

Special Warfare

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**STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT
OF SOF IN A
UW ENVIRONMENT**

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
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Special Warfare

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As the new commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, I am happy to be back. It has been some years since I was assigned to the schoolhouse, but in that time, it has maintained and built upon its image as the university for special-operations forces.

During the last four years, my predecessor, Major General James Parker, and the Soldiers and civilians at SWCS have done an amazing job of transforming the training pipelines, incorporating technology into our instruction and increasing the output of training courses to meet the demand for personnel in the force. Training courses are now shorter and more relevant to the current environment, and, as two of the articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* show, students are able in many cases to access or download materials that allow them to prepare beforehand or actually accomplish portions of their training by distributed learning.

SWCS' progress is impressive, but challenges remain.

As we expand ARSOF, we need not only to train new Soldiers but also to work on retaining the experienced Soldiers we have. I am encouraged by the recent creation of the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations branches as a good step toward improving career progression and the management of personnel. The skills of CA and PSYOP Soldiers will be increasingly important in the future. We must also ensure that as we fill the force, we further qualify Soldiers with the advanced skills they will require. The SF groups are pleased with the graduates that we produce, but making sure that we get Soldiers trained in advanced skills will also be a challenge as we increase the size of the force.

In this issue, Major General John Mulholland discusses the successes of ARSOF in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. In another article, retired Colonel Joseph Celeski examines the strategic uses of special-operations forces and the various ways that our UW skills can contribute to achieving national objectives. By studying and discussing the ways we contribute, he says, we can update concepts for use in the future and ensure our relevance and strategic niche.

I second the comments of both these warriors. As commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, I have seen our SF Soldiers perform admirably all over the globe. Their success in working with host-nation and coalition forces is a tribute to their training, adaptability and hard work. We do what we do better than anyone in the world, but we can never become complacent in our success. We operate on a battlefield that changes 24 hours a day, and we must always be alert to changes in the environment and variations on the threat. We will not be given time to get ready for the next test.



Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIER AWARDED DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

A Soldier from the 7th Special Forces Group was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross during a ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., April 30 for valorous actions during Operation Enduring Freedom.

In his 20th year of military service, Master Sergeant Brendan O'Connor, formerly a senior medic in the 2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group, was presented the award while he stood before family, friends and fellow Soldiers.

"For the men who were with him that day, Master Sergeant O'Connor is a savior," said Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander of the United States Special Operations Command. "For all Americans, he is a hero, and for all members of special operations across the services, he is a source of enormous pride."

O'Connor was instrumental in keeping his team alive during an intense battle with more than 250 Taliban fight-

ers in southern Afghanistan on June 22, 2006. While making a temporary stop during a patrol, his team and their attached Afghan National Army soldiers were attacked from all sides with small-arms fire, heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, recoilless rifles and mortars.

During the 17 1/2 hours of sustained combat that followed, O'Connor and his team fought off wave after wave of Taliban attackers from a group of small compounds, fighting for their lives against insurgents who were intent on killing or capturing the beleaguered defenders. Much of the combat was so close that the defenders of the compounds could hear cursing and taunting from the enemies who swarmed the perimeter.

After hearing two Soldiers were wounded at another location, O'Connor removed his body armor and low-crawled under heavy machine-gun fire to treat and extract his

wounded comrades. O'Connor then carried a wounded Soldier back to a safer area, again passing through intense fire.

"I don't think that what I did was particularly brave," said O'Connor. "My friend needed help, and I had the opportunity to help him, so I did. I think I'm lucky to get this sort of recognition; there are so many other Soldiers who do similarly brave things overseas and are happy with just a pat on the back when they get home."

O'Connor is the second Soldier to be awarded the DSC for actions taken during Operation Enduring Freedom. The first was a 5th SF Group Soldier, Major Mark Mitchell, in 2003. The DSC is the second highest award for valor, surpassed only by the Medal of Honor.

"I've never been more honored, but this medal belongs to my whole team. Every member was watching out for the other, inspiring each other, and for some, sacrificing for each other. We all fought hard, and it could just as easily be any one of them standing up here getting it pinned on; every one of them is a hero."



Green Beret earns MacArthur Leadership Award

The General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Awards were presented on May 14, 2008, to 28 Army officers at the Pentagon by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George W. Casey.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Robert Hunt, assigned to the 1st Special Forces Group at Fort Lewis, Wash., was recognized as one of the finest leaders in the U.S. Army when he was presented the General Douglas MacArthur Award.

Hunt, the only active-duty warrant officer selected for the award, stated that receiving the award is "humbling." He went on to say, "I personally felt overwhelmed to have been selected. When you look at the people that are past winners, it hits you what my superiors thought of me. The name Douglas MacArthur means a lot."

The road Hunt traveled to be recognized was long and arduous. In the 1st SF Group, Chief Hunt has served on separate deployments to Afghanistan, the Philippines and Iraq. Among his credits on his latest deployment to Iraq were advising two Iraqi battalions.

However, the dedication to his men may be Hunt's greatest

attribute. Wounded on two separate occasions on his recent tour in Iraq, Hunt continued to fight. He was evacuated to Germany after his vehicle struck the second IED. Against the advice of family and doctors, Hunt insisted he be returned to Iraq to finish the tour of duty with his SF team.

Hunt said the reason for any success he has can be found in those he works with.

"You aren't anything without the people around you," said Hunt. "I don't think it's me. I've been fortunate to work with people who brought out the best in me."

The General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award recognizes company-grade officers who demonstrate the ideals General MacArthur stood for — duty, honor and country. The award promotes and sustains effective junior-officer leadership in the Army.

Twenty-five company-grade officers and three warrant officers were selected for the presentation of the 21st annual General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award. (USASOC PAO)

SPECIAL FORCES MIA AWARDED SILVER STAR

The search that began more than 41 years ago to find a Special Forces sergeant missing in the jungles of Vietnam led to the presentation of his Silver Star Medal to his mother April 19.

Staff Sergeant Roger Hallberg was the point man March 24, 1967, on a mission deep behind enemy lines, when a force estimated to be in the hundreds ambushed him and the men of SF Detachment A-302. Hallberg, who led a counterattack while the main element pulled back, was never heard from again, but his actions that day saved the lives of other Americans and the indigenous force that he was working with. He was later listed as missing in action.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, presented Hallberg's medal to his mother, Doris Cobb Hallberg, on a pier at Yerba Buena Island, Calif., next to the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *George Cobb*, which is named for her father. In 1896, Cobb rescued three sailors off California's Point Bonita, where he was a lighthouse keeper. For his heroism, Cobb was awarded the Silver Lifesaving Medal, the Coast Guard's equivalent of the Silver Star. Csrnko described the family as "amazing," and said that Cobb and Hallberg "are cut from the same cloth."

Anne Hallberg Holt, sister of the missing Soldier, said that even though it was a "sad situation" that linked the heroism of her grandfather and her brother, she is proud of the accomplishments of both men. But while the awarding of the nation's third-highest medal for valor "brings some resolution" to what happened to her brother, she said, it does not bring closure.

Retired Captain James P. Monaghan followed Csrnko. Monaghan served with Hallberg in Vietnam. During his speech, Monaghan described a combat rookie's typical reaction to an ambush and that Hallberg was not that type of person.

"When the U.S. is at war, we can manufacture and purchase the best and most expensive weaponry in the world," said Monaghan. "But you can never purchase (Hallberg's) courage."

Hallberg's family first received word of his status in 1967 while they were living in Venezuela. The head of the family, Lewis Hallberg, was stationed there while working for Chevron Oil. It was there that the search for information regarding Hallberg's

incident began.

"As time went on, I hoped they would find him," said Doris. "I kept thinking, 'Where is he?'"

A few years later, the Hallbergs moved back to the United States. In a quest that led the family from the North Vietnamese consulate in France decades ago to Washington, D.C., the Hallbergs carried on a search for information on Roger Hallberg's disappearance.

The hunt for those who might be able to shed some light on the situation took a positive turn about five years ago when the Hallberg family met with John M. Throckmorton, a former Special Forces Soldier who was serving with Hallberg on that early spring day in 1967. In talking with the Hallbergs, Throckmorton realized that the award recommendation he had submitted for Hallberg years before had never made it through the system.

In a letter re-recommending Hallberg for the award, Throckmorton described the hell he was last seen in.

"I witnessed (Staff Sergeant) Hallberg expose himself to this intense fire in an effort to coordinate an effective response. At least twice he ran through the maelstrom to deliver tactical information to (Captain) Stewart. He then fought his way forward, returning to his troops in an effort to rally them and mount a coordinated response to the enemy. It looked as if he were running through a blizzard of confetti, which in fact was leaves, bits of bark and clumps of earth churned up by enemy fire," wrote Throckmorton.

That was the last time Roger was seen alive. His actions diverted the attention of two battalions of communists long enough to create an opening through which his comrades escaped. After a day spent evading the enemy, the Americans and Vietnamese partisans were safely evacuated from the area by helicopter.



▲ **EARNED HONOR** The family of Staff Sergeant Roger Hallberg receives his Silver Star. Hallberg disappeared 41 years ago in Vietnam. U.S. Army photo.

Hallberg and his commander were placed on MIA status shortly after the mission.

Tough and determined

Holt describes her brother as a "tough and determined" individual who could overcome anything he set his mind to. Hallberg started his career outdoors as an Eagle Scout and later graduated from the University of Oregon with a degree in forestry.

It was Hallberg's determination that led to his siblings' mission to find out what happened to him.

With the help of Throckmorton, the family has been able to direct the Joint Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Accounting Command, or JPAC, to the area where Hallberg was last seen.

In the search for her brother, Holt says she has become an advocate in spreading the word on prisoners of war and those missing in action. She has spoken publicly about her brother across the country in an effort to make people aware of POWs and MIAs.

"There is no closure for us," said Holt. "We cannot give up. This chapter is not closed until everyone comes home."

With the help of Throckmorton and JPAC, the Hallberg family may soon get word on the status of their brother and son. JPAC has informed them that next year, a mission will be searching the area where Hallberg was last seen. (1st SF Group PAO)

USASOC REMEMBERS FALLEN HEROES

Rain mixed with tears from family and friends of fallen special-operations Soldiers as the names of their lost loved ones were unveiled on the memorial wall at the United States Army Special Operations Command's annual memorial service for fallen special-operations warriors.

