corrupted local leaders of the ISF and government. AQI conducted grisly executions for minor infractions of the Sharia law, including beheadings in the center of towns. Through those coercive tactics, AQI gained the ability to collect local taxes and command control of the area. However, with the execution of the tribesman and the arrival of ODA 0324 to the area, that was all about to change.

The ODA developed a close relationship with the general and the area tribal leaders, who previously had been wary of CF, ISF and the GOI. The ODA fostered the development of a tribal *sahawa*, or "awakening," against AQI, in the form of a network of concerned local citizens. The sahawa organization slowly began providing the ODA with atmospherics and intelligence. With that intelligence, the ODA began combat-advising its counterparts in the 4th IA, ISR and 18th SIB to conduct

^ **TEAM LEADER** An SF captain and members of his team combat-advise Iraqi forces prior to going on a mission. *U.S. Army photo.*

direct-action raids against AQI facilitators and weapons caches.

As the ODA and FID partners degraded AQI control of the area, the sahawa grew in its strength, willingness and ability to provide intelligence. Local ISF also began cooperating more with the ODA and even asserting itself to enforce the GOI rule of law. The regional police chief began coming to sahawa meetings and cooperating fully with the ODA. The commander of the 18th SIB also grew less corrupt and began to employ his line companies in ODA-advised clearing operations against AQI.

On Sept. 17, 2007, the ODA and the 18th SIB Scout Platoon were en route to recover a cache when the combined force was caught in a two-sided ambush in a tight alley in the AQI stronghold of Hugna. All the FID training paid off — the SIB Scouts responded professionally.

The combined element returned fire, pushed beyond the kill zone and quickly began clearing back through that portion of the village. The ODA synchronized maneuver of the combined assault force, the Humvee-based support-by-fire elements, close air support from the 2-6 Cavalry, and a company-sized QRF provided by the 18th SIB and the 5-82 Field Artillery Battalion.

The action resulted in no friendly casualties, 14 detained AQI operatives and one enemy killed. The dead man, Baha Turki Abd Shabib, had been on the ODA's high-value target, or HVT, list. He was the AQI leader of the Hugna area and had been linked to the deaths of more than 60 innocent Iraqis, including the notorious beheading of an Iraqi soldier. Shabib had been responsible for manufacturing IEDs and directing numerous IED attacks against CF and ISF.[3] The operation was an ISF victory and resulted in the degradation of AQI in the Hugna area.

Also in September 2007, the ODA received a tip from a sahawa contact about a regional AQI leader in Old Zaab Village. The ODA and the 18th SIB QRF Platoon conducted a daylight time-sensitive raid and arrested Sattam Hamid Khalif, the area AQI leader, former Baath Party leader and 3/25 BCT HVT, who had been the primary target of nearly a dozen CF-led raids since 2003.[4] The celebration in the streets over his capture lasted for the next several days.

Sattam's capture was a huge psychological blow to area AQI. In just three months, the ODA had trained the formerly stagnant 18th SIB and

^ **TESTING METTLE** An SF Soldier from the 10th SF Group keeps a close watch on the recruits for the new An Najaf SWAT team. *U.S. Army photo.*

advised them as they performed 32 successful direct-action operations, captured or killed 43 AQI operatives and recovered seven caches. These operations demoralized the AQI in the Zaab Triangle and asserted the ODA-advised ISF as the authority of the area.

In a third activity in September 2007, the ODA arranged a "Sons of Iraq," or SOI, contract between the sahawa and the 5-82 Field Artillery Battalion to assist the ISF in securing the IED-laden roads of the northern Zaab Triangle. This SOI contract proved so successful that the 5-82 FA expanded the concept to other groups across its sector of the southern Ninewah Province.

