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

CAN MILITIAS BE USED EFFECTIVELY?

CONTENTS

November - December 2007 | Volume 20 | Issue 6

ARTICLES

DEPARTMENTS

ON THE COVER
A local citizen provides security for a medical civic-action program in an Afghan village. Often groups of local citizens, or militias, when used appropriately, can help bring stability to an otherwise unstable region.
U.S. Army photo

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Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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One of the most challenging aspects of training Soldiers for special operations is adapting our training to widely varying mission requirements and trying to ensure that our Soldiers will be prepared for any situation they may encounter.

The articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* give some idea of the variety of ARSOF missions and the need for our Soldiers to think on their feet. One aspect of ARSOF operations that often gets less attention is sustainment, but the article by Captain John Hotek and 1st Lieutenant Christopher Manganaro shows that geographic features, force composition and nonstandard missions, coupled with the minimal numbers of ARSOF logistics-support personnel, make logistics extremely challenging in the contemporary operating environment.

In their article on the use of militias, Majors Terry Hodgson and Glenn Thomas discuss reasons for tailoring our approach to militia groups in countries that require nation-building and the restoration of security. They argue that although the standard approach is to begin disarming militia groups as soon as possible, in some situations, and for some militia groups, the host-nation government might do better to allow some militias to remain armed until government forces can assume responsibility for security.

In his article, Major Matthew Coburn suggests ways of making the most of the experience ARSOF Soldiers have gained from their repeated deployments during the GWOT. By operating in increasingly smaller groups and continuing to pass their military expertise along to partner-nation forces, they not only act as force multipliers but also build relationships with the partner-nation's military and civilian population.

In all these articles, from the examples and lessons learned that the authors provide, it is clear that we operate in an environment in which there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. The situations we face often require flexibility, adaptability and the capacity for innovation, all of which are hallmarks of Army special-operations forces. In our role as ARSOF trainers, we select applicants for their possession of those traits and the aptitude to learn, then we provide training that develops those traits and skill sets. Other training provides the military expertise (MOS skills), as well as the historical and cultural knowledge that will enable our Soldiers to work by, with and through the populace.

ARSOF operate in difficult, unique situations, in some cases far from the oversight of their commands. At times they must make split-second decisions. Often their only support will be the training they have received, clear mission guidance and command support for the difficult decisions we ask them to make.

Major General James W. Parker

^ **NEW STAR** Major General James W. Parker, commander, U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and Ellie Pagan pin Brigadier General Hector Pagan, deputy commanding general, SWCS, with his first star. *Photo by Curtis Squires, SWCS Public Affairs Office.*

PAGAN EARNS HIS STAR

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School deputy commanding general was promoted to the rank of brigadier general Sept. 28, the sixth promotion in Brigadier General Hector E. Pagan's 27-year career in the U.S. Army.

In a ceremony at the Fort Bragg Officer's Club, Pagan, one of only six Hispanic-American generals in the Army, attributed his promotion to his family.

"No one can make this trip alone," Pagan said. "Anyone who knows me knows that family is very important to me."

"The love for his family goes both ways, as you can see from the large turnout by Hector's family here today," said Major General James W. Parker, commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, who officially promoted Pagan from the rank of colonel to brigadier general.

Parker said Pagan has proven to be an absolute professional throughout his career. "He has shown that he can lead as a professional with quiet confidence," continued Parker. "Above all else, he is a warrior who leads by example!"

Pagan was born in Manhattan, N.Y., and was raised in Puerto Rico. He was commissioned in the Infantry from the ROTC program at the University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez.

He served in Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, in Operation Just Cause, and he deployed to El Salvador in 1989.

He also served with the 1st SF Group at Fort Lewis, Wash.; Special Operations Command South, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and upon completion of the U.S. Army War College in 2003, he took command of the 5th SF Group in Baghdad, Iraq, where he served as the commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula for two combat tours in 2003 and 2004.

Following multiple assignments at the U.S. Special Operations Command, Pagan became the deputy commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in May.

Pagan is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, the Army Command and General Staff Course, the Joint Forces Staff College and the Army War College. — *USASOC PAO*

RANGERS' VALOROUS ACTIONS HONORED

Eight hundred Rangers from the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, stood quietly in formation as they were recognized by their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Rudicille, for their combat actions at an awards ceremony, Aug. 17, at Hunter Army Airfield's Truscott Air Terminal. The Rangers returned to Hunter last month, after their ninth deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

"These Rangers bring great credit on themselves and the U.S. Army," said Rudicille. "They're the finest in our nation's arsenal."

Seven Bronze Star Medals for Valor were awarded at the ceremony, along with 13 Joint Service Commendation Medals for Valor, and one Army Commendation Medal for Valor.

Sergeant First Class John Fader, an Infantry platoon sergeant and Bronze Star for Valor recipient with the Third Platoon, Alpha Company, said that training for the Iraq deployment was more difficult than actual combat.

"The award ceremonies are really for our families," he said. "They give closure between deployments. Patches and badges are nice but when it comes to combat, they don't stop the bullets or change our mission."

Fader received the Bronze Star for Valor as a result of his actions during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He pulled two wounded Rangers in his platoon to safety after coming under enemy fire.

Fader's actions reinforce the Rangers' motto to leave no Soldiers behind in combat. — *Hunter Army Air Field Public Affairs Office*

KINGSBURY TAKES HELM OF MEDICAL GROUP

In a ceremony at the John F. Kennedy Memorial Plaza, the Special Warfare Medical Group, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, was activated and received a new commander, Oct. 1.

Colonel Kevin Keenan oversaw the activation of the medical group and then transferred command of the joint unit to Colonel Jeffrey Kingsbury.

During Dr. Keenan's watch, medical training was moved from under the auspices of the 1st Special Warfare Training group, and the Special Warfare Medical Group was provisionally stood up, said Major General James W. Parker, commanding general, SWCS.

"The training for our medics was so unique, it demanded a special organization," Parker said. "The fact that we are standing here today, activating the Special Warfare Medical Group, is a testament to Doc Keenan's vision, tenacity and leadership."

The Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center trains more than 1,500 students each year, including Special Forces medics, Army Rangers and Navy Seals.

While serving as the dean of the JSOMTC and as the first commander of the group, Keenan reduced the instructor to student ratio, increased the number of class starts each year, developed a formal recycle program and embraced the teach, coach and mentor philosophy.

"These actions succeeded in greatly reducing attrition all without lowering the standard," Parker said. "In 1999, only 43 percent of the students who started the (18 Delta Military Occupational Specialty) phase graduated the qualification course. In 2004 it was 47 percent. Today, over 80 percent of these students graduate from the most professional and academically challenging enlisted medical training in the world."

Kingsbury, a native of Bangor, Maine, graduated with his doctorate in 1989 and has completed two medical residency programs. He is board certified in family and preventive medicine and received his master's in public health from Johns Hopkins University. Kingsbury, the former chief of preventive medicine at Fort Bragg, has served as the associate dean of the JSOMTC for the past two years.

"He knows the mission, the troops and the terrain," Parker said, "I am sure the (JSOMTC) will not miss a beat during the transition."

— *USASOC PAO*

^ **JOINT COMMAND** Colonel Jeffrey Kingsbury (facing) takes the guidon for the Special Warfare Training Group from Major General James W. Parker, commander, U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School during a change of command ceremony. *Photo by Curtis Squires, SWCS Public Affairs Office.*

Understanding the new Defense Language P

Last year, the Department of Defense began using a new version of the Defense Language Proficiency Test that is a significant departure from earlier language tests. Since then, the Defense Language Proficiency Test, version V, or DLPT V, like other innovations, has caused some concern and anxiety.

Although the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center initiated an information-awareness campaign in September 2005 to acquaint the foreign-language-teaching community, DoD linguists and other personnel who must demonstrate language skills with the development and administration of DLPT V, apprehensions and myths regarding the new test remain. In order to dispel some of them, let's examine what the test is and is not.

First, DLPT V seeks to measure language proficiency. It measures reading and listening skills based on the scale of 0+ to 4 developed by the Interagency Language Roundtable, or ILR. It is intended for native English speakers who speak a foreign language and for native speakers of a foreign language who have strong English skills. (For more information on the ILR, visit http://www.govtilr.org/.) Second, DLPT V is a computer-delivered, common metric for civilian and military personnel.

DLPT V is not intended to be a measure of performance, a measure of work-related skills, a measure of aptitude or a measure of achievement. The chart lists some of the differences between DLPT IV and V.

DLPT V contains material from content areas that include military; security; science; technology; economics; politics; cultural/social/religious aspects; and physical, political and economic geography. It also includes such venues as authentic sources; public-speaker announcements and advertisements; phone calls; voice-mail messages; news (print, TV, radio); editorials; commentaries; speeches; interviews; talk shows; debates and lectures; theatrical plays; and TV series.

