

Special Warfare

JANUARY - FEBRUARY 2009
VOLUME 22 ISSUE 1



TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

January-February 2009 | Volume 22 | Issue 1

ARTICLES

8 Character and the Special Forces Soldier

Brigadier General Bennett Sacolick discusses the character of today's SF Soldiers.

10 Opportunities for ARSOF Education at Fort Leavenworth

CGSC offers new programs to educate ARSOF officers and war-rant officers.

14 Cliffhanger

A look at SF Detachment 3336's battle in the Shok Valley.

18 Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan *COVER STORY*

Special Forces Soldiers reach out to tribal leaders in remote areas of Afghanistan.

27 Training and Educating the Army's Newest CMF

The SWCS NCO Academy expands training to Civil Affairs NCOs.

29 Relief in Place

This article suggests a means of improving the transfer of authority in theater.



DEPARTMENTS

4 From the Commandant

5 Update


32 Career Notes

33 Doctrine and Training Updates

35 Book Reviews

ON THE COVER

Members of the 3rd Special Forces Group participate in a tribal meeting in Afghanistan.
U.S. Army photo



Special Warfare

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

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On Dec. 12, in the auditorium of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the 3rd Special Forces Group held the largest Silver Star Medal ceremony since the Vietnam War. Eighteen SF Soldiers received the Silver Star Medal for their actions in Afghanistan, 10 of them for a single battle in Afghanistan's Shok Valley in April 2008. The account of that battle, printed in this issue of *Special Warfare*, is a story of courage, coolness under fire and self-sacrifice.

Self-sacrifice encompasses the qualities that have defined special-operations Soldiers throughout our history. It places the needs of the unit over the needs of the individual and manifests itself in a number of ways. Loyalty, excellence, duty, honor, integrity and personal courage all require a person to give of himself. In another article in this issue, the SWCS deputy commanding general, Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick, discusses the demands of our Special Forces training and the need for character in our training and in our missions, but the need for the Special Forces values applies equally to our Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers.

The actions in the Shok Valley and the Soldiers' comments also demonstrate the complexity of the environment we must prepare ARSOF for. One of the Soldiers commented that their normal contact with the populace was to sit and drink tea with them and find ways that they could help them. But when the Soldiers were ambushed by a large group of insurgents, they had to be prepared for a much different type of contact.

I am proud of the fact that the SF Soldiers involved in the action in the Shok Valley were trained at the Special Warfare Center and School. It is imperative that SWCS remains a world-class special-operations training center and school with an integrated unconventional-warfare center of excellence that produces agile, adaptive, warrior-focused Soldiers. We can never lose sight of the fact that we are the only source that provides a highly trained force with the intuitive abilities to work by, with and through our indigenous partners. We provide, and will continue to provide, our operational force with the most relevant advanced skills necessary to make us an irreplaceable force.

We will also work with other training institutions to ensure that ARSOF Soldiers receive the training they need to be versatile in working with other forces and government agencies. The article by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Spence details the opportunities for intermediate-level education available to ARSOF officers and warrant officers at Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College. The Special Warfare Center and School is working with the staff at CGSC on various programs, the most exciting of which is the Interagency Studies Program that offers SOF officers a chance to earn a master's degree in interagency studies while they complete their ILE training. All these programs at CGSC offer relevant education as well as a chance to build beneficial relationships with Soldiers in conventional units.

It is a privilege and an honor for those of us at the Special Warfare Center and School to do a job that is truly crucial to meeting the needs of our nation. It is not a task that we take lightly. We will do our best.



Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

Strike the Term 'Surrogate From UW Doctrine

The unfortunate proliferation of the term "surrogate" in our unconventional warfare, or UW, doctrine is a good illustration of what can come of the thoughtless and unrestrained use of a popular buzzword.

In current UW doctrine and dialogue, the term surrogate has come to be used interchangeably with the terms "guerrilla" or "irregular," so much so that some speakers seem to believe the terms are synonymous. They are not; they have quite different meanings. We in Special Forces have long understood the importance of building rapport and avoiding an ethnocentric view of other cultures, and of other population groups and their problems. I can think of no more ethnocentric and demeaning way of referring to our irregular partners than by calling them surrogates. Used in this context, the word has an unmistakable "U.S. puppet" ring to it.

The implication, of course, is that these irregular forces are fighting our wars for us, precluding the need to

deploy larger numbers of U.S. forces. Participation in coalition efforts by our conventional international partners also precludes the additional deployment of U.S. forces, but we would never get away with referring to our coalition partners as surrogates. We should apply the same degree of correctness when referring to our irregular partners, rather than belittling their role and relationship by calling them surrogates.

The only true surrogate fighter is a paid mercenary, and that is not what UW is about. UW is about helping indigenous irregular elements fight their war because it is in our national interest to do so. It serves our purpose as well as theirs.

Even in cases where we might truly view the irregulars we are supporting as nothing more than surrogates or mercenaries, we should at least have the wisdom and discretion not to openly say so. Many within Special Forces see no harm in using the term in our own doctrine, as though that doctrine were limited to our own private use. They should be dis-

abused of this fantasy and understand that people all over the world — governments and militaries, the media, even our adversaries — read our doctrine.

Our adversaries have not yet recognized the propaganda value of this. It is ammunition for an explosive and damaging anti-U.S. propaganda effort. Sooner or later, continued use of the term surrogate in this context will come back to bite us. We should be clever enough to foresee this and take steps to prevent it by guarding against the inappropriate use of such buzzwords.

LTC Will Irwin

U.S. Army (ret.)

Will Erwin is a former executive officer of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine and has served as a research fellow at the RAND Corporation. He is the author of The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 (Public Affairs, 2005) and Abundance of Valor: Special Forces in the Operation That Went "A Bridge Too Far" (Random House, forthcoming in 2009).

Special Forces Pioneer Passes Away

A U.S. Army Special Forces pioneer who fought in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, retired Colonel William M "Buzz" Miley Jr., passed away at age 86, Nov. 22, in Memphis, Tenn. A memorial service was held in his honor Dec. 17 at Odd Fellows Cemetery in Starkville, Miss.

Miley served 31 years in the U.S. Army. He was commissioned through Infantry Officer Candidate School in 1942 at Fort Benning, Ga., and completed parachutist training in 1943. He served in combat in the Pacific theater with the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 11th Airborne Division.



He commanded the Airborne Department at Fort Benning from 1953-1955, and then served as the secretary of the general staff of the Berlin Command.

Miley completed Special Forces training at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1961, and served as a Green Beret until his retirement in 1973. During 1964-1965, he served in Vietnam, training South Vietnamese airborne units, before returning to take command of the 3rd SF Group.

Needing a seasoned combat veteran, Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough appointed Miley as the

director of the Special Forces School in 1968. Under his leadership, SF training became more formalized, and standards were implemented for those Soldiers attending the course.

Among Miley's awards and decorations are the Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, Meritorious Service Medal and Air Medal. He earned the Combat Infantry Badge with Star and the Master Parachutist Badge. Miley was also inducted into the Officer Candidate School and Airborne halls of fame.

Memorials can be sent to the U.S. Army SF Association Scholarship Fund, P.O. Box 41436, Fayetteville, NC 28309-1436. — SWCS PAO.

3rd SF Group recognizes more than 100 in valor ceremony

On Dec. 10, more than 100 members of the 3rd Special Forces Group received valor awards for their actions in Afghanistan.

The 3rd SF Group commander, Colonel Gus Benton II, presented the awards to his men at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Auditorium, in the presence of more than 300 of their friends, family members and colleagues. In all, the Soldiers received 43 Bronze Star Medals with V-device, 39 Army Commendation Medals with V-device and 42 Purple Hearts.

The valor device denotes that individuals were awarded a decoration in recognition of a valorous act they performed during combat operations while under direct fire from enemy forces. It may also denote an accomplishment of a heroic nature in direct support of operations against an enemy force.

Benton encouraged the Soldiers to continue to find, fight and finish their enemies. He also took a few moments to praise his men and their actions. Benton said that if asked, none of the Soldiers would claim any greatness. They cling to the concept that they were just doing their jobs.

Benton was speaking about men like Staff Sergeant Morgan P. Ford, who received the Bronze Star Medal with V-device for his actions in a firefight Nov. 2, 2007. Ford was the .50-caliber machine-gunner on his truck when his convoy was attacked.

"I don't know what I think," said the Special Forces weapons sergeant, who had a hard time finding words to describe his feelings on receiving the award. Ford wouldn't talk about his actions that day, but he did say that his team performed very well.



▲ SHINING MOMENT One hundred forty-three Soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group were recognized for their acts of gallantry, bravery and duty during a valor ceremony on Dec. 10 at the SWCS Auditorium. Photo by Staff Sergeant Corey T. Dennis, USASOC PAO.

He added that the action made him more ready for later firefights, of which there were many during the six-month deployment. Ford also received two Purple Hearts for injuries sustained while on his first tour of duty in Afghanistan.

"I did my job, and I'll continue to do my job," said Sergeant First Class Karl W. Wurzbach, the senior weapons sergeant for his team. "I like to think I'm good at it, and I couldn't imagine life in the civilian world."

Wurzbach was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with V-device for his efforts during a six-and-a-half hour gun battle on April 6 in Afghanistan, in which six members of his team were injured — four of them critically. — USASOC PAO.

USSOCOM announces 2008 Medic of the Year

Sergeant First Class Eric Strand, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, was named the United States Special Operations Command Medic of the Year during the Special Operations Medical Association's annual Mess Night Dec. 16 in Tampa Bay, Fla.

Strand was chosen as the Special Forces Medic of the Year by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, while Specialist Rotha R. Dornes, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, was selected as the USASOC special-operations combat medic of the year.

Twenty-two nomination packets, consisting of a two-

page recommendation from the medic's supervisor and a chain-of-command endorsement, were submitted for review by Command Sergeant Major Parry Baer, USASOC command sergeant major.

On Dec. 14, Strand and Dornes received recognition for their selection from the USASOC Surgeon's Office at the annual USASOC Surgeon's Conference in Tampa, Fla. — USASOC PAO



STRAND

3rd SF Group Silver Star ceremony largest since Vietnam era

In one of the largest award ceremonies since the Vietnam era, the 3rd Special Forces Group awarded 19 Silver Star Medals, two Bronze Star Medals for Valor, two Army Commendation Medals for Valor and four Purple Hearts at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School Auditorium, Dec. 12.

Colonel Gus Benton II, the commander of the 3rd SF Group, said the men of his unit distinguished themselves by taking the fight to the enemy and simply "doing what had to be done."

"It is my distinct honor and privilege to celebrate the awarding of these medals to our intrepid warriors," Benton said. "History will record and we will long remember their sacrifices."

Prior to the awarding of the medals, vignettes narrated by members of the group explained the daring feats of the SF Soldiers. Each vignette told the story of the battles that occurred and the actions performed by each man receiving a medal. As each group of Soldiers received their medals, they were treated to a thunderous and standing ovation from the audience.

"As we have listened to these incredible tales, I am truly at a loss for words to do justice to what we have heard here," said Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, who presented the awards to the Soldiers. "Where do we get such men? There is no finer fighting man on the face of the earth than the American Soldier. And there is no finer American Soldier than our Green Berets."

Mulholland said that many people wouldn't believe the courage displayed by these men.

"If you saw what you heard today in a movie, you would shake your head and say, 'That didn't happen,'" Mulholland said. "But it does, every day."

He explained that the majority of the firefights highlighted in the vignettes took place within ranges that would fit inside the auditorium.

"You can't imagine the intensity and the stress these men endured for hours and days on end," he said.

Prior to taking command of USASOC, Mulholland was the commander of Special Operations Command Central, the command that has control over the SOF forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"As the commander responsible for the



▲ **COMMAND PERFORMANCE** Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland (sixth from left), commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, stands with the members of ODA 3336 after awarding 10 Silver Star Medals to the Soldiers. Team 3336 was one of seven groups of Soldiers honored during a Silver Star ceremony on Dec. 12 at the SWCS Auditorium. *USASOC PAO photo.*

area, as the reports rolled in, I would shake my head in disbelief," he said, speaking of the courage and persistence of the SF Soldiers.

"Alone and unafraid, working with their counterparts, they took on a tenacious and dedicated enemy in his homeland, in his own backyard. Imagine the Taliban commander thinking, 'What the hell do I have to do to defeat these guys?'"

Mulholland said that he was "incredibly humbled" to stand and address the actions of his men, because their actions "speak volumes beyond what I can say."

"Day-in and day-out, they are the unsung heroes, seeking no recognition," he continued. "If you asked them, I'm sure they would say the other guy did it."

