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

TAMING THE TAGAB VALLEY

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

ON THE COVER
Afghan forces, working in conjunction with SF and coalition forces, secure insurgents during Operation Al Hasn in the Tagab Valley.
U.S. Army photo

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Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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As the United States looks for ways to conduct and counter irregular warfare, we are re-learning that success in irregular operations often means avoiding the pursuit of conventional strategies. We do not truly free the oppressed by fighting their battles — we must train them to fight with us and then by themselves. However, if we help them establish a force that is a copy of our own, it may not be viable without our continued presence and support.

Instead, we must help our partner nations to develop their own effective solutions that they can sustain without us. That is a mission that not all forces can perform: It requires the ability to speak the language; it requires knowledge of cultural, religious and historical factors; and it requires the ability to adapt our planning, actions and training to the environment and the culture at hand. It is a mission for which Army special-operations forces are uniquely qualified and which they are performing magnificently.

The articles in this issue of Special Warfare demonstrate special-operations Soldiers performing various aspects of successful IW in Afghanistan. Based on his experience in Afghanistan, Captain Matthew Coburn shows how SF Soldiers could be used in a village-focused strategy to train various components of an Afghan force designed to deny the Taliban insurgents the support of the people.

Part of understanding the environment is knowing who the enemy is, how he is organized and what makes him fight. By understanding the enemy structure, we can identify his center of gravity, influence his actions and reduce his effectiveness. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bolduc's and Captain Mike Erwin's article examines the insurgency in Afghanistan, providing an effective analysis of the insurgency that can serve as a template for analyzing other enemy forces.

The article on the 2005 Al Hasn operation shows the way that Soldiers of the 3rd SF Group helped employ the clear, hold and build strategy in the Tagab Valley. Previous conventional operations had moved the Taliban out of the area, but they returned once military forces departed. By planning and conducting a joint, multinational operation that included nonlethal measures to win popular support and establish the legitimacy of the Afghan government, the members of Special Operations Task Force 33 adapted the capabilities of the force to the situation.

The ability to adapt and find creative solutions has always been one that we seek to select and train in special-operations Soldiers. We have increasingly emphasized adaptability in our selection of SF candidates and in the training they receive in the Special Forces Qualification Course. Some of the training our SF candidates receive, particularly Adaptive Thinking and Leadership, is now also a part of the training for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers, as we transform the training pipelines for those areas of special operations. As we prepare Soldiers to fight on an irregular battlefield, one of their strongest skills may need to be the ability to adapt.

Major General James W. Parker

We Will Not Forget

On May 28, the commanding general of the United States Army Special Forces Command, Major General Thomas Csrnko, and the Special Forces Association hosted the annual Special Forces Memorial Day Ceremony. The following Soldiers were killed in combat during the past year, and their names have been added to the Army Special Operations Forces Memorial Wall at the Army Special Operations Forces Plaza at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Headquarters at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

3rd Special Forces Group
SFC William R. Brown
SFC Tung M. Nguyen

5th Special Forces Group
SGT Dustin M. Adkins
SGT Daniel W. Winegeart

19th Special Forces Group
SFC Daniel B. Crabtree

20th Special Forces Group
SGT Marco L. Miller

412th Civil Affairs Battalion
CPT Brian S. Freeman

402nd Civil Affairs Battalion
MAJ Alan R. Johnson

414th Civil Affairs Battalion
SSG Carlos Dominguez
LTC Daniel E. Holland
SSG Ronald L. Paulsen

489th Civil Affairs Battalion
CPT Shane R. Mahaffee
SSG Nathan J. Vacho

490th Civil Affairs Battalion
1SGT Carlos N. Saenz
SPC Teodoro Torres

4th Psychological Operations Group
SSG Michael A. Dickinson

46th Psychological Operations Company
SPC Adam L. Knox

303rd Psychological Operations Company
SGT Thomas E. Vandling Jr.

75th Ranger Regiment
SGT James J. Regan

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
CWO Jamie D. Weeks
MAJ Matthew W. Worrell

USASOC
SFC Richard J. Herrema

Operation Enduring Freedom

3rd Special Forces Group
SSG Kyu H. Chay
CWO Scott W. Dyer

7th Special Forces Group
SSG Eric Caban
SSG Christian H. Longsworth
MSG Thomas D. Maholic

19th Special Forces Group
2LT Scott B. Lundell

364th Civil Affairs Brigade
SFC Merideth L. Howard
CWO Hershel D. McCants Jr.
SSG Robert J. Paul

75th Ranger Regiment
SPC Ryan C. Garbs
PFC Kristofer D.S. Thomas

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SPC Brandon D. Gordon
CWO John A. Quinlan
SPC Travis R. Vaughn
SGT Adam A. Wilkinson

GREEN BERETS AWARDED SILVER STAR MEDAL

Three Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, were awarded the Silver Star Medal in a ceremony at the United States Army Special Operations Command May 15. The Soldiers, stationed at Fort Bragg, were honored for their actions during deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2005.

The three Silver Star recipients, Major Christopher B. Wells, Sergeant First Class Nicholas S. Gross and Sergeant First Class Cliff Roundtree, were presented their medals by Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, the commander of USASOC.

The Silver Star Medal is the Army's third highest award for combat valor and is presented to Soldiers distinguished by their gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States during military operations.

Wells, a captain at the time of the deployment, was a team commander. His team entered a village that was a staging area for Mullah Abdul Wali, a Taliban commander. Walls' team surprised Wali and his fighters on July 25, 2005. The Taliban fighters quickly regrouped and launched an attack.

Wells moved his men around the fighters to high ground north of the village, and by calling in airstrikes and employing his team's weaponry, he was able to suppress enemy fire.

Several times, he exposed himself to enemy fire to ensure that the team's mortar fire was on target. The 14-hour battle resulted in the team driving the enemy from the town and taking control of the city.

^ **VALIANT WARRIORS** Lieutenant General Robert Wagner (left), commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presents a Silver Star Medal to Sergeant First Class Cliff Roundtree during a ceremony May 15 in the USASOC headquarters at Fort Bragg, N.C. Sergeant First Class Nicholas S. Gross (second from right) and Major Christopher B. Wells (not pictured) were also awarded the Silver Star Medal. *U.S. Army photo.*

On Aug. 7, 2005, Gross and Roundtree were on a reconnaissance patrol in the mountainous area of southern Afghanistan when their team came under enemy fire. Roundtree, a weapons sergeant, and Gross, a communications sergeant, were manning the guns in their respective Humvees. The two laid down a stream of fire that allowed their teammates to take the battle to the enemy.

Roundtree's ammunition can was hit by enemy fire, causing the gun turret to burst into flames. Roundtree remained in the turret, supporting his team until the driver of the Humvee pulled him out.

The 56-hour gun battle was at its fiercest the following morning, when Gross' vehicle was hit with a rocket-propelled grenade that knocked him off the machine gun. He didn't hesitate to regain control of the weapon and get back in the fight.

Information for this article came from the Fayetteville Observer and the USASOC Public Affairs Office.

DEGREE PLAN FOR 18D SOLDIERS ANNOUNCED

A new distance-learning program that will allow Special Forces medical sergeants to earn a college degree has been added to the Army Career Degree Program, or ACDP.

The degree, a bachelor of science in emergency medical care, is offered by North Carolina's Western Carolina University. The new program is accredited by the Committee on Accreditation of Education Programs for the EMS Professions and, like all Western Carolina's programs, by the Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

The new degree program is designed to allow students to work as paramedics and enhance their leadership skills while employed in the health-care field. Students must complete one of two concentrations: science or health-services management. The science concentration is for students seeking to complete medical or graduate school. The health-services management concentration is designed for those seeking careers in health-care administration. The amount of credit Western Carolina University will award Soldiers toward degree requirements varies, depending on their training and experience.

The ACDP, a specialized Army education initiative in the Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges Army Degree program, or SOCAD, provides options for Soldiers to obtain college degrees that are directly related to their military occupational specialties. Reviewing the degree plan — along with a visit to the local Army Education Center — should be a Soldier's first step in deciding whether ACDP is the right program. Interested Soldiers can review the MOS 18D ACDP plan online at http://www.soc.aascu.org/socad/18D.html. The site also provides information about other MOS-related ACDP plans, as well as tuition information.

For more information about the SOCAD ACDP, send an e-mail to: socad@aascu.org, or call 1-800-368-5622.

"Predictive intelligence" unrealistic expectation

The January-February 2007 issue of *Special Warfare* contained an article titled "Know Your Enemy: Human Intelligence Key to SOF Missions." Its emphasis on SOF missions being intelligence-intensive highlights a fact frequently overlooked by many experienced policy-makers, strategists, operators and intelligence professionals. Still, an in-depth look at the article's premise and content reveals a predisposition requiring exploration and discussion.

The article was prefaced with a quote credited to the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps. Identified as "Principles of Intelligence," the quote read:

The aim of intelligence is to forecast what a terrorist can do, where and how he will do it and at what time and in what strength. It is concerned with the enemy and all their activities. If it is accurate and timely, it will reduce the risks in planned operations, increase the number of "kills," thwart the terrorist in his plans and psychologically upset him.

Of concern is the first part of the statement: "The aim of intelligence is to forecast what a terrorist can do, where and how he will do it and at what time and in what strength." This statement is illustrative of a predisposition within the U.S. military, the intelligence community and the U.S. government to equate "intelligence" with the concept of "predictive intelligence." The predisposition is an unrealistic expectation that skews planning, decision-making and actions.

Understanding your adversaries and being able to reasonably anticipate their decisions, courses of action and objectives is far different from being able to predict them. Focusing analysis on information in an attempt to anticipate adversarial actions certainly has, and has had, significant value. However, intelligence — what we know about the enemy (his intentions, motivations, capabilities, environment, culture, etc.) — needs to be viewed and employed far differently if we are to deny, disrupt or destroy the prevailing threats: insurgents, terrorists and organized criminal groups.

We need to view intelligence operations as providing a foundation for planning and executing actions that will drive our adversaries to act. Our goal should be to collect and process information about, or subsequent to, the adversaries' response and exploit what we learn in order to fully understand and further target our adversaries. In other words, intelligence operations are not the starting point for a linear process but for a layering process.

For example, we believe that Adversary A is running low on transportation assets. We know that he is prone to view the loss of material items unemotionally, as a cost of doing business. Rather than trying to predict what our adversary will do in the near or long term based on our limited information, we should plan and execute operations that result in the seizure, degradation or incapacitation of any of Adversary A's transportation assets.

This provides an opportunity for conducting reconnaissance and surveillance focused on Adversary A's human infrastructure. The result may be actionable intelligence and time-sensitive targets, or the opportunity for an asset to gain access to the target, based on the asset's ability to solve the target's transportation problems. The most likely result is that by employing link analysis, personality-event matrices and other analytical tools, in concert with a critical thought process and specific technologies, we will learn more about Adversary A, who his associates are, and how they think and act. This new knowledge will go a long way toward helping us deny, disrupt and destroy Adversary A's objectives — maybe even his network or movement.

The phrase "deny, disrupt and destroy" is used for a reason. It represents effects-based thinking instead of the linear thought process reflected in "find, fix and finish." Until we can get away from our predisposition to rely on a linear thought process, we will most likely fall short in our efforts to engage the most adaptive of threats: groups of people.