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, the USASOC commanding general, hosted the event. "Today ... we honor our nation's greatest heroes, 32 special-operations Soldiers who, during the past year, answered our nation's call and gave their life preserving freedom and our way of life," Wagner said.

"Their image, and your image, reflect what is absolutely the very best of America, courageous heroes who knowingly and selflessly serve our nation to preserve our way of life," Wagner continued. "We gather to honor [these] men and women of uncommon courage, valor and service, and the families and communities who reared, nurtured and instilled the values that matured youngsters into the character of American heroes."

The names of more than 800 heroes are inscribed on the wall, men and women who have served in such far-flung countries as Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Glenda Penton of Defuniak Springs, Fla., the mother of Sergeant Timothy Padgett, said dealing



▲ **MEMORIES** A family member points out the name of a loved one killed in service during the past year. U.S. Army photo.

with the grief of losing her son proved difficult.

"Families deal with grief in different ways, and sometimes through the pain and hurt there are some negative things that come out," Penton said. "I found my healing comes more from reaching out and continuing to give. That's what helps my heart to heal."

Padgett, a Special Forces medical sergeant with the 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, was killed May 8, 2007, in Afghanistan, when his patrol was ambushed by enemy fighters.

As the last roll call of the fallen Soldiers was

read, the memorial wall was unveiled. "This is not an easy moment," said Wagner. "But it is forever a proud moment."

As memories of loved ones swam through families' thoughts, Wagner assured them that their loss will never be forgotten.

"With all that is pure in America and the world, the absolute and lasting truth is that our fallen Soldiers are good men of the highest order," he said. "Their service was selfless. They are our friends, our heroes, and they will remain in our hearts and memories forever." (USASOC PAO)

Night Stalkers welcome new commander

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment welcomed a new commander as Colonel Kevin W. Mangum relinquished command to Colonel Clayton M. Hutmacher during a ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky., May 27.

"Let there be no doubt this is the most complex and advanced aviation regiment in the world," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, who presided over the ceremony. "And you have been well commanded for the last 36 months each and every day by Mrs. Mangum and Colonel Kevin Mangum."

Wagner told the crowd of Mangum's proven combat leadership, courage, judgment and quality of service.

"As with many other leaders and Soldiers whose successes you have enabled and whose lives you have saved, your service is legendary," he said.

In his farewell remarks, Mangum reflected on his time as a Night Stalker and recognized his Soldiers and their families, including his own.

"Having spent my proudest moments of my life as a Night Stalker, this great organization

defined who I am in many ways," he said. "Being part of a high performance team opened my eyes to what is possible and how to reach out and achieve it."

"Here I learned how to fly, how to lead, how to listen, how to lead a complex organization and what genuine and sincere care is and how to provide it," he continued. "In short, I am a better commander, a better pilot, a better Soldier and a better man as a result of my Night Stalker experience."

"Night Stalkers, it is an honor to serve among men such as (you)," said Hutmacher. "Collectively you represent everything that I hold dear as a Soldier. I look forward to serving you over the next few years."

"There is not a more qualified, combat-proven, experienced commander to replace Kevin than Clay Hutmacher," said Wagner. "We have every confidence in you."

"This is another historically proud day for the regiment as one great command team replaced another," Wagner concluded. "But the heart, the character, the standards of excellence that define the regiment have remained absolutely unchanged."



▲ **IN CONTROL** Lieutenant General Robert Wagner passes the colors of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment to the regiment's new commander, Colonel Clayton M. Hutmacher. U.S. Army photo.

USASFC WELCOMES NEW COMMANDER

Brigadier General Michael S. Repass took the reins of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command from Major General Thomas R. Csrnko during a ceremony on Meadows' Parade Field, Tuesday, June 17.

Repass, a West Virginia native and a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, was serving as the deputy commander of Special Operations Command-Europe, in Stuttgart, Germany, prior to being tapped to lead the SF command.

"I am humbled to be in command of the new legends of our regiment," said Repass, who counts among his awards one Legion of Merit and two Bronze Star Medals.

"I look into the crowd and see a handful of great Special Forces officers, warrants and NCOs with whom I have served," said Repass.

"Many are easily my equal or better, but I happen to be the lucky one standing here."

"I've worked with (Major General) Csrnko twice, and it's an honor to follow in his footsteps," said Repass. "It's great to see your faces, and I'm honored to be your commander. I will always endeavor to remember that much is expected of me in this command."

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, hosted the event. Wagner noted that Repass and Csrnko are "career-proven professionals" who are well-equipped to execute their respective assignments.

Wagner explained during his remarks that under Csrnko's watch, the command deployed more than 33,678 SF Soldiers, on 943 deployments to 93 countries and 37 states, adding that there has not been a day during his tenure when fewer than 3,500 SF Soldiers were in combat.

"I stand here today because of the mentors that raised me in the Army and the Special Forces community," said Csrnko.

"The hardest duty for the past two years was officiating at the funerals of our fallen warriors," said Csrnko, who has



▲ **THE PASS** Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, the incoming commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, passes the SF colors to Command Sergeant Major Mario Vigil, signifying his acceptance of command, during the change-of-command ceremony, June 17, 2008, at Fort Bragg, N.C. Major General Thomas R. Csrnko relinquished command to Repass. *U.S. Army photo.*



attended a number of funerals over the last few years. Csrnko asked the crowd to join him in a moment of silence to remember those fallen warriors and their families.

"It has been my honor and privilege to command and walk within your ranks for the past two years," said Csrnko of the thousands of men he has commanded within the SF community.

Csrnko, a graduate of Indiana University of Pennsylvania, left to take command of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. "I look forward to the challenges of the Special Warfare Center and School," he said. *(USASOC PAO)*

▲ **TALKING POINTS** Brigadier General Michael S. Repass addresses his troops after accepting command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. *U.S. Army photo.*

Csrnko takes command of SWCS

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School welcomed a new commanding general while saying farewell to another in a change-of-command ceremony at Meadows Parade Field June 20.

During the ceremony, Major General Thomas R. Csrnko assumed command from Major General James W. Parker. Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, hosted the event. Wagner and Parker expressed confidence in Csrnko's experience, calling him the ideal person to command SWCS.

"Tom Csrnko is eminently qualified and the exact person to command the center and school," Wagner said.

Parker, who retired later in the day, noted that it was usually hard for him to pass on the guidon, but this was different.

"It was much easier this time, because I knew it was going to exactly the right person and exactly the right officer to take the Special Warfare Center and School to the next level," Parker said.

Csrnko was commissioned into the Army in 1974 from Indiana University of Pennsylvania with a bachelor of science degree. He relinquished command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command June 17.

Among Csrnko's first words as commanding general of SWCS were those of gratitude, honor and excitement.

"It's an honor to return to USAJFKSWCS as the commander," Csrnko said.

He said he was grateful to Wagner for entrusting him with the task and thankful to Parker for helping him through the transition.



▲ **AT THE HELM** Major General Thomas R. Csrnko accepts the guidon from Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, as Major General James W. Parker looks on. *U.S. Army photo.*

"I am very excited to be retuning home," Csrnko said.

"This will be my third tour back in the Special Warfare Center and School, and I look forward to the challenges before us."

The ceremony could not end without honoring Parker and his contributions to the command. Wagner recapped SWCS's progress under Parker's command with a 20-item list of accomplishments, but Parker gave all the credit to those who have supported him during the past four years, the Soldiers and civilians of SWCS.

"If there was a Department of Defense award for innovation in training and training transformation, it most certainly would have to be awarded to Jim, the Soldiers and civilians of SWCS," Wagner said.

Csrnko ended the ceremony by saying, "God bless this great institution, and God bless America. De Oppresso Liber!"

Csrnko is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Infantry officer basic and advanced courses.

His awards and decorations include two Defense Superior Service Medals, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, eight Meritorious Service Medals, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Joint Service Achievement Medal, two Army Achievement Medals, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Special Forces Tab and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge. (USASOC PAO)



▲ **FAREWELL** Major General James W. Parker addresses his troops one last time during the change-of-command ceremony June 20 at Meadows Parade Field. *U.S. Army photo.*

Counterterror coordinator

Mulholland leads CENTCOM's special-operations forces in the war on terror

Major General John F. Mulholland Jr. assumed command of Special Operations Command Central, or SOCCENT, June 22, 2007. Before taking command of all special-operations forces in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, he was the deputy commanding general of the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. In March 2008, Mulholland was nominated for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and given a follow-on assignment as the commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg.

Mulholland graduated from Furman University in 1978 with a bachelor's degree in history and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in Infantry. His first assignment was to Fort Clayton, Panama, from 1979 to 1980, where he served as a rifle platoon leader in Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 20th Infantry, 193rd Infantry Brigade. From 1980 to 1982, he was rifle platoon leader and weapons platoon leader in Company A (Airborne), 3rd Battalion, 5th Infantry, at Fort Kobbe, Panama.

In 1983, he completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and then graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course. He then was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, where he served as a detachment commander and as a company commander from 1984 to 1986. Mulholland returned to Panama from 1987 to 1989, where he was appointed current operations officer and later exercises and ground operations officer in J3 (operations), Special Operations Command South, U.S. Southern Command.

He attended the Defense Language Institute and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from Janu-



ary 1990 to June 1991.

From June 1991 to 1993, Mulholland served with the 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, at Fort Bragg as operations officer and later as executive officer.

Following his tour with the 7th SF Group, he served as an assistant operations officer, deputy operations officer and operations officer with the 1st Special Forces Operational Detach-

ment-Delta until June 1996.

Mulholland commanded the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, U.S. Army Pacific Command in Torii Station, Japan, until June 1998. He then assumed a battalion-level command within the U.S. Army Office of Military Support in Washington, D.C., until August 2000, when he attended the National War College in Washington, D.C. He assumed command of the



▲ **TRAIN UP** United States Special Forces Soldiers work hand-in-hand with Afghan commandos to train them for their role in the ongoing fight against terrorism. U.S. Army photo.