Honored during the ceremony with Silver Star Medals were:

The Soldiers assigned to ODA 3336, for valorous actions undertaken in Afghanistan April 6, 2008:

CPT Kyle Walton (Carmel, Ind.)
MSG Scott Ford (Athens, Ohio)
SSG Dillon Behr (Rock Island, Ill.)
SSG Seth Howard (Kenne, N.H.)
SSG Luis Morales (Fredericksburg, Va.)
SSG Ronald Shurer (Pullman, Wash.)
SSG John Walding (Groesbeck, Texas)
SGT David Sanders (Huntsville, Ala.)
SGT Matthew Williams (Casper, Wyo.)
SPC Michael Carter (Smithville, Texas)

The Soldiers assigned to ODAs 3312 and 3214, for valorous actions undertaken in Afghanistan Nov. 2, 2007:

MSG Frederick Davenport (San Diego, Calif.)
SSG Robert Hammons (Huntsville, Ala.)
SFC Jacob Allison (Livonia, N.Y.)
SFC Paul Fiesel (La Porte, Texas)

For actions undertaken in Afghanistan Nov. 10, 2007:

SGT Gabriel Reynolds (Oswego, Ore.)

For actions undertaken in Iraq July 27, 2007:

CPT Kent Solheim (Oregon City, Ore.)

For actions undertaken in Afghanistan Aug. 26-Sept. 13, 2006:

SFC Benjamin Konrad (Winchester, Tenn.)

For actions undertaken in Afghanistan Aug. 7-9, 2005:

CPT Brandon Griffin (Athens, Ga.)

For actions undertaken in Afghanistan July 25, 2005:

SFC Larry Hawks (Bowling Green, Ky.)
Schurer, Fiesel, Allison and Reynolds each received additional awards during the ceremony.

The Silver Star Medal is awarded in recognition of a valorous act performed during combat operations while under direct fire from enemy forces. It may also denote an accomplishment of a heroic nature in direct support of operations against an enemy force.

— Janice Burton, *Special Warfare*

CHARACTER AND THE SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIER

by Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick

On a recent Friday I had the opportunity to address some of the finest Soldiers in the United States Army. These young men were graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course — not an easy feat. Having spent 27 years in the special-operations arena, I understood their excitement and how proud they felt during the ceremony; I had sat in a similar chair myself. However, it was important to me that their families understand exactly what their loved ones signed on for. And, in further thinking, it's also important to me that the citizens of this country know the dedication and professionalism that is embodied in the men of Special Forces. It is to that end that I share my graduation remarks with you.

Intuitively, I think we all know how hard our graduates work for the privilege of wearing a Green Beret. But did you know that some of these young men have been in training for more than two, maybe three years? This doesn't count the months they spent just physically preparing themselves before the course began, or the countless hours spent with a rucksack on their back in total solitude, usually very early in the morning or very late at night, but almost always on their own time, because they had other obligations that filled their day.

Appreciate the fact that 75 percent of the Soldiers who began the course, mostly airborne Soldiers, and many with combat experience, are no longer here today. This is the Army's most physically demanding course. Scholastically, each Soldier must master more than 1,000 critical tasks specific to his assigned specialty and hundreds of advanced war-fighting tasks, plus

demonstrate a proficiency in a foreign language before he graduates. There is simply not a more demanding school in the entire U.S. Army.

There are also several more intangible qualities that the Special Warfare Center and School is tasked to evaluate before we can allow a Soldier to wear a Green Beret: qualities such as maturity, commitment, judgment, courage, initiative, decisiveness, empathy, self-confidence and adaptability. These qualities can be summarized in one word: character. There are men who master their occupational skills, hone their tactical skills, become proficient in a foreign language and become the most prolific warrior since Rambo, but without character, they will not be a member of this regiment. Character is what defines Special Forces.

Character is a fundamental demand that our operational environment places upon our force. The men who don the Green Beret will be sent to the ends of the earth, and in most cases, they alone will represent and make decisions on behalf of the United States of America. Our Special Forces Soldiers routinely work in small, isolated detachments, alone and far removed from the support and protection or daily guidance of the U.S. government. They will have only each other to depend upon, so we must ensure that every single one of them has the character and integrity to function, maneuver and operate in these very complex environments. When our young men are thousands of miles away from their leadership, can we depend upon each of them to do what is right? Can their fellow teammates count on them, without

regard to the dangers involved? Of course they can, and I am very, very confident that our graduates will always achieve their assigned mission. This is the expectation that our country, and all those who have gone before them, place upon our regiment.

What makes this all so important is the critical role that Special Forces Soldiers play in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Think about the beauty of a force specifically designed to deploy and resolve conflicts before they require a huge military intervention, a force that clearly excels in training, leading and motivating an indigenous population of a troubled foreign country, a force designed to prevent the next insurgency or failed state. I'm proud to say that we have such a force, and they are called Green Berets!

I believe that the operational detachment that each of our graduates today will soon be a member of represents the only force in the world with the innovative ability to seamlessly integrate the various facets of host-country domestic and foreign needs with diplomacy and combat power into one perfectly designed element, the operational detachment-alpha. This is why character is so vital for our men. I'm obviously biased, but I believe we may be the only force in the world that intuitively understands the balance between diplomacy and force and possesses the judgment to determine which is most applicable in any given situation. It's understanding the equilibrium between these two seemingly polar-opposite notions and instinctively knowing when to apply each.

Before I go any further, I need to point out that one of our primary missions in Special Forces, one of the missions of every one of our gradu-

ates, is to defeat terrorism. So perhaps you're asking yourself, "How is character going to win the war on terrorism?" I have just spent the last three years working at the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, and I can assure you that there are hard-core terrorists out there who want nothing more than to attack America. The only solution for these criminals is to persistently hunt them down and kill them with the precision and the agility that typifies all our activities. In the application of pure combat power, the skills of our Special Forces Soldiers are second to none. But herein lies the problem: Eradicating terrorists alone will not win the war on terror; frankly, it won't even put a small dent in it. Our real problem lies in the fact that the vast majority of the world has no idea how to deal with the extremists in their own countries.

How do we change that?

One possible solution is that we send Special Forces Soldiers to these countries that have become the breeding ground for terrorism, and we engage in nation-building. We send Green Berets with judgment, imagination, character and intellect, armed with a demonstrated understanding of the language and culture.

Special Forces Soldiers have become experts in the economic and political environments of these countries and combine with that their intuitive abilities to work by, with and through our indigenous friends. We help these countries build their capacity to defeat terrorism and the insurgencies that threaten stability in their country before these ills can become a threat to our homeland. This mission of fostering relationships with our partner nations is the task that the graduates sitting here today will soon be executing. This is what they trained for, and this is what they are prepared to do.

Has this worked in the past?

Shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom began, we realized that our presence in Iraq would

be longer than anticipated, so the president asked the international community to send troops to serve in Iraq as part of a coalition. Not many countries answered the call. In August 2006, three years after the war started, there were only 21 non-U.S. countries participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Of those 21, the eighth-ranked nation providing personnel in Iraq was El Salvador. Now, as a former member of the 7th Special Forces Group and one who had multiple tours in El Salvador, I found this remarkable, because their military was so small.

What is even more remarkable is that, a year later, at a NATO-sponsored summit, the president once again asked the international community to step up to the plate, and once again, El Salvador, sent an additional company to Iraq. What possible reason could this tiny, poor, Central American country have to send troops 8,000 miles away to Iraq? None. They went because we asked them to go. They went because, in their time of need, the United States of America sent and maintained a Special Forces presence in their country for more than a decade. This

is a perfect example of Special Forces Soldiers executing U.S. foreign policy and successfully defeating an insurgency that could have destabilized the entire hemisphere.

To my fellow Green Berets, I'll ask you to reflect upon what you have achieved and to appreciate a small portion of a great paper written by Thomas Paine 250 years ago: "The harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives everything its value."

Although he was talking about liberty, in essence, we can apply those profound words to just about any life experience. What we obtain too cheaply, we esteem too lightly. I'll ask you to think about this as it applies to your great accomplishments and appreciate that the long tab we all wear on our left shoulder is a lot more than a simple 3-inch piece of cloth.

De oppresso liber!

Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick is the deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.



Opportunities for ARSOF Education at Fort Leavenworth

by Lieutenant Colonels James W. Spence Jr. and Casey Lessard

For officers in Army special-operations forces, education opportunities in Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., have never been greater.

Those opportunities include the SOF Studies Program, a SOF-specific ILE education track tailored for SOF field-grade officers; the Interagency Studies Program, a fully funded master's-degree program in inter-agency studies offered to selected ARSOF officers by the University of Kansas; new ways for officers to apply for the School of Advanced Military Studies, either before they arrive for ILE or after returning to the force; and the opportunity for five Special Forces warrant officers to attend ILE and some of the graduate-school programs each academic year.

This article will provide details and qualifications for each program, along with application information. While some of the programs are under development, all will be initiated by the start of academic year 2009 in August, and interested officers should begin early to prepare their applications.

SOF Studies Program. Resident ILE programs conducted by the services at Fort Leavenworth; Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.; the Naval War College, Newport, R.I.; and the Marine Command & Staff School, Quantico, Va., form the centerpiece of professional military education, or PME, for field-grade officers. With a large, experienced SOF faculty and a dedicated SOF curriculum that lasts several months, Fort Leavenworth has the most robust SOF-specific education track of any of the services' one-year ILE programs.

During the final months of the academic year, just prior to their return to the force, all Fort Leavenworth

field-grade ILE students bound for SOF assignments participate in the 72-hour SOF-specific academic track. In each class, as many as 80 joint and ARSOF officers receive focused preparation for their future field-grade SOF assignments. The SOF-specific track includes updates on the component forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command, joint and service SOF doctrine, and secure video-conference updates on current operations from the theater special-operations commands.

The SOF Studies Program also incorporates seminar discussions with guest instructors who are interagency experts; a joint-planning-group exercise that simulates operations of a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, in coordination with a joint task force; and SOF historical case studies, many of which are mentored by SOF general officers or by current or recent JSOTF commanders who commanded during the operation under study. Recent guest mentors include Admiral Eric Olson, commander, USSOCOM; Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, former commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Major General Thomas Csrnko, commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Brigadier General Hector Pagan, commander of Special Operations Command-South, and numerous former JSOTF commanders. These officers spoke on current operations while mentoring students on SOF utilization in past operations and the road ahead for SOF.

Beginning in August 2009, the SOF Studies Program will be conducted in two parts: a pre-course that will provide students critical ARSOF updates prior to the beginning of the academic year, and a more advanced course

taught during the latter part of the year that will feature the SOF case studies and sessions with guest mentors.

The combined SOF education provided during the one-year "Fort Leavenworth experience" will be continuously upgraded, driven by the SOF Education Element, which has the faculty and resources that are adequate for developing a current and relevant curriculum while incorporating experienced and respected commanders from the field. The SOF Studies portion of the ILE year is primary in preparing SOF majors for key and developmental, or K&D, assignments.


Interagency Studies Program.

Beginning in August, SOF officers will also have the opportunity to build upon the ILE curriculum by earning a master's degree in interagency studies from the University of Kansas, or KU. The Interagency Studies Program, or ISP, will be fully funded and integrated into the ILE year to minimize the impact on the officer's time. As SOF officers work in an increasingly interagency environment before, during and after their K&D time, the ISP program is ideal for preparing ARSOF officers for interagency assignments.

The ISP offers several clear benefits to ARSOF officers. On a personal level, the ISP awards a no-cost master's degree from a well-respected university while minimally increasing the standard ILE workload. Professionally, the SOF officer is better prepared to operate in the increasingly vital reality of interagency cooperation. For the Army, the ISP produces a growing population of experienced ARSOF officers who have been exposed to the challenges, advantages and requirements of interagency operations in the war on terror.

The ISP is a 30-credit-hour pro-

SOF Education at CGSC – July 2009



gram, with KU granting six hours of credit for ILE education. The remaining 24 credit hours will come from eight KU courses that focus on the structure and culture of the U.S. government and government agencies, organizational and negotiation theory, and the legal and international-relations considerations that relate to interagency issues. While individual courses will have writing assignments, the ISP has no thesis requirement and does not require students to take the Graduate Record Examination for admission.

