Special Warfare

BUILDING CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

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ARSOF Soldiers break bread with their Afghan counterparts, observing the cultural aspects of hospitality.

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SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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In the battles our nation is fighting, true success often depends less upon the lethal aspects of our arsenal than upon the nonlethal ones.

Sun Tsu's admonition to know the enemy and one's self is often quoted, but in this issue, Scott Swanson examines what that maxim means and how we should go about accomplishing it. He stresses that knowing ourselves and putting ourselves in the enemy's position will help us not only to gain intelligence but also to verify, understand and apply the intelligence we gather.

But in the current environment, knowing and understanding even the enemy and ourselves is insufficient. We must also understand the population, not as bystanders to our military actions, but as the central element of the struggle. Ron Fiegle's article shows that of the variety of cultural factors, religion is the one found consistently in every culture. He shows that because of religion's influence on so many aspects of private and public life, an understanding of religion is indispensable to working with the population, and that religion is a valuable aspect of risk assessments, audience analysis and area assessments.

Colonel Kenneth Tovo's excellent article on counterinsurgency examines the history of the Vietnam War's Phoenix Program in order to glean lessons that are applicable today. He suggests that targeting the insurgent infrastructure, as the Phoenix Program did, is an effective means of combating insurgency. Essential to that effort are language capabilities and a cultural understanding, skills that ARSOF Soldiers possess and that we constantly strive to improve.

Part of the training at the Special Warfare Center and School puts Soldiers into situations that will require them to use their skills in language, culture and adaptive thinking. Those methods are built into exercises in our Adaptive Thinking and Leadership training, which has been part of officer training in Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations and is being now included in the military occupational specialty training for CA and PSYOP NCOs.

Our Soldiers are equipped with skills that will allow them to succeed on the battlefield. In their arsenal is a mix of lethal and nonlethal skills. In the "long war," neither will ensure success in itself, but together they prepare ARSOF Soldiers for the missions they will face. Lethal military skills are still of paramount importance in winning force-on-force confrontations, but in the struggle to achieve legitimacy and win the trust and support of the populace, operations that allow us to take and hold the human terrain often take on greater importance.

Major General James W. Parker

Rangers

Approximately 350 Army Rangers from the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, were recognized at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga., Nov. 3 for their commitment and combat service during their recent deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

"In its purest form, that absolute commitment is what we are recognizing here today," said Brigadier General John F. Mulholland Jr., deputy commanding general of the Joint Special Operations Command and presenter of the 68 combat awards. The awards included two Bronze Star medals for valor, 10 Joint Service Commendation medals for valor, seven Purple Heart medals, 44 Bronze Star Medals for service and five Air Medals.

To the hundreds of Soldiers standing at attention in the Truscott Air Terminal, Mulholland explained that there is a commonality among the Rangers in that they share a golden fiber woven of excellence, commitment to fellow Rangers and an absolute oath to the nation.

Among those Rangers recognized with valorous awards, Sergeant First Class Quint F. Pospisil and Sergeant First Class Jesse Yandell were presented the Bronze Star for valor.

Although Pospisil was quick to give credit to the members of his Ranger squad and their actions during an enemy attack, he saved the life of his squad leader, who was engaged in hand-to-hand combat with an enemy soldier. The award citation recognized Pospisil for his "quick reaction and precision marksmanship" that eliminated the enemy threat. A native of Bolton, Conn., Pospisil has been a Ranger for more than eight years and has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan seven times.

While leading a team during a direct-action raid, Yandell, who has been a Ranger for six years, was providing overwatch for a team entering a building when enemy soldiers began firing on the Rangers. He fired on an enemy soldier who was about to attack the entry team. According to his award citation, Yandell "aggressively flanked the remaining compounds as several more enemy were engaged." Yandell, from Bremerton, Wash., is also a combat veteran and has also deployed seven times to OIF and OEF.

COMMANDING MOMENT Sergeant First Class Quint F. Pospisil is congratulated by Command Sergeant Major James Hardy, also of the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, during a combat awards ceremony, Nov. 3, at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga. Pospisil was awarded the Bronze Star for valor for his actions during combat in Iraq. *U.S. Army photo by Steve Hart, HAAF PAO.*

Language Corner

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Army Special Operations Forces Language Office, or ARSOFLO, in conjunction with the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, has developed a new learning aid designed to assist ARSOF Soldiers in learning a foreign language.

The product, an interactive multimedia CD entitled "How to Learn a Foreign Language," provides students with a variety of strategies for tackling the challenges of acquiring a second language. The CD, now being issued to all selectees from Special Forces Assessment and Selection, helps prepare Soldiers to learn the basics of a foreign language. It is designed to serve as a scaffold upon which language students can use the tools needed to successfully navigate an intensive program in their designated target language.

Foreign-language instructors often comment that the most difficult hurdles students face are memorizing large amounts of vocabulary and grasping the mechanics of the new language. A better understanding of the way one's own language works makes the transition to the new mechanics much easier. As a reinforcement to foreign-language study, the CD includes a component that guides students through a comprehensive review of English grammar and usage.

By the end of January 2007, the CD is scheduled to be available to the ARSOF community as a language sustainment and enhancement tool. It will also be accessible from the Army Knowledge Online portal and from the ARSOF University Web page. For additional information, telephone Terry Schnurr, ARSOF Sustainment Language Program Manager, ARSOF Language/Advanced Distributed Learning Branch, Training Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 236-6699 or commercial (910) 432-6699, or send e-mail to schnurrt@soc.mil.

FROM THE ASHES OF THE PHOENIX:

LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

By Colonel Ken Tovo

This article is reprinted from Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism, *a collection of essays edited by Williamson Murray and published in September 2006 by the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute — Editor.*

The Vietnam War was the most controversial conflict in America's history; it wreaked havoc on civil society, colored a generation's perception of its government and devastated the American military, particularly the Army. Its specter continues to cast a shadow over every American political debate about the use of force abroad. After the war, disgusted with the inherently messy nature of counterinsurgency, the Army turned its attention to the kind of wars it prefers to fight — conventional, symmetric conflict.[1]

While a number of civilian scholars examined the war, the Army focused on how to defeat the Soviets on the plains of Europe.[2] While academic historians often deride the military for trying to refight the last war, in this instance no one can accuse the Army of that sin. Through its doctrine, scenarios within its officer education system and national training centers, and almost every other aspect of force development, the Army has remained singularly focused on fighting a conventional conflict. The result has been spectacular performance in both conventional wars with Iraq.

Today, however, the Army finds itself in the middle of a major counterinsurgency effort — this time on a global scale against the insurgent threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism. The current counterinsurgency involves major combat operations, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, major advisory and training missions such as the Philippines, Georgia, the Horn of Africa and North Africa, and numerous smaller missions around the world.

Unfortunately, such is the baggage still attending the Vietnam War nearly three decades after Saigon's fall that senior military and political leaders speak the word "Vietnam" only in sentences along the lines of, "Iraq is not another Vietnam." Yet the Vietnam conflict constitutes the longest and most intensive counterinsurgency effort in American history. The best and brightest civilian and military minds in the government developed strategies and concepts for defeating the communist insurgency in Southeast Asia as part of an overall strategy of containment. Today, the United States contends with a similar challenge as it seeks ways to defeat new insurgencies. To ignore the lessons learned from the counterinsurgency efforts of the Vietnam War is imprudent, particularly in regard to the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure through the Phoenix Program — a key in understanding and dealing with the current insurgency.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

U.S. involvement in Vietnam spanned more than two decades. When the U.S. military implemented the Phoenix Program in 1967, 12 years had passed since the first official American military death in the war.[3] By 1967, two years of conventional-force operations and the commitment of nearly 450,000 U.S. troops had prevented a collapse of the South Vietnamese government, but they had failed to defeat the insurgency.[4]

As early as 1966, President Lyndon Johnson met with senior U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and military officials in Honolulu to discuss placing an increased emphasis on winning the political war in South Vietnam, since it seemed unlikely that conventional military operations alone could produce victory.[5] In the president's view, "the other war," the war for the support of the South Vietnamese population, was as important as the military struggle with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units.[6] While civilian agencies and some military units had put considerable effort into pacification and development programs, such efforts remained largely uncoordinated and ineffective.

A failed initial attempt to unify the civilian effort in Vietnam under the Office of Civil Operations began in November 1966. Consequently, in May 1967, Johnson decided to unify all military and civilian pacification operations under an organization called Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, a component of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, or MACV.[7]

OVERVIEW

MACV Directive 381-41, July 9, 1967, officially inaugurated the "Phoenix Program" as the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on Viet Cong Infrastructure, which came to be known as the Phoenix Program. Phoenix did not initiate the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure; instead, it centralized existing efforts and raised the level of attacks on the Viet Cong infrastructure to the mission of destroying the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong guerrilla forces. Phoenix embodied an understanding that an insurgency principally represents a political struggle for primacy between competing political ideas. The insurgency first seeks legitimacy and then supremacy for its political agenda in both the eyes of the populace and the outside world, while the counterinsurgency effort struggles to deny such legitimacy.

The Viet Cong insurgency, instituted, directed and supported by the North Vietnamese, had two major components: armed Viet Cong guerrillas, augmented by soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army, who had infiltrated into South Vietnam and became the focus of American coun-

terinsurgency efforts; and the Viet Cong infrastructure — personnel and organizations that performed support roles, such as recruiting, political indoctrination, propaganda and psychological operations, intelligence collection and logistical support.

The CIA assumed the initial responsibility for attacking the infrastructure component of the insurgency, as anti-infrastructure operations were a logical adjunct to the State Department's pacification and civil-support programs. The targeted personnel in the infrastructure were primarily civilians; consequently, as noted in MACV Directive 381-41, "[t]he elimination of the VCI is fundamentally a Vietnamese responsibility employing essentially police type techniques and special resources."[8]

The primary South Vietnamese organizations to prosecute operations against the infrastructure were intelligence organizations, the police and paramilitary organizations. The CIA largely was responsible for the creation of such units and organizations.[9] Key CIA leaders recognized the importance of fighting the political component of the enemy's organization. Unfortunately, senior military leaders, particularly during General William Westmoreland's tenure as MACV commander, considered the Viet Cong infrastructure to be a peripheral issue.[10]

First initiated in July 1967, Phoenix aimed at providing U.S. advisory assistance to ongoing operations that targeted the enemy's infrastructure at the corps, province and district levels.[11] The program became a more coordinated effort when the South Vietnamese created the Phung Hoang program in December 1967. But it took the Tet and May offensives in 1968 to highlight the critical role of the infrastructure in facilitating the enemy's main-force operations.[12] As a result, South Vietnam's president issued a decree in July 1968 that committed the South Vietnamese to establishing structures at every level of government for coordinating operations against the enemy's civil infrastructure.[13]

At the province and district levels, intelligence-and-operations coordinating centers served as the foci of intelligence fusion on reports and operational planning for ex-

ecuting operations against the Viet Cong infrastructure.[14] The centers provided a mechanism for consolidating information from the numerous organizations operating on the battlefield, deconflicting intelligence-collection activities, and planning and coordinating anti-infrastructure operations. The United States primarily provided military advisers in the intelligence and operations coordinating centers.

The understanding that the principal objective of the counterinsurgency operation was to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the population led inevitably to the realization that large-scale combat operations were counterproductive to pacification goals.[15] According to MACV Directive 381-41, the intent of Phoenix was to attack the enemy's infrastructure with a "'rifle shot' rather than a shotgun approach to the central target — key political leaders, command-and-control elements and activists in the VCI."[16]

Heavy-handed operations, such as random cordon-and-search operations, large-scale and lengthy detentions of innocent civilians, and excessive use of firepower, had a negative effect on the civilian population. Government forces often appeared inept and unable to meet the security and stability needs of the people — in other words, they were, on occasion, the main threat to these goals. The Phoenix approach also acknowledged that capturing the enemy's political operatives was more important than killing them.[17] The prime source of information for identifying and locating future targets was the capture of current enemy operatives and leaders.

