


Special Warfare



JULY/AUGUST 2006
VOLUME 19 ISSUE 4



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WHY WORDS MATTER**

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
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Special Warfare

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The United States military is changing the way it fights, and that change is driving changes in Army training, as well. Those changes are especially acute for Army special operations forces, who are not only in high demand, but who also must train for a number of difficult and sensitive missions particularly relevant to prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism.


At the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, we are transforming our training in a number of ways and are helping implement new programs designed to change the face of ARSOF. In previous issues of *Special Warfare*, we have discussed the changes to the SF training pipeline. The changes are not limited to the training of SF Soldiers. Demand for Army Civil Affairs Soldiers has never been higher, and to prepare CA forces for the missions they face, and to man the newly created active-duty CA Branch, which stands up Oct. 16, 2006, we have transformed our training of CA officers, developed a new course for CA NCOs, and have reviewed current CA operations to ensure that our training is relevant to the current battlefield. As Major Buck Ross points out in this issue, we are taking the steps necessary to produce the most capable Soldiers Civil Affairs has ever had.

In the advanced training of our SF NCOs, we are also revising our programs of instruction to streamline the training, concentrate on SF core tasks and take every advantage of technology. CSM William Eckert's article in this issue highlights how we placed a new emphasis on leadership and management in our SF ANCOC, leaving the MOS-particular skills to be trained in the SFQC. These changes, along with an enhanced use of technology, have allowed us to increase the number of students graduating annually, to make the ANCOC more relevant to the current battlefield, and to avoid increasing the size of the NCO Academy's cadre, as the personnel who would fill those billets are badly needed in the SF groups.

To fill the personnel needs of the SF groups, we have increased the number of SF Soldiers we train annually, and one of our greatest accomplishments in that area is the success of the initial-entry, or 18X, program. The off-the-street SF recruits have shown that they are mature, intelligent and dedicated to learning the craft of Special Forces. As Janice Burton's article in this issue demonstrates, senior SF NCOs in the groups have been impressed by the 18X Soldiers, and the program has been an excellent method to assist in filling the force.

Changes are also prompting us to update our doctrine. As Major D. Jones points out in his article, "Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Why Words Matter," there has been some confusion over the definition of UW. The soon-to-be-published FM 3.05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, reflects the work of doctrine writers at SWCS and many others to make the definition of UW more relevant to the modern battlefield.

In all, we are training our Soldiers in ways we would have thought impossible just a few years ago, but new threats demand new strategies, and we are adapting to make sure that our Soldiers will be prepared for whatever challenges await.

Major General James W. Parker

USASOC memorializes 50 fallen Soldiers during Fort Bragg ceremony

USASOC Public Affairs Office

Fifty Army special-operations Soldiers killed during combat operations while deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan were remembered during a somber ceremony held by the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, May 25.

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of USASOC, addressed an audience of about 500 Soldiers, family members, friends and special guests.

“No words can adequately describe the valor of the men and women we honor today,” said Wagner. “The Soldiers we honor today follow in the footsteps of our forefathers who made the ultimate sacrifice to protect America and to spread freedom throughout the world.”

Approximately 260 family members of the fallen warriors traveled from across the U.S. to participate in the ceremony, held on Fort Bragg’s Meadows Memorial Plaza. After personalized nameplates were unveiled, family members celebrated the life and military service of their loved ones as they approached the wall to lay roses at its base and touch the engraved legacy of courage and selfless sacrifice of their Soldier.

“The completeness of these Soldiers’ lives is not measured in length, but in deeds, commitment and accomplishments that gave their life such great purpose. They died that others may live in freedom and they’ve earned a place of honor in our history books to remind future generations that these Soldiers’ sacrifices are the price of freedom,” said Wagner.

The Memorial Wall originally listed Soldiers killed in action during combat in Vietnam, and was updated in the 1980s to include Soldiers who were missing in action or declared dead. The wall was later expanded to include all Army special-operations Soldiers killed in action since 1983.

The Memorial Wall now displays the names of 965 fallen special-operations Soldiers. The names of the following Soldiers were added to the Memorial Wall during the ceremony:

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Master Sgt. Joseph J. Andres Jr., USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Staff Sgt. Ricardo Barraza, 2nd Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Lewis, Wash.
Sgt. Dale G. Brehm, 2nd Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Lewis, Wash.
Sgt. 1st Class Lance S. Cornett, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class Trevor John Dising, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Maj. Gregory J. Fester, 322nd CA Bde., Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
Staff Sgt. Gary R. Harper Jr., 2nd Bn., 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, Ky.
Master Sgt. Robert M. Horrigan, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Master Sgt. Ivica Jerak, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Pfc. Dillon M. Jutras, 3rd Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Benning, Ga.
Staff Sgt. Matthew A. Kimmell, 3rd Bn., 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, Ky.
Sgt. 1st Class Obediah J. Kolath, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class Steven M. Langmack, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Cpl. George A. Lutz II, 9th Psychological Operations Bn., 4th PSYOP Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Master Sgt. Michael L. McNulty, USASOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class Lawrence E. Morrison, USACAPOC, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. Regina C. Reali, 351st CA Command, Mountain View, Calif.
Cpl. Timothy M. Shea, 3rd Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Benning, Ga.
Staff Sgt. Ayman A. Taha, 3rd Bn., 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, Ky.
Maj. Jeffrey P. Toczylowski, 1st Bn., 10th SFG, Panzer Kaserne, Germany.
Sgt. 1st Class Brett E. Walden, 1st Bn., 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, Ky.
Sgt. Cheyenne C. Willey, 351st CA Cmd., Mountain View, Calif.
Master Sgt. Anthony Ray Charles Yost, 3rd Bn., 3rd SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.



IN MEMORY Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and Command Sergeant Major Michael Hall pay tribute to 50 members of the special-operations community whose names were added to the Memorial Wall on May 25. Photo by Gillian M. Albro, USASOC PAO.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Staff Sgt. Leroy E. Alexander, 1st Battalion, 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class Victor H. Cervantes, 1st Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Capt. Jeremy A. Chandler, 1st Bn., 3rd SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Staff Sgt. Edwin H. DazaChacon, 3rd Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Master Sgt. Emigdio E. Elizarraras, 3rd Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Staff Sgt. Christopher M. Falkel, 1st Bn., 3rd SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Pfc. Damian J. Garza, 3rd Bn., 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga.
Staff Sgt. Shamus O. Goare, 3rd Bn., 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
Sgt. 1st Class Chad A. Gonsalves, 3rd Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.,
CWO Corey J. Goodnature, 3rd Bn., 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
Pvt. John M. Henderson Jr., 3rd Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Benning, Ga.
Sgt. Kip A. Jacoby, 3rd Bn., 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
Sgt. 1st Class Allen C. Johnson, 1st Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
1st Sgt. Tobias C. Meister, 321st Civil Affairs Brigade, San Antonio, Texas.
Sgt. Alberto D. Montrond, Group Support Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class Marcus V. Muralles, 3rd Bn., 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
Staff Sgt. Clinton T. Newman, 321st CA Bde., San Antonio, Texas.
Sgt. 1st Class James S. Ochsner, 2nd Bn., 3rd SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. Jason T. Palmerton, 1st Bn., 3rd SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Staff Sgt. Christopher N. Piper, 1st Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class James “Tre” Ponder, 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
Maj. Stephen C. Reich, 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
Capt. Charles D. Robinson, 1st Bn., 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Sgt. 1st Class Christopher L. Robinson, 2nd Bn., 20th SFG, Elliott, Miss.
Sgt. 1st Class Michael L. Russell, 3rd Bn., 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.
CWO Chris J. Scherkenbach, 3rd Bn., 160th SOAR, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.



7th Group Soldiers Honored

Thirteen Special Forces Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, were honored May 18 for valorous actions in the Global War on Terrorism.

The medals were presented by Brigadier General John F. Mulholland, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Mahaney, commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group.

The Silver Star, the Army's third highest award for combat valor, was awarded to:

**Chief Warrant Officer Jason Hope
Sergeant First Class David Lowe**

The Bronze Star with a "V" device for valor was awarded to:

**Chief Warrant Officer Roy Anderson
Sergeant First Class Jonathon Arndt,
Sergeant First Class Joffre Celleri
Staff Sergeant Irving Lara
Sergeant First Class David Lowe
Staff Sergeant Charles Maxwell
Staff Sergeant Peter McKenna
Staff Sergeant Matthew Phillips
Master Sergeant Vincenzo Quevedo
Staff Sergeant Vroyoan Riefkohl
Sergeant First Class Mark Roland
Major Leonard Rosanoff**



CHANGE OF COMMAND

USASOC Public Affairs Office

Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Ruth II assumed command of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel James Wolff June 6, at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Parade Field.

Ruth, from Milton, W. Va., was previously assigned to the U. S. Army Human Resources Command, where he served as the Civil Affairs assignments officer. He is a graduate of Marshall University in Huntington, W. Va., where he earned bachelor's degrees in economics and business management.

Ruth was commissioned as a second lieutenant into the Air Defense Artillery in 1988. He has held various leadership positions within the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, including Civil-Affairs team leader and battalion executive officer.

Wolff now serves as the acting commander of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The unit was designated a brigade in a provisional status on March 16, in line with the Army's redesign and transformation initiatives. The 95th is currently being equipped with personnel and being fielded for activation in 2007.

The 96th CA Battalion, currently the Army's only active-duty CA unit, will fall under the 95th CA Brigade along with three other battalions, the 91st, 97th and 98th. The 97th CA Battalion will be the first to come on line in March of 2007. The 98th will stand up in October of 2007, and the 91st will stand up in October 2008.

USACAPOC realigns from USASOC to Army Reserve Command

USASOC Public Affairs Office

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command transferred operational command and control of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command to the U.S. Army Reserve Command May 23.

"Today's transfer of command is about recognizing the critical Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations mission-support requirements for both special operations and conventional operations," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, USASOC commanding general.

"I will miss not having CAPOC as a part of Army Special Operations Command; nevertheless, the transformation is the right thing to do, and I fully support it. The focus is not on the transfer; it is on the importance of the mission," he said.

The move will enable the Army to maximize the effectiveness of CA and PSYOP forces by reducing the number of coordinating headquarters, enabling closer and more direct care for the Army Reserve Soldiers and

family members assigned to these units.

Referring to the Army Song "The Army Goes Rolling Along," Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, commander of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, stressed the importance of modernization. "I think we have to streamline and flatten our command and control structure to push more resources into the operational pool."

The realignment affects 9,000 Army Reserve Soldiers located in 25 states. The Army Reserve major subordinate units include the 350th, 351st, 352nd and 353rd Civil Affairs commands, each with subordinate brigades and battalions, and the 2nd and 7th Psychological Operations groups, each with four battalions and subordinate companies.

"We are proud of our heritage, we're proud of our roots in specialized military operations, and we are especially proud to have been a part of SOCOM and Army special operations at this time in our country's history," said Major General Herbert L. "Buz" Altshuler, commanding general, USACAPOC.

Wagner and Altshuler presented USACAPOC with the Army Superior Unit Award by placing a streamer on the command's flag.

Citing the value of USACAPOC's contributions, Wagner explained that the Army Superior Unit Award is very important, as it recognizes the command's exceptional service from Sept. 15, 2004, to Sept. 15, 2005. The award recognized the difficult and challenging mission of supporting CA and PSYOP units, individual Soldiers, USASOC and regional combatant commanders worldwide.

USASOC will retain proponentcy for CA and PSYOP operations, including doctrine, combat development and institutional training. Additionally, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Provisional) and the 4th Psychological Operations Group, which were part of USACAPOC, will remain assigned to USASOC.

On May 16, the Department of Army announced the Department of Defense-directed decision to realign Army Reserve CA and PSYOP forces to USARC.

Book reviewer missed book's point

As someone who usually enjoys retired Colonel Al Paddock's work, I was disappointed by his hostile review of Robert Kaplan's *Imperial Grunts*. While Colonel Paddock's scholarship is otherwise impeccable, he is apparently oblivious to the fact that Kaplan does not profess to be either a historian or an expert on special operations.

Colonel Paddock ends his review with, "If you are a reader who wants a travelogue and a well-written narrative ... read this book. Otherwise pass it up." Colonel Paddock completely misses the point that Kaplan uses his descriptive skills to draw insights into broad geopolitical themes. *Imperial Grunts* is narrated through the personal stories of Soldiers and Marines deployed around the world, but the book's focus is about how they are making a difference at the American strategic-policy level.

