Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–03–3 February 2004 Vol. 16, No. 3

From the Commandant

February 2004 Special Warfare Vol. 16, No. 3

Recently Major Mark Mitchell received the first Distinguished Service Cross awarded to a Special Forces soldier since the Vietnam War. He earned the medal, the Army's second highest award for heroism, for his actions during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Despite the award citation's description of his "unparalleled courage," "decisive leadership" and "personal sacrifice," Major Mitchell modestly described his actions by saying, "I was just doing my job."

The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School produces such leaders through a developmental process of accession, selection, training and follow-on developmental assignments that ensures that soldiers will have the aptitude, training and opportunity to contribute their all to the war on terrorism.

Critical for success in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces are a detailed knowledge of the culture of a particular region of the world, and the ability to communicate in at least one foreign language. Sensitivity to political, religious and cultural nuances allows soldiers to see beyond their immediate mission to assess the second- and third-order effects of their decisions.

The officers, noncommissioned officers and civilians of the USAJFKSWCS have been working day and night to optimally prepare our men and women for combat; altering programs of instruction, creating new courses and increasing student production.

Our soldiers have overthrown the Taliban in Afghanistan, dominated the north and controlled the western desert in Iraq, operated behind the lines in both

urban and rural terrain, and expelled guerrillas from Basilan Island in the Philippines, while assisting the government of Colombia in its struggle against insurgent elements.

Cultural understanding has made the difference in each endeavor, facilitating combat operations where our soldiers consistently display courage, decisive leadership and personal sacrifice — all while "just doing their jobs."

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Major Combat and Restoration Operations: A Discussion

by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

On Dec. 17, 1989, at Fort Bragg, N.C., the operations officer of the 7th Special Forces Group[1] asked a desk officer on the staff of United States Army's 1st Special Operations Command to send a message to the "highest levels" to call attention to a serious flaw in the U.S. plan to invade Panama. The operations officer explained that there was no synchronization between the plan (code-named Blue Spoon) to destroy the Panamanian Defense Force, or PDF, and the plan (code-named Blind Logic) to restore the government of Panama under the democratically elected President Guillermo Endara.

The operations officer predicted chaos: The destruction of the PDF, he contended, would engender a government of Panama that would have no Army or police (because the Army *was* the constabulary), no customs service, and no navy or coast guard. In addition, Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega had so corrupted the government that few government agencies would be able to function after the cessation of his gangster-like regime.

The action officer sent a message stating the operations officer's concerns to the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. As a result, on Dec. 19, the day before the invasion, the J5 of the U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, was designated as the skeleton around which the new government of Panama would be formed.

The J5 staff rapidly read and digested the plan for Blind Logic. Staff members held hurried meetings, and on Dec. 20, after the invasion, the staff decided that its primary effort had to be to jump-start the new Endara administration. U.S. forces began providing security training to Endara's guard force, and the elements of the J5 that would be working to return power and water to the Panamanian legislative palace began moving into the building.

In the meantime, the work on prisoner-of-war facilities and other pillars of restoration languished. Within days of the invasion, planners from Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, and Civil Affairs, or CA, reinforced the J5. In addition, with no prior force listing or force preparation, and with virtually no notice, CA units and the 7th SF Group arrived to facilitate the transition to peace. In January 1990, the operation was named Operation Promote Liberty. Elements of SF remained in Panama until December 1990 to ensure that democratic institutions would take root.

After the invasion, when the U.S. Army Special Operations Command submitted its lessons-learned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, one of the major lessons was the need to plan effectively for the transition to peace.

John T. Fishel best captures the unorchestrated transition to peace in Panama in the premier examination of the issue, *The Fog of*

Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama.[2] Fishel concludes that without a long-term vision and a strategy for the restoration of Panama, the major combat and restoration operations were less than optimal successes.

Describing the effects of the restoration, a Panamanian businessman credited the J5 with accomplishing the necessary tasks: "You got the police working — not too well, but working. Second, you got the government ministries working." A quote from a woman on the street a year after the invasion is more pessimistic: "The government has done nothing. It seems that we were mistaken about Endara. Now we are worse off than before. The streets are full of thugs; you can't sleep in peace. There is more unemployment than before; and this situation affects everyone and everything."

Fishel summarizes the failure to synchronize major combat operations and restoration in Panama with the following comments. In light of current conditions in Iraq, Fishel's comments appear to remain valid.

- *There is an absolute requirement for articulating political-military strategic objectives in terms of clearly defined end states.*
- *U.S. government and civilian agencies must develop the capability to conceive strategy in terms of ends, ways and means. Until such a capability is developed, the military will have to take the lead in organizing the strategy-development process.*
- *Unity of effort in the interagency environment can be achieved only if all critical government agencies are included in the contingency-planning process. Even the combat phase of the contingency plan will require input from the State Department and other agencies, but the civil-military operations, or CMO, phase certainly will demand very heavy participation, particularly from the State Department; the Agency for International Development, or AID; and the Department of Justice.*
- *A campaign plan for linking the strategic and operational levels is absolutely necessary. The military must take the lead in developing a full-fledged campaign plan that will include CMO through the termination of the campaign. A major part of the CMO planning will involve the hand-off from the military to the lead civilian agency. The follow-on campaign may well be State Department's or AID's lead, with the military serving in a support role for both planning and execution.*
- *Both the commander of the civil-military-operations task force, or COMCMOTF, and the U.S. military support group failed to be fully effective in orchestrating CMO in Panama because they were wholly military. An interagency organization for conducting restoration operations is required. Such an organization must work directly for the U.S. ambassador. It must be an addition to the normal country team, and much of its membership needs to be military.*
- *There are serious costs to operational capability if the total-force concept is not exercised as intended. The bottom line is that the use of the Reserve call-up authority must be made routine.*
- *Critical to the effective massing of forces in restoration operations is adequate funding and a sense of urgency. In the immediate aftermath of combat, operational funds must be used for restoration purposes. This source of funding should not*

Figure 1 Cold War Planning



Figure 2 Superpower Planning



be terminated solely for budgetary reasons. Long-term funding from appropriations requires that the executive branch have a well-developed plan for convincing the Congress to pass the required legislation with a real sense of urgency.

In light of Fishel's observations and the lessons learned from Panama, one might wonder why planning for Iraq did not fully include the transition to peace. The restoration phase of the plan was termed Phase IV. Reportedly,[3] the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a report, entitled "Operation Iraqi Freedom," that listed several problems in obtaining a smooth transition to peace in Iraq:

- Planners were not given enough time to put together the best blueprint for Phase IV.
- Troop formations for Phase IV operations were designated too late and flowed into theater too late.
- Planning for Phase IV was not initiated early enough.
- Ongoing revisions of plans for combat operations limited the planners' focus on Phase IV.

The recurring problem of "Phase IV" integration may be a holdover from the Cold War planning scenario. The objective under the Cold War model was to survive the onslaught of Soviet weapons of mass destruction and stop the Red Army short of its objectives in Europe. Since both sides of the conflict would be going for the jugular and national existence itself might be an issue, reconstruction was an afterthought. The survival of Western democracy and of our nation was the paramount measure of success. Figure 1 illustrates the Cold War planning process.

Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Middle East, as well as the crumbling of the Soviet Union, made apparent that the bipolar world was evaporating and that only one superpower would remain. This meant that the U.S. and its allies or coalition partners would, in most conflicts, be assured of military victory. That reality gives us certain superpower luxuries in the planning process. One of those is that we can afford to be compassionate and to spend significant resources in determining what we do *not* want to destroy — from economic infrastructure to cultural centers.

Secondly, certainty of victory allows planners to look well past the firing of the

Figure 3 Hyperpower Planning



last bullet in order to determine Phase IV end states. Therefore, planners should attempt to plan reconstruction *first*, and then use reverse-sequence planning to determine appropriate *supportive major combat operations* (Figure 2).

Lastly, some in Europe have suggested that the U.S. is the world's only "hyperpower." Hyperpower planning could conceivably envelop the info sphere and the entire globe. It could focus on new global and regional equilibriums as end states, identify preventive strategies, and potentially significantly change *major combat operations and reconstruction activities in support of the interagency derived end states* (Figure 3).

Regardless of the scenario, it is clearly time for military planners to become more holistic and to look well beyond major combat operations as they define "success." ✂

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert is commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He previously commanded the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, which provided SF units for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and Colombia. He has been an Infantry and Special Forces officer, and he has held the additional specialties of foreign area officer and Civil Affairs.

Notes:

[1] The author.

[2] John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College) 15 April 1992.

[3] Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning," *Washington Times*, 3 September 2003.

Demobilization: The SF Detachment's Role in Assessing Infrastructure Development

by Captain Neil Tator

The global war on terrorism has placed Special Forces in a position to affect the infrastructure of various countries and regimes. As with most special-operations missions, the interaction begins at the basic level, with the SF A-detachment. It is imperative for the A-detachment to assess the infrastructure development of the host nation as it relates to the detachment's immersion with indigenous forces.

According to the World Bank Group, "Infrastructure is an integral part of the development of any country. It is not simply about the construction of large projects. It is about providing and delivering basic services that people need for everyday life."[1] It is vital that a nation strive for stability once armed conflict has ceased. However, an infrastructure assessment begins with the initial contact between the A-detachment and the host-nation force. That contact can be an important step toward demobilization.

"Demobilization is defined as a process whereby armed forces (the government and/or the opposition or armed factions) are significantly reduced in numbers or completely disbanded in the framework of a transition to peace."[2] In order for demobilization to be successful, the host nation must achieve stability by building a solid infrastructure. Because demobilization begins essentially when SF makes contact with the indigenous force, the SF detachment should begin assessing the host-nation infrastructure early. As it interacts with the host nation, the SF detachment has a unique vantage point for examining the host nation's elements of national stability.

Elements of national stability

The elements of national stability can be organized into five categories: (1) security; (2) political stability; (3) economic stability; (4) internal and external trade; and (5) global legitimacy.

Security. Security entails the establishment or re-establishment of a national army. It also involves the stabilization of local and area police forces in order to deter criminal activity.[3] The A-detachment interacts daily with host-nation indigenous forces and local police forces, and it can assess whether those elements are capable of tying into national-security interests. "Critical to the success of any national army is that the soldiers and civilians understand their individual and unit relationships to higher headquarters and to the host nation government."[4]

Political stability. Many nation-states are challenged to maintain political stability as their tribal and ethnic factions vie in conventional and unconventional conflicts. The SF detachment can determine at the local level whether the various factions and tribes are capable of forming and recognizing a local government institution

that is tied into a national political hierarchy. The challenge is not to disband the various factions, but rather to stabilize them into one functional system.

Economic stability. Conflict often leads to instability in the local economy. The A-detachment can monitor the value of the national currency, the actions the host nation is taking, and whether those actions weaken or strengthen the economy at the local level. The SF detachment can also gauge the influx of United States currency, which can either help or hurt the host nation's national monetary system.

Internal and external trade. Internal and external trade go hand and hand with the nation-state's ability to maintain a strong economy. The SF detachment can assess which goods and services may be economically viable and whether there is a local means of transporting those goods and services into and out of the detachment's area of operations. Such an assessment can be tied in to determining the state or the existence of roadways and railways within the operational area and the ways those avenues could be used to develop and sustain a trading network.

Global legitimacy. Global legitimacy begins at the local level. Tribal and local community leaders must demonstrate a willingness to work toward a common national goal. The SF detachment can determine whether local elements are truly striving toward nationalism, which is a key component of legitimacy.

Area assessment

Assessing the operational environment is a natural activity for SF detachments. Once they infiltrate, SF teams conduct an area assessment to evaluate the overall situation within an operational area. "The assessment includes information on the capabilities and intentions of military and paramilitary forces, as well as social, cultural, and demographic data. The area assessment is an integral part of unconventional warfare and is conducted during activities incidental to other mission taskings."[5] The area-assessment process can serve as a template for developing a more detailed picture of a war-torn nation-state's ability to demobilize and achieve a more stable environment.

Conclusion

Military victory is a key objective in establishing stability. Military victory does not, however, assure the achievement of the desired political end state. "Rapidly extracting forces, securing vital interests, or resolving the conflict may produce nothing except a vacuum and an ensuing anarchy. Mission planners must therefore consider consolidation and demobilization operations during post-hostilities operations."[6] The process of demobilization begins with a thorough assessment by soldiers at the basic level: the SF A-detachment.

Captain Neil Tator is commander of Headquarters Company, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He previously served as an SF detachment commander in Afghanistan with the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. He also served in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, National Training Center Opposing Forces, as a recon platoon leader, executive officer and assistant S2. Captain Tator holds a bachelor's degree from Hampton University and a master's degree in public administration from Golden Gate University.

Notes:

[1] World Bank Group, Web page on infrastructure development (www.worldbank.org/infrastructure).

[2] U.S. Army, FM 31-20-5, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense*.

[3] Graham Turbiville, "The Organized Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and Operations Other Than War," *Special Warfare*, April 1994.

[4] Dr. Richard L. Kiper, "An Army for Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group and the Afghan Army," *Special Warfare*, September 2002.

[5] U.S. Army, FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*.

[6] U.S. Army, FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*.

Officer Professional Development: Civil Affairs Branch

by Majors Charles R. Munguia and Michael J. Karabasz

The career development of Army Reserve officers in the Civil Affairs Branch continues throughout their career life cycle with progressive responsibilities in troop-program-unit, staff-officer and institutional-training assignments. Officers must also complete their professional-military-education requirements in order to ensure their professional growth and to remain competitive for Army promotion-selection boards.

CA officers selected for promotion to major must complete some form of military-education-level 4, or MEL 4, training, and all officers selected for promotion to colonel should complete MEL 1 training. Self-development is key for all officers in the CA Branch. Because CA is a reserve-component branch, officers must develop their regional expertise and foreign-language capability through self-development. The CA Branch's goal in officer development is to access officers at the tactical level and develop them into strategic-level CA campaign planners who can support combatant commanders.

Accessions

As a nonaccession branch, the CA Branch draws its officers from all other branches of the United States Army. CA officers are expected to have served a successful initial tour as a small-unit leader (a lieutenant) in another branch. As a result, when accessed they should be experienced Army leaders who have a working knowledge of conventional Army operations and tactics. The majority of officers are accessed into CA as senior first lieutenants, captains or majors. Occasionally, on a case-by-case basis, the CA Branch may access lieutenant colonels who have civilian skills that are relevant to one of the CA functional areas.

Lieutenant colonels must receive a waiver to attend the branch training and to be allowed to branch transfer into the CA Branch. The waiver request must be endorsed by the applicant's chain of command and forwarded through the commanding general of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, or USACAPOC, to the commanding general of the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Attn: AOJK-SP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5200.

CA Branch officers should have already attended their captains career course or the officer advanced course of their basic branch; they will continue to follow the Army Officer Education System according to the standards of the Army's new Officer Personnel Management System, OPMS III. The Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC, is the branch-producing course for Army Reserve CA officers. Officers who graduated from the Civil

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This article has been adapted from the input prepared by members of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office for the updated DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, scheduled to be released in 2004.*

Affairs Officer Advanced Course, or CAOAC; or the Mobilization Civil Affairs Course, or MCAC, prior to the establishment of the CAQC are considered to have met the course-qualification requirement for the branch.

The CA Branch offers officers opportunities to command at various levels: a major may command a CA company, a lieutenant colonel a CA battalion, a colonel a CA brigade, and a brigadier general a CA command. All Branch 38-coded positions are open to women, including all positions in CA units and all command positions.

To be eligible for branch-transfer into the CA Branch, officers must meet the following unwaiverable criteria:

- Have completed their basic branch's officer basic course.
- Have completed their basic branch's officer advanced course, captain's career course or the equivalent.
- Have completed either CAQC, CAOAC or MCAC.
- Be assigned to a position that is coded for the CA Branch or the CA functional area.
- Possess a bachelor's degree.
- Possess a secret security clearance.
- Have a physical profile of 222221.
- Be serving in the rank of major or below in the Army Reserve (exceptions considered on a case-by-case basis).

Because of the regional orientation of Army Reserve CA units, it is highly desirable that officers have a foreign-language skill, as well as regional and cultural expertise. In addition, advanced civilian education and a strong background in one of the CA functional areas (per DA Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, Chapter 4) is essential.

Commissioned officers who meet the minimum criteria outlined above and who desire to transfer to the CA branch may apply in one of two ways:

• Members of Army Reserve troop program units, or TPUs, who are not assigned to USACAPOC may apply through their chain of command to Headquarters, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Attn: AOJK-SP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5200. TPU members who are assigned to USACAPOC or who fall under its control may apply through their chain of command to Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Attn: AOPE-RP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5200.

• Individual mobilization augmentees may apply through their respective personnel management officer at the U.S. Army Human Resource Command-St. Louis; 1 Reserve Way; St. Louis, MO 63132-5200.

The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is the proponent for all Army special-operations forces and the final authority in determining course prerequisites and the requirements for branch transfers. All requests for exceptions to policy should be routed through the applicant's chain of command to: Commanding General, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Attn: AOJK-SP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5200. Upon their acceptance for branch transfer, officers will be managed as CA officers by the Army Human Resource Command-St. Louis.

Because of the regional orientation of Army Reserve CA units, it is highly desirable that officers have a foreign-language skill, as well as regional and cultural expertise. In addition, advanced civilian education and a strong background in one of the CA functional areas is essential.

In order to be considered best-qualified in the branch at each grade, CA officers must complete the appropriate operational assignments and schooling. By meeting those requirements, officers will acquire the skills and knowledge necessary for them to remain proficient in the CA Branch and best-qualified for promotion. Furthermore, CA officers are strongly encouraged to attain exceptional qualification requirements at each grade. That will increase officers' probability of being selected for promotion and increase their probability of retaining a TPU position. Meeting exceptional requirements will also improve officers' probability of selection for command as lieutenant colonels and colonels. Officers at all grades must recognize, however, the importance of exceptional performance in all assignments.