5th SF Group at Fort Campbell, Ky., in July 2001, and in October of that year became commander of Task Force Dagger, Joint Special Operations Task Force North, during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

He later served as commander of Coalition-Joint Task Force West and then Coalition-Joint Task Force-Arabian Peninsula during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In August 2003, he was assigned as chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. From August 2005 through July 2006, Mulholland served as commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. From August 2006 until June 2007, he served as deputy commanding general of the Joint Special Operations Command.

Mulholland's military awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Joint Service Achievement Medal, Army

Achievement Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Valorous Unit Award, Special Forces and Ranger tabs, Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Pathfinder Badge, Master Parachutist Badge and Military Free-fall Parachutist Badge.

Q: A great number of our coalition partners have special-operations forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan. What are some of the biggest take-aways from the current operations on coordinating with coalition special-operations forces?

A: The major coalition SOF contributors in Afghanistan are the Romanian SOF contingent and the United Arab Emirates.

Romanian SOF have provided support to medical civic-action programs and dental civic-action programs throughout Regional Command West. Mainly ROMSOF medical personnel support these missions.

The UAE has provided more than \$9 million to humanitarian-assistance missions during this past year and more

than \$34 million in total assistance to the Afghan people.

Some of their recent projects include the building of more than 200 residential homes in the Kabul area and the construction of the University of Khowst, which has been recently completed and is scheduled to open next month. Currently, the UAE is working on constructing multiple mosques in support of the Afghan commando program, the end state being one mosque per commando location.

Q: Among special forces in the region, how would you characterize the relationship with the Jordanian Special Operations Command? Do you share similar relationships throughout the region?

A: The Jordanians continue to provide a showcase example of the special-operations relationships in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, or AOR. Our long-standing efforts to train special operators in Jordan have been a great benefit for both the Jordanian Special Operations Command and our

own special-operations forces. This vital partnership goes far to promote our political and security interests in the region. Similar relationships are being developed in a number of other countries within the AOR.

Q: Can you tell me about the training of the Iraqi and Afghani special-operations forces [or commando forces]? How would you rate their growth along the capability curve and their ability to perform independent operations?

A: The focus of coalition special operations right now is to ensure that there is a collective synergy with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and fielded forces. Close coordination between NATO's International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, the Ministry of Defense and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan remains critical as we combine our efforts toward the same objectives. As Afghan forces become more established and capable, it will be imperative that our coalition special-operations forces develop solid partnerships so we move forward together.

As always, a key objective is to deliberately enable and empower the Afghan forces to eventually plan and conduct operations independently. Coalition special-operations forces provide valuable mentorship and training through close partnership with Afghan units. The Afghan National Army Commandos are an excellent example of progress in this area, as they are taking increased responsibility in certain areas of the country. They have shown initiative and proven their effectiveness on the battlefield under the mentorship of SOF mentors and trainers.

The same objective is true for Iraqi forces. We build capability through close partnerships with Iraqi SOF and SWAT forces. Our partnership begins from the stand up of a new unit, through that unit's training and certification, and ultimately to responsible, effective, independent operations. This is our operational construct.

Our primary partner in Iraq is the Iraqi Special Operations Force, or ISOF, Brigade. The ISOF Brigade has

made significant improvements over the past year and is capable of independent operations at the battalion level with U.S. SOF advice, assistance and enablers. They have proven themselves as the most professional and competent Iraqi force, and they'll continue to improve the overall security situation in Iraq. We are in the process of expanding the ISOF Brigade with four additional regional commando battalions, providing an additional ISOF capacity throughout Iraq.

In addition to the ISOF Brigade, SOCCENT forces are partnered up with Iraqi police elements, forming Iraqi special weapons and tactics, or ISWAT, units in nine Iraqi provinces. These ISWAT units provide a provincial counterterrorist capability to react to threats throughout the provinces. The current capability varies among the different ISWAT units, with some in the initial stages of development and others fully capable with U.S. assistance and enablers. As the ISWAT program develops, we see the units taking on a primary role as first responders at the local level.

In Afghanistan, our main effort is the training of Afghan commandos. As I've said, our commando program has been extremely effective. We continue to steadily improve the screening, training and employment of commando candidates. The commando program is an excellent place to showcase the progress Afghanistan has made toward establishing functional and effective forces to provide for their own security. These enhanced light-infantry units are doing great things in eastern Afghanistan, and they are beginning to independently plan and conduct their own operations.

Q: Where in the process is the restructuring of CENTCOM/SOCCENT to move the Horn of Africa into AFRICOM/AFRISOC?

A: Over the past year, three mission transfer conferences have occurred between AFRICOM and the supporting combatant commands and their components. Several more of these planning conferences are scheduled for the remainder of this fiscal year to facilitate a positive mission transfer and the

stand-up of AFRICOM component commands. SOCCENT is currently working with USCENTCOM to transfer specific missions, activities, plans and programs to SOCAFRICA, the future SOF component command of AFRICOM. SOCCENT and SOCAFRICA staff members will ensure a seamless transition of our current command-and-control element in the Horn of Africa to SOCAFRICA.

Q: USSOCOM has been on the receiving end of a few MRAP trucks. In general terms, do you think that heavier, armored vehicles have a long-term place with special forces?

A: In general terms, I would say that the heavier armored vehicles certainly have a long-term utility for certain types of special-operations missions. Special operations often seek a delicate balance between maintaining a small footprint, mobility and armor. There are some missions that require a level of mobility and discretion that can make larger armored vehicles impractical.

Q: Although no SOF V-22s are in theater, have any of your people had any operational experience on the MV-22s there?

A: To my knowledge, the SOF variant of the Osprey, the CV-22, has not been used operationally. I believe the MV-22 is currently being used by conventional Marines in Iraq.

Q: There have been some transformational changes with the SOF training pipeline in recent years. U.S. SOF have also been growing. With the combination of these two elements, have you noticed any differences in the warriors that are coming out of the pipeline more recently?

A: I cannot speak to the level of training for the entire U.S. SOF community. However, I am very proud of the warriors that I have the opportunity to work with in the USCENTCOM AOR. The quality of these warriors and the tactics they employ in accomplishing their missions are world-class. **SW**





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Not your team sergeant's ANCOC

USAJFKSWCS-NCOA
SF ANCOC
Distributed Learning

MOTIVATOR

Supervise AOB Operations
Lesson 1 of 2
PFN# ANCO0027

We served as the final rehearsal, and launch site for several large company operations. We also provided C2 and additional support to ODA's that were in prolonged contact.

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^ **HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY** The Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course is taught predominately through the use of distributed learning. *U.S. Army photo.*

By SFC Rob Dufresne

Special Forces are front and center in the war on terror. Soldiers serving in SF units are among the most deployed Soldiers in the U.S. Army. With a high op tempo that appears to have no end in sight, the cadre at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, started looking for a new way to train its Soldiers — a better way. That research and innovation by the cadre has resulted in a transformation of the Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Officer

Course, or ANCOC, that is unparalleled in today's Army.

The transformation effort by the NCO Academy has laid to rest the old summary of the NCO Education system: "200-plus years of tradition unencumbered by progress." In its place is a new tradition, one which saw Special Forces Soldiers putting their ingenuity and adaptability to the test as they redesigned the ANCOC from the ground up. Charged by the SWCS commanding general to inte-

grate the latest technology throughout the school house, the cadre of the NCO Academy began researching not only how to shorten the course but also how to make it accessible from anywhere in the world.

The result is a Special Forces ANCOC that has revolutionized the way academies and trainers throughout the Army are beginning to view each aspect of NCO education. What follows is a short narrative on what has been done with the course, as well

▲ **WORLDWIDE** Through distributed learning, Soldiers enrolled in the SF Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course can take the majority of their classes anywhere in the world. *U.S. Army photo.*

as a primer on what today's prospective students and their leaders should know.

An academic revolution

In almost every appreciable way, the NCO academy's cadre has taken SWCS' tradition of excellence and made exponential improvement upon it. They've clear-cut much of the former curriculum and replaced it with operationally focused, leader-nominated, operator-demanded training that fits what SF Soldiers in the mountains of Afghanistan,

the jungles of the Philippines and the deserts, roads and cities of Iraq actually require.

What's more, they've taken an introspective inventory of not just what is being taught but how it is being taught, in an effort to take full advantage of the most relevant traditional training and the most applicable modern adult-learning theories.

In short, this is not your team sergeant's ANCOC. Today's course is designed to better prepare mid-career NCOs to be the senior leaders of tomorrow.

Fight globally – learn globally

The course that once required more than four months of temporary duty at Fort Bragg is now self-paced and offered 60-percent online, to keep Soldiers where they belong — either in the fight with their unit or at home with their family.

Students now have up to 12 months to finish Phase I (Web-based instruction), and Phase II is just 15 days of resident classes at Fort Bragg, N.C. We think we've got the formula right. We don't take any



The role an AOB serves in our current Operations is never set in stone. It never acts solely as a logistics center, radio relay site, or staging base.



▲ **TIME TABLE** Once enrolled in the online ANCOC through SWCS, Soldiers have one year to complete the course. *U.S. Army photo.*

more of Soldiers' time than we need, but the instruction they receive is better than anything the academy has ever offered.

Now graduates of SF ANCOC are fully qualified to perform a myriad of tasks traditionally done only by team sergeants. Students receive extensive professional development and senior-leader mentorship. They graduate ready to counsel their juniors, write NCO evaluation reports and assist the team sergeant by writing training concepts, calendars and plans.

Students are also equipped with

the knowledge and skills necessary to be a full partner during operational planning at multiple echelons, up to and including joint assignments. To that end, each student learns to apply both the artful and scientific aspects of the military decision-making process, or MDMP, to real-world scenarios.

Students learn to employ the software suite — Special Operations Mission Planning Environment-Ground, or SOMPE-G — that is used by operators and staffs at all levels in special operations to perform detailed mission

planning. SOMPE-G includes Adaptive Planning Software, which is used to write orders that result from the MDMP, and Falconview, software that allows two- and three-dimensional mapping for use in mission planning and targeting. Using what they have learned, students produce concepts, plans and orders for a variety of lethal and nonlethal operations.

Phase I

This is the distributed learning, or DL, phase. SWCS uses Blackboard™ as the vehicle to make our online in-

struction available to any student who has access to the Web. If you've ever taken an online college course, odds are you've already used Blackboard. It's robust, user-friendly and is widely held to be the "gold standard" in on-line education.

