Special Warfare

MAY - JUNE 2010
VOLUME 23 ISSUE 3



PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT

CMSEs OPERATING IN USCENTCOM

CONTENTS

May-June 2010 | Volume 23 | Issue 3

ARTICLES



ON THE COVER
Civil Affairs Soldiers conduct decisive military-to-civilian engagements in the CENTCOM AOR.
U.S. Army photo

DEPARTMENTS

SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all contributions. *Special Warfare* will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version; requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author's chain of command prior to submission. No payment or honorarium is authorized for publication of articles. Material appearing in *Special Warfare* is considered to be in the public domain and is not protected by copyright unless it is accompanied by the author's copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Special Warfare* and the authors.

Submit articles for consideration to:
Editor, *Special Warfare*;
Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; USAJFKSWCS,
Fort Bragg, NC 28310
or e-mail them to steelman@soc.mil.
For additional information:
Contact: *Special Warfare*
Commercial: (910) 432-5703
DSN: 239-5703

Special Warfare

Commander & Commandant
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

Editor
Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor
Janice Burton

Graphics & Design
Jennifer Martin

Webmaster
Eva Herrera

Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Special Warfare* and the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Special Warfare* is also available on the Internet (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/).

By order of the Secretary of the Army:
George W. Casey Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1010203

Headquarters, Department of the Army

While Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, place great emphasis on the selection and training of warriors, it is important to remember the more humanitarian aspects of the ARSOF mission.

All of our components have a role in that aspect of our mission. Civil Affairs Soldiers work not only to re-establish government services but also to assist other government and nongovernment agencies in providing humanitarian assistance in areas where war and natural disasters have left inhabitants and governments unable to provide for themselves. Psychological Operations Soldiers use their abilities to deliver messages to the populace regarding public safety and the availability of shelter and supplies. Special Forces Soldiers also provide civic assistance as needed, and one of SF's most important missions can be the provision of medical and veterinary care by our SF medical NCOs.

In this issue, Major Ross Lightsey writes about the role of Civil Affairs Soldiers in the civil military support elements operating in the United States Central Command. As a means of unifying the efforts of a number of military, government and volunteer organizations, the CMSE is a valuable tool in providing security and support. In CMSE operations, Major Lightsey points out, what is important is not so much the project itself as the community involvement and popular support that it generates.

Also in this issue, authors from the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center describe the training in trauma management given to students in the Special Operations Combat Medic Course. Although they are training to be combat medics, our students hit the streets and hospitals of major urban areas, where they receive comprehensive training in a full range of situations, including labor and delivery and management of patients from the ER to the ICU. In the remote areas in which they will operate, they may be the only medical professionals available for any type of treatment.

During a recent visit to Fort Bragg, Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi, chief of operations for the Afghanistan National Army, revisited the Special Warfare Center and School, where he had completed the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1973. After returning to Afghanistan, he lived through a military coup in Afghanistan in 1978, the Soviet invasion in 1979, 15 months of torture and imprisonment, service with the mujahedeen, a flight to Pakistan to escape the Taliban and finally restoration to active military service.

During his visit, we presented him with new certificates of training to replace the ones he had lost over nearly 40 turbulent years. In turn, he shared his insights on the need to counter insurgency by providing security and internal development, ideas perhaps shaped here during the SFQC and certainly tempered by 40 years of experience. "Fighting alone will not bring peace," he said. "As one of our proverbs goes, 'You cannot build communities by force.' "

General Karimi's comments remind us of an important lesson: That the Soldiers we train may have to free the oppressed not only from tyranny but also from poverty, famine and chaos. While we must train warriors, our Soldiers' nonlethal operations are an important part of ARSOF and, in certain situations, may prove to be some of the most effective and lasting things that we do.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

USAJFKSWCS OFFERS MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM

Beginning Sept. 7, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, in partnership with the National Defense University,or NDU, will offer a fully accredited program for a master of arts in strategic security studies.

The program will mirror the master of arts in strategic security studies, or MASSS, offered by NDU's College of International Security Affairs. The NDU program is designed for students from U.S. departments and agencies, congressional staffs and military and civilian representatives of the international community who operate in the Washington, D.C., area. The SWCS/NDU program will be offered to NCOs in grades E7 and above, warrant officers and officers from all special-operations branches who have a bachelor's degree from a regionally accredited institution.

The 10-month curriculum will offer a strategic perspective on the global threat environment; the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements; the relationship between political objectives; strategy; all instruments of national power; and the roles of power and ideology. Through seminar participation, independent study, research and the writing of a thesis, students will develop strategies for working with other agencies and with members of the international coalition. Through a combination of academic and practical learning, the program will prepare professionals to develop and implement national and international security strategies for conditions of peace, crisis and war.

Students who complete the MASSS degree should be able to meet the following learning objectives:

(1) Analyze the 21st-century geopolitical environment characterized by the rise of nonstate armed groups and the uneven erosion of state sovereignty;

(2) Evaluate the roles of power and ideology, the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements and the bases for authority and legitimacy;

(3) Understand the relationship between political objectives, strategy and all instruments of national power;

(4) Develop skills needed for thinking critically and strategically and for differentiating between policy and analysis. Put knowledge into practice in complex circumstances involving collaboration with diverse partners.

The SWCS/NDU master's program will be fast-paced and demanding. Students' education backgrounds will vary — some may have completed their undergraduate degree recently, while others may have completed it years ago. To better prepare all students for the academic rigors of the program, the Education Management Division of the SWCS Directorate of Regional Studies and Education is coordinating with the Army Center for Enhanced Performance-Fort Bragg to develop an academic-success program tailored to the needs of the students.

Soldiers may still apply for this year's program, but they should apply as quickly as possible. Applications should be sent to the SWCS Directorate of Force Management and should include an application for the NDU College of International Security Affairs (available at http://www.ndu.edu/cisa/index.cfm?pageID=112&type=page), official transcripts from all colleges and universities previously attended, and a letter of release/endorsement from the current unit commander. For additional information, telephone the SWCS education counselor at DSN 239-9604 or commercial (910) 432-9604.

Gaming: The future of training

by Angela Kershner

A training specialist at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently won the prestigious dL Maverick Award at the ninth annual Army Distributed Learning Conference.

Created in 2007 by self-professed "maverick" Dr. Connie Wardell, the director of the Individual Training Support Directorate for the U.S. Army Training Support Center, the award is designed to recognize mavericks in the field of distributive learning.

This year's winner, Preston Short, serves as a supervisory training specialist in the Office of Interactive Multimedia Instruction in the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine. He was one of eight nominees Armywide.

Short, a former Special Forces operator, draws on his training, real-world experience and passion for video gaming to run the in-house gaming-development division. In fewer than five years, he has brought the concept of using gaming in SWCS distributed learning from an idea to reality, building a team that has the capabilities to make it happen.

"I surrounded myself with people that could get me to the vision of where we were going," said Short. Working with another former-SF operator and gaming enthusiast, and with two programmers lured from high-end gaming companies, Short hopes that the IMI will be able to create dL materials that will be able to compete with commercial games.

Short credits his team with winning the dL Maverick award. "I felt proud initially — then awkward," he said. "Those are the guys that bring it to life. For me to accept the award as if I'm the only one that completed the race … it's just awkward. To me dL has always been a team effort, not an individual effort."

Colonel David Witty, director of DOTD, nominated Short for the award because he is a recognized pioneer in his field. "It's just phenomenal what all he's done," said Witty. "Anything that happens in the battlefield we can recreate digitally with very good effect." Short and his team use a commercially available software program to create realistic battlefield simulations.

Witty appreciates the future possibilities of using gaming to train troops. "This new generation of kids — we call them digital natives — they absorb information differently than we do."

Aside from the efforts of his team and the quality of the products IMI is producing, Short sees the dL Maverick Award as much more than a recognition of their efforts. "The special thing about that Maverick Award," Short said, "is that it recognizes the out-of-the-box thinking that's prevalent here at SWCS."