In October, the ODA encouraged the 1-87 Infantry Battalion, in Hawijah, to work closely with the Zaab ISF and to initiate a SOI program for the sahawa in order to secure the roads of the central Zaab Triangle. From the beginning, the ODA influenced the Kirkuk provincial government to co-sign the SOI contract to ensure the sahawa's loyalty to the GOI. Seeing the value of the SOI program, the 1-87 commander employed it across his entire battalion battlespace. The effect was rapid and remarkable. Camp McHenry, the 1-87 headquarters in Hawijah, had received daily indirect fire for the previous year; but by November 2007, the attacks had ceased.[5]

The 1-10 Infantry BCT followed suit and employed the SOI program across its entire sector. The new alliance was the single largest volunteer mobilization since the war began.[6] The expansion of SF's influence and the long-term shaping of the operational environment was made possible by the foundation of FID training. The ODA's ability to neutralize a previous AQI stronghold and promote the primacy of the ISF was no aberration. Detachments from the 10th SF Group accomplished similar results across all of northern Iraq during OIF V.

ODA 0324 had a similar experience in gaining influence through FID during OIF VI in the holy city of Najaf, the capital of the Shia world. The previous ODA in Najaf focused on conducting leader engagements and collecting atmospherics and had conducted only four SF-advised ISF operations during the previous year. The provincial governor and the provincial director of police had a standing agreement with JAM in Najaf that JAM would not be targeted if it refrained from conducting attacks there. Therefore, JAM and JAM

^ **KEEPING WATCH** A busy check point in Hugna keeps this SF Soldier from the 10th SF Group on guard. *U.S. Army photo.*

Special Groups, or JAM-SG,[7] had freedom of movement in Najaf while they facilitated and planned attacks in other provinces. So while JAM-SG conducted attacks against CF convoys in adjacent provinces, in Najaf, the ISF elements, the police and the IA's 30th Brigade, 8th Division, were stagnant. On the surface, Najaf appeared calm; in reality, it resembled a turbulent JAM-SG beehive.

Soon after its arrival in May 2008, ODA 0324 implemented an intensive FID training program with the burgeoning An Najaf SWAT, or ANSWAT, and special-forces platoons within the 30th IA BDE. The ODA revamped the ANSWAT qualification course program of instruction, or POI, into a five-week course that began with a challenging selection phase, followed by an operator training phase. The ODA helped the ANSWAT commander select NCOs to run future qualification courses and sustainment training for the unit. The ODA taught the ANSWAT NCOs how to lead training and then supervised them as they trained the unit. By September 2008, Najaf had a 110-man SWAT company that was fit, motivated, tactically sound and sustainable.

Brigadier General Majid, commander of the 30th IA, witnessed the development of the ANSWAT and grew receptive to the ODA's suggestions. He accepted the ODA's recommendation to unite the three special-forces platoons in his brigade into one unit, the 30th IA Brigade Special Forces Company. The ODA conducted an assessment of the IA special-forces soldiers and developed a training POI. The soldiers had been trained by SF in the past, and the ODA determined that they needed to refresh their skills in combat marksmanship and small-unit tactics, or SUT. Once that was complete, the ODA leveraged its new influence with Majid to supply the special-forces company with flashlights for their weapons and trained them extensively on nighttime marksmanship and SUT. Those night skills proved critical during subsequent operations.

The training and skills-development of both Iraqi units led to a healthy competition to be the best in Najaf. Each unit wanted more training and combat-advising from the ODA to improve their skills and reputation, which expanded the ODA's influence significantly. Soon the commander of the Najaf police's Thu Al Fuqar Battalion approached the ODA to request training for his "special platoon." This was significant because he, the provincial director of

^ **RECRUITING STATION** Special Forces Soldiers recruit for the An Najaf SWAT team at the Najaf Police Academy. *U.S. Army photo.*

police and the lieutenant governor had served in Badr Corps[8] together for decades and now formed the true power trio in Najaf.

Although the governor held the governorship,[9] those three actually possessed more power in the province because of their standing within Badr Corps and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.[10] In recent years, the secretive Thu Al Fuqar had gained a reputation as a rogue but effective unit that operated on behalf of the Badr Corps. The ODA capitalized on the opportunity to gain better access and influence with these actual leaders of Najaf, trained the police battalion's special platoon, and later combat-advised its operations to effectively neutralize a JAM-SG IED cell in northern Najaf.