Numerous students have already completed Phase I in part or in its entirety while deployed to the Philippines, Afghanistan or Iraq. Gone are the days when getting an ANCOC slot forced a Soldier to drop what he was doing to report to the academy without regard to his unit's activities or his family's plans. This new approach to ANCOC gives Soldiers and their leaders a greater degree of flexibility and the freedom to choose when the student will attend the resident phase. There simply hasn't been a more accommodating approach to education in the history of Army NCOES.

Once NCOs are enrolled, they can access their courses from virtually anywhere in the world. We use the Worldwide Web to transcend geographic boundaries, to overcome resource inadequacies and to extend the academy's reach to the regiment. Even in a combat theater, if you have Internet access, you have access to your instructors, your classmates and every reference resource the classes require.

That being said, we are not focused only on making ANCOC more widely available. Two of our primary goals from the outset were to improve the quality of instruction and to increase both the incidence and the effectiveness of student-to-student as well as student-to-instructor interaction within each of the classes. To achieve this, we use instructor-advisers. Students are guided through Phase I by former team sergeants of the active-duty group with which they're associated.

For example, Master Sergeant Mike

Keifer, a former 10th Special Forces Group team sergeant, now instructs DL for each of the 10th SF Group's students. That provides a foundation of firsthand knowledge upon which we provide tailored mentorship on issues peculiar to each group. But it doesn't stop there. All five group instructor-advisers interact closely with students in order to encourage a thorough "cross-pollination" of knowledge, tactics, techniques and procedures, and lessons learned.

Additionally, students are encouraged to share their knowledge via the class forums. Each assignment requires students to write a response to various scenarios. Those responses are posted online, and other students must comment on the response on the basis of their own experience. This give and take allows the students to share their experience and lessons learned with one another.

Phase II

The three-week resident phase of ANCOC consists of 15 days of training. In this phase, small-group leaders, or SGLs, provide face-to-face guidance and facilitate student learning. Master sergeants all, our SGLs provide direct leader development and mentorship in the traditional sense but double as "platform instructors" for the most advanced curriculum we've ever taught. Our instructors are hand-picked for their knowledge, presence and pedagogical prowess — all long-held hallmarks of the Special Forces Soldier.

In Phase II, we apply Phase I knowledge and SOF leader skills in a dynamic and collaborative environment. Our culmination planning exercise, or CPX, challenges each student in multiple, varying leadership roles — forcing them to use previous experience, apply new

knowledge and make decisions in a time-constrained environment. This practical application of knowledge-based skills cultivates mastery of the course material and affords excellent retention of the lessons.

At the end of Phase II, each graduate will be Level I-certified in the Modern Army Combative Program. Integrating combatives into ANCOC physical training is just another in a series of steps taken toward harmonizing this new curriculum with the warrior ethos.

A "learn-ahead" philosophy

While others can access the material through ARSOFU, only students enrolled in the course will be given access to tests, forums and receive credit for completing the course.

How can one get enrolled? To be eligible for Phase I, you must be a staff sergeant with at least one year's time in grade and hold an 18-series MOS. Your unit schools NCO is responsible for submitting your name to the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, or ATRRS. That being said, your command sergeant major and sergeant major might be better suited to describe the schools process within your unit.

The NCO Academy does not enroll you into ATRRS. We look at ATRRS to see who has been slotted for ANCOC and enroll those prospective students into Blackboard. We then e-mail a letter welcoming students to SF ANCOC and give them 15 days to log on and confirm their "seat" in the class. Those who log on are in the course; those who do not are dropped from ATRRS and will have to be re-registered by their schools NCO at a later date.

ANCOC online vs. college

SF ANCOC distributed learning is like any other schooling that's avail-

able online — only better. Although we use the same courseware that most of the major universities use, we develop 100 percent of our content in-house. Nobody understands SF guys like SF guys. Each of our 106 lessons was designed and developed by veteran SF senior NCOs with operators in mind. Our instructors stake their reputations on their products, and the result is an unparalleled body of interactive multimedia instruction.

After having solicited feedback from educators and trainers — military and civilian — who hail from a wide variety of backgrounds and professions, we're confident that our online classes are as good as or better than any online education you'll find.

excel, as many have already done. Still, the consequences of failing to meet the Phase I requirements within 12 months could be a career spoiler. A student who is dropped from the course will receive a negative Academic Evaluation Report (DA Form 1059).

The dropped student must wait one year to be re-enrolled and must re-negotiate Phase I in its entirety. The course may be new and improved, but it's still ANCOC. Take it seriously.

All extension requests must be signed by the first O6 in a student's chain of command. Extensions may be granted in rare cases where the student has a legitimate reason for not completing the coursework on schedule. However, don't count on an extension if you've done nothing

doesn't matter whether you attended SF ANCOC recently or back when the course was a veritable PCS move. You'll be happy to know we've left you a key under the welcome mat.

Access our REACHBACK module on the academy's Web site, and you'll have access to all of our online instruction, minus the exams and discussion threads. We hope you'll use these tools to keep your leader skills sharp, to develop your men or to review. Send us your suggestions in order to keep the academy's instruction on the cutting edge of what the detachments need.

Need more information?

For class dates, points of contact and more detailed information about

“SF ANCOC distributed learning is like any other schooling that's available online — only better . . . Nobody understands SF guys like SF guys. Each of our 106 lessons was designed and developed by veteran SF senior NCOs with operators in mind. Our instructors stake their reputations on their products.”

Deadlines closer than they appear

Having given students 12 months to complete Phase I, we're obligated to warn you: Be proactive! Don't let deadlines hold you hostage. Start early and work often.

Most students could finish Phase I within a few months if they tried; those who fall behind are not always able to catch up. If you fail to finish in the allotted 12 months, there are serious consequences. If you finish early, however, you may request an early Phase II slot.

Can you fail ANCOC online?

In a word, yes! But you can also

for the first 10 months and suddenly come up with a legitimate excuse during your last two. Time management is something you should have learned long before you attend ANCOC.

A lifetime of learning

When lives are on the line, one must never be satisfied with his current breadth of knowledge or level of expertise. Our profession requires that we hone our skills and maintain the ability to recall information from as far back as the qualification course, even as we continue to learn new things during our second decade on the A-detachments.

If you're an ANCOC graduate, it

the NCO Academy or its digital initiative, visit <https://training2.soc.mil/SWCS/NCOA/>. There's much more to learn about today's SF ANCOC and its transition to the Senior Leaders Course and beyond. For distributed learning questions not answered on our Web site, call 1-800-268-0054.

Sergeant First Class Robert E. Dufresne is an instructor/writer at the SWCS NCO Academy, where his primary duty is to author and develop content for distributed learning. He was formerly assigned to the 1st Special Forces Group, and he has served 16 of his 19 years in the Army as an SF Soldier.



Strategic employment of SOF in a UW environment



by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army (ret.)

“Do SOF improve strategic performance?” The question is a fundamental test when considering the use of special-operations forces in a strategy or campaign plan. It also serves as a key departure point for educating our joint component commanders to properly employ SOF during operational war-fighting. We often tell them that SOF is a strategic force and conducts strategic missions, but what do we mean?

With regard to unconventional warfare, or UW, we often repeat the “by, with and through” mantra diligently memorized and ingrained within our community, but that is not necessarily the best answer when discussing operational art and strategy. When tasked to plan and prepare a UW campaign, we cannot afford to be thwarted by the creation of a strategic mismatch — in which our ways and means for UW cannot achieve our ends. While SOF are extremely adept at the execution of guerrilla warfare, that is but one arrow in the quiver of the wide scope of activities we could accomplish with a UW campaign plan.

This thought-piece is intended to further the SOF community’s discussion of the purpose of UW in the context of strategy and operational art. It is a product of the author’s own research, analysis and desire to spur commentary. It is meant to inform planners and future strategists who may need to consider UW options in their theaters of operation. It will be through informed dialogue at the operational level that we can convince senior, joint-force commanders to consider adopting UW as a line of operation.

STRATEGIC ROLE OF SOF

To help frame the discussion of whether SOF’s function is strategic, we should first ascertain the reason why our nation, or any nation, creates SOF. SOF are created for a variety of reasons: as a countervailing force (direct action) for executing critical deterrent and punitive missions (and thus also providing an inherent psychological deterrent to the enemy who may fear their use); as elite infantry for conducting raids and specialized, albeit tactical, missions; as anti-access forces (intervention, placement, access,

etc.); as palace guards and regime protectors; and as instruments of foreign policy to further the political goals of the nation-state.

The true strategic use of SOF rests primarily on their use as a countervailing force (if they have the capability to maneuver globally as a national security tool), and secondarily on their use as an instrument of foreign policy. SOF are normally used as instruments of foreign policy when large, conventional military formations are not desired or the political risks dictate that SOF, which can be used with discernment, are the best option. When used as an instrument of foreign policy, SOF most often perform the missions of foreign internal defense, or FID; combating terrorism, or CbT; or UW — all indirect forms of applying strategy.

STRATEGIC UTILITY

For SOF to remain in the “strategic” domain, they must demonstrate strategic utility and lend themselves to achieving strategic performance. To paraphrase the eminent strategist Colin Gray, most SOF organizations struggle for correct employment to gain or achieve strategic utility because of the lack of unified, persuasive and sound SOF theory upon which senior decision-makers can understand their usefulness.

In terms of theories of conflict, SOF conduct activities in conventional war (strategies of annihilation and attrition) and in unconventional and irregular warfare (strategies of exhaustion and erosion). We are well-schooled and-educated in the war theories of state-on-state, force-on-force Clausewitzian and Jominian constructs for wars of annihilation. In order to understand indirect forms of war, SOF intellectuals expanded their knowledge of conflict theory through studying Sun Tzu and perhaps the German theorist Hans Delbrück to understand the complexities of war of exhaustion — the “war of a thousand cuts.” (Mao did not produce his book on guerrilla warfare in a vacuum; to develop his protracted, people’s warfare, he synthesized what he had studied in classics from theorists on wars of exhaustion.)

