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OEF-PHILIPPINES:
THINKING COIN, PRACTICING FID

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



ON THE COVER
U.S. involvement in the Philippines from 2001-2009 is an example of host-nation forces taking the lead in the stabilization of the country and its security responsibilities.

DEPARTMENTS

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As strategists look at better ways to confront the changing security environment, there is an increasing appreciation of the importance of people-centric operations. Not only are the people an important source of support for insurgencies and a source of intelligence; if we talk to them and listen, they can also help us to identify the causes of unrest and hostility that are often the genesis of insurgency and rebellion in the first place.

By working through and with the people, small groups of Soldiers adept at language and familiar with culture can produce results not possible with larger groups in force-on-force confrontations. In the Philippines, for example, small groups of Special Forces Soldiers are able to work within a number of restrictions to assist Philippine forces in their counterinsurgency efforts. Their indirect approach allows them to share their knowledge while allowing the host nation to retain responsibility and control for operations.

In Afghanistan, small groups of Civil Affairs forces are creating positive changes by engaging local leaders and citizens to ascertain what the locals think their needs are and then assisting them to meet them. Despite the apparent simplicity of that task, it represents a movement away from a cookie-cutter approach that has been shown to waste effort and produce frustration for the populace.

Last fall, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School created the Language and Culture Division within its existing Directorate of Special Operations Education. The new division will allow us to place additional emphasis on training in languages and culture. The new division is responsible not only for training in language and culture within SWCS but also for developing sustainment and enhancement training in those disciplines for units throughout the Army Special Operations Command.

Although Army special-operations forces excel in people-centric operations, we cannot assume that the training we are providing or that the people we are training will be suited for all situations. By teaching our Soldiers the importance of working with the people and by giving them the language and culture skills that will allow them to hear and truly understand what the people are saying, we can prepare them for success, but it is not guaranteed.

Experience has shown that because of the fluid nature of hybrid threats, it is more important to teach people how to think than to teach them what to think. We will soon have selection and assessment for candidates for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, similar to what we are already doing for Special Forces. We must ensure that our training will continue to emphasize the adaptability and quick thinking that are always necessary when dealing with people.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

SWCS Focuses On Language, Cultural Training

On Sept. 16, 2008, Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, the commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, directed the creation of the Language and Culture Division of the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Education. The new division was created to place greater emphasis on and commit additional resources to the implementation of the ARSOF language and culture transformation.

Following its formation, the division conducted a bottom-up review to determine the health of foreign-language instruction at SWCS in the areas of curriculum, instructional presentation, assessment and academic support to staff, faculty and students. Based on the review's findings, SWCS has fundamentally restructured the instruction, reducing rates of attrition and retraining while significantly improving student exit-level foreign-language proficiency.

The division, located in Aaron Bank Hall at SWCS, has four missions: provide foreign language initial-acquisition training for personnel in the Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses; develop cultural training for all SF, CA and PSYOP personnel; provide regional-studies education; and conduct language sustainment and enhancement programs for subordinate units of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Initial-acquisition instruction

The division is responsible for conducting initial-acquisition training in 17 core languages. The current core languages are Arabic (modern standard), Korean, Chinese-Mandarin, Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Thai, Russian, Persian-Farsi, Tagalog, Turkish, Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Indonesian, French and Spanish. These languages were selected using input from the theater special-operations commands and operational forces; the list is reviewed every two years. Course lengths for Category I and II languages are 18 weeks; Category III and IV languages take 24 weeks.

Initial-acquisition language training is intended to give students mastery of 33 critical tasks, as well as helping them develop cultural and socio-linguistic competency at the 1/1 level, as measured by the Two-Skill Oral Proficiency Interview, or TSOPI, according to the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable.

TSOPI is a SOF-unique instrument for measuring students' abilities in listening and speaking the target language — more important to SOF operators than reading, because they work closely with people. The Language and Culture Division reviews the critical-task list periodically and makes modifications necessary to ensure its currency, applicability and relevance to the ARSOF community. The review gives significant consideration to five principal content areas: military and security, politics and economics, geography, science and technology, and socio-cultural. Areas of functional application will focus on mission-related tasks, enhanced rapport-building techniques, information extraction and dissemination, cultural-mitigation strategies, document exploitation, and methods of controlling interpreters.

Intermediate, advanced training

SWCS and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command will select Soldiers who demonstrate the aptitude and motivation to attend specialized intermediate and advanced training in language, culture and regional studies related to the 17 core languages. The intermediate program will begin in February 2010 in Pashto, Dari, Urdu and Arabic and is scheduled to include the other core languages by October 2010. Advanced training is scheduled to begin in the October 2011 time frame. A brief program description follows:

Intermediate. The objectives of the intermediate program are to develop a minimum TSOPI rating of 2/2 (listening and speaking). Graduates should demonstrate a commensurate degree of competency in culture and regional studies (specific to group affiliation) with an emphasis on the physical, social, economic, political, national-security, information, infrastructure and technological systems of the target region, from the perspective of an SF-mission focus. Course lengths for Category I and II languages are 24 weeks (18 weeks of language and six weeks of culture and regional studies). Category III and IV languages will receive 30 weeks (24 weeks of language and six weeks of culture and regional studies).

Advanced. The objectives of the advanced program are to develop a professional operator who has a minimum rating of 3/3/3 (listening, reading and speaking), based on the Defense Language Proficiency Test and TSOPI. He should demonstrate a commensurate degree of competency in culture and regional studies (specific to group affiliation) with an emphasis on the physical, social, economic, political, national-security, information, infrastructure and technological systems of the target region, from the perspective of an SF-mission focus. The course length for all language categories is 30 weeks (24 weeks of language and six weeks of culture and regional studies).

- Contributed by Mike Judge, Language and Culture Division, SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Education.



Connecting to the Populace:
CA Tackles People-Centric Operations

By Major Matthew T. Ziglar

A recent article in the *Army Times* reported that a strategy shift is likely for the conduct of operations in Afghanistan. Specifically, the article noted that panelists at a counterinsurgency symposium identified the key to the problem in Afghanistan as being: "integrating with the local community on a full-time basis and taking the time to learn and understand the local culture."[1]

Special-operations forces, or SOF, have already embraced this population-centric vision for the mission in Afghanistan. Active-duty Civil Affairs, or CA, forces that have been deploying from Fort Bragg have consistently been providing community- and government-centric approaches that are at the foundations of the proposed policies in Afghanistan. When we examine the success demonstrated by CA in Afghanistan, it is no surprise that various leaders are calling for policy shifts.

Through the support, guidance and tactical employment of the CA company, CA teams, or CATs, are the implementation force of CA operations. Company B, 91st CA

Battalion, deployed to Afghanistan in December 2008 and performed CA operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan for eight months. As was the case with each previous deployment of CA forces into Afghanistan, B/91st added significant value to the SOF mission and was a highly productive enabler for elements of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-A.

It is important to note that a CA company is relatively small. B/91st deployed with a company headquarters of 10 Soldiers that included a civil-military operations center, or CMOC, of four personnel. The company contained five organic CATs, with one additional CAT task-organized to the company for the deployment. Each CAT contained four personnel — one officer and three NCOs. While the B/91st headquarters remained at Bagram Airfield during OEF XIII, each CAT was assigned to a specific province in support of both Special Operations Task Forces 71 and 31. B/91st also established a CMOC element at Kandahar Airfield in order to support the CATs working in the southern portion of the country. The CATs also worked closely with Special Forces operational detachments from the 7th and 3rd SF groups.

CA operations in Afghanistan have been successful largely because their missions continue to focus on the population. That tenet has been one of the greatest factors in the ability of such a small organization to create positive change. To identify specific areas in which B/91st employed the population-centric approach, it is useful to examine two vignettes from the recent deployment.

CAT 122 'Bazaar Power System'

CAT 122 operated in the Oruzgon province in Afghanistan, largely in support of SF B-detachment 3110 and its subordinate A-detachments. While CAT 122 was tasked with CA operations across the entire province, it focused much of its efforts in the Deh Rawood District of Oruzgon. In many ways, CAT 122 engaged the community through daily interactions with local leaders and average citizens. Through that interaction, CAT 122 helped identify critical issues that the local government could resolve in order to gain further trust from the populace and provide stability to the area.

