Special Warfare

SFQC Phase II:
Building the SF
Warrior

From the Commandant

One of the most dramatic changes in the transformation of the Special Forces Training Pipeline has occurred in Phase II of the SF Qualification Course. During SF Assessment and Selection, which we discussed in the last issue of *Special Warfare*, we select students who have the requisite physical and mental attributes for success in SF training and operations — the "whole man." During Phase II, we begin the training they will need to be effective members of SF detachments.

Phase II has always concentrated on small-unit tactics, but now it includes other combat skills, too — hand-to-hand combat; marksmanship; and SF tactics, techniques and procedures. The demand for SF Soldiers has increased, but we are committed to maintaining our standards, which requires us to train smarter. Accepting the challenge, Phase II cadre members in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group developed a modular system that not only allows us to train greater numbers of Soldiers but also includes lessons learned from current operations and gives more instructor attention to the students. Close association with these veteran SF operators is a significant factor in the students' development of a warrior mindset and the instillation of the SF core values.

Other changes to Phase II instruction include the addition of a two-week block of language training. It is imperative that our SF soldiers learn to communicate with the populace of the regions in which they will operate. It has always been the hallmark of SF Soldiers that they possess warrior skills and cross-cultural communication skills, as both are necessary in the performance of SF missions. Warrior skills, alone, will not be enough for SF Soldiers who need to work by, with or through indigenous forces or who need to train host-nation forces. They must have the language skills and the cultural sensitivity that will allow them to communicate and build rapport with members of other cultures.

As trainers, we have a duty to prepare our SF Soldiers for the demands of the battles they will face — and they almost certainly will face them, most within six months of graduation from the SFQC. The changes in Phase II training have been made possible through the innovation of the NCOs in the cadre. Students need to learn to analyze problems, adapt, and solve the problems innovatively, and the cadre has set an example for them to follow.

Major General James W. Parker

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SFQC Phase II: Building a Warrior

by Major Jonathan A. Blake

The transformation of the Special Forces training pipeline is affecting virtually all areas of the training, from selection to graduation. If the newly designed Special Forces Selection and Assessment, or SFAS (Phase I), is designed to select a candidate who is as strong physically as he is mentally — the "whole man," then Phase II is designed to train that man as a "whole warrior."

It is during Phase II that the NCOs of Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, build the foundation of combat skills that are essential for every Special Forces Soldier. The NCOs focus on how to increase the lethality of each Soldier, viewing the individual not as a repository of basic skills, but as a weapons platform — one that can function well with any weapon, whether it's his hands and feet, a knife, a stick, a pistol or a rifle. The goal is not only to develop essential physical skills and teach tactical drills, but also to instill in Soldiers the mindset and the core values that are required of every Special Forces

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In the February 2005 issue of Special Warfare, *Lieutenant Colonel David P. Fitchitt's article, "Raising the Bar: The Transformation of the SF Training Model," gave an overview of the transformation of the SF training program. This is the second in a series of articles examining the individual aspects of that transformation in greater detail. — Editor*

Warrior. In truth, the shaping of the mindset is as important as the development of a Soldier's combat skills. It's this warrior-oriented perspective that prepares a Soldier to function as an entry-level operator on an SF detachment.

Phase II did not always have this warrior focus; however, the growing demand for SF Soldiers on today's battlefield has brought about changes not only to what is taught in Phase II, but when and how often it is taught.

In August 2004, Phase II Class 04-04, the largest in the history of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, arrived at Camp Mackall, N.C. The class — 458 students in all — was 33-percent larger than the previous class and more than double the size of other classes taught during 2003 and 2004. The sheer amount of logistics and personnel support needed to accommodate larger classes was one of three factors that prompted the cadre to change the way the course is conducted.

The cadre had only 16 team sergeants available for training Class 04-04's 458 students. Generally, Phase II maintains a 1-15 instructor-to-student ratio, which would would require 30 15-man student detachments for Class 04-04. In order to accommodate the high number of students and maintain training quality, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group tasked 14 SF NCOs from other battalions within the U.S. Army SF Command and the JFK Special Warfare Cen-

SFQC Phase II training builds the combat skills that are essential for the Special Forces Soldier. It places equal emphasis on instilling the SF core values and the warrior mindset, both of which are needed for successful SF operations.

ter and School to serve as temporary cadre members for two months, bringing the instructor-to-student ratio to an acceptable level. In addition to the need for instructors, resource requirements for transportation, mess, training areas, ranges, classrooms, time to train Soldiers and ammunition increased greatly. If the larger classes were to continue, the increased costs across the board would make it unfeasible to run Phase II training on a quarterly basis.

Acknowledging that in light of the current global situation, the larger classes are here to stay, the NCOs of Company C looked at developing a better way of training Soldiers to the standard, and in the quantities that the SF Regiment needs. Sergeant First Class Frank Enriquez, one of the cadre team sergeants from the 7th SF Group, was the first to express the idea of dividing the program of instruction, or POI, into five six-day blocks and assigning each block to a specific cadre group.

First Sergeant Steve Davidson picked up on Enriquez's idea, comparing it to the way the business world deals with the same issue of increasing throughput while maintaining quality. Davidson said, "In every case where production needed to be increased while maintaining the same quality, yet without increasing support, the companies always turned to specialization as the answer."

Davidson, and later First Sergeant Bob Johnson, led the cadre of Company C in a mission analysis to identify a modular course of action. The modular training concept was later briefed to the 1st Special Warfare Training Group commander, Colonel Manuel Diemer, and, after his approval, to Major General James W. Parker, the SWCS commander, who approved the concept for execution.

The innovative change to the training schedule was driven by necessity. The SF NCOs within Company C creatively solved the problem of quantity vs. quality while minimizing the requirements for personnel and logistics.

Another factor besides cost — relevance

U.S. Army photo

of the POI — led to changes in Phase II instruction. From 2002 until 2003, instruction was oriented primarily on conventional small-unit tactics, using the infantry squad and Army Field Manual 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, as a model. The POI focused almost exclusively on an ambush based on techniques from the *Ranger Handbook*, with limited attention devoted to marksmanship and to platoon operations. This focus, although essential, had become the whole of Phase II, to the exclusion of any training that might better prepare Soldiers for operating as part of an SF detachment on today's battlefield.

The final factor for making the changes to Phase II training is the reality that all of the graduates of the SFQC will see combat. Most graduates are being deployed within 180 days of being assigned to an SF group — some deploy in as few as seven days. Moreover, many of the SFQC students are not former combat-arms personnel, which means that Phase II may be the first time that they fire a weapon, fight as an individual, conduct battle drills, conduct a patrol or experience close-quarters battle. These conditions made the question of training priority crucial and led to the addition of new skill sets in Phase II.

Historically, Phase II was taught from four to six weeks, once a quarter, and it covered small-unit tactics. In the past, the curriculum also included survival skills, land navigation and fieldcraft. Phase II is now broken down into five six-day blocks of training, called "modules." One set of five modules, called a "track," covers all of the material in the Phase II POI. Company C teaches five tracks per quarter, or 20 tracks per year.

Each Phase II module focuses on specific critical tasks, with one group of five to

Subject/Track Training Calendar

WEEK	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
MOD 1	Common Task Training		Light Infantry Tactics/Battle Drills/Small Unit Tactical SOP Training			
2	TLP/WARNO	TLP/WARNO	Cadre-Led Ambush		Cadre-Assisted Ambush	
3	SUT FTX 1			SUT FTX 2		Recovery
4	SF Tactics Classes	ABN INFIL	Special Forces Tactics FTX			
5	M-4 Marksmanship		Advanced Marksmanship M-4/M-9/Barricades/Transition		Basic MOUT/Simmunitions CULEX	

CLASSROOM/Team Room   RANGE   FIELD TRAINING

During Phase II, Soldiers learn principles of ambushes, patrolling and SF core tasks. During a field-training exercise in Module 4, they learn to adapt those principles to the constraints of an asymmetrical environment.

seven cadre members assigned the responsibility for conducting the module of training. In other words, it is training by a committee that specializes in certain skills.

Module 1. Module 1 trains Soldiers to perform SF detachment-level battle drills (react to contact, break contact, make a team attack), tactical standard operating procedures (linear danger areas, patrol bases, halts, etc.), movement formations and techniques and hand and arm signals. This module also introduces the sequence and mechanics of reconnaissance and ambush operations.

Module 2. Module 2 builds on the tactical base of knowledge students acquired during Module 1, including troop-leading-procedures. Through cadre-led exercises, students learn to plan and execute reconnaissance and ambushes, then they are repeatedly drilled in the execution of those operations during cadre-*assisted* exercises.

Module 3. In Module 3, the entry-level SF Soldiers are trained through multiple field-training exercises, or FTXs, that ensure that they have demonstrated warrior skills, can apply the principles of patrolling commensurate with their rank and experience, and can plan and execute a portion of a combat or reconnaissance patrol while in a leadership position.

Module 4. Soldiers learn the "conventional tactical box" during the first three modules, repetitively drilling the ambush, reconnaissance and team-level standard operating procedures. During Module 4, they learn to modify the principles of patrolling in order to compensate for a lack of resources, time or personnel.

In this module, students perform their first tactical airborne combat-equipment infiltration as member of an SF detachment, jumping into a tactical FTX. During the FTX, they are introduced to selected SF core tasks and supporting missions (direct action, special reconnaissance, and recovery of a cache or of personnel) in a time-constrained, asymmetrical environment that is designed to force them to analyze and solve problems.

Students are given the freedom to fail and a chance to learn from their mistakes. Adversity has always been the best teacher: Rarely do people really learn when a task is too easy or simple for them — they most often learn the hard lessons from their mistakes. That's the opportunity they're afforded in Module 4 — the challenge to accomplish a mission without all the assets they need or have grown used to.

U.S. Army photo

Phase II emphasizes the combat skills and the warrior ethos that Special Forces Soldiers will need as a member of a Special Forces detachment.

It's their plan, and they execute it. Later, cadre members coach them through what they did well and how they can become better, more efficient and more lethal.

Module 5. During Module 5, they capitalize on those lessons. Training in this module focuses on building marksmanship and getting the Soldier to the point at which he's safe and confident with his organic weapons systems. Students shoot an average of 340 rounds of 9 mm ammunition and 760 rounds of 5.56 mm over a six-day period, building from basic combat marksmanship to transition drills to basic close-quarters battle. Every student will become proficient in M-9 and M-4 marksmanship and be able to qualify with both weapons systems.

Students also learn to safely execute combat marksmanship tasks and to move as a member of a team in an urban environment. Training introduces students to basic tactics of military operations on urban terrain at the SF-detachment level: single-team, single-room clearing; movement through streets and intersections; hallway and stair movement; rudimentary building-climbing; and strong-pointing buildings.

Overall, our future Special Forces Soldiers now shoot more rounds and spend more time in the field during Phase II than they ever have in the history of the SFQC. But the change in Phase II training is not one merely of numbers: The beauty of the modular system is that it establishes the conditions for student success in a variety of ways. First, the system dramatically reduces the class size, thereby reducing the weekly requirements for all resources. Secondly, it enables the cadre to become true subject-matter experts. Whereas the cadre had previously been responsible for all 35 days of training, the cadre team sergeant for each module is now responsible for six days and can produce a more detailed and thorough training module for his students.

The system also lends itself to more accurate reviews of a Soldier's performance, because more than one cadre member trains and observes each Soldier. This gives a more fair and balanced appraisal of a student's overall performance.

Moreover, the cadre has designated Sunday as the day for the student detachments to train and rehearse SOPs, to recover, and to address training deficiencies on their own, under the guidance of the student tactical adviser counselors, or TACs, for their specific track. This allows the seasoned TACs to truly get to know each detachment — their strengths and weaknesses — and then

U.S. Army photo

Phase II students now fire more rounds of ammunition than they have in the history of the SFQC.

address them on the spot with corrective training. All of these efforts translate into a foundational course that produces entry-level SOF warriors at the standard and in the quantity that the SF Regiment requires.

Future SF Soldiers are not being trained simply to "survive" on today's battlefield; they are being trained to dominate it — both militarily and politically — and to possess the savvy to leverage the conditions made available to them to achieve our nation's goals in ambiguous environments. They must have a collection of foundational combat skills, such as conventional small-unit tactics, SF tactics, hand-to-hand-combat skills and combat marksmanship, to get them there, but just as important is the warrior ethos that will enable them to function as a member of a team in an elite brotherhood. ✄

Major Jonathan A. Blake has been the commander of Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, since 2003. In 1989, while assigned to the 20th SF Group as an SF engineer sergeant, he graduated from the University of Maryland at College Park with a bachelor's in English. Later, he enlisted onto active duty with the 10th SF Group at Fort Devens, Mass., and was assigned to Company B, 3rd Battalion, as a engineer sergeant. He graduated from Officer Candidate School in 1994 and was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division as a rifle and scout platoon leader. His most recent assignment was with the 2nd Battalion of the 7th SF Group, where he served as commander of SF ODA 744 from 2000 to 2002, and as chief of current operations during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Understanding Training, Transformation and Warfare

By Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

As the JFK Special Warfare Center and School works to meet the challenges of Army transformation and to support the Global War on Terrorism, we must remember that our number-one priority is training Soldiers for war — that is non-negotiable.

We must never underestimate the enemy when preparing our Soldiers for war. We face a formidable opponent who uses up-to-date technology, is highly mobile, is very selective in his recruiting

CSM Dave M. Bruner

efforts, is flexible and adaptive, and has shared beliefs and values. We must clearly understand that the enemy is patient and that he can and will use any means necessary to attack United States forces, interests, allies or coalition partners. The enemy will employ a variety of tactics, including military operations, economic strategies, Internet chat rooms, news articles, radio and television broadcasts, and diplomatic pressure. Discontented groups, such as al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, will make any sacrifice in pursuit of their goal, which is to take away or destroy our freedom, our ideals, our way of life and our nation.