SOF officers will attend ISP classes at two locations: night courses at Fort Leavenworth and day courses at KU. The night-school classes — four ISP courses taken in sequence — will be taught from September to March. These classes will meet one night a week during regular ILE coursework,

but they will be taught exclusively for ISP students by full-time KU professors. The final four courses of the ISP will be taught on the KU main campus at Lawrence, Kan. For this final portion, the KU campus will be ISP students' daily place of duty. In April and May, ISP students will attend the first two courses as an "ISP cohort," and in June and July, they will attend the second two courses as members of the KU student population at-large. Upon completion of the eighth course, the student will receive a master of arts degree in interagency studies from KU. The SOF officer will then return to the force to apply the newly acquired education.

Participation in the ISP is open to any active-duty officer in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations or Special Forces who is attending ILE at Fort Leavenworth. Non-military ILE stu-

dents representing various U.S. government agencies may also take part in the ISP. ISP scheduling will preclude immediate follow-on attendance at SAMS, but that will not prevent officers from returning to SAMS later in their careers. Officers who already have a graduate degree may still be eligible for ISP under Army Regulation 621-1, depending upon the circumstances under which they obtained their first master's.

ISP application packets must be submitted through the branch assignments officer before the officer reports for ILE. Packets will consist of the following:

- Current Officer Record Brief.
- Letter of recommendation from the current senior rater.
- Three most recent Officer Evaluation Reports.
- Transcripts for undergraduate study.
- A 750-to-1,000-word, double-

4 hrs (A581/A582)

2 hrs (A583)

SOF Studies Program- April 2008

<p>31 March</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Intro to SOF Studies •Cultural Intelligence / Human Terrain Systems (COL(Ret) Greer, MSG Ridenour) 	<p>1 April</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Intelligence (Mr. Chris Nelson, DIA) 	<p>2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Organization, Capabilities, and Limitations Case Studies (Small Group) 	<p>3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Cultural Anthropology (Dr. Bart Dean, KU) 	<p>4</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Radical Islam (Mr. Joseph Butta)
<p>7</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Information Operations and Strategic communications - JMISC (COL R. Stagner) 	<p>8</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •COIN Overview •IPB and effects on the Environment (COIN COE) 	<p>9</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •COIN Insurgency Fundamentals •Insurgency COAs (COIN COE) 	<p>10</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Doctrine – JSOTF Operations (Small Group) 	<p>11</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Budgeting (COL Chris White, USASOC)
<p>14</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •COIN Center of Gravity Analysis PE (COIN Center) 	<p>15</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ARSOF Doctrine Update –SWCS DOTD (COL Mulbury et. al.) 	<p>16</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Military Liaison Elements and Country Teams (LTC Mahaney) 	<p>17</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Joint Fires Integration •Operation Anaconda Case Study (Small Group) 	<p>18</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Tactical Exercise (Small Group)
<p>21</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Special Mission Units (CAG Guest Speaker, Cancelled) 	<p>22</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •TSOC SVTC Updates •SOCSOUTH •SOCCENT •SOCPAC 	<p>23</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Liaison and Coordination (JSOLE) (COL Paul Harmon) 	<p>24</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Panama Case Study (Small Group) •LTG Wagner Panama Presentation 	<p>25</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Somalia Case Study (Small Group)
<p>28</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SOF Paper Research Time (Small Group) 	<p>29</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •USCG SOF and Homeland Defense (RADMT. Atkins) 	<p>30</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •UK and Polish SOF (SAS/GROM Guest Speaker) •SF Branch Brief 	<p>1 May</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Bn S3/XO/AOB Command Roundtable and AAR (SOF Ed Director) 	<p>2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 60+ Joint SOF & IA Students - 72 Contact Hrs - Two GO/FOs - SOF Essays

SOF Track as it was executed for the Class of June 2008

spaced essay on the topic, “How Inter-agency Studies Will Contribute to My Career Goals and Strengthen SOF’s Defense Contributions.”

The first step for officers who want to start ISP in 2009 is to submit a complete application packet to their branch at the Army Human Resources Command not later than March 21, 2009. The timeline for the ISP process will be:

- Completed packet to branch: March 21, 2009.
- Notification to officers selected: April 15, 2009.
- ISP courses start: Sept. 1, 2009.
- ISP completed: July 31, 2010.

For additional information on ISP, send e-mail to Lieutenant Colonel Casey Lessard of the CGSC SOF Education Element: casey.les-

sard@conus.army.mil.


School of Advanced Military Studies. The SAMS Advanced Military Studies Program, or AMSP, is a master’s-degree producing program that educates future commanders and leaders of our armed forces, our allies and our interagency partners to think strategically and operationally in solving complex problems.

Students may now attend AMSP by two methods, and a third method is under development. Under the traditional method, students apply during ILE. Under the second, officers in CA, PSYOP and SF may now apply to SAMS-AMSP through their chain of command during their K&D assignments and return to attend AMSP as a field-nomination following their K&D time. Officers accepted in

this method can thus invest a year in their professional development while retaining the flexibility to stay on as faculty, serve in joint commands, or depart for battalion-level command if they are selected.

The method under development would allow officers to be selected for AMSP prior to attending ILE. Details are still to be announced, but once officers are slated to attend ILE at Fort Leavenworth, they would be eligible to apply for AMSP or request nomination through their chain of command. If accepted, they would be confirmed for a two-year tour at Fort Leavenworth and slated for return to K&D operational assignments after completing SAMS.

All three AMSP options should soon be in place, and HRC branch



▲ IN THE SPOTLIGHT Dr. Steve Bucci of the Department of Defense (standing) and Special Agent Frank Capra of the Drug Enforcement Agency speak to ILE students during an ILE interagency panel. *U.S. Army photo.*

representatives will have the most current information from the CGSC SOF Education Element. Regardless of the application method and timing, SAMS remains one of the premier schools for preparing officers for the challenges of 21st-century conflict and for excelling at all levels of war.

SF warrant officer attendance at ILE. Beginning in August 2009, five volunteer SF warrant officers

will be selected to attend the year-long ILE course at Fort Leavenworth. The program will seek SF CWO3s who have significant operational experience and a bachelor's degree to attend this field-grade education program. Warrant officers are also eligible for the ISP at KU, as well as for numerous other master's-degree programs and follow-on assignments. Leavenworth is also working to de-

velop future opportunities for SF warrant officers to attend SAMS. Warrant officers interested in attending ILE, with the potential for attendance in the programs outlined above, are encouraged to contact CWO5 Tony Fox in HRC's Special Forces Warrant Officer Branch.

SOF education programs at Fort Leavenworth have increased exponentially in the past two years with the advent of the ISP, additional opportunities for field-grade officers to attend SAMS AMSP, and the inclusion of senior SF warrant officers in opportunities for ILE and graduate school.

The CGSC SOF track of ILE remains the most beneficial SOF-specific preparation at any of the one-year ILE institutions. For majors and senior chief warrant officers seeking to prepare professionally for their next 10 years of SOF assignments, Fort Leavenworth offers multiple significant SOF-education opportunities and graduate-level degrees at one convenient location. In addition to these opportunities, education at Fort Leavenworth provides SOF officers the primary venue for developing long-term relationships with approximately 1,400 conventional-force counterparts with whom SOF interoperate daily in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Spence is director of the SOF Education Element, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. A seven-year veteran of the 1st SF Group, he has also served in the Special Operations Command-Pacific, in an interagency assignment in Malaysia and as commander of an advanced operating base in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Lieutenant Colonel Casey Les-sard is the senior SF instructor for ILE at CGSC. A seven-year veteran of the 5th SF Group, he has also served as the security-assistance officer at the U.S. Embassy in Slovakia and as commander of an advanced operating base in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

CLIFFHANGER

Fierce battle in the Shok Valley tests SF team's mettle

by Janice Burton

There are no roads leading into the Shok Valley. A village that stands sentinel over the valley is home to one of the fiercest of the insurgent forces in Afghanistan — the Hezbe Islami al Gulbadin, or HIG.

On April 6, 2008, a daring raid into the stronghold by Afghan Commandos and their Special Forces counterparts tested the mettle of the Afghan forces and further forged the bond between them and their SF brothers.

On Dec. 12, Lieutenant General John F. Mullholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, pinned Silver Star Medals on the chests of 10 of the men involved in the raid and the ensuing six-and-a-half-hour firefight that saw more than 150 insurgents killed.

The ceremony was the largest of its kind since the Vietnam era. But for the members of Team 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group, it was never about the medals.

When you ask them to use one word to describe April 6, their words pop, much like the gunfire that rained down on them.

"A nightmare."

"Baptism by fire," said Staff Sergeant Daniel Plants, "It was my first firefight."

"Cliffhanger."

More words followed as the team went back in their minds to that day.

The mission

The team was assigned to take out high-value targets within the HIG. The insurgent group was entrenched in the Shok Valley and was guarded by a number of highly-trained foreign fighters. The sheer number of weapons and the amount of ammo used by the insurgents led the team to conclude that the HIG had been stockpiling the weaponry within the fortress-like village since the Russian invasion of the country during the late 1980s.

Accompanying the team that day was a group of Afghan Commandos.

"We have such a big rapport with the commandos we've trained," said Staff Sergeant Luis Morales, the team's intelligence sergeant. "They have such a loyalty to us. They try as hard to protect us as we try to protect ourselves."

"We eat, sleep and train with these commandos," said Captain Kyle Walton, the detachment commander. "We die with them, too. These guys are close friends to us. At the outset of the attack, I lost my interpreter, and we were as close as anyone."

The interpreters hold a special place within the team.

"They are just like a member of the team," said Morales. "One of our interpreters has seen as much combat as any of us. He has six years of combat experience. He's been with six SF teams and been in hundreds of firefights — but he doesn't get the six-month break.

"With our tactical knowledge and (the commandos') knowledge of the local populace, terrain and customs, we can truly become a force multiplier," said Walton. "That's what SF does. We bring things to the fight that they don't have, such as close air support and weaponry. But in the end, it's an Afghan fight, and we are part of it."

The commandos who accompanied the SF team on the mission have developed something of a reputation throughout Afghanistan.

"The Taliban calls them the wolves. When they hear the wolves are coming, they know they are in trouble. The commandos are pretty feared. Everywhere we go, they identify us with the commandos, and the fact that this group of insurgents was prepared to sit and fight us to the death was indicative of an enemy force you don't see every day," said Morales.

One way in

"Eighty percent of the guys on the ground that day had been in firefights before," said Walton. "We feel fairly

comfortable in a firefight any time."

But that day was different. The team was going into the unknown. The Russians, during their 20-year occupation of the country, never made it into the Shok Valley. Before that day, no coalition troops had been there. This was a first. To get into the valley, the team had to fly.

"I feel comfortable with my feet on a ground," said Morales. "I don't feel comfortable in the helicopter — we can't control what happens there. But on the ground, we have a plan, we go in and do it, and the rest falls into place.

"We knew this was going to be a difficult mission. We expected there to be a number of insurgents because of the high-value targets we were after, but we really thought the terrain would be the greatest difficulty," explained Walton.

That thought almost proved correct. As the helicopters settled over the valley, the pilots couldn't set the birds down, so the Soldiers had to jump about 10 feet off the bird. Many of them landed waist-deep in an icy river. With temperatures in the low 30s, the climate immediately began to take its toll. Then they faced a climb up the mountain.

Walton explained the idea was to go into the village unannounced, with the plan to take the fight to the insurgents in the village. "We didn't want to fight uphill," he said, adding that the village is at an altitude of 10,000 feet.

The team decided to use switchbacks, which were actually terraced farm plots, as a means to get up to the village. The team divided up into three maneuver elements, with members of the SF team paired up with about six commandos and their interpreters in each element.

The village itself is situated on a finger off the mountain. The team would have to head up a draw to the village.

"The buildings in the village are built one on top of the other, on top of



▲ TAKING STOCK Members of ODA 3336 survey the Shok Valley, the scene of a six-and-a-half-hour gun battle on April 6, 2008. *U.S. Army photo.*

a slope thousands of feet in the air,” said Walton. “So we started the climb. The insurgents waited until the lead element was within a couple hundred meters of the compound before they initiated contact. As soon as the shooting started, we realized that they had their defensive positions dug in, and they were occupying buildings 360 degrees around us.”

The fight

As soon as the opening salvo was fired, the interpreter standing beside Walton in the command-and-control element was killed. Moments later, Staff Sergeant Dillon Behr was shot

in the leg. Behr, a communications sergeant, stayed in the fight and sustained another wound before he became unable to continue the fight.

“We knew we needed to regain the initiative, so we started initiating danger-close air runs,” said Walton.

Staff Sergeant David Sanders was in the lead assault element.

“I had approximately 10 commandos with me, and we got into the village before we started receiving fire. We couldn’t move any farther forward,” he recalled. “Through the radio traffic, we heard some of the team had gotten shot, so we started trying to identify the buildings where the fire was coming from. We hoped to

neutralize the threat.”

