Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

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When Special Forces was formed in 1952, the United States was facing the possibility of supporting guerrilla uprisings against communist forces in Eastern Europe. Although we live in a vastly different world today, the need for soldiers qualified to perform unconventional missions has not diminished.

Over the years, as the operating environment and the nature of SF operations have changed, SF training has evolved to keep pace. In response to lessons learned during the war on terrorism, we have added training in a number of skills, including close air support, adaptive leadership, marksmanship and urban warfare.

Having commanded the U.S. Army Special Forces Command during Operation Enduring Freedom and the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I am intensely proud of the performance and the sacrifices of our Special Forces officers and NCOs. While I revere the accomplishments of our predecessors, I think we have never produced finer soldiers than those we have today.

Operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq have demonstrated the dedication, intelligence, technological skill and adaptability of our SF soldiers, and the number of Silver Stars that they have already earned is a testament to their warrior spirit. While some lessons learned during these operations have pointed out areas in SF training that need change, many more have validated our existing training.

As the global war on terrorism continues, SF may need to adapt further in order to find new ways of contributing with its unique capabilities. The Special Warfare Center and School must respond to field requirements while simultaneously ensuring that the SF training pipeline fills the force. The outstanding officers, NCOs and civilians of the command stand ready to do so.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

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Features

Departments

The Evolution of Special Forces Training: Maintaining High Standards

by Command Sergeant Major Joseph Lupyak, U.S. Army (ret.)

In June 1952, the United States Army activated a unique unit — the 10th Special Forces Group — at Fort Bragg, N.C. The unit's primary mission, as defined by the Army, was "to infiltrate by land, sea or air, deep into enemy-occupied territory and organize the resistance/guerrilla potential to conduct Special Forces operations, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare." SF's secondary missions included deep-penetration raids, intelligence missions and counterinsurgency operations. The soldiers who would perform SF's primary and secondary missions would need to have a commitment to professionalism and excellence that was unparalleled in American military history.

The 10th SF Group's commander, Colonel Aaron Bank, was a veteran of World War II's Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. Many of the volunteers for the 10th had also served during World War II, either as members of Ranger or Airborne units, or like Bank, as members of the OSS. Other volunteers had escaped from communist-controlled areas of Europe in order to join the U.S. Army. As the 10th Group grew, Bank began building on the experience of his troops, training them in advanced tactics of unconventional warfare, or UW. The training was tough, and the soldiers were held to high standards.

Today, within the SF community, there are some people who believe that SF training is no longer as difficult as it once was, and that the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has lowered SF training standards in order to graduate a greater number of students from the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Over the years, operational demands have affected the way that SF soldiers train and the operations for which they train. Despite those demands, SF training standards have remained as high as those followed by the 10th SF Group in the 1950s. As SF training continues to evolve in the face of increasingly complex operational demands, the standards are, if anything, higher than ever.

To understand how SF training can be affected by operational demands, it might be helpful for us to review SF training strategies that have been employed over the last 50 years.

1950s

When the 10th SF Group deployed half of its soldiers to Germany in November 1953, the other half remained at Fort Bragg and was redesignated the 77th SF Group. As new soldiers reported to the 77th, they were assigned to one of the 77th's FB teams (equivalent to a company) to begin their training in the SF military occupational specialties, or MOSs. Each soldier was required to cross-train in all of the SF MOSs: weapons sergeant (light and heavy weapons, patrolling techniques, and

File photo

The unconventional-warfare exercise is one aspect of Special Forces training that has been consistent since the 1950s.

tactics); engineer sergeant (conventional and unconventional demolitions); medical sergeant (life-saving procedures, including venous cut downs and suturing); and communications sergeant (radio and antenna theory, and message transmission by advanced international Morse code at seven words per minute). Soldiers who completed SF MOS cross-training earned a completion certificate. After the initial phase of training, soldiers attended conventional advanced training in their specific MOS. For instance, weapons sergeants attended the 16-week Light and Heavy Weapons Course at Fort Benning, Ga.

During the three-week third phase of training, soldiers organized into SF teams and parachuted into North Carolina's Pisgah National Forest. There, they received one week of mountain training, which included instruction in ropes and knots; rope climbing; free climbing; rappelling; and the use of one-, two- and three-rope bridges. After the mountain training, soldiers moved to a guerrilla base camp for two weeks of training in UW. Soldiers received the SF skill designator "3" after having completed the third phase.

In 1956, 16 soldiers taken from the 77th SF Group formed the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment, or SFOD. The 14th performed operations in Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam. Soon three other SFODs — the 12th, 13th and 16th — were also formed for operations in the Far East. In June 1957, the SFODs were combined to form the 1st SF Group, which was oriented on both Asia and the Pacific. SF was steadily growing.

1960s

During the 1960s, the Kennedy administration's emphasis on counterinsurgency, as well as the demands of conflicts in Laos and in Vietnam, contributed to the growth of SF. Although Southeast Asia was SF's primary focus during the decade, SF training teams also conducted missions in both Central America and South America. The worldwide nature of SF's operational requirements increased the need for additional numbers of trained SF soldiers. In September 1961, the 5th SF Group was activated, joining the 1st, 10th and 7th (redesignated from the 77th SF

Group in June 1960). Also in 1961, the SF schoolhouse, the Special Warfare School, established the SFQC to meet the increasing challenge of training soldiers for the expanding SF units. At that time, the SFQC consisted of three phases: the individual-training phase (Phase 1); the MOS-training phase (Phase 2); and the collective-training phase (Phase 3), which concluded with a UW exercise called Cherokee Trail. In 1963, three more SF groups were activated: the 8th (in April), the 6th (in May) and the 3rd (in December). The challenge of filling these units with fully trained soldiers caused the Special Warfare School to increase not only the number of students who attended each cycle of the SFQC, but also the number of cycles that were taught each year. In addition, lessons learned in Laos and in Vietnam caused the schoolhouse to include training in base-camp construction and jungle warfare in the SFQC.

1970s

The end of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s reduced the requirement for SF soldiers. The 3rd, 6th and 8th SF groups were inactivated, and during the late 1970s, the 7th SF Group was also on the chopping block. But a newly developed program called Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation-Building, or SPARTAN, provided SF with a new mission. SPARTAN was designed to assist Native Americans in Florida, Arizona and Montana with all types of civic actions.

With the deactivation of three SF groups, the SF schoolhouse, which was now called the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, or USAIMA, began concentrating on SF sustainment training. USAIMA reduced its SFQC student output by decreasing the number of SFQC cycles and the number of students per cycle. In spite of those changes, the SFQC remained consistent except for one change: the culminating UW exercise Cherokee Trail was renamed Gobblers Woods.

1980s

The 1980s saw successful SF operations in Panama (Operation Just Cause) and in El Salvador, as well as a resurgence of worldwide SF deployments. The SF schoolhouse (renamed the JFK Special Warfare Center, or SWC, in 1983 and then the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, in 1986) responded to the increased demand for SF soldiers by teaching six cycles of the SFQC per year. Still consisting of three phases, the SFQC was extended to 19 weeks: SF common skills (three weeks), MOS training (13 weeks), and SF collective training (three weeks). The culminating UW exercise, Gobblers Woods, was renamed Robin Sage.

Initially, because the training cycles for the various SF MOSs were not synchronized, the student teams that were organized for Robin Sage seldom included soldiers from all five SF MOSs; e.g., some teams consisted of all officers, all 18Bs, or combinations such as 18Cs and officers. Optimum training requires a fully manned, fully functioning SF team that contains all five SF MOSs. The SWC's newly established Special Forces Department required that its MOS committees establish 13-week training cycles and that all MOS training cycles have common beginning and ending dates. That change in training strategy made it possible for teams in Robin Sage to represent all five SF MOSs so that candidates could become familiar with all the aspects of a fully functioning SF team.

SFAS

In June 1988, SWCS began conducting the three-week Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, prior to the SFQC. Patterned after the assessment program of the OSS, and developed with the assistance of the Army Research Institute, SFAS screens applicants to ensure that soldiers who are selected for SFQC training possess the personality traits that will enable them to meet the challenges and the mission requirements that SF demands.

Other training modifications during the 1980s included altering the SFQC training-phase sequence from 1-2-3 to 2-1-3. Following SFAS, SF candidates attended the MOS-training phase at Fort Bragg. The individual-training and collective-training phases were combined to give students six weeks of continuous training at nearby

Camp Mackall, N.C. But the 2-1-3 sequence led to a higher student attrition rate during Phase 1, and SWCS returned to the 1-2-3 training sequence.

1990s

The 1990s brought an even greater increase in SF operations. Because of lessons learned from operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and from operations in Haiti and Somalia, the SFQC added training that SF soldiers would need in order to meet cultural and geographic challenges of operations in the Middle East, eastern Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. The SFQC also added training in surveillance techniques and in hide-site construction, with the intention of shifting the focus from UW to direct action and special reconnaissance.

The Robin Sage UW exercise remained unchanged, but not without a fight. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Army hierarchy believed that UW was an antiquated skill. Had it not been for the forcible objections of retired Lieutenant General William Yarborough, Major General Sidney Shachnow and several retired SF command sergeants major, the exercise might have been cut from the curriculum, and UW reduced to a four-hour block of platform instruction.

2000s

Thus far in the decade of the 2000s, SF training has been influenced by the global war on terrorism and by SF operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. SWCS has implemented changes to the SFQC that place additional emphasis on training in close air support, in marksmanship, in adaptive leadership, in leadership reaction, in long-range team movement and in urban warfare. Interestingly enough, recent SF experiences with indigenous forces in Afghanistan and in Iraq have validated the UW tactics and techniques that have been taught in Cherokee Trail, in Gobblers Woods and in Robin Sage since the 1950s. Soldiers of the 3rd, 5th and 7th SF groups have stressed the relevance of their UW training during Robin Sage to the situations they encountered in dealing with various tribal chiefs and cliques.

Since 1952, SF has performed demanding missions that call for dedicated professional soldiers. As the world, technology and the SF operational environment have changed, SF training has changed with them. But the requirement for highly-trained professionals has never changed, and SF's training standards have remained high. Recent and ongoing changes to the SFQC are not deviations from the traditions of SF — they are continuations of the SF tradition of adapting training to operations. Today, as in the past, SF training, SF training standards and SF soldiers themselves remain without equal.

Command Sergeant Major Joseph Lupyak, U.S. Army (ret.) is a branch chief in the Training Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. After enlisting in the Army in February 1951, he was assigned to the 11th Airborne Division and completed jump school in May 1951. In October 1951 he was assigned to the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, in Korea. During 13 months in Korea, he participated in numerous operations of the Korean War. His Special Forces experience began in February 1954, when he joined the 77th SF Group at Fort Bragg. He served in Detachment A-Berlin during the early 1960s; served in the 7th and 3rd SF Groups; participated in the Son Tay Raid in 1970; and served in Vietnam with the 5th SF Group. He was selected as the command sergeant major of the 5th SF Group in 1976 and served in that position until his retirement in 1980. In 1983, he was one of the first civilian instructors hired to teach in the Special Forces School. He later became the assistant operations officer/training officer for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Mr. Lupyak is a former president of Special Forces Association Chapter 62, of the Special Forces Museum Association, and of the Son Tay Raid Association. He is a member of the executive board of the Special Forces Museum Association.

Special Forces: Selecting and Training Officers for Adaptability

by Captain Will Cotty, Jat Thompson and Dr. Michael G. Sanders

United States Army Special Forces requires soldiers who will be able to perform their missions in unique environments. In order to ensure the mission success of SF soldiers and to maximize the effectiveness of SF training, SF uses its training pipeline as a means not only of training but also of selecting soldiers for SF. The process, especially in the training of SF officers, can be seen as an example of natural selection.

Natural selection has been defined as a process that promotes the survival of species that are able to adapt to changes in their environment. While it is normally discussed in scientific circles, natural selection has its place in the military environment, as well. A good example of natural selection in the military environment is the evolution of the M-16 rifle.

During the early 1960s, the U.S. military was looking for a rifle or carbine that could be used in fighting communist forces armed with AK-47s in the jungles of Southeast Asia. The U.S. had the 7.62 mm M-14 rifle and the .30-caliber M-1 carbine in its inventory, but no matter what modifications were made to either weapon, neither met the demands of the environment. What was needed was a carbine or a short-barreled rifle that would fire an intermediate-weight cartridge and was capable of full automatic fire.

The M-14 performed well, but it was considered to be too heavy for soldiers to carry in the humid jungles of Southeast Asia. Because of the size and weight of the M-14's cartridge, soldiers could not carry more than 100 rounds on patrols, which severely limited the rifle's capability as an assault weapon. The M-1 carbine was lighter in weight than the M-14 and used a smaller cartridge, but the carbine's cartridge was considered to be severely underpowered.

The U.S. eventually chose the 5.56 mm AR-15 rifle, the forerunner of the M-16, not because it was a superior weapon, but because it had greater capability for modification — it was capable of adapting. The M-16 weapon system is still in use today because it has been able to continually improve in order to meet the demands of the changing global environment. The latest design is the M-4 SOPMOD, which features a rail system that allows attachments — including flashlights, sights, lasers and grips — to be placed on the weapon, adapting it to a particular environment.

This example illustrates the importance of adaptability to the survival of a weapon system. Like the M-16, officers attempting to become SF team leaders go through a selection process. SF is looking for officers who have or will be able to build their own rail system. Officers who embody rail-system adaptability are capable of adjusting to the demands of almost any environment. The training for that type of officer is a progression of learning that allows him to acquire knowledge and skills that can be

Table 1
The Nine Attributes of an SF Officer
(as listed in DA PAM 600-3)

- Thrive in complex and ambiguous situations.
- Possess the cognitive resilience and mental dexterity needed for acting autonomously while under great stress.
- Be mentally flexible and willing to experiment and to innovate in a decentralized and unstructured environment.
- Be a self-reliant team player who can function as a leader in a tightly knit small group.
- Possess good interpersonal skills and display political acumen and cultural sensitivity.
- Be extremely physically fit.
- Possess unquestioned integrity.
- Be able to inspire others to perform effectively under stress.
- Be a war fighter.

attached to his rail system. This article will look at the process by which the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, selects and trains adaptive officers. Specifically, the article will describe the core attributes that SF officers (18A) must possess if they are to be capable of adapting to changes in the SF environment.