The threat we face on today's battlefield compels us to make changes immediately. Throughout its history, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has adapted its training methodology many times to defeat our nation's enemies. SWCS must continue to change rapidly, incorporating new ideas and lessons learned into training that will empower the Soldiers we train to win the Global War on Terrorism. We need cadre members who are adaptive, who understand and support our transformation initiatives, who can keep pace with technology and who are aware of the changing battlefield. Our training in tactics, techniques and procedures must adapt quickly to remain relevant to our changing enemy. I charge everyone assigned to SWCS to continue to look at the way our Soldiers will fight, both now and in the future, and to execute change. If SWCS cannot adapt as quickly as special-operations forces change the way they fight on the battlefield, we may become irrelevant. We must work now to find innovative solutions; we cannot be held back because we fear leaving our comfort zone regarding the way we train Soldiers. We cannot take a "time out" or use peacetime processes for change — *we are at war*!

Veritas et Libertas! ✄

Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner is the command sergeant major for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Military Cultural Education: Necessary Part of Soldier-Development Programs

by Colonel Maxie McFarland, U.S. Army (ret.)

Over the past decade, the Army has increasingly engaged in lengthy overseas deployments in which mission performance demanded significant interface with indigenous populations. The way that interface affects military operations is important. In fact, engagement with local populaces has become so crucial that mission success is often significantly affected by Soldiers' ability to interact with local individuals and communities. Learning to interact with local populaces presents a major challenge for Soldiers, leaders and civilians.

Lengthy deployments to areas with other cultures are not new. Since the end of World War II, the Army has experienced many long-lasting operations on foreign soil. The Army attempts to instill in deployed forces an awareness of the societal and cultural norms of the regions in which they operate. While these programs have proven useful, they fall far short of generating the tactile understanding necessary for today's complex settings, especially when values and norms are so divergent that they clash.

Working with diverse cultures in their home element is more a matter of finesse, diplomacy and communication than of the direct application of coercive power. Success demands an understanding of individual, community and societal normative patterns as they relate to the tasks Soldiers perform and to the environment in which the tasks are performed. Cultural education is now necessary as part of Soldier- and leader-development programs.

During the Persian Gulf War, the United States demonstrated an awareness of cultural issues and the way they affect military operations. The potential for friction and a clash between ideas, behaviors, values and norms led to adjusting paradigms for cultural engagement. For example, the significant differences between U.S. and Saudi Arabian cultures caused active isolation of U.S. troops from the population. The risks posed by differing or competing cultural norms were too great to overcome.

Cultural friction is certainly a more complex issue today than it was in the past. During the Cold War, a bias existed on the part of nations wishing to align themselves with either the East or the West. Siding with one or the other was necessary in a bipolar world in which the major powers' ideologies competed through aligned or nonaligned states. Nations sought identity by becoming more like the Big Brother of their choice.

The end of the Cold War forced a new paradigm on prevailing ideas of national identity. States, individuals and societies felt free to reconnect with their own cultural and social norms. In addition, U.S. and Western economic and cultural values overshadowed those of societies based on more traditional or religious values. This basic competition of cultural norms resulted in a retreat from Western values in many regions of the world, becoming a source of friction rather than a means of achieving common understanding.

The emerging importance of cultural identity and its inherent frictions make it imperative for Soldiers and leaders — military and civilian — to understand the societal and cultural norms of populaces in which they operate and function. They must appreciate, understand and respect those norms and use them as tools for shaping operations and the effects they expect to achieve.

Defining culture

The first step in solving any problem is to define it. Defining

Understanding and respecting the importance of the village elder in countries such as Afghanistan helps special-operations Soldiers in performing their various duties. Here, Major Wes Parker, 486th Civil Affairs Battalion, greets an Afghan village elder prior to entering the village to give medical care and food assistance.

"culture" usually consists of describing origins, values, roles and material items associated with a particular group of people. Such definitions refer to evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate.[1]

Everyone has a culture that shapes the way they see others, the world and themselves. Like an iceberg, some aspects of culture are visible; others are beneath the surface. Invisible aspects influence and cause visible ones.

Ethnography, a qualitative research method that anthropologists use to describe a culture, attempts to fully describe a cultural group's various aspects and norms. The intent behind military cultural education is to help Soldiers be more effective in the environments in which they must function. They must be culturally literate and develop cultural expertise in specific areas and regions. When balanced with study in potential areas of application, proficiency in cultural literacy and competency aids the understanding of cultural factors in areas of operations.

Literacy, competency

Our cultural background is one of the primary sources of our self-definition, expression and relationships within groups and communities. When we experience a new cultural environment, we are likely to experience conflict between our own cultural predispositions and the values, beliefs and opinions of the host culture.[2] Cultures

often experience alterations in cultural identity (which might create significant insecurity in both interacting cultures), and in values (which might result in an adversarial relationship).

Culturally literate Soldiers understand and appreciate their own beliefs, behaviors, values and norms, but they are also aware of the way their perspectives might affect other cultures' views. Achieving self-awareness of our own cultural assumptions enables us to use this understanding in our relations with others.

Cultural competency, which is more than just a framework for individual interaction, is necessary for managing cross-cultural or mixed-cultural activities of groups, organizations or communities. It demands a more in-depth and application-oriented understanding of culture than cultural literacy requires. Competency is demonstrated through organizational leadership capable of crossing cultural divides within organizations and establishing cooperative frameworks between communities and groups from different cultures. Competency is about building successful teams with a common vision, effective communications and acceptable processes that benefit from cultural diversity.

Military leaders are trained to make decisions rapidly, with little time available for discussion, debate or consideration of dissenting views. Events involving potential destruction or violence demand one-minute managers or leaders, but making quick decisions entails rapidly obtaining key facts and essential information, internally processing them and then choosing and implementing an appropriate course of action.

Encouraging participation of a variety of people in all activities is difficult against this backdrop.

Delegation members from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States meet at a remote site just inside Pakistan to discuss issues affecting border security in the region. Border security is a critical issue that is affecting the stability of the region and the process of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Understanding the historic conflicts and tribal loyalties in these border regions is key in the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism.

However, encouraging participation is a key value in the framework of cultural competency. Recognizing differences as diversity rather than as inappropriate responses is a challenge in tactical and operational environments. Cultural competency accepts and creates an environment that allows each culture to contribute its values, perspectives and behaviors in constructive ways to enrich the outcome.

Cultural literacy is about understanding your individual cultural patterns and knowing your own cultural norms. Understanding the way your culture affects someone else's can profoundly affect chances for success. Military leaders have an additional challenge: They must understand and appreciate their own military culture, their nation's culture and the operational area's culture.

To effectively manage the dynamics of differences, leaders must learn effective strategies for solving conflict among diverse peoples and organizations. They must also understand how historic distrust affects current interactions, realizing that one might misjudge others' actions based on learned expectations.

Integrating information and skills for interacting effectively in various cross-cultural situations into staff-development and -education systems helps institutionalize cultural knowledge. Incorporating cultural knowledge into the mainstream of the organization and teaching the origins of stereotypes and prejudices also helps.

Diversity might entail changing the way things are done to acknowledge differences in individuals, groups and communities. One must develop skills for cross-cultural communication and understand that communication and trust are often more important than activity. Institutionalizing cultural interventions to solve conflicts and confusion caused by the dynamics of difference might also be necessary.

With the increase in coalition and multinational cooperative mil-

itary efforts, cultural competence is a critical leadership requirement. Stability-and-support operations demand adept leaders who can work with community, international and private organizations whose members come from widely divergent cultural backgrounds. The Army's description of the objective force describes the need for conventional forces with Special Forces qualities, including being culturally competent.

The Army has many programs that are designed to build cultural competency, including multinational and partnership training-exercise programs; liaison officers; foreign students integrated into leader-education and -training programs; and officer-exchange programs, to name a few. These programs are useful, but unfortunately, they are mostly crafted around educating the foreign student about U.S. cultural norms and operations rather than the inverse. Perhaps liaison officers could be charged with instructional duties, and exchange programs could bring more foreign instructors and experts into the school system.

A need for cultural literacy and cultural competency is clear, but it is also clear that the educational process for achieving both will take some time to establish. The key question is, Where do we start?

Cultural differences

Culture, which is learned and shared by members of a group, is presented to children as their social heritage. Cultural norms are the standard, model or pattern a specific cultural, racial, ethnic, religious or social group regards as typical. Cultural norms include thoughts, behaviors and patterns of communication, customs, beliefs, values and institutions.[3]

Culturally Literate Soldiers:

- Understand that culture affects their behavior and beliefs and the behavior and beliefs of others.
- Are aware of specific cultural beliefs, values and sensibilities that might affect the way they and others think or behave.
- Appreciate and accept diverse beliefs, appearances and lifestyles.
- Are aware that historical knowledge is constructed and, therefore, shaped by personal, political and social forces.
- Know the history of mainstream and nonmainstream American cultures and understand how these histories affect current society.
- Can understand the perspective of nonmainstream groups when learning about historical events.
- Know about major historical events of other nations and understand how such events affect behaviors, beliefs and relationships with others.
- Are aware of the similarities among groups of different cultural backgrounds and accept differences between them.
- Understand the dangers of stereotyping, ethnocentrisms and other biases and are aware of and sensitive to issues of racism and prejudice.
- Are bilingual, multilingual or working toward language proficiency.
- Can communicate, interact and work positively with individuals from other cultural groups.
- Use technology to communicate with individuals and access resources from other cultures.
- Are familiar with changing cultural norms of technology (such as instant messaging, virtual workspaces, e-mail, etc.), and can interact successfully in such environments.
- Understand that cultural differences exist and need to be accounted for in the context of military operations.
- Understand that as Soldiers they are part of a widely stereotyped culture that will encounter prejudices that will need to be overcome in cross-cultural relations.
- Are secure and confident in their identities and capable of functioning in a way that allows others to remain secure in theirs.

As individuals, groups and societies, we can learn to collaborate across cultural lines. Awareness of cultural differences does not have to divide or paralyze us for fear of not saying the "right thing." Cultural awareness puts a premium on listening and comprehending the intent behind others' remarks. Becoming more aware of cultural differences and exploring similarities helps us communicate more effectively.

With so many diverse cultures and the enormous amount of study required to become expert on any given one, how do we narrow the field to find the right focus for generating cultural skills in Soldiers? Certainly specific cultures repre-

sent states or groups that might be more likely to develop an adversarial relationship with the United States. Perhaps it would be best to learn more about states or cultures with whom we are most likely to form a coalition or participate in a multinational campaign. Unfortunately, history demonstrates the uncertainty of predicting where, when and with whom Soldiers might be required to operate. Of course, this would not rule out the need to study high-probability cultures. Adopting an approach, at least initially, oriented toward some foundational cultural norms, with broader application across a wider range of settings, might prove to be more prudent, however.

Foundational norms

Foundational cultural norms are normative values and factors having the greatest effect on military operations and the relations of Soldiers with the populations they encounter. Researchers identify four cultural syndromes — complexity, individualism, collectivism and tightness — that are patterns of beliefs, attitudes, self-definitions, norms and values organized around some theme that can be found in every society. Using cultural syndromes as a frame of reference, we can develop foundational normative values having common application across all cultures, which should provide the starting point for a cultural education program.

Cultural norms are often so strongly ingrained in daily life that individuals might be unaware of certain behaviors. Until they see such behaviors in the context of a different culture that has different values and beliefs, they might have difficulty recognizing and changing them.[4] Usually, our own culture is invisible until it comes into contact with another culture.

People are generally ethnocentric: They interpret other cultures within the framework of the understanding they have of their own. Six fundamental patterns of cultural norms have greatly affected relations between differing cultures: communication styles, attitudes toward conflict, approaches to completing tasks, decision-making styles, attitudes toward personal disclosure and approaches to knowing.

Another major aspect of communication is the degree of importance given to nonverbal communication, including facial expressions and gestures, as well as to seating arrangements, personal distance and sense of time.

Communication styles. Communicating between two cultures involves generating, transmitting, receiving and decrypting coded messages or bits of information. It is about much more than language, although language is certainly key to communication and should be a part of any cultural-training program.

The early focus, however, should be more on effective use and application of language than on making a Soldier a linguist. Someone struggling to communicate in an unfamiliar language cannot communicate complex issues. The goal should be to orient language-skill developmental programs, at least initially, on effectively conveying simple terms rather than on lin-

guistic competence — learning to make the most out of simple meanings. The Army needs to find simple ways of communicating that will speak to other cultural norms and that will require listening. Communication is a two-way street.

Common, universal languages are available that almost all cultures understand. Other types of languages include mathematics, music, computing, physics and engineering. Although such are not immediately useful in most military tasks, they offer a common frame of reference of possible value under special circumstances.[5]

One of the most overlooked and effective communication tools is the use of pictures, drawings or photographs. A great deal of truth is behind the expression "a picture is worth a thousand words." Creating graphic and pictorial aides for cross-cultural communication is much easier and often much more effective than linguistic aids. However, in any form of information transmission, meanings are not always clear, and certainly, missing presentation skills, timing and context can be confusing and counterproductive. Using a culture's iconography, such as religious symbols — the cross for Christians or the crescent moon for Islamics — can lead to developing means of symbolic communication.