The FID program expanded the ODA's influence in intelligence-collection, as well. Cooperation with the ISF units' intelligence sections helped the ODA develop more reliable targets. The expansion of the ODA's influence with provincial leaders also led to relationships whereby key governmental leaders often shared valuable intelligence with the ODA. Ultimately, the FID program enabled the ODA to develop dependable intelligence and served to influence the provincial governor and ISF leaders to begin approving SF-advised direct-action operations to arrest mid- and high-level members of JAM-SG seeking refuge in Najaf.

The Hay al-Rathma neighborhood, in the Sadr City of Najaf, was long considered a JAM-SG controlled area, off-limits to ISF and CF. On Oct. 23, 2008, the ODA gained intelligence and approval to conduct a series of raids against three targets in Hay al-Rahtma. The ODA combat-advised the 30th IA Brigade SF Company in the successful arrest of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq's number-three HVT, Ali Hamza Hadad; the ODA's HVT, Sayid Jihad Musawi; and the Multi-National Division-Central's HVT, Nasir the Fat. Those raids ended Hay al-Rahtma's status as a JAM-SG safe zone.

From October 2008 to January 2009, ODA 0324 continued to combat-advise the ANSWAT, the 30th IA Brigade SF Company and Thu Al Fuqar during 23 raids across the An Najaf Province with 21 of them (91 percent) resulting in the arrest of the primary target. In all, 38 warranted JAM-SG insurgents were put behind bars. These terrorists included an unprecedented nine HVTs of the MNC-I, MND-C and Task Force-17. Intelligence feedback indicated that

not only was Najaf no longer a safe haven for JAM-SG but also that terrorists who once found sanctuary in Najaf were fleeing the province to seek refuge elsewhere.

The ODA's FID program not only led to degradation of JAM-SG but also enabled the ODA to expand its influence into the rural tribal areas of the province. The commander of the 5th Department of Border Enforcement, or DBE, approached the ODA to request training for his Cobra Force. The ODA provided some training and developed a relationship that would facilitate intelligence-gathering and access to area sheiks.

The sheiks were totally disenchanted with the GOI, especially the Badr-led provincial government and police. In November 2008, the ODA learned that several sheiks were so angry with the provincial government that they were making plans to conduct a provincial coup with 300,000 armed tribesmen. Through FID training and integrating Civil Affairs projects funded by Najaf's provincial reconstruction teams, the ODA was able to gain great influence over the 5th DBE and the tribes and eventually convinced the sheiks to conduct a "democratic revolution" instead of an armed one.

For the first time, these tribes began to acknowledge the new GOI and became involved in the democratic process. The sheiks began organizing conventions and political rallies. During the 2009 provincial election, they won six seats in the Najaf provincial parliament and helped elect the new Najaf governor, Adnan Zurfi, of the Beni Hassan tribe.[11]

ODA 0324's ability to build confident and competent ISF, to persuade previously distrustful Shia and Sunni tribes to support the GOI, and to influence provincial and ISF leaders to support effective direct-action operations that ended AQI and JAM-SG sanctuaries was all made possible by the ODA's robust FID programs.

The detachment's ability to gain influence and shape the operational environment through FID during OIF V and VI was no anomaly. The 10th SF Group ODAs had similar accomplishments in dozens of outstations across Iraq. During OIF V and VI, the 10th SF Group-led CJSOTF-AP conducted 4,644 FID training events, an average of 15 events per day, with a unit of only brigade strength. Direct extensions of the 10th Group's FID priority, CJSOTF elements brokered 3,011 tribal engagements and conducted 1,783 direct-action operations, resulting in the capture of 1,138 primary targets and 1,743 persons of interest. FID, as exemplified by ODA 0324 and all 10th SF Group elements in OIF V and VI, directly expands SF influence, and it will remain paramount to successful COIN campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. ***SW***

Notes:

[1] Jaysh al-Mehdi is an Iraqi paramilitary force created in June 2003 by the radical Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. JAM was responsible for most of the insurgent violence in southern Iraq from 2004 to 2007.

[2] Kirkuk Province is also known as At Ta'mim Province to westerners.

[3] The Hugna ambush story is reported at: http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14106&Itemid=128.

[4] The ODA paid out the standing $10,000 reward for the information that led to Sattam Hamid Khalif's capture.

[5] Information about the effects of the Hawijah SOI program come from: http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18614&Itemid=128.