TRAUMA TRAINING:

by Lieutenant Colonel LoryKay Wheeler, Hospital Corpsman Senior Chief Petty Officer Mark E. McNeil, Sergeant First Class Matthew D. Campbell, Michael J. Lasko and Danny J. Yakel

Hospital Rotations Critical Facet of Training Special Operations Combat Medics

Emergency medical services workers wheel a male patient with multiple gunshot wounds into the emergency department's trauma bay. The patient has been shot in the back, and the bullets have penetrated into his chest and abdomen. In less than 30 seconds, Specialist Noah Smith performs an endotracheal intubation, which is the placement of a flexible plastic tube into the trachea to provide a secure and stable airway. Next, he moves to place bilateral chest tubes for the treatment of pneumothorax (the collection of air or gas in the chest cavity), then continues to assist with further assessment and treatment of the casualty.

In another urban location, Specialist John Olson's experience reinforces the importance of situational awareness and expecting the unexpected as he rides with first responders to the point of injury in a "rough neighborhood." When they arrive, the situation on the ground is much worse than reported by dispatch.

Smith and Olson are students participating in clinical training as part of the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, or SOCM, conducted at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center, or JSOMTC, at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The JSOMTC is a 75,000-square-foot, tri-service facility that is staffed by the Special Warfare Medical Group and has under its auspices the Naval Special Operations Medical Institute. The staff and cadre train more than 1,500 students annually from all subordinate units of the U.S. Special Operations Command and from allied special-operations units.

In addition to SOCM, the JSOMTC conducts four other medical-training courses: the Special Forces Medical Sergeant Course, the Special Operations Independent Duty Corpsman Course, the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Course and the Special Operations Combat Medic Skills Sustainment Course. SOCM is the prerequisite course for all special-operations medical training. During the academically demanding 26-week course, students receive more than 1,200 hours of classroom instruction and hands-on training.

SOCM is divided into six phases: medical fundamentals, three progressively intense phases of trauma training, training in civilian urban-trauma centers and a block on military medicine. During the first phase, medical fundamentals, students receive training in anatomy and physiology, pathophysiology, pharmaceutical calculation, physical examination and medical patient assessment.

After completing medical fundamentals, students begin their trauma training, where they learn how to assess and manage trauma patients from the point of injury through casualty evacuation. From that training, students must demonstrate proficiency in a wide array of life-saving skills, including advanced airway management, hemorrhage control, splinting, vascular and intraosseous access (access through the marrow of the bone), medication administration, shock management and a variety of emergency surgical procedures. Those

^ **MAKING ROUNDS** An SF medical student works in an emergency room as part of his trauma training. *U.S. Army photo.*

procedures include cricothyrotomy (an incision through the skin and cricothyroid membrane to secure a patient's airway during certain emergency situations), chest-tube thoracostomy (the insertion of a flexible plastic tube through the side of the chest to remove air or fluid from the area) and venous cutdown (the surgical exposure of a vein in order to gain vascular access in trauma and shock patients).

Students receive training in combat casualty care as well as certification in civilian-recognized programs, including Basic Life Support, Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support, National Registry of Emergency Medicine Technicians-Basic, Pediatric Education for Pre-Hospital Professionals and Advanced Cardiac Life Support. These civilian certifications are paramount in the SOCM students' ability to train in civilian urban trauma centers. That training composes the fifth block of SOCM training.

The highlight of SOCM is the training conducted during a comprehensive four-week deployment to one of three metropolitan areas: Richmond, Va.; Tampa, Fla.; or St. Petersburg, Fla. During those four weeks, students deliver health care to ill and injured citizens of those communities while completing a 144-hour clinical rotation of hospital training and a 144-hour field internship of pre-hospital training with emergency medical services, or EMS.

During the hospital clinical rotations, conducted at Richmond's Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center, Tampa General Hospital or through a combination of St. Petersburg's Bayfront Medical Center and All Children's Hospital, SOCM students provide care to the full spectrum of medical and trauma patients. They spend a significant amount of their clinical-rotation time working in the adult emergency department, where they become proficient in emergency assessments and life-sustaining procedures.

Training in other departments is crucial to the development of well-rounded special-operations combat medics. Students obtain further training in areas such as labor and delivery, where they assist with deliveries and learn how to manage newborns and obstetrical complications; the operating room, where they obtain and manage patient airways and assist in surgical procedures; various intensive-care units, such as neurosurgical and burn, where students assess and monitor patients who have traumatic brain injuries and assist with the management of burns; and the pediatric emergency department, where students treat patients ranging from infants to adolescents.

During the field internship with EMS, students assigned to Richmond work with the Henrico County Division of Fire, and those in Tampa and in St. Petersburg work with Tampa Fire Rescue. Field internships give SOCM students vital experience in providing medical care at the point of injury or illness. It's important that the medic be able to provide medical care, but he must also be able to lead a cross-trained team in providing that care, especially in the event of a mass-casualty situation. Therefore, a critical element of SOCM training is teaching students to perform a variety of team-leader roles throughout the clinical experience.

It's also important to note that although the special-operations combat medic must be able to assess a patient and perform acute life-saving interventions, he must also be able to manage the patient through the myriad of complications that can arise during a prolonged delay in casualty evacuation. He must develop medical critical-reasoning skills by monitoring and assisting in the management of patients from the point of injury or serious illness, through the emergency department and through the first 24-48 hours of ICU care, in order to recognize and appropriately treat potential complications.

The coordination and provision of the necessary clinical training to ensure that SOCM students acquire these skills is an incredible undertaking. The SOCM program assigns an active-duty-military or government-service employee as a clinical coordinator at each of the three sites for program management. It relies heavily on dedicated civilian preceptors at the sites to train the medics. On-site clinical coordinators have established an incredible relationship with their respective hospitals and fire departments.

In November 2009, Danny Yakel, a retired Special Forces medical sergeant and the SOCM clinical coordinator in Richmond, was asked by Virginia Commonwealth University's Department of Emergency Medicine to give a presentation at the National EMS Symposium, held in Virginia Beach, Va. The convention is the largest of its kind

and is attended by representatives from EMS departments throughout the United States. Yakel's presentation portrayed a real-life comparison of civilian EMS and special-operations medicine to give the civilian EMS departments a better understanding of the training and capabilities of special-operations combat medics.

Clinical coordinators are primarily responsible for educating the preceptors on the SOCM training level, scope of practice, requirements and objectives of the clinical experience. Preceptor education became especially imperative during the past year, because of the establishment of new program requirements and patient-management goals. It is one thing for preceptors to receive a briefing on the training and capabilities of the combat medics, but their comprehension is taken to a new level when they experience the training firsthand. Annual preceptor site visits to the JSOMTC to observe SOCM training have significant affects on preceptor buy-in.

After a recent site visit, Dr. John Cha, a trauma surgeon from Tampa General Hospital, said, "It was a real eye-opener to see the medics perform technically complex clinical maneuvers a mere six months into their rigorous program, particularly considering that a significant number of them had no prior medical education. I am confident that I was nowhere near the SOCMs' level of proficiency after medical school and even several years into my surgical residency. As for the SOCMs' performance during their rotation with us, it is a testament to their training that they integrate well with the trauma resuscitation team. I have found the SOCMs to be always ready, motivated and professional in conduct. I only wish that they rotated with us for a longer period of time."

Site visits also provide preceptors with a better understanding of the combat medics' typical work environment and available equipment. Tracy Brown, a registered nurse and a preceptor at Tampa General, said, "I have all the most advanced equipment and unlimited access to many specialty services, and yet these boys go out with a backpack and save many lives." That understanding allows preceptors to ask students thought-provoking questions, such as, "How would your treatment of this patient differ if you were in an austere location with limited resources?," further expanding the development of students' critical reasoning.

Dr. Kevin Ward, the program director at Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center, noted, "Even the challenges that exist in an inner-city, level-one trauma center and busy EMS system will pale in comparison to what they will experience later in the field."

Ward pointed out that members of the faculty, residents, nurses and members of the paramedic staff involved in training the SOCM students uniformly consider themselves to be beneficiaries of the program because of the model behavior of the SOCM students.