Whether your frame of reference is Galula or Giap; the OSS, SAS or SF; Malaya, Northern Ireland or the streets of Los Angeles, you are aware of the ultimate target: people. Whether you seek to engage adversaries or desire to win the hearts and minds of other critical groups, you must be focused on the human factor. So it is important for everyone concerned with SOF operations and intelligence to critically explore current ideas; approaches; concepts of operation; and tactics, techniques and procedures of the special-operations and intelligence communities, with an eye toward human factors and the way we affect them. In the end, technologies defeat technologies; humans defeat humans.

William Krieg
Senior Adviser
Tate Incorporated

(William Krieg was formerly chief of the Nonconventional Assisted Recovery Division at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. As an Army intelligence officer, he served in support of U.S. Special Forces, and his last duty position was commander of a military intelligence company (linguist). His frame of reference also includes more than eight years of experience as a special agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration.)

SOUND OFF

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Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Letters dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

Readers should also be aware that the forums on the ARSOF University Web site can be used for exchanging ideas related to doctrinal and training issues.

It Takes a Village to Counter an Insurgency

Adopting a village-focused plan to counter insurgency in Afghanistan

by Major Matthew D. Coburn

The Department of Defense has recently emphasized the concept of irregular warfare as the doctrinal answer for engaging our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism. The focus has resulted in emerging doctrine in counterinsurgency, or COIN, for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, with numerous academic works selling the concept of "clear, hold and build." The strategy places an emphasis on controlling a population in order to separate it from the influence of insurgents.[1]

Academic work in the special-operations community couples the clear, hold and build strategy with the idea of SOF working by, with and through indigenous forces to focus efforts on controlling and separating a population from an insurgency at the village level.[2] After five years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, the assets necessary for executing an indigenous and village-focused strategy are present there.

Clear, hold and build

The clear, hold and build strategy calls for using U.S. Special Forces to build indigenous paramilitary police and self-defense forces inside geographically linked villages and towns, and to couple the local indigenous forces with the Afghan National Army, or ANA, in order to deny the Taliban access to the population.[3]

This strategy would prevent the Taliban from acquiring the resources necessary to sustain its insurgency. The Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, or CFC-A, should shift to an indigenous and village-focused counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy should combine the effective use of the ANA; an SF effort to raise local indigenous defense forces; and the clear, hold and build methodology. This strategy would control the Afghan population at the village level, protect the population from Taliban insurgents, sever the Taliban's access to resources and ultimately defeat the insurgency in the most effective manner.

The ANA as the foundation

The ANA soldiers play a key role in the future of Afghanistan. Since the spring of 2002, SF has played an integral role in the ANA's development. That development has been disjointed at times, but it has produced a sizeable force with the capabilities necessary to fulfill its duties in defeating the Taliban insurgency and in securing Afghanistan for the long haul. Understanding the development of the ANA is essential to properly employing it in a winning COIN strategy.

In early April 2002, CENTCOM tasked SF to organize and train the ANA. The task called for units experienced in training indigenous forces in austere and potentially hostile environments and capable of functioning without robust overhead and command and control.[4] Over the next 15 months, SF led the organizing, training and equipping of the first seven Afghan kandaks (battalions). By summer 2003, the ANA provided a force capable of protecting the government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and of projecting away from the Afghan capital city of Kabul in order to assist in counterinsurgency efforts.[5]

The creation of an army from scratch presented many issues that were not addressed in the original plan to create the ANA. One of the issues identified by SF involved determining how to sustain and maintain, logistically and administratively, an indigenous army above the battalion and brigade levels. Doctrinally, SF can organize, train, equip and advise host-nation forces up to the battalion and brigade levels. The mission in OEF called for staffing and sustainment at the corps level and above. This problem went beyond the scope of SF battalion-level capabilities.

Task Force Phoenix

In the summer of 2003, Combined Joint Task Force-180 and the Office of Military Coordination-Afghanistan, or OMC-A, created Task Force Phoenix to take charge of building and training the ANA.[6] The task force deployed an ad hoc organization of officers and NCOs pieced together from elements of the 10th Mountain Division and the Florida National Guard.

The embedded training teams deployed with an enthusiastic attitude, and with their larger size, they were immediately able to improve the professionalism of the ANA. Many of the logistical and administrative issues that had been encountered by the SF advisers were either surmounted or reduced over the next three years. Task Force Phoenix was able to assign officers and NCOs with the correct specializations for working alongside the relevant staff organizations in the ANA. In addition, the ANA continued to grow: It currently fields 40 battalions, 24 of them combat-arms battalions.[7]

The plan developed a potential weakness from the danger of mirroring.[8] Mirroring occurs when conventional forces advise the ANA to organize, train and fight like conventional forces. This becomes an issue if the conventional advisers feel uncomfortable or untrained in the complex asymmetric environment of irregular warfare. While TF Phoenix displayed a decisive strength in advising the ANA on actions such as logistics management, equipment maintenance and administrative functions, it had a marked weakness in its ability to decentralize, train and fight

^ **JUST BREATHE** Civil military operations, like this medical civic-action program, aimed at improving the lives of the Afghan villagers help to build grassroots intelligence networks. *U.S. Army photo.*

in an asymmetric capacity.

The stationing of the ANA kandaks presented another weakness. The original concept called for the kandaks to form under a central corps centered in the capital city of Kabul. Meanwhile, the SF Soldiers, focused on securing the Afghan population and defeating the Taliban, remained distributed throughout southeastern and eastern Afghanistan. While the SF Soldiers knew their areas of operation, or AOs, the ANA forces, who rotated for month-long deployments to each of the different firebases, were unable to establish solid ties with the local populations. This limited the effectiveness of the ANA forces, who, though culturally and linguistically capable of operating in the different AOs, were unable to produce information about the shadowy Taliban infrastructure. The ANA recently began to solve this problem: It stationed four of its brigades in Kandahar, Gardez, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif and began rotating its kandaks forward to the SF firebases located in the respective regions.

SF detachments that played a part in building the ANA over the past three years are more comfortable working with the ANA than conventional forces because they understand the ANA's strengths and weaknesses. The best solution for the improvement and employment of the ANA would be to decentralize the ANA kandaks out to SF advanced operating bases and detachments, where they can be trained and employed unconventionally by SF yet maintained, sustained and administered as a functioning army by embedded trainers who possess the skills, knowledge and training needed to perform the appropriate logistics and administrative functions.

An objective assessment of the ANA will find that the ANA represents the most competent indigenous force in Afghanistan. The ANA can function at the squad, platoon and company levels, and thus it can perform in the decentralized COIN environment, where the most effective tactics involve small units. To most effectively employ the ANA, the government of Afghanistan and the leaders of OEF may have to assume risk and decentralize the elements of the ANA to uncomfortable levels in support of sound counterinsurgency principles. Proper employment of the ANA must remain the key focus of any counterinsurgency strategy.

Village-focused plan

The indigenous and village-focused plan calls for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghani-



stan, or CJSOTF-A, to maintain two SF forward operating bases that would retain their focus on southeastern and eastern Afghanistan. SF detachments and advanced operating bases, or AOBs, would deploy into towns and adjacent villages in "contested areas" of Afghanistan.[9] Many of the detachments and AOBs may remain in their current locations; however, their focus would be modified. The controlled areas should be linked geographically in order to facilitate an ever-growing expansion of the "oil spot."[10] SF and the ANA would clear their areas of insurgents, but they would hold their villages and towns in accordance with sound counterinsurgency principles[11] and emerging U.S. DoD COIN doctrine.[12]

Once established in their villages, SF Soldiers would focus on the establishment and training of a constabulary force[13] of squad or platoon size.[14] The constabulary force would be the strategy's main effort and must be sufficiently supported. Most Afghan districts possess some form of rudimentary police force that SF could develop into the constabulary police force. SF detachments must focus on either building up the existing police forces that show promise or starting from scratch in areas where the villages lack police or where the police are corrupt.

The constabulary forces, once organized, trained and equipped, should be advised to focus their efforts on determining the identities of the insurgent infrastructure in their villages by means of thorough police work and by developing intelligence and informant networks. The police forces' knowledge of their neighbors, tribesmen and family members, coupled with SF's training in intelligence-collection and light-infantry skills, would be of paramount importance to the strategy's success. Supporting the police force would be a second element: the village self-defense force, or SDF.[15]

SF should orient the SDF on assisting the constabulary police force in securing, protecting and controlling the population. The SF organization, training and employment of the SDF should mimic the Vietnam-era execution of the CIA's Civilian Irregular Defense Group program.[16] The SDF should consist mostly of part-time labor, thus facilitating the continuation of endeavors important to the village and tribal economy, such as farming or small business. Each village should have a full-time platoon- or company-sized element of the SDF that remains available to assist the police force with implementing personnel- and resource-control measures, in addition to its most important task of acting as the village quick-reaction force, or QRF, which will respond to any villagers in need or disrupt any insurgent attacks on SF, the police force or the villagers.

Former members of the Afghan militia forces and Afghan security forces, as well as local veterans of the ANA or Soviet-invasion-era mujahideen, might provide sound members of the SDF. SF training in basic tasks such as checkpoints, searches, ambushes and reaction to ambushes; along with training in first-aid, weapons and communications skills, would prove appropriate. With the villages under physical control, a movement-to-contact, or MTC, force would fill the void in the uncontrolled areas in each AO.[17]

The ANA stands ready to perform a vital supporting function in this COIN strategy. Aside from serving as an interim SDF and assisting SF in training the constabulary police force and the village SDF, the ANA kandaks could serve as MTC elements.[18] The MTC kandaks would operate along the seams of the controlled areas. While the constabulary police forces weed out the insurgent infrastructure, the ANA, with SF advisers, can operate in areas such as the Afghan/Pakistan border or, via dismounted operations, inside mountainous areas, denying sanctuary to insurgents hiding and

operating outside the controlled areas. Via intelligence-driven clearance operations meant to keep the insurgents off balance and on the run, the ANA can also deny sanctuary to insurgents who gather in populated areas outside the controlled areas. Each AOB should retain one A-detachment at the AOB firebase to advise the ANA MTC force and to stand ready with an additional ANA QRF company.[19] This QRF should stand vigilant to rapidly respond to their comrades in need. The QRF would prove integral as the SF and indigenous allies assume the risk of decentralizing in order to affect and control the largest area possible.

With the appropriate assets arrayed, the operations necessary to defeat the insurgency can commence. The process for clear, hold and build occurs in steps, but as in all asymmetric operations, SF can perform steps simultaneously or even skip steps, depending upon the results of the local assessment.[20] As they interact with the population and assess the insurgency's level of control, SF leaders can determine which tactics, techniques and procedures work best for them at any given time and place.