Another major aspect of communication is the degree of importance given to nonverbal communication, including facial expressions and gestures, as well as to seating arrangements, personal distance and sense of time. Different norms regarding the appropriate degree of assertiveness in communicating can add to cultural misunderstandings.[6]

Attitudes toward conflict. Some cultures view conflict as a positive thing; others view it as something to be avoided. In the United States,

conflict is not usually desirable, but people most often deal directly with conflicts as they arise. For example, a face-to-face meeting is a customary way to work through problems. In many Eastern countries, open conflict is considered embarrassing or demeaning. Differences are best worked out quietly. A written exchange might be the favored means of addressing the conflict. Another means might be enlisting a respected third party who can facilitate communication without risking loss of face or humiliation.

American military culture deals with problems head-on. As in a game of checkers, the intricacies of subtle and indirect moves are more often than not relegated to civilian and military strategists. Many other cultures, however, employ indirect approaches and subtle means as part of day-to-day activity. When Soldiers trained in the direct approach encounter these cultures, communication is difficult and can lead to profound misunderstandings and miscalculations.

Approaches to completing tasks. From culture to culture, people have different ways of completing tasks. They might have different access to resources, different rewards associated with task completion, different notions of time and different ideas about how relationship-building and task-oriented work should go together. Asian and Hispanic cultures tend to attach more value to developing relationships at the beginning of a shared project, with more emphasis on task completion toward the end, as compared to European-Americans. European-Americans tend to focus immediately on the task at hand, allowing relationships to develop as they work together.

Decision-making styles. The roles individuals play in decision-

Army News Service

In Muslim countries, female Soldiers play a key role in dealing with the women of the villages. Special-operations units knew this going in; however, traditional Army units didn't, and they encountered many problems because they had male Soldiers trying to interact with the females.

making vary widely from culture to culture. In America, decisions are frequently delegated; that is, an official assigns responsibility for a particular matter to a subordinate. In many southern European and Latin American countries, strong value is placed on holding decision-making responsibilities oneself. When groups of people make decisions, majority rule is a common approach in America. In Japan, consensus is the preferred mode.

Attitudes toward personal disclosure. In some cultures, it is not appropriate to be frank about emotions, about the reasons behind a conflict or a misunderstanding, or about personal information. Questions that might seem natural to us might seem intrusive to others. (What was the conflict about? What was your role in the conflict? What was the sequence of events?)

Approaches to knowing. Notable differences occur among cultural

groups when it comes to epistemologies — that is, the ways people come to know things. European cultures tend to consider information acquired through cognitive means, such as counting and measuring, more valid than other ways of coming to know things. African cultures prefer affective ways of knowing, including symbolic imagery and rhythm. Asian cultures tend to emphasize the validity of knowledge gained through striving toward transcendence. Recent popular works demonstrate that American society is paying more attention to previously overlooked ways of knowing.

Obviously, different approaches to knowing can affect the way we analyze or find ways to solve a community problem. Some group members might want to conduct library research to understand a shared problem better and to identify possible solutions. Others might prefer to visit places and

Religion, education and many other factors affect the way cultures interact. In many Third World countries, subjects as simple as hygiene become an opportunity for Soldiers to interact with the people.

people who have experienced similar challenges and touch, taste and listen to what has worked elsewhere.

Specific cultures to study

In the future, key powers in a regional or global context will most likely be the United States, the European Union, China, Japan and Russia. Future alliances, coalitions and partnerships will most likely be tied to these nations. Key regional powers, whose activities or issues have the greatest possibility for creating global consequences, are most likely to be Indonesia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria and Mexico. In addition, natural resources in the Caspian Basin, off the coast of east-central Africa, and in Venezuela, will certainly increase those regions' importance. These nations might offer a good starting point for a program of study of other cultures.

Cultural expertise takes time. Cultural literacy and competency skills will enable us to cope with

almost any circumstance of cultural difference. Areas of specific expertise deepen those skills and provide context to their application, but programs designed to achieve expertise in a given region or culture must begin early and be continuous.

The officer corps should begin training while in precommissioning programs. Prescribed courses in regional studies and some language training would be a great beginning. We could certainly look at expanding summer opportunities for travel and study in specified foreign countries. A program of this nature, involving West Point cadets, currently exists within the Foreign Military Studies Office. We could expand the program to include select Reserve Officer Training Corps students. Branch schools could coordinate with local universities for instructors, course materials and expertise.

The country-studies program of the Army War College, or AWC, could certainly serve as a model for cultural education at lower levels. Using electronic connectivity between schools and individuals

would allow the creation of virtual teams with AWC, the Command and General Staff College, or advanced-course students, around a specific country or regional area. The AWC students could serve as study directors, orchestrating and facilitating team members' efforts in other schools.

Another possibility is to leverage business and industry programs for cultural education, making them available through distributed learning. We should also not forget the expertise available from the Special Forces. The bottom line is that there are many ways available to achieve our goals if we can agree on the focus and end state.

Three other factors play into cultural differences that influence communication: religion, tribal affiliations and nationalism.

Religion. Religion, one of the most important aspects of the resolution of cross-cultural conflict, is a powerful constituent of cultural norms and values, and because it addresses the most profound existential issues of human life (freedom and inevitability, fear and faith, security and insecurity, right and wrong, sacred and profane), it is deeply implicated in individual and social conceptions of peace. To transform current conflicts, we must understand the concepts of peace within diverse religious and cultural traditions while seeking common ground.[7]

An exploration of religious cultural norms could take the form of comparisons of foundational cultural values as they apply to the world's prominent religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism). Tribal cultures, prevalent in developing countries, are often the only structure in ungoverned areas. Tribal cultures differ, but at their core, they share a common foundation. They arise from a social tradition that often

lacks written histories or philosophies and independent perspectives, and they espouse ideas and beliefs held unanimously by the entire tribe. Tribal leaders are not accustomed to external challenge.

Regardless of region, tribes also share foundational norms with respect to decision-making, knowledge and disclosure. Studying norms for tribal structures might well prove to be the only way to understand these cultures because of the absence of written material.

Nationalism. To study nationalism is to study cultural norms and values as driving factors. Separated from the context of states, nations embody the importance that people place on culture and heritage without respect to geography. Nationalistic movements have common aspects in the way they relate to other cultures and the way their behaviors are governed. This area of study would be particularly useful in understanding and dealing with transnational organizations, whether they are legitimate, criminal or terrorist.

Cultural education is not a new subject or issue. Over the years, the Army has introduced internal and external programs to address cultural factors within its organization and during long-duration deployments. The programs effectively created an Army value of cultural acceptance as a standard, but only so long as differing values did not compete with Army values or standards. These same programs, modified and refocused, could serve as the foundation for an expanded cultural-education program to create better skills for dealing with other cultures during conflicts, partnerships, or stability-and-support operations. Resources associated with such programs could be the nucleus for a rapid startup and foundation for expansion.

Cultural education is a growing concern among major businesses operating in the global market. For this reason, there are a wide variety of commercial, academic and government programs for cultural education. In many cases, courseware is available, and training-development work has been completed. Assessing and, where practical, *using* these programs offers significant cost savings in developing educational materials and courses.

The Army can expand on the educational base by ensuring that tactical and operational training programs address cultural factors. At the national training centers, opposing-force role players should be skilled in emulating key cultural norms that might affect military actions and activities. All leaders should be exposed to these factors and receive appropriate feedback on how well they manage differences and accomplish tasks. Perhaps the Army should also consider introducing cultural-awareness training into the Battle Command Training Program and combat training centers, where, with allies and partners, commands and staffs would be combined to foster development of cultural-competency skills.

As the Army moves to an agent-based construction, models and simulations in support of training and education should begin to include cultural factors, which will increase the number of variables and complicate environments so that they more closely approximate reality. This type of program, which is already being worked by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is one that we should seek to guide and direct.

In generalized study areas, the Army should educate Soldiers and leaders on foundational cultural norms and values and teach them skills used to understand and bridge cultural differences, looking at religious, tribal and nationalis-

tic factors in representative and nonrepresentative societies. Over time, specialized study should enable Soldiers to build expertise in specific regions concerning specific societies. ✄

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The SF Intelligence Sergeant: Ensuring His Continuity and Effective Training

by Major Marshall V. Ecklund

T he position of Special Forces intelligence sergeant, or 18F, is finally beginning to get the recognition and the attention that it deserves.

For many years, some members of the community have viewed the position as the weakest on the SF detachment for several reasons, including the timing of training in the life cycle of an SF Soldier's career, problems with career management, and the mindset that the position was merely an additional duty rather than an essential function of the detachment.

Recent changes initiated by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, have greatly enhanced the 18F position, but more can and needs to be done to ensure not only stability and continuity but also effective training for this key position.

In September 2002, for example, SWCS took the first step toward bringing more stability and appropriate prominence to

the 18F position by creating the 13-week Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, or SFISC. Before the SFISC was created, an SF NCO had to meet only two prerequisites in order to reclassify to the military occupational specialty, or MOS, 18F: graduate from one of the three operations-and-intelligence, or O&I, courses[1]; and serve an assignment to the single 18F billet on an SF detachment. The SFISC now focuses its curriculum on training the intelligence-specific aspects of the 18F position, with most SFISC graduates receiving MOS 18F as a primary MOS.[2]

The SFISC lays the foundation for producing competent SF intel sergeants, but it is not the only way to address the underlying problems inherent with the SF detachment's only dedicated intelligence position. With additional resources, SWCS could transform the new course into one that is focused on properly preparing what could become one of the most critical members of the detachment.

Education alone does not make one an expert, and the training provided by the SFISC is no exception Only through extensive

experience, usually gained over considerable time, can an SF intelligence sergeant gain and refine the skills necessary for him to be fully effective and productive for the detachment. The same can be said of the other SF MOSs. Unfortunately, SF intel sergeants have rarely had sufficient opportunity to acquire intelligence-specific experience.

Before the creation of the SFISC, the SF intel sergeants not immediately selected for promotion to master sergeant were usually senior sergeants first class. By virtue of being among the senior members of the detachment, NCOs requesting and obtaining reclassification to MOS 18F were likely nearing the end of their normal tours and due to make a permanent-change-of-station move. The 18F position thus rotated more often than any other on the detachment.

Unit command sergeants major recently sought to resolve the issue by asking the Army's Human Resources Command, or HRC, to evaluate the feasibility of granting 24-month job stabilizations for Soldiers who graduate from the SFISC. HRC could not support such a policy for every

SFISC graduate because of "18F requirements across the force."[3] HRC determined that it could grant the exception to policy only on a case-by-case basis. Management practices such as these do little to bring stability to the SF intelligence-sergeant position.

Because of the importance of the 18F to the detachment's intelligence operations, it seems unreasonable to treat MOS 18F as an afterthought or an additional duty. SF intelligence sergeants need to be trained in the same manner as Soldiers in all other SF MOSs; that is the only reasonable and practical solution for resolving the issues of time, experience and duty-position stability.[4]

Of the 150 Soldiers who graduated from the SFISC during its first five iterations, 28 were members of National Guard SF groups, 18 were SF warrant-officer candidates, and one was already an SF warrant officer. Thus, 47 of those 150 SFISC graduates, nearly one-third, will not serve as active-duty SF intel sergeants on SF detachments and thus will not contribute to increasing the stability of the position.

Until SF is able to rectify its active-duty shortages in MOS 18F, the allocation of course slots to Soldiers in other categories should be kept to a minimum. Moreover, the SF Warrant Officer Course should either change its requirement for all candidates to be graduates of the SFISC or provide the necessary training using its own resources and instructors. Sending personnel to the SFISC who will never perform the duties of an SF intel sergeant is a grossly inefficient use of already scarce resources.

SF can adequately address the stability problem only by identifying its source — the timing of MOS 18F training in the SF per-

The SF Intelligence Sergeant Course, created in 2002, teaches students traditional and state-of-the-art techniques in intelligence-gathering.

U.S. Army photo

sonnel-development pipeline. One of the ways SWCS attempted to bring more stability to the intelligence position was by removing the ANCOC prerequisite and allowing SF Soldiers to attend the SFISC earlier in their careers. Instead of training senior

The SFISC now accepts staff sergeants, who, in theory, have more SF-detachment time remaining in their careers. … It would further enhance SF-detachment intelligence capabilities if SF intelligence sergeants were trained during the SF Qualification Course.

sergeants first class, the SFISC now accepts staff sergeants, who, in theory, have more SF-detachment time remaining in their careers and have several years remaining before they can be promoted to master sergeant.

It would further enhance SF-

detachment intelligence capabilities if SF intelligence sergeants were trained during the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC. If SWCS were to integrate the SFISC into the MOS phase of the SFQC, and the SF Branch pursued action that would allow staff sergeants to classify or to reclassify into MOS 18F,[5] the SF Branch could take a critical step toward transforming the SF detachment, over the long term, into a more capable fighting force.

Along with providing SF intelligence sergeants training at an even earlier time in the SF personnel-development pipeline, SWCS needs to modify the SFISC before making it part of the SFQC. In order to fully develop the concept of intelligence and operations working together, the SFISC would have to alloy its current focus on intelligence with instruction in operations — reminiscent of the approach of the former O&I Course. Younger SFISC students, who would not yet have attended SF ANCOC, would have insufficient appreciation for the need to, or the knowledge of how to, integrate operations with intelligence. The SFISC should also strongly emphasize interagency, or IA, cooperation and intelligence fusion. SWCS could

best accomplish this intelligence integration by facilitating and developing students' relationships with other government agencies, or OGAs, early during their intelligence training.

As an integral part of training at the apprentice level, the SFISC should provide more training with OGAs and other Department of Defense, or DoD, intelligence agencies. SWCS needs to thoroughly integrate these agencies into the course so that they can fully appreciate the mutual benefits of sharing information with SF. At the journeyman level, there should be internships with OGAs and with DoD intelligence organizations, similar to the mandatory "continuing training" certification program for SF medical sergeants. Because these internships would further solidify relationships critical to the success of intelligence fusion in support of future operations, SWCS should integrate internships into a larger "credentialing" program for SF intel sergeants.