[6] The *USA Today* report on the SOI mobilization: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-11-28-iraq-wednesday_N.htm?csp=34.

[7] Jaysh al-Mehdi - Special Groups are the cell-based Shia insurgent organizations operating within Iraq, backed by Iran. These groups have some connections with Jaysh al-Mehdi and are largely funded, trained and armed by the Iranian Quds Force.

[8] The Badr Corps (also known as Badr Brigade or Badr Organization) was based in Iran for two decades during the rule of Saddam Hussein. It consisted of thousands of Iraqi exiles, refugees and defectors who fought alongside Iran in the Iran–Iraq War. Returning to Iraq following the 2003 coalition invasion, the group became the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.

[9] Although the Najaf governor was a member of ISCI, he was a moderate who was new to the party. ISCI leadership expected him to follow the guidance of the lieutenant governor.

[10] The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq is an Iraqi political party currently led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. Its support comes from the country's Shia Muslim community and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council.

[11] The tribes won six seats on the An Najaf Provincial Council under the political party names of "Loyalty to Najaf" and "Najaf Unity": http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2395&lang=0.

Captain Stephen C. Flanagan is commander of ODA 0324 and conducted two tours to OIF with his detachment. Commissioned through ROTC as an Infantry lieutenant in May 2001, he completed the Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger School and then served as a rifle platoon leader in the 1-501 Parachute Infantry Regiment from 2002 to 2003. He served as a rifle platoon leader and support platoon leader in the 1st Ranger Battalion from 2003 to 2005, during which time he completed one tour in Iraq and one tour in Afghanistan. After completing the Infantry Captain's Career Course and the Special Forces Qualification Course, he reported to the 10th SF Group in May 2007. He holds a bachelor's in electrical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y.



The Lion, the Starfish and the Spider

Hitting Terrorists Where It Hurts

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bruce E. DeFeyter

"*You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometime, you just might find you get what you need.*"[1]

Today policy-makers, law-enforcement officials and military leaders struggle to come up with innovative ideas for neutralizing terrorist organizations and their activities. One such idea, not given much thought until after Sept. 11, is attacking terrorist financing structures, methods and sources.[2]

Attempting to destroy terrorists by denying them financing or interrupting their money stream is unlikely to succeed as a sole point of effort for at least three reasons. First, organizationally, terrorists are structured to slip behind, around and underneath centralized organizations, rules and bureaucracies. Second, terrorist organizations can conduct operations for literally pennies on the dollar, and any serious effort to interrupt these financially insignificant activities will have serious second- and third-order effects on the larger financial community. Third, even with the thousands of laws enacted and the historically unprecedented cooperation between partner nations, terrorism continues to escalate by nearly every conceivable measure.[3] Bluntly put, counterterrorism financing reform simply doesn't work.

This is not to say that the United States and the larger worldwide community should ignore terrorist financing — instead, it should take a different approach, using the lion, the African predator, as a model. In order to understand the predator model, we need to define who our enemy actually is and understand the three reasons given above for the failure of financing reform. Only then will we be able to structure a more effective mechanism for interdicting terrorist organizations through their financing rather than by trying to starve them out of existence.

DEFINE THE ENEMY

In any conflict, it is imperative to understand exactly who the enemy is. It is generally understood that terrorism is a tactic and not an organization or group. Consequently, if we do not further define the enemy beyond a tactic, we risk fighting this war alongside other ill-defined wars declared on poverty, drugs, cancer and obesity. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, a terrorist is better defined as a nonstate actor, someone who acts on the international stage outside the knowledge or permission of the state to which he or she owes allegiance. The quintessential nonstate actors are Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

The nonstate actor is the ultimate persona non grata, operating across country lines and boundaries, restricted by nothing but conscience. By definition, nonstate actors do not have a state (or legitimate authority) to report to and can be involved in criminal activities, such as selling drugs, smuggling weapons or, of course, terrorism. Primarily, nonstate actors remain behind the scenes and out of sight of the state, emerging only to make demands, threats or attacks.

Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, authors of the book *The Starfish and the Spider*, also define and classify most nonstate actors as decentralized organizations. It is this organizational definition that will illuminate a significant difficulty in attempting to attack a nonstate actor.