Over time, the Phoenix Program generated negative press coverage, accusations that it was a U.S. government-sponsored assassination program, and eventually a series of Congressional hearings. Consequently, MACV issued a directive that reiterated that it had based the anti-infrastructure campaign on South Vietnamese law, that the program was in compliance with the laws of land warfare, and that U.S. personnel had the responsibility to report breaches of the law.[18] Clearly, the intent of these operations was not indiscriminate killing and assassination; unfortunately, decen-

tralized operations in an uncertain, ambiguous environment did lead to abuses.[19]

Officially, Phoenix operations continued until December 1972, although certain aspects continued until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Ultimately, the entire counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam was a failure for a variety of reasons; one critical factor was that the Viet Cong had established a large and effective support cadre throughout South Vietnam before the South Vietnamese and the Americans undertook a serious, coordinated effort to eradicate it.[20] While indications are that Phoenix achieved considerable success in damaging that infrastructure, it was too little and too late to change the war's overall course.[21]

TODAY'S INSURGENT THREAT

Vietnam was a classic example of a mass-oriented insurgency as defined in U.S. Army doctrine.[22] The Viet Cong sought to discredit the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government in the eyes of the population through a protracted campaign of violence, while developing and offering their own parallel political structure as a viable alternative to the "illegitimate" government.[23] The "battlefield" in a mass-oriented insurgency is the population — the government and the insurgents fight for the support of the people.

As one author has suggested, both sides in this type of conflict have two tools in the struggle for control and support of the populace: "popular perceptions of legitimacy and a credible power to coerce."[24] He goes on to note that the target of coercion, the populace, defines the threat's credibility, not the employer of the threat.[25] Consequently, conventional military power does not equate necessarily to credible coercive power. The conventional force may possess state-of-the-art weaponry and overwhelming destructive power. Nevertheless, if the populace believes this conventional power will not, or cannot, be used against them, it has limited coercive value — particularly if the insurgent has demonstrated the ability to locate and punish noncompliant members of the populace and reward supporters.

Field Manual 3-05.201 states that

mass-oriented "[i]nsurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action."[26] The militant Islamic movement, present throughout the Middle East and in many parts of Africa and Asia, is a mass-oriented insurgency that seeks to supplant existing regimes with its own religious-based political ideology. As espoused by al-Qaeda, its ideology seeks re-establishment of an Islamic caliphate, removal of secular or "apostate" regimes and removal of Western influence from the region.[27]

The militant Islamic insurgency is inchoate; while nearly global in nature, it does not yet appear to be truly unified in a single insurgent movement, despite al-Qaeda's attempts to serve as a coalescing force. Rather, the current insurgency appears to be a loosely coordinated effort of multiple groups with nearly coincident goals and objectives, who have not yet joined into a single unified front. Consequently, jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq may not respond directly to instructions from the al-Qaeda leadership, but they share similar anti-Western, fundamentalist Islamic goals, and they are likely receiving support from the same population base.

Army doctrine establishes three general phases of development for an insurgent movement. It acknowledges that not every insurgency passes through each phase and that success is not contingent upon linear progression through the three phases. In Phase I, the latent or incipient phase, the insurgent movement focuses on recruiting, organizing and training key membership, as well as on establishing inroads into legitimate organizations to facilitate support of its objectives. It establishes the clandestine cellular support structure that facilitates intelligence collection and operational actions, and it infiltrates its supporters into critical positions within governmental and civilian organizations.[28] The insurgency normally avoids all but selected and limited violence during this phase in order to avoid provoking effective regime counterinsurgent operations

CAPABLE FORCE To ensure legitimacy, U.S. forces should be seen as advisers and government forces seen as capable of meeting the insurgent threat. *Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive.*

before the insurgency can respond.[29]

In Phase II, guerrilla warfare, the insurgent movement takes active measures to challenge the regime's legitimacy. This can include attacks, assassinations, sabotage or subversive activities (such as information operations) to challenge governmental legitimacy.[30] In a rural-based insurgency, the insurgents often are able to establish relatively secure base camps from which to operate, as the Viet Cong did. In an urban-based insurgency, the members rely on the anonymity of urban areas to conceal their presence within the population.

In Phase III, mobile warfare or the war of movement, guerrilla forces transition to conventional warfare and directly confront government security forces. If the transition is properly timed, the government has been weakened sufficiently to succumb to assault by insurgent forces. This phase takes on the character of a civil war, in which the insurgents may control and administer significant portions of terrain by force of arms.[31]

Because of the widespread nature of the Islamic insurgency, assessment of its developmental progress is dynamic and regionally dependent. For example, in Iraq, the Islamic insurgency (in loose coordination with other nationalist-based insurgent elements) is largely in Phase II, guerrilla warfare. In Saudi Arabia, recent

VIOLENT COMPONENT Spectacular events such as the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon keep attention focused away from the support infrastructure of the militant Islamic insurgency. *U.S. Army photo.*

attacks suggest that the insurgency is transitioning from Phase I to Phase II. In Egypt, government control has kept the insurgency in Phase I, with Islamic dissident groups conducting propaganda operations but rarely able to use violence. Based on the global nature of attacks initiated by militant Islamic organizations, the insurgency has already spent significant time and effort in Phase I; as a result, it has developed insurgent infrastructure capable of supporting operations in selected locations throughout the world.

As in the early years of the Viet Cong insurgency, the violent component of the Islamic insurgency captures the majority of current attention and has been the focus of regime counterinsurgency operations.[32] Spectacular attacks such as 9/11, the embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on the *USS Cole*, the Madrid subway bombings or the now-routine daily guerrilla warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan focus attention on the paramilitary element of the insurgency. Yet, as with the Viet

Cong, the armed Islamic elements cannot survive without a support infrastructure. Investigation of the high-profile attacks indicates the presence of a widespread support network for intelligence collection, material support, finance and movement of insurgents.[33] However, these "direct support" cells represent only one component of the overall militant Islamic infrastructure.

The militant Islamic infrastructure also has a "general support" component. It includes religious/political infrastructure consisting of Islamic scholars and mullahs who "justify" violent actions by their interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law and use the pulpit to recruit, solicit funds and propagate the insurgency's information-campaign themes.[34] This component is critical to providing the insurgents with the stamp of religious legitimacy.

The general-support component of the militant Islamic infrastructure also includes Islamic nongovernmental organizations that solicit money on behalf of al-Qaeda and

other terrorist organizations and fund fundamentalist madrassas and mosques throughout the world. Such religious institutions serve as recruiting centers and platforms for spreading their propaganda messages. This component also includes media organizations and Web sites that provide forums for the insurgents' psychological operations and assist in the furtherance of their information-campaign objectives.[35] The infrastructure directs, supports and sustains the execution of violence against the regime and Western enemies; it constitutes the insurgency's center of gravity.

To defeat the insurgency, the infrastructure must be neutralized, although it is frequently harder to find than the armed elements and is less susceptible to normal U.S. technology-focused methods of intelligence-collection. Rules of engagement regarding infrastructure are less clear-cut, as the targets frequently are noncombatants, in the sense that they do not personally wield the tools of violence. Consequently, the risk of negative me-

dia attention and adverse public reaction is high. Moreover, infrastructure targets are likely to fall into interagency "seams." While armed elements in Iraq or Afghanistan clearly are a military responsibility, the responsibility for infrastructure targets, particularly those outside a designated combat zone, can cut across multiple agency or departmental boundaries.

Five years of operational experience against the Viet Cong infrastructure yielded significant lessons at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Those lessons can be classified into three major categories: command and control, operations and legal/ethical issues.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Identification of objectives. The most basic function of command is to define the organization's objectives. During the Vietnam War, the belated identification of the infrastructure as a center of gravity gave the Viet Cong an insurmountable time advantage. For the current struggle, that lesson has two implications. First, and foremost, the U.S. strategic leadership must acknowledge the nature of the war that it confronts. A militant Islamic insurgency, not "terrorism," is the enemy.[36] Second, the United States must wage a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign that includes neutralization of the insurgency's infrastructure as a critical component of a holistic campaign. By focusing solely on the operational element of the insurgency (the terrorist or insurgent "operator"), the United States risks paying too little attention to the "other war" and thus repeating the mistakes of Vietnam.

Unity of command. One of the most significant successes of the Phoenix Program lay in the establishment of unity of command among disparate civilian agencies and military organizations.[37] The Phoenix Program, led by a civilian deputy in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support department under the commander of MACV, essentially created an interagency command element to unite civilian and military lines of command.[38] The intelligence-and-operations coordinating centers provided a mechanism that enabled inter-

agency cooperation and coordination in anti-infrastructure operations at the operational and tactical levels. Unfortunately, there was no mechanism that enforced cooperation. Consequently, while senior leaders synchronized civilian and military policies and objectives at the highest levels, organizations at lower levels were still working at cross-purposes. This was particularly true in the intelligence arena, where organizational rivalries often resulted in a failure to share intelligence.[39] Timely and accurate intelligence is essential if counterinsurgency forces are to execute focused operations that neutralize the insurgent and avoid negative consequences on the population. Compartmented or stove-piped intelligence processes impede development of a comprehensive picture of the insurgents.

The U.S. government must unify today's counterinsurgency effort at every level. The United States should establish a single interagency organization or task force, empowered to promulgate policy, establish objectives, set priorities and direct operations for the global counterinsurgency effort. The current decision to unify the nation's various intelligence agencies under a single director is the first step in establishing unity of the intelligence effort; however, the United States must wield all the elements of national power in a coordinated fashion.

Unity of command should extend down to the tactical level. Forums based on cooperation, such as the intelligence-and-operations coordinating centers in Vietnam, are largely personality dependent — they work well only when the participants "mesh"; they fail when personalities clash. Organizational structures, empowered to direct interagency counterinsurgency tasks, must exist at every level.

Metrics. Evaluating operational effectiveness is another basic function of command. Commanders can use two types of metrics — measures of performance and measures of effectiveness — to assess their organization's effectiveness. Measures of performance show how well an organization executes an action — they do not indicate whether the action contributes to long-term objectives. Mea-

sures of effectiveness demonstrate whether an organization's planned actions yield progress toward its objectives. For example, the Phoenix Program levied infrastructure-neutralization quotas (killed, captured or rallied) on the intelligence-and-operations coordinating centers and used the number of infrastructure personnel neutralized to evaluate the campaign's success.

There were two problems with such an approach: first, it confused measures of performance with measures of effectiveness. Numbers of neutralizations that a subordinate element executed might be a valid measure of performance: i.e., it demonstrated whether or not the organization was actively pursuing infrastructure personnel. However, neutralization numbers confused actions with effectiveness. The objective of the Phoenix Program was to limit the infrastructure's ability to support operations and exercise control over the population. Neutralization numbers did not measure whether the overall campaign was making progress toward those objectives.[40]

The second problem with the Phoenix quotas was that they caused dysfunctional organizational behavior. Driven to achieve neutralization quotas, police and military units often detained innocent civilians in imprecise cordon-and-sweep operations.[41] The overburdened legal system then took weeks or months to process detainees — making the jails and holding areas excellent environments for the Viet Cong to recruit and indoctrinate previously apolitical civilians.[42]

While reforms eventually corrected many of the deficiencies in the Phoenix Program, the lesson for current counterinsurgency operations is clear: Metrics designed to measure organizational performance and effectiveness can significantly influence the conduct of operations, both positively and negatively. It is critical to establish measures of effectiveness that are tied to operational objectives. Simple attritional numbers, while easily produced, are, more often than not, meaningless. For example, neutralizing 75 percent of al-Qaeda's leadership might seem to indicate effective operations. However, without considering issues such as replace-

ments, criticality of losses, or minimum personnel levels required for directing operations, one cannot truly assess the effect of operations. Useful measures of effectiveness require a significant understanding of the enemy, the ability to collect detailed feedback on effects and a major analytical effort. The experience of the Phoenix Program suggests that it may be better to use no metrics than to use inappropriate ones.