Colonel Paddock even pans the

title of the book, which whether you agree with it or not, should have been the first clue that it is written for a broader audience than the Fort Leavenworth library clientele. The nuances of SF history might be fascinating grist for some of the academics in the SOF community, but the two pages that Kaplan spends on them is the appropriate level of background for his intended readership. Colonel Paddock devotes most of his two-page review to what appears to be a history lesson of his own, complete with some heavy-handed commentary on terminology that comes off as petty rather than definitive.

As a final note, Colonel Paddock seems to take issue with Kaplan's lack of "objectivity" when dealing with SF, an attitude I find inexplicable and maybe inexcusable. If Kaplan's obvious like for Soldiers and Marines enables him to portray our operations sympathetically, we should only cherish a writer who is out of step with the mass of the press who often get

the story wrong in their attempts to be "neutral."

This is probably the right place in this letter to disclose that Kaplan profiled myself and several of the Soldiers in my unit in the Colombia chapter of *Imperial Grunts*. These narrative snapshots were positive, but they simply reflected Kaplan's willingness to report on some great work that was being done out of the public eye.

I think it is unfortunate that Colonel Paddock chose to focus his review on a few technical subjects, some of which are debated even within our own SOF community, rather than the fact that Kaplan's well-written book tells a positive story about the American military. If you are a Green Beret who spasms at the thought of being called a commando, pass Kaplan's book up. Otherwise, I encourage you to read it.

COL Kevin A. Christie
JRTC Operations Group
Fort Polk, La.

SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all contributions.

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In Sync

EBA Synchronizes Operations for the SF Headquarters

Story by Captain Darrell Carr

The concept of the effects-based approach to operations, or EBA, has been gaining popularity among Army units that conduct combat operations. However, EBA is not a new concept for Special Forces groups, which are typically given broad-scope missions and attempt to gain maximum results with limited assets. The United States Joint Forces Command recommends the application of an EBA process at the operational-level headquarters.¹ As SF missions often span the tactical to operational and operational to strategic levels of war, SF headquarters can benefit by adapting the organization, processes and products of emerging EBA doctrine to enhance SF operations.

From late 2004 until mid-2005, the 2nd Battalion, 1st SF Group, served in Afghanistan as one of two forward operational bases, or FOB, under the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF. FOB 12 implemented an EBA process to accomplish its mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations in Regional Command-East. FOB 12's area of operations included more than 35 provincial districts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, multiple border-control points and 12 firebases within its assigned joint area of operations and the conventional-force battlespace. By disrupting insurgent activities, FOB 12 allowed the conventional task force to conduct stability-and-support operations, or SASO, throughout the area of operations.

FOB 12's application of EBA doctrine produced a systematic and synchronized approach to operations. The FOB



▲ **BASIC NEEDS** A Special Forces Soldier distributes food during a humanitarian-aid mission in Afghanistan. All photos courtesy Darrell Carr.



UGR-A

BREAKFAST
MENU 3: B
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BOX 2 OF 3

commander and his staff worked to ensure that operations were nested, synchronized and coordinated at all levels and with adjacent units. EBA allowed the commander to adapt and seize opportunities for maintaining the initiative and control of operations, and allowed direct feedback on the course of operations of the advanced operational base, or AOB, and SF A-detachments. The ability to adapt and seize opportunities depended heavily on the AOB and team commanders having a thorough understanding of the FOB commander's intent and of the AOB leader's or team leader's ability to make sound decisions to achieve that intent.

Terminology


FOB 12 used the following definitions, developed in accordance with U.S. Joint Forces Command terminology, as the basis of its EBA process:

1. *Effect*: An effect is the physical and/or behavioral state of a political, military, economic, social, infrastructure or information system that results from military or nonmilitary actions.²

2. *Effects-based approach*: Operations that are planned, executed, assessed and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.³

3. *Effects-based targeting, or EBT*: A focused targeting process to produce courses of action that will change the enemy's behaviors and compel him to comply with our will.⁴ FOB 12's EBT cycle gave the FOB commander the ability to generate the effects necessary to create his desired results and to meet his objectives.

During FOB 12's EBT process, the FOB 12 commander provided initial guidance and tasks to the AOBs and SF detachments for the conduct of operations. The FOB staff then ana-



lyzed and evaluated the team reports, intelligence and operations for targets that would achieve an effect or that required additional guidance. The FOB commander issued subsequent guidance in an effects tasking order to guide the AOB and team commanders toward the desired end state.


4. *Effects tasking order, or ETO*⁵: A means of tasking, providing guidance and synchronizing the actions of the FOB's assets in order to achieve the FOB commander's intent. ETOs were issued as fragmentary orders to the FOB operations order, or OPORD, that outlined the concept of employment that was developed during pre-mission planning. ETOs were generated as a result of the FOB's EBT board meetings. FOB 12's ETOs followed the five-paragraph format for fragmentary orders, with a slight content modification. The situation paragraph of an ETO reflected the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB, that was used during the development of the target. To ensure that the desired effects and measures of effectiveness,

or MOE, were clear to the executing unit(s), the desired effects were listed immediately following the commander's intent, and the MOEs were listed under the coordinating-instructions portion of Paragraph 3, execution.⁶ In the event that an adjacent unit supported an operation of an AOB or an SF team, the ETO was courtesy-copied to the supporting unit's higher headquarters.

Applying EBA to COIN

According to U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces*, four principles apply to all counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations: 1) maximize the use of intelligence; 2) use the minimum amount of violence necessary; 3) ensure unity of effort in all operations; and 4) develop a responsive government.⁷

A unified effort is critical and requires a significant amount of coordination between military units, the host-nation government and nonmilitary organizations at all lev-



els. In Afghanistan, an AOB and its subordinate SF teams would set the conditions for stability operations by improving security in an area and advising the Afghan forces. Conventional forces conducted stability operations while the provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, rebuilt the infrastructure. Leveraging complementary capabilities and manipulating supported and supporting command relationships to accomplish the mission adhered to the unity-of-effort principle. The fourth principle posed the most significant challenge to FOB 12, as the Afghan government remained undeveloped. The Afghan government was continuously attempting to expand its influence to all areas of the country, develop internal security mechanisms and mechanisms to provide the appropriate responses to military and civic crises.

Three key relationships exist in a COIN environment: the relationships between the populace and the government, between the populace and the insurgents, and between the govern-

ment and the insurgents.⁸ The populace is the center of gravity in a COIN environment, as it supports either the government or the insurgents. In order to win popular support for a legitimate government, the people need to be convinced that the government is capable of providing their basic needs. FOB 12 attempted to build support for the government of Afghanistan by maintaining a routine presence and interacting with local leaders and key individuals, supporting government messages, assisting government-sponsored units (Afghan National Army, Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Police) in improving security, and assisting in setting the conditions for expanding the government's programs.

To combat the insurgency without losing the people's support or increasing popular support for the insurgency, the government must provide appropriate responses. FOB 12 attempted to improve the government's relationship with the populace by advising and assisting Afghan forces

in the conduct of their operations, adhering to Afghan customs and government directives regarding the use of force, and focusing operations against key nodes of the insurgency.

An insurgency will not die as long as the people support it and look to the insurgents instead of the government to meet their basic needs. FOB 12 focused its operations on disrupting the insurgency and its leadership, conducting civil-military operations, or CMO, and information operations, or IO, for tactical benefit, supporting the Afghan-sponsored allegiance and reconciliation programs, and continuously interacting with the Afghan populace and key leaders. The relationships between the government, its people and the insurgents in a COIN environment⁹ are depicted at left, along with the key goals for improving or severing these relationships. Building on these relationships and integrating the COIN principles, FOB 12 developed a successful strategy that produced stabilized areas or at least set the conditions for stabilization.

EBO and MDMP

FOB 12's EBA strategy began during pre-mission planning with the development of the operation order. The commander's intent played a central role in setting the conditions for the EBA process and in linking tactical objectives to operational objectives and strategic plans. The key products developed during the military decision-making process, or MDMP, included a detailed intelligence-collection plan, with 22 named areas of interest, and a high-payoff-target list, or HPTL. These products, combined with the commander's intent, were instrumental in guiding the EBT process.

In conjunction with the MDMP and the development of a concept of employment, the FOB commander's staff conducted a relative-combat-power analysis to identify factors that could lead to successful operations against the insurgency, as well as factors

that could degrade COIN operations. The analysis results focused on the assets available to the friendly units (maneuver forces) and the enemy (criminal networks, insurgent fighters, insurgent auxiliary, insurgent underground and population factors). The relative-combat-power analysis, while constantly in flux, greatly assisted FOB 12 by focusing the EBT process

the FOB 12 EBT process describes the methodology used at the FOB, AOB and SF-detachment levels in identifying a particular high-payoff target, allocating time and assets to gaining more information about the target, developing a course of action, executing a course of action, and assessing the results of the operation(s). Based on the SF detachments' ongoing opera-

three AOBs.

At the FOB level, the EBT process required three decisions. The first decision, made by the FOB targeting officer, was to develop a nominated target for approval. The second decision, made by the FOB commander or the director of the operations center, or OPCEN, was to engage a target. The third decision, made by the FOB

“AOB and SF team commanders were responsible for conveying their view of the battlespace and effects-achieved through their daily reports.”


and identifying areas not covered in the HPTL.

Colonel John R. Boyd, an American fighter pilot and military strategist, developed the concept of the observation, orientation, decision and action, or OODA, loop.¹⁰ FOB 12's EBT process was modeled after Boyd's concept. The OODA loop description of

tions, FOB 12 developed and executed targets. The teams' operations were reported through all portions of the targeting cycle. The AOB received reports and managed the operations of four to six SF teams and provided guidance to the teams based on the targeting cycle. The FOB received reports and guided the operations of

commander, with a recommendation by the OPCEN director or FOB targeting officer, was whether to re-engage the target.

As in all SF operations, the team was the main asset available to the FOB commander. Additional assets include Civil Affairs teams-alpha, tactical Psychological Operations teams



and other units that serve as enablers to SF team operations.

The FOB 12 battle rhythm included at least three EBT meetings weekly. Two of these were EBT working groups in which the participants discussed ongoing operations and presented targets for development. The third meeting, the EBT board, held Friday, provided an update on current targets and nominated new targets for approval.¹¹

FOB 12's OPCEN configuration included one to two AOB area-support teams per 12-hour shift. The teams were responsible for tracking all approved or pending AOB/SF team operations for their respective area and assisting in recording the effects achieved. The AOB area-support teams' understanding and familiarity with an AOB's operations permitted the FOB targeting officer to focus on managing the EBA process and developing ETOs rather than managing all targeting and effects. Normally the effects discussed by the teams at the targeting meetings were related to a particular target and ongoing operations. AOB and SF team commanders were responsible for conveying their view of the battlespace and effects-achieved through their daily reports and their assessments of the unconventional-warfare operations area, or UWOA.

FOB 12's OPCEN also included a PSYOP NCO as the principal PSYOP planner, as well as a planner dedicated to CMO. The PSYOP and CMO planners provided the expertise needed to synchronize and plan CMO and IO. The PSYOP planner worked closely with the CJSOTF-A and JTF 76 IO planners to develop products, disseminate approved products and messages to the AOBs and SF teams and assist in developing product-dissemination methods to support the EBT process. The CMO planner worked closely with the CJSOTF-A and JTF 76 CMO planners and assets to ensure that AOB and SF-team tactical CMO projects



▲ **HIT THE BOOKS** SF Soldiers give school supplies to children in an Afghan orphanage.

were properly resourced and executed.

The format for the EBT working group meetings included a review of all outstanding tasks supporting the development of previously nominated targets, followed by a review of all active targets and the nomination of new targets. During the discussion of the active targets, the S2 briefed any changes or updates to the target's IPB. The S35 (FOB targeting officer) discussed the concepts of operation, or CONOPs, and operations (either ongoing or pending approval) and reviewed any effects measured from previous operations. During the discussion of nominated targets, the S2 provided IPB based on available information, the individual nominating the target presented a draft of the desired effects, and the group developed a preliminary course of action for target execution. Before the next EBT working-group meeting, a modified plans cell consisting of the S2 and S35 would refine the target's IPB, establish desired effects, and

determine realistic MOEs. The FOB 12 EBT coordination board followed a similar process, the exception being that nominated targets were subject to approval by the OPCEN director or the FOB commander. The three weekly EBT meetings gave FOB 12 the ability to balance current and future operations and allowed time for subordinate elements to produce the necessary reports. Throughout the EBT process, the targeting-cell participants worked to allocate or marshal resources to support the courses of action required to achieve the desired effects.