The CA branch does not have assigned positions in the grade of lieutenant. Because the geographic locations of CA units are limited,

Civil Affairs Life Cycle Development Model (USAR)



Branch Qualifying	Team Leader, CAT BN Staff	Company Commander BN XO BN S3	Battalion CDR CA Brigade Staff	Brigade Commander Deputy Commander, BDE or CACOM ACof S BDE or CACOM
Developmental	CAT-B Functional Spec Tm BDE or CACOM Staff USACAPOC Staff	BN Team Chief or BDE or CACOM, Functional Spec Tm USASOC Staff USACAPOC Staff USAJFKSWCS Staff Joint Staff Instructor CTC Observer/Controller	CACOM Staff Team Chief, CAPT-A CAPT-B, CAP3T Functional Spec Tm MACOM/MSC Staff Joint Staff	BDE or CACOM staff Team Chief, Functional Spec Tm Team Chief, CAPT-B CACOM staff MACOM/MSC Staff Joint Staff

the definition of branch-qualifying assignments is broader in the reserve component than it is in the active component. The following assignments are recommendations of positions that will make RC CA officers best-qualified at each grade and exceptionally qualified for future promotion. CA officers can expect to execute their duties during scheduled TPU training events, when they participate in a variety of missions and deployments in support of combatant commanders and theater special-operations commands, and when they participate in various exercises at the combat training centers (including Warfighter exercises and exercises in the battle-command training program).

Lieutenants, captains

Professional military education. First lieutenants and captains should complete a captain's career course, basic branch advanced course, CAQC and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School or its equivalent.

Assignments. CA captains should successfully serve 24 months in any of the positions listed below or in any combination of these positions:

• CA team-alpha, or CAT-A. CAT-As are led by captains. CAT-As are the basic "maneuver element" of CA forces. During their assignment as a CAT-A team leader, CA captains can expect to lead and train CA NCOs and soldiers assigned to CAT-As; to provide maneuver commanders with support for CA planning and assessment, and with staff augmentation for civil-military operations, or CMO; to provide linguistic, regional and cultural expertise to supported commanders; to plan and execute tasks for CMO and CA operations, or CAO, in support of conventional and special-operations forces in a joint, interagency and multinational environment; to employ a CAT-A in conducting CAO and CMO.

• CA team-bravo, or CAT-B. The CAT-B is the CA company headquarters. Captains serve as operations officers within the CAT-B. During their assignment to a CAT-B, CA captains can expect to provide CMO staff support to brigade-level organizations and to assist the command and control of CAT-As; to plan, coordinate and conduct CA activities in support of CAO/CMO; to provide a supported command with advice, coordination and staff assistance on the employment of CA capabilities and on issues relating to the civil populace; to update CAO and CMO estimates, area assessments, and CA, CAO and CMO annexes; and to assist in establishing and operating a civil-military operations center, or CMOC.

• Functional specialty team. Captains are detachment-level operations officers on each of the four CA functional-specialty teams in the functional-specialty company of a tactical CA battalion. During their assignment to a functional-specialty team, CA captains can expect to provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing the systems, agencies, services, personnel and resources of indigenous populations and institutions, or IPI; to determine the capabilities and the effectiveness of IPI systems and their impact on CAO and CMO; to develop plans for rehabilitating or establishing IPI systems, agencies and resources and to provide the necessary operational oversight and supervision; and to provide liaison with and coordinate with government and nongovernment IPI agencies in support of CAO and CMO.

Captains on functional-specialty teams will also advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing and operating public systems and agencies; advise and assist in developing the technical requirements, policies and procedures needed for providing government services to the local population; assist in planning, organizing and coordinating IPI, information operations, or IO, and in the provision of assistance to local governments by U.S. government agencies and nongovernment organizations, or NGOs; coordinate the use of government and commercial supplies, equipment and other resources during CAO, CMO and other military operations; coordinate the military use of government and nongovernment IPI resources to support CAO, CMO and government administration.

• Staff officer. The primary developmental assignment for CA captains is duty as a primary staff officer (S1 or S4) or as an assistant S3 in a CA battalion. The responsibilities of CA staff officers are similar to those of officers in other Army branches. A detailed listing of staff-officer duties and responsibilities is contained in Chapter 4 of FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.

Majors

Professional military education. Majors should complete at least 50 percent of the requirements for the Command and General Staff Officer Course, or CGSOC, or for Intermediate Level Education, or ILE. But to be among the best-qualified for promotion selection and to be competitive with officers of the other RC branches, officers should complete CGSOC or ILE and meet the MEL 4 requirements of the Army Officer Education System.

Assignments. Assignments of CA majors include planning and executing CA and CMO tasks, employing CA soldiers, and leading and developing subordinates. Majors should successfully serve 24 months in any of the positions listed below or in any combination of these positions:

• CA company commander. Majors command CA companies. During their assignment as a CA company commander, majors can expect to command and lead the CA officers, NCOs and soldiers assigned to the company; to direct the company's collective training; to direct the planning, coordination and conduct of CA activities in support of CAO and CMO; to provide a supported command with advice, coordination and staff assistance on the employment of CA capabilities and on issues relating to IPI, IO, NGOs and other government agencies; to employ CAT-Bs, CAT-As and functional teams to conduct CAO and CMO; and to establish and operate a CMOC.

• Staff officer. The primary developmental assignment for a CA major is duty as a primary staff officer (S3 or executive officer) in a tactical CA battalion or in a special-operations battalion. The responsibilities of CA staff officers are similar to those of staff officers in other U.S. Army branches. Chapter 4 of FM 101-5 contains a detailed listing of Army staff officers' duties and responsibilities.

• Member of a functional specialty team. Majors lead the functional specialty teams assigned to a tactical CA battalion and serve on the specialty teams in CA brigades and commands. During their assignment to a CA functional specialty team, CA majors can expect to employ the team to provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing the CA functional specialties.

• Officer on a general staff. Majors can continue their professional development as members of staff sections at the CA-com-

mand, major-subordinate-command or major-command levels.

• Staff officer at the Department of Army, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff or theater special-operations command levels; staff officer in a joint or combined headquarters; or service in interagency positions that require CA experience and skill. All these positions will normally be held by Army Reserve officers who are serving active-guard-and-reserve tours, but Reserve officers in TPU assignments may serve in these positions during a presidential selected reserve call-up, during temporary tours of active duty, or during active duty for special work.

Lieutenant colonels

Professional military education. CA lieutenant colonels should complete CGSOC, if they did not complete it while they were majors. To remain competitive for subsequent promotion, lieutenant colonels should strive to be selected for a senior service college.

Assignments. Key developmental assignments for CA lieutenant colonels include:

• Service as a battalion commander. The most critical developmental assignment for CA lieutenant colonels is service as a CA battalion commander. That service will develop them to fulfill the responsibilities of a CA brigade commander.

• Service as primary staff officer in a CA brigade.

• Service as a staff officer in a CA brigade or a CA command.

• Service as a member of a CA planning team.

• Service on one of the six CA specialty teams of a tactical CA battalion.

• Service as a staff officer at the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; service in a joint or combined headquarters; or service in interagency positions requiring CA experience and skill. These positions are not normally open to Reserve officers in TPUs, but they can become available during a presidential selected reserve call-up, during temporary tours of active duty, or during active duty for special work.

Colonels

Professional military education. CA colonels should complete a senior service college or the requirements for MEL 1.

Assignments. CA colonels will continue to serve the CA Branch, special operations and the Army through service in many CA-coded colonel positions or combinations of positions within the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the Department of the Army, the joint staff, service schools and other key organizations. Key developmental assignments for CA colonels include:

• Command of a CA brigade.

• Deputy command of a CA brigade or a CA command.

• Service as assistant chief of staff for one of the primary staff positions at the CA brigade or CA command level.

• Service as team chief of a CA specialty team.

• Service as team chief of a CA planning team.

• Service as a staff officer at the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; service in a joint or combined headquarters; or service in interagency positions requiring CA experience and skill.

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Officer Professional Development: Psychological Operations Functional Area

by Jeanne Goldmann and Lieutenant Colonel Fran Landy

Active-component Army officers in the Psychological Operations functional area form a pool of regionally aligned, culturally attuned and language-qualified officers who are capable of supporting tactical-, operational- and strategic-level requirements for Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, during peace and war.

Effective Oct. 1, 2005, the PSYOP functional area, now identified as FA 39B, will be designated FA 37A. For the sake of simplicity, as well as to acquaint soldiers with the change, this article will use the new designation throughout.

Expert in the command and employment of PSYOP soldiers, teams and units in the execution of PSYOP missions, FA 37A officers conduct PSYOP planning and PSYOP operations in support of missions that encompass the spectrum of conflict. They provide PSYOP training, as well as advice and assistance, to United States forces, to U.S. government agencies, and to friendly nations and forces. They analyze target groups from cultural, historical, political, social, economic, systematic and religious perspectives and ascertain target groups' psychological weaknesses. To perform their missions successfully, PSYOP officers must possess a wide range of skills, knowledge and attributes.

Required characteristics

The core competencies for all officers in Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, are: cross-cultural communication; regional expertise; language ability; interpersonal skills; personal lethality (warrior ethos); adaptive thinking and leadership; and technical proficiency. ARSOF officers must also be qualified military parachutists.

PSYOP officers must be proficient at operating in widely dispersed areas; in integrated combined-arms teams; with joint, interagency or multinational units; and in teams of special-operations forces, or SOF.

PSYOP leaders must be self-aware and adaptive; they must be comfortable with ambiguity and able to predict the second- and third-order effects of their actions and decisions. They must have the ability to solve complex political-military problems and to develop and employ conventional and unconventional solutions. They also must be able to develop and employ nondoctrinal methods and techniques when necessary, and they must be capable of taking decisive action in missions for which no doctrine exists.

PSYOP officers are adept at cross-cultural communication, proficient in multimedia marketing techniques and planning, familiar with the use of polling and focus groups to provide scientifically based measures of effectiveness, and skilled at integrating the PSYOP effort with other components of information operations or information warfare. Officers in PSYOP must have an aptitude for learning a foreign language, and they must sustain their foreign-language proficiency throughout their careers.

Selected PSYOP officers will be afforded the opportunity to obtain a PSYOP-related

PSYOP Life Cycle Model (Active)



NOTE: Officers who serve 90 or more days in contingency operations will receive special consideration regarding branch qualification.

master's degree, or its equivalent, through a graduate program authorized by the PSYOP proponent, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, at Fort Bragg, N.C.

PSYOP offers a number of opportunities for female officers. There are only five PSYOP-officer positions that are closed to female officers.

FA 37A training provides officers with basic knowledge of the functional area's operations. As they develop, officers gain a broader understanding of PSYOP and its application in support of conventional forces and SOF in joint, interagency and multinational environments.

Development pattern

PSYOP officers begin their careers in one of the Army's accession branches. As lieutenants and captains, all attend basic officer leadership courses and captain career courses and serve in branch-qualifying positions. They are accessed into FA 37A between their fifth and sixth years of service.

All officers accessed into FA 37A must meet the following criteria:

- Be eligible for a top-secret security clearance according to the provisions of AR 604-5, *Personnel Security Clearance, Department of the Army Personnel Security Program Regulation*.
- Possess a bachelor's degree, preferably in social science, political science or a related discipline. Officers' previous academic performance must demonstrate their potential for success in graduate study.
- Score at least 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery, or demonstrate a foreign-language ability of at least 1/1 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.
- Be airborne-qualified or be medically and physically capable and willing to volunteer for airborne training.

Education and training

After their branch-qualification as captains, FA 37A officers will begin their functional-area training. Officers who are accessed into FA 37A must attend the Psychological Operations Officers' Course, or POOC, at SWCS. POOC is followed by the Regional Studies Course, and by language training (if the officer is not language-qualified). Functional-area training lasts nine to 11 months. The preferred advanced degree for FA 37A is a master's of science in defense analysis. After their initial FA 37A training and 12 to 15 months of utilization assignments, selected officers will be given the

opportunity to complete their military-education-level 4, or MEL 4, requirements and earn a master's degree in defense analysis from either the University of Kansas or the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Officers who career-field designate into FA 37A will attend a master's-degree program and Intermediate Level Education, or ILE. Selected officers will have the opportunity to complete a training-with-industry assignment.

PSYOP officers may also have an opportunity to attend the highly competitive Advanced Military Studies Program, or AMSP, a year of advanced study at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. AMSP provides a broad, deep education in the art and science of war at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. AMSP is usually followed by a tour as an operational planner.

Officers in FA 37A have to meet certain requirements for FA qualification and for development at each level of their career.

Captains

To meet the qualification requirements for FA 37A, captains must:

- Complete all FA 37A requisite training.
- Serve at least 12 months, preferably 24, in FA 37A-coded positions within the 4th Psychological Operations Group.
- Conduct PSYOP in an operational environment.

In addition to acquiring professional development through training and operational assignments, FA 37A captains should begin an intensive process of self-development. Their self-development efforts should focus on gaining an in-depth understanding of combined-arms operations, as well as on gaining and maintaining regional and linguistic skills.

Majors

Majors must meet the following qualification requirements:

- Complete all FA 37A requisite training.
- Serve at least 12 months, preferably 24, in any of the following positions or combinations of positions: company/detachment commander; battalion executive officer; battalion operations officer; group executive officer; group operations officer; or PSYOP staff officer at the army, corps, division or SF-group level. These assignments will prepare majors for future leadership responsibilities as battalion commanders and as senior field-grade officers.
- Serve as a member of a joint or combined staff. Special operations are joint operations, and PSYOP majors should seek joint or combined duty, either before or after they serve in their branch-qualifying assignment.
- Officers who serve 90 days or more in key leader-development assignments in contingency operations will receive special consideration regarding their branch qualification.

Successful service in more than one of the aforementioned branch-qualifying positions is considered to improve a PSYOP officer's qualification for battalion command.

PSYOP majors must also maintain and improve their foreign-language proficiency and continue their self-development reading program.

Lieutenant colonels

PSYOP lieutenant colonels should complete a senior service college, but the key developmental requirement is that they serve successfully in any FA 37A-coded lieutenant-colonel position or in any combination of those positions. The most critical of those assignments is service as a battalion commander. That service will develop the lieutenant colonel for the responsibilities of a group command or its equivalent.

A PSYOP officer who has commanded at the lieutenant-colonel level is eligible to compete for command of a PSYOP group. Lieutenant colonels will also have opportunities to command PSYOP units during contingency operations. The majority of PSYOP lieutenant-colonel assignments are aimed at developing the incumbent to make broader contributions to the functional area, to special operations and to the U.S. Army.

Colonels

Colonels in FA 37A will continue to serve PSYOP, special operations and the Army through service in any FA 37A-coded colonel position or combination of positions within the U.S. Special Operations Command; the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psy-

PSYOP Life Cycle Model (Reserve Component)



chological Operations Command; Headquarters, Department of the Army; joint staffs; and other key organizations. Opportunities also exist for PSYOP colonels to fill command-selection-list billets in the institutional-garrison category.

Raters and senior raters must clearly indicate which officers should be retained in FA 37A and which ones should return to their basic branch. That information will assist members of career-field-designation boards to choose the best officers for FA 37A.

RC officers

All officers in the Army National Guard, or ARNG, and the U.S. Army Reserve, or USAR, who desire to become PSYOP officers must complete their officer basic and advanced courses before they can attend training for FA 37A.

Officers in the reserve component, or RC, should make it their goal to complete the same training requirements as their AC counterparts. RC officers may, however, be unable to complete all of the training concurrently, as the AC officers do. As a minimum, RC PSYOP officers must complete the two-phase Reserve Component Psychological Operations Officer Course, or RCPOOC. Officers must complete Phase I by distance learning before they can begin Phase II, a two-week resident course taught at SWCS.

While it is not strictly required, it is highly desirable that RC PSYOP officers complete the Regional Studies Course, take language training and earn an advanced degree. They should also strive to attend the various PSYOP-related courses taught at SWCS and at the Joint Special Operations University at Hurlburt Field, Fla.

Like their AC counterparts, RC officers should be regionally oriented and possess an expert knowledge of their region's culture, history, politics, economics and religion. Ideally, the officer's regional knowledge will include the ability to speak one of the region's languages. The RC officer's ability to learn and to sustain a foreign language is usually acquired through self-development and through mandatory language training during regularly scheduled Army Reserve drills.

RC captains

PSYOP officers must request functional-area designation from the Special Operations Proponency Office at SWCS once they

have completed their FA 37A training. ARNG and USAR PSYOP captains must complete an advanced course or a captain's career course and the RC POOC before they can be considered qualified for further promotion. RC captains should serve in any PSYOP captain's position at the group/brigade level or below. Except for the PSYOP positions authorized in the ARNG SF groups, all PSYOP positions in the Army reserve components are open to female officers.

Additional professional-development goals for RC PSYOP captains include:

- Achieving foreign-language qualification.
- Completing the Regional Studies Course.
- Completing an FA 37A-related advanced degree.

RC majors

PSYOP majors must have completed at least 50 percent of the Command and General Staff Officer Course, or CGSOC, or Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, before they can be considered qualified for promotion. RC majors must serve in an FA 37A-coded major's position for at least 12 months, preferably 24, as commander of a company or detachment, as a battalion executive officer or operations officer, or as a member of a brigade or group staff.

Additional professional-development goals for RC PSYOP majors include:

- Completing CGSOC.
- Achieving foreign-language qualification.
- Completing the Regional Studies Course.
- Completing the Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course or the Joint Psychological Operations Course.
- Completing an FA 37A-related advanced degree.

RC lieutenant colonels

Lieutenant colonels in FA 37A must have completed either CGSOC or ILE to be considered qualified for promotion. ARNG and USAR lieutenant colonels must serve in an FA 37A-coded lieutenant-colonel position for at least 12 months, preferably 24.

Additional professional-development goals for RC PSYOP lieutenant colonels include:

- Enrolling in a senior service college.
- Achieving foreign-language qualification.
- Completing the Regional Studies Course.
- Completing an FA 37A-related advanced degree.

RC colonels

To be considered for promotion, RC PSYOP colonels should have served at least 12 months, preferably 24, in an FA 37A-coded colonel position.

Additional professional-development goals for RC PSYOP colonels include:

- Attaining MEL 1.
- Achieving foreign-language qualification.
- Completing the Regional Studies Course.
- Completing an FA 37A-related advanced degree.