OPERATIONS

Combined operations. Analysis of the Phoenix Program suggests that operations against the insurgent infrastructure are best done in a combined manner, with U.S. military and civilian organizations supporting

The experience in Vietnam demonstrates that there is significant incentive for avoiding or minimizing combined operations with indigenous forces. The Viet Cong infiltrated the South Vietnamese government and security apparatus at every level, which decreased operational effectiveness.[44] That decreased effectiveness, coupled with the belief that U.S. forces were more capable than the host-nation forces, resulted in an American tendency to marginalize South Vietnamese operational participation and inhibited a wider dissemination of intelligence, even between U.S. organizations.[45]

Americans must avoid the temptation to do everything themselves; unilateralism or operational primacy

level of its advisers through training programs and improved personnel-selection policies.[48] Unfortunately, the U.S. effort lost valuable time before it implemented changes, and the problem remained largely unresolved; however, the Phoenix advisory effort provides some key lessons for advisory efforts in support of an attack against the militant Islamic infrastructure.

Advisers must possess a basic level of regional expertise and language capability that they further develop once deployed. Advisers who understand their operating environment can assess the impact of operational techniques, avoid pitfalls that might alienate the population or provide the insurgent with ammunition for his

> ## "As it executes its counterinsurgency campaign, America must maintain moral ascendancy over its opponents and never lose sight of its democratic principles."

or advising host-nation counterparts. In order to achieve their aim of a rifle shot, Phoenix operations more closely resembled police operations than military ones.[43] Such focused operations require a level of cultural understanding and local knowledge that only a native can achieve. Attempts to operate unilaterally without such expertise can result in indiscriminate use of force and firepower, lost opportunities and a disenchanted, anti-American civil population.

Combined operations with clear American primacy tend to send the message that indigenous organizations are inept or incapable. In the battle for legitimacy, it is critical for the regime not only to *be* effective but also to be *seen* as effective by the populace. Overt U.S. presence often provides the insurgent with ammunition for his information campaign. Insurgent groups in Iraq have leveled charges of neo-colonialism against the United States in order to rally nationalists to their cause. The less a regime appears to have surrendered control of basic governmental functions to the United States, the better it can deflect the insurgent's propaganda messages and gain or retain the allegiance of the populace.

hinders overall operational effectiveness by inhibiting the development of indigenous counterinsurgency expertise and undermining the legitimacy of the host-nation regime. Unilateralism also requires a greater commitment of limited U.S. resources, particularly personnel. U.S. military and civilian security organizations must establish and use common procedural safeguards, such as standards for vetting indigenous personnel, to ensure operational security without encouraging unilateral operations.[46]

Advisers. One of the most significant limiting factors in the Phoenix Program was the competence of the U.S. advisers detailed to serve with the South Vietnamese military and civilian security organizations that were tasked with executing anti-infrastructure operations. For a variety of bureaucratic reasons, the Phoenix advisers were often young, inexperienced and lacking in appropriate skills to advise their South Vietnamese counterparts properly.[47] This problem severely impeded the Phoenix Program from reaching its full potential. As the program matured, the United States made efforts to increase the quality and experience

propaganda campaign, and design operations that will target the insurgent infrastructure effectively, while enhancing the regime's reputation. A language capability often allows the adviser to verify the accuracy of translators and host-nation intelligence products, as well as to judge the effectiveness and trustworthiness of host-nation counterparts. In an environment in which the population fears contact with host-nation security forces because of corruption or insurgent infiltration, civilians may provide information directly to an adviser who speaks their language.[49]

Advisers must be ready to operate under vague and uncertain circumstances and within broad procedural guidance. Advisers must be intellectually and professionally comfortable with the concept of applying police-like methods instead of normal military means in attacking the militant Islamic infrastructure.

The qualities necessary to be a counterinsurgency adviser are resident in the special-operations community and the CIA's paramilitary organizations. Advisory teams should also include expertise from the law-enforcement investigatory agencies, such as the FBI.

HELPING HAND U.S. advisers must possess basic regional expertise and language capability. Their operations must avoid alienating the population, and they must never lose sight of their democratic principles. *U.S. Army photo.*

LEGAL/ETHICAL ISSUES

Legal and ethical issues are of paramount concern in an attack on the militant Islamic infrastructure. These issues have the potential of wielding considerable influence on the population's perception of legitimacy. Operations must stand the long-term scrutiny of world and U.S. popular opinion. Perceptions of the Phoenix Program as an immoral assassination operation drew intensive scrutiny from Congress and the media, and weakened the legitimacy of the governments of South Vietnam and the United States. The inability of the South Vietnamese legal system to house, process and adjudicate the large numbers of detainees generated by the Phoenix Program dramatically hampered the program's effectiveness.[50] In many cases, the system be-

came a revolving door, with hard-core members of the infrastructure being released prematurely. In other cases, lengthy detainment of innocents abetted the enemy's recruitment efforts.[51] Interrogation of detainees provided the best source of information on future attacks; however, accusations of torture and inhumane treatment resulted in a considerable loss of legitimacy for the regime.

A fair, responsive and firm judicial system must be available for dealing with insurgents captured in a campaign against the infrastructure. The United States can influence this issue directly when those insurgents are captured under its jurisdiction; it can influence the issue indirectly with governments to which it provides aid and advice. To retain legitimacy, the United States must maintain the

moral high ground. For example, while the unilateral and indefinite incarceration of al-Qaeda detainees in Guantanamo may be legal, it may not be in the long-term best interest of the counterinsurgency effort. The incarceration has negatively affected relations with coalition partners and has contributed to a negative image of the United States.[52]

Agreements that return captives to their nation of origin for disposition, while still allowing U.S. intelligence agencies access for interrogation purposes (rendition), have been one method used to minimize U.S. exposure to continuing criticism.[53] However, this procedure invites accusations that the United States is using a surrogate to do its dirty work. In the long term, the United States must establish a process of cooperat-

EARLY OPS U.S. operations in Vietnam, including psychological operations, had gone on for years before the Phoenix Program began but had failed to defeat the insurgency. *Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive.*

ing with its coalition partners that not only yields intelligence for future operations and prevents detainees from rejoining the insurgency but also meets basic legal and ethical standards that do not jeopardize popular perceptions of the legitimacy of the counterinsurgency effort.

CONCLUSION

Twenty-six years after the fall of Saigon signaled the failure of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in South Vietnam, the United States found itself thrust into another major counterinsurgency effort by the attacks of 9/11. The counterinsurgency against militant Islamic fundamentalism requires operations on a much broader scale than the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia, and the stakes are significantly higher. The communist insurgency in South Vietnam attacked a government of only symbolic importance to the United States. The current militant Islamic insurgency directly threatens vital U.S. national interests — potentially the most vital of its interests, national survival. The United States must recognize and identify this threat in order to engage and defeat it. Words matter; when the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism identifies a technique — terrorism — as the enemy, it can only lead to strategic and operational confusion.[54]

Once the United States acknowl-edges the threat posed by the militant Islamic insurgency, it must plan and conduct a holistic counterinsurgency campaign. This article has focused on only one component of such a campaign, the neutralization of the insurgency's infrastructure. That component is critical — the longer the United States delays effective infrastructure-neutralization operations, the more difficult they will become, as militant Islamic movements further develop clandestine infrastructure throughout the world.

Neutralization of insurgents and their supporting infrastructure is only one line of operation in a counterinsurgency strategy. The United States and its coalition partners also must protect populations from the insurgent's coercive methods, pursue social and economic development to eliminate root causes, and mobilize populations to support counterinsurgency efforts. Each of these lines of operation can succeed. Yet the overall counterinsurgency effort can fail without an information campaign that both supports them and capitalizes on their success.

The battleground of an insurgency lies in the minds of the populace. The United States and its coalition partners can defeat the militant Islamic insurgency only when it can convince the overwhelming majority of the people in the Muslim world that free, representative and open societies that export goods and services instead of violence and terror best serve their interests — and that the United States stands ready to help them develop such societies. As it executes its counterinsurgency campaign, America must maintain moral ascendancy over its opponents and never lose sight of its democratic principles. **SW**

Colonel Ken Tovo is commander of the 10th Special Forces Group.

NOTES:

[1] William Colby and James McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (Chicago, 1989), 9.

[2] Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War* (Lexington, Mass., 1990), xiii, asserts that the Vietnam War is the best-documented conflict in history, judging by sheer volume.

[3] Arlington National Cemetery Web site, "A. Peter Dewey, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army," avail-

able from www.arlingtoncemetery.net/apdewey.htm; internet; accessed Nov. 17, 2004. The author identifies Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey, U.S. Army, Office of Strategic Services, as the first American killed in Vietnam. Dewey was killed in action by the communist Vietminh forces on Sept. 26, 1945, near Hanoi. The Defense Department has set Nov. 1, 1955, the date the MAAG was officially established, as the earliest qualifying date for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Air Force Technical Sergeant Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr., who was murdered in Vietnam by a fellow airman June 8, 1956, is officially considered the first American to die in the Vietnam War under these criteria.

[4] Colby and McCargar, 180; Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis, Md., 1997), 6; and "Named Campaigns — Vietnam," U.S. Army Center for Military History, available from www.army.mil/ cmh-pg/reference/vncmp.htm; Internet; accessed Nov. 17, 2004; hereafter cited as "Named Campaigns."

[5] Andrade, 53.

[6] Colby and McCargar, 205.

[7] Moyar, 48. The author discusses the short-lived Office of Civil Operations and the subsequent decision to establish the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

[8] MACV Directive 381-41, 2.

[9] See "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," A-4, for the official description of each of these organizations. See Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program* (New York, 1990), for an in-depth analysis of each organization.

[10] Andrade, 12-13, 57.

[11] William L. Knapp, "Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future: A Critical Analysis of the U.S./GVN Program to Neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure," Student paper, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, March 1971, 45. Hereafter cited as "Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future."

[12] Valentine, 177. Valentine notes: "Tet proved to the world that the VCI shadow government not only existed, but was capable of mobilizing masses of people. … Tet revealed … the intrinsically political nature of the Vietnam War. Even if the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments found it impossible to admit that the outlawed VCI was a legitimate political entity, they could not deny that it had, during Tet, dictated the course of events in South Vietnam. And that fact pushed Phoenix into the limelight."

[13] "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," 1.

[14] "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," A-7.

[15] Andrade, 100-01, provides an example of a typical firepower intensive sweep. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 856. Shy and Collier argue that the U.S. military never really came to this realization.

[16] MACV Directive 381-41, 3.

[17] Andrade, 153; and "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," A-8.

[18] U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, "Military Operations, Phung Hoang Operations. Directive 525-36," Nov. 5, 1971, Military History Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.), 1-2. Hereafter cited as "MACV Directive 525-36."

[19] Valentine threads accusations of an assassination program throughout his book. See 311-14 as an example. Many of the accusations of "assassination" were based on the idea that a "targeted kill" equaled assassination. Valentine, 319. As Andrade, x, notes, infrastructure attack involved "shades of warfare that Americans would prefer not to think about. Most of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were, strictly speaking, civilians." Moyar, 224-32, addresses the issue of Phoenix as an assassination program in great detail and counters many of Valentine's primary sources. See Andrade, 123, in regard to charges of brutality and torture.

[20] Moyar, 11, highlights a 1967 CIA estimate of the VCI at 80,000 to 150,000 personnel. "Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report," 9, estimates the total of VCI at 74,000 personnel. Despite Phoenix's increasing effectiveness over time, the VC had been given too long to establish themselves nearly unmolested within South Vietnamese society.

[21] See Valentine, 414. See also Andrade, 263-64, 268-70, 278; and Moyar, 245, on the overall effectiveness of the Phoenix program.