The FOB EBT cell focused its efforts solely on identifying patterns and trends of HPTs and tracking the effects of operations on those targets. The patterns and trends identified by the targeting working group assisted the commander in achieving a broader understanding of the tactical situation and allowed him to provide appropriate tactical guidance. AOB and SF team commanders captured the effects of their operations in the daily situ-



▲ **LOCAL INTERACTION** By maintaining a routine presence and interacting with the populace, SF Soldiers help to win popular support for the government. Interaction can also yield information on insurgent activities.

ation report and the monthly UWOA assessment report. Another role of the FOB targeting cell was to identify assets, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; CMO or PSYOP, that would be required to assist in engaging the targets and to coordinate the allocation of those assets to the particular target.

Example of the process

Over the course of several weeks, an active improvised-explosive-device, or IED, cell began conducting IED attacks in Area A. Based on the commander's guidance, the goal was to disrupt the IED cell by increasing force-protection measures, to disrupt the insurgents' ability to influence stability operations, and to improve local security.

The S2 conducted an IPB analysis

on the area to determine the command-and-control structure, identify potential cache sites and obtain an understanding of the insurgents and their tactics. During its next meeting, the working-group nominated the IED cell as a target and discussed IPB. Based on that discussion, the group developed a draft version of the desired effects, MOEs, assets or products required, and additional tasks. Before the next meeting, the S2, S35 and other staff members worked to refine the desired effects, MOEs and lethal and nonlethal methods of disrupting the IED cell. They brought that information to the EBT coordination board for approval and for allocation of assets. The working group developed several concepts for the target: conducting security patrols in Area A to disrupt the cell's

sanctuary, coordinating assets to pave the roads in the area to decrease the effectiveness of IEDs and developing IO products the populace could use to report IED activity and information on known members of the IED cell.

With the FOB commander/OPCEN director's approval and directives, the working group began coordinating the operations to disrupt the IEDs. The ETO included the IPB from the EBT working group, the commander's intent, the desired effects, MOEs and assigned tasks for the AOB. After analyzing the ETO, the AOB commander assigned appropriate tasks to the SF teams, who developed CONOPs for their operations. During the course of AOB and team operations, the EBT working group tracked the operations and reports regarding the IED-cell target and provided target updates.

From the AOB and team reports, the working group compiled the achieved effects and listed them as either effects favoring coalition forces, effects favoring insurgents or effects requiring additional review for determination. The process enabled the targeting cell to provide immediate analysis to the FOB commander.

Clearly defined desired effects and MOEs were crucial to FOB 12's process. The desired effects and MOEs discussed in the example are typical of FOB 12's EBT process. The MOEs focused on quantifiable events to determine the effectiveness of an operation rather than leaving the determination to a subjective interpretation.

UWOA assessment

In addition to daily reports, FOB 12 required each AOB and SF team to submit a monthly UWOA assessment report. The report, a snapshot of the current situation, included information on threats to the Afghan government and coalition forces; insurgent TTPs; and assessments of the local government, local villages, Afghan National Army units, Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Police. The UWOA assessment reports were a modification of the UWOA assessment report included in FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*.¹² The UWOA assessment reports were useful in determining the results of operations and identifying areas previously overlooked that required guidance from the FOB commander. An important benefit of the UWOA assessment reports was the use of the reports for measuring effects and trends over a period of time.

An area not specifically addressed in the Joint Forces Command EBA doctrine was a measure for an effectiveness-deficiency analysis.¹³ Measure of performance, or MOP, evaluation requires a comparison of tactical tasks assigned to tactical tasks conducted. The MOPs are then compared to the MOEs, and an analysis of the

deficiency can help the commander guide the EBA process. Because of the way FOB 12 conducted its EBA process in managing effects vs. a target, this method would have been difficult to implement. FOB 12 simply did not have the manpower or staff depth to follow such a system; however, linking and comparing tasks accomplished to effects accomplished can be beneficial for an FOB commander.

FOB 12's EBA process worked extremely well given the conditions and tactical scenarios of OEF-Afghanistan, and it greatly assisted in the synchronization of operations. The process allowed the FOB 12 commander to adapt and to seize a great number of opportunities for maintaining the initiative and controlling of operations within his assigned AO. The EBA process aided the FOB 12 commander in providing assets and guidance at the proper time to focus the combat operations of his subordinate AOBs and SF teams. An effects-based approach to operations greatly enhances an SF unit's ability to synchronize lethal and nonlethal operations and achieve the desired outcome on the enemy. **SW**

Notes:

¹ United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)* (Norfolk, Va.: Doctrine and Education Group of the Joint Warfighting Center, 2004), 2. Since FOB 12 developed its EBO process, the U.S. Joint Forces Command has developed a follow-on publication to describe EBO processes in greater detail. The updated publication is United States Joint Forces Command, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, 24 February 2006.

² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, 1-1.

³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, 2.

⁴ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Forces Command Glossary" 12 November 2004,

<<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>> (12 November 2004).

⁵ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Forces Command Glossary" 12 November 2004, <<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>> (12 November 2004).

⁶ While it is not entirely consistent with the format used by FOB 12, the U.S. Joint Forces Command provides an additional example of an ETO in Appendix B of *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* (2006).

⁷ U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1994), 1-6 to 1-9 and 3-9.

⁸ U.S. Army FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, 1-7 to 1-10, 1-21 to 1-24, 3-15 to 3-21.

⁹ U.S. Army FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 2003), 1-3 to 1-6.

¹⁰ Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War* (New York: Time Warner Book Group, 2002), 334-38, 344.

¹¹ Forward Operating Base 12, *Operations Order for Operation Enduring Freedom VI* (2004).

¹² U.S. Army FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 3-1 and G-1 to G-5. FM 3-05.201 provides an outline for a UWOA assessment. FOB 12 used that format with the content manipulated specifically for OEF-A IV as a means of developing its monthly UWOA assessment report.

¹³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (EBO)*, III-10.

Captain Darrell Carr served as the FOB 12 targeting officer for 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, during Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan VI. He is currently serving as an SF A-detachment commander. His other assignments include Field Artillery officer in the 10th Mountain Division and the 25th Infantry Division. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in civil engineering.

THE CHANGING FACE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Training Today to Meet Tomorrow's Requirements

Story by Major Elbert "Buck" Ross

At no point in recent United States military history has there been a greater need or a greater demand for Civil Affairs, or CA, personnel. That need manifests itself clearly in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the need for and impact of CA operations extends far beyond the borders of those two countries and far beyond the limited spectrum of combat operations.

CA operations contribute to the success of every major command and extend from Colombia to Kenya to Yemen to the Philippines, spanning the entire spectrum of military operations. Combatant commanders in every theater of operations have developed an extraordinary appreciation for the direct contributions that CA Soldiers have made to their mission success.

The explosive demand for greater numbers of CA personnel finds its genesis in the operational needs and requests from ground commanders. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, has met the challenge of providing competent, capable CA personnel by implementing the most extensive transformation of the training process in CA's history.

In order to appreciate fully the evolution of the CA training pipeline, it is necessary to summarize that training as

it was conducted in the past. The following discussion will focus first on

the former four-week Civil Affairs Officer Course, or CAOC, which was the standard until the transformation.

The four-week CAOC consisted of 169.5 academic hours. The course-module breakdown (p. 17) shows the allocation of 58 training hours to CA critical (core) tasks, followed by 31 hours devoted to general subjects. The core and general-subject task training at that time included the basics of conducting CA operations; specific CA activities; concepts, principles and methodology of CA; and mission planning. Of the 58 hours allocated to core tasks, nearly 20 percent (11 hours) was devoted to training on legal issues.

Students also received 18 hours of training on political-military factors. The potential impact of CA personnel on U.S. political interests in any given operational area made it essential for CA officers to have a basic understanding of international affairs and the various factors that must be considered during an analysis of any region of interest. Additionally, the introduction to political-military factors also provided the CA officer with exposure to concepts and considerations involved in the interagency process and in the development of national strategies for a given country or region.

Finally, the field training exercise, or FTX, conducted during the early stages of the CA course differed significantly from the current one. Ten years ago, the FTX was five days long, executed in large part during a regular eight-hour work day, with comparatively unrealistic scenarios and assessments. That is no longer the standard.

In December 2004, the United



States JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, approved a new program of instruction, or POI, that laid the foundation for an extensive revision of nearly every aspect of what is now the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC. The objective of the new POI was twofold: (1) to enhance the learning curve of the terminal learning objectives and tie those directly to the specified, clearly articulated critical skills; and (2) to develop a training program that would afford students the opportunity to put into practice all the operational doctrine and theories taught during the CAQC. The bottom-line analysis is that the new course is designed to form a “bridge” from doctrinal concepts to on-the-ground application in CA operations. The CAQC now provides continual reinforcement of CA activities, methodology and mission-planning through practical exercises, and it provides the common thread of operational planning and considerations throughout the course.

A comparison of the POI for the nine-week CAQC to that of the four-week CAOC shows that not only have the contact hours more than doubled (from 169.5 hours to 426.8) but also that the content and focus of the training have been significantly expanded.

A curriculum-review board, or CRB, preceded the creation of the new POI. The CRB identified 22 Civil Affairs critical tasks that receive 88.6 hours of instruction. More importantly, those skills are continually reinforced through practical exercises, as well as by execution and evaluation during the FTX. The Civil Affairs critical-task list now provides an articulation of performance standards for each skill level. The task list delineates every function and capability that will be expected of Soldiers in Civil Affairs units.

The CAQC also has a greatly enhanced introduction to political-military factors, foreign policy and the entire interagency process, instead of the former cursory overview. The former Regional Studies Course has been transformed into the Advanced Regional Analysis Course, which provides CA officers with in-depth, graduate-level study of the entire spectrum of the national elements of power, collectively referred to as DIME (diplomatic, informational, military and economic). The foundation that Soldiers receive


Civil Affairs Officer Course POI

	<i>Four-week CAOC Hours</i>	<i>Nine-week CAQC Hours</i>
CA Critical Tasks	58	88.6
General Subjects	31	26.4
Political-Military Factors	18	40.2
Field Training Exercise	40	120.2
Administrative Time	22.5	7.8
Adaptive Thinking and Leadership		108.2
Digital Training		35.4
Total Hours	169.5	426.8

in the CAQC establishes a new standard for CA personnel regarding their understanding of the dynamics that must be considered in analyzing any potential area of operation.

The nine-week CAQC puts into practice several significant initiatives. Three of the most noteworthy initiatives are the introduction of a module focused on adaptive thinking and leadership, or ATL; the incorporation of cultural role-players to the culmination exercise; and the integration of NCOs to serve on teams with the officers during the FTX.

The ATL module is designed to train, develop and evaluate CA Soldiers’ abilities to (1) maintain situational awareness while under duress, (2) develop interpersonal skills in order to negoti-



ate or mediate more effectively within an operational environment, and (3) provide the student with feedback and an assessment of his or her individual personality traits. The CAQC administers the Test of Attentional and Interpersonal Style to all students. A trained behavioral psychologist provides students with feedback on their strengths and weaknesses. That feedback may contribute to more effective decision-making or leadership on the student's part during the remaining training. More importantly, however, this knowledge of traits and characteristics that previously may have been unknown to the students may prove even more important to them as CA Soldiers at a more critical time later on.

Second, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, has expanded the degree of training realism to an unprecedented level. SWCS has used local role-players effectively for many years in support of numerous training programs, and local role-players still provide significant support to the CAQC, as well as to many other SWCS courses. However, the introduction of "cultural role-players" as a new element within the culmination exercise has contributed to the relevance and efficacy of the culmination FTX.



▲ **STRAIGHT TALK** Civil Affairs Soldiers participating in the CA Qualification Course FTX interact with cultural role players in a variety of scenarios that call for cultural understanding and diplomacy. *Photo by Janice Burton.*

In the past, students could interact with the role-players under any circumstances. Now they must contend with the possible inability to communicate with the "locals" because of language barriers; they must acquire trustworthy translators for their particular area of operations; and they must make allowances for cultural sensitivities and norms that may not necessarily favor U.S. personnel. The cultural role-players currently in use

are from Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East. They bring with them a wealth of experiences and observations that have contributed profoundly to the comprehensive training the CAQC provides. The CA students must now contend with many unexpected issues their predecessors were spared, and very often, they learn lessons the hard way.