If the SF detachments must "cold call" a new village, then the team will begin an area assessment of the village and develop political, cultural, social and economic awareness of the village and its area of influence.[21] Next, the detachment will make contact with the village shura and "meet and greet" the village elders and begin to establish rapport. They should explain that they intend to move into the village in order to "protect and serve" it.[22]

At this point, the team will occupy a house in the village and should begin to clear and secure the village through the interim use of the ANA.[23] Any clearance operations should utilize intelligence as much as possible, create the minimum intrusion on the population and be coupled with an intensive information campaign designed to explain why the clearance is occurring and that the counterinsurgents intend to remain in the area permanently. The SF and ANA soldiers should then begin to organize, train and equip the constabulary police force and the village self-defense force.[24]

^ **SELF DEFENSE** To clear, hold and build Afghan villages, U.S. Special Forces must work to build indigenous paramilitary police and self defense forces inside geographically linked villages and towns, and to couple the local indigenous forces with the Afghan National Army, or ANA, in order to deny the Taliban access to the population. *U.S. Army photo.*

Simultaneously, the A-detachment begins to establish its "grass roots" intelligence network.[25] The members of the police and SDF recruited from the village and local area will possess valuable knowledge of the area that will strengthen the SF detachment's intelligence-collection. Upon securing the village, SF Soldiers should begin to improve the village through means previously assessed as appropriate to the village's needs.[26] These civil-military operations, coupled with timely information operations, can further sway the population from the control of the coercive insurgent infrastructure and simultaneously legitimize the government of Afghanistan.[27]

The efforts to assess and fill the villages' needs will yield positive effects when the people see that their lives improve as the insurgency loses control. Those positive effects will reduce the time it will take before the SF detachment can transfer control of the area to the police and move to a new area.

Historically, counterinsurgents have used color coding to measure effectiveness.[28] The Frenchman David Galula used red, pink and white areas, for example.[29] As the SF detachment commander perceives that the SF Soldiers and the police have begun to defeat the insurgent infrastructure, he may determine that a village is "pink," and proceed to go split-team, spreading his forces out to begin gaining control of another village. When the detachment commander feels that a village is prepared to stand on its own, with only its indigenous forces, then he declares the village "white," and moves the detachment to an

adjacent area's villages to continue to spread the control of the population.

Oil spot

This method uses Andrew F. Krepenivich Jr.'s "oil-spot strategy."[30] As SF provides each village with the capability to protect itself and defeat the insurgent infrastructure in that village, the detachments move onto geographically linked villages, and the control of the population spreads from village to village like an oil spot. As the controlled area grows (over months or years), the insurgents will substantially weaken because they will be forced away from their supply of needed resources, such as new recruits, weapons, food and money. Unable to find sanctuary in the restricted terrain of the mountains, and with their supply lines from the Pakistani tribal areas severed (the ANA MTC forces should continually disrupt their supply efforts), the Taliban may attempt to return to the controlled villages, where the indigenous police and SDF can defeat them. These military and law-enforcement actions, coupled with the ongoing political and economic actions of the government and its civilian-agency supporters, should defeat the Taliban and assist in stabilizing Afghanistan.

Conclusion

This indigenous and village-focused strategy would require a shift in the current command-and-control paradigm in Afghanistan. The protection of vested interests, at all points along the political and military spectrum, involved in stabilizing Afghanistan would hinder this counterinsurgency strategy. Encouraging the government of Afghanistan to revamp its current use of ANA, police and Afghan militia forces toward a more decentralized and aggressive posture focused on controlling the population at the village level would receive friction from the highest levels of the Afghan ministries of defense and interior, and perhaps from President Hamid Karzai himself. However, defeating the Taliban insurgency, stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan and bringing Afghanistan into the fold of globalized nations, would be worth the effort.

After five years in Afghanistan, the means are available for defeating the insurgent Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan. SF must continue its long-term relationship with the ANA, and through understanding its strengths and weaknesses, employ the ANA in accordance with the best practices of counterinsurgency. SF and the ANA must organize, train, equip and advise local indigenous police and village SDFs in order to control the population at the village level. Through the use of the sound and proven counterinsurgency principles of clear, hold and build, the government of Afghanistan, and its allies in the CFC-A and CJSOTF-A can secure and protect the population of Afghanistan. Though this indigenous and village-focused strategy employs a decentralized, irregular and asymmetric paradigm, it presents an effective means to secure, stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan in order to welcome it into the globalized community. ***SW***

Notes:

[1] This strategy can be found in classic counterinsurgency works. For example, see David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

[2] John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, "Unconventional Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006).

[3] Dyke and Crisafulli.

[4] Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Dinter (group executive officer, 3rd SF Group) in telephone discussions with the author, Aug. 9 and 16, 2006.

[5] The Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, worked by, with and through the ANA from April-October 2002 and again from March-July 2003. The 1st Battalion has deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, four times to date and, similar to the rest of the 3rd SF Group, has spent 30 of the past 53 months deployed in support of OEF. The Soldiers of the 5th Battalion, 19th SF Group, advised the ANA from October 2002-March 2003.

[6] OMC-A reflagged as the Office of Security Coordination-A in 2006.

[7] Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 27, 2006), 24.

[8] Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 23.

[9] Dyke and Crisafulli, 19, 43.

[10] Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 70.

[11] Galula, 107-27.

[12] Department of the Army, FM 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 3-13.

[13] Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare* 18, 2 (2005):6-7.

[14] Dyke and Crisafulli, 19.

[15] Dyke and Crisafulli, 21.

[16] John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 128-29. See also Krepinevich, 70-71. SF teams built an indigenous village-defense system with 38,000 irregulars and secured an entire Vietnamese province.

[17] Wendt, 7.

[18] Dyke and Crisafulli, 21.

[19] Dyke and Crisafulli, 22.

[20] Wendt, 9-12.

[21] The A-detachments in each SF group have various tactics, techniques and procedures for this process and are certainly comfortable with the task.

[22] The use of a police motto sets the appropriate tone for the COIN environment.

[23] The ANA had mastered basic small-unit COIN tasks by the spring of 2004 and began to train local police on the tasks in the Shinkay District of Zabol Province.

[24] The ANA proved to be valuable indigenous militia trainers in Bamiyan Province in the summer of 2003 and police trainers in the Shinkay District of Zabol Province in the spring of 2004.

[25] Dyke and Crisafulli, 30.

[26] Dyke and Crisafulli, 31.

[27] Dyke and Crisafulli, 31. Dyke and Crisafulli capture the fact that the process will take months or years to accomplish. That is the nature of the "long war."

[28] Galula, 96-97. See also Dyke and Crisafulli, 32.

[29] Dyke and Crisafulli, 96-97.

[30] Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005; available from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html.

Major Matthew D. Coburn served as the detachment commander of SF Detachment 325 through three deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, 2003 and 2004; as the assistant operations officer for 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group; and as the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Coburn is currently a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.



The Anatomy of an Insurgency:

An enemy organizational analysis

by Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bolduc and Captain Mike Erwin

It is risky to oversimplify the enemy on the Afghan battlefield. While the Taliban can be broken down into four major groups, their organizational capacity goes much deeper. Though not as organized as Western military forces, the enemy is still capable of moving forces on the battlefield, adapting to the environment, conducting re-supply operations and determining strategic goals and plans. The enemy's structure and operational environment also drive his strategy for conserving combat power, surviving, waiting and organizing.

By necessity more than by design, the enemy falls into four groups: leaders (area commanders), fighters (guerrillas), facilitators (underground) and supporters (auxiliary). These groups enable the Taliban to operate in Afghanistan, pressure International Security Assistance Forces-NATO, undermine the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and influence the local populace to support the Taliban. The combination is helping the Taliban work toward its goal of driving NATO forces from the country and rising to power once again. Not every insurgent will fall into one of these groups, but the classification makes communication and targeting between intelligence and operations more clear and concise.

Leaders

As in any military organization, an insurgency's leadership is critical to its success. These leaders know that they are targeted, so they move around the battlefield frequently and practice good operational security. They often travel with a personal security detachment to safeguard them from potential attacks. An insurgency's leaders are often charismatic and capable of motivating fighters to take the battlefield despite the dangers. They know the right people from whom to acquire weapons, ammunition and other supplies necessary to fight; they provide guidance to supporters and facilitators; and they make command decisions about when to attack and when to avoid a fight. In short, they make things happen and are the most critical component to the insurgency's architecture.

Fighters

The fighting force of the Taliban is occasionally supplemented by foreign fighters recruited from areas such as Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Paki-

stan. Some fighting elements undergo training, while others are merely recruited by force from the local populace and the camps of internally displaced persons, or IDPs. The elements' area of operation is often determined by their origins and tribal affiliations. The guerrilla commander is responsible for the fighters, the indirect-fire experts and the experts on improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. The fighters are typically broken down into cells of five to 15 Taliban, primarily equipped with AK-47s, a PKM machine gun and a rocket-propelled-grenade launching system.

Engagements with the enemy in the fall of 2006 proved that a "heavy-weapons cell" exists in some areas, with groups of five to 15 fighters armed with strictly PKMs or RPGs. The indirect-fire experts have been trained to use mortar systems and rocket launchers. They are not to be confused with locals who accept money to prop a rocket on an incline and fire in the direction of NATO-ISAF forces.

A typical fighter in the Afghan insurgency is uneducated and easily invigorated by the radical Islamic ideology. He can survive on the battlefield despite cold weather and a lack of supplies. In most cases, he fights because the Taliban is paying him two to three times as much as he can earn anywhere else in the country. If the typical insurgent fighter is well-led, he will fight despite the high risk to his personal safety.

A simplified break-down of insurgent fighters follows:

Guerrilla cell: These are the main fighter units who use direct and indirect fires while conducting ambushes and assaults, and defending safe havens and the movement of their leaders. They often set up hasty illegal checkpoints, patrol areas and strike targets of opportunity. Recruiting for fighters continues to flourish in Afghanistan because of the financial and economic situation. Personnel making up the guerrilla cells are often paid up to three times the salary that a member of the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF, earns. The pay inequity is compounded by the fact that ANSF in some areas sometimes go months without receiving their pay.

IED cell: This is a more specialized cell. Its main purpose is to build and sometimes emplace IEDs within its area of operations in order to deny movement to the ANSF and ISA-NATO forces, protect routes and inflict casualties through minimal effort. IED cells also operate in unison with guerrilla cells for complex ambushes and area defense. In some cases, the IED cell will emplace an IED and use a local national to man, arm or initiate the device. In other situations, it will emplace the device, leaving it armed — and then instruct the populace to drive a certain route to prevent them from triggering the IED.

Rocket/mortar cell: These are composed of personnel specializing in indirect-fire attacks through the use of rockets and mortars. When used to attack bases, rockets are typically pre-positioned and armed with a timer so that the operator has ample time to evacuate the area and elude a quick-reaction force or coalition force indirect fire to the point of origin.

Prior to 2006, the enemy relied primarily on rockets propped up on some type of incline, pointing the rocket in the general direction of the intended target; however, 2006 saw BM-1 tubes with tripods and sites used for much more accurate rocket fire. These launchers require specific training. The use of mortars is normally situation-dependent; mortars have been used in Afghanistan in offensive and defensive roles, supporting complex attacks, area defense and withdrawals of high-value targets.