The foundation of a USAR FA 37A officer's qualification for command of a battalion and a group is experience and above-average job performance. When evaluating USAR PSYOP officers for command, command-selection boards should consider the following:

- FA 37A-related training. The more FA 37A-related training an officer has attained, the better.
- FA 37A assignment history. The officer should meet the USAR captain and major branch-qualification requirements detailed earlier. Certain FA 37A assignments are more critical than others.

Officers who serve successfully in key jobs should be considered to be more qualified for command than officers who have not. However, an officer's manner of performance is the most important criterion that distinguishes and prepares him or her for command selection. FA 37A duty positions that are considered to be key for USAR command selection are: PSYOP group operations officer, executive officer or deputy commander; PSYOP battalion commander; PSYOP battalion operations officer or executive officer; and PSYOP company commander.

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Lieutenant Colonel Fran Landy is the chief PSYOP/CA proponent in the Special Operations Proponency Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Officer Professional Development: SF Officers, Warrant Officers

by Major Mark A. Strong; Major Paul C. Thorn; Chief Warrant Officer 5 Walt Edwards, U.S. Army (ret.); and Chief Warrant Officer 5 William A. McPherson

Officers and warrant officers in United States Army Special Forces plan, coordinate, direct and support the SF primary missions of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and combating terrorism.

SF is composed of multipurpose forces capable of a rapid response to various situations. It provides capabilities unavailable in other forces, and it operates in war, peace or contingencies. In war, SF provides unique combined or unilateral capabilities to the combatant commander. Serving as teachers as well as warriors, SF soldiers interact closely with people of other cultures. During peacetime, their forward presence can assist in creating conditions for stable development, thereby reducing the risk of armed conflict.

In order to be successful in these demanding missions, SF officers and warrant officers must:

- Be extremely physically fit.
- Possess unquestioned integrity.
- Be self-reliant team players who can function as leaders in tightly knit small groups.
- Possess the cognitive resilience and mental dexterity needed for acting autonomously while under great stress.
- Thrive in complex and ambiguous situations.
- Be mentally flexible and willing to experiment and innovate in a decentralized and unstructured environment.
- Have the ability to solve complex political-military problems and to develop and employ conventional or unconventional solutions. Be able to develop and employ nondoctrinal methods and techniques when applicable. Be capable of taking decisive action in missions for which no doctrine exists.
- Be able of inspiring others to perform effectively under stress.
- Possess good interpersonal skills and display political acumen and cultural sensitivity. Mission success will often depend on SF officers' ability to establish rapport with and influence the attitudes and behaviors of people from foreign cultures.
- Possess regional expertise. SF officers and warrant officers continuously undergo intensive preparation for assignment to their unit's designated geographic area.

Whether the mission profile calls for clandestine employment in a denied area or a low-visibility foreign-internal-defense mission in a developing nation, the overall requirement for regional orientation, language proficiency and cross-cultural interpersonal skills remains the same. Scores on the Defense Language Proficiency Test, or DLPT, reflect soldiers' language proficiency, and DLPT scores must be updated annually through formal testing. SF soldiers are not organized

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This article has been adapted from the input prepared by members of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office for the updated DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, scheduled to be released in 2004.*

Life-Cycle-Development Model For Special Forces Officers



Branch Qualifying	–Commander, SF A-Detachment	–Commander, SF company –XO/S3 SF Bn/Group –Commander, GSC –SMU equivalent –JSOTF equivalent –TSOC Ops/Plans officer	–SF coded LTC Position	–SF coded COL Position
Developmental	–Battalion or Group Staff –Cdr, HSC/HHC –CTC Observer Controller –Joint Staff or OSD Intern –SMU –ROTC/USMA Faculty and Staff –SO/LIC –Functional Area	–CTC Observer Controller –MACOM/MSC/DA/Joint Staff –SMU –ROTC/USMA Faculty and Staff –JTF/JSOTF/TSOC Staff	–SF coded LTC Position –JSOTF/JTF Staff	–SF coded COL Position –JSOTF/JTF Staff

strictly according to their unit's area of concentration; thus, the management of regional expertise is informal and subject to modification as the needs of the Army change.

Captains

To attain branch-qualification, SF captains must successfully command an A-detachment for at least 18 months. A-detachment command equates to command of a company, battery or troop in the other combat-arms branches. Typically, command of an A-detachment will be an officer's initial assignment following the completion of his SF qualification training.

The goal for SF captains should be to serve 36 months in positions coded 18A (SF officer) within an SF group. Ideally, a captain will serve two years as an A-detachment commander; the third year can be spent as a detachment commander, a headquarters-company commander, or a staff officer.

The primary developmental assignment for SF captains is service as a staff officer in the headquarters of an SF battalion or an SF group. Other key developmental assignments include:

• A second command following SF A-detachment command. Second commands for SF captains are limited to headquarters and support companies at the SF-battalion and SF-group levels; captain commands in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS; or within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. Selection for a second command is appropriate for an officer who displays high potential.

• Service as an observer-controller at a combat training center.

• Service as a small-group instructor at SWCS in the SF Detachment Officer Qualification Course.

• Service as a joint staff officer or as a Department of Defense staff intern.

• Completion of the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., and the ensuing utilization tour.

In addition to the professional development that they acquire through operational assignments, SF captains should begin an intensive program of self-development. Their self-development efforts should focus on gaining an in-depth understanding of combined-arms operations, on gaining and maintaining regional and lin-

guistic expertise, and on becoming proficient in common-core and branch-specific tasks for SF and Infantry.

Although they are not required, courses in advanced special-operations skills, such as the Combat Diver Qualification Course; Combat Diving Supervisor Course; Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course; Military Free-Fall Jumpmaster; Advanced Special Operations Techniques; and Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course provide valuable professional development. SF captains should seek to take these courses prior to or during their A-detachment command. If they are not Ranger-qualified, SF captains should attend Ranger training after they complete a branch captain's career course or when they are en route to their initial SF-group assignment. SF officers, as commanders of airborne units, are expected to complete static-line jumpmaster training early in their careers.

Majors

The key leader-development assignment for SF majors is branch-qualification service that will prepare them for future leadership responsibilities as SF battalion commanders and senior field-grade officers.

Ideally, SF majors should successfully serve 24 months in any of the positions, or combinations of the positions, listed below:

- SF company commander. SF companies are commanded by majors. Each SF company commander is responsible for his company headquarters and six subordinate A-detachments.
- SF battalion S3. The SF battalion S3 performs duties as the battalion operations, training and plans officer.
- SF battalion or SF group executive officer. The SF executive officer performs duties similar to those of executive officers in other combat-arms battalions and brigades.
- SF group S3. The SF group S3 performs duties as the group operations, training and plans officer.
- SF group support company, or GSC, commander. The SF GSC commander is responsible for logistics, medical, intelligence and communications support to the SF group.
- Positions corresponding to the above positions in a joint special-operations task force during contingency operations, in the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or in special-mission units.
- Commander of SF Operational Detachment-K in Korea.
- Designated operations-and-plans-staff-officer positions in a theater special-operations command, or in an equivalent joint special-operations unit.

The primary developmental assignment for SF majors is duty as a staff officer in an SF position at the Army, major-Army-command, or major-subordinate-command level.

Other key developmental assignments for SF majors include:

- Service as an observer-controller at a combat training center.
- Service as a member of a joint or combined staff. Special operations are inherently joint operations, and SF majors should seek joint or combined duty after their branch-qualifying assignment.
- Attendance at the highly competitive Advanced Military Studies Program, or AMSP, taught by the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. If the officer has already attained basic-branch qualification, AMSP will be followed by a tour as an operational planner at the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM; at USASOC; in a theater special-operations command, or TSOC; or in designated joint special-operations task forces, or JSOTFs, during contingency operations.

When they are not serving in command positions, SF officers who have completed AMSP will serve recurring assignments as operational and strategic planners on the staffs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, USASOC, and the TSOCs, and they can expect to serve as planners on JSOTFs during contingency operations.

- Attendance at the highly competitive Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Lieutenant colonels

The primary developmental requirement for SF lieutenant colonels is successful service in any SF-coded lieutenant-colonel position or any combination of such positions. The most critical

Life-Cycle-Development Model For Special Forces Warrant Officers



*Promotions/Institutional Training based on 5 year promotion gates. Individual performance may vary.

of these assignments is service in an SF-coded battalion-command billet. For the majority of SF lieutenant colonels, their promotion to lieutenant colonel will constitute success, and further assignments will aim at developing them for broader contributions to the SF Branch, to special operations and to the U.S. Army.

Key developmental assignments for SF lieutenant colonels include:

- Service in a command-selection-list billet or command of a USSOCOM- or TSOC-designated JSOTF during a contingency operation.
- Service as deputy commander or executive officer of an SF group.
- Service as a DA, DoD or JCS staff officer, or service in interagency positions that require SF experience and expertise.
- Service as a staff officer or as a commander in a joint or combined headquarters that earns a joint-service skill identifier.
- Service as chief of the special-operations training detachment at the Joint Readiness Training Center.
- Service as a special-operations-forces representative to the Battle Command Training Program.
- Service as the operations, plans and training officer of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC.
- Service as the USASOC assistant deputy chief of staff for operations.
- Service on the staff or faculty of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Colonels

SF colonels will continue to serve the SF Branch, special operations and the Army through service in any SF-coded colonel's position or combinations of those positions, within USSOCOM, USASOC, SWCS, USASFC, Department of Army headquarters, joint staffs, service schools and other key organizations.

Primary developmental assignments for SF colonels include command of an SF group or command of a USSOCOM- or TSOC-designated JSOTF during a contingency operation. Key developmental assignments include:

- Service as commander or deputy commander of a special-mission unit.
- Service as commander, deputy commander, chief of staff or operations officer of a TSOC.
- Service as a joint staff officer or as a commander in a critical joint position that

Life-Cycle-Development Model For Reserve-Component Special Forces Officers



Branch Qualifying	–Commander, SF A-Detachment	–Commander, SF Company –XO/S3 SF Bn/Group –Commander, GSC	–SF coded LTC Position	–SF coded COL Position
Developmental	–Battalion or Group Staff –Cdr, HSC/HHC –Functional Area	–JSOTF/JTF Staff	–SF coded LTC Position –JSOTF/JTF Staff	–SF coded COL Position –JSOTF/JTF Staff

requires SF expertise.

- Service as the USASOC chief of staff or deputy chief of staff for operations.
- Service as the deputy commander or chief of staff of USASFC.
- Service as the SWCS assistant commandant, chief of staff or director of training and doctrine.
- Service on the Army staff or with another government agency.
- Service on the staff or faculty of the CGSC or the U.S. Army War College.
- Service on a combined staff.

Warrant officers

Like his officer counterpart, the SF warrant officer must meet established professional-development requirements. He must complete the Warrant Officer Basic Course before his initial warrant-officer assignment. SF warrant officers will branch-qualify at the SF-detachment level. Between an SF warrant officer's fourth and fifth year of warrant-officer service, he must complete the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course.

As a WO1 or CWO2, the SF warrant officer will serve as the deputy commander of an SF A-detachment. He commands the detachment in the absence of the assigned commander and half the detachment during split-team operations. As the deputy detachment commander, he supervises and directs all staff functions at the detachment level, including the development of the detachment's mid-range and long-range training plans. The warrant officer provides the detachment with tactical and technical assistance during the execution of all SF core tasks and assigned missions. The SF warrant officer should strive to achieve proficiency in a language that corresponds to his regional affiliation. He should also strive to earn an associate's degree prior to his eligibility for selection to CWO3.

Upon his selection for promotion to CWO3, the SF warrant officer must complete the Warrant Officer Advanced Course. The CWO3 SF warrant officer may serve as an SF-detachment or SF-company operations warrant officer, whose focus is primarily SF operations and intelligence. The SF CWO3 may also serve on the staffs of USASFC, USASOC, USSOCOM; on the staff of a TSOC; or as an instructor at SWCS. He may also serve as the senior warrant-officer adviser to the company commander on issues of warrant-officer

professional development. SF warrant officers in the grade of CWO3 should make it their goal to complete a bachelor's degree before they become eligible for selection to CWO4. CWO3s who possess a bachelor's degree and demonstrate the capability for serving at the operational and strategic levels may be selected to attend the Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Postgraduate School and earn a master's degree in defense analysis. Graduates of the program incur a three-year active-duty service obligation and will serve as special-operations planners in TSOCs or in SF battalions and groups.

SF warrant officers who are selected for promotion to CWO4 must complete the Warrant Officer Staff Course. The CWO4 SF warrant officer will serve as the battalion operations warrant officer, focusing primarily on SF operations and intelligence. The SF CWO4 may also serve on the staffs of USASFC, USASOC, USSOCOM, the various TSOCs, or as an instructor at SWCS. He will also serve as the senior warrant-officer adviser to the battalion commander on issues of warrant-officer professional development.

Upon selection for promotion to CWO5, the SF warrant officer must complete the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course. The CWO5 SF warrant officer may serve as the SF-group operations warrant officer or as the SF-group intelligence warrant officer. He may also serve as the SF warrant officer manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, as the warrant officer strength manager at USASOC, or as a member of the G3 staff of USASFC. He will also serve as the senior adviser to the commander on all warrant-officer issues.

RC officers

SF branch-transfer and branch-qualification requirements for reserve-component, or RC, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels are the same as those for corresponding active-component, or AC, officers. RC officers will not be branch-transferred to SF until they have met all SF branch-transfer requirements.

RC branch-qualification and developmental assignments are also the same as those for AC officers. RC service sometimes presents challenges not present for AC officers: RC officers may not be able to find an SF unit that has openings at their grade; they may be ineligible for promotion until they can find a troop-unit position at the proper grade; and civilian careers and other considerations may limit RC officers to serving in geographically available units.

Alternatives for officers in such circumstances include serving in the Individual Ready Reserve, which may have Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program positions or short-tour positions; serving in Active Guard and Reserve Program positions; and serving in positions in non-SF units. Some officers may even have to branch-transfer. An RC officer may have to branch-transfer several times during his career and may not be able to follow the normal SF career model.

The RC SF warrant officer should follow the professional-development guidelines set forth earlier for AC SF warrant officers.

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Officer Professional Development: Civil Affairs Functional Area

by Jeanne Goldmann and Lieutenant Colonel Fran Landy

Active duty Army officers in the Civil Affairs functional area form a pool of regionally aligned, culturally attuned and language-qualified soldiers who are capable of supporting tactical-, operational- and strategic-level requirements for Civil Affairs, or CA, during peace and war.

Effective Oct. 1, 2005, the CA functional area, now identified as FA 39C, will be designated FA 38. For the sake of simplicity, as well as to acquaint soldiers with the upcoming change, this article will use the new designation throughout.

Experts in the command and employment of CA soldiers, teams and units in the execution of CA missions, FA 38 officers train and advise U.S. forces, other government agencies, international organizations, nongovernment organizations, humanitarian-relief organizations, and indigenous populations and institutions. FA 38 officers analyze and assess the political, social, economic and religious aspects of an operational environment. To be successful, they require a wide range of skills, knowledge and attributes.

This article has been adapted from the input prepared by members of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office for the updated DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, scheduled to be released in 2004.*

Required characteristics

Unique skills. The core competencies for all officers in Army special-operations forces are: cross-cultural communication; regional expertise; language ability; interpersonal skills; personal lethality (warrior ethos); adaptive thinking and leadership; and technical proficiency. ARSOF officers must also be qualified military parachutists.

CA officers must be proficient at operating in widely dispersed areas; in integrated combined-arms teams; with joint, interagency or multinational units; and in teams of special-operations forces. CA leaders must be self-aware and adaptive; they must be comfortable with ambiguity and able to predict the second- and third-order effects of their actions and decisions. They must be proficient in executing missions through, with and by indigenous populations and institutions.

CA officers must have the ability to solve complex political-military problems and to develop and employ conventional and unconventional solutions. They also must be able to develop and employ nondoctrinal methods and techniques when necessary, and they must be capable of taking decisive action in missions for which no doctrine exists.

CA Life Cycle Model (Active)



Branch Qualifying	FA 38 Tng CAQC RSC LANG	Any FA 38 position at Bn level or below	CA Det Cdr (96th CA) CO Cdr Bn XO Bn S-3 Grp/Bde CA Off CA Off TSC CAV CA Off Asst Div G-5 SBCT CA Off JTF-B Dep J5 Army CA Off Rgr Rgt CA Off	Bn Cdr Div G-5 Dep Corps G-5 Army CA Off ACR G-5 MP Bde S-5 JT CA J-5 JTF-B Joint CA Off	Bde Cdr Army CA Off Corps G-5 SHAPE CA Off
Developmental			USASOC Staff USACAPOC Staff USAJFKSWCS Staff Joint FA 38C Off ACE Europe CA Off CS Combined Arms CA	CA Off CS Combined Arms CA USAJFKSWCS Staff USACAPOC Staff ACE Europe	USACAPOC Staff Off

NOTE: Officers who serve 90 or more days in contingency operations will receive special consideration regarding branch qualification.

Unique knowledge. CA officers are adept at cross-cultural communication, proficient in humanitarian-relief operations and developmental programs, skilled in mediation, skilled in developing and evaluating measures of effectiveness, and skilled at integrating the CA effort with information operations and other warfare components. They provide CA training, advice and assistance to U.S. forces, to other government agencies and to friendly nations and forces. CA officers are able to analyze and engage the civil dimension of the battle space from cultural, historical, political, diplomatic, informational, social, economic, systematic and religious perspectives.

Officers in FA 38 must have an aptitude for learning a foreign language, and they must sustain their foreign-language proficiency throughout their careers. FA 38 officers require an in-depth knowledge of at least one region of the world. That knowledge includes a proficiency in at least one of the region's languages.

Selected FA 38 officers are given an opportunity to obtain a CA-related master's degree or its equivalent through a graduate program authorized by the proponent, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

All FA 38 authorizations are open to women except those in the Special Forces groups and the 75th Ranger Regiment, which have been identified as having a high direct combat probability.

