Special Warfare

November-December 2006
Volume 19 Issue 6

WAGING PEACE IN THE PHILIPPINES



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

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Special Warfare

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

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Probably in no realm of military activity is the human element as important as it is in special operations, and this issue of *Special Warfare* illustrates various facets of that importance.

Command Sergeant Major William Eckert's article shows how the activities of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, or JSOTF-P, are designed to improve the lives of the populace in JSOTF-P's area of operations. The article clearly shows the relationship between the task force's programs and JSOTF-P's success in reducing popular support for terrorists and insurgents.

Chaplain Timothy Bedsole's article on the need to appreciate and assess the religious aspects of our operations shows that even operations not targeted at the population need to be planned with an appreciation for the way they will affect and will be perceived by the people. One of the most important determinants of the people's perception may be their religion, and he offers ideas for evaluating the ways our actions may be perceived.

From the viewpoint of military leaders, one of the most important aspects of the human element is the Soldiers they lead. Based on their experience in multiple rotations overseas, Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bolduc and Command Sergeant Major Thomas W. Hedges Jr. of the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, write about dealing with the effects of continual deployments upon their Soldiers. By sharing their techniques and lessons learned, they can help other units sustain effective operations and maintain their warriors' edge.

As trainers, we must focus on the Soldiers we train and on teaching them to work with others. In the article on peer evaluations, Meredith Cracraft, Dr. Michelle Wisecarver and Lieutenant Colonels Mark Baggett and Tom Miller show how peer evaluations are useful and how they are used in our training at SWCS. By conducting peer assessments and making Soldiers aware of their peers' assessments of their strengths and weaknesses, we can build their self-awareness and help them in their efforts toward self-development.

Including religion in our doctrinal products, broadening language training and improving the cultural education of our Soldiers are all part of the changes we are making to support ARSOF operations in the Global War on Terrorism. During the last two years, we have made the most significant changes to Special Forces training in recent history, and now we are in the process of transforming our PSYOP and CA training, as well. In producing adaptable Soldiers, we must be adaptable trainers. Our foremost concern for the human element must be the Soldier whose success and whose life may depend upon the value of our training.

Major General James W. Parker

SF Soldiers awarded Silver Stars for Valor

USASOC Public Affairs Office

Thirty-one Soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group were decorated in a Fort Bragg ceremony Aug. 8 with honors that included three Silver Star Medals for valorous actions during Operation Enduring Freedom.

The three Silver Star Medal recipients were Master Sergeant Keith Logsdon, Sergeant First Class Bruce Holmes and Staff Sergeant Matthew Keefe.

The Silver Star Medal is the Army's third highest award for combat valor and is presented to Soldiers distinguished by their gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States during military operations.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, presided over the ceremony and awarded the medals to each honoree.

"Today we acknowledge valor and sacrifice of individuals who displayed a level of bravery and courage in combat beyond the call of duty and who epitomize quiet professionals," said Csrnko.

In addition to the Silver Star Medal, 3rd Special Forces Group Soldiers received the Bronze Star Medal for Valor, the Purple Heart and the Army Commendation Medal for Valor.

^ **SILVER STAR** Staff Sergeant Matthew Keefe receives the Silver Star Medal from Major General Thomas R. Csrnko during the Aug. 8 ceremony. *Photo courtesy USASOC PAO.*

Receiving the Bronze Star Medal with "V" device were Captain Mir Ali, Captain Christopher Augustine, Sergeant Jonathon Bennett, Sergeant Richard J. Concepcion, Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Craig, Sergeant First Class Euclid Cruz, Chief Warrant Officer Bruce Defeyter, Sergeant Trent Garner, Captain Roger Gavriluk, Sergeant First Class Donald Grambusch, Sergeant First Class Charles Green, Master Sergeant Van E. Hines, Sergeant First Class Jerry Hochstedler, Master Sergeant Rob Latham, Sergeant First Class Troy A. Lettieri, Staff Sergeant Donald C. Maguin, Staff Sergeant Richard Moore, Staff Sergeant James Parsons, Master Sergeant Brian E. Penrod, Sergeant First Class Mario A. Ramirez, Sergeant First Class Jared B. Reesor, Sergeant First Class Robert Thibeault, Sergeant First Class Robert Vires, Master Sergeant Ricky Wigent and Sergeant First Class Shaun Womack.

New SWCS branch to capture operational trends

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has formed a new branch to analyze trends resulting from Army special-operations missions and training and incorporate them into SWCS training and doctrine products.

As part of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Joint and Army Doctrine Integration Division, the new Trends Analysis Branch will collect and analyze data from a variety of current and historical sources, according to the branch chief, Cameron Barr. Those sources will include the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Special Operations Command of Joint Forces Command.

The branch will provide lessons, observations and insights from its analysis and make recommendations to Army special-operations trainers and doctrine writers to integrate them into their products. "Our goal is to facilitate positive changes in doctrine and training to enable ARSOF Soldiers to achieve higher levels of survivability and combat performance," Barr said.

For additional information, contact the Trends Analysis Branch at DSN 236-1348, commercial (910) 396-1348, or send e-mail to jallarsof@soc.mil (NIPRNet) or jallarsof@usasoc.socom.smil.mil (SIPRNet).

Irizarry assumes command of 95th CA Brigade

Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry II assumed command of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade in a ceremony on Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Field Aug. 17.

Presiding over the ceremony was Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The assumption-of-command ceremony marked a new milestone in the brigade's history.

"Rarely do you get to stand in a place where history is being made, and that is exactly what is happening here today," said Wagner.

The 95th CA Brigade assumed provisional brigade status in March and will remain in carrier status until March 2007. It was originally constituted as the 95th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Government Group, on Aug. 25, 1945. Since then, the brigade has undergone a series of inactivations, reactivations and deactivations.

Irizarry was formerly the G3 of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. According to Wagner, Irizarry is now in charge of a fighting force that has consistently been deployed. Wagner explained that 30 to 50 percent of the Soldiers were deployed throughout the entire year of 2005. Currently, the brigade is deployed to five continents in support of the Global War on Terrorism and many other missions.

"The current reality of the world is such that your skills and unique capabilities are heavily in demand throughout the world," Wagner said to the Soldiers of the 95th.

"Since the early 90s, Civil Affairs have been what we called the high-demand, low-density force. The demand exceeded the inventory."

In addition to Irizarry assuming command, Command Sergeant Major Timothy Strong was officially appointed to the responsibilities of command sergeant major.

^ **DISPLAYING THE COLORS** Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry and Command Sergeant Major Timothy Strong, both of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, uncase the unit's provisional colors in an assumption of command ceremony Aug. 17 at Fort Bragg. *USASOC PAO.*

During the ceremony, Irizarry and Strong uncased the unit's provisional colors for the first time. The uncasing of this brigade's colors happened 61 years after the brigade's original activation and almost 32 years after it was deactivated. The colors are identical to the colors of the 95th Civil Affairs Group, which were cased Dec. 18, 1974, in a deactivation ceremony at Fort Bragg. Relative to colors of other fighting forces, the 95th CA Brigade colors depict not only the heritage and history of the brigade but also its loyalty of its Soldiers.

The 95th CA Brigade is the only active-duty Civil Affairs brigade in the Army.

USAJFKSWCS honors top instructors

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School honored five instructors in a ceremony held Sept. 26.

Major Thomas Stamp Jr. was recognized as the 2006 Officer Instructor of the Year, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Patrick Mitchell as the Warrant Officer Instructor of the Year, Sergeant First Class Eric Strumski as the NCO Instructor of the Year and Andrew Borsz as the Civilian Instructor of the Year.

Strumski, who teaches at the SWCS NCO Academy, says there is a sense of urgency among all SWCS instructors because they know the Soldiers they are training are likely to be deployed soon after leaving SWCS. "It's real easy to keep the material fresh, and I try to take their (the Soldiers') experiences and tie it in to the training," he said.

Stamp, who was a Psychological Operations instructor when he was nominated for the award, is now the company commander for all entry-level Soldiers in PSYOP training.

"I try and plug in with current operations and use that information to keep things current," he said.

Mitchell teaches advanced special-operations techniques, and Borsz teaches negotiation and mediation to all ARSOF Soldiers.

The schoolhouse has more than 600 instructors, and choosing one in each of the four categories is not an easy task, according to Dr. Rebecca Campbell, director of the Department of Education. "Our instructors are some of the best in the business," she said.

That quality was evident during a special presentation made to Sergeant First Class Keith Gates, another SWCS Soldier, who was selected earlier this year as the top Army instructor by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC.

Gates, the SWCS 2005 NCO Instructor of the Year, competed against 30 other nominees from schools and training centers across the Army to win the top-instructor designation.

During the ceremony, Major General James W. Parker, the SWCS commanding general, presented Gates with a Meritorious Service Medal, as well as a plaque and a letter from TRADOC.

Gates, who now works in the operations office at the NCO Academy, says the recognition is not a sign of his personal achievement. "Every one of the instructors who are my peers could be in my place right now," Gates said.

Working in classroom and field environments, the civilian and military instructors of SWCS train more than 7,500 students each year.

SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS HONOR THEIR HERITAGE

U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers paid tribute to more than 80 surviving veterans of the First Special Service Force, or FSSF, a World War II special-operations unit to which they trace their lineage, during that unit's 60th reunion Aug. 17-19 in Helena, Mont.

The FSSF, a unique combined force of Americans and Canadians, was activated in July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison and saw heavy fighting in Italy and southern France before its deactivation in December 1944.

With representatives from all seven U.S. Army Special Forces groups and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command present, the Green Berets — joined by their Canadian Special Forces colleagues — provided interpretive equipment displays and parachute jump demonstrations, and they participated in all FSSF remembrance activities during the three-day reunion.

The reunion's two main remembrance events: a memorial service and a military tattoo, were held Aug. 18. During the memorial service at Helena's Memorial Park, hundreds gathered to pay respects to the members of the FSSF, living and dead. Wreaths were placed at a stone memorial with an encased FSSF flag, while silent prayers were offered during a bagpipe rendition of "Amazing Grace."

Later, at Fort Harrison, the tattoo included a number of re-enactments and musical performances dedicated to the FSSF, including those of Canadian and American pipe-and-drum marching bands. A crowd favorite was a demonstration of military free-fall parachuting by a U.S. Special Forces team, which landed on the post's parade field.

At a banquet held Aug. 19 in honor of the Force, hundreds of people — Force veterans, their families and friends — gathered with present-day Soldiers to honor fallen comrades, recall the unit's history and recognize the legacy of modern Special Forces units spawned by the Force's creation.

During the banquet, the winners of the First Special Service Force Association's annual Frederick Award were announced. Named for Major General Robert T. Frederick, the decorated first commander of the FSSF, the Frederick Award is presented to both an American and a Canadian Special Forces Soldier in recognition of outstanding contributions to their military units and local communities.

^ **PAYING RESPECTS** First Special Service Force Soldiers pass by their successors as they march into a memorial service held in their honor at Memorial Park, Helena, Mont. Aug. 19. *Photo by Gillian M. Albro, U.S. Army Special Operations command.*

First Sergeant Daren Drudy of the 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky., and Canadian army Sergeant Gary Grant, a seven-year veteran of Canadian special-operations forces, were named the recipients of the Frederick Award.

"How humbling it is to be associated with the First Special Service Force, and to have your name mentioned in the same sentence as General Frederick," Drudy said. "The true blessing in receiving this award was the fact that I got to come here and see, to rub elbows with, the men … who served with the First Special Service Force."