[22] Department of the Army, "Special Forces Unconventional Forces Operations," Initial Draft, Field Manual 3-05.201, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., November 2001), 1-9. Hereafter referred to as Field Manual 3-05.201.

[23] Field Manual 3-05.201.

[24] Dr. Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peace-keeping Post Cold War," *Journal of Small Wars and Insurgency*, Vol. 4, Autumn 1993, 229.

[25] Cable, 230.

[26] Field Manual 3-05.201, 1-9.

[27] Michael Vlahos, "Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam" (Laurel, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 1. See also "Al Qaida Threat Brief: Executive Summary," Decision Support Systems, Inc. Reno, Nev., 2001. Available from the internet at www.metatempo.com/AlQaidaThreatBrief.PDF, 2.

[28] FM 3-05.201, 1-7.

[29] Shy and Collier, "Revolutionary War," 850.

[30] FM 3-05.201, 1-7.

[31] FM 3-05.201, 1-8.

[32] For the purposes of this article, the regime is defined as the coalition of governments working against the militant Islamic insurgency.

[33] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, D.C., 2004), 365-66.

[34] For example, prior to the attack on Fallujah, the Sunni clerical Association of Muslim Scholars declared that resisting the American and Iraqi government forces was a duty and issued a fatwa prohibiting followers from supporting the regime forces in any war. Fadel Al-Badrani, "Insurgents in Iraq Launch Deadly Attacks: Attacks Carried Out Across Central Iraq, Killing Over 30." Reuters, from AOL ar.atwola.com/link/93197704/1 096675187, accessed Nov. 6, 2004.

[35] Nick Wadhams, "Insurgents Step Up Violence," *Harrisburg Patriot*, 4 January 2005, sec. A, 3, reported that a videotape found in Baghdad shows a former al-Jazeera manager telling one of Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday, "Al-Jazeera is your channel." The Qatar-based television station has been the recipient of al-Qaeda's videotaped messages and consistently has served as an outlet for insurgent propaganda.

[36] George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C., February 2003), 1. The NSS states that "The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

[37] Moyar, 48; Andrade, 57.

[38] Moyar, 48-49.

[39] Valentine, 183, 204, 225, 325, 369-71; Moyar, 340.

[40] Valentine, 274. See also Moyar, 189-93, on the use of neutralization quotas.

[41] Andrade, 96-97.

[42] Andrade, 206.

[43] Valentine, 206-07, provides an example of a typical "rifle-shot" operation.

[44] Valentine, 213 and 363. Valentine provides estimates of the extent of this infiltration.

[45] Valentine, 182-83, 213, 225, 300-01, 354. See also Andrade, 50.

[46] See Moyar, 154-55, reference operational security procedures. See Valentine, 340, for his ideas on how to force intelligence sharing.

[47] Valentine, 225, 353, 364, on adviser problems and solutions. See also Andrade, 138-40; and Knapp, 51.

[48] Lieutenant Colonel Leo Kennedy and Lieutenant Colonel Marty Anderson, "An Examination of Vietnam War Senior Officer Debriefing Reports," Military Studies Paper, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 1986, 26-27.

[49] See Valentine, 229, for the difficulties that can arise when the adviser cannot speak the language. See also Valentine, 108, for the idea that all counter-insurgent personnel must be intelligence collectors.

[50] Andrade, 219-22, argues that the inadequacy of the judicial system to meet the workload, lenient sentencing, and a generally inept legal system was the critical weakness of the Phoenix Program. See also Knapp, 56.

[51] Andrade, 206, 221.

[52] Neil A. Lewis, "U.S. Sets Stricter Ban on Torture," *Harrisburg Patriot*, 1 January 2005, sec. A, 9.

[53] Dana Priest, "U.S. Seeks Long-Term Solution for Detainees," *Harrisburg Patriot*, 3 January 2005, sec. A, 3.

[54] Bush, *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism.*

KNOW YOUR ENEMY

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE KEY TO SOF MISSIONS

Story by Scott Swanson

THE AIM OF INTELLIGENCE IS TO FORECAST WHAT A TERRORIST CAN DO, WHERE AND HOW HE WILL DO IT AND AT WHAT TIME AND IN WHAT STRENGTH. IT IS CONCERNED WITH THE ENEMY AND ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES. IF IT IS ACCURATE AND TIMELY, IT WILL REDUCE THE RISKS IN PLANNED OPERATIONS, INCREASE THE NUMBER OF "KILLS," THWART THE TERRORIST IN HIS PLANS, AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY UPSET HIM.

—PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE, RHODESIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS

In this "new era" of extremist Islamic elements, how much more do we know about that enemy than we did five years ago? Even with our experiences in Vietnam, El Salvador, the Balkans and the Middle East, how well-prepared are we to fight today's unconventional wars? With an increase of asymmetrical conflicts in which belligerents take full advantage of their own strengths and the weaknesses of their more powerful adversaries, why do intelligence models fail to provide the actionable insights needed for locating and defeating such armed elements? In Iraq, for example, those fighting American forces include a complex mix of Sunni tribal militias, former regime members, foreign and domestic jihadists, Shiite militias and criminal gangs. Each group has different motivations and ways of fighting, but most commentary categorizes them as Iraqi insurgents, fundamentalists, Arabs or al-Qaeda, and there is apparently no unique means of successfully identifying their members.

Not so obvious

To many, though, it sounds as if a solution should be quite straightforward — you simply must know your enemy. Numerous articles, books and e-mail signatures cite Sun Tzu's "Know your enemy and you have won the battle." That is apparently all there is to it. Oddly enough, very few who cite this sage advice ever explain how to know one's adversary or how to collect the deep intelligence needed. Usually, there is some mention of culture, social knowledge and proper communication, but there are few illustrations or techniques.

Some academics and strategists claim that such knowledge of the enemy can provide a framework for profiling the organizational and operational tendencies of these armed groups to learn their strengths and weaknesses. But how does someone actually obtain these insights and make sense of them? And how do special-warfare elements at the forefront of these unconventional asymmetrical conflicts collect the appropriate intelligence as it pertains to special-operations forces or the cultural aspects of that collection?

In *Special Operations in U.S. Strategy*, B. Hugh Tovar states, "Intelligence is to special operations — any type of special operations — as water is to fish. The one is unthinkable without the other." Special operations entail intelligence that is more complex and detailed in assessing the degree of risk, techniques, modes of employment and indigenous considerations than intelligence for conventional operations. The information is used to plan and rehearse operations, but the need for intelligence continues throughout the mission — to ensure continued mission feasibility and to predict changes in enemy capability, critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity.

A target intelligence package, an area study, an operational net assessment and, if there is time, a Psychological Operations or Civil Affairs assessment, will provide some of the needed information. But to truly understand an enemy and the means necessary to obtain intelligence about such an adversary in asymmetrical and asynchronous encounters, elements of special-operations forces, or SOF, need to re-embrace the role of social/political adviser or develop additional skills and deeper cultural insights, so that they can obtain the necessary information from locals and detainees.

Projects vs. programs

The type of skills and deeper cultural bridging needed to gain additional insights into the adversaries' centers of gravity and the development of collector skills depends largely on two types of intelligence collection: initiative-based and program-based.

Initiative-based intelligence collection is a more on-off type operation. It typically involves fewer resources, has greater time sensitivity, has potentially high covert or clandestine attributes, and is a substitute for or precursor to a larger intelligence-collection program. It is smaller scale and geared toward short-term, "quick hit" results. Initiative-based collection includes opportune collections, such as screenings, walk-ins, spot reports and post-targeting exploitation of detainees. Unfortunately, because these sources of information have been acquired quickly and through situational opportunities, the reliability of the information is often in question.

Program-based intelligence collection is loosely defined as a situation in which the U.S. supports a series of operational activities for a specified period of time through resources and formal infrastructure. For example, during the mid-1960s, a CIA "intellocrat" officer on detached duty with the National Security Council, Robert W. Komer, helped to build a Vietnam-pacification program to collect information on suspected Viet Cong who could then be neutralized. The project concept, which stemmed from the Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group and a smaller hamlet-level intelligence-collection initiative, later grew to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Developments Staff Program, emerged into the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program, and later became the more-renowned Phoenix Program, with interrogation centers in every one of South Vietnam's 235 districts and 44 provinces. The program was supported by roughly 500,000 local militia troops, about 600 Americans (20 to 40 State Department and CIA specialists), and 50- to 100-man strike forces of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit. During the Reagan administration, the U.S. conducted a similar program in El Salvador, but on a smaller scale, to support nationalist forces by pacifying rebel leaders and sympathizers.

The medium-to-large-scale operations of program-based collection will often use a unified structure to com-

MEET AND GREET A Civil Affairs team meets with an Iraqi family. Getting to know members of the local population and building a rapport with them is a key to success. *U.S. Army photo.*

bine military forces, local law enforcement, civil programs and other enemy-pacification efforts. Ideally, that coordinated activity will establish government-wide programs that will improve the lives of the people and build their loyalty and support for operations against the adversary's infrastructure. Coordinated activity also reduces compartmentalization of information and keeps different groups from utilizing the same individuals. Locals must be involved to do most of the work to reduce the enemy's capabilities and presence among the population; to overtly target the hostile infrastructure as part of a security program and to reduce the fear of a secret police activity aimed at civilians; and to develop a legal framework for conducting such activities in accordance with local laws and customs. The host nation has to be committed to providing programs or institutions to meet the population's needs. This is critical for the U.S in developing an exit strategy that will allow it to leave and not appear to have colonialist intentions. Intelligence activities can be maintained through constant local presence and improved by leveraging local experience and knowledge to communicate with the people. Interviewees feel more comfortable and tend to talk more freely when the topics are familiar.

Using the collected information, SOF activities can be focused against local cells that are responsible for political propaganda, finance and supply, information and culture, social welfare and recruiting from the population. Contrary to popular belief, counterinsurgency and counterterror operations usually require a minimal application of force to overcome the adversary, for whom the population serves as a human shield (whether actively or passively). Soldiers and law-enforcement personnel must learn to overcome the temptation to conduct seek-and-destroy actions or to concentrate overwhelming fire on the enemy among civilian populations. The local infrastructure, in tandem with the operational components, can foster a more trustful intelligence-gathering environment by showing the locals that life is improving because of the efforts of the government and the presence of U.S. military advisers.

In Vietnam, the Marine Combined Action Platoons used Marines and Navy corpsmen who lived with the Vietnamese people, learning their cultural idiosyncrasies, becoming immersed in their culture and, most importantly, gaining their trust. The program achieved immediate success in intelligence support. The locals broke their silence and gave intelligence leads once they decided to rid their villages of guerillas and to protect their new American friends. In similar initiatives today, by living in the villages, SOF could provide CIDG-like training to their host-nation counterparts.

PAYING ATTENTION Even though a listener may understand the words, understanding their true meaning will depend upon how well the listener understands the speaker's society and position in it. *U.S. Army photo.*

Missing nirvana, meeting Sun Tzu

In a perfect world, the intelligence-collection program would support a local regime that has a history of inflicting few or no political and social injustices on the populace, and trust-building would be less of a challenge. In reality, however, SOF units must often execute intelligence-collection operations within areas in which communities are oppressed by corrupt or inept government leadership. In such environments, it is especially difficult to collect intelligence: Rapport-building must begin immediately, and there is a high threat to the security of the collectors and the population. Many of today's hot spots are not conducive to sitting down with an individual for a relaxed tea and dinner. In these cases, it is going to require taking a step back to understand what Sun Tzu's *Art of War* really means about determining who the enemy really is.

> *If you know the enemy and yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the enemy, you will succumb in every battle.*

Direct understanding of the words is pretty easy, but to really understand the meaning, a bit of psychology is required. When collectors can comprehend the underlying causes of why humans in a particular culture and social system act the way they do, there is a good possibility that they can anticipate how people will react in various circumstances.