Suicide cell: Quickly becoming the weapon of choice in Afghanistan, the suicide cell allows the Taliban to cause the most catastrophic damage, both physically and mentally. A suicide cell may be as small as one person wearing a suicide vest or driving a vehicle laden with explosives. The enemy has demonstrated the ability to use multiple suicide bombers operating in unison: They strike the initial target and then the first responders. Dangers of suicide cells stem from the inability to detect the bomber, the method, the timing, the



intended target and even the trigger. The platform of delivery varies, ranging from a simple vest to animals, bicycles, motorcycles and various types of vehicles used either in a stationary or mobile manner. This is the most complex cell, consisting of safe houses, suicide bomber keepers, recon elements, experts used to build the vehicle or vest, and a key leader to determine what target will be attacked and when.

Facilitators

The facilitators are not organized in traditional guerrilla cells but rather are a network of personnel who accomplish a myriad of supporting tasks. In southern Afghanistan, the Taliban utilizes this network to assert its freedom of movement and help control operations within the region. This network remains in contact with the Taliban's senior leadership based in Pakistan and ensures that their intent is met.

The centralized underground government in exile is headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar, who delegates various areas to his subordinates, and many positions mirror those of an established government. The Taliban shura selects individuals to represent its movement and decides who controls issues such as religion, financing, recruitment and public affairs, in addition to appointing normal governmental officers, such as ministers, regional leaders, provincial and district shadow governors and legal officials, including Taliban judges and police.

A simplified break-down of facilitators follows:

PSYOP and information operations, or IO: This is the section most responsible for the Taliban IO campaign and relations with the populace. It uses both friendly and coercive methods of turning the populace to the Taliban ideal. This group also uses radio and international media to promote the Taliban agenda; however, anti-coalition-forces mullahs and night-letter writers are the most common members of the facilitator/underground network. Their activities are complemented by the distribution of DVDs/CDs and music audio tapes in local bazaars.

C2: There is a command-and-control element of the Taliban for each area. Directions and coordination stem from this section. While the area commander is in charge of a geographic area (district, set of villages), he receives his guidance from outside the operational area through the C2 or the local shuras and tribal elders who hold influence over the area.

Finances: This element manages the financial component of the Taliban structure. Most money within the finance section comes from outside sources: the drug trade, donations from other countries, extortion and the black market. The finance section is responsible for paying the leaders and fighters for making attacks.

Training: This section is composed of individuals or elements responsible for teaching recruits basic soldiering skills, depending on their need and assignment. It also facilitates the training of suicide bombers and IED makers, as well as instruction in communications, medicine and small-unit tactics. Foreign fighters often work in this section, being deemed too important to use in direct contact against IRoA and CF forces.

Recruiting: Personnel in this section are tasked with rallying individuals to support the fight, either willingly or under duress. Their main focus is to replenish the Taliban ranks. Tribal elders, influential mullahs and recruiters offer money and materials to those who join the Taliban faction.

> **"The ability to describe the enemy is essential in a counterinsurgency, or COIN, environment. It facilitates the creation of a COIN model that defines the insurgency's center of gravity, survival requirements, strategy and objectives."**

Supporters

The support network aids the leadership by providing the logistics support necessary for moving goods back and forth and for fueling the insurgency. This network also plays a vital role in sustaining operations through supplying, facilitating and transporting money, equipment, supplies and personnel to Taliban commanders in Afghanistan.

A simplified break-down of the supporters follows:

Early-warning network: The group of personnel who actively support the guerrilla cells by providing intelligence on ISAF-NATO and ANSF movements and patrol routes. While it is possible that this role is filled by members of the guerrilla cell in some locations, the responsibility typically falls on the facilitator/auxiliary network. This network is the most difficult to defeat. After five years of fighting, the enemy has determined the coalition force's footprint, routes, fire bases and capabilities. This network can be as simple as children and old men in tea shops or as sophisticated as operators. The network uses a variety of means to communicate: push-to-talk radios, cell phones, mirrors, fires and runners.

Smuggling network: These supporters are responsible for getting weapons, supplies, explosives and personnel into and out of Afghanistan. The primary function of this network is the narcotics trade, but it can easily be used for guerrilla purposes.

Cache keepers: These are personnel who store supplies, ammunition and weapons in specified areas for the Taliban. The areas are guarded and discreetly maintained while the cache keepers wait to either arm or re-fit the guerrilla cells to conduct attacks.

Safe-site keepers: These are personnel who own, control or rent buildings, mosques, farms, etc., that are used to hide, rest or provide assistance to members of the Taliban insurgency (in essence, a safe house). In some instances, SSKs also provide security to enable the Taliban to take full advantage of rest, recovery and re-fit operations before continuing on to their next objective or mission, whether that is an attack or a move in or out of Afghanistan.

The ability to describe the enemy is essential in a counterinsurgency, or COIN, environment. It facilitates the creation of a COIN model that defines the insurgency's center of gravity, survival requirements, strategy and objectives. The model will also allow COIN planners to develop the most effective combination of roles for civil authorities, political authorities and the military to produce the desired effect on the enemy and the population. To affect an insurgent infrastructure, it is important to recognize its structure. By doing so, a commander and his staff will be more effective at developing a strategy, applying and combining appropriate force structure, and conducting tactical operations that achieve operational and strategic results. SW

Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bolduc *has served in combat in Grenada as a squad leader with the 82nd Airborne Division, in the Persian Gulf War as an assistant S3, and in Afghanistan as a battalion operations officer on an advance team acting as the primary military adviser for Hamid Karzai and Ah Gul Sharzai. This is his second rotation as commander of Task Force-31 in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He has been awarded two Bronze Star Medals, The Bronze Star Medal with "V" device, the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device, and two Purple Hearts for service in Afghanistan. During his command, TF-31 was awarded the Valorous Unit Award.*

Captain Mike Erwin *has served in combat in Iraq with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, as the assistant intelligence officer. His service in Iraq included participation in the battles of An Najaf and Al Fallujah. He served as the intelligence officer and intelligence center director for TF-31 in Kandahar, Afghanistan.*

STATE OF THE INSURGENCY



"CONSERVE, WAIT, SURVIVE, ORGANIZE"

INDICATORS

- Protracted contacts in remote areas and strategic acts in population centers
- Comparision of activity from last 24-36 months in the same region
- Nature and composition of the contacts
- PTS program and ACM integration into IROA
- Elected and appointed officials and enemy targeting
- Reaction/support of populace
- Government impact and popular support

TAMING THE TAGAB VALLEY

Planning and executing a full-spectrum operation in the Afghan theater

by Major Darin J. Blatt, Major Scott T. McGleish and Captain Peter G. Fischer





"THIS IS ANOTHER TYPE OF WAR, NEW IN ITS INTENSITY, ANCIENT IN ITS ORIGINS – WAR BY GUERRILLAS, SUBVERSIVES, INSURGENTS, ASSASSINS; WAR BY AMBUSH INSTEAD OF COMBAT; BY INFILTRATION, INSTEAD OF AGGRESSION, SEEKING VICTORY BY ERODING AND EXHAUSTING THE ENEMY INSTEAD OF ENGAGING HIM. … IT REQUIRES IN THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE WE MUST COUNTER IT … A WHOLE NEW KIND OF STRATEGY, A WHOLLY DIFFERENT KIND OF FORCE, AND THEREFORE A NEW AND WHOLLY DIFFERENT KIND OF MILITARY TRAINING."

— PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1962

In 2005, members of a special-operations task force conducted an offensive operation in the Tagab Valley, located in the southeastern corner of the Kapisa Province in Central Afghanistan. This assault sent insurgent fighters into nearby Pakistan to escape the coalition offensive. Once the coalition troops stabilized the security situation in the Tagab Valley, they shifted to other parts of the theater, leaving the valley undefended. By the fall of 2006, insurgent Taliban fighters had returned to the Tagab Valley from Pakistan and had firmly regained control.

The Tagab Valley was as deadly in September 2006 as it had been prior to the 2005 offensive. Local leaders reported to coalition forces that there were almost 500 Taliban fighters living in the 40-kilometer-long valley, some of whom had trained at one of the three nearby suicide-bomber training facilities. Only weeks before the cold winter months, in defiance of the coalition, Tagab Valley residents burned blankets and winter clothing from humanitarian-assistance, or HA, drops in the southern portion of the Valley. Taliban fighters set up fighting positions and weapons caches in the Kohi Safi Mountains, which separate the Tagab Valley from Bagram Airfield, so that they could fire on coalition forces. Until November 2006, coalition ground convoys could not pass through the valley without receiving small-arms fire in a series of pre-planned ambushes.

The Tagab Valley, only 60 miles northeast of Kabul, was an ideal safe haven from which Taliban commanders could project suicide bombers and other insurgent activity into nearby Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul and Kapisa. A stable and peaceful Tagab Valley would have significant effects on the security of central Afghanistan.

Special Operations Task Force 33, or SOTF-33, composed of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, worked hand-in-hand with the Kapisa provincial governor and soldiers from the United Arab Emirates Special Operations Task Force 8, or TF-8, to bring long-term stability to the Tagab Valley. On Oct. 31, 2006, members of the two task forces began Operation Al Hasn (Arabic for "fortress" or "castle") as a joint, multinational, multi-agency operation designed to implement the clear, hold and build strategy in the Tagab Valley. The operation included more than 1,000 soldiers and policemen from the Afghan National Security Forces, composed of the Afghanistan National Police, or ANP, and the Afghan National Army, or ANA. TF-8, the 3rd SF Group and the Afghan National Security Forces operated under the command and control of SOTF-33.

PLANNING AS A PARTNERSHIP

SOTF-33, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ashley, rotated into Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom IX. It established a strong partnership with TF-8, whose leader, Lieutenant Colonel Nasser Al Ottabi, was eager to apply his country's significant assets where they could be most effective in stabilizing Afghanistan. Almost immediately, SOTF-33 and TF-8 planners recognized the strategic importance of denying the Tagab Valley safe haven to the Taliban. With that objective in mind, SOTF-33 and TF-8 began creating a friendly network for degrading the Taliban influence in the valley. That required the identification of key friendly personalities with whom SOTF-33 and TF-8 could build their alliance. SOTF-33 and TF-8 understood that the key to success in establishing long-term stability in the Kapisa Province lay in empowering the province's officials.

With similar Islamic cultural norms and streamlined financial-support procedures, TF-8 had the unique ability to build almost instant rapport with local Afghan leaders. Nasser had developed a relationship with the governor of Kapisa, Satar Murad, and he recommended that the governor participate in the planning to deny the Tagab Valley as a safehaven for the Taliban. In September 2006, Ashley, Nasser and Murad met at TF-8's compound to discuss the future security of the Tagab Valley.

From the first planning sessions, Governor Murad, SOTF-33 and TF-8 agreed that bringing stability to Tagab was not exclusively a military matter. Instead, it was a battle that had to be won by the local legitimate government. Long-term success in the Tagab Valley would require tangible demonstrations of the Afghan government's commitment to security and stability in the region. The government of Afghanistan, or GOA, would do more than provide symbolic ownership: it would bear the mantle of leadership for this operation.

SOTF-33, TF-8 and the regional Afghan leaders began planning an operation to clear the insurgents from the valley, to hold a lasting security posture and to build legitimate government structures capable of combating an insurgent threat over the long term. SOTF-33 conducted the U.S. military decision-making process, or MDMP, including the Afghan partners and TF-8. Their participation challenged SF planners accustomed to tightly structured MDMP. Elements of the planning that a U.S. staff might accomplish in minutes took significantly longer in the combined/interagency environment with partners who were not accustomed to MDMP.