Finally, one of the most significant



changes to the CAQC is the return of the NCO. Prior to the establishment of Civil Affairs as a branch, officers and NCOs attended a joint CAQC, forming teams for the culmination exercise. With branch status, the CAQC became an officer basic course. The establishment of the 38B military occupational specialty, or MOS, required a new course for the NCOs — the 38B NCO Military Occupational Specialty Training Course, or MOS-T.

The MOS-T, a critical link to the

ate will have the requisite proficiency in CA specific skills to successfully conduct CA operations.

Once the officers and NCOs merge as teams for the FTX, each team conducts its infiltration, completes the Soldiers Urban Reaction Facility, or SURF, exercise — the situational awareness/behavioral assessment portion of the ATL — and mission-planning isolation before entering the culturally- and operationally-based FTX scenarios.

from the CAQC will have the requisite skill, competency and adaptability to conduct successful civil-military operations as part of any team, on any front. From comprehensive cultural training, to the operational understanding and application of the national elements of power, to fully integrating staff operations at every level, the CAQC has taken unprecedented steps toward producing the most capable Civil Affairs Soldiers ever. **SW**

“We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight.”

overall CA transformation, is a six-week, branch-qualifying transition course specifically for prospective CA NCOs. The first iteration of the MOS-T was conducted in September 2005; it is now in its third iteration. Initially, the MOS-T was conducted separately from the CAQC; however, it became clear that there was substantial value-added by integrating the NCOs and officers as cohesive teams during the FTX. That interaction helps develop the team mentality in training that Soldiers will need to build while operationally deployed.

The end result is a significantly refined MOS-T that provides the same operational foundation for NCOs that the officers receive during the CAQC. Specifically, the new MOS-T gradu-

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the following observation, which is the cornerstone of not only the CAQC transformation, but of the ongoing transformation of all special-operations forces:

“We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight.”

The CAQC transformation ensures a rigorous, realistic and operationally-focused training program for every Civil Affairs officer and NCO. The skills the course teaches and continuously reinforces have been meticulously selected to ensure that every Soldier graduating

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


UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

EDITOR'S NOTE:

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AND WHY WORDS MATTER

STORY BY MAJOR D. JONES

One of the greatest contributions special-operations forces, or SOF, bring to interagency efforts is their ability to work by, through and with indigenous forces. However, the confusion over the doctrinal definitions for unconventional warfare, or UW, and foreign internal defense, or FID, continues to cause misunderstanding among SOF and interagency organizations. While this debate has been ongoing for more than 50 years, the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, has muddied the waters even more in its search for a means of defeating asymmetric threats.

SOF operators define UW in different ways. At one end of the spectrum are those who define UW as everything SOF do, regardless of the type of mission — it's all unconventional. Somewhere in the middle, Soldiers define UW as any operation in which SOF are conducting operations by, through and with indigenous or surrogate forces. At the other end of the spectrum, some will define UW as SOF's support to an insurgency. The last definition is actually on-target, but the doctrinal UW definition found in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, does not support that answer. JP 1-02 defines UW as:

Military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and often more direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence gathering and escape and evasion.

With such a broad and vague definition, it is no wonder there is so much confusion.

The epitome of a clear definition is the definition of FID. JP 1-02 defines FID as, "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency." JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, divides FID

into three types of support: indirect, direct (not involving combat operations) and combat support. JP 3-07.1 notes, "These categories represent significantly different levels of U.S. diplomatic and military commitment and risk."

Unlike the FID definition, which is clear in its meaning without any other context, the UW definition requires context for proper understanding. This context comes from the paragraphs that normally follow the UW definition in the joint and Army SOF, or ARSOF, doctrinal manuals that describe UW in detail and list its seven phases. From that context, we can form a question that will help us clarify the definition: Which of the seven phases of U.S.-sponsored UW has SOF been conducting in Afghanistan and Iraq — preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, combat operations or demobilization?¹ This question should help to end debate over the first two UW definitions given above: "Everything SOF do," and "By, with and through operations." Those who would try to cram SOF's current efforts of counterinsurgency, or COIN, into the "combat operations" phase should remember that COIN is a component of FID, not of UW. The answer to the question is that SOF are conducting FID.

It is hard to believe that the definitions of UW and FID, arguably the key missions of SOF, could be so completely opposite in clarity. Clinton J. Ancker III, director of the Army's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, stated in a 2005 briefing on doctrine imperatives, "If you spend more than 30 seconds debating what it means, it isn't clear enough for users."

SOF has been debating UW for more than 50 years with no more clarity. The same issue haunted the fathers of SOF, Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann. Bank explained their frustrations: "Neither of us liked the fact that so much terminology was being bandied around concerning behind-the-lines operations. The terms unconventional warfare, clandestine operations, unorthodox warfare, and special operations were being used interchangeably."²

When Bank and Volckmann refined the mission statement for SOF, there

was only one mission, originally called special-forces operations, or SFO, which focused solely on supporting resistance movements. SFO were defined as "the organization of resistance movements and operation of their component networks, conduct of guerrilla warfare, field intelligence gathering, espionage, sabotage, subversion, and escape and evasion activities."³

Thus was born the SOF mission of supporting indigenous insurgencies behind enemy lines. FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare*, published in March 1955, replaced SFO with UW. This single mission lasted only through the 1950s. In early 1960, President John F. Kennedy added FID as SOF's second core mission. SOF's success with special reconnaissance and direct action in the Vietnam War added those two missions, as well. Thus began the muddying of the waters as SOF searched for relevance in the 1980s and 1990s.

The discussion of current UW and FID trends may provide clarity to UW and FID definitions in light of the GWOT, as well as provide context of why words matter by showing the transition between these two core missions during major contingency operations, or MCO. It might also help if we could create a clear definition of UW.

Unconventional warfare

The confusion over the meaning of UW is not new, nor is the idea of trying to clarify it. Numerous times during the last 50 years, studies have been conducted on UW, and despite these studies, the UW definition in the 1955 FM 31-21 is nearly indistinguishable from today's definition. FM 31-21 then defined UW as:

Operations ... conducted in time of war behind enemy lines by predominantly indigenous personnel responsible in varying degrees to friendly control or direction in furtherance of military and political objectives. It consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states.

The last detailed study of UW, conducted by the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, was called *UW 2020*. The study ended in the summer of 2001 after nearly three years of intense review



▲ **COFFEE TALK** A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier explains operational terminology to officers of the Senegal army in Thies, Senegal, in order to prepare the army for peace-enforcement operations in Sierra Leone. *U.S. Army photo.*

and debate.⁴ At the conclusion of the study, the Army Special Forces Command determined that to ensure SOF's continued relevance, UW should be adopted as an overarching term for all SOF missions. This seemed like a prudent measure, considering that with the end of the Cold War, there was serious doubt about whether SOF would ever conduct UW as originally defined.

All of these changes were implemented with good intentions to ensure SOF's viability long into the future of the still naïve pre-9/11 world. Colonel Michael Kershner highlighted why UW, as an overarching term, ensured SOF's niche, "By law, only the forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, are authorized to conduct UW."⁵ Unconventional warfare was to become a universal term for working with indigenous or surrogate elements in any type of environment that seemed to be "unconventional." Although cultur-

ally accepted by a majority of SOF, these findings never found their way into the doctrine because of the events of 9/11.

By the summer of 2003, nearly two years after the end of the UW 2020 study, SOF had successfully prosecuted two textbook UW missions in Afghanistan and in Northern Iraq. In both of these efforts, SOF's successful partnership with insurgents proved that the concept of UW as support to an insurgency is still valid and viable.

Foreign internal defense

Some find it hard to equate the current high-intensity environments in Iraq and Afghanistan to their idea of FID. For the most part, FID has been conducted during times of peace. However, high-intensity FID is not new, as any veteran of Vietnam or El Salvador can attest. When President Kennedy gave FID to SOF, UW and FID were two separate missions. UW was actions de-

signed to assist indigenous elements in overthrowing a government or removing an occupier, and FID was aimed at defending a government from those who are trying to overthrow it.

Where this difference between the two missions really became evident was in SOF's post-conflict performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the fall of Baghdad, the war seemed to be winding down. Since the general consensus was that the coalition would be welcomed as liberators, the main task was hunting down former regime elements. Within two months it was evident that the coalition was facing an increasingly effective insurgency that was producing politically significant casualties. It was not until the coalition determined that these enemy elements were not just "dead-enders or criminals" but organized insurgents, that it began to adjust the post-conflict strategy to include COIN.



▲ ON POINT U.S. Army special-operations Soldiers instruct members of the Armed Forces Philippines during a security-assistance training exercise. The training is designed to assist and advise Philippine forces in order to refine their counterterrorism capabilities. *U.S. Army photo.*

SOF were again in a doctrinal and operational predicament, having to refocus their search from former regime elements to the more widely supported and complex emerging insurgency. All elements of the coalition failed to realize that a fundamental shift in operations had taken place. For SOF, this meant that FID became the mission almost overnight.

Logical lines of operations

Some may ask why words matter as long as the SOF operators understand what they are supposed to be doing. The same group will also point out that tactics, techniques and procedures are similar in UW and FID. The problem is that UW and FID are completely opposite mission sets. This seems obvious now, but SOF have had to relearn this lesson while in combat. UW is conducted to overthrow an enemy government and FID to protect a friendly government. At the tactical level, the SOF

skills may seem similar in UW and FID, but that is where the similarities end.

During UW, the primary goal is to assist the insurgents in de-legitimizing the enemy government through subversion, sabotage and armed conflict. During FID, the goal is to protect and increase the legitimacy of the host-nation government. FID may include helping the government relieve grievances, providing sustained services and advising during security operations. Often security operations are more like police work than combat operations. To clarify these two opposites, it is necessary to have an understanding of the logical lines of operation, or LLO, for each mission.

LLOs are defined by Dr. Jack D. Kem as, “a cognitive operational framework/planning construct used to define the concept of multiple, and often disparate, actions arranged in a framework unified by purpose. ... All logical lines of opera-

tion should lead to the [center of gravity]”⁶ For example, the UW LLOs could be: gain popular support; gain international support; use information operations; organize insurgent underground political, operational and logistics infrastructure; and conduct armed conflict to de-legitimize the government. In this case, the center of gravity is the people. The end state would be the host-nation government overthrown and replaced by the insurgent political wing; the opposition defeated or minimized, and the country rebuilding as a viable state.

For FID, a good example of the LLOs are conducting information operations, conducting security operations, developing security forces, re-establishing essential services, developing government infrastructure and promoting economic growth. All of the LLOs are aimed at the center of gravity — the people. Like the insurgents, the government must gain its legitimacy

from the people. The FID end state is a “secure and stable environment ... maintained by indigenous ... forces under the direction of a legitimate national government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism.”⁷

Transition point

There is no discussion in doctrine of a transition between UW and FID. In fact, the idea that UW and FID are related has never really been articulated. In a major combat operation involving conflict and post-conflict

order to remain the state. The transition from the counter-state to the state corresponds to the transition between UW and FID, as well as the transition between conflict and post-conflict.

So what happens to the old state? At the time the old state becomes the counter-state it has two options: accept defeat or not. If it accepts defeat, then the post-conflict nation-building will occur much faster and with less turmoil, as in the case of Germany and Japan after World War II. If the counter-state does not accept defeat, then it

focused SOF’s continued efforts on hunting former regime elements or on other activities that were tangential or irrelevant to securing the state. The mindset was that the mission was not over until all of the key members of the former regime had been killed or captured. In Iraq, this focus was provided by the “55 most wanted” deck of cards. In Afghanistan, the hunt for Osama bin Laden and his associates continued unabated, with all efforts focused on him.

In both cases, our efforts were focused on individuals, with little regard

“By the time that SOF and the conventional military identified a transition to FID, the insurgency had already escalated.”

environments, there is an identifiable transition between UW and FID. It happens at the point when U.S. or coalition forces have removed the regime and become the occupying power or have installed an indigenous governing body, even if only for the interim.

SOF witnessed the transition from UW to FID in both Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this transition was indiscernible until it was too late, especially in Iraq. By the time that SOF and the conventional military identified a transition to FID, the insurgency had already escalated. Had this transition been identified earlier, counterinsurgency operations could have been conducted to disrupt the insurgency before the insurgents could gain the initiative.

This transition point can be modeled using the state vs. counter-state relationship.⁸ The state is the enemy government or an occupying power. The counter-state would be the insurgent elements, assisted by or operating in conjunction with U.S. forces, using military force to overthrow the regime or the state. The goal is either to remain or to become the state.