Later, three shell casings and a piece of stone from the cliffs of Monte la Difensa, the site of the Force's first battle in the Italian theater, were presented by an Italian delegation as a gift to the FSSF Association for its famed defeat of Nazi troops there in December 1943. The items were accepted by Major General Randall D. Mosley, Montana's adjutant general, on behalf of the association; the artifacts will be displayed at Fort Harrison's museum.

The events at Monte la Difensa were famously profiled in a 1966 book and a 1968 film, both titled *The Devil's Brigade*, a nickname the Force had earned because of its fierce and unconventional fighting style.

Capping the evening's events was an announcement from Major General Thomas Csrnko, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, that the Department of the Army had approved the awarding of the Bronze Star Medal to the Canadian members of the FSSF. Only the American FSSF veterans had previously been eligible to receive the award.

At last year's reunion, held in Calgary, Alberta, the Canadians were presented with the U.S. Army's Combat Infantryman Badge in recognition of their hard-won contributions to the Force's fight.

Thomas Phillips, 84, of Fairmount, Ga., was with the Force from its early days in Helena and participated in all unit deployments, from the Aleutian Islands in 1943 to action in southern France in 1944.

When Phillips spoke of a fallen comrade killed during combat in Italy, his words embodied the bittersweet emotions that permeated the reunion: "It brings tears to my eyes to think of what we accomplished — and what we lost."

Csrnko said the spirit of the First Special Service Force will continue to live on through the U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers of today.

"We followed in their footsteps, so the legacy that we are born from is a mantle we have to hold high and maintain," he said. "We will continue to uphold the standards that they set."



Religion: The Missing Dimension in Mission Planning

By Chaplain (Major) Timothy K. Bedsole

Since 9/11, United States Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, have been at the forefront of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT. As a result of SOF expertise in military operations ranging from counterinsurgency to nation-building, they are recognized as one of the greatest force multipliers in the U.S. military arsenal.

One of the foundations of ARSOF's expertise is their ability to incorporate cultural intelligence into their operations. Since 9/11, a growing awareness of the role of religious identity has caused our nation's leaders to focus increasingly on the importance of religious ideology. The recent "long war brief" addresses the need to counter the religious ideology of extremist Islamic groups. Doing so will require not only a deeper understanding of religion's effects upon society than is currently provided by intelligence analyses and products, but also an increased emphasis on including religious factors in mission planning.

The changing dynamics of conflict are driving a profound change in ARSOF operations. Finding the center of gravity of the conflict may require translating unfamiliar religious traditions into mission factors. Religion, in the form of nonstate actors, faith-based transnational networks, polygonal insurgency operations and transcendent ideology, challenges the power of secular organizations. The answer to overcoming those challenges is not to exclude religion from planning but rather to increase our understanding of religious factors.

ARSOF need to examine the application of religious factors to mission planning and develop a synchronized process within intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB. There is a need to integrate a new religious-factors analysis, or RFA, into the IPB process so that religious factors become actionable elements of the mission plan.

Why religion matters

In the movie "Flight 93," there is a poignant scene showing the terrorists of 9/11 lifting up prayers for the success of their mission, while the passengers are asking God for strength to survive the terror. It is a moving moment that illustrates the complexity of religion: It motivates some to kill, and it gives others strength, but for both groups, religion speaks to the deeper meaning of life. Given religion's complexity and power, it is imperative that we understand the way it shapes modern warfare and the modern battlefield.

There are several reasons for religion's ability to shape the battlefield:

- Religion answers the big questions in life, death and war. It is germane to all conflict.
- Religion adds a higher intensity, severity, brutality and lethality to conflict than do other factors.
- Religion offers a stronger identity to participants in conflicts than other forms of identity, such as nationality, ethnicity, politics or language.
- Religion can motivate the masses quickly and cheaply, and it often remains outside the view of nation-state security forces.
- Religion offers an ideology — or a platform for a political ideology — that resonates stronger than other forms of propaganda.
- Religious leaders are often the last leaders left when states fail, and they offer a voice to the disempowered or oppressed.
- Religious leaders are often the first to seek peace and reconciliation after conflict.
- Religious factors are fundamental to conflict resolution and conflict management.
- Religious nongovernmental organizations supply a major portion of support to humanitarian efforts in military missions.[1]

Given the nature of SOF missions, understanding religious factors is critical to predicting the human response to ARSOF operations. One definition of religion is "the human response to the perceived sacred." As a human response, it can be negative or positive. Understanding the positive and negative aspects is critical to explaining the human response. Trying to win the hearts and minds of local populations without understanding their souls deprives our efforts of one of the greatest avenues of approach. Combatting religious insurgents without understanding religious factors limits ARSOF's abilities. While we are not engaged in a religious war, we must understand religious factors if we are to gain a clear view of the battlefield.

Religion has shaped every conflict of the past, and there are indicators that its influence will only grow. For this reason alone, ARSOF Soldiers must seek to understand the impact that religious factors have on their missions, and they must learn to leverage those factors. Sometimes the impediment to understanding is not the lack of tools for analysis but rather the failure to apply them. The mission of each ARSOF unit calls for a different emphasis in religious analysis, but a good beginning step is to examine why we need to emphasize religious factors. If we do not know why religion is important to a culture, we may fail to interpret the culture's responses to our military actions. To begin an analysis of religious factors, we must first look within ourselves.

Religious implications of today's missions

In 1996, the unit to which the author was assigned as a chaplain entered Gradačac, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to begin the mission of the international peacekeeping force. As a force-protection measure, my commander sent me to meet the town's religious leaders. After returning from a meeting with the local imam, I relayed a message to our controlling unit that the imam would like to meet with someone from the military to discuss issues in the town. I will never forget the unit S2's reaction: "Chaplain, what has God got to do with this mess?" Taking a typical secular approach,[2] he failed to see any military importance in meeting with a local religious leader. He suffered from "secular myopia" and could not see the religious factors in the mission.[3] He dismissed the action as unnecessary, completely discounting the fact that five religions — Ro-

man Catholicism, Islam, the Serbian Orthodox church, Judaism and Protestantism — shaped the conflict.[4]

Now, 10 years later, when some SOF Soldiers are asked about religion, a common response is, "We don't do religion ... it is too dangerous to work with, so we leave it alone." Thankfully, this view is changing with a renewed interest in cultural intelligence, but we must be careful to look at the total picture in our mission analysis. If we fail to consider the dynamics of religion in a culture, we limit our intelligence and allow religion to remain a secret code of motivating messages and symbols that will confound our analysis and hamper our understanding of the enemy's center of gravity. Framing the GWOT in religious ideology, symbols and terms, Osama bin Laden has lifted the fight into the spiritual realm, giving him a power lacking to secular insurgents and terrorists.

Re-education process

The Western education system embraces the idea of the separation of church and state. That separation often results in a minimalist view of religious factors, and in military operations, that view can prevent an accurate area analysis.

When one considers that the Western view is shared by less than one-sixth of the world's population and is a concept foreign to the indigenous populations in most of today's areas of operations, the possibility of error in analysis increases.[5] To prevent errors from occurring and to increase the understanding of religious factors in mission planning, we must develop a new understanding of the basic religious worldview. Such an understanding must link transcendent values with temporal actions.

To increase their understanding of religious factors, Soldiers must develop a view of religion that erases the separation between private religion and public actions. This does not mean that the Soldier must convert to a particular religious view, but he must seek to understand religion if he is to leverage it in mission planning. Soldiers don't have to "do" religion, but if we don't "get" religion, we will miss a tremendous opportunity to use the center of gravity in many conflicts.

Religion and politics

A quick study of the link between international politics and religion would help to improve our understanding of religion. Providing security is a major goal of political powers. As Barry Rubin, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, states:

In many areas of the world, religion should be seen as a central political pillar maintaining the power of any ruler — a major pole in determining the people's loyalty — and as a key ingredient in determining a nation's stability or instability. ... [R]eligion plays a key role as an important defining characteristic of politically contending communities.[6]

For many societies, religion is the richest form of public motivation. It allows unrelated groups to coexist peacefully and gives people a higher motive for selfless service.[7] Presidents of the United States have understood religion's power to reassure our nation in difficult times. Soldiers who have dealt with mass movements or riots started by a religious leader or a religious ritual understand the power of religion to shape the mission.

Normally, the American Soldier thinks in terms of providing security through strength and firepower — bringing religion into the formula requires a deeper understanding of the linkage. Osama bin Laden understands the link and has exploited it. His *fatwas*, or religious edicts, against the American presence in Saudi Arabia and his inclusion of the United States into the classification of infidels plays to a populace of the disempowered and provides them the promise of security through a religious hope. He has linked religious and political ideology with psychological finesse.

How does the SOF Soldier counter this exploitation of religion for ideological and political purposes? By understanding how religion interacts with society and exploiting the weakness of bin Laden's ideology through unconventional countermeasures and tactical diplomacy. Khaled Abou El Fadl, in his book, *The Great Theft*, states, "[N]othing helps the puritans' cause as much as Western ignorance, prejudice and hate."[8] Promoting a deeper understanding of religion and political security gives the American Soldier a countermeasure for use against those who believe we are spreading Americanization — also labeled as globalization or Westoxification — to other parts of the world. Leveraging this understanding could help us find innovative approaches for helping indigenous people retain their group identity while working with SOF. It would also help us rob a religiously motivated insurgency of its ability to use ideology to promote insecurity and to alienate the indigenous population.

An example of the effective use of religion in a military mission comes from Afghanistan, where the 1st Battalion, 19th SF Group, used money from the Commander's Emergency Response Program to refurbish several mosques in the Konar Province. Refurbishing the mosques countered the messages of al-Qaeda and the Taliban that the Americans hated Islam. It was a psychological action that had deep resonance with the population.[9] As the members of the local population observed the American-funded effort, they developed a trust for the units throughout the area.[10]

Why religion is missing

In an age when we are seeking cultural intelligence in order to understand the indigenous society and the insurgent ideology, we seem to minimalize one of the most important factors of life — religion. This missing — or minimalized — dimension of mission analysis could extract a high cost for the U.S. and limits our ability to predict future reactions. As Thomas Friedman says, "While we were celebrating 11/9 [the fall of the Berlin Wall], the

RESTORE FAITH Villagers of Zormat, Paktya Province, Afghanistan, gather around their newly restored mosque. The mosque was repaired by Afghan contractors using U.S. funds, which helped build trust between U.S. Soldiers and the local population. *U.S. Army photo.*

seeds of another memorable date — 9/11 — were being sown."[11] Internationally, we missed the impact of religion on world politics. Strategists and futurists wrote religion off as a declining factor in social life and missed the implications of a religious resurgence.

There are several reasons for the minimalization of religion in mission planning. First, religion is a complex subject. There are no definitive templates for religion. Too often, we oversimplify the subject with a broad statement that all religions are basically the same or that they share universal beliefs. Try the simple exercise of defining religion among a group of people. Each person will have a different definition. While an analysis of religion does not fit well within most analytical studies, it does not mean the complexity is incomprehensible. Marc Gopin offers several recommendations for government and nongovernmental agencies in performing religious analysis. Summarized, these recommendations represent a good start for that analysis in military planning:

1. Study the fears and resentments of religious worldviews that oppose present civil societies and develop policies that do not increase those fears.
2. Study causal chains that link religious violence to both internal and external religious traditions and understand how mass traumas affect groups.
3. Know religious traditions affected by the mission and anticipate the impact on religious life, religious institutions and religious leaders.
4. Know when religion or religious figures have influenced social transformation in a positive sense and reinforce policy to continue the positive transformation.
5. Know the darkest expression of a religion's or a culture's interpersonal behavior patterns to anticipate causes and counteractive measures.
6. Study the perceived and remembered traumas of a society from the religious interpretations and involve the religious community in healing the trauma.
7. Bring all parties, no matter how violent or exclusive, into interactions. This short-circuits the martyr complex.
8. Isolate truly violent groups not by confrontation, which strengthens them, but by coopting; address the grievances of the violent groups through cooperating with religious leaders and organizations.[12]

The consideration of any one of these recommendations would aid the SOF Soldier in leveraging religion.