Moreover, the GOA leaders were forced to divide their attentions between operational planning and their governing duties. Despite these challenges, SOTF-33 gave its Afghan partners ownership of the process by pushing the plan forward according to their priorities. The operational principle of "Afghan ownership" had been recently derived from lessons learned in conducting effective operations from tactical to strategic levels.

When planning Operation Al Hasn, the coalition evaluated historical operations and looked to three lessons learned in previous operations in the Tagab Valley: (1) Successful counter-insurgency operations separate the insurgent from the populace; (2) temporary displays of military might do not lead to effective growth and transformation; and (3) the long-term presence must be supported by a responsive and flexible logistics system that is sustainable by the host country.

^ **DECISION MAKERS** The governor of the Kapisa region of Afghanistan, Sata Murad, listens intently to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ashley, the commander of Special Operations Task Force 33, as he discusses plans for the mission in the Tagab Valley. Murad was instrumental in gaining local support for the mission. *U.S. Army photo.*

First, Operation Al Hasn was designed as a true partnership between the US, the United Arab Emirates and the government of Afghanistan. Throughout Operation Al Hasn, SOTF-33 and TF-8 included Governor Murad as an equal partner in the planning, coordination and execution.

Today, special-operations forces in Afghanistan must empower Afghan governmental agencies to separate the civilians from the insurgents and minimize the impact of the insurgents on legitimate government organizations. While lethal operations may be a necessary catalyst for change, it is just as important that nonlethal operations be imbedded in those operations to produce the lasting effects necessary to win in Afghanistan. SOTF-33 and TF-8 designed the partnership between coalition forces and the GOA during Operation Al Hasn that set the conditions for the Kapisa government to separate the populace from the insurgent fighters.

Second, the mission marked the beginning of a long-term presence of the coalition and the Afghan government in the valley. Long before lethal operations have ended, the battle to win the support of the populace must begin. The Afghan government must provide security and stability through nonlethal and lethal operations that have a long-term strategic effect. Counterinsurgency operations, or COIN, require a multitude of aggressive nonlethal operations that draw on assets provided by Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, Civil Affairs, or CA, and provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs. To bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the minds of the Afghan people, local officials must be seen leading actions that are relevant to their lives and effective at meeting their needs. Tactical success in the short term holds little value if it does not lead to operational success in the long term.

Finally, stockpiling all classes of humanitarian assistance and civil-military resources is essential for ensuring a seamless transition from lethal to nonlethal operations within the valley. CA teams; HA drops; medical civic-action programs, or MEDCAPs; and PSYOP resources must be pre-positioned for movement prior to the start of the operation. That allows the leaders to move nonlethal assets throughout the area of operations where and when they are needed, not when they become available.

^ **BASE BUILD-UP** One of the first steps in the Tagab Valley mission was establishing an initial foothold in the valley. This process was made easier by using the "firebase in a box" concept. *U.S. Army photo.*

SHAPING

If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient — at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve.

- Karl Von Clausewitz

Initial shaping efforts began more than six weeks prior to the execution of Operation Al Hasn through meetings between SOTF-33, TF-8 and the governor of Kapisa. During those meetings, SOTF 33 planners determined that the key location for the forward command-and-control element should be in the north of the Tagab Valley, because it was the most secure area from which to direct the operation and receive accurate intelligence. At the onset of the operation, an SF detachment from SOTF-33 and a company of the Afghan National Army's 201st Corps would secure a small foothold in the north that would later become a permanent firebase. SOTF-33 and TF-8 gathered intelligence through the Afghan security organizations in the region. The location chosen has since become the regional government center in the valley.

Members of SOTF-33's PSYOP section prepared products for each stage of the operation. These included leaflets to provide instructions to the local population. The PSYOP section also used radio messages to provide important information to the populace during the operation. All the products helped support an information-operations plan that circumvented Taliban attempts to undermine the operation. Several days before the operation, Governor Murad recorded messages of assurance, guidance and leadership for broadcast by local radio stations during the operation. The messages encouraged his people to identify the insurgents who had brought instability, poverty and violence to their otherwise peaceful valley.

The Voice of Kapisa radio station agreed to play Murad's messages and to work with SOTF-33 PSYOP personnel to ensure that the messages were broadcast throughout the region. To support the information operations, SOTF-33's PSYOP section distributed several thousand radios to enable the population to listen to Murad's messages. The radio transmissions allowed Murad to update the people of Tagab with critical and accurate news and information.

Executing these radio programs required the distribution of civil-military operations' assets at the right times in the right places. Pre-positioned logistics allowed the coalition to support Afghan leaders when and where required rather than binding the leaders to a coalition supply timeline. Operation Al Hasn's logistics, HA and MEDCAP movements were event-driven to allow the command to react to events

on the ground. More than 30 days before the operation began, SOTF-33 requisitioned blankets, sundry kits, radios, foodstuffs and clothing. All classes of logistics were requisitioned, drawn and prepared for movement weeks before the mission began. Days before the operation began, SOTF-33 and TF-8 loaded prepackaged medical and HA supplies on Afghan trucks. SOTF 33 packaged, prepared, stocked and assembled logistical packages in order to respond to operational needs in the valley.

By pre-positioning supplies, coalition forces have the ability to support operations without delay. The large MEDCAP team, which consisted of more than 30 medical personnel, deployed to the Tagab Valley region on the first day of Operation Al Hasn. The SOTF-33 surgeon spent more than a month assembling the team, which consisted of personnel from the U.S., the UAE, Afghanistan, Romania and Korea. Prior to the mission, SOTF-33 medical personnel provided refresher training in trauma management for Romanian, Korean and UAE medical personnel.

The SOTF-33 surgeon tailored the MEDCAP to provide expanded capabilities for treating women and children; and to include a veterinary package for treating pets and livestock. CA planners worked with the ANA to provide internal and external security and a patient-management system that would maximize the number of people who could receive care. As the MEDCAP plan came together, TF Tiger, a Bagram-based Civil Affairs element, and the Bagram PRT contributed medical supplies and equipment to the already robust package. Medical personnel prepared this package, like the logistical package, to move days in advance, and the MEDCAP team entered the valley only hours after the initial phases of lethal operations.

Establishing a foothold in the valley was made easier by using the "firebase in a box" concept developed by the engineer for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan. The SOTF-33 support center delivered mobile buildings and ready-made defensive resources at the onset of the operation. These, along with CJSOTF-A pre-coordinated contracting with host-nation workers, ensured that the firebase was in place within days of the initial assault. This command-and-control post was so robust that it became a permanent firebase.

While SOTF-33 and TF-8 assembled the logistics, Murad and his intelligence chiefs identified key enemy locations and key players, and they discussed unique environmental and political challenges in the valley with the SOTF-33 and TF-8 planners. The local Afghan leadership drove the targeting process with their unique knowledge of the environment. Their unparalleled insight into the region gave Operation Al Hasn precise targeting information that would reduce the risk of collateral damage and allowed the coalition to maximize the effectiveness of its reconstruction efforts.

In October, SOTF-33 published the warning order, and TF-8, SF detachments and their partner Afghan forces began mission-focused training to prepare for the operation. SOTF-33 tasked TF-8 and their partnered SF detachment to execute an air-assault mission to capture key leaders of the Tagab Taliban network. To prepare for the mission, TF-8 and the SF Soldiers began a crawl-walk-run training program. They first rehearsed helicopter loading and off-loading procedures and practiced each of their contingency plans. Two nights before the operation, the training culminated in a full fly-away task-force rehearsal in which the entire assault element loaded onto its helicopters and flew away to a mock target that it assaulted and secured at full speed.

Other SF detachments, tasked by SOTF-33 to create blocking or clearing positions during Al Hasn, rehearsed military operations in urban terrain with their Afghan partners. Each element of the lethal operation polished its contingency procedures and movement techniques. By Oct. 30, each element had planned and rehearsed key phases of its operations for more than three weeks.

EXECUTION

"The clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him."
- Sun Tzu

"Success against an insurgency demands that the time, place and conditions are set in order to establish long-term stability for the legitimate government."

During the initial phase of the operation, ANSF, SOTF-33 and TF-8 planned to isolate and clear the valley to separate the insurgents from the populace. The coalition expected 250 ANP from surrounding provinces to link-up with SF detachments to conduct the clearing operations. To SOTF 33's surprise, the night before the operation, almost 900 ANP responded to Murad's call by reporting for duty at his headquarters. Others positioned themselves in the northern part of the valley, near the SF detachment and the ANA. With this good news and a favorable weather forecast, Murad, Ashley and Nasser met in the SOTF-33 operations center to monitor and direct the beginning of Operation Al Hasn. With Murad located with the military commanders, real-time intelligence from the Kapisa intelligence officers flowed to the SF Soldiers and the ANP on the ground.

^ **WELL BEING** Medical personnel participating in the Tagab Valley mission saw more than 4,000 patients during the first two weeks of the operation. *U.S. Army photo.*

On the first evening of Operation Al Hasn, the coalition cleared Taliban insurgents from their positions and established a security presence in the valley. The operation coordinated three efforts throughout the valley. As the main effort, TF-8 and its SF detachment partners conducted an air assault against a known Taliban leader in the north of the valley, while the ANSF and two SF detachments sealed the south end of the valley.

TF-8, an SF detachment and a dog team commenced the raid just after midnight on Oct. 31, signaling the beginning of the operation. This was the UAE military's first combat air assault. Once on target, the element cleared the objective, captured a key Taliban leader and established strong points. Within 30 minutes, squad-sized elements of Taliban engaged the TF-8 positions. TF-8 suppressed the enemy while the SF Soldiers called in AH-64 Apaches and AC-130 gunships for close air support.

As the air assault began, the commander of the SOTF-33 support center briefed the massive logistical convoy as it prepared to move from Bagram Airfield to the Tagab Valley. This convoy included not only supplies for the HA and MEDCAP missions and logistics necessary for sustained operations, but also the armored vehicles to be delivered to the air-assault element once it had secured its objective. A company of ANA and an SF detachment met the convoy when it arrived at the new Tagab firebase. The ANA, the SF detachments, and a portion of the convoy then moved from the firebase to link-up with the TF-8 air-assault element and deliver the vehicles.

As the Afghan, U.S. and UAE forces began clearing the insurgents from the valley, Ashley, Nasser and Murad moved into the northern part of the Tagab Valley and established a forward combined command post. Murad stayed at the forward headquarters to plan and direct operations for the entire 11 days of the operation. The governor was an essential link with the people of the valley and the Afghan media. When the insurgents published false information in the press about civilian casualties during lethal operations, the governor immediately contacted the Afghan minister of information, the minister of interior and President Hamid Karzai to expose the misinformation. During the operation, Murad sent factual information to the Afghan national media, which they published on the same day. As a result, the Taliban's misinformation campaign stopped within the first few days of the operation.

Meanwhile, the Afghan Border Patrol and two SF detachments in the southern part of the valley began fighting their way northward toward the valley's center, with close air support from A-10 Warthogs, B-1 bombers, AC-130 gunships and AH-64 Apaches. The further north the element moved, the more the enemy force increased the intensity of its counterattacks. At the same time, two SF detachments, TF-8 and their partner units from the ANP pushed south toward the village of Tagab.