FA 38 training provides officers with basic knowledge of functional-area operations. As officers develop, they gain a broader understanding of CA and its ability to support conventional and special-operations forces in joint, interagency and multinational environments.

Development pattern

FA 38 officers begin their careers in one of the Army's accession branches. All attend basic officer leadership courses and captain's career courses, and they serve in branch-qualifying positions as lieutenants and captains. Officers are accessed into their functional area between their fifth and sixth years of service.

All officers accessed into FA 38 must meet the following criteria:

- Be eligible for a top-secret security

clearance according to the provisions of AR 604-5, *Personnel Security Clearance, Department of the Army Personnel Security Program Regulation*.

• Possess a bachelor's degree, preferably in social science, political science or a related discipline. Officers' previous academic performance must demonstrate their potential for success in graduate studies.

Score at least 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or demonstrate a foreign-language ability of 1/1 or higher on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.

Be airborne-qualified or be medically and physically capable and willing to volunteer for airborne training.

Education and training

After FA 38 officers achieve their branch-qualification as captains, they can begin their functional-area training. Officers who are accessed into FA 38 must attend the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC. CAQC will be followed by regional studies and language training (if officers are not language-qualified). Functional-area training lasts from nine to 11 months.

The preferred advanced degree for FA 38 is a master of science in defense analysis. After their initial qualification as FA 38 officers and utilization assignments of 12 to 15 months, selected officers will have the opportunity to complete their military-education-level-4 requirements by earning a master's degree in defense analysis from either the University of Kansas or the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Officers who career-field designate into FA 38 attend the FA 38 master's program and Intermediate Level Education. Selected officers will have an opportunity to complete a training-with-industry assignment.

FA 38 officers may also have an opportunity to attend the highly competitive Advanced Military Studies Program, or AMSP, a year of advanced study at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. AMSP provides a broad, deep education in the art and science of war at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. AMSP graduates frequently serve their follow-on utilization tours in special-operations units, conducting strategic and operational planning.

Officers in FA 38 must meet certain requirements for qualification and development at each level of their career.

Captains

To meet the qualification requirements for FA 38, captains must:

• Complete all FA 38 requisite training.

• Serve at least 12 months as the leader of a CA team.

• Conduct CA activities in an operational environment.

The goal for an FA 38 captain should be to serve 24 months in an FA-38 coded position in the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. In addition to the professional development that they acquire through operational assignments, FA 38 captains should begin an intensive process of self-development. Their efforts should focus on gaining an in-depth understanding of combined-arms operations, as well as on gaining and maintaining regional and linguistic skills.

Majors

Majors must meet the following qualification requirements:

• Complete all FA 38 requisite training.

• Serve at least 12 months, preferably 24, in any of the following positions or in any combination of the positions: company/detachment commander; battalion executive officer; battalion S3; group/brigade assistant S3; CA officer for a theater-support command; CA officer at the Army level; assistant corps CA officer; assistant division G5 officer; group/brigade CA officer; cavalry CA officer; CA officer for a Stryker brigade combat team; deputy J5 of Joint Task Force-Bravo; and 75th Ranger Regiment CA officer. These career-field qualifying assignments will prepare FA 38 majors for leadership responsibilities as battalion commanders and senior field-grade officers.

• Serve as a member of a joint or combined staff. Special operations are joint

operations, and FA 38 majors should seek joint or combined duty before or after they serve in their branch-qualifying assignment.

- Officers who serve 90 days or more in key leader-development assignments in contingency operations will receive special consideration regarding their branch qualification.

Successful service in one of the aforementioned branch-qualifying positions will improve a major's qualification for battalion command. FA 38 majors should also maintain and improve their proficiency in a foreign language and continue their self-development reading program.

Lieutenant colonels

Lieutenant colonels should complete a senior service college, but the key developmental requirement for FA 38 lieutenant colonels is that they serve in any FA-38-coded lieutenant-colonel position. The most critical of these assignments is service as an FA 38 battalion commander. Furthermore, there are opportunities for lieutenant colonels to command CA units during contingency operations.

An FA 38 officer who has commanded at the lieutenant-colonel level is most preferred for command at the colonel level. But for the majority of lieutenant colonels, their promotion to lieutenant colonel will constitute career success. Their subsequent assignments will be aimed at developing them for broader contributions to the functional area, to special operations and to the Army.

Colonels

FA 38 colonels continue to serve the functional area, special operations and the Army through service in FA-38-coded colonel positions at the corps and joint-staff levels; in positions within the U.S. Special Operations Command; the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and in other key organizations.

Opportunities exist for FA 38 colonels to command a command-selection-list billet in the institutional/garrison category or in a reserve-component unit.

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SF Personnel Recovery: Some Thoughts On Planning

by Chief Warrant Officer 4 John D. Patrick and Major Eric A. Patterson

Personnel recovery, or PR, is often thought of as the directed application of rotary and fixed-wing air power for recovering an isolated person, or IP, who is usually a downed pilot. But the recent isolation of a portion of the 507th Maintenance Company in Iraq has emphasized that IPs can also be members of a ground force. PR is therefore the recovery of anyone who is separated from his or her unit in an uncertain or hostile environment.

Department of Defense Directive 2310.2 states that it is DoD policy to preserve the lives and well-being of United States military personnel, DoD civilians and contract-service personnel who may have to evade or who are in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained or captured. It is also DoD policy to prevent captured personnel from being exploited or used as leverage against the U.S. In fact, DoD Directive 2310.2 identifies PR as the aggregation of military, civil and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas.

Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, can contribute unique capabilities to the PR effort. U.S. Special Operations Command Directive 525-21 outlines the contributions of U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF. SOF contributions include combat search and rescue, or CSAR; unconventional assisted recovery, or UAR; and, when directed by a theater commander, joint CSAR, or JCSAR.

Specific PR contributions of U.S. Army Special Forces, or SF, are detailed in FM 3-05.231, *Special Forces Personnel Recovery*. SF contributions include unassisted evasion, opportune support to PR, unilateral and joint CSAR, UAR, and liberation operations. (FM 3-05.231 also lists the support that Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units can provide to PR.)

ARSOF have a responsibility, within their capabilities and their mission functions, to plan for and perform PR in support of their own operations and as directed by the joint force commander, or JFC. Recovery, whether it is called PR or emergency exfiltration, must be an integral part of the planning for all ARSOF operations.

Planning

Joint Pub 3-50.3, *Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery*, categorizes the types of recovery (Figure 1), and the revised final draft of JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, has formulated a new method for articulating the various types of PR (Figure 2). Each of the categorizations in the two publications accounts for the four basic types of PR — unassisted, opportune, component-level and joint. JP 3-50 also addresses multinational and multi-agency PR.

Both publications give guidance on the various factors and considerations involved in recovery planning. However,

neither of the publications articulates the planning of operations for the recovery of prisoners of war, which is mandated by DoD Directive 2310.2.

The publications may also blur the distinction between planning for the evasion training of individual personnel (to facilitate unassisted and opportune recovery) and planning for recovery missions. Granted, a trained evader has a higher probability of recovery, but it may be beneficial for planners to separate the planning of individual training from mission planning.

Categorizing PR planning

The authors propose a method of categorizing, or describing, PR planning below the JFC level that can help ARSOF planners "get their arms around" the PR-planning issue of individual training vs. mission. The proposed method divides PR planning into *individual PR planning* and *unit PR planning*.

All PR missions incorporate five primary tasks: reporting, locating, supporting, recovering and repatriating. To the evader, the differences in the methods of planning and executing these five tasks mean little, so long as the recovery is successful. To the planner, however, the differences are critical. Therefore, to clarify planning and training considerations, the proposed categorization classifies PR activities from the point of view of the planner and the recovery force.

Individual PR planning is the planning needed for preparing unit members either to evade successfully and return unassisted or to exploit (successfully and safely) possibilities for opportune recovery. Individual planning also considers the need for additional training to prepare personnel for unassisted recovery or to ensure that personnel understand regional and country evasion pitfalls or the use of evasion aids.

Unit PR planning concentrates on the capabilities and force requirements (at the unit level) for units to recover their own forces and provide tasked PR support during component and joint recovery operations. The unit PR planning subcategories are *directed, reactive* and *proactive* (see Figure 3). All doctrinal SF PR activities fall into one of the three subcategories. Each recovery method is based on the capabilities and resources of the unit or joint force.

Figure 1 Types of Recovery



Directed recovery

The directed-recovery category covers traditional direct-action missions that are performed primarily for the purpose of recovering personnel held in confinement by a hostile force or entity. The Son Tay raid during the Vietnam War and the recent rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch during Operation Iraqi Freedom are the most vivid examples of this category.

Undoubtedly, some readers will take issue with the authors' proposal for a doctrinal inclusion of direct-action operations as a method of supporting the aggregate personnel-recovery effort. However, any operation that seeks to locate, support and recover isolated personnel, whether the personnel have

been captured or are evading, is conducted for the purpose of personnel recovery, regardless of the mission profile. While the operation may employ DA tactics, techniques and procedures, by virtue of its purpose it falls logically under the heading of PR.

Reactive recovery

Reactive recovery encompasses those operations for which planning is conducted after an isolating event occurs. Units normally conduct rehearsals to ensure that their capability is sufficient to meet projected mission requirements.

Reactive recoveries can be performed by classic CSAR assets (ground vehicle, boat or aircraft), by retasked elements in the field who are close to the incident, and even by quick-reaction forces. Available resources, mission requirements and the tactical situation will dictate what, if any, reactive capability a unit will have.

Proactive recovery

Under the category of proactive recovery, the authors introduce a new term, "pre-positioned recovery." The term is proposed as a means of making clear the difference between positioning an ARSOF team in denied or sensitive territory solely for conducting unilateral recovery, and using the UW skills of an ARSOF team for establishing a recovery capability by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces.

A pre-positioned recovery team, or PRT, is a proactive, unilateral recovery effort, distinguished from CSAR or opportune recovery by the fact that the PRT is infiltrated prior to an IP incident with recovery as its only mission. Conceptually, a PRT is similar to the maritime "duckbutt," in which a ship or aircraft is pre-positioned forward for the purpose of recovery.

A PRT might interact with an unconventional-assisted-recovery mechanism, or UARM, but by definition, the PRT would have neither the mission nor the authority to establish and control an evasion mechanism. Establishment of the UARM is the domain of an unconventional-assisted-recovery team, or UART, which the authors suggest as a means of identifying an unconventional-warfare team that is tasked to establish and control a UARM.

From time to time, the UART, primarily tasked to act indirectly through local assets, might find itself acting unilaterally, as a PRT would, if the situation demands (e.g., recovery of very senior personnel or of extremely sensitive equipment). Doctrinally, such a tasking would be analogous to tasking a UW team to conduct a unilateral DA mission during the execution of its UW mission.

Ultimately, the suggested refinement of UAR-related terms, such as PRT and UART, would maintain doctrinal consistency with UAR as a subset of UW. The refinement would also clarify the difference between various proactive personnel-recovery activities that now may be classified as either unilateral or unconventional.

Command and control

Command and control, or C^2, of PR operations normally falls to the component recovery coordination cell or to the joint

Figure 2 PR Options & Categories



Figure 3 ARSOF Personnel Recovery

SOF PR category	**Direct Recovery**	**Reactive Recovery**	**Proactive Recovery**
Mission/task	• Direct action • Raids	• CSAR • Opportune/Mission re-task	• Pre-positioned recovery • Unconventional assisted recovery
Executing element	• DA ODA • Ranger platoon/co./bn. • Special-mission unit	• SOF CSAR TF • JCSARTF • SR/DA ODA re-role	• Pre-positioned recovery team – conducts unilateral UART. No interaction with mechanisms; no action by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. • UART – performs current UARM and UART as sole mission or as part of overall UW mission.

personnel recovery cell, or JPRC (if the recovery operation involves multiple components). Two exceptions are the C^2 for UAR and for directed-recovery operations.

The SOF commander, normally located within a joint special-operations task force, will normally maintain operational C^2 for UAR and directed-recovery operations. UAR will normally be coordinated through a UAR coordination cell, which will coordinate with required elements and organizations, including the JPRC, to deconflict operations and facilitate the recovery.

Conclusion

This article has sought to explore new thoughts on PR and to clarify recovery roles. Although PR is normally a supporting mission for ARSOF, PR planning is required for every ARSOF operation to ensure that all avenues have been explored for bringing back every DoD member isolated in hostile territory.

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Understanding ILE: How Is It Different from CGSOC?

by Colonels Neal Bralley, Jim Danley, Dan French, Chuck Soby and Paul Tiberi, U.S. Army (ret.)

By now, most Army officers should know and understand that Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, is the third tier of the Army's Officer Education System, and that ILE is linked directly to Army Transformation.

Some may even be aware that ILE's mission is to produce "field grade officers with a warrior ethos who are grounded in warfighting doctrine and who have the technical, tactical and leadership competencies and skills to be successful in their career field, branch, or functional area."

But what does that mission statement mean? What is ILE really about, and how does it differ from the old Command and General Staff Officer Course, or CGSOC?

Sir Basil Liddell Hart said, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out." That reluctance to change may account for some of the concern that officers have expressed over ILE and where the Army is going with the education of its officer corps. In this article, the authors, who are ILE instructors, hope to clear up exactly what ILE is and show how it differs from its predecessor, the CGSOC.

Under ILE, officers attend schooling and are subsequently assigned based upon the needs of their respective career field, branch or functional area. ILE will increase the quality of educational opportunities available to majors in order to better prepare them for their next 10 years of Army service, to enhance the capability of the Army to conduct full spectrum operations, to "regreen" all officers on Army war-fighting doctrine, and to provide lifelong learning opportunities aimed at developing officers who are self-aware and adaptive.

ILE includes completion of a common-core curriculum as well as the training and education required by an officer's career field, branch or functional area. Three aspects of ILE distinguish it from the former CGSOC: student population, curriculum and instructional method.

Student population

The most fundamental difference between ILE and the CGSOC is that ILE shows the Army's commitment to provide the best possible intermediate-level education to *all* majors. Previously, the Army used a central selection process to choose the majors who were in the top 50 percent of each year group for attendance in the 10-month resident CGSOC at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The majors who were not selected for resident CGSOC could still receive the education and be competitive for promotion to lieutenant colonel by volunteering to take CGSOC by correspondence or by attending CGSOC taught by reserve-component instructors in The Army School System, or TASS.

Under the CGSOC system, half the Army's majors did not get an opportunity to pursue a resident education program for

developing their technical, tactical and leadership competencies and skills. Also, majors from the Information Operations Career Field, or IOCF; Institutional Support Career Field, or ISCF; Operational Support Career Field, or OSCF; and special branches — who needed only the common-core portion of the course and functional-area-specific education — were required to attend the entire 10-month course.

Under ILE, all Army majors in the Operations Career Field, or OPCF, will attend the 10-month resident course at Fort Leavenworth. They will complete a three-month common-core course, followed by the seven-month Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course, or AOWC. Majors in the IOCF, ISCF, OSCF and special branches will also pursue a resident ILE common-core course, but their training will be located near large populations of officers in career fields other than OPCF. Teaching teams from Fort Leavenworth have already been sent to Fort Gordon, Ga., and to Fort Lee, Va., to instruct the ILE common-core courses to students there. Pilot courses are also planned for the Naval Postgraduate School and Fort Belvoir, Va. All graduates of the ILE core curriculum will be qualified at the military education level IV and joint professional military education I levels.

Most majors in the reserve components will complete the ILE common-core course via TASS or through an upgraded Advanced Distributed Learning program that will replace the correspondence-course program. As the student population attending resident ILE at Fort Leavenworth increases, the number of reserve-component majors attending ILE will also increase.

Curriculum

The second difference between ILE and CGSOC is ILE's totally revamped curriculum. The course's competency map, linked directly to the Officer Evaluation Report, or OER, codifies the skill set that students must acquire in order to graduate from ILE.

While the skill-set is a new concept for the Command and General Staff College core curriculum, the Army has been using the OER for nearly six years, and field-grade officers who attend ILE should have been exposed to the need for the competencies before their arrival for ILE.

According to a study performed by the 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel, the Army needs officers who are adaptable and capable of thinking in a fast-paced, constantly changing environment. Meeting that need is the foundation of the ILE core curriculum. ILE educates students how to think, not what to think, and the skill-set focuses on problem-solving and decision-making. Classroom time is devoted to the application level of learning. Students soon realize there are no "school solutions" to the problems that they encounter. Instructors encourage students to work through the problems; they critique students' ability to identify the problem and formulate a solution. As long as students' solutions demonstrate basic principles of planning and do not violate evolving doctrine, they are acceptable. The approach represents a tremendous step forward in the development of field-grade officers who are capable of thinking instead of simply regurgitating their lessons.

According to a study performed by the 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel, the Army needs officers who are adaptable and capable of thinking in a fast-paced, constantly changing environment. Meeting that need is the foundation of the ILE core curriculum.

The aim of the three-month ILE common-core curriculum is to prepare students for service at the division level and above. It is designed to produce officers who understand full-spectrum operations, who know how to think, who understand how to solve complex problems, who are able to balance their focus between current and future operations, who understand staff principles and concepts, who know how to synchronize battlefield effects, and who understand performance-oriented training and education.

ILE common-core comprises four blocks of instruction: (1) foundations of critical reasoning and leader assessment and development, (2) strategic fundamentals,

(3) operational fundamentals, and (4) tactical fundamentals. Common-core instruction integrates parallel courses in leadership, history and force-management.

The seven-month AOWC is designed for majors in the OPCF. AOWC is divided into three blocks of instruction: brigade level, division level and land-component-command level. AOWC has retained some of CGSOC's elective program to give students opportunities to pursue additional focused studies. AOWC prepares officers for battalion and brigade command, giving them a war-fighting focus and making them capable of conducting full-spectrum operations in joint, multinational and interagency environments. AOWC graduates will be competent to serve as staff officers from the division level through the echelons-above-corps level. They will have a deeper understanding of full-spectrum operations, of component roles and responsibilities, of decisive and enabling operations at the tactical level, of asymmetric operations, and of urban operations.