Walton said Sanders was the first person he thought of who might be able to identify where the insurgents were.

“I was standing next to the combat controller, and when we got to a place where we could talk, he called in close air support, and the F-15s rolled in immediately. I knew my guys were up there, and I know that when you call in danger-close air, you are probably going to get injured or killed. I called back to Sanders and asked if he was too close. He said, ‘Bring it anyway.’ Bombs started exploding everywhere. When I called to see if he was still alive, all I could hear him saying was,

'Hit them again.' ”

Walton said that it is rare to call in danger-close air even once during a firefight. Throughout the afternoon, the team called it in 70 times.

“We did take some casualties from the danger-close air,” said Staff Sergeant Seth Howard. “A lot of the commandos got injured from falling debris. The bombs were throwing full trees and boulders at them — they were flying hundreds of meters.”

At one point in the battle, when it looked as if the command-and-control element would be overrun, Sanders called for the bombing to come closer.

up beside them or hitting them, they definitely heard them crack near them. Snipers were receiving heavy play during the engagement.

Three-story implosion

The only break in the battle was when a bomb was dropped on a three-story building. The building exploded outward. “Good guy or bad guy, you’re going to stop when you see that,” said Morales. “It reminded me of the videos from 9/11 — everything starts flushing at you, debris starts falling and everything gets darker.”

Plants recalls hearing the call for

Howard directed the Afghan commandos to fire on insurgent positions so that he could get into place with his sniper rifle and his recoilless rifle.

“They had been hunting us, and now they were getting hunted, too,” said Walton. “We had been trying to return fire, but we couldn’t find them. They were firing in a very disciplined manner. They were not hanging out windows or running at us.”

As Howard and his element engaged the enemy, Walton knew time was running out. Reports from the air said more insurgents were moving in their direction. Everyone on the

“ We sent a pretty big message to the insurgents. We let them know we could penetrate their comfort zone. We told them there’s nowhere you are safe that we aren’t willing to come in after you.”

“They dropped a 2,000-lb. bomb right on top of our position,” said Walton. “Because of the elevation, the bomb blew upward rather than down. It just didn’t seem like we had much of a decision. Our guys were wounded, and we couldn’t go back the way we came.”

“We knew we might get hurt, but we really didn’t think about it,” said Sanders.

With bombs falling and heavy gunfire coming from every side, the team returned fire. Team members recall going through masses of ammo, in addition to the bombs that were dropped and the rounds the aircraft were firing.

The team’s fire was controlled, though, according to Walton.

“Cloud cover was coming in, and there was no certainty that we would be able to get out that night. So we didn’t waste our ammo. We really didn’t fire unless we had a shot or when we needed to lay suppressive fire to allow people to move.”

The insurgents, likewise, were shooting in a controlled manner. The gunfire was heavy, sustained and accurate. Team members recall that even if the bullets weren’t kicking

fire and wanting to see where the bomb was going.

“I was staring at it and saw the building go up,” he said. “I remember looking up, and then all of this stuff starting coming down. All I could do was roll up tight and hug the cliff wall.”

Sniper turns tide

The battle started to turn when Howard, a trained sniper, started picking the insurgents off. Howard, who was not in the lead element, had to fight his way up the mountain to aid his team.

The fight was not easy. He and the team of commandos he led up were under intense insurgent fire. They were getting hit with rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and machine-gun fire.

“We knew some of our guys were hurt and that we had to get to them,” he said.

“We were pinned down,” said Walton. “When the fire became so intense, we moved out onto a ledge against the cliff to protect our wounded. What turned the battle was Seth (Howard) and his element.”

team, including the commandos, had sustained some sort of injury, four of them critical.

“Everyone kept fighting, but there was a window closing on us,” said Walton. “We knew we had to get out.”

One way out

“Our higher command told us we had to get out of there,” said Walton. “The weather conditions were closing in, and the window to be on the ground was rapidly closing. Most of the objective was gone at that point, but our casualties were mounting — we were in a mass-casualty scenario at that point — and they became our priority. We never thought of retreating. That was never an option.”

“The weather was a deciding factor,” continued Howard. “When the weather rolled in, we could be stuck there at least overnight, possibly for days. They couldn’t fly in to get us, and we would have been stranded in completely hostile territory. That was not a plan for success, especially with the pilots observing another 200 insurgents moving in on us.”

With their backs literally against



▲ **BATTLE HARDENED** Afghan Commandos and their U.S. trainers prepare for action in the Shok Valley of Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo.

a wall, and recognizing that they couldn't go down the same way they came up — the switchbacks they had climbed up were the primary focus of the insurgent fire — they began assessing another route for exfil.

Final cliffhanger

"We knew we couldn't go back the way we came, so our only option was going down the cliff," said Walton.

Had the team been healthy, that would have been a difficult scenario. But with the number of wounded and the fire raining down, it seemed impossible. "We were completely pinned down. There was intense fire all around us. We couldn't leave the casualties. We were prepared to sit there and die with them, but we decided we were going to get them out of there," he said.

Sanders made the first climb down the mountain by himself. When he climbed back up the sheer face of the cliff, Walton had one question, "Do you think we can make it down?"

Sanders' reply put the climb in

perspective, "Does it matter if they have broken necks or backs?"

"My question was will they live," said Walton. With Sanders' assurance that they would live, the team began the treacherous climb.

Master Sergeant Scott Ford, the team sergeant, set up the medevac and organized the less seriously wounded to carry the more critically injured down. While organizing the commandos, Ford was shot in the chest plate by sniper fire. He immediately got to his feet and continued to lay down suppressive fire. One of the insurgent snipers had Ford in his sights, and he shot him in the upper left arm, nearly severing it. With a tourniquet around his arm, Ford climbed down the mountain and continued to organize the medevac.

Morales said that the team made its way down the cliff hanging onto branches and rocks. Near the bottom of the cliff, most made a 20-foot drop. "I remember seeing John (Walding) carrying his leg down." (Walding's leg had been amputated by sniper fire.)

As the wounded made their way

down the cliff, Howard, Walton and Specialist Michael Carter, a combat cameraman assigned to the unit, remained behind to cover the team and retrieve equipment.

"There were a lot of guns around where everybody had been shot," said Howard. "It kind of became an issue that there were too many guns up there, and we didn't want to leave them in enemy hands."

Carter ran through a hail of fire to retrieve guns and other equipment. His cameras had been shot up during the initial minutes of the battle. He gathered equipment and began throwing it off the cliff, while Howard continued to pick off enemy combatants.

"The stars really aligned," said Walton. "Bullets were coming down from the side and behind us, and we could hear guys yelling above us. An element that came to reinforce the team on the ground stepped out into the open and started firing and gave us the chance to get out. Seth was crazy enough to stay up there and cover us while we made the climb down."

Alone, with less than a magazine of ammunition left, Howard covered his team as they made their way down, and only after they were safe did he leave the mountain.

"We didn't go into this mission hoping to make history. For us, it was just a regular mission — just like the one we had done the week before. Our goal is never to get into a fight, we'd rather sit down and drink some chai," said Walton. "We were hoping this mission would be the same, but we got into a big fight, and some of us got hit while trying to save each other. That's what we do."

The team as a whole is looking forward to returning to Afghanistan to continue its mission with the commandos.

"We think we sent a pretty big message to the insurgents. We let them know that we could penetrate their comfort zone. We told them there's nowhere you are safe that we aren't willing to come in after you," concluded Walton.

Janice Burton is the associate editor of Special Warfare.

TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

by Major Darin J. Blatt, Captain Eric Long, Captain
Brian Mulhern and Staff Sergeant Michael Ploskunak





There is an ongoing discussion about the merits of engagement activities — activities between coalition military forces and foreign civilian personnel — as a means of obtaining information, influencing behavior and building an indigenous base of support for coalition and government objectives.

During a recent rotation to Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Forces A-detachments 3321 and 3315 developed models in the Paktia and Paktika provinces of what can be accomplished in terms of tribal engagement by working within the existing tribal power structure in Afghanistan. An examination of the detachments' understanding of the operational environment and subsequent methods of engagement can provide a model for others to use throughout Afghanistan.

Southeastern Paktia lies between the Tora Bora mountain ranges and Nangahar Province to the north and Khowst Province to the south. To the east lies Paktistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, including the Shia-controlled Kurram Agency and the city of Parachinar. To the west lies the provincial capital, Gardez. Significant to the surrounding areas in Afghanistan is that they are all critical nodes in the lines of communication that connect Kabul to the populace. Eastern Paktia is strategically important because many of the insurgent infiltration routes pass through it. The separation of the insurgents (Taliban, Hezbe Islami al Gulbadin and Haqqani) from eastern Paktia would result in a decreased ability of the insurgents to project power into Afghanistan, allow for the development of capable governance and permit the necessary (and expected) reconstruction projects necessary to connect the people of eastern Afghanistan with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, or IROA.

The rural population of eastern Paktia consists of subsistence farmers. The area is free of poppy cultivation, and crops consist mainly of wheat and potatoes. The challenges include a population largely untouched by modern times and tools. Issues such as electricity, running water and the lack of progress being made by the central government are not primary concerns. Most of the population is trying to survive, making do as their ancestors have done for generations.

The local tribes, all Pashto, include the Mangal, Moqbil, Jaji and Chamkani. Nomadic Kuchi tribes also make regular passages through the area, returning from Pakistan. Each tribe is divided into sub-tribes, all possessing unique cultures, norms and hierarchy of needs. Concepts such as national identity are far outweighed by loyalty to family, clan and tribe. Through the SF detachments' analysis, it became clear that tactics, techniques and procedures used against a relatively sophisticated and networked adversary were going to need adjusting. Because all the tribes are concerned mostly with providing for their immediate future, successful engagement is simply a matter of making their lives a little better.

ODA 3321 arrived in Afghanistan in late October 2007. Following a brief transitional phase with an SF detachment from the 7th SF Group, the team conducted a thorough assessment of their area of operations, or AO. The initial area assessment is essential for understanding the operational environment. After studying an extensive collection of reporting and analysis on insurgent operational patterns, the team began to develop logical lines of operations, or LLO, for the AO.

In early December 2007, the ODA met with the squad-

ron commanding officer and tactical air commander for the 4th Battalion, 73rd Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division. The Cav unit was the battlespace "owner," so it was extremely important to meet with them and share operational philosophies. Although the SF detachment has neither tactical control nor operational control for the International Security Assistance Forces, or ISAF, it is still imperative to nest LLOs with adjacent units. Understanding the need for unity of effort is the first step to success in the counterinsurgency, or COIN, environment.

The Cav unit had massed the majority of its combat power in the vicinity of Gardez. It needed to focus its security efforts there, because the Task Force 82 provincial reconstruction team had developed the city into a center of commerce, based on the classic ink-blot methodology. Through joint mission analysis with 4-73, the ODA determined that a primary infiltration route for insurgents to reach Gardez came directly through the ODA's identified AO.

Many successful examples of engagement in COIN were available, including Tal Afar in Iraq in 2005 and the Tagab Valley in Afghanistan in 2006. However, achieving success was going to require a new look at COIN engagement — large, "clear, hold and build" operations were uniquely unsuited to this environment. First, the force structure that would be required to influence a population estimated at more than 350,000 did not exist. Afghan and coalition forces totaled fewer than 330 and 30 respectively, including support personnel. That 1,000:1 ratio was a far cry from the 20:1 to 25:1 ratio of population to counterinsurgent ratio that is doctrinally recommended for effective counterinsurgency operations. Additional forces were not going to be forthcoming during the ODA's rotation. It was going to have to make good with what it had on hand: an ODA, a tactical Psychological Operations team and a Civil Affairs team.

Second, the battlespace owners' efforts were centered on securing the major supply routes that enabled the IROA to connect to the population. The main effort lay to the east in Zormat District and secondarily in the Waza Zadran, Schwak and Gerdai Serai districts (the Zadran Arc) in the mid-south portion of the province. Third, even if forces could be massed to clear a given area, the porous border made for a relatively easy egress for insurgents.

In eastern Paktia, three centers of gravity are the real power needed to influence the population: the tribal elder, the local political leadership (the subgovernors; commanders of the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF; and other IROA/CF-sponsored leaders) and the local mullah. The power-broker who holds primacy is determined more by strength of personality, the problem at hand and the current local conditions than by any set of ideological values. If an element can influence the balance of power by tipping it to one side with incremental inputs, then that player has become the de facto power broker in the region. This was the genesis of the Moqbil Project.