"The professionalism and hunger for knowledge that these young men demonstrate to us, day in and day out, while they are with us, is a true inspiration for all. While we are not on the field of combat, the presence of the SOCM students is a constant reminder to us of the War on Terror and the importance of constant vigilance. … We are one of the few civilian medical centers who can say we are truly contributing to the war effort. We try to constantly remember that because of what the SOCM students will be doing, we can continue to do what we do without fear."

Clinical rotations and field internships are essential elements of SOCM training. SOCM students rely on civilian health-care providers to assist in perfecting the critical medical skills acquired at the JSOMTC. When SOCM students return to Fort Bragg, they complete the sixth and final phase of training, a one-week block on military medicine. After that, Special Forces Qualification students go on to the second half of training in their military occupational specialty, but the remaining SOCM graduates report to their units and are subject to being deployed within weeks of their departure from the JSOMTC. ***SW***

"We are one of the few civilian medical centers who can say we are truly contributing to the war effort. We try to constantly remember that because of what the SOCM students will be doing, we can continue to do what we do without fear."

Lieutenant Colonel LoryKay Wheeler is an emergency medicine physician and director of the Special Operations Combat Medic Course.

Hospital Corpsman **Senior Chief Petty Officer Mark E. McNeil** is the SOCM senior instructor.

Sergeant First Class Matthew D. Campbell is the SOCM clinical coordinator with Bayfront Medical Center and All Children's Hospital.

Michael J. Lasko, a retired Special Forces NCO, is the SOCM clinical coordinator with Tampa General Hospital and Tampa Fire Rescue.

Danny J. Yakel, a retired Special Forces NCO, is the SOCM clinical coordinator with Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center and the Henrico County Division of Fire.

^ **CASE STUDY** American citizens trapped in Lebanon are evacuated by the U.S. Navy. The 2nd Lebanon War is a perfect case study on dealing with hybrid threats. *U.S. Navy photo.*

PREPARING FOR HYBRID THREATS

Improving Force Preparation for Irregular Warfare by William Fleser

As the United States military transitions in Iraq and addresses new challenges in Afghanistan, a strategic question looms: "And then what?" The challenges of those two wars have consumed much of the strategic thinking over the past eight years, and while those operations retain priority, it is probably prudent at this point to think about what today's challenges tell us about the nature of future conflicts.

As Karl von Clausewitz noted, it is important to understand the nature of the war before engaging in it, but in some respects, we don't have that luxury.[1] In February, the Department of Defense released its 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, or QDR, which provides a more-than-adequate discussion of the pre-eminent security challenge facing our nation today and into the future:

The continued dominance of America's armed forces in large-scale, force-on-force warfare provides powerful incentives for adversaries to employ methods designed to offset our strengths. From nonstate actors using highly advanced military technology to states employing unconventional technologies, our current adversaries have shown they can and will tailor their strategies and employ their capabilities in sophisticated ways.

Thus, the QDR moves away from its previous Long War strategic construct toward more flexibility: It recognizes the increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved and the resulting tendency to blur the lines between traditional forms of conflict. It recognizes that today's adversary may engage in "hybrid approaches" that demand preparation for a broad range of potential conflicts.[2] Hybrid adversaries, including state-sponsored entities, independent individual actors with access to high technology, terror franchises and aligned criminal organizations, may use terror as a tactic, as an operational concept or as a strategic gambit. They often use international humanitarian organizations to raise funds, and they employ proxies where needed to accomplish their ends. Hybrid threats readily employ the technologies of the 21st century to provide security, perform operational planning, obtain lessons learned and provide safe havens. They often act like nation states with state foreign-policy objectives while simultaneously employing terror, para-

Note: Observations expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect official positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Quotations are not attributed to avoid risk of compromise.

military militia, humanitarian, political, criminal and even conventional military capabilities.[3]

The purpose of this paper is not to engage in another debate over a new military term. Let's simply start with the assertion that it does not matter what terminology we use, because, in the end, the enemy gets a vote. And although he routinely reads our doctrine, he doesn't care about our internal intellectual debates. This paper is intended only to advance some ideas on what can be done to better prepare "the force" (special-operations forces, or SOF) to deal with irregular or hybrid threats. Given that our forces have been involved in nonstop combat operations since mid-October 2001, we have gained a great deal of operational experience. But our adversary has also learned. What can we expect to deal with in the future, and how do we deal with emerging hybrid threats?

The experiences of the Israeli Defense Force, or IDF, during the 2nd Lebanon War provide some examples of the challenges inherent to hybrid conflicts. This is not to say that what they learned automatically translates to our situation, because the adversary also learns by experience. In 2006, Hezbollah, operating in Lebanon, was simultaneously a state-sponsored terrorist group, a political movement, a humanitarian organization and a conventional military force. Hezbollah employed new technologies as force multipliers, including strategic rocket assaults, unmanned aerial vehicles, night-vision technology, IEDs and the latest antitank guided missiles. To combat Hezbollah, the IDF was forced into a type of hybrid warfare: warfare that goes beyond conflict between states and armed groups and includes multiple forms of combat simultaneously, including conventional maneuver warfare, irregular tactics, information warfare, terrorist acts and criminal disorder.[4]

Revisiting the 2nd Lebanon War in detail is also not the purpose of this paper (for an excellent discussion of the conflict, see Russell W. Glenn, *All Glory is Fleeting: Insights from the 2nd Lebanon War* (Suffolk, Va.: National Defense Research Institute, 2008). From a force-preparation perspective, i.e., "How do we get ready for this kind of warfare?," we can draw at least three insights from IDF experiences in Lebanon and Gaza.

The first insight is that there is a need to understand the nature of irregular or hybrid adversaries. The IDF noted that hybrid organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, which combine criminal and terror activities along with political, religious and civic roles, seek victory through non-defeat and "disappearance" into the local population. That strategy has inherent weaknesses that can be exploited. The organization's need to hide within the population makes that population vulnerable to the kind of retaliation visited on the region of southern Lebanon in 2006. Simultaneously, there is a need to protect that host population, to the greatest extent possible, from the ravages of war and to ensure that the people understand where the real problem lies. That was Hezbollah's strategic paradox: By inviting open warfare with Israel, they also put at risk the support of the population on which their continued legitimacy depended.[5] By not exploiting that weakness, the IDF enabled the international press and biased information outlets to praise Hezbollah for "standing up" to Israel, while locally, Hezbollah was able to win hearts and minds through the distribution of humanitarian aid, gaining a victory by information.[6]

During a rigorous self-examination following the war, the Israelis noted their unpreparedness for that kind of conflict. They recognized that military power alone is insufficient for dealing with the complex problem sets posed by the geopolitical situation unfolding during the summer of 2006.[7] The IDF's military-heavy approach left it unable to capitalize on the inherent contradictions between Hezbollah's hybrid nature (a terrorist organization with conventional capabilities masquerading as a humanitarian governing agent), and thus the IDF lost the strategic narrative, both at home and abroad.

Conversely, in 2008 the IDF successfully adapted and exploited the contradictions and friction between the various factions within Hamas, achieving a favorable strategic outcome. IDF operations against Hamas were characterized by precision air strikes, a skillful combination of ground maneuver and special operations — synchronized with the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population — and homeland defense measures, all reinforced by an active information campaign. In short, the IDF successfully applied the lessons of 2006 to achieve victory.[8]

This is useful information for the theorist and the strategist, but it does not provide any actionable conclusions or templates that can be used to prepare the joint force to deal with hybrid threats. There were no templates generated from the 2nd Lebanon War, because the adversary also adapted after the conflict. That the IDF learned and adapted from its 2006 experiences was obvious by the results of the 2008 conflict. In the case of our current hybrid adversaries, they also learn from their mistakes and successes, and they adapt. In preparing for the next hybrid conflict, teaching U.S. and partner-nation organizations how to deal with complex problems and to find unique, adaptive and innovative solutions is as important as teaching them to perform tasks to doctrinally acceptable standards during a training exercise.