A second reason religion is minimalized in mission

RISE AND SHINE Iraqi soldiers at An Numanyah conduct early-morning prayers before sunrise during Ramadan. *U.S. Army photo.*

planning is that it is often seen as irrelevant. The belief that religion is a cover for other motivating factors causes us to underestimate the connections between religious ideology and societal responses to military actions. This belief still misses the point that even if an insurgent is misusing religious ideology to gain a political end, he is nonetheless "thinking" religiously. Until we gain a better understanding of the religious factors, we will not defeat religiously motivated terror. Bullets will not defeat "spiritual warriors," and the more we react in purely secular terms, the more we empower the religiously motivated insurgent. As Mark Juergensmeyer states, "When governments abandon their own moral principles in responding to terrorism, they inadvertently validate the religious activists' most devastating critique of them: that secular politics are devoid of morality."[13]

A third reason for the minimalization of religion in mission planning is a limited cultural understanding by Soldiers and staff members. As one senior Special Forces Soldier stated about his initial understanding of the operational environment of Fallujah, Iraq: "I didn't know the difference between Shi'ia and Sunni when I deployed into the area … and I didn't know enough to ask about it. … You don't know to ask about what you don't know."

Too often, cultural briefs on religion are either limited to one practitioner of a faith or conducted by non-religiously oriented staff. Obtaining a broader view of religion's influence on the mission should include the use of the unit chaplain. Although chaplains are not subject-matter experts in world religions, they are an internal resource that can aid the staff in exploring and bringing into focus the religious factors that might affect mission planning. Chaplains provide the staff with a religious perspective that can assist in exploring the religious impacts on mission planning, and they provide a "theological" voice throughout the mission-planning process. Their role as religious leaders and military leaders, and their education in religious schools, uniquely position them to understand religion from an "insider's" view.

One word of caution in this area is in order, however, as some chaplains — and other religiously-oriented Soldiers — often lack the theological flexibility to advise the command on religious issues.[14] Too often, individual and theological prejudices overshadow religious and cultural considerations in mission planning. Still, it is better to have some understanding of religion than to have none, and the inclusion of chaplains in the planning process enhances the understanding of religious factors.

A new approach

The current doctrinal guidance for mission analysis gives credence to religious factors. The formal doctrine of each ARSOF branch includes a mention of "religious analysis" as part of the overall mission-assessment process. None gives much detail to the process, and none attempts to align the assessment process with IPB. Looking into the chaplains' doctrine for guidance on RFA, we find several steps that help in an overall assessment, but again, the lack of alignment with the IPB process decreases the harmony of the process. (See FM 1-05, *Religious Support*; Appendix G, "Religious Area Assessment," or TC 1-05, *Religious Support Handbook for the Unit Ministry Team*; Table D, "Religious Area/Impact Assessment.")[15]

A new approach to templating and integrating religious factors into mission planning would need to consider critical religious factors. It would need to align these factors with the rest of the IPB process, and it would require us to evaluate implicational considerations. Since religious factors are so difficult to encapsulate into a process, the approach would have to have a measure of flexibility in understanding religious conditions unique to the area of operations.

Religious factors do not exist in a vacuum, but too often, the considerations for inclusion leave them outside mission planning. For this reason, two critical factors for RFA in mission planning are imperative: intentionality and interpretation. Intentionality is the vital commitment to continual consideration of religious factors in all stages of the IPB. Interpretation of the religious factors is the most difficult step in the planning process, since religious meaning is subjective. Translating religion through only anthropological or social-science disciplines of study leaves the process incomplete. Triangulating the interpretation of religious factors through the additional study of theology yields a more accurate picture of the affects of religion upon the military mission and allows commanders to more properly understand their enemies and potential allies on the ground. This triangulation requires careful consideration of the local applications of a religious worldview. According to Dr. Scott Appleby:

The unique dynamism of lived religion — its distinctive patterns of interaction not only with secular, nationalist, ethnic and other elements of political or personal identity but also with its own sacred past — means, among other things, that religious behavior cannot be predicted merely on the basis of an individual's or group's affiliations with specific religious traditions. … [Therefore] there is no substitute for continual on-site analysis, fieldwork of a highly specialized and particular sort that is best conducted by experts in the religious tradition(s) in questions.[16]

Given the warnings of working with the sacred, the need to understand and interpret religious factors in military planning demands that we approach the subject. Synchronizing the approach with the present IPB process would give the military planner the best approach to the integration of religious factors and allow the re-examination of assumptions throughout the total process. This would keep the process transparent and applicable to the final mission.

Integrated approach

Integrating the RFA with the IPB is no small feat. Simplifying the process using existing doctrine, terminology and information would allow ARSOF Soldiers to better use the tool. Adapting an abbreviated IPB process in applying RFA factors would also simplify the procedure. FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, gives the following steps for an abbreviated IPB process: work ahead; focus on the essentials; stay objective-oriented; and use minimal essentials. Adapting these steps to the RFA would give the mission planner these advantages:

"Given religion's complexity and power, it is imperative that we understand the way it shapes modern warfare and the modern battlefield."

1. Work ahead: Working ahead to recognize religious factors in the area of operations, or AO, would save time and give understanding of the basic implications of the mission. Building an analysis of religious factors would give the staff flexibility during contingency planning and save time in mission planning.

2. Focus on the essentials: Religion is complex, but the essentials for understanding the reaction of a religious group are similar, regardless of the AO. Thinking through the essential religious factors begins the integration process.

3. Stay objective-oriented and use the minimum essentials: If the objective is to help commanders and staffs plan a mission efficiently, then integrating the religious factors must begin early in the process. Including the effect of religious factors on the mission objective requires continual integration by the staff. In the case of religious factors, identifying the minimum essentials for planning begins with the most obvious factors and moves to the most difficult. In synchronizing these factors within the four-step IPB process, the intentionality and skill of the

commander and staff determines their usefulness to the mission. Building a model for RFA can ensure that the process stays objective-oriented while using the minimum essentials for planning.

Religious terrain assessment

The terrain of religion is vast, sometimes restrictive, but open to understanding. Navigating the terrain requires an understanding of a few basic factors before beginning the analysis process. It is the nature of religion to espouse beliefs and to endow the physical world with a transcendent reality. Where the sacred affects the physical world, it is a beginning point for terrain assessment in the IPB process. Using three areas in which religion intersects with the physical world in a visible, somewhat measurable focus would allow ARSOF Soldiers to begin navigating the religious terrain.

The first area of religious terrain is visible expression of religion. This stage of assessment asks where religion is practiced in the AO. Assessment in this area locates religious sites and seeks to understand their use, their priority to the populace and their symbolism to the community. It is the first stage in the RFA and the easiest to assess.

The second area of religious terrain is human assessment. It focuses on the religious actors in the AO. Actors can range from formal religious leaders to religiously motivated laymen. They can fill the ranks of the political leadership or religious insurgent groups, but they all operate within a religious sphere, and understanding their role gives insight to their influence. In this area, the mission planner seeks to understand who the leaders are, their rank or status, their resources, their lines of communication and their location. Religious leaders are often the only voice of stability in disrupted societies, often providing powerful leadership that should be acknowledged and included in the larger mission.

The third area of religious terrain is ideology. Identifying religious ideology includes gaining knowledge of the values, codes, practices, holy days, symbols, history, heroes and villains of the religious population. Ideological factors are the most difficult to assess in an RFA, but they yield a deeper understanding of the core elements of the culture. Understanding the way that religious ideology shapes the greater society and individuals can provide the commander with the greatest ability to shape the battlefield of the hearts and minds. This level of assessment often requires reaching out to local cultural or academic specialists to gain deeper insight.

All three levels require an effects-based assessment. This is the most difficult skill to develop in assessment of religion. Identifying religious sites is easier than understanding their meaning, but a thorough assessment is required for accurately predicting the impact of religion on the mission. Continually asking the "so what" question keeps the RFA relevant to the mission for the SOF Soldier.

In summary, the consideration of religious factors will not guarantee mission success. It has been said that all politics are local, and so it is with religion. Those who engage in religious analysis must understand that religion is too broad a subject to predict accurately, but that does not obviate the need to study and interpret religion's impact on the mission. A cursory glance at religion as part of cultural awareness is often the training solution, and that lack of depth is too often the reason we get it wrong in our analysis.

The renewed interest in cultural intelligence at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is one effort to develop the ARSOF warrior. Through doctrinal development, classroom instruction and practical application, there is a renewed effort to understand religious factors in ARSOF missions. Since the inception of the school, instruction on religion and religious factors has played an important role in making Special Forces Soldiers a combat multiplier. **SW**

This paper represents an ongoing effort with the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's SF, CA and PSYOP doctrine developers and the author to reassess the religious factors on the SOF mission and refine doctrinal guidance. A future article will provide specific applications to the SF, CA and PSYOP missions. The author invites readers' comments and feedback. Reply to bedsolet@soc.mil.

Notes:

[1] These statements represent conclusions based on the author's experiences in military operations, readings on the subject of religion and conflict, and other sources. One noted source is Chapter 1, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century," by Dr. Pauletta Otis in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 15-21. Dr. Otis works with the U.S. Marine Cultural Training Center and is professor of strategic studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The author is personally indebted to her advice and expertise in the area of religion, violence and the assessment of religious factors in military operations.

[2] "Secular" came from the Latin word, ***saeculaum***, or "world," and signified a religious person who left the monastery to return to the world. From the Enlightenment period's philosophical separation of God and man to the political separation of the Treaty of Westphalia and Western democracy, the Western tendency to divide the world between secular and sacred affects the military analysis.

[3] Secular myopia, defined as "an inability even to see, much less understand, the role of religion in human life." An example is the way the American intelligence community in the 1970s, following its secular-focused training, discounted the power and views of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and misinformed the U.S. leaders, who misinformed the Shah's regime. From, "Patterns and Contexts of Religious Freedom and Persecution," by Paul Marshall in *The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs*, published by the Council on Faith and International Affairs, Alta Vista, Va., Volume 2, No. 3, Winter 2004-2005, 27-31.

[4] In 1996, the focus was on the clash of culture between Eastern-oriented Islam and Western-oriented Serbian Orthodox, but, in reality, five religious traditions shaped the conflict in the area of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The author found remnants of each religious tradition in the area.

[5] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 3.

[6] *Ibid., 20-21.*

MEETING OF THE MINDS As military leaders trained in religious schools, chaplains offer a unique "insider's" view of religion. *U.S. Army photo.*

[7] *Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, And Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 278.

[8] Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (San Francisco: Harper, 2000), 286. Fadl, professor at the UCLA School of Law and an Islamic jurist, defines "puritans" as what some writers call fundamentalists, militants, extremists, radicals, fanatics, jihadists and Islamists. He explains the limitations of these terms and gives his reasoning on the use of purist because it describes the "distinguishing characteristic" of the group as absolutist and uncompromising, with an intolerant exclusivist attitude (pages 16-25.)