Observable factors can be combined with analysis based on intelligence models and psychological tools. Behavior is governed by laws, standards, socialization, rules and codes, which means it can be predicted in similar situations. But to best interpret an adversary and his behavior, one must understand one's own behavior, feelings, self-concept, self-esteem and fears. Our perceptions of others are a set of norms we apply to social categories such as leadership, gender and culture. It is often hard to step outside our perceptions of others and see them as they see themselves.

Using Sun Tzu as a starting point, if we really understand our own pre-judgments, then we can start viewing the enemy as he really is. Cultural aspects of right vs. wrong or evil vs. good make a difference in communications and in comprehension. The key to leveraging the social factors will be to move beyond the visible manifestations of people's intentions and delve into the inner origination of their perceptions. Collectors who can shift rapidly from their observations of basic differences to seeing the key differences and sensing their likely effects will fare better than those stuck in a cultural blind-spot.

Basic listening occurs on four levels, according to Claus

Otto Scharmer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The first type of listening is *downloading* — listening by reconfirming habitual judgments. This type of listening occurs when almost everything that happens confirms what the collector knows or can observe. The second type of listening is *objective* or *attentive listening* — listening by paying attention to disconfirming data. In this type of listening, a collector pays attention to what differs from what is already known. He processes highlights about a reality that differs from his own understanding, rather than denying them. Objective listening is the basic mode of asking good questions and carefully observing the responses given.

The third level of listening is *empathic listening*, in which the place from which our listening originates shifts to the place from which the other person is speaking, because we connect directly with the other person. At this level, a collector can almost feel what another person wants to say before the words take form and may recognize whether or not a person chooses the right word to express something. That judgment is difficult for collectors

teraction? The informant's level of energy, situation, work, social role or phase of life may alter his behavior, but the core desire usually remains the same. Translating across different cultures makes the difference between understanding critical aspects of information that can be used in tactical operations and missing them.

Traits

SOF information collectors who have a general knowledge of Meyers-Briggs Type Indicators can fall into the trap of categorizing individuals as extroverted or introverted, and observing that one need only listen to extroverts to gain information, and that introverts require someone to ask them specifically about information. It is true that most extroverted action is reflected in outward behavior that is fairly easy to observe; however, introverts have as much action going on, but on the inside, where it is not as apparent to the observer. The easiest way to see through the introvert's illusion of calmness is to observe the physiological and behavioral forms that often transcend cultural roots.

> **"Intelligence is to special operations — any type of special operations — as water is to fish. The one is unthinkable without the other."**

who have less-than-fluent language skills or must rely on translators.

The fourth level is *generative listening*. At this level, the collector, through his understanding of the situation and belief structure, is able to "read" the individual. At this level, the information that the person and the collector are sharing falls into place with the knowledge that would logically correlate to their social bearing and position within the society. The collector will understand whether the individual would be likely to possess the information or to share it truthfully. For most collectors, getting to this stage requires either an intimate knowledge of the people or significant background intelligence.

In cultures that focus on the meanings conveyed nonverbally, communications tend to be informing. In cultures in which most meaning is conveyed verbally, communications tend to be directing. Power/distance relationships are also an important communication factor in cultures in which persons with more authority or higher status are seen as more directive than those with less authority and lower status. As a result, interaction with individuals of those cultures will require an interviewer or interrogator to change his behavior for maximum results. In these situations, it is critical to learn not only how someone is doing something but also why — what do they want out of the in-

Extroverts will likely demonstrate more obvious changes in their interactions, whereas introverts may be less obvious. SOF collection "teaming" comes into play here, as one member can initiate conversation while another keeps a slight distance from the interaction to observe the personality dynamics.

Physiologically, stress yields symptoms of:
- Increased adrenaline, heart rate, blood pressure (blushing).
- Dry mouth.
- Perspiration.
- Pupil dilation.
- Capillary constriction.

Behaviorally, stress yields symptoms of:
- Withdrawal from social interaction.
- Nervousness, trembling hands, mumbling, hesitation in actions and speech.
- Anger or attack.
- Age regression.
- Moodiness.
- Apathy or change of the conversation/topic.

Grasping dynamics of society

So far, our discussion has assumed that the SOF element will have an opportunity to speak one-on-one with a

		Personality Type			
		In-charge *Fast-paced*	**Planner** *Analytical* *Processor*	**Collaborator** *Consensus builder* *Sensitive*	**Laid-back** *Behind the scenes*
Interaction	**Greeting**	• Brief and cordial opening • Fast pace • Speak in strong voice • Show confidence • State directly why you are there	• Brief opening • Intermittent eye contact • Casual yet erect posture • Keep a distance and don't invade their space • State why you are there	• Use a warm voice tone • Be expressive • Make personal comments • Make eye contact • Be energetic and even jovial	• Quiet, friendly tone • Disclose something about yourself • Try low-key connecting with some eye contact • Slow, calm pace
	Getting Information	• Ask directly • Be matter-of-fact • Don't be too personal • They may want to know why you need the information	• Limit small talk • Be matter-of-fact and less personal • Pause • Don't interrupt • Step back a little	• Be prepared to listen • Be very responsive, verbally and nonverbally • Speak with an upward inflection	• Don't rush them • Don't interrupt • Take pauses • Use head nods and affirm • Speak with upward inflection
	Getting Feedback or Asking Questions	• Don't digress, yet stay friendly • They are not likely to accept roadblocks to what they are asking	• Don't rush them • Reflect back to them what you hear • Don't interrupt • Use active listening	• Allow them to digress and ramble as they think aloud • Acknowledge and encourage them to share	• Don't finish their thoughts and sentences • Reflect back to them what you heard • Answer questions honestly for them • Be supportive
	Ending	• Convey a sense of composure • Assure them that things are under control	• Convey a sense that things are on track and under control • Be brief yet assuring	• Show warmth • Gently close the conversation	• Use caring and gentle friendliness • Gently close the conversation

person. From an information-collection standpoint, group dynamics pose a challenge. Understanding group dynamics enables a collector to look more deeply into four areas: *group polarization* — expressing more extreme views as a member of a group than as an individual; *social facilitation* — acting differently when other people are watching; *bystander effect* — diffusing responsibility when large groups of people are around; and *conformity* — following the behavior of a group. If the group dynamics cannot be changed, then collectors should at least note the atmospherics in order to convey the context within which information was gathered and the credence that it should be given.

When collectors are also the analysts, they must temper their social cognition to reduce their personal biases in interpreting and understanding social events. For example, a collector observes during an interview that the subject is edgy, nervous, perspiring and will not make eye contact. For some, especially those trained in dealing with Arabs and who know their tendency to stand close while staring into the other person's eyes, the body language and observable physiological responses of the subject indicate that he is lying. As a result, he may be put through grueling interrogation.

But it is important to note that in some cultures, it is a sign of respect not to look persons of authority in the eye. Such was often the case in Vietnam, and inexperienced collectors sometimes overreacted to subjects who showed body language that they interpreted as deceit. The stressful situation alone could warrant nervousness and perspiration. It could also be that the adversary-in-hiding threatened to punish the subject (or his family members) if he shares any details about the adversary's activities. Pushing the individual harder may not yield more information or a confession, and the interrogator's over-aggressive approach could make the subject more sympathetic to the adversary's cause.

ON THE TABLE Soldiers meet with local Iraqi leaders to gather information and to build relationships. *U.S. Army photo.*

The power of influence changes based on changing individual or group needs, immediate priorities and individual or collective experiences. Pressure and tactical actions are created for different situations, but they may also produce reactions not initially considered. Overall, there are about 50 observed tactics of influence, which largely stem from about 16 core techniques. Each of the tactics will create a correlating result, based on overriding needs. The order of Maslow's hierarchy of needs changes according to the social culture of a people, and the hierarchy is unfortunately not written on a prominent sign posted at the country's border. The hierarchy must be researched and discovered.

Shifting perspectives

One of the most productive means of obtaining information from an individual, either individually or in a group setting, is to shift perspectives and communication styles to match the other person's. During the first interaction, greetings set the tone. They are the initial means of demonstrating empathy and moving toward true cooperation. The difficulty of gathering information will be determined by a personality style's natural resistance to giving information or by the group surroundings. Similarly, the way a person gives explanations and answers will be related to whether the individual listens and understands and is in a position to share openly. Ending a meet-and-greet creates the last impression, which is often as important as the first.

These considerations are for general personality traits. Cultural norms will override many aspects of the social etiquette, especially in group settings. While questioning may be impolite in a social setting, the emphasis of cultural understanding is to avoid inappropriate behavior. This all changes when risk is high and lives are under an imminent threat. When in doubt, it is best to resort to conversational questioning techniques with a polite-yet-authoritative tone that is direct and purposeful in order to detect intentions and mitigate such threats.

A key variable in any situation is the perception of comfort by those being interviewed for information. Effective interviewers can set the tone for eliciting the necessary information by knowing, understanding and attempting to satisfy the emotional needs that motivate human activity. The lead stress factor will be the individual's perception of the threat from the SOF interviewer. That stress will lead to two other factors: the perceived susceptibility to the risk of the adversarial element taking a more active affect upon the individual's life, and the perceived severity of consequences, in the form of fear or social repercussions, from the adversary's increasing strength. Second in importance to the perceived threat is the perceived benefit. This is the individual's belief that the information he shares will help to improve the situation.

Perceived barriers are the degree to which the individual will share information and the consequences that may result from informing. Cues to action are situations or events that will cause the individual to change his perceptions and become motivated to share information. Finally, self-efficacy is the subject's perception of his ability to execute the behavior and action necessary to create the desired outcome.

It will shift the odds in favor of SOF information-collectors if they have a realistic understanding of the plight individuals face and the improvement that SOF can offer. Key in this regard are the individual's actual needs, not the needs the SOF interviewer perceives. The SOF interviewer must be able to personalize the risks and risk-levels to the population, based on the individual's or group's behavior; specify the consequences of the risk and conditions that could worsen; define actions the people must take and the expected effects; motivate and assist the populace to reduce barriers to information-sharing; and instruct the people in safe methods of providing information.

Information, intelligence and insights

When the SOF element has gained the trust of the people or learned to read between the lines of a society, the element can then follow a systematic way of "profiling" specific armed groups that are pertinent to the element's missions. Most guides are a "laundry list" of the generic elements of insurgency movements — leadership, organization and networks, popular support, ideology, activities and foreign support. The profiling methodology should assess and categorize the potential for inappropriate, harmful, criminal or terrorist behavior. That analysis should be blended with any historic actions of the adversary and the adversary's perceived capabilities and evolution.

Studying historical acts of aggression can yield clues that would help analysts identify developing situations from the reports of these individuals. Through planning and pre-defined scenarios, we can use insights on unfolding events to protect locations or areas of influence. Collectors can obtain intelligence from witnesses by avoiding unnecessary direct confrontation; by skillful use of open and closed questions; by keeping questions simple, avoiding ambiguously-worded questions and using leading questions properly; by having the confidence to ask tough questions, to pursue unanswered questions and to assume that more information is available.

Final thoughts

Insurgent conflicts and terrorist acts equate to war. Wars are based on psychological, socio-cultural and geo-political drivers. Resolution of asymmetrical and unconventional wars has historically been based on finding, capturing or killing terrorist and militia leaders. All these actions are fostered by intelligence that targets components of those drivers. Special Forces operations require extensive planning and preparation, of which intelligence is an intrinsic component. Intelligence can be used to understand current social, political and tactical patterns; to predict events; and to mitigate threats to SOF. If resource conflicts and other priorities override the strategic importance of intelligence in planning, the battle may be lost before it is fought. SOF commanders have a daunting task: to balance all that is required for planning and creating not only their own vision of the battlefield but also the adversary's vision. This may mean reducing tunnel vision in order to gain a larger picture. It also means that the commander must clearly identify his priority intelligence requirements so that intelligence resources can provide the type and amount of intelligence needed to direct the operation.