In order to prepare for the test, students should read and listen to authentic material — TV, radio, newspapers and magazines — daily or as often as the mission allows. Students can also use materials from the DLI Field Support Division at http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org/. In addition to using language e-learning tools, students should go beyond simply translating into English — think about what the author/speaker really means, learn more about the ILR scale and make sure you actually are able to do what the ILR says. Finally, learn about the target culture.

What does language proficiency mean to the ARSOF community? While the SOF operator is not trained to be a linguist, foreign language proficiency is an enhancing skill and a military-occupational-skill requirement. In fact, the commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has

PSYOP DOCTRINE UNDER DEVELOPMENT

Three new publications from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School will give Soldiers in Psychological Operations information on PSYOP critical tasks, on self-development and on career progression in the new PSYOP Branch.

The first publication, STP 33-37II-OFS, *Psychological Operations Officer Foundation Standards Manual*, is the first OFS for PSYOP and is specifically designed to support the establishment of the PSYOP Branch, said Captain Greg Seese, chief of the PSYOP Training Branch. It identifies the individual requirements for company-grade officers serving in the PSYOP Branch (Branch 37).

The OFS also describes operations-based individual tasks required of all PSYOP officers at the detachment and company levels. For the new PSYOP captain, the manual will serve as the primary reference and base document to support further self-development and to sustain career progression in the PSYOP Branch. For majors and lieutenant colonels who were previously career field-designated into PSYOP and assigned to PSYOP positions, it will provide a standard reference of Branch 37 critical tasks. The OFS is now available through Army Knowledge Online at: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7726785.

The second publication, Special Text 3-05.302, *Mission Training Plan for the Tactical Psychological Operations Company*, provides commanders of tactical PSYOP companies with training and evaluation documents for their headquarters and subordinate detachments. It offers guidance on how to train Soldiers to conduct supporting missions that are key to tactical PSYOP. The MTP provides flexible, unit-modifiable training plans for typical unit missions and training requirements.

Mission scenarios include training exercises for the tactical product development detachment that take the element through the seven-phase PSYOP process, training lanes for the company and detachment headquarters and training lanes for tactical PSYOP teams. The MTP is also now available on AKO at: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7726785.

The third publication is the revised STP 33-37F-SM-TG, *Solder's Manual and Training Guide, 37F, Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 through 4*. The manual will reflect emerging trends resulting from the Army transformation initiatives, the new PSYOP Branch and revisions in the developmental path for the PSYOP specialist, as described in DA Pam 600–25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*.

The manual will revise the critical MOS tasks of PSYOP Soldiers in the ranks of E1 through E7, Seese said. It will provide PSYOP specialists a one-stop guidebook that will summarize the training and knowledge they need to perform their duties. Specifically, it will include critical MOS tasks and task summaries that describe performance standards. The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division will staff the manual's initial draft for feedback from field units during the first quarter of fiscal year 2008.

For additional information on any of these publications, telephone Captain Greg Seese at DSN 236-0295, commercial (910) 396-0295, or send e-mail to: seeseg@soc.mil.

Proficiency Test: What it is and what it isn't

established a graduation standard of 1/1/1 (ILR level) as measured by the DLPT.

Commanders of units that report directly to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command are responsible for maintaining a command language program, or CLP, to support refresher, sustainment and enhancement language training that will allow Soldiers to maintain or improve their skill levels. Commanders at all levels must encourage Soldiers to strive to attain the 2/2 level in listening and speaking and must make Soldiers aware of the many incentive programs and of foreign-language proficiency pay.

ARSOF Soldiers can get more information on the DLPT V by visiting the DLI Web page (http://www.dliflc.edu) or by visiting their CLP training facility. Information is also available from Terry Schnurr, USASOC sustainment program manager, at schnurrt@soc.mil or Rusty Restituyo, USASOC contingency program manager, at restituf@soc.mil.

DLPT IV	DLPT V
ILR Scale Levels 0+ to 3	Two ranges: 0+ to 3 and 3 to 4
65 questions	60 questions for lower range (0+ to 3), 35 for upper range (3 to 4)
Reading: 2 1/2 hours	Reading: 3 hours
Listening: About one hour; fixed pace	Listening: 3 hours; self-paced
One question per passage	May have several questions per passage
Questions are multiple-choice	Multiple-choice and constructed-response questions
Focused on Level 1+ and 2	Focused on Levels 2, 2+ and 3
Testing on paper	Testing on computer


by Captain

John A. Hotek and First Lieutenant Christopher G. Manganaro

Agile Sustainment:
A Practice in Agility

As the battlefield environment is constantly changing, logistics support provided to units engaged in counter-insurgency operations must remain fluid. For a Special Forces battalion task force, which employs a small force structure, it is imperative that every aspect of logistics planning and operations be performed with attention to detail and ferocity of execution.

"Virtually every aspect of forecasting, stocking and managing goods and services must be adapted, to some degree, to ensure that the support requirements of the force are met," said Captain Paul Toolan, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. When his battalion deployed to Afghanistan from August 2006 to April 2007 to conduct counterinsurgency operations as Special Operations Task Force 31, Toolan served as director of SOTF-31's support center.

SOTF-31's experiences demonstrate the critical need for flexibility, innovation and imagination in logistics support. Without flexibility and ingenuity on the part of logisticians, the capability of supporting fluid, decentralized, intelligence-driven, full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations will be considerably reduced.

Although the service detachment of an SF battalion task force includes personnel to perform roles in supply and transportation, vehicle maintenance, electronic maintenance, food service and parachute rigging, the task force will have an inverse ratio of combat to support personnel, as is the norm in the SF community. However, in the contemporary operating environment of southern and western Afghanistan, the inverse ratio can become an operational limitation if assets and personnel are not managed appropriately and task-organized across the area of operations, or AO. What is often overlooked but commonly drives the need for realignment is the sizable geographic land mass that the task force occupies. Small in physical numbers, the task force often covers a footprint equal to or greater than that of a conventional infantry brigade and requires a level of force sustainment commensurate to a brigade minus. This fact alone causes stress on the task force's organic resources and manpower. However, it was only one of numerous challenges faced by SOTF-31.

In anticipation of additional support requirements driven by the environment in Regional Command-South and Regional Command-West, SOTF-31 requested personnel augmentation from the 3rd SF Group Support Battalion, or GSB, prior to deployment. The augmentation came in the form of a forward logistics element, or FLE: 13 additional personnel led by a first lieutenant. Composed primarily of riggers and personnel in electronic maintenance, food service and transportation management, the FLE was intended to provide the service detachment with additional flexibility and enhanced battlefield service capability. Soldiers from the service detachment and the FLE were immediately deployed throughout the area of operations in support of 13 firebases and outstations in a geographic area slightly larger than the state of New Mexico. Additional GSB augmentation would later prove to be quite difficult because of the geographic separation between the two

^ **LOADING PALLETS** A member of Task Force 31's logistics-support team loads a helicopter. *U.S. Army photo.*

units — more than 370 miles — and the unstable security situation of the ground lines of communication, or LOCs, between Bagram and Kandahar.

Arrayed across the AO in a manner that supported a "hub and spoke" distribution network, the personnel of the combined service detachment and FLE were charged with providing food and water, bulk fuel, construction and barrier material, ammunition and explosives, medical supplies, repair parts and components, and humanitarian-assistance items to the advanced operating bases, or AOBs, and SF teams assigned to SOTF-31. Kandahar Airfield, or KAF, was established as the primary logistics hub, with secondary hubs in Qalat, Tarin Kowt and Shindand that serviced the Zabol, Oruzgan and western provinces, respectively. Each secondary hub served as a distribution point for at least three other locations. These hubs were chosen for their accessibility to KAF via air and ground, and in the cases of Qalat and Tarin Kowt, for their co-location with an AOB.

The original concept of support called for using AOB personnel at the secondary hubs to facilitate distribution efforts throughout their respective provinces. However, following an initial assessment of the task-force area of operations in early August 2006, SOTF-31 determined that because of the security situation, traditional means of using partner-nation commercial trucking, mission-support sites and AOB personnel for distributing assets would not be effective.

The diminished security of the ground LOCs, combined with a decreasing availability of rotary-wing airlift, added to the logistics problems of Afghanistan. There was also a growing need to resupply the two most remote firebases by air-dropping container delivery systems, or CDSs. That method would not normally be an issue; however, the use of air drop further taxed the already diminished rotary-wing capacity, because the same rotary assets were needed to transport air items back to KAF.