[9] Psychological Operations Action: an action conducted by non-PSYOP personnel that is planned primarily to affect the behavior of a target audience (FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*.)

[10] George Adams, "Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan" (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 39.

[11] Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 55.

[12] Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 207-09.

[13] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 244. On pages 233-49 Juergensmeyer offers five possible outcomes to the GWOT: destroying violence with force; terrifying terrorists with threats of reprisal; violence wins and terrorists use violence to leverage political gain; separating religion from politics, something impossible; and using religion to heal politics. Juergensmeyer favors this final outcome for success in a global war against terror.

[14] For a more comprehensive explanation on the role of chaplains, read "Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," available at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks56.html. Adams also gives a good assessment of chaplain competency in relating to other religions, and he explains the difficult role of the chaplain on a staff.

[15] Chaplains avoid the connection to intelligence factors in an attempt to retain their noncombatant status. For this reason, chaplains use the term "assessment" and not "analysis" when looking into the religious factors in mission planning. They still offer insight into the religious thought, and a good IPB should include some religious analysis by a religiously trained staff member.

[16] Appleby, 56.

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Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Philippines

By Command Sergeant Major William Eckert



A recent newspaper headline read, "Is the U.S. winning a war?" The headline wasn't referring to Iraq or Afghanistan but rather to another front in the Global War on Terrorism: The Philippines. Unlike the other two conflicts, where American Soldiers are daily engaged in armed conflict, the war in the Philippines is one for peace and prosperity. The battle in the Philippines is a battle against an idea, and it is being waged by the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines, or JSOTF-P.

The work by JSOTF-P has gained the attention of senior military leaders who believe its work may change the way the United States operates around the world. During the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, in May, Major General David Fridovich, commander of U.S. Special Operations Forces-Pacific, or SOCPAC, noted, "We think there is a model here that's worth showcasing. There's another way of doing business. We've been doing it for four years with some decent results — not grand results, not flashy results, but some decent results. We think it's worthwhile."

The most telling result is the decline in terrorist activity in and around the islands where JSOTF-P is operating. In 2001, Basilan Island, a remote island in the southern Philippines, was home to hundreds of members of the violent Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG, and Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI, two terrorist elements with links to al-Qaeda. Prior to 9/11, terrorist training camps operated unchecked in the region, with up to 40 percent of the 9/11 operatives having links to the region. As is the case in the Middle East, kidnappings for ransom and beheadings were commonplace.

For example, in May 2001, the ASG assaulted the Dos Palmas Resort and took guests there hostage. The hostages included Americans Martin and Gracia Burnham, U.S. missionaries in the Philippines, and U.S. businessman Guillermo Sobero. The kidnapping ordeal lasted more than a year, during which Sobero was beheaded, Martin was killed during the rescue, and Gracia was injured.

The predominantly Muslim population in the area had, over time, become disenfranchised, disgruntled and dissatisfied with the government and the abject poverty of the region. Together, these conditions created an environment in which extremists could operate freely. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, and Philippine police elements were unable to control the violence or address the conditions that gave rise to the lawlessness.

Though the challenges in Basilan called for military action, the response did not warrant the deployment and use of U.S. conventional military forces. Because of the political climate in the Philippines, U.S. troops cannot involve themselves in combat operations there.

This battlefield in the southern Philippines necessitated the use of many different unconventional capabilities — increasing the capacity of our allies through foreign internal defense, or FID; civil-military operations, or CMO; and information operations, or IO. These three mission areas, for which the U.S. special-operations forces are well-suited and well-trained, have become the cornerstone of JSOTF-P's operations.

The mission in the Philippines required two things to happen concurrently. The AFP had to increase its ability to establish a secure environment for the people, and the economic and political environment that allowed extremists to recruit, seek sanctuary and prosper on the islands had to be changed.

To be effective, JSOTF-P needed to devise a plan for meeting both requirements simultaneously. During the ongoing capacity-building and humanitarian missions, the JSOTF also engaged in an information-operations campaign — using all aspects of the information mission, including public affairs, information operations and psychological operations, to inform and positively influence the islanders.

The battle in the Philippines is a battle against an idea: the idea of intolerance and subjugation to totalitarian rule. In the southern Philippines, that idea is endorsed by the ASG and JI, whose goal it is to eliminate a way of life for freedom-loving people.

For 15 years, SOF leadership has implemented a vision and capability for this unconventional-warfare battlefield through a steady buildup of capabilities. These capabilities have enabled special-operations forces of the JSOTF-P to reach out to the populace while providing positive influences across the military, demographic, government and economic spectrums. SOF leadership also made the investment of resources for the development of professional military training and doctrine specific to the Philippines. As a result of the foresight of the U.S. Special Operations Command in establishing these disciplines in the special-operations community, the men and women of Joint Task Force 510, and its follow-on, JSOTF-P, have accomplished what few others could.

Throughout the year, U.S. SOF personnel from JSOTF-P work jointly with the AFP to assist and support the AFP's ability to sustain its counterterrorism capability in the region, while addressing, at their root, the conditions that foment the enemy "idea."

Success in Basilan is measured by prosperity; by reduced AFP presence — from 15 battalions in 2002 to only two today; by new development, and by a nonviolent method of problem resolution. That success, known as the Basilan Model, has resonated throughout the region and is being duplicated with great success on nearby Jolo Island.

Capacity building

The cornerstone of this operation is the successful training of the AFP and the Philippine National Police. Prior to 2002, lawlessness was the rule, rather than the exception, on Basilan. Kidnapping for ransom was commonplace, and villagers lived in fear. In order for the island to prosper, the rule of law had to be enforced, and that could happen only through

IN TRAINING A marksmanship instructor with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines talks through the live-fire portion of the squad drill with members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines during a subject-matter-expert exchange. The exchange was held at a firing range on Sulu Island. *U.S. Army photo.*

expanding and developing the capacity and capability of the country's security forces.

Additionally, to ensure the greatest return, getting the best possible information on the threat faced in the region is vital. Working in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy, JSOTF-P uses Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces to conduct deliberate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in very focused areas, and based on collection plans, to perform tasks to prepare the environment and obtain critical information requirements. The information is used to determine the capabilities, intentions and activities of threat groups that exist within the local population and to focus U.S. forces — and the AFP — on providing security to the local populace. It is truly a joint operation, in which Navy SEALs and SOF aviators work with their AFP counterparts to enhance the AFP's capacities.

Recently, intelligence collection on the island of Jolo has been used to track two JI leaders, Umar Patek and Dulmatin, and the Abu Sayyaf chief Khadaffy Janjalani. The two JI members have been tied to the bombings on nightclubs in Bali, as well as to a bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Indonesia.

The information gathered early on, combined with the overall plans of the AFP leadership, allowed the JSOTF-P to prepare focused subject-matter-expert exchanges through which the AFP units acquire the skills needed to gain and maintain security within the joint operations area. During the time the JSOTF-P has focused on Sulu, the subject-matter-expert exchanges have been conducted with the AFP on an almost daily basis, including topics such as the combat-lifesaver course, small-unit tactics, marksmanship, maritime interdiction operations, radio communications, night-vision goggle use, close air support and leadership development.

This increased capability for providing security is critical in contributing to the ability of the host-nation government to govern more effectively, and the improved security and effective governance also provides greater legitimacy to the host-nation government — a critical reason the AFP presence on Basilan has dropped so dramatically since 2002.

Civil-military operations

With support from U.S. SOF, the AFP didn't just show up on Basilan or Sulu with guns, rather it brought the resources to rebuild schools and hos-

DOCTOR'S ORDERS A doctor assigned to the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines writes out a treatment form while talking with a resident of Sulu. Medical civic-action programs are key activities the JSOTF-P and the Armed Forces of the Philippines use to gain acceptance in the local communities by providing critically needed care and opportunities to the people. *U.S. Army photo.*

pitals, and the engineers to dig wells to provide fresh water. But the CMO line of operation is more than social and infrastructure projects. In JSOTF-P, it encompasses the full range of support to the AFP and local civil authorities to increase their ability to address needs while managing the expectations of the local population. Further, the operations address the root causes that allow the idea of subjugation and intolerance to flourish.

While the JSOTF-P presence was initially regarded with suspicion by the local population, the humanitarian and development-oriented approach of Philippine and U.S. forces in the southern Philippines has proven to be even more effective than a direct military approach. As a result, U.S. and AFP forces have gained access to areas where they had previously been unwelcome. The people now see the government and the U.S. forces as a force for change and a way to better their lives.

For example, in November 2005, the AFP was not accepted on Sulu as a trustworthy advocate. Access into *barangays*, or villages, and communities was met with suspicion by the local populace. One year later, after the AFP has engaged in extensive CMO and capacity-building work on schools, roads, wells, community centers and more, the civilian population is responding positively to the presence of the AFP — no longer a bully but rather a "big brother." As a result, the people are refusing to harbor the terrorists and are instead turning to the AFP for protection from those

"lawless" elements.

The people in the region need development, and the AFP has given them hope for development. Without exception, when given the choice, the population chooses development, peace and prosperity. That changing viewpoint has garnered the support of the local population and is now denying the terrorists the sanctuary and physical support they need to thrive.

Because resources are limited, JSOTF-P has formed a strong link to nongovernmental organizations such as 3P-USA, Knightsbridge International and the Mabuhay Deseret Foundation. The support of these organizations, as well as of the government of the Philippines, has greatly increased the scope and nature of the humanitarian projects on the islands. Projects like school construction; infrastructure development in the form of water lines and wells; and medical care are the lifeblood of the JSOTF's mission in the southern Philippines.

> **" The people now see the government and the U.S. forces as a force for change, a way to better their lives."**

There was an elderly woman in Jolo City who had been blind for 14 years as a result of cataracts. Her mistrust of the AFP was topped only by her suspicion of U.S. forces in her town and on the island. In June, her desire to see overcame her mistrust, and she allowed herself to try out the promises of the U.S. forces and to visit the USNS *Mercy*, a naval hospital ship, during its week-long stop off the shores of Jolo City. While there, she allowed AFP doctors and clinicians to operate on her cataracts.

The operation restored clear sight to her for the first time in 14 years. After her eyes adjusted and she recovered from the surgery, she wanted to personally meet and thank those U.S. and AFP personnel who gave her back the gift of sight. She graciously offered them her gratitude, and as a result of actions making her life better, this one-time opponent of the AFP and U.S. forces now supports them.

In many instances, CMO projects are undertaken with strong buy-in by the local population. The JSOTF's goal is to ensure that the projects are not only needed but are also sustainable by the local population. Once complete, every project is turned over to the local *barangay* for maintenance. This buy-in and responsibility for the project by the local populace ensures that the project will continue beyond the stay of JSOTF-P.

During 2006, the AFP and JSOTF-P have built 19 school-construction/renovation projects, dug 10 wells, begun five road projects, started work on five community centers and built five water-distribution centers on Jolo Island. Additionally, more than 13,000 people have benefited from the medical, dental and veterinarian civic-action projects. These projects have positively affected more than 25 communities on Jolo Island and provided the critical access into areas that were previously sanctuaries for terrorist groups.

At one medical civic-action program, or MEDCAP, in particular, in the Indanan area of Jolo Island — a stronghold of the ASG at the time — an ASG operative was ordered to set off an improvised explosive device during the MEDCAP. The operative refused the assignment because his wife and children would be attending the program and receiving needed medical care.