As an officer progresses through the SF training process, his ability and his determination for acquiring the knowledge and skills he will need to be an effective 18A will determine his future in SF. During the process, some soldiers will recognize that the SF environment is not a good match for their skills and interests. In other instances, SWCS will make that determination, even if the soldier does not. In either case, an officer who leaves the SF training process early departs a better soldier because of the experiences and training that he received while he was in the SF training pipeline. SWCS recognizes that many of the soldiers who leave the pipeline early are capable and talented officers whose skills are not a good match for 18A.

Required attributes

An officer who assumes command of an SF A-detachment will face many challenges that are unique to SF. The 18A job is complex, and it requires an adaptable soldier who can perform effectively in a number of roles and missions. SF is clear about the type of officer required to fill the job, and it has established nine attributes[1] that an officer must possess in order to be successful as an 18A:

- Thrive in complex and ambiguous situations.
- Possess the cognitive resilience and mental dexterity needed for acting autonomously while under great stress.
- Be mentally flexible and willing to experiment and to innovate in a decentralized and unstructured environment.
- Be a self-reliant team player who can function as a leader in a tightly knit small group.
- Possess good interpersonal skills and display political acumen and cultural sensitivity.
- Be extremely physically fit.
- Possess unquestioned integrity.
- Be able to inspire others to perform effectively under stress.
- Be a war fighter.

The following discussion will describe the attributes in detail and examine the type of training in the SF training pipeline that produces SF officers who are ready to assume command of an SF team.

- *The 18A must thrive in complex and*

ambiguous situations. The breadth of the SF officer's job is extreme. Effective performers in that job "are those who anticipate future needs and adapt to changing job requirements by learning new tasks, technologies, procedures, and roles."[2] The Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, is designed to expose candidates to the types of missions they may face as SF team leaders.

Each of the SF missions has different demands. As candidates are exposed to the missions, they must be able to acquire new skills and to learn the nuances of each mission so that they can become effective performers in unconventional environments. By exposing candidates to the different mission tasks, SF trainers are able to assess the candidates and provide feedback on the appropriateness of candidates' actions relative to the tasks.

Using that feedback, candidates can build a larger body of knowledge that will help them to make better decisions in the future. The SF training pipeline assesses a candidate's ability to learn SF tactics and procedures and to demonstrate that he can understand and effectively execute SF fundamental tasks. The ability to learn is essential for every 18A because it will be critically important for them to learn the situational demands of each mission and to thrive in environments that are complex and changing.

• *An 18A must possess the cognitive resilience and mental dexterity for acting autonomously while under great stress*. The 18A has an unpredictable job, and he must be able to adjust to mission changes, changes in resources and shifting priorities. The effective SF officer will be able to shift his focus when necessary and to continue to take reasonable actions despite the uncertainty of the situation.[3]

Many of the training exercises within the SF training pipeline create situations in which there are changes in resources, in the mission or in mission priorities. Those changes force the 18A candidate to develop new courses of action based on evolving realities. The training assesses whether officers can create structure in a situation in which there is no structure or in which the existing structure has fallen apart.

• *An 18A must be mentally flexible and willing to experiment and to innovate in a decentralized and unstructured environment*. The effective SF officer must be able

Because SF team leaders will consistently interact with their team members, with host-nation personnel and with other key personnel, there is a critical requirement for 18As to be situationally aware and interpersonally adaptable.

Photo courtesy Will Cotty

to solve the ill-defined and complex problems that are often associated with his job and, in so doing, to develop creative and novel solutions that will produce the desired end state.[4] The adaptability training that 18A candidates receive addresses this attribute. The officers are taught to look at circumstances and facts differently and to consider alternative solutions to problems.

There are numerous exercises throughout SF training that provide unstructured situations that encourage the 18A candidate to experiment and to develop innovative solutions. During the military-occupational-specialty phase of SF training, the officer candidates are encouraged to perform informal after-action reviews and to discuss the different ways that they chose for solving the same problems. The candidates are encouraged to learn from their peers and to develop alternative strategies for dealing with atypical problems.

• *An 18A must be a self-reliant team player who can function as a leader in a tightly knit small group*. This attribute "includes such things as demonstrating interpersonal flexibility; adjusting interpersonal style to achieve a goal; adapting interpersonal behavior to work effectively with a new team."[5] To "new team," we could add host-nation personnel, or representatives from another agency. Many of the SF training tasks and exercises require candidates to function in small groups so that they can develop and demonstrate interpersonal adaptability. The 18A candidates who demonstrate that they can adapt their interpersonal behavior to the situation have a much higher chance of success as SF team leaders than those who don't.

This attribute involves a strong component of situational awareness, because the 18A must identify the role appropriate for him to play in different situations and then be adaptable enough to perform that role. The issue of social intelligence has lately received a great deal of attention and discussion. Because SF team leaders will consistently interact with their team members, with host-nation personnel and with other key personnel, there is a critical requirement for 18As to be situationally aware and interpersonally adaptable. Various exercises throughout SF training provide opportunities for candidates to interact with others. The candidates later receive feedback on their interactions and developmental guidance to help them make any necessary improvements.

• *An 18A must possess good interpersonal skills and display political acumen and cultural sensitivity*. Mission success will often depend on SF soldiers' ability to establish rapport and influence the attitudes and behaviors of people from a foreign culture. Recent feedback from Afghanistan indicates the importance of cultural adaptability in SF missions. Cultural adaptability continues to be an attribute that distinguishes SF from many other components of the Army. An SF team's cultural adaptability often determines the success of the team's mission.

Cultural adaptability includes learning such things as language (including the acronyms, slang and jargon that are unique to the culture); goals and values (formal rules and principles, as well as unwritten, informal goals and values that govern behavior); history (traditions, customs, myths and rituals that convey cultural knowledge); and politics (formal and informal relationships and power structures within the culture).[6] But to fully integrate into a culture, the SF team must be willing to behave in accordance with the acceptable customs of that culture.[7] Situational awareness and social intelligence have a great effect on cultural integration, because one must first recognize the need to behave in a certain manner and then be adaptable enough to act appropriately.

A culturally adaptable SF team leader will significantly enhance the probability of his team's success, because he often sets the tone for the team. Several exercises during the training of SF officers expose the candidates to the challenges of establishing working relationships with and influencing people in other cultures. The Robin Sage exercise has a strong impact on students because they are often shocked by the cultural dilemmas that it presents.

• *An 18A must be extremely physically fit*. SF officers must maintain a high enough

Mission success will often depend on SF officers' ability to establish rapport with and influence the attitudes and behaviors of people from a foreign culture.

Photo courtesy Will Cotty

state of physical fitness to inspire their soldiers, no matter how difficult the physical environment, how high the level of exhaustion or how desperate the tactical situation, in peace or in war. During SF missions, "quickly adapting to the varied and challenging physical conditions as one moves from country to country and climate to climate is a key aspect of effective performance."[8]

SF officers must be able to adapt to many different physical factors, and SWCS places a great deal of emphasis on physical fitness during SFAS and throughout the SFQC, in terms of requiring candidates to perform physically demanding tasks and exercises. Various exercises throughout SFQC are designed to replicate real-world missions that require good mental and physical stamina.

• *An 18A must possess unquestioned integrity*. Throughout SF training, candidates are faced with dilemmas and exercises in which they must demonstrate a strong moral compass. All candidates' behavior is evaluated along that dimension, and candidates receive clear guidance concerning the expectation of integrity for SF soldiers. Candidates who demonstrate behavior that is inconsistent with the requirement for integrity are eliminated from SF training.

• *An 18A must be able to inspire others to perform effectively under stress*. A key feature of the 18A training is the emphasis on self-awareness and individual development — two important components of effective leadership in the unconventional environment. All officers are given tests that address personality dimensions related to successful performance, both in SF training and in the field. The officers receive feedback on the test results. The feedback gives them a greater understanding of their strengths, possible vulnerabilities and preferred operating style.

Subsequent to the tests and the feedback, 18A candidates rotate through leadership positions during exercises in SFAS and SFQC, allowing the cadre to closely observe and rate each officer in terms of the appropriateness of his actions. After the exercises, each officer's performance is critiqued and a summary given him for his personal development.

Throughout the process, cadre work with the candidates to ensure that each candidate understands what he needs to do to improve his performance in areas that are critical for success in SF operations. The intent is to give each officer feedback on his preferred operating style (this feedback is provided by professional psychologists) and on exercise-based performance (provided by cadre members) and to help him develop a plan that will facilitate his growth and movement toward successful performance as an 18A.

• *An 18A must be a war fighter*. This attribute is a reflection, in part, of all of the issues addressed in this article. Many of the exercises conducted during SF training are designed to be intensely real simulations of what candidates will do in combat situations. SF believes in the adage, "You fight as you train." Tough, realistic training prepares the future 18A to be an effective war fighter. Realistic training gives the candidate a preview of what his life will be like as an 18A. Candidates who realize that their skills are not well-suited to the demands that are placed on an 18A have the opportunity to drop out of training and return to a part of the Army that will provide a better match for their skills and abilities.

Conclusion

The type of warfare being conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates the need for SF leaders who must adapt if they are to succeed. Based on lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, SWCS is ensuring that SF soldiers will be prepared to meet the demands of future engagements. Just as the rail system of the M-4 allows it to adapt to various environments, the SFQC gives SF officers their own rail system that will allow them to adapt to the various environments that they may face in the 21st century.

There are many changes underway in the SF training pipeline — so many that they could not all be addressed in this article. Future articles will describe more fully the critical components that are being configured at SWCS to produce adaptable SF soldiers, leaders and teams.

Captain Will Cotty is commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Company G, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. His previous assignments include small-group instructor, Company A, 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; A-detachment commander, 7th SF Group; and executive officer, rifle-platoon leader and anti-armor platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. He received his bachelor's degree from The Citadel in 1994.

Jat Thompson is a Consortium of Universities research fellow with the Army Research Institute at Fort Bragg. A graduate student in the industrial/organizational psychology Ph.D. program at North Carolina State University, he has recently completed his master's thesis.

Dr. Michael G. Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, Dr. Sanders continued his research on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment and retention. He holds a master's and a Ph.D. in experimental psychology, with an emphasis on human factors.

Notes:

[1] U.S. Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development* (1 October 1998), Paragraph 15.2.D.

[2] Elaine D. Pulakos, Sharon Arad, Michelle A. Donovan and Kevin E. Plamondon, *Adaptability in the Workplace: Development of a Taxonomy of Adaptive Performance* (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, 2000).

[3] Pulakos *et al*.

[4] Pulakos *et al*.

[5] Pulakos *et al*.

[6] Pulakos *et al*.

[7] Georgia T. Chao, Anne M. O'Leary-Kelly, Samantha Wolf, Howard J. Klein and Philip D. Gardner, "Organizational Socialization: Its Content and Consequences" in *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 79 (1994), 730-43.

[8] Pulakos *et al*.

A Unique Organization: The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group

by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis D. Boyd

At 3 a.m., drill sergeants and cadre from a battalion of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group storm through the barracks, banging on doors to wake sleeping students. Within minutes, the students are standing in formation as drill sergeants bellow orders for the coming events. In less than 30 minutes, the students are inspecting their gear and loading their rucksacks and other field equipment onto trucks waiting to take them to the airfield.

At the airfield, students review jumpmaster procedures, receive pre-jump instructions and rehearse aircraft-loading and -unloading procedures before boarding the plane from which many of them will jump or airland

Students from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, board a plane prior to jumping in to begin their portion of the Robin Sage field-training exercise.

File photo

3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group



into their first tactical field operation. The students are infiltrating into the fictional country of Pineland to play roles in the Robin Sage field-training exercise, the culminating exercise of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. But these students are not Special Forces candidates — they are training to serve in active- and reserve-component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units.

During Robin Sage, the students will support the unconventional-warfare operations of the SF A-detachments and provide tactical support to a conventional maneuver brigade by leveraging resources and by planning, coordinating and developing products and programs. The Pineland scenarios will allow the students to exercise their capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The exercise conditions, as intense and ambiguous as those the students will encounter in an operational CA or PSYOP unit, ensure that students will be prepared to make relevant contributions to CA and PSYOP mission success regardless of the operational challenge. Providing this realistic training is the job of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

The mission of the 3rd Battalion is to train and educate initial-entry enlisted soldiers and officers in CA and in PSYOP; to conduct regional-studies courses that will increase students' cultural awareness of the regions to which they may be assigned; and to conduct language training for Army special-operations forces and for other personnel in the Department of Defense. The 3rd Battalion conducts initial-entry training, or IET, and reclassification training in CA and PSYOP for junior enlisted personnel in the active component, or AC, and the reserve component, or RC. It also conducts CA and PSYOP training for AC and RC officers.

Organization

The 3rd Battalion comprises cadre and staff members that represent the AC and the RC CA, PSYOP and SF groups and commands. Nearly one-third of the battalion's cadre are RC soldiers serving on full-time active duty as Active Guard and Reserve, or AGR. The officer and enlisted AGR soldiers bring a high level of maturity and a wealth of AC and RC experience to the 3rd Battalion's training. Four of the battalion's eight drill-sergeant positions are filled by AGR NCOs, who are the Army's only full-time RC drill sergeants. The remaining drill-sergeant NCOs are active-duty soldiers who have served in the 4th PSYOP Group. Women are equally represented — four of the eight drill sergeants are females.

Because 80 percent of the 3rd Battalion's student population is destined for service in the U.S. Army Reserve, or USAR, the cadre is appropriately tailored to meet the training demands of the AC and RC groups and commands. The 3rd Battalion's cadre

also contains civilian administrative specialists and civilian instructors who oversee the battalion's language programs, negotiations training and the Regional Studies Course. The civilian instructors are highly educated professionals who have extensive academic and practical knowledge of their subject matter.

Enlisted training

The 3rd Battalion's Company D and Company B share the responsibility for conducting the 12-week advanced individual training, or AIT, for CA enlisted specialists (MOS 38A) and PSYOP enlisted specialists (MOS 37F). The AIT completes the soldierization process by refining basic soldier skills, introducing SOF skills and inculcating the seven Army values. The 3rd Battalion is the only Army IET unit not located on an Army Training and Doctrine Command installation that conducts MOS training and certification. The AIT courses train CA and PSYOP specialists prior to their first assignment to an active or reserve unit to give them the skills that they will need to be immediately deployable for operational missions.

Active-component soldiers in MOS 37F must attend AIT, basic airborne training and language training prior to receiving an operational assignment. Except for a small number of 37F specialists who are assigned to airborne RC PSYOP companies, soldiers in the RC MOS 37F attend only AIT prior to their assignment to one of the two PSYOP groups in the USAR. Because there is no active-component enlisted CA MOS,[1] all enlisted CA specialists are members of the USAR; they are required to attend only AIT prior to their assignment to one of the seven USAR CA commands.