That method of using the local government for internal organization and implementation of projects gave local leaders a vested interest in addressing the issues of the population centers. Through a shura/jirga system, tribal and community representatives brought concerns to the district chief and his designated ministerial representatives. The district chief, in turn, brought these issues to a council of nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and governmental organizations, or GOs, organized by the CAT, that included all the major military and nonmilitary partners in the area. When the issues were relatively small, the district chief had the ability to act on them himself. For large-scale problems, he would seek assistance from the NGO/GO council.

For example, the district chief brought the consistent and recurring concern of power generation to the council. The district chief explained that the Deh Rawood district center was experiencing numerous problems from its antiquated power grid. Power for the bazaar and the district center facilities, such as the police headquarters, health clinic and district governmental buildings, was extremely limited. The system, two dynamos powered by old car engines, was built to power only a very small amount of equipment. Additionally, the power lines were not insulated and were held aloft in most cases by sticks, creating a significant safety risk. The district chief explained that two stores had burned down as a result of the inadequate power grid.

Seeking assistance for this problem, the district chief made clear the importance that electrical power had for the area. Commerce was in part contingent on the ability to power various stores. Health care partially relied on power, and lights after dark created a safer environment that allowed the populace to assist with security and provide information on nightly activities. Part of the funding for local governmental activities came from the revenue collected from shopkeepers for the use of electrical power.

To tackle the problem, the members of the NGO/GO council took a two-phased approach. CAT 122 began work on a proposal for a project to be performed under the Commander's Emergency Relief Plan, or CERP, while the Dutch provincial reconstruction team, or PRT, and the NGO Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, or GTZ, worked on a plan to develop alternative power sources.

CAT 122 called upon the resources and help from the CA company by soliciting the CMOC element at Kandahar Airfield for assistance. Once the CMOC had learned the full scope of the problem from CAT 122, it coordinated with various agencies available in theater and ultimately referred the project specifics to an Afghani electrical contractor and the Dutch engineers in the Oruzgan Province. With those contacts, CAT 122 was able to complete a plan specific to the problem that would be suitable for local implementation and sustainability. This plan included more than 35 power-line poles, a power-plant building and two new generators. The CMOC element of

^ **PUBLIC COMMENT** Civil Affairs Soldiers meet with tribal leaders to get their input on the needs of the community. *U.S. Army photo.*

B/91st also completed all the paperwork needed to nominate the project and ensured that the $150,000 project received the attention required to get it approved.

Working in parallel with this effort was the Dutch PRT and GTZ's plan for sustainable power using hydroelectric generators from irrigation canals. While the CAT 122 CERP project was seen as a solution for the immediate problem, the PRT/GTZ plan of shifting toward a low-cost, low-maintenance power model was the best option for the future. The plan also incorporated an adult learning center, solar lighting and better farming practices within its scope.

The result was a new power grid and the establishment of a new learning center. The endeavor was the culmination of more than three months of interaction with the populace and cooperation with the local government. Additionally, all of the resources available to the CA company were leveraged to effect change and provide the community with tangible results, demonstrating that the forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force support the government of the Independent Republic of Afghanistan.

CAT 125 'AP3'

CAT 125 began the operational deployment in the Paktika Province. After a few months of successful operations in Paktika, the team was given a short-order mission to move to the Wardak Province in order to facilitate the initial implementation of the Afghan Public Protection Program, or AP3. Partnered with SF B-detachment 3230, CAT 125 also established operations with an element of the B/91st CMOC from Bagram Airfield.

It is important to understand that the intent of AP3 was to bolster and legitimize an indigenous force to deal with security issues at the lowest level. Fighting-age males from villages in the Wardak Province were recruited to receive security training and become the first AP3 forces. The recruits received instruction from SF Soldiers and were given uniforms and equipment upon completion of training. Although not designed to replace Afghan security forces such as the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police, the AP3 forces create a bridge between the national forces and the members of the local community.

CAT 125 primarily supported



^ **HARD WIRED** A modern electric grid was installed to replace the outdated system, bringing power to the community, which led to security and commerce. *U.S. Army photo.*

the AP3 effort by engaging the local communities at the district level. The team attended various shuras and jirgas in order to explain the plan and identify local problems or concerns. During the meetings, CAT 125 also explained that the AP3 model would assist in district-level security, which would, in turn, enable development. CAT 125 used all of the tools available to CA teams, including humanitarian assistance; medical, dental and veterinary civic-action programs; and CERP projects, to improve local development. By working in that manner, the team was able to establish within the community a vested interest in the success of the AP3 plan.

In order to complement that effort, the CMOC in Wardak facilitated communication at the provincial level. While CAT 125 continued with its efforts at the lowest level to ensure the buy-in needed for the program, the CMOC was able to work through the details with the Afghan provincial governor as well as a Turkish PRT. The CMOC's coordination efforts at all levels were a significant reason why the team was able to make large steps for the acceptance, integration and implementation of the AP3 program.

Conclusion

Senior leaders in the military and in the civilian sector will continue to analyze the best approach for the war in Afghanistan. SOF units have demonstrated that they can make a difference on the ground and capitalize on security gains through the continued application of a model that is people-centric. By continuing operations in this manner in Afghanistan, small SOF units will not only make a difference at the tactical level but will also have a strategic impact. ***SW***

Notes:

[1] McCullough, "Petraeus: Strategy shift possible in Afghanistan," *Army Times*, 5 October 2009, YourArmy section, 20-21.

Major Matthew T. Ziglar is the officer in charge of Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection. Major Ziglar previously served as the team leader for Civil Affairs Team 122 in Company B, 91st Civil Affairs Battalion. During Company B's deployment to Afghanistan in 2008-2009, Major Ziglar's team was deployed to the Oruzgon Province in Afghanistan. He holds a bachelor's in English/secondary education and a master's in curriculum and instruction from the University of Montana.

OEF-PHILIPPINES:

Thinking COIN, Practicing FID

by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit

Counterinsurgency is the formative mission of today's military. The dominant missions of the past seven years — Iraq and Afghanistan — have inexorably shaped a new force. Our leaders, equipment, tactics, logistics, and doctrine all bear the traumatic discoveries learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaigns. Reasonably, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts will continue as the primary shaping experience for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency (COIN) and for the practice and theory of stability operations. Given the dominant hold of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) on our military culture, what then, does Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) contribute to the expanding aperture of U.S. military counterinsurgency study?

OEF-P is more relevant to the broader COIN conversation now than ever before. The OEF-P operating environment is characterized by strict — yet prudent — constraints executed by a strikingly small U.S. Task Force. Similar constraints are now in place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Legal prohibitions, strict operational directives, host-nation caveats, and reduced U.S. forces are all constraints that force a revision of operational thinking, a reconsideration of tactics, and increasingly disciplined force application. The existing and forthcoming constraints in Iraq are similar in nature to the constraints imposed upon U.S. forces deployed to Southern Philippines since 2001. Under such constraints, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philip-

pines apply an operational approach and tactical methodology that has applicability to current and future U.S. counterinsurgency and stability endeavors. The U.S. involvement in the Philippines (2001 – 2009) can be examined as a preview of the way U.S. counterinsurgency and stability strategies and tactics might look in other theaters as governments stabilize and security responsibility shifts primarily to the host nation. This article presents three tactical vignettes illustrative of the way U.S. forces in the Southern Philippines operate effectively within confined parameters.

OEF-P Background

Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) has quietly entered its eighth year. OEF-P bears little resemblance to OIF or OEF-A; the contrasts are stark, the comparisons few. Initiated in 2001, OEF-P targeted al-Qaeda affiliates nested in insurgent interior lines in the southern Philippines, bordering Malaysia and Indonesia. The principal targets, the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), demonstrated both the skill and the will to plan and execute effective acts of terror. These acts ranged from kidnapping for ransom (the kidnapping of missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham in 2001) to sophisticated and highly lethal terror attacks (the Bali bombing in 2002). OEF-P was planned and began execution within weeks after the U.S. unconventional-warfare campaign in Afghanistan began in October 2001. The mission earned the "OEF" moniker based on the national objective to contain, and ultimately defeat, Al Qaeda's Asia-Pacific affiliates based in the Southern Philippines.