CURRENT GAME

Brafman and Beckstrom note several interesting "rules" about decentralized organizations, which they call "starfish." First, "When attacked, a decentralized organization tends to become even more open and decentralized."[4] In plain language, an already dark and secretive organization, when attacked, becomes more dispersed and darker; meaning that it becomes exponentially harder to find.

Furthermore, the increased decentralization does not affect the organization's performance — in some scenarios, performance actually improves. Granted, there might be some "trophies" captured in the attack, but the larger organization continues to exist in a more nebulous fashion. Furthermore, the starfish, operating in a more open environment, are more capable of mutating.[5] That mutation allows starfish to adapt and change more quickly than centralized organizations can react by passing laws or effective legislation. Finally, and more ominously, smaller, autonomous, decentralized organizations have a habit of sneaking up on centralized organizations, or spiders.[6] That effect has been noted separately by Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, who observe, "A decentralized, networked al-Qaeda composed of self-funded cells is more flexible and less vulnerable to attack."[7]

The second major reason that financing reform will not work is that there has never been a single case of a terrorist organization that ceased to exist as a direct result of financing problems. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that nonstate actors conduct operations for literally pennies on the dollar. Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert note several high-profile terrorist operations and their associated costs, such as the 2002 Bali bombings ($20,000-$35,000); the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Africa ($50,000); the 1993 World Trade Center bombing ($18,000); and more recently, the 2004 Madrid attack, estimated to have cost less than $10,000.[8]

Simply put, the cost of any single one of these operations could have been bankrolled by an average middle-class American family. Imagine the difficulty, complexity and absurdity of attempting to pass legislative and financial laws that can distinguish between a nonstate actor bent on terrorism and an American family taking out a loan to purchase a recreational vehicle or a home. Giraldo and Trinkunas deal with the issue squarely: "The truth is that such small amounts cannot be stopped," no matter how badly we wish otherwise.[9]

Finally, the third reason for change is obvious — the 2007 report from the National Counterterrorism Center noted a steady increase in terrorist events, even excluding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[10] This increase is in stark contrast to the decrease in the number of terrorists assets being frozen. "In the 16 weeks after the 9/11 attacks, 157 suspected terrorism

fundraisers were identified, and assets valued at $68 million were frozen. The numbers fell after the initial rush by authorities. The totals for 2005 — $4.9 million frozen in the accounts of 32 suspects or organizations — suggest the effort is losing intensity."[11] As stated above, counterterrorism financial reform has been and is failing. These statements are consistent with the theory described and articulated by Brafman & Beckstrom. Therefore, armed with theory and facts, why do we insist on pursuing a method that is clearly failing?

PREDATOR MODEL

Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to pass financial or legislative laws that will starve nonstate actors into inactivity, is there another way? As stated earlier in the paper, the African predator model might be a better choice and strategy for dealing with terrorists and their money. The African male lion, with his pride, patrols an area of more than 100 square miles. Often, the pride will stake out a watering hole in the knowledge that sooner or later, dinner will have to come for a drink. As the prey drinks water, the lions position themselves along the exit route and "cherry pick" dinner off the trail. Could we not use money the same way to lure nonstate actors into our sights?

The predator model would have several advantages. First, it would use money to our advantage by illuminating and possibly destroying a dark network, without disrupting average American families. Second, money can serve as a means of centralizing starfish and thus making them more vulnerable to attack by traditional law-enforcement mechanisms. Third, it would overcome the problems noted earlier with attempting to "starve" nonstate actors into nonexistence.

Less than two weeks after 9/11, President George W. Bush noted, "Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations," and a few days later, Gordon Brown, then-finance minister for Great Britain, echoed that sentiment: "If fanaticism is the heart of modern terrorism, then finance is its lifeblood."[12] So if money acts as the lifeblood of terrorists, why can't we use that to our advantage by taking the analogy further?

Imagine that a terrorist organization is like a human body, with its different elements acting as the heart, brains, legs and arms. Most dark networks will employ a series of cutouts and security measures to isolate and protect the organization from penetration. The only common thread throughout the organization is money. It flows from the collectors to the brains and outward to the limbs, and it identifies people associated with the organization by their very contact with it. Instead of automatically shutting down financial ties when they reach arbitrary thresholds of $10,000, why not monitor, investigate and infiltrate the organization through its money stream? Instead of making modern banking methods risky for terrorists, we should make the banking systems of the U.S. and partner nations attractive and encourage terrorists to come to our "watering hole."