Other areas of the SF intel sergeant's training, utilization and employment that the SF Branch should consider include mandatory Level 3 training in advanced special-operations techniques, placing emphasis on advance-force operations and operational preparation of the environment, and integrating a counterintelligence course similar to the one run by the Army's Military Intelligence Branch.

The increasing emphasis on intelligence operations at the tactical level may require larger numbers of SF intel sergeants. Studies have been conducted on increasing the size of the SF detachment to 13 in order to assign two intelligence sergeants.[6] This increased authorization could allow SF detachments to

focus sufficient attention to the critical areas in which intelligence supports operations at the tactical level. The increase is equally defensible for the same reasons that there are two members of other MOSs on SF detachments.

MOS 18F should not be treated as an additional duty, and by integrating the SFISC into the SFQC, SWCS could effectively put an end to the perception that the SFISC is a prerequisite for promotion to master sergeant. Since the

This shift in focus will allow SF intel sergeants to focus on their primary mission of tactical intelligence, and it will make the assistant detachment operations sergeant position an additional duty for the most competent NCO on the detachment — one who has demonstrated the greatest potential for serving as a detachment operations sergeant.

course's inception, some sergeants major and command sergeants major have advised their senior NCO leaders, "Send E7s whom you want to be team sergeants to the SFISC." Such a misuse of the new course would be counterproductive to its intent and would only contribute to making the SF intel sergeant position the "weak link" on the detachment. "Intelligence drives operations," yet, compared to most other members of the detachment, the SF intel

sergeant typically has the least amount of experience in his MOS. This will not change unless the SF Branch considers the training of SF intel sergeants to be a long-term investment in the health of the branch.

SWCS has already modified the duty description of the SF intel sergeant, removing the institutional bias of "seniority" associated with the SF intel sergeant and the additional duty of being the assistant detachment operations sergeant. This shift in focus will allow SF intel sergeants to focus on their primary mission of tactical intelligence, and it will make the assistant detachment operations sergeant position an additional duty for the most competent NCO on the detachment — one who has demonstrated the greatest potential for serving as a detachment operations sergeant. Assignment to that duty should not be based entirely on seniority or on the possession of a specific MOS. Master-sergeant promotion boards should properly focus their attention not on whether a Soldier holds MOS 18F or has graduated from the SFISC, but on how well he performed the additional-duty position of assistant detachment operations sergeant.

A recurring theme since the national and strategic "intelligence failures" that resulted in the successful terrorist attacks of 9/11 has been the admission by the federal government that it must improve the collection, processing, analysis, dissemination and fusion of intelligence. At the point of the spear, where intelligence directly supports tactical operations (such as firebases in Afghanistan and forward operating bases in Iraq), SF's selection, preparation and management of the intelligence-sergeant position

has many comparable shortcomings. SWCS has taken the first steps in the right direction — focusing on improving intelligence operations on the detachment. If SF had had more properly trained intelligence personnel at the lower levels of command during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, operations might have been more efficient. It was the rank-and-file SF NCOs who made it happen — even with little or no training in IA operations. If IA operations are the way of the future for SF, then it would make sense to train SF intel sergeants to meet or exceed all expectations.

The NCOs in SF are the best in the world, and there should never be any doubt about the quality of the majority of the NCOs selected to serve as SF intel sergeants — they will accomplish the mission even when they are not set up for success. But through its less-than-optimal employment of MOS 18F, SF is not fully exploiting many opportunities that could greatly increase the effectiveness of the SF detachment. If quality intelligence is vital to SF's operational success, then the SF intel sergeant is as critical as any other member of the detachment, if not more so, and he should be trained accordingly.

There is now a compelling argument for training SF intel sergeants earlier in their careers, even during the SFQC. By providing the right training at the right time, SF could eliminate many of the problems associated with managing the senior NCOs who are currently SF intel sergeants. Reclassifying NCOs to MOS 18F earlier would eliminate the "additional duty" mindset, and it would correct the perception that graduation from the SFISC is a prerequisite for promotion to master sergeant. These changes could help SWCS and the SF Branch meet the objective for 18Fs envisioned by the SWCS Special Forces Evolution Steering Committee: producing a vital and functioning member of the detachment, while simultaneously transforming the SF detachment into a more lethal fighting force. ✂

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Notes:

[1] The three were the O&I portion of the SF Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC O&I), the "O&I Transition Course" and the O&I Course. ANCOC O&I was accepted until 2001, but during 2001, only those who had graduated from either the O&I Transition Course or O&I could be reclassified into MOS 18F.

[2] "Due to current 18D strengths, 18Ds who graduate the 18F course will *not* [author's emphasis added] receive 18F as a primary MOS. As a result, SWCS has recently announced they will no longer accept 18Ds into the 18F Course until 18D strengths increase. No Skill Level 3 [SSG] graduate will be reclassified to 18F until they are promoted to Skill Level 4 [SFC] (MOS 18F3 does not exist)." From the CMF-18 Enlisted Branch Web site, https://www.perscomonline.army.mil /epsf/CMF-18(HOT%20TOPICS).htm, last accessed 6 June 2004.

[3] From the CMF-18 Enlisted Branch Web site, https://www.perscomonline.army.mil /epsf/CMF-18(HOT%20TOPICS).htm, last accessed 6 June 2004.

[4] It is worth noting that only the SF detachment operations sergeant (MOS 18Z) does not attend any special training before being awarded the MOS, in contrast to all other positions on the SF detachment. At this point, the SF Branch should consider a post-ANCOC course for those master sergeants-select before they assume duties as detachment operations sergeants. Similar in concept to the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy's First Sergeants Course, this course could offer beneficial training on the administrative nuances inherent in the managerial facets of the position (e.g., writing NCOERs and recommendations for awards), with which most NCOs on an SF detachment typically have little experience prior to working as a detachment operations sergeant.

[5] Currently, MOS 18F is a "one-grade" or "single-grade" MOS, open only to skill-level 4 NCOs. One-grade MOSs are much more difficult to manage than multiple-grade MOSs.

[6] One such study, the for-official-use-only post-war-game draft of TRADCOM Pam 525-x-xx, entitled *Military Operations: Special Forces Operational and Organizational Plan*, dated 31 December 2001, is a supporting document to the pamphlet, *U.S. Army Objective Force O&O Concepts for Army Special Operations Forces*. The proponent for the pamphlet, SWCS's Army Special Operations Battle Lab, proposed that objective-force SF detachments should have a 13th man. This SFC/MSG "SF operations & intelligence sergeant (area specialist)" was in addition to the SFC "SF operations & intelligence sergeant" on the SF detachment.

CA and PSYOP: Major Changes in Personnel, Training Upcoming for Officers, NCOs

by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Boyd

As the Army is immersed in a transformation, so, too, are the roles of Soldiers in Civil Affairs, or CA, and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP. As the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, continues, the demand for CA and PSYOP's unique skills and services has also increased, highlighting the important role both groups play not only in fighting the war but in winning the peace.

In recognition of that key role, the Army has major changes in the works for officers and enlisted Soldiers in both fields, including the creation of CA and PSYOP branches and the creation of Career Management Field 38B, Civil Affairs Specialist for private through command sergeant major in the Army Reserve and sergeant through command sergeant major in the active Army.

Branch initiative

A proposal for the creation of two distinct nonaccession officer branches for CA and PSYOP has been approved by the Department of the Army and will be effective Oct. 16, 2006. The branch activations will eliminate the current CA and PSYOP functional areas. For CA and PSYOP officers, the initiative has been a long time coming, as functional areas within the Army have understandably taken second priority to regular Army branches. CA and PSYOP officers believe they will have greater career potential, more rewarding assignments and receive greater recognition for their unique expertise under the branch concept.

It is important to note that CA is already an officer branch for the United States Army Reserve, but not for the active Army. By contrast, PSYOP is a functional area in both. Inevitably, formation of branches for PSYOP and CA will recognize the importance of each career field. Both have made historic contributions to countless military operations, and their continued presence and noteworthy performance can be seen in current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, their readiness and relevance will be an integral component in the drive to extend the reach and influence of the U.S. military and eliminate sources of instability in the GWOT.

Training the branch

Key to the implementation of the branch concept is an extensive review and transformation of training for active-Army and reserve-component officers. Accordingly, the CA and PSYOP branch proposal reflects operational need and changes to the requirements in support of the GWOT. Moreover, the expansion in the roles of U.S. Army CA and PSYOP officers in the active Army and reserve components underlines the importance of having a CA and PSYOP officer corps with skills, regional and cultural expertise, language abilities, mediation/negotiation skills, analytical talent and technical assessment skills to draw upon.

The Army has completed a thorough staff analysis and extensive coordination to assure the accuracy and credibility of the branch proposal. The two areas that received the most scrutiny were training qualification and force structure. If we are to meet transformation objectives and expeditionary goals and achieve modularity, it is imperative that we have a more inclusive and comprehensive CA and PSYOP force structure and more operationally relevant CA and PSYOP force.

The credibility and legitimacy of the branches will depend heavily on a corps of CA and PSYOP officers and enlisted Soldiers who have the knowledge, competency and skill necessary to deliver their requisite expertise anywhere and anytime to

The continued relevance of Civil Affairs officers is evident in Afghanistan, where CA officers work to extend the influence of the U.S. military and eliminate sources of instability in the region.

satisfy today's and tomorrow's CA and PSYOP requirements.

The CA and PSYOP training pipelines have been revitalized to secure competencies commensurate with promotion, utilization and standards of grade. Skills previously characteristic of the active-Army CA and PSYOP training pipelines have now been incorporated earlier in the training path and made available to reserve-component officers, as well. The training has been divided into three phases to appropriately dedicate time and resources to standards of performance and core competencies at each level and during each phase.

Phase I, company-grade qualification, enables the branch officer to be successful at the tactical team and detachment level. This phase has expanded the current program of instruction, or POI, for the CA and PSYOP officers' courses, including a more in-depth lecture series, seminars, more training in the military decision-making process, an operational-unit orientation, practical exercises and a culmination field exercise. The culmination exercise includes all CA and PSYOP critical tasks, each of

which is reinforced during training by a module on adaptive leadership, negotiation, political-military analysis and interagency orientation.

Phase II, field-grade officer qualification, will transition from the current 16-week Regional Studies Course into a 10-to-12-week Advanced Regional Analysis Course that is more operationally relevant and situationally focused. The course is designed to weave effects-based targeting and theater-level operational challenges into the instruction.

Phase III is language and other specialized training, as required. The move to incorporate language training throughout the pipeline is being driven by the new language program of the Department of Defense, or DoD, which seeks to tie language skills to an officer's promotability. The DoD language program seeks to produce Soldiers who are more culturally savvy and are capable of operating in constantly changing environments. The changes are much like those being made to the Special Forces language program. Soldiers participating in the CA and PSYOP programs will be gradually exposed to more lan-

guage training in each phase and will be offered the opportunity to take the Defense Language Proficiency Test, or DLPT, to meet qualification standards early. "Head-start" materials will be made available in Phase I. Phase II changes will include scheduling a language elective that is commensurate with regional/targeting instruction, and the addition of a more intensive 18- to-24-week language instruction for those who do not score 1/1/1 on the DLPT.

Maintaining the branch

The active-Army branch officer will complete all phases of his training without interruption, but the reserve-component branch officer may complete Phase I for initial company-grade qualification and return later for Phase II, field-grade qualification. Reserve-component branch officers are not required to complete Phase III. DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management,* and DA Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, have been revised to include the training qualifications that are tied to promotion eligibility and utilization assignments. Ultimately, implementation of the branch concept will seek officer interchangeability within the active and reserve branches. The origin of one branch officer must be indistinguishable from another. The credibility and competence of our officers will originate in training, be reinforced in regulation and enforced in utilization.

To ensure career progression and proper personnel management, the Army has scrutinized grade and force-structure pyramids as closely as it has training standardization and qualification. Each of the CA and PSYOP career paths and promotion pyramids have been reassessed to secure a credible career path, a viable promotion pyramid and a career model that provides officers the competitive advan-

tage necessary for above-average promotions and access to senior-level positions within the Army.

Transforming the current structures from functional areas to viable branch pyramids has included the Army's modularity requirements for CA and PSYOP presence in conventional structures. Developers of the branches have also coordinated with force developers in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command during recent force-design updates. Inevitably, the establishment of separate branches will allow the CA and PSYOP communities to operate successfully in the future operational environment, ensuring nearly identical active-Army and reserve-component capabilities, creating the capacity for seamless transition and promoting professionalism in each career field.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, has accepted the CA and PSYOP branch initiative for consideration and Army-wide staffing. Pending the outcome of Armywide staffing, the target date for HQDA's formal recognition of the active-Army and reserve-component CA and PSYOP branches is Oct. 1, 2006.

CMF 38B, CA Specialist

Oct. 1, 2005, is the date that the active Army will officially have an active-Army Civil Affairs NCO. More than 100 positions within the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, will be recoded 38B from their previous 11-, 21- or 18-series billets. The Army's transformation of CA NCO billets to official 38B-coded authorizations is expected to take three years, which will be necessary for in-service recruiting, training development (initial reclassification and NCOES) and promotion qualification.

As recognition of the importance of Civil Affairs has grown Armywide, so, too, has the need for NCO career progression beyond USASOC. Accordingly, the Army has introduced the 38B into its modular structure, which will include NCO growth concurrent with the 38B authorizations across USASOC modified tables of organization, as well as within Army structures at the brigade combat team, unit of execution, and corps of the Army land component.