However, OEF-P, unlike OIF and OEF-A, was not a cold start. OEF-P drew on the historical engagement that the U.S. forces shared with the Government of the Philippines, or GRP. The mission was planned in conjunction with, and enabled by, a willing and cooperative sovereign nation. That cooperation, however, came with caveats. The U.S. and Philippine Forces operate under specific restrictions levied by both the Government of the Philippines and the U.S. Pacific Command. In short, U.S. forces would be prohibited from direct combat roles or direct engagements with enemy forces. While this key restriction neutralized the efficacy of U.S. joint-force operational power and reach, it also generated a campaign design and operational culture that centers on Philippines forces and institutions. Dubbed the "indirect approach," U.S. force application in the Philippines continues to adhere to the FID and COIN principles adopted at the inception of OEF-P.

The Philippine Struggle

The Armed Forces of the Philippines are in a lethal and sustained struggle against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF. The MILF is an Islamic based separatist group with an organized military arm estimated at between 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The MILF is a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF. The MNLF entered into a peace agreement with the GRP in 1996. The MILF, dissatisfied with the terms and implementation of the 1996 agreement, shifted emphasis to an Islamic vs. ethnic focus, and took up the mantle of armed struggle for an independent or expanded autonomous region for the southern Philippines Moros. The MILF continue to seek an expanded autonomous region in the southern Philippines.

The GRP, contending with both MNLF and MILF agendas, brokered the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF and agreed in 2003 to a cease-fire with the MILF. This tenuous peace prevented large-scale warfare but allowed undergoverned regions to wittingly and unwittingly host transnational actors like Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayaaf.

The southern Philippines COIN environment is familiar to OIF or OEF-A practitioners: regionally focused insurgent organizations that collaborate with transnational, ideologically driven and lethally capable, violent extremists.

Indirect Approach

OEF-P is unique in that it was conceptualized and implemented by a small nucleus of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Command Pacific, and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) implemented the "indirect approach" methodology, applying U.S. capacity strictly "through or with" the Armed Forces of the Philippines against the enemy and for the population. The indirect approach is both a philosophy and a method that is inculcated into all practitioners. The heart of the strategy is based on building relationships, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building security-force capabilities, sharing intelligence and information, developing focused civil-military programs, and aggressively promoting local acts of good governance. The indirect approach requires the discreet application of U.S. influence and assistance. Leaders continually calibrate the political implications of their actions, and quickly implement adjustments at the local level. The U.S. mission is led by the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines.

OEF-P focuses on the Sulu Archipelago, a vast island chain that stretches from the southern Philippines to Malaysia. The enemy is ASG, JI, and violent Islamic ideologues whose actions are often more criminal than religious. These operatives and affiliates nest within supportive or neutral populations, complicating the Philippine mission to identify, capture and incarcerate them. Currently, the mission focuses on three lines of operation: (1) gathering and sharing information, (2) building capacity and (3) Targeted Civil Military Operations.

OEF-P is essentially a branch plan, developed from an existing foundation of mutual cooperation and defense, theater-security cooperation, and U.S.-Philippine military relations. OEF-P was uniquely designed to accomplish U.S. and Philippine

counterterrorism objectives immediately following 9/11, thus cultivating a new dimension in U.S.-Philippine relationships. The U.S. and Philippine governments shared the view that the terror groups had to be reduced. However, exactly how the U.S. would apply its capabilities against terrorist groups, given the political considerations, was unclear at the inception.

Think COIN, Practice FID

Contrary to popular perception, the U.S. mission in the Southern Philippines is not COIN. COIN is the mission of the GRP. The U.S. mission is FID in support of the GRP COIN campaign. This distinction is critical for two reasons: (1) The GRP, not the U.S., is directly responsible for combating insurgents, terrorists and lawless elements; (2) the U.S. role is to support a sovereign nation in both building the capacity of its armed and civil-security forces, and applying that capacity against violent extremists operating in undergoverned regions. This distinction requires U.S. SOF personnel to "think COIN but practice FID." This mindset is part of the institutional and operational culture of U.S. Special Forces, and it is a critical mindset for both SOF and conventional forces operating in increasingly constrained environments.

Tactically, the indirect approach requires clear-eyed recognition that U.S. capacity will be applied through — and not around — the host nation. This paradigm seems simple, but it runs counter to U.S. military "can-doism" and requires a long-term view and immense operational patience. The indirect approach does not satisfy appetites for quick, measurable results. By building capacity with host nation security forces and simultaneously applying population-focused, civil-military programs, the indirect approach rarely produces singularly spectacular results in tactical engagements. Measures of effectiveness are often best assessed over time and anecdotally.

The following tactical vignettes illustrate the way certain operational methods are applied within the existing policy constraints.

Tactical Vignette #1: OEF-P Medical Seminar (MEDSEM)

The medical seminar, or MEDSEM, is an innovative medical operation that builds upon the concept of the traditional medical civic-action program, or MEDCAP. The MEDSEM enhances the MEDCAP by adding education, promoting self-reliance and improving sustainability of medical interventions. The MEDSEM promotes local governmental interoperability by requiring collaboration between local medical providers, governmental leaders, host nation forces and U.S. SOF.

A MEDCAP is typically a single-day event that provides medical or dental care and can vary in size from a few hundred patients to a few thousand. It is a medical operation used by commanders to engage a given population or geographical area in order to gain initial access to or maintain a relationship with that population. In order to be successful and effective, the event must avoid undermining the local medical infrastructure. Local medical officials should be involved in all facets of planning and should be pushed to the forefront during execution. Medical interventions should be safe and effective in order to enhance public health and to avoid adverse events or negative informational outcomes. Finally, and most importantly, the event must positively engage the specified population and stimulate continued interaction in the future.

The MEDCAP can be an effective tool if employed correctly. However, a MEDCAP is typically hampered by limited planning time that leads to inadequate involvement of local medical providers. U.S. Forces are then viewed as executors which undermines confidence in the local medical infrastructure. The MEDCAP culminates in a short, one-day event with limited or nonexistent follow-up interactions. Any ground gained during the MEDCAP is often temporal — at times adverse — and future relationship-building is inhibited. The majority of patients attending central Mindanao MEDCAPs were women with children requiring over-the-counter treatments or education alone. Less than 5 percent of patients required prescription medication (usually antibiotics), yet these medicines were abundant and comprised the bulk of MEDCAP costs.

The MEDSEM was created to address the shortcomings of the MEDCAP within central Mindanao. It is a civic action program as well, but it was named differently in order to avoid confusion with the traditional MEDCAP. The MEDSEM is a five-day event and required up to one month of planning and coordination between the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, the local governmental unit, or LGU, the municipal health office, or MHO, the Philippine National Police, or PNP, and U.S. Forces. These meetings promoted interoperability between the groups through information exchange and collaborative planning. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) were invited to participate in planning and execution, as well. That supported the AFP-MILF cease-fire by providing a common venue for meetings and discussion.

The MEDSEM consists of three days of classroom instruction and two days of medical-care programs. For one MEDSEM in the summer of 2008, invitations were sent out to 15 *barangays* (villages), inviting three volunteers from each village to participate in the MEDSEM. Often, the villages were previously inaccessible to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Medical experience was not a requirement. Students were taught basic women's and children's healthcare, with an emphasis on preventive-health measures. The LGU provided the classroom, the MHO created and taught all lectures, and the villages donated money to pay for student transportation. Security was provided by the AFP and PNP during the classroom phase. They were joined by MILF and MNLF security during the medical-care programs. Everyone involved in these events contributed to their success. The AFP, LGU, PNP, and MHO remained in the forefront throughout all phases.