That technique would have several advantages. First and foremost, we would control the playing field and rules, as opposed to Third World hawallas (debt transfers) and other traditional financial methods. The rules that we control do not have to be made public, and we could institute random measures that would vary on a daily or weekly basis, requiring banks to submit names, accounts and activities to a central database for further investigation.

Second, we should not disrupt terrorist financial networks when we discover them. Instead, we should use our system of banking to trace the money as it comes into accounts and to see where it is transferred and who is accessing it, thus using money to illuminate a potentially dark network. This illumination would then give military and police forces the surgical precision to remove "cancerous lesions" instead of randomly seizing property and accounts by arbitrary activity and associations. Third, this illumination would generally provide intelligence agents with access points for penetrating the organization through distributors, suppliers and trainers in order to gain access to the network's plans and intentions.

Another significant reason for encouraging nonstate actors to use our financial networks would be that it would give us the ability not only to monitor financial activity but also to set up financial deception operations designed to degrade terrorist networks. Joel Garreau, author of the article "Disconnect the Dots," suggests that there are different ways of fighting terrorist networks.

Garreau makes the first point by recognizing that networks are not built along the lines of physical infrastructure. Instead, "they are political and emotional connections among people who must trust each other in order to function."[13] Trust is the key point of attack in a network — not the leadership, and certainly not the finances. "There's no reason organizational glitches, screw-ups, jealousies and distrust that slow and degrade performance can't be intentionally introduced."[14] Money might be one of the easiest ways to do just that. Accounts that are suddenly flush with money — or conversely, empty — could and will cause friction, as individuals attempt to explain unusual activity. Tensions would gradually build until the unity that was previously taken for granted would be ineffectual, as the group would have to sort out issues of trust and betrayal, thus turning the network in on itself.

CAVEATS

Clearly, there would be some stipulations with regard to encouraging nonstate actors to use our financial networks. First, if the organization we are investigating knows that it is being monitored through its financing, the game is up, and we will need to send in police, lawyers and bankers to arrest, collect and seize what they can before the terrorists disappear. Secondly, and more challenging, the network would have to be exposed when it is ready to commit catastrophic operations that would result in the loss of life and or property. The trick would

be to determine what thresholds need to be established in order to safeguard lives. Will the U.S. need to intercept the nonstate actor before it detonates a small bomb with no expected loss of life? These are the questions policymakers and law-enforcement agencies will need to grapple with early on in the investigation in order to deal with them as they occur.

RISKS

The current practice of freezing assets is virtually without real peril. Freezing assets, as well as legal and financial reforms, reward politicians and law-enforcement officials with the illusion of success — it provides headlines, figures and what appear to be results. Yet, as noted earlier, the very organizations that are supposedly the target of the reforms continue to exist and even flourish. The predator model is not without risks. It would be an extraordinary politician who would publically admit that a terrorist group that was being monitored had committed an act of violence on their watch. The public backlash could unseat all but the most stable or successful politicians. Next, much of what goes on would be done in secret, and accolades would have to be given anonymously as "tips" that brought down the terrorists. Again, very few political establishments are willing to take on that kind of risk without some political recognition for their actions when things go right. Finally, if money was introduced into terrorists' accounts in the attempt to destabilize the network, as Joel Garreau suggests, the average citizen might not be so understanding, especially if the terrorists were able to carry out a successful operation under the eyes of the very people who put it there. However, it might be prudent to remember the adage, "With great risk comes a great reward," and realize that the current game, with little to no risk, carries no reward at all.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is increasing,[15] in spite of a plethora of legal and financial efforts enacted to control it.[16] This is due, in no small part, to the relatively tiny amounts of money it takes to launch spectacular attacks.[17] According to the authors of *The Starfish and the Spider*, our very efforts to attack decentralized networks might be contributing to their proliferation and success.[18] Because current methods are failing, it is only prudent that we change strategies in an attempt to thwart nonstate actors and their intentions. Because terrorists seem to have a preference for using our financial networks, why can't we use that weakness to our advantage by centralizing them through the predator model outlined here?