The transition point is the point at which the counter-state defeats the regime and becomes the new state. An important revelation for the new state comes at the transition point: The new state must immediately switch its mindset and tactics to protect itself in

begins using tactics appropriate to its capabilities, either political or military, or a combination of the two, to regain its state status. As William Flavin explains, “When the friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare.”⁹ The former regime elements in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan are examples of new counter-states that have not accepted defeat.

The confusion between UW and FID comes, much as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the U.S. and the coalition became the state prior to the end of major combat operations. Flavin explains that the transition point, or what he calls conflict termination, is “the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict.”¹⁰ In Iraq, after the regime was defeated, combat operations were still ongoing, but inadequate steps were taken to ensure that the U.S. and coalition protected the interim government and themselves as the state.

The fact that SOF never positively identified this transition and continued to conduct what they thought was UW, versus attempting to disrupt the budding insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, is important. The failure to identify the shift from UW to FID had a detrimental effect on U.S. stabilization operations. First, the UW mindset

for other, more crucial missions aimed at securing the environment and the state. This allowed the insurgents and foreign fighters to establish underground elements — command, intelligence, operational and support networks. The establishment of underground organizations allowed the insurgency to transition from a latent or incipient phase to the guerrilla-warfare phase.

UW, FID, GWOT

According to Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, UW has been identified as an important concept in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR.¹¹ If UW is going to be used to support insurgencies against rogue nations, then this finding is correct. However, if the QDR determines that UW will be used against nonstate actors, such as al-Qaeda, then the debate becomes more complicated.

The problem with this theory is that UW was designed for use against the government or occupying power within a state. Al-Qaeda is neither a state nor an occupier as of yet; it is better classified as a global insurgency. All these facts eliminate UW as the correct operation to be used in countering al-Qaeda or other nonstate actors. The “global” aspect of the insurgency does not support the use of FID as an overarching term, either. The effort to defeat a global counterinsurgency is beyond the scope of this essay.

UW and FID do have a place within the GWOT. UW is appropriate for operations against a rogue state or an occupied state transformed into a caliphate, like the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. If there is an existing radical fundamentalist insurgency or the potential for one within a country, then FID could be conducted to bolster the host nation's ability to counter that threat.

The use of other-than-U.S. forces or surrogates in operations against al-Qaeda cellular networks would more precisely be called direct action, special reconnaissance or counterterrorism. All of these operations can doctrinally be conducted with surrogate forces, but they are not UW or FID. This subtlety is another important aspect of why words matter.

Recommendations

First, UW should be defined as *operations by a state or nonstate actor to support an insurgency aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government or occupying power in another country*. As with FID, there would be three types of support: indirect, direct and combat.¹² This would make the definition of UW as clear as the current definition of FID and would finally end the confusion.

Also like the FID definition, the new UW definition would be universal. In other words, external support could be provided by Iran, Syria, China, Cuba, North Korea and even al-Qaeda, not only by the U.S. In fact, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's operations in Iraq were nothing more than al-Qaeda advisers conducting UW by providing training, advice, funding and a form of precision targeting — the suicide bomber — to the Sunni insurgents.

Second, UW doctrine should include the transition to FID as the final phase of UW. Post-9/11 UW operations validated the seven-phase concept of U.S.-sponsored insurgency. Obviously because of constrained time lines, many of these phases were much shorter than described in doctrine — days instead of months. But the final phase, now demobilization, should become a transition phase. Doctrine would thus call for SOF to begin shaping the environment



▲ **TAKE AIM** A U.S. Army special-operations Soldier gives a new recruit pointers at the Afghan National Army firing range in Kabul, Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo.

as combat operations end to ensure success in the post-conflict phase. They would identify potential threats, provide security and transition the insurgents into local militia units that would disrupt any attempts by former regime elements to establish an insurgent infrastructure. The UW-to-FID transition point should also be captured within UW and FID doctrine.

Third, core joint and service doctrinal manuals should describe UW in detail to ensure a broader understanding of UW throughout the military and government agencies. Currently, for example, UW is not mentioned in FM 3-0, *Operations*. Instead, support to insurgency, with no reference to UW, is described in a single paragraph under stability operations. The success of UW in Afghanistan demonstrated that SOF can perform economy-of-force operations by supporting insurgencies, the Northern Alliance in this case, and that these combined forces can conduct decisive offensive operations. SOF's UW efforts in Northern Iraq advising the Kurds also validated the concept of using insurgents to conduct shaping operations in support of

conventional forces.

Finally, if the statement by Whitman about UW's importance is prophetic, and UW becomes an overarching term for operations supporting insurgencies and operations against nonstate actors, then the confusion over UW will continue. A possible solution would be to define the UW and FID missions separately. The above-recommended UW definition could instead be used to define a new term, such as support to insurgency, or STI. The second operational term could be called operations against nonstate actors, or OANA, that could include all operations against a nonstate actor using surrogate forces or former members of the nonstate actor who have been turned and now operate for the government. Thus, STI and OANA would be clearly defined and retain separate lines of operations and doctrine to ensure clarity and understanding.

Conclusion

After 50 years of confusion, it is time for SOF to clarify the meaning of UW. Using our FID definition as a model of clearness and simplicity, we



▲ A TIME TO TALK A U.S. Army special-operations Soldier gives a class on self-aid and buddy care to a group of Free Iraqi Forces (FIF). U.S. Army photo.

should define UW in terms that leave no question as to its meaning. Based on SOF's current experiences around the world, the possibilities of conducting UW and FID — indirectly, directly or in combat — have never been greater or of more importance. The clear understanding of these two missions and of the transition between them will be critical for the most effective employment of interagency efforts within the GWOT and in future conflicts. **SW**

Editor's note: The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine has been working for more than a year to produce a more modern definition of UW as well as UW doctrine that reflects the current and future operating environment.

Recognizing that the UW definition was the key descriptive component necessary for writing new doctrine, SWCS purposely sought input and advice from key ARSOF leaders, including retired and active-duty general officers and serving field commanders. Throughout the process, several variations of a UW definition were developed and circulated

for discussion, with numerous changes being recommended by experienced, professional SOF personnel. As a result, the revised Special Forces definition of UW captures the key components of the joint definition listed in JP 1-02 and adapts to the changing nature of conflict.

The upcoming editions of FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces; FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations; and FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, scheduled to be published within the next few months, define UW as: "a broad range of military and paramilitary operations and activities, normally of long duration, conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and otherwise directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW operations

can be conducted across the range of conflict against regular and irregular forces. These forces may or may not be state-sponsored."

Notes:

¹ U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 2003), 1-11 to 1-17.

² Colonel Aaron Bank (ret.), *From OSS to Green Berets* (New York: Pocket Books, 1986), 166.

³ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁴ Colonel Michael R. Kershner, "Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations," *Special Warfare*, Winter 2001, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶ Dr. Jack D. Kem, *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, no publication date), 34-35.

⁷ Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirements for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, 7.

⁸ The state vs. counter-state theory was originally based on a presentation on the relationship between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent by Dr. Gordon McCormick, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Division, presented at the Unconventional Warfare Conference, August 2003, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. For further discussion of Dr. McCormick's "Diamond model," see Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendi's article, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare*, September 2005, 5.

⁹ William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, <http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03autumn/flavin.htm>, [accessed 24 August 2004].

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹¹ Ann Scott Tyson, "Plan seeks more elite forces for U.S. military," *The Washington Post* (24 January 2006), <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10995787/> [accessed 24 January 2006].

¹² Numerous discussions on this subject with Major Mark N. Grdovic, Fort Bragg, N.C., 2003-2005.

Major D. Jones is assigned to the 10th SF Group. His other SF assignments have included small-group instructor for the officer portion of the Special Forces Qualification Course, and assistant S3 and detachment commander in the 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group. Major Jones holds a master's degree in military art and science from the Command and General Staff College and will soon obtain a master's degree with a concentration in unconventional warfare from American Military University.

18Xs MAKE MARK

Initial-entry SF Soldiers earn praise of senior SF NCOs



ROAD TO SUCCESS Initial-entry Special Forces Soldiers, or 18Xs, complete a pre-Special Forces Assessment and Selection program to put them in top physical condition for SFAS.

Story and photo by Janice Burton

Since the inception of the 18X program in 2001, the initial-entry Soldiers who have won the coveted Green Beret have made their mark on Special Forces. The Soldiers, with an average age of 21, have won accolades for their willingness to learn, their dedication to duty and their maturity in the field.

"18Xs are motivated, eager to train and eager to deploy," said Command Sergeant Major Keith W. Kocher of the 7th SF Group. "They are in very good to excellent physical condition. The 18Xs are intelligent, quick to learn, can problem-solve and are creative. Their level of maturity is generally above the norm, and they are committed."

Kocher is one of many senior SF leaders who have high praise for the Soldiers who enter the service specifically to become Green Berets. But while they are proving themselves in the field, many myths and misconceptions are giving the program problems in garrison.

Perhaps the biggest misconception about the 18X Soldier is that the standards have been lowered in order to meet requirements to fill the force.

"The fact is that entry requirements are higher for 18Xs than in-service recruits. All students are held to the same high course standards," said Lieutenant Colonel David Fitchitt, secretary to the general staff at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. "18Xs are actually triple volunteers: They volunteer for the Army, they volunteer to become Airborne-qualified, and they volunteer to become Special Forces."

"Every one of the 18Xs I received either met or exceeded my expectations," said Sergeant Major Buzz DeGroff, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. "Overall, I am completely pleased with the program."

Soldiers who enter through the 18X program must complete basic training and Infantry advanced individual training. Prior to entering the SFQC, they must complete a pre-Special Forces Assessment and Selection program aimed at getting them in top physical condition. Upon completion of that course, they attend SFAS, and, if selected, they move on to a pre-small-unit tactics course designed to bring them up to speed on patrolling, team movement and weapons. Once they complete that phase of training, they move into the same pipeline as all other candidates.

Another misconception about the 18X Soldier is that he is a raw youth — barely out of his teens. The average age of the 18X Soldiers is currently 21. Following the implementation of a change in policy to raise the minimum age for 18X enlistment to 20, the average age will become 23. Many of the 18Xs have already completed a four-year degree, and some have "real world" experience — an 18X on one team was a history teacher prior to entering the Army, another worked in the computer industry after having earned a degree from a major university. A company sergeant major in the 10th SF Group noted, "The assessment of an 18X in our group is that he is very

mature, physically fit and disciplined. He is a very intelligent Solider."

The age factor lends itself to another misconception — that there is a huge disparity in an 18X Soldier's practical experience, maturity and skills of value to Special Forces. While the 18X Soldiers come to the teams with only their school-house training, the teams have found that the 18Xs have a desire to learn and seek out ways to gain more experience. "What they lack in experience they make up for with their desire to become a productive member of the detachment," said Command Sergeant Major Melvin L. Bynum, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group.

Team sergeants who have deployed with 18X Soldiers to Operation Iraqi Freedom have seen that motivation in action. "I had personal experience with an 18X in Iraq, and his performance was superb," said one SF team sergeant. "He was very motivated, quick to learn things he didn't know, in very good physical condition and very mature. He always demonstrated competence and courage."

The final misconception plaguing the program is that 18X Soldiers have a higher learning curve, when in actuality, the 18X only lacks about 18 months experience that most in-service recruits have.

"I can validate that the 18Xs are performing very well. One of my 18Xs was selected as the 1st Special Forces Group, United States Army Special Forces Command and United States Army Special Operations Command NCO of the Year. I have sent many 18Xs to numerous advanced-skill courses, and all have returned with success," said Command Sergeant Major Kurt D. Lugo, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group. "I received excellent reports from company sergeant majors and team sergeants on 18X performance, attitude, and their high level of motivation to succeed, along with their quick acceptance within the ODAs. Their performance and maturity is on par with in-service recruits."

While the 18X Soldiers are performing well in the field, the command is working to ensure that the force is not overpopulated with NCOs who, although qualified 18-series Soldiers, lack experience and knowledge.

In fiscal year 2005, Special Forces recruited 1,500 18Xs, in FY 2006 it brought the number down to 1,000, and in FY 2007, Special Forces will recruit 900. The reduction in numbers reflects the success of in-service recruiting by the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion: As the number of in-service recruits increases, fewer 18Xs are needed.