Meanwhile, for the U.S. Army Reserve, current 38A enlisted billets will be recoded to 38B, which will improve standards of training across the active Army and reserve components and will achieve the desired interchangeability across the Total Army Career Management Field 38. By the year 2008, CMF 38B NCOs will be integral members of CA teams in operational units and will serve as staff NCOs on the staffs of brigade combat teams and higher-level organizations.

Joining the CA team

Active-Army or reserve-component NCOs interested in reclassifying to

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CA NCO Reclassification Packet

NCOs desiring to reclassify into Civil Affairs must provide the following documents to determine their eligibility for selection:

- DA 4187 requesting reclassification to MOS 38B.
- Memorandum stating why they desire to reclassify into Civil Affairs.
- Two letters of recommendation (O4 or above and one endorsement from the CSM of the 96th CA Battalion; for those Soldiers who are currently serving in the 96th CA Battalion, one recommendation needs to come from outside USASOC).
- Copies of NCOERs. Soldiers must submit, at a minimum, their last three NCOERs and all NCOERs received while they served in the 96th CA Battalion.
- Current ARSOF medical examination PUHLES 222221.
- DA Form 705, *Army Physical Fitness Test*, with a minimum APFT score of 229.
- Verification of security clearance.

NCOs will be screened and evaluated in accordance with DA Pamphlet 611-21 on an individual basis. An evaluation of the above documentation will be considered subject to:

- Overall strengths of CMF 38, including the MOS in which the Soldier is qualified at the time of the request.
- Amount of time Soldier has spent out of the CMF, if the NCO is reclassifying back into Civil Affairs.
- Anything the board determines to be inconsistent with the integrity, professionalism and proper conduct of a Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations Soldier

Army News Service

In the ongoing engagements of the GWOT, CA NCOs are not only waging the war but also winning the peace. The establishment of CMF 38B will increase promotion potential and standardize training for these highly sought-after Soldiers.

CMF 38 must meet the prerequisites as prescribed in DA Pamphlet 611-21, para. 10-123, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, policies as applicable:

• USAR Soldiers reclassifying into CMF 38 must complete airborne training (if necessary); military occupational specialty, or MOS, reclassification training; additional skill identifier, or ASI, training; and the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, or BNCOC, (if they are staff sergeants or sergeants first class) conducted under the auspices of SWCS or one of the ARSOF TASS battalions.

• Active-Army Soldiers must be in the grade of sergeant and have at least five years of active federal service or be a sergeant who is promotable to staff sergeant. Soldiers must be or be willing to become airborne-qualified, complete MOS reclassification training and ASI training, and attend a BNCOC conducted under the auspices of SWCS.

• Exceptions to grant MOS 38B to active-Army Soldiers in the grades of staff sergeant (promotable) or sergeant first class can be authorized only with the written approval of the proponent, the commanding general of SWCS, in accordance with DA Pamphlet 611-21.

• Reserve-component Soldiers who are reclassifying into MOS 38B will be restricted to the grade of staff sergeant and below, in accordance with AR 14-158.

CA specialists must possess the following physical-demands rating and qualifications for the initial award of the CA MOS:

• A physical-demands rating of "moderately heavy," with a physical profile of 222221.

• A minimum score of 100 in aptitude area ST of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery administered prior to Jan. 2, 2002, or 96 for tests administered after Jan. 2, 2002.

• Be able to obtain a minimum security clearance of secret (or eligible for top secret).

• A U.S. citizenship. ✄

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Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Boyd is the deputy director of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Special Operations Proponency. He was formerly commander of SWCS's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1984, he served tours with Infantry units in Germany and at Fort Bragg, N.C. In 1995, he began his operational tours in the 4th Psychological Operations Group, where he served as a detachment commander, group operations officer and battalion executive officer. He has served in a variety of operations, including Just Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor and Enduring Freedom. In addition to holding a bachelor's degree in interdisciplinary studies from Norwich University, Lieutenant Colonel Boyd is a 1992 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School's special operations and low-intensity conflict curriculum, and he is a 1994 graduate of the Defense Language Institute.

SF Command Addresses Joint-Fires Shortfalls at the SF Group, Battalion Levels

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Kent

Lessons learned during recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq show that Special Forces groups and battalions lack the manpower and capability they need for the effective planning and integration of joint fires.

To address that shortfall, the United States Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, is taking a two-pronged approach: achieving a long-term manpower solution through the process of the Department of the Army's force-design update, or FDU; and pursuing shorter-term measures that offer a more immediate, although temporary, solution.

Compelling need

Special Forces groups require precision joint fires (lethal and nonlethal) that have virtually unconstrained reach, but the SF groups have limited organic capabilities for joint-fires integration and planning. SF units have always had to build a JFE capability from a cold start — building a joint-fires element from scratch via augmentation and the joint-manning-document process. In many operations, the SF group and its battalions have been dependent upon Army, Air Force, Navy and other joint-fires assets for supporting fires. Experience and lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have clearly displayed that SF groups require enhanced capabilities for synchronizing and integrating the multitude of lethal and nonlethal joint fires available to them on today's battlefield.

The SF group also requires experienced staff officers and NCOs who are experts in Army- and joint-level fire support. These leaders must understand the joint-targeting process and have the ability to plan for direct lethal and non-lethal fires from all sources and at all levels of conflict, from major combat operations through stability-and-support operations. Fire-support personnel in Field Artillery, or FA, have the right experience base for this mission. With proper training, they can perform that role superbly, in coordination with a select group of Air Force liaison personnel and organic staff officers and NCOs. Experienced fire-support personnel would have the right expertise in the tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, of joint fires and effects, significantly enhancing the capability of SF units.

ESFG bands I, II and III

To address shortfalls in personnel and manning, USASFC has adopted an initiative called the Enhanced Special Forces Group, or ESFG. For the active component, ESFG Band I will add 97

positions per SF group in Fiscal Year 2006, and ESFG Band II will add 158 positions per SF group in FY 2008. For the reserve component, ESFG Band I will add 97 positions per SF group in FY 2006 and ESFG Band II will add 156 positions per SF group in FY 2008.[1]

ESFG Band III will address the JFE requirement. The FDU is engaged in the Total Army Analysis, or TAA, to compete for manpower in the FY 2008-2013 time frame. For the active component, ESFG Band III[2] will add 457 positions, which will constitute five additional SF battalions and a joint-fires element, or JFE, in the group and battalion S3 sections. For the reserve component, ESFG Band III will add 14 positions, which will constitute a JFE in the group and battalion S3 sections.

The ESFG Band III FDU is being staffed and is pending approval by Headquarters, Department of the Army. If the FDU is approved and resourced by the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, in the FY 2008-13 Major Force Program-11 program objective memorandum, or POM, the earliest date that the ESFG Band III force structure can be implemented is FY 2008.

ESFG Band III will address SF operational shortfalls and capability gaps for joint-fires planning, coordination and execution. Based on ongoing operations and lessons learned, SF subordinate units require JFEs within the battalion and group S3 sections. The JFE would advise the commander on the use of joint fires, on joint-fires support, on the allocation of resources via air-tasking orders, on the distribution of close-air-support sorties, on logistics considerations, on target acquisition, on reducing the risk of fratricide, and on meteorology and survey conditions.

JFE composition

The JFE will provide experienced staff officers and NCOs who are experts in Army- and joint-level fire-support. SF group commanders will then have at their disposal a wide range of joint operational TTPs with which to influence the conduct of actions. The JFE will also increase the joint capabilities, interoperability and combat effectiveness of Army SF.

The SF groups' manning requirements for joint-fires support are depicted in Figure 1. The four-man JFE will consist of an FA major (the JFE officer); an Aviation major (the rotary-wing close-air-support officer); an FA chief warrant officer 3 (the targeting officer); and an FA E7 (the JFE NCO).

The SF battalion's manning requirements for battalion joint-fires support are depicted in Figure 2. The three-man JFE will consist of an FA captain (the

Figure 1: The SF Group Joint-Fires Element

Figure 2: The SF Battalion Joint-Fires Element

JFE officer); an Aviation captain (the rotary-wing close-air-support officer); and an FA E7 (the JFE NCO).

JFE capabilities

The JFE will provide SF group and battalion commanders with the following capabilities:
- Tactical integration of fires.
- Leveraging of lethal and nonlethal joint fires and effects for battlefield dominance.
- Fires integrated with the joint-force commander's scheme of maneuver.
- Facilitation of timely fires, and a reduction of "sensor-to-shooter" time that will significantly increase the unit's capability for classifying and engaging targets of interest.
- Joint-fires expertise at all critical junctures (coordination and operations).
- Total coverage of the ground battlespace.
- Increased joint-fires expertise for planning future operations.
- Reduction of the risk of fratricide.
- Coordination of joint attack of targets, synchronization of fires with maneuver, land fires to support aviation, synergistic fires and effects, and time-sensitive targeting.

JFE proof of concept

With the support of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, USASFC initiated a proof of concept during the third quarter of FY 2004: USASFC placed FA and Aviation personnel in SF units. The 7th SF Group has one FA warrant officer and four FA NCOs attached to its organization, and these Soldiers have deployed with the group to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In addition to providing critical JFE expertise to the combined joint special-operations task force, these Soldiers have provided valuable after-action reports and lessons learned that will ultimately provide additional justification for support of ESFG Band III.

The Army Human Resources Command, or HRC, has also approved a directed-military-overstrength, or DMO, request to assign one FA major and three FA captains to the 7th SF Group in order to fully integrate the JFE within the organization. The intent is to fully exercise the group and battalion JFE during the next operational deployment.

The way ahead

The FDU process is the long-term JFE resourcing solution, but even though USASFC has captured the JFE requirement in ESFG Band III, it will not be implemented before FY 2008. The near-term solution for providing the JFE capability to all SF groups and battalions is to establish a memorandum of

agreement, or MOA, as a stopgap until the FDU can be approved and resourced. USASFC's goal is to get the MOA signed and work out the personnel requirements with U.S. Army Forces Command and HRC. The command understands that the JFE requirement may not be immediately resourced — it may be resourced and implemented in phases, with the priority given to providing JFEs to units supporting operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The MOA would provide a great mechanism for a proof of concept and provide additional justification in the concept and organization plan and the operations plan for the FDU. The MOA will transition to a DMO once the FDU has been approved and funding has been secured within the POM process.

Conclusion

Within ESFG Band III, the joint-fires element is the most important priority for USASFC, and the JFE meets one of the USASFC commanding general's vectors: Transform for the future fight. USASFC will remain on the leading edge of doctrinal and technological develop-ments that will enhance mission readiness and the war-fighting capabilities of its units. The joint-fires element is a critical piece of the command's transformation strategy, and it is a combat multiplier that the SF groups cannot do without. ✂

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Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Kent is the assistant chief of staff G7 (force management) for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. His previous SF assignments include staff assignments in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and USASFC, and command and staff assignments in the 3rd and 10th SF groups.

Notes:
[1] Reserve-component funding was disapproved by USSOCOM in the FY 2006-11 MFP-11 POM. USASFC will renominate this requirement for resourcing in the FY 2008-13 MFP-11 POM.
[2] ESFG Band III does not include the force-structure numbers for combat-service-support transformation, or CSST. CSST is the transformation of the active-component group-support company into a group-support battalion.

Army News Service

An OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter from the 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, provides close air support during a raid in Al Shahabi, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Gunfire Detection System Brings the Enemy Out of the Shadows

by Master Sergeant Francis Vangel

Unlike the battlefields of the past, today's battlefield is far from defined, often leaving Soldiers wondering exactly who and where their enemy is. Soldiers assigned to the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, have recently received a new tool that will help answer those questions — the Gunfire Detection System, or GDS.

When put into use by a headquarters brigade at a forward operating base, the system was able to quickly locate the source of sniper fire and give reliable information to a quick-reaction force, which was able to find its target approximately 40 to 50 percent of the time.

The GDS is designed to quickly and accurately detect and locate sniper and small-arms fire. The GDS is an acoustic detection system that determines, within three seconds, the azimuth, elevation and range to the origin of a shot. Within a 360-degree, 1,200-meter surveillance zone, the system can detect and identify the location of shots fired from subsonic and supersonic weapons whose caliber is between 5.56 mm and 20 mm.

Information concerning the origin of the shot is displayed on a computer screen. Optical systems that give day and thermal visual data are being integrated with the current acoustic system. Each optical system, which includes the day and thermal cameras, is attached to a pan/tilt mechanism that is mounted on a tripod. The GDS has two variants: a fixed-site system and a vehicle-mounted system.

Funded entirely through Congressional plus-ups, or additions to the budget, the system costs $65,000, with an additional $165,000 per optical system. Congressional funding for the system

The vehicle-mounted gunfire detection system will help Soldiers pinpoint sniper fire when they are moving through hostile territory.

The optical pivot of the Gunfire Detection System, attached to a pan/tilt mechanism and mounted on a tripod, provides daylight and thermal cameras.

allowed USASOC to procure, test and modify the systems as necessary, without using any USASOC operational funds.

All active-duty Special Forces groups, as well as the reserve-component 20th Special Forces Group, have received the GDS and have been trained on it. The 19th SF Group is next in line for fielding and training on the equipment.

The systems are in use in Afghanistan and Iraq by both ARSOF and conventional Army units. USASOC fielded 20 systems to conventional units for use in Iraq in July 2003. Soldiers were trained in theater on the use of the systems.

Utilization of the system by the conventional forces has had positive results. When put into use by a headquarters brigade at a forward operating base, the system was able to quickly locate the source of sniper fire and give reliable information to a quick-reaction force, which was able to find its target approximately 40 to 50 percent of the time.

The executive officer of a brigade combat team noted that the GDS with optics has proven to be a combat multiplier for operations in Iraq. His comments followed the use of the GDS by his unit on a mission to an Iraqi army compound.