Influencing others

Everything that we do in the security, capacity-building and CMO arenas can go awry if we fail to communicate our plans and objectives to the local populace. Many Filipinos still view the U.S. with a wary eye from their days as a protectorate. They see the presence of the U.S. military in their country as a threat to their independence. JSOTF-P has to ensure that U.S. presence is seen as beneficial to the community by working with the media and other key communicators within the local communities. Throughout its tenure on the island, JSOTF-P has engaged in a powerful information campaign to ensure that the populace is informed. That campaign has created a positive atmosphere.

Rather than using the doctrinal definition of IO as "information operations," the personnel of JSOTF-P define IO as "influencing others" in a positive and effective manner. Through public-affairs efforts, the task force is constantly telling people what it is going to be doing, how it is going to do it and how it will benefit them. The goal is to ensure that people are not surprised or caught off guard by anything the teams are accomplishing.

An example of this acceptance occurred in the small town of Tiptipon on Jolo Island. An AFP commander and his U.S. counterpart entered a town to assess the work needed for a school and for a hospital-improvement project. The Muslim town leader, a self-acknowledged former ASG member, speaking to the team in his native Tausug, assured the team of its safety in his town, stating, "We want your development, and we want you to help repair our school and hospital and help us improve the lives of our people. We know what you did in Basilan, and we want that, too."

The mission of positively influencing others in the joint-operations area is more than scheduling media and community-relations events. Those are

important, but the planned, focused use of PSYOP teams is just as critical.

The Soldiers assigned to the JSOTF-P PSYOP teams conduct assessments at each location and propose projects for each location by analyzing the various cultures and subcultures. With more than 7,100 islands making up the Philippines, the cultures of regions, provinces and neighboring communities can vary substantially. By reviewing the culture and history of the specific islands, clans and provinces, the team is better able to positively communicate its intentions and activities.

The teams assigned to the JSOTF-P have produced a multi-dimensional influencing operation on Jolo Island and throughout the joint-operations area. Some of their activities have publicized the Department of Defense's and Department of State's Rewards for Justice Program that supports the war on terrorism. Other activities have focused the thoughts of the local populace on the choices they can make to take control of their lives by no longer tolerating terrorists who operate in the midst of their communities. Each PSYOP campaign utilizes the media that will best get its message across.

One example of a product line that the JSOTF-P's PSYOP team has worked hard to produce, aimed at giving hope and bringing awareness of the evil that terrorism brings to families and communities, is a unique, first-of-its-kind graphic-novel series. The 10-part series, which is still in production, contains local-culture and real-world correlations. The title, names, attire, scenery, dialect and historical subtleties are all designed to appeal to the targeted community.

Each book in the series is pretested and reviewed at multiple levels, including a focus group of local professionals, to ensure that any culturally offensive dialogue, gestures or activities are avoided. The reviews help to ensure that the product and others resonate with the island people.

ROUND UP Major Daniel Leach, 1st Special Forces Group veterinarian, is assisted by a local resident from Barangay Lamisahan in Zamboanga, as he prepares to vaccinate a cow during a Veterinary civic-action program conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. *U.S. Navy photo.*

Conclusion

There is no question that while the environment in the southern Philippines is improving, the Sulu Archipelago is still a volatile area. Bomb threats, kidnappings for ransom and detonations of improvised explosive devises are a daily occurrence. Only through the skill and professionalism of the U.S. joint special-operations forces and the support of the local population have JSOTF-P casualties been avoided so far.

For this unconventional mission, the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command have the right force with the right skill sets in place for success. SOF will continue to develop and refine the mission as they achieve positive effects in the southern Philippines now and in other troubled spots in the future.

As the SOF role diminishes in the southern Philippines, the key for Philippine success over the long term will lie in sustaining the improvements thus far achieved. Perpetuating the peace will require continued involvement of the U.S. government; interagency efforts with other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development; and most importantly, the collaboration and commitment of the Philippine government, nongovernmental organizations and private investors to work and prosper.

The SOF indirect role is proving itself in the southern Philippines, and with patience and persistence, the unconventional warfare tools used here, along with proven SOF methodologies, will continue to succeed and to provide a powerful new tool for our nation in fighting the Global War on Terrorism. **SW**

Command Sergeant Major William Eckert is the command sergeant major of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.

UNEVEN LOAD Peer evaluations help Soldiers assess whether they are carrying their weight. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

SELF-AWARENESS: Getting the Ground Truth From Peer Evaluations

By Meredith Cracraft, Dr. Michelle Wisecarver, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Baggett & Lieutenant Colonel Tom Miller

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. — Sun Tzu

Technical and tactical capabilities are critical for success in special operations. But beyond these concrete war-fighting capabilities are "softer" skills and abilities that are required for success — one of these is self-awareness.

Self-awareness forms a cornerstone for success in areas such as rapport building, negotiation and leadership. Simply put, self-awareness means having an understanding of your own strengths and weaknesses, and of the way you and your actions are perceived by others.

The importance of self-awareness has been cited in a number of Army reports, including the Army Training and Leader Development Panel, or ATLDP. The ATLDP officer report referred to self-awareness as one of "the most important skills and characteristics requisite for mission success in the Objective Force."

In support of the "coach, teach and mentor" training philosophy practiced at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, the next question is how to develop self-awareness in future special-operations forces Soldiers. Some people may have a natural talent for self-awareness, while others require some degree of development in that area. There are many tools that can be used to provide insight into one's strengths and

Perception is reality

When it comes to interactions with other people, perception is reality. Succeeding in interactions with others requires understanding their perspective and the way they perceive you and your actions. If you are trying to build rapport and think you are respectful to someone, but the other person does not feel that you are, you fail the mission. Just as with the destruction of a military target, success in this area must be defined by actually achieving the mission, not just in believing that you did. Raising your self-awareness so that you understand how you are being perceived by others is critical to success.

TEAM EFFORT Log drills force Soldiers to work as a team and allow evaluators to monitor students' physical strength. *Photo by Janice Burton.*

weaknesses. Soldiers receive feedback about skills and abilities from sources such as supervisors, psychological tests and skill tests in training or on the job. One good source of information about strengths and weaknesses and how you are perceived is your peer group.

Peers often provide unsolicited feedback … whether someone wants it or not. That feedback can serve to motivate Soldiers to improve if they are lacking in some areas and helps ensure a high level of performance within the unit. It also gives a "pat on the back" for a job well done.

On the other hand, unsolicited feedback from peers is not always thorough or given in a constructive manner. It can be helpful to have a formal process in place to capture that information and provide Soldiers with feedback they can use to improve.

Peer evaluations at SWCS

Peer evaluations have been used by the military as an assessment technique for decades. Research during the 1940s and 1950s demonstrated the validity of peer evaluations for predicting critical outcomes such as military leadership success and performance in combat. At the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or 1st SWTG, peer evaluations have been used in different phases of the Special Forces, or SF, training pipeline over the last four decades, although in a somewhat sporadic manner.

Phase I, the Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, and Phase V (the culmination exercise) have used peer evaluations nearly continuously for decades. Other phases, such as Phase II (SF common skills) and the Phase III (military-occupational-specialty training) officer and communications-sergeant courses have used them periodically, and some have never used them.

Until now, there has been little to no standardization across the phases of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, in the format or content of the peer evaluations, or in the way they are applied within the assessment and training process. Standardizing the evaluation systems can provide a consistency across phases that enables students and course personnel to track student progress throughout the SFQC. Tracking progress over time and across multiple situations provides an invaluable depth of feedback regarding a Soldier's personal strengths and weaknesses before he arrives at an operational unit.

Although in the past the use of peer evaluations would have been too time-consuming and costly in some courses, technological advances and a skilled team of designers make them feasible now. A peer-evaluation system has been developed for the 1st SWTG by Dr. Don Martin, Dr. Jat Thompson and Nick Mangine, working through the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, or ARI. This system uses scanning and computer-based entry forms, in conjunction with an automated processing and reporting system, to produce real-time peer-evaluation feedback for students and cadre.

The goal of the 1st SWTG is to conduct peer evaluations at several points during courses in which it has been determined that peer evaluations can provide students and cadre with valuable feedback. Peer evaluations are scheduled for implementation in phases I to V of the SFQC as well as for the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses.

When possible, consistency will be used in the format and content of the ratings, although to some extent, each phase may need to capture some unique information about performance.

Peer evaluations are an invaluable element of the "whole man" approach to assessment and training (see the April 2005 issue of *Special Warfare* for a description of the whole-man assessment approach). In the whole-man approach, peer evaluations provide critical information in key performance areas such as the unconventional-warfare interpersonal quotient, or UWIQ, which captures a Soldier's judgment and his ability to influence others. Part of having a high UWIQ involves being self-aware and recognizing one's strengths and weaknesses when dealing with team members and with people in intercultural situations.

Myths about peer evaluations

Even though the information and feedback that comes from evaluation systems can be valuable for Soldiers, peer evaluations often elicit strong negative responses from students and cadre. There are a number of concerns about peer evaluations that are understandable but invalid.

Myth #1: **All peer evaluations are selection tools.** Many do not like the idea of peer evaluations because they view them as a tool for selecting people "out" of the training process. They believe peer evaluations are used to identify Soldiers who are low performers.

Truth: **Peer evaluations can be used for different purposes**. Peer evaluations are a tool, and the way they are used depends on the objective of a given situation. If the goal is identifying and selecting individuals out of a program, then they can be used for that purpose. However, if the goal is training or self-development, peer evaluations can be used to focus on feedback and present data in a way that will facilitate feedback rather than selection.

When training and development are the objectives, peer-evaluation feedback can be discussed with cadre members during counseling sessions, and the cadre can mentor students regarding ways to improve their performance. At the end of the training, if the peer-development system has not succeeded, and if a Soldier has shown no improvement in identified weak areas, there are two options. First, if the student has demonstrated weak areas in job-critical skills, commanders will need to determine whether his level of performance meets the standard required for the job he would be taking. In this case, the pattern of peer evaluations, along with all other course information, can be effectively applied to give a more complete picture for making this determination.

On the other hand, if the student has weak areas in skills that can be learned on the job once he arrives at his new unit, the pattern of peer evaluations can serve as a self-development guide from which the student can continue to work toward improvement after arriving at the operational unit. Again, the decisions regarding the use of a peer-evaluation system depend on the objectives of the situation and the criticality of the information it provides. These decisions must be made proactively by the command and specified clearly to both cadre and students.

Myth #2: **Peer evaluations are friendship ratings.** Some people believe that when peers evaluate each other, it is not an accurate rating, fearing that individuals will give only their friends high ratings and give low ratings to those who are not friends.

Truth: **Friendship bias is not a big problem.** The truth is that while some type of bias exists in all forms of subjective ratings, whether cadre, commanders or peers are making the ratings, research shows that peers do not necessarily play favorites when evaluating job performance. Findings indicate that peer evaluations are highly reliable and valid predictors of performance. There is evidence that positive thoughts and positive examples of performance come to mind first when rating someone who is well-liked, but there is not a persistent bias in favor of friends. People do acknowledge when others perform well, even though they are not good friends with them.

In addition, an advantage of using a peer system is that any biases that may exist in one rater tend to get averaged out when pooling the ratings of several people. If one person rates an individual higher because he is a friend, ratings by others will average the score out and provide a more accurate perspective.

Myth #3: **People have to know each other for a long time before they can give accurate peer evaluations.** To some, it may seem unfair that someone who has seen a Soldier only in a few training situations should be allowed to provide performance ratings for that Soldier.