All that leads to the second insight, namely, that preparation for hybrid warfare necessitates that we teach staffs and leaders how to think, not what to think. Prior to 2006, the IDF had been immersed in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, or COIN, including an 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon. During that time, the IDF lost much of its proficiency in high-end joint operations of the type that characterized its rapid victories in the Yom Kippur and Six Day wars. It was essentially not prepared for a new emerging scenario in 2006.[9]

Engagement in long-term COIN did not prepare the IDF for the incursion into Lebanon, leading to the conclu-

sion that operational activity is no substitute for training against emerging scenarios. The lesson to a force that has constantly been in conflict since October 2001 is obvious but painful: All that operational experience is potentially negated if we do not develop opportunities for "thinking through" hypothetical but realistic scenarios of what a hybrid adversary might throw at us.

The third insight on hybrid warfare comes from the author's personal interview with an IDF officer in 2006.[10] While discussing the relationship between close cooperation and interoperability between SOF and conventional forces and success against hybrid adversaries such as Hezbollah, the author asked an Israeli colleague for his views on the role of leadership in operations involving conventional forces and SOF. The Israeli officer stated that in the IDF, it is common for conventional units to be subordinated to or directly support a special-operations unit, regardless of the rank of the SOF commander. This was particularly true when the SOF unit had been operating in the area and knew the population and terrain better than its conventional counterpart. In the IDF, experience and combat perspective outweighed considerations of rank as deciding factors in determining supporting/supported relationships. The Israeli colleague also stated that IDF special-operations forces were well-versed in employing conventional units as part of their operations.It seems that successful leadership against hybrid threats is more a function of experience and knowledge, both cultural and geographic knowledge, than it is a matter of rank.

"The experiences of the IDF in Lebanon are an instructive example of the challenges of dealing with a hybrid or irregular enemy."

So what can be gleaned from these insights and turned into actionable recommendations? It would be easy at this point to dismiss some of these observations by noting the differences between the IDF and the U.S. Department of Defense. The IDF is smaller, with different strategic considerations that come from being surrounded by enemies and having a lack of strategic depth, a reliance on its reserves for major operations, etc. Conventional wisdom might say that there is nothing to be learned from the IDF because of its inherent differences in size, make-up and strategic focus. However, if there is genuine concern over "what next after Afghanistan," there is one potential challenge in the SOF community that can be addressed, based on the IDF's experiences.

Current joint-training programs do not adequately train leaders and teams to think adaptively under pressure in regard to dealing with future hybrid threats and adversaries. Joint training is often focused on the process, not on problem-solving. As a result, the joint force could lack the kind of agile command and control necessary to combat adaptive adversaries, if it is not offered the opportunity to think about the problem set.

Additionally, SOF are rarely the supported elements in joint operations and are more often than not seen as enablers instead of as the main effort — a fact somewhat inconsistent with the nature of hybrid threats. U.S. conventional forces sometimes have cultural difficulty supporting SOF. Also, SOF organizations, with very few exceptions, do not consistently train to be the supported command. The 2010 QDR notes the need for more supporting and enabling capabilities for SOF, but absent creative thinking on how to employ them and effective command and control, employment of "enablers, support and sustainment" capabilities could be sub-optimal in future conflicts.

Smart people can make the complex sound really simple. A professor at the National Defense University once captured the essence of irregular or hybrid warfare: "Put your best plan in place and then play for the breaks." The problem is, without aggressive training against complex scenarios, staffs and leaders will lack the kind of agility necessary to effectively "play for the breaks." There may be a trend in the SOF community similar to one the IDF experienced leading up to 2006: specifically, viewing operational activity as a substitute for training and wargaming against future scenarios. At the same time, that operational activity constrains SOF from participating in training exercises. Given the cycle times between deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no room for new training programs. Also, programs like joint mission-readiness exercises do not provide optimum training experiences for SOF leaders and staff teams. SOF presence in those programs normally consists of "response cells" focused on the integration of SOF and conventional forces. A force-preparation experience that builds staff proficiency in complex problem-solving is missing. Finally, exercising SOF as a supported command may sound like a minor consideration, but if in future conflicts SOF are called into a lead role, they may be poorly prepared to employ the wide array of joint enablers available and needed for victory. That will likely require cultural as well as operational innovation. "Who's in charge" makes a difference.

While this problem is in itself complex, the following recommended actions could be undertaken now to help improve force preparation for hybrid threats.

The first recommendation is that we develop a joint-training working group as part of the Global Synchroniza-

tion Conference, or GSC, hosted by the U.S. Special Operations Command approximately every six months. It is a true global forum, during which participants discuss strategies for dealing with current problem areas and formulate solutions. The GSC audience includes combatant commands, or COCOMs; theater special-operations commands, or TSOCs; other government agencies; and allied partners. A GSC joint-training working group could be focused on identifying best training practices and opportunities, and on developing a broad community approach to training.

A second recommendation is to add wargaming to the force-preparation toolbox, particularly for the TSOCs. As the operational SOF entity in each COCOM, TSOCs have an inordinately high operational tempo. While training exercises provide some means for gaining proficiency in problem-solving, rarely do TSOCs have the ability to "wargame" their potential strategies and test assumptions about their own theater and operational plans. As we move into the realm of steady-state irregular warfare, TSOC theater plans need to be wargamed to determine a potential steady-state demand signal for both SOF and conventional forces. In recognition of the fact that conventional-force capabilities are needed for steady-state IW, TSOC wargames would be better identified as "subordinate unified command" wargames. The intent would be to provide the TSOCs with a forum, prepared and executed by an outside supporting agency, in which they could build proficiency in complex problem-solving while also building an understanding of the joint functional requirements necessary for addressing hybrid-warfare contingencies.

A related recommendation would be to pursue development of immersive training simulations that would enable TSOC and SOF-unit staffs to take advantage of available training time in small blocks in order to build proficiency. These simulations could be configured to push staffs to the limit against "virtual" adversaries, providing the kind of stresses that are not practical in larger exercises. This capability would be intended to provide training capabilities "to the edge," for use when and where unit leaders find time available. The U.S. Joint Forces Command's Small Group Scenario Trainer is an example of this kind of emerging technology.

We know that we are engaged in a protracted conflict and that our adversaries will continue to adapt and find new ways of exploiting our weaknesses. The experiences of the IDF in Lebanon are an instructive example of the challenges of dealing with a hybrid or irregular enemy. What is perhaps more instructive are the improvements the IDF made between Lebanon and Gaza to institutionalize advancements in its capabilities: rigorous analysis, application of lessons learned, wargaming of new approaches and the addition of new training programs. As a result, they out-adapted Hamas in Gaza. Making institutional changes to force-preparation turns out to be one of the key ways to out-think, out-adapt and out-fight our hybrid adversaries. **SW**

^ **HELPING HAND** U.S. Marines help evacuate American citizens from the beach in Lebanon onto a landing craft. *U.S. Navy photo.*

Notes:

[1] Karl von Clausewitz, ***On War***, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, ***Quadrennial Defense Review***, February 2010, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), 8.

[3] Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," ***Joint Forces Quarterly***, Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009, 34, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/9.pdf.

[4] Hoffman, 34.

[5] The initial IDF incursion into Lebanon was in retaliation for the ambushing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. See "2nd Lebanon War": http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/Second_Lebanon_war.htm.

[6] Max Boot, "The Second Lebanon War," Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11363/second_lebanon_war.html.

[7] Haartz Staff: "The main findings of the Winograd report on the 2nd Lebanon War," at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854051.html.

[8] Toni O'Laughlin, "Israel mounts PR campaign to blame Hamas for Gaza destruction," in ***The Guardian***, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/28/israel-gaza-hamas.

[9] Boot and Haartz Staff.

[10] Author interview with IDF officer, 12 October 2006.

William Fleser is director of plans, policy and integration in the Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command. During more than 30 years of service to the Department of Defense, he has served in Infantry and Special Forces billets, including assignments to the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 10th SF Group. His joint special-operations experience includes four years at Special Operations Command-Europe, from which he retired in 2001. Since joining USJFCOM, he has worked in future-concept development, in homeland defense and in SOCJFCOM. He is a 2007 graduate of the National War College. He welcomes feedback to this article directed to: william.c.fleser@jfcom.mil.

PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT

Civil Military Support Elements Operating in CENTCOM

by Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr.



In ongoing irregular conflicts, the civil-military support element, or CMSE, is a unique resource that provides military commanders and United States ambassadors in various regions and countries with a means of conducting decisive military-to-civilian engagements. Within the area of responsibility, or AOR, of the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, strategic leaders are employing this vital tool to synchronize and unify joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational civic actions.

The new national civil-engagement strategy seeks to establish relationships and an enduring presence in areas of interest and to assist partner nations in building a capacity for recognizing and denying terrorist safe-havens around the globe. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, recently activated within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, supports a key component of the new strategy: the Civil Military Engagement Program, or CMEP.

The strategy of persistent engagement is a worldwide effort to provide support from Civil Affairs, or CA, to the combatant commanders through five theater special-operations commands: Special Operations Command-Central, or SOCCENT; Special Operations Command-Europe; Special Operations Command-Pacific; Special Operations Command-Africa; and Special Operations Command-South.

Building on its extensive knowledge derived from supporting combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs, in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines over the past eight years, the 95th CA Brigade trains, equips and deploys CMSE teams that currently support operations in 23 countries. The CMSE mission is intended to fuse efforts of the Department of State, or DoS; Department of Defense, or DoD; and other U.S. agencies. Teams also share information with and facilitate the efforts of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, that are involved in building host-nation capacities. CMSEs provide much-needed interagency support to the on-ground commanders. It is a complicated and complex mission, and CMSE teams are receiving national-level attention as the conduit for the civil-engagement effort.

CMSE concept

The CMSE concept is a nondoctrinal approach for addressing a nondoctrinal enemy. Irregular warfare, or IW,[1] calls for a systematic process that includes efforts throughout the DoD; DoS; United States Agency for International Development, or USAID; NGOs and partner nations. The CMSE concept is simple: SOF engage high-priority countries separately, but collectively, they conduct multiple security-and-support engagement initiatives; such as infrastructural assessments, humanitarian assistance, educational programs and health programs.

Working with embassy country teams and TSOCs, CMSE teams assess and analyze civic infrastructures, identify critical requirements for governance, determine critical civil capabilities and examine targeted countries' overall vulnerabilities. As the common link to all these entities, the CMSE seeks to combine their efforts into a universal strategy — and to mitigate redundancy and overlapping of projects and initiatives.

To accomplish its mission, a CMSE needs to have extensive training and experience,[2] including:

- Cross-cultural experience and training.
- Foreign-language training.
- Dialogue, mediation and negotiations training.
- Joint-interagency [NGO, DoS, DoD] operational experience.
- Country and regional analysis courses.
- Government financial and resource support familiarization.

CMSEs throughout the CENTCOM region can be expected to work autonomously. That requires a high degree of professionalism, maturity and a keen sense of situational understanding of the environment. A CMSE must be able to adapt very quickly in an uncertain environment. Environments range from fully permissive to nonpermissive — and all these environments can occur within the same country if it has a high degree of contention.

CMSEs do indeed meld into the populace extremely well, as the teams are trained to operate independently, but securely. However, when security situations are tense, CMSE operations can extend beyond the reach of our nonmilitary partners. With the CMSE level of training, maturity and deployment background, an embassy's regional security officer, or RSO, is usually amicable in allowing movement. CMSEs always work closely with RSOs throughout these regions — regardless, there are undoubtedly multiple risks involved with operating amid an uncertain population with limited assurance of security and safety.

Where other interagency support structures are forbidden access, CMSE members are typically allowed to conduct assignments, such as infrastructural assessments, key-leader engagements, humanitarian assistance and civil reconnaissance. CMSEs may be differently configured based upon mission requirements, but a typical CMSE is composed of 2-6 CA-trained personnel who can be configured in modules, is tailored to the country and mission, and provides persistent, long-term engagement to high-priority countries.

The CMEP is part of a long-term strategy that calls for a concerted logistics effort, including embassy housing, office space, vehicle requirements, a

^ **GROUND TRUTH** Civil Affairs Soldiers talk with Tajik villagers about improvements to infrastructure. *U.S. Army photo.*

communications base and an operational platform at an embassy. A CMEP is different from a standard six-week joint combined exchange training, or JCET, as JCETs are episodic in nature. JCET missions do in fact engage countries and partner-nation forces; however, JCETs do not provide a continual presence in any given country. A JCET's intent is to obtain or give training, whereas a CMSE is focused on partner-nation requirements. CMSEs demand a degree of funding and effort through DoD channels, and the 95th CA Brigade resources its CMSE mission through the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM.[3]

The country team is one of the most integral partners with whom CMSEs must collaborate. According to Ambassador Robert Oakley, "The country team must work with unified purpose. … The country team builds the American image abroad and implements strategy."[4]

CMSEs and country teams are currently engaging contentious regions within the Middle East and in central Asia other than Iraq and Afghanistan. We must engage these countries because the enemy is reaching out to those neighboring regions.

CMSE mission

The CMSE mission is to provide civil-military planning and execution as part of a larger spectrum of joint or country-team operations. The CMSE team serves as the link between the humanitarian and developmental strategies that it executes as part of a country team and the objectives of the U.S. government. That combined DoD/DoS strategy is termed the mission performance plan, or MPP[5] — and it includes the CMSE, the forward commander and the USAID. Though the MPP varies from one country to another, it sums up the overarching requirement to be the civic conduit between multiple elements.

Examples of CMSE key tasks:

- Build capacity of local leadership, military and regional key players.
- Conduct key leader engagements — face-to-face dialogues with the populace.

^ **STRAIGHT TALK** A Civil Affairs Soldier talks with a construction worker about ongoing work at a facility. *U.S. Army photo.*

- Legitimize local governance through programs and humanitarian assistance.
- Gather critical infrastructural information to determine civil vulnerabilities.
- Collaborate with USAID and developmental organizations.
- Maintain positive relations through interaction, media information and local events.
- Support the ambassador's public-diplomacy mission.
- Build enhanced engagement into the civil structure.
- Develop enhanced governance and spur economic growth.
- Facilitate interagency synchronization with DoS, DoD, NGOs and partner nations.

Nonkinetic strategy

In a 2009 article in *Foreign Affairs*, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, "Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the disconnected, from whom the terrorists recruit."[6]

His statement represents the purpose of the CA methodology to engage the populace and determine the population's needs first, much like the MPP. A CMSE takes this approach and applies nonkinetic, or nonlethal, strategies that are developed at the TSOC level. There will always be a need for direct combat operations; however, the need for the indirect application of tangible infrastructural resources and governance incentives has received greater attention — and the need is growing.

For example, during the combat surge in Iraq in 2007, General David Petreaus said, "We employed nonkinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct of our kinetic operations."[7] In a televised interview in September 2009, General Stanley McChryrstal alluded to Gates's article, saying that efforts need to shift away from kinetic operations toward nonkinetic operations for a new strategy in Afghanistan.[8]

In the article, the Secretary of Defense talked about "elevating measures that were previously thought to only

reside in Department of State." What he meant to convey is the idea that it is far better economically to engage and develop the governance of a nation-state that may be on verge of collapse than to invade it with multiple brigade combat teams. The adage, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," may be applied in this scenario. Is it more efficient to build or to destroy and then have to rebuild? Economically speaking: sending CMSEs to a country, along with governmental programs, at a cost of several million U.S. dollars, is a small price to pay and more efficient than sending five brigade combat teams later on to quell an all-out civil war. Conducting military intervention can cost U.S. taxpayers billions. If we are speaking of the human equation, continued large-scale military intervention through kinetic operations can cost thousands of servicemembers' lives.

It is difficult to measure nonkinetic efforts and deliverables from just one year, but they may have to be measured over several years. The lack of warfare may be a basic measurement of effectiveness. For example, the widespread Ethiopian famine and internal strife from the early 1970s and mid-1980s were eventually cured through the infusion of millions of U.S. dollars in aid programs and enhanced governance agendas.[9]

Objectively, there still exists some instability in Ethiopia, however, that country is now one of the strongest members of the African Union and has a well-trained military. Ethiopia has come a very long way in the course of more than 20 years, thanks to a long-term, nonkinetic NGO/USAID approach that averted sending thousands of U.S. troops to the region. "Correlation does not mean causality"; however, it is safe to say that applied building programs from USAID and DoD can indeed stabilize a region.