Editor’s note: This article reflects many of the issues incorporated into the creation of the latest version of FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (September 2007) and FM 3-05.130 ARSOF UW (currently in final draft). The latest doctrine explains that UW is, in fact, strategic in nature and is no longer exclusively directed toward regime change (as traditionally accepted). The concept of using UW against nonstate actors (which includes violent extremists like al-Qaeda) is addressed in the classified portion of FM 3-05.201. Under the current ARSOF definition of UW, only operations conducted “by, with or through irregular forces” constitutes UW. When the philosophy “by, with or through” is applied toward regular state forces of a country or partner nation, it is associated with foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency or coalition operations.



▲ **FLAG BEARER** Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, operate in Afghanistan. *U.S. Army photo.*

From wars of exhaustion sprang theories on political warfare — attacking an enemy regime’s politics, economic system, psychology, ideology and resources. Political warfare is generally warfare without a declared war and without the intervention of the state’s military forces. However, even in political warfare, the need sometimes arises for political violence or for minimal military power and action, applied indirectly (this is where surrogate and proxy warfare reside). It is in this realm that UW fits nicely.

U.S. SOF achieve strategic utility when they operate within the framework of a strategic concept. The employment of SOF will achieve greatest strategic utility when resources (means) are sufficient to strategic concepts (ways) for achieving theater strategic aims and objectives (ends), thus improving overall strategic performance.

A strategic concept outlines the necessary arrangement of resources in time and space to achieve strategic objectives. The concept provides direction and boundaries, and it answers the questions who, what, where, when and why. It is a clear and cogent expression of the joint

force special-operations component commander’s intentions for accomplishing the mission, given his available SOF resources.

Strategic concepts include the following organizing mechanisms: the commander’s intent (with objectives and desired effects), a phasing construct, directions for SOF command-and-control arrangements, the commander’s desired organization of SOF in theater, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, and joint functional concepts (the arrangement of all elements of service SOF for achieving maneuver, fires, intelligence, etc.). The best SOF strategic concepts combine integrative concepts for using cumulative effects, achieving persistent presence and highlighting nonlinear and indirect capabilities. (Again, UW is most useful here.)

Regardless of the strategic concept chosen, SOF achieve strategic utility when they accomplish at least one of the following:

- a. *Improving the performance of conventional forces.*
- In theory-of-conflict models, SOF conduct activities in



▲ **THE HEALER** A Special Forces medic interacts with Afghans during a medical clinic. Clinics such as this one help to counter insurgency by building the host-nation government's ability to meet the needs of its people and thereby increasing its legitimacy. *U.S. Army photo.*

conventional war that augment and support conventional forces and contribute to the accomplishment of the campaign. All SOF core tasks can be accomplished in the execution of this strategy to achieve a synergistic effect with conventional forces. Often, this type of campaign is linear.

SOF achieved this strategic utility through the clandestine actions of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II to support Allied maneuver. In operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, SOF achieved strategic utility as the “glue” that held the coalition together while serving as coalition-support teams and conducting cross-border operations to support conventional maneuver.

The contributions SOF have made to American military and political efforts in counterinsurgency, or COIN, during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are another example. In the COIN role, SOF are not the main effort. They will perform in a supporting or economy-of-force role, and they very rarely achieve the strategic objective based on their own activities. The strategic concept for COIN operations will evolve from conventional strategy and campaign plans.

b. *Serving as a lead in covert or clandestine activities (UW).* Enabling proxy, surrogate or guerrilla forces is

also an indirect strategy. It is used in an environment of political warfare in which SOF achieve strategic utility by enabling the performance of others to conduct political, economic, ideological or military actions against a common enemy (generally within the milieu of the populace).

SOF achieved strategic utility during the opening of the OEF campaign when an SO-centric course of action was chosen for overthrowing the Taliban, recapturing the main population centers and enabling the placement of an interim government. SOF helped achieve U.S. political and theater strategic military objectives through guerrilla warfare by maneuvering elements of the Northern Alliance resistance movement, in conjunction with covert and clandestine activities.

The national strategic objective for SOF in this role is to achieve U.S. political objectives of overthrowing or replacing a competing regime. In the 21st century, SOF may contribute to subversion, sabotage and the defeat of attempts by violent extremists to create alternate states, such as al-Qaeda's caliphate. Violent extremists may possess all the characteristics of a belligerent state — leadership, ideology, organizational structure, financing, resources and a support system, with armed militants serving as their pseudo-army. (It is worth noting that, in documents posted



▲ **THE TEACHER** Carrying out foreign-internal-defense missions, Special Forces Soldiers instruct the armies of foreign governments to bolster their security. U.S. Army photo.

on-line, al-Qaeda has called on its associates to conduct “political warfare” against the West.)

c. *Preventing war or conflict.* By supporting regional engagement; theater security-cooperation plans; presence; security-assistance missions; FID; and joint, combined exercises for training, or JCETs, SOF help to attain strategic objectives of ensuring stability and security in many regions of the world. The strategic goal for SOF is to enable our allies and partners to enhance their performance in achieving their own security objectives, which are often consistent with U.S. objectives.

If SOF cannot assist in deterring war or conflict, they then assume the mission of conducting activities to keep the conflict from developing into a larger war (i.e., improving partner performance), precluding the need for the deployment of main combat forces. SOF’s strategic utility in this role is one of deterrence, containment, enabling partners and alliance building.

POLITICAL WARFARE AND UW

It is in precluding the deployment of a major military force, or during non-war or lack-of-conflict periods, that we return to the discussion of political warfare and UW’s

purpose. Political warfare is as old as the history of non-military belligerence between states. Political warfare can also find its roots in war-of-exhaustion/war-of-erosion theories. Political warfare is the use of aggressive political actions by one regime or government against another’s political system, ideology, beliefs, economics and resources. Brian Michael Jenkins is a former Army SF officer who founded RAND Corporation’s research program on international terrorism in 1972 and now is a senior advisor to the president of RAND. In his commentary titled “Strategy: Political Warfare Neglected” in the *San Diego Union-Tribune* on June 26, 2005, Jenkins wrote:

Few Americans understand political warfare, which, in its broadest sense, may encompass everything other than military operations, from assassination to political accommodation. Reversing Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is the extension of politics by other means,” political warfare is the extension of armed conflict by other means.

The aim of political warfare is to wear down or exhaust the morale and matériel assets of the opposing system in order to cause its destruction, capitulation or replacement, all the while furthering one’s political aims and achieving one’s national objectives. The attributes of political warfare



▲ **FIRING LINE** Afghan Special Forces practice firing at a range under the watchful eye of their American counterparts. *U.S. Army photo.*

consist of the use of elements of a nation's power and the struggle for the capture of the populace (who are needed to support and sustain the regime in question).

Great Britain brought the art of political warfare to its modern context by combining political actions with indirect military actions. Political-warfare activities began during World War I, when England developed procedures for wearing down German military and civilian morale, seeding disinformation and attacking resources that the German government needed to sustain its war effort.

As a result of the success of those procedures, England officially established the Political Warfare Executive, or PWE, as one of the strategic means of conducting indirect warfare against the Axis powers during World War II. As an auxiliary function to military action, PWE was called the fourth fighting arm of the three strategic services. Armed action cells of the Special Operations Executive deployed to conduct activities ranging from collecting intelligence and spreading propaganda, to sabotage and the sponsoring of resistance and guerrilla organizations that hastened the downfall of the Axis governments (in consort with conventional maneuver).

It was in this hothouse of ideas that the Office of

Strategic Services, or OSS, learned its UW lessons. All of the activities taken covertly and clandestinely in order to conduct political warfare were passed on to SOF and the CIA after World War II, but forgotten in the transfer were the theoretical and intellectual underpinnings of this type of warfare.

Thus, political warfare is an attempt of one regime or government to create the eventual downfall or diminution of another — all steps taken to exhaust or erode the opposition and to deny them their supporting populace. When political actions alone cannot achieve one's objectives in political warfare, then a catalyzing agent of violence is added to the mix, often conducted covertly or clandestinely. State-sponsored terrorism, assassination, subversion, sabotage, surrogate and proxy warfare, and insurgencies are the violence catalysts of political warfare.

While America prefers using diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law-enforcement means to achieve its national objectives, other competing regimes may focus on violent activities to achieve their aims of destabilizing other nations or blackmailing them into acquiescence. What military ele-

ment of national power might America use to advance its political and social goals during political warfare?

SOF is an instrument of foreign policy and thus is the perfect military tool in the tool-kit for political warfare. We use UW as the offensive component of maneuver and FID as the defense component of maneuver (protecting our allies or friendly regimes) when conducting political warfare.

UW THEORY AND PURPOSE

A theory is a belief or a way of thinking, that tends to hold true. The reason for a UW theory for SOF is to prevent our misuse and better inform us as to what constitutes an unconventional operation and its purpose. The author's proposed theory of UW for SOF is: the employment of specifically trained UW forces of SOF as one of the military components of the elements of national power and as a strategic instrument of foreign policy, in order to further the demise of a foreign government, enemy regime or nonstate actor. All operations are conducted under the aegis of SOF offensive maneuver and bounded by principles embodied in war of exhaustion/erosion conflict theory.

That it may predominantly comprise tactically maneuvering "by, with and through" does not mean that every time SOF conduct an activity by, with and through it constitutes UW. It constitutes UW only if the purpose of the offensive maneuver is to achieve the strategic aim of the demise or wearing down (protracted warfare principles) of a foreign government, enemy regime or nonstate actor.

For example, training indigenous troops on another continent to shoot or maneuver better strengthens the host nation's capabilities, but if its aim is not for the purpose of the demise of a foreign government, enemy regime or nonstate actor, it is probably not UW and should not be confused as such (more appropriately, it is FID). The same goes for maneuvering with auxiliary forces in COIN in support of main maneuver forces in defense of a friendly government — FID, not UW.

CONCLUSION

UW provides an indirect capability that is consistent with the requirements outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review. UW also allows us to conduct what Edward Luttwak calls relational maneuver — maneuver by weaker or smaller forces lacking resources and firepower — to take on larger and more powerful forces. The weaker force, by necessity, must maneuver and remain highly adaptive to seek out the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the enemy's structure, doctrine and contextual environment. Relational maneuver corrects for the imbalance in force-on-force ratios, striking blows where the enemy is found to be weakest and where they can achieve the highest payoff.