Truth: **Useful peer evaluations can be made even after a couple of hours, but it is important that they capture the right information.** If the peers focus on the key aspects of performance that were observable during a given time period, and only those performance dimensions are

Selecting an evaluation format

Peer evaluations have three formats: nominations, rankings and ratings. It is important to find an assessment format that provides a good fit with your objectives.

Nominations: In this method, members of a unit select a few top performers or a few bottom performers and explain why they are at the top or bottom. This is particularly useful with large groups (greater than 15) whose members may not have had a chance to observe everyone in the group closely. It is also particularly useful in selection situations, because it forces members to place individuals at the top and bottom. This enables the "best" to be selected, or the "worst" to be removed. One drawback of nominations is that the level of performance for individuals who have few or no nominations is ambiguous.

Rankings: In this method, members of a group rank the other members from best to worst, often on a single broad dimension, such as overall contribution to the team effort. This method is useful with smaller groups (15 or fewer) and, like nominations, is particularly useful in selection situations, since the ranking forces some individuals to be placed at the top and bottom.

One drawback of nominations and rankings is that each individual's peer score is based on performance relative to the other members of the group, rather than on an identified standard. If a student scores near the bottom, he is one of the low performers, but we do not know whether he is successful enough for special-operations work. If the team is a high-performing team, the worst may still be very good.

Ratings: This method uses multiple-point scales, such as a five-point scale (1 = very poor to 5 = very good) and is useful with smaller groups (15 or fewer). This format is particularly useful in situations in which feedback is a key objective, since the individual's scores can be given with reference to an identified behavioral standard rather than with reference to the performance of others on the team. Typically, ratings will be collected across a number of performance dimensions for added specificity of the performance feedback — this is preferable to a single dimension, particularly when training and development are important objectives. One drawback of ratings is that peers can give everyone a perfect rating for each dimension, if they choose. Typically, this can be prevented by instilling in them the importance of the task.

included in the peer-evaluation system, then it is appropriate to have Soldiers rate each other after they have participated in only a few activities or after a few hours. Individuals may not have a complete picture of another Soldier's personality or capabilities, but they do have firsthand knowledge of how that Soldier responded in a particular situation and can provide feedback specific to that situation.

Defining the rating dimensions is critical. Dimensions should be used that (1) are critical to successful performance on the job, and (2) can be validly assessed in the given training situation. For example, if Soldiers are given a road march and an obstacle course to complete, they might be able to rate each other on physical fitness and motivation, but they would have little information for ratings on interpersonal skills.

Finally, it is critical that the dimensions are described in sufficient detail so that peers can provide valid assessments. To do this, behavioral examples are used to provide raters with examples of good and poor performance.

Myth #4: **Peers do not have enough job knowledge to be able to judge performance.** The argument may be made that in a selection or training situation, peers are all at the same entry-level stage and are not in a position to evaluate whether others are performing at the necessary standard.

Truth: **Peers are appropriate sources of judgment for certain aspects of performance.** While it is true that peers in selection or training situations do not have the personal experience to judge what is necessary for success in the field, there are certain aspects of performance they can judge, and they do have the ability to see skill differences among their peers. Research also suggests that peers may be better judges of certain aspects of a person's behavior, such as level of motivation, than cadre are. This is because individuals tend to perform at their best when cadre are around, so when cadre are gone, peers can see actions that are more typical of an individual's usual performance.

Conclusions

Both research and applied experience have demonstrated the usefulness of peer evaluations in providing feedback on individuals' strengths and weaknesses. While peer evaluations are not a perfect source of information, their feedback provides a valuable perspective that can be used to inform self-awareness and self-development activities. Implementing a peer-evaluation system during training can provide a career foundation for developing more self-aware Soldiers. Of course, self-awareness is just the first step. It must be followed with self-development activities in order to lead to improvement.

Self-development and maintaining self-awareness are continuous processes. Just like going to the range to practice and requalify, it is important to get frequent feedback from peers and others, both during a training course and on the job. To some extent, this will be done informally, but there are a number of advantages to having a more systematic approach to obtaining feedback.

This also highlights the importance of feedback once Soldiers are at their units, using tools such as after-action reviews and multiple-rater feedback systems. Multiple-rater feedback, often called 360-degree feedback, provides feedback from superiors, peers and subordinates. Each of these tools, if implemented well, has the potential to help a Soldier to learn how he is perceived by different people and which skills he needs to improve. When it comes to mission success, perception is reality, and ensuring that each Soldier receives systematic feedback from others will provide Soldiers with a foundation for continued improvement in self-awareness. ***SW***

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SUSTAINING THE SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIER

By Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bolduc and Command Sergeant Major Thomas W. Hedges Jr.

Small-group behavior and the dynamics of human performance in a combat environment has always been a concern for combat leaders. The war in Afghanistan has provided an opportunity to observe these kinds of dynamics in a combat environment that has not been possible since the Vietnam War.

Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, has employed small units composed of specially selected and trained Soldiers operating in remote, hostile, enemy-controlled areas during frequent rotations of six to eight months, with short breaks between rotations. Given this operational tempo, the question of long-term sustainment inevitably must be addressed. In order to better analyze this requirement and how best to approach it, observations were made of a unit that has been involved in operations in Afghanistan since 2001.

The unit that formed the substance of the observations reported here was a Special Forces battalion on its fifth rotation to Afghanistan. Since 2001, the battalion has operated in small, isolated groups that have been exposed to the threat of death or serious injury in combat. The intent of the observations recalled here is to share an understanding of the long-term physical and psychological impact of this repeated exposure and to develop the operational, training and support requirements for sustaining this force on and off the battlefield. The lessons learned will help develop the systems and processes for ensuring combat readiness and effectiveness for units involved in multiple, consecutive combat deployments.

The Soldiers are members of 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, which consists of a battalion headquarters command and staff, three Special Forces companies, a support company and 17 operational A-teams. In late 2001, these units were sent into Afghanistan to conduct decentralized, offensive operations in an unconventional-warfare environment. During the first OEF rotation, they worked with indigenous forces. During the second OEF rotation, they transitioned these indigenous forces into a formal, internationally recognized army (The Afghan National Army, or ANA). For the third, fourth and fifth rotations, they constructed firebases, and then (partnered with the ANA) operated out of those bases in remote areas at strategic locations controlled by the enemy.

Throughout every rotation, but particularly during the last three rotations, the threat of direct and indirect attack and improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, was always present. This threat fluctuated throughout the year and was considerably higher during the spring through late fall. The stress which this changing threat created fluctuated further depending on intelligence reports about enemy disposition and activity in the area.

Enemy snipers and mortar or small-arms fire into a firebase were enough to reinforce on a daily basis the fact that team members were in a hostile environment. Leaving the firebase was an emotional event, given the constant threat of ambush and IEDs. Although no firebase had been overrun, indirect-fire assaults on the bases occurred frequently. Nine members of the battalion have been killed in action, and 45 have been wounded in action since March 2002.

In short, the repetitive nature of the rotations, and the conditions experienced during those rotations, created a level of physical and psychological stress disproportionate to that experienced by other Soldiers in singular rotations under less frequent contact with the enemy.

The compensatory mechanism that allows Special Forces Soldiers to deal with this elevated stress level begins with training. The selection process and training of Special Forces Soldiers make them ideal for operating effectively in this environment. The personality traits of integrity and individuality, coupled with a culture of true teamwork, give them confidence in their own capabilities and capacities and serve as a coping mechanism for overcoming the stressful environment. These traits make Special Forces Soldiers ideally suited to these demands and to countering the effects of a dedicated, resourceful and deadly insurgency.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL Teams must conduct reconnaissance patrols to disrupt the enemy and drive th

However, that same coping mechanism can create the inverse effect on stress management. The leader of Special Forces Soldiers must understand this and constantly talk to his men about the dangers of combat and operational arrogance and complacency. The feeling of invincibility that comes with surviving numerous encounters with the enemy is a real danger to the safety of our Soldiers. The first lesson learned is simply that with realistic, high-quality training, there is a necessity and a responsibility to manage the potential development of a superiority complex that may preclude appropriate consideration of the dangers being faced.

Beyond the training, the operational requirements for long-term sustainment revolve around the pattern of warfare that Special Forces Soldiers employ in Afghanistan. This pattern attempts to array firebases to best fight the enemy, assist the populace, train the security forces and use the firebase as a secure base from which to improve security concentrically from the base. Soldiers do this by searching for the enemy, attacking him lethally and nonlethally, assisting the local populace with civil-military operations and humanitarian assistance, and training the national security forces. The idea of protecting the populace, keeping constant pressure on the enemy, pursuing him wherever he goes and punishing him until he is defeated, is highly consistent with the personality traits of Special Forces Soldiers. The firebases are located near population centers in order to assist and influence the local populace, promote the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and train the security forces in counterinsurgency operations. In this situation, the men on the firebase feel completely surrounded by the enemy, and in many situations they are.

To overcome the effects of long-term exposure to these conditions, it is imperative that an outer and inner ring of security be established and maintained. The team, accompanied by host-nation military, must conduct aggressive combat reconnaissance patrols to disrupt the enemy and keep the enemy off the lines of communication, drive them out of the key villages, and push them into the high ground, where they can be interdicted with less collateral damage. It is an absolute responsibility of leadership to ensure that the operational detachments have the freedom to execute this tactical strategy. Furthermore, it is imperative that the higher headquarters be responsible for articulating a clear and concise strategy for allowing the team to fight the enemy and reduce the threat to the firebase. When the men are restricted to the firebase for political or operational reasons, the inactivity and constraints that keep them from conducting their mission creates frustration and gives the enemy the opportunity to conserve combat power, wait, survive, organize forces and ultimately increase the overall stress level. Combat stress in Soldiers is lower when they are allowed to do their jobs, even if the threat is high and constant.

Providing the freedom to conduct operations, and supporting that freedom with a foundation of quality training, is the bedrock for long-term sustainment. Creating a system of combat support and combat-service support that recognizes the need to provide sustainment for the long haul is the house that is ultimately built upon that bedrock. This begins with ensuring that the best equipment and most complete services are procured and established.

Resources must be provided so that the team lives in comfort and has mechanisms for decompressing. The men in the firebases must know that the higher headquarters cares for those fighting the war and that their welfare is the command's number-

hem from the key villages. *U.S. Army photo.*

one priority. Providing the camp with a kitchen, food stuff, e-mail, phones, mail service, laundry services, barber services, exercise equipment, adequate sleeping and social space, hot and cold running water and sports gear has a significant impact among the men who co-exist in a precarious and often changing balance of relationships. The physical confines of the firebase exacerbate the emotional stress, and steps must be taken to mitigate stress and enhance combat efficiency and effectiveness.

Little things that make life bearable in the field go a long way toward sustaining positive mental health and mitigating battlefield stress. Therefore, fantastic attention to detail by combat-support and combat-service-support elements must be the standard. The Soldiers' attempts to achieve physical and mental space from one another need to be facilitated by proper firebase construction and design. Providing individual space will mitigate the territorial friction experienced by people who live together in groups for long periods of time. Understanding human nature and the need for social space, and providing for this need in the long-term, will maintain healthy relationships that promote good order and discipline.