Unfortunately, there are incentives that many near-failing states will ignore, malign or abuse, resulting in the likely collapse of the state. We cannot always force the "carrot" onto one of the rogue countries that is not aligned with normal economic prosperity, way-of-life fundamentals and human-rights awareness. There are a handful of countries that neither respect nor desire a more pleasant approach to international diplomacy — they react more to the "stick" aspect of diplomacy.

Regardless, when nation-states accept U.S. governmental and military efforts, we can measure the benefits of employing CMSE, USAID and other aid organizations. If the populace has a distinct infrastructural requirement, then let's address what is needed. That is not to say that we are engaged in winning hearts and minds. A strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the people in contentious regions does not work — for we will never win their hearts or their minds — but we can gain their trust and confidence that the U.S. government will do the right thing at the right time.

CMSE efforts in central Asia

CMSE operations in Tajikistan are a good example of our current strategy in the CENTCOM AOR. Tajikistan has had its full share of discord and conflict, with civil wars, famine and a previously corrupt governance. The charter of the CMSE team in Tajikistan is to build upon the current educational and health systems. From 2008-2009, in a nine-month rotation, the CMSE team in Tajikistan renovated three hospitals, refurbished four schools, restored an orphanage, rebuilt water pump stations and hosted a medical civic-action program.

So how have these engagements brought us closer to stability in Tajikistan? That can be measured through the increased involvement and interest of local leaders. Throughout Tajikistan, the district head is a *hukumat* — the equivalent of our county manager, but one dual-hatted with mayoral duties in his region. He is responsible for anything that occurs in his region, regardless of the town or village. When the CMSE team conducts a project, everything is done by or with the local leaders. The funding comes from DoD; however, our taking credit would hinder the overall strategy of legitimizing the local leaders. The CMSE team nominates, and then manages, the project through various contractors and in conjunction with the hukumat. When it comes to completing a project during a re-opening event, efforts are made to ensure that media are present and that the local leadership takes credit. This is not putting a "Tajik face" on an effort — such a term is insolent. The CMSE team ensures that the Tajik contractors have coordinated with the various school districts, who in turn have organized involvement with the hukumats.

Responsibility and liability are placed upon the Tajiks, with respect to quality control, productivity, standards, equal opportunity and efficiency. The multiple projects were not unilateral and included collaboration and synchronization with the efforts of USAID and the U.S. Embassy's country team. Therefore, a solid measurement of effectiveness is a notable increase in the respect the district's populace had for its leaders, as well as a notable increase in the government's accountability to its people. The CMSE team derived these measurements through "atmospherics," which require the team to engage the local populace and gain valuable feedback. Obtaining an objective temperature of the populace is critical for determining success or shortcomings.

CMSEs across the CENTCOM AOR conduct projects and atmospherics not for their own sake but to achieve the long-term intent. Random projects could actually be detrimental in the long term. The goal is not to build

a school, but to build a community that is involved in the school and responsible for it. A school is simply a building with four walls, desks, chairs and books. However, a school with a community involves teachers, parents, managers, faculty, principals, accountability and standards in student testing. Building an accountable community is the long-term intent.

The results of our efforts determine our success, not the dollar amount spent. Many governmental accountants get fixated on the dollar amount of aid programs and lose sight of the intent. It is easy for CA practitioners to get absorbed in the physical project, as well, but Soldiers must continually take a step back and ask themselves whether they are keeping the overall goal to the forefront.

In Pakistan, the CMSE efforts were, to some extent, similar to those in Tajikistan. Despite the fact that both are central Asian states, however, the angle of approach was somewhat different: CMSE efforts in Pakistan were mainly humanitarian-assistance in nature. Pakistan is fraught with internal conflict, and open civic projects are difficult. Security is paramount there, and the CMSE team was continually accompanied by local military elements.

The CMSE team in Pakistan is one of the most efficient U.S. government maneuver elements that conducts projects through physical coordination. The CMSE team is on the ground, conducting face-to-face coordination with the region's leaders (termed *maliks*) for humanitarian-aid projects, school projects, well projects, playgrounds, etc. Very few organizations can attest to the civil closeness that is achieved through this type of engagement. According to one SOCCENT tactical commander, "The CMSE projects continue to be the primary vehicle for getting to the population. … We have been able to engage with the local population and maliks during these missions, which has allowed us to learn more about the tribes and their needs."

Using the same strategy as in Tajikistan, the CMSE makes all efforts to ensure that local maliks, police, military commanders and the community as a whole are heavily involved in taking care of the people's needs. Again, the CMSE team takes a back seat during the process and ensures that the existing governance or tribal leaders get full credit.

Ultimately, we have to assess objective measurements of effectiveness. For example, the enhanced, positive relations with local media are clearly evidenced by the dozens of articles and news interviews that show the Pakistani government and military in a favorable light. Additionally, maliks are more involved at humanitarian-assistance sites, evidence that they are taking a more positive control over the distribution of aid and full management of the populace.

Another effort that the CMSE team focused on was the development of a civil-military coordination cell, or CMCC, which increased the effectiveness of government institutions and exercised responsibility and accountability among the civil structures attempting to rebuild the war-torn regions. The CMSE initiated the CMCCs as a type of forum that included members from the USAID, the DoS, the Pakistani military, local maliks, political agents and the CMSE. There were unmistakable positive indicators in the increased willingness of local Pakistani leaders to take civil action and to become more involved in the establishment of reconstruction teams. Undoubtedly, there is much room for improvement in Pakistan, and the CMSE approach will surely result in continued measurable benefits. A more concerted nonkinetic effort in Pakistan will avert total military involvement in that critical region.

CMSE efforts in Yemen

The CMSE team in Yemen was established in the spring of 2009. Because it is relatively new to the area, the Yemeni government is ensuring that security measures are emplaced prior to all engagements. Tight security thus limits movement outside of the capital city, Sana'a. The CMSE team in Yemen ventures throughout Sana'a to engage the populace and is heavily involved with the interaction and collaboration with USAID, Yemenia' Joint Venture, local civil governments and multiple NGOs.

One of the CMSE's most promising accomplishments so far has been working with USAID to assist in the long-term engagement and development strategies. One of the CMSE team members attended a Yemen strategy conference in Cairo, which opened a number of opportunities for sharing collective plans for the development of the Yemeni economy. USAID also invited the CMSE to work with the political and economic advisers during the interagency design team conference

> **"The new national civil-engagement strategy seeks to establish relationships and an enduring presence in areas of interest and to assist partner nations in building a capacity for recognizing and denying terrorist safe-havens around the globe."**

^ **RIGHT DIRECTION** A Civil Affairs Soldier conducts a needs assessment at a Tajik Hospital. *U.S. Army photo.*

in Sana'a. The CMSE has also worked with USAID's Basic Education and Skills Training, which allowed the team to engage educational leaders in Sana'a and determine the locations, types and sizes of schools throughout Yemen. That type of data is critical to identifying civil vulnerabilities. It also allowed the CMSE to propose projects and get educational leaders' recommendations on the best sites for providing educational support.

Supporting the DIME principle

Members of DoD and DoS are familiar with the DIME principle[10] — that diplomatic, informational, military and economic factors can be used to affect and engage other nation-states or even to influence recognized factions or rogue nation-states. CMSE operations can assist the political and irregular-warfare battle by tapping into all four DIME principles:

- ***Diplomacy.*** CMSE teams are trained in international relations, cross-cultural relationships and mediation between factions. The mere fact that American CMSE teams hold dialogues with foreign states and conduct grass-roots assessments is, itself, diplomacy.
- ***Informational.*** CMSEs can best be used in the course of successful information operations aimed at the local populace. In the Middle East and central Asia, most ideological views are formed through word-of-mouth interaction rather than published media, which can work to our advantage if it is used correctly.
- ***Military.*** The U.S. military currently dominates any head-to-head operations by conventional forces. While CMSEs do not engage in any combat operations, their military training and experience give them the ability to interact with foreign military forces and to teach or to take the lead in basic CMO with partner nations.
- ***Economic.*** When used efficiently, CMSEs, USAID and other governmental programs can have an influence in enlivening and reviving local economies. Again, we must be careful to remember that while money can be a tool, the dollar amount spent is not a measurement of effectiveness.