An analysis of the security of the ground LOCs between KAF and Tarin Kowt, as well as the cargo manifests of rotary-wing assets departing Tarin Kowt, revealed a hidden capacity that could alleviate the burden on rotary-wing aircraft departing from KAF and simultaneously increase the ability to supply SOTF-31's remote firebases in the Oruzgan Province. Four members of the GSB FLE were forward-deployed to Tarin Kowt to act as a push-pull team. They were tasked to use both scheduled and unscheduled rotary opportunities for the movement of supplies, manpower



^ **WIDE-OPEN SPACES** Task Force 31's area of operation covered 13 firebases located in a geographic area slightly larger than the state of New Mexico. *U.S. Army photo.*

and equipment in and around the Oruzgan province. This team used U.S. and coalition rotary-wing assets to move all classes of supply throughout their assigned region. Pushing commodities delivered to Tarin Kowt by host-nation trucks, fixed-wing assets and some rotary-wing assets, the FLE push-pull team was able to make a dramatic increase in the delivery of supplies, fuel and equipment to the more remote firebases. It did so by taking advantage of any available cargo space on aircraft departing Tarin Kowt. These same aircraft were full when they departed KAF, destined for Tarin Kowt, and provided limited cargo space for SOTF-31. The team's efforts bypassed the restrictive flow of outbound cargo from Kandahar and successfully used the secondary capacity of available air frames.

The most strenuous test of SOTF-31's ability to provide logistics support manifested itself during Operation Medusa, conducted from late August to mid-September 2006. During that time, SF Soldiers and more than 350 soldiers of the Afghan National Army conducted combat operations in and around the district of Panjaway in western Kandahar Province as part of a larger offensive of NATO and the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF. Because of the size of the operation and the need for additional support, a conventional infantry company, field-artillery platoon and engineer platoon were attached to SOTF-31. That task organization nearly doubled the size of the task force and introduced an additional 39 vehicles to the task-force fleet.

Not one of the attached units possessed organic maintenance or logistics capability. Thus, these units became reliant on SOTF-31 for logistics and force sustainment. By combining its electronic-maintenance and vehicle-maintenance sections, the service detachment created refit teams that simultaneously performed vehicle service and repair and installed and calibrated electronic countermeasures. The refit teams were able to complete pre-mission vehicle services on all 39 vehicles in less than 12 hours.

However, the logistics challenges of Medusa did not cease with the completion of the pre-mission refit of the conventional forces. SOTF-31 was faced with the challenge of sustaining a force structure that exceeded 600 combat personnel. Because of the lack of organic ground transportation assets within SOTF-31 and the unstable security of ground LOCs between KAF and the Panjaway district, the use of military resupply convoys or host-nation carriers was ruled infeasible. Therefore, SOTF-31 became reliant on resupply by air land, air drop and sling load.

^ **ON THE MOVE** As part of its logistics mission, SOTF-31 had to ensure that logistics support was provided throughout its area of operations, utilizing air and land assets to get supplies where they were needed. *U.S. Army photo.*

From Aug. 26 to Sept. 15, 2006, SOTF-31 delivered more than 264,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition; 1,450 mortar and rocket rounds; 15,000 gallons of bottled water; 21,000 meals ready-to-eat; 10,000 gallons of fuel; and assorted repair parts for vehicles and communications equipment to troops engaged in ground combat in and around the Panjaway district. All this was completed while the service detachment supported the other 13 firebases within the SOTF-31 battlespace.

The resupplies were made possible through diligent coordination and management of available rotary-wing assets and fixed-wing air-drop capabilities. The nesting of the task force's rotary- and fixed-wing NCOs within the service-detachment infrastructure provided for accurate and timely sharing of available flights and mission-support opportunities. That symbiotic relationship provided the support-center logistics planners with a greater variety of delivery options and opened a communication channel for the use of coalition rotary- and fixed-wing delivery platforms. Through the end of the rotation, the open communication begun during Operation Medusa between SOTF-31 and coalition aviation assets would prove its utility.

The ability to share aviation assets during the Medusa operation did not solve all the problems of logistics planning. Further problems arose when it came to preparing CDS air-drop bundles and kicker pallets for rotary-wing deliveries. As previously mentioned, the ratio of combat to support personnel within an SF battalion task force is the inverse of the proportion in conventional forces. For an operation of the size and scope of Medusa, the rigger section of an SF service detachment is ill-equipped and undermanned. It was therefore evident that augmentation was needed to produce the constant stream of kicker pallets and CDS bundles required to sustain the forces. At the height of Medusa's operations, the 3rd GSB provided manpower augmentation in an effort to ease the strain endured by SOTF-31. However, even with the additional manpower, SOTF-31's riggers began cross-training Soldiers from other sections of the task force on preparing kicker pallets and CDS bundles. With the creation of build teams for kicker pallets and CDS bundles, the riggers were able to focus on packing chutes, conducting aerial-delivery inspections and performing sling-load activities. The shared-work concept allowed the riggers to focus their efforts on technically intensive areas, while the division of labor increased the efficiency with which SOTF-31 conducted aerial-delivery activities.

Building on lessons learned from Operation Medusa, primarily those of cross-training and shared-work teams, SOTF-31 began to modify its logistics support plan and tailor its operations to the environment. However, in making those changes, SOTF-31 noted that many of the support efforts were based on concepts more often executed in conventional units.

Concepts such as the use of an FLE, cross-training

and work teams are not new to the logistics community or to the Army, but they are relatively new concepts to an SF battalion task force conducting counterinsurgency operations. The joining of conventional logistics practices and the need for flexibility, innovation and imagination on the battlefield began to produce dramatic effects for SOTF-31 and contributed lethal and nonlethal effects to counterinsurgency operations.

The effects of this combined approach to logistics support in the area of operations were evident during Operation Baaz Tsuka in December 2006. The scope of that operation for SOTF-31 was similar to that of Operation Medusa. The force was arrayed throughout the vicinity of the Panjaway district but used one central location for command and control and for logistics-support operations.

Prior to the start of Baaz Tsuka, an FLE from SOTF-31 was embedded with the SF Soldiers to provide distribution management and battlefield sustainment during the operation. The FLE consisted of one first lieutenant, two vehicle mechanics, one vehicle/material-handling equipment operator and an electronics-maintenance technician.

This small but versatile element provided immediate logistics support to the ground force, effectively extending the combat element's reach and reducing its reliance on aviation and ground resupply. The FLE pre-positioned more than 120,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition; 250 mortar and rocket rounds; 10,000 gallons of bottled water; 25,000 MREs; 10,000 gallons of fuel; and assorted maintenance and communication repair parts.

These pre-positioned stocks were maintained by the FLE and distributed to more than 450 personnel of the U.S. SF, NATO/ISAF coalition and the Afghan National Army. The integration of the conventional FLE with an SF mission-support site was evident in a 94-percent reduction in the use of rotary-wing aviation support between Operation Medusa and Operation Baaz Tsuka. Other factors that contributed to the logistics support of Baaz Tsuka were coalition convoys and logistics-synchronization conferences that made possible the shared use of resources.

SOTF-31 mitigated its lack of force-protection assets for ground resupply by integrating its forces into NATO/ISAF combat logistics patrols. In turn, elements of NATO/ISAF, such as Task Force 42 (United Kingdom) and the Dutch special-operations forces employed SOTF-31's air-drop-rigging capabilities to provide pre-positioned emergency resupply bundles and sling loads for their respective combat elements.

An analysis of the provision of support to an SF battalion task force engaged in counterinsurgency operations exposes the contrast between providing support by conventional means and by means organic to the SF community. Such an analysis does not demonstrate that one facet of support outweighs the other. Rather it exposes that, in a fluid and ever-changing environment such as the one found in southern and western Afghanistan, an open-minded and combined approach to force sustainment can be the most beneficial to achieving strategic levels of lethal and nonlethal effectiveness.

When reviewed in its entirety, the amount of supplies and material synchronized, managed and distributed by an element of fewer than 30 personnel, spread across multiple locations in an area covering more than 125,450 square miles, is staggering: 850 individual transportation movement requests; 631 kicker pallets, totaling 1,260,000 pounds; 210 CDS bundles, totaling 420,000 pounds; 52 individual sling-load operations, totaling more than 520,000 pounds; 3,600,000 pounds of construction materials; 2,900,000 rounds of ammunition; 2,100,000 gallons of bottled water; and more than 1,500,000 gallons of JP-8 fuel.