Assembling necessary intelligence or conducting collection in areas with different cultures and languages requires Soldiers to ask for more help, tools, techniques or time. Resisting unrealistic requirements is not weakness or insubordination but rather feedback from intelligence specialists who know their profession. When resistance is not possible, younger members may have to step up for the post-mission debrief assessments, area research and anthropological insights. Knowing one's own weaknesses and the components of the adversary will indeed grant the victory through a thorough understanding of both parties. At the very least, it will provide the insight required. You can better "free the oppressed" when you know what the people believe is oppressing them most. *SW*

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RELIGIOUS FACTORS ANALYSIS:

A New Emphasis and a New Approach

By Ian Courter, Ron Fiegle and
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Buford Shofner

There is no historical example of a culture without religion. Furthermore, all governments and states that have attempted to eliminate religion have ultimately failed to do so. Throughout history, religion has influenced the types of political systems that govern people, the economic systems in which people trade and the social systems in which they live. As part of a complete military mission analysis, religion's role has to be defined in order to determine its effect on the political, social, economic and cultural life of a population.

The analysis of the religious dimension of an area of operations, or AO, by Army Special Operations Forces, or ARSOF, currently varies as widely as the functions of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. Each ARSOF branch uses a mission-analysis template that addresses the religious aspect of the

civil component, but to what extent does it improve overall situational understanding? Current operations have identified the need to look closer at religion's role and influence in the population's daily life, politics, economics, rule of law and governance.

As a matter of operational necessity, religious analysis of the AO has assumed greater importance. It is no longer only a targeting endeavor that identifies key leaders, communicators and spheres of influence. Now it is a key element in understanding the overall cultural environment and identifying the key nodes, linkages and centers of gravity that are influenced by religious affiliation.

As evidenced by our own society, religious beliefs may strongly influence the culture, politics, governance, and to a lesser degree, the economics, at both the local and national levels. A key tenet identified by the

first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "*Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.*"[1]

In our society, the interpretation of U.S. public law by the judiciary defines the separation between church and state, in direct contrast to many Islamic countries, where the law of the land has direct and distinct ties to religious law. A review of lessons learned during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom by the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine's SF, CA and PSYOP doctrine developers and the SWCS chaplain has concluded that the ARSOF doctrinal templates for analyzing the degree to which religion influences a specific society lack the depth and articulation necessary for developing a thorough understanding of the operational environment.

∧ **ONE VOICE** Muslim and Christian religious leaders gather at a multi-religious forum in Kirkuk, Iraq, Sept. 19, 2005, to address the issue of terrorism. *U.S. Army photo.*

Analysis shortfalls

The working group found that with the exception of PSYOP forces, ARSOF do little analysis of the psychological ramifications that their operations will have regarding religion, religious leaders and religious sites. For example, operations in Iraq conducted on or near religious sites have elicited strong negative responses from local populations. Those responses have increased awareness within the military of the need to be sensitive to the perceptions of the local populace and to the people's possible responses to operations.

However, sensitivity does not equate to an in-depth analysis that provides specific information on what can and cannot be done in an operation. Furthermore, a true religious-factors analysis, or RFA, is lacking in step two of the military decision-making process, or MDMP, during which planners formulate the commander's critical information requirements, or CCIRs. Because the information gained from CCIRs directly affects mission success, the MDMP findings can provide accurate guidance on targeting and targeting objectives.[2] For ARSOF in general, an RFA can be ben-

eficial when conducting target-value analysis and determining high-value targets.

Proposed approach

In order to obtain a useful and, most importantly, accurate RFA, mission planners should combine a synthesis of the area studies and assessments for SF, CA and PSYOP with a modification of the PSYOP target-audience analysis, or TAA, and the chaplaincy's religious assessment. The area studies and assessments provide comprehensive information about the target population. The TAA and the religious assessment complete the analysis by providing answers about why a given group of people behave in a certain manner. Combined into an RFA format, the findings can provide vital insights about the way the population may perceive military operations involving their religious figures and sites. Because the RFA may serve as a model for potential populace behavior, it ultimately affects the overall mission analysis.

As we suggested previously, an RFA can be vital in step two of the MDMP, when CCIRs are formulated. However, the RFA's utility is not limited to that

step alone; it is relevant to mission analysis in the following tasks:
- Conducting the initial intelligence preparation of the battlespace, or IPB.
- Determining constraints.
- Identifying critical facts and assumptions.
- Conducting a risk assessment.
- Reviewing facts and assumptions.
- Conducting a mission-analysis briefing.

In IPB, the RFA results may provide the information necessary, for example, in determining command relationships in a theocratic state ruled by religious elite. Such information aids in defining power relationships within the religious organization and the nature and strength of its relationship with the government. In addition, relationships with the government or any fault lines within the organization or the government may then be identified for exploitation.

When determining constraints, an RFA is particularly suited to providing key information on human and geographic targets that should be identified as protected targets or that require great care if combat operations are conducted in their vicinity. For example, a raid on a religious site that is being used for weapons storage may involve a relatively small percentage of the congregation. Not alienating the uninvolved members would be crucial to preventing strong negative reactions within the congregation. U.S. and allied forces could possibly use the incident as a means of separating the population from hostile forces who used their place of worship and endangered their lives. If the operation is done correctly, those uninvolved might actually provide valuable intelligence regarding those who were involved.

As planners identify critical facts and assumptions, the RFA can increase the number of facts and lower the number of assumptions. Obviously, operational planning based on facts is far more effective than planning based on assumptions. There will always be some assumptions, but RFA-based assumptions fall more into

the realm of educated guesses derived from specific information. Consequently, an RFA can help achieve a far greater level of accuracy. The later review of facts and assumptions will be easier, as long as the analysis is kept current with new information, because the RFA will already have established the baseline data defining the operational environment.

The accuracy of a risk assessment improves if the number of facts is greater than the number of assumptions. Knowing how the population in a particular area of operations will react if combat erupts weighs heavily in determining whether the amount of force is adequate for the planned operation. Whether the people are for,

scholars previously defined 20th-century conflicts in terms of political ideology, economics or regional power struggles, contemporary perspectives of conflicts are heavily influenced by the Islamic world-view that sees no separation between religion and politics, economics or other facets of human society. This belief system influences Muslim thought, beliefs, attitudes and ultimately, behavior. To reach those audiences, PSYOP must thoroughly understand the influences guiding their behavior; otherwise, most attempts to change undesired behavior will be unsuccessful. An RFA, as an augmentation of a PSYOP TAA, can increase the ability of PSYOP to specifically address such behavior.

by any actor in the area of operations. Non-PSYOP forces have to understand the wants and motivations that drive the population's behavior so that they can understand the effects military operations have upon the population. An additional benefit that an RFA provides is that it helps non-PSYOP forces understand PSYOP capabilities and limitations.

For overall military operations, what other effects can be influenced by the TAA and RFA? The following examples demonstrate specific effects that can be achieved:[4]
- Limit the effectiveness of hostile propaganda, misinformation and other forms of political warfare directed against the United States.
- Create conditions that reduce

> **"Current operations have identified the need to look closer at religion's role and influence in the population's daily life, politics, economics, rule of law and governance."**

against or indifferent to an operation greatly affects its scope and the dangers that friendly forces face.

Finally, when conducting the mission-analysis briefing, the use of facts gleaned from the RFA can increase the likelihood that well-devised plans will be approved. The RFA also aids contingency planning, because it will thoroughly assess the reaction of the people, potential pitfalls and possible corrective measures. The result is that the RFA provides facts that clarify the briefing and help address outstanding issues.

PSYOP implications

One of the fundamental tasks of PSYOP is to perform a thorough TAA, which is used to assess target audiences in detail and to determine what makes them behave in a certain manner. Once the factors underlying the audience's behavior are known, PSYOP can devise specific actions and products to affect that behavior.

In current conflicts, even secular governments are more aware of religious implications in international affairs, especially in relations with Middle Eastern countries. While

It is true that a PSYOP TAA identifies key aspects of the target audience, such as the most compelling benefits of performing the behavior of interest, perceptions about competing behaviors, risk to the audience of changing behavior, and the best method of informing and persuading audiences about the benefits of new behavior. However, the necessary emphasis on religious factors peculiar to a given society is not present in TAA. RFA can sharply focus PSYOP on religion, providing detailed information on what is needed to cause a change of behavior or to prevent undesired behavior in religiously-based societies.

As part of PSYOP, an RFA can be crucial to mission success. It can be critical to identifying religious barriers to achieving specific behaviors. Identifying those barriers, in turn, provides essential information that aids in developing psychological actions, or PSYACTS,[3] and products to overcome those barriers.

While PSYOP products fall exclusively within the domain of PSYOP units, PSYACTS can be conducted either purposefully or inadvertently

collateral damage (material, buildings, etc.).
- Reduce resistance to U.S. operations.
- Enhance safety of U.S. citizens.
- Increase effectiveness of host-nation police and military.
- Increase support by the people for the host-nation government.
- Reduce concern among populace over the arrival of U.S. forces.
- Facilitate transition to host-nation government.

Consequently, RFA contributes to the success of PSYOP in particular by:
- Providing information for the TAA.
- Suggesting religious barriers to behavior change.
- Aiding in the development of lines of persuasion.
- Assisting in the development of PSYACTS.
- Assisting in media selection.

CA Implications

Analysis of the civil considerations of the operational environment is a capability that CA Soldiers provide to the supported commander. Through the area assessment process, CA

describes the civil components of the operational environment, both in general terms and definitively by CA functional-specialty concentration. The goal of any CA analysis is the identification of the key and decisive civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events[5] present in an area of operations and the way they interact.

As stated earlier, analysis of the religious aspects of an area has always been a consideration in the development of the cultural-relations section of the CA area assessment.[6] Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, while providing valuable insight to Islamic culture, did not require the close interaction with religious, tribal and clan leaders that today's operations demand. In fact, U.S. forces basically adopted a "hands-off" policy in dealing with Islamic religious leaders and holy sites within the joint operational area during the first Gulf War.

After-action reports and informal interviews with CA Soldiers returning from current operations have identified the need for an in-depth RFA at the lowest echelons in order to clarify the interactions between religion and the population's leadership, politics, economics, rule of law and governance. Subsequently, the doctrinal CA area-assessment template has been revised in the current FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, and incorporated into the RFA template presented here.

In today's and future operating environments, conducting a detailed RFA can help clarify the overall cultural environment of the area of operations and can provide the information necessary to:
- Identify the linkages between influential religious leaders and leaders of tribes, clans and local governments.
- Identify those religious leaders who support legitimate government efforts to provide a secure environment and a better quality of life to the populace.
- Identify those religious leaders to isolate from the populace in support of counterinsurgency operations as part of an overall plan for populace and resources control.

Religious Factors Analysis

Religious Group:
Country:
Regional Area:
Prepared By:
Date Prepared:

1. **Religious entities in the area**
   a. What religions are indigenous?
   b. Organized and unorganized.
   c. National, regional, local.
   d. Rural or urban.
   e. Are the religious entities associated with specific families, clans, tribes, ethnic groups or races?

2. **History/background**
   a. What is the religious history of the area?
   b. What ethnic groups came into the area, and when?
   c. How did the religion arrive? Trade? Conquest? Spread in other ways?
   d. How were the religions affected by colonization?
   e. Past conflicts involving religion?
   f. Historical relationship with the government?
   g. How were they affected by recent history, major shifts, social changes and status in society (within the past 100 years)?
   h. How did groups weather changes?