Moqbil project

The Moqbil Project (named for the predominant tribe that straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan) required an in-depth understanding of the local cultural norms. In eastern Paktia, the population's ethical decisions are not governed by a rigid moral compass based on moral imperatives. Ethics are based on self-interest and self-preservation. Using one's position to better one's family, clan, village or tribe is expected. Why else would a public



▲ **PROMISING SECURITY** A district police chief talks with elders of a village that is controlled by anti-coalition forces. The promise of security is one means of engaging the tribes. *Photo copyright Eric Long, used with permission.*

official hold an office, if not to advance his tribe's interests? Understanding the culture, and working within the culture of eastern Paktia, not of the Western world, was essential if the teams were to make progress. The goal was to manage a tolerable level of what might be looked on as corruption in the Western world. The challenge was to get the mix right.

Armed with an understanding of the population, coalition forces led by SF Soldiers set out to separate the insurgents from the population. Based on its analysis of the districts in eastern Paktia, the team deemed the Moqbil tribal area in the Patan district the most important. The plan called for the SF teams to operate along two lines: security and development.

Security consisted of providing the population of eastern Paktia with a strong, capable and morally acceptable police force. In eastern Paktia, the Afghan Border Patrol, or ABP, is a relatively proficient force. Given the porous border and limited manpower resources, the ABP faced a challenging mission. However, the ABP was spending a disproportionate amount of time in the provincial interior, doing the job of the ineffective Aghan National Police, or ANP. Creating ANP capability was vital. The challenge was to create a training

program with a program of instruction, or POI, that could succeed where others had not.

The plan for the Chamkani Training Center, or CTC, was designed to improve the capability of the ANP and the ABP. One of the problems was enabling the already over-committed ANP to conduct training without rendering the rest of the force incapable of conducting operations. This problem was dealt with by a POI that required attendance for four hours a day, three days a week. Although this arrangement was not ideal for developing capability, it was acceptable to the ANP.

Moreover, the training conducted was professional and respectful of Afghan culture. ANP or ABP officers running up hills or doing push-ups was not appropriate. The CTC concentrated on tasks necessary to bridge the gap between the training that officers received at the regional training centers, or RTC, and the training required to survive in the area's COIN environment. The CTC sharpened the skills of ANP and ABP without creating more stress on the attendees. Moreover, the CTC developed an Afghan train-the-trainer methodology that provided Afghan ANP and ABP instructors. A more capable ANP and ABP force demonstrated



▲ **HELP ON DEMAND** Humanitarian-aid drops conducted in remote villages show the tribes that the government is looking out for them. *Photo copy-right Eric Long, used with permission.*

to the local tribal leaders that the IROA subgovernors could provide security.

Another initiative taken was the creation of a joint communication center, or JCC, and a joint tactical operations center, or JTOC. The ODA's communications sergeant opened a JCC/JTOC in the Chamkani District Center. This command-and-control node began as a JCC, giving all local ANSF elements the ability to communicate with each other on a daily basis and in time of crisis. As the ANSF matures in this area (because of ODA training and influence), the capability of a JTOC will be realized. The JCC/JTOC will facilitate the coordination of operations among the coalition forces, ANP, ABP and the tribal representatives. This JTOC will allow for real-time planning and action on time-sensitive threats and issues (criminal and insurgent). Although Arbaki (tribal militia) are not an official part of the security team, their support in the local villages is essential. The JTOC provides a physical structure for sharing the common intelligence picture. It enables the leaders of the local tribes to report information to the IROA, vet the information against personal vendettas and leverage the responsiveness of the ANP and ABP, combat-advised by U.S. Special Forces, to respond to the requirement. Furthermore, through

a tip line, locals can call information into the JCC/JTOC. The JTOC not only provides the ability to deconflict but also provides a venue for synchronizing operations in order to prevent the tribes from playing one element of the security force against another.

A second part of increasing the security is closing the traditional insurgent infiltration routes into the region. Team Chamkani's extensive engagement with the geographic and human terrain provided intelligence on the major infiltration routes, especially in the Moqbil tribal region in Patan District. Some of these routes are walking trails, others are so robust that they were easily trafficable 11 months a year by fully loaded trucks. These "ratlines" enabled the insurgents to move across the border to Pakistan unchecked. More significant was the ease with which insurgents could move north and south once across the border. Team Chamkani worked with the local Afghan security forces to establish a series of checkpoints for interdicting uncontested movement. Not only did the checkpoints begin to deny the insurgents freedom of movement, but they also provided a valuable means of projecting the rule of law through ANSF presence.

The ANSF presence was warmly received by the locals.

In Pesho Ghar, the local merchants stated that they could go home without worrying about criminals robbing their shops. What is more interesting, at the Naray Pass checkpoint, 50 locals came out with shovels and pickaxes to help the ANSF construct the checkpoint.

There are many ways to separate the insurgents from the population. At times, the method of choice is through lethal targeting. At other times, it is through nonlethal engagement. In the Moqbil tribal region, one venue for engaging the tribes was the repatriation of Mullah Noor Kabahr. Noor Kabahr, a key leader and respected elder of the Moqbil tribe in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, had been detained by coalition forces in mid-2007. First, Team Chamkani was able to articulate why Noor Kabahr's repatriation would facilitate connecting the IROA to the population. Then, Team Chamkani gained influence over Noor Kabahr, and by working with the Moqbil tribal elders, the ABP and the Patan subgovernor, the ODA was able to leverage his release to develop influence with the Moqbil tribe (the population in the area).

The ODA leveraged SOTF-33's excellent relationship with the Combined Joint Task Force, or CJTF, at Bagram to coordinate a large ceremony for Noor Kabahr's release from detention. Following an overnight stay at the firebase, Team Chamkani escorted Mullah Noor Kabahr back to the Moqbil tribal area. A key leader engagement, or KLE, was held near Noor Kabahr's home. The Patan subgovernor spoke to the many Moqbil elders in attendance. Following the KLE, Kabahr invited the ODA to a small lunch. Immediately following lunch, Team Chamkani and the ANSF established the series of checkpoints along the border of Pakistan in the Moqbil area. The following day, Noor Kabahr held a shura with the elders from the Pakistan side of the tribe. During the shura, the elders focused on securing their tribal areas and recognizing the importance of the new security positions along the border.

Engaging key facilitators

The ability to target the key tribal facilitators within an area is essential to building a bond between the IROA and the tribe. However, a more capable security force alone cannot separate the insurgents from the population. One needs the support of the population, which is gained by applying the appropriate influence. If we can shape the operational environment by nonlethal means, the population becomes more flexible in its support of lethal targeting of insurgents. Without the ability to provide security from the insurgents, no amount of improvement in the standard of living was going to convince local tribes to support the IROA. Once the security improved to the level that the insurgents could not mass on isolated villages, the conditions were set to effectively begin reconstruction projects.

The tactical PSYOP team, or TPT, and the Civil Affairs team, or CAT, were an integral part of Team Chamkani's efforts to engage the tribal elders. The TPT and CAT assisted the ODA by providing quick assessments about villages and local elders. The TPT ran a radio station from the firebase. The Voice of Chamkani broadcasted throughout ODA 3321's AO, as well as into Pakistan. TPT 921 distributed hundreds of hand-cranked/solar-powered radios throughout the area, and almost every resident in eastern Paktia could listen to the Voice of Chamkani. Among the Voice of Chamkani's messages were reports of IEDs, local tribal elders who had secured the commander's emer-

gency-response program, or CERP, and U.S. Agency for International Development projects through their IROA officials, and information for tribal elders about the next security meeting.

Most important to the Moqbil Project was the focused reconstruction projects implemented by the CAT. Nested with the reconstruction efforts of the 4-73 Cav and the provincial reconstruction team, these projects ranged from simply lending firebase-construction equipment to local elders to improve their control of floodwaters, to large-scale CERP (more than \$750,000 spent in three months). Some of these projects included: Serangur village school: \$45,300; Matwarkh village school: \$45,300; farming equipment for the Moqbil tribal agriculture co-op: \$78,800; farming equipment storage building for the Moqbil tribe: \$32,546; maintenance and training facility for the Moqbil co-op: \$32,136; Chamkani hospital solar power: \$60,000; and Moqbil tribe government building: \$31,846. One of its essential aspects of tribal engagement is that it is done through the IROA subgovernors. Tribal engagement was a means of establishing the legitimacy of the IROA, not supplanting it. Likewise, in an area where the tribal elders speak for the tribe, Team Chamkani's approach moved the local population toward a representative form of government, not away from it.

For example, in the Serangur village, historically an insurgent support site, the ODA lent its firebase bulldozer to the village elders. The ODA provided fuel and an operator. The village elders were entrusted with the bulldozer for three weeks. This single action caused a major change in insurgent tactics. The insurgents were no longer welcomed into the village by the elders and were forced to move through the mountains. Although that did not stop insurgent infiltration, it did deny the insurgents the use of a high-speed avenue of approach. Alone, the action does not sound significant, but coupled with similar programs, it went a long way toward separating the insurgents from the population.

Another of the keys to engaging the tribes through the IROA leadership is coordinating government officials' actions. First, the ODA conducted internal team planning and coordination (including the CAT and TPT). The ODA knew what resources that it could offer and what it wanted to achieve. Then the ODA organized a weekly security meeting at the firebase. The subgovernors from the surrounding districts, as well as the ANP and ABP chiefs, met to discuss pertinent security issues. At first, the Afghans were hesitant to talk. Over time, and when they came to realize that the ODA could facilitate certain resources, the Afghans began to take the lead. The CF simply sat in the back and observed the IROA officials discussing concerns and conducting coordination for items of mutual interest.

While it is tough to measure the effectiveness of tribal engagement, there are regular indications of improvement. For example, the ODA commander was invited to a shura held by the Chamkani subgovernor. The issue at hand was the debt between two individuals from the Jaji and Mangal tribes. The Mangal man had kidnapped the Jaji because of an unpaid debt. A month earlier, the Chamkani subgovernor, with the support of the ABP and ANP (advised by the ODA), conducted a patrol to the Mangal's village and freed the Jaji man. At that point, the Paktia provincial governor ordered the Jaji man to remain in the custody of the Chamkani police during the subsequent investigation. A jirga, or assembly of elders, was held that included the IROA and elders from each tribe. With the blessing of the provincial

governor, the decision was made by the elders for the Jaji man to repay his debt, minus an amount to compensate for his time while detained.

Another example is the detention of the target Abdul Jalil. Abdul Jalil lives in the Martwarkh village, but he would move between Pakistan, Khowst, Paktia, etc., on a regular basis. On April 12, 2008, the ANP received a tip that Jalil was back at his house (Jalil enjoyed freedom of maneuver because the ANP was not willing or capable to mount an operation to capture him.) The ANP chief decided to act. Following a cordon and search, the chief held a shura with the local elders. These are the same elders that the ODA/IROA had been working with over the past several months. The chief told the elders to have Jalil turn himself in to the ANP or subgovernor as soon as possible. He told the elders that Jalil would be arrested, “either tomorrow or 20 years from now.” When Jalil returned home, the elders forced Jalil to go see the subgovernor. Jalil did. The subgovernor thanked Jalil for being forthcoming and then brought him to the firebase.

The key take-away from this scenario is IROA tribal engagement. The decision in these specific cases was for the IROA to empower the tribal elders to have a voice in a criminal case that clearly involved elements of traditional Pashtunwali, or hospitality. This integration of Pashtunwali into IROA tribal engagement was not lost on the tribes. Having a coalition-force representative present (the ODA commander) in support of the IROA gave great credibility to the CF in the eyes of the tribal elders.

Tribal dynamics and governance in Shkin

Shkin lies in the southeastern portion of the Paktika Province, on the southern border of the Bermel district and the northern border of the Gomal district. The Pakistan border lies just to the east of Shkin, highlighted by the city

“ The ANSF do not have the ability yet to protect the population in rural areas from enemy influences. Therefore, the people feel the need to both support the government and the enemy, depending on who is in their area at any given time. ”

of Angoradda. The predominant tribe in the Bermel district is the Waziri. The Waziri tribal area stretches into North Waziristan and South Waziristan in Pakistan. The other major tribe in the Shkin area is the Kharouti tribe, whose area encompasses the Gomal district. The Bermel district center is adjacent to Forward Operating Base Boris, and both are located 12 kilometers north of Shkin. The Bermel district center houses the Bermel district subgovernor and a small 10-man ANP element responsible for the entire Bermel district. Because of limited resources, this small ANP element can effectively control only the bazaar near the Bermel district center, and security for the entire district is the responsibility of the ANA battalion and the conventional U.S. Army infantry company stationed in FOB Boris.