The unit came under fire within hours of setting up at a compound that was frequently a target of sniper fire. Data received from the GDS enabled the battalion to locate the source of the sniper fire and to initiate a raid that resulted in the detainment of two individuals suspected of being snipers associated with the attack. The unit has now integrated the GDS into a variety of its missions and looks forward to receiving the mobile system. ✄

Master Sergeant Francis Vangel is a combat developer in the United States Army Special Operations Command G8. He specializes in night-vision and laser weaponry. Prior to moving to USASOC, Master Sergeant Vangel served in the 3rd Special Forces Group, the 1st Special Forces Group and at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Special-Ops Imperatives Guide ODA 972 in Afghanistan

by Major Vincent Martinelli

The special-operations imperatives provide a guide for the worldwide strategic activities of United States Special Forces Soldiers. The first two special-operations imperatives — understand the operational environment and recognize political implications — were particularly useful for the 19th SF Group's SF Operational Detachment Alpha 972 in its work with the 2nd Battalion of the Afghan National Army (now known as the 3rd Kandak) from October 2002 to April 2003.

Up to that time, U.S. special-operations forces operating in Afghanistan had concentrated largely on taking the fight to the enemy, operating independently or with ethnically-based militias. While active, hostile forces still existed in Afghanistan — particularly in the Pakistan border regions — ODA 972 had a foreign internal defense, or FID, mission that focused on training Afghan soldiers to defeat hostile forces indirectly, by establishing security and stability for the populace. FID has much greater potential for long-term success, because it allows U.S. forces to influence and shape the battlespace and to become force multipliers. Indeed, FID provides the only realistic path for reaching the conditions that will eventually allow the U.S. to achieve its national objectives and leave Afghanistan.

Success in FID missions required patience and flexibility on the part of ODA 972, first to rid itself of the direct action, or DA, mindset it brought to Afghanistan, then to grasp the new operational environment, recognize the political implications of its actions, and devise and implement a strategy accordingly.

ODA 972's mission, the first of its kind in Afghanistan, was in essence to extend the authority of the central government of President Hamid Karzai into the Province of Bamian.

The events playing themselves out in Bamian (of which the 3rd Kandak played a central role) are representative of the larger sweep of issues facing the rest of Afghanistan — issues that will be encountered repeatedly as disarmament and the establishment of national authority is attempted in other areas.

The simple truth in Afghanistan is that the people want peace, stability, prosperity, disarmament and civilian authority. They are proud of the new, professional, multiethnic national army and inspired to hope by the pos-

Photo courtesy Todd Harrell

A group of soldiers from the Afghan National Army trains at the Kabul Military Institute under the direction of Soldiers of the 19th SF Group.

sibilities inherent in the national government. Understanding this reality, and adopting tactics to leverage the existing environment in a positive way was the mission of U.S. special-operations forces.

Another task was to grasp how, in this environment, seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by U.S. forces could have immediate and profound political implications. Understanding the variety of groups who are vying for influence, and their methods for attempting to use or influence U.S. forces or the Afghan army to further their own purposes, was vital. The primary concerns voiced by civilians to the National Army and ODA 972, and the cause of much hesitation over turning in weapons, was that people were afraid the National Army would take weapons from the civilians and leave, exposing the civilians to retribution from local commanders. If special-operations forces could employ the Afghan National Army to provide a secure environment, the Afghans would have the justification and assurance they sought for turning over their weapons and ordnance, and for supplanting their reliance on local commanders with a reliance on a national authority.

Before ODA 972 arrived in Afghanistan, the 3rd Kandak had received basic training at the Kabul Military Training Center; however, it had not completed the full program of instruction, or POI. In the interim, 3rd Kandak soldiers had moved into barracks at the presidential palace, where they had stagnated without further training, guidance or resources. The soldiers had no government-issued standard gear. Morale was low, and attrition was high. Out of an authorized strength of around 600, only 220 soldiers remained. The ODA's first task was to establish a 10-week POI that began with squad tactics. The training, designed to be a refresher, turned

out to be something more. The team found that the months of inactivity had taken their toll on the soldiers — training would need to start from the beginning (individual movement techniques) and proceed to the mandated goal of achieving a company live-fire assault.

With all its problems, the 3rd Kandak had one thing in its favor — a cohesive, experienced officer cadre that believed in the purpose of the National Army. One of the finest and most committed officers was the battalion com-

While active, hostile forces still existed in Afghanistan … ODA 972 had a foreign internal defense mission that focused on training Afghan soldiers to defeat hostile forces indirectly, by establishing security and stability for the populace.

mander, Colonel Aminulla. In words that were supported by his actions, he passionately espoused the goals and ideals of a National Army that was ethnically diverse and free from political leanings and aspirations.

Aminulla, a Nuristani, is in an ethnic minority, and having been absent from the country for much of the civil war, he was able to maintain a neutral position while implementing the ideals established for the National Army. He picked strong company commanders, maintained a balanced ethnic mix within his officer and enlisted cadres, and was very receptive to the suggestions and ideas of U.S. trainers. The SF NCOs earned the respect of the Afghan soldiers

through hard work and a willingness to understand, respect and work within the Afghan Islamic culture. That willingness allowed them to establish an amazing rapport with the Afghan soldiers and officers.

Completing the 10-week POI in December, the Kandak started a continuation-training course. This training allowed the SF Soldiers to further develop a strong rapport with the Afghan soldiers and to more fully understand their strengths and weaknesses. The Kandak's future deployment provided the focus of this continuation training, which was designed to teach the Afghan soldiers to conduct confidence and combat missions (presence patrols, checkpoint operations, cordon-and-search operations and humanitarian-assistance and security operations). Foremost in ODA 972's assessment of the requirements for the Kandak's mission success was the ability of the 3rd Kandak to conduct liaison operations with the Afghan Militia Forces, or AMF, and the civilian populace in any region. To that end, the SF Soldiers held formal and informal training in these subjects.

Before it deployed, the Kandak conducted two high-visibility battalion-level live-fire assaults — one for the chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, or OMC-A, Major General Karl Eikenberry, and the other for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

The majority of the Kandak was ordered to the Madr/Khamard valley region as part of Operation Roll Tide, under Advanced Operating Base, or AOB, 2030. The remainder of the battalion was detailed to construct an Afghan army base in Bamian, farther south. Upon completion of Roll Tide, the battalion, based in Bamian, was scheduled to conduct follow-on operations for another two weeks. However, because of conditions in the Madr and Khamard valleys, OMC-A and the Afghan administration decided

Photo courtesy Todd Harrell

One of the goals of the 19th SF Group was to get villagers to turn weapons in. They found that their efforts were more successful when the Afghan National Army battalion commander spoke to the villagers first.

to maintain elements of the battalion in the area around the city of Madr, establishing a permanent National Army presence not only in Bamian, but in Madr, as well.

The 3rd Kandak was only the second Afghan battalion to deploy outside of Kabul. This was the first time the Afghan National Army had participated as an equal partner in a U.S.-conceived, -planned and -executed combat operations. Two Afghan officers were, in fact, isolated with U.S. forces during the mission planning. While they were not given information about all aspects of the mission, they were able to provide valuable intelligence to assist U.S. Soldiers in developing the plan. Complicating the mission was the variety of ethnic and political groups vying for power, influence and resources in the area.

The SF AOB's mission in Roll Tide was based on intelligence that indicated that there were a number of Hesbi Islami Gulbaddin, or HIG, and former Taliban commanders still operating (albeit not under those banners) in the Madr/Khamard valley. These groups were allegedly suppressing the population, committing crimes and stockpiling weapons and ammunition. The mission of the AOB was to insert into the Madr/Khamard valley, seize the weapons caches and certain local commanders in the area, establish security and disarm the local population. The Kandak's initial limited role was to assist with security, searches and other confidence and combat missions.

Three things became clear at the outset of Operation Roll Tide: first, that the soldiers and officers of the Kandak far exceeded mission expectations regarding their ability to deal effectively and positively with the local population; second, that the Kandak was successful and better adapted than U.S forces to effect disarmament and collect weapons; and finally, that the political and social situation in Madr/Khamard was far more complex than anticipated. This is where the special-operations imperatives became valuable in the decision-making process for continuing operations.

The operational environment in most of Afghanistan is permissive. SF's goal was to leverage the detachment's abilities by being a force multiplier — implementing the Afghan Army, developing intelligence-asset networks and employing other means. Three suspected HIG/Taliban commanders disappeared prior to the ODA's arrival in the area. The SF Soldiers entered the area without any resistance, to a mostly welcome reception from the civilian population. Having adopted a realistic view of the operational environment freed the team to identify and focus on the most important issues — introducing the Afghan army and achieving civilian disarmament.

The Kandak proved to be far more effective than the Americans at convincing the population to surrender their weapons, as evidenced by events in Madr, the first town the team entered to effect disarmament. Thereafter, the AOB put the Kandak in the main effort. The model the AOB adopted was to move into the towns with the Kandak soldiers traveling in the front and rear of the convoy. The Kandak, with ODA 972, established security elements on either edge of town, and other ODAs secured a command post within the town. The remaining American and Afghan forces moved to secure known or suspected weapons caches.

Town elders approaching the command post began a dialogue with the Kandak and the ODA. The Kandak commander and the ODA 972 commander talked with the villagers. The Kandak commander discussed the role of the National Army, its eth-

nic diversity and the need to "bury the hatchet" in order to achieve peace, security and disarmament. The audience often gave vocal interjections of support during the commander's speech.

The ODA commander echoed the Kandak commander's comments, but he approached the issue from a slightly different angle. This added credibility and strength to the Kandak commander's words because of the respect given to American strength, ability to vouchsafe peace and security, and potential for delivering Civil Affairs assessors and accomplishing humanitarian projects in the area.

Variations on this routine included the Kandak commander explaining to the villagers how the Americans used satellites and computers to pinpoint and verify the AK-47 that a certain old man had buried in his home but was reluctant to admit that he was hiding. The ODA commander, looking significantly from his Global Positioning System to the close-air-support aircraft circling overhead, confirmed this technological capability in the villagers' minds.

The elders would go to their homes alone, or with Afghan soldiers and officers, and they would return bearing weapons. This process would continue over the next few days until the Kandak and U.S. forces were satisfied that they had secured a large part of the ordnance in the town. The same process was repeated throughout the valley.

These methods were successful and efficient, having a more positive effect on the civilian population than U.S.-led efforts by teams searching house-to-house with guns at the ready. There were too many homes, too many hiding spots and insufficient intelligence and manpower to rely on that course of action. The harsher methods were reserved for rare instances in which intelligence indicated a large cache or very hostile

environment. Working with the elders in a firm but respectful way helped the ODA develop a foundation of leadership and establish contacts that furthered efforts to collect information and shape the message in the towns. The majority of the population showed overwhelming support for the national government and army; for U.S. forces; and for peace, security and disarmament. The villagers also wanted to see AMF and local commanders replaced by the National Army and civilian authorities, including civilian-led police forces.

The second special-operations imperative — understand the political environment, allowed the team to overcome its greatest obstacle to mission success — AMF and ethnic rivalry and turf battles in the operational area. The southern portion of the Bamian province, which includes the town of Bamian, is dominated by ethnic Hazarans. Hazarans make up 19 percent of the Afghan population. An AMF "division" exists there, commanded and manned mostly by Hazarans. During the civil war, the Hazarans and Tajiks, a group that makes

A medic from the 19th SF Group treats the hand of village elder in Afghanistan. The SF Soldiers relied on their ability to gain the trust of the villagers by meeting some of their most basic needs, such as health care.

A member of the Afghan National Army's 3rd Kandak, or 2nd Battalion, pulls security while villagers listen intently to requests by the 19th SF Group and the Kandak for information and weapons.

up 25 percent of the country's population, fought each other fiercely, and many Tajiks sought safety in the northern part of Bamian province, where they formed an AMF "brigade" composed and led mainly by Tajiks. While their role in supporting the U.S. should not be minimized, these soldiers usually have no formal training, lack equipment and uniforms and generally are not considered to be a professional military force.

Initial intelligence reports, which provided the basis for the planning for Operation Roll Tide, came from sources in the Bamian area. Being on the ground in Madr allowed the ODAs to develop a more balanced, complex view and an understanding of the political environment throughout the province and of the political effects of their actions. The ODA learned that many of the AMF commanders were opportunists who traded their loyalty to the Taliban for power over the people, using their authority to deal in drugs, weapons and organized crime. The ODA found that the senior AMF commander had a deep personal rivalry with the deputy commander of the AMF Division in Bamian.

Both commanders had the backing of powerful leaders from different parties in the Afghan national government, and the politically motivated rivalry led to problems for the ODA and the Afghan battalion it was advising. Supporters of the AMF commander from the Bamian area often provided intelligence on caches in the Madr and Khamard valleys, the base of support for the other AMF commander. Because of their successes in disarming civilians and discovering weapons caches in the Madr area, and because of their mission mandate, the SF Soldiers applied far less pressure on the Bamian area. That upset the Afghan government leader, a member of the Ministry of Defense, whose political allies were being disarmed. Through Afghan channels, he indicated to Colonel Aminulla that perhaps the team was being too partisan in its disarmament efforts. In effect, the ODA's disarmament successes were undercutting Aminulla's position within the Ministry of Defense, and he was exactly the type and quality of commander that the U.S. needed to support and help to succeed.

Having achieved success at disarmament in the villages of the Madr valley and the western half of the Khamard valley, and recognizing the new political landscape and stakes, the team turned its attention to the eastern half of the Khamard valley, which was still under the firm control of the AMF commander who was allied with the key leader in the Ministry of Defense.