3. **Holy days, rituals and customs**
   a. What holy days and/or festivals may affect military operations?
   b. What are important religious "do's and don't's" to observe?
   c. What are the sexual customs/mores (interrelationships and inter-marriages)?
   d. What are the dietary habits and restrictions?
   e. What are the group's distinctive symbols and colors and their significance?
   f. How do they worship? What are the forms, nature, location, frequency and traits of worship?
   g. What are appropriate protocols for issues related to birth/marriage/death?
   h. How do these protocols affect the

local culture?
   i. How many forms of worship are there? Sects? Denominations?
   j. What are the membership requirements?
   k. Are distinct rites of passage observed for the following: conversion, initiation, youth to elder, single to married, baptism, confirmation, warrior induction, commissioning? If so, what observances and customs mark their passing?
   l. Are there unique festival celebrations that may affect military operations?
   m. How are religious observances prioritized?
   n. What is the role of women within the religion?
   o. What are the rituals for mediations, forgiveness (cleansing of guilt), reconciliations and retributions?

4. **Sites and shrines**
   a. What and where are the places of worship, pilgrimage and memorial sites? Why?
   b. Where are sacred areas located? What is the character of their makeup?
   c. Is there a distinctive architecture unique to the group's gathering place? What do these distinctions represent to the group?
   d. Where are cemeteries located, and what are the characteristics of their make-up?
   e. What religious sites are off-limits and when?
   f. How do the locations, architecture or use of holy spaces support or detract from the mission objectives?
   g. What is the location and composition of religious records (property/marriage/birth/death, etc.)?
   h. What is the location and makeup of ecclesiastic archives or relics?

5. **Primary values**
   a. What are the major tenets and beliefs of the religion?
   b. How are beliefs initially formed

(family, tribe or church/mosque/temple)?

c. What are the believers willing to die for?

d. What subjects incite an emotional response?

e. What behaviors does the group reward? What behaviors are punished? How are they rewarded or punished?

f. What value is placed on women, children, ancestors, certain animals or objects?

g. How are values transferred (oral, written, symbols, other media)?

h. How do outside influences threaten (real or perceived) these values?

i. Is the religion or group focused more on the individual or the community?

6. **Leadership**

a. Who are the religious leaders (official and unofficial)?

b. How many leaders are there, and where are they located?

c. What is the political role of the religious leaders?

d. What is the relationship of religious leaders to government officials?

e. What is the scope of the government's influence on religious leaders (and vice-versa)?

f. What are the motivations of the religious leaders (theological, ideological or political)?

g. How are the leaders organized; what are their administrative and clerical ranks, titles and roles?

h. What does their jurisdiction cover, and how are they connected to a higher organization?

i. What is the religious leader's scope of influence on the populace/area?

j. Do the religious leaders have an impact on the armed forces?

k. How and to what extent is religion integrated into the military?

l. What do religious leaders wear to symbolize their position?

m. How are leaders selected and trained in these religious groups?

n. What methods of religious education, legitimization, ordination and discipline are in place?

o. How are religious leaders monitored, what missionary efforts are present, and what is their base support?

p. What is the relationship between religious leaders, other religions and non-government organizations?

q. What role do religious leaders play in the cultural society?

7. **Tolerance/religious intensity**

a. What is the degree of religious commitment/conviction in each group?
   (1) Nominal.
   (2) Mild.
   (3) Strong.
   (4) Inclusive, exclusive or pluralistic.
   (5) Radical/fanatical.

b. How are competing groups viewed and received?

c. How easily can others join and quit the group? Are there repercussions?

d. How accepting are they of members who convert from other groups?

e. How tolerant is the group of members who convert to other groups/religions?

f. How do members react to bad behavior within their own ranks?

g. How do they perceive modernity, globalization and secularization?

h. How do they view the U.S./Western society?

i. What factors are present that affect fundamentalism?

8. **Relationship to society**

a. How does this society relate to the religious group?
   (1) Stamp out the group.
   (2) Contain the group.
   (3) Assimilate (absorb) the group.
   (4) Share power with the group.
   (5) Promote pluralism with this group.

b. How is this group viewed?
   (1) Religious group.
   (2) Secret society.
   (3) Protest movement.
   (4) Political party.

c. Does the group have a distinct subculture or communal life?

d. How does the group seek to influence society?

e. How does the group use media resources to relate/influence society?

f. Does the group withdraw through symbolic separation (distinct subculture) or segregation into communal life?

g. What is the relationship of religious/spiritual leaders to government officials?

h. What political influence do religious/spiritual leaders have?

i. What is the socio-economic influence of the religion on the society?

j. How is the religion resourced/funded?

k. How does the religion view ownership of private property?

l. How is the ownership of property by the religion viewed by the society?

m. What is the relationship of a secular education to a religious education? How are they legally distinct from one another?

9. **Organization**

a. What is the official hierarchy within the religious institutions? If it is a religion in name only, what is the de facto power structure?

b. What subgroups (sects) are present within the religion?

c. What are the location, size, attendance and influence of the religious learning centers?

10. **Doctrine/myths**

a. What are the sources of doctrinal authority?

b. What are the sources of ethics?

c. What are their concepts of justice?

d. Who are the historical heroes, villains, friends, foes and rivals?

e. What are their concepts of afterlife/salvation?

f. What is their spiritual focus or center of gravity for their belief system?

g. What is the central truth of their most famous myths?

h. What are the local interpretations of their myths?

i. How can these truths and interpretations affect operations?

j. How much variance is there between the official doctrine/teachings and the folk doctrine/teachings?

11. **References/sources used for analysis.**

- Define the linkages between religious influence and the economic condition of the AO.
- Provide a more detailed perspective of the civil components of the supported commander's common operational picture.
- Better define the areas controlled by influential religious leaders and their organizational structure.

As with all CA assessments, an RFA must be a continuous process, and the results must be updated and disseminated as new information becomes available.

SF IMPLICATIONS

In SF, part of the IPB process is to complete an area study. This is a collection of specific information pertaining to a given area and is developed from available sources prior to entering the operational area. The intent of this analysis and evaluation is to identify intelligence gaps and to conduct a detailed IPB in support of the development of the plan of execution.

Complementary to the area study is the area assessment. This is the collection of specific information by the commander that begins immediately upon infiltration and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes or adds to previous intelligence of the area acquired from area studies and other sources. Continual area assessment refines the initial assessment.

Area assessments are critical to the commander's decision-making process. The assessments also include the characteristics and capacity of the indigenous infrastructure and support systems, as well as any other information of military value or relevance to regional orientation. Area assessment is an integral part of SF missions and is conducted during activities incidental to other mission taskings.

The ultimate purpose of the area study and assessment is to provide detailed information for the SF intelligence and operations cycle. Deliberate SF targeting and mission planning may require weeks or months to complete an adequate IPB and to prepare for commitment of an SF detachment area study and assessment before commitment.

Conducting a detailed RFA can help clarify the overall cultural environment of the area of operations and its possible impact on operations. Much of the information that the RFA can provide for SF operations is similar to that provided for PSYOP and CA, but is used for different reasons — mainly for human-mapping and targeting purposes. This information can help by:

- Providing information for target analysis.
- Identifying the linkages between influential religious leaders and leaders of tribes, clans and local governments.
- Identifying religious leaders who support legitimate government efforts (during foreign internal defense, or FID, or counterinsurgency missions, or COIN).
- Identifying religious leaders who support an insurgency (in support of FID or COIN operations).
- Identifying religious leaders who support a resistance movement (during unconventional-warfare, or UW, missions).
- Identifying religious leaders who support government efforts (during UW missions).
- Defining the linkages between religious influence and the economic, political and social conditions of the AO.
- Defining the areas controlled by influential religious leaders and their organizational structure.
- Reducing the resistance to U.S. operations.

A well-conducted RFA will assist with mission preparation before, during and after deployment

RELIGIOUS RITES >
A religious adviser leads early morning prayers during Ramadan. *U.S. Army photo.*

and will assist the SF detachment, as well as follow-on forces, with their overall mission. **SW**

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NOTES

[1] Amendment I, United States Constitution, Dec. 15, 1791, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

[2] Department of the Army, FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C., 2006).

[3] According to FM 3-05.30 *Psychological Operations* (2005), a psychological operations action is one "conducted by non-PSYOP personnel, that is planned primarily to affect the behavior of a TA."

[4] FM 3-05.30.

[5] Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, D.C., 2003).

[6] Department of the Army, FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C., 2006).

New MOS Training Produces More Competent CA, PSYOP NCOs

By First Sergeant Peter J. Sabo

One of the most important missions of the Soldiers of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, is training NCOs in Civil Affairs, or CA, and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP.

In the past, NCOs took training in either CA or PSYOP advanced individual training in order to train and be reclassified as CA and PSYOP specialists. But when the Department of the Army created enlisted military occupational specialties, or MOSs, for CA (38B) and PSYOP (37F), it also determined that the new MOSs needed innovative courses that would train students not only in fundamental operations skills but also in the skills necessary for them to become competent leaders in their new MOS.

Last year, SWCS began teaching two new courses: the CA MOS training, or MOS-T, and PSYOP MOS-T. The new courses are designed to train students in the skill sets necessary to ensure that the NCOs will be able to operate as CA or PSYOP team sergeants. Since October 2005, Company B, 3rd Battalion, has conducted four MOS-T courses for each specialty, producing more than 75 CA and 60 PSYOP NCOs.

At their inception, the six-week courses covered a broad range of skills, from basic MOS doctrine to digital training, and culminated with a seven-day field training exercise, or FTX. The NCO courses ran independently of the training for their officer counterparts — the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC, and the Psychological Operations Qualification Course, or POQC.

∧ **REAL WORLD** Soldiers in the Civil Affairs and PSYOP MOS Training encounter real-world scenarios in the Soldiers Urban Reaction Facility. *U.S. Army photo.*

During the validation trials of CA and PSYOP MOS-T, SWCS determined that more advanced NCO training was needed, and that a linkage of CA and PSYOP MOS-T with the CAQC and POQC was necessary to maintain the "train as you fight" philosophy. The instructors of Company B, along with their counterparts in the SWCS's Training Development Division, revised the program of instruction to meet those needs. They conducted a collective analysis of the way NCOs work with their officer counterparts during missions. Their findings led to the synchronization of training and operations for officers and NCOs, and an expansion of the MOS-T course from six to nine weeks.

At various points in the MOS-T courses, NCOs are now integrated into teams with their officer counterparts in the CAQC and POQC, allowing them to build the team skills that will be stressed during the FTX. During the FTX, Operation Certain Trust, the teams conduct full-spectrum mission analysis, planning and execution in a simulated wartime environment.

The new MOS-T model incorporates adaptive thinking and leadership, cultural training, branch-specific critical tasks and an expanded 10-day FTX. The addition of three weeks of training also allows the students to develop the leadership skills that will be tested in the Soldiers Urban Reaction Facility, or SURF, during the FTX.

Soldiers must demonstrate their ability to adapt to changing environments, under the stress of mental and physical fatigue, while going through the various scenarios they encounter in the SURF. Cultural role players are introduced during the SURF, adding to the realism of the mission. These new courses have greatly enhanced the training of CA and PSYOP NCOs. **SW**

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Enlisted

E8 promotion board selects 174 SF NCOs, provides guidance

The fiscal year 2007 Master Sergeant Promotion-Selection Board selected 174 NCOs in CMF 18 (Special Forces) for promotion to master sergeant. SF had a selection rate of 15.8 percent, compared to Infantry's 12.8 percent and the Army's overall selection rate of 13.9 percent. The following are excerpts from the selection board's review and analysis of the records it reviewed:

• *Performance and potential.* The board paid specific attention to the most recent NCO Evaluation Report, or NCOER, to determine the best qualified NCOs who demonstrated performance and aptitude for increased responsibility. Selection by the chain-of-command and successful job performance were key indicators of potential and were considered favorably in the evaluation process. A strong pattern of quantifiable excellence ratings by the raters, specifically the senior raters, ensured that the most qualified NCOs were identified and selected.

• *Utilization and assignments.* NCOs who lacked operational experience or were away from operational assignments for an extended period were penalized. SF NCOs should avoid consecutive or extended assignments (those in excess of 48 months) outside the operational groups or special-mission units. Favorable consideration was given to NCOs who seek the tough and high-risk jobs.