The only class taught by a U.S.

doctor or medic was "MEDCAP preparation." Local providers were taught how to set up and run a medical program from start to finish. The last class was followed by a formal graduation ceremony in which students received graduation certificates and photos. All students were then responsible for conducting the medical program in their village on one of the last two days. That was their final exam. Medical-care teams consisted of local doctors and nurses. Prior to the medical team's arrival, the students registered and seated between 200 and 400 patients. The students then delivered one of the recently learned preventive-health lectures to their neighbors. Students then identified 30 to 50 patients to be seen by physicians, while local providers, under the supervision of MHO nurses, delivered individual education and dispensed over-the-counter medications. Follow-up engagements were scheduled for 90 to 180 days following the MEDSEM.

To date, four MEDSEMs have been conducted within central Mindanao. Measures of effectiveness include:

• Local officials and providers take responsibility and are credited by the population for the events.

• A medical "auxiliary" is built for future engagements and medical surveillance.

• Relationships were forged between students, village leaders, health care providers, insurgent / resistance groups and security forces.

The MEDSEM engaged 10 times as many patients as the traditional MEDCAP, at a fraction of the cost. Only a few prescription medicines were included in the MEDSEM supply pallet which decreased costs. The MEDSEM effectively engaged the specified populations through the host nation medical infrastructure and delivered sustainable and safe medical care to thousands of patients.

Vignette #2: Rule of Law

The mission of the southern Philippines rule-of-law engagement is threefold: (1) to build essential capacity in the Philippine security forces in the southern Philippines, (2) to criminalize terrorism, and (3) to support the GRP in extending the rule-of-law to this area of their country. The rule-of-law exists when: the state monopolizes the use of force in the resolution of disputes; individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial legal system; basic human rights are protected by the state; and individuals rely on the existence of legal institutions and the content of the law in the conduct of their daily lives.

The strategic objective is to create a hostile environment for international terrorist elements in the southern Philippines by building the population's respect for the rule of law and the state organizations responsible for its enforcement. The operational objective is enabling the PNP to enforce the rule-of-law, thereby minimizing the role of the Philippine military in law enforcement. Strengthening the criminal-justice system will reduce extra-judicial killings and restore confidence in the government's security abilities. The tactical method is to provide the PNP professional-development training, integrating technology into evidence analysis and exploitation, and working within the Philippine criminal-justice system to obtain arrest warrants and active prosecution of terrorist elements within the southern Philippines. Each tactical method is discussed below.

PNP professional development training. The southern PNP lack the necessary training to adequately provide security to their respective municipalities. To address the fundamental requirements of policing, JSOTF-P, through the U.S. Department of Justice, supports two courses of instruction for the PNP.

The first course is the Basic Police Operations Course, or BPOC. This course is designed to provide basic police training that introduces the knowledge, skills and abilities of international policing standards. It also strives to introduce and improve the PNP's knowledge of police ethics, human rights and community policing.

The second course is the Basic Criminal Investigations Course. This course builds on the BPOC human-rights instruction and includes the following: lessons on proper evidence collection at sensitive sites containing evidence of arson or explosives; methods of identifying the origin of an explosion or fire; and discovery of evidence that can be used to identify suspects, physical evidence, trace evidence, fingerprint evidence, tool-mark evidence and firearm evidence.

PNP graduates from these courses are applying the investigative procedures necessary to ensure that evidence is properly collected, preserved and processed. These skills ensure accurate attribution to the person, place, and event (e.g., pocket litter, cell phones, IED component); preserves the chain of custody for the evidence collected; and allows the evidence to be fully exploited in court.

Integrating technology into evidentiary procedures. Historically, a significant portion of the evidence collected in the southern Philippines has not been processed or exploited. The rule-of-law team assists with capabilities such as (1) the ability to extract and store DNA from living or dead persons, (2) analysis of electronic data, and (3) document and media analysis. Dramatic improvements in evidence processing and exploitation are a critical step toward sound evidentiary procedures and ultimately, prosecution. This initiative is Philippine-centric. Operations and relevant data support Philippine information requirements and civil authorities.

Arrest warrants and criminal prosecution of terrorist elements. Terror groups and lawless violent extremists continue to commit acts without a genuine threat of prosecution within the southern Philippines. This is largely the result of the substantial number of vacant judge positions and prosecutors. To that end, the rule-of-law engagement coordinated with a regional trial court to obtain jurisdiction for criminal prosecution of terrorist elements located in Basilan and on Jolo island. That enabled a trial prosecutor from the regional trial

court to secure a murder conviction in Basilan. Prosecutors are currently preparing additional extremist-related cases from Jolo Island.

The rule-of-law engagement supports the expansion of the police role in bringing effective law enforcement to the southern Philippines. An effective police force is arguably the key missing component in defeating violent extremists operating in undergoverned spaces in the southern Philippines. The program is modest: fewer than 25 U.S. personnel are directly aligned against this effort, with many more in general support roles. The aim is to balance the Philippine COIN strategy with effective law-enforcement institutions and mechanisms.

Tactical Vignette #3: Advising Philippine Combat Operations on Pangutaran Island

Special Forces teams live, eat, train, and work with their Philippine security-force counterparts, and they have since 2001. In the Philippines, the only bases and outposts are Philippine. All U.S. forces are integrated with military and police units in tactical outposts at the invitation of the Philippine Armed Forces Commanders. All arrangements – living, working, billeting, operational – are subject to the consent of Philippine commanders, from the Philippine chief of staff down to tactical Philippine infantry battalion commanders.

This environment requires mature, studied and respectful U.S. forces that bring the right competencies. The OEF-P environment does not suffer well undisciplined behaviors, ill-advised engagements or well-meaning but heavy-handed American "candoism." The core advisory team is the twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha (SFOD-A). SFOD-As train for this type of environment and are prepared linguistically, culturally and doctrinally to operate in these environments. In the Philippines, SFOD-AS are generally split in half and augmented with Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Joint Service enablers and logistics personnel, totaling about 8 to 12 U.S. personnel per outpost. Operationally, these are called "Liaison Control Elements" (LCE). Naval Special Warfare SEAL platoons also split and form LCEs embedded with Philippine Marine units. LCEs generally operate at the Philippine Battalion, Brigade, and Division level.

Pangutaran Island is a municipality belonging to the Province of Sulu, Republic of the Philippines. It is located approximately 45 kilometers off the northwest shore off the main provincial island of Sulu. Because it was not believed to be a safe haven for lawless elements, there had not been a persistent Philippine Security Forces presence on the island. During the summer of 2008, Joint Task Force Comet, a 2-star Philippine task force comprised mainly of Philippine Marines, and its U.S. counterpart, Task Force Sulu, were making great strides in reducing Abu Sayyef Group (ASG) influence and reducing its access to populations on the provincial capital island of Sulu. What is described below is how ASG elements attempted to acquire safe haven on Pangutaran Island and, along with its Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) brethren, sought to reposition itself beyond the reach of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Marine forces.

The importance of Pangutaran Island is apparent when one visits the island. The people are relatively prosperous in spite of the poverty felt among its neighboring island municipalities. This is because of the abundance of natural resources found on the island and in its surrounding seas. More importantly however, Pangutaran Island enjoys a robust trading relationship among Indonesian sea traders and other small-scale yet lucrative sea-based enterprises. The island's relative prosperity was also due to the lack of Abu Sayyef Group presence on the island that habitually prey upon local populations to acquire resources necessary to carry out their violent activities.

In the summer of 2008, the ASG were under severe pressure. The ASG had been effectively isolated from both popular support and access to resources. Intelligence had indicated that both the ASG and JI organizations, on Jolo Island, found it increasingly difficult to gather the basic necessities for sustainment, such as food and water. Its leadership was known to complain about the lack of available food within its archipelagic camps. Yet ASG and JI are nothing if not resilient — a new base of operations or new supply routes had to be found that was out of reach of Philippine government forces.

Pangutaran Island fit the ASG's and JI's needs. Initially, the connectivity to Indonesia, the birthplace of JI, was extremely tempting to both the ASG and JI, primarily as a safe haven. Secondly, there were no AFP military forces on the island. There was a small PNP garrison on the island, but this small force would be no match in a struggle with ASG/JI elements for control of the island. Although ASG/JI elements were living hard times on Sulu and Basilan, they nonetheless retained significant capability to conduct violent acts of terror – particularly against the ill-equipped and ill-trained forces of the PNP.