The ODA switched its tactics with that commander to "hard-nosed" cooperation and communication, and blunter communication with his rival in Bamian. The

(See ODA 972, next page)

SOF-specific pay scale needed

There are many bonuses, etc., bandied around these days. My thoughts are that a sliding, SOF-specific pay scale is what we need. Or simply a separate pay scale along the lines of what USSOCOM has set up for the 150k bonus (Army SF, SEALs, and AFSOC). In any case, pay the operators what they are worth, and don't wait until they are at 20 years of service.

Maybe [with a SOF pay scale] we won't perpetuate a "gray" force. My company warrant [officer] has grandchildren! Good on him, but he is actu-ally so long-toothed he is past the 26 years service eligibility for any of the 150k bonus.

So in short, the benefits would be twofold: to prevent folks from leaving the force for contract jobs, and to keep a younger force (that whole "warrior" frame of mind). The solution is coming, who will be the first to grasp it?

SFC Troy H. Thomas
1st Battalion / 10th SF Group

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DT-DM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28310; or send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil.*

ODA 972

team's efforts included establishing a regional peace council made up of elders from all the villages in Madr/Khamard. The council would meet once a week to discuss peace, security, disarmament and civil-affairs projects in the valley.

The U.S. and the 3rd Kandak hosted two peace conferences, one in Madr, the other in Bamian, involving both of the rival commanders, the Bamian provincial governor and police chief and their assistants, advisers and sub-commanders. The conferences resulted in a written, signed pact specifying disarmament and confidence-building actions both sides would take to decrease tensions.

The SF Soldiers supervised the establishment of the governor's civilian authority in Madr/Khamard, including the fair and open election of a Madr/Khamard sub-governor and police chief by elders from all the villages, and the establishment of a civilian police force in Khamard.

The National Army and AMF forces continue to co-exist in the province. Both groups maintain security and peace, but the role of the AMF vis-à-vis the Kandak is still ambiguous at best. The opportunity may still exist for a comprehensive peace in the Bamian-Khamard region, building on the progress of the initial peace agreements, which will provide the model for similar peace agreements in other areas of Afghanistan between rival ethnic, political and government groups.

The Afghan National Army, by establishing security, inspiring confidence among the Afghan civilians and setting a positive example of the ability of multi-ethnic groups to work together, will be key to the process. The experiences of the SF Soldiers of ODA 972 show how U.S. Special Forces, by understanding the environment and recognizing the political implications of their actions, can play a critical role in bringing stability to Afghanistan.

Major Vincent Martinelli served with the 19th Special Forces Group in Afghanistan during 2002 and 2003. He has since returned to active duty and is serving as a foreign-area officer. His previous assignments include service in mechanized-infantry and long-range surveillance units. His SF assignments include service as a detachment commander in the 10th and 19th SF groups. Major Martinelli is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

Warrant Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF warrant officers approved for CSRB

The Department of Defense has authorized a critical-skills retention bonus, or CSRB, for Special Forces warrant officers (military occupational specialty 180A) who have between 19 and 25 years of active federal service and who are fully eligible for continued service. Warrant officers in MOS 180A must have at least 18 years and six months of service before submitting their CSRB request; they may request the CSRB entitlement up to their 25th year of active federal service. The approval of the CSRB term will be the authority to retain the Soldiers up to their mandatory retirement date, which is specified in other provisions of law. Warrant officers will be required to obligate themselves for at least two additional years of service, without exceeding 25 years of service. An exception to the minimum obligation will be made for Solders who have completed at least 23 years of service. Those Soldiers may be offered a one-year CSRB contract, providing that they will not have completed 25 years of service prior to the end of their contract. Bonuses will be paid as follows:

Years obligation:	6	5	4	3	2	1*
CSRB amount:	$150K	$75K	$50K	$30K	18K	$8K

*One-year contract option only for Soldiers who have completed 23 years of service.

Soldiers can elect to receive their CSRB in a lump sum or in installments. Those who elect to receive their bonus in installments will receive equal annual payments based on the number of full years (12 months) of their obligation. The date of the annual payment will be based on the effective date established in the memorandum from the Army Human Resources Command, or HRC, that approves the request. A Soldier's active-duty service obligation will be determined from the effective date of the HRC approval memorandum.

Enlisted Soldiers who are serving an enlisted CSRB commitment and who are appointed as SF warrant officers will not be required to repay their previously awarded CSRB; however, they will be required to sign an agreement to complete the remaining portion of their CSRB period. Tax-exempt status will be determined by the Defense Finance Accounting Service, or DFAS, based on the warrant officer's location on the date of the HRC approval memorandum. Warrant officers who have approved retirement orders and are within the 19-to-25-year service period are eligible to apply for the CSRB. They must request withdrawal of their retirement in conjunction with their request or before processing of their CSRB is complete. The CSRB request cannot be approved until the approved retirement has been withdrawn. Warrant officers serving in MOS 180A who are under a CSRB obligation cannot be approved for separation or retirement without HRC approval.

Applicants should submit a CSRB request memorandum through their chain of command. A chain-of-command recommendation, signed by a lieutenant colonel or above, must be submitted on a separate memorandum. Requests should be mailed to: HRC; Attn: ARC-PLP-I; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332; or faxed to: DSN 221-6389 or commercial (703) 325-6389. The CSRB request memorandum, the endorsement from the chain of command and the

approval from HRC establishing the effective date are the documents that will obligate the warrant officer to the terms of the agreement and will be used by DFAS as the authority for disbursing payment of the bonus. For additional information, telephone the SF Service Career Manager, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Albert Buchinski, at DSN 221-5231 or commercial (703) 325-5231, or send e-mail to: albert.buchinski@hoffman.army.mil.

SF warrant officer accession bonus authorized

In an effort to attract and retain Soldiers in the Special Forces Warrant Officer Branch, the Department of Defense has authorized an accession bonus of $20,000 to SF NCOs in grades E6 through E8 who are selected and appointed as SF warrant officers (military occupational specialty 180A). As of May 18, qualified SF NCOs will receive a lump-sum payment upon their technical certification as SF warrant officers or upon completion of the Warrant Officer Basic Course for MOS 180A. The accession bonus is available to Soldiers with not more than 15 years of active federal service. Enlisted Soldiers currently serving under a commitment for a selective re-enlistment bonus or a critical-skills retention bonus who are selected and appointed as warrant officers will not be required to repay the previously awarded disbursements; however, they will have to sign an agreement to complete the remaining portion of their SRB/CSRB period. SF warrant officers who are obligated under an accession-bonus contract will not be approved for separation or retirement without the approval of the commander of the Army Human Resources Command, or HRC. Warrant officers who elect to receive the accession bonus will be counseled on the eligibility criteria, the service obligations, and the amount and payment of the bonus before they sign an agreement. The agreement will be forwarded to the Pay and Incentives Branch, HRC, for execution. A copy of the agreement will be placed in the warrant officer's military personnel records jacket, and a copy will be provided to the officer for his personnel records. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will inform HRC by memorandum of qualifying graduations from the Warrant Officer Basic Course. The Soldier's eligibility will be confirmed by HRC and reported to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to enable the disbursement of funds. For additional information, telephone the SF 180A accessions managers, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Santoro or Chief Warrant Officer 3 Charles Moritz, at DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to: santorom@soc.mil or to moritzc@soc.mil.

New chief warrant officer of SF Branch named

In May, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Frank became the new chief warrant officer of the SF Branch and the MOS 180A proponent manager, replacing Chief Warrant Officer 5 Bill McPherson. CW4 Frank has more than 20 years of SF experience, having served in operational positions at the SF detachment, company, battalion and group levels. He has served as an SF warrant officer in the 7th and 3rd SF groups. CW5 McPherson had served as the chief warrant officer of the SF Branch since early 2003. During his tenure, he was instrumental in the advancement of the Warrant Officer Education System, as well as in securing approval for SF warrant-officer pay and acquisition incentives. CW4 Frank may be reached by telephoning DSN 239-1879/7597 or commercial (910) 432-1879/7597, or by sending e-mail to: frankd@soc.mil.

Officer Career Notes

DA approves creation of CA, PSYOP officer branches

The proposal by the commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School for the creation of a Civil Affairs officer branch in the active Army and a Psychological Operations officer branch in the active Army and the reserve component has been approved by the Department of the Army. The effective date for the new branches will be Oct. 16, 2006.

PSYOP, CA functional-area codes to change

On Oct. 1, Functional Area 39, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, will realign its codes to more accurately differentiate its component functions. Psychological Operations, now FA 39B, will be redesignated FA 37A. Civil Affairs, now FA 39C, will be redesignated FA 38A. The changes will more accurately align officer and enlisted career fields, with the intent of creating a more committed, cohesive and professional officer and NCO corps. For questions pertaining to this realignment and the eventual transformation of the functional areas to branches, contact Lieutenant Colonel Curt Boyd, deputy director of the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, at DSN 239-7576, commercial (910) 432-7576, or send e-mail to curt.boyd@us.army.mil.

Distant-learning qualification for CAQC, POQC to end in 2006

Reserve-component officers in Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations who desire to complete the Civil Affairs Qualification Course or the Psychological Operations Qualification Course using the distant-learning option and attend the two-week resident Phase II at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School will have until July 1, 2006, to do so. The resident Phase II courses will be scheduled on an as-needed basis to support the population of officers in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command who have completed Phase I. As mobilizations for Iraq and Afghanistan continue, a 29-day intensive Mobilization Civil Affairs Course will provide deploying U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command officers the qualifications required to be operationally successful. USAR officers eligible for Branch 38A or Functional Area 37A qualification must be captains or majors, have completed the Captains' Career Course and meet the standards outlined in DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*. USAR CA or PSYOP officers desiring further attendance at the active-component pipeline courses (Advanced Regional Analysis Course, formerly Regional Studies and Language Training) can do so on a space-available basis. For questions regarding course prerequisites, telephone Major Kevin Shackleford at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: shacklke@soc.mil.

Enlisted Career Notes

Assignment Incentive Pay authorized for selected SF NCOs, warrant officers

The commander of the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, has directed the United States Army Special Operations Command to initiate and manage the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Assignment Incentive Pay, or AIP, program. AIP went into effect in May and will be paid at the rate of $750 per month. The program is open to SF warrant officers, SF enlisted Soldiers in grades E6 to E9, and enlisted members of special-mission units in grades E6 to E9, who are serving in USSOCOM-approved billets and have at least 25 years of active-duty service. To apply for AIP, eligible Soldiers must sign a written contract to remain on active duty for at least 12 months. Soldiers may be allowed to obligate themselves only until their mandatory retirement date. The contract, DA Form 4187, will be maintained in the Soldier's service record. The following statement must be used on the DA Form 4187:

I volunteer to remain on active duty in a United States Special Operations Command-designated assignment, (specify billet) for (state number of months), from the date of this agreement, and I agree to accept Assignment Incentive Pay of $750 per month for each month I serve in this assignment under this agreement.

I understand the consequences for voluntary or involuntary termination of this AIP contract:

(1) If I should terminate the AIP assignment or the actual contract I am now signing, all AIP will be stopped immediately.

(2) If my AIP tour is curtailed by HRC or curtailed for other, no-fault-of-mine reasons, AIP will be adjusted on a case-by-case basis.

(3) If I am placed in an AWOL or confinement status prior to completion of this assignment, AIP will be stopped. Furthermore, I understand that if I am absent from this USSOCOM-designated operator billet on a temporary additional duty assignment, I will continue to receive AIP.

For additional information, Soldiers should contact their unit S1.

Army seeks NCOs for new Civil Affairs MOS

To meet the manpower requirements of active-component Civil Affairs units, the Army Human Resources Command; the Special Operations Recruiting Command; the Training Development Division, or TDD, of the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine; and the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency have undertaken a coordinated effort to access, recruit, train and manage in-service active-duty enlisted NCOs who will be among the first active-duty NCOs in the new Civil Affairs military occupational specialty, 38B. TDD has completed the critical-task selection board and task analysis for MOS 38B and is designing the six-week reclassification course. For information, telephone Master Sergeant Robert Crite at DSN 239-5379, commercial (910) 432-5379, or send e-mail to: ca-psyoprecruiting@soc.mil. For reclassification instructions, contact the enlisted personnel manager, Sergeant First Class J.A. Cassel, at DSN 221-3899.

Update

SWCS producing new PSYOP publications

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, announces the publication of FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*.

The manual was released April 15. Emerging trends resulting from Army transformation initiatives, current operational procedures, force-design updates and new equipment are a few of the changes that precipitated the revision of this keystone manual for psychological operations, or PSYOP.

In rewriting the manual, the DOTD Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division sought to precisely define the mission, roles and functions, and core tasks of PSYOP. The manual introduces a newly refined seven-phase PSYOP process, which will appear in greater detail in subsequent manuals. FM 3-05.30 captures those changes that are having a profound impact on the planning and execution of PSYOP, particularly in support of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT.

Two additional manuals that focus primarily on tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTP, for PSYOP forces are also priorities for the PSYOP Division. A new manual, FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, is being readied for release during the summer of 2005. This manual will provide PSYOP Soldiers with the necessary information to facilitate the planning and conduct of tactical-level PSYOP.

Much of the contents of FM 3-05.302 were derived from exhaustive research and analyses of current Army doctrine and concepts, and direct observations of TTPs and lessons learned from the field. The increased demand for tactical-level PSYOP forces, the implementation of Army modularity and the number of tactical lessons learned from operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, or OEF and OIF, made the need for a separate tactical PSYOP TTP evident. Included in the manual is an expansion of the seven-phase PSYOP process introduced in the keystone manual and a discussion of the role of PSYOP in stability operations.