• *Training and education.* A skill set common to all (SF E7s) is static-line jumpmaster. Those who performed well as a static-line jumpmaster were looked on favorably. NCOs who maintained language-proficiency ratings based on their group of assignment were considered better-qualified than those who did not.

• *Physical fitness.* On the average, SF Soldiers were physically fit. A significant number of NCOs had Army Physical Fitness Test, or APFT, scores of 300 or above. Raters need to ensure that excellence is annotated on the NCOER when the NCO scores 90 percent or greater in each APFT event.

• *Photos.* Overall, photos were marginal. Many NCOs' files still had photos taken when the Soldiers were staff sergeants. The photo is one of the first items a board member sees, and it forms the initial impression of the Soldier. In situations in which Soldiers had opportunities to get an updated photo, missing photos were viewed unfavorably.

Miscellaneous comments:

• Prior to each promotion board, NCOs should read the promotion board announcement message. This message specifies the eligibility criteria and zones of consideration. It also contains instructions for submitting complete-the-record NCOERs, performing an electronic review of the Enlisted Record Brief, communicating with the board, and updating the Official Military Personnel File and photo.

• All NCOs should also read the promotion board documents from the previous fiscal year, as well. Those documents include the promotion board announcement message, the memorandum of instruction to board members and the board guidance. The board guidance explains how board members should determine the best-qualified candidates. These documents can be found online at: https://www.hrc.army. mil/site/active/select/Enlisted.htm.

For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Charles Stevens at DSN 239-7594 or commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to stevensc@ soc.mil.

Warrant Officer

Candidates must request removal from WO training

The SF NCO who is considering becoming an SF warrant officer must continually demonstrate the Army values and a high level of leadership attributes, skills and actions. The decision to become a Special Forces warrant officer should always be centered on a Soldier's motivation and desire to accept the challenge of the duties and responsibilities of a warrant officer.

Each year, following the announcement of the E8 promotion-selection list, two things happen: The Directorate of Special Operations Proponency sees a spike in the number of SF NCOs interested in becoming SF warrant officers, and one or more NCOs previously selected as warrant-officer candidates and then selected for promotion to E8 drop from the warrant-officer program. This happens because applicants and their chain of command are unaware of the proper warrant-officer-candidate removal procedure.

The procedure is explained in DA PAM 601-6, *Personnel Procurement-Warrant Officer Procurement Program*, dated June 14, 2006: Prior to school attendance, an applicant who is selected as a candidate will retain the training seat in Warrant Officer Candidate School and the Warrant Officer Basic Course unless removal is recommended by the applicant's commander for misconduct, loss of qualification or other disciplinary action; or unless the individual requests voluntary removal or separates from the service. This change in policy also applies to Soldiers slated to attend the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course.

Requests for removal from candidate training must be submitted through command channels to Commander, HRC (AHRC-OPP-P), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400.

SF WOAC requires final top secret clearance

In order to attend the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or WOAC, an SF warrant officer must possess a final top secret, or TS, clearance and be eligible for access to sensitive, compartmented information. An interim TS clearance is unacceptable. The Joint Personnel Adjudication System, or JPAS, will be used to verify the status of a prospective student's security clearance prior to the beginning of classes. Students who do not have a verified final TS will not be allowed to start WOAC and will be returned to their home station.

Soldiers should verify their clearance status with their unit S2 through the JPAS prior to requesting attendance at WOAC. SF warrant officers must include a copy of the JPAS verification with their DA 4187 requesting WOAC attendance.

Officer

Branch activations part of HRC transformation

The United States Army Human Resources Command, or HRC, is in the middle of a transformation. The activation of the Civil Affairs, or CA, and Psychological Operations, or PO, branches is one of the first steps in this transformation, and it is significantly changing the way the Army manages its special-operations officers. Branches for Special Forces, or SF, CA and PO now fall under the direction of the Army Special Operation Forces, or ARSOF, Group.

As HRC transforms, this group will be directed by an ARSOF colonel and will be responsible for all assignment actions of personnel in the grades of E1 to O5.

Outstanding performance key to O6 selection

Congratulations to the following SF, CA and PO officers for being selected for colonel. The list reflects the fact that there are many ways to make colonel. Some of the SF officers did not command at the battalion level; however, their outstanding performance warranted selection to colonel. This selection represents a healthy mix of command categories.

SF officers: Gus Benton, Paul Burton, Allen Chappell, Robert Cornelius, Kevin Davis, Todd Dodson, Daniel Enoch, Jeffrey Goble, William Hager, Steven Harris, Kenneth Hurst, James Kraft, Sung Hee Lee, James Moller, Joseph Osborne, Wilfred Rowlett, William Shaw, Bartholomew Shreve, Scott Waterman and David Witty.

CA officers: Douglas Robertson and Michael Warmack.

PO officers: Michael Ceroli, Carl Phillips, Robert Wieler and Jeff Feldman.

ARSOF accessions board scheduled for April 2007

The next ARSOF accessions board for officers in YG04 is scheduled for April 2007. The board is a combined accessions board that selects the best-quality officers to enter SF, CA and PO. The best recruiters for the board are the officers and Soldiers currently serving in these branches.

Application packets require a statement explaining why the officer wants to join the branch. In 90 percent of the cases, prior exposure to the branch is the underlying factor in the officer's desire to join. ARSOF need the best officers to apply, and ARSOF officers should seek out the best officers and encourage them to become part of ARSOF.

Focus on officer retention

Retention of ARSOF officers remains an important issue. Enlisted retention is monitored, controlled and overseen at all levels, but officer retention is not as closely monitored. ARSOF officers should be retention officers. Commanders must be the first individuals to engage officers as they request release from active duty or submit their retirement paperwork. All commanders need to engage these officers and determine whether there is a way to retain them. Contact HRC for assistance in keeping a good officer in the Army.

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RESISTING REBELLION:
The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency

Few counterinsurgency books effectively blend academic theory, case studies, politics and lessons learned. Anthony James Joes blends all of these in his new book, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*.

Joes, an accomplished writer and scholar, is well-known in the political-science and military-history communities. A professor of political science and the director of the international relations program at Saint Joseph's University, Joes is probably best recognized for his widely acclaimed works, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (1996) and *America and Guerrilla Warfare* (2002).

The central theme of *Resisting Rebellion* is that insurgency is quintessentially a political phenomenon, and therefore, any effective response to it must be primarily political, as well. Joes further articulates that an intelligent policy for counterinsurgency, or COIN, is aimed at peace or, at least, stabilization. In this book, Joes effectively advances his view that lasting peace and counterinsurgency victory are synonymous. The way political entities define peace and victory directly relates to the development of insurgent and COIN strategies.

Joes asserts that lasting peace, or COIN victory, comes through conciliation. vConciliation is achieved through a two-fold approach involving military action and a political program that puts a "wedge" between the insurgent leaders and their followers. Joes defines each aspect of the two-fold approach and uses historical examples to illustrate his points. The military-action approach is typical of armies fighting in a COIN conflict, but he emphasizes the development of a strategic plan for victory, isolation of the target area and the extensive use of human intelligence. The political-program approach addresses many familiar political programs, such as amnesty, reintegration and mechanisms for the peaceful reso-lution of disputes. Joes leverages his political-science background to forward some of the most important political programs, such as splitting revolutionary elites from their followers and addressing legitimate popular grievances.

The book develops several other themes of interest. The review of guerrilla strategy and tactics is illuminating, as is the section that addresses the religious aspects of insurgencies. Joes also discusses themes such as the sources of insurgencies, the population as the enemy (and friendly) center of gravity, the "centrality" of intelligence, the necessity of rectitude and the utility of amnesty. Joes concludes the book with his recommended elements of a national COIN strategy, a comparative analysis of national COIN strategies from past conflicts, lessons learned and an epilogue on the current conflict in Iraq.

Joes is successful at taking difficult, theoretical concepts and synthesizing them to form a clear picture of what insurgencies are, how they develop, what makes them successful and how they can be defeated. Additionally, his comparative analysis employs relevant case studies to illustrate the dynamics between insurgent politics and military responses to insurgent threats. His elements of a national COIN strategy are significant.

This book is a unique addition to the study of COIN because of the comparative analyses of both political and military action. The historical examples and the integration of insurgent or revolutionary theory set this work apart from most others. Joes' notes pages and bibliography are extensive and enhance the book. The author's credibility is further enhanced by his teaching relationship with the U.S. Army War College.

The strengths of the book are the fusion of politics and military action into a COIN-strategy framework, the application of social theories relating to COIN and the thorough lists of lessons learned and tactical and operational applications. However, the book could be improved. In-depth analysis of the affects of international media and the Internet on the COIN battlefield would be helpful. Additionally, Joes could address the way foreign internal defense relates to COIN. Also, military readers may find his 2004 analysis of the Iraq situation outdated and his numerous references to the 1968 Tet Offensive oversimplified.

Military professionals with extensive COIN experience will not find all of the material new, but they will find the COIN concepts, case studies and lessons learned succinctly packaged in a logical, organized manner. Joes' book is strongly recommended for military professionals tasked with developing COIN strategies, and for those in government agencies outside the military who work in the gray area where politics and military strategy meet. *SW*

AFGHANISTAN
& THE TROUBLED FUTURE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

As Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, marks its fifth year in Afghanistan, many in the United States government contemplate whether we will ever win the war. What appeared to be a masterpiece of military innovation and unconventional warfare, or UW, in the infancy of OEF is now more accurately described as a "hyper-conventional" operation of attrition warfare. In *Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, Hy S. Rothstein presents the war in Afghanistan as a case study to support his analysis that the U.S. military continues to fail to effectively create and maintain the capability for UW.

Rothstein is a professor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He was a career Special Forces officer with 30 years of active service. He draws upon his extensive academic knowledge of organizational-management theory and the history of UW, then couples it with exhaustive firsthand research to provide the framework for his analysis. The book highlights the institutionalized resistance of the conventional military to anything unconventional.

The book is organized as a scholarly study comprising six chapters. Rothstein uses the first two chapters to establish the history and baseline capacity of U.S. UW capabilities. In Chapter 3, he discusses contingency theory, innovation development and the impact of both on organization structures. This becomes the framework for chapters 4 and 5 and his assessment of OEF and the Department of Defense's in-

ability to conduct UW. Finally, in Chapter 6, Rothstein provides his conclusions and makes recommendations for addressing the future of UW. Photos of Special Forces conducting operations in support of OEF can be found in the center of the book; however, they serve only as a frame of reference for the author's description of operations in Afghanistan.

Rothstein's central argument is that the strategic framework of the war in Afghanistan has been and remains a conventional operation. From its birth, the U.S. military established an ancestry for attrition warfare that consistently turned its back on any historic unconventional experience, whether it was a success or a failure. He argues that the current organization has established a system of internal incentives that promotes the conventional mindset and reinforces the belief that a proficient force, whether it be "special" or not, can adapt or transform to meet the challenges of an unconventional battlefield.

Rothstein does an excellent job of laying out the requirements for conducting UW and uses his analysis of operations in Afghanistan to expose the failures of the U.S. military, and more specifically, of U.S. special-operations forces.

He argues that a UW force must be organized to adapt to its environment and not constrained by a bureaucratic command-and-control structure that by its nature rejects innovation. Rothstein effectively exposes the inability of the current U.S. military and SOF to create a true unconventional capability. He concludes that it will take the creation of a separate service, similar

to the Office of Strategic Services, to provide the nation with an unconventional-response capability.

This book is recommended for the senior company-grade officers and NCOs of Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs branches, who constitute the present and future foundation of the U.S. UW force. Rothstein provides a simple framework for understanding past and current failures and a well-thought-out option for the future.

Many senior officers and defense officials may balk at the idea of radical innovation during a time of war. However, given the U.S. military's inability to stabilize and secure the unconventional environments of Afghanistan and Iraq, the "troubled future of unconventional warfare" must be fixed now. *SW*

U.S. Army photo

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