Relational maneuver also allows us to counteract the strategies of our opponents in an irregular-warfare environment. Within any irregular opponent's strategy lie the

essential elements (asymmetric weapons) that the adversary combines in unique ways to achieve his objectives. These elements consist of: time, space, will, legitimacy and, in today's environment, criminal business enterprises (support). UW, as a strategic concept, counters these enemy essential strengths.

We have before us complex challenges that require us to think more broadly about how we may continue to use UW: Is it UW to subvert and sabotage violent extremists' goal of providing social services to a populace? Can we counter with a holistic, developmental strategy for undermining enemy attempts to create alternate governance (Civil Affairs UW)? Is it UW to sabotage the corner cyber-cafe used by jihadists? Can we create guerrillas from academics and local businessmen, as surrogates or proxies?

Do we need to create an OSS-like media capability for ideological warfare? How do we subvert the will of the enemy populace? Where does UW fit into human-influence operations? What will be our new strategic/operational unorthodox UW techniques? Can UW be solely used to achieve a strategic *coup de main*? What are the requirements for a global UW infrastructure, and how do we build it?

These are speculative questions, but perhaps as we have discussions, forums and symposiums on where we are with UW, a new set of ideas will emerge to help us maintain the quality niche we have in conducting UW for the nation. Of greatest importance will be developing updated UW concepts and doctrine and identifying the UW capabilities and resources that we will require in the future.

Do we need to establish joint, UW task forces as command-and-control organizations (functionally or organizationally), as outlined in our SF doctrine of the 1960s? We might also explore the need for establishing a UW enterprise, along with a UW knowledge center, to capture the wider aspects of political warfare, study conflict-of-exhaustion theories, publish scholarly papers on the subject, and maintain a myriad of other resources needed to remain relevant and provide for the intellectual growth of our SOF strategic thinkers.

By, with and through ... Is it always UW? Is this phrase purposeful for explaining SOF operational art? Perhaps, but not always.

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army (ret.) is a SOF senior fellow, instructor and research analyst for the Joint Special Operations University. He also serves in the Washington, D.C., area as a senior consultant for matters pertaining to irregular warfare. He is currently working in support of U.S. Central Command's UW initiatives as a senior strategist and campaign planner. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Columbus University in Georgia and a master's in public administration from Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania. He served as a Special Forces officer during his active-duty career, with duties throughout the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.



DELIVERING THE MESSAGE

by STAFF SERGEANT JESSE W. CARD

Editor's note: PSYOP use of video compact discs, or VCDs, began early in the Iraq campaign (2003). As the local populace increasingly had access to computers and DVD players, VCDs became an important means to reach target audiences and disseminate PSYOP messages. The use of this media continued in successive rotations. This article provides guidance on how to employ this medium for disseminating PSYOP messages.

In developing campaigns for psychological operations, or PSYOP, U.S. forces tailor their techniques to the foreign population. In Iraq, the enemy knows the target audience, or TA, better than we do, and if enemy operations are successful, we should take a lesson from their success that we can apply to our own operations.

One PSYOP technique that the enemy in Iraq uses regularly and to great effect is the distribution of their messages on video compact discs. VCDs allow the delivery of complex messages through a mixture of audiovisual ele-

ments that are easily understood by the TA. As with all PSYOP products, VCDs have limitations — their usefulness is limited by the TA's ability to view and understand them and by the ability of U.S. forces to disseminate them — but they certainly have their place within the spectrum of effective and available media.

Production requirements

1. Hardware and software:

The most significant limitations to the effectiveness of VCDs are related to the systems and software used to produce them. VCDs' quality is directly related to the quality of the resources their authors use. Video production puts high demands on a computer. Video-editing software programs specify the minimum system capabilities required for their use, but the specifications are the bare minimum. To avoid system crashes and to minimize the amount of time and other resources used in creating VCDs, the following system specifications should be considered minimal:

- A 4.3 GHz (or better) processor. A Pentium 4 processor is best for low-level video production.
- At least 1 GB of RAM. Anything less drastically increases the probability of system failure and the amount of time required for creating videos.
- 80 GB of hard-drive disk space, although more is always better. Files associated with video production take up a lot of space, so a large, dedicated drive is a must.
- A large monitor (capable of a screen resolution of at least 1024 x 768 pixels) is preferable in order to optimize organization during production and to bring previews nearer to the size and quality of a standard TV screen. Better still would be a dual-monitor system that would separate the video-editing workspace from the preview area.
- A FireWire card. All digital video is transferred via FireWire, so the PC used for video editing requires a FireWire interface port.
- A good video card. Video cards come in many different brands and with different specs. For processing video effectively, it is necessary to have

a separate video card, with at least 64 MB of internal video RAM, placed in an expansion slot — vs. a video card placed “on board” the motherboard. On-board video cards divert internal memory from program functions to monitor functions, distracting the computer in a sense. That can cause the computer to freeze or slow down when its underlying processes are disrupted. A separate video card with its own internal memory alleviates that problem.

- A DVD recorder. There is a difference between DVD-R and DVD+R, and most blank DVD/CD disks purchased by the Army are of the DVD-R type, which is good, because most computers and DVD/VCD players use that format. Be sure to buy a DVD-R burner or one that reads both types.

- Windows XP or higher. This is a must for running any modern video-editing software.

- A separate disc-copying system. It takes far too long to create hundreds of VCDs one at a time on the installed DVD/CD or an external one. Having a separate system for copying is preferable.

The system used for VCD production should be dedicated only to VCD production and associated tasks (e.g., image-editing, voice-recording and disc-burning). It is inevitable that users will gradually add more programs and/or peripheral devices to their systems. More programs running means less processing power, so the lack of a dedicated system will make a loss of operability more likely. Regardless of the speed and abilities of the system, video creation is a lengthy process, so remember to save files often!

Video-editing software changes as quickly as any other software, and newer software usually means better production capability. Avid and Adobe Premiere Pro are both good choices, but the Adobe program interfaces well with Adobe Photoshop, one of the programs often used by PSYOP personnel for image editing.

2. Training:

There is a good reason why video production is a separate military occupational specialty: There is a lot to learn, and Soldiers can always learn more about making videos

better and more effective. The more training PSYOP personnel receive in this area before deployment, the better, and it is always good to have instruction manuals available for the program(s) being used. Here are some suggestions for making VCDs to be used in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility:

- There are two standards for pixel-aspect ratios: The North American-standard National Television System Committee, or NTSC, and the European-standard Phase Alternating Line, or PAL. PAL is standard in Iraq and is also used in a large portion of the world. Videos created under either standard will have some “screen clipping” when they are viewed on systems of the opposing type. To prevent clipping of necessary elements, consider the following:

- 1) Create a sufficient border or dead space on the screen so that important data will not be clipped.

- 2) Format the project in PAL from the beginning and ensure that the final encoding is PAL, as well.

- 3) Format any images to match PAL prior to importing them into the video project. There are various ways of doing that, all thoroughly discussed in the video- and image-editing software manuals. Adobe Photoshop has available presets for PAL and NTSC products on the “Preset” drop-down list in the “New project” window. Another option is to click on the “Image” drop-down list and then select “Pixel aspect ratio.”

- Format the VCD so that it can be viewed on most local players. For examples of the best formats, look at the formatting of VCDs in circulation among the TA. The Roxio DVD/CD burning software has a movie-creation program that will allow authors to format VCDs in the same manner as the insurgents’ VCDs.

- For previewing products, it is good to have a local-purchase DVD player and TV that are programmed to PAL.

3. Video and still images:

Acquiring relevant video and still imagery is an issue that PSYOP personnel face in the production of all products. There really is no single asset dedicated to providing such images.

That gives the insurgents the upper hand, because they have the ability to film everything they do. When U.S. forces capture relevant and timely images, they are often classified, making them unavailable for use until a later date. By then, they may no longer be relevant. However, there are other sources for imagery:

- The Internet. This is a good resource for finding media, but often it will be too low-quality to be of any practical use — professional products should be expected. Another concern is copyright, which can prevent the use of many relevant images.

- Joint Combat Camera. JCC can be the best available resource for capturing images for PSYOP use; and developing a good working relationship with them is a must. Coordinate with them and the unit public-affairs officer early-on to discuss image requirements so that they will know what to look for.


- Cameras in the hands (or on the helmets) of the guys on the ground. Tactical PSYOP teams, or TPTs, have electronic-news-gathering kits, but they do not use them as extensively as they could. PSYOP elements do not always have dedicated TPT support, and there are not enough TPTs to capture even a small percentage of the significant events. Again, it is important to develop working relationships, because there is never enough communication between various PSYOP/PAO/information-operations elements. All these units have images, but they cannot provide them if they do not know you need them.

- Overdone effects. When filming video and applying effects and motion to still images, don’t overdo the effects. Techniques like zooming in and out and making images bounce all over the screen can be distracting.

4. Audio:

It is easy to underestimate the importance of the audio element, but poor audio will just as easily render a VCD ineffective as poor imagery will. All video-editing software includes applications for audio recording and editing. Here are some basic considerations for audio:

- Too much or not enough? This is determined by the quality/effectiveness



▲ **ADJUSTMENTS** The above illustration shows how adjustments can be made in the pixel ratio for use on VCDs. All adjustments are made in Adobe Photoshop.

of the video images and the complexity of the message. The “keep it simple” maxim applies more here than with the video — too much text could have the effect of sounding like the run-through of possible side effects at the end of a prescription drug commercial. If the imagery is good, just a few lines of text throughout the VCD may be all that is needed. If the imagery lacks the ability to portray a complex message on its own, then a continuous narrative may be necessary.

- **Sound effects.** As with the video, having too much going on with the audio can be distracting or, even worse, can make the product seem unprofessional. If the effect does not add to the effectiveness of the VCD, do not use it.

- **Background noise.** The music or background noise is a play on the subconscious. It sets the mood of the project and, depending on how it is used, may be the deciding factor in whether or not the audience is going to

sit through the whole thing. Make sure the music is appropriate for the target audience. If you have any uncertainty about using it, don’t.

- **Use the right voice.** People are either good at making audio recordings or they are not. The person whose voice is used for the recording must be able to articulate clearly, using a tone appropriate to the message. They must also be able to use a dialect that is easily understood by the TA and does not identify the narrator as a member of a group or nationality that the TA resents or mistrusts.