The PSYOP Division has begun the revision process of FM

Making friends

A Soldier from the Asadabad Provincial Reconstruction Team of the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force is greeted by a little boy in Manoi, Afghanistan.

Army News Service

3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (December 2003). Although a good portion of the contents of this manual remains fresh, there are a sufficient number of changes to warrant an early revision. Rapid modifications to operating tactics and procedures; changes in relationships of command and control; and the fielding of new equipment, all brought about by OEF/OIF, provided ample justification for revising the TTP manual.

With the creation of a separate tactical PSYOP TTP manual, FM 3-05.301 will now focus more on PSYOP TTP at the operational level and above. It will also include emerging TTP for the newest fielded PSYOP system, the Wind Support Aerial Delivery System.

Finally, in addition to the revision of the keystone manual and the development of the tactical PSYOP TTPs, the PSYOP Division has developed and released another new product; *Psychological Operations Handbook: Equipment Types, Specifications and Capabilities*. This pocket-sized handbook was printed in April 2005 and is being shipped to PSYOP units.

The handbook replaces the former version of this handbook, SWCS Pub 525-5-16. The initial intent was to produce a graphic training aid; however, to expedite its release and delivery to deployed PSYOP Soldiers, the handbook was printed locally.

Another pocket-sized handbook, the *PSYOP Leader's Planning Guide*, is in production and is scheduled for release during July and August 2005. OEF/OIF lessons learned indicated the need for a standardized "smart book" that could be kept in a Soldier's cargo pocket for quick reference.

The handbook incorporates information found in other tactical reference guides and contains pertinent excerpts from FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics,*

Changing of the guard

The commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger, passes the guidon and control of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment to Colonel Kevin Mangum during a June 3, 2005, ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky. Mangum replaced Colonel Andrew Milani, who will become the USASOC chief of staff.

Army News Service

Techniques and Procedures, and the new FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.*

The PSYOP Division continues to strive to anticipate and meet the needs of the community through the development of relevant and timely products. The field manuals and handbooks are only a few of the products being produced by the division at this time. In addition to the products mentioned, a number of training videos that depict new doctrine are also being developed. These products will be used to supplement PSYOP initial-entry training for enlisted Soldiers and officers, as well as to serve as professional-development products for refresher training. Information regarding the videos will be provided in the future.

For additional information, telephone Dave Farrington, DOTD PSYOP Division, at DSN 239-7257, commercial (910) 432-7257, or send e-mail to: farringd@soc.mil.

Book Reviews

Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World. *By Ralph Peters. Mechanicsburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 2002. ISBN: 0-8117-0024-0. 353 pages. $22.95.*

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters' book, *Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World*, is an anthology of thought-provoking articles Peters wrote for various periodicals between 1998 and 2001. These articles focus on strategy, foreign policy and military affairs. He wrote the book with the goal of sharing his observations on national security and to be an honest witness to recent events that have challenged U.S. leaders who set policy as well as the service-members who are tasked with carrying it out.

To get an appreciation for the comprehensiveness of the book, we should first remind ourselves of one of the enduring strategists Peters writes about, Sun Tzu, who said, "Know your enemy, know yourself, and your victory will not be threatened. ... Know the terrain and your victory will be complete." This admonition frames the book. Peters looks critically at the enemy (terrorists and other transnational actors), ourselves (the U.S. national-security apparatus) and the terrain (the urban environment and the heart and soul of man).

Peters devotes much of his book to the strategic issues involved in combating terrorism. Peters uses his background in military intelligence and his broad experience from worldwide deployments to write cogently about terrorist motivation and psychology (know your enemy). He explains different types of terrorist organizations and how ideology, religion, culture, mass behavior and hatred affect them. After giving the reader a better understanding of the threat, Peters suggests concise and operational ways of dealing with it.

To improve capabilities for successfully confronting transnational and ambiguous threats, Peters examines the U.S. (know yourself). He speaks about the power of information management and how populations differ in their abilities to discern quality information. Peters is also interested in preparedness, pressing for the need for alignment between strategic goals and the military capabilities and training that are needed to successfully fulfill national objectives. These capabilities include lithe expeditionary and constabulary forces that are prepared psychologically for a violent world. In terms of improving the nation's ability to fight terrorism, Peters is not afraid to take on sacred cows, criticize bureaucratic careerists or confront self-serving intellectuals.

Having written about knowing the enemy and knowing oneself, Peters then describes the environment in which conflicts occur (know the terrain). He dedicates a portion of the book to terrain, especially urban terrain. He assesses the challenges of urban combat and suggests new ways of thinking about it.

Peters also takes the concept of "terrain" to a different level. For intelligence and military operations to be successful, one must understand the terrain of the human mind and heart. To do so also means ensuring that the military personnel system rewards and promotes those who are willing to challenge, adapt and improve systems, procedures and ways of doing business in an uncertain environment.

Whether or not one agrees with Peters' views, one must give him credit for his deep appreciation for the threat of terrorism prior to 9/11, as well as for his uncanny eye for much-needed military capabilities. Given Peters' breadth and grasp of military affairs, history, culture and politics covered in his articles, his recommendations for further reading in those areas would have been welcome. Peters takes the reader beyond the traditional paradigm of strategy to offer some of the most innovative

thinking available on the security challenges confronting the United States. *Beyond Terror* is a great read for anyone interested in intelligence, national security, military strategy or terrorism.

LTC Fred Krawchuk
SOCPAC
Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG. *By John L. Plaster. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004. ISBN: 0-684-85673-5. 366 pages. $26.*

John Plaster has become the premier chronicler of the Vietnam-era Studies and Observation Group, or SOG. Prior to the publication of his earlier books, there was little known about this outfit, and considerably little of that was in the public domain.

A few files were held in the Special Operations Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defended for a quarter-century by a succession of special-operations staff officers who recognized the historical value of this trove and resisted repeated efforts to send it to classified destruction. A bit more was to be found in the U.S. Army Military History Institute's senior-officer interviews. The official SOG annual historical reports, cryptic to the point of being understandable only by a *cognoscente*, were buried yet elsewhere.

The bulk of the available knowledge, however, was in the memories of the widely dispersed surviving SOG veterans. Many of the last, recalling the classified nature of the operations and their long-ago secrecy oaths, spoke little of their experiences, and then usually only to other SOG veterans.

Plaster hunted down the dispersed and obscure documentary sources — often pursuing the mere

rumors of sources. Of equal importance, he pressed the Department of Defense, or DoD, to declassify the remaining records. This was complicated, not because DoD wanted to retain classification, but because these were old files, and the personnel demands of daily administrative duties took priority over the downgrading of what were essentially historical materials.

Declassification was further complicated by the fact that as SOG had disappeared near the end of the Vietnam War, there was no successor organization to pass on the validity of the downgrades and redacts. But Plaster's persistence paid off, and the documents were eventually declassified.

Then, armed with a statement by DoD to the effect that it was no longer necessary to maintain silence on SOG activities, Plaster went in search of the veterans. His first book based on his accumulated materials, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam*, was well-received, doing very well both in individual and book-club sales. It also provided an incentive for some very imaginative but dishonest TV writers to produce the CNN "Tailwind" fiasco.

On a more positive note, Plaster's efforts were instrumental in the Department of the Army, 29 years after SOG's demise, awarding the unit a laudatory and richly deserved Presidential Unit Citation. Plaster subsequently produced *SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars*. Nominally a coffee-table photo book, it was exceptional both because of the impressive number and content of the photos of what had been an obscure and highly classified subject, and because of its excellent and extensive accompanying text.

Secret Commandos, Plaster's latest effort, is his best. Unlike his first book, which was essentially a collection of vignettes, *Secret Commandos* is a personal memoir of his

three years in SOG — almost half of the organization's operational life. It records his infiltration of SOG, for which he had minimal training and no experience, his near deployment on a disastrous mission, his subsequent training and experience as a team member and team leader, and finally, his time as a SOG airborne controller or covey rider.

The memoir format gives the book a personal character and a continuity that was impossible with Plaster's earlier books. His descriptions remain vivid, but here, they are enhanced by his personal narrative, often including his thoughts and emotions. His descriptions of his training, preparations and operations provide a mental movie of SOG team operations.

The book presents a number of lessons, intended or not. The most important has to be the necessity of having quality personnel in such demanding operations. One aspect of this is the quality of the team leaders (called one-zeros) and their dedication, decisiveness, independence and strength of character. Another aspect is the unimportance of pay grade in a deadly environment in which the only real criterion of worth was a man's ability to do the job.

In recent Special Forces campaigns, the total dependence on aviation for communications, fire support and exfiltration may have become commonplace, but at the time of SOG's operations, it was both new and unique. It was also a product of the professionalism of the aviators, not of their senior headquarters, which were largely opposed to providing support.

Plaster describes some events during stand-down periods that could most kindly be described as immature. The reader should recognize these revelations as evidence of the honesty of the book. The reader should also recognize that these men were living in the total absence of domesticating influences, were daily losing comrades who were as close as brothers, were operating with a recognition that the odds of surviving were prohibitively negative, and above all, that many of them were *very* young. Plaster himself was only 22 at the end of his three years of combat in SOG.

Secret Commandos is highly recommended as a valued addition to any Soldier's professional library and as an exceptionally enjoyable read. It contains Vietnam War history, Special Forces heritage, examples of both tactical and supervisory leadership, and operational accounts that are far more exciting than any fictional yarns.

That the SOG reconnaissance teams performed their missions with courage, wit, panache and a defiant morale in the face of enormous casualties is both a wonder and a proud heritage. It is best summed up in their self-devised motto:

You've never lived till you've almost died.
*For those who fight for it,*
Life has a flavor
The protected will never know.

   COL J.H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam. *By Timothy J. Lomperis. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996. ISBN: 0-8078-4577-9 (paperback). 440 pages. $21.95.*

This is a book about the non-lesson "lessons" of the Vietnam War. Published in 1996, it could be considered the most horribly confusing book about political-military strategy ever conceived. It is based tightly on articulating research bounded inside a "paradigmatic presupposition," and many early readers would venture to believe that Lomperis wasted a decade of research to make sense of a society "in the throes of a revolutionary insurgency struggling to form and consolidate an independent and modernizing state." But reading this book in 2005 makes it all relevant. It actually makes perfect sense, so much so that when read and digested properly, it can be used to predict not only how the newly formed Iraqi government will stabilize and prevail, but also to predict when it will happen, by month and year, and that will determine the U.S.- exit strategy.

Like wine, this book definitely got better with age! Lomperis grew up as a missionary kid in India and, like how most MKs grow up (this reviewer included), become prescient long-range thinkers, groomed by years of thinking multi-culturally, in multiple languages, and knowing multiple theories of what constitutes rebellion and change in non-democratic societies. Using that type of upbringing, Lomperis asks his readers to understand two significant ideas. First, what are the ingredients of a successful insurgency (and, conversely, of a successful counterinsurgency) and second, what is the optimal level of a Western intervention in either thwarting (or aiding) an insurgency?

These two conceivably simple questions form both an empirical question and a policy question in which the United States currently finds itself, again, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lomperis' non-lessons about Vietnam now ring true when overlaid onto our current situation. The empirical question has been answered: Can nations involved in an insurgency conduct free, fair and competitive elections? Obviously the answer is "yes," since it was so admirably demonstrated in both war-torn nations. Elections are the key non-lesson learned from Vietnam since they were never accomplished correctly, fairly, freely or even competitively. Lomperis states, then proves conclusively, that elections are the "true Achilles heel" of the insurgent's strategy to destroy popularly-elected government.

As for the concept of involvement, Lomperis demonstrates that once a legitimate government has been empowered, the building of respect for it must be undertaken. From a policy viewpoint, our intervention/involvement with a nation struggling to overcome a fully enveloped insurgency must be a threefold arrangement.

First, Lomperis argues that society's fundamental "constitutional" arrangements and historical traditions must be upheld; second, by being itself duly constituted by these arrangements and performing the group functions prescribed for it; and, finally, by being acceptably competent in the discharge of its duties and policies. An insurgency, which is a challenge to constituted authority, will attempt to undermine the police forces first and foremost because they are the most conspicuous targets. However, the more legitimate the government and the more corrosion that can be placed on the insurgent forces, the sooner the insurgency will be broken and stability returned. The summary of this concept is policy in action: belief, opportunity, interest.

To bring about the change of government from turmoil due to insurgency and into a sphere of stability,

Chapter 11 is the most interesting and useful because it demonstrates how to create a timeline for an exit strategy. Using lessons from six case studies: Mao's long march in China from 1920-1949, Greece 1941-1949, the Philippines 1946-1956, Malaya 1948-1960, Cambodia-Laos 1949-1975, and Sendero Luminoso's Peru 1970-1992, Lomperis benchmarks insurgent successes and defeats in a smartly laid out timeline that identifies factors important to legitimate governments. He then plots categories and possible futures which are laid out for policy analysts to mull over. Lomperis' work shows that after legitimate national elections, victory will take approximately five years to achieve, if all involved will stay the course.

This book is an important addition to the body of knowledge regarding insurgency in nations

that have undergone Western interventions. While the author may have struggled to make sense of the Vietnam War and couldn't, he definitely makes sense of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would behoove those who quantify and codify "lessons learned" for special warfare instructional purposes to read this book, again, and develop the wherewithal and policies to ensure that Iraq and Afghanistan survive and prosper and that our exit from those nations be seen as a victory over those who believe in anarchy.

Dr. David Bradford
Merritt Island, Fla.

Special Warfare welcomes submissions

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to Editor, *Special Warfare*; Attn: AOJK-DTD-DM; USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310; or e-mail them to steelman@soc.mil.

Manuscripts should be 3,000 to 5,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double spaced, in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all contributions. *Special Warfare* will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version; requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

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Special Warfare

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