By the fifth day of operations, on Nov. 4, all of the elements involved in Operation Al Hasn turned east to at-

tack the fiercely defended Bedrab Valley, on the eastern wall of the Tagab. TF-8 and its partnered SF detachment established a blocking position along known routes of Taliban egress and ingress. By dusk, the ANSF and its partners sealed the southern and northern routes out of the valley, while another SF detachment established a blocking position on the western route out of the Bedrab Valley.

The coalition partners coordinated the lethal operation against the Taliban stronghold in the central portion with Murad's information operations and a comprehensive MEDCAP in the north. More importantly, Murad brought together key mullahs in the valley to encourage them to identify Taliban criminals. After discussion about the future of the valley, the governor sent those mullahs to the center of the Tagab village to help the ANP and the SF detachments separate the insurgents from the civilians. After the governor deployed the mullahs, he hosted a meeting with Kapisa's parliament members from Kabul to keep them informed on the progress of the battle, and he received their support for the operation. Murad followed up this meeting with a local shura to spread the message of support and encouragement that he had received from Kabul.

Meanwhile, the first of seven MEDCAPs began. Throughout the valley, U.S. medical personnel saw almost 4,200 patients during the first two weeks of the operation. The prepositioning of HA and medical assets enabled the MEDCAPs to be employed when and where the local population needed them. The first MEDCAP in the village of Tagab saw only 400 patients. That night, the governor decided to plan a second MEDCAP for the following day and announced the new time and place over the new Voice of Kapisa radio station, at local mosques and through his personal contacts. The next day, the MEDCAP attendance doubled to more than 800. The operational and logistical flexibility provided by pre-positioned assets and the wide breadth of local influence gained from the Afghan leadership gave the coalition forces the ability to tailor their operations based on local conditions.

As operations continued, supplying maneuver units became increasingly important. The intensity of the fighting required continuous resupply either by rotary wing or containerized delivery system, or CDS. On the second day of the operation, clearing elements participated in decisive direct-fire engagements throughout the valley for more than 10 hours. As the clearing elements moved closer to the center of the Tagab Valley, insurgent resistance intensified. Essential ground resupply and aerial resupply drops reached the troops when and where they were needed. Every night during the first week of operations, Air Force aircraft conducted CDS drops for the maneuver units. In addition, TF Centaur, composed of Soldiers from the 10th Aviation Regiment, conducted five resupplies of ammunition and water by rotary-wing assets.

Throughout the maneuver phase of operations, TF-8 fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soldiers of SOTF-33. TF-8 soldiers were essential to the main clearing element and to facilitating ground resupply for troops in contact. TF-8's tactics and weapons systems increased fire superiority during the long, decisive direct-fire engagements. The valiant combat action of TF-8's soldiers earned them the right to wear the U.S. Army's combat infantryman's badge.

As coalition forces cleared each area, the lethal operations flowed seamlessly into stability operations. Local radio stations played pre-recorded messages from Murad, encouraging the locals to reject the violent ways of the Taliban criminals and to support the coalition forces who were bringing security and prosperity to the Tagab. Murad was instrumental in placing the right asset in the right place at the right time. Every night, he conducted a two-hour operations meeting with his key leaders. The meeting followed a format similar to an after-action review, in which key leaders discussed what went well, areas to improve and the goals for the next day's operations.

By the seventh day, coalition forces had almost completed the clearing operations in the major population centers, allowing the ANSF, TF-8 and their partnered SF detachments to clear secondary portions of the valley and to solidify the security posture. The coalition then focused on supporting the population and bolstering the legitimacy of local officials. All of the coalition and Afghan elements received actionable intelligence from the population. Some residents contacted SF detachments to disclose the location of large caches. ANP units received reports on the locations of stalwart insurgent commanders who remained in the valley. Sensing a turning point in the Tagab, Murad took an opportunity to address the people at the Tagab bazaar. He made an extemporaneous speech on the evils of the Taliban that was broadcast by the Voice of Kapisa radio station. The villagers appeared eager to see a secure and prosperous Tagab with a confident and competent leader.

One week after lethal operations began, the homes in the Tagab Valley lit up again, and life in the valley began to return to normal. SOTF-33 provided messages on the future of Tagab to the Voice of Kapisa radio station, which broadcast them for 10 minutes each hour during every evening of the operation. At MEDCAPS and CA events throughout the valley, the people no longer appeared to be anxious about the coalition's pres-

> **"This should be the model for COIN operations in Afghanistan."**

^ **FORCE PROTECTION** At the outset of the mission, planners expected 250 Afghan National Police to help in the clearing of the valley. More than 900 ANP answered the call for help and assembled at the command headquarters. *U.S. Army photo.*

ence. SOTF-33 logistics trains built a permanent firebase in the northern part of the valley, which now serves as home for an SF detachment and a company of ANA soldiers. As coalition forces conducted MEDCAPs throughout the valley, planners made preparations for monthly Tagab medical humanitarian-aid programs. Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76) committed millions of dollars in funding from the Commander's Emergency Relief Program, or CERP, to rebuild the Tagab infrastructure. Representatives of the United States Agency for International Development developed a strategy with the PRT, the Kapisa government and the coalition to establish long-term infrastructure-development projects. SOTF-33 held weekly coordination meetings between Murad, key leaders and the Tagab SF detachments to maintain their close relationship. The people of Tagab now have close allies and security support for the foreseeable future.

EFFECTS ACHIEVED

"I am Taliban, I have been Taliban, but I am not a stupid Taliban. I have seen what the government of Afghanistan is doing for the people, and their ways are much better for the people than the Taliban ways are."

- Local elder Afghanya Shura
Nov. 6, 2006

During Murad's final day in the Tagab Valley, he held a press conference with all national Afghan TV and radio stations to emphasize the progress in the Tagab Valley. In his statement, he emphasized partnership with the coalition in both security and development. SOTF-33 SF detachments are taking the lead in developing local law-enforcement capabilities in the Tagab. A permanent structure is under construction at the new Tagab firebase to facilitate meetings between the coalition and the ANSF. An ANP and National Defense Services liaison will be permanently stationed at the firebase to maintain the partnership between the Kapisa government and coalition forces. Meanwhile, Tagab officials are encouraging residents to build stores outside the firebase in which local vendors will be able to sell goods, stimulating local economic development and progress.

Less than eight weeks after Operation Al Hasn began, the Tagab Valley was a different place. Counting the number of dead insurgents does not tell the story of the Tagab's transition. The story is best told by the Afghan men, women and children who returned to the valley and flooded the streets in celebration. Shopkeepers

^ **FOOD DISTRIBUTION** U.S., Afghan National Army and United Arab Emirates soldiers distribute food to local villagers in one of many humanitarian-assistance projects conducted during the mission. *U.S. Army photo.*

in the main bazaar replaced doors, repaired walls and hung new signs. The local ANP, trained by SOTF-33 SF Soldiers, conducted constant patrols to instill a sense of security and stability. Parents dressed their children with coalition-distributed backpacks and drove in vehicles that openly displayed pro-Afghanistan stickers. Murad saw an improvement at his level, as well. With increased security, a $3-million CERP funded road project through the Tagab Valley was completed on time. What was a four-hour drive from Bagram Airfield to Tagab now takes a little more than 90 minutes.

The focus is now on the development of the Tagab Valley's infrastructure and civil society to maintain the momentum and long-term strategic effects that SOTF-33 designed Operation Al Hasn to deliver. Maintaining stability and building rapport with the populace to discourage the return of insurgent elements remain the primary objectives in the Tagab Valley. Since Operation Al Hasn ended on Nov. 11, 2006, there has been little enemy activity in the Tagab Valley, and insurgent-related violence in nearby Kabul has been significantly reduced. Operation Al Hasn has become a template for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. As stated by Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, commander of Combined Forces-Afghanistan, in the SOTF-33 operations center on the first night of the operation: "This is the best example of full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations. This should be the model for COIN operations in Afghanistan." Success against an insurgency demands that the time, place and conditions be set in order to establish long-term stability for the legitimate government. SW

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Developing Adaptive Leaders

by Rose Mueller-Hanson, Michelle Wisecarver, Mark Baggett, Tom Miller, and Kip Mendini

The asymmetric and uncertain nature of the threats facing the United States in the 21st century demands increased adaptability among Soldiers and military leaders. According to a recent report from the Institute for Defense Analysis, conventional mindsets and cold-war-era tactics are no longer sufficient for dealing with "fourth-generation wars" — small wars characterized by irregular enemy forces that have varied objectives.[1]

The recent Army Leadership Development and Training Panel concluded that adaptability and self-awareness are critical skills for leaders.[2] In support of that finding, Army leadership standards now incorporate adaptability as a core competency.[3] However, more work remains to be done in developing the adaptive capabilities of Army leaders.

Success in U.S. Army Special Forces, or SF, and other special-operations units has historically required adaptive performance because of their unconventional missions and ambiguous mission environments. From the beginning, elements of the SF training pipeline were implicitly designed to require adaptive performance, and recent transformations to the SF selection and training program at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, have brought an even greater emphasis on adaptability.

SF model

Adaptive performance can be broadly defined as making an effective change in response to an altered situation.[4] Four overarching types of adaptability have been identified, each of which is important in developing Army leaders: mental, interpersonal and physical adaptability and leading an adaptive team. Opinions vary regarding the degree to which adaptability can be developed. One view is that adaptability is a characteristic that is inherent in the individual — a person is either adaptable or not. Another view is that adaptability can be developed through training and experience. It's likely the case, however, that both of these views are partially correct. Research has demonstrated that there are a variety of characteristics related to adaptability. Some of these characteristics are more trainable than others. Therefore, developing adaptive leaders entails selecting individuals based on factors that are not trainable (e.g., intelligence, personality) and providing training and development to enhance the factors that can be changed (e.g., one's level of knowledge and experience).

The SF program for developing adaptive leaders does so by merging three critical success factors: a) selecting leaders who have a natural inclination to be adaptable; b) providing them with the right training and experience to hone their skills; and c) structuring the training environment (e.g., organizational rules and culture) to encourage adaptive performance.

Selecting the right soldiers

The culture and values of SF have traditionally attracted Soldiers who thrive in unconventional and ambiguous environments. The rigorous process used in the Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, program is designed to retain those who are among the most creative and adaptive. As Major Edwin Flick, former commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, SWCS, noted, "Adaptability is central to what we do … an adaptive individual is someone who consis-

tently performs well, even when things go bad."

Consequently, the SF selection model has moved to a "whole man" concept that considers the full range of an individual's strengths and weaknesses when making a selection decision.[4] In this model, SF candidates are evaluated on six major dimensions: intelligence, trainability, judgment, influence ability, physical fitness and motivation. Selection decisions are based on a holistic assessment of performance regarding all of these dimensions, with emphasis on the dimensions that are less trainable. Several components of the whole man assessment program contribute to selecting individuals who are more likely to perform in an adaptive manner. These can be seen in the table on page 30.