The Pangutaran inhabitants knew about the activities of Philippine and U.S. military forces on the main island of Sulu and how those activities were improving the lives of many Sulu residents. JTF Comet and TF Sulu had been building schools, roads, water distribution networks and other civil infrastructure projects on Sulu in a successful attempt to build the legitimacy of the Philippine government forces. As the legitimacy of the military forces increased, the freedom of movement of ASG/JI elements consequently decreased. Moreover, significant amounts of intelligence on ASG/JI whereabouts flowed from the population to AFP military forces as a result of these activities. In addition to civil projects, AFP Marine forces relentlessly pursued ASG/JI elements deep in their jungle redoubts. The inhabitants on Pangutaran had been hearing about these activities and, even before ASG/JI elements would attempt to seek refuge on their island,

they made contact with Joint Task Force Comet to see what assistance they could receive to better their island infrastructure.

As a result of increased pressure from JTF Comet, ASG/JI sought to establish themselves on Pangutaran Island. The ASG moved a small force to Pangutaran Island to gain control through their normal methods: fear, intimidation, violence and extortion. The inhabitants of the island, knowing that JTF Comet was pursuing ASG/JI wherever they might be, contacted the Sulu-based AFP. Because of the distance from its Sulu-based forces, TF Sulu would assist the AFP with communications and control of the AFP forces as JTF Comet deployed elements to Pangutaran to assist the inhabitants. Additionally, TF Sulu had SFOD-As already conducting advise and assist activities with the AFP Brigade's organic battalions. During this mission, TF Sulu would deploy an SFOD-A to Pangutaran Island in support of the Philippine Brigade's mission to expel ASG/JI elements from the island.

The Philippine Marine Brigade assigned AFP Marine Battalion Landing Team (MBLT) to conduct the mission to expel the emerging presence of ASG and JI elements from Pangutaran. The MBLT, supported by its partnered SFOD-A, planned the mission. Although U.S. forces are restricted from participating directly in combat operations within the Philippines, the SFOD-A would be co-located with the MBLT commander during the execution of the mission to advise and assist where required. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe fully the details of the mission. In short, the MBLT did come into contact with ASG/JI elements. During the encounter, AFP forces received minor casualties, but the cost of the effort was worth the expense: the Marines earned a tactical victory and demonstrated to the populace an appropriate and timely use of force and follow-through. Colocating the SFOD-A with the MBLT commander was instrumental to the success of the mission — discreet, offset, advisory and technical assistance proved invaluable during the multi-phased mission.

Outcome. The ASG was unable to escape the reaches of JTF Comet by attempting to reposition itself to Pangutaran Island. Indeed, even before their attempt was made, the fate of this endeavor was sealed. The activities being conducted by JTF Comet and TF Sulu on the main island of Sulu were known to the inhabitants, and the people of Pangutaran sought close ties with JTF Comet and TF Sulu. The population knew that JTF Comet was interested not only in destroying ASG/JI elements but also in providing needed infrastructure and development assistance to the people of the Sulu Archipelago. Because of this, the inhabitants reached out to JTF Comet forces even before ASG/JI made their presence known on Pangutaran. As a result of this cooperation to expel the terrorists, JTF Comet established a small AFP Marine outpost on Pangutaran Island to prevent a see-saw battle for control of the island. Almost a token force, this presence was enough to dispel any notion of ASG/JI terrorists that the island was their's for the taking. The small outpost of Marines work closely with the island's well-run yet underequipped PNP station to ensure security for the inhabitants. TF Sulu and JTF Comet continue to visit the island routinely and have conducted a series of medical clinics and infrastructure-development projects as a way of both thanking the inhabitants of the island for their support and increasing the perception of persistent presence to any lawless elements wishing to prey upon the civilian population. The combined efforts of U.S. and Philippine military forces, along with those of the PNP and civilian municipal government on Pangutaran, truly made this effort a notable tactical success and a worthy case study for COIN and FID practitioners.

Counterinsurgency or FID

All three vignettes represent the studied application of COIN strategies applied by, with and through host-nation forces that were genuinely in the lead. The OEF-P policies shape behaviors and outcomes that are textbook FID doctrinal solutions in a complex COIN environment.

In 2009, we are a COIN-conversant military, hard-wired to the gravitational pull of our OIF and OEF-A experiences. Our self-critique of COIN is the mark of an adaptive institution and is bearing results in campaign objectives and individual behaviors. However, understanding COIN doctrine and application is not good enough for U.S. general purpose or special-operations forces. While the focus on and understanding of COIN is paramount to U.S. success, it is in many ways a foundational step required to successfully conduct our actual mission: FID in support of COIN.

Though FID is doctrinally a SOF Title X responsibility, FID accurately describes the mission of major U.S. joint task forces in both OEF-P, OIF and OEF-A as well as other regional engagements. As we progress from COIN-centric thought to FID-centric behavior, OEF-P offers some lessons for applying U.S. capacity within significant operational constraints. No matter the theater, "thinking COIN, practicing FID" is the proper state of mind for operational planners, tactical forces and ground practitioners. **SW**

This article was written collaboratively by the members of 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group. The battalion deployed to OEF-P from June 2008 to February 2009. Main article written by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit, battalion commander. MEDSEM vignette written by Major Shawn Alderman, battalion surgeon. Rule-of-law vignette written by Captain Rich Williams, judge advocate. The combat advising vignette was written by Major Joe Mouer, Company C and Task Force Sulu Commander. The Commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines is Colonel William Coultrup.

STREAMLINING THE PROCESS:

Advanced Operating Base and Special Operations Task Force Operations in Iraq

by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Scheper

During Operation Iraqi Freedom VI, the author served as the company operations officer for the Special Forces B-detachment organized as Advanced Operating Base 1310, or AOB 1310, which was assigned to Special Operations Task Force-North, or SOTF-N. One of the operations officer's most significant duties was staffing the presentations of the concept of operation, or CONOP, for the missions of the AOB's subordinate SF A-detachments. Each mission CONOP required approval either by the commander of the AOB, SOTF or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula, or CJSOTF-AP, depending on the mission's importance and sensitivity. At times, the mission-approval process could be ponderous and lengthy, leading us to look for a better way to do it.

CONOP APPROVAL PROCESS

Based on the sensitivity and complexity of the mission, CONOPs are classified at one of three different levels. In Iraq, Level III CONOPs are routine movements and are approved at the AOB. Level II CONOPs are lethal operations that have regional- or local-level effects and are approved at the SOTF. Level I CONOPs have national-level implications and are approved by the CJSOTF.

The approval process begins when an SF A-detachment submits a CONOP. If the CONOP is Level III, it will be staffed at the AOB level and approved by the AOB commander. If it is Level II or I, it will be forwarded to the SOTF, staffed, approved and forwarded to the CJSOTF, if it is Level I. Approval at each level will take, on average, two hours, not counting the time and effort the A-detachment has to put into crafting the briefing for Level II and Level I CONOPs. The cumulative time demand of this process limits the A-detachment's ability to react quickly to new information and developing targets.

The CONOP is staffed at the AOB, with the operations center, or OPCEN, coordinating actions and informing adjacent units of the activities, essentially following up the A-detachment's initial coordination with the conventional-force commander. The AOB OPCEN also conducts coordination with external assets, as required. The AOB works through the SOTF and directly with providers of assets, such as aviation or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, to support the A-detachments. For CONOPs at levels I and II, the AOB S2 section will deconflict the target and provide intelligence that will enable the commander to gauge second- and third-order effects.

The SOTF staffing process for level I and II CONOPs begins after their approval by the AOB commander. The SOTF is able to leverage some theater assets to which the AOB does not have access, such as electronic warfare and other information-operations elements, as well as aircraft of the combined

joint special-operations air component. The SOTF will staff the CONOP at the battalion level, repeating the process that the AOB conducted at the company level. If the CONOP is level I, the SOTF will send it to CJSOTF-AP for staffing and the CJSOTF commander's approval.