^ **GRAND OPENING** The U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan (in blue scarf) is on hand for the opening of a new orphanage. *U.S. Army photo.*

Human terrain

It is crucial that CMSE teams, as well as the company-level civil-military operations center, conduct an analysis of the human terrain prior to deploying to areas such as the Middle East. Knowing the intended audience in Pakistan and the way the tribal community is organized, for example, is critical to overall mission success.

Power in central Asia and the Middle East moves through interpersonal relationships. We have a similar system, sometimes called the "good 'ole boy" system. Regardless of how we view the system, we still must accept the fact that it is the way certain societies operate. And if we don't build upon those relationships, who will? Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents surely know the importance of maintaining interpersonal connections with the local populace. CMSE teams are keenly aware of the importance of interpersonal relationships and, at times, must put themselves in the mindset of a central Asian or Middle Eastern layman.

Conclusion

Franklin D. Roosevelt said, "True individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made." With that said, if al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents are providing sustenance to the populace and our partner nation is not, then the insurgents appear to be compassionate. Basic needs for sustenance have to be met by someone, something or some organization. It is not in anyone's best interest to have our sworn enemies supporting the very people with whom we are trying to partner, because of bonding and the strings that may be attached by terrorists. Therefore, we must take action in these contentious regions to ensure that our allied governments are responsible, willing and capable of providing the people's needs.

SOF CMSE teams are very resourceful in providing flexibility

^ **HOSPITAL CALL** A Civil Affairs team inspects a local hospital during a needs assessment. *U.S. Army photo.*

and adaptability to the civic leadership. If fully supported with appropriate funding and resources, CMSEs will continue to be successful in providing face-to-face dialogue and providing a strategic foothold in any country.

Finally, we must ensure that we approach these nonkinetic measures with a process-orientated — as opposed to a results-oriented — mindset. In the military, we always want to complete the mission, and sometimes we get too immersed in tangible and monetary measurements. What is not always tangible is the people's trust and confidence in their government. We need to be cognizant of that fact as we attempt to measure or quantify results. The project isn't the mission — the mission is to win the confidence of a community and a nation. A newly built town hall is merely a physical structure — our goal is to get the people to respect their elected officials, and for those officials to bear responsibility. Those actions will ultimately provide stability in the region, fostering cooperative prosperity, freedom of trade, individual property rights, rule of law, equal justice and international economic globalization. ***SW***

Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr., is assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Formerly assigned to the 96th CA Battalion, he has served assignments in Infantry, Special Forces and Civil Affairs. He has served multiple combat tours in the CENTCOM area of operations, as well as numerous operational deployments. His most recent tour was to Qatar as commander of a CMSE that had elements across Pakistan, Tajikistan and Yemen.

Notes:

[1] Irregular Warfare, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directiyes/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf.

[2] Also refer to Civil Affairs Qualification Course curriculum, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., 2007.

[3] Major Force Program-11, SOF Programming, Special Operations Command.

[4] Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 47, 4th Quarter 2007.

[5] See USAID Mission Performance Plan, FY 2004-2009, <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/par05/highlights_052.html>.

[6] Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2009.

[7] General David Petreaus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," 10-11 September 2007.

[8] CBS news, 60 Minutes interview of General Stanley McChrystal by David Martin, 27 September 2009.

[9] "Ethiopian Famine, 1984-1985," Wikipedia.org.

[10] JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7, "Instrument of Power. All ways and means — diplomacy, informational, military, economic (DIME)."

Back to his Roots

by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe and Dr. Troy J. Sacquety



^ **CASE STUDY** Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi observes a class at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. *U.S. Army photo.*

Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi, the chief of operations for the Afghanistan National Army, or ANA, returned to his special-operations roots at Fort Bragg, N.C., Feb. 10-11.

Karimi attended the United States Army Special Warfare School, the forerunner of today's JFK Special Warfare Center and School, in 1973 as a student in the Special Forces Qualification Course. The Special Warfare School was only one of a number of international military schools Karimi attended. Following his graduation from the Military Academy in Kabul, he attended the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, United Kingdom, and was its first Afghan graduate. After training in Great Britain, he came to the United States, where he completed Airborne, Ranger and Special Forces training and attended the Army Command and General Staff College. In India, he attended the intelligence-officer training and the National Defense College.

Following his foreign-military training in the 1970s, Karimi returned to Afghanistan to serve in what became a communist-dominated Afghan army. After the coup of 1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, he was imprisoned for having a Western education. After enduring 15 months of torture and captivity in a 6-foot-by-6-foot cell with four other men, sharing a single blanket in winter, Karimi, by then severely crippled, was released. Despite the ordeal and his physical condition, Karimi was not discharged from service and was denied retirement pay. After two years of recuperation, during which time he worked with the communist military, Karimi elected to assist the mujahedeen in driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan. When the Taliban seized power, Karimi and his family fled to Pakistan. Though granted asylum in the U.S. through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees shortly before 9/11, Karimi chose to remain in Pakistan to await the outcome of the American effort to topple the Taliban regime. That proved to be a wise decision.

Faced with a dearth of experienced professional officers to lead conventional brigades and divisions, the Afghan government realized the necessity of restoring Soviet-trained former officers to command positions. Those with the formal military training, experience and leadership skills necessary to command brigades and divisions were rare commodities. Karimi was recalled to active service in 2003 as the ANA G3, where his expertise was put to the test in increasing the Afghan Army from 100,000 to 172,000 by the fall of 2011 as part of the U.S.-led coalition exit strategy.

The need to balance Afghanistan's two major ethnic groups was another reason for Karimi's recall.

Karimi, like Lieutenant General Mohammad Akram, who headed the communist Afghan Army's southern regional command in the early 1990s, is from the Tanaie tribe of ethnic Pashtuns in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency. The ANA chief of staff, General Bismullah Khan Mohammadi, a former aide to the late mujahedeen leader Ahmad Shah Masood, is Tajik. The presence of members of both groups in the senior ranks helps reduce perceptions that the ANA is dominated by Tajiks, whose militias overthrew the Taliban with American assistance in 2001 and currently dominate the ANA officer corps.

Fluent in Pashtu, Dari and English, the highly respected, well-educated Karimi advocates national unity. In early 2006, he "raised the flag" about resurgent al-Qaeda and Taliban threats in Afghanistan, citing specific examples of increased terrorism and drug-trafficking. American SOF in-country faced the realities of that phenomenon, but it was two years before the U.S. and NATO shifted priorities back to Afghanistan from Iraq. Late in 2006, Karimi implored Pakistan to post more troops along the porous border to reduce al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltration and to strengthen cross-border counterterrorism operations with the Afghan military.

Progress toward that end was finally achieved on March 29, 2009, when the Tripartite Commission, composed of military officers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and coalition forces in Kabul, met to break ground for the construction of the Khyber Border Coordination Center on the border of the Nangarhar Province. It was the first of six tripartite coordination centers planned along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The commander of the Pakistani XI Corps, Lieutenant General Masood Aslam, commented: "Both of our countries have suffered the maximum for the last eight years … and we … have been the victims of all types of all terrorism for over 30 years." Karimi joined him and Major General David Rodriguez, commander of Regional Command East in Afghanistan, in planting three small trees to symbolize the long-term partnership of Afghans, Pakistanis and international forces.