"The 18X Soldiers who successfully complete the SFQC join the SF ranks as valuable and productive members of the force," said Fitchitt. "Additionally, they have the potential for a significantly longer career on a Special Forces ODA than their in-service-recruited peer. Based upon their high quality and the historical results of the previous SF initial-accessions program, we expect to see some of the future senior NCO leaders in the SF community to have been recruited under the 18X program." **SW**



In the

In its effort to build a modern 21st-century fighting force, China has had its own revolution in military affairs that has touched almost every aspect of the armed forces. Chinese special-operations forces have been no exception.

Major transformations in China's elite special forces began taking place in the late 1980s and early 1990s.¹ The People's Liberation Army, or PLA, has concentrated on selecting the highest quality individuals within the military, providing them with the most advanced equipment available, and training them in a wide range of military disciplines. The PLA has placed a high degree of emphasis on the physical and mental abilities of the candidates: The training can be grueling, and those who are found to be unsuited are cut from the program immediately. The dropout rate during initial training is said to average between 50 and 90 percent.²

Within the military forces of the People's Republic of China, or PRC, there are many units that could be classified as "special forces." They include rapid-reaction forces, airborne divisions, amphibious landing units and marines. While these organizations certainly fit the category of special forces, for the purposes of this article, they will be considered to be large special-mission units and therefore not included. Instead, the focus here will be on smaller, more elite units tasked with unconventional or asymmetrical warfare.³

Two developments have provided excellent methods for separating Chinese special forces from the larger special-purpose components. The first development is a sharpening of doctrine regarding the special forces' missions. In *An Analysis of 20th Century Com-*

bat Theory, authors Chang Wanquan and Yu Guohua of the *People's Liberation Army Daily* provide a summary of the operating doctrine of PLA special forces. They note, "Special forces warfare includes detailed battle theories, such as special forces reconnaissance, attacks and sabotage, and comprehensive battle theories, such as integrated land-sea-air-space-electronic combat, all-dimensional simultaneous attacks, nonlinear combat, no-contact long-range warfare, asymmetrical combat, large-scale night combat and 'surgical' strikes."⁴

The second development is the adoption of code names to distinguish units, which is often done by select military organizations.⁵ The PLA has assigned at least one dedicated special forces unit to each military region.⁶ The size of the special-forces unit depends upon the military region. Units have been reported to range from battalion to division size.⁷

While Chinese special forces are designed to perform various operations, their two main missions are direct action and special reconnaissance. Direct action can be broken down into five categories: decapitation, harassment, security, terrorist response and rescue. (These are the author's categories, not the PLA's.)

Direct action

Decapitation. The decapitation strategy of Chinese special forces is to attack key personnel and control elements, leaving the enemy leaderless and unable to communicate.⁸ China's military has conducted exercises employing special forces using various modes of transport, such as helicopters and powered parachutes, to attack enemy command posts.⁹

While destroying enemy command-and-control elements is certainly not a new concept, it is possible that the PRC may add a new strategic wrinkle to the scenario in the event of conflict with Taiwan. The strategy would involve a pre-emptive strike against the Taiwanese civilian leadership prior to the outbreak of major hostilities between the two countries.¹⁰ There have been rumors that the PRC plans to infiltrate, or has infiltrated, special-forces units into Taiwan to capture or kill key government leaders. This would enable the PRC either to force the Taiwanese government to negotiate or to replace it altogether with a government more supportive of mainland China.

This decapitation operation could theoretically be accomplished in a short period of time, which could eliminate outside intervention and negate some of the problems associated with a force-on-force action.¹¹ It must be emphasized that this type of operation is dependent upon the PRC being able to stand up an alternate means of governing the country.

Harassment. Harassment activities are designed to inhibit the enemy's ability to operate, or as Jiang Jianxiong, the battalion commander of the Flying Dragons, phrased it, "To make the special forces battalion the 'eyes' of our side and a 'thorn' in the flesh of the other side."¹² These disruptions include sabotage of equipment and systems, attacks on vital civilian infrastructure, and ambush of military forces.¹³ Psychological operations may also play a part in the overall scheme, with special forces carrying out raids simply to cause fear and confusion behind enemy lines.

Security. Security operations include the shielding of air and naval

Shadow:

Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-Century Fighting Force

Story by Scott J. Henderson

facilities for follow-on forces after a strike.¹⁴ Special forces are also expected to be able to handle “sudden incidents” that occur within the country.¹⁵ An article written in the *People’s Liberation Army Daily* may provide a clue as to what sudden incidents entail. In the article, a military training department suggests, “The troops, key units, special forces, and emergency special safeguard detachments stationed in areas where natural disasters and violent terrorist activities happen frequently should conduct training in a selective manner, install a near-actual-combat situation, emphasize training in dealing with an emergency and effecting an emergency rescue, and improve their capabilities to cope with various sudden incidents.”¹⁶

Terrorist response. Terrorist-response activities have been noted beginning in 2002. The PLA has included antiterrorism as a part of its new training program for special-forces units and intends to make it an integral part of their future mission.¹⁷ On Jan. 4, 2002, it was reported, “A special forces regiment in the Chengdu Military Region known as the Hunting Leopards carried out an antiterrorist exercise for the first time.”¹⁸ Links between this unit and the People’s Armed Police, or PAP, cannot be ruled out because, historically, PAP forces have handled antiterrorist activities. From Aug. 6-12, 2003, Chinese special forces participated (with member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in Coalition-2003, a “multinational” joint exercise in antiterrorism.¹⁹ On July 15, 2004, the *People’s Liberation Army Daily* reported on a “multinational counterterrorism exercise,” consisting of combined-arms and special-forces troops, that was carried out in the Xinjiang Military District.²⁰

Rescue. Rescue operations range from securing the release of hostages to searching for and retrieving downed pilots. In 1999, the Beijing, Jinan and Shenyang military regions carried out a consolidated training exercise that included hostage and battlefield rescues.²¹

Special reconnaissance

An article in the *Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching* provided a generic description of the special-reconnaissance mission of Chinese special forces:

*During wartime, special forces usually send small teams deep behind enemy lines to collect and monitor enemy information in regions that are of concern to their headquarters and provide urgently needed information. In war, special forces can carry out strategic, campaign and tactical-level special-reconnaissance missions, and through special reconnaissance, they can obtain relevant data on the weather, hydrological and geographical features of specific regions. Special reconnaissance includes actions such as target search, area evaluation and verifying the effects of a strike. Special forces use reconnaissance by combat and monitoring techniques similar to those used by long-range monitoring units. However, more often than not, more advanced technology is used in special reconnaissance.*²²

China’s special forces use “triphobious” (sea, air and land) means of infiltration to conduct short-term and sustained reconnaissance behind enemy lines, using digitized battleground monitors and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to relay information back to their command units.²³

Training for PLA special forces is exacting and can be quite dangerous. Safety is not emphasized as it is in

the West; on the contrary, it appears to be a source of pride for the Chinese to train their troops under hazardous conditions.²⁴ The majority of training for PLA special forces takes place in one of three categories: infiltration, mountain training, or wilderness and survival training.

Infiltration training

The ability to infiltrate undetected behind enemy lines is one of the most essential skills required for China’s special forces. While little is known about the actual training methods, Chinese special forces are said to undergo “highly intensive and comprehensive multi-course training in complex terrain, including in-depth infiltration and ‘covered reconnaissance’ behind the enemy line.”²⁵ The Chinese use a “three-dimensional” “all-weather” infiltration approach, using sea (submarine, high-speed ferry, open-water swimming and scuba diving), air (airborne, powered parachute and helicopter) and land (long-distance movement and rock climbing).

Sea infiltration. Sea training is known to comprise three elements: open-sea swimming, sea demolition and sea shooting.²⁶ “During sea training [special forces] are tested to their physical limit conducting dangerous and difficult courses, including a 10,000-meter (approximately 6.2 miles) swim, a nighttime swim in full gear, diving, underwater transport and survival drills on islets.”²⁷ Infiltration by submarine is also a common method of insertion in which trainees may perform various missions, such as clearing away underwater mines.²⁸

Air infiltration. In parachute training, the PLA has “effected a gradual transition from using multi-type para-



Fierce Tigers
of the Northeast
SHENYANG MILITARY REGION



Sword of Southern China
GUANGDONG MILITARY REGION



Falcons of the Southwest
CHENGDU MILITARY REGION

chutes and planes to armed parachuting in mountain areas and over waters from both high- and low-altitude insertion.”²⁹ One of the unique infiltration methods devised by the PLA for penetrating enemy lines is the use of powered parachutes and paragliders.

Land infiltration. In various exercises, special forces have been able to penetrate through defensive positions that use night-vision equipment, noise- and motion-warning systems, anti-infantry radar systems and other high-tech warning equipment.³⁰ The penetration techniques used by the units, the conditions under which the exercises were carried out, and the exact type and age of the detection equipment are all unknown.

Mountain training

With a majority of special-forces training focusing on cross-Taiwan Strait confrontations, the mountainous terrain of Taiwan takes on a special significance. Taiwan is divided north to south by a central mountain range that covers 2/3 of the northeast.³¹ The ability to operate in this type of environment is vital, considering that during the early 1990s Taiwan constructed hardened underground shelters capable of protecting at least 1/3 of the country’s fighter aircraft from direct missile attack.³² It is almost certain from the words of the PLA special forces commander, Jiang Jianxiong, that his forces train for this type of operation. He advocated “attacking the enemy’s hangars and caves housing their aircraft” as a new tactic.³³

China routinely trains in a variety of mountainous areas said to offer extremely harsh conditions. The Chinese have conducted combined-arms and individual soldier training from around 12,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level. Training and testing included:

- The use of heavy equipment, determining its maximum speed and climbing capability at different altitudes, in various types of terrain and under different climates.
- Maximum rate of fire and range of fire of different weapons.
- Long-range raids lasting up to four hours, followed by extended periods of work in altitudes approximately 16,400 feet above sea level.³⁴

(Note: Taiwan’s highest peak is just under 13,000 feet. Mountain ranges in Tibet and Central Asia are much more consistent with the training range listed above, offering insight into other possible areas of operation, such as Tibet.)

Special forces mountain training includes: hostage rescue, battlefield

rescue, ammunition transport, passing through minefields, and first aid. Special forces have also been known to train in the use of armored vehicles, tanks and armed helicopters.³⁵

Wilderness/survival training

Wilderness and survival training is conducted in the Luliang Mountains, located in western Shanxi province. The training area was selected for its “all-weather environment, sparse population, high mountains and dense forest.”³⁶ The training consists of a seven-day course. Students learn to catch wild pigs, snakes, fish, birds and insects; to gather flowers, plants and fruits; to find, extract and purify water; to conserve water and prevent dehydration; to make fire by many means; to make shelters and resist rain and insects; to make winter clothing using on-site materials; and to recognize and apply medicinal herbs to wounds.³⁷

Special-forces equipment

Global Positioning System. A cell-phone sized GPS that works in conjunction with three Beidou (Chinese name) all-weather, all-time, regional (including Taiwan) navigational satellites and ground receiver stations to deliver positioning data that is accurate from 1-3 meters.³⁸

Video-voice-data headsets. In 2002, personal VVDH were introduced into select special-forces units.³⁹

Unmanned aerial vehicles. UAV model ASN-104 has been noted in training exercises, but it is reported that more advanced models are already in the field.⁴⁰ There have also been reports of hand-launched UAVs being used to support special forces and other small units.⁴¹

Trimaran Ferry. The Trimaran Ferry is envisioned as a high-speed transport that might be used in combination with UAVs and diesel submarines to assist special-forces units in invading Taiwan. While the ferry is not in the special forces’ current inventory, military sources have stated that they are considering adding it.⁴²

Night-vision goggles. While there have been numerous references to China’s special forces using NVGs in training and exercises, no specific model has been noted.

Low-light televisions. LLTVs are used for battlefield monitoring.

Powered parachute. The powered parachute is a triangular-shaped parachute that uses a motorized fan to provide self-propulsion. The parachute and fan can be mounted on a solitary jumper, a three-wheeled ve-

hicle or even a boat. In 2002, Beijing's China Central Television showed members of a special forces reconnaissance militia using ultralight trikes (a powered parachute with a three-wheeled vehicle attached) and an ultralight with a small rubber boat, similar to a small Zodiac, attached.⁴³

Zhanshen. A four-wheeled vehicle that is almost identical to the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle used by U.S. forces. The vehicle was developed by the Shenyang Aviation Company and was given the name zhanshen, or "god of war."⁴⁴

Firearms. The Chinese special forces were the first to be equipped with the 5.8 mm KBU88 sniper rifle.⁴⁵

Special-forces units

- *The Beijing Military Region's Recon and Strike Force.* This group is trained to assault airfields and to take out command-and-control elements using assault helicopters, powered parachutes, mortars and flamethrowers. The unit is known to target communications centers, radar systems and ammunition depots. They are considered to be endurance swimmers who are proficient at underwater demolitions and can pilot boats.