ADVANCED OPERATIONS BASE

The B-detachment is an operational command-and-control, or C2, element and is normally employed according to one of three doctrinal templates:

- It can establish an AOB, which is usually small, light and tailored to perform specific missions, such as forward launch and recovery, logistics and communications. As an AOB, it usually exercises C2 over one to six A-detachments.
- It can also establish an isolation facility within the framework of the SOTF to isolate and prepare as many as six A-detachments for infiltration, mission-execution and exfiltration.
- Finally, it can establish a special-operations command and control element or Special Forces liaison element at the headquarters of a functional component or service-force to facilitate the joint-force commander's designated command relationships between the JSOTF and that headquarters.

A B-detachment normally requires augmentation from SF-group or -battalion assets to perform any of these missions.[1] Its current configuration in Iraq is that of a robust AOB that mimics the operations of the SOTF in most areas. The Iraq AOB maintains an OPCEN that has sections for operations and intelligence, as well as a signal center, or SIGCEN, that has redundant communications with higher headquarters, A-detachments in outlying areas and adjacent units. The AOB executive officer and operations sergeant direct a support center that contains numerous maintenance-and-supply personnel to support the A-detachments.

To fulfill these duties, the AOB is augmented. The OPCEN includes additional liaison personnel and personnel from the SOTF and the company's A-detachments to man an intelligence cell and an operational control element. The battalion signal detachment provides additional personnel to man the SIGCEN. The average B-detachment in Iraq is increased to approximately 30 personnel with augmentation from the SOTF and group support battalion. The AOB, as configured in SOTF-N, was capable of supporting approximately six A-detachments.

AOB 1310 was focused on operations and intelligence in the Ninewah Province and worked with the individual A-detachments to synchronize efforts with commanders of the area of operations, or AO. The AOB commander was primarily involved in maintaining a working relationship with brigade-level conventional leadership to assist the A-detachments engaging leaders at the battalion level and below.

The AOB also supported the A-detachments with limited logistics to provide what they could not acquire through conventional supply systems. The AOB S2 provided limited intelligence support and coordinated with other intelligence elements, such as the Mosul Fusion Cell. The AOB also conducted detainee operations and exploitation to assist the A-detachments in completing the intelligence cycle.

The AOB's most active role occurred during troops-in-contact situations, maintaining communications with engaged detachments and augmenting communications with conventional and host-nation quick-reaction forces and medical-evacuation assets. Because of the reliability of ARSOF communications systems, the A-detachments had better communication with the AOB than with conventional forces.

The AOB did not have a fire-support officer to leverage all theater assets directly, but those capabilities were available through the SOTF.

THE SOTF

SOTF 13 functioned as SOTF-N with full capability, even while augmenting the AOBs throughout the SOTF area. The primary factors affecting the conduct of A-detachment missions from the SOTF were leveraging air and ISR assets at the theater level. The SOTF had staff augmentations from the U.S. Air Force to properly employ those assets. SOTF staff sections are more robust than the corresponding AOB staff sections and maintain a broader focus across the SOTF AO and area of interest.

The SOTF also worked to coordinate across AOB boundaries and worked through the CJSOTF to integrate SOF operations into those of the Multinational Corps-Iraq. The SOTF commander had the authority to authorize level II CONOPs. The A-detachments' key hurdle for level II CONOPs was staffing them at the SOTF level and gaining the commander's approval.

DISCUSSION

There is an expedited version of the standard CONOP format available for operations against time-sensitive targets, or TSTs. The intent of the modification was to streamline the process to allow for missions within six hours of notification from the A-detachment to the AOB. The TST CONOP allows the AOB to create a one-slide format when given the basics of the operation by the A-detachment. But despite the streamlined format, the approval process did not change, and quick approval of a Level I TST CONOP was essentially impossible because of the time required to work through command levels to the CJSOTF.

The current CONOP approval process leads to the work being duplicated at least twice for any CONOP of level II or I. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, tells us that this is not the path to success[2]:

Although ARSOF personnel must be included in centralized planning at the CCDR and subordinate JFC levels, successful ARSOF require decentralized planning and execution for individual missions. Independent judgment and effective coordination by ARSOF leaders at every echelon are vital to successful SO.

Most coordination in Iraq is conducted via e-mail and phones. As a

result, coordination can be done from anywhere. Moving a headquarters element from one location to another has no impact on coordination, provided that communications connectivity is maintained. The only advantages to be gained by moving headquarters elements would be gaining the ability to conduct face-to-face communications with higher or lower elements and removing duplication of effort. Co-locating headquarters elements consolidates logistics requirements, which diminishes manning requirements and improves coordination.

Two methods for streamlining the CONOP approval process are: decentralizing level II approval authority to AOB commanders and consolidating AOB staff and coordination functions at the SOTF level.

DECENTRALIZED APPROVAL AUTHORITY

The first course of action is to decentralize approval authority for level II CONOPs to the AOB commander. The current AOB structure allows for staffing with a more narrow area focus and greater understanding of A-detachment targeting and second- and third-order effects of detachment operations. At the same time, the AOB maintains an adequate distance from the detachments' operations to view them from a broader regional and national perspective.

Requirements that cannot be coordinated at the AOB level can still be resourced through coordination with the SOTF staff. The SOTF will always maintain oversight, but decentralizing the approval process removes a hurdle. A similar process already exists at the higher level: It is being done for level II CONOPs approved by the SOTF when the SOTF requests and competes for CJSOTF assets.

The advantages to this course of action include the AOB commander's ability to maintain a precise focus on the A-detachment targeting process. Because of their proximity to the AO, AOB commanders have better situational awareness, and maintaining a close relationship with adjacent units will alleviate potential conflicts between U.S. SF and conventional units.

The disadvantage would be the need to maintain a more robust AOB concurrent with personnel requirements from the battalion, group support battalion and the A-detachment. More headquarters elements means more personnel requirements. The SOTF would lose some of its flexibility for moving its capabilities from AOB to AOB.

CENTRALIZE STAFF FUNCTIONS

The second course of action would be to consolidate functions at the SOTF, modeling on the older SF concept of having A-detachments report directly to the SOTF. Having the B-detachment collocated with the SOTF would improve communication and advocacy for the detachments. This course of action would streamline and simplify the staffing process, with a B-detachment commander circulating through the AO to maintain a strong linkage with A-detachments and the situation on the ground. The B-detachment commander could be a face-to-face advocate with the SOTF commander for the detachments in his company. This course of action is in line with doctrine, as illustrated below:

Unnecessary layering of an HQ decreases responsiveness and available mission planning time and creates an opportunity for a security compromise.[3]

The AOBs would still exist to provide logistics support to outlying detachments, but the removal of staff functions would lessen their manning requirements. That would provide commanders with improved flexibility in personnel management, as well as the streamlining effect noted above. The SOTF would be able to retain more robust elements in intelligence, the SIGCEN and the SUPCEN that could be moved throughout the SOTF to address issues as they arise, rather than being tied down to individual AOBs.

Drawbacks to this approach include a decreased ability to coordinate with conventional brigade-level commanders and staffs through the AOB; it places the onus of conventional-force coordination fully on the A-detachment. This option would also make it more difficult for the commanders to maintain situational awareness regarding the individual detachments. The increased distance to the A-detachments could also limit the SOTF's capability to provide logistics support.

CONCLUSION

Both courses of action offer different merits, and the choice between them will depend on the commanders involved and mission variables. However, either course of action flattens the command structure and diminishes the time required for mission approval. Empowering the AOB commander to approve basic lethal operations in support of A- and B-detachments takes advantage of the AOB commander's experience and situational awareness. The structure to support these courses of action is already in place. Centralizing staffing diminishes the burden on electronic communication and increases the more preferred face-to-face communication. Both options diminish the levels of bureaucracy for the A-detachment mission-approval process and improve detachment flexibility and responsiveness in compliance with the nature of special-operations forces. ***SW***

Notes:

[1] FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces.*
[2] FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces.*
[3] FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces.*

This article was written while **Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Scheper** was a student in the Warrant Officer Advanced Course at SWCS. He is the company operations warrant officer for Company C, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group. He has served in the Army for 18 years, with 10 years in Special Forces, and has served as assistant detachment commander and Special Forces communications sergeant, with multiple deployments throughout Asia and the Middle East.