Each week, the Bermel subgovernor holds a shura in the Bermel district center for the Bermel tribes. The Waziris have a majority, with minor tribes also in attendance. The SF teams operating in the area hold a weekly shura for the same Waziris from Bermel and the Kharoutis from northern Gomal. Forty elders regularly attend the Shkin shura — half from the Waziri tribe and half from the Kharouti

tribe.

The ANA in southeastern Paktika is composed solely of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 203rd ANA Corps, which is stationed at FOB Boris. One company from the ANA battalion is rotated to Border Crossing Point-213 in the Shkin area, seven kilometers east of Firebase Lilley and just west of Angoradda, Pakistan. One kilometer north of BCP-213 is the ANA’s north observation point, which holds one platoon from the ANA company and was designed to protect the BCP from enemy attacks from the north.

The ODA in Shkin is located at Firebase Lilley. The ODA employs several hundred Afghan security guards, or ASG. The Shkin ASGs secure Firebase Lilley’s perimeter and occupy three border outposts in the Shkin area. The ASG Sangar observation post, or OP, is located two kilometers north of the ANA’s north OP and was built to protect the north OP/BCP-213 from enemy attacks from the north because the north OP was deemed a “soft target” by the enemy. Sangar OP is on tactically advantageous terrain and dominates the area. The ASG south OP is located three kilometers south of BCP-213 and is designed to protect the southeastern portion of Shkin from enemy attacks. The ASG Shkin Bazaar OP is located seven kilometers south of Firebase Lilley and five kilometers west of South OP and is designed to protect Shkin from enemy attacks from the south.

When the ASG was created in 2006, it was composed only of former SF-trained Afghan Security Forces, or ASF, who were located on ODA firebases. From 2005 to 2006, in an effort by the Afghan government to stand on its own, the ASF were demobilized so that the government of Afghanistan could focus on the official branches of the Afghan military and police forces, such as the ANA, ANP, ABP and National Directorate of Security. Following the ASF demobilization, many former ASF soldiers were hired as ASG. Eighty percent of the 270 Shkin ASG were prior ASF. Since

2007, conventional forces have been hiring civilians “off the street” as ASG to guard Afghan convoys of resupply trucks or to secure routes all over the country and on the firebases of conventional forces. Most of the time, these ASG are untrained, and they have given a bad name to the ASG for those who are not familiar with the SF-trained version. The Shkin ASG on Firebase Lilley and its three border outposts have been trained by SF teams for the past five years, and they continue to set the standard for other Afghan forces for their professionalism, tactical excellence and maturity. The tribal elders see and understand the difference between Shkin’s ASG and other regular ASG.

In 2007, to counter the new ASGs’ lack of offensive capability, 20 of the best ASGs on Firebase Lilley were sent to the RTC in Gardez to attend basic training and become ANP. ODAs must conduct partnered operations with an official Afghan force in the lead. The ANP is a logical choice, because it allows the ODA to focus on surgically removing key enemy nodes within target networks by police action, i.e., to gather intelligence and arrest the person responsible.

The tribal elders in Bermel and northern Gomal recognize and respect the outstanding ability of the relatively



▲ **TRAINING CADRE** Afghan soldiers train their troops in standing training practices and processes. Photo copyright Eric Long, used with permission.

small Shkin ANP because of their operational history over the past year, their operational history as ASF over the past five years, and their continuing partnership with the ODAs. Also, a majority of the ASG and ANP are from this region and are recognized as understanding the environment and the culture — as opposed to Afghans brought from other regions of the country. The elders understand the Shkin ANP's ability to arrest known enemy facilitators and commanders. The Shkin ANP arrested nine persons during ODA 3315's deployment from October 2007 to May 2008. Three of these arrests were a direct result of local tribal elders cooperating with the Shkin ANP.

During shuras and other tribal engagements, elders were constantly reminded by both ANSF and coalition forces of the Afghan government's continued struggle to support the population and provide for the people. The elders usually remained "on the fence," because they did not believe their government was doing enough to support them and protect them from enemy forces. The ANSF do not yet have the ability to protect the population in rural areas from enemy influence. Therefore, the people feel the need to support the government and the enemy, depending on who is in their area at any given time.

Tribal engagement is arguably the most important aspect of the COIN effort in Afghanistan. The tribal sys-

tem in Afghanistan is a strong facet of day-to-day life. The system of government establishing itself in Afghanistan has subgovernors in each district, a governor for the province, and a parliament and president for the country. The elders represent their villages and tribes; the government must receive their support if it is to survive. The majority of the population still views the elders as the decision-makers, as opposed to the government representatives. This is evidenced when the elders ask for a prisoner release after a person is arrested by either the ANSF or CF. The elders will ask for release because they collectively "vouch" for the prisoner's innocence and still believe that the tribal system is a much more appropriate method for dealing with criminals. Efforts are constantly made to convince the elders that the person was arrested based on evidence collected according to the new Afghan law system outlined in the new Afghan constitution.

Tribal elders are reluctant to submit to the proposed system of government for a number of reasons. According to the proposed system of law, power is taken away from the tribal elder and given to an elected official. The tribal elder has been the cornerstone of Afghan governance for thousands of years, and elders are not willing to relinquish this power to someone who may be from a different tribe. Elders assume that their tribe or sub-tribe will not be rep-

resented appropriately, and they often are correct in this assumption. Tribal loyalty, in many cases, is more important than loyalty to the country of Afghanistan. Elders are not willing to place a united Afghanistan over advancement of their particular tribe.

ANSF operations and tribal engagements are the keys to convincing the population and elders of Afghan governmental efforts and the importance of a united Afghanistan. ANSF is tasked with securing the country. Progress in governance can be made only when security is established. Only after security is established will the elders and the general population see the IROA as a legitimate force for stabilizing the country. Integral to the stabilization of Afghanistan is allowing the tribes to retain their individual identities while conceding some power to the new system of governance. This can be accomplished only through the engagement of tribal elders by ANSF and IROA representatives.

Tribal elders in close vicinity to ANSF or coalition firebases and outposts are much more likely to support the IROA government because of the constant presence. Enemy groups and facilitators constantly engage local villagers, but most of the time they get little or no support because of the constant ANSF and coalition presence.

The Afghan people understand power, and they will support the element that has the power in their eyes — either ANSF or enemy. The elders know the enemy can affect them more in remote areas, so they will harbor enemy facilitators more readily than elders who are near coalition firebases. The elders near a coalition or ANSF presence understand the power of the ANSF to arrest any facilitators that harbor enemy elements. This is the case in Shkin. The elders know the Shkin ANP will investigate and arrest anyone helping or participating in enemy attacks, and they therefore cooperate with the coalition.

Numerous ongoing projects in the Shkin area continue to supplement ANSF security operations. Road construction and solar-light projects increase and develop the area's economic growth and provide a source of income for local construction workers, which in turn benefits the villages and families in the area. Shkin ANP distribute humanitarian supplies to the local tribes to demonstrate the government's support of the people. These humanitarian and civil projects encourage the local citizenry to assist the ANSF and coalition effort against the enemy. Civilians in Shkin often report the location of IEDs before an ANSF or coalition convoy travels through the area. This type of support from the people is instrumental in the effort to battle the insurgency.

It appears that the Shkin-area elders are cooperating with the ANSF to improve security, eliminate insurgents and increase the stability of the government, but in reality, the elders have cooperated with the ANSF because it is a formidable force. Tribal elders would rather appease the ANSF and keep them from conducting operations in their villages than facilitate insurgents. In this immediate area, elders refuse to allow insurgent operations, to eliminate the risk of their village being targeted by the ANSF. The relationship between elders and Shkin ANSF works because of the overtly successful counterinsurgency operations of the ANSF rather than because the elders are working toward a unified Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The Team Chamkani and FOB Lilley models for tribal

engagement produced results because they accommodated the unique tribal environment of southeastern Paktia. However, the effort is ongoing. Several factors make this possible, including the strong hold on the population by the tribal leadership. Additionally, the ODAs had a tremendous working relationship with the battlespace owners. The ODAs understood and were completely nested within the battlespace owner's vision of separating the insurgents from the population in the battlespace and striking an acceptable balance between lethal and nonlethal targeting. That set the conditions for connecting the IROA to the population. With the full support of the battlespace owner and as the only significant coalition combat power in southeastern Paktia and southeastern Bermel, the ODAs had the latitude and the capability to conduct the full spectrum of operations, including tribal engagement.

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TRAINING AND EDUCATING THE ARMY'S NEWEST CMF

by First Sergeant Ronald T. Barker

The creation of the Civil Affairs career management field, CMF 38, in October 2006 provided better utilization, career management and promotion opportunity for enlisted Soldiers in Civil Affairs. It also created a need for Civil Affairs training under the NCO Education System, or NCOES.

In April 2006, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion selected two experienced CA NCOs and reassigned them to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy, or NCOA, to assist in the development and instruction of NCOES courses for CMF 38: the Basic NCO Course, or BNCOC, and the Advanced NCO Course, or ANCOC. Prior to that time, there were no courses to prepare active-duty CA NCOs for their career progression.

Soldiers in the new CMF who were otherwise eligible for selection and promotion received waivers on their NCOES requirements. Without the level of required NCOES to support these promotions, CA was quickly acquiring a backlog of NCOs requiring advanced education. The NCOA, through cooperation with the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Training Development Division, began developing pilot courses for the CMF 38

BNCOC and ANCOC. It began running the BNCOC during the spring of 2007, but ANCOC was not available until the summer of 2008.

The need for CA ANCOC training was critical. Soldiers in 38B who are sergeants first class and above are assigned throughout the Army to advise commanders at all levels and their staffs. The curriculum for CA ANCOC teaches CA senior NCOs the skills they will need to serve as team sergeants and planners at various levels, from brigade combat team to group, division and corps levels.

The current CA ANCOC is a four-week course training and educating CA NCOs in Civil Affairs and civil-military operations. The majority of these students attend ANCOC from the 95th CA Brigade, located at Fort Bragg, N.C. Many of the NCOs have served as CA team sergeants and bring a variety of experience into the resident course.

During their first week, ANCOC students are instructed on the cultural elements for the major regions of the world. Students receive an overview of the Quran and Islam, with emphasis on Islamic history and customs. All classes use small-group methodology and incorporate

students' operational experience in the region.

The second week introduces ANCOC students to political-military analysis. A thorough analysis of the civil environment is essential in making informed decisions regarding Civil Affairs and civil-military operations. The instruction prepares CA NCOs to provide the best guidance and recommendations to the supported commander. After completing the political-military instruction, students begin immediate and continued analysis of the assigned area, preparing for the culmination planning exercise, or CPX.

The third week provides details on planning and executing CA and civil-military operations across the full spectrum of operations. Students receive comprehensive training on the military decision-making process, the joint-operations planning process, performing civil-military-operations estimates, project planning, determining and assessing measures of effectiveness, and performing other critical staff functions. Practical exercises reinforce the instruction by small-group leaders and enable continued preparation for the CPX.

The CPX provides students with the opportunity to collectively apply lessons taught throughout the course. Students divide into teams and perform functions of Civil Affairs teams, company-level civil-military-operations cells and the J9 of a combined, joint special-operations task force. Teams plan and brief on Civil Affairs operations in their area of responsibility, or AOR.

Students rotate positions, giving each senior NCO the opportunity to coach, teach and learn duties and responsibilities at the different levels of CA operations. Teams plan, develop and submit mission requests using the concept-of-operation, or CONOP, format they will use in their AOR. Each day, teams conduct a full transition brief and rotate positions for the next day's operations. The final portion of the CPX is the planning and execution of a relief-in-place or transfer of authority with replacement forces, or a transition to local forces. Teams conduct after-action reviews following each phase of training. These

reviews are one of the most valuable tools for keeping information current and relevant for future classes.

Students are required to pass three examinations during the course. The NCOA uses its new digital testing facility, located in SWCS' Kennedy Hall, for all examinations. Using a campus-area network and BlackBoard® software, students log on with a user ID and password, receive initial instruction and take their exam. Students submit their completed exams and receive immediate feedback, along with the correct answers to any questions they may have missed. Student feedback on this examination format has been extremely positive.

Digital training is now an important aspect of all training at the SWCS NCOA. The NCOA commandant, Command Sergeant Major David D. Putnam, tasked the NCOA leadership to implement a digital system that would have unlimited capabilities and global reach. The NCO Academy's small-group leaders used off-the-shelf software in designing the network architecture for distributed learning, resident classes and examinations. Today, the NCOA trains digitally worldwide, and its resident courses are 90-percent paperless, saving SWCS almost \$40,000 in reproduction costs annually.