The predator model allows terrorists to use our financial systems, like prey at a watering hole. The only difference is that we need to enact a series of random checks and triggers to identify suspicious movement. Once that movement has been identified, it can be turned over to investigative services who will try to trace the organization rather than arrest individuals for prosecution. Since we control the banking rules and methods, we might even be able to insert a question of trust into the network by inserting funds into various accounts or deleting them. That course of action would carry some caveats and some risks. In the end, it would be better to take that new course of action than to continue spending disproportionate sums of money on a method that has been proven to fail. **SW**

NOTES

[1] Mick Jagger and Keith Richards, "You Can't Always Get What You Want," 1969.

[2] Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Terrorist Financing: Explaining Government Responses," in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Palo Alto, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 2007), 283.

[3] Adam Blickstein, Global terror increasing, says US state department (30 April 2008), (http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2008/04/global-terror-i.html) Accessed 25 May 2008.

[4] Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (Portfolio Hardcover, 2006), 21.

[5] Brafman and Beckstrom, 40.

[6] Brafman and Beckstrom, 41.

[7] Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, "The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing," in Giraldo and Trinkunas, eds., *Terrorism Financing and State Responses*, 16.

[8] Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge Press, 2008), 6.

[9] Nikos Passas, "Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas," in Giraldo and Trinkunas, eds., *Terrorism Financing and State Responses*, 31.

[10] National Counterterrorism Center, *2007 Report on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 36.

[11] Kevin Johnson, "U.S. freezes fewer terror assets," *USA Today*, 30 January 2006. (http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-29-terror-freezes_x.htm) Accessed 12 September 2008.

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[13] Joel Garreau, "Disconnect the Dots," *The Washington Post,* 17 September 2001: C1.

[14] Garreau.

[15] National Counterterrorism Center, 2007 Report on Terrorism.

[16] Whitlock .

[17] Biersteker and Eckert, 6.

[18] Brafman and Beckstrom, 21.

This article was written while **Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bruce E. DeFeyter** was a student in the Warrant Officer Advanced Course at SWCS. He is assigned to the 3rd SF Group. He has served on ODA 3123 and ODB 3120 for six years as the assistant detachment commander, detachment commander and company operations warrant during three rotations to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He has also served at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School as a doctrine writer assigned to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Mr. DeFeyter holds a bachelor's in management and administration from Excelsior College in Albany, N.Y., and a master's in defense analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Enlisted

AF-PAK HANDS PROGRAM

Afghanistan and Pakistan Hands is a new program designed to develop a cadre of AF-PAK experts. It is a volunteer program under which selected personnel will receive language, regional-cultural training, and repetitive deployments in key positions to allow them to focus on AF-PAK issues for an extended period of time. Selection for the positions is competitive and requires operational experience and expertise in the Afghanistan and Pakistan area of operation. The intent is to create greater continuity, focus and persistent engagement across the battlefield. Personnel who are interested in the program should contact their assignments manager at the Army Human Resources Command.

PROMOTION BOARDS SCHEDULED

Beginning in December, the Army will select Soldiers to fill all command-sergeant-major positions through a separate, competitive, CSM command-selection board. The change will establish a lateral-appointment process between sergeant major and CSM. All Soldiers eligible for the CSM board will compete unless they "opt out." CSM candidates in Army special operations will compete under two boards: the Army open board and the ARSOF board. Eligible Soldiers need to ensure that they are competing for the board that holds the positions they would like to fill.

Under the ARSOF board, in addition to positions in ARSOF organizations, Soldiers can compete for positions in combined joint special-operations task forces, in theater special-operations commands, on the joint manning document, in AF-PAK Hands and in special-operations coordination elements.

Warrant Officer

NEW 180A CAREER MANAGER AT HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND

In May 2010, CWO 4 Terry Baltimore will assume duty as the Special Forces warrant officer career manager at the Army Human Resources Command. Baltimore's PCS from the 7th SFG to HRC coincides with the movement of HRC from Alexandria, Va., to Fort Knox, Ky. He can be reached by email terry.baltimore@us.army.mil.