- **Tie it all together.** Mixing the volume and speed of the various audio elements is a delicate process, so take the time to get it right. Synchronizing the video to the audio can be tricky, but a well-timed audiovisual product in which all of the elements come together harmoniously is much more effective than one in which elements happen at random and are independent of each other.

Effectiveness of VCDs

Looking at what the enemy is doing in Iraq can be beneficial: They are part of the TA, so what they do will often be what we should be doing. The main benefit of using VCDs is that they allow PSYOP elements to compensate for the TA’s low literacy rate. Imagery can be placed in a logical sequence to better develop the message, ensuring that the TA will be guided to the desired perception.

A major limitation of VCDs is that the TA has to be able to play them. The good thing is that most Iraqis have a VCD player and a television set, and those who do not typically know someone who does. Probably the most significant factor affecting the TA’s ability to watch VCDs is the unreliable electrical grid in Iraq. It may not be feasible to use VCDs in all areas, but even in areas without public electricity, many homes have generators. In the



▲ **DISSEMINATION** An insurgent hands out video discs to local villagers. The footage was captured by American forces. Video discs are an effective means of spreading a message — one that insurgents have capitalized on. *U.S. Army photo.*

end, VCDs should compose only part of a comprehensive PSYOP program, but the production needs mentioned above must be met if the message is to be effective.

Disseminating VCDs

Dissemination is another major limitation to the VCDs' effectiveness as a PSYOP product. VCDs are larger and more fragile than paper products, not to mention more expensive and time-consuming to create. Because they will never equal the target-area saturation possibilities of a leaflet drop, it is necessary to determine during the planning phase how and where VCDs will be disseminated.

Though fewer in number than paper products, VCDs will more naturally be copied or uploaded to the Internet by the TA than any other product medium. The key is getting them onto

the streets. A few randomly placed as leave-behinds en route to or on the objective will help, but often the best way to disseminate them will be through trustworthy sources. A local resident can disseminate a stack of VCDs much more effectively among the populace than Soldiers can, perhaps even creating copies or uploading the files to the Internet themselves.

The point

VCDs are a cost-effective medium that is easily propagated and readily understood by the TA. To be credible and effective, they must be high-quality, and unless PSYOP elements have adequate resources for training and production, they run the risk of producing low-quality VCDs. Units also require a reliable dissemination system to get the VCDs from the shelf to the TA. While traditional paper, audio and

audiovisual products still have their place within a PSYOP program, VCDs have proven to be effective in Iraq, and they should be given more attention than they have received in the past. **SW**

Staff Sergeant Jesse W. Card is assigned to the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group. During his battalion's 15-month deployment to Iraq, he was the primary producer of video products for his detachment. He has also served in the 4th POG's 9th Battalion, with whom he deployed to Haiti for three months in support of Operation Secure Tomorrow and to Iraq for 13 months. His military schools include 37F Advanced Individual Training and Special Operations Language Training. He is pursuing a bachelor's in middle-eastern studies from American Military University.

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Welcome to ARSOFU

The **ARSOFU Portal** aims to be the central home for Special Operation's training needs. Access online courses, download training materials, conduct collaborative discussions with peers and subject matter experts via forums and much more.

To enter the ARSOFU Portal you will need to have an **AKO account**. If you do not have an account, you will need to create one before you can use this site. Click "create account" to be redirected to the AKO accounts page.

Getting Started

To get started click on one of the **Resource menu** items listed on the left. These links provide easy access to all the information you need to know.

At anytime you can login to the **ARSOFU Web Portal** or **Blackboard** by clicking on one of the login buttons located in the upper left corner of the site.

▲ **LOG IN** The ARSOFU Web site puts information in the hands of ARSOF Soldiers — no matter where they are.

ARSOFU: KEEPING THE FORCE CONNECTED

by Janice Burton

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is harnessing Web-based technology to keep its Soldiers in the know, even if they are sitting on a hilltop halfway around the world.

ARSOFU is a Web portal designed specifically for Army special-operations Soldiers. Currently there are more than 15,000 members. The site is geared toward sustaining Soldiers whether they are deployed down range or training in garrison. It's a collaborative site that offers everything from current news to lessons learned to language sustainment and downloads to forums. By utilizing

the site through their AKO sign-in, Soldiers can have a wealth of information in their hands.

The site has a myriad of features; however, the two most important features may be the forums and downloads. The forums allow Soldiers to share information either general to the special-operations community or specifically addressed to their military occupational specialty, or MOS. Each forum is moderated by a subject-matter expert who monitors the forums to ensure that security is not violated. The moderators are also available to answer questions and add content to the site when it becomes available.

As they do on the AKO site, members can choose to "subscribe" to a given topic or forum and receive an e-mail notification whenever a reply or new topic is addressed. All information posted on the site is unclassified. It is hoped that more Soldiers will also utilize the forums to interact with other special operators.

The other big draw for the site, the download section, may prove the most helpful to Soldiers in the field. Downloads available range from guides to many of the foreign countries to which Army special-operations forces deploy to anti-virus protection to language training. New



▲ **PODCASTS** Soldiers can also access podcasts via ARSOFU. U.S. Army photo.

to the site are podcasts, which feature lectures and classes given to students. These classes and lectures can be downloaded for later use.

As the Army begins to place greater emphasis on language skills, some of the more sought-after downloads may be the language familiarization courses. The courses provide 200 hours of familiarization in the 10 languages SWCS has adopted under its language transformation plan. The courses are designed to give Soldiers a head start on their language training, or they can be used simply as a refresher.

ARSOFU also has a wide array of podcasts that Soldiers can access. The podcasts vary in content from informational (an outline of the new Reserve Civil Affairs pipeline) to doctrinal (clips from the information-warfare lecture series sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command). The 18D forum has a number of podcasts that will benefit special-operations medics in the field. The podcasts serve as helpful “how-to’s” in a variety of medical skills. Like the language training aids, these podcasts

can be downloaded for quick reference or used as refreshers in the field.

Soldiers can also access doctrine and training manuals via ARSOFU. This one-click access to current manuals gives Soldiers in the field immediate access to information without the need to perform complex Web searches.

Soldiers enrolled in SWCS training will also use the portal to link to the Blackboard server, where they can obtain information and coursework from the classes in which they are enrolled or view transcripts of training they have completed. Additionally, Soldiers can find train-up materials on the site to prepare them before they enter the class. Soldiers who have already completed classes can also utilize the site for course refreshers.

The use of Blackboard in online training is commonplace at major universities around the world. By harnessing this technology, SWCS has changed the face of special-operations training, allowing Soldiers to spend time not deployed at their home station rather than on temporary-duty status for advanced schooling. The SWCS NCO Academy has been

a driving force in this arena. The academy cadre, under the leadership of Command Sergeant Major David Putnam, has developed a robust online training program that allows Soldiers to complete the majority of the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course online. Students have one year from the date of enrollment to complete the online portion of the course. Once that is completed, they attend a brief resident course at Fort Bragg. Online training allows them to spend more time at home station or to complete the bulk of their training while deployed.

The online ANCOC is taught in brief modules, and Soldiers are required to write responses to questions posed. Other Soldiers then comment on their posts, creating a forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences.

The Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations reserve officer courses were also recently transformed and placed on Blackboard. The use of Blackboard and online courses, again, allows Soldiers to train while at home station, resulting in less time away from their homes and jobs.

Once a Soldier has completed the course, he can go back to the information for a refresher. This reach-back capability gives Soldiers a source of reliable information that is in line with the latest doctrine and training.

Soldiers can also access professional reading materials, including *Special Warfare*, via the portal. *Special Warfare*, the Army special-operations professional-development publication, is published bimonthly.

Both the current and previous issue of the publication can be found on ARSOFU. The publication, in addition to being a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas, also contains career guidance, book reviews and updates on doctrine and the force. *Special Warfare* can be found online at www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag. **SW**

Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs language board

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has approved a policy establishing the assignment of language designation for active-duty Civil Affairs officers selected to attend the Civil Affairs Qualification Course.

The intent of the new assignment process is to ensure the individual Soldier's success by assigning the right language to the right Soldier in order to meet the demands of the operational force.

Language assignments will be based on objective qualifiers such as Soldier preference; cultural, career and life experiences; foreign-language history; previous civilian and military education; Defense Language Aptitude Battery scores; and the needs of the Army. CA officers selected by the 2008 ARSOF Accessions Board will be assigned languages by mid-summer and notified shortly thereafter of their language selection.

CA E7 assignments available

Soldiers who wish to explore new assignments should contact Master Sergeant Butler, Civil Affairs assignment manager, at 703-325-8399.

The following assignments are open to E7s:

- HHC, 2nd Cavalry, Vilseck, Germany.
- HHC, 2nd BCT, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
- HHC, HQ, 3rd Brigade Command, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
- HHC, 4th BCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.
- HQ, 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry, Fort Hood, Texas.
- HQ, 3rd Brigade Command, Fort Drum, N.Y.
- HHC, 172nd Infantry Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas.
- JFK SWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C. (two slots).

Civil Affairs recruiting

Civil Affairs is continuing to recruit qualified Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA PAM 611-21,

Military Occupational Classification and Structure. (See link below, sign in using your AKO user ID and password, then go to Chapter 10, 38B) <https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf>.)

Interested Soldiers should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, DSN 239-9697 or commercial 910-432-9697. The next Civil Affairs Accessions Board will be held in September.

Staff sergeants are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus of \$10,000.

For more information on the SRB, contact your local career counselor. The critical-skills re-enlistment bonus for sergeants first class and master sergeants has been approved. See your career counselor for eligibility requirements and information.

SWCS NCO Academy offers CA BNCOC, ANCO

The Civil Affairs Basic NCO Course and Advanced NCO Course are available at the SWCS NCO Academy. Soldiers should contact their chain of command and schools NCO for class seats and dates.

PSYOP

Psychological Operations language board

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, has approved a policy establishing the assignment of language designation for active-duty officers and enlisted Soldiers in Psychological Operations selected to attend the Psychological Operations Qualification Course and the 37F Advanced Individual Training Course.

PO officers selected by the 2008 ARSOF Accessions Board will be assigned languages by mid-summer and will be notified of their language selection.