Movement of such large quantities of assets and material would not have been possible without the concerted effort of all individuals involved and a comprehensive concept of support that was integrated into the overall counterinsurgency strategy of SOTF-31. This fusion of operations and logistics further enhanced the lessons learned by SOTF-31 on supporting SF Soldiers during counterinsurgency operations. In that environment, there is no single solution or concept of support for force sustainment. As observed, and later tested on the battlefield of Afghanistan, force sustainment must embrace flexibility, innovation, imagination, and a never-take-no-for-an-answer mentality. There is always a way to sustain the force. Sometimes, a selected sustainment course of action envelops the tactics, techniques and procedures of our traditional counterparts; capitalizes on the capabilities of coalition partners; or exploits the resources of the local populace to support decentralized, intelligence-driven, full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations. ***SW***

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MILITIAS: IS THERE A ROLE FOR THEM IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?

by Major Glenn R. Thomas and Major Terry Hodgson

The army is still weak and the police are worse. Until the government can provide security, no one will feel secure enough to turn over their weapons. It's very frustrating.[1]

- Shuhei Ogawa (Japan's UN-Afghan DDR liaison)

Nation-building, formerly a mission avoided by the military, is now a central facet of U.S. policy. The Department of Defense emphasizes the establishment of governance through its strategy of stability, security, transition and reconstruction, or SSTR. DoD Directive 3000.05 promotes the concept of SSTR and tempers the U.S. military's focus on the destruction of enemy forces with the more difficult task of "winning the peace." The U.S. military conducts stability operations to help establish order that will advance U.S. interests and values. Often the immediate goal is to provide the populace with security, restore essential services and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop the indigenous capability for securing essential services, a viable market economy, the rule of law, democratic institutions and a robust civil society.[2]

The U.N. is the organization with the greatest experience in nation-building, measured both in successes and failures. The U.N. has identified three "security gaps" that hinder its efforts at nation-building: an inability to deploy adequate forces for immediate security; an incapacity for enforcing long-term security; and an inability to establish adequate indigenous-government capacities for assuming the responsibilities of security.[3] The gaps identified by the U.N. are by no means peculiar to multinational efforts. They affect U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and they will likely remain challenges to any future nation-building endeavors. In addition to these security gaps, the U.S. shares another challenge with the U.N.: Controlling local armed groups, or militias.

Recognizing the roles of militias and the challenges they pose to a developing host-nation government, or HNG, could help us find ways of eliminating the security gaps. It is easy to label indigenous populations as either pro- or anti-government, but doing so ignores potential splits within populations. It could be that families, tribes or ethnicities come together only in the face of an external threat, when otherwise, the groups would not be unified or necessarily firmly pro- or anti-government. When confronted by a threat, most militia groups will seek relations with or against the HNG based on what lies in their best interest. When working with militia groups, it is always important to remember that even within those groups, loyalties are often temporary and require steady

^ **VICTORY DANCE** Members of the Al Anbar Salvation Council join hands with Iraqi police during a celebration of the province's Hope of Al Anbar Conference in Ramadi. Local sheiks, tired of al-Qaeda's terror tactics, put their militias to use in combating al-Qaeda by working jointly with the Iraqi and American security forces to stabilize the region. *U.S. Army photo.*

positive and negative reinforcement.

Before we consider using militias to facilitate U.S. nation-building efforts, we need to appreciate two challenges that affect U.S. operations. The first, driven by domestic constraints, is the difficulty the U.S. faces in conducting long-duration operations. The second, driven by indigenous factors, is the side effects created by the introduction of U.S. forces into environments that require nation-building.

LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS

The three security gaps identified by the U.N. appear to plague U.S. efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Accusations persist that the U.S. did not provide adequate numbers of forces to prevent lawlessness and violence. Additional accusations concern a lack of foresight in predicting and resourcing the efforts for long-term success.

The initial combat victories of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom led many to believe that large numbers of forces were no longer needed and that effective use of technology could be used as viable substitute for troops. Initially lauded as an incredible success, "the Rumsfeld doctrine emphasizing high technology, special-operations units, and sheer brainpower to defeat future foes" presented critical weaknesses for operations of lengthy duration.[4] What is really needed is the quick establishment of security if there is to be a transition to long-term stability efforts, and this, in turn, requires a large investment of resources, both in personnel and material.

DOMESTIC PRESSURES AFFECT NATION-BUILDING

Recent experiences in Iraq make it appear that initial efforts to conserve resources led to the need for even greater investments of resources over time. With deteriorating conditions, the tendency is to keep increasing the number of personnel in order to re-establish levels of security previously lost, as can be seen in the recent "surge" in U.S. forces sent to re-establish previous levels of security in and around Baghdad.

The increase in U.S. forces sent to Iraq has been accompanied by requests for additional forces to deal with a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan.[5] In both countries, greater troop numbers are being sought to improve the security situation. Unfortunately, this is posing a major strain on the U.S. military. Andrew Krepinevich concluded in a 2006 study, "the Army cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the back of the insurgency."[6] A year after Krepinevich's report, there has been no respite for the military, and forces in both theaters are not only growing in numbers but also facing extended tours of duty.[7]

As politicians debate the effectiveness of surging more forces into both theaters, there are some reasons for cautious optimism. While walking down the streets of Ar Ramadi, a notorious hotbed of insurgent activities, the commander of U.S. efforts in Iraq, General David Petraeus, recently pointed out that greater force numbers and tactics are working: "Once the people know we are going to be around, then

all kinds of things start to happen." [8] It is yet to be seen whether U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan will succeed, but Petraeus' strategy, like the security gaps identified by the U.N., requires a long-term investment, one in which the U.S. public appears to be losing interest. A recent *USA Today*/Gallup poll conducted March 23-25, 2007, reported that nearly 60 percent of those questioned believed a timetable should be set for removing most U.S. troops from Iraq by September 2008.[9] It is difficult to maintain public support for long-term operations that use large numbers of forces — both of which are required for successful nation-building.

Not only does nation-building entail a heavy initial investment of resources and troops to stabilize and secure an environment, but rebuilding and consolidating HNG capacities takes time. It is a daunting task to build an HNG capable of assuming the burdens of governance within a time frame that will prevent the erosion of public support. U.S. nation-building efforts will more than likely remain centered on developing western-style governments — an almost overwhelming task, especially considering how few historical successes there have been. Although nation-building does not always require fighting against an insurgency, efforts to establish governance in environments with insurgent threats offers us a way of gauging likely security requirements.

RAND mathematician James T. Quinlivan has studied British counter-insurgency efforts in Northern Ireland and Malaya, as well as international stability operations in Kosovo. Quinlivan calculates that establishing security takes from one to four security personnel (military and/or police) per 1,000 inhabitants in peaceful environments, to as many as 20 per 1,000 in more troubled regions. Quinlivan further explains that successful stability efforts are long-term in nature and require the rotation of security forces. That rotation requires an optimal ratio of five personnel at the ready (not deployed) for every member serving in a security role (deployed). Based on his calculations, Quinlivan estimates that operations in Iraq alone would require 500,000 service members and a standing force of roughly 2.5 million. The numbers for Afghanistan, with its larger population are even more staggering.[10]

Mathematical calculations by themselves are not an adequate predictor of the success or failure of strategies, but they do serve as indicators of constraints that must be considered by policy-makers prior to initiating stability and security operations.

Weighing the chances of success against the need to pace their efforts, political and military leaders face a paradox: Larger numbers of forces may increase the likelihood of success, but the greater investment in financial, military and even political capital tends to shorten the length of time allocated for success. As is evident in current and past military endeavors, domestic support tends to diminish the longer violence continues.

CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

If policy-makers accept the premise that nation-building requires adequate forces to guarantee security, they must also realize that shortcomings in an HNG's capacity for fulfilling its responsibilities will be inherited by the U.S.

An unfortunate side effect of increased U.S. involvement is the HNG's possible development of an over-reliance on U.S. forces and resources. A major consequence of U.S.-led efforts in nation-building is the tendency for the efforts to become more American and less host-nation. A greater U.S. presence begins to resemble an occupation, leading the local populace to question the nature and legitimacy of the HNG.

Various local groups, with their influence and power at stake, may mobilize their populations against U.S. efforts and those of the HNG. In an effort to quell resistance or challenges, the U.S. may introduce additional forces further alienating the population. As we can see in case after case, external forces, however well-intentioned, become a catalyst for armed resistance against what is deemed an external threat. Increases in violence lead to greater force requirements, leading to greater resistance. It is a vicious and unfortunate cycle that often plagues nation-building, and it is one with which the U.S. has become familiar.

The U.S., like the UN, has accepted the premise that the best means of nation-building is to remove the capacity of groups that threaten or might threaten the HNG. However, in so doing, an external actor is often challenging the local authorities who are best able to maintain a baseline of security in the absence of an HNG presence.

Though it is often necessary, the removal of armed groups should not be a default strategy. Actions against armed groups should be based on their actual challenges to governance, not on their potential for challenges. The U.S. and the HNG's desire for action should likewise be balanced against their capacity to maintain efforts over the long term and to follow through. Also, when U.S. and HNG efforts include policies that threaten the identity of some local groups, it can actually produce greater resistance.

The strategy of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or DDR, is one example of the way that external actors can both pose such a threat and oversimplify a complex issue. The U.S. and the U.N. view DDR as an immediate means for bolstering an HNG's legitimacy, but they often pursue it at the expense of alienating local groups.

The basis of DDR is sound. The HNG, supported by external aid, removes excess weaponry, dismantles illegal armed groups and then offers them alternative means of livelihood. In order for the aims of DDR to be met, however, the HNG must possess the positive and negative means of enforcing DDR initiatives. The HNG must possess the capacity for compelling adherence to the disarmament and demobilization efforts, and the prospects of alternative employment must be maintained for the duration of time required to change the micro-economies of weak and failing states. Adding to the difficulties of DDR is the requirement that the HNG take responsibility for maintaining the security that the disbanded armed groups provided.