These assessments take place in an environment that demands adaptability. "We assess the candidate's ability to adapt by putting him in an ambiguous environment in which the order and duration of events is constantly changing," said Flick. Individuals who perform well in these dynamic situations are more likely to adapt effectively to changes in the operational environment. SFAS is geared toward identifying individuals with the greatest capacity for adaptive leadership. Once selected, these individuals are given extensive training to hone their inherent skills.

Building a foundation

The Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, builds on SFAS by taking highly qualified individuals and giving them intensive training to maximize their performance. Training principles that promote adaptability are firmly entrenched in the SFQC. They include:

- Providing a foundation of job-relevant knowledge.
- Developing adaptability-related skills such as communication, negotiation, influence, decision-making and problem-solving.
- Providing opportunities for students to build experience through repeated practice and feedback.
- Developing self-awareness through feedback from multiple sources.

In addition, the training environment must be supportive of adaptive performance. Throughout the SFQC, these principles are emphasized differently. Phases II and III, small-unit tactics and military-occupational-specialty training, focus largely on building job-relevant knowledge. Phase IV, language training, is a mixture of knowledge and skills, while Phase V, focuses on building experience by taking students through several unconventional-warfare exercises. Feedback, coaching and mentoring, important for self-awareness, are provided to students throughout.

Job-relevant knowledge

A solid foundation of job-relevant knowledge is necessary for adaptive performance. For example, when 18B weapons-sergeant students have mastered the tasks of field-stripping, cleaning and repairing a particular type of weapon under ideal classroom conditions, they must fix a broken weapon without all the necessary parts. To succeed, they must be resourceful and use what they have available to make the weapon operational.

In addition to technical knowledge, knowledge of the concept of adaptability itself is also important. Officers receive an overview of the concept of adaptability and its importance in leadership through the Adaptive Thinking and Leadership program, or ATL, a two-day classroom-based training course, developed through the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

In addition, a computer-based simulation game has been developed as a companion to the classroom-based ATL. According to Major Donald Franklin, commander, Company A, 4th Battalion, 1st SWTG, ATL is "a unique experience for 18A officer candidates that helps them to better evaluate new situations and focus on how they can change to more effectively handle problems or unfamiliar situations."

The content of the SFQC is regularly reviewed and updated to reflect the realities of the operational environment. Two of the most recent changes have been integrating language training throughout the pipeline and introducing culture training, both of which are key to interpersonal adaptability.

Adaptability-related skills

At a basic level, officers build adaptability-related skills through participation in scenario-based exercises in ATL that focus on mental-adaptability competencies, such as critical thinking and problem-solving. For example, in one exercise, students must learn to switch mindsets to gain a deeper understanding of the way an

Training Potential of Adaptability Characteristics

Stable Attributes (Selection Factors)			Malleable Attributes (Training Factors)
Cognitive Ability/Intelligence Openness Resiliency Tolerance for Ambiguity Achievement/Motivation	Problem-Solving Decision-Making Skills Metacognitive Skills General Self-Efficacy	Communication Skills (Negotiation and conflict resolution, persuasion, collaboration) Awareness (self, others, situation)	Domain-specific Knowledge Varied Adaptive Experience

adversary might plan an attack. In another exercise, students are presented with real-world problems that other SF leaders have faced. Students describe how they would handle the situation and then compare their answers to the videotaped responses of the experts.

After completing ATL, skills learned in the classroom are reinforced in scenario-based field training that incorporates role-players in real-time events. These events are dynamic — depending on the student's responses, role-players adapt and respond in a natural fashion. Other adaptability-related skills are addressed in the following manner:

- *Negotiations/persuasion* — during the Robin Sage UW exercise, students receive comprehensive training in conducting negotiations and are assessed on their ability to influence others.
- *Interpersonal skills/communication* — nearly all training is done in a team environment. Students, especially leaders, are held accountable for the team's success, and there is a focus on learning to work in a team environment.
- *Cultural sensitivity* — role players from other cultures are frequently used in scenario-based dilemmas and field-training exercises that allow students to practice and get feedback on how well they interact in a diverse environment.
- *Physical adaptability* — several of the MOS training companies have instituted innovative physical training programs that enhance physical adaptability by continually varying the exercise routines so that students do not become too complacent. As they would in the operational environment, students may be required to run or ruck-march for indeterminate lengths of time, or they may have to extend their exercise session when something unexpected happens. Cadre in the communications-sergeant program combine technical-skills training with physical activities.

For example, students may be required to run to a specified location, set up their equipment and make contact with the base camp. Once they have completed these steps, they are given instructions to run to another location to repeat the process. This program mirrors real-world situations in which technical tasks may need to be performed under physically demanding conditions.

In addition, hand-to-hand-combat skills, called combatives, are taught in the small-unit-tactics phase and integrated into the other phases to ensure that Soldiers build the skills and become comfortable using combatives vs. a firearm. This provides a degree of inoculation to personal contact in combat and builds physical adaptability. It also provides Soldiers with additional options for making adaptive decisions regarding engagement in dangerous or uncertain situations.

- *Planning/decision making* — planning and decision-making skills are emphasized throughout training. For example, the 18A officer training contains a number of planning exercises. Decision-making skills are reinforced by requiring students to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and to explain the rationale for their decisions.

Adaptability Predictors and SFAS Assessments

Adaptability-Related Characteristic	SFAS Assessment Strategy
Cognitive Ability/Intelligence	Several standardized tests are used to assess general intelligence and specific academic achievements. Land-navigation assessment also tests intelligence and trainability.
Decision-Making, Problem Solving, and Interpersonal Skills	Judgment and influence skills are assessed through peer evaluations, cadre observations and candidate performance during team events.
Physical Adaptability	Physical fitness, an important prerequisite of physical adaptability, is evaluated throughout the course during runs, ruckmarches, the obstacle course, land-navigation exercises and team events.
Personality & Related Characteristics	Characteristics such as resilience, confidence, openness and tolerance of ambiguity are assessed through peer evaluations and simulation exercises.
Achievement/Motivation	Motivation is assessed throughout the course through cadre and peer evaluations.

Practice and feedback

Research has shown that leaders who are more experienced in handling situations that require adaptability are more likely to perform in an adaptive manner when faced with new situations.[5] Experienced individuals are more successful than novices because they have a larger repertoire of experiences that they can apply to new situations. Therefore, exposing trainees to a variety of realistic and challenging situations and then providing them feedback on their performance helps them to build a catalogue of experiences that they can later draw from when faced with novel problems. Realism is critical to building experience that will transfer to operational settings. The SFQC is kept relevant and fresh through the efforts of cadre who incorporate their operational experiences into the lesson plans.

Experience-building activities are incorporated throughout the SFQC. For example, 18D medical sergeants participate in an intensive three-week scenario, learning how to care for gunshot wounds. The exercise provides

^ **WORKING IT OUT** A student participating in Robin Sage must convince the guerrilla chief that his plan has merit. Many scenarios in the unconventional-warfare exercise require Soldiers to think outside the box. *Photo by Janice Burton.*

them with the opportunity for making mistakes in a safe environment, learning from their mistakes and trying again. Colonel Kevin Keenan, commander of the SWCS Special Warfare Medical Group, said, "Essentially, 18D training is similar to a physician's-assistant training model — students are given difficult dilemmas, and they must make high-stakes decisions under pressure — mentors challenge their decisions and push the students to think about the short- and long-term implications of their actions."

The SF communications-sergeants training also makes extensive use of simulations to reinforce technical skills. For example, students might be required to monitor frequencies while under fire, or they may be required to set up a complex communication system when they have had little rest. These simulations replicate operational environments and force students to develop creative solutions to challenging problems.

During the UW exercise, students again have the opportunity to practice their adaptability performance with mission readiness exercises, or MREs. MREs are like a "mobile classroom," in which a team of students rotates through several different situational exercises. During each exercise, the students are presented with a real-world dilemma (e.g., negotiations, trying to prevent a human-rights violation, black-market buys). After completing the exercise, the team and cadre do an after-action review that provides valuable feedback to help students prepare for Robin Sage.

Robin Sage provides one of the best opportunities in the SFQC for practicing adaptive performance. During this exercise, students encounter problems that require mental, physical and interpersonal adaptability, as well as leading an adaptable team. Although the basic scenario in Robin Sage has remained consistent for many years, the exact flow and outcome of the exercise is dependent on the way students approach the numerous decisions they are forced to make. As in real life, even the smallest incident can snowball and become an enormous problem, depending on the decisions that the students make. To be successful, students must consider the unexpected and develop contingency plans in case their initial plans go awry. Feedback is provided throughout the exercise in the form of coaching from the cadre and through the direct consequences the students experience as a result of their actions and decisions (e.g., reactions from the guerrilla role-players).

Developing self-awareness

A primary way to increase self-awareness is to obtain feedback from multiple sources and compare it to one's own self-perception. The SFQC is a feedback-intensive program: Students receive feedback and coaching from the cadre during each phase. In addition, psychologists are available to meet with students one-on-one and to provide coaching and feedback based on training performance and psychological-test results.

Officers receive individual feedback based on the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory, which measures several personality dimensions, and the Test of Attentional & Interpersonal Style Inventory, which measures how well individuals concentrate and interact with others. Students are able to discuss the implications of these results with psychologists so that they can have a better understanding of their individual

strengths and weaknesses in relation to adaptability and other skills needed for effective performance.

In addition to psychological tests, the use of peer feedback in the SFQC has increased substantially in the past few years. Peer evaluations foster greater self-awareness by giving students a realistic view of the way they are perceived by others. This information is especially important to leaders, who need a clear and accurate understanding of whether they have earned the trust and respect of their followers.

Right training environment

In addition to the content of training, the environment in which the training is delivered must support adaptability. The SF training climate has historically encouraged students to "think outside the box," but recent changes to the program have resulted in an environment that is even more conducive to adaptive performance. Earlier selection-and-training philosophies in SF emphasized the joint role of selection and training throughout the pipeline. However, this philosophy has shifted recently, and now there is a clearer distinction between selection and training, with SFAS dedicated to selection and the rest of the pipeline dedicated to training.

That distinction contributes to adaptability by encouraging a "learning orientation" rather than a "performance orientation" during training. During the SFQC, students are encouraged to learn through trial and error, using creative approaches where appropriate. Allowing students to make honest mistakes and to learn from them (without fear of being selected out of the course) is essential for building adaptive expertise. In support of the concept of learning through trial and error, student evaluation has shifted from a singular focus on performing tasks to standard to a broader focus on mission success (emphasizing outcome vs. process). For example, when students make a mistake, they are asked to describe where they went wrong and how they would correct their error the next time. Getting students to articulate the rationale for their decisions can lead to greater decision-making and critical-thinking skills, reinforcing the credo of "teaching students how to think rather than what to think," which better prepares them for mission success.

For training to transfer to the operational context, however, the organizational climate must also support adaptability. As one SF Soldier noted, "In the past, I was criticized for my lack of conformity; but in SF I'm praised for it." Clearly the nature of SF missions calls for high adaptability in which innovation is encouraged rather than stifled. Fortunately, the SF environment has a reputation of attracting and supporting individuals who feel comfortable operating outside conventional norms. SF leaders are given latitude for independent thought and action in the field, which reinforces the adaptability foundation laid in the SFQC.