The lessons in foreign internal defense and development that Karimi learned at Fort Bragg nearly 40 years ago have stuck with him: "Since 2003 and 2004 we have been shouting loudly that fighting alone will not bring peace. We need to bring about reconstruction for the people … while rebuilding and creating a sound administration, so that security measures can move parallel to reconstruction. We need to win the people's hearts and minds, because as one of our proverbs goes, 'You cannot build communities by force.' "

While Karimi was able to share that sage advice with the troops at Fort Bragg, he was also able to regain some of his documents that were destroyed while he was imprisoned. Lieutenant General John Mulholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presented Karimi with new diplomas from Ranger School and the Special Forces Qualification Course, as well as a Yarborough Knife, enabling the general to put some missing pieces of his past back together. **SW**

Dr. Charles H. Briscoe is the chief historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Dr. Troy J. Sacquety is a historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

^ **LOST AND FOUND** Lieutenant General John Mulholland presents Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi with diplomas from Ranger School and the Special Forces Qualification Course. *U.S. Army photo.*

Education Opportunity

Board to consider applicants for NPS, ISP

The board to consider Soldiers in Army special-operations forces for attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS, and the Interagency Studies Program, or ISP, will convene the week of July 12.

NPS is an 18-month program open to ARSOF officers, warrant officers and NCOs. The school conducts two cycles: winter (January start) and summer (June start). Applicants must specify whether they are applying for a winter or summer start.

ISP is open to commissioned officers in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces. The program, taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., runs concurrently with Intermediate Level Education and ends in late July or early August so that personnel will arrive at their new assignments in late summer.

Target groups this year for both programs are CA and PSYOP officers in year groups 1999, 2000 and 2001; SF officers in YGs 1998, 1999 and 2000; SF warrant officers in grades CWO 3 and CWO 4; and CA, PSYOP and SF NCOs in the grade of master sergeant and sergeant major, or sergeant first class with a waiver.

There are some additional considerations for ARSOF NCOs:

• Must be on active duty.

• Must have completed the NCO educational programs appropriate for grade and years of service.

• Must not have more than 22 years of active federal service, as of the report date to the academic institution.

• Must possess a bachelor's degree from an accredited institution.

• Master-sergeant applicants must have completed 24 months as a team sergeant.

• Sergeant-major applicants must have completed 12 months as a company sergeant major.

• Must have remaining enlistment equal to or greater than three times the length of the requested schooling.

• NCOs will incur a three-year additional service obligation and will be slated by the command sergeant major of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to serve in a key utilization billet following graduation.

NPS application requirements are:

• Obtain an academic profile code from NPS.

• Have an undergraduate grade-point average of 2.5 or higher.

• Obtain transcripts from all educational institutions.

• Complete DA Form 1618-R.

• Submit a copy of the latest enlisted or officer record brief.

• Submit a letter of recommendation.

• Submit copies of the applicant's last three evaluation reports.

SF warrant officers must be in grades CWO 3 or CWO 4 and have less than two years time in grade.

PSYOP officers assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group must have a letter of endorsement from the group commander or his representative.

CA officers assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade must have a letter of endorsement from the brigade commander or his representative.

Applications from officers in Military Intelligence must have a letter of recommendation from the G2 of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Applications from NCOs must include a letter of recommendation from the applicant's group command sergeant major.

ISP application requirements are:

• Obtain transcripts from all educational institutions.

• Submit a copy of the latest officer record brief.

• Submit a letter of recommendation.

• Submit copies of the last three evaluation reports.

• Submit an essay of 500 words titled, "How Interagency Studies Will Contribute to My Career Goals and Strengthen SOF's Defense Contributions."

Application packets for both programs must be submitted to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Force Management by June 30; no late packets will be accepted. DFM, in coordination with the Army Human Resources Command, will determine the applicant's eligibility.

E-mail packets to Jeanne Goldmann (goldmanj@soc.mil) in PDF or TIF format, or mail them to: Commander; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; ATTN: AOJK-SP (Ms. Goldmann); Fort Bragg, NC 28310. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922 or commercial (910) 432-6922.

SF Warrant Officers Needed for Active, NG Units

Special Forces NCOs who seek greater opportunities can apply to become SF warrant officers. Some opportunities available are:

• Serving in a direct, ground-combat leadership role as the assistant detachment commander of a detachment.

• Spending an average of five additional years on a detachment.

• Leading specialized teams in advanced special operations, counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and other missions, as directed.

• Serving in joint, strategic, operational and tactical assignments at all levels of planning and execution of special operations worldwide.

• A critical skills accessions bonus of $20,000 for eligible active-duty Soldiers and $10,000 for members of the National Guard.

For more information, go to www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html. Applicants can also get assistance by contacting the unit senior warrant officer or by contacting CWO 3 Bobby Craig in the Directorate of Force Management: DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to craigb@ahqb.soc.mil.

CARNAGE AND CULTURE:
Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power



DETAILS

Victor Hanson
New York: Anchor, 2002.
ISBN: 978-0385720380 (Paper)
544 pages. $16.95.

Reviewed by:
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Petersen
U.S. Air Force
Air Land Sea Applications Center

In his book, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*, Victor Hanson has penned a highly readable, although sometimes controversial view of the Western military tradition as being a direct offshoot of the values inherent in Western civilization.

The central lesson of the book is that the West's rise to dominance was no accident. Hanson contends that Western military prowess over the centuries has been the result of "larger social, economic, political and cultural practices that themselves seemingly have little to do with war." He argues that Western nations have "a long-standing Western cultural stance toward rationalism, free inquiry and the dissemination of knowledge that has its roots in classical antiquity."

Hanson describes important historical battles to present ideas about the foundation of Western civilization and its cultural values in contrast to those of Asia, Africa and South America. The vignettes are employed to address overarching issues, such as the reasons why Europeans colonized undeveloped areas of the globe. The author also provides theories as to why Western values now seemingly dominate the world.

Central to the book's theme are the notions of individualism and civic militarism — ideas that were developed exclusively in ancient Greece. In fact, Hanson attempts to relate every facet of history to the ancient Greeks. He contends there is a distinct "Western way of war" that began in ancient Greece and has brought Western nations victory over non-Western ones ever since. The essential features of Western warfare, Hanson argues, are deeply rooted in Western culture. Individualism encourages initiative on the battlefield, free markets lead to technological innovation, and democracy (which gives soldiers a stake in the battle's outcome) accounts for the West's preference for ruthless, decisive warfare.

The book describes nine battles — from Salamis in the 490s B.C. to the Tet Offensive in 1968 — that illustrate the Western way of war at work. Each case study describes the battle and attempts to provide reasons for its outcome. Hanson's sources are neither extensive nor completely up-to-date, but they're solid and authoritative, and the case studies are entertaining.

Though historians and military experts could surely debate the exceptions and minor details of Hanson's examples, he generalizes in order to present the underlying fundamental elements with clarity. Indeed, at one point he acknowledges, "Although important exceptions should always be noted, generalization — so long avoided by academics out of either fear or ignorance — is indispensable in the writing of history."

In essence, Hanson's view is that there is no clearer example of the differences in ideas and values that form the basis of cultures than in the clash between East and West on the battlefield. What is clear, however, is that once developed, the West — ancient and modern — has placed far fewer religious, cultural and political impediments to natural inquiry, capital formation and individual expression than have other societies, which often were theocracies, centralized palatial dynasties or tribal unions.

Hanson points out, "Western armies in Africa, Asia and the Americas, as soldiers everywhere, were often annihilated — often lead by fools and placed in the wrong place in the wrong war at the wrong time. But their armies, for the cultural reasons this book has outlined, fought with a much greater margin of error than did their adversaries." He further contends Western armies "enjoyed innate advantages that over the long duration could offset the terrible effects of imbecilic generalship, flawed tactics, strained supply lines, difficult terrain and inferior numbers." Hanson submits that these advantages were immediate and entirely cultural, and that they were not the product of the genes, germs or geography of a distant past.

Even if you end up questioning some of Hanson's conclusions, you will not easily dismiss the strength of his ideas. Overall, the book is a worthwhile read, and the points it makes are informative and thought-provoking. **SW**

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK-DTD-MP
2175 Reilly Road, Stop A
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited • Headquarters, Department of the Army • PB 80-10-3

PIN: 086267-000

U.S ARMY PHOTO