GOOD INTENTIONS GONE WRONG

A major drawback of U.S. and U.N. nation-building efforts is the immediate application of DDR as a default method for achieving stability. Instead of implementing a more modest "oil-spot strategy," which could introduce DDR to areas where the HNG is most capable of meeting its responsibilities for long-term security, they often project DDR actions to areas in which the potential dangers are greatest and the HNG capabilities are least robust.[11]

Projecting DDR too soon creates environments in which the introduction of anything externally generated, especially in the form of disarmament efforts, fuels resentment and violence against the government. In the absence of a strong HNG, DDR creates even greater challenges for the HNG when developed and cohesive militias respond negatively to government involvement in their regions. In those cases, security gaps will be filled by insurgent groups whose existence is a direct reflection of government incapacity.

Using a combination of coercion and benevolence, local militias often provide protection and dispute-settlement capabilities in areas beyond the reach of the HNG. The success of DDR in those areas depends on the willingness of the population to share or divert its loyalties to an external entity that offers few benefits. Again, the concept of DDR is well-intentioned, but it assumes that the population is willing to or capable of granting legitimacy to an HNG at the expense of its own safety. For instance, DDR efforts in Afghanistan implemented under the U.N.'s Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program, or ANBP:

Had two main goals: to break the historic patriarchal chain of command existing between the former commanders and their men and to provide the demobilized personnel with the ability to become economically independent — the ultimate objective being to reinforce the authority of the government. However, DDR was never mandated to disarm the population per se or provide direct employment but to assist AMF military personnel to transition from military into civilian occupations.[12]

From ANBP's start in April 2003 through its reported completion in June 2006, "DDR supported the disarmament of 63,380 former officers and soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF), as well as the decommissioning of 259 AMF units."[13]

In addition to its demobilization-and-disarmament efforts, ANBP also claims to have re-integrated 53,415 former AMF members, including hundreds of local commanders and even Ministry of Defense generals.[14]

With DDR completed, the ANBP began supporting the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups, or DIAG. The Afghan government identified illegal armed groups as an immediate threat to its ability to govern:

The disarmament and demobilization element of the DDR process is now complete, and we must tackle the disbandment of non-statutory and illegal armed groups. These illegal armed groups, and there are far too many, pose a threat to good governance generally, and more specifically to the extension of the rule of law and the writ of the central government into the provinces.[15]

Although DDR was officially concluded by the ANBP in 2006, "remnants of the AMF, as well as groups which had never joined the AMF, were declared illegal" (Afghan Presidential Decree 50, July 24, 2004).[16] The ANBP's transition from DDR to DIAG in an effort to quell violence actually fed, and continues to feed a cycle of violence, because the concept of a centralized government runs counter to the societal norms of many local communities. The Afghan law on fire weapons, ammunitions and explosive materials states, "The government has sovereignty over those weapons, ammunitions and explosive material which are existing [sic] in this country. Other persons and authorities without legal permission have no right to produce, import, export, gain, use and keep them."[17]

Although it is designed to promote stability, the Afghan government's attempt to register and confiscate weapons will likely backfire. In many remote regions of the country, armed groups existed before the central government was established, and individuals view ownership of weapons as a personal right. Implementation of DDR and DIAG, although well-intentioned, has focused government efforts on eradicating possible threats before developing a capacity to fill whatever positive roles the armed groups might have played in protecting locals from brigands, crime and other threats to security.

By starting with the disarmament of former members of the AMF, who were not integrated into the newly formed national army, the government created a security gap that it could not fill; furthermore, in doing so, it short-circuited its ability to influence the actions of those it had demobilized. Upon implementation of the DIAG program, the HNG vilified members of many of the AMF groups that had previously lent it important support. In a short period of time, many localized militias throughout Afghanistan went from being government-sanctioned military forces to outlaws, a policy that continues to haunt efforts to legitimize the government. In fact, many of these local groups now view the Afghan central government as worse than just an impotent organization; they consider it a direct threat to their existence.

The U.N. and the Afghan government have alienated the populace by designating all armed groups outside HNG control as illegal. According to the Afghan government, "An illegal armed group is understood to be a group of five or more armed individuals operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion from (a) loyalty to the commander, (b) receipt of material benefits, (c) impunity enjoyed by members, (d) shared ethnic or social background."[18]

Once so many armed groups in Afghanistan have been stigmatized as illegal, the ability of the U.S. and the Afghan government to develop any positive influence has been lost. The populations the government seeks assistance from in its efforts to eradicate insurgent threats now view the government in a less-than-favorable manner.

Although the DDR efforts have made many positive contributions, they are far from being "successful." The reality is that many areas of the country are drifting back to control by insurgent forces. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commis-

^ **FACE OFF** Members of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, discuss the demobilization process with members of an Afghan militia. *U.S. Army photo.*

sion claimed in August 2006 that the Taliban insurgency has "psychological and de facto military control of nearly half of Afghanistan."[19]

The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan should not be blamed solely on DDR efforts, but some blame is warranted. Successful nation-building requires that the population identify with the HNG and believe that it is capable of fulfilling the tasks of basic governance. Legitimacy of a government is not a given: It is earned through demonstrated performance of actions that the population believes enhance or protect its well-being. Even strong, functioning governments find it necessary to maintain the loyalty of their populations in this way, or they risk having to rely on coercion.

Like the governments they sometimes challenge, leaders of militias are required to deliver benefits to their constituents as well, and they cannot rely on coercion alone to maintain loyalty. Furthermore, coercion jeopardizes their legitimacy and makes them susceptible to removal. The promotion of DDR in regions where the HNG is incapable of improving security and economic opportunities invites exploitation by militias that can, and often do, fill the security gaps thereby created.

An obvious but unfortunate side-effect of well-intentioned DDR efforts has been that in some areas, a semblance of security has been replaced with none. At the time of the ANBP's DDR program, the Afghan government lacked the coercive capacity to monopolize the use of violence and often relied on AMF/militia groups to fill that role.

Although they were not always effective to the degree desired, AMF organizations (often with U.S. assistance) did assist the central government in influencing and controlling actions in many regions beyond its immediate reach.

SECURITY AND STABILITY DOES NOT MEAN COIN

When viewed through the lens of counterinsurgency, or COIN, all players are potential insurgents. Following the violent actions of 9/11, the strategy of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism strategy has been aggressive toward terrorist organizations and their sanctuaries. Ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the military's prowess at rooting out and destroying threats, but we've also come to better appreciate the difficult nature of security operations and the way that unintentional consequences might derail strategy.

In both countries, the U.S. military finds itself involved in complicated struggles with insurgent forces that use violence with the intent of destabilizing and ultimately overthrowing the U.S.-supported HNG. The attention paid to the military's combat actions in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to the unintended consequence that many planners now view stability operations as synonymous with COIN.

Because of the need to identify threats to the U.S. and the HNG, military efforts generally categorize groups among the populace according to the insurgent threat they pose. Insurgents

seek to remove the government; pro-government groups seek to protect it; and those outside these two groups make up the group the other two seek to influence. But reality is more complicated: Generally, the survival or removal of the government is a far more remote concern for the populace than protecting the way of life. Viewing the populace in a simplified manner may assist COIN policies, but it is of little help in addressing underlying issues, such as immediate local defense and security.

In COIN operations, the government is dedicated to establishing its legitimacy in the eyes of the populace; this requires a stable and secure environment. The new COIN manual, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (December 2006), defines militias as "extragovernmental arbiters of the populace's physical security" and categorizes them as threats to host-nation governments.[20] While recognizing the role that militias play in providing security, the U.S. military describes their role in a manner that makes them appear to be diametrically opposed to the goals of the HNG. Based on DoD's purely negative categorization of militias, the manual gives a prescription for removal:

Militias sometimes use the promise of security, or the threat to remove it, to maintain control of cities and towns. Such militias may be sectarian or based on political parties. The HNG government must recognize and remove the threat to sovereignty and legitimacy posed by extragovernmental organizations of this type.[21]

U.S. COIN efforts focus on the removal of the threat posed by armed groups that offer potential challenges to the HNG. But, as with the U.N., U.S. efforts to disarm armed groups create gaps in security that the HNG is incapable of filling. That gap leads to lawlessness and violence.

In those situations, U.S. forces take responsibility for stability and security, with unfortunate side effects. The HNG often willingly grants the U.S. the lead in its COIN efforts, further diminishing the HNG's legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The population either becomes increasingly dependent on U.S. aid rather than on the services of the HNG, or worse, it begins to perceive the U.S. as an occupying force, which serves to motivate dissension against the HNG.



^ **SERVICE AWARD** During the demobilization of an Afghan militia, a member of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, presents awards to militia members. *U.S. Army photo.*

While the actions of local irregular forces (militia groups) and the HNG do invariably affect each other, they should not be viewed as zero sum: Activities that benefit one side do not always come at the expense of the other side.