In the typically remote locations occupied by Special Forces, command visits carry special weight. It is through direct contact with leaders that Soldiers are reassured of the command's sincere interest in their well-being. This direct interaction also serves to reinforce the detachment's understanding of the operational picture and strategy, which in turn allows it the freedom to conduct operations commensurate with the situation in its area of responsibility. Through this interaction, the formal structure of the chain of command is reinforced, and discipline and standards are emphasized. The character of the leader is essential to maintaining good order and discipline. The battalion commander and the battalion command sergeant major must ensure that military discipline is maintained and that regimentation is applied appropriately so as not to inhibit creativity and ingenuity. Discipline in self and in others is never compromised, but regimentation and adherence to a checklist mentality varies, and deviations must be accepted. Regimentation is applied differently in a Special Forces unit. Because of the seniority and experience in a Special Forces company and its teams, more latitude is given as to how and when things get accomplished. A leader must promulgate the highest values in combat and not compromise on the legal issues, moral standards, humanity and compassion toward the enemy and the civilian populace. Clear rules of engagement and adherence to the law of war are essential to maintaining mission focus and rationalizing the killing in war. Competence, discipline and trust are the three pillars that are non-negotiable when conducting decentralized operations over long distances. A clear vision, guidance, mission and commander's intent must be articulated and understood. By training in the fundamentals, by understanding the psychology of war and by doing the right thing, leaders can mitigate stress in combat significantly. Leaders who properly supervise, communicate and provide purpose, direction and motivation to their men will ensure their success in combat and mitigate the effects of battlefield stress.

The aforementioned emphasis on training, operations and support are the basis for long-term sustainment of the force. The final essential aspect of managing stress and maintaining good order and discipline is the less tangible cultural climate that has to be created to allow the mechanics to thrive. A belief in what you are doing and pride in your unit form the nucleus of such a culture. Soldiers must believe in their fight and be proud of their unit. There must be a valid reason for going to war, and leaders must reinforce this reason to their men and demonstrate that the unit is contributing to the strategic goals. Leaving your family for long periods, living in austere conditions, witnessing human suffering, killing and wounding the enemy, and watching your fellow Soldiers get killed and injured requires justification. Justification can be derived only through a common system of beliefs based on specific cultural values. A culture that can support a unit through multiple rotations requires a judicious and responsive system of rewards and punishments, a capable and functioning rear detachment and a robust element of esprit de corps.

A valid system of rewards and punishments must be created and adhered to in order to reinforce the value system. We do not always recognize our Soldiers as we should, and this can lead to battlefield stress and problems with retention and conduct. Failing to hold Soldiers to a standard can be as damaging as not awarding them appropriately for their valorous actions on the battlefield. Commanders have a responsibility to develop a streamlined awards and punishment process that is fair and not capricious. Awards justify actions in combat, and punishment places parameters on behavior in combat. Both are necessary to mitigate battlefield stress and to maintain good order and discipline.

When the unit deploys, a functional rear detachment is essential for ensuring cohesive connectivity between the deployed unit, the families and the home-station higher headquarters. The abilities to deploy incoming Soldiers and equipment; to re-deploy Soldiers for family emergencies, births and schools; and to conduct the daily business of the unit in the rear area are critical to sustaining operations and maintaining a healthy command climate. It is advisable not to take

short cuts when organizing the rear detachment. The commander must be of the highest quality; posses combat experience, tact and the ability to deal with family members; and have experience in the way the organization works. Failure in any of these critical areas will result in unnecessary distractions down range, increased stress and complaints from family members. Soldiers need to know that in an emergency they can count on their chain of command to do the right thing and take care of their family.

Unit esprit de corps is an essential element in the health, welfare and morale of the Soldiers and their families. Long absences away from loved ones, and the tragic loss of life and limb must have a valid reason and be honored and recognized by commanders. The development of unit symbols, mottos and spiritual references help achieve esprit de corps and pride that transcends the military unit and resonates with family members. The promotion of these hallmarks allows families to feel part of the unit and can be manifested in respectful and appropriate ways through such simplicities as unit signs, T-shirts, ball caps, coffee mugs and coins.

Unit symbols need to have depth and relevance. The Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, adopted the eagle as the battalion symbol because of its noble character, vigilance, aggressiveness, honor and strength. Their area of responsibility consists of an austere, high-mountain, desert terrain and environment. They combined their symbol with the primary attribute of the environment in which they operate and call themselves "Desert Eagles."

Attention to details like the unit symbol creates an esprit de corps that can contribute to a measurable level of pride. This pride translates into a sense of duty and loyalty that not only aids in creating an environment conducive to long-term commitment but also fosters a sense of belonging that helps alleviate the stress of multiple rotations.

A concise motto that further defines the unit's culture can also contribute to long-term sustainment. In the example of the Desert Eagles, a battalion coin serves as the medium for promulgating the motto. On this coin, the lettering is raised from the surface to symbolize the bold and audacious nature of the men of the battalion. Displayed on the back of the coin is the lieutenant-colonel and command-sergeant-major rank insignia, which are representative of the officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted men of the battalion. In the middle of the coin, the Special Forces regimental crest is superimposed over the 3rd SF Group flash. These symbols are deliberately placed on the coin between the lieutenant colonel and command sergeant major insignia to show the quiet professionalism and unity of the officer corps, NCO Corps and the Soldiers of the 1st Battalion. Above the flash is the word "Integritas," the battalion motto, which means armed and ready to fight. Integritas defines the Desert Eagles code of strength, honor and duty. It exemplifies fortitude, compassion, integrity, loyalty, respect and their war-fighting reputation. Below the flash are the words "Pressure, Pursue, Punish," which define the culture and the battalion's aggressive approach to training and combat operations. The color of the coin is brushed silver. It is formed in the shape of a dog tag to symbolize selfless service, sacrifice and duty.

All of this detail serves to demonstrate the unit's commitment to its Soldiers and their families. The coin is a simple device that symbolizes an obligation to take every conceivable measure to ensure that the long-term commitment of each Soldier is never taken for granted or unappreciated by the unit leaders. The Soldier is ingrained with a belief that he will receive a level of sustainment (through training, operations and support) sufficient to carry him through multiple combat rotations.

With values-based leadership, focused operations, an established, functional communications architecture and robust support systems, the unit can be sustained in combat for long periods of time over multiple deployments and short recovery/dwell periods. Unit cohesion and mission continuity are critical to a unit's success in combat. *SW*

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Command Sergeant Major Thomas W. Hedges Jr. has served in Army special operations for over 25 years and has been in combat operations in Grenada, the Balkans and Afghanistan. He has held leadership positions as an operations sergeant, company sergeant major, CJSOTF command sergeant major and SF battalion command sergeant major. Hedges was assigned to 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group in June 2006, and he is currently the TF 31 command sergeant major in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He has been awarded the Joint Commendation Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Armed Forces Service Medal, the NATO Medal with star, the Kosovo Service Campaign Medal with star, the Valorous Unit Award, and the Army Superior Unit Award.

Major Robert Hardy and Captain Paul Toolan contributed to this article. Hardy is the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group executive officer and has deployed in support of Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and twice to Operation Enduring Freedom. Toolan is the Headquarters Support Company commander for the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and has deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom four times.

Assessors: The Backbone of SFAS

By Sergeant Major David S. Randall

This is a great time to be part of the process of Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, and to contribute to the force. Because of the ever-changing battlefield, SF Soldiers must be more adaptive than ever before. SFAS has evolved from being an exercise in strength and toughness to being a situation exercise that is even more physically and mentally demanding than in the past.

SFAS candidates are faced with daily activities and assessment exercises. They have no idea what is next or what the cadre members are looking for. In this process, one of the most important roles is played by the SFAS assessor. He is the primary means of assessing the candidate for future service in the SF Regiment.

Assessment in SFAS has always been about selecting the right man for continued training in the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, but assessors haven't always received the accolades they deserve. Without them, SF would not be capable of doing the things we do on a daily basis. SF is people-oriented. We don't rely on sophisticated equipment to track and monitor our weapons systems; we *are* the weapons system. Every Soldier who dons the Green Beret does so knowing that he has passed a difficult test that most candidates fail. It is important that he has done so under the watchful eyes of an SF Soldier who assessed him and determined that he was suitable to follow in the footsteps of great men before him.

Today's SFAS assessor is better trained and has more real-world experience than any of his predecessors, and he needs that extra training and experience. To select the right man for SF, the assessor now has more traits to identify, more issues to deal with, and ultimately, more input as to whether or not a candidate should be selected. The importance and value of what the assessors do is demonstrated by the role their feedback plays in the selection process: The assessor has direct input to the selection-board process and is expected to offer candid explanations regarding any of the assessments he made during a given class. There are no secrets during selection anymore. When there are concerns about a candidate's performance, the assessor who had contact with that Soldier will be asked to brief the board members about any issues or concerns during the Soldier's assessment.

For these reasons, the SFAS assessor must be competent, confident, and most importantly, capable of effectively assessing the candidate's trainability and suitability for continuing in the SFQC. There is more than that to consider though: The SFAS assessors also understand that they may eventually serve with these young men, so choosing the right Soldier is important, because that young candidate may someday be a member of their team.

The average SFAS assessor has 10 to 12 years in the Army and six to eight years in SF. He is highly skilled and has multiple combat deployments. Despite their high level of experience, they don't flaunt their accomplishments — they perform their duties with absolute professionalism and motivation to do the right thing, because they know the importance of their decisions.

Both the Special Warfare Center and School's commander, Major General James Parker, and his command sergeant major, Command Sergeant Major David Bruner, have stated that SFAS is the most important part of the SF training pipeline. If we don't get it right, we cause problems down the line, so we stay focused on the fact that we bear a direct responsibility for the future of SF. No other committee can say that: The others receive what we send them. If we get it wrong, they will have to try to fix our mistakes. The SFAS assessor is, and will continue to be, the linchpin. Much of the success that SF enjoys can be traced back to that man with his stubby pencil and notepad (and now a PDA) who makes solid, valid assessments of every SFAS candidate. The assessors certify the foundation upon which all SF training will take place. SW

> **" If we don't get it right, we cause problems down the line, so we stay focused on the fact that we bear a direct responsibility for the future of SF."**

Sergeant Major David S. Randall is assigned to the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, and is the company sergeant major for SFAS. His conventional assignments include serving in long-range surveillance companies in the 9th Infantry Division and in I Corps. Since becoming a member of Special Forces in 1988, he has served in the 1st SF Group as a senior weapons sergeant, assistant team sergeant, team sergeant and company sergeant major. His other assignments at SWCS include student-company first sergeant and instructor in the SF Advanced NCO Course.

Enlisted

SF sets FY 2007 recruiting goals

For fiscal year 2007, the overall recruiting goal for SF active-duty enlisted Soldiers is 2,800: 1,900 from in-service recruiting and 900 from the initial-accessions program, or 18X. The overall goal is the same for the second year in a row — the difference lies in the numbers for in-service and 18X recruiting: The in-service recruiting goal increased from 1,800 to 1,900; the 18X recruiting goal decreased from 1,000 to 900.

Number of SF intel sergeants increasing

During fiscal year 2006, the population of MOS 18F (SF intelligence sergeant) increased from 46 percent of authorizations to 70 percent. Projections based upon the number of students in the SF Intelligence Sergeant Course, or SFISC, and current SFISC loss rates indicate that 18F strength will exceed 95 percent of authorizations by the end of FY 2007. The increase is due to several initiatives, including increasing the number of SFISC class seats annually from 150 to 200, and recoding 171 18F authorizations outside the U.S. Army Special Forces Command to either 18B (SF weapons NCO) or 18C (SF engineer NCO). Soldiers in all CMF 18 MOSs except 18D (SF medical NCO) are eligible to attend SFISC. Qualified SF E6s are encouraged to apply for SFISC; the SF Advanced NCO Course is no longer a course prerequisite. All E7 graduates of SFISC will be reclassified as 18F40 immediately upon graduation. Those below E7 will receive an F1 identifier and will automatically be reclassified to 18F40 upon their promotion to E7.