A series of exercises evaluates students' mastery of the concepts taught during the ILE common-core instruction and during AOWC. During each exercise, students perform the planning and execution, and they man the opposing forces. Exercise scenarios place students in a joint, combined, complex environment that gives them numerous opportunities for identifying and solving problems. Instead of waiting until the end of the course to exercise their newly acquired knowledge, students are able to plan and execute multiple operations as they pursue ILE. They receive continuous feedback that allows them to improve throughout the course.

Instructional method

Team teaching is the third area in which ILE differs from CGSOC. Team teaching is a major change. It represents the "means" by which the school will achieve its "end" — graduates with a warrior ethos who are grounded in war-fighting doctrine and who have the technical, tactical and leadership competencies and skills needed for success in their career field, branch or functional area.

Each teaching team is made up of instructors who have differing areas of expertise: joint and combined operations, tactics, leadership, history and logistics. The team provides all instruction to its students throughout the academic year. The team also exercises student oversight during the major exercises at the end of the common-core portion and during each block of AOWC.

Each team member also coaches seven or eight students. In the coaching role, team members are responsible for providing feedback, and for mentoring, counseling, observing and assisting students in their professional and personal development. Keeping the students in small groups allows the instructors to get to know the students and to better provide developmental counseling.

ILE will prepare majors to understand and solve problems in the highly complex operational environment they now face. No longer can they memorize General Defense Plan battle positions in the Fulda Gap and know who and where they will fight.

ILE will produce field-grade officers who are capable of thinking through the most difficult situations, of adapting to changes in their operational environment, and of ensuring the continued success and freedom of our nation. It may take time before the officer corps is comfortable with the notion of having no school solution, but as we have seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and other hot spots throughout the world, our enemy is constantly changing, thinking and adapting.

Some will reason that ILE is resource-intensive, or costly in other ways, or that it necessitates changes in the personnel system. Those arguments are compelling, but until we come up with a more cost-effective system for producing the quality officers upon whom our nation will depend in the future, ILE is a step in the right direction. ✂

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ROTC: A Different FID Mission for Special Forces

by Major Bob Seals

This is not an article about Special Forces soldiers free-falling from 20,000 feet at night from a blacked-out MC-130; locking out from an undersea submarine off an enemy coastline; or conducting an unconventional-warfare mission on horseback, providing advice and assistance to tribal forces in a remote mountainous location. The FID mission referred to in the title involves a small but significant number of dedicated SF officers and NCOs training the future leaders of the U.S. Army by serving in the senior level of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or ROTC, program.

ROTC is the Rodney Dangerfield of SF assignments, seemingly getting no respect, and this article will briefly survey the role of the SF branch in the ROTC program, describe the author's experiences, and pay tribute to the quiet professionals who are engaged in the mission of training many of the leaders of tomorrow's Army.

Army ROTC consists of two distinct programs: junior level and senior level. The junior level is taught in high schools and college-preparatory academies, and the senior level is taught at 272 colleges and universities in all 50 U.S. states and commonwealths. Both levels of the ROTC program are commanded by the U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Va.

Senior Army ROTC is a commissioning source distinct from other sources — including the United States Military Academy, or USMA; federal and state officer candidate schools, or OCS; direct commissions; lateral transfers; recalls; and activations.

ROTC provides the majority of the Army's commissioned officers each year. In 2002, ROTC commissioned 2,550 active-duty and reserve-component officers; USMA produced 900 and OCS 850.[1]

History

Founded in Vermont in 1819 by Captain Alden Partridge at what is now Norwich University, ROTC has grown from its humble beginnings to an organization of 30,000 cadets and 3,000 cadre, including 1,047 active and reserve officers and 998 NCOs.[2] Because of recent Army efforts to increase personnel strength in operational units, ROTC now also uses 386 civilian contract cadre (officers and NCOs) provided by private companies. From the student's viewpoint, there is no discernable difference, as all cadre members wear the same uniform and meet the same standards.

The typical ROTC cadet is a white male who is a criminal-justice major and has a GPA of 2.99 on a 4.0 scale. He scores 251 of 300 points on the Army Physical Fitness Test, is commissioned at the age of 23 years and 8 months, and must wait an average of three months before attending his officer basic course. It is estimated that 70 percent of all ROTC graduates are academic generalists (vs. majors in hard science, engineering or math), and this statis-

tic causes some concern at the general-officer level.[3]

Since July 2002, the author has been assigned as an assistant professor of military science in the Army ROTC detachment at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, N.C. Wake Forest has partnership school agreements with two other schools, Winston-Salem State University and Salem College, in Winston-Salem. Part of the ROTC's 4th Brigade, Eastern Region, the Wake Forest detachment is fairly typical for most colleges and universities. Commanded by a professor of military science, or PMS, who is a lieutenant colonel, the detachment consists of five officers (active and Army Reserve), two NCOs, three Army civilians and one university employee, the PMS's secretary. The detachment often has newly graduated second lieutenants temporarily assigned as gold bar recruiters while they wait to begin their officer basic course.

Senior Army ROTC is the primary commissioning source for the Army and will remain so into the foreseeable future. It is, in many respects, a classic SF FID mission: It requires dedicated, competent trainers, willing troops and decentralized command and control of training and operations.

The detachment has approximately 100 cadets enrolled in the program, ranging from unsure freshmen to reasonably mature college seniors who are preparing for commissioning. Although it is small, the detachment operates as a battalion in order to familiarize cadets with a typical battalion's organization and functions.[4] Seniors are the cadet officers for the battalion — the cadet commander; the primary staff; and the primary-level trainers in military science, or MS. The detachment uses the cadet chain of command, as much as possible, for day-to-day operations.

Training intensity and responsibilities increase as cadets matriculate. Freshman are referred to as MS I cadets, sophomores as MS II cadets, juniors as MS III cadets, and seniors MS IV cadets. The key event in cadet life is attendance at the National Advanced Leadership Camp, or NALC, at Fort Lewis, Wash., between the junior and senior academic years. NALC, held each summer, qualifies cadets for commissioning after graduation. Another course, the Leader's Training Course, or LTC, is a basic course held each summer at Fort Knox, Ky., to qualify students who have not completed the MS I or MS II classes for entry into upper-level MS classes.

A normal training year will include such events as leadership labs held on local training areas; physical training; drill and ceremonies; training on weapons and equipment; field-training exercises at Fort Jackson, S.C., and Fort Bragg, N.C.; brigade-level Ranger Challenge competitions, and visits by distinguished guest speakers such as retired Lieutenant Colonel Ed Ramsey, a leader of Philippine guerrillas during World War II; retired Command Sergeant Major Joe Lupyak, former command sergeant major of the 5th SF Group and a veteran of the Son Tay raid; and retired SF Colonel Roger Donlon, the first recipient of the Medal of Honor during the Vietnam War.

The Wake Forest University ROTC detachment has the mission to commission 15 active and Army Reserve officers each year. In 2003, the detachment commissioned 17 officers — an amazing feat for a program that four years ago commissioned only four officers.[5]

Changes

ROTC, like the Army, has changed significantly since the author first donned his fatigue uniform on the campus of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville in the fall of 1978. With the decline in strength of the post-Gulf War Army, ROTC has seen a corresponding reduction in officer-production requirements. In many schools, cadre rank structure and the number of cadre positions has been significantly reduced. Many programs have seen the billet of their PMS reduced from a colonel to a lieutenant colonel, and their top NCO position

reduced from a sergeant major to a master sergeant.

Army ROTC has become less time-consuming and intrusive for the average college student. Instruction still consists of a mixture of classroom and leadership labs; however, leadership lab, or drill, has decreased from a weekly to a biweekly event. Summer training, whether NALC or LTC, has also been reduced, from six weeks to approximately 32 days. The ROTC program of instruction has also changed, evolving from one that possessed healthy doses of basic military history, drill and ceremonies, small-unit tactics and map-reading to one that attempts to teach not only leadership but also what appear to be business-management concepts and exercises, practical "life skills" and the like. The changes are in keeping with the Army slogan advertising ROTC as the world's best leadership course — emphasizing the civil rather than the martial aspects of the program.

Because of the extraordinary costs of attending some institutions, ROTC scholarships are the lifeblood of many ROTC programs, including the one at Wake Forest. The cost of attending Wake Forest University for one year is now more than $32,000, with substantial increases projected for the future.

Anyone discouraged by the alleged shortcomings of the youth of generation X, Y or Z should meet our cadets, who are, for the most part, magnificent. They are patriotic, intelligent, fit young men and women who have a strong desire to serve their country. Our cadets cover the collegiate spectrum. They include varsity athletes, fraternity presidents, law-school students, and undergraduates majoring in drama, pre-med, history and political science. Cadets are eager to serve, and many volunteer for additional military training — airborne, air-assault, mountain and northern-warfare schools — during the summer months. One cannot help but be inspired by these enthusiastic young Americans.

The SF Branch remains decisively engaged in supporting the ROTC program with quality officers and NCOs. Figures supplied by the SF Branch at the Total Army Personnel Command show that 24 SF officers and 27 SF NCOs are serving throughout the Cadet Command. These soldiers include former SF battalion and group commanders and former SF detachment operations sergeants.[6]

Senior Army ROTC is the primary commissioning source for the Army and will remain so into the foreseeable future. It is, in many respects, a classic SF FID mission: It requires dedicated, competent trainers, willing troops and decentralized command and control of training and operations. The ROTC shoulder patch bears the words "Leadership Excellence," and ROTC is fertile ground for recruiting, training and motivating the future leaders of SF and of the Army. All SF soldiers, officer or enlisted, who desire to make a difference should volunteer for an ROTC assignment. You will not regret it. ✂

Major Bob Seals is an assistant professor of military science at Wake Forest University. His SF assignments include service with the 1st and 3rd SF groups, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group and Security Assistance Training Management Office, and Special Operations Command-Korea.

Notes:

[1] Briefing by the director of the Recruiting Operations Directorate, U.S. Army Cadet Command, to the Recruiting Operations Officer Course, Fort Monroe, Va., 16 June 2003.

[2] Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee S. Harford, "U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History" (Fort Monroe, Va.: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1996), 7-8.

[3] Briefing by the director of the Recruiting Operations Directorate, U.S. Army Cadet Command, to the Recruiting Operations Officer Course, Fort Monroe, Va., 16 June 2003.

[4] See the Wake Forest University Army ROTC Web site (http://www.wfu.edu/academics/arotc/).

[5] Wake Forest University Army ROTC Web site.

[6] E-mail message from the chief of the SF Branch, Total Army Personnel Command, 30 May 2003.

Lieutenant Jack L. Knight: MARS Task Force MOH Winner

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

During World War II, American fighting men earned 432 Medals of Honor. In the China-Burma-India Theater, however, only one Medal of Honor was awarded to a ground combatant. That medal was awarded posthumously to the commander of a cavalry troop, First Lieutenant Jack L. Knight, who was a member of the MARS Task Force, a long-range penetration unit that is part of the heritage and lineage of Army special-operations forces.

The MARS Task Force was the second American long-range penetration unit to operate in northern Burma. It was the successor to the Galahad Task Force, more commonly known as Merrill's Marauders.[1] Some background information on the war in the China-Burma-India theater will provide a better appreciation of the operational difficulties that both of the early special-operations units faced.

Background

The first long-range penetration unit, Galahad (known officially as the 5307th Provisional Unit) had been led by Colonel (later Brigadier General) Frank Merrill and dubbed Merrill's Marauders. Organized originally to operate for 90 days, the Marauders were to take part in the northern Burma offensive begun by Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the China-Burma-India theater, in the winter of 1944-45. They were to conduct behind-the-lines operations while Stilwell's Chinese forces advanced on the Japanese front.

The three battalions of the Galahad Task Force endured great physical hardship as they led Stilwell's Chinese regiments across the mountains and rivers of northern Burma to Myitkyina. Stilwell was determined to capture the city of Myitkyina and the airfield before the monsoon season arrived. The cost of instilling "backbone" in the Chinese offensive was high. By the end of the action, the 2,997-man American force would be reduced to 1,400 — most having been evacuated for illness.

Motivated by Merrill's promise that Myitkyina would be their last battle, the Marauders seized the airfield on May 17, 1944. But by then the fighting edge of the Marauders, Stilwell's most mobile and obedient force, had been ground dull, and the city remained to be taken.[2] The Japanese quickly rushed reinforcements into the city, the fighting became heavy, and the monsoon rains descended. The brilliant maneuver to seize the airfield proved to be the apogee of Stilwell's career. Numerous Allied efforts to capture the city were debacles, and Myitkyina did not fall until mid-August. In the process, the supporting British long-range penetration force, the Chindits (the 22nd Division), was also rendered combat ineffective. Lieutenant General William Slim, the commander of the 14th British Army, admitted later that the Chindits and Galahad "had shot their bolt … both were asked to do

more than was possible."[3]

The U.S. War Department envisioned that Galahad would be replaced by a second, similar unit, the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), the MARS Task Force. To form the task force, China's 1st Infantry Regiment (Separate), which had been trained in long-range penetration at Ramgarh, India, would join two American regiments, the 475th Infantry Regiment (which contained Marauder veterans and the two battalions of replacements shipped into Myitkyina) and the 124th Cavalry (Dismounted) Regiment, a former National Guard unit from Texas, to form a light division. This Sino-American force could then be used to open land communications between Burma and China.

In October 1944, at the request of Chiang Kai-shek, Stilwell was recalled from his command. The China-Burma-India theater was split into the China theater and the Burma-India theater. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, the new commander of the Burma-India theater, inherited the MARS Task Force, called the New Galahad.[4] Sultan's mission in north Burma was the same as Stilwell's had been — to control the Burma Road and reopen access to China, and to support the British main effort to recapture southern Burma.

The MARS Task Force, as Galahad before it, received the most physically demanding mission — to march across the roughest mountain country in north Burma, cross the Shweli River to reach the Mong Wi area, and cut the Burma Road near Ho-si. Sultan wanted to stimulate the Chinese advance against the Japanese, who controlled Lashio and the upper traces of the Burma Road. He hoped that the MARS Force's efforts would spur Chinese commanders to greater activity to avoid losing face. But Sultan's visions of a Sino-American force eventually faded, and he held the MARS Force's Chinese infantry regiment in general reserve.[5]

Knight's actions

By mid-January 1945, the Japanese 56th Division was easily bypassing the blocking positions set up by the Chinese 114th Infantry Regiment and the MARS Task Force along the Burma Road. It was critical that the MARS Force control the high ground to the east, near Hpa-pen. When the Chinese had tried to cross the road north of Hpa-pen, the Japanese had driven them back. The Hpa-pen hill mass to the west of the road and a smaller nearby hill were key terrain. The high ground surrounding Hpa-pen blocked observation of the road from the 124th Cavalry Regiment's positions, making it impossible for the unit to control the road by fire. If it could control the hills, the 124th could readily block Japanese traffic along the Burma Road.[6] Efforts to get the Chinese 88th Infantry to join in a combined attack only obtained an agreement that the Chinese unit would provide fire support.

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The MARS Task Force had the demanding mission of marching across the rough mountain country of northern Burma.

Feb. 2, 1945, proved to be a big day for the 124th, when its 2nd Squadron attacked what proved to be the center of Japanese resistance.[7] As the 2nd Squadron waited on line about a mile west of the Japanese positions, fire from artillery (75 mm pack howitzers) and mortars (81 mm and 4.2 inch) hammered the area for 20 minutes. The final artillery rounds were white phosphorous, signalling the start of the attack. Soldiers from E Troop and F Troop attacked abreast, with D Troop in support. Although F Troop had to make a longer approach, through a wooded draw into the valley, it was already moving up the steep

slope to the hilltop before E Troop, on the left, broke free of the heavy vegetation.[8]

F Troop, from Mineral Wells, Texas, was climbing the hill in open column along a rough trail. Well in the lead was its commander, First Lieutenant Jack L. Knight, followed closely by his brother First Sergeant Curtis Knight, and Sergeant Wayne Doyle of Santos, Texas, a cook who volunteered to be a messenger. When two Japanese soldiers suddenly appeared at the crest of the hill, Jack Knight killed them with his carbine.

At the top of the hill, Jack called to the troopers scrambling up behind, "There's nothing up here! Come on up!" Under heavy fire from mortars, "whiz-bangs" and small arms, Knight pointed out locations for his men to dig in. Then he moved off to investigate the southwest slope of the hill. The real battle began when Knight spotted a well-camouflaged pillbox (actually a dug-in fortified position).[9] He quickly threw a grenade into the position, and then he discovered another similar position nearby. As he moved to attack it, Knight called back, "Come on, there's a whole nest of 'em down here!" Continuing down, he found himself in the center of a horseshoe formation of well-built dugouts.



Army Center of Military History

"Fear was not part of Jack's make-up. He preferred doing a dangerous job himself to calling on his men," wrote Lieutenant Colonel John Randolph, the historian of the MARS Task Force, in 1946. The soldiers from F Troop who came over the side of the hill to see what was going on described Knight as "fighting like a madman," acting as if he had to destroy all the emplacements himself.

When a grenade sailed toward Knight from one of the pillboxes, his men yelled at him. Instead of dropping to the ground, Knight backed up, and shrapnel from the grenade hit him in the face. Out of ammunition, he moved back a few feet beside Lieutenant Leo C. Tynan Jr., his artillery forward observer from San Antonio, to get more. Knight's only comment to Tynan was, "I can't see." As he headed back into the hornet's nest, one of his eyes was closed, and blood was running down his face. Soldiers from F Troop, now fighting around him, were dropping like flies. Doyle, the cook turned messenger, was one of those killed. Knight hesitated long enough to direct his men's efforts with arm motions and to shout, "Come on, we've got 'em now!"[10]

Then Knight was out in front again, throwing a grenade into another hole. After a second enemy grenade exploded, he went down, wounded again. Curtis Knight called out, "Jack's hit!" and ran to him. Curtis fell, seriously wounded. Jack raised up on his elbow and shouted, "Curtis, are you hurt?" Someone responded, "Yes!" Jack pleaded, "Go on back! Somebody get Curtis back!" Propped on an elbow, Jack then urged his men forward with his free arm. As he struggled to get up to assault his sixth bunker, a Japanese bullet hit him, and he lurched forward. In Randolph's words, "A trooper's trooper, loved and admired by all" was dead.[11]

Private First Class Anthony Whitaker fired three antitank rockets into the fortified position from which the shot came that killed Knight. After all three rockets failed to explode, Whitaker cast the launcher aside,

grabbed his rifle and grenades and single-handedly assaulted the position. His attack was successful, and his action may have been the turning point in the battle. Whitaker was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. By the end of the day's fighting, the 2nd Squadron had 22 troopers killed in action. More than 200 Japanese soldiers were buried on that hill near Hpa-pen.