In a COIN environment, a secure population might hinder insurgent activities, serving as a force multiplier for both the U.S. and the HNG. Although local militia groups might not support the HNG, their neutrality might be preferable to hostility and, in the long-term, stability might provide a more conducive environment for the introduction of improved governance.

Indeed, it might be not only be possible but also prudent to incorporate some militias as a deterrent against actual insurgent forces. Sometimes the best strategy for countering insurgents is to lessen the HNG's need for external forces and rely more on local, nongovernmental security mechanisms — a strategy that might be gaining acceptance in Iraq.

CAN MILITIAS BE USED SUCCESSFULLY?

Within regions of weak and failed states, even the most chaotic and violent ones, small pockets of stability exist. Where a central government

is incapable or unwilling to provide security and social services, other regulating mechanisms will fill the void. The dangers posed by militia forces are real, but removing them might create even greater difficulties for the U.S. and the HNG.

Militias exist because a void exists or is perceived in the government's capacity to protect the populace. Any desires to remove militias should be tempered with a close look at the government-like roles they play and whether the HNG has the capacity to assume the militia's duties. Many experts believe that it is unconscionable even to consider using militias in nation-building efforts. They believe that including militia forces directly contradicts DDR efforts and will ultimately lead to armed groups outside the control of the HNG being granted too much power.[22]

There are many considerations when it comes to condoning the establishment and maintenance of armed groups outside the control of the HNG. A government that has to rely on militias advertises its own military weakness and causes citizens to question its legitimacy. Also, how does it then prevent the proliferation of militias, each vying for power or control over its specific region or population?

Ultimately, the establishment of governance takes time, and the lack of security dramatically shortens the time frame a government has in which to earn legitimacy. Viewing militias in a monolithic and purely negative manner does not allow planners to realize that militias, like individuals, vary. Some do engage in activities that should preclude the U.S. or HNG from ever viewing them as anything but a threat. However, some militias offer useful capabilities that can facilitate long-term nation-building efforts. The U.S. and the HNG should not expect to work with all militia groups, any more than they should choose to fight against all of them. **SW**

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[15] Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), on its Web site, http://www.diag.gov.af/history.htm, presents Dr. Zalmai Rassoul's (National Security Advisor of the Islamic Republic) address to the ISAF PRT commanders at a conference on 6 November 2005. Quoted from United Nations' "Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Final Strategy," dated 26 January 2006 (accessed 13 April 2007).

[16] DIAG.

[17] DIAG.

[18] DIAG. According to the United Nation's "Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Final Strategy," http://www.diag.gov.af/history.htm, dated 26 January 2006, "An illegal armed group is understood to be a group of five or more armed individuals operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion from (a) loyalty to the commander, (b) receipt of material benefits, (c) impunity enjoyed by members, (d) shared ethnic or social background."

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GWOT 2.0

Capitalizing On Experience Gained

by Major Matthew D. Coburn

Since 9/11, the United States has been involved in more than six years of continuous irregular warfare. In that time, a majority of Army special-operations Forces, or ARSOF, have deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, multiple times and have gained an unprecedented level of combat and operational experience.

But also in that time, the force has changed at the grassroots level. Soldiers who were members of ARSOF units on 9/11 have earned promotions and are serving in new positions, sometimes with different units or at different stations. Senior ARSOF officers and NCOs on 9/11 have since retired. Their replacements have come from a new generation of ARSOF Soldiers who have gained increased experience from global operations in support of the GWOT.

Though the initial stages of the GWOT were planned, led and conducted by U.S. special-operations forces and the CIA during the summer of 2002, general-purpose forces joined the fight and took command of large portions of the military operations in support of the GWOT. Those protracted operations, focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, have strained the conventional Army and eroded U.S. political will.[1]

Should the U.S. government attempt to shore up political will and the readiness of the conventional Army by decreasing the U.S. military's global footprint by redeploying large portions of its general-purpose forces, ARSOF may once again find itself taking charge of the planning, leadership and operations of the GWOT, with the expectation that SOF and their interagency partners continue to implement U.S. foreign policy, but below the CNN line, outside of daily public view, in the manner that they were legislatively mandated to do.[2]

With this returned level of strategic responsibility, ARSOF will benefit from the experiences gained through the first six years of the GWOT as they step quietly and comfortably back into the lead of a second generational phase of the GWOT. During this "GWOT 2.0," ARSOF can maximize the utility gained from the increased level of operational experience in the force through its use of a more decentralized and "indirect approach."[3]

To date, units within ARSOF have deployed for as many as six deployments, of six to eight months each, since 9/11. The individuals and their detachments in ARSOF have answered their nation's call repeatedly in a valorous manner befitting their SOF lineage. In addition to the experience gained in combat, the units in ARSOF have

built up an even more valuable asset in the form of the experiences they have gained during the other 99 percent of their time deployed, in which special operators weren't lethally engaging the enemy but instead were interfacing with the strategic target of the GWOT — local populations — and training and advising host-nation, or HN, security forces.

Any Special Forces, Civil Affairs, or Psychological Operations Soldier will echo the fact that for every valor award earned in direct combat since 9/11, the very same operator spent countless tedious hours, days and months of sweat and hard work engaging in local politics, training host-nation military, paramilitary and irregular forces, building local infrastructure, and tracking down leads on shadowy members of insurgent and terrorist auxiliaries and undergrounds.

As ARSOF units continue to deploy globally in support of the GWOT, they can maximize their impact by harnessing their increased level of operational experience through increasingly decentralized operations. This increased decentralization can be accomplished in several ways. ARSOF can ensure that each individual operational detachment conducts operations in the manner for which it was designed, and then push those detachments to the boundaries of their comfort levels to perform population-focused irregular warfare. ARSOF can ensure that their staffs operate in an enhanced capacity that provides the greatest utility possible to the detachments they support. ARSOF can also evolve its command-and-control mechanisms to ensure that they provide synergistic leadership to subordinate detachments and partner nations.

Increased capabilities

The capabilities and individual experience levels found in today's special-operations detachments should be fully exploited during future deployments. In the past, much of the political wheeling and dealing performed by operational detachments was conducted by the detachments' leaders. Expertise gained in the 18A, 180A and advanced-special-operations courses, or through repeated deployments to combat and joint combined exercises and training made detachment officers, warrant officers and team sergeants the natural choice for engaging local leaders. ARSOF could gain added utility during future operations by decentralizing detachments beyond the split-team level.

During Vietnam, SF NCOs led indigenous combat patrols into nonpermissive environments, often with only one or two accompanying Americans.[4] ARSOF could use this same concept during the GWOT, but in population-focused operations vs. enemy-focused operations. For example, if a detachment finds itself tasked to conduct remote-area operations or consolidation operations as part of a counterinsurgency strategy, that detachment can decentralize its experienced special operators to live in local villages and neighborhoods as trainers and advisers to host-nation security forces that are being used to deny sanctuary to insurgent and terrorist cells.[5]

Using this strategy, a detachment could influence a local population in multiple villages, day and night; advise HN military; train irregular

^ **HOUSE CALL** A Special Forces medic discusses the health of a child with its mother. *U.S. Army photo.*

^ **TOWN CRIER** A Psychological Operations Soldier posts information in Rashid, a town west of Baghdad. Over the past five years, PSYOP teams have been able to hone not only the way they measure the effectiveness of their missions but also the messages they need to put out to the people to draw their support from the insurgents. *U.S. Army photo.*

self-defense militias; engage local village leaders to gain support and insight into the political, economic and social needs of the multiple villages; and employ HN small-unit patrols and personnel-resource- control measures in a manner that would be more dispersed and less predictable to the enemy.

Increased leadership

Today's ARSOF NCOs have the experience necessary for performing these more complex tasks because they have already engaged in these tasks during the GWOT, or they have worked alongside those who have. The less-experienced members of a detachment can partner with more experienced teammates until they gain the competency needed for them to take the lead on a future deployment. This strategy of allowing operators to live in foreign villages and neighborhoods would require increased risk-acceptance, as operators would potentially be more exposed to danger. But the risk would be mitigated by the interpersonal relationships and social capital established with local populations, as well as by the security provided by the indigenous forces that the operators organize, train and advise.

Meanwhile, the detachment and HN military leadership could focus on supporting these decentralized ARSOF NCOs and their HN partners by collating the information gathered and ensuring necessary enabling support while the decentralized forces interact with local political, economic and social leaders inside the area's local networks. While the SF NCOs operate at the village and neighborhood level, the detachment leaders can operate at the district and provincial levels. The detachment and host-nation leaders can also spend greater amounts of their time sending pertinent information up to the higher-level political and military leaders. That information could provide an enhanced effect through greater population control and support, coupled with improved

^ **FARM REPORT** A Soldier from the 3rd SF Group, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., stops to talk with an Afghan farmer and his son. By building relationships with the local citizenry, SF Soldiers become more effective and are better able to counter insurgents operating within their area of operations. *U.S. Army photo.*

situational awareness for senior political and military leaders.