Physical fitness is another important aspect of CA ANCOC. Each student receives instruction in modern Army combatives, taught by combatives-certified members of the NCOA cadre. The combatives program is one of the most popular events conducted at the NCOA. It allows students to determine their individual strengths, weaknesses, limitations and skill sets.

Combatives instruction focuses on developing a Soldier's tenacity, capability for hand-to-hand-combat and survivability on today's battlefield. Following ANCOC, students are certified by the NCOA commandant in level-1 combatives training, according to the requirements of the Modern Army Combatives Program at Fort Benning, Ga. The final day of combatives training is a double-elimination, "ironman" competition. The winner of each class's competition is recognized at graduation, and the accomplishment is annotated on the NCO's academic evaluation report.

Constructive feedback provided by each graduating class enables the CPX to maintain its realism and relevance to current operations for Civil Affairs NCOs. Although the course has evolved and improved with fine tuning of the practical exercises and the CPX, the cadre members are continually seeking improvements. Future developments may include the implementation of a distributed-learning, nonresident portion of ANCOC. In less than two years, CA ANCOC has developed from a concept of a much-needed course into demanding and relevant instruction that prepares Civil Affairs NCOs to lead teams and advise commanders worldwide in support of conventional and SOF forces.



▲ **COMBATIVES** Soldiers enrolled in CMF 38 advanced education at SWCS NCO Academy take instruction in combatives. U.S. Army photo.

First Sergeant Ronald T. Barker is chief of the CMF 37/38 Branch of the SWCS NCO Academy.

RELIEF IN PLACE: MANAGING TRANSITION OF AUTHORITY

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 William S. Sobat

The necessity for conservation of the fighting power of the troops requires provision for the periodic relief of units in line.¹

Anyone who has served in a Special Forces group during the last six years has certainly participated in a rotation of forces to a combat theater, even if they have served only in a rear detachment.

Rotations of forces are massive undertakings. When one considers that the Soldiers, individual and organizational equipment of entire battalions, and possibly a group headquarters, must be moved from one hemisphere to another, the logistics seem staggering. Considering the complexity of the move and all of the preparation required, commanders would be justified in feeling a tremendous sense of accomplishment for completing the rotation alone, regardless of the success of their combat operations.

By the way, the unit will perform a rotation of forces every seven months. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, that would have been a dizzying prospect. Today, with some SF Soldiers on their seventh combat rotation, we have become quite adept at these complicated operations. Yet we all recognize that the operations themselves affect the greater objectives of our war of counterinsurgency, or COIN. Given the frequency of combat rotations and transition periods, and the varying methodologies commanders employ to manage them, transition periods have a potential for significant negative impact on our operational objectives.

One could argue that “rotational warfare,” as it is often called, is one of the single greatest obstacles to the long-term success of COIN in our respective theaters. So why do we rotate? Since the vast majority of our combat formations are committed to, or are preparing for, operations in one or more theaters, consideration of that question is elevated to the strategic level.

FM 3-90, *Tactics*, which contains the doctrine for Army relief-in-place operations, says, “A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units.” According to the manual, the relief-in-place frees the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance or specialized training.² In this era of all-volunteer forces, strategic-level planners must also consider personnel retention as a means of preserving the military component of national power.

In a COIN operation, even isolated actions by a few Soldiers can have significant negative effects on strategic objectives. As in all combat operations, COIN requires a single-minded focus in the form of a mission statement and the commander’s intent that subordinate commanders can use to guide their efforts. Maintaining that focus over multiple combat rotations is one of the most daunting aspects of the operation. Commanders at the operational level provide guidance in operations orders. Their implementation instructions should be broad enough to allow tactical-level commanders to exercise the initiative needed to adapt to the circumstances in which they find themselves. That tactical freedom to act is absolutely essential to success.

Historically, Special Forces units’ initiative and creativity have allowed higher-level commanders to treat them as a fire-and-forget weapon. However, during six years of combat rotations, different units have established different methodologies for accomplishing their missions. These differences in methodology strike at the heart of what tactical units see as the main problem with rotational warfare. The truth is that all of our groups have proven to be extremely effective. We simply employ different methodologies, based on unit cultures and command philosophies. So if all the groups are capable, and all can demonstrate success, what’s the problem? In short, even subtle shifts in methodology every seven months hinder the establishment of a single-minded tactical-level perspective on our operations’ broader objectives. That is a challenge that all counterinsurgents have faced, but FM 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, makes no mention of unit rotations or their effects.

I am not about to advocate that tactical-unit commanders have their initiative restricted by operational-level leaders in order to achieve a single-minded intent. Yet operational-level leaders have a significant role to play in helping their subordinates achieve continuity in methodology while helping to preserve initiative.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, one SF group headquarters has been granted executive-agency authority. However, in practice, that authority has been largely without teeth. Conventional wisdom holds that the commander on the ground be given the broadest possible degree of latitude to accomplish his missions. Therefore, geographical combatant commanders, or GCCs, and their associated theater special-operations commanders, or

TSOCs, may be reluctant to interfere with group commanders' use of initiative as commanders of combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs.

Strict enforcement of the single-group concept of executive agency would, by definition, limit the flexibility of half of the commanders executing SF operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But without enforcement, the efforts in each country will remain subject to the personalities and unit culture that each rotation brings with it.

Given the problem, what can TSOC commanders do to ensure that subordinate commanders have the flexibility they need while maintaining a similar execution of their intent by multiple units on a rotational basis? One possible answer is to revamp the concept of executive agency. First and foremost, we must do away with the concept of single-group executive agency. Instead, the TSOC could host semiannual commanders' conferences to establish binding orders developed in concert with the group commanders who share rotations in each of the CJSOTFs.

In other words, executive agency should rest with a council of group commanders, subject to the approval of the TSOC and GCC. TSOC leadership and staff coordination are key to the concept. Without TSOC direction, individual commanders will inexorably be drawn in the direction that their own problem-solving methodology and unit culture takes them. Furthermore, a TSOC commander may feel freer to enforce policies that have received a buy-in from each of his rotating CJSOTF commanders in a given country. Group commanders would then be co-leaders in the executive agency and would have a chance to ensure that their own visions were included in executive-agency direction.

Force-provider commands also need to be involved. Any decisions at the executive-agency level that involve manning will most certainly need their approval. What is the use of developing plans at the tactical level that will ultimately be shot down by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, who must responsibly manage the operational tempo? Furthermore, force providers, as commanders of CONUS-based SF groups, can help to achieve greater synchronization of the objectives of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, by providing guidance on manning levels and resources to executive-agency planners.

These CONUS-based commanders could use executive-agency documents in two ways. The first and most obvious would be to determine personnel and equipment requirements for the theaters they support. The second would be to streamline resource requirements for equipment and training, particularly for specialized schools, and provide the JFK Special Warfare Center and School with statements of the requirements for supporting the needs of supported and subordinate com-

mands. This method could greatly enhance synchronization of effort across all levels of command.

What potential obstacles lie in our path? Commanders would have to cede some elements of control to their partner commanders in developing plans that they can support during their rotations. Multiple combat rotations to the same theater, coupled with unit pride and a culture of self-reliance, lead many of our Soldiers to scoff at the notion that anyone from another unit might be able to show them anything useful about their environment. Commanders and Soldiers at all levels cannot let this desire to do it "our way" interfere with overall mission accomplishment. Everyone must accept some level of common guidance over their desire to show the other group "how to do things right."

Finally, we must consider the reality of emerging operations in a world of questionable stability. This final consideration may be the most important of all. If events outside U.S. Central Command's operational environment dictate the commitment of one of the groups currently manning a rotation in Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom, the TSOC must be able to efficiently transition one of the other groups into the same methodology. This will be particularly complex, given all of the other challenges the new group would face in adjusting to that contingency. Enforcing executive agency would smooth the transition. If the new order of rotation were to remain in effect, the additional group would have to have an equal stake in determining the overall methodology.

Specifically, what would be required to make this work? First, an executive agency must be established that takes into account the requirements and vision of all the stakeholders. That includes the group commanders who are responsible for commanding the CJSOTFs in their respective countries — one each for Iraq and Afghanistan. Also included should be senior representatives from the TSOC and USASFC staffs, to ensure that their commanders' requirements are met and to facilitate approval by those commanders.

The relationship would be strengthened further if the TSOC maintained a representative cell in the specific country or area in which the CJSOTF operates. That cell, which would report to the TSOC, should be led by at least a senior colonel. Further, that cell could coordinate regularly with the conventional joint-force commander and staff, thus easing some of this burden for the CJSOTF commander.

The executive council should meet at least every seven months to ensure that policy reflects changes in the tactical environment. The meetings should occur at mid-rotation: first, so that the mechanics of unit rotations aren't the primary consideration; second, so that incoming commanders don't view the outgoing commander's input as an attempt to steer the vision of his rotation. Policies established through the executive agency would have to be enforced. That is not as easy as one might

think: Group commanders answer to multiple commanders, depending on where they are or what situation is being considered. Enforcement would require not only discipline but also sensitivity of commanders to the demands they place on the group commanders and the way the group commanders will be evaluated.

In addition to the semiannual commanders' conferences, unit commanders would need to reinforce the need for frequent communication between individual counterparts in groups that share rotations. Ideally, this would be facilitated by establishing CONUS-based positional e-mail accounts that mirror the accounts of deployed units. The TSOC Web-based portals should also include phone rosters of key positions of the deployed and CONUS-based groups.

Finally, USASFC and USASOC should consider ensuring that a percentage of the key leaders in each group have spent some time in their counterpart group. By establishing a cross-leveling percentage (I recommend 33 percent), the force provider could ensure that each group retained the benefits of continuity in leadership while satisfying the need to facilitate cross-group communication through these transplants. Professional-school slots could also be grouped so that students from those same two units could attend schools together, to further forge cultural bonds between the two units.

The establishment of uniform methodologies for the accomplishment of given missions for SF groups that share rotations in a given country would ensure that overarching goals of the war on terror could be more easily achieved. Achieving those goals would be facilitated by a continuity of effort and the sharing of operational- and tactical-level vision and planning consid-

erations that would extend beyond the next unit rotation.

The conflict that will dominate the history of our generation of Green Berets has been called "the Long War." Given the nature of our all-volunteer Army and the COIN efforts in which we find ourselves, successful prosecution of that war will depend upon unity of effort and preservation of combat power. It falls to those of us responsible for working out the mechanics of rotational warfare to ensure that the all-important concept of a single-minded vision is pursued with an equally single-minded application of methodology that rivals the efforts we put into the physical movement of Soldiers and equipment across continents.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 William S. Sobat is the special-activities chief for the 3rd SF Group. After serving in the Army from 1979 to 1983, he re-enlisted in 1990. Following a series of Infantry and Ranger assignments, he attended SF Selection and Assessment in 1992 and was trained in the SF Qualification Course as an SF medical sergeant. He attended Warrant Officer Candidate School in May 1999 and subsequently graduated from the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course. His overseas assignments include four combat rotations — two each to Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to his military training, he holds a bachelor's degree from Regents College. He wrote this article while a student in the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course.

Notes:

¹ FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, May 22, 1941.

² FM 3-90, *Tactics*, July 4, 2001, Chapter 15.

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Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

Enlisted

Army shifts approach to training, promoting SGMs

The fiscal year 2009 Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant Major/Sergeants Major Course Selection Board will be conducted June 3-24. Eligible NCOs should remember that the Army has changed the way that it selects and trains future sergeants major.

The change is a shift from the former policy of train-select-promote to one of select-train-promote. It has eliminated the selection of alternates to attend the Sergeants Major Course, or SMC, at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy.

Beginning with the FY 2008 selection board, NCOs selected for the SMC are also selected for promotion after they complete the course. The transition requires that the

selection board results be released in two lists: promotion and training.

The promotion list will announce those master sergeants targeted for promotion up through the SMC graduation in May 2010. All earlier SMC graduates and alternates for the SMC class graduating in 2009 should appear on the list. Any master sergeant appearing on the list who is not an SMC graduate or student will have to complete the nonresident SMC.

The training list will show those master sergeants selected to attend the SMC class that begins in 2010. They will attend SMC as master sergeants and be targeted for promotion between their graduation in May 2010 and May 2011. They will be frocked to sergeant major at graduation and will be managed and assigned as sergeants major.

Warrant Officer

TS clearance required for SF WOAC

Attendance at the SF Warrant Officer Advance Course requires all students to possess a final top-secret clearance and be eligible for sensitive compartmented information.