Enlisted

PROMOTION BOARDS SCHEDULED

The fiscal year 2010 sergeant major/command sergeant major promotion selection board will convene in April 2010. The 2010 sergeant first class promotion selection board will convene Feb. 2-26. NCOs in the zone for consideration for either board should ensure that their records are up-to-date and validate their Enlisted Record Brief and Official Military Personnel Folder for accuracy and make arrangements to take a new DA photo. For more information about either board, refer to the most current MILPER message.

SWCS NCOA CONDUCTS CA BNCOC, ANCOC

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy is now conducting the Civil Affairs Basic NCO Course and the Civil Affairs Advanced NCO Course. Soldiers should contact their chain of command and their schools NCO for information about class seats and dates.

FY 2011 TARGET DATE FOR PSYOP GRADS' AUTOMATIC E5

As previously reported in Special Warfare, the Army G1 has approved automatic promotion to E5 for Soldiers who graduate from the Psychological Operations Qualification Course and are awarded MOS 37F. However, that policy will not become effective until release of the appropriate DA message, which is currently scheduled for the beginning of fiscal year 2011. Once the DA message has been released, the effective date of a Soldier's promotion will be the earliest date that both requirements are met. The policy does not apply to non-prior-service accessions.

CIVIL AFFAIRS LOOKING FOR QUALIFIED SOLDIERS

Civil Affairs continues to recruit qualified Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*. CA is not currently accepting applications from sergeants first class or promotable staff sergeants, but that may change as the CA force continues to grow.

To obtain more information, Soldiers can visit the following link: https://perscomnd04. army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/. Sign in using AKO user ID and password, then go to Chapter 10, 38B.

Soldiers who are interested in reclassifying into CA should contact SFC Robert Herring or SFC Dennis Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, located on Fort Bragg on Macomb Street (Building 2-1120), or telephone (910) 432-9697 or DSN 239-9697. Send e-mail to: robert.herring@usarec.army.mil or dennis.pease@usarec.army.mil.

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SOLDIERS CAN CHECK ON CA ASSIGNMENTS

CA Soldiers who wish to explore new assignments should contact MSG Aldo Palacios, Civil Affairs assignment manager, at (703) 325 8399, e-mail: aldo.palacios@conus.army.mil; or the CA senior career manger, MSG Ralph Weller, at 910-907-4171 or wellerr@ahqb.soc.mil.

SF TO ESTABLISH LINGUIST MOS

Special Forces is establishing a new military occupational specialty: 18L, SF linguist. The goal of creating the new MOS is to provide two 18Ls, either staff sergeants or sergeants first class, per A-detachment by fiscal year 2012.

As interim goals, SF will fill one detachment slot with an 18L having a language capability of 2/2/2 between FY 2010 and FY 2011. By FY 2012, each A-detachment will have one 2/2/2 18L and one 3/3/3 18L. The intent is to maintain a basic level of linguistic ability while achieving a high level of skill and to provide a small number of Soldiers competent in languages specific to regions of current and future deployment.

Development of training is ongoing, although authorizations for training will not be available until FY 2013.

POCS FOR CMF 18 INFO

Soldiers who would like more information about CMF 18 recruiting can contact SFC Hughes at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, telephone DSN 239-9710 or commercial (910) 432-9710. For questions related to the 18X program, contact SFC Long Seth, 18X career manager, at DSN 239-7359, commercial (910) 432-7359, or send e-mail to: longs@soc.mil.

For any other questions related to CMF 18, contact MSG Pedro Padilla, senior career manager, at DSN 239-6995, commercial (910) 432-6995, or send e-mail to: pedro.j.padillamendez@soc.mil.

Warrant Officer

SF WARRANT OFFICERS HAVE NEW PROPONENT MANAGER

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bart Bryant is the new proponent manager for SF warrant officers, MOS 180A. Bryant assumed his new duties within the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Special Operations Proponency 1 Nov. He was previously assigned to the 3rd SF Group, where he served in numerous positions culminating in his assignment as company operations warrant officer for Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. Bryant can be reached at DSN 239-1879/7597, commercial (910) 432-1879/7597, or by e-mail at bart.bryant@us.army.mil. Chief Warrant Officer 5 Samuel Doyle remains the chief warrant officer of the branch. He can be reached at DSN 239-1879, commercial (910) 432-1879, or by e-mail at: doyles@ahqb.soc.mil.

SF WARRANT-OFFICER SERVICE OFFERS ADVANTAGES

As growth in the force continues, SF warrant-officer-inventory requirements remain high, and efforts to recruit SF NCOs in the active and reserve components are in full swing. Service as an SF warrant officer offers a number of advantages:

- Serve in a direct, ground, combat-leadership role as the assistant detachment commander of an SF A-detachment.

- Serve an average of five additional years on an A-detachment.

- Lead specialized teams in missions involving advanced special operations, counterterrorism, psychological operations, civil affairs and other operations, as directed.

- Serve in worldwide joint, strategic, operational and tactical assignments, at all levels of special-operations planning and execution.

- Have opportunities to obtain intermediate-level education at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., with the potential to obtain a master's degree through the Interagency Studies Program.

- Become eligible for a critical-skills accession bonus of $20,000 (active component) or $10,000 (National Guard).

For additional information, visit the Web sites www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or http://www.1800goguard.com/warrant-officer/warrant.html. SF Soldiers can also contact the senior warrant officer in their unit or contact Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bobby Craig in the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency at DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or e-mail: craigb@ahqb.soc.mil.

Officer

OFFICERS HAVE OPTIONS FOR COMPLETING ILE

The primary means by which active-duty officers may complete their intermediate-level education, or ILE, and attain certification for military education level 4 and joint professional military education Phase I are:

1. Complete the 10-month resident ILE course at the Army Command and General Staff College, or CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

2. Attend sister-service schools:

• Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, R.I.

• Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va.

• Air Command and Staff College, Montgomery, Ala.

3. Complete the CGSC Interagency Fellowship. The CGSC Interagency Fellowship immerses majors and promotable captains of all branches and functional areas within a federal agency for one year to give them a more thorough understanding of the agency's mission.

4. Attend an approved foreign staff college:

• Argentina (taught in Spanish); one student per year.

• Australia (taught in English); two students per year.

• Belgium (taught in French); one student per year.

• Brazil (taught in Portuguese); one student per year.

• Canada (taught in English); one student per year.

• France (taught in French); two students per year.

• Germany (taught in German); one student per year.

• Ireland (taught in English); one student per year.

• Italy (taught in Italian); one student per year.

• Japan (taught in Japanese); one student per year.

• Kuwait (taught in English); one student per year.

• Spain (taught in Spanish); one student per year.

• Switzerland (taught in German); one student per year.

• Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (taught in Spanish); 12 students per year.

Officers should address specific questions about ILE, sister-service schools, the CGSC Interagency Fellowship or foreign schools to their career manager at the Army Human Resources Command. Requests to attend sister-service schools, the CGSC Interagency Fellowship or foreign schools should be received by the applicant's career-management branch not later than August of the year prior to the academic

year during which the applicant wishes to attend.

ILE PREPARATORY COURSE BEGINS AT NPS IN JUNE

The ILE Preparatory Course, P-950, for students attending the Naval Postgraduate School beginning in the summer of 2010 will be held June 14-25, 2010, at NPS. Officers and warrant officers are expected to attend P-950 prior to beginning NPS, but if they are unable to attend the June session because of an emergency, the next session will be held in December. However, attendance in December will mean that they cannot take any of the Naval Command and Staff courses that are required in order to receive full credit for ILE/ Joint Professional Military I.

DEADLINE APPROACHING FOR JOINT-QUALIFICATION ASSESSMENT

Joint qualification is an important part of an officer's professional development, and officers who require a retroactive assessment of their joint qualification have until Sept. 30, 2010, to request it.