As ARSOF detachments further their decentralization and enhance their strategic impact, their supporting staffs at the levels of the special-operations task force, or SOTF, and joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, can also enhance their level of support. Today's SOF supporting staffs possess an improved level of understanding about what their detachments need in their operational environments. In addition, recent organizational changes have increased the staff size in supporting headquarters. SOF staffs must accordingly provide an enhanced level of support to their detachments.

For example, SF operations centers, or OPCENs, have traditionally pulled detachment members up to the OPCEN during deployments in order for them to serve as area specialists and liaison officers and ensure support to the detachments in the field. But increased decentralization will call for stringent mechanisms aimed at ensuring that as many SF detachment NCOs as possible are located where they belong — with their detachments, providing strategic effects on the battlefield. To facilitate decentralization, staff officers who may have traditionally rotated between an OPCEN and its supporting support center and signal center can now be called upon by the SOTF and the OPCEN directors to focus their efforts within the OPCEN and then disseminate appropriate information and taskings to the support detachment, signal detachment and headquarters support company to ensure that the proper level of support reaches operational detachments and their HN partners. With this greater level of staff experience and manning, today's ARSOF staffs can provide enhanced support to their detachments and their HN partners.

The increased level of operational experience should show future strategic effects within an evolved ARSOF command and control, or C2. During the first years of the GWOT, ARSOF units often found themselves centralized on the battlefield, as different leaders experimented with different techniques to find, fix and finish insurgent and terrorist organizations. While this C2 style certainly provides greater combat power, it fails to sustain the strategic outlook necessary for providing the most effective utilization of the SF detachment's limited and valuable assets. When company and battalion

leaders focus on tactical problems, their companies and battalions subsequently lose a strategic focus on their assigned areas of operation.

During this next generation of ARSOF employment, the first generation of detachment commanders and team sergeants has risen to command companies, and the first generation of company commanders and sergeants major has risen to the battalion level. Thus, most have now been tested on the field of battle, and the ARSOF community should benefit accordingly. With the enhanced experience level of the second generation of ARSOF leaders, company and battalion C2 should evolve and provide improved effects.

The former detachment commanders, having passed the test of combat, can now focus their efforts on providing guidance and support to their subordinate detachments. Company commanders and sergeants major can now couple their combat and operational experience synergistically with the insight they have gained at higher levels of command, staff and schooling to provide detachments with a sound and specific task, purpose and commander's intent, and then give their detachments the freedom to work independently through their host-nation partners to provide strategic effects within the operating environment.

Rather than spending time commanding and controlling tactical missions of several detachments, today's senior leaders can spend their time visiting their decentralized detachments in order to spot-check their performance and morale, gaining valuable feedback on what the detachments really need in order to meet their commander's intent with strategic effects. Should the commanders find any of their detachments falling short of meeting the intent, they can quickly correct the shortcoming with additional guidance or support.

With this enhanced situational awareness at the company level, the SOTF leadership can harness the resulting increased feedback to provide even more effective and efficient support to the subordinate detachments. They can also use the time gained from greater awareness to further develop the senior leaders of their HN partners and to achieve synergy operating by, with and through their partners rather than maintaining a separation, with its inherent organizational and operational deficiencies.

The indirect approach

Experience gained since 9/11 has proven that the SOF Imperatives are relevant and appropriate during the U.S. execution of the GWOT.[6] In particular, the GWOT has proven that an indirect approach is best when attempting to achieve long-term, strategic effects on targeted populations. The Department of Defense will not be able to unilaterally "kill or capture" its way out of the GWOT. Instead, ARSOF have proven that by working indirectly through indigenous surrogates, SF, CA and PSYOP units can have strategic effects through indirect, economy-of-force operations, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

For example, operations conducted in the Philippines have not only provided strategic effects but have done so while remaining outside the media's attention. These unsung operations have legitimized a host nation and begun long-term effects that will counter insurgency, lawlessness and subversion in a nation friendly to the United States. In addition, the operations have not involved the large-scale conventional deployments that operations within Afghanistan and Iraq have required, and thus they have not contributed to the current strain placed on the conventional Army.

A second example of the value of working indirectly can be found in Afghanistan. Although traditionally counterinsurgency should focus on police operations, the absence of law-enforcement institutions within Afghanistan left a strategic security void. In a country that is culturally averse to centralized authority, the Afghan National Army, or ANA, has grown from a force that was predicted by many to be corruptible into one of the few functioning national-level organizations. The establishment of the ANA involved time-consuming and thankless operations by members of Special Forces, but it has resulted in a national institution capable of protecting its local population. The ANA should remain one of the linchpins of any successful efforts to stabilize Afghanistan for the long term.

Additionally, the experience gained within SF as it conducted unconventional warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq has re-established UW as a strategically powerful irregular-warfare mission that may be used for disproportionate effects in support of the protracted GWOT. Under-governed spaces and rogue states remain, and ARSOF's UW experience provides a strategic tool which the United States can implement or threaten to implement as it executes its foreign policy during the GWOT. As the nation requires it, ARSOF can work indirectly through irregular forces to achieve asymmetric effects.

Combat-proven

Finally, the direct combat experience that ARSOF have acquired since 9/11 cannot be questioned. Countless detachments have fought their way out of harrowing ambushes in the mountain passes of Afghanistan or the alleyways of Iraq, and countless more have bravely entered rooms known to be infested with enemy combatants. When insurgents and terrorists have made the mistake of hitting SF teams and not running away fast enough, or of allowing human-intelligence assets to detect their location, they have paid for it dearly. This war-fighting prowess represents one of the key attributes that will allow ARSOF leaders to further decentralize these valuable national assets. However, that prowess must also be maximized by passing it on to appropriate host-nation partners while they simultaneously work indirectly to provide other nonlethal effects so that ARSOF detachments can have the maximum impact every time they deploy.

^ **ON TARGET** Afghan security forces practice their marksmanship skills under the watchful eye of a Special Forces adviser. *U.S. Army photo.*

In warfare, the requirement to have a trained force standing ready to kick down a door or enter a cave in the middle of the night to destroy the enemy will never go away. But ARSOF realize their full strategic potential when they use their forces to organize, train, equip and employ host-nation partners to fill lethal and nonlethal roles. The math is obvious — by employing one detachment to work by, with and through a surrogate force in executing direct-action and quick-reaction missions rather than acting unilaterally, an SF company supporting a joint task force will have five more detachments available for decentralizing and engaging local populations in support of the GWOT.

In conclusion, should the U.S. government choose to return special-operations forces to the forefront in planning, leading and performing GWOT operations, ARSOF stand more prepared than ever to provide incredible effects for their nation. By harnessing the increased level of experience gained during more than six years of continuous irregular warfare in support of the GWOT, ARSOF can achieve even higher levels of excellence and produce greater strategic effects by further decentralizing well-supported detachments that are tasked to operate by, with and through indigenous host-nation forces in support of U.S. foreign policy.

Major Matthew D. Coburn, a Special Forces officer, served as a detachment commander and assistant operations officer in 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group and then commanded the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, United States Army Special Operations Command and United States Army Special Forces Command. He served three tours in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan. He is currently a student at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.

Notes:

[1] Mark Thompson, "Broken Down: What the War in Iraq Has Done to America's Army — and How to Fix It," Time, April 16, 2007, 30-35.

[2] Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 144-47.

[3] David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," Joint Forces Quarterly 44 (2007):24.

[4] John L. Plaster, SOG: *The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 30-34.

[5] FM 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations*, January 2007, A-9.

[6] FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, September 2006, 1-20 to 1-22.

Officer

ARSOF officers eligible for CSRB

According to MILPER Message Number 07-237, AHRC-OPL-R, Implementation of the Army Officer Menu of Incentives Program (Regular Army), eligible officers in Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations who are approved for a critical-skills retention bonus, or CSRB, will accept a three-year active-duty service obligation, or ADSO.

The ADSO will begin either when they complete their current ADSO or the date their contract is approved by the chief of the Retention Branch of the Army Human Resources Command.

Officers volunteering for SF, CA or PSYOP who meet the CSRB prerequisites will be eligible to apply for and receive the CSRB and still become SF, CA and PSYOP officers.

For officers in the SF training pipeline, the ADSO will begin when they graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course.

For officers in the CA or PSYOP training pipeline, there is already a training ADSO of one year.

For those officers, the training ADSO will run concurrently with the CSRB ADSO.

Colonel command-selection board scheduled

The Colonel Command-Selection Board for maneuver, fires and effects is scheduled for Jan. 8-17, 2008. A MILPER message with more details will be published soon.

Promotion boards set for 2008

The Lieutenant Colonel Promotion-Selection Board will convene in February 2008, and the Major Promotion-Selection Board will convene in April.

Primary-zone candidates for the lieutenant-colonel board will be active-duty majors in year-group 1992; those in the primary zone for the major board will be active-duty captains in year-group 1999.