The status of students' security clearances will be verified before each SF WOAC class begins. Students without verified final TS will not be allowed to start class.

Officer

Screening improves promotion files

ARSOF officers continue to remain competitive for promotion and command because of quality officer evaluation reports and because officers know when to update their Officer Record Briefs. Listed below are a few tips for screening records prior to a board:

- Check the Human Resources Command Web site for the MILPER message corresponding to the upcoming board (<https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf>). It provides information on OER close-out and through dates. By regulation, cutoff dates are not negotiable.

- Officers are required to view and certify their files. The certification takes the place of the signed board ORB. Review the file two to three months prior to the board to ensure that the ORB, Official Military Personnel Folder and photo match.

The photo is critical: It's one of the first documents the board sees. If it's outdated, it will send the wrong impression to the board member who reviews the file.

Waiting until the last minute to update records will leave the Army Special Operations Forces Branch little time to ensure that the record is accurate and complete. The ARSOF

Branch will review files for inconsistencies approximately 30 days before the board convenes.

Officers can review everything that a board member will see by going to My Board File (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/portal/?page=active.record.mbf>). This site is active only for a specified period of time before the board's convene date. Information on My Board File and its active dates is provided in the MILPER message announcing the board.

- Communicate with the assignments officer throughout the process. It takes teamwork to ensure that the file is the best it can be when the board convenes.

FY 2009 officer board schedule

The table to the right is the schedule of Army boards for command, promotions and schools for the remainder of fiscal year 2009.

In light of the high operational tempo, all officers should work proactively with the Army Human Resources Command, Special Operations Division, to ensure that their records are up-to-date and that their file contains a DA photo that is less than a year old.

BOARD	TENTATIVE DATES
CWO 3/4/5	21 JAN - 06 FEB 09
LTC ARMY/MAJ SELCON	18 FEB - 12 MAR 09
SENIOR SVC. COLLEGE	31 MAR - 17 APR 09
COL ARMY/ LTC SELCON	07 - 24 JULY 09
CFD (YG 02/06)	09 - 22 SEP - 09
LTC MFE CM	22 SEP - 09 OCT 09

PSYOP manual will describe company-level TTPs

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine is developing a manual that will describe revised tactics, techniques and procedures for tactical Psychological Operations forces at the company level. FM 3-05.302, *Psychological Operations and Maneuver Unit Operations*, will reflect emerging PSYOP trends that are the result of lessons learned in the war on terror, Army transformation initiatives and recent doctrine contained in FM 3.05-301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (August 2007).

The initial draft of FM 3-05.302 will be staffed for review and comment in February. For more information, contact Ian Courter, project manager, DOTD PSYOP Division, at DSN 236-0295, commercial (910) 396-0295, or send e-mail to: courteri@soc.mil.

SF WOAC to include nonresident phase

The Training Development Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine and the Advanced Computer Learning Company are collaborating to create six lessons using interactive multimedia instruction, or IMI, for the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SF WOAC. The classes will cover operational art and design, effects-based approach to operations, critical thinking, essay writing, analysis of insurgencies, and integration of

SOF and conventional forces.

The IMI lessons are designed to engage students in an active learning environment, requiring them to collaborate with other warrant officers in their small group to produce products and submit them for evaluation by the instructor. The lessons will form the essence of SF WOAC Phase I, which SF warrants will complete at their home station before they attend resident training at Fort Bragg.

SWCS reviews SF WO tasks

In January 2009, the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine hosted a critical task review board related to the professional military education of Special Forces warrant officers. The board was designed to select critical skills, knowledge and abilities required for SF warrant officers to function in assignments ranging from an SF detachment to service on the staff of a combined joint special-operations task force.

Board members, who represented active- and reserve-component SF organizations, reviewed current and future operational requirements. The tasks selected will form the basis for development of future curriculum redesigns of the SF WO Technical and Tactical Certification Course and the SF WO Advanced Course, as well as the design of the proposed proponent-specific phases of the Army's WO Staff Course and Senior Staff Course. The phases would become the SF CWO4 Course and CWO5 Course.

Joint FID doctrine in development

In June 2008, a new manual joined the doctrine library of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF. FM 3-05.137, *ARSOF Foreign Internal Defense*, assumed the role of providing umbrella doctrine to all ARSOF units performing FID operations. While examining the holistic "all of ARSOF" approach to FID, it also stresses the "whole of government approach." That approach stems, in large part, from ARSOF doctrine's long history of articulating the use of multiple instruments of national power in operations such as FID and unconventional warfare.

FM 3-05.137 was particularly well-received at the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, because the publication of the new ARSOF FID manual coincided with the revision of Joint Publication 3-07.1, *FID*, which is being

published under the new numbering system as JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*. USSOCOM, the lead agent for JP 3-22, tasked the Joint and Army Doctrine Integration Division, or JAD, of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine to be the technical review authority on JP 3-22 and to attend the first joint doctrine working group on the new manual in April 2008. In response to the working group's request for feedback, participants and members of the joint force raised several issues with the current FID manual. The working group found that many of those issues were answered by sections of FM 3-05.137, and those sections will be incorporated into the new JP 3-22.

This new version of JP3-22 will address the integration of special-operations forces and conventional forces in FID operations,

as well as the unprecedented level of conventional forces' recent contributions to FID. It will also address interagency cooperation in FID operations in greater detail than ever before. But perhaps most importantly, JP 3-22 will define and articulate, for the first time in joint doctrine, the concept of security-force assistance operations.

The current author's draft of JP 3-22 is being revised prior to its release for initial staffing. As the technical review authority, JAD has had considerable input into the development of JP 3-22. FID remains an integral part of securing American interests globally by helping our friends and allies. The ARSOF community will continue to contribute to the development of JP 3-22 to ensure the best product possible for the joint force.

SWCS to conduct PSYOP job-analysis survey

The Psychological Operations Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine will soon begin conducting a job-analysis survey of all active and reserve-component PSYOP Soldiers. The purpose of the survey will be to collect information regarding the capabilities, limitations, missions and training of PSYOP units.

The survey results will be used to identify issues, practices and gaps that need to be addressed in future doctrine. They will also be used as a basis for determining future training requirements for PSYOP officers and NCOs. This will be the first in a series of surveys designed to obtain data that are critical and relevant to improving the quality of doctrine and

training for Army and joint PSYOP leaders.

The survey will be conducted via AKO. Community-wide notifications and instructions will be sent out in the near future. For more information, telephone Captain Greg Seese, chief of the PSYOP Training Branch, DOTD PSYOP Division, at DSN 236-0295, commercial (910) 396-0295, or send e-mail to: seeseeg@soc.mil.

New SOTACC more challenging course

In October, the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course, or SOTACC, evolved into a more challenging program designed to improve the coordination of close air support, or CAS, in the ground-combat maneuver plan. Special-operations Soldiers now attend a four-week course that places more emphasis on planning and air-support integration to provide the ground commander with increased joint interoperability.

In addition to fixed-wing sorties, the qualification process of the new SOTACC includes live rotary-wing call-for-fire. The student must also now integrate CAS missions with surface-based fires and plan, request and integrate

illumination in support of CAS operations using fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.

The course also integrates the employment of unmanned aerial systems and remotely operated video-enhanced receivers to augment day and night CAS operations. Their addition to the curriculum will teach students to perform target acquisition via a remote-observer platform, integrating real-time sensor information into the air-support plan.

The design of the new SOTACC also ensures graduates' interoperability with joint terminal attack controllers throughout the Department of Defense.

Doctrinal Products Update

Joint and Army Doctrine Division

FM 3-05.130	ARSOF Unconventional Warfare	September 2008
FM 3-05.140	ARSOF Logistics	February 2009

Civil Affairs Doctrine Division

FM 3-05.40	CA Operations	Revision began December 2008
FM 3-05.401	CA Tactics, Techniques and Procedures	June 2008
GTA 41-01-002	Arts, Monuments and Archives	May 2009
GTA 41-01-003	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	October 2009

Psychological Operations Doctrine Division

STP 33-37F14	PSYOP Specialist	July 2008
TC 33-02	PSYOP Targeting HB (U)	August 2008

Special Forces Doctrine Division

FM 3-05.203	SF Direct Action	December 2008
FM 3-05.210	SF Air Operations	March 2009
FM 3-05.222	SF Sniper Employment and Training (U)	January 2009
FM 3-05.230	SF Tactical Facilities	January 2009
TC 31-20-2	SF HB for the Fingerprint Identification System	September 2008
TC 31-20-1	SF Sensitive Site Exploitation	April 2009

THE LAST FIGHTING GENERAL

The Biography of Robert Tryon Frederick

A biography of Robert T. Frederick is long overdue. Frederick organized and commanded the First Special Service Force in World War II, among other accomplishments. Frederick, a hard-driving, inspirational leader, commanded from the front. His life should be celebrated in U.S. Army leadership courses, but it isn't. This is due, in part, to a general unfamiliarity with Frederick, his accomplishments and his leadership philosophy.

Frederick was born in San Francisco in 1907. When he was 14 years old, he lied about his age to join a cavalry unit in the California National Guard. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1928 and was commissioned in the Coast Artillery Branch.

Between the world wars, most Americans questioned the need for a standing Army. Those years were grim ones for professional Soldiers, including Frederick. In those years, he served in several Coast Artillery units and was even assigned to the Civilian Conservation Corps in the West Coast area.

In the spring of 1942, Frederick evaluated a British proposal, known as Project Plough, which advocated training troops to be sent to Norway who would use specialized equipment, including a motorized snow sled. Frederick recommended against U.S. involvement in the project. When the U.S. and England agreed to go forward with the project, Frederick was selected, in typical Army logic, to raise, train and command the unit. This was the birth of the First Special Service Force, a joint U.S.-Canadian unit composed of three battalions, which was based at Fort William Henry Harrison, in Helena, Mont. Training for the force included techniques of parachute operations, snow and mountain operations (with emphasis on night-time execution) and a new method of hand-to-hand fighting known as the O'Neill System. Eventually, the plan to use the snow sled in combat was dropped; however, the force continued to train for combat.


The force's first combat action was in August 1943 during the invasion

of Kiska, Alaska. The plan was for one battalion of the force to drop by parachute, while the other two were to land by amphibious assault. The operational command level cancelled the parachute drop when it learned that the Japanese had left Kiska prior to the planned assault. The force gained its first victory under fire in Italy when it took Monte la Difensa. The men of the force climbed this almost sheer obstacle in one night in a cold rainstorm and then assaulted the German forces on top at dawn, sweeping them from the area. La Difensa had been an obstacle in the Fifth Army's march to Rome. Frederick continued to command the force through the amphibious assault at Anzio and led his unit (and Fifth Army) into Rome June 4, 1944.

Following the liberation of Rome, Frederick was promoted (to brigadier general) to organize and command the First Airborne Task Force as part of the invasion of Southern France in August 1944. When this invasion was successful, Frederick was promoted again (to major general) to become commander of the 45th Infantry Division, a position he held until war's end. No unit that Frederick commanded ever gave up ground it had taken in combat — a remarkable achievement. Frederick eventually retired from the Army in 1952, following assignments to the Military Government Group in Vienna, Austria; the U.S. Advisory Group in Greece; and as commander of Fort Ord, Calif.

Frederick was a very visible leader in all of his assignments with troops. Many of his former subordinates tell stories of fighting their way to a position, only to find Frederick waiting for them. Frederick had little time for leaders whom he believed were interested only in self-promotion (he counted George Patton and Mark Clark among these). His main interests were the two basic prongs of leadership: accomplish the mission and take care of the troops.

This book tells the story of Frederick in a fairly straightforward way. However, it is a difficult book to read.



DETAILS

By Anne Hicks

Atglen, Pa.:

Schiffer Military History, 2006.

ISBN: 0-7643-2430-6.

270 pages. \$35.

Reviewed by:

Michael F. Dille
U.S. Army (ret.)

Hicks has an awkward style of writing that includes long, wandering introductory phrases to sentences that are confusing enough anyway. There were more than several words missing from sentences throughout the book. At least one major fact is wrong (Truman's opponent in the 1948 election was Thomas E. Dewey, not John Dewey). Schiffer usually produces better books, and this one could be better with more careful editing. One other failing that should be mentioned is that not any of Frederick's speeches or papers on leadership have been included or summarized. These are worthy of mention because they had a major impact on those who heard or read his philosophy or served under him.

Despite the difficulty you will encounter in reading this book, I recommend it. Frederick set an example that is a benchmark in military leadership, one that all military leaders should strive to emulate.



Photo by J. Burton

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