Curtis Knight survived his wound, and Jack was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously in May 1945.[12] The citation for his medal reads:

On 2 February 1945, near Loi-Kang, Burma, First Lieutenant Jack Llewellyn Knight, 124th Cavalry Regiment, Mars Task Force, led his cavalry troop against heavy concentrations of enemy mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. After taking the troop's objective and while making preparations for a defense, he discovered a nest of Japanese pillboxes and foxholes to the right front. Preceding his men by at least 10 feet, he immediately led an attack. Single-handedly, he knocked out two enemy pillboxes and killed the occupants of several foxholes. While attempting to knock out a third pillbox, he was struck and blinded by an enemy grenade. Although unable to see, he rallied his troop and continued forward in the assault on the remaining pillboxes. Before the task was completed, he fell mortally wounded. First Lieutenant Knight's gallantry and intrepidity were responsible for the successful elimination of most of the Jap's positions and served as an inspiration to the officers and men of his troop.[13]

Private First Class Ernest H. Barkley, who had been a Marauder, said, "I went through five attacks during the Battle for Myitkyina. This was my sixth attack, and it was the biggest and toughest I've ever been in. I don't want another one like it." Colonel William L. Osborne, commander of the 124th Cavalry, a veteran of the siege of Bataan who escaped from the Philippines to Australia in a 22-foot native boat, and Merrill's former 1st Battalion commander, said:

"In over four years of combat I have seen many officers fight and die for their country, but the actions of Lieutenant Knight in leading his troop against a strong enemy will always remain as the finest example of American courage, valor, and leadership of any officer I have had under my command. It is officers of Lieutenant Knight's caliber, and troops that follow that kind of leadership, who are winning the war — not colonels and generals."[14]

The exceptional valor "above and beyond" the call of duty demonstrated by First Lieutenant Jack Knight of the 124th Cavalry Regiment on Feb. 2, 1945, near Hpa-pen, Burma, was in the highest traditions of Army special-operations forces, and he clearly merits induction into the U.S. Army Special Warfare Hall of Heroes and the Ranger Hall of Fame.

USASOC Historical Archive

First Lieutenant Jack L. Knight

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Notes:

1 George Lang, Raymond L. Collins and Gerard F. White, *Medal of Honor Recipients 1863-1994, Vol. II: World War II to Somalia* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1995), 520.

2 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *The United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), 191.

3 Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War 1941-45* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 377.

4 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), 90-91.

5 Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out*, 126, 186.

6 Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out*, 206-07.

7 John Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma* (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Co., 1946), 189.

8 Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out*, 207-08.

9 Randolph, 191.

10 Randolph, 191.

11 Randolph, 191.

12 Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out*, 208-09; Randolph, 197.

13 Lang, Collins and White, 521; and *The Congressional Medal of Honor: The Names, The Deeds* (Forest Ranch, Calif.: Sharp & Dunnigan Publishers, 1984), 365-66.

14 Randolph, 197.

Behind Friendly Lines: The Need for Training Joint SOF Staff Officers

by Commander Steven R. Schreiber, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant Colonel Greg E. Metzgar, U.S. Army; and Major Stephen R. Mezhir, U.S. Air Force

The requirements of the global war on terrorism, or GWOT, have caused a significant expansion of the operations of the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and of its assigned special-operations forces, or SOF. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM has been assigned the unfamiliar role of acting as a supported combatant command.[1] The combination of expanded operations, the higher demand for SOF assets and capabilities, and the increased command responsibility produce a daunting challenge for USSOCOM and SOF.

USSOCOM's expanded operations in the GWOT have increased the command's needs for SOF personnel who can plan at the strategic level and function effectively on the staff of a combatant commander or on a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF.[2] But if USSOCOM draws more SOF operators out of its units and trains them to perform strategic-planning duties, the SOF units may lose capabilities.[3]

The four SOF Truths are: (1) Humans are more important than hardware; (2) Quality is better than quantity; (3) Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced; and (4) Competent special-operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Thus, the expanded requirement for both operators and strategic planners puts USSOCOM in a dilemma:[4] How do we educate the SOF planners needed for the expanded operations without compromising the capabilities of SOF units that are already short of experienced manpower?

Outside of the training in their intermediate service school, or ISS, SOF field-grade officers have no formal education process that prepares them to plan and conduct joint special operations.[5] The lack of formal joint-special-operations education limits the ability of these officers to contribute to and integrate SOF's attributes into joint staffs. SOF officers must be introduced to joint special operations early in their careers, either through formal classroom instruction or through distance learning, in preparation for their eventual service with a regional combatant commander; a theater special-operations command, or TSOC; a joint task force, or JTF; a JSOTF; or a joint staff.[6]

The shortfalls among SOF officers in joint SOF education, training and operational experience are not new. Over the past decade, many SOF leaders have recognized and attempted to address the shortfalls by developing programs to produce SOF officers who are well-versed in their service doctrine and in joint doctrine. However, those efforts have fallen short in meeting the increasing demand for the unique skills and experience of field-grade SOF officers educated and trained in joint SOF operations.

Given the demands of the GWOT, we must place increased emphasis on developing joint SOF staff officers who can effectively communicate the capabilities and requirements of SOF in a joint environment.[7] In particular, the SOF staff officer must be able to transition rapidly from being an operator to being an effective member of a JSOTF.[8]

Defining the problem

In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, operational planners at the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, tasked Special Operations Command-Central, or SOCCENT, to prosecute the opening phase of the campaign in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After conducting an initial mission analysis, SOCCENT immediately tasked the 5th Special Forces Group to form a JSOTF, which eventually became known as Task Force Dagger.[9]

Although the formation of a JSOTF in this manner appears to have been successful, it made the SF group commander the JSOTF commander, a role for which he was doctrinally unprepared at the beginning of the campaign.[10] Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations,* states, "the core of the JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the theater SOC staff or existing SOF component with augmentation from other service SOF."

Forming the JSOTF from an existing service component impeded operations for the TF Dagger commander by placing him in the unenviable position of having to plan major joint operational-level functions and tactical-level service tasks simultaneously. In such a situation, as one former SF group commander noted, the commander does not have an organization of joint staff officers who are accustomed to working with the combatant commander's staff at the joint operational level.[11]

While Army doctrine for SF and other SOF is nested in joint doctrine, the SF group headquarters is rarely, if ever, manned with joint-qualified staff officers (graduates of the Joint Forces Staff College or of Phase II of Joint Professional Military Education, or JPME-II). During operations in Haiti in 1993, the commander of the 3rd SF Group was tasked to form a temporary JSOTF. He immediately determined there were no joint-qualified officers in his headquarters who could fill essential JSOTF positions. He later stated, "We thought we could do it all, but found that we could not."[12]

The officers who perform the majority of the staff functions for an SF group or a Navy special-warfare group are normally newly promoted field-grade officers who have little or no joint experience. Some of them may be recent graduates of ISS, and they may have served temporary duty with a joint headquarters during a deployment when they were company-grade officers, but few will have attended any individual instruction at the Joint Special Operations University, or JSOU, or participated in collective JSOTF training exercises hosted by the Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command. How can SOF commanders enhance the joint-operations knowledge of their assigned field-grade officers?[13] The answer is joint SOF education and training. One senior SOF officer who has served several joint tours noted, "Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures must be learned and practiced. Learning can conceivably be done in service schools; practice must be done in joint training exercises, experimentation, testing and, finally, operations."[14]

The officers who perform the majority of the staff functions for an SF group or a Navy special-warfare group are normally newly promoted field-grade officers who have little or no joint experience. … Few will have attended any individual instruction at the Joint Special Operations University.

Training requirements

According to JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, "SOF requires a combination of basic military training and specialized skill training to achieve operational proficiency. SOF specific training includes both individual skill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness." Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 167, charges the commander of USSOCOM with the training of all special-operations forces. That training, particularly individual training and professional military education, should include interoperability with conventional forces and other SOF.

Through their TSOCs, regional combatant commanders articulate SOF mission-essential tasks needed for supporting their theater's campaign and security-cooperation planning.[15] The sooner that SOF officers are educated and trained at the operational strategic level of joint operations, the better prepared they will be when they find themselves assigned to a TSOC or to a joint staff that is responsible for SOF integration.

Because SOF units can be employed unilaterally or in support of a conventional force, officers must retain the company-level skills they developed prior to moving to special operations. Company-grade officers know the mission-essential tasks of SOF and continue to hone their skills for integration into conventional-force operations in support of theater objectives.[16]

According to USSOCOM Publication 1, *Special Operations in Peace and War,* "Training and education are the twin pillars of special operations professional development. Training is designed to produce individuals and units that have mastered the tactics, techniques and procedures through which units accomplish their missions. Through education, individuals learn the art and science of war and peacetime operations, and develop military judgment necessary to apply initiative and cre-

ativity to the solution of problems and challenges." This education and training must also focus at the operational strategic level of war-fighting in a joint environment. The same skill sets can be applied to the campaign planning required for the GWOT.

SOF personnel must complement their formal training with education. Specific education goals and requirements are outlined in USSOCOM Directive 621-1, *Joint Special Operations Education System.* As part of the education process, SOF personnel usually attend a host of joint and service courses, such as ISS. Selected SOF officers may attend an advanced-military-studies program (the Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, or the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies).

Others may choose to attend joint-SOF education courses offered by the JSOU at Hurlburt Field, Fla. However, this is about as far as most SOF officers take their education requirements. USSOCOM acknowledges, "The majority of a serious professional-development program must be self-development."[17] That approach leaves it up to the individual to obtain follow-on and advanced education and training. With the expansion of USSOCOM operations, it is time to change the requirement for "self-development" and ensure that SOF officers receive, as a minimum, education and training that focuses on some of the joint warfighting skill sets that experience in the GWOT has shown to be critical.

Although this list is not all-inclusive, the following are subjects that need to be addressed in the education and training of SOF officers:

- Integrating joint fires and deconflicting the air and battle space.
- Special activities and compartmented operations.
- Information management and technologies.
- Joint special-operations doctrine and its linkages to the theater campaign plans.
- JSOTF manning requirements — particularly those for reserve-component forces.

In addition to the above subjects, joint SOF officers must be educated and trained in joint operations and planning, in full spectrum and unconventional approaches to operations ranging from small-scale contingencies to high intensity conflict, in the synchronization of joint operations to achieve synergistic effects with sister-service capabilities, and in the interoperability of SOF and conventional forces.

Integrating joint fires

Integrating joint fires and deconflicting the air and battle space have significant effects on SOF planning and employment. During the last several years, SOF have become proficient in the use of tactical fires at the Joint Readiness Training Center, or JRTC, and the National Training Center, or NTC.[18] Prior to operations in Afghanistan, most SOF incorporated only organic attack aviation or artillery. Several recent scenarios at the training centers have attempted to employ time-sensitive targets and bombers performing close air support. However effective the training is at the tactical level, the scenarios do not train SOF group staffs or JSOTF commanders, who usually have little practice or experience in the joint-fires process or in synchronizing the battle space at the operational level. In some cases, the training at JRTC and NTC may leave conventional and SOF commanders with false expectations regarding SOF doctrine and employment.[19]

An initial analysis from Afghanistan indicated that airpower, coordinated with SOF and maneuvering indigenous forces, "was a joint air-land struggle in which the ability to combine fire and maneuver by diverse arms made the difference between success and failure."[20] However new and appealing this concept may seem, it is consistent with previous SOF employment — it has only been relearned by the current generation.[21]

Airpower will continue to play an important role in supporting SOF assets. The flexibility of airpower, particularly from aircraft carriers, make it possible to provide SOF with operational fires quickly, as in Afghanistan. The strategic bomber has also emerged as one of the preeminent weapon systems in support of SOF, having the advantages of long loiter time, all-weather operations, reduced short-range foreign-basing requirements, large numbers of near-precision guided weapons, and large crews able to man a number of communications radios. Crucial to the joint SOF operator and planner is the understanding of what joint assets can bring to the fight. In the GWOT, Navy and Air Force assets will be the most responsive joint fire support for SOF.

The critical link in accessing joint fires and deconflicting the battle space remains the special-operations liaison element, or SOLE.[22] The SOLE integrates all SOF air and surface operations in the combined aerospace operations center. The SOLE is the JSOTF commander's representative and is responsible for ensuring that the JSOTF commander's intent is accomplished when the combat-plans division of the joint force air-component commander, or JFACC, initiates the joint air-tasking order. Efforts to promote the integration of SOLE operations and doctrine must continue through research conducted

Level 1 Training Audience	Level 2 Training Audience	Level 3 Training Audience
All staff officers, NCOs and personnel, including AC and RC augmentees, who may serve in a JSOTF HQ or who are in the process of being assigned to a theater SOC. Training may conducted using computer-based, self-paced training via CD-ROM. The Joint Special Operations University is responsible for maintaining and updating Level 1 JSOTF training.	The theater SOC commander, potential theater SOC commanders and selected personnel serving in or slated for service in a SOC or JSOTF. Level 2 training is conducted in a formal instruction environment at the Joint Special Operations University.	Staff officers, NCOs and personnel assigned to or supporting a theater SOC or JSOTF HQ that supports a JTF or higher joint force. USSOCOM-sponsered SOF training teams conduct Level 3 training.

Table 1: Target Audiences for Joint Training

by Air Force officers and Army SOF officers in their ISS, through the education and training of JSOTF staffs, and through experimentation by DoD with agencies such as the Combined Aerospace Operations Center-Experimental at the Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

Along with the SOLE, future JSOTF commanders might ask for and integrate an air-support operations center, or ASOC, within their JSOTF staff. The ASOC is an asset of the JFACC that is normally attached to an Army corps headquarters operating as a JTF. There is shift toward this thinking as demonstrated in the recent Final Coordination Draft of JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. According to this draft, "ASOCs can help the SOF commander request and integrate air power into all the JFC's special operations."

Compartmented operations

The modern JSOTF can be employed as a stand-alone organization, as part of a JTF, or as part of a joint interagency task force. However it is employed, the JSOTF becomes the interface between conventional forces and unconventional compartmented operations. Security is of paramount importance to the success of special operations, but in Afghanistan, some zealous SOF staff officers created stovepipe arrangements that bypassed some other members of the staff. Those stovepipes, created in the name of security, actually hampered the coordination of necessary operational support, such as logistical support to the Northern Alliance and some critical air support.

Certainly not all special operations should be disclosed — some of them must be compartmented in order to avoid compromise. But SOF staff officers must ensure that their theater counterparts on whom they rely for support (air, logistics, intelligence, etc.) are sufficiently "read-in" to allow them to plan for and leverage the required theater support. Joint SOF officers must be aware not only of the need to continually identify the necessary participants in theater-level planning but also of the need to critically assess the overall impact of operational security on the accomplishment of the campaign plan.

In the context of compartmented operations, the interagency process significantly effects SOF operations. SOF operations, perhaps even more so than conventional operations, can affect national prestige and objectives.[23] In the GWOT, some of SOF's roles appear to be shifting, coming closer to roles normally associated with other government agencies. Officer education must address this apparent shift. Key areas are the requirements of Title 10 and Title 50, U.S. Code. With SOF's geographic and cultural orientation, SOF personnel must have an understanding of the theater security strategy for each country in which they might need to operate.[24] As USSOCOM develops strategy for the GWOT, it must continue to synchronize overt and covert efforts within the interagency arena and within the regional combatant commanders' areas of responsibility.

Information management

Information management and technologies must also be included in SOF officer education and training. Today's technologies make it possible to streamline traditional linear or sequential planning processes using collaboration tools that provide the JSOTF with an interactive and dynamic interface with its components or with the JTF.[25] One recent study of the technological challenges of the GWOT stated, "Integration of ARSOF and the leveraging of multilateral capabilities more seamlessly



Figure 1: Joint SOF Officer Training Timeline

with conventional forces operations must be another priority."[26]

The recent joint experiment Millennium Challenge-02, or MC-02, introduced a number of collaboration tools for JTFs and JSOTFs. As technology increases, these collaboration tools will become more efficient and have greater capabilities.[27] But proficiency in technology is perishable, and technology itself is continually changing. Reliance on technology alone, without a back-up system, must be examined carefully. When technology falters or is disrupted, it can become a millstone to the JSOTF staff.

At the beginning of MC-02, selected personnel received as many as three train-ups on the technological systems and procedures. Personnel coming into the exercise late, with little or no training, were overwhelmed by the demands of an information-based JSOTF (i.e., telephone, e-mail, netchat, radio, television, video teleconferencing, Web pages and online collaboration). SOF must take advantage of the advances in information management and technologies if they are to remain relevant in the increasingly complex environment of joint operations.

Joint doctrine

If SOF and conventional forces are to synchronize their operations, they must understand the language and expressions used by each service and each component. That understanding can be achieved through familiarity with service and joint doctrine. Unfortunately, military culture tends to discount doctrine more than it adheres to it. By not knowing our doctrine better, we sacrifice time and energy. We also sacrifice developing warrior-scholars who have a balanced set of skills for employment at all operational levels. SOF personnel must read, understand and implement our strategies for national security, for combating terrorism and for military operations, and they must understand how each strategy fits into our joint operational doctrine and capabilities. We must use those strategies to build SOF's strategy for prosecuting the GWOT. SOF personnel must have a working knowledge of sister-service doctrine that will allow them to incorporate and synchronize SOF capabilities into the support and supporting relationships during operational planning.

JSOTF manning

No examination of joint operations would be complete without a discussion of JSOTF manning. Experience has shown that establishing a JSOTF is relatively easy, but manning it with qualified joint personnel is extremely difficult. SOF must do a better job of educating their officers, especially field-grade officers, in the communications, intelligence and support needed in joint SOF operations. In addition, SOF must find ways of tracking and recalling SOF officers who have experience in joint SOF operations.