- *The Nanjing Military Region's Flying Dragons.* Established in late 1992, the unit conducts training said to be unconventional and carried out with "great intensity" under dangerous conditions.⁴⁶ In 1997, the unit carried out a simulated attack on a concealed enemy airfield in the Zijin Mountains of Nanjing. During the exercise, the group used UAVs to relay battlefield intelligence back to headquarters and assaulted the site using parawings and armed helicopters.⁴⁷

- *The Guangzhou Military Region's Sword of Southern China.* This group, comprising 4,000 soldiers, operates out of Qixi, in the Guangzhou Military Region.⁴⁸ Established in 1988, it is said to be one of the earliest groups formed after China began modernizing its military.⁴⁹ The unit is said to be a triphibious force capable of all-weather warfare; of carrying out long-range airborne operations; of underwater crossings; and of capturing beachheads.

Soldiers of the unit cross-train in 60 subject areas (individual subject areas are not referenced) of the Chinese navy and air force. The unit is trained in contingency operations and has carried out joint training in island operations with other branches of the military.⁵⁰ It is said that the unit has 400 personnel trained to fly aircraft, perform "stunt driving" and pilot boats.⁵¹

- *The Jinan Military Region's Black*

Berets/Heroic Falcons. The Heroic Falcons are trained in special reconnaissance and in triphibious warfare. The members of the unit work daily on upper-body strength and cardiovascular endurance. Soldiers must be able to run 3,300 meters (2.05 miles) in 12 minutes to pass, 3,400 meters (2.11 miles) in 12 minutes to receive a "good," and 3,500 meters (2.17 miles) in 12 minutes to receive an "outstanding." The unit's soldiers also practice Qigong, a Chinese form of martial arts and hand-to-hand combat.

- *The Shenyang Military Region's Fierce Tigers of the Northeast.* This is a marine special-forces unit trained to perform airborne and commando "SEAL-type" assault operations on airfields, command-and-control sites and radar-warning sites using powered parachutes and scuba equipment. Members of the unit undergo extensive survival training in jungle, desert, prairie, mountain and urban conditions.⁵²

- *The Chengdu Military Region's Falcons of the Southwest.* Established in 1992, this group uses high-tech equipment to carry out special combat reconnaissance. The unit has received numerous awards and was profiled in a documentary showing air-assault and forward-reconnaissance skills. The group is credited with attaining amazing results in four disciplines: reconnaissance, airborne insertion, surprise attacks and emergency evacuations.⁵³

- *The Chengdu Military Region's Hunting Leopards.* This unit carried out its first antiterrorism exercise in 2002 in the Xiling Mountains.⁵⁴ From available reporting, it is difficult to ascertain whether this unit is strictly military or has ties to the PAP.

- *The Lanzhou Military Region's Tigers of the Night.* Information on this unit is vague; reports offer only general references to a "certain" special-forces unit located in the Lanzhou Military Region being involved in various types of activities. "North Education," an online site sponsored by the Tianjin Education Committee, references a dedicated special-forces unit in the Lanzhou Military Region and talks about the unit's participation in Estonia's "ERNA" special-forces competition. However, the article does not give any background, the unit's mission or the unit's code name.

- *The Daggers* (military region unknown). This amphibious unit, formed in 2001, is described as "one of the ace cards" for dealing with Taiwanese independence. In 2004, the unit carried out a mock exercise involving the capture of a coastal island in which the unit set up an "electronic interference system," followed by the arrival

of armed helicopters and airborne troops. The unit destroyed the island's airport, oil-storage facilities, command center and ammo dumps. The island was then secured for follow-on forces by removing the enemy's biological and chemical weapons.⁵⁵

Threat analysis

Although it appears that China's special forces are still in the early stages of their development, it would be a mistake to dismiss their capabilities. The PLA began by selecting the most experienced officers and cadre from PRC military forces (estimated to be well in excess of two million).⁵⁶ After establishing the groups, the PLA supplied them with the most advanced equipment available; vigorously cross-trained them in multiple disciplines; and pushed them to their mental and physical limits.

Training scenarios provide insight into the intended use of Chinese special forces. A large portion of the training focuses on skills necessary for infiltrating and invading Taiwan. The decapitation strategy, as applied to Taiwanese civilian leadership, whether or not it is truly a part of PLA strategy, presents two problems. First, like a bomb threat, it has to be taken seriously. Time and resources have to be allocated, and countermeasures put in place, to deal with the threat. Second, the decapitation threat places psychological pressure on the Taiwanese leadership.

If the decapitation strategy is indeed part of a PLA plan, why does the PLA conclude that it would be successful? One possible reason is that it senses a lack of resolve in the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan, and that a rapidly installed de facto government would be enough to deter U.S. interference. It seems unlikely that the U.S. would acknowledge a new government's legitimacy while Taiwanese forces were still actively engaged. However, it is possible that the PRC envisions that a large portion of Taiwan's military and civilian populace would not actively oppose the invasion, allowing the PLA to conclude operations before the U.S. had time to act militarily or politically.

Recent world events have raised other possibilities for employment of China's special forces. Is there a scenario in which China's special forces might use the decapitation strategy against North Korea? It is not in China's long-term interest to have an unstable nuclear neighbor. Should China decide to take matters into its own hands and resolve the situation,



Flying Dragons
NANJING MILITARY REGION



Recon and Strike Force
BEIJING MILITARY REGION



Heroic Falcons
JINAN MILITARY REGION

special forces could be used in the same way as we have envisioned them in Taiwan.

The other party that would stand to benefit from a stabilized North Korea would be Russia. Last year, China and Russia held a joint exercise on the Liaoning Peninsula.⁵⁷ Some have speculated that the exercise was related to the Taiwan anti-secession law and designed to place greater pressure on Taiwanese separatists not to move forward. However, the Liaoning Peninsula is located directly across the Yellow Sea from North Korea.

Chinese special forces also present a serious threat to Taiwan's undersea lines of communication. Internal and external communications would be vital for Taiwan in any cross-strait conflict. During the opening salvos, China would more than likely try to isolate the island, shutting off all contact with allies and the outside world. Deploying special forces by submarine would be an ideal method for sabotaging Taiwan's undersea fiber-optic cable system.

Analysts from the RAND Corporation make a particularly dire analysis of Taiwan's communications system in their book, *A Concept of Operations for a New Deep-Diving Submarine*. In the book, they caution:

A recent survey of the number of international submarine cables reaching Taiwan is particularly disconcerting. Four out of five undersea fiber-optic cables reaching Taiwan do so at either Fangshan or Toucheng (the fifth, a "self-healing loop" reaches Taiwan at both, meaning that both cables would have to be damaged for Taiwan to be cut off). ... In short, Taiwan's ability to send and receive data over submarine cables might be significantly impaired by an attack on cables leading into either landing area. ... This information may well have increased relevance in light of China's renewed emphasis on information warfare.⁵⁸

This information is particularly troublesome taken in concert with recent naval activities of Chinese surveillance ships. In August 2004, Taiwan's Prime Minister Yu Shyi-kun stated that Chinese surveillance vessels had made 21 attempts during the previous two years to map underwater terrain in the vicinity of Japanese waters. He further stated that there had been numerous intrusions into Taiwanese territorial waters. The prime minister suggested that these moves were in preparation for a possible conflict with the U.S. and that a fleet of submarines could cross the Pacific defensive line of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.⁵⁹ If submarines were used to transport

Chinese special forces to sever or damage these underwater communication lines, it could have devastating repercussions on the outcome of the war.

Given the numerous references to the use of powered parachutes in exercises, it is natural to wonder what risks they might present. Recent improvements in powered-parachute technology have reportedly given newer models the ability to fly up to 100 miles and carry payloads of at least 500 pounds. It is possible that powered parachutes could be air-dropped near target locations and guided in during night infiltration using GPS.⁶⁰ If so, it might put the Penghu Islands, a Taiwan-controlled island chain located approximately in the center of the strait, within range for China to pre-position special forces. Increased payload capacity would allow special forces to attach fairly large munitions to the undercarriage of the powered parachute and direct them to their target using remote guidance.

China's special forces seem to be well on their way toward becoming cohesive and competent units. Successive wins in international reconnaissance competitions show that they are mentally and physically tough, mastering many of the soldier skills needed in combat. The PLA is fully prepared to supply special forces with any and all training and equipment necessary for them to achieve high international standards. A line in the *Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service* sums up their potential capabilities, referring to them as: "fierce tigers on land, dragons at sea and falcons in the sky."⁶¹ **SW**

Notes:

¹ Shui Chih-shan, "China's Special Forces Are World-Class, with the Military's 'Elite Units' Specially Coping with Terrorist Acts," *Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching*, 16 February 1999, No. 317, 26-29, as translated by FBIS reference FTS19990223001835.

² Shui Chih-shan, "China's Special Forces Are World-Class."

³ Chang Wanquan and Yu Guohua, "PRC PLA Analysis of 20th-Century Combat Theory," *People's Liberation Army Daily*, 26 January 2000, 5, as translated by FBIS reference FTS20000225000004.

⁴ Chang Wanquan and Yu Guohua, "PRC PLA Analysis of 20th-Century Combat Theory."

⁵ Code names are not a perfect method for identifying units. In some instances, smaller sub-elements within special forces regiments will choose the name of larger units outside of their military region. For example, there are sub-elements within the PLA special forces that refer to themselves as "daggers," which has also been noted as a code name for a "Taiwan contingent" unit.

⁶ "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia," 3 August 2004.

⁷ "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia," 7 January 2005.

Virtual instructors lead transformation of NCO Academy

By Command Sergeant Major William Eckert

In May 2005, Major General James Parker, commander of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, met with the commandant of the SWCS NCO Academy to discuss the future of the NCO Academy and its relationship to the training of NCOs in Army special-operations forces. General Parker's guidance was clear: leverage and exploit technology; develop a method of instruction that will minimize the operations tempo for SF Soldiers attending the SF Advanced NCO Course, or ANCOC; develop solutions that can be implemented without increasing manpower; and ensure that training remains relevant.

The NCOA commandant and First Sergeant Terry Sanchez, the first sergeant of SF ANCOC, immediately began analyzing the course content of SF ANCOC. Their analysis defined the difference between training and education: Training is the venue by which NCOs learn the mechanics of a skill set; education is the use of knowledge in the employment of the mechanics of a skill set. Following their analysis, the commandant and first sergeant developed courses of action for meeting General Parker's requirements: instructing SF Soldiers not stationed at Fort Bragg via video teleconferencing, or VTC; reducing SF ANCOC from 10.3 weeks to 7.2 weeks by removing redundant instruction; and

changing the student-to-instructor ratio from 14:1 to 20:1. These changes will increase SF ANCOC's annual throughput from 480 to 800 in fiscal year 2006 and to 880 in FY 2007. The increase will allow the NCO Academy to support the Band III expansion of the SF groups and is being accomplished with no increase in the number of NCOA instructors.

Unlike standard VTC systems, the NCOA's VTC system uses network-conferencing software to transmit and receive instruction. The software was designed for conducting meetings, but through additional technical input and experimentation, the NCOA developed a system, which it calls "network facilitated teaching," that matches the quality of more expensive VTC systems.

The transformation of the SWCS NCO education system has made SF ANCOC less technically-based and more leadership-based. ANCOC now emphasizes the SF common-core subjects NCOs will need as SF detachment operations sergeants, including military-management templates, to manage Soldiers, training and resources in the preparation and employment for combat. SF Soldiers learn the supervisory roles of their SF specialty, as well as the management and planning templates, during the military occupational specialty, or MOS, phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course. MOS subjects evolve faster than the SF com-

mon-core subjects. Understanding this, SF is prepared to accept the greatest change in the MOS area in order to maintain relevance.

The instructors applied the same analysis to other courses taught by the SWCS NCOA. The NCOA is also responsible for teaching the Psychological Operations ANCOC and the PSYOP Basic NCO Course, or BNCOC, and in August 2006, it will begin conducting BNCOC and ANCOC for active-duty Civil Affairs Soldiers. Following the lead of the SF ANCOC, the PSYOP and CA BNCOC and ANCOC will also refine their methods of instruction.