SF WARRANT OFFICERS NEEDED FOR ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS

Special Forces NCOs who seek greater opportunities can apply to become SF warrant officers. Recruiting efforts are in full swing in order to meet SF warrant officer inventory requirements as growth in the force continues. Some of the opportunities open to SF warrant officers are:

- Serving in a direct, ground-combat leadership role as the assistant detachment commander of a detachment.
- Spending an average of five additional years on a detachment.
- Leading specialized teams in advanced special operations, counterterrorism and psychological operations, civil affairs and other missions related to special-operations capabilities, as directed.
- Serving in joint, strategic, operational and tactical assignments at all levels of planning and execution of special operations worldwide.
- Having opportunities for Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., with the potential to obtain a master's degree through the Interagency Studies Program.
- A critical skills accessions bonus of $20,000 for eligible active-duty Soldiers and $10,000 for National Guard.

NCOs seeking additional information may go to the www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html. They can also get assistance by contacting the unit senior warrant officer or by contacting CWO 3 Craig in the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency: DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to craigb@ahqb.soc.mil.

TO DARE AND TO CONQUER:

Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to al-Qaeda



DETAILS

By Derek Leebaert

New York.:
Back Bay Books, 2006.
ISBN: 9780316014236
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Reviewed by:
Major Cliff Keller
Naval Post-graduate School
Monterrey, Calif.

In *To Dare and To Conquer*, Derek Leebaert illustrates more than the military spectacle and prowess of the commando — he shows the political impact of special operations on the direction and development of nations and world leaders. He also raises some vital questions concerning the future of special operations. Leebaert goes outside the normal definition of special operations to include a wider range of innovative actions, even in the world of organized crime. He uses this wider view to show a common thread in the type of person required for success in these highly innovative and risky endeavors. He also uses the broad view to illustrate what truly makes some operations special, instead of simply fortuitous.

To Dare and To Conquer offers a broad look at the impact of special operations on the implementation of international relations and world politics. From the earliest history of international conflict in the Trojan War to the current post-9/11 political environment, Leebaert also illustrates how a bold and determined few can change the world. Leebaert clearly presents how the formation, training and application of special-operations forces affects the internal power flows of both militaries and governments. He concludes by examining the influence of the current special-operations organization and doctrine on the historical essence of special operations.

This book is a rather large volume but it is very neatly organized so that reference to the reader's particular interests is quite easy. The book is organized chronologically into four parts that encompass the ancient world, the great European empires, the pre-industrial revolutions and modern wars. The chapters are divided by a thematic focus on select actions that represent the particular period's conduct of warfare. Additionally, Leebaert's extensive notes and expansive bibliography make further research on any specific topic uncomplicated.

One of the key strengths of *To Dare and To Conquer* is its sheer breadth of scope. By expanding beyond the current doctrinal definitions of special operations and special-operations forces, the author brings the theoretical underpinnings of special operations to light. Leebaert first exposes some fundamental properties of special operations, such as originality, innovation, deep purpose and high risk. He then examines strategic actions from both sides of war, from ancient Greece to European imperialism, to the American and French revolutions to both world wars, to Korea and to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leebaert concludes with some poignant questions about the future of special operations and special-operations forces. He implies that the current institutionalization of Special Operations Forces, the tendency for selection to create a new homogeneity, and the impact of defined doctrine on originality may turn special operations into "a more clever level of routine."

Admittedly, *To Dare and To Conquer* is not particularly light reading. The book is written much like a historical anthology and is very heavy on details. While the broad scope of the book is meant to develop the core elements of special operations and their impact on history, the inclusion of so many actions can be a bit overwhelming. While each of the anecdotes is relevant, the reader may find himself lost in the story and far away from the book's central theme.

To Dare and To Conquer is a very good source for anyone interested in a concise and comprehensive anthology of the history and development of special operations. Above all, though, the book is meaningful reading for any member of the special-operations community who may be concerned with the direction and future of the profession. With so many recent publications regarding the future of special-operations forces, Derek Leebaert provides a concise historical context for many of the concerns within and outside the community. **SW**

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK-DTD-MP
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

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