Also crucial is the JSOTF role of reserve-component SOF. Before conducting JSOTF operations in

Afghanistan, the 20th SF Group had conducted several train-ups and participated with the Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command, or SOCJFCOM, in MC-02. That training was an excellent "shakedown" prior to the 20th group's deployment. Nonetheless, given the tempo of current operations, few JSOTFs will have the luck and timing the 20th SF Group had. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, major headquarters and combatant command staffs were operating at a reduced level. Most headquarters are now reliant upon augmentees who have little experience working as part of the team. The augmentees therefore have no unit cohesion until they have spent some time on the staff. Manning JSOTFs with properly educated and trained teams must be of paramount importance while we prepare for the prolonged conflict that the GWOT will require.

Now that we have identified the issues, how can SOF eliminate the problems? Several solutions seem applicable.

Recommendations

SOF will not arrive at a simple, one-size-fits-all solution. The solution will require creativity, perseverance and a long-term, broad strategy. In the near term, USSOCOM must provide the necessary funding for education and training, ensure a unity of effort to make joint SOF training and education more effective, and leverage the capabilities of the JSOU and SOCJFCOM to ensure that assignments are filled by properly trained personnel and that lines of operations are clearly delineated.

An education and training outline is already provided in JP 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, and in USSOCOM Directive 621-1, *Joint Special Operations Education System*.

In accordance with JP 3-05.1, the commander of USSOCOM has tasked SOCJFCOM to conduct training of selected JSOTFs and to assess SOF-related doctrine that supports USSOCOM's collective training program. JP 3-05.1 describes three training audiences that must be addressed. Those audiences are detailed in Table 1.[28] As Figure 1 shows, educating SOF personnel in joint operations is a matter of timing: The more senior an officer becomes, the greater the requirement for joint education and training.

Unfortunately, military culture tends to discount doctrine more than it adheres to it. By not knowing our doctrine better, we sacrifice time and energy. We also sacrifice developing warrior-scholars who have a balanced set of skills for employment at all operational levels.

One recommendation is that an overview of joint-special-operations doctrine and procedures be provided to new SOF personnel attending courses such as the Special Forces Qualification Course. The overview would not make them doctrinal experts, but it would address jointness early in the officers' careers — normally during their fourth or fifth year of service.

By their seventh or eighth year of service, most officers are no longer commanding SEAL platoons or SF detachments and have moved to assistant staff positions in Navy special-warfare-group headquarters, SF battalions or in SF groups. Others may be serving in assignments such as the JRTC Special Operations Training Detachment or in positions in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. There should be a concentrated effort to expose those officers to joint SOF doctrine in preparation for their ISS and their advancement to the field-grade-officer level.

The model for the proposed Joint Special Operations Staff Officer Course, depicted in Table 2, is similar to one that was originally established in 1989, with a few modifications made to account for updated doctrine.[29] The course's education objectives must focus on SOF personnel at the joint operational level. The course should fall under the direction of the JSOU, and it could be taught in residence or by mobile education teams traveling to outlying SOF duty stations. Some instruction might be given as self-development training via CD-ROM or as interactive, Web-based instruction.[30]

Joint SOF education can also be integrated into ISS. One model is currently in place at the Army Command and General Staff College, or CGSC, which an estimated 75 percent of all SOF ISS students attend each year. The CGSC "SOF track" includes more than 200 hours of instruction that is supported by JSOU. It includes core- and graduate-level tasks taught in four tracks: Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Forces and Special Operations Aviation.

JSOU is expanding its efforts to include more SOF instruction at the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force ISS colleges and in their respective programs of advanced military studies. According to one SOF officer responsible for ISS education, this high-payoff targeting is putting a larger number of SOF officers in the

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
National Security Strategy – Elements of Power – National Interests – POTUS/SECDEF – National Military Strategy (QDR) – Foreign Policy Theory and Practice – Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) – Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) – Joint Officer's Guide (JFSC Pub 1) – Other Agencies	– Operational Concept (USSOCOM Pub 1) – Regional Combatant Commanders Role – USSOCOM Commander Roles – Mission/Mission Activities Comparison – Service Components and doctrine • Army • Navy • Air Force • Marine Corps – Command Relationships – Full-Spectrum Operations – Synchronization of Joint Ops – Joint Fires – SOF/Conventional Forces Interoperability	– Joint SOF Doctrine • JP 3-05 • JP 3-05.1 • JP 3-07 (FID) • JP 3-0 • JP 3-33 – Joint Doctrine (Operational) • JP 2-0 Intel Support • JP 4-0 Log Support • JP 2-01.3 JIPB • JP 4-01.8 JRSOI • JP 5-0 Joint Operations • JP 0-2 UNAAF • JP 3-50.2 CSAR • JP 3-53 PSYOP • JP 3-13 IO – Training Doctrine – Campaign Planning

Table 2: Model for Joint Special Operations Staff Officers' Course

advanced-military-studies programs and in follow-on placement in areas in which they can make the greatest contributions to SOF and to the joint community.

USSOCOM must continue to develop programs for those officers selected to fill joint billets but not selected to attend resident ISS. According to a 2002 report by the Government Accounting Office, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions during fiscal year 2001 had completed both phases of the joint education training program (JPME I and JPME II).[31] The report noted, "The Joint Forces Staff College, from which most officers receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its 906-seat capacity."

One possible solution would be to have SOF personnel attend ISS and then attend the Joint Forces Staff College en route to their new assignment. That would put more SOF JPME-II graduates into the units, joint-educated and ready, if needed, to be part of a JSOTF. This solution would require greater flexibility in the personnel system, but the benefit of having more JPME-II qualified staff officers in SOF tactical units, in SOF headquarters and on joint staffs would be invaluable to the operations and planning teams. Over the long term, it would be a great investment and a benefit both to SOF and to conventional forces.

Conclusion

Given USSOCOM's and SOF's expanded operations in the GWOT and the requirement for conducting those operations in a joint environment, field-grade SOF operators and planners need to be educated and trained at the operational and strategic levels of joint operations. That education and training must be focused to enable SOF officers to function effectively on a combatant commander's staff or on a JSOTF. Joint SOF staff officer training should be accomplished at the senior captain/major phase of an officer's career and should include the following skill sets: joint operations and planning, full-spectrum operations, synchronization of joint operations, familiarity with all service components' doctrine and capabilities, employment of joint fires, interoperability of SOF and conventional forces, and coordination of JFACC operations and air tasking orders. An ideal place to conduct standardized joint training would be at each service's ISS as part of the required curriculum for SOF officers. If that is not feasible, the education and training could be conducted in residence by JSOU or by mobile education and training teams of SOCJFCOM. USSOCOM, with JSOU and SOCJFCOM, must take the lead in ensuring unity of effort and standardization.

As Major General Sidney Shachnow stated in *Special Warfare* in October 1995, "Undoubtedly, some people will point to the magnificent manner in which SOF have succeeded in meeting all challenges to date. These same people will remind us not to fix something that is not broken. My response is, show me a thoroughly satisfied man, and I will show you a failure. Of all our human resources, the most precious is the desire to improve."

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Command. He was formerly commander of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Five, or HS-5, deployed aboard the USS John F. Kennedy *in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. His other assignments include executive officer, HS-5; C4I and TACAIR analyst, Secretary of the Navy's staff; aide and deputy executive assistant to the Navy's Director of Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N6) at the Pentagon; operations officer, HS-3; and Naval test pilot, Patuxent River, Md. He was selected as the first American helicopter pilot to attend the British Empire Test Pilot's School in England in 1990. Commander Schreiber holds a bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering from the University of Arizona and a master's degree in systems management from the University of Tennessee.*

Lieutenant Colonel Greg E. Metzgar is assigned to the J7, SOCJFCOM. He has held numerous troop-leadership positions in his 16 years of commissioned service, including support platoon leader, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. His Special Forces assignments include detachment commander, battalion headquarters support company commander, group support company commander, and battalion operations officer, 7th SF Group; SOF observer/controller and planner, Joint Readiness Training Center; and special-warfare planner, USSOCOM Campaign Support Group. Lieutenant Colonel Metzgar holds a bachelor's degree in international relations from Boise State University and a master of science in administration from Central Michigan University. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Lieutenant Colonel Metzgar has previously published articles in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin *and* Special Warfare.

Major Stephen R. Mezhir is chief of nuclear security policy at the United States Strategic Command. His previous assignments include operations officer, 509th Security Forces Squadron, Whiteman AFB, Mo.; operations officer, 343rd Training Squadron Detachment 1, Camp Bullis, Texas; course chief, Security Police Officers Course, Air Force Security Police Academy, Lackland AFB, Texas; operations officer, 64th Security Police Squadron, Reese AFB, Texas; security/law-enforcement flight commander, 51st Security Police Squadron, Osan AB, Korea; and missile security flight commander and nuclear convoy commander, 91st Security Police Group, Minot AFB, N.D. Major Mezhir is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Joint Forces Staff College. He holds a bachelor of science degree from the U. S. Air Force Academy and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Notes:

[1] Refer to the following: Rowan Scarborough, "Rumsfeld Bolsters Special Forces," *Washington Times*, 6 January 2003, 1; Rowan Scarborough, "Special Ops Gets OK To Initiate Its Own Mission," *Washington Times*, 8 January 2003, 8; and Glenn W. Goodman, "Expanded Role for Elite Commandos," *Armed Forces Journal International*, February 2003, 34-38.

[2] Goodman, 36. Refer also to JP 5-0 (Second Draft), *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 10 December 2002, IV-5, which refers to global campaign planning, a new addition to joint doctrine.

[3] Experienced SOF commanders are hesitant to expand higher headquarters. Unless there is a direct contribution to those responsible for executing SOF missions in the field, they see expanding headquarters as bureaucratic and wasteful of critical manpower assets.

[4] Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 17 April 1998).

[5] Intermediate service schools are the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.; the Marine Corps Command and General Staff College at Quantico, Va.; and the Naval War College at Newport, R.I.

[6] It is important to note that only the top officers from each year group have the opportunity attend a resident ISS. Officers not selected to attend in residence are required to complete ISS by correspondence, missing the opportunity to "network" during a year of residence.

[7] See Michael Findlay, "SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forces," *Special Warfare*, Spring 2000, 10-17; and Steven P. Bucci, "Fighters vs. Thinkers: The Special Operations Staff Officer Course and the future of SOF." *Special Warfare*, Spring 1989, 33-37.

[8] To paraphrase USSOCOM Directive 621-1 (9 March 2001), "Joint Special Operations Education System," 5, there are four USSOCOM education goals: (1) Understand strategic, operational and tactical utility of SOF; (2) Provide people with the necessary analytic tools; (3) Facilitate a broad exchange of experience and lessons learned; and (4) Provide people with an educational foundation that reinforces warrior spirit, character and ethical decision-making.

[9] TF Dagger was designated a JSOTF by SOCCENT planners in order to leverage resources that are normally assigned to joint headquarters (i.e., joint communications assets, etc.). Planners assisting SOCCENT argued to have TF Dagger designated a SOTF rather than a JSOTF. However it was defined, on 18 June 2002, TF Dagger was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its actions in Afghanistan from 8 October 2001 to 28 February 2002 (Joint Staff Permanent Order J-ISO-0199-02), leaving many of those unfamiliar with joint doctrine to think that the 5th SF Group was a JSOTF.

[10] For more information concerning the pros and cons of establishing a JSOTF, refer to "Special Operations Forces Joint Training Team," *Joint Special Operations Insights*, June 2002. Available on SIPRNET Web site: (http://138.165.46.253).

[11] Retired Army Colonel Ed Phillips, electronic mail message to the authors, 6 February 2003. In June 1998, while commanding the 7th SF Group, Phillips conducted a unique education and training opportunity

by organizing the 7th Group into a JSOTF configuration and executing a JRTC rotation based upon the concept of the regional engagement force.

[12] Colonel Mark Boyatt, "Haiti-Unconventional Operations," 1994 (videocassette). Boyatt commanded the 3rd SF Group during its operations in Haiti.

[13] This is based on the premise that the model established by the 5th SF Group in Afghanistan — i.e., SF groups acting as JSOTFs — will continue in the near term.

[14] Retired Air Force Colonel Greg Jannarone, electronic mail to authors, 10 January 2003. Jannarone retired from the Air Force after 27 years of assorted joint SOF assignments. He is now a contractor working on Air Force psychological-operations doctrine. He also has been a guest lecturer at several ISS and at the JSOU.

[15] The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (February 2003), lists the global goals and objectives for defeating terrorism: (1) Defeat terrorist networks and their organizations; (2) Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; (3) Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; (5) Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. All of these goals have direct military tasks tied to them at the operational level for SOF mission sets (i.e.: UW, FID, SR, DA and CT). Copies of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* can be obtained at www.whitehouse.gov.

[16] One of the principal missions of U.S. Army Special Forces is foreign internal defense, or FID. Units such as the 7th SF Group have been conducting FID training in Colombia, the majority of it in light-infantry tactics and employment of mortars, fire and maneuver. In order to perform the FID mission, the trainer must be thoroughly versed in infantry tactics. See Linda Robinson, "Warrior Class: Why Special Forces Are America's Tool of Choice in Colombia and Around the Globe," *U.S. News and World Report*, 10 February 2003, 34-46.

[17] U.S. Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM Pub 1: Special Operations in Peace and War* (MacDill AFB, Fla.: USSOCOM, 25 January 1996), C-6.

[18] This has focused primarily around Army Special Forces, Rangers and Special Operations Aviation assets training at the training centers, with some occasional rotations incorporating Navy SEALS.

[19] A case in point is a recent article that states that during a 1998 visit to the JRTC, the Army chief of staff commented, "The brigade has the opportunity to interface with special-operations forces through the SOCCE." This SOCCE-brigade match-up is questioned by many in SOF, since by doctrine, the SOCCE is attached to a JTF or JFLCC for command and control of SOF operating in the JFLCC/JTF area of responsibility. See Thomas P. Odom, "SOF Integration: A JRTC Tradition," Center for Army Lessons Learned, 18 February 2003 (http://call.army.mil/products/trngqtr/tq4-02/odom.htm).

[20] Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002); and Don D. Chipman, "Airpower and the Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif," *Air Power History*, Spring 2003, 34-45.

[21] For a case in point, refer to W.R. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review*, July 1948, 12-20.

[22] Another critical link for battlespace deconfliction is the special operations command and control element, or SOCCE, assigned to the JTF or JFLCC headquarters. For a detailed description of the SOCCE's roles and mission, refer to FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, and FM 3-05.20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*.

[23] JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, 17 April 1998.

[24] It should be noted that not all SOF are regional and culturally oriented. Only the units of the U.S. Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, and the Air Force 6th Special Operations Squadron, conduct that type of training. To a lesser degree, some Navy SEALs undertake some regional training when they are conducting foreign internal defense.

[25] SOC-JFCOM, *Joint Special Operations Insights: Issues and Lessons Learned* (Norfolk, Va.: Joint Forces Command, June 2002).

[26] Center for Strategic Leadership, October 2002.

[27] One of the highlights of MC-02 was the JTF commander's use of a C-17 equipped with a suite of computers and communications equipment. The equipment allowed him to travel across the country, receiving briefings and issuing planning guidance as if he were in his headquarters.

[28] JPUB 3-05.1 identifies a "training audience" as officers and NCOs, including designated AC and RC augmentees, who may serve on a JSOTF HQ. They should be service- and branch-qualified, but they may not necessarily be joint- or SOF-qualified (IX-2).

[29] This model is an updated version of an original POI that was proposed in 1989. See Steven P. Bucci, "Fighters vs. Thinkers: The Special Operations Staff Officer Course and the future of SOF." *Special Warfare*, Spring 1989, 33-37.

[30] One recent RAND report notes, "DL (distance learning) media support asynchronous learning (that is, learning whenever an individual chooses to) and allow learning programs to be redesigned and offered as modular units, thus tailoring the material to current skill levels, new assignments, and time constraints of individual soldiers. Moreover, DL can more easily provide refresher training and 'just-in-time' training, allowing soldiers to remain proficient in a wider range of skills or to have proficiency restored when and where needed." See RAND Arroyo Center research brief, "Army Distance Learning Can Enhance Personnel Readiness" (http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3028).

[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, "Joint Officer Development Has Improved, But a Strategic Approach is Needed" (GAO-03-238) (Washington, D.C.: GAO, December 2002).

Foreign SOF

Former Polish commandos set to fill security billets in Iraq

Polish contract security guards intended to protect selected buildings and other infrastructure in Iraq and to support the creation of Iraqi security forces are being readied for deployment pending the completion of arrangements. At least two Polish commercial security companies have prepared security groups for the mission, drawing heavily on former military and security personnel. One of these, the Ipel Security Company, has hired 25 former members of the elite Polish GROM (Operational Mobile Reaction Group) and individuals from other special security organizations. Ipel and another firm anticipate working in support of U.S. and British commercial security firms, but as late as November 2003, they had not made final arrangements.

New Philippine force to help protect capital

A new 6,000-man special Philippine military command, designated the National Capital Region Command, or NCRC, has the mission of countering terrorist attacks and coups against the administration. The command's area of responsibility includes Manila and 16 adjacent suburbs. The NCRC will include air, ground and maritime components and will be headed by the former commander of the Philippine Army's 7th Infantry Division.