Conclusions

The success of SF in developing adaptive leaders is the result of (1) selecting the right Soldiers, (2) providing the right training and (3) ensuring that the training environment supports adaptive performance. Moreover, the operational environment and structure of SF reinforces adaptive performance in the field, enabling the transfer of training. A number of useful points can be taken from the SF model, including:

- Ensure that training and operational climates are conducive to and support adaptive performance.
- Build ambiguity and uncertainty into training events.
- Train for learning and mastery rather than for adherence to standards; emphasize outcomes and mission success in addition to processes and procedures.
- Teach principles of adaptability to all leaders, including adaptability concepts and application through dynamic, simulation-based training.
- Teach Soldiers skills related to adaptability (e.g., negotiation, communication, critical thinking, decision-making, cultural sensitivity, interpersonal awareness, etc.).
- Use multi-rater feedback to improve self-awareness.
- Encourage accountability for self-development through mentoring and coaching.
- In the last decade, much progress has been made in researching methods of adaptability training. That work will need to continue to better prepare us to overcome the asymmetric threats that define modern warfare. **SW**

Notes:

[1] J.C.F. Tillson, W.D. Freeman, W.R. Burns, J. Michel, J.A. LeCuyer, R.H. Scales and D.R. Worley, *Learning to adapt to asymmetric threats,* IDA Document D-3114 (Alexandria, Va: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2005).

[2] Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*, 2001 (http://www.army.mil/atld).

[3] FM 6-22, *Army Leadership.*

[4] W. Cotty, B. Bluestein and J. Thompson, "The Whole Man Concept: Assessing the SF Soldier of the Future" *Special Warfare*, April 2005, 18-21.

[5] E.D. Pulakos, N. Schmitt, D.W. Dorsey, S. Arad, J.W. Hedge and W.C. Borman, "Predicting adaptive performance: Further tests of a model of adaptability," Human Performance, 2002; 15, 299-323.

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Officer

YG 2000 officers need CFD preference

The career-field-designation, or CFD, board for officers in year group 2000 will convene Sept. 5-21. The designation board will consider officers whose date of rank to captain is between March 1, 2003, and March 16, 2004. All eligible officers will receive instructions via their Army Knowledge Online e-mail account approximately 90 days before the board convenes. Instructions will explain how to access the Army Human Resources Command's Officer Career Management Knowledge Center to submit an online career-field-designation preference statement. Instructions are also available at the CFD home page: https://www.hrc.army.mil/ site/protect/active/ opfamdd/ CFD_Upcoming_Boards.htm.

Officers will also receive an e-mail giving them access to a "My Board" application, which will allow them to review their files before the board sees them. Once the board recesses, the results go the Army G1 for approval. After the approval, G1 will post a consolidated CFD list on the Web site under the "completed boards" link. The release of the approved list starts the clock for appeals — not the board's convening date. Officers may not appeal the results of the board on grounds of an incomplete or missing preference statement.

Officers who want to remain in Special Forces should list Branch 18 as their first choice. Their selection will be approved automatically, and they will not be seen by the board. SF captains who do not submit a preference statement will be assigned a branch or specialty based on Army requirements. Captains who already have been accessed into Branch 37 (Psychological Operations) and 38 (Civil Affairs) will be locked for designation in those new branches. The preference page link is https://isdrad16.hoffman.army.mil/ahrc/ospp/ home/HTDocs/.

Warrant Officer

FY 2007 CWO selection board results

High promotion rates for warrant officers assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command can be attributed to high-quality officers, well-written officer evaluation reports and the Soldiers' attention to detail as they update their files for promotion boards.

Rank	Above Zone	Primary Zone	Below Zone
CWO5			
Army (Tech)	19.2%	73.8%	0%
USASOC (Tech)	*	66.7%	0%
(MOS 180A)	*	75%	0%
Army (AV)	13.5%	70.8%	1.9%
USASOC (AV)	100%	100%	0%
CWO4			
Army (Tech)	27.3%	82%	
USASOC (Tech)	*	82.8%	
(MOS 180A)	*	75%	
Army (AV)	40%	92.7%	
USASOC (AV)	100%	100%	
CWO3			
Army (Tech)	0%	95.4%	
USASOC (Tech)	*	95.6%	
(MOS 180A)	*	100%	
Army (AV)	20%	88.1%	
USASOC (AV)	*	100%	

Notes:
There was no FY 2007 Below Zone for CWO3 and CWO4.
* – indicates that no files were available.

Enlisted

Keeping records updated pays dividends

The fiscal year 2008 Master Sergeant Promotion Selection Board is scheduled to convene Oct. 2–25. With the continuing increased OPTEMPO, Soldiers should keep their official military personnel folder, DA photo and enlisted record brief updated as part of a continuous process.

Finding the time to take care of records while not deployed will pay dividends by ensuring that the files a selection board sees paint the full picture. For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Jeff Bare, DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to barej@soc.mil.

For the selection-board schedule, visit the HRC's Enlisted Selections and Promotions home page: https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/select/Enlisted.htm.

Special Forces

SF to increase in size

The strength of Career Management Field 18 (Special Forces) is at an all-time high, in preparation for the growth of the force. The number of new SF Qualification Course graduates from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the high SF NCO retention rates will keep the force healthy.

Beginning in fiscal year 2008, the number of positions at the SF company level and above are scheduled to increase. Also, each active-duty SF group will add one battalion, beginning in FY 2008 with the 4th Battalion, 5th SF Group, and continuing with one new battalion per year through FY 2012.

Psychological Operations

New CMF 37 assignments manager

CMF 37, Psychological Operations, welcomes its new assignments manager at HRC, Sergeant First Class Carrie Vernon. Vernon replaces MSG Brian Crews, who has moved on to the 4th PSYOP Group. For information about assignment opportunities, telephone Vernon at DSN 221-8901, or send e-mail to: carrie.vernon@conus.army.mil.

New PSYOP positions increase promotion opportunity

During FY 2008, the 4th PSYOP Group will add four regional companies, and in FY 2009, it will add another tactical company. This growth added to the many positions outside USASOC, and will increase opportunities for promotion. Promotion boards give special consideration to civilian education, but the most important factors remain operational experience and performance.

For more information, contact Master Sergeant John Seagraves, senior career manager, at DSN 236-4349, or send e-mail to: seagravj@soc.mil.

PSYOP seeks volunteers

Soldiers in grades specialist (promotable) through staff sergeant who are interested in a career in PSYOP should contact either Sergeant First Class Sutton or Staff Sergeant Spaugh in the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion-PSYOP. Telephone DSN 236-6533 for more information.

PSYOP NCOs eligible for bonuses

The critical-skills re-enlistment bonus for PSYOP sergeants first class is still in effect, and the Army G1 is considering a proposal for a CSRB for PSYOP master sergeants. For more information on the CSRB, contact your unit retention NCO.

Civil Affairs

CA accession board selects 72

The 2008 Civil Affairs Accession Board met May 4. The board considered 84 Soldiers and selected 72, for a selection rate of 86 percent. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion is now accepting packets for the next accession board, tentatively scheduled for the fourth quarter of FY 2007. Interested Soldiers should contact Sergeant First Class Herring or Sergeant First Class Pease at 910-907-9697.

New CA battalions offer opportunity

During FY 2008, the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion will be activated as part of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, followed by the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion in FY 2009. These activations will create new positions in addition to the many existing outside USASOC.

For more information on promotions or any other aspect of the CA CMF, contact Master Sergeant Stefano Rizzotto, senior career manager, at DSN 337-4171, or send e-mail to: rizzotts@soc.mil.

CA NCOs should check on bonuses

CA Soldiers in the rank of sergeant are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus of up to $15,000. The SRB for staff sergeants can be as much as $10,000. A critical-skills re-enlistment bonus for CA sergeants first class and master sergeants is pending review and approval by the Army G1. Soldiers should contact their unit career counselor for information on bonus eligibility.

CA ANCOC being developed

The Civil Affairs Advanced NCO Course is under development. Dates for the first class will be announced as soon as they have been determined. For assignment to the CA Basic NCO Course, Soldiers should contact their unit schools NCO. The dates for Class 003-07 of the CA BNCOC are:

Phase 1 – July 30-Aug. 14.

Phase 2 – To be determined.

NETWORKS, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL INSURGENCY



DETAILS

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Reviewed by:
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Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, originally published as a special issue of *The Journal of Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, is a compilation of articles written by leading professors, consultants and researchers in the fields of terrorism, insurgency and criminal activity. The editor, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, is himself a well-published author and counterterrorism consultant to the National Institute of Justice.

The book's main purpose is to explain why military and law-enforcement institutions must alter their organizational structure to become more network-based or risk becoming ineffective against future terrorist and insurgent threats. Three main themes run throughout the book: (1) Terrorism has grown out of the change in the global political landscape, the rise of nonstate players and the changing nature of warfare; (2) Cyberspace has given almost any group with an Internet connection the ability to mobilize support, gather information and initiate operations on a global scale; and (3) Terrorism is a protracted form of psychological warfare without quantitative outcomes or decisive victories whose primary objective is to implement regional or even global change through the spread of fear and intimidation.

The book is organized into four sections, with each section having its own focus. The first section, "Theory and International Law," defines the term "netwar" and explains the five levels of network analysis: organizational, narrative, doctrinal, social and technological. The articles also redefine national security as defending not only national territory and interests but also global political, economic and social stability. Finally, the articles discuss the need for and challenges of international enforcement of terrorist sponsorship by state and multinational organizations.

The second section, "Terrorism and Global Insurgency," focuses on specific aspects of terrorism and insurgency. It examines how terrorists and insurgent groups have become intertwined with criminal organizations, giving the groups another avenue for sponsorship. Next, it offers a statistical analysis of supposed Iranian-sponsored terrorist actions and the subsequent United States responses during the 1980s, concluding that state sponsors have relented to consistent counterterrorism policies. In the future, however, these policies will need to be more proactive, employing diplomatic and economic measures with military action to reduce the availability of terrorist sanctuaries. Finally, the section uses lessons learned in the fight against the Provisional Irish Republican Army to illustrate current leadership and motivational trends in terrorist groups.

The third section, "Al Qaeda Focus," examines the objectives, courses of action and available resources to the group. The articles demonstrate that a standard military order of battle can be modified for conducting a thorough assessment of the group's strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and limitations.

The last section, "Network Focus," provides an analysis of the operational networks of two terrorist groups (al-Qaeda and the Chechen insurgency) and proposes a model for defeating them. It offers an operational combat analysis of past al-Qaeda actions as a way of better understanding this terrorist threat. The section concludes with a model for multilateral counterinsurgency groups (based on the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group developed in 1996) that allows a government to adapt to its enemy and develop a strategy for efficiently defeating it.

The book's greatest strength lies in the wealth of knowledge, expertise and experience of the contributing authors. The reader has an opportunity to gain insight into terrorism and insurgency from several viewpoints.

Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency is an excellent book for a reader who wants an introduction to the concept of netwar and seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the way this new type of warfare applies to terrorism and counterterrorism. Officers, warrant officers and enlisted Soldiers will benefit from reading the book early in their special-operations careers. However, the book is not recommended for someone who already has a thorough understanding of its topics. **SW**

Photo by Steve Hebert

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