37F MOS-T program to run four classes during FY 2007

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School completed the pilot program for the 37F MOS-T reclassification program during fiscal year 2006. The course is designed for Soldiers who wish to join CMF 37, Psychological Operations. Reports from the PSYOP community indicate that the program is a success. The 37FMOS-T program will run four 30-seat classes during FY 2007. The course is designed for Soldiers who wish to join CMF 37, Psychological Operations. For more information, Soldiers should contact their unit retention NCO or a 37F recruiter in the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, telephone DSN 239-1650 or commercial (910) 432-1650.

SFC promotion board to convene in January

The Sergeant First Class Promotion-Selection Board for fiscal year 2007 is scheduled to convene Jan. 30, 2007; the cutoff date for submitting records for consideration by the board is Jan. 12. All staff sergeants in the zones of consideration should check now to ensure that their enlisted record brief, official military personnel folder and DA photo are up-to-date with the latest awards, military and civilian education, and NCOERs. For more information on updating records, Soldiers should contact their battalion S1.

Warrant Officer

WO promotion boards to convene

MILPER Message No. 06-273 announced the zones of consideration for the FY 2007 promotion-selection boards for CWO 3, CWO 4 and CWO 5. Boards will convene from Jan. 30 to Feb. 21, 2007. Zones of consideration for all technical services warrant officer specialties, and the applicable active-duty dates of rank, or ADOR, are as follows:

Rank	Zone	ADOR
CWO 3	AZ	10/3/03 and earlier
	PZ	10/1/03-9/30/04
	BZ	None
CWO 4	AZ	9/30/03 and earlier
	PZ	10/1/03-9/30/04
	BZ	None
CWO 5	AZ	9/30/02 and earlier
	PZ	10/01/02-9/30/03
	BZ	10/1/03-9/30/04

For more information go to: https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf.

Training expands to meet demand for SF WOs

In order to meet the manning requirements of the Special Forces groups, the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or SWTG, is conducting two overlapping classes of the newly established Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Course, or WOTTC. Because of 1st SWTG's efforts and recruiting programs within the SF groups, more than 85 new SF warrant officers will have been trained and returned to the operational force by the end of 2006.

The SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC, a military education level 6, or MEL 6, professional military education course, *continued on page 33*

Officer

Current ILE information

- Special Forces officers in year groups 1995 and 1996 should contact the majors' assignments officer in the SF Branch to verify the timeline for their intermediate-level education, or ILE, and to approve any tentative plans for ILE scheduling or locations.
- There are a limited number of slots each year for officers to attend the summer and winter ILE courses conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. When selecting officers to attend either course, the SF Branch will give heavy consideration to an officer's year group and the timing of his follow-on assignment.
- A MILPER message released May 30, 2006, announced procedures by which sister-service officers and foreign officers will be allowed to attend the Command and General Staff Officer Course, or CGSOC, at Fort Leavenworth. Officers who wish to apply for sister-service or foreign CGSOC programs during academic year 2007-2008 must submit written requests to their branch managers.
- One of the opportunities open to SF officers for advanced civil schooling and ILE qualification is the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. The thesis-based program provides a broad-based course of instruction that focuses on the employment of special-operations forces; examines theories of unconventional warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency; and confers a degree of master of science in defense analysis. With the addition of the three-month ILE common-core requirements, the length of SOLIC is 21 months. The SF Branch closely monitors the utilization assignments of SF officers following NPS, and an officer's utilization assignment will generally be linked to his thesis research.

The SOLIC program for summer 2007/winter 2008 will be open to officers in year groups 1995, 1996 and possibly 1997, but the target population is branch-qualified captains in YG 96. Applicants should submit a DA Form 1618, *Application for Detail as Student Officer in a Civilian Educational Institution or Training with Industry Program*, endorsed by the officer's battalion commander. Applications must also include certified college transcripts, current scores on the Graduate Record Examination or Graduate Management Admission Test, a current officer record brief and a current official photograph.

Army welcomes two newest branches

The two newest branches of the Army, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, were activated Oct. 16. Army personnel systems now support both branches: The Total Officer Personnel Management Information System shows the branches' letter designation (PO or CA) on individual officer record briefs, or ORBs, and PSYOP and CA areas of concentration show the proper numerical designation (37A or 38A). Officers' new basic branches are now shown in the proper column of the ORB.

Officers previously listed as members of Functional Area 39 have been notified of the creation of the new branches and offered the option of joining the PSYOP or CA Branch, as appropriate, or returning to their basic branch. The Army has notified 776 officers in the rank of captain through colonel — 357 FA 39B (PSYOP) and 419 FA 39C (Civil Affairs).

So far, the response has been tremendous, with high officer enthusiasm for the two new branches. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is well-positioned to fill the approved branch authorizations during FY 2007 and is postured to meet the growth in FY 2008 and beyond.

Boards to convene for LTC, MAJ in February

In February 2007, the Army will convene promotion-selection boards for lieutenant colonel and major. The primary-zone year group for the lieutenant-colonel board will be 1991; for the major board, it will be 1998. Officers are responsible for updating the information in their officer record brief and official military personnel folder, ensuring that their DA photo is up-to-date and accurately reflects the awards and decorations in their OMPF and on their ORB. If there are any errors or missing documents, officer should go to their personnel service battalion to correct discrepancies.

Warrant Officer Career Notes *continued from page 32*

provides MOS-specific advanced training and education to prepare the 180A for assignments above the SF-detachment level. SF warrant officers who meet WOAC prerequisites must request attendance by submitting a DA Form 4187 through their chain of command to the Army Human Resources Command. The Warrant Officer Staff Course (MEL 4) and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (MEL 1) are professional military education courses required as preparation for all Army warrant officers who will serve in staff positions above the CWO 3 level.

SF WO recruiting in full swing

Fiscal year 2007 recruiting for SF warrant officers is in full swing. The Army Recruiting Command will conduct two additional warrant-officer accession selection boards during FY 2007: one in January and one in July. For additional information, Soldiers should go to www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrantofficer/warrant.html or telephone DSN 239-7597/7596/1879 or commercial (910) 432-7597/7596/1879.

THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM:
How Americans are Seduced by War



DETAILS

By Andrew J. Bacevich
New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005
ISBN 0-19-517338-4.
288 pages. $28.

Reviewed by:
Major Lawrence O. Basha
Naval Postgraduate School

After 9/11, America embarked on a Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, deploying our military to locate and destroy terrorists around the world. Andrew Bacevich, the author of *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, doesn't agree. He believes that the GWOT is a "sideshow" to the real objective of the military force, which is to secure the oil in the Middle East for the U.S. market.

Bacevich argues that the Cold War (which he calls World War III) saw American society's normalization of the forever war. He believes that what America is involved in is not the GWOT, but rather a fourth world war for the procurement of oil. He further asserts that America measures its greatness by its military power.

Bacevich believes that civilian expectations and understanding of the military's use have become inflated and convoluted since the start of the GWOT — making America's view of its military one of the themes explored in this book.

Bacevich discusses the shift of the role of the American military from providing domestic defense to enforcing American will and policy abroad. This book is relevant to the special-operations professional because the continuing military involvement in Iraq, problems with military recruiting, America's dependence on oil and the continuing fight against terrorists outside Iraq all directly affect military regulation and engagement. T*he New American Militarism* provides background about these issues, offers a glimpse of where the "new militarism" is headed and prescribes recommendations for change.

This book is one of the most important works on the contemporary military because of its comprehensive analysis of the roots of American military power and the political ideology behind that power. Bacevich, a West Point graduate, Vietnam veteran and director of the Center for International Relations at Boston University, gives military personnel an insight into how they and their culture are viewed by American society and politicians, and where the civilian-military relationship is headed.

Three themes intertwine throughout the book — the history of the use of military force, the evolution of the military since the Vietnam War and the perception of the military by the general public and policy-makers in American society. The chapters, organized thematically rather than chronologically, are successfully crafted into a coherent analysis of the modern American military.

The last two chapters of the book, "Blood for Oil" and "Common Defense," critique today's attitude toward the use of military force and the way the military is employed to achieve America's political objectives. Bacevich decries the transformation of the military from a force intended to defend American territory to one that is almost completely focused on offensive and external use.

In these two most controversial chapters, Bacevich argues that America's economic elite has determined that controlling Middle Eastern oil resources is necessary to America's well-being, and that concept, developed into official U.S. policy during the Carter administration, has become further entrenched through each subsequent administration. The military is increasingly the tool of choice for securing American economic interests — thus the chapter name, "Blood for Oil."

Bacevich believes that the all-volunteer military is increasingly separated from the general population. Because most people do not have any firsthand military contact, the general population has an unrealistic expectation of the military's purposes and abilities. In his final chapter, Bacevich provides 10 ideological, political and practical recommendations for reintegrating the military into society and adjusting the way the politicians view and employ military force.

Many military people will be put off by Bacevich's book because his analysis does not present the military — or the current administration — in a completely positive light. Additionally, many readers will be offended by Bacevich's pragmatic and unvarnished view of the purpose of our nation's military. No matter what the reader's political perspective, Bacevich provides a thorough understanding of the way the military is perceived and employed by American policy-makers, with some ideas on what civilians might demand of the military in the future.

Bacevich's insistence on the importance of history is a major strength of this work. The intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution was that the Army be used to defend the United States. This expectation has changed, and the book methodically describes development of the Wilsonian ideal of using the military to export American values through international intervention. The combination of Wilsonian ideals, the ever-changing threats to democracy worldwide, and improved American military technology help explain why America intervened in areas like Somalia and the Balkans.

Bacevich describes the transformation of military culture to a more professional corps since the end of the Vietnam War, and the increased social acceptance from positive Hollywood movies. The explanation of this transformation, and how it is relevant to the use of military force today, is as informative as it is interesting.

The New American Militarism is not without contentious points, most notably the assertion that U.S. Middle East policy is designed to control the region's oil resources and maintain them as a stable source of energy for the America economy. Although this claim may be disputed, Bacevich makes a strong case in support. Another controversy is implicit in Bacevich's discussion of whether the U.S. government is more likely to use military force prior to exhausting all diplomatic options. Although not mentioned explicitly, Bacevich's point here seems to be directly illustrated by President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq.

Bacevich's recommendations call for the reform of the military and for the return of the military function to that originally envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. His argument is strong in the abstract, but it seems unlikely to be implemented without changes in the social and political forces that influence American foreign and military employment.

What value does this book have to the military? Military professionals must understand both the internal and external influences that govern the military. Understanding what is expected of the military will help military leaders make the best recommendations for military employment. It will also help the military professional understand the larger political context in which the military is employed, allowing military leaders to develop better strategies and procedures.

The armed services' interaction with American society, or the lack thereof, is also important to the military professional. The general public's unfamiliarity with the military can lead to civilian apathy about or misuse of the military.

One aspect of this book is slightly misleading: Bacevich implies that Americans are being seduced into the use of military force no matter what the cost. In reality, Americans have become accustomed to a large standing military, and they will support military intervention and accept casualties as long as they believe the war is just and necessary to American security. However, they will quickly quash military adventurism when they do not believe it's necessary to domestic safety; thus the difference between the American public's reaction to casualties in Somalia vs. Afghanistan. **SW**

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Photo by Kathleen Devine

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