Joint qualification is especially important for officers in Army special-operations forces, whose assignments are inherently joint. The joint nature of a position is important when it is being validated for placement on the joint-duty-assignment list or when an officer's joint experience is being validated.

When officers apply for retroactive joint credit, the Officer Evaluation Report, or OER, is used to substantiate their joint experience or education. It is therefore important for raters to articulate, whenever possible, the joint nature of operations or training in Part V of the OER. Questions to be answered are what the officer did; whether the assignment was related to national-security strategy, strategic and contingency planning, command and control of operations under a unified command, national-security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States, or combined operations with military forces of allied nations. Raters should also indicate whether the assignment involved other U.S. departments and agencies, military forces or agencies of other countries, or nongovernmental persons or entities.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires officers to have joint education and experience. The Joint Qualification System, or, JQS, provides officers an opportunity to earn joint qualification upon completion of their requisite joint professional military education, or JPME, and a tour of duty in a joint assignment.

There are four levels of joint qualification. Level I is awarded upon completion of an officer's basic course and joint certification of pre-commissioning courses that provide an introduction to and awareness of joint operations. Officers begin to accrue qualification points following their commissioning via joint experiences, training, exercises and other education.

Level II is awarded upon completion of JPME I, accrual of 18 points (at least 12 of which come from joint experience) and certification by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Level III is awarded upon completion of JPME II or AJPME (reserve-component officers), accrual of 36 points and certification by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. At least 12 joint-experience points must have been accrued since the awarding of Level II. At Level III, an officer is designated as a joint-qualified officer, or JQO. As of Sept. 30, 2008, an active-component officer must be JQO to be appointed to O7.

Level IV (general or flag officers only) is awarded upon completion of the CAPSTONE course, accrual of 60 points and certification by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. It requires at least 24 additional joint-experience points accrued from an assignment in a general- or flag-officer billet in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a combatant-command headquarters, a joint-task-force headquarters or a defense agency.

To request retroactive joint qualification, officers should visit the Web site below: https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/jmis/JQSindex.jsp.

ARSOF LTCS SELECTED FOR PROMOTION TO COL

The following special-operations officers have been selected for promotion to colonel:

Bryan H. Blue
Reginald Bostick
Scott E. Brower
James C. Brown
Leslie F. Brown
Brian Cavanaugh
Chadwick W. Clark
Kevin C. Colyer
Charles T. Connett
Edwin J. Deedrick Jr.
David L. Dellinger
Heinz P. Dinter Jr.
David P. Fitchitt
Antonio M. Fletcher
Michael L. Franck
David L. Grosso
Miguel Hobbs
Kris Kenner
Robert E. Lee Jr.
Guy A. Lemire
Adam A. Loveless
John E. Maraia
Dennis J. McCormack
Christopher C. Miller
Wade L. Murdock
Paul A. Ott
Leo Pullar
Paul J. Roberts
Leo Ruth
Nestor A. Sadler
Ernesto Sirvas
Timothy P. Small
Bradly S. Taylor
Gerard P. Tertychny
Daniel W. Whitney

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AMERICAN STYLE:

The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond



DETAILS

By Robert J. Kodosky
Plymouth, U.K.:
Lexington Books, 2007.
ISBN: 1-59114-350-0.
248 pages. $75.

Reviewed by:
Sergeant First Class Mervyn Roberts
345th PSYOP Company
Dallas, Texas

Robert Kodosky is a professor of history at West Chester University and based *Psychological Operations American Style* on his 2005 Temple University Ph.D. dissertation. As the title suggests, this study focuses on the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, or USPAO, in the Vietnam War. Kodosky argues that Vietnam proved an ill fit for the American way of war and that U.S. PSYOP efforts in Vietnam were doomed to fail, largely because of poor organization and lack of cultural understanding. He finds little evidence that the U.S. made a concerted effort to change hearts and minds. This was largely because field commanders considered PSYOP to be a tactical weapon that they could use to instill fear or capture prisoners rather than to win the support of the populace.

JUSPAO was an organization composed primarily of military personnel and employees of the U.S. Information Agency. It was formed in 1965 and given control over both PSYOP and public affairs in Vietnam. Kodosky asserts that this dual role undercut U.S. credibility by blurring the lines between fact and the lies that he asserts were used in PSYOP. Kodosky argues that JUSPAO undermined its credibility by being used to both inform and persuade its audiences. In this, he continues the line that Caroline Page argued in *U.S. Official Propaganda During the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The Limits of Persuasion.* For those trying to understand U.S. information operations in Vietnam, *Psychological Operations American Style* is a useful counterpoint to William M. Hammond's *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, which is the official history of JUSPAO during the period.

Kodosky notes a disconnect between psychological warfare and information, which raises the question of how to influence and be truthful at the same time. The problem he notes of using JUSPAO for both has some validity. However, in order to ensure a unity of effort, some organizations had to oversee both sides in order to avoid information fratracide. The problem is not necessarily that they fell under JUSPAO as much as larger questions over the conduct of the war. H.R. McMaster pointed to the foundation of the problem in *Dereliction of Duty* by noting the propensity of the Johnson administration to lie, which undercut information activities at all levels of the war.

Kodosky admits there may have been tactical successes for PSYOP, but these were overshadowed by the negatives associated with the loss of truth. "Any advantages that officials hoped to gain in the 'war for hearts and minds' by using these agencies clearly became eclipsed … by providing critics of the American effort with legitimate questions concerning United States credibility." The major metric of success was the amount of product delivered rather than effects generated. He states that PSYOP was "reduced to a numbers game." This is in line with the American way of war, which focuses on using overwhelming force and technological means to defeat an enemy.

In addition to organizational problems, Kodosky argues cultural chauvinism left the PSYOP effort with little chance for success. He points to surveys and memoirs to show that Americans had a poor understanding of the Vietnamese culture, which led to many mistakes. He is on solid ground with this, and it is a lesson that can never be too strongly emphasized. However, Kodosky then points out the "simplistic" nature of the pamphlets and training materials used to help soldiers learn about Vietnam. JUSPAO spent much effort producing analyses of Vietnamese and tribal cultures. However, Kodosky presents no counter

evidence that the pamphlets were in fact wrong besides a vague multicultural assumption that they must have been wrong because they were incomplete.

Kadosky's narrative is heavily weighted toward the beginning of the JUSPAO period, which does not allow for an adequate assessment of change over time. Although the U.S. had been engaged in Vietnam for roughly a decade by 1965, the number of Americans who had experience in the country was very low. That was even more the case for those involved with trying to influence behaviors. The troop buildup in 1965 exponentially increased the number of troops and the need for tactical PSYOP support. Ending the book in 1968 ignores the Vietnamization phase and overplays the mistakes made when large numbers of foreign soldiers, new to Vietnam, tried to learn a new culture and operate in it at the same time. Many mistakes could be expected in a situation like that.

The book is at its weakest in its assessment of the current war. Kodosky is writing from the outside and is dependent on highly biased news accounts. It is clearly far too soon to make some of the assertions he does. Because much of what PSYOP is doing is classified, he cannot be faulted too heavily on this point though.

Psychological Operations American Style is well-sourced with primary documents and the sparse secondary works available. Papers come from all the archives one would expect from a book like this, including the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, the Vietnam archives at Texas Tech, and the Military History Institute. The book contains a bibliography and end notes, and each chapter is preceded with an outline essay describing what is to be covered. In fact, one could quickly scan all the chapter overviews to gain a quick understanding of the author's thesis and major arguments. The chapters are organized topically rather than chronologically.

Despite its limitations, this book should be required reading for all personnel involved with PSYOP. Vietnam was the testing ground for many of the concepts currently used in PSYOP, and the mission of influencing a foreign culture over a long period is similar to what the U.S. faces today. *Psychological Operations American Style* brings up many issues that will help PSYOP professionals learn the lessons from Vietnam. As a study of the PSYOP conducted during the Americanization phase of the war, Kodosky's book adds a great deal to the historiography. In spite of the problems noted, this book is well worth reading, both for understanding how PSYOP was conducted in Vietnam and for informing the reader of potential pitfalls in conducting effective PSYOP in the current war. ***SW***

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E-MAIL:
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Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

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