Russian customs committee has special-designation forces

The occasional media focus on one or another of the smaller Russian special-designation forces recently provided additional information on Russian Customs spetsnaz. These units, available to the Russian leadership for armed actions including counterterrorism, are designated "Special Rapid Response Detachments," or SOBR, of the State Customs Committee. First organized in 1993, SOBR units — armed principally with light automatic weapons — train to undertake assault actions of various types against armed criminal groups. Force preparation includes conducting specially prepared ambushes. SOBR training also emphasizes camouflage and concealment of a type normally associated with military special-operations forces. SOBR is required to conduct air, maritime and ground operations, and its transport resources include Mi-8 and Ka-32 helicopters, at least one Mercury-class 99-ton 50-knot fast patrol boat, and land transport. SOBR elements also work with other security components of the State Customs Committee, including frogmen, when required. The reason for creating paramilitary SOBR and support elements is explained by the requirement for these forces to operate in situations that are more "unusual" than those found in foreign countries.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., who recently retired from the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Career Notes

CAQC qualifies officers, NCOs for CA duties

The Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC, is a resident four-week course taught by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School to qualify active-component captains and majors who have been accessed into the functional area for Civil Affairs, or CA, for their first utilization tour. Also eligible to attend the course are captains and majors who are members of the Army Reserve, or USAR; or who are designated active-guard-and-reserve, or AGR; or individual mobilization augmentees, or IMA; as well as active-component NCOs who are assigned to or en route to CA assignments.

The first two weeks of CAQC trains students to plan, coordinate and execute CA activities and civil-military operations, or CMO. During the third week, students receive training in negotiations and in the military decision-making process. The fourth week consists of a mission-oriented field training exercise, or FTX, that incorporates five of the six CA mission activities and exercises the skills taught during the first three weeks.

The Reserve Component CAQC is taught in two phases: nonresident Phase 1 and resident Phase 2. Phase 1, a distance-learning course, teaches the proper methods of planning, coordinating and executing CA activities and CMO. To be eligible for the course, students must be assigned to or en route to a billet designated for a member of the CA Branch. Students have one year to complete Phase 1.

Phase 2 is a resident, two-week course that is identical to the third and fourth weeks of the AC CAQC. During the first week, students receive training in negotiations and in the military decision-making process. During the second week, students deploy into a mission-oriented FTX that incorporates five of the six CA mission activities in the fictional country of Pineland. The skills learned during the distance-learning phase and the resident portion are put to the final test to ensure students' CA qualification.

Special information:

- Captains and majors, whether AC, AGR, USAR or IMA, must have completed a captain's career course or an officer advanced course and be assigned to or on orders to a duty position coded for the CA Branch or CA functional area.
- AC NCOs must be assigned to or on orders to a position that requires a skill-qualification identifier "D" (Civil Affairs).
- Students in the AC and RC CAQC must meet the height and weight standards of AR 600-9 and pass the Army Physical Fitness Test.
- AC and RC students must have a secret security clearance to attend resident CAQC classes.
- Applicants request enrollment in CAQC Phase 1 by submitting DA Form 145 to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-GPC-SB; Nonresident Training Branch; B Company, 3rd Bn., 1st SWTG; Fort Bragg, NC 28310.
- Units may not make a reservation through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System for CAQC Phase 2 until the officer has completed CAQC Phase 1 and the Phase 1 examination.

For more information, telephone Major Michael Karabasz, CA Branch

manager, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102, or send e-mail to karabasm@soc.mil.

SOPO explains CA waiver requests

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office, or SOPO, receives a number of inquiries from officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers regarding the granting of waivers of prerequisites for accession and training into Civil Affairs. The following information should clarify the waiver requirements:

For officers, the prerequisites for attending the Civil Affairs Qualification Course are:

- Be a captain or major in the active component or the U.S. Army Reserve.
- Be a graduate of a captain's career course, or CCC, or an officer advanced course, or OAC. (This requirement is not waiverable.)
- Be assigned to, or on orders to, a CA unit.

Officers may be granted waivers for grade, unit or duty position. Waivers for unit or duty position can be granted to an officer who is not assigned to a CA unit but assigned to a validated CA Branch or CA functional-area position. First lieutenants may be granted grade waivers if they have completed a CCC or an OAC. Grade waivers for lieutenant colonels and colonels are difficult to justify: CA is at 127 percent of duty-MOS qualification for lieutenant colonels and at 156 percent for colonels.

Waivers may be granted to allow enlisted soldiers who are E6 (promotable) and E7 to reclassify into the CA career-management field. According to AR 148-150, the proponent does not have the authority to grant the waiver needed to reclassify an E8, and waiver requests from E8s will be returned without action. Waivers can be granted to allow soldiers with lower "skilled technical," or ST, scores to qualify for CA, but the waiver cannot exceed five points.

All requests for waivers must include the following:

- A memorandum from the applicant that explains not only how the applicant's civilian skills can be applied to the CA community but also how the Army and the unit will benefit.
- An endorsement memo from the applicant's chain of command.
- A biographical summary emphasizing the applicant's civilian skills.
- A copy of the applicant's DA Form 2-1 (personnel qualification record) and DA Form 2A (enlisted personnel qualification record, Part 1) or DA Form 2B (officer personnel qualification record, Part 1).
- A unit manning record showing the CA officer billet (if the applicant is not in CA unit), or a letter of acceptance from a gaining CA unit and a copy of the DA Form 4156-R.

Waiver requests must go through the applicant's chain of command. If the applicant is assigned to a unit of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, or USACAPOC, the request must be endorsed by the USACAPOC headquarters before SOPO will take approval action. Civilians employed by the Department of Defense or other government agencies; allied officers; and NCOs, warrant officers and officers of other services who are assigned to or on orders to a position requiring CA training may also request a waiver of the CAQC prerequisites. Waiver requests should be addressed to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-SP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310.

For more information, telephone Major Michael Karabasz, CA Branch manager, SOPO, at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102, or send e-mail to karabasm@soc.mil.

Update

SF officer awarded first DSC since Vietnam War

A Special Forces officer has become the first soldier to receive the nation's second-highest military award for valor since the Vietnam War.

Major Mark E. Mitchell received the Distinguished Service Cross Nov. 14, 2003, for his actions near Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, in November 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom. Mitchell led a team of 16 American and British soldiers into combat operations against approximately 500 al-Qaeda-trained Taliban fighters who had taken over the Qala-i-Jangi fortress, in which they had been imprisoned.

Mitchell's actions freed an American held by the rioting prisoners and ensured the posthumous repatriation of another American. Mitchell's citation states that from Nov. 25-28, 2001, "his unparalleled courage under fire, decisive leadership and personal sacrifice were directly responsible for the success of the rescue operation and were further instrumental in ensuring the city of Mazar-e-Sharif did not fall back in the hands of the Taliban."

General Bryan D. Brown, the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, presented the medal to Mitchell in a ceremony at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

"It is a tremendous honor," Mitchell said. "But I don't consider myself a hero. I am not personally convinced that my actions warranted more than a pat on the back. Wearing the Special Forces foreign service combat patch on my shoulder and serving with the finest soldiers in the world is enough. I was just doing my job, and our mission was accomplished."

Photo by Jennifer Whittle

Major General Bryan Brown (left) presents the Distinguished Service Cross to Major Mark Mitchell.

Mitchell was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, during his deployment to Afghanistan. He now is assigned to the U.S. Central Command's Special Operations Command-Central.

SWCS breaks ground for new weapons facility

Senior Army special-operations leaders helped break ground Dec. 4, 2003, at the site where the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Weapons Training Facility is scheduled for completion in 2005.

The 74,000-square-foot structure will consist of an armament center, a weapons training center and a supply handling facility, said Donald Strassburg, the facility's designer. The facility will store thousands of U.S., foreign and nonstandard weapons systems and the support structure necessary for maintaining them.

Colonel Thomas F. Spellissy, program executive officer for special programs at the U.S. Special Operations Command, said nonstandard weapons training is critical to the survival of special operators on the unconventional battlefield.

Although Special Forces students and soldiers assigned to SWCS's 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, will be the primary users of the weapons training facility, Spellissy stressed the joint nature of the facility, saying that it will serve the entire USSOCOM community, as well as a host of other government agencies. — *Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner, USASOC PAO*

SOCSOC teaches integration of SOF communications

As technological advances continue to improve the communications capabilities of special-operations forces, or SOF, SOF communicators are challenged to develop new techniques and procedures for integrating a growing variety of communications systems.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Communications Systems Operators Course, or SOCSOC, is a four-week course designed to teach students to integrate communications systems at the SF-battalion level. The course trains students to serve as members of special-operations signal detachments, to operate SOF-unique communications systems, and to set up communications systems in a forward operational base, or FOB. Students learn to implement the TSC-135 joint base station, or JBS, a communications system that comprises several components.

The JBS provides communications up to 2,400 miles between an SF forward operations base and SF

operational detachments. It also allows communications between SF detachments. The JBS allows SF detachments to send e-mail reports, which can be routed via a local area network to reach several recipients, even higher headquarters, within seconds. Reports can thus be received, disseminated and acted upon more quickly.

Before they can attend SOCSOC, students must have a basic knowledge of the primary radio equipment that is included in the JBS. Units must also certify that students have been trained in antenna theory, in radio-wave propagation, in antenna construction and installation, and in communications-security procedures. SOCSOC training is mainly hands-on, with some lecture and computer instruction. The course culminates in a week-long command-post exercise.

SOCSOC is open to active- and reserve-component officers and enlisted personnel assigned to SF battalion or SF group signal detachments. Attendance by senior communications personnel, such as battalion signal officers and commanders and NCOICs of signal detachments, is critical to the success of the SOCSOC curriculum because of the value of their collective experience. For additional information, telephone the course NCOIC, Sergeant First Class Richard Butler, at DSN 236-4826 or commercial (910) 396-4826, or send e-mail to butlerri@soc.mil.

Building dedication honors TF Ranger crew chiefs

Two special-operations soldiers killed in action in Somalia in 1983 were honored during a ceremony at Fort Eustis, Va., Nov. 14, 2003, when the U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School, or USAALS, named a Black Hawk maintenance training facility in their honor.

Staff Sergeant William D. Cleveland Jr. and Sergeant Thomas J. Field, members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, were serving as maintenance crew chiefs on board a Black Hawk helicopter that was shot down in Mogadishu on Oct. 3, 1993. Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, the aircraft's pilot, survived the crash and was taken prisoner. Co-pilot Ray Frank also died in the crash.

Cleveland, a native of Phoenix, Ariz., was posthumously awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with "V" Device (third award), Air Medal (second award) and Purple Heart.

Field, a native of Lisbon, Maine, was posthumously promoted to staff sergeant and was awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with "V" Device and Purple Heart.

The Cleveland/Field Training Facility is used by Army NCOs to teach Army and Air Force students in the UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter Repairer Course. — *Patti Bielling, Fort Eustis PAO*.

SOCSOUTH announces move to Florida

The U.S. Special Operations Command announced plans Nov. 18 to relocate the headquarters that provides command and control for special operations in Central and South America to Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla., by March 31, 2004.

U.S. Special Operations Command-South, or SOCSOUTH, is based at Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, Puerto Rico, which is slated to close.

SOCSOUTH forces conduct counternarcotics operations, provide multinational training, and host symposiums for Latin American countries on combating terrorism, among other missions. — *American Forces Press Service*.

SWCS writing new manual for tactical PSYOP

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is writing a new field manual that will cover tactical psychological operations.

The SWCS Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division is developing the author's draft of FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. The FM will provide doctrine for active- and reserve-component tactical PSYOP forces assigned to SOF units or supporting conventional or joint operations.

Tactical PSYOP support to Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, or OIF, has led to the rapid emergence of new PSYOP operating procedures; new relationships of PSYOP command and control, or C^2; the fielding of new PSYOP equipment; and operational modifications to PSYOP doctrine. FM 3-05.302 will incorporate OEF and OIF lessons-learned, new terminology and equipment, and the impact of reachback technology on tactical PSYOP C^2 and on the production, distribution and dissemination of PSYOP products.

FM 3-05.302 will provide doctrinal guidance to commanders, staffs, and personnel performing tactical PSYOP duties and tasks. The U.S. Marine Corps also intends to adopt FM 3-05.302 as a Marine Corps publication.

The initial draft of FM 3-05.302 is scheduled to be available for review during the summer of 2004. The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division encourages PSYOP commanders, PSYOP staff officers and PSYOP soldiers at every skill level to review the initial-draft publication and provide comments. The publication will be accessible through the ASOCNet; the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Web site; the ARSOF Doctrine and Training Library, Psychological Operations section; and Army Knowledge Online.

For additional information, telephone Stephen Childs, PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division, at DSN 239-7257 or commercial (910) 432-7257, or send e-mail to childss@soc.mil.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

The Code of the Warrior. *By Shannon E. French. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. ISBN 0-8476-9756-8, 258 pages. $24.95.*

A few years ago, the officers of the Special Forces Branch gave this reviewer the branch's "pass around" copy of Steven Pressfield's *Gates of Fire* (Bantam, 1998). From their conversations, it was clear that the SF Branch officers were intrigued by more than the mere facts of the Battle of Thermopylae described in the book. Their interest centered on the creation and maintenance of the dedication that led a small force to engage a much larger one and fight it to the bloody finish.

These now widely dispersed officers should enjoy Shannon French's *The Code of the Warrior*. It addresses the cultures and resultant behavioral codes of a number of notable warrior groups. Included are ancient Greeks, Romans, Vikings, Arthurian knights, American Indians, Chinese warrior monks and Japanese samurai — truly a farrago of doughty men-at-arms.

Of at least equal value are the book's thought-provoking opening and closing chapters, "Why Warriors Need a Code," and "The Warrior's Code Today." It could be argued that those chapters alone are worth the price of the book.

Some of the lessons encompassed within the book arise from cultures so different in time and place from our own as to surpass mere obscurity and verge on the incomprehensible. Other lessons are immediately clear. For example, allowing some latitude for the archaic language of



the following passage and the baggage of translation, most special-operations commanders could identify with its essence:

> *Is my understanding equal to this task or not? If it is, I apply it to the work as a tool presented to me by Nature. If not, then I either make way — if my duty permits it — for someone more capable of doing the business, or else I do the best I can with the help of some assistant, who will avail himself of my inspiration to achieve what is timely and serviceable for the community. For everything that I do, whether by myself or with another, must have as its sole aim the service and harmony of all.*

Although an SF detachment commander could find relevance in the passage, it was written by Marcus Aurelius, articulate warrior-emperor of Rome and then-ruler of most of the known world, in 167 A.D.

One chapter, on Arthur and his knights, does not quite fit in, either in pattern, tone or content. This is somewhat understandable: The chapter was written by a respected colleague of French's. Its major disconformity is that it is written about the characters who people a work of fiction, Sir Thomas Mallory's *Le Morte D'Arthur*. Because historical proof of the existence of Arthur, his knights and their code is largely lacking, the chapter's exhaustive discussion of this code therefore seems excessive. This is not to say that it is not interesting or that it lacks content — merely that it lacks the historical relevance of the other chapters.

Although the book is relatively short — some 250 pages in all — it is not recommended for rapid or single-session reading. There is too much philosophical meat in it for that. *The Code of the Warrior* should be bitten off in manageable chunks (a chapter or less), tasted, mentally chewed and digested. To most, it will provide mental sustenance.

COL J. H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

Unarmed Combat: A Complete Manual Of Self-Defense, Groundfighting & Joint Locks. *By Steven S. Iverson. Colorado: Spartan Submissions, Inc., 2003. ISBN: 0-9714133-2-0 (paper), 480 pages. $39.99.*

Unarmed Combat is a complete work on hand-to-hand combat. The book covers a variety of subjects, including self-defense techniques, stand-up fighting, groundfighting, and a variety of situations in which soldiers may find themselves in

combat. *Unarmed Combat* is illustrated with nearly 2,000 black-and-white photographs.

The book's first section addresses stand-up fighting, covering scores of self-defense scenarios. Of particular interest are the techniques for defeating an opponent who is trying to punch you — the most common type of attacker. The section shows techniques for taking an opponent to the ground, as well as techniques for defeating a takedown.

The second section, which could stand alone as a manual on ground-fighting, describes hundreds of striking and choking techniques and joint locks. From the book's description of arm bars, knee bars, foot locks, neck cranks, shoulder locks and chokes, it appears that every joint in the human body can be targeted for attack.

The third section covers a variety of subjects, including prisoner control, physical searches, counters to searches, weapons disarming, weapons retention, and sentry removal techniques, that are particularly relevant for military professionals who work with weapons and physical confrontation. The techniques covered in this section build on those of the previous sections.

Some readers may disagree with *Unarmed Combat's* basic fighting philosophy, which is based on the art of Brazilian jiu-jitsu. However, the book takes a balanced approach to the different styles of fighting and does not attempt to promote Brazilian jiu-jitsu over other martial arts. Overall, *Unarmed Combat* offers the military professional a detailed reference manual on the art of hand-to-hand combat.

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Beyond Nam Dong. *By Roger H.C. Donlon. Leavenworth, Kan.: R∞N Publishers, 1998. ISBN: 0-9621374-8-0 (hardback). 227 pages. $24.95.*



In *Beyond Nam Dong,* Roger Donlon, America's first Special Forces hero from the war in Vietnam, recounts the historic battle in which he and the other 11 men of his A-detachment, along with 160 indigenous troops, successfully defended their camp at Nam Dong in July 1964.

Donlon's purpose for recounting these harrowing events is found in the epilogue, in which he relates a request from a high-school student who asked him to tell "his story" and, more specifically, to relate the truth of what happened. The picture on the book's jacket of a then young and fearless Green Beret captain, wearing the Medal of Honor, gives a foretaste of what lies within the pages of this patriotic epic, which is not written exclusively for the military community but rather for the layman.

The "team" concept is a theme as Donlon relates the formative events of his early life. From the team found in his childhood home, the story unfolds from team to team in Donlon's later life: his SF team, his marriage team, and the larger concept of the global team that comprises our international allies. In the story of his life after the Army, Donlon brings his story to closure by sharing his experiences as one of the men responsible for determining whether the United States would initiate normalization with the government of Vietnam.

Central to the book is the account of the 5½-hour battle for the camp at Nam Dong. Donlon's desire to heal old wounds and move toward a better future for both the American and Vietnamese peoples comes through as his primary message. Donlon's deep faith and love for his God, his family and his country are clearly related as the foundation from which he has persevered throughout a remarkable life of service.

This book should be read by everyone from high-school students to international diplomats. It embodies the oldest of American ideals and is a tribute to those who have paid the ultimate price to preserve American liberties. Finally, this book carries a sincere message of reconciliation between the American and Vietnamese people, which is timely and appropriate.

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Special Warfare

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