PSYOP accession board

The 37F Accessions Board was conducted in May 2008 in order to select the best-qualified Soldiers for attendance in the PSYOP Qualification Course, or POQC, and reclassification to 37F, Psychological Operations. The panel consisted of command sergeants major and sergeants major from SWCS and the 4th Psychological

Operations Group. The panel reviewed 52 files to fill 35 training seats in the fiscal year 2009 POQC.

Files were grouped into three categories: best qualified; fully qualified; and never to reapply. After reviewing and grading the files, the board established an order-of-merit list. Of the 35 Soldiers selected, 13 were specialists; 14 were sergeants; and six were staff sergeants.

The selected files were forwarded to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command for processing and placing the Soldiers on assignment. It is important to note that even if a Soldier is considered best-qualified, his availability to attend the POQC will determine his class date. The next 37F Accessions Board is tentatively scheduled for late August or early September 2008.

For more information on a potential career in PSYOP and to submit a reclassification packet, contact the recruiters at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, www.bragg.army.mil/PSYOP, or telephone (910) 396-6533.

Warrant Officer

Warrant officers needed

Special Forces NCOs in the active and reserve components who seek greater opportunities and more responsibility can apply to become Special Forces warrant officers. SF warrant-officer recruiting efforts remain high in order to maintain the SF warrant-officer inventory as growth in the force continues. A critical-skills accession bonus, or CSAB, is available to those who complete the Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course and are awarded the 180A MOS. For eligible active-duty Soldiers, the CSAB is \$20,000, and for eligible National Guard Soldiers, the CSAB is \$10,000. Eligible Soldiers must meet the following prerequisites:

- Be a U.S. citizen (non-waiverable).
- Have a GT score of 110 or higher (non-waiverable).
- Be a high school graduate or have a

GED (non-waiverable).

Possess a "secret" security clearance (non-waiverable).

Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test in accordance with FM 21-20 and meet height/weight standards in AR 600-9.

Have at least 12 months remaining on the current enlistment contract.

Hold the grade of staff sergeant (E6) or higher.

Hold one of the CMF 18-series military occupational specialties.

Be no older than 46.

Have a minimum of 36 months documented experience on a SF A-detachment.

Attain a minimum score of 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or have a current Defense Language Proficiency Test score of 1/1 or higher (validated on DA Form 330).

Be medically fit and able to meet

physical standards for appointment.

Have letters of recommendation from current company, battalion and group commanders and from the unit's senior SF warrant officer.

Active-component applications must include a letter of endorsement from the commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and the command's chief warrant officer.

Applicants may request waivers for certain prerequisites. The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is the final authority for waiver requests for MOS prerequisites.

For more information, visit www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or <http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html>, contact the senior warrant officer in your unit or call the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency at DSN 239-7597/7596/1879 or commercial (910) 432-7597/7596/1879.

Enlisted

ARNG SPECIAL FORCES JOB OPENINGS

Army National Guard Special Forces is looking for highly motivated, qualified officers, warrant officers and NCOs who want to join its ranks after they leave active duty.

Positions are open in the 19th and 20th SF groups, with unit locations throughout most of the United States.

19th SF Group: Los Alamitos, Calif., (562) 795-2300/2317; Redwood City, Calif., (650) 369-2082; Fort Carson, Colo., (719) 526-8259; Watkins, Colo., (720) 250-2900; Columbus, Ohio, (614) 336-6630/6634/6477; Coventry, R.I., (401) 275-1101; Middletown, R.I., (401) 275-4711; San Antonio, Texas, (512) 968-4496; Draper, Utah, (801) 523-4290/4291; Riverton, Utah, (801) 878-5636/5633/5435/5626; Buckley, Wash., (253) 512-8623/8622; Kenova, W. Va., (304) 453-6351/6352; Kingwood, W. Va., (304) 791-4030.

20th SF Group: Auburn, Ala., (334) 887-8973/5541; Birmingham, Ala., (205) 957-2317/2350/2351; Decatur, Ala., (256) 308-3452/3453; Huntsville, Ala., (256) 883-7570/4156; Mobile, Ala., (251) 405-4930/4931; Ocala, Fla., (362) 732-1213/1214; Starke, Fla., (904) 662-3550/3317/3413/2012; Wauchula, Fla., (863) 773-0335; Chicago, Ill., (708) 824-5821/5822/5823; Springfield, Mass., (508) 233-7941; Glen Arm, Md., (410) 592-8788; Grenada, Miss., (662) 294-0056/0054/0304; Jackson, Miss., (601) 313-6774; Roanoke Rapids, N.C., (252) 537-3678.

For more information, contact your local RCCC personnel, call 1-800-Go-Guard or visit the Web site at www.1800goguard.com/special_forces.

Special Forces selected for pilot of Army Career Tracker

CMF 18 has been designated as one of two CMFs to pilot the new Army Career Tracker, or ACT. The ACT is designed to be a user-friendly tool for individual Soldiers to gather information about career choices available to them and map out short- and long-term goals for their careers. Leaders will be able to use the ACT as a counseling tool to inform and develop their subordinates with counseling and interaction on opportunities, key decisions and requirements for career progression. ACT will give Soldiers access to their administrative and training history and accomplishments via the professional-development module.

The system pilot, now in development, is scheduled to begin in September 2008 with selected individuals from Fort Bragg, N.C. The complete product is scheduled for implementation in 2009.

BLOODSONG!

Jim Hooper's *Bloodsong!* details the exploits of Executive Outcomes, or EO, the most successful private army in recent history, and their actions in Angola from 1993-1995.

Hooper tells his story through the eyes of the men of EO, who have a unique and unusual perspective of fighting on both sides of a bloody insurgency. He begins with their stories of supporting the Angolan rebels, or UNITA, while serving in the ranks of the South African Defense Force, or SADF, then explains how they came to switch sides and, as a private army, began helping their former adversaries (the Angolan government) defeat their longtime allies.

Hooper, a writer with extensive firsthand experience in many African sub-state conflicts, was the only journalist taken on active operations with EO. His articles about the company appeared in a wide range of publications, from *Jane's Intelligence Review* to the best-selling *World's Most Dangerous Places*, and he was asked by those in the book to write their story. The result is an excellent account of how a small, highly trained private army had an enormous impact on the insurgency in Angola.

Hooper introduces the main characters of the book by detailing their accounts as SADF special forces, reconnaissance commandos and pilots working covertly in Angola alongside the UNITA guerrillas, led by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi.


The UNITA guerrillas were struggling for democracy against the communist-backed (Cuban and Soviet) forces of the Marxist Angolan government, or MPLA. After harrowing accounts of guerrilla fighting and playing "cat and mouse" with the MPLA and Cuban forces, UNITA and the South Africans were ultimately effective in their guerrilla war, enough

so to finally bring both sides to the table after the end of the Cold War.

Both sides agreed to a cessation of fighting, a military drawdown and public elections. For the most part, the fighting stopped for the first time in almost 15 years, until the elections in 1992. After a controversy over rigging the election results on both sides, UNITA lost the national election by a mere 1 percent and proceeded to find justice by resuming the fight. This time, however, UNITA had the upper hand because the Cubans and Soviets were gone, and Savimbi had been hoarding an arsenal, using the diamond trade to upgrade and restock his forces. The MPLA desperately needed help and called on an unlikely group of men to come to their rescue — the very same people who had fought so effectively against them.

EO was founded as a "military advisory company," whose ranks consisted of experienced SADF soldiers, most having fought side-by-side with the UNITA rebels in Angola. As a private military company, EO was contracted by the Angolan government in 1993 to regain control of the valuable petroleum complex taken over by the rebel UNITA forces. After a decisive victory over UNITA forces and the return of the petroleum complex to the Angolan government, EO's actions became legendary and controversial because they were small in number and were an "outsourced" or mercenary army.

EO members were quickly labeled by the media and some of their South African counterparts as traitors. Nevertheless, EO was given an exclusive contract to train and advise a brigade-sized element of the Armed Forces of Angola to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the UNITA forces. EO's stunning success in beating and driving back the reb-



DETAILS

By James Hooper

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els forced UNITA to the table for negotiations and brought a temporary end to the conflict. EO's operations, however, were not without failures and losses, and many EO personnel were missing or killed in the conflict. Ultimately, EO was forced to leave the country as a part of the negotiations (a tribute to their effectiveness), and UNITA resumed hostilities once the United Nations troops were brought in and EO had departed.

Along with giving excellent accounts of the fighting that took place from the perspectives of the men on the ground and in the air wing, *Bloodsong!* also shows the side of a foreign internal defense/unconven-

tional-warfare mission that special-operations personnel will truly appreciate. The stories of working with the Angolan forces range from comic to tragic, and certain Angolan military leaders demonstrated a distinct lack of basic military knowledge and common sense that led to the deaths of their own men, as well as to those of EO personnel.

Hooper gives insight on how the men of EO could change loyalties and sides so quickly by explaining how many of them felt they were betrayed by Savimbi and UNITA for not accepting the results of the elections and complying with the terms of the cease-fire they had all fought for so courageously. Additionally, UNITA's tactics became more brutal and heavy-handed over time. By intimidating, torturing and murdering locals suspected of sympathizing

with the MPLA, UNITA showed that its ideology had begun to develop into something the South Africans would not tolerate.

Hooper also attacks head-on the question of the morality of using "soldiers for hire," claiming that EO's entrance into the conflict helped shorten it and brought the war to an end mainly by EO's hegemony. He counters those who are critical of using "mercenary" forces to intervene in conflicts by stating, "a philosophy that sees the butchering of innocents as preferable to the stability brought by a private military company is the same as to insist that terrorists — to include the perpetrators of the September 11 atrocity — should be engaged in meaningful discussion. God save the innocent from the sanctimonious."

Whatever EO employees may

have been fighting for — be it money, adventure, excitement, love of the job or resentment of UNITA — the stories of bravery, audacity, innovation and fighting for the man next to you are truly universal. The impact that this group of fewer than 300 men had on the outcome of the Angolan conflict was remarkable, and it will likely be examined by militaries all over the world for years to come.

Bloodsong! is solely an account of EO operations in Angola. Although it does give the reader insight as to how the company came into being, it does not give any account of other EO operations that followed in Sierra Leone, Congo and elsewhere that are at least as impressive and worthy of mention. *Bloodsong!* is highly recommended as a well-detailed account of the realities of a modern private army operating in a brutal guerrilla war. **SW**

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