Technology will have its greatest impact in the integration of the Battle Staff Noncommissioned Course, or BSNOC, with the PSYOP BNCOC. The integration is based upon emerging requirements identified by the commandant of the NCOA, Command Sergeant Major Carney of the 4th PSYOP Group and Sergeant Major Beidleman, chief instructor at the SWCS NCOA. The combined course, scheduled to begin in January 2007, will train PSYOP NCOs to perform division-level staff-planning functions normally done by officers. Combining the courses yielded 582 hours of training — an increase of 233 hours over the standard BNCOC. Using distance-learning technology and refining the program of instruction, the NCOA reduced the training time to 501 hours. In the future, the NCOA hopes to teach an additional 50 to 72 hours of common-core training through distance-learning methods to reduce the amount of time that a Soldier would have to be away from his unit and his family. Once the pilot PSYOP combined course has been validated, the NCOA plans to implement the same changes for the CA courses.

The NCOA is also explor-

ing the feasibility of conducting some courses in an online-studies format. By March 2007, SF ANCOC common-core instruction will be available in two phases: nonresident and resident. The nonresident phase will consist of the unclassified portion of the SF common-core subjects; the resident phase will consist of one week of classified instruction, one week of an operations staff exercise and two weeks of SF MOS training. To enroll in the online studies program, Soldiers will have to be staff sergeants who either have two years' time in grade or who have been selected for promotion to sergeant first class. Once enrolled, they will have one year to complete the nonresident phase and must complete it before they can be scheduled for the resident phase.

In summary, the NCOA fully supports asynchronous training initiatives while keeping up with the high pace of transformation and the changing battlefield. New training concepts will make it possible for students and instructors to be in different places at different times. The virtual instructor will be able to support a greater number of students and will be able to answer questions in a timely manner. Technology will create a reach-back capability for former students who need current information or assistance. In an age when obtaining and managing information is critical, the SWCS NCOA is leveraging technology to support our Soldiers in their missions. Through all this, the NCO Academy abides by the motto, "Not just doing the same thing better, but doing things in a better way."

Veritas et Libertas! **SW**

Command Sergeant Major William Eckert is the former commandant of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School NCO Academy.

Enlisted

MSG selection board to convene Oct. 3-26

The Fiscal Year 2007 Master Sergeant Promotion Selection Board is scheduled to convene Oct. 3-26, 2006. Soldiers should consult MILPER Message No. 06-174, FY07 MSG Promotion Board Announcement Message, for information on being considered. A link to the message is posted on the Army Human Resources Command's Enlisted Selections and Promotions home page (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/select/Enlisted.htm#cp1>). The message provides details on eligibility criteria; zones of consideration; NCO evaluation reports; performing an electronic review of the enlisted record brief; communicating with the board; and updating the official military personnel file and official photo. At the HRC site, Soldiers can also review documents from the FY 2005 master-sergeant promotion board to gain a better understanding of the way board members determine the best-qualified SFCs for promotion.

Warrant Officer

Bonuses offered for new SF warrant officers

The Army continues to offer bonuses for Special Forces NCOs to become SF warrant officers, and it has increased the bonus available to NCOs who become SF warrant officers in the Army National Guard.

On June 1, the Army National Guard officer affiliation/accession bonus was increased from \$6,000 to \$10,000. The affiliation/accession bonus for SF warrant officer, MOS 180A, is available to National Guard NCOs in all SF MOSs who are selected for appointment as National Guard SF warrant officers. Eligible Soldiers will be paid the bonus when they complete their technical certification through the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course, or WOBC.

The critical skills accession bonus, or CSAB, for active-duty SF warrant officers will remain in effect until Dec. 31, 2007. Eligible warrant officers will be paid a lump sum of \$20,000 when they complete technical certification through the SF WOBC. The CSAB is available to active-duty NCOs, in grades E6 through E8, in all SF MOSs who have not more than 15 years active federal service and who are selected for appointment as warrant officers in MOS 180A.

SF NCOs and warrant officers who have questions pertaining to their eligibility for bonuses should contact their servicing career manager.

Officer

SF officers in YG 1999 need CFD preference

The Career Field Designation Board for officers in Year Group 1999 will convene Sept. 12-29, and eligible officers must submit their CFD preference by Aug. 11. Officers will receive instructions through their Army Knowledge Online e-mail account for submitting their CFD preference online. Instruction is also available at the CFD home page: https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/active/opfamdd/CFD_Upcoming_Boards.htm.

Special Forces officers who want to remain in the Operations Career Field (SF) should select "BR – Current Branch" as their first CFD preference. The policy of the Department of the Army G1 is that SF officers whose first preference is to remain in the SF Branch do not need to be seen by the board. SF officers who do not submit a CFD preference will be designated by the board according to the requirements of the Army. Officers may not appeal the designation of the board on grounds of an incomplete or missing preference statement.

NOT A GOOD DAY TO DIE:

The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda

One of the primary reasons the United States Special Operations Command was formed was to ensure unity of command. Yet more than 20 years later, unity of command remains a life-or-death issue. Sean Naylor describes the consequences of a lack of unity of command in his latest book, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda*. Unfortunately, Naylor's account of Operation Anaconda and his critique of special operations is incomplete and heavily influenced by sources who had their own biases.

Naylor's account begins in January 2002, when multiple intelligence sources indicated a significant al-Qaeda presence in the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan. At that time, Special Forces was running the show; however, the transition of central command to a conventional commander led to the development of an ad hoc organization, Combined Joint Task Force Mountain, to plan and conduct the operation. To complicate matters, the CJTF commander did not receive tactical control of the national units whom he would be fighting alongside, nor of the air assets assigned to those national units.

During operational planning, it was believed that there were no more than 200 to 300 al-Qaeda operatives in the area. In the opening stages of battle, troops encountered more than 1,000 al-Qaeda enemy troops who were prepared to stand and fight, not flee as predicted. Naylor describes how conventional and special-operations forces overcame the failure of intelligence with quick reaction and courage. His use of firsthand interviews with conventional units shows the reader the difficulties faced by troops trying to execute a flawed plan.


Naylor spends only nine pages on the final 11 days of the battle. Although he states the operation was "winding down," unclassified Air Force after-action reports show that from March 4 through March 15, the Air Force dropped more than 3,000 bombs in pre-planned and emergency close-air-support missions.

Not a Good Day to Die contains

passages that seem biased against the Navy's special operators. Analyzing the fight at Takur Ghar, Naylor wonders why the SEALs did not communicate with the AC-130 circling overhead. Without assessing the capabilities of a six-man unit to break contact long enough to use a radio, he states, "[P]erhaps because they [the SEALs] spent so much time in the water, SEALs were not as obsessive about radio communications as Army special operators." This observation is clearly the result of sources who know little about Navy special warfare. The ability to communicate in close combat requires time to ignore the immediate threats to your life. Although Naylor was unable to interview any Navy personnel involved in the battle, he could have made a better assessment of the situation by asking a simple question: In a similar fight, how long did it take the Rangers' quick-reaction force to call for air support? Instead, Naylor makes an unsubstantiated observation about the entire NSW community.

When Naylor discusses TF-KBAR, a special-operations task force composed mainly of SEALs and a few foreign special-operations units, he states "[M]any, especially those in the Army, worried about Navy operators being thrust into extended land operations." When the reader refers to the endnotes to see the support for this passage, the citation reads, "a K-bar is a knife particularly popular with sailors." Because Naylor's coverage of operations after March 5 lacks depth, he also leaves out any mention of TF-KBAR's successes. But TF-KBAR later received the Presidential Unit Citation for its work in Afghanistan, including Operation Anaconda.

Naylor is trying to accomplish for Afghanistan what Mark Bowden did for Somalia, but there are significant differences in the research, balance and documentation of the books. *Blackhawk Down* was written five years after the fact, the Somali conflict was over, Bowden had access to the tapes of airborne video feeds and radio transcripts, and he had interviews with many special opera-



DETAILS

By Sean Naylor

New York:
Berkley Books, 2005
ISBN 0-425-19069-7.
425 pages. \$24.95.

Reviewed by:

Lieutenant Rafael E. Duyos III, U.S. Navy
SEAL Team Eight

tors and even some Somalis. Naylor's book was written two and a half years after the fact, while the conflict was still ongoing, and he was denied access to personnel for interviews needed to balance the book. Naylor depends on unnamed sources for all the controversial material in his book. To his credit, Naylor was embedded with conventional units that participated in the battle and was able to walk much of the ground. However, his in-depth knowledge of these units unbalances the book.

The book could have been better with a more detached assessment of the situations and the players. That would have left Naylor more time to assess the framework these Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines were forced to deal with under enemy fire. The fact that he did not means we will have to wait for the balanced and complete account of Operation Anaconda. **SW**

NARCO-TERRORISM:

A United Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace

In his book, *Narco-Terrorism: A Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace*, Douglas J. Davids presents an analytical study of narco-terrorism — a term he defines as: “terrorism that aims to protect and support the activities of illegal drug traffickers” and “terrorism by organizations that use the financial profits of narco-trafficking to support their political, religious or other goals.”

Davids shows how revenues earned from the sale of illicit drugs on the international market have financed insurgencies, terrorist organizations, and recognized enemies of the United States. He uses seven case studies to identify the relationship between the worldwide use of illegal drugs and financial support for internationally recognized terrorist organizations.

Davids argues that contemporary drug eradication and interdiction efforts have failed because of a lack of international cooperation for any counternarcotics plan; a strict interpretation of national sovereignty that prevents country-specific law-enforcement agencies, or LEAs, from pursuing escaping narco-traffickers into neighboring countries; and a flawed approach that overemphasizes the role of LEAs and restricts the use of military forces.

To overcome these shortfalls, Davids presents a “unified strategy” that is based on four pillars: education, extradition, a specialized force and civic action. Davids argues that most Americans are unaware that profits from the sale of illegal drugs finance the activities of international terrorist organizations and insurgencies. He recommends that members of the U.S. public be educated about the connection and held accountable for their actions. Failure to comply with U.S. drug laws, he argues, should then result in the extradition of “drug distributors, dealers, or repeat offenders” to those foreign nations affected by narcotics-funded insurgencies or terrorist organizations.


The plan’s third pillar — focused specifically on Latin America — calls for the creation of a “specialized

force” composed of special-operations forces from the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Accompanying this multinational force, or MNF, would be a cadre of legal experts to conduct arrests and provide legal advice. According to Davids, the MNF would operate under U.N. jurisdiction and would be led by the Organization of American States. The MNF would be used to “attack, first, the command and control structure of the drug cartels, and second, the active narco-traffickers.” Davids admits, “in countries such as Colombia, where both the guerrillas and the right-wing paramilitary are already deeply involved in drug trafficking, fighting with both insurgents and paramilitaries would be inevitable.”

The fourth pillar of Davids’s unified strategy is civic action. He argues that providing peasant farmers with the means to plant and cultivate legal crops is not enough: The social conditions of regions affected by the drug trade must be socially and economically transformed. This, Davids believes, could be accomplished by providing those areas with basic services, such as running water and electricity, and, by investing in the social and economic development of those regions.

Narco-Terrorism is a well-researched and interesting study. Davids delivers an analysis that is informative and contemporary, if not controversial. However, as with any solid performance, there are always some areas that can be improved.

The use of the MNF raises numerous questions. First, Davids alludes to the fact that the Western Hemispheric states constituting the MNF would be “more likely” to share intelligence. However, he does not address the difficulties associated with sharing intelligence with foreign nations, nor does he prescribe a means by which this could be accomplished. Consequently, the reader is left with the impression that allied members of the MNF would simply share intelligence based on interpersonal relationships and camaraderie — a possibility that



DETAILS

By Douglas J. Davids

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Reviewed by:

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AF Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

would give personnel assigned to any special-security office sleepless nights. Second, Davids’ assertion that the MNF would wind up fighting narco-trafficking organizations would likely dissuade most Latin American militaries from contributing forces to the MNF. Furthermore, logistical and manpower constraints, as well as political considerations, would also be likely to discourage Latin American leaders from contributing military forces. Third, Davids does not address MNF financing. Although the U.S. would likely foot a large percentage, it should not be responsible for assuming all the costs, which would probably be astronomical.

Despite the above critiques, Davids turns in a solid performance that is sure to provoke debate among scholars and military personnel alike. *Narco-Terrorism* is a timely work that confronts a policy issue placed on the back burner far too long. **SW**



Photo by Janice Burton

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