AIT for both CA and PSYOP has three components: basic combat skills, MOS training and a situational-training exercise/command-post exercise/field-training exercise, or STX/CPX/FTX. The first component, four weeks long, consists of training and testing in common tasks, land navigation (dismounted and mounted), patrolling, communications, night-vision devices, marksmanship, fieldcraft and driver's training (day and night). The second component, MOS training, lasts six weeks. The third component, the two-week STX/CPX/FTX, tests soldiers' individual MOS proficiency and collective team-task proficiency in a crawl/walk/run sequence. Imposing an operational timeline and emphasizing the troop-leading procedures that are necessary in preparing for a combat deployment, the exercise scenario replicates operations in both hostile and semi-permissive environments. It is during the third com-

CA and PSYOP Enlisted Specialist AIT



CA and PSYOP Officer Training



NOTES

1. Reserve component officers may optionally attend the same CAQC/POOC or complete a distance learning Phase I and a resident Phase II.
2. The CAQC resident Phase II is 14 days long, the POOC resident Phase II is 21 days long.

ponent that students take part in the Robin Sage exercise.

To meet the operational needs of the force, the 3rd Battalion also emphasizes training students to the SOF certification standards of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, or USACAPOC. Soldiers must complete combat water-survival training; they must achieve 70 points or better on each event in the Army Physical Fitness Test; they must complete a 10-kilometer march within two hours while carrying a 55-pound rucksack; and they must complete their annual common-task testing. The battalion's intent is to provide the operational groups and commands with soldiers who will be immediately capable of contributing to the success of operations at the tactical-team and detachment levels.

Officer training

Initial training and education in CA and PSYOP for branch-qualified captains and majors is conducted by the 3rd Battalion's Company B, which also conducts the 15-week Regional Studies Course.[2] During the CA and PSYOP training for active-component officers, students must complete either the four-week CA Qualification Course, or CAQC,[3] or the four-week, three-day Psychological Operations Officer Course, or POOC; the Regional Studies Course; and either a four- or six-month language program, depending upon the level of difficulty of the language they will study. These training requirements must be completed before AC officers can proceed to their operational assignments.

USAR CA and PSYOP officers have the option of attending the same CAQC and POOC as the AC officers or completing a distance-learning Phase I and a resident Phase II. Phase I is available as a "box of books" for PSYOP officers and as a CD-ROM for CA officers. Once RC officers complete Phase I, they are eligible to enroll in the resident Phase II: either the 21-day RC POOC for PSYOP officers or the 14-day Phase II CAQC. The Phase II CAQC aligns with the AC CAQC four times each year, allowing AC and RC students to have identical training for the final 14 days of the course.

CAQC includes a comprehensive mid-course examination, training in hand-to-hand combat and self-defense (now known as linear infighting neural-override engagement, or LINES), marksmanship training with the 9 mm pistol, and training in negotiations and in the military decision-making process. CAQC and Phase II CAQC culminate with the students' deployment as part of the Robin Sage field-training exercise, during which the stu-

dents provide CA mission support to fictional conventional and special-operations task forces.

During the exercise, the officer students must conduct basic troop-leading procedures and prepare for combat tasks that are similar to those performed by the AIT students as they prepare for deployment to Pineland. Once the CA officer students receive the operations orders for the division and for the joint task force, they begin preparing their brigade-level courses of action, their commander's estimate, their CA annex and their support plan.[4]

Over the next 72 hours, the CA students will work around the clock to prepare and issue their civil-military operations estimate and mission analysis; to provide a capabilities brief, an area studies brief and a course-of-action brief; and to deploy via fixed-wing airborne or airland infiltration to begin their CA mission activities. During the next four to five days, they will be required to plan and execute five of the six CA mission activities,[5] to conduct a negotiation; to work with an interpreter and to conduct an interview with the local media. At the end of the exercise, the CA students will receive a fragmentary order to prepare for the transition to a follow-on force or other designated authority.

Language training

The 3rd Battalion is also responsible for the ARSOF language program, which is conducted by the battalion's Company C. The language program includes instruction in 20 foreign languages.[6] During Operation Enduring Freedom, in order to adjust to the operational needs of the force, SWCS also added Persian Farsi, Pushtu and Dari to the menu of languages available for instruction. Because the demands of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere brought an increase in the number of SFQC candidates in training, the language school's population doubled. But despite the increase in the quantity of students, the 3rd Battalion allowed no decrease in the quality of language instruction, and students continued to meet the 0+/0+ standard on their Defense Language Proficiency Test, or DLPT. In fact, on average, students scored (and continue to score) 1/1 or better on the DLPT.

To give students greater motivation for learning language and to provide operational rele-

Training for enlisted soldiers in Civil Affairs and in Psychological Operations now includes driver's training, patrolling and land navigation.

File photo

vance for language training, Company C has added situational training exercises to make the language training more hands-on. Each class capitalizes on the unique skills of its ARSOF students by applying their talents to a mobile-training-team scenario during which the class uses its newly acquired language skills to simulate teaching military tasks to the military or security forces of a target country. From the SF medical NCO who teaches administering an IV to the PSYOP specialist who teaches how to operate a tactical loudspeaker, the students put their language skills to the test. This practical training not only instills confidence among the members of the class, it makes clear that the time spent in the classroom is valuable and that language skills are applicable to operational missions.

Training tempo

The tempo of 3rd Battalion continues nonstop. Each year, the battalion conducts 16 iterations of AIT, four iterations of the POOC, two iterations of the RC POOC, seven iterations of CAQC, two iterations of the RSC and 80-90 language classes. The battalion also sends a number of mobile training teams and subject-matter-expert guest lecturers to various locations.[7]

During fiscal year 2002, the demands of Operation Enduring Freedom placed additional demands on U.S. forces, and USACAPOC required a 20-percent increase in the duty-MOS qualification of its PSYOP and CA soldiers to ensure that soldiers would be available to meet force-manning requirements. The 3rd Battalion responded by training 849 officers and 629 enlisted soldiers for duties in operational PSYOP groups and CA commands, and 2,038 students graduated from 3rd Battalion courses overall. During FY 2003, the battalion trained nearly 1,700 students, and the projection for FY 2004 is approximately 2,500.

Regimentalization

Although the number of students in the 3rd Battalion continues to increase, the battalion has maintained its enthusiasm for instilling the Army values in its SF, CA and PSYOP students and for imbuing them with a strong sense of professionalism, tradition, career-mindedness, and pride in themselves and in their units. To achieve that end, the 3rd Battalion has developed the process of regimentalization, which provides a means for soldiers to become assimilated into their respective regiments. For AIT students, regimentalization consists of four initiatives designed to inculcate a sense of unit, esprit, pride, history and lineage: the "living-heroes" program, regimental excursions, the rite-of-passage ceremony, and the graduation.

The living-heroes program provides special recognition to a CA or PSYOP soldier or veteran who has made a significant contribution to the career field (representative of the seven Army values) and whose accomplishments serve as an inspiration. Each class names its regimental excursion after the class living hero and invites its hero to serve as a guest speaker during the class rite-of-passage ceremony.

The regimental excursion is a trip to an area of historical significance to both strengthen soldiers' connection to the history of the defense of our nation and recognize the class's living hero. Regimental excursions have included trips to the *USS North Carolina* in Wilmington, N.C.; to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Fayetteville, N.C.; to the Civil War battlefield at Bentonville, N.C.; to Lewisburg, W.Va.; and to the White House and Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C. The regimental excursions are memorable experiences that help the students develop a strong sense of brotherhood.

The rite-of-passage ceremony is the culmination of the field-training-exercise component of AIT. Upon redeployment from the FTX, AIT students receive orders to reload the trucks, with their rucksacks, and return to Pope Air Force Base. At Pope, they are ordered to dismount and begin a road march to an undisclosed location. The students are, in fact, en route to the rite-of-passage ceremony. During the ceremony, the drill instructors and cadre recognize the AIT soldiers for their competencies, honor their units, issue regimental crests and enter the soldiers in the rolls of their regiment. Following a dinner, the soldiers listen to words of advice and congratulations from their class hero, followed by a ceremonial recognition of their accomplishments in training and a reading of their regimental history. Afterward,

the senior instructor, first sergeant and drill sergeants recognize the class members for their achievement of the course standards and authorize their names to be read and entered in the official roll of the CA or PSYOP regiment. Once all the names have been entered on the rolls, the guests and spectators extend their congratulations. The CA and PSYOP officer students have recently begun conducting similar rite-of-passage ceremonies in conjunction with evening graduations.

The battalion holds its AIT graduation ceremonies at Fayetteville's Airborne and Special Operations Museum. The museum provides a place in which students' families and friends can more easily share the significant event, and the historical associations help to instill in the graduates a sense of honor and pride in their achievements.

From initial-entry soldierization and training to regimentalization and standardization, the 3rd Battalion's objective is to ensure operational readiness and relevance within the student population and to create a common thread within the PSYOP and CA communities. That common thread sets conditions prior to instruction; indoctrinates soldiers during instruction; and reinforces and sets conditions for fraternity, camaraderie and professionalism following instruction.

The battalion's regimentalization process has four goals: (1) to develop and enrich our community with a true sense of history, patriotism and brotherhood; (2) to create a positive training experience that will ensure competence and promote longevity in the career field and in the Army, and that will sustain confidence within the regimental associations; (3) to promote and increase recruitment, membership and retention; and (4) to establish a sense of lineage, fraternity, commitment and pride in individual soldiers, in the unit and in the regiment.

As the demand for qualified and quality CA, PSYOP and SF soldiers continues to increase, the 3rd Battalion will remain relentless in its efforts to train ARSOF operators to be warriors who will be ready and relevant to confront an asymmetric and ambiguous threat on any battlefield. Even when hostile, permissive and semi-permissive environments occupy the same battlespace, supported commanders can be assured that these soldiers will competently and successfully execute their missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis D. Boyd is commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Commissioned as an infantry officer in 1984, he served tours with Infantry units in Germany and at Fort Bragg, N.C. In 1995 he began his operational tours in the 4th Psychological Operations Group, where he served as a detachment commander, group operations officer and battalion executive officer. He participated in Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor, Enduring Freedom and others. In addition to holding a bachelor's degree in interdisciplinary studies from Norwich University, Lieutenant Colonel Boyd is a 1992 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School's special operations and low-intensity conflict curriculum, and he is a 1994 graduate of the Defense Language Institute.

Notes:

[1] The active-component enlisted equivalent to the USAR's 38A are the 18-series NCOs who occupy positions in the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

[2] RSC is a 15-week course of instruction that is tailored to provide ARSOF officers and NCOs with the ability to assess the significance of diplomatic, informational, military and economic factors in a regional and cultural context. Regions of study include Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Europe and Africa. RSC Class 01-03 is the first to contain officers, NCOs and allied students.

[3] Class 01-03 (conducted in January 2003) was the first CAQC to combine RC and AC CA officers into a single training course.

[4] Currently, the POOC conducts only a CPX at the end of the course. POOC training in the military decision-making process culminates in the preparation of a briefing for an ambassador. The POOC Class 02-03 (February 2003) replaced its Cortina scenario with a Pineland scenario.

[5] The six CA mission activities are: foreign-nation support; humanitarian assistance; population and resource control; military civic action; emergency services; and support to civilian administration.

[6] Language instruction begins at the conclusion of the SFQC's Phase IV. Classes start in March, June, September and November.

[7] Class listing does not include mobilization courses and other courses that were conducted to meet operational-force requirements. There were 543 CA and PSYOP graduates of mobilization courses during FY 2002. FY 2003 will be the last year that the 3rd Battalion will conduct a CA Officer Advanced Course.

Colonel Robert S. Moore
U.S. Army (ret.)
1919–2003

Robert S. Moore joined the First Special Service Force at Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont., in January 1943 as commander of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment. At the time, he had been in the Army for three years. After receiving his ROTC commission upon his graduation from Wofford College, Spartanburg, S.C., he had seen duty as a platoon leader and company commander with the 29th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, Ga. Immediately prior to joining the Force, he had served with the War Plans Division of the War Department in Washington, D.C., where he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel in August 1942.

Serving overseas with the FSSF, Moore took command of the 2nd Regiment during the battle for Monte La Defensa on Dec. 6, 1943. He commanded the regiment for the next year, distinguishing himself by his lead-from-the-front style, tactical acumen and physical prowess. He led the 2nd Regiment during the battles around Anzio, during the liberation of Rome and during the campaign in southern France. The highlight of the campaign in southern France was the regiment's capture of the chateau at Villeneuve-Loubet, an action that opened the way for the Force to move up the French coast.

When the FSSF disbanded in December 1944, Moore moved to command the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. While assigned to the 82nd, he commanded two battalions and served as the division G3. His subsequent career included assignments as the G4 of U.S. Army Alaska; G4 of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning; commander of the Military District of Seoul, South Korea; commander of the Special Operations Task Force, U.S. European Command; and chief of staff of the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He retired from the Army as a colonel in 1972 and took up residence in Henderson, N.C.

In August 2001, while serving as president of the First Special Service Force Association, Colonel Moore returned to southern France to represent the unit at celebrations commemorating the FSSF's liberation of various French towns from German occupation. His legendary stamina was still evident as he actively took part in the whirlwind activity of memorials and parades, in the midst of which he found time to conduct a battlefield tour for the Special Forces soldiers who formed the honor guard for the U.S. contingent.

Robert S. Moore was a true Southern gentleman, and with his passing in June 2003, he left a legacy of leadership and dedication that is in keeping with the highest traditions of military service.

— Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, SWCS historian

photo by Earl Moniz

National Archives

Above: Retired Colonel Robert S. Moore (left) leads members of the First Special Service Force Association during the Force's 60th reunion, held in Helena, Mont., in August 2002.

Left: Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Moore (right) with Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick in Italy in January 1944.

SOCCE-Kuwait: Establishing Long-Term Military-to-Military Relationships

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Joyce

In March 2003, during the final days of the United States' preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces crossed the desert of Kuwait and passed smoothly through the Kuwaiti lines of defense. While the operation was apparently seamless, it might have been extremely difficult had it not been preceded by years of training and rapport-building between U.S. Special Forces and the forces of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense. The success of the U.S.-Kuwaiti training relationship is due in large part to a forward-positioned, permanently deployed U.S. element in Kuwait, the Special Operations Command and Control Element-Kuwait, or SOCCE-KU.

SOCCE-KU was formed Sept. 15, 1997, when the commander of the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, approved a proposal to establish permanent special-operations command-and-control elements, or SOCCEs, in Kuwait and Bahrain.[1] SOCCE-Bahrain later evolved into another headquarters, but SOCCE-KU has remained relevant as a subset of CENTCOM's theater-engagement strategy. Although SOCCE-KU now focuses on its liaison function, the history of its operations provides an example of the value of the continuous presence of U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF, in CENTCOM's area of responsibility.

Background

The primary impetus for maintaining a continuous SOF presence in Kuwait was the need to conduct Exercise Iris Gold, a training mission performed predominantly by soldiers from the 5th SF Group but also supported periodically by soldiers from the 3rd, 19th and 20th SF groups. Managed by the Fort Bragg, N.C.-based Security Assistance Training Management Office and by the Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait (in coordination with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense), Iris Gold was an aspect of the U.S. program of foreign military sales with Kuwait.

Iris Gold came into existence shortly after the liberation of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. It was initially imbedded within a larger exercise, Operation Intrinsic Action, which was later renamed Operation Desert Spring, or ODS. During the ODS scenario, a brigade combat team and an SF company, with its six SF A-detachments, deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, in support of CENTCOM's land-component commander during contingencies related to the defense of Kuwait.

SF tasks during ODS included foreign internal defense, or FID, and coalition support. In the event of combat operations, SF coalition-support teams, or CSTs, would provide connectivity between CENTCOM's land-component commander and selected brigades and battalions of the Kuwaiti Land Force. When alerted, the three-man CSTs would move to their predetermined brigade or battalion assignments to serve as liaisons between Kuwaiti ground forces and U.S. forces or headquarters of U.S. ground troops.

U.S. Army photo

The primary function of Exercise Iris Gold was to allow U.S. forces to conduct training with Kuwaiti forces and forge lasting military-to-military relationships.

The primary function of Iris Gold was to allow U.S. forces to conduct regular training with the forces of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense and forge lasting military-to-military relationships. Those relationships would enable U.S. and Kuwaiti forces to make a quick transition to coalition-support operations in the event that combat operations again became necessary for deterring threats to Kuwait's sovereignty.

Before SOCCE-KU was established, SF advanced operating bases, or AOBs, deploying to Kuwait were required to work within Camp Doha's complex logistics structure without the benefit of any institutional knowledge of the systems or any familiarity with key Camp Doha personnel. The AOBs' missions consequently met with limited success. In order to acquire the necessary support while they were deployed to Kuwait, the AOBs were often forced to depend upon their own initiative and the generosity of the Camp Doha staff. When the AOB redeployed, the interpersonal rapport that it had developed with the Camp Doha garrison evaporated and had to be re-established by the next SF unit.

The establishment of SOCCE-KU created a permanent SOF presence in Kuwait that would take the burden of logistical and administrative coordination from the rotating SF unit. SOCCE-KU's presence as a tenant unit at Camp Doha also facilitated the flow of communication regarding force-protection measures and general information about the garrison.

SOCCE-KU's specified mission set encompasses four complex responsibilities: systemic continuity; organizational liaison; foreign internal defense, or FID; and command and control, or C^2, of combat forces. Applicable in peace, conflict or war, the mission tasks may be executed simultaneously, individually, in multiple pairs or in sequential order, depending upon the level of conflict.

Systemic continuity

SOCCE-KU was established for maintaining professional, redundant, long-term relationships with key Kuwaiti personnel, units and organizations in the vicinity of Camp Doha. Those relationships are focused on the administrative and logistics functions that are provided by Army Central Command-Kuwait, as well as by the staff of the 3rd U.S. Army's land component commander, referred to during combat operations as the coalition forces land-component commander, or CFLCC.

SOCCE-KU also fosters the development of host-nation military-to-military contacts and civilian contacts. The relationships thus formed with units and individuals in Kuwait have assisted SOCCE-KU in coor-

dinating logistical and administrative support for units that are forward-deployed in or near Kuwait. SOCCE-KU also performs liaison with other U.S. SOF stationed in Kuwait in order to share information and to deconflict operations.

Organizational liaison

As a subordinate command of the Special Operations Command-Central Command, or SOCCENT, SOCCE-KU has a mandate to tell the SOCCENT story. SOCCE-KU is charged with conveying to various audiences the operations, plans and intent of the SOCCENT commander, as well as demonstrating the professional capabilities, prowess and maturity of SOF NCOs. SOCCE-KU's liaison function also includes providing relevant information from the land-component commander back to SOCCENT.

In March 2003, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOCCE-KU served as the foundation of a wartime liaison cell that communicated information between SOCCENT and CENTCOM's CFLCC. This expanded liaison cell included sub-cells that represented each of the key subordinate components of SOCCENT. Each sub-cell was led by an Army SF colonel or a Navy special-warfare commander. Each sub-cell also had 3-5 additional SOF personnel so that it could provide 24-hour liaison support. A senior Army SF colonel, SOCCENT's senior liaison with the CFLCC, synchronized the efforts of the liaison sub-cells.

FID

During peace and conflict, SOCCE-KU has executed the SF mission of FID through Exercise Iris Gold. More than a training mission, Iris Gold was the bridge by which SF units established long-term military-to-military relationships that would allow them to quickly transition from being trainers to being partners with Kuwaiti forces during coalition-support operations.

In coordination with the Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait, the U.S. Embassy and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, SOCCE-KU ensured that each fiscal year, SF A-detachments conducted four four-week Iris Gold programs of instruction, in accordance with both the desires of

SOCCE-KU Organizational Liaison



U.S. Army photo

The bond forged between SF soldiers and Kuwaiti forces paid huge dividends when U.S. coalition-support teams deployed with Kuwaiti forces in December 2002.

the host nation and the restrictions of the FMS program.

During its 12-year history, Iris Gold trained thousands of Kuwaiti soldiers, sailors and airmen. Training typically consisted of instruction in entry-level soldier skills. It focused on skill-level-one tasks such as basic rifle marksmanship, first-aid training, map-reading and land navigation. Additional training courses that the SF soldiers provided to Kuwaiti units included training for senior NCOs and officers on operations orders and on the military decision-making process. The training cycles typically began during the second month of a 90-day deployment. Class sizes varied with each SF detachment, but classes were usually limited to 30 students.

Command and control of CSTs

During combat operations and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOCCE-KU is charged with maintaining command and control of the CSTs assigned to work with Kuwaiti land forces, with ensuring the CSTs' combat readiness, and with making prudent distribution of CSTs to appropriate battalions of the Kuwaiti land forces. The CSTs provided two-way connectivity between the Kuwaiti battalions and CENTCOM's land component commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The bond created between Kuwaiti brigades and hundreds of SF teams during the 12 years of Iris Gold training paid huge dividends when CSTs deployed with Kuwaiti forces in December 2002 as a covering force during the defense of Kuwait. The seamless operations of the coalition forces was a direct reflection of the rapport that had been established by SF soldiers during Exercise Iris Gold and of the administrative, technical and operational continuity that has been provided to SF units by SOCCE-KU since 1997.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Joyce is commander of Special Operations Command and Control Element-Kuwait. His previous enlisted and officer assignments in Infantry and Special Forces units include service with the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), the 82nd Airborne Division, the 10th SF Group, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group and the U.S. Army Personnel Command. He was commissioned in 1987 through ROTC upon his graduation from St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas. He holds master's degrees from Syracuse University (MBA 1997) and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (MMAS 1998). Lieutenant Colonel Joyce is scheduled to assume command of a recruiting battalion during the summer of 2004.

Notes:

[1] Memorandum to SOCCENT, through the U.S. Central Command for USCENTCOM J1, dated 15 September 1997.

Special Forces Role Different in Iraq

by Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner

As Operation Iraqi Freedom tightened the noose around the outlaw regime of Saddam Hussein, U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers were busy conducting missions designed to bring fast freedom to an oppressed Iraqi citizenry.

Freeing the oppressed, in fact, is a concept close to the hearts of all Special Forces soldiers. "De oppresso liber," their regimental motto, means exactly that in Latin.

Photo by Kyle J. Cosner

A soldier from the 3rd SF Group looks down the barrel of an M-2 .50-caliber machine gun mounted on a Ground Mobility Vehicle, or GMV. The GMV is in use by SF soldiers deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Although the concept of exporting democracy through these warrior-diplomats has seen success during many conflicts — most recently in Afghanistan — the mission of U.S. special-operations forces in Iraq will most likely be different than anything seen so far during the global war on terror, said Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, commanding general of the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School and former commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

According to General Lambert, the missions for SF soldiers in Iraq were unlike those they conducted in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, where special-operations assets have been relied upon heavily as the force of choice.

During the first year of the global war on terrorism, SOF operations in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Georgia were generally unilateral in nature. The challenge for SOF in Iraq, Lambert said, was to find their niche as a support asset for larger, traditional forces on the ground.

Because the deployment of SOF in Iraq is the largest in history, Lambert said, SF soldiers have yet to conduct joint missions on a scale as large as Operation Iraqi Freedom, even though they've had experience with integration into conventional operations in the past. During the first Gulf War, SOF had a more limited role than in Iraq. "We did that integration in Afghanistan, but now we've got to go in there and get the

complete parts of the modern battlefield — precision special-operations strike forces and conventional land forces — together."

General Tommy Franks, then-commander of the U.S. Central Command, made similar remarks during a March 22 press briefing at Doha, Qatar.

"In some cases, our special-operations forces support conventional ground forces," Franks said. "Examples of this include operations behind enemy lines to attack enemy positions and formations or perhaps to secure bridges and crossing sites over rivers or perhaps to secure key installations, like the gas-oil platforms, and, of course, in some cases, to adjust air power, as we saw in Afghanistan."

"That plan gives commanders at all levels … latitude to build the mosaic … in a way that provides flexibility so that we can attack the enemy on our terms, and we are doing so," Franks said.

During a March 27 speech at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., President George W. Bush made references to "the silent warriors who were first on the ground … in Iraq."

"Many of you here today were also involved in the liberation of Afghanistan," the president said to an audience filled with personnel from the U.S. Special Operations Command headquarters. "The military demands are very different in Iraq."

"At the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Special Forces helped to secure air fields and bridges and oil fields, to clear the way for our forces and to prevent sabotage and environmental catastrophe," Bush said.

General Lambert noted that another important difference between operations in Iraq and previous missions is the immediate presence of the media, both national and international, on the ground with coalition forces as part of the Department of Defense's new media embed program. The initiative places reporters alongside military units on the front lines.

General Lambert said media reports on special-operations integration would be a valuable tool for assessing SOF success.

"It will be interesting in the open environment with the press and embedded reporters … to gather the observations from the potential upcoming battles of how the integration … has worked into the precision fires (and special-operations forces) mix," he said.

General Lambert predicted that a smaller special-operations role in Iraq could allow conventional forces and other branches of the military to share in a media spotlight that Army special-operations forces have dominated since Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001.

Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner is a journalist assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the 'Forgotten War'

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Those who are familiar with the history of Army special operations recognize the terms "OSS," "SOE," "Det 101" and "Jedburgh" — all those terms are associated with unconventional warfare, or UW, conducted during World War II.[1] Few who are familiar with the foregoing terms, however, have heard of "Donkeys," "FEC/LG," "8086 Army Unit," "8240 Army Unit," "CCRAK" and "JACK" — those terms are associated with UW during the Korean War.

Although the 50th anniversary of the Korean War has given rise to several works that examine the previously unrecognized role of partisan operations in that conflict, UW remains a little-known aspect of the Korean War.

The military legacy of the Korean War has been Task Force Smith, Inch'on, the Yalu River, the Chosin Reservoir, Heartbreak Ridge and the 38th Parallel. Yet while conventional soldiers were fighting initially for survival, and finally for re-establishment of a free South Korea, guerrillas and partisans — aided by a few American soldiers — were conducting an active UW campaign behind the lines of North Korean forces, or NK, and the Chinese Communist Forces, or CCF.[2] Although the 50th anniversary of the Korean War has given rise to several works that examine the previously unrecognized role of partisan operations in that conflict, UW remains a little-known aspect of the Korean War.

During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, provided the United States with the capability for performing UW. But three weeks after World War II ended, President Truman disbanded the OSS, and the American military capability for performing unconventional operations disappeared.[3] Not until the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency did the U.S. government formally acknowledge the need for a UW capability. National Security Council Directive 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," dated June 18, 1948, assigned to the CIA the responsibility to "conduct covert operations," including "direct action, including sabotage … assistance to underground movements … [and] guerrillas."

NSC Directive 10/2 also directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the CIA during "wartime covert operations." The Joint Chiefs implemented the military's portion of Directive 10/2 through a March 1, 1949, memorandum, "Study on Guerilla Warfare," which stated that the Army "shall be

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Dr. Kiper's article is part of a larger research project on special operations during the Korean War that he is producing for publication under contract to the USASOC Historian's Office. — Editor

Initial Attrition Section Organization



assigned primary responsibility for all other guerrilla warfare functions."[4] But not until September 1950, when Secretary of the Army Frank Pace forced the Army to activate the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare under Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, was there a branch of the Army G3 section that was responsible for UW.[5]

General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the U.S. Far Eastern Command, or FECOM, in 1950, had a long-standing antipathy toward the OSS during World War II. It is therefore not surprising that when war came to the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950, the CIA (the successor to the OSS) had only six personnel in Japan for planning and conducting UW operations.[6] The FECOM G2, Major General Charles Willoughby, had not detected any basis for conducting UW operations in Korea, although he had received unconfirmed reports of guerrilla resistance.

In fact, after United Nations forces landed at Inch'on Sept. 15, 1950, and advanced northward, Korean guerrillas rose up behind the U.N. advance and supplanted the communist North Korean government officials who had been in control since 1945. But after China entered the war, the U.N. forces were forced to withdraw from North Korea, leaving the Korean partisans in dire straits. The partisans soon withdrew to Hwanghae Province, on Korea's west coast. From there, many of them were able to flee to nearby islands; others went into hiding.

Not until FECOM's Army component, the U.S. Eighth Army, or EUSA, received a message from Navy Task Force 95.7 on Jan. 8, 1951, that there were 10,000 partisans in Hwanghae Province, were the reports of guerrilla resistance confirmed.

The intelligence regarding the existence of such a large body of partisans was passed immediately to Colonel John McGee, the officer in the EUSA G3 who was responsible for UW. One week later, EUSA created, within its G3's Miscellaneous Division, the Attrition Section, which had the responsibility for managing partisan operations. By Jan. 23, McGee had produced "Operational Plan Number One" for employing partisans in support of an anticipated U.N. counteroffensive.

McGee's plan called for the establishment of three partisan units: "William Able Base" (soon renamed Leopard), which would operate off the west coast of Korea; "Kirkland," which would operate off the east coast; and "Baker Section," which would conduct airborne operations throughout North Korea. The plan included a fourth unit, "Task Force Redwing," which was actually a company of Republic of Korea Marines that was organized for conducting raids and sabotage. All the partisan units were to be commanded by McGee's Attrition Section.[7] Thus began U.S. Army UW operations against North Korean

and Chinese-communist forces.

Immediately after McGee received the report of a potential partisan force on the islands off the west coast in January 1951, he sent Major William Burke to assess the situation and to provide the partisan force with weapons and ammunition.

Burke learned that partisans occupied five islands, with the largest group being on the island of Paengnyong-do, which is just south of the 38th Parallel. On the basis of Burke's report, McGee quickly revised Operational Plan Number One. Among the revisions was a provision that American officers would command each partisan base. The Americans would train and equip the partisan forces and deploy them in accordance with orders from EUSA.[8] After making his report, Burke quickly assembled a staff and returned to Paengnyong-do in February to establish a partisan-training program.

The partisans had organized themselves into bands whose leader was usually a prominent individual from the area. … The bands referred to themselves as 'donkeys.' Three primary theories exist for the origin of that name, none of which can be agreed upon by former partisans as* the *reason.

Burke's new mission was to prepare the partisans to conduct guerrilla operations in conjunction with a planned U.N. counterattack that would force the NK army and CCF to withdraw at least to the 39th Parallel. He moved quickly to establish training bases on Paengnyong-do, Taechong-do, Sok-to, and Cho-do.[9] By March the training bases were ready.

The partisans had organized themselves into bands whose leader was usually a prominent individual from the area that was home to that particular band. The bands referred to themselves as "donkeys." Three primary theories exist for the origin of that name, none of which can be agreed upon by former partisans as *the* reason. One theory is that the name originates from the Korean word "dong-li," which means "liberty." Another theory is that the name refers to the traits of a donkey: mean, patient and sturdy. A third theory is that the partisans thought they looked as if they were riding a donkey when they were operating the crank-driven generator for the AN/GRC-9 radio.[10] Whatever the origin, the name was a source of pride. So, too, would be their accomplishments.

'Leopard' activities

On March 3, 1951, Donkey 1, led by former merchant Chang Jae Hwa, became the first Donkey unit to return to the mainland of North Korea. Chang and 37 partisans moved to the vicinity of Sari-won and Hwang-ju to obtain information about enemy movements on the main highway leading south from P'yongyang. When the partisans returned to their island base, Chang reported 280 enemy killed and railroad and telephone links cut.[11] On March 5, Donkey 4 (known as the "White Tigers") landed on the mainland, followed by Donkey 7 on March 27, Donkey 11 on April 14, and Donkey 3 on May 27.[12] Most Donkey units had one or more American advisers, but existing records indicate that the Americans only occasionally accompanied the partisans on operations.[13]

One such operation was launched from Wollae-do, two miles off the North Korean coast, on July 13, 1952. A North Korean 76 mm gun was harassing the partisan base on Wollae-do as well as ships operating in the coastal waters. Pak Chol, leader of Donkey 4, persuaded the U.S. adviser on Paengnyong-do, 1st Lieutenant Ben Malcom, that the gun had to be eliminated. After four months of intense training, Pak, Malcom and 118 partisans boarded four junks and set sail for the mainland.

At 4:30 a.m., according to plan, the U.S. Navy began a 30-minute barrage of the objective. At 5 a.m., Donkey 4 began its attack. With Navy air support, the partisans gained the top of the bunker that housed the gun; from there, they threw grenades through the gun apertures. Eventually they forced open the door leading into the bunker. Close-quarters fighting ensued, and several partisans


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Hungnam
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SEA OF JAPAN
P'yongyang
Wonsan
Sok-to
Hwang-ju
Nam-do
Cho-do
Sariwon
Hyon-ni
Hwanghae Province
Wollae-do
Seoul
Taechong-do
Inch'on
Paengnyong-do
Korea
Nakdong River
YELLOW SEA
Pusan

were killed. Finally, Donkey 4 overcame all enemy resistance and, using C-3 explosive, its members destroyed the gun and the bunker. When Navy aircraft reported that enemy reinforcements were moving in rapidly, the partisans began a wild run to the beach. Naval gunfire was invaluable as it covered their withdrawal. Soon Pak, Malcom, the partisan force and 10 refugees reached Wollae-do.[14]

The mission was a success. Sustaining losses of six partisans killed and seven wounded, Donkey 4 had destroyed a hardened enemy position, had killed approximately 60 enemy soldiers, and had garnered an abundant haul of intelligence. Also important was the fact that the training techniques and skills of the partisan advisers had been proven effective. By accompanying the raiders, Malcom had gained great "face" with the Koreans. The raid also demonstrated that the North Koreans were not invulnerable.[15]

'Baker' activities

Although the CIA had begun parachuting agents into North Korea shortly after the war began, Baker Section did not conduct its first airborne operation until March 15, 1951.[16] That night, the Special Air Mission Detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron dropped four Americans and 20 Koreans near Hyon-ni, 30 miles inland from the Sea of Japan, where the partisans were to destroy railroad tunnels.

Two of the Rangers involved in Operation Virginia, Edward Pucel (2nd from left) and William Miles, are received on board the USS St. Paul *following their rescue by helicopter. Miles had been shot in the left side of his face.*

National Archives

The Americans — three corporals and one private first class — were from the 4th Ranger Company and had volunteered for a classified mission.

The mission, code-named Operation Virginia, was a disaster. The team missed the drop zone, and a blizzard delayed the team's arrival at its primary objective. Finding that tunnel to be too heavily defended, the team slowly moved east to attack another tunnel. After the attack, because of heavy cloud cover and cold so severe that it caused the team's radio batteries not to function, the team was unable to contact friendly units for two weeks.

When the team was able to make radio contact, the Navy dispatched three helicopters to rescue the team. One helicopter was shot down as it approached the pick-up zone. The remaining two helicopters managed to hoist three Americans out, but heavy enemy fire prevented any further evacuations. The pilot of the downed helicopter, the remaining Ranger and seven Koreans escaped the site. The two Americans were captured after they had evaded the enemy for 10 days. They would not be released until Sept. 6, 1953. Five of the seven Korean partisans returned to friendly lines on foot.

By the end of the war, Baker Section had conducted 19 airborne operations, involving 389 partisans. Including the five partisans who returned from Operation Virginia, only 10 of the 389 partisans returned. Two advisers were never heard from. Tangible results of airborne insertions made by Baker Section are nil. A 1956 study concluded: "These decisions to use partisans against enemy supply routes in airborne operations appears to have been futile and callous."[17]

'Kirkland' activities

Kirkland, the third partisan force, was organized in April 1951. Jurisdictional disputes between the Army and the CIA led to Kirkland's area of operations being limited to the area from Wonsan south. The CIA conducted all operations north of Wonsan. McGee transferred 1st Lieutenant William S. Harrison from Donkey 4 to command Kirkland. Initially, one other U.S. officer and two U.S. enlisted soldiers assisted Harrison. Based on the island of Nam-do, Kirkland had the initial mission, as did Leopard, of supporting a major U.N. counteroffensive.

When the U.N. did not mount the counteroffensive, Kirkland's mission changed to conducting coastal raids, collecting intelligence, and identifying targets for Navy air operations and naval gunfire. The scarcity of islands off Korea's eastern coast forced Kirkland to become a secondary partisan operation. During the war, slightly more than 1 percent of the partisan operations occurred along the east coast. By January 1952, only 11 Americans and 195 partisans had been assigned to Kirkland's region. Seventeen months later, Kirkland's personnel strength peaked at 4,844 partisans and 32 American advisers. Soon afterward, an increase in the number of enemy troops along the east coast and the pending armistice led the U.N. to evacuate the partisans to islands lying south of the 38th Parallel.[18]

The mission, code-named Operation Virginia, was a disaster. The team missed the drop zone, and a blizzard delayed the team's arrival at its primary objective. … After the attack, because of heavy cloud cover and cold so severe that it caused the team's radio batteries not to function, the team was unable to contact friendly units for two weeks.

Reorganizations

At the same time the Army's UW operations began, there also began a bewildering series of command changes, reorganizations and redesignations, as FECOM sought to establish the responsibility for UW. Fortunately for the Americans who worked closely with the partisan groups, the successive UW reorganizations had little direct impact on partisan operations.

Although the Attrition Section was established in January 1951 as part of the FECOM G3's Miscellaneous Division, which was an operational organization, the Attrition Section

Final Unconventional Warfare Organization



received its operational guidance from the FECOM G2, through a sub-section known as the Far East Command/Liaison Group, or FEC/LG. On April 11, 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway replaced MacArthur as commander of FECOM, and Lieutenant General James Van Fleet replaced Ridgway at EUSA. On May 5, Van Fleet redesignated the Attrition Section as the Miscellaneous Group, 8086 Army Unit, or 8086 AU, "to develop and direct partisan warfare."[19] Partisan operations were now the responsibility of an Army *unit*, not of a staff section.

On July 26, Ridgway designated the FEC/LG as FEC/LG, 8240 Army Unit. He also activated the Far East Command/Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240 Army Unit, or FEC/LD (K). Initially FEC/LD (K) was responsible only for intelligence-gathering; partisan operations remained the responsibility of EUSA's 8086 AU.[20]

That arrangement changed dramatically on Dec. 10, when, in an attempt to resolve jurisdictional disputes and to deconflict ongoing UW operations, FECOM created another organization — the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea, 8240 Army Unit, or CCRAK. CCRAK, under the command of FEC/LG,[21] assumed total control of all partisan operations. Although FEC/LG was based in Tokyo, CCRAK was to be based in Seoul. While EUSA retained some staff, administrative and logistics functions for supporting guerrilla operations, all covert activities were to be the responsibility of one command at the theater level, at least on paper.[22] EUSA abolished the 8086 AU, but several of 8086 AU's functions were taken over by FEC/LD (K). FEC/LD (K), which remained under the operational control of the FECOM G2, now had two sections — an intelligence section and a guerrilla section that controlled partisan operations.

The reason why there were jurisdictional disputes and conflicting UW operations was that while the U.S. Army had been establishing a structure for managing partisan operations, the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had been doing the same. In July 1950, one month after North Korea invaded South Korea, Hans Tofte, an OSS veteran, had arrived at CIA headquarters in Tokyo to take charge of the agency's covert operations in Korea in accordance with NSC Directive 10/2. Tofte began to recruit, train and insert agents who would gather intelligence behind enemy lines. In July 1951, the CIA created an operational arm known as the Joint Advisory Commission-Korea, or JACK, for inserting agents.

In early 1951, the Air Force had created Special Activities Unit Number One, one of whose missions was to conduct guerrilla operations, but in March 1951, that portion of the unit's mission had been deleted. The Air Force allowed the CIA to use the Special Air Mission Detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron and aircraft from the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing for parachuting agents into North Korea. The Air Force also operated a fleet of boats for inserting agents into the north.[23]

At one time, therefore, three autonomous agencies were planning and conducting guerrilla operations in Korea, with no centralized control. After the Air Force relinquished any pretense of advising guerrillas in March 1951, the major issue over the control of UW was between the Army and the CIA. Coordination between the two agencies was not improved by the bitterness that resounded between Tofte and FECOM G2's Willoughby.[24]

When Ridgway directed FECOM to create CCRAK, he determined that, in order to enhance coordination and reduce conflict, the commander would be an Army officer, and the deputy commander would be a member of the CIA. Unfortunately, while the CIA's JACK came under the operational control of CCRAK, the orders that created CCRAK did not place JACK under CCRAK's *command*. Furthermore, CIA officers in Korea had no confidence in the ability of the FECOM G2 staff to command operations. So while the creation of CCRAK appeared to alleviate the bureaucratic bickering between the Army and the CIA, the reality was otherwise.[25]

By early 1952, it became apparent to the partisans, who had believed that they would support a U.N. counteroffensive, that they existed only for providing intelligence. Their perception changed on Oct. 1, 1952, when the U.S. activated U.S. Army Forces Far East, or AFFE, as the theater Army-component command. General Mark Clark, who had replaced Ridgway as FECOM commander, then removed CCRAK from the jurisdiction of FEC/LG, renamed it Army Unit 8242, placed it directly under AFFE, and gave it operational control of FEC/LD (K). FEC/LG remained a part of FECOM G2 but would provide administrative and logistics support to CCRAK. Simultaneously, Clark directed that partisan strength be increased from 10,000 men to 20,000 by March 1953 and to 40,000 by July 15, 1953. On May 10, 1953, FEC/LD (K) OPLAN Partisan Operations (K), Phase IIA, directed that partisan activity be increased. FECOM also began drafting plans for a general offensive.[26]

At one time, therefore, three autonomous agencies were planning and conducting guerrilla operations in Korea, with no centralized control. After the Air Force relinquished any pretense of advising guerrillas in March 1951, the major issue over the control of UW was between the Army and the CIA.

Another organizational change occurred on Nov. 21, 1952, when the guerrilla section of FEC/LD (K) became United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, or UNPFK. Of the guerrilla section's partisan units, Leopard, Wolfpack (which had been created Jan. 1, 1952, by taking part of Leopard) and Scannon (renamed from Kirkland in September 1952) became partisan infantry regiments. Baker Section became the 1st Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment. In December 1952, in a major shift of responsibility for guerrilla operations, Clark ordered that FEC/LG become a sup-

National Archives

Korean partisan infantry soldiers receive training on American weapons. Partisan forces had no schools for tactics; they learned those through experience.

port element for partisan operations, and that the operations themselves be returned to the control of EUSA.[27]

In April 1953, FECOM formed two additional partisan infantry regiments. On Aug. 16, 1953, FECOM, in cooperation with the government of the Republic of Korea, or ROK, established the 8250 ROK Army Unit to provide administrative support to partisans. The last UW organizational change occurred in the fall of 1953. On Sept. 23, UNPFK became United Nations Partisan Infantry-Korea, or UNPIK. CCRAK was abolished and re-established in Japan as the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East, 8177 Army Unit, or CCRAFE. Simultaneously, AFFE activated the AFFE Coordinating Detachment, 8078 Army Unit, in Korea to represent AFFE's UW interests.[28]

Belated doctrine

These organizational changes and shifts in responsibility for UW occurred during less than three years. Bureaucratic rivalries contributed significantly to the constantly changing landscape of lines and boxes on organization charts. Much of the flux also resulted from the lack of Army doctrine for implementing NSC Directive 10/2. To remedy the lack of doctrine, the Army began drafting two manuals. FM 31-20, *Operations Against Guerilla Forces*, acquainted commanders with the "organization and tactics of guerillas" and provided "a guide for combating and destroying guerillas." FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare*, addressed "organizing, training, commanding, and exploiting guerilla forces in war." Unfortunately, neither manual was published until 1951, and FM 31-21 was not published until October of that year.[29]

Retired Colonel Ben Malcom, who was the adviser for Donkey 4, made clear how the lack of doctrinal guidance affected those who were charged with executing the mission: "We were sent to conduct partisan operations with no knowledge of the history of these operations and no training in how best to implement them." He continued: "To my knowledge not a

single copy of FM 31-21 ever filtered down to the operational level."[30] The officers and enlisted men who were detailed to advise the partisan groups were on their own.

The only doctrine available to partisans prior to the arrival of the Americans in January 1951 was the principle of surprise. Although the principle was not codified, as partisan leader Pak Chol stated, "Surprise is the whole of guerrilla warfare." Pak and other leaders knew that, because they lacked training and equipment, they could not stand against regular army units. All their operations had to be planned for striking the enemy when they would be least expected. No school prepared the partisans with studies of tactics; they learned from experience. "We guerrillas had no theory, but we had experience," said Pak. "In the experience we found the theory."[31] But experience is of little use without transportation, communications, weapons, ammunition and training.

Compounding the problems resulting from the lack of both doctrine and in-place organizations was the fact, as retired Colonel Al Paddock put it, that the Army's "unconventional warfare capability was nonexistent."[32] After World War II, soldiers with UW experience who remained in the Army had been assigned to conventional units. The burden of providing trainers for the growing partisan force fell to McGee and his replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Jay Vanderpool (who had World War II experience with Filipino guerrillas), and soldiers such as 1st Lieutenant William S. Harrison (who had advised a South Korean guerrilla battalion), and a few Rangers who had been recruited when the Army disbanded all its Ranger companies in August 1951.

Competing with the Army for the few available soldiers who had OSS experience was the CIA, which recruited officers such as Major John K. Singlaub, who had served with the OSS in France and in China. The shortage of experienced personnel was the reason that infantry officers, such as Malcom, who had no language skills, no UW experience, and no training to prepare them, were pressed into the role of UW adviser.[33]

Conclusions

What are we to make of the UW campaign of the Korean War? Did its operations have a material effect on the war? Between March 1951 and the armistice on July 27, 1953, partisans reported 4,445 combat actions and 69,084 enemy casualties. While these figures are impressive, they cannot be verified. Furthermore, because the CCF had an almost inexhaustible pool of manpower, the number of casualties inflicted by the partisans had virtually no effect on the war's outcome. The UW campaign's airborne operations, other than those the CIA conducted for gathering intelligence, were complete failures. Until the beginning of truce talks, partisan activity did tie down enemy forces. Once the lines stabilized, however, the CCF and NK were able to shift their forces to the coastal areas. The subsequent overwhelming number of enemy soldiers in the coastal areas rendered any partisan activity inconsequential.[34]

The operational ineffectiveness of partisan operations can be blamed on a number of factors:

- The lack of experienced guerrilla-warfare personnel in the U.S. Army as a whole.
- The inability of the Army and the CIA to work together consistently toward a common goal.
- The lack of understanding at FECOM of what partisans could do.
- The lack of U.S. doctrine on unconventional warfare.

The results of those shortcomings were:

- Haphazard mechanisms for identifying soldiers who had OSS experience.
- The assignment of soldiers to a foreign culture for which they had no understanding.
- A lack of training — other than basic infantry training — that would prepare American soldiers for organizing and training partisan forces.
- A constantly changing command structure that only confused UW

responsibilities.

- A rotation policy that allowed soldiers who were gaining in-theater UW experience to leave just when they were becoming most effective.

Not until Nov. 14, 1986, when the U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act, were many of the problems identified above resolved.[35] Nevertheless, the little-known story of UW during the Korean War and the courage of the Korean partisans, guerrillas and their American advisers remains a notable chapter in the history of Army special operations.

Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Kansas. He served as an officer in Special Forces, airborne and Infantry units, served on the Army Staff, and was an instructor at West Point and at the Army Command and General Staff College. He earned his Combat Infantryman Badge and Purple Heart in Vietnam, where he served as an Infantry company commander and in the 5th Special Forces Group. He is the author of Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform*, which received the Fletcher Pratt Award for best nonfiction Civil War book in 1999. He also edited* Dear Catharine, Dear Taylor: The Civil War Letters of a Union Soldier and His Wife*, which was published in 2002. He co-authored* Weapon of Choice: Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, to be published in 2003. Dr. Kiper teaches history at Kansas City Kansas Community College.*

Notes:

[1] The Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was responsible for conducting UW, both in Europe and in the Pacific. The Special Operations Executive, or SOE, was the British equivalent of the OSS. Detachment 101 conducted guerrilla operations for the OSS in Burma. Jedburgh teams coordinated French resistance operations in support of Allied ground operations.

[2] The *Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms* for 1950 defines partisan warfare as "activity carried on against an enemy by people who are devoted adherents to a cause, but who are not members of organized and recognized military forces." The *Dictionary* defines guerrilla warfare as "operations carried on by small independent forces generally in the rear of an enemy." The *Dictionary* does not define either "unconventional warfare" or "special operations." In practice, guerrilla and partisan often were used interchangeably.

[3] The same is true for Ranger and psychological-warfare capabilities.

[4] NSC 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," http://www.state.gov//www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html; "Memorandum for the Record: Study on Guerrilla Warfare," 1 March 1949, National Archive Record Group 319.

[5] Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 68, 93.

[6] Richard J. Aldrich, et al., eds., *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 22-23; John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986), 68.

[7] Message, CTG 95.7, to Eighth U.S. Army Korea, 080135Z Jan 51; Rod Paschall, "Special Operations in Korea," *Conflict* 7 (1987):158; Frederick W. Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951–1954* (Chevy Chase, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, 1956), 30, 32, 39; Ben Malcom, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea* (Washington: Brassey's, 1996), 19. During World War II, McGee had been captured by the Japanese in the Philippines, had later escaped, and had then fought with Filipino guerrillas.

[8] Ed Evanhoe, *Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 38, 40.

[9] William Breuer, *Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 161; Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 32.

[10] Evanhoe, *Dark Moon*, 41; AFFE MHD 8086 AU, *UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict*, 21, 94; Malcom, *White Tigers*, 56. Former Donkey 13 leader Kim Chang Song provides the generator version as the reason for the name "donkey."

[11] Breuer, *Shadow Warriors*, 161; Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 32; AFFE MHD 8086 AU, *UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict*, 47. Although Donkey 1 was the first partisan unit to be inserted behind enemy lines, the CIA had been inserting agents. In Operation Bluebell, the CIA inserted stay-behind agents whose mission was to gather intelligence, not to conduct combat operations. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA in Korea, 1946-1965* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1973), 1:100, 3:97; Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 69. The Tactical Liaison Office, a section of FEC/LG, recruited agents as line-crossers to gather intelligence immediately behind enemy lines. The 25-man Korean teams, usually controlled by one American officer and two enlisted men, were attached to each front-line U.S. division. Garth Stevens, et al., *Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor* (Fort Knox, Ky.: The Armor School, 1952), 1:19.

[12] AFFE MHD 8086 AU, *UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict*, 47, 77, 99, 101, 117, 119.

[13] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 13.
[14] Malcom, *White Tigers*, 83-107.
[15] Malcom, *White Tigers*, 106-07.
[16] The code name for clandestine airborne operations was Aviary. Douglas C. Dillard, *Operation Aviary: Airborne Special Operations-Korea 1950-1953* (Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2003), 4.
[17] The first insertion of an intelligence team by the CIA was on 9 December 1950. Stevens, et al., *Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor*, 1:10; Evanhoe, *Dark Moon*, 50-51; Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 85; John W. Thornton, *Believed to Be Alive* (Middlebury, Vt.: Paul S. Eriksson, 1981), 70-80, 100, 255; Michael E. Haas, *Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations During the Cold War* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 44; Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 52, 94; Lawrence V. Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1964), 146-49. Some sources say 19 partisans went on Operation Virginia.
[18] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 32, 41, 82, 114, 117, 132, 158. In July 1951, 1st Lieutenant Joseph Ulatoski replaced Harrison as commander of Kirkland Forward when Harrison returned to the United States. Major A.J. Coccumelli became commander of the entire Kirkland area of operations.
[19] Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Table of Distribution 80-8086, Miscellaneous Group, 8086 Army Unit, undated, Record Group 319, National Archives, as quoted in Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 104.
[20] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 34-37.
[21] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 37-39.
[22] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 39.
[23] Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, 73-74, 77-78. The 581st also had H-19 helicopters that were used to insert agents. B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadron eventually assumed the UW support missions of the Special Air Mission Detachment. Haas, *Apollo's Warriors*, 66-75.
[24] "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273; Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000), ix, 40, 177-79; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 106.
[25] Malcom, *White Tigers*, 27; Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 41-42.
[26] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 62-64, 66, 156, 162-65.
[27] Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 42; Headquarters and Service Command, FEC, General Order 21, 3 October 1952; Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 67-68, 155-56; "United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, 8240th AU (FEC/LD) Partisan Operations," http://www.korean-war.com/SpecOpsRosters/UNPIKPART.htm.
[28] Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 112, 157; Harry G. Summers, *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 112.
[29] Field Manual 31-20, *Operations Against Guerilla Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 1951), 1; FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1951), 1.
[30] Malcom, *White Tigers*, 40-41.
[31] Armed Forces Far East Military History Detachment 8086 Army Unit, *UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 1951–1952: A Study of Their Characteristics and Operations* (Tokyo: 8086 Army Unit, 1954), 66-67.
[32] Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 65.
[33] Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 37, 62-63, 65.
[34] Stevens, et al., *Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor*, 1:13; Cleaver, et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 16. In 1985, retired Colonel Glenn Muggleberg, former commander of U.N. Partisan Infantry Korea, commented on the partisan reports. "The partisan reports were about as accurate as our own," he said. U.S. Army Military History Institute Oral History Project 85-S, 15 November 1985.
[35] Public Law 99-661 created the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict), established the unified United States Special Operations Command, and dramatically increased funding for special operations. On Dec. 1, 1989, the Army activated the Army Special Operations Command as a major Army command that would command all Army special-operations forces in the continental United States and train all Army special-operations soldiers.

Special Forces Soldier Receives Silver Star for Afghanistan Combat

by Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner

A soldier from the 5th Special Forces Group received the Army's third highest award for valor in June for his actions during a January 2002 raid on a suspected al-Qaeda stronghold in Afghanistan.

Master Sergeant Anthony S. Pryor, a team sergeant with Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, received the Silver Star Medal for his gallantry in combat. During the raid, he single-handedly eliminated four enemy soldiers, one in unarmed combat, all while he was under intense automatic weapons fire and suffering from a crippling injury.

Photo by Kyle Cosner

Master Sergeant Anthony S. Pryor receives the Silver Star Medal from Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger Jr., commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

"Receiving this award is overwhelming, but … this isn't a story about one guy," Pryor said of the events that led to his Silver Star. "It's a story about the whole company. … If the guys hadn't done what they were supposed to do, (the mission) would've been a huge failure."

"I just did what I had to do," he said, recalling his hand-to-hand struggle against the suspected terrorists. "It wasn't a heroic act — it was second-nature. I won, and I moved forward."

During the ceremony, Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, then-commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, said that Pryor was a perfect example of the SF mentality.

"About a year ago … I said to Tony, 'What did you think when that fellow knocked your night-vision goggles off, pulled your arm out of its socket and was twisting it, all while you were fighting with your other hand?' " Lambert said. "And (Pryor) said, 'It's show time.' He must have meant what he said, because he earned that Silver Star. Think about a cold, black night; think about fighting four guys at the same time, and somebody jumps on your back and starts beating you with a board. Think about the problems you'd have to solve — and he did."

"This is the singular hand-to-hand combat story that I have heard from this war," Lambert added. "When it came time to play, he played, and he did it right."

On Jan. 23, 2002, Pryor's company received an order from the U.S. Central

Command to conduct its fourth combat mission of the war — a sensitive site exploitation of two compounds suspected of harboring Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan.

Because of the presence of women and children within the compounds, Pryor said, aerial bombardment was not an option. Once on the ground, the company was to search for key leadership, communications equipment, maps and other intelligence.

Sergeant First Class Scott Neil, an SF weapons sergeant, was one of Pryor's team members that night. He found himself momentarily pinned down by a sudden hail of bullets after the team's position had been compromised.

"After the initial burst of automatic weapons fire, we returned fire in the breezeway," Neil said. "After we heard the words 'Let's go,' everything just kind of kicked in."

Moments later, though, the team became separated in the confusion, but with the situation desperate for the SF soldiers against a determined and larger-than-expected enemy force, Pryor and one of his teammates kept moving forward, room to room. They began entering a room together, but another enemy soldier outside the room distracted Pryor's team member, who stayed outside the room to return fire.

Pryor first encountered an enemy soldier who charged out of the room; he assisted in eliminating him. Then, without hesitating, Pryor moved into the room. There he found two enemy soldiers at the back of the room firing their weapons at his comrades who were still outside the compound.

"I went in, and there were some windows that they were trying to get their guns out of to shoot at our guys that hadn't caught up yet," Pryor said. "So I went from left to right, indexed down and shot those guys up. I realized that I was well into halfway through my magazine, so I started to change magazines. Then I felt something behind me, and thought it was (one of my teammates) — that's when things started going downhill."

Pryor said it was an enemy soldier, a larger-than-normal Afghan, who had sneaked up on him. "There was a guy behind me, and he whopped me on the shoulder with something and crumpled me down." Pryor would later learn that he had sustained a broken clavicle and a dislocat-

ARSOF Soldiers Earn Silver Stars for Actions in Iraq

Five soldiers from Army special-operations units have recently been awarded the nation's third-highest medal for valor in wartime as a result of their actions during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Chief Warrant Officer Donald Tabron, Master Sergeant Patrick M. Quinn, Staff Sergeant Jason D. Brown, Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Adamec and Corporal Jeremiah C. Olsen have been awarded the Silver Star Medal. Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker awarded the medals to Tabron, Quinn and Adamec Sept. 10 in Washington, D.C. Brown and Olsen were awarded the medal at their home stations.

Tabron is a MH-47E Chinook pilot assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Quinn is a Special Forces team sergeant in Company A, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group. Brown is assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group. Adamec is an SF weapons sergeant in Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group. Olsen is assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Interviewed following the ceremony, Quinn and Adamec said that the Silver Star medals they received were about what their units did during the war. "Every unit functions as a team on some level," said Adamec. "Most of the awards people get … (are) not just about them, (they are) a direct reflection on the abilities of the people around them to do their job."

"To me, it's a tribute to everything that my (detachment) did during our fighting in Iraq," Quinn said. Quinn was awarded the medal for leading his team and a group of Kurdish militia during a battle with an Iraqi armored unit April 2-5. During the battle, Quinn's actions resulted in the destruction of two tanks and four armored personnel carriers, the killing of 30 Iraqi soldiers and the seizure of 30 kilometers of ground. Adamec destroyed four Iraqi armored personnel carriers and one enemy position with Javelin anti-tank missiles, while under fire, when his team attacked a fortified ridgeline in northern Iraq. His actions helped secure an intersection linking Mosul and Kirkuk, Iraq. Details of Tabron's, Brown's and Olson's actions were not available.

Quinn and Adamec want the American public to understand that good things are happening every day in Iraq. "There are a ton of amazing soldiers in the Army and they're doing amazing things every day," Quinn said, "and a lot of that story's not getting out." — *Specialist Bill Putnam, Army News Service*

ed shoulder during the attack.

"Then he jumped up on my back, broke my night-vision goggles off and starting getting his fingers in my eyeballs. I pulled him over, and when I hit the ground, it popped my shoulder back in," Pryor said. When he stood up, he was face-to-face with his attacker. Pryor eliminated the man during their hand-to-hand struggle.

Pryor had now put down four enemy soldiers, but the fight wasn't over yet. "I was feeling around in the dark for my night-vision goggles, and that's when the guys I'd already killed decided that they weren't dead yet."

Pryor said that it was then a race to see who could get their weapons first, and the enemy soldiers lost. He left the room and rejoined the firefight outside. When the battle ended, 21 enemy soldiers had been killed. There were no American deaths, and Pryor was the only soldier injured.

The announcement of the award and the circumstances surrounding it shifted an intense public focus onto Pryor, who took every opportunity to shift that focus from himself onto his team's efforts in the successful raid.

"Tony is getting a Silver Star because he entered a room by himself, and he engaged the enemy by himself," said Sergeant First Class James Hogg, an SF medical sergeant on Pryor's team. "He elevated his pure soldier instinct and went to the next level, and that's what this award is recognizing. He didn't stop after his initial battle, and continued to lead."

Leading his soldiers, despite his injuries, is something Neil said that Pryor couldn't seem to stop doing. "As soon as he left that room, he came running up to me and wanted to know if everybody was okay," Neil said. "He never mentioned anything about what went on … and during the whole objective and as the firefight continued, he never stopped. He was always mission-first, and that's what his Silver Star is all about."

Pryor is the third SF soldier to receive the Silver Star Medal for actions during Operation Enduring Freedom. The other two, Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis and Sergeant First Class Daniel Petithory, also of the 5th SF Group, received their Silver Stars posthumously.

Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner is a journalist assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Nepal establishing new special-operations unit

A new battalion-sized Nepalese special-operations unit — termed a ranger unit — will be subordinate to the Royal Nepalese Army. According to media reports, the 1,000-man airborne-qualified battalion is being trained to conduct "commando" style missions, especially counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations, and operations against armed criminal groups, such as drug traffickers. The unit is expected to be the beneficiary of foreign training, drawing on the earlier elite-force traditions of British, Israeli and U.S. special-operations units.

Russians discuss logistics support to special-ops units in Chechnya

A March 2003 interview with Russia's Rear Services Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD Internal Troops, highlighted logistics support for MVD special-operations forces in Chechnya. The interview principally discussed logistics support for the five deployed battalions of the 46th Separate Brigade of Operational Designation, as well as for the expanding MVD special operations, or Spetsnaz, detachments deployed in the region. Support of the Spetsnaz components is said to have challenged the rear-services system because of the need for nonstandard clothing, rations and equipment items that, in some cases, had to be designed and manufactured. The MVD elements collectively are tasked to locate and kill Chechen insurgents, to conduct reconnaissance, and to perform a range of law-enforcement and other "special operations" missions. Russian has placed emphasis on establishing infrastructure for MVD troops, and plans call for new barracks and medical and equipment-maintenance facilities at basing areas.

Mexico increases internal and external security

Mexican President Vicente Fox has called for increased security measures in Mexico's border areas, around sensitive strategic facilities, and around transportation and energy infrastructure. The measures will involve the Mexican army and navy, as well as other national and regional law-enforcement agencies. To prepare for the stepped-up security, the Mexican navy conducted an exercise in the Gulf of Mexico in early March. The exercise featured surface combatants, aviation and marine (naval infantry) elements. Mexico's southern border is also receiving substantial attention. Mexican security forces, including the army, naval special-operations forces and Beta Group immigration components, are concerned about the large number of illegal border-crossers entering the southern state of Chiapas. Most of the illegals are Central Americans, but others are Asians, Arabs or South Americans. Mexico is concerned over the potential of terrorists and insurgents being introduced into Mexico, although drug traffickers, arms dealers and other contraband smugglers represent a more common problem. While Mexico's porous border is not a new problem, the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have added new urgency to Mexico's efforts to reinforce control measures.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., who recently retired from the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Enlisted Career Notes

SF IAP exceeding expectations

The realities of SF manpower requirements and an analysis of the available in-service recruiting base have prompted the Special Forces proponent to take several initiatives aimed at filling and sustaining CMF 18. One of those is the Special Forces Initial Accessions Program, or IAP. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command began recruiting for IAP in January 2001. A soldier can enlist in the Army as an "18X" and attend Infantry one-station unit training, or OSUT, and airborne training at Fort Benning, Ga. He will then make a permanent-change-of-station move to Fort Bragg to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, and the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, as an SF weapons sergeant or SF engineer sergeant. Training for 18X soldiers is two years long. Those who make it through SFAS, the SFQC, language training and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course, or SERE, will be promoted to sergeant.

The quality of the IAP recruits is impressive. A demographic snapshot of the 18X soldiers shows that they have an average GT score of 121, that their average age is 21.5, and that 50 percent have attended college (18 percent are college graduates). The Army has developed the following IAP requirements in order to identify the highest-quality recruits:

- Be at least 18 years old but under 30 at the start of OSUT.
- Be qualified for and volunteer for airborne training.
- Be a U.S. citizen.
- Attain a minimum GT score of 110 and a minimum CO score of 98.
- Possess a high-school diploma.
- Be eligible for a secret clearance.
- Take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or the Defense Language Proficiency Test within 30 days of entering the program.
- Score at least 229 on the Army Physical Fitness Test, with at least 60 points on each event.

So far, the 18Xs have exceeded expectations. 18X soldiers are just beginning to complete the SFQC, language training and SERE. Six have reported for duty on SF A-detachments, and approximately 150 more are scheduled to arrive in FY 2004. To date, more than 1,300 18X soldiers have begun OSUT, more than 800 have arrived at Fort Bragg, nearly 400 have completed SFAS, and nearly 300 are attending the SFQC. Eventually, SF detachments will average receiving a new 18X every 8-12 months.

SF detachments in the field will perform a thorough qualitative assessment of the 18X population in approximately one year. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will continually evaluate the 18X IAP recruiting mission and make adjustments relative to the 18Xs' success in SF training and feedback from the force. The 18X recruiting mission for FY 2004 is to recruit 1,500. Probably fewer than 400 of those will ultimately complete SF training. For additional information, telephone Master Sergeant Larry P. Deel at DSN 432-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army designates chief warrant of MOS 180A

The Army has approved the designation of Chief Warrant of the Branch for MOS 180A, Special Forces Warrant Officer. The duties of the position have been incorporated within the duties and responsibilities of the position of the SF warrant officer proponent manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The new SF warrant officer proponent manager is CWO 5 William McPherson, who has replaced CWO 5 Walt Edwards. CWO 5 Edwards has retired after more than 30 years' service. He has been the driving force in the advancement of MOS 180A at the tactical and operational levels, and he will be missed. CWO 5 McPherson, most recently assigned to the 10th SF Group, has more than 27 years of SF experience. He may be reached at DSN 239-9002/1879 or commercial (910) 432-9002/1879, or send e-mail to: mcphersw@soc.mil.

FA 39 2003 LTC selection rate under OPCF average

The overall 2003 FA 39 selection rate for promotion to lieutenant colonel was slightly below the average rate for the operations career field, or OPCF. An examination of the promotion rates for PSYOP and CA officers within FA 39 shows that if three more PSYOP officers had been selected, the PSYOP selection rate would have matched the OP CF average. If one more CA officer had been selected, the CA selection rate would have been above the OP CF average. This year's eligible FA 39 officers had six more months of branch-qualification time than last year's group (27 months vs. 21 months). They also had an average of 10 more months of FA 39 utilization time, because of their early career-field designation as FA 39 officers. For additional information, contact Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

Only YG 2001 officers may apply for 2004 SF accession board

SF officer management has matured to the point that SF is now recruiting and accessing officers strictly by year-groups, so that it can properly manage the strength of each year-group and ensure that all officers compete for accession on an equal basis. The commander of the Special Warfare Center and School recently signed a policy change that prohibits officers outside the targeted year-group from applying for SF training. The FY 2004 SF accession board, which will meet in April 2004, will consider officers in year-group 2001 only. Interested officers should apply by January 2004 if they hope to be considered. Officers who fail to submit their packets in time, for any reason, will be ineligible. Officers are responsible for ensuring the completeness and accuracy of their initial packets. Officers will no longer be allowed to submit appeals packets to the SF proponent. For assistance or further information, visit the SF Branch Web page at PERSCOM Online (www.perscomonline.army.mil) or contact the SF Recruiting Office at DSN 239-1818 or commercial (910) 432-1818.

Update

SWCS welcomes new commander

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School welcomed a new commander and saw its former leader promoted to lieutenant general during ceremonies held July 16.

Major General William G. Boykin relinquished command of the special-operations training center to Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert. Immediately following the change of command ceremony, Boykin received his third star.

Lambert, a 30-year Army veteran and an SF officer for most of his career, was formerly commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Lambert's other assignments include rifle platoon leader and assistant operations officer, 75th Infantry (Ranger); battalion commander, 7th SF Group; commander, 10th SF Group; commander, Special Operations Command-Europe; and director, Center for Operations, Plans and Policy, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Boykin is now Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Special Warfare Museum displays GWOT artifacts

An exhibit featuring artifacts from the global war on terrorism opened Aug. 21 at the JFK Special Warfare Museum.

The exhibit is a work in progress that allows visitors to see how recent special-operations missions are becoming milestones in history. "It is an educational tool, not only for those who are going to go into those theaters, but also for those who have come out of (them)," said Roxanne M. Merritt, museum director and curator.

Photo by Jennifer Eidson

Items on display in the new global war on terrorism exhibit at the Special Warfare Museum.

The display contains items, mostly from Operation Enduring Freedom, that were donated by different SF groups. "We also have two items that are from the World Trade Center," Merritt said.

While the museum is limited by space, Merritt said it is looking to expand the exhibit as operations continue. "We are looking for things that are representative of people's participation, whether it is in OEF, OIF or in the Philippines. We want to be able to show the best-rounded picture of SOF's involvement."

Because the display is growing and receiving contributions from Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, the artifacts will eventually spill over into a different room in the museum. "We are starting to get items that deal primarily with the other SOF units," Merritt said. "We want to make sure they get equal coverage."

The museum is open from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m., Tuesday through Sunday, and closed Mondays. For more information, telephone the JFK Museum at DSN 239-1533 or commercial (910) 432-1533. — *Specialist Jennifer Eidson, USASOC PAO*

4th POG opens SOF media operations complex

The 4th Psychological Operations Group has opened a new facility at Fort Bragg that brings all the group's media elements under the same roof.

The Special Operations Forces Media Operations Complex opened June 30. Colonel James Treadwell, then-commander of the 4th PSYOP Group, said the 51,756 square-foot facility cost $8.1 million and will receive additional equipment worth about the same amount over the next few years.

"This complex, coupled with new equipment that is scheduled for purchase during the next several years ... marks PSYOP as a growth field — one that is becoming more important in the achievement of the national goals and objectives," Treadwell said.

"This complex consolidates the heavy print facility, the media production facility, production distribution facility, electronics maintenance shop and the maintenance support team of the 3rd Psychologi-

cal Operations Battalion under one roof," Treadwell said.

Without the hard work of past and current PSYOP specialists, the complex would not have been possible, Treadwell said. "These new facilities are a tribute to the success of previous psychological-operations soldiers, as they proved the value of PSYOP as a combat multiplier and a peacetime contributor," he said. "The commitment of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to build these facilities for us recognizes the great potential for psychological operations in all future military operations."

Special Forces Command changes hands

Brigadier General Gary M. Jones assumed command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command Sept. 15 from the deputy commanding general and acting commander, Brigadier General David P. Burford.

Jones was formerly commander of the Special Operations Command-Europe. Since completing the SF Qualification Course in 1982, he has held a number of leadership positions within the special-operations community.

"Jones is the right man … to take over the command," said Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger Jr., commanding general of the U. S. Army Special Operations Command. "He is the epitome of the special-operations soldier — a skilled, combat-experienced soldier. … He is a leader who will take this highly trained group of Special Forces soldiers where our nation most needs them."

With the high demand on SF soldiers to support the global war on terrorism, Jones said, SF soldiers must continue to evolve with the requirements of their mission and maintain high standards of readiness. "The hallmark of Special Forces is that we are always open to change and out-of-the-box thinking," Jones said.

SWCS honors instructors of the year

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School named its instructors of the year Aug. 14.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, SWCS commanding general, presented Army Achievement Medals and congratulatory letters to the top officer, NCO and civilian instructor.

The officer instructor is Major Jesse McIntyre III. McIntyre, assigned to Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, teaches in the Psychological Operations Officer Course.

The NCO instructor is Sergeant First Class Kelly S. Foster. Foster, assigned to the SWCS NCO Academy, is an instructor in the SF Advanced NCO Course.

The civilian instructor is Robert T. Lane. Lane, assigned to Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st SWTG, is an instructor in the Survival, Evasion Resistance and Escape Level-C Course.

SOSCOM welcomes new commander

With soldiers from the United States Army Special Operations Support Command standing in formation on Fort Bragg's Dick Meadows Field, Colonel Kevin A. Leonard passed SOSCOM's reins to Colonel Robert L. Cursio Jr., June 26.

Cursio was formerly assigned to the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. "Colonel Cursio is not a stranger to the (special operations) community or Fort Bragg," said Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger Jr., commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. "He did a tour with the Ranger Training Brigade. … He was an infantry officer for more than 10 years, and his deployments and experience over the last 10 years as a quartermaster officer made him the right man to lead these outstanding soldiers in providing the logistical and signal support Army special-operations soldiers can't do without."

Leonard will become chief of the Logistics Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Pentagon.

Summe takes command of 4th PSYOP Group

Colonel Jack Summe took command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group July 17 during a ceremony at Fort Bragg.

Summe, formerly assigned to the Joint Staff at the Department of Defense, had previously served in the 4th PSYOP Group as commander of the 1st PSYOP Battalion.

Summe assumed command from Colonel James Treadwell, who is now assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

USASOC announces NCO, Soldier of the Year

The United States Army Special Operations Command announced its fiscal year 2004 NCO and Soldier of the Year July 25.

Sergeant First Class John C. Dozer, a small-group leader at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy, and Specialist Jason A. Parsons, a member of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Lewis, Wash., are this year's winners.

1st Special Warfare Training Group changes command

Colonel Manuel A. Diemer assumed command of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group from Colonel Charles King June 13.

Diemer was formerly deputy commander of the United States Army Special Forces Command. His other SF assignments include chief of staff, U.S. Army Special Forces Command; commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; group

operations officer and executive officer, 10th SF Group; company commander and operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; and detachment commander, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group.

King's new assignment is chief of staff, Special Operations Command-Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command.

7th SF Group receives new commander

The 7th Special Forces Group conducted a change of command at Fort Bragg July 10.

Colonel Jeffrey D. Waddell assumed command from Colonel Peter J. Dillon. Waddell, a 28-year Army veteran, has been an SF officer for most of his Army career. He was formerly the plans and operations officer for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Dillon, who had led the 7th Group since June 2001, has assumed new duties as a member of the Army Joint Staff in Washington, D.C.

Special-ops unit wins top Army deployment award

An Army special-operations support unit based at Fort Bragg has won honors for its excellence in deployment.

The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion was recognized in July by the Department of the Army as the first-place winner in the large-unit category of the 2003 Chief of Staff of the Army Deployment Excellence Awards.

The awards are designed to acknowledge units that exceed Army standards for deployment planning and execution. Competition categories are designed to recognize deployment excellence at all levels of the Army, including small units, large units, support units and installations.

"Deploying to war is what we're all about, and the fact that we're being recognized for deployment excellence is something I'm tremendously proud of," said Lieutenant Colonel Peter Gallagher, the 112th's commander.

"The award … recognizes the professionalism of the soldiers and the unit," he said. "Deployment excellence is almost a state of mind here. If we can't take off on a dime, we're no good to anybody."

As the Army's only special-operations signal battalion, the 112th has the mission of providing worldwide operational and tactical communications in support of Army special-operations forces and the commanders of joint special-operations task forces.

AAR to yield PSYOP lessons from OEF, OIF

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, is conducting after-action reviews, or AARs, with Psychological Operations units returning from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

The purpose of the AARs is to capture lessons learned, to identify issues and to analyze PSYOP operational and methodological trends. Information gleaned about current operations will help developers of PSYOP doctrine and training initiate any necessary improvements.

The AAR was begun by Major Albert F. Armonda, an Army Reservist activated for active-duty special work in order to augment the PSYOP Division's Collective Training Branch. Armonda and several of the PSYOP Division's doctrine and training-development specialists began conducting AARs in mid-July with members of the 305th and 310th PSYOP companies.

The input of returning PSYOP units has yielded worthwhile lessons in a number of areas, including:

- PSYOP force structure and organization.
- Integration of active- and reserve-component PSYOP units.
- PSYOP support to Army and Marine conventional forces and other special-operations forces.
- Critical tasks for MOS 37F (skill levels 1-4) and FA 39 officers.
- PSYOP command and control.
- PSYOP planning.
- Effective PSYOP programs, products and psychological activities.
- PSYOP targeting.
- Equipment (PSYOP-specific and non-specific).
- Utilization of host-nation media.
- Measures of effectiveness.

The PSYOP Division's goal is to capture input from all PSYOP units redeploying throughout the duration of OEF and OIF. The division is working with other PSYOP units and headquarters in an effort to capture pertinent information and incorporate it into doctrine and training products. The PSYOP Division is also collecting lessons gathered by teams sponsored by the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The PSYOP Division plans to begin making periodic releases of the AAR results in the near future. To submit recommendations or to provide assessments or comments, contact Debra A. Weltz, deputy division chief, at DSN 236-4010, commercial (910) 396-4010; or send e-mail to: weltzd@soc.mil or debra.weltz@us.army.mil.

The PSYOP Division is also soliciting photos of PSYOP personnel in action in support of OEF/OIF. The photos will be included in new doctrinal and training materials. Photos may be hard-copy or digital; hard-copy photos will be returned. To obtain submission instructions, contact Staff Sergeant Daniel A. Reeder, Training Development Branch, at DSN 239-7257, commercial (910) 432-7257, or e-mail: reederda@soc.mil.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

In the Devil's Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War. *By Michael E. Haas. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. ISBN: 1-55750-344-3. 243 pages. $33.*



It would not be surprising if many who served in the Korean War saw it as an aftershock or echo of World War II, which had ended only five years earlier. With few exceptions, the organizations, equipment, weapons and uniforms were the same as those used during World War II. The generals were World War II generals, and because of the presidential decision to call up reserve officers, even a great many of the company-grade officers were World War II veterans.

In the earlier war, excepting the great Philippine guerrilla-warfare effort, what is now titled special operations had been almost exclusively the province of the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. Service leaders, except for General Douglas MacArthur, did not view that as a strange or hostile arrangement. From the early days of World War II, the OSS was subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it provided liaison to major field commands, and it drew most of its operational personnel from the services.

The OSS had been disbanded soon after the war ended, but it had been replaced within a few months by the Central Intelligence Group, which soon became the Central Intelligence Agency. The new agency drew on the services, particularly the Army, for operational personnel, in much the same way that the OSS had done. Given these similarities and the interagency agreements that said that in wartime the CIA would support the regional military commander, one can easily understand how military commanders could have expected that in Korea the CIA would reprise the OSS's World War II role. That was not to be.

The CIA saw a need to make a reputation, and not one as merely a handmaiden to the services. It therefore took a very independent tack and conducted its own special operations under the cover title Joint Advisory Commission-Korea, or JACK. It was aided in its independent actions by its largely unchallenged self-view as the president's own operational organization and the fact that as a new agency it was not yet encumbered with layers of administrative, legal and congressional restraints.

At the time, service commanders were clearly at a disadvantage in dealing with the CIA. The CIA enjoyed the advantage of a small organization and the direct communication to its Washington headquarters that have long been an effective weapon in interagency disputes. Lack of restraint by the normal government ethics allowed the CIA to bribe Army clerks to divert officers to CIA assignments. A senior general who served as a captain with JACK described it as, "Dealing with people who have been trained to lie to you and who don't hesitate to."

If the Army ever protested the CIA's independent stance, it was unsuccessful, and such protests were probably drowned out in the high pace of activities during the first chaotic year of the war. In any event, the Army took advantage of the opportunities offered by thousands of anti-Communist North Koreans and established a seminal unconventional-warfare capability, primarily operating from islands off of North Korea's west coast.

Peace negotiations and a stabilized front soon undermined efforts to create a true internal resistance, and the UW effort evolved into a coastal-raiding program. Special Forces experienced its first combat and suffered its first casualties when 50 newly trained SF officers joined this program during the last six months of the war. In organizational isolation from the major effort, the Army conducted other operations, primarily intelligence-related, that would now be considered to be within the special-operations arena.

The Air Force, which had been a separate service for only two years when the war began, employed its newfound independence to conduct special operations: unilaterally, in

consort with the Korean government, and in support of the CIA. One of its more notable activities was the establishment of air resupply and communications wings, its first special-operations unit as a separate service and its first since the World War II air-commando groups were disbanded.

As might be expected, the Navy, with its long history of contending both that naval forces were different and should not be subordinated to regional commands, and that by possessing air, ground and afloat forces, it was by definition "joint," also went its own way and conducted special operations. These, if not as extensive, were at least as varied as the Army's and included the infiltration of U.N. forces.

With four independent players, the potential for interference and disaster was enormous. In reality, disaster did not occur. Geographical separation, possibly abetted by each party's desire not to have to coordinate with the other players, served to keep the operations separate. The establishment of an overall interagency command with the title of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, or CCRAK, was largely abortive. The CIA saw it as an Army effort to control all special operations. Given the fact that all of the senior Army leaders had World War II experience wherein the OSS supported the field armies, that view probably contained more than a grain of truth. The CIA provided representation but gave only lip service to coordination, much less cooperation. Some service members saw the CIA as using the organization only as a means of spying on the other players. Given these conditions, few can be surprised that CCRAK had little effect.

Retired Air Force Colonel Mike Haas has written a book that addresses all of these organizations and their activities. It could be said that he has written the premier book on the subject, but as the reviewer knows of no other author who has had the courage and dedication to take on this daunting subject, that would not be high praise, nor would it be very helpful to potential readers.

Irrespective of its lack of competitors, *In the Devil's Shadow* is an excellent book. It is organized into four sections or monographs that are centered on the special-operations activities of each of the major organizations. Unlike many history writers, Haas does not limit himself to mere recitation of facts but provides analysis of the good and bad aspects, the potential, and the impact of essentially unilateral operations. With an extensive military special-operations background that includes service as an SF NCO and as an officer in Air Force special operations, Haas is exceptionally well-qualified to make such judgments.

In his attempt to provide an extensive and inclusive picture, however, Haas fails to provide a fully balanced picture. He weighs relatively minor Navy and Air Force activities equally with the larger and longer-term Army programs. Haas' treatment of CIA programs is somewhat spare, but that problem is explained in the introduction, wherein the author indicates that the CIA's failure to declassify and release historical documents as directed by law was a major research limitation.



This is not a book of high adventure in the Orient. If that is the reader's interest, he is referred to recently published memoirs such as Colonel Ben Malcom's *White Tigers,* Ed Evanhoe's *Dark Moon,* or "Heine" Aderholt's *Commando One. In the Devil's Shadow* has its share of tersely described combat operations, but its real wealth lies in its revelation of the wheels-within-wheels and the cross-connections and disconnections that composed Korean War special operations.

In the Devil's Shadow is well-organized and has an excellent index and bibliography. Furthermore, up front, it has a list of abbreviations without which the reader would be lost in Acronym Swamp. It is highly recommended to those who have an interest in special-operations history or the Korean War, or to those who sometimes have doubts concerning the utility and desirability of modern joint special-operations headquarters.

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Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War. *By Jon Latimer. New York: The Overlook Press, 2001. ISBN 1-58567-381-1 (paperback). 356 pages. $17.95.*

John Latimer's *Deception in War* is an excellent primer for anyone who is interested in learning more about the value or the techniques of military deception. Although the book could be better organized, it is a good blend of theory and historical examples at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

Deception is one of the most challenging tasks for the staff planner. Deception can be a significant combat multiplier and can ultimately save lives and conserve resources. A poorly planned and poorly executed deception may actually give away one's intentions to the enemy. The best deceptions reinforce what the enemy commander already believes, but it is never easy to know what is in the enemy commander's head.

Latimer, a career British army officer, maintains that because active deceptions (whose intent is to get the enemy to act) are inherently risky, most planners consider passive deception (whose objective is to hide one's intentions or strength) more important. Passive deception is essentially camouflage and operational security. This reviewer's observations during four Warfighter exercises over the last five years support Latimer's assertion.

The key part of *Deception in War* is the chapter in which the author explains the principles of deception. Latimer's principles are similar to current principles of deception outlined in Joint Publication 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*. A few of Latimer's principles deserve to be examined here.

- *Focus*. Deception must always be aimed at the opposing commander or someone who is empowered to make decisions.
- *Action*. The purpose of deceptions is to get the enemy to perform actions that support your plan. It is not enough to make someone think something. A good deception makes him *do* something.
- *Coordination and central control*. Although deception is mainly the domain of the operations staff, each staff element has a role in supporting it. Deceptions need to be carefully controlled, because you are essentially trying to paint a complex and delicate picture.
- *Preparation and timing*. A poorly planned deception is worse than none at all. Deception needs time to work. You cannot influence the enemy instantly.
- *Security*. A deception plan must be kept as secure as the operations plan.
- *Creditability and confirmation*. A deception is of no value if the enemy does not believe it. The creditability of the cover plan is increased when it is confirmed from a variety of sources. False information is made more credible if it is fed to the enemy in ways that will make him believe that he has discovered your intentions through his own efforts.
- *Flexibility*. A deception is not static, because no plan survives contact. Deception operations must be guided by feedback and by changes in the situation.

Latimer's chapter on the methods of deception is poorly organized, but it does contain some valuable insights. The chapter begins by discussing electronic warfare and psychological operations, or PSYOP, and then proceeds to categorize the different methods of deception. Electronic warfare and PSYOP are really tools, not methods, of deception, and the chapter makes no clear distinction between tools and methods. However, Latimer does a good job of using historical examples to outline several basic deception methods.

- *Masking*. Disguise your forces as something else.
- *Substitution*. Make the enemy see one thing, and then replace it with something completely different.
- *False routines*. Repeat a process so many times that it does not appear unusual.
- *Lures*. Draw the enemy into an unfavorable position.
- *Mistakes and bad luck*. Feed the enemy false information that appears to be the result of your incompetence or misfortune.
- *Double bluffing*. This is the most difficult. The objective is to make the enemy recognize that he is being deceived, and to make his reaction to the apparent deception advantageous to you.

In the final chapter, Latimer comments on the future of deception operations. Deceptions will not be made obsolete by modern technology. The air campaign against the Serbs showed that there is a variety of low-tech and time-honored measures that can effectively deceive sophisticated intelligence-gathering means. The fact is that modern surveillance and information technology provides the deception planner with more avenues to the target and more ways to focus the deception.

Deception in War is an interesting read for the experienced deception planner and a "must read" for the junior staff officer or anyone who is new to deception planning.

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Special Warfare

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