All candidates should review their Officer Record Brief and Official

(Continued on Page 30)

Warrant Officer

Personnel changes

CWO4 Tony Fox has replaced CWO4 Butch Buchinski as the MOS 180A Assignment Manager at HRC's ARSOF Group-Maneuvers, Fires and Effects Division. CWO4 Fox can be reached by phone at DSN 221-5231, commercial (703)325-5231, or send e-mail to: tony.l.fox@us.army.mil.

CWO4 T.D. Doyle is replacing CWO5 Doug Frank as the warrant officer of the SF Branch in the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency. He can be reached at DSN 239-1879, commercial (910) 432-1879, or send e-mail to: doyles@soc.mil. CWO5 Frank will become the first chief of warrant-officer education in the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Education.

TS clearance required for SF WOAC

Attendance at the SF Warrant Officer Advance Course requires all students to possess a final top-secret clearance and be eligible for sensitive compartmented information. The status of students' security clearances will be verified before each SF WOAC class begins. Students without verified final TS will not be allowed to start class.

National Guard changes WO promotion policies

The Army National Guard Bureau, or NGB, has published two changes to the warrant-officer promotion policy that significantly affect SF warrant officers (180As) in the Army National Guard, or ARNG.

NGB-ARH Policy 07-026 makes sergeants first class with two years' time-in-grade eligible for promotion to CWO2 after they complete the Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course. This change effectively eliminates the pay losses that ARNG 180As previously encountered upon appointment to WO1.

NGB-ARH Policy 07-025 reduces the TIG needed for promotion to CWO3 to four years, if the Soldier is serving in a CWO3-grade-coded position, or five years if he is serving in a CWO2-grade-coded position. CWO2s can now attend WOAC with two years' TIG, potentially making 36 ARNG 180As eligible to attend SF WOAC within the next two years.

All ARNG SF WO1s and CWO2s should monitor the status of their security clearance and ensure that they are scheduled to attend the course.

WO promotion boards to convene

MILPER Message No. 07-260 announced the zones of consideration for the FY 2007 promotion-selection boards for CWO 3, CWO 4 and CWO 5. Boards will convene from Jan. 29 to Feb. 20, 2007. Zones of consideration for all technical services warrant officer specialties, and the applicable active-duty dates of rank, or ADOR, are as follows:

Rank	Zone	ADOR
CWO 3	AZ	9/30/04 and earlier
	PZ	10/1/04-9/30/05
	BZ	None
CWO 4	AZ	9/30/04 and earlier
	PZ	10/1/03-9/30/05
	BZ	None
CWO 5	AZ	9/30/03 and earlier
	PZ	10/01/03-9/30/04
	BZ	10/1/04-9/30/05

Enlisted

Screen records now for 2008 SFC promotion board

All staff sergeants in the zone for consideration for the 2008 Sergeant First Class Promotion-Selection Board should ensure that their records are up-to-date. The board will convene Jan. 29-Feb. 22, 2008. More information will be released in an upcoming MILPER message.

2007 saw dramatic growth in CMF 18

Fiscal year 2007 was a banner year for growth in the Special Forces career management field, CMF 18. SF began the year at 101-percent strength and grew to 113 percent by year's end. Two historically low-strength MOSs, 18D and 18F, grew dramatically: 18D from 86 percent to 106 percent and 18F from 69 percent to 104 percent. Two factors contributed greatly to the growth: First, the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion recruited a large number of highly motivated, quality Soldiers to fill the force. Second, in spite of the increased operations tempo, SF Soldiers are remaining in the force in greater numbers than anticipated.

Apply now for Civil Affairs accession

The second Civil Affairs Accessions Board considered 58 Soldiers and selected 34. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion is taking application packets for the next CA Accessions Board, scheduled to be conducted in mid-2008. Interested Soldiers should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at (910) 907-9697. The accessions board looks for Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure, Chapter 10*. Soldiers can view the prerequisites online at: https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/.

Some CA NCOs eligible for re-up bonuses

CA Soldiers in the ranks of sergeant and staff sergeant are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus, or SRB. The maximum bonus for sergeants is $15K; for staff sergeants, the maximum is $10K. The critical skills re-enlistment bonus for CA sergeants first class and master sergeants is still pending approval by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For more information on SRBs and CSRBs, Soldiers should contact their career counselor.

Active CMF 37 to eliminate skill-level 1

The military occupation and classification structure proposal for the elimination of skill-level 1 from CMF 37 (PSYOP specialist) has been approved by the Army G1. The G1 has released a notification of future change announcing the resulting re-grading and restructuring. The change to force-structure documents is scheduled to become effective in October 2010. Soldiers who would like more information about PSYOP or PSYOP recruitment should contact SFC Sutton or SSG(P) Spaugh at the Special Operations Recruitment Battalion, DSN 236-6533 or commercial (910) 396-6533.

Officer

Military Personnel File online to make sure that their files are complete.

If there are any errors or missing documents, officers should correct the discrepancies at their personnel service battalion. Officers should also ensure that their official photo is no more than a year old and accurately reflects the awards and decorations in their OMPF and ORB.

Screening improves promotion files

ARSOF officers continue to remain competitive for promotion and command because of quality officer evaluation reports and because officers know when to update their ORBs. Listed below are a few tips for screening records prior to a board:

• Check the HRC Web site for the MILPER message corresponding to the upcoming board (https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf). It provides information on OER close-out and through dates. By regulation, cutoff dates are not negotiable.

• Officers are required to view and certify their files. The certification takes the place of the signed board ORB. Review the file two to three months prior to the board to ensure that the ORB, OMPF and photo match.

The photo is critical: It's one of the first documents the board sees. If it's outdated, it will send the wrong impression to the board member who reviews the file.

Waiting until the last minute to update records will leave the ARSOF Branch little time to ensure that the record is accurate and complete. The ARSOF Branch will review files for inconsistencies approximately 30 days prior to the board's convene date.

Officers can review everything that a board member will see by going to My Board File (https://www.hrc.army.mil/portal/?page=active.record.mbf). This site is active only for a specified period of time before the board's convene date. Information on My Board File and its active dates is provided in the MILPER message announcing the board.

• Communicate with the assignments officer throughout the process. It takes teamwork to ensure that the file is the best it can be when the board convenes.

BEATING GOLIATH:
WHY INSURGENCIES WIN



DETAILS

By Jeffrey Record
Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007.
ISBN: 978-1-59797-090-7 (Hardback)
192 pages. $19.96.

Reviewed by:
Danny Marchant
Fayetteville, N.C.

The premise of *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* is to explain why some insurgencies, consisting of poorly equipped and numerically inferior forces, can defeat powerful nations with, at least in comparison, limitless material resources. The author, Jeffrey Record, looks at specific factors of insurgencies and how these factors affected the outcomes of 11 insurgencies in which the insurgents defeated a larger, more powerful opponent. He then looks at the role of external support in aiding insurgents, concluding that, statistically, it is the most significant single factor. He also applies his analysis to the current insurgency in Iraq and draws some conclusions concerning the likelihood of an insurgent victory.

The factors Record analyzes are the will to fight, including the political will of the antagonists; strategy and the strategic interaction of the opponents; regime type (liberal democracy vs. authoritarian); and external support to the insurgency in the form of money, weapons, personnel and safe areas.

External support, being the single most influential factor in determining the success of the weak vs. the strong, rates its own chapter. This chapter does not get stuck in a scientific statistical analysis: Record analyzes qualitatively as well as quantitatively. His analysis is not a sterile comparison of a set number of variables, but a wide-ranging analysis of many factors and indirect influences on the external support and the outcome of the insurgencies.

Taking on a hot media topic, Record compares Vietnam and Iraq. He highlights the differences, the similarities and the way these factors can influence the outcome of the war in Iraq. He looks at strategies, will at all levels, political factors in the U.S. government and external support. This chapter is a great help in breaking some myths perpetuated by the popular media.

Record's analysis of the American way of war surpasses the insightfulness of the earlier chapters. He describes how the separation of politics and war violates all the basic principles of counterinsurgency and as a strategy is doomed to failure in the long term. His assessment of this way of war is spot-on.

The apolitical way of war leads inevitably to the strategy of attrition, and tactically, to search-and-destroy operations. It may have many short-term successes, and may even be a critical part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy, but its exclusive use is counterproductive and leads to failure. In the final chapter, Record enumerates several conclusions that must be recognized if we are to reach any sort of agreeable conclusion to the Iraq war.

Record does fall into the trap which his book is trying to correct — thinking of the insurgency in strictly military terms and of whether the U.S. military can defeat the insurgents in Iraq. There is no military solution, there can only be a political solution brought about by the Iraqi people. These minor lapses are more a result of wordsmithing in the final copy than any academic mistake on Record's part.

This book is highly recommend to any national-level elected political officials, military personnel of all ranks, civil servants dealing with foreign policy or the Department of Defense and to any citizen who wants to know more than the popular media can give you. This is an excellent work. **SW**

U.S. Army photo

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