Special Warfare

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

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From the Commandant

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One of the many lessons that we have learned from recent Special Forces operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is the value of close air support, or CAS. Experience also indicates that we must provide SF soldiers with more training in CAS.

CAS has become a survival skill. It is a fundamental part of every Special Forces soldier's training. It is essential that SF soldiers be able to call in air support and to guide airstrikes. When SF soldiers train indigenous infantry forces, it may also be necessary for them to train those forces to coordinate air support. And as we have seen in Afghanistan and in Iraq, our ability to provide pilots with the exact coordinates so that they can execute airstrikes with speed and precision helps strengthen our relationship with indigenous forces.

Recognizing the need for SF to coordinate CAS in current and future operations, the Training Development Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, and the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, working in conjunction with the SWCS Marine Corps liaison and members of the U.S. Air Force, have developed the Special Operations Terminal Air Controller's Course, or SOTACC. SOTACC is being taught at two levels. Level 1 consists of three days of training that has been added to the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course and to the collective-training phase of the SF Qualification Course. Level 2 is a temporary duty-and-return course that provides students with classroom instruction, simulator-based training, and live training with aircraft on a gunnery range.

SF's unique training has always been difficult and varied because of the demands that are placed upon SF soldiers during operations in every conceivable part of the world. The quality of SF selection and training programs has been validated in operations that have spanned 50 years. SOTACC is part of our continuing

effort to ensure that SF training will prepare our soldiers for the demands of their missions. We must exercise care when modifying successful programs, but considering the constantly varying environment in which SF soldiers operate, changes in the training program are inevitable. As I have emphasized before, while we may change our training strategy, we will not lower our training standards, and we will not compromise our purpose of providing the best-trained and best-qualified soldiers possible to Army special-operations units.

Major General William G. Boykin

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Features

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The Integration of Special Forces into U.S. Air Force Counterland Operations

by Major Christian M. Karsner

The operations of United States Special Forces during Operation Enduring Freedom have focused attention on the need for SF soldiers to be able to employ close air support, or CAS.

Because SF generally operates deep in the enemy's rear areas, isolated from other friendly units and from the artillery support that those units can provide, the ability to access and coordinate air support is vital to an SF team's force protection and survival. There is also a requirement for SF teams to provide air support for multinational and coalition forces.

But the air support required by SF may actually consist of two types: CAS and air interdiction, or AI. The U.S. Air Force merges AI and CAS operations under the mission set known as "counterland operations." The Air Force defines counterland operations as "Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of superiority over surface operations by the destruction, disrupting, delaying, diverting or other neutralization of enemy forces. The main objectives of counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same."[1]

Counterland operations may support friendly ground operations, or they may be employed to provide air attacks against enemy ground forces or military targets. The distinction between the two components of counterland operations is that AI is

File photo

Operations of U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan, such as terminal-guidance operations, have focused attention on the need for SF soldiers to be able to employ close air support.

not always conducted to support friendly ground forces, but CAS is always air support that is provided to friendly ground forces.

CAS is defined as the employment of tactical airpower to directly support friendly ground forces that are in contact with enemy forces. It is important to remember that SF teams are considered to be friendly ground forces, even though they are generally located deep beyond the fire-support coordination line, or FSCL. CAS typically involves aircraft attacks on ground targets that are in "close proximity" to friendly units. Close proximity is defined as "The distance within which some form of terminal attack control is required for targeting direction and fratricide prevention."[2] This definition is open to broad interpretation; what may be close proximity to one person is not to another.

There are three types of CAS: preplanned, immediate and push. In preplanned CAS, aircraft are scheduled to fly missions at a particular time. Immediate CAS is provided in response to unanticipated (often emergency) needs. Push CAS schedules aircraft for a specified time and place so that the assets will be available should ground components request them.[3]

AI is defined as "Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces." AI is conducted "at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required."[4]

AI may be either preplanned or nonpreplanned. Preplanned AI missions are flown against fixed targets or mobile targets not expected to move before the mission is executed. Nonpreplanned AI may be flexible or immediate. Flexible AI is an armed reconnaissance to search for targets in a particular area. Immediate AI is often flown from airborne-alert aircraft that respond to real-time targeting information.[5]

"Detailed integration" refers to "the level of coordination required to achieve the desired effects without overly restricting CAS attacks, surface firepower or the ground scheme of maneuver. It is also necessary to protect aircraft from the unintended effects of friendly surface fire."[6] To a small, isolated SF team on the ground, detailed integration will consist of:

- Timing the CAS attack in relation to ground actions and fires.
- Identifying the target to be attacked by the CAS aircraft.
- Separating friendly forces from the undesirable effects of the CAS attack; i.e., preventing fratricide.
- Minimizing undesirable collateral damage.

SF's requirements for air support demand more terminal air controllers than the Air Force can supply. The number of Air Force tactical-air-control parties, or TACPs; special-operations terminal attack controllers, or SOTACs; and special-tactics squadrons, or STS, that could be assigned to SF will always be insufficient to provide Air Force terminal controllers for every SF team. Furthermore, even though Air Force personnel are superb air-traffic controllers and tactical air controllers for conventional ground forces, they have not been trained to operate in the manner that SF requires for actions behind enemy lines.

Thus, the need for SF to perform unilaterally as terminal controllers not only exists, but it is also becoming more urgent because of the increased number of combat operations that SF soldiers are conducting and because of SF's increased requirement for air support. As SF's dependence on air support increases, it is essential that SF accordingly improve its air-support capabilities; its tactics, techniques and procedures; and the interoperability of SF and Air Force communications equipment (voice and data).

When we discuss providing CAS to SF units on the ground, the real issue is how to provide immediate CAS to SF elements that are not only deep in an enemy rear area without other means of support, but that are also in contact with superior enemy ground forces. Because of the fluidity of the ground situation and because SF generally avoids contact with enemy forces except when the terms are favorable (e.g., superiority in forces or conditions), SF does not generally use preplanned or push CAS. The only foreseeable circumstances under which SF would make an exception to this rule would be during a direct-action raid, (proba-

bly one involving counterterrorism, or CT, or the recovery of precious cargo). In preplanned CAS operations, Air Force TACPs, SOTACs or STS personnel would likely be assigned in adequate strength to provide terminal guidance, so preplanned and push CAS will be excluded from this article.

SF units conducting cross-FSCL missions other than CT or recovery may also be compromised, and contact with enemy forces may be imminent. If the SF unit is not able to put enough distance between itself and the enemy force, immediate CAS will be needed to ensure that ordnance is delivered accurately onto enemy forces and that it is safely separated from friendly forces in order to prevent fratricide.

Photo by Vernon Pugh

The increasingly precise targeting of air-delivered ordnance will have a positive effect on CAS and AI operations.

If the SF unit is able to get out of "close proximity" to the enemy force, then the air-support mission needed may be immediate AI or flexible AI. In any case, SF has the communications capability, the training (as mandated by the training requirement of U.S. Army Special Forces Command Regulation 350-1), and the authority granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as a ground terminal controller for CAS from any service.[7]

The coordinated air-ground operations that have been performed during Operation Enduring Freedom, particularly those that called upon the ability of SF teams on the ground to direct most of the airstrikes, have demonstrated a vast improvement in air targeting. The SF operators on the ground coordinated not only CAS for the ground forces but also ground support for the AI campaign. The ability of forward SF teams to locate and direct AI attacks has proven to be an invaluable element of the AI campaign, and it has been a key contributor to the AI effort in OEF.

AI operations

It is important to emphasize that the joint-force air-component commander, or JFACC, is the *supported commander* for the joint-force commander's overall planning and execution of the theaterwide AI effort. Thus, SF teams that are conducting special reconnaissance or terminal-guidance operations may be working in support of the JFACC and his counterland AI campaign. As has been demonstrated during recent deep operations, instead of interdicting targets in the enemy's rear through traditional DA ground attacks, SF teams now relay target information to the rear, to the deep-operations coordination cell, which then programs the information for AI targeting.

While it is desirable for SF soldiers to have radios, frequencies, and communications-security procedures that are compatible with those of the attack aircraft or with those of a forward air controller (airborne), or FAC(A), such compatibility is not essential in AI operations. Only in CAS, where friendly and unfriendly forces are in close proximity, is detailed integration required. The SF team needs only to send a report detailing the size, activity, location and equipment of enemy forces on the target; identifying any known threat to the aircraft; providing recommended flight headings;

and perhaps identifying the friendly position. To further enhance the effectiveness of the AI mission, the SF team could use a beacon during offset bombing. For more sophisticated targeting, the SF team could hold a laser-illumination spot on the target — a technique that allows targeting to be accurate within about 10 meters.

Emerging technology such as the laser range finder, which sends an imbedded grid of a target directly to an aircraft weapons system, could also allow aircraft to deliver ordnance accurately within 10 meters. The laser range finder would give an SF team the ability to electronically relay accurate strike information to AI aircraft, and it would alleviate many of the current shortcomings in the area of equipment interoperability.

The increasingly precise targeting of air-delivered ordnance will have a positive effect on CAS and AI operations. As the delivery of ordnance becomes more precise, the desired effects will be achieved using smaller amounts of explosives. The resulting smaller munitions will reduce even further (but will not eliminate) the chance of fratricide in AI and CAS operations.

It may not be necessary for the SF team to talk to attack aircraft or to the FAC(A) if a digital means exists for the SF ground observer to transmit the target location and the friendly location directly or indirectly to the aircraft weapons system. This would be particularly true if the SF ground observer is transmitting data regarding multiple moving targets and multiple friendly locations. However, if SF ground elements are linked to a FAC(A), the information-and-decision cycle can be reduced to include only the SF team and the FAC(A), thus increasing responsiveness and giving both parties the flexibility to adjust rapidly to a changing situation. Reducing the decision cycle to the SF team and the FAC(A) requires that SF teams, FAC(A)s and AI aircraft all well understand each other's tactics, techniques and procedures.

SF has the capability, the need and the authority to conduct CAS and to provide ground support to AI. The CAS is generally cross-FSCL "deep CAS" of an immediate nature, involving a small, isolated friendly force in an enemy-controlled area. SF's ground support to AI will consist of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that are needed to locate and identify enemy forces; to perform terminal-guidance operations necessary for assisting in the delivery of ordnance from air platforms; and to assess battle damage and provide feedback for future targeting. SF can provide this support in a unilateral direct-action role or in an indirect unconventional-warfare role (by, with or through indigenous personnel or surrogate forces).

Because the methods and the techniques that SF uses in its deep operations are often different from those used by conventional ground forces, SF's potential contribution to the deep fight is also different. Because of that difference, special consideration should be given to integrating SF into the deep battle and maximizing SF's potential as a valuable partner in the Air Force counterland air-ground team.

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Notes:

[1] Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] Joint Publication 1-02.

[5] Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3.

[6] *Ibid*.

[7] From a review of the definitions of CAS and AI in Joint Pub 1-02 and the joint requirements for providing targeting data and terminal guidance/control, it seems clear that SF meets, or could meet, all the criteria for providing terminal guidance/control. The Air Force states, in AFDD 2-1.3, that target information for AI may come from "ground-based special operations forces."

SOTACC: Training SF Soldiers in Close Air Support and Terminal Air Control

by Lieutenant Colonel Sean Mulholland; Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Singleton, USMC; and Major Shannon Boehm

During the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, situation reports from United States Army special-operations soldiers in the field showed that those soldiers were having a substantial problem executing terminal-air-control operations.

As the global war on terrorism has continued, the terminal-air-control problem has grown. Although the U.S. Air Force has personnel qualified as members of tactical-air-control parties, or TACPs, the Air Force does

SOTACC LEVEL-1 POI TASK LIST

- Aircraft Capabilities and Limitations
- Ordnance Capabilities and Limitations
- Lasers and Ground Equipment
- CAS Mission Briefs
- AC-130 Capabilities and Employment
- Night CAS
- Rotary-Wing CAS/Capabilities and Employment
- CAS Nine-Line Practical Exercise

SOTACC LEVEL-2 POI TASK LIST

- Aircraft Capabilities and Limitations
- Aircraft Ordnance Capabilities and Limitations
- AC-130 Capabilities and Employment
- CAS Mission Briefs
- CAS Planning and Tactics
- CAS Air Support Briefs
- Command and Control
- Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Utilization
- NATO CAS
- Night CAS
- Lasers and Ground Equipment
- Rotary-Wing CAS/Employment
- Artillery and Naval Surface Fire Support
- TACP Coordination
- Targeting
- 160th SOAR Integration
- Threat/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
- EA-6B Capabilities and Limitations
- UAV Integration
- Urban CAS
- AC-130 Practical Exercise
- CAS Practical Exercise
- Naval Surface Fires Practical Exercise
- Rotary-Wing CAS Practical Exercise
- Fixed-Wing CAS Practical Exercise
- Artillery Practical Exercise
- CAS Live Controls Day/Night

File photo

Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan perform a terminal-air-control mission. SOTACC will provide standardized training in those operations.

not have sufficient TACP personnel to augment Special Forces A-detachments in their increasing operations worldwide.

To address the shortage of TACP personnel, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, in conjunction with the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, has created a training course, the Special Operations Terminal Air Controller's Course, or SOTACC. SOTACC will provide SF soldiers standardized training in terminal-air-control operations and will certify graduates' capability to perform terminal operations, which are becoming mission-essential to many joint operations.

Initial guidance for SOTACC came from the SWCS commander. Next, the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine asked SWCS's U.S. Marine Corps adviser (who is also the senior Marine Corps representative for special operations at Fort Bragg) to serve as the SOTACC subject-matter expert in close air support, or CAS, and to assist with the development of the SOTACC concept.

During the fall of 2002, SWCS conducted the initial pilot course for SOTACC Level 1 as part of the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course. Afterward, the commander of SWCS gave final approval for continued validation and implementation of SOTACC, which began its first formal class in December 2002.

SOTACC trains students at two levels. During Level 1, which is currently a three-day module, students receive initial training in CAS, and they become familiar with terminal-air-control planning. Level 2 is a two-week temporary-duty class. Students attend five days of classroom instruction and simulator-based terminal-guidance training at Fort Bragg, and five days of live terminal-air-control training at the Piney Island Aerial Gunnery Range in eastern North Carolina.

Level 2 provides students with certification as limited combat-capable forward air controllers, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreement 3797. The training in Level 2 also meets or exceeds the joint-close-air-support standards of the Joint Technical Advisory committee.

Level 1 will be incorporated into Phase 4

DoD photo

SOTACC includes instruction in the capabilities, limitations and proper employment of AC-130 aircraft, as well as an AC-130 practical exercise.

(collective training) of the SF Qualification Course as three days (24 training hours) of additional training for NCO and officer students. It will also be incorporated into the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course, or SFWOBC, as three days of additional training for warrant-officer students. Level 2 is scheduled to be conducted quarterly, and its classes will be limited to 25 students per iteration.

The SOTACC committee consists of one Marine captain/major FAC; two Air Force TACP-qualified airmen; and two SF SOTACC instructors. The committee has conducted three Level 1 pilot classes: one in the SFWOBC and two in the SFQC. The first Level 2 pilot class was conducted March 10-21.

SOTACC is a work in progress. SWCS continues to refine the SOTACC program of instruction and to equip the SOTACC committee for a broadened level of training. Initial feedback from SOTACC students indicates that they approve of SOTACC's content and quality.

By completing the two levels of SOTACC, SF soldiers will substantially increase their familiarity with terminal-air-control operations. As a result, SF will be able to relieve the demand that is being placed on the limited pool of Air Force terminal air controllers and to increase the effectiveness of joint-operations capabilities at this critical juncture in U.S. national and military history.

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New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare

by Timothy L. Thomas

Chinese military analysts have meticulously studied the use of armed force during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted with great interest the integration of military strikes and psychological-warfare activities, and the increased strategic role that the mass media played during both operations.[1]

To highlight the apparent shifting emphasis toward psychological warfare for officers of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the prominent Chinese military journal *China Military Science* has published six articles on psychological warfare during the last two years:[2] "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," by Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping; "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng; "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," and "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy," both written by Xu Hezhen; "Comparison of Psychological Warfare between China and the West," by Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong; and "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," by Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.

With the exception of Wu Juncang, Zhang Qiancheng, Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the authors of the six articles are identified as being instructors at the Shijiazhuang Ground Forces Command Academy, which indicates that the academy has an active and influential psychological-warfare department. In fact, judging by the tone of some of the articles, they could have been lifted directly from lectures presented during the academy's psychological-warfare courses.

The authors suggest that at the strategic level, China's psychological-warfare operations will be characterized by coercion, which will take the form of intimidation achieved through demonstrations and shows of force. (Their suggestion supports a recent Pentagon finding that viewed Chinese coercion as the greatest threat to Taiwan.)

At the tactical level, the articles suggest that the Chinese are interested in offsetting their current deficiencies by procuring advanced psychological-warfare equipment and by developing advanced deployment techniques. The advanced equipment would include unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, fitted with loudspeakers and capable of distributing "talking leaflets."

The articles also underscore the differences in the cultural and subjective-cognition patterns of Oriental and Western minds. Those differences lead the Chinese to apply the principles of psychological warfare differently from the West. If the U.S. is to see "eye to eye" with the Chinese and truly understand their psychological-warfare methodology, it is vital that we comprehend those differences. Finally, the articles provide recommendations about the PLA's future psychological-warfare requirements. From the discussion in all six articles, it is clear that China is working hard to develop its psychological-warfare capabilities for peacetime and wartime uses.

History of Chinese PSYOP

In "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng note that China's history of psychological operations goes back more than 4,000 years. The authors point out that during the period 2100-256 B.C., psychological operations were part of such historical events as the

Zhuolu War (Zhuolu is a county in Hebei Province), during which "victory could not be achieved with weapons"; the Tang Oath, under which Chinese swore to do everything possible to spread propaganda; and the Mu Oath, which prohibited the killing of enemy soldiers who surrendered or who were taken as prisoners of war — a psychological operation for that time period. Schemes for sowing deception and creating false impressions and expectations represented the acme of psychological operations during the period.[3]

According to Wu and Zhang, those early psychological experiences culminated in Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, which describes the main objective of war as defeating the enemy without having to fight; the main essence of war as attacking the enemy's strategy; the main principle of war as contending for control of hearts, minds and morale; and the main idea of war as focusing on the enemy commander's decision-making skills and personal traits. Ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine also focused on attacking the enemy's strategy and diplomacy; on conducting demonstrations and seeking dominance; on ignoring luck and dispelling doubt; on making threats; and on adhering to the Tao, the philosophy and system of religion based on the teachings of Lao-tzu during the sixth century B.C.[4]

Wu and Zhang indicate that Taoism, which coupled hardness with softness in warfare, was not the only influence on the theory of psychological operations in ancient China. Other influences were military studies; Confucianism, which stressed the idea of "just wars"; and the study of the *I Ching* (Book of Changes), which stressed the idea of yin and yang (hardness and softness) being coupled to each other and thereby changing each other. The *I Ching* formed an important theoretical foundation of psychological-operations doctrine in ancient China[5] that continues to influence subjective cognition patterns in China today.

According to Wu and Zhang, the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-8 A.D. and 25-220 A.D.) periods of Chinese history witnessed other types of psychological operations. The Qin period used the diplomatic psychological-operations strategy of maintaining friendly relations with distant enemies while attacking the enemy nearby. The Han dynasty raised psychological operations to a new level by integrating their political, economic and military aspects.

Ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine also focused on attacking the enemy's strategy and diplomacy, on conducting demonstrations and seeking dominance, on ignoring luck and dispelling doubt, on making threats and on adhering to the Tao.

The authors note the Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.) and the Two Jins (263-420 A.D.) for the diversity of their psychological-operations theory. Both dynasties believed that attacking the enemy's psychological state was more effective than attacking his cities; therefore, they favored psychological operations over combat operations with troops. The Ming (1368-1662) and Qing (1662-1912) dynasties, on the other hand, allowed Chinese psychological-operations doctrine to stagnate.[6]

Ancient Chinese books discuss the psychological-operations experiences of their time. For example, the *Six Arts of War* notes that in a command structure of 72 men, 19 (26 percent) were psychological-operations personnel responsible for controlling morale: Five were to tout the army's strength; four were to tout the army's fame in order to destroy the enemy's confidence; eight were to scout out the enemy's mood and intent; and two were to confuse the people by exploiting their beliefs in gods and spirits. The book also instructs Chinese soldiers to protect their morale by ignoring rumors, by disregarding luck and by avoiding any dealings with omens or superstitions. The *Six Arts* also tells soldiers to sap enemy morale, to string enemy nerves, and to strike terror in the enemy. Wu and Zhang discuss two ancient tales that hint at the creativity of the Chinese in accomplishing these tasks. In the first tale, Chinese soldiers tied reed pipes to kites and flew the kites at night. The kites made a wailing sound that, in the darkness, unnerved the enemy. In the second tale, Chinese soldiers painted oxen in odd colors and tied oil-soaked reeds to the tails of the oxen. The soldiers lit the reeds and sent the enraged animals charging through the enemy camp at night, causing terror among the enemy soldiers.[7]

Wu and Zhang note that the *Six Arts* also refers to another key psychological aspect that should be attacked — the mind of the enemy's commanding general. While the *Six Arts* discusses the psychological condition of the commander at the strategic and tactical levels differently, it lists intelligence, temperament and moral character as the three main characteristics required

of a Chinese commander.[8] The book also lists 10 psychological weaknesses of commanders that must be exploited. Those weaknesses include being brave, treating death too lightly, being impatient and thinking too quickly.

According to Wu and Zhang, the Marxist concept of the "dialectic" — the process of change brought about by the conflict of opposing forces — had a significant impact on the development of ancient Chinese psychological-operations theory, although that fact was not "discovered" until the advent of Marxism. The authors note that ancient doctrine involved many categories of contradictions, out of which evolved many of the principles and methods of psychological operations.[9] Although ancient, Sun Zi's *Art of War*, Wu Zi's *Art of War*, and Weiliao Zi and Sun Bin's *Art of War* provide incisive and comprehensive explanations of the objectives, principles, methods and laws of psychological operations, and their explanations are still valid.

In summarizing their understanding of ancient Chinese psychological operations, Wu and Zhang maintain that those operations were designed to achieve strategic deception, to map out a strategy, to secure victory through strategy, and to integrate military strategy and psychological attack.[10] The authors find these objectives or activities of ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine to be reflective of what the Chinese observed during the Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo, further emphasizing the importance of psychological operations in the modern era.

Definitions

Each of the Chinese articles on psychological operations define the concepts of psychological warfare or psychological operations in a different way. Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng (who do not teach at the Shijiazhuang Academy) define a psychological operation as the use of various measures to influence a combat opponent's ideology, attitude, will or actions. The objective of a psychological operation is to win without fighting or to win a big victory with only a little fighting. Only by securing a favorable position in terms of politics and in terms of the nature of warfare (by making one's own reasons for waging war appear to be moral and just) can one achieve a fundamental psychological advantage.[11]

Xu Hezhen, a major general in the Chinese army and president of the Shijiazhuang Academy, defines psychological warfare as a kind of propaganda and as persuasion that uses real force as its foundation. According to Xu's definition, a group can use political, economic, scientific, military, diplomatic, ideological or cultural forces to change an opponent's national will or to influence and change an opponent's belief in, attitude toward, or hostility toward a populace, toward organizations, or toward military and government agencies. Xu's two articles stress the need for using power and intimidation as key psychological-warfare tools.[12] Regarding the importance of psychological warfare, Xu notes: "You may not be interested in psychological warfare, but psychological warfare is interested in you."[13]

According to Xu, psychological warfare is also the exploration and study of the psychological quality of the thinking practiced by a nation's strategic leadership. To the Chinese, psychological quality includes the aspects of psychological attainments and psychological character. Psychological attainments primarily reflect the level at which a person grasps and understands psychology. Psychological character is the individual human aspect, primarily the psychological character that an individual has already formed or is developing; e.g., an individual's intellect, temperament, disposition, emotions and will.[14]

Xu notes that Eastern psychological attainments are developed through education in both dialectical materialism and historical materialism, as well as through the influence and edifying effects of Eastern culture. His theory applies particularly to strategic thought, in which "how to think" is the key element and the most valuable quality.[15] Xu agrees that, in the end, the most important battles of modern psychological war will be fought over values. The superpowers, he feels, are using armed force to impose their value systems on other people. That was demonstrated during operations in Kosovo, in Xu's opinion, when politicians expressed the idea that human rights are greater than sovereign rights.[16]

After 50 years of Marxism, Xu notes, "Decadent culture has unavoidably entered China. … Foreign culture has constantly infiltrated China in the form of weapons and then at the mental and conceptual level. In particular, the value system of Western culture, with the idea of individualism at the center, a decadent lifestyle based on materialism, and a concept of gain or benefit in interpersonal relations, has produced a profound effect on certain people's values."[17]

Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the three other authors who are not identified as being faculty of the Shijiazhuang Academy, define psychological-warfare theory as a field of study that serves both as the point of intersection and as the boundary line between psychology and the study of strategy and tactics. In their

opinion, psychological-warfare theory has a psychological foundation as well as an ideological/theoretical foundation. The latter foundation is determined by national characteristics, but the former foundation is more constant. Psychological-warfare strategy is a psychological embodiment of the orientation of a country's national and military strategies. [18]

Li Yuankui, a senior colonel at the Shijiazhuang Academy, and Lieutenants Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli (who are both master's-degree candidates), define psychological warfare as a multilevel activity that is employed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The authors perceive the targets of psychological warfare as national will, the state of social awareness, cultural traditions, a nation's economic pulse, an opponent's public sentiment, the tendencies of popular will, military morale, and the opponent's various social groups, classes and strata. Because of the increased use of information technology, the number of people who are subjected to psychological war is greater than ever before.[19] The increase in psychological-warfare targets requires the development of a people's war-defense mentality.

Li, Wang and Yang, like Xu, focus on values. They define a system of values as a system of psychological tendencies that people use to discriminate between good and bad. A system of values also provides the basis by which a person recognizes the correct way of thinking and acting. The highest strategic objective in psychological warfare, the authors note, is achieved by changing a country's fundamental social concepts and its society's sense of values. In this regard, the West uses a system of values (democracy, freedom, human rights, etc.) in a long-term attack on socialist countries. The West used the ideas of democracy and human rights to undermine the communist party in the Soviet Union, and it intends to use the same rationale for interfering in China's internal affairs. The U.S.'s strategy is to attack political, moral, social and cultural values in target countries.[20] Chinese authors are fond of quoting former U.S. President Richard Nixon's phrase, "Attacking ideas is key to affecting history" as an explanation of U.S. strategy.

Senior Colonel Wang Zhenxing and Major Yang Suping of the Shijiazhuang Academy did not define psychological warfare or psychological operations in their article.

Psychological security

A key aspect of psychological warfare is understanding the psychological characteristics of an opponent's strategic leadership and conducting psychological attacks against them.[21] Authors Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng, and Yan Jianhong discuss differences in Eastern and Western minds in order to highlight East/West variances both in the characteristics and in the laws of psychological warfare. The authors note, "Differences in environment, cultural traditions, political systems, economic strength, national-defense capability and national spiritual belief lead to a great distinction in various nations in subjective cognition, ideological basis, principles of applications and structure of organization of psychological warfare."[22]

According to the authors, even though China is a socialist country, the Marxist theory of war provides the theoretical basis for Chinese psychological warfare and gives Chinese psychological warfare its advanced, moral, open and unified nature.[23] Marxist theory regarding proletarian strategy and tactics was one of Mao Zedong's "magic weapons" during the Chinese revolution. And even though psychological warfare is characterized by active defense, China's approach emphasizes psychological attacks and the use of stratagems, particularly the use of deception activities.[24]

Marxist theory opposes peaceful evolution, which the authors assert is the basic Western tactic for subverting socialist countries. According to Wang, Ma and Yan, peaceful evolution is the process that caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the Chinese must not allow peaceful evolution to take place in China. The authors note that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping developed a theory and a complete set of tactics designed to counter the Western strategy.

In "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," Li, Wang and Yang emphasize that China must take the initiative in psychological-warfare defense because psychological security is now an important aspect of national security. Information and psychological factors are now political and diplomatic weapons, and their power cannot be ignored. Psychological warfare requires a low investment; it involves low risk; and it is highly effective. The greater the amount of information that is available to a population, the more opportunity there will be for conducting psychological warfare. Any corner into which information can spread can become a battlefield for psychological warfare. China must establish the strategic idea of an active psychological-warfare defense.

Active defense should include tempering the minds of the Chinese people by inoculation: allowing the people to come into contact with other ideas and, through education and guidance, enabling them to see what is wrong with those ideas. That approach will

allow people to develop psychological immunity. Opening their minds up to other ideas, however, is not the same as cutting them loose.[25]

Li, Wang and Yang forecast that the main form of psychological warfare will be contests for public opinion. To be able to seize public opinion, China must develop its own independent information and media power, guide public opinion, and conduct public-opinion propaganda. The demand for information is a universal psychological need. Passive psychological defense will not suffice. Only with initiative and offense can China take the strategic initiative with regard to public opinion. Propaganda must be prepared in advance, and it must include material designed to counter the attacks that will be made against the initial release of propaganda.[26]

In "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," Wang and Yang emphasize the importance of attaining media superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage. Media control will be one of the front lines in psychological wars. News broadcasts and computer technology now allow people to watch a battle in progress, as they would watch a sporting event. An event that might have been known to only a few people in the past can now be witnessed by millions. Such access to information affects public sentiment and morale. Wang and Yang accuse the West of fulfilling its hegemonic wishes by manipulating public opinion, by attaining media superiority, and by guiding people's psychological tendencies.[27] Yet all three methods are exactly what the Chinese are proud to claim elsewhere as their heritage.

According to Xu Hezhen in "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," intimidation is a key strategy that can be used to influence both public opinion and the media. In fact, psychological war and intimidation are so difficult to tell apart that they are almost twins. Intimidation is both a strategy and a method. In modern times, the use of nonviolent intimidation, which includes alliances, media manipulation, economic sanctions, financial attack, information isolation and network attacks, has increased.

Strategy can create psychological misperceptions that will cause one side to remain unprepared. The prepared side can then win without fighting. … The use of strategy may be seen in demonstrations and feints that surprise the enemy by hitting him where he is unprepared.

The U.S., Xu says, uses its advantage of power as the foundation of psychological war, employing arms displays, arms sales, and military exercises as intimidation.[28] In response, China must implement its own intimidation-psychological war plan that includes Chinese threat forces and mechanisms, and intimidation-psychological war strategy.[29] China should develop an elite and effective military intimidation force, fully apply all kinds of nonmilitary intimidation methods, establish a psychological-intimidation mechanism that will have strategic maneuvering as its core, and organize and apply all kinds of psychological intimidation factors, thus developing the greatest possible psychological intimidation effect. Intimidation must be established on the foundation of power; without power, intimidation is only a scarecrow.[30]

Strategy

In "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng argue that strategy is fundamental, and that mapping out a strategy is the most traditional Chinese characteristic of psychological warfare. Mapping out the strategy is followed by attacking an opponent's alliances, attacking his army, and attacking his cities — in that order. The best strategy is to attack the enemy's mind, leaving him unable to plan. Strategy can create psychological misperceptions that will cause one side to remain unprepared. The prepared side can then win without fighting. In a more narrow sense, the use of strategy may be seen in demonstrations and feints that surprise the enemy by hitting him where he is unprepared.[31]

Authors Wang, Ma and Yan see major differences between China and the West regarding the way that they perceive strategic starting points and the orientation of psychological warfare. By strategic starting points, the authors mean psychological warfare's nature, objectives and factors for victory. China, the authors say, perceives psychological warfare as a method of spreading truth and justice; of trying to win people's minds; and of exposing an enemy's plot to confuse, corrupt or penetrate China's mental space. The West, the authors contend, views psychologi-

cal warfare as a way of promoting its hegemonic strategy that is designed to create turmoil and division within other countries. (Clearly, more than a few Western analysts would disagree with that categorization.)

Wang, Ma and Yan list two strategic orientations of psychological-warfare: offensive and defensive. The orientations differ in their roles, in their employment, and in the structure of their deployment. China must continue to combine offense with defense, and to use offense for defense (so that the country can shift from passive to active modes and expand its room for maneuver).[32]

From Wu and Zhang's perspective, demonstrations and shows of force are the basic strategic methods of conducting psychological operations. Demonstrations were used in ancient times, as detailed in the "Thirty Six Stratagems of War," a collection of Chinese proverbs and instructions for winning at war. A demonstration is an attack that exploits strengths and weaknesses, and its objective is to take the enemy by surprise. One may exploit strengths and weaknesses by appearing to be strong when one is weak, or by appearing to be weak when one is strong.[33] In short, demonstrations are a way of getting friendly and enemy forces to interact psychologically. Demonstrations are also a form of deterrence, which is another psychological-warfare concept. Demonstrations establish credibility and fear, two of the three elements of deterrence theory (reliability is the third).

Strategy's essence, according to Xu, is thinking, and the quality of one's thinking determines the quality of one's strategy. Strategic thinking is a big-picture, integrated method of thought — a bird's-eye-view way of thinking. It is anticipatory, realistic and response-oriented, and it is a kind of rational thinking.[34]

Information technology

Information technology has made it possible for psychological warfare to become both a strategic resource and a method, and psychological specialists are exploiting many information-age technologies. For example, future military attacks will be combined with attacks on electronic technology; virtual reality will plant false information in an enemy's command-information system, creating misperceptions among commanders; and network intruders may be able to penetrate terminals on the network, executing an all-directional psychological attack.[35]

Network data can be put online in secrecy by almost anyone, … and access to information is not subject to restrictions of time or place. Network attacks can throw a country's social, political and economic life into chaos, producing a shock effect on people's minds and leading to political instability.

According to Wang and Yang, "In modern times the vast development in information science, psychology, the science of broadcasting, and other sciences, and in particular the emergence of new and high technologies such as satellite communications, electronic computers, networking technology, and multimedia technology, provide a firm theoretical foundation and modern tools for psychological warfare."[36]

Li, Wang and Yang see networks as the most important aspect of the technological battle. Network psychological warfare is a new topic in psychological-warfare defense, but networks will become the main psychological-warfare battlefield in the future. Global networks provide more space in which to engage in propaganda. Network data can be put online in secrecy by almost anyone; it is difficult to verify who the providers of network data are; and access to information is not subject to restrictions of time or place. Network attacks can throw a country's social, political and economic life into chaos, producing a shock effect on people's minds and leading to political instability. In order to develop network defense, China must develop network sovereignty, establish laws for network activities, and establish information-protection forces. Creating competent forces for information war and psychological warfare will help ensure China's information security and psychological security.[37]

Writing about the impact of information technology, Wang and Yang list several futuristic ideas for psychological-warfare equipment, but they do not specify whether the ideas are theirs or those of another country. They note that an "intelligent" component has been added to psychological-warfare equipment. The intelligent component includes computers used to guide the operating and sensing systems of UAVs. UAVs can recognize targets, broadcast propaganda and scatter leaflets before returning to their base. In the future, leaflets will combine visual, audio and speech elements — much like the talking birthday cards currently marketed by some U.S. card manufacturers.

In a direct reference to U.S. technology, the authors note that Livermore Laboratories has developed a method of projecting holographic images high into the clouds. According to Wang and Yang, the projections produce a type of illusory psychological warfare by portraying Islamic martyrs who appear to speak to soldiers from the clouds.[38]

In contemporary wars, such as the Gulf War, the first targets attacked have been those with psychological value, such as television, broadcasting and other communications venues. Destruction of those targets helped cause psychological passivity, panic and, eventually, defeat. Russia underestimated the power of communications during its first war with Chechnya from 1994-96. The Chechens were able to exert a major psychological influence on the course and the outcome of the war by utilizing the impact of instantaneous field reporting to TV stations. That reporting greatly affected public opinion.[39] TV also played a major role in the Gulf War, demonstrating the lethality of coalition weaponry to the Iraqi leadership. On the other hand, TV reports on Iraqi Scuds also played a significant psychological role by invoking terror and panic among the residents of Israel and Saudi Arabia.[40]

Threats

General Xu Hezhen's article, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy," describes the threats facing China as "hard warfare" (high-tech warfare) and "soft warfare" (psychological warfare designed to "westernize" or "split" China). Xu notes that while high-tech warfare is more difficult, psychological warfare could be accomplished in the context of a grand strategy in which it plays an increasingly important role in safeguarding national security and in winning high-tech wars.[41]

Because psychological war takes almost no risks and yet can achieve the greatest number of political benefits and the highest level of psychological influence, Xu believes that the U.S. is using a psychological-warfare strategy — peaceful evolution — to enhance the disintegration of socialist countries. He says that as part of that strategy, the U.S. has developed a military force that possesses advanced weapons, and that the U.S. has carried out violent psychological threats toward socialist nations. According to Xu, the U.S. has used economics and trade to infiltrate socialist nations and has used personnel exchanges to carry out ideological and cultural psychological infiltration, thereby fostering an anti-socialist force.

According to Xu, U.S. psychological warfare undermined the Soviet Union. He sees evidence of a similar threat to China in the policies of the last two U.S. presidential administrations. While the Clinton era focused on engaging China, Xu says, the Bush administration has a clear strategic goal of containing China.[42] Finally, in Xu's opinion, the U.S. is using religion to weaken the ideology of Marxism.[43]

Of course, the greatest psychological-warfare threat is the threat that one country will be able to take control of another country's morale (the foundation stone for victory), according to Wu and Zhang. They describe five tactics for controlling morale:

- With a mighty opponent, wait him out.
- With an arrogant opponent, show him respect for a long time.
- With a firm opponent, entice and then seize him.
- With an evasive opponent, get close to him in front, make noise on his flanks, dig deep ditches and put up high ramparts, and make it hard for him to get provisions.
- With a placid opponent, make noise to frighten him, jolt him by breaking through, and if he comes at you, then attack him; otherwise, fall back.[44]

Conclusions

The foregoing discussion indicates that the theory of psychological warfare has tremendous significance and value to China. Chinese theorists are attempting to develop an updated ideology and strategy of psychological warfare — one that will focus on intimidation and on exploitation of the differences between Eastern and Western mentalities. That implies that China will be establishing a command structure for psychological warfare, as well as creating special units that will attempt to overcome Chinese inferiority in high-tech weapons.[45] More important, Chinese theorists appear to believe that because modern psychological warfare can help ensure stability and shape national-security thinking, it is more applicable in peace than in war.[46]

In offering a recommendation for future psychological-warfare forces in China, Major General Xu asks Chinese leaders to:

- Develop a psychological-warfare system that integrates specialized and nonspecialized personnel, and that emphasizes China's special characteristics.
- Establish a psychological-warfare coordination agency at the national level to provide guidance and coordination for national psychological-warfare actions.
- Establish a psychological-warfare command agency, under the

unified leadership of the Central Military Commission and the party committee.
- Establish psychological-warfare scientific research agencies of all kinds to guide the work nationally and in the military.
- Establish a specialized psychological-warfare corps that would form a consolidated and effective psychological attack force.
- Develop a modernized basis for psychological-warfare material and technical equipment.
- Form a people's psychological-warfare mentality by developing psychological-warfare education for the masses and for all commanders in the military.[47]

According to Wang and Yang, China has many psychological-warfare shortcomings to overcome. Those include the backwardness and the nonspecialization of its current psychological-operations forces, a lack of talent, and the lack of a unified and coordinated psychological-warfare command. Wang and Yang also believe that China lacks a unified understanding of the strategic role of psychological warfare and of the role that psychological warfare can play in high-tech local wars.[48]

Wang, Ma and Yan believe that in order for China to overcome its weakness in equipment, materials and technical content, it must develop a force that combines its mass-action strength with a specialized structure for psychological warfare.[49] Overall, China's shortcomings are hindering the development of a coordinated psychological-warfare strategy for the PLA.

Apparently, other nations have noticed China's focus on psychological warfare and have responded. In January 2002, Taiwan, taking advice from U.S. military officials, activated its first modern psychological-warfare unit to counter China's buildup.[50] The existing Taiwanese psychological-operations unit, which is part of the political-warfare department, does not focus on such subjects as information warfare.

Finally, China will continue to view the U.S. as its major psychological-warfare threat. Xu says that the U.S.'s objective is to gain benefits from the Chinese consumer market and to maintain long-term political and psychological pressure on China. The U.S. will accomplish that objective by attacking China's national self-respect and by compelling China to do what the U.S. asks.[51] Xu warns the Chinese that psychological acceptance of socialism depends on China's comprehensive national strength and on the level of progress that the social system achieves in economic development and in socialist awakening. He says that one cannot believe that "the foreign moon is rounder than our own," for this is defeatist psychology. Conviction in the correctness of one's own system is what works, and that is what is required.[52]

In order for China to overcome its weakness in equipment, materials and technical content, it must develop a force that combines its mass-action strength with a specialized structure for psychological warfare.

In the end, we should not expect China to waver from the main characteristics of its psychological-warfare doctrine: strong reliance on the use of war experience; deep cultural roots; the influence of Marxist materialist dialectics; and the role of strategic deception.[53] China will use power projection as a means of achieving success in influencing the activities of foreign nations. Its centralized leadership system will continue to exert control over the news, propaganda and public opinion.[54] Most important for Western analysts is the fact that Chinese theorists "think" strategically in a way that few foreigners do. Western analysts will have to come to terms with this fact if they hope to learn to predict Chinese psychological-warfare strategy in the coming years. ✂

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Notes:

[1] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping, "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," *Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), 20 December 2000, pp. 127-33, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site on 8 March 2001. No specific pages will be listed for quotes from the articles used in the preparation of this article, since the author cannot read Chinese and does not know on which pages of the articles the translations (from FBIS) appeared.

[2] These articles form the basis for this discussion. The journal *China Military Science* is the rough equivalent of the U.S. armed forces' *Joint Force Quarterly*. One of the Chinese articles noted that the terms "psychological warfare" and "psychological operations" are interchangeable (which, of course, Western analysts would refute). This author uses the term "psychological warfare" because FBIS translators used the term more often than they used "psychological operations." One exception is the article by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng, for

which translators used the term "psychological operations" exclusively.

[3] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng, "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," *Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), Issue 5 2002, pp. 88-94, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 14 January 2002.

[4] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[5] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[6] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[7] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[8] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[9] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[10] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[11] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[12] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," *Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), Issue 5 2000, pp. 67-76, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 11 December 2000.

[13] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy," *Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), 30 September 2001, pp. 94-100, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 21 November 2001.

[14] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[15] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[16] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[17] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[18] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, "Comparison of Psychological Warfare Between China and the West," *Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), Issue 6 2000, pp. 102-10, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 25 June 2001.

[19] Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli, "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," *Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), Issue 6 2000, pp. 117-26, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 8 March 2001.

[20] Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.

[21] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[22] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.

[23] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.

[24] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.

[25] Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.

[26] Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.

[27] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[28] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[29] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[30] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[31] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[32] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.

[33] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[34] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[35] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[36] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[37] Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.

[38] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[39] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[40] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[41] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[42] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[43] Xu Hezhen, "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy."

[44] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[45] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[46] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[47] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[48] Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.

[49] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.

[50] Brian Hsu, *Taipei Times* (Internet Version-WWW), 7 December 2001, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 7 December 2001.

[51] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[52] Xu Hezhen, "Focus on Psychological War."

[53] Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

[54] Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.

Special Forces: What Makes It Special?

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Charles E. Simmons, U.S. Army (ret.)

What's so special about Special Forces? I agree with Command Sergeant Major William Edge that what is special is that SF is the only combat unit in the United States Army in which enlisted men can and do command troops — in schools as teachers, in guerrilla bands as organizers and leaders, and in foreign armies as advisers and leaders. Where else can staff sergeants serve as platoon leaders, sergeants first class as company commanders, and master sergeants as battalion commanders?

Perhaps you don't believe that three companies of 150 men and a 40-man scout platoon could be a battalion? Why? Because they were Montagnards, Cambodians or Chinese Nungs? Think again. Did you ever hear of the Mike Force? Delta? Sigma? Omega? CCN? All of those units were led by SF; some of them were even led by E4s.

But they were not led by the bare-chested, snake-eating, guitar-playing Rambo types portrayed by the media as the "Green Berets." A green beret is nothing more than a hat — a symbol to the world of what you are: an SF soldier. No, the Special Forces I am referring to are the men who worked at Khe Sahn, the Ashau Valley, Phu Bai, Kontum, Dak To, Lang Ve, and a thousand other places that were denied to the enemy because six to 12 SF soldiers lived there and dared "Charlie" to come and take it.

In many cases Charlie tried, but the SF soldiers and their Montagnards, Combods and Chinese Nungs in the Mike Force denied him the victory. There were no 175 mm howitzers or eight-inch guns for artillery cover — just air cover when we could get it, and we got plenty of it in Vietnam. It was deadly accurate, usually called in by sergeants. The Hueys, Cobras, bombers and sleek fast movers all brought death from the sky to our common enemy.

The heart of the SF group is the A-detachment, which is composed of 10 sergeants and two officers. The A-detachment is a self-contained, do-anything group of men. And yet those men are the first to tell you that they could not do their jobs without the support of the unsung heroes who man the supply, commo, personnel, psywar, civic-action and flight organizations farther back.

You see, the A-detachment is only the blade of the axe. But it takes the whole axe to cut a tree, and that's the real SF: the whole axe. Officers — good men who had blisters and cuts from stringing wire, sunburns and bug bites from filling sandbags, and bruised shoulders from firing BARs — were right there in the mud and blood with their men.

These officers wore oak leaves and bars, but usually you could not see their rank, because they hung their shirts on tree

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Mr. Simmons' article is taken from a speech he gave to graduates of the SF Qualification Course during their regimental supper in February 2003. — Editor

File photo

Special Forces soldiers meet with members of an Afghan militia unit. SF requires soldiers who are self-starters and who are capable of working with little supervision.

limbs while they worked and sweated with the troops. They had nerves of steel; they were leaders you respected and never forgot. There was the major who personally led a relief party to rescue a wounded sergeant who was cut off, lost and pursued by the remnants of an NVA company — and brought him out alive. There were the lean and mean "slick" pilots who stood their groaning Hueys on their tails in order to load wounded Montagnards. Or perhaps they yanked you out of the jungle on a McGuire rig for a ride you would never forget. There were also the soft-voiced chaplains who gave comfort to the dying in a bloody mortar pit in the drenching rain.

And the medics — they are truly the eighth wonder of the world. Their routine feats read too much like fiction, but they were and still are more than medics; they are also super riflemen and scouts — killers as well as healers. They are often your first link in establishing rapport.

That was and still is Special Forces. Vietnam wasn't Saigon bars; it was hard reality and too much death. We had our crooks and drunks and quitters, all to our shame. We also had our giants, and by God, most were there because they wanted to be there. Professionals every one, trained as force multipliers. They were few in number, but they were strong in mind, heart and spirit.

Yes, I miss them. I miss their friendship and their respect. It's all a part of being special. Webster defines special as "distinguished by some uncommon quality; designed or selected for some particular purpose; having an individual character that is noteworthy; unique."

SF NCO/officer interoperability

The demands of SF operations, then and now, are directly proportional to the interoperability of SF NCOs and officers. We are not a squad in the 82nd, the Rangers or some other conventional unit. We are all highly competitive, proactive self-starters who require the absolute minimum of supervision and guidance to get the job done. We are able to work alone for long periods of time, if necessary, with no light at the end of the tunnel. But our most endearing asset is the innovative, intelligent, thinking NCO.

It is imperative that newly appointed SF officers fully understand seven facts:

- SF NCOs are experts at their jobs.
- The officers don't know the NCOs' jobs.
- SF NCOs don't want and don't need close supervision.
- The team sergeant is the detachment commander's first point of reference.
- The warrant officer and team sergeant can do the detachment commander's job.
- The team can function without the detachment commander.
- The detachment commander should be prepared and willing to take off his shirt and get down and dirty with the team.

Detachment commanders, if you want to

earn the respect of your team members, don't show up with the attitude that you know it all, because you don't. Be a team player. Lead by example and, most of all, trust your men and their advice. They have been performing real-world missions for years, and you are the new kid on the block who must prove his worth.

SF's role in the war on terrorism

On a night in mid-October 2001, 11 members of an A-detachment from the 5th SF Group dropped into a valley deep inside Taliban territory in central Afghanistan. The austere, wild gash in the earth prompted some of the team members to remark to one another, "This place looks like the back side of the moon." Gentlemen, every man on that team was carrying America's foreign policy on his shoulders, and that's one hell of a responsibility.

On a night in mid-October 2001, 11 members of an A-detachment from the 5th SF Group dropped into a valley deep inside Taliban territory in central Afghanistan. … The success or failure of … America's war on terrorism rested entirely on the shoulders of each member of that team, regardless of rank.

Out of the darkness stepped Hamid Karzai, now the interim leader of Afghanistan, but who was then merely the head of a modest militia force that the U.S. hoped could galvanize the Pashtun tribes of southern Afghanistan against the Taliban authorities. The success or failure of uniting those tribes and the conduct of America's war on terrorism rested entirely on the shoulders of each member of that team, regardless of rank. These are some of the responsibilities you will face when you wear the green beret. Can you handle it?

Sept. 11, 2001, was America's introduction to terrorism, and that A-detachment, your brothers, was our answer to the Taliban and al-Qaeda who had made the big mistake of waking a sleeping giant. Once again, SF was called on to fight an unconventional war: our type of war. For me, watching the news — the images of horseback-riding SF troopers directing B-52 strikes with laser designators and working with their Afghan counterparts — brought back many memories, tears and tremendous pride. Those fine young SF warriors were doing what thousands of SF troopers had done before — adapting to the conditions, establishing rapport, pressing on and getting the job done.

But SF's greatest contribution to the campaign in Afghanistan occurred unseen during the two years before the terrorist attacks. In 1999, the U.S. president's Middle East envoy, Anthony Zinni — then a four-star Marine general who was responsible for strengthening relations with the former soviet republics in central Asia — directed his special-operations forces, in the words of Brigadier General Frank Toney Jr., to use their "military-to-military peacetime techniques to open up the new Asian nations for training with U.S. forces."

Roughly 2,000 SF soldiers are engaged in training missions around the globe at any given time. At a time when U.S. businesses and many diplomats viewed the central Asian region as a dangerous place that was best left to its own devices, Army SF teams were conducting training missions in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, where they developed personal relationships that remain critically important in that part of the world.

When the time came for the U.S. to wage war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the Uzbeks immediately offered their assistance. American transport aircraft were touching down on Uzbeki soil barely a week after Sept. 11, and a major base was quickly established at Khanabad, 130 miles north of the Afghan border. By mid-November, the Tajiks had made available three bases from which the U.S. could launch offensive operations (the Pentagon chose one of them), and the Tajiks' offer was soon followed by one from the Kyrgys. SF's familiarity with each nation's culture and topography, along with the mutual trust that had developed between the central-Asian and American soldiers, allowed the U.S. to conduct combat operations with stunning rapidity and effect.

In Afghanistan, SF demonstrated that it had learned well the lessons of the past. In the new war against global terror networks, SF needs all its hard-won experience and skills to bring the fight to those who would harm America.

The war on terrorism is a far more dangerous war than the Vietnam War was. At least in Vietnam, we knew the country that we were fighting against. You who are graduating face no specific country or army, and the enemy — the terrorists — are dedicated to destroying America and are willing to die for their beliefs. Your skills, adaptability and courage will be put to the test, and the test will be ongoing for many years, because this will be a long and deadly war. Unfortunately, we have already lost some of our brothers, and more will die in combat. There is a job to be done, and our country and our president are depending on us to see it through to victory. We will be victorious, but it will not be easy.

During World War II, there were many who said that the Nazis were 10 feet tall and that the Japanese were unbeatable. Yes, the Germans were ahead of us in technology (with jet fighters, V-2 rockets and V-1 buzz bombs), and when our forces entered the mountains of Peenamunde, they found on the drawing boards a prototype three-stage rocket designed to hit New York City. The Japanese had resorted to kamikaze attacks with devastating results. Yet, we beat both armies, won the war and turned our former enemies into prospering democracies who are world powers in the 21st century. I believe we can do the same in the Middle East: We can win the war, and we can lay the foundations of democracy. All people, regardless of their location on this planet, want to be free. The people of Iraq are no different, and you will play a significant part in their liberation.

The ways in which SF operates are changing. The tried and battle-tested techniques of World War II, Korea and Vietnam are blending with the high-tech weapons of war. That's as it should be — SF is known

Photo by JaMarco Bowen

An NCO from the 10th SF Group describes to a Russian jumpmaster the drop zone to be used during an exercise. Each day, nearly 2,000 SF soldiers are engaged in training missions worldwide.

SF teams in Afghanistan have performed close air support missions using laptop computers and satellite communications.

File photo

for its flexibility. Historically, the military has been resistant to the development of SF and to the use of unconventional methods in dealing with threats. All that is changing because of the reality that terrorists will target areas in which the state is weak. Changes also mean that SF may have to work in different ways, using techniques not associated with conventional military operations or even with "white" elements of SF operations.

Afghanistan has shown how new weaponry, combined with real-time intelligence, can transform a conflict while using very few people on the ground. The SF teams in Afghanistan used backpack-sized satellite laptops that linked them to aircraft and allowed the precise targeting by close air support that proved pivotal in forcing the Taliban's collapse.

But as things change, the old battle-tested requirements are even more important. The very survival of SF depends on detailed mission planning that is based on strategic, operational and tactical intelligence that is specific, comprehensive and current. Such intelligence requirements are not new to SF, but they are far more vital in today's war on terrorism. SF personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the operational area — including its geographic, political, social, economic and environmental conditions and its language. One reason that we were able to get into Afghanistan as quickly as we did is that we had spent years working in Uzbekistan, training Uzbeki border guards.

These are exciting times for SF, but they are also extremely dangerous times. I would love to be out there with you and about to start a career in SF, but my time has passed, and the torch is now handed to you. I have had a wonderful career. As a young black kid from the ghettos of Brooklyn, I never dreamed that I would one day qualify for America's elite Special Forces. President Kennedy authorized the wearing of the beret by Special Forces in October 1961. Exactly one year later, in October 1962, I came to Training Group to begin my SF training. I am still in awe, knowing that I stood in the ranks with some of the greatest heroes in SF and American military history. To be respected and counted as one of them is a unique, special privilege and an honor that I will always deeply cherish.

Family

Your family will suffer emotionally, perhaps far more than you will realize. When you're deployed, which will be quite often, you will know that your family is safe, regardless of where you are. However, your family will have to live with the uncertainty of your location and with the uncertainty of

your safety. The burden of not knowing is deeply depressing, and it can create problems upon your return if you, the returning SF warrior, do not make every effort to assure your family that you understand what they have experienced. It is paramount that you demonstrate that understanding by spending real quality time with your family. Once you are home, no matter what mission you were on, it is not the time to hang out or to party with your team.

Over time, I came to understand that my family established their own daily SOP during my absence and that their SOP worked. My coming home signaled a change in the daily SOP, and that change led to conflict and family disruption. Yes, on deployments I was great at establishing rapport; I was flexible; I could blend in with the indigenous people of any culture. But at home, I was an absolute failure at establishing rapport and in being flexible with my own family. But I learned, and learned quickly, to change my ways. From my experience, it is best not to assert control once you are home. It is far better to support your wife's SOP with understanding and patience — the same understanding and patience that you demonstrated on your last mission. I cannot emphasize this point enough in support of family harmony.

For 29 years of my 31-year SF career, my wife was an SF wife extraordinaire. Not once was I ever called home during those 29 years, for any reason. This speaks volumes of her dedication as an SF wife to me, to the U.S. Army and to our country. I am sure that one of the main reasons our marriage has worked is that I learned to make some changes in my attitude once I came home. Without a doubt, my wife is the real unsung hero in our family, the true trooper. All SF wives are unsung heroes. They receive none of the recognition, glory or praise that the SF soldier receives. That's why it's incumbent upon you to ensure that your wife and family know that you consider them heroes — a special breed who make great sacrifices daily on your behalf. Their sacrifices allow you to perform your job as an SF soldier without worry. Through your actions, you must demonstrate to your family that you appreciate and recognize the sacrifices they make in supporting you.

Thank you for allowing me to share this special time with you. I only hope that perhaps something of what I said this evening will be of benefit to you as you start your SF career. Remember, SF does not follow where the path leads. Instead, we go where there is no path and leave a trail for others to follow. That's the SF way. Good luck, keep your head down, and watch your six o'clock.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Charles E. Simmons, U.S. Army (ret.), entered the Army in 1959. Following Infantry assignments in the 101st Airborne Division, he volunteered for Special Forces training in 1962. His enlisted SF service included a variety of assignments with the 5th, 8th, 11th, 6th, 10th and 1st SF Groups, including service with the 5th SF Group in Vietnam. In 1985 he completed the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course and was commissioned an SF warrant officer. During his SF warrant-officer assignments, he served as an SF technician and as a battalion assistant plans and operations officer, 1/1st SF Group; and as senior instructor/writer, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Involved in competitive swimming for the last 51 years, Simmons has represented North Carolina as a swimmer in the Senior Olympics and in U.S. masters swimming. In retirement, he continues to serve the SF community. He plays the role of a guerrilla chief during the SF Qualification Course's Robin Sage field-training exercise, and he serves as a swimming instructor during Special Forces Assessment and Selection.

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What is Civil Affairs?

by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Cahill

For many years, soldiers in United States Army Civil Affairs, or CA, have participated in major and minor operations as well as in numerous training exercises at all levels of command. Despite the exposure those operations and exercises have given CA soldiers, commanders and military planners at all levels appear to retain misconceptions about CA. Moreover, because the nature of CA is complex, many soldiers in the CA community find it difficult to explain to others what CA's mission really is.

The current definition of Civil Affairs, accepted both by the Army and by the joint community, is contained in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Feb 2000). CA units are defined as "designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations." This article will explore the definition in detail in order to provide information that will assist CA soldiers in educating others on both the makeup and the functions of Civil Affairs.

Designated forces

Department of Defense Directive 2000.13 (27 June 1994) designated "U.S. Army civil affairs forces (as) 'special operations forces' (SOF) under 10 U.S.C. 167." As SOF, CA soldiers possess unique skills that are not found elsewhere in the Army. Those skills include language expertise, regional orientation, and a keen appreciation for an operational environment's civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and history. Some CA soldiers have additional civilian specialties that can be maintained only in the civil sector. However, the skills, capabilities and perspectives that those CA soldiers bring to a military operation can be critical.

Soldiers enter the rolls of CA by joining the Civil Affairs Branch (Branch 38), by becoming members of Functional Area 39, or by acquiring the enlisted skill-qualification identifier, or SQI, "D."

Branch 38 is found only in the Army Reserve. Ninety-one percent of CA forces are assigned to the reserve component. The CA Branch is not an accession branch for officers. CA officers transfer into Branch 38 after they complete the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC. Officers must graduate from a basic-branch captain's career course (formerly officer advanced course) prior to attending the CAQC. Enlisted soldiers receive military occupational specialty 38A when they complete advanced individual training at Fort Bragg, N.C., or when they complete the 38A reclassification course offered at one of several locations of The Army School System, or TASS.

Soldiers in the CA Branch fall into two categories: CA generalist and CA specialist. They wear the CA Branch insignia and are members of the CA Regiment.

In the active component, officers are part of Functional Area 39C (the Department of the

Army should soon approve the designation of CA as FA 38). NCOs receive skill-qualification identifier, or SQI, "D" when they complete the CAQC. Most CA soldiers receive additional training in a selected language, and they attend the Regional Studies Course. Soldiers who complete that additional training will be qualified to fill positions in the 96th CA Battalion and on civil-military operations, or CMO, staffs throughout the Army — most notably, the posts of Stryker Brigade Combat Team CA officer, and division and corps G5. Active-duty CA soldiers are almost exclusively CA generalists; very few have CA-specialty capabilities. They wear the insignia of their basic branch and are invited to affiliate with the CA Regiment.

Whether the soldiers of the CA community are soldiers in Branch 38, officers in Functional Area 39, or NCOs with SQI D, they are all integral to CA operations. Their complementary capabilities, when properly employed, increase the effectiveness and the success of CA operations.

Units

CA forces are organized into commands, brigades and battalions. All CA units based in the continental United States are assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, a major command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. CA units support military organizations from the theater commander to maneuver battalions.

Some CA units are specifically designated to work with theater-support commands, area-support groups, corps-support commands, or special-operations commands. CA units focus on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of military operations corresponding to the operational focus of their supported organization. They also focus on national, provincial and local levels of government.

Organization and training

CA forces are often employed as teams or as individuals. The CA unit structure contains planning teams, tactical teams and specialty teams. The planning teams augment organic CMO staff sections at the division level and above. The tactical teams provide generalist expertise at the brigade level and below. The specialty teams provide expertise in government functions, public-facilities functions, economics and commerce functions, and five special functions at all operational levels. Specialist capabilities are more numerous at the CA command and brigade levels and are somewhat limited at the battalion level. The specialty functions are addressed in more detail later in this article.

CA planning teams and tactical teams are capable of establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center, or CMOC, at all levels of command. The purpose of the CMOC is to facilitate early collaborative interagency planning and to synchronize the operations of military and nonmilitary organizations in an operational area, or OA, across full-spectrum operations. In the past, CMOCs have relied on their supported unit to provide most of the equipment required to perform their critical function. As of this writing, initiatives are under way at USASOC to add the necessary CMOC equipment to unit tables of organization and equipment.

Photo by Cecilio Ricardo

A U.S. Civil Affairs soldier visits a displaced-persons camp in Afghanistan to evaluate security concerns of humanitarian-aid agencies.

Civil Affairs activities

CA soldiers prepare for and execute operations that fall into six CA activities, described in detail below. There are strategic, operational, and tactical considerations

Photo by Daniel T. Dark

U.S. Civil Affairs soldiers work with Iraqi citizens to unload humanitarian-relief supplies in Iraq.

for each of the activities. There are also requirements for both CA generalists and specialists in each activity. The CA activities become CA lines of operation and occur simultaneously with military operations across full-spectrum operations (from war to military operations other than war). The goal is to transition the CA activities to indigenous civilian control as quickly as possible. The CA activities are:

Foreign nation support, or FNS. FNS is civil or military assistance given to the U.S. or its allies by a host nation or by other members of the international community during peacetime, crises, emergencies or war. The CA role during FNS is to:

- Identify or validate sources of FNS.
- Consult, enforce or monitor FNS agreements.
- Track the costs associated with the use of FNS assets.
- Perform quality-control assessments of FNS products, services and associated costs.
- Identify and evaluate measures of effectiveness.
- Assist in the arbitration of problems arising from the use or the misuse of FNS.
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of populace-and-resource-control, or PRC, operations from military control to the control of agencies of either the indigenous government or the international community.

PRC operations. PRC operations provide security for the populace, regulate the movement of or the consumption of material resources, mobilize human or materiel resources, deny personnel or materiel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace-control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards and resettlement. Resource-control measures include licensing, regulations, guidelines, checkpoints, ration controls and amnesty programs. Dislocated-civilian, or DC, operations and noncombatant-evacuation operations are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

The CA role is to:

- Identify or evaluate existing host-nation PRC measures.
- Advise the commander on PRC measures that could support his objectives.
- Recommend ways the command could implement PRC measures.
- Publicize control measures among host-nation authorities or educate the populace.
- Assess the effectiveness of control measures.
- Participate in implementing selected PRC operations and activities as needed or as directed. CA soldiers cannot be everywhere and do all things, but they may be useful at key decisive points; e.g., roadblocks or DC collection points.
- Assist in the arbitration of problems that arise from the implementation of PRC measures.
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of PRC operations from military control to the control of agencies of either the indigenous government or the international community.

Humanitarian assistance, or HA. HA is provided by U.S. military forces to relieve or reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property. The CA role is to:

- Participate in the interagency assessment of, the planning of, and the synchronization of HA operations.
- Identify, validate or evaluate the resources of either the host nation or the international community that are designated for use in HA operations.
- Track costs associated with the use of HA assets.

- Perform quality-control assessments of HA activities and costs.
- Assist in the arbitration of problems that arise from HA operations.
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of HA operations from military control to the control of agencies of either the indigenous government or the international community.

Military civic action, or MCA. MCA is the use of predominantly indigenous military forces to accomplish mitigating or developmental projects that will be useful to the local populace. An essential feature of MCA is that the projects also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces or of the indigenous government with the populace. The CA role in MCA is to:

- Identify, validate, and evaluate nominations for MCA projects.
- Synchronize MCA projects with other programs.
- Participate in the implementation of selected MCA activities, as needed or as directed.
- Perform quality-control assessments of MCA activities and costs.
- Assist in the arbitration of problems that arise from MCA operations.
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of MCA operations from military control to the control of agencies of either the indigenous government or the international community.

Emergency services, or ES. ES is the employment of the combined emergency-management authorities, policies, procedures and resources of local, state and national governments in order to mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural, man-made or technological disasters. ES includes incorporating voluntary disaster-relief organizations, the private sector, and international sources into a national response network. The CA role in ES is to:

- Participate in the interagency assessment of, the planning of, and the synchronization of ES operations.
- Identify, validate or evaluate the resources of either the host nation or the international community that are designated for use in ES operations.
- Participate in the implementation of selected ES activities, as needed or as directed.
- Track costs associated with implementing ES.
- Perform quality-control assessments of ES activities and costs.
- Assist in the arbitration of problems that arise from ES operations.
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of ES operations from military control to the control of agencies of either the indigenous government or the international community.

Support to civil administration, or SCA. SCA operations help stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or the civil structure of an OA through civil assistance, civil administration in friendly territory, or civil administration in occupied territory. The CA role in SCA is to:

CMO refers to the activities of a commander that focus on the relations between the indigenous populace and the various military, government and nongovernment organizations. CA soldiers must be involved early in the CMO planning process.

- Identify, validate or evaluate the host-nation infrastructure.
- Identify the host nation's needs in terms of the 16 CA functional specialties.
- Monitor and anticipate the host nation's future requirements in terms of the 16 CA functional specialties.
- Perform liaison functions between military organizations and civilian agencies.
- Coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational support for civil-administration activities.
- Participate in the implementation of selected SCA activities, as needed or as directed.
- Perform quality-control assessments of SCA activities and costs.
- Assist in the arbitration of problems that arise from SCA operations.
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of SCA operations from military

control to the control of agencies of either the indigenous government or the international community.

Civil-military operations

CMO is a command responsibility. CMO refers to the activities of a commander that focus on the relations between the indigenous populace and the various military, government and nongovernment organizations. CA soldiers must be involved early in the CMO planning process if they are to adequately support the commander in executing CMO. CA soldiers must be fully integrated into the staff of the supported unit, and they must educate the supported unit on the operational risks of not engaging the civil component of the operational environment. Some of the common roles that CA soldiers perform in support of CMO are as follows:

Photo by Kelly Matthew Burkhart

A U.S. Civil Affairs soldier shows Afghani soldiers how to heat MREs during a medical civic-action program in Afghanistan.

- Establish and maintain a CMOC to facilitate interagency coordination.
- Analyze the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events of the OA to determine how they might help, hinder or be affected by military operations.
- Monitor operations to minimize any negative impact, to identify the need for follow-on CA activities, and to determine when CMO measures of effectiveness have been achieved.
- Assist commanders at all levels in fulfilling the command responsibilities that are inherent in CMO, either directly (by conducting CA activities) or indirectly (by serving as an adviser).
- Coordinate and synchronize the transition of CMO from military control to the control of the indigenous government.
- Facilitate transition of operations from military to indigenous civilian control.

Additionally, CA soldiers perform specialized roles that support CMO, including:

- Enhance force protection and situational awareness by routinely engaging indigenous authorities in the OA.
- Provide support to the civil administration in the 16 CA functional specialties, as required.

Functional specialties

The 16 CA functional specialties fall into four broad categories that reflect the basic elements of modern societies: government functions, economics and commerce functions, public-facilities functions and special functions.

Government. The government function includes the CA functional specialties of international law, public administration, public education, public health and public safety. The primary goals of the government function are as follows:

- Ensure that legal systems conform to accepted international law principles.
- Ensure that governmental processes are viable and that they are supported by the indigenous populace.
- Ensure that an education system is established, that it is functioning, and that it is sustainable.
- Ensure that public-health systems are in place, that they are viable, and that they are available to all.
- Ensure that public-safety organizations exist, that they meet the needs of the populace, and that they operate in a nondiscriminatory manner.

Economics and commerce. The economics-and-commerce function includes the CA functional specialties of civilian supply, economic development, and food and agriculture. The primary goals of the economics-and-commerce function are as follows:

- Ensure that civilian resources used in

support of military operations are obtained and that they are accounted for according to international law and U.S. policy, while also maintaining adequate civilian resources to support the essential needs of the populace.
- Ensure that systems and incentives exist to stimulate economic development.
- Ensure that resources, facilities and systems exist to support the production, processing, storage and distribution of food, fiber and wood products.

Public facilities. The public-facilities function includes the CA functional specialties of public communications, transportation, and public works and utilities. The primary goals of the public-facilities function are as follows:
- Ensure that adequate communications services exist to support public services and private enterprise.
- Ensure that adequate transportation systems exist and that they allow the mobility of people and goods.
- Ensure that facilities that support power generation, public water, sewage treatment, sanitation, flood control, port operations, public housing and other public works and utilities exist, that they are operating, and that they are properly maintained.

Special functions. The special functions include the CA functional specialties of civil information, cultural relations, dislocated civilians, emergency services, and environmental management. The primary goals of the special functions are as follows:
- Ensure that resources, organizations, plans and agreements exist to support the dissemination of civil information through various media while retaining a "single voice" message.
- Ensure that friendly forces understand, preserve and protect the OA's social and cultural aspects, including traditions, language, and significant cultural property and facilities.
- Ensure that resources, organizations, plans and agreements exist to minimize civilian interference with military operations and protect civilians from combat operations.
- Ensure that resources, organizations, plans and agreements exist to support the mitigation of, the preparedness for, the response to, and the recovery from natural, man-made and technological disasters.
- Ensure that adequate systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities exist to support environmental and pollution control.

The purpose of this article was to explore the current definition of Civil Affairs and to help CA soldiers explain the many aspects of CA to others. In the end, there is no simple explanation that encompasses all aspects of CA. The main point is that military operations and civil-military operations occur simultaneously in all environments. While the rest of the Army focuses primarily on war-fighting and on defeating a defined enemy, CA soldiers focus on the various, complex nonmilitary aspects of the operation. As military destructive engagements give way to civilian constructive engagements, CA soldiers — generalists and specialists — facilitate the transition. CA soldiers engage the civil component of the operational environment at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In any operation, their knowledge, experience and perspective can be of great value from the early planning stages to the final redeployment of U.S. forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Cahill is chief of the training branch of the CA/CMO Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He is a 1984 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. In prior assignments, he served in Company C, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade; and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. He holds an additional skill identifier as a Civil Defense Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill is a graduate of both the Command and General Staff College and the Army Management Staff College. In addition, he holds a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Cross-Cultural Communication in Support of Group Dynamics

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton

I don't believe that conventional military minds have grasped the potential of Special Forces. In Haiti, we had an infantry division sitting around, wondering what to do, while 20 Special Forces teams were out running the country. There were enough dissidents in Panama that 20 Special Forces teams could have raised a revolution that would have taken care of Manuel Noriega. Instead, we launched an invasion in 1989 and then had to pay for the damage.

Aaron Bank, February 1998

The purpose of this article is to assist the Special Forces soldier in assessing the cultural environment in his area of operations, thus improving the likelihood of mission success.

SF A-detachments interact with diverse, unique groups while executing their mission of unconventional warfare, or UW. The relative influence of the various cultural groups and their effects on the SF detachment are largely determined by whether the detachment is engaged in warfare or in peacetime activities. Understanding the way that the various cultural groups affect the operational environment and developing relationships with those groups are critical to the SF detachment's success.

Because most North Americans have a limited amount of cross-cultural experience when they join the military, their ability to understand and influence other cultures is limited. But it is imperative that the SF soldier assess his surroundings more efficiently than conventional soldiers do so that he can achieve his desired end state without losing his credibility or losing rapport at the start of the mission.

Although every situation is different, soldiers can analyze special situations by applying general principles. In this article, we will consider the relationships of different cultural groups in a peacetime scenario. For clarity's sake, we will evaluate several groups in order to demonstrate the multiple facets of cross-cultural communication. The groups chosen for our scenario are generalizations; individual situations will vary. In the area of operations, there will be social, military and professional organizations. They will have their own objectives and their own cultural ethos within which they will compete for limited resources, leadership and influence. Each organization's relationships, history and agenda will have unique influences on the other organizations. Values that are common to the United States military, such as unity of effort or selfless service, may not exist within these organizations.

This article will measure other cultural groups' values against a group of U.S. individual values. SF team members must understand their own individual values and compare them to those of the other groups. We will use one control group, eight

File photo

To build rapport and to accomplish its mission, the SF team must understand the multiple cultures and subcultures within a country.

core groups and two supplemental groups. The control group is "Individual U.S. Values." The eight core groups are "U.S. Country Team," "Host Nation Military," "Guerrilla Force," "Host Nation Government," "Host Nation Populace," "U.S. General-Purpose Forces," "U.S. Special-Operations Forces," and "Enemy Groups." The supplemental groups are "U.S. Public Opinion" and "U.S. Policy-Makers," but we will not discuss the supplemental groups in this article.

Before an SF team enters a country, its members must have divested themselves of cultural stereotypes, and they must have developed an understanding of the multiple cultures and subcultures within the country. Sometimes, team members will have to make generalizations, but doing so is always dangerous. The consequences of applying Western stereotypes can hurt the team's credibility; they can hamper the team's ability to build rapport and, ultimately, they can affect mission accomplishment.

The first cultures that team members must understand are their own U.S. military value system and their individual ethnic cultural background. A person from New York City may not have the same cultural mores as someone raised in southern Louisiana, but generally there are some "core" U.S. values. The following list is a starting point from which the team members can begin to compare their collective values to those of the various groups with whom they will be interacting.

The SF team will also interact with the

Core American Values (the control-group values)	**Other Country's Values**
Individualism	Group membership
Equality	Status
Competition (individual)	Cooperation
Hard work=material gain	Status/birthright
Judaeo-Christian culture	Religion
Immediate family	Extended family
Focuses on youth	Venerates age
Gov't by law/republic/ democracy	Gov't by personality/ connections/power

Figure 1



core groups, specifically the U.S. country team. Country teams are organized differently, and their goals may vary; however, their general dynamics remain constant. The SF team's best course of action will be to look, to listen and to identify the embassy's "power players." Although officers of the U.S. Foreign Service do not wear military uniforms or adhere to military discipline, they do follow implicit standards of conduct and protocol. If SF soldiers do not follow those same standards, they can damage their team's credibility with the country team.

If an SF soldier enters an embassy poorly dressed, he will alienate himself, because he will be unable to blend in with his surroundings. The embassy may not have a dress code, but the soldier will always be under close scrutiny because he is not a part of the organization. Generally, wearing a business suit, necktie and dress shoes will go a long way toward creating a professional appearance. Wearing suits that are trendy, flamboyant or 30 years out of date will not help the SF team accomplish its mission.

The speech and body language that the SF soldier uses in the embassy are also important. Many Foreign Service officers are erudite. They have been educated in Ivy League schools and consider themselves to be educationally elite. Speaking English correctly and clearly is an indicator of education. A soldier who uses vulgar or profane language in the embassy risks characterizing himself as someone who lacks professional credibility. Even if State Department and Foreign Service personnel are using crude language, the SF soldier must remember that he is not a member of the club, and he should tactfully refrain

from becoming involved in the conversation. Maintaining a professional demeanor, without being arrogant, will pay great dividends in credibility.

Professionalism counts, and a professional appearance can be a foot in the door. SF soldiers should always afford common courtesy and respect to their counterparts in the embassy. There are many officers in the embassy who are equivalent to general officers and colonels. They should be given a level of respect and courtesy commensurate with their rank. In summary, never forget your military bearing. Simple courtesies, such as standing when a person of higher rank enters the room, may catch the embassy personnel off-guard, but the courtesy will usually be appreciated.

Figure 1 shows the typical structure and responsibilities of a country team. As the country team interacts, it rarely acts in an entirely harmonious manner because it represents so many organizations. Although all country-team organizations work for the ambassador, each organization has its own goals, and each one answers to its own chain of command in the U.S. There is always a possibility that an organization's representative in-country could receive guidance from his supervisor in the U.S. that conflicts with the guidance from the ambassador.

The SF team leader must understand the operational environment and know where the SF detachment fits into the embassy's big picture. Large bureaucratic organizations and the individuals within them will push for power, and the team could fail in its mission if its members do not understand their operational limits.

The embassy's MILGROUP focuses on security-assistance efforts and engagement activities in order to develop the host nation's military forces, to provide assistance, and to strengthen military-to-military ties. The status of the MILGROUP depends upon the amount of military action that is needed in the country. In a country that places a low priority on military effort, the MILGROUP will have a significantly lower standing than the other embassy departments.

Most country teams have a rudimentary appreciation of SF. The SF team will need to educate the civilian and military members of the country team about SF's capabilities and SF's possible usefulness to the country team. Within the country team,

Figure 2

	Individual U.S. Values	U.S. Country Team	Guerrilla Force	Host Nation Military	Host Nation Government	Host Nation Populace	U.S. General-Purpose Forces	U.S. Special-Operations Forces	Enemy Groups	U.S. Public Opinion	U.S. Policy-Makers
ODA											
Plan/Problem											
Decision											
Action											
Reaction											
Counteraction											

Often, the populace is the center of gravity for other groups that the SF team is trying to counter. Gaining the support of the populace may be a protracted effort.

Photo by Ronald Mitchell

each section's attitude toward the U.S. military will be determined by the section's agenda as well as by the section's experience in working with members of the U.S. armed forces. The SF team members must be aware of the different personalities within the country team's agencies and of the agencies' varying agendas. For example, the deputy chief of mission, who is second in command of the embassy, may be the "power projector." Typically, the ambassador would be the power projector.

SF soldiers must understand their operational environment. Operational detachments adapt well to change and to new circumstances because SF soldiers are trained to be flexible, whereas the rest of the Army is trained to work in a structured environment. Understanding the different approaches and cultures within the Army will help the SF team achieve unity of effort with various groups.

The host nation is always a key to the team's success. The host nation will be home to numerous groups — including the military, the government, the civilian populace and the enemy forces or guerrilla forces. The interaction among those groups will directly affect the team's status and the team's interaction with each of the groups.

For example, if the host nation's government is concerned about a potential coup by the country's military, one's loyalty to the government, rather than one's competency, will become a major selection criterion for advancement. Educated insights into the host nation's systems and the balance of power will help the team make properly calculated decisions. Understanding the country's history and cultural ethos will also be vital in understanding the inhabitants' decision-making process. SF soldiers should pursue an aggressive theater reading program, and they should never assume that the host nation is ignorant of U.S. history.

The team's influence on the host nation's military will affect the team's relations with the host nation's populace. Often the populace is the center of gravity for either the enemy or the guerrilla support that the SF team is attempting to counter through internal defense and development. Gaining the support of the populace and legitimizing either the host nation's military or the host nation's guerrilla forces may be a protracted effort. Preconceived notions exist among all social groups, but prejudices may be especially strong between the populace and the military. The populace may be more likely to support their own internal guerrilla force than to support either their national military or a foreign force. The SF team must exercise extreme caution, because it is possible that a large number of the populace and of the military may not be loyal to the established government.

An SF-detachment commander should ask himself, How do my decisions and actions affect the short-term and long-term

relationships and courses of action, or COAs, of the different organizations with which I interact? He must understand the theater commander's regional-engagement plan so that he can comprehend his own mission and the commander's intent. Just as the SF team's actions affect the enemy's COAs, so do the enemy's actions affect the SF team's COAs — in other words, the enemy has a vote.

Figure 2 shows the interdependent relationship of the various groups and illustrates how the SF team's actions and decisions can affect many groups. The figure is a basic war-gaming chart that allows SF teams to compare the reactions of different groups to the same situation. The matrix is a simple tool for demonstrating the interaction of the groups and the complexity of their relationships. The chart may help SF teams avoid the mistake of failing to consider the implications of their decisions.

The supplemental groups do not have a impact on the day-to-day interactions within the various groups. However, the sentiments of these two groups can have a long-term influence on the SF team's mission.

In summary, an SF team engaged in either unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense must form a clear picture of the group dynamics that exist within its environment. Constant assessment of the "power players" and of the various relationships will enable the SF team to properly influence the battlefield on which it operates. The techniques and the procedures for building rapport may be different for each region, country, culture or subculture. An SF team that does not fully understand the U.S. political system and culture will have difficulty in assessing its COAs, in influencing multiple foreign groups and target groups, and in accomplishing its UW mission.

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Escape from Behind the Iron Curtain: The Odyssey of a Lodge-Act SF Soldier

by Rudolf G. Horvath

There was no moon; the night was dark; and the hour was close to midnight. It was July 1, 1950, and I was in Linz, Austria, standing on the north shore of the Danube, one of the longest and most majestic rivers in Europe. The river was the last obstacle that I would have to overcome on my four-day, circuitous escape from behind the infamous "Iron Curtain."

Linz is divided by the Danube, and there was only one bridge, about one or two kilometers to the west of my position, that connected the two sides. The river served as a natural boundary between the Russian zone of occupation (to the north) and the American zone (to the south). (After World War II, Austria and Germany were divided into four zones: Russian, American, French and British.)

From my vantage point, the contrast between the Russian zone and the American zone was striking: The Russian zone was dark and dreary, with no sign of life. Across the river, the American zone was lit-up by streetlights and neon signs. Strains of Big Band music came drifting across the river. The friendly glow of the American zone reinforced my decision to leave communist-occupied Eastern Europe.

Library of Congress

The Danube River flowing through Budapest. Following World War II, the Danube was a natural boundary between the American and Russian occupation zones.

Crossing the Danube by the bridge was not an option. The bridge was heavily guarded by the Russians. There was no rowboat in sight that I could "borrow," so my decision was made for me: I would have to swim across.

This would not be my first time to swim the Danube. My home, Budapest, is also divided by the Danube. As a high-school track-and-field athlete, I routinely swam across the river so that I could save trolley fare while on my way to the sport/swim stadium on Margit Sziget's (Margaret Island) to practice.

In the darkness, I jerry-rigged a small raft using an empty gasoline can and some wood. I completed my preparations for the swim by securing my briefcase and my clothes to the raft. After taking one last look for any patrol

boats, I entered the dark but "familiar" waters of the Danube.

Iron Curtain

Why was I placing myself in harm's way by attempting to escape from communism? To explain, I have to go back to 1945 and the end of World War II. The war had ended for us in Budapest in the spring of 1945. The Russians were occupying my birth country, and they had no plans of leaving soon. Hungary was isolated behind the Iron Curtain that extended across Europe. Moscow-trained members of the communist party had moved into all key positions of the Hungarian government. With their autocratic rule came restrictions on freedom of movement, as well as restrictions on freedoms of the press, free speech and education. For example, in assessing a person's qualifications for the pursuit of higher education, the government paid less attention to academic achievements than to political reliability. I did not fit the mold.

Around 1946 an American legation opened in Budapest. In the legation's information center, I could look at American magazines and books, and I could view American movies. As I compared American culture to that of communism, my desire to escape grew.

Here is another illustration of what motivated me to defect. My brother, who was 12 years my senior, served in the Hungarian army during World War II, and his unit operated on the Russian front. Near the end of the war, he and his unit, not wanting to be captured by the Russians, moved westward to meet the advancing Americans. My brother was taken prisoner by the Americans and was interned near Strasbourg, France. Being an officer, he was not required to perform any manual labor. For sustenance, the prisoners ate the "C" rations that the American GIs ate, but they received only half the daily ration given the GIs. When my brother returned home, he was so well-nourished (read "fat") that he could not fit into his old civilian clothes. The obvious benefits of his having fed on American food (we had very little food during the postwar years), along with his stories about the material abundance of his captors, convinced me that my future lay in America.

File photo

Postwar Europe faced the task of rebuilding shattered cities and ruined economies. The Lodge Act offered U.S. citizenship to Eastern Europeans who served five years in the U.S. Army.

A year or two after my brother's return, our lackluster existence under communism only increased my conviction that I needed to defect as soon as possible. During that time, almost all of the citizens in eastern Europe listened to the Voice of America, or VOA. Even though it was illegal to listen to VOA, the station provided our only source of untainted information. One day, as I was listening to the station, I heard, to my amazement, that able-bodied men from Iron Curtain countries were eligible to join the U.S. Army. After completing five years of service, any of them who wished could become U.S. citizens and reside in the U.S. I cannot describe my excitement. The time had come to put my plan into action!

Fifteen months later, after crossing the Iron Curtain, I learned that the action by America was known as the "Lodge Act," because it was sponsored by then-Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., who later became the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Officially, the Lodge Act was designated Public Law No. 597, 81st Congress.

My opportunity to defect had come a week or so before the night I

swam the Danube in Linz. My school's track-and-field team, on which I was the javelin thrower, had traveled by train from Budapest to Prague, Czechoslovakia, where we competed in an athletic contest. When the games were over, I simply did not board the return train to Budapest with my teammates. Instead, I took a local train heading south, toward Austria.

Why escape from Czechoslovakia into Austria? During my planning, I had considered many escape routes. Probably the most obvious route would have been to cross from Hungary to Austria, but rumors had it that the Hungary-Austria border was fortified and heavily guarded. The Iron Curtain was strongest there, and not many escape attempts had been successful. Crossing from Czechoslovakia into Austria was not a popular route, because after crossing the border, one would still have been in the Russian zone and would have had to cross a formidable river, the Danube. However, after taking that fact into consideration, I reasoned that the Czechoslovakia-Austria border would not be as heavily guarded. As you shall see, my assumption was correct.

The small local train that I had taken from Prague was making slow but steady track going south toward Austria, and I relaxed. Big mistake! The border buffer zone, the so-called "no man's land," on my side of the border, extended deeper than I had been informed. I was expecting it to extend 5 kilometers from the border, and I had planned to get off the train at a small station before the buffer zone began. But the buffer extended 10 kilometers, and the train stopped short of my intended station. Before I could react, a pair of armed border guards came aboard at each end of the coach, in a pincers maneuver, and began to check each passenger's identification papers. Not having the proper permits, I shouldn't have been anywhere near the border, but there I was. I had a 9 mm Frommer automatic in my briefcase, but it would have been no match against the guards' submachine guns, even if I could have retrieved it from my bag. If I ran, I would be dead. If they searched me and found the gun, I would receive, at the very least, a long jail sentence, but most likely I would be shot on the spot. My only option was to stay cool and try to bluff my way out.

A young soldier, not much older than I, began questioning me. I showed him a piece of paper, which was legitimate but not an official document, stating that I was attending school. Along with that, I concocted a story about being on summer vacation and going to visit my grandmother who lived down the road. He let me go! To this day, I am convinced that the young soldier knew what I was up to. As quickly as I could, but trying not to appear too anxious, I left the train and disappeared behind some houses. I knew that if the guards called me back, I would not be as lucky a second time. The soldier had let me go, but I had to consider the possibility that he had alerted the other guards and that they would be looking for me at the border.

Leaving the small village behind, I headed south, but not in a straight line. Dusk was settling in, covering my 90-degree turns, zigzags and other maneuvers that I was using to confuse anyone who might be trying to follow me. In the distance, I could see my target: a tall pine forest where the border would be. I decided against attempting to cross that night: The guards could be on alert, and I wanted a full night to attempt my crossing. (I was right about the alert.)

I needed a hiding place for the night and the next day. Still walking across flat farmland, I was surprised to spot a faint light in a farmhouse about a half kilometer away. No one was supposed to be living in this no-man's land. I desperately needed information — I had changed directions many times from my intended track and had become disoriented, but more importantly, I needed intel about the border's location, condition, guards, etc. I would have to take a chance! I approached the house cautiously. The house was dark, but there was a light in the barn, where one man was working. To keep from alarming him, I called out gently for water.

I learned that he was alone; his wife and children were visiting someone. I started to concoct another story to explain my presence there, but he interrupted, saying that he knew all about me. The soldiers had come by earlier, looking for me. He said they would not be back that night. We sat outside, in the dark, and talked about school athletics. It turned out that, like me, he had been a javelin thrower. Incredible! Javelin-throwing is a complex sport, and we began discussing throwing techniques. I saw headlights in the distance and became nervous. He assured me that if the headlights turned toward his house I would have time to hide. He suggested that I sleep in a crawl space above the kitchen in his house. I was hesitant — there would be no way of escaping from there — but I accepted. I felt confident that no javelin thrower would rat on a fellow athlete. Human nature is totally predictable.

The next morning, the soldiers returned. They came into the kitchen, and although I was only inches above them, I remained undetected. It got very warm in that small space, and I was glad

when it finally got dark enough for me to come down. Before I departed, the man gave me some information about the geographical features ahead. He had not been allowed near the border in years, but some of his land was there. I tried to give him money, but he wouldn't take it. We parted almost in tears, knowing that neither of us was out of danger. (After the Cold War ended, I attempted to find him, but without luck. So, my javelin-throwing friend, God bless you and your clan wherever you are.)

As I headed toward the forest, a tremendous thunderstorm broke. Again, what a lucky break! Rain was pouring, and the thunder and high winds masked any noise that I made. Still in open fields, I had to hit the mud every time lightning flashed, because my silhouette could have been seen from the woods. The going was slow, but within an hour, I had entered the forest. The storm was still raging, and I felt safer. Now I could spot any guards better than they could spot me. Between lightning flashes, it was pitch dark in the forest. I oriented myself by feeling for the moss growth on tree trunks. I found south by facing 180 degrees from the moss, looked for a reference spot up ahead and inched toward it, all the while looking out for guards.

I was making decent progress in crossing the forest, and the storm was beginning to let up, when I came to what looked like a firebreak. A cleared strip, between 50 and 100 meters wide, ran through the forest. Barbed wire ran down the center of the strip. About 200 meters to my right stood a watchtower. The tower appeared to be unoccupied, but there was no way of being sure.

There appeared to be breaks in the barbed wire, verifying my hunch that the border here would be less heavily fortified. I was overjoyed and thought it possible that this section might not even be guarded. Not taking anything for granted, I crawled on my belly, looking for mines, trip wires, booby traps, or electric fences. I found nothing but a poorly constructed barbed-wire fence. I eased through, making sure not to touch anything, and about 20 minutes later I was in the forest on the other side of the strip.

My javelin-thrower friend had informed me that the actual border would be a small stream running perpendicular to my south heading. I resumed my moss/180-degree orientation routine, and in five minutes, sure enough, I fell face-first into the stream. Cursing, but unhurt, I breathed easier. I estimated that I had covered between 5 and 7 kilometers since crossing the wire. To confirm that I was in Austria, I knocked on the door of the first farmhouse I came to and asked, in Czech, "Where am I?" A sleepy voice told me (in German) to get lost because Russian patrols would be coming by. I was in the Russian zone of Austria. I took off like a jackrabbit.

I needed a place to hide during the day, and I needed to dry out, too. I selected a gentle hillside that overlooked the road. The hill was covered by a growth of small pine trees about 4-5 feet high — a tree nursery. When I stood among the trees, only my head showed; when I lay down, I was completely hidden. As the sun rose, I undressed and laid out my clothes and my pistol to dry. Naked, I was cold in the chilly morning air. I curled up and was soon in a deep sleep.

In my stupor, I could hear cars passing on the road below. I had no interest in investigating. I was perfectly safe in my hiding place, and I did not want to compromise my position. By afternoon I was dry and warm, so I got dressed and was ready to move out. At dusk, I hit the road. Within a few kilometers I left the woods behind. I assumed a method of moving quickly that I had practiced many times as a Boy Scout: the "wolf trot." Using the method, one alternates between a walk and a jog and can cover a lot of ground in a short time without becoming overly tired.

It was dark, there was still no moon, and I was enjoying the exercise. I came to a small village whose road sign identified it as Zwettl. I was feeling smug about how well I had handled the first part of my escape, and my guard was down. I rounded the corner of the road and literally ran into a large wedding party. The whole village must have turned out for the occasion. A band was playing and people were dancing. When I appeared, everything came to a stop. People were looking at me with their eyes and mouths wide open. I definitely did not belong in that part of Austria. I realized my mistake, but I picked my way through the crowd, smiling and waving. It took me 10-15 seconds to make my way through the crowd, but it felt like it had taken an hour.

As soon as I was away from the crowd, I broke into a dash. At the first cornfield, I turned 90 degrees to the right. After repeating the maneuver three more times, I was back on my original course, but I had bypassed the village. Just after making my first 90-degree turn, I heard two motorbikes racing down the road I had just left. It was obvious that people were looking for me. I easily evaded the motorbikes, but I wanted to kick myself for letting my guard down and making my escape more complicated.

Having resumed my original heading and my wolf trot, I was able to cover a lot of ground. It was well past midnight when I picked up the scent of the river. There was not enough darkness left for me to attempt a crossing, so I would have to find another hiding place. For the past few hours I had been traveling through more densely populated areas, avoiding people and vehicles by moving strictly cross-country. I stopped at a point where the terrain began sloping down toward the Danube (the Duna in Hungarian). Looking at Linz down below, I could not miss the brightly lit American zone south of the river. I said to myself, "I am getting there!"

Soon I found a cemetery with a church on one side. I hid in some bushes near the church. When dawn came, I saw that my hiding place was no good — I was as exposed as a newborn baby. I could see a priest feeding some animals in a barn near the church. I got his attention and asked him if I could take shelter in the barn. He must have known what I was doing, but he agreed.

The Zwettl incident was still on my mind, and before I entered the barn, I surveyed the area for possible avenues of escape. I reasoned that the officials in Zwettl must have alerted the Russians, and I could not sleep because I expected a patrol to come by. Although I still had the 9 mm, the cartridges had gotten wet two days earlier during the storm, and I doubted whether they would work. I sat and talked with the priest, pumping him for information, and he gave me some good intel. There were no patrols, and the day dragged on. At 10 p.m., I bade the priest goodbye and headed out. In less than an hour, I was standing on the sandy shores of the Danube. (After the Russians ended their occupation of Austria, I revisited the priest to thank him for his help and to make a donation to his church.)

The general flow of the Danube is from west to east, but just east of Linz, the river makes an almost 90-degree turn to the south. The southward turn of the river causes the strength of the river's current to be concentrated on the north shore, where I was standing. When I dove in, I swam hard for some time, pulling and sometimes pushing my makeshift raft. But the current was very strong, and when I looked back, I had barely gained a few meters. I was not concerned; I

adjusted my drift angle to make the river work for me, and I kept on swimming. Not wanting to attract attention, I tried not to splash too much. Because I was low in the water, I did not waste time looking for patrol boats. Instead, I relied on sounds to warn me in good time if any patrol boats came. I thought that, in any event, no one would capture me this close to my destination. If there had been an encounter, I would have let go of the raft and evaded underwater. Halfway across the river, the current lessened, and I was able to make good progress. When I struck the beach on the south shore, I was more than 5 kilometers downstream from Linz. I was jubilant; I had finished a difficult trip. Now all I had to do was to walk back to Linz, contact the U.S. Army and begin serving my five-year enlistment. What naïveté! I would not begin wearing an American Army uniform for another 15 months.

The Lodge Act

I began walking back to Linz but did not use the wolf trot this time: No one was after me, and I had plenty of time. I savored the moment: What a journey! What incredible luck! As I reached the narrow streets of Linz, I wondered how I should approach the Americans. Linz was jumping: Bars lined both sides of the street, and American GIs were everywhere. I was goggle-eyed, but I liked what I saw.

Regaining my composure, I flagged down the first military-police jeep that I saw. The MPs were surprised when I burst into my rehearsed story. Frequently thumbing through my waterlogged dictionary, I explained in broken English that I had just swum the Danube and was now ready to join the U.S. Army. The MPs looked at me with disbelief. They must have been thinking, "Who is this nut?" I learned later that most GIs then were draftees who wanted to get out, not in.

As I repeated my story, it must have begun to make sense to the MPs, and they began asking me questions. I did not fully understand their questions, but I understood some of the words — at least I thought I did. They kept asking, "Have you been to CIC?" The words that I thought I understood were "See I see."

The Lodge Act

After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, postwar Europe faced the daunting task of rebuilding its shattered cities and restoring the ruined economies of the nations that had been occupied by the Third Reich. Among the many difficulties was that of "displaced" or "stateless" persons — those people who had either been forcibly removed from their homes to serve as forced labor in Germany or who had fled the countries of Eastern Europe ahead of the Red Army.

These displaced persons were effectively homeless in Western Europe. Their number — nearly 14 million — represented a huge problem for the rebuilding nations of Western Europe and the United States in terms of food, housing and jobs. The U.S. and Western European nations tried numerous programs designed to assimilate the displaced population, including one that offered enlistment in the U.S. Army.


Lodge

In 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the Republican senator from Massachusetts, authored Public Law 597 as a means of incorporating select members of the displaced population into the U.S. Army. Popularly called the "Lodge Act," Public Law 597 offered the opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship in return for five years of enlisted service in the U.S. Army. Passed by the 81st Congress in June 1950, the "alien enlistment program" received its first enlistees at the 7720th Replacement Depot at Sonthofen, Germany, in 1951.

The Lodge Act did not bring in the flood of combat veterans that the Army had envisioned. Problems in advertising the program, as well as bureaucratic mismanagement, curtailed the number of enlistees. While the actual number of Lodge Act inductees is the subject of some debate, fewer than 400 from the pool of 2,336 candidates eventually completed basic training at Fort Dix, N.J., in the 1950s. Of these, several dozen found their way into the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg and subsequently deployed with the 10th under Colonel Aaron Bank to Bad Tölz, Germany, in 1953.

Lodge had envisioned the program as the initial step toward eventually replacing a significant percentage of the U.S. Army in Europe with units of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" — trained battalions composed of displaced Europeans. The concept of the Volunteer Freedom Corps lived on in a tenuous fashion until nearly 1960, when the U.S. finally abandoned the idea in the face of opposition from the European nations. — *Dr. Kenn Finlayson, USAJFKSWCS historian*

The American acronym caused mutual confusion. Knowing that one who joined any army had to be in good physical condition, which I was, I thought that perhaps the U.S. Army had additional requirements regarding eyesight. So I kept insisting that I had 20/20 vision. In fact, CIC stood for the U.S. Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, and the MP's were doing their job by directing me, a newly arrived refugee, to the most likely starting point. My reply to the MPs' questions made no sense to them, and they gave up trying to communicate with me. Instead, they bought me sandwiches and ice cream and drove me to the CIC billets. It was the Fourth of July weekend, and at CIC there was only one person on duty: the lonely guy who had CQ duty. Everyone else was gone for the weekend. I was invited to stay and wait for the staff to return.

When the CIC staff returned, I thought, "Finally I have the opportunity to tell them I am here to join the Army." But the staff had never heard of such a thing. My hopes were dashed. On the other hand, the staff began asking me all kinds of questions about my escape and about the conditions of everyday life in Budapest. They were gathering intelligence, and they kept me there for the next day or two. They were confused about the route that I had taken across the Russian zone; I had to show them where Zwettl was. They were all dressed in civilian clothes, and I couldn't tell whether they were in the Army, but I knew they needed training in map-reading.

After they had pumped me dry of information, the CIC people let me go. I was no better off than I had been three days before! One of the men from CIC suggested that I go to the 7th Army Headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany, where someone might know about "my" program. I asked for assistance in getting to Heidelberg, but they said they could not (or would not) help me. I was disillusioned.

I calculated that if I could get to Salzburg, on the Austria-Germany border, it might be easier to get to Heidelberg, because the German autobahn ran from Salzburg to Heidelberg. But the distance from Linz to Salzburg was 124 kilometers — a long walk. How would I get there? I did not want to spend the little money that I had, but I went to the railroad station. Once there, I observed that two conductors worked each train, boarding at each end and working toward the center. I reasoned that if I were to stand in the center, each conductor might think that the other had checked my ticket. The trick worked. Soon I was in Salzburg (the birthplace of Wolfgang A. Mozart), a lovely little town hardly damaged by the war. But I had no time to enjoy it; I had a date with the U.S. Army in Heidelberg.

Another river, the Salzach, forms the border between Austria and Germany. After successfully crossing the Danube, a much larger river, I thought the Salzach would be easy. But the river, carrying snowmelt from the Alps, was ice-cold, and its waters were fast-flowing. Although the water was only hip-deep, when I tried to wade across, the current knocked me down. I could not swim across, because the riverbed was extremely rocky, and a collision with any of the big boulders sticking up would have caused serious injury. I saw the autobahn bridge downstream, so I headed to it. As I walked across it, a man in some sort of uniform began yelling at me in German. I was confused: I was only going from one part of the American zone to another. What could be wrong? Unbeknownst to me, the prewar borders had been reinstated and were being guarded.

The man in uniform asked if I had any cigarettes or coffee, and not realizing what he was after, I told him that I did not use tobacco or coffee — both were in short supply where I had come from. I explained that I was going to Heidelberg to join the American Army, and that if there was a problem, I wanted to talk to the Americans. He assured me that that I would be allowed to talk to the Americans if I would go with him to Berchtesgaden, a few kilometers away. He explained that because it was Sunday, he wouldn't be able to get the Americans to come until the next day, Monday, but that he had a place for me to stay overnight. It was all very civil. While we were walking to Berchtesgaden, I had a number of opportunities to run away, but my mental guard was down again.

The next thing I knew, I was in jail! I was furious, but the guards calmed me by saying that the Americans would be there the next day. It was a lie. I learned that I was being charged with illegally crossing the border and with smuggling. The punishment would be three months in jail. I was ready to kill someone. I kept insisting that I be allowed to speak with the Americans, but none came.

On Wednesday, I threw a chair against the cell door, demanding that I be allowed to see the Americans. Within an hour, two MPs showed up, and I told them (using now well-rehearsed and more understandable English) why I was there. The MPs wanted to help, but the Germans said that I would have to go before a judge to resolve the issue. In the courtroom, the German judge read the charges and asked me in which court I wished to plead my case: German or American. I shouted, "Ameri-

Rudolf Horvath's German identification card. He found the card useful later when he took part in escape-and-evasion exercises in Germany as a member of the 10th SF Group.

can," and with that, I was handed over to the MPs. The MPs drove me to an Army motor pool and put me on the first truck headed for Munich.

In Munich, still not in the Army and now in another strange city, I looked for the American Information Center. Even there, no one had heard of the enlistment program. I was beginning to doubt myself: Had I heard it right? However, the staff at the Information Center was able to provide me with other important information, and they made two useful suggestions: that I get a German identification card, and that I get an address to which official notification could be mailed. (I still have the German ID card. In fact, I later used it during escape-and-evasion field exercises in Germany when I was serving with the 10th Special Forces Group.)

Once again, I hit the road, this time to get an ID. My destination was Heidelberg, via Nürnberg. This time my mode of transportation was any motorized vehicle driven by someone who would give me a ride. When I reached Heidelberg, I went to the 7th Army Headquarters; there, no one had heard of the enlistment program either. I returned to Munich.

For the next several months, my life was strictly a matter of survival. I worked odd jobs for a few German marks so that I could buy food and shelter. I frequently visited the American Information Center, where I studied English. In March 1951 I made a routine visit to an Army post in Munich. To my amazement and relief, one of the clerk typists had heard about the program. He told me that it had been introduced as the Lodge Act, but that it had been passed as law. I asked him to type an application for me, but he had no specific forms to use. Not letting him give up, I insisted that he improvise, using a standard form and adding Lodge Act-specific information. He then put the doctored-up application into Army channels for processing.

It was summer before I received a notification to report to another Army post in Munich for testing. My knowledge of English had increased. By the time I reported for testing, I had memorized more than 2,000 English words. Even though I recognized the words and knew their meanings, I could not pronounce most of them. The test, I learned later, was the same one given to applicants for Officer Candidate School — it was not Iron Curtain refugee-friendly. The test was difficult; even though I had done well with the math and science questions, I had a bad feeling when I turned the test in. I did not think that I had passed!

While waiting for my test results, I stayed at the post to help out with the testing program, getting food in exchange for working. Each group that reported for testing consisted of 50-60 applicants, and all of them had difficulty with the test. In September 1951, I received my "marching" orders: I had passed the test and was to report to Sonthofen, Germany, for induction into the U.S. Army. I was elated! When I arrived for induction, I saw only eight or 10 of the applicants with whom I had taken the test. I did not think that the program was achieving its intended purpose.

During the first week of October 1951, I was sworn in. After more than a year of overcoming major obstacles, I was a member of the U.S. Army. The Lodge Act enlistees were slowly gathering, and in November, when our number reached 50, we embarked for the U.S. by ship. I must have been the first one to spot the Statue of Liberty on that foggy November evening

when we sailed into the New York Army Terminal in Brooklyn. My persistence had paid off. The Lodge boys went to Camp Kilmer, N.J., where, after taking more tests (this time full of Army terminology), we were divided into two groups. Those with high scores were sent directly to basic training at Fort Dix, N.J. The others were sent to Fort Devens, Mass., to learn more English. I was sent to Fort Dix.

Our 16 weeks of basic training were eventful, but not unusual in terms of Army routine. My English was improving rapidly. I had an American friend (and still have) who helped me. The Lodge boys were integrated with regular troops — we received no special treatment or allowances. At the end of basic training, I received orders, along with about 10 other Lodge boys, to report to the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. I had no idea what my assignment was about. There was no mention of Special Forces, and no hint of things to come. I was enjoying my new life.

The 10th SF Group

Life at the Psywar Center wasn't what I wanted for my next five years of Army service, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the unit designation — psychological warfare — had an unsavory connotation for me, because of my experience while living in Eastern Europe. I saw psywar as another form of propaganda, and I had already had a bellyful of that. Granted, I was now on the right side of the Iron Curtain, where the reasons for conducting propaganda were more noble, but the principles remained the same.

Second, I was not doing anything constructive. The unit seemed to be disorganized. We had no formalized training and no classroom studies, and we did nothing but boring housekeeping duties. We were constantly sweeping, mopping and waxing floors — sometimes three or four times a day (I became an expert at using buffing machines). There were many draftees who were doing the same tasks that the Lodge boys were doing. The draftees also operated duplicating and recording machines and typed. As I recall, the Lodge boys and the draftees didn't mix well, militarily speaking. Our objectives were completely opposite. I knew that I had more to offer the Army and the U.S. than my skill at mopping floors! But I was stymied by not knowing what other assignments were available to me or how I could go about getting them.

My doldrums continued until one morning in the spring of 1952, when all of the enlisted men of the Psywar Center were ordered to report to a meeting in the small post theater on Smoke Bomb Hill. Once again, it was a moment that would drastically change my life.

At the theater, Colonel Aaron Bank stood onstage and addressed the group of enlisted men, which contained mostly draftees and about a dozen Lodge boys. The essence of his short presentation was that he was forming a new, elite unit. Anyone coming into the unit would have to be a double volunteer: first, for the unit itself; and second, for paratroop training. Colonel Bank made no direct mention of Special Forces. He emphasized the paratroopers' privilege of wearing their trouser legs tucked into their jump boots. About that time, all the draftees walked out, wanting no part of such "crazy" schemes. Fewer than 10 Lodge boys stayed. To this day, I am very proud that I was among those who remained and volunteered.

I was intrigued by the uniforms, but I had no illusions that we would do nothing but parade around in jump boots! There had still been no mention of Special Forces or any word about operating behind enemy lines or in civilian clothes. To me, none of that would have made any difference. Despite the Army adage, "Never volunteer," I was anxious to sign up. Recognizing the far-reaching implications of Colonel Bank's comments and reading between the lines, I saw a great opportunity for returning to Hungary and settling some old political and personal scores.

Colonel Bank made no reference to any other prerequisites for becoming part of his special unit, and we Lodge boys took it for granted that he was after our language talents and indigenous backgrounds. He had access to our records, so he must have known that only a few of us had previous military experience. Of the Lodge boys who remained in the theater, only one or two had military experience; the others, like me, had been students. We had completed our infantry basic, but that was *really* basic compared to what was to come. But despite our lack of combat or military experience, all the Lodge boys had one thing in common: a knack for survival. We had survived World War II and all the postwar hardships, and we had made our way out of Eastern Europe. We possessed a skill that was hard to duplicate through training, and it would be a very useful skill in the operations that Colonel Bank foresaw.

In hindsight, it seems obvious that Colonel Bank was faced with a problem. In Europe, the Cold War was simmering, and it could have erupted into World War III at any moment. Bank had organized his elite unit (on paper) around language specialists. Without language specialists, he could not send any group of U.S. Army soldiers

behind enemy lines to work. But in one brilliant move, he had solved his problem by coming to the Psywar Center and recruiting the Lodge boys for his yet-unformed unit. The Lodge boys were a crucial factor in his efforts.

I was now in Special Forces at Smoke Bomb Hill, and what was I doing? Sweeping, mopping and waxing floors, and scrubbing latrines — in general, about the same things I had done before, except that the motivation was different. Now it was for SF, and the work detail did not seem as disagreeable as it had before. Our mission was to get a row of barracks ready for use by incoming SF troops. We, the initial troops, had nothing to move into, and within days, more and more enlisted men and officers would be coming in to assume their duties. Hence a sense of urgency prevailed.

Built during World War II, the barracks had not been used since the end of the war. One day, as I was scrubbing seven years of caked-on yellow deposits from toilet bowls, a towering figure of a soldier came to give me a helping hand. His name was Lieutenant Colonel Shannon. I had never seen a lieutenant colonel up close before, let alone one scrubbing toilet bowls. That was the SF spirit then.

Our priority soon shifted from cleaning to getting much-needed supplies — from paper clips to pistols, and everything in between. I am sure that we requisitioned most of those items through the proper channels, but there were times when we cut corners and secured equipment through less-than-official means.

Normalcy was slowly coming to SF. We were organized into a military unit, and one of the first orders of military business was physical training, or PT. The training was intense. The unit administered PT tests, and everybody had to pass. I loved it! All my life I had worked to stay in good physical condition, and this was just an extension of that, with a real purpose. It felt good to pass the PT test with a high score. NCOs with specialty MOSs — demolitions, radio, medical and weapons — began forming groups, writing lesson plans and tests, and trying out training procedures on all the enlisted men and officers present. The Lodge boys received no favors, nor did we ask for any. We all had to qualify to SF standards. In addition to earning my foreign-language MOS, I earned a demolitions MOS, and I later earned MOSs in both light and heavy weapons.

Initially, except in PT and in map- and compass-reading, I felt inadequate among the incoming volunteer NCOs. They all had specialties and 10-15 years of service. At that point, I had eight months of service and no specialty. I spent many hours studying the new subjects, and I had to soldier hard to keep up with the NCOs.

One day the soldiers were heading out to make parachute jumps in order to meet their jump-pay requirements. To their surprise, they found out that I wasn't jump-qualified. I said, "It's O.K., I'll go with you and you will show me what to do!" Well, of course, that would not do. Shortly afterward, all of us SF Lodge boys were on our way to jump school at Fort Benning, Ga. I did not find jump school to be very difficult, and the four weeks of training there were almost like a vacation.

By the end of September 1952, I had graduated from jump school and was headed back to Fort Bragg. I returned to a beehive of activity: The SF school was in full swing; training was more formalized; and we were cross-training on all SF specialties. I was finally a fully qualified member of Special Forces.

Closure

More than 50 years have passed since the formation of SF. Looking back to that time, I have experienced the same problem as anyone else who has tried to recall the past: Time either dims or highlights events that happened long ago. I have attempted not to let that problem taint my chronicle. I have tried to keep my story short and to the point. Anyone who is familiar with SF history knows that there are hundreds of side stories that one can read between the lines. My intent was not to rewrite SF history, but to show, through my own experiences, what motivated the Lodge boys, the beginnings of Special Forces, and the role that the Lodge boys played in those beginnings. In this, I hope that I have succeeded, and I am grateful for the reader's indulgence.

Rudolf G. Horvath was a member of the first iteration of the 10th SF Group to deploy to Bad Tölz, Germany, in November 1953. In addition to performing his assigned duties at Bad Tölz, he taught skiing to the other 10th Group soldiers. He served the remainder of his five-year enlistment at Bad Tölz and was discharged, as a sergeant, in October 1956. Granted his U.S. citizenship in February 1957, he began attending college part-time and working full-time. After 12 years, he received his bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from the City College of New York in 1969. Licensed as a professional engineer by the state of New Jersey, he worked as a mechanical engineer for more than 30 years before his retirement. He is a licensed pilot (multi-engine rating) and, at age 71, remains an avid downhill skier.

Letters

SF training standards need to remain high

Recently, on a trip to Fort Bragg to visit the JFK Special Warfare Museum, I met a young Special Forces NCO who was assigned as a Phase I instructor at Camp Mackall. After we established a mutual comfort level, he began describing some of the changes that are being implemented at Mackall and his concern about the quality and caliber of SF soldiers who are being graduated and sent on.

He was genuinely disappointed that trainees with substandard performance ratings were being approved for graduation against the advice of their instructors. He detailed their lack of physical preparedness, academic inability and nonprofessional attitudes that never would have been tolerated when I went through the SFQC. The word "quota" was used more than once.

Promoting inadequate skills and poor attitude is a disservice to the individual soldier/trainee, and certainly doesn't serve the best interest of the Army or of the SF Regiment.

The entire special-operations brotherhood, our allies, our families, and Americans everywhere depend on the United States Army Special Forces soldier to be the epitome of "the quiet professional." Our leadership should ensure that getting into SF and staying in requires the highest standards we can achieve. Nothing less will do. Nothing else is acceptable. We owe it to those who have gone before, to those who serve today, and to those who aspire to wear the beret to make sure we produce the best-trained, best-equipped special-operations soldier in the world.

Jack Damron
(retired SF soldier)
Commerce, Mich.

Reply: High standards have been retained

From Major General William G. Boykin, commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, on down through the chain of command, you will find agreement that we must train to standard. General Boykin recently said, "While we may change our training strategy, we will not lower our training standards. … Our purpose is to provide Army special-operations units with the best-trained and best-qualified soldiers possible, and that purpose must never be compromised."

Today the SF pipeline is a six-phase program of unprecedented length and difficulty. The ultimate product is an SF soldier who is effective upon assignment to his first A-Team. The quality of the pipeline's product is routinely attested to by the SF groups, and the proof is found on the battlefields of recent years, where the success of newly-minted SF soldiers speaks for itself. That a soldier in an early phase of the pipeline is not a finished product is to be expected, but our graduates are trained to standard.

There is no quota for graduates, and the SFQC instructors are charged to train to standard. As SF seeks to replace its losses and to expand its force, we are committed to giving every deserving soldier the training necessary for him to succeed, but that does not translate into a quota. Phase 1 selects students for further training, based on their suitability and trainability. You can be proud of the work accomplished by the instructors of SWCS — the commitment to train soldiers to standard is their imperative.

COL Charles A. King
Commander, 1st Special Warfare Training Group
USAJFKSWCS

Security clearance important prerequisite for SF

In the December 2002 edition of *Special Warfare* magazine, there is an article entitled "The SF Training Pipeline: Responding to Operational Challenges." The authors identified were members of the JFKSWCS, 1st SWTG.

While I understand that the emphasis of this article was to outline changes in the recruitment and training of SF soldiers, one important factor that should have been mentioned is the requirement to obtain and maintain a security clearance. The lack of a clearance can be a major impediment, and soldiers interested in becoming SF should be encouraged to submit their investigation packets before they begin SF training to help expedite the process.

John Watkins
Chief, Security Division
USASOC DCSINT

For more information on security clearances, readers should telephone the S2, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at DSN 239-7174 or commercial (910) 432-7174. — Editor

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

MOS 180A short of FY 2003 recruiting goals

The career field for Special Forces warrant officers, MOS 180A, is at 90.7 percent of its full strength, and 29 soldiers are in training to become SF warrant officers. Despite that good news, at the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2003, MOS 180A had achieved only 31.7 percent of its recruiting goal for the fiscal year. Many SF soldiers are currently deployed; nevertheless, SF should be identifying its future warrant officers now. More than 48 percent of the personnel in MOS 180A have more than 20 years of active federal service, or AFS, and more than 57 percent have more than 19 years' AFS. If too few new soldiers come into the MOS, and if the large retirement-eligible population should exit all at once, the force could be set back for years. The last board for 2003 will be conducted July 14-18. For additional information, telephone CWO5 Walt Edwards, the SWCS Proponency Office's 180A MOS manager, at DSN 239-1879 or commercial (910) 432-1879.

FA 39 selection rate for LTC command tops Army's average

The FA 39 selection rate for the 2003 lieutenant-colonel command board was above the Army's average selection rate. The board considered 41 FA 39 officers from eight commands. The 4th PSYOP Group's PACOM battalion received command-selection-list designation, and FA 39 was allocated a garrison command and a recruiting-battalion command. The officers selected for command had an average of 27 months of branch qualification. All selectees were fully trained in FA 39; all possessed master's degrees; and all had FA 39 experience gained during recent contingency operations.

Enlisted Career Notes

USASOC seeks soldiers in MOS 91W

The United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, is seeking eligible male soldiers in MOS 91W to join the special-operations community as special-operations combat medics, or SOCM. USASOC has critical shortages in 91W, especially in the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which has more than 20 vacant staff-sergeant and sergeant-first-class positions. USASOC also has SOCM vacancies in the 75th Ranger Regiment, in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and in the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion. Soldiers who fill the SOCM positions will have above-average prospects for promotion, a challenging occupation and a chance for involvement in real-world operations.

A message detailing the prerequisites for the Special Operations Combat Medic Course and USASOC unit assignments was released via the RETAIN System (RMB Message 03-07c) Jan. 13, 2003. The prerequisites for entry into any USASOC unit are as follows:

- Possess a high-school diploma or GED equivalent.
- Be a U.S. citizen by birth or by naturalization.
- Possess, or be eligible to obtain, at least a secret security clearance.
- Have no record of conviction by courts-martial or of lost time to be made good under 10 USC 972 during current enlistment or last three years, whichever is longer.
- Have no record of civil convictions, except minor offenses that would not disqualify a soldier from obtaining a top-secret security clearance.
- Have no personal habits or character traits that would be questionable from a security standpoint, including financial irresponsibility, foreign holdings or interest, heavy drinking, drug abuse, gambling, emotional or mental instability.
- Have a minimum GT score of 100.
- Meet body-composition requirements outlined in AR 600-9.
- Have 36 months remaining in service upon arrival at assignment, unless designated OCONUS tour is less.
- Not be suspended from favorable personnel actions; however, a disqualifying flagging action for a minor infraction is waiverable.
- Be airborne-qualified or be willing to volunteer for airborne training if the position is airborne-designated.
- Be fully MOS-qualified. If there is a disqualifying permanent profile, an MMRB would determine whether the soldier is assignable (deployable) worldwide and whether he can be properly utilized in a USASOC organization.

The Special Operations Combat Medic Course is 24 weeks long (120 training days). SOCM students train side by side with candidates for MOS 18D (Special Forces medical sergeant), and both groups train to the same standard during the SOCM Course. Soldiers must meet the following prerequisites for the SOCM Course:

- Be airborne-qualified or be willing to complete airborne school.
- Have a minimum GT score of 100.
- Hold a medical primary MOS of 91W or 91WM6.

- Have no adverse actions pending that would preclude the processing of a security clearance of secret or higher.

For additional information, contact MSG David O'Neal, 91W/W1 coordinator, at DSN 236-8256 or commercial (910) 396-8256; e-mail oneald@soc.mil, or contact the unit points of contact listed below:

75th Ranger Regiment	SFC Harold Montgomery; DSN 835-5766, comm. (706) 545-5766; e-mail: montgomj@soc.mil.
96th Civil Affairs Battalion	SFC Dave Launder; DSN 239-3652, comm. (910) 432-3652; e-mail: launderd@soc.mil.
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment	MSG Cory Lamoreaux; DSN 635-9416, comm. (270) 798-9416; e-mail: lamoreauxc@soc.mil.
528th Special Operations Support Battalion	SFC Thomas Wilmot; DSN 236-6856, comm. (910) 396-6856; e-mail: wilmott@soc.mil.

96th CA Battalion seeks soldiers in MOSs 11B, 12B

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the Army's only active-component Civil Affairs unit, is expanding to add two more tactical companies. One company will be activated during fiscal year 2004; the other will be activated during FY 2005. The battalion needs to fill 84 positions in MOSs 11B and 12B. These positions will be part of six tactical teams in the two tactical companies. Each team will consist of a team sergeant, a team engineer and a team medic. To qualify for these positions, soldiers in MOS 11B must be sergeants first class; soldiers in MOS 12B must be staff sergeants. Interested soldiers should telephone MSG Larry P. Deel at DSN 239-8423/5555 or commercial (910) 432-8423/5555, or SFC David A. Campbell at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102, in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office.

Foreign SOF

Russian airborne troops continue restructuring

Airborne troops continue to be the subject of restructuring in the Russian armed forces. During the Soviet era, the airborne troops consisted of seven airborne divisions (plus a training division), 12 air-assault brigades, and several air-assault battalions. Today, the airborne troops consist of four airborne divisions; a separate airborne brigade; a training center, the V.F. Margelov Ryazan Military Institute of Airborne Troops; and support and maintenance units. Military transport aviation is in short supply, mainly because it was based in a non-Russian state of the former USSR at the time of Soviet dissolution. Nevertheless, the leadership of the airborne troops points to the development of a new family of airborne vehicles, including a 125 mm self-propelled antitank gun that is being billed as a "light amphibious tank." In fighting strength, it is equal to the T-80; in mobility, it is equal to the BMD-3. The 76th Guards Airborne Division at Pskov, which is especially well-known for its Soviet service as a contingency force for intervention and crisis response, will become the first division-sized unit to be converted to contract service. For years, Russian units, rather than relying on conscription, have experimented with the concept of allowing volunteers to sign contracts. But the effort to convert an elite division-sized unit to contract status will test the program's feasibility, and the relatively small size of the 76th Guards Airborne Division was a factor in its selection. The 4,600-man division comprises only two regiments, and its nondivisional support is limited. Airborne-unit personnel will live near unit garrisons to facilitate their alert warning and deployment. Even the contract servicemen who are married will be required to live in barracks. Married servicemen and their families will be assigned to two-room flats that will accommodate two families, according to officials. Unmarried contract soldiers will be required to live together in groups of three or four. Eventually, the entire Russian armed forces will be converted to contract status. The process of converting the most-ready units is to be accomplished by 2011. The 76th Airborne began its program Sept. 1, 2002, with an estimated completion date of March 1, 2003. As of late October 2002, only 519 servicemen had signed up. The 76th, which in Soviet days was deluged with conscript volunteers, is offering bonuses to spur new sign-ups.

Greece targets development of special-operations force

Greece, influenced by the U.S. war on terrorism, by the terrorist incidents around the world, and by the specter of terrorist incidents during the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, has begun a major restructuring of its counterterrorism forces. The Greek armed forces and the police are taking steps to realign their forces to meet the changed terrorist threat. Two new training facilities are being constructed for military special forces and other components that will operate in urban environments. The Greek restructuring effort has received additional impetus from the recent "unorthodox" special operation in Moscow, during which the Russians tried to dislodge armed Chechens who had seized several hundred hostages in a Moscow theater. Restructuring actions include the creation of a "special section" of three 35-man platoons trained to deal with nuclear, biological and chemical threats; the designation of Army support units

as backup; and the acquisition of new equipment. Foreign specialists from the U.S. and Britain will conduct training of the Greek military, police and Coast Guard forces. Greece also plans to participate in counterterrorist aerial-surveillance programs of the European Union later in the decade.

Mexican special unit plays central role in counterdrug operations

Although mentioned infrequently in recent months, the Mexican Army's Special Airborne Forces Group, or GAFE, units, which were first established in the 1990s, continue to play an essential role in drug interdiction and in preparing for operations against other violent criminal and terrorist organizations. GAFE elements are tasked to conduct intelligence gathering, hostage rescue, and the capture of the most dangerous criminals. In these roles, the GAFE elements work closely with many Mexican national law-enforcement organizations.

India delays expansion of elite unit

Plans by the Indian army to expand its special-operations "commando battalions" have been curtailed in favor of force modernization for those units. Earlier reports indicated that four new commando battalions would be established and that the personnel would receive training in Israel. The decision not to proceed with the army's expansion plans reportedly was reached in order to emphasize qualitative improvements in the army's existing units. The force-modernization plans call for the introduction of new helicopter aviation, the latest small arms, and battlefield technology such as laser target designators and night-vision equipment. The modernization plans themselves, however, may be slow in coming. As of March 2003 — evidently as a consequence of budget shortfalls — implementation of special-operations-force improvements were stalled, and they could be stalled until as late as 2008.

Venezuelan island reported to be terrorist staging area

Since Sept. 11, 2001, numerous foreign and U.S. domestic media reports, and occasionally more authoritative reports (e.g., the U.S. State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism*), have addressed the presence of various Islamic terrorist elements in Latin America. Chile, for example, has been sited as a center of activists from Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda, while the Tri-Border region of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil has received special notice because of the large numbers of and the activities of émigré Palestinian (and other Muslims) in the area. Ecuador, some Colombian-Venezuelan border areas, and the Colon Free Trade Zone in Panama have also been mentioned in this regard. Over recent months, Venezuela's Margarita Island — less than 40 kilometers from the Venezuelan mainland and a popular tourist destination — has been a focus of reports that assert the presence of an al-Qaeda terrorist staging area there and the establishment of Margarita as a Caribbean "center" for terrorist financial support. These reports have encouraged foreign speculation, in particular about U.S. reaction, about the involvement of the Venezuelan and Cuban governments in terrorism, and about the interaction of Islamic terrorists with the Colombian insurgency. Collectively, these continuing reports and Venezuela's economic and political unrest may further highlight Margarita Island as a hemispheric threat — at the very least to local tourism.

Articles are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr, who recently retired from the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and is now a security consultant near Austin, Texas. All information is unclassified.

Update

SWCS producing three new ARSOF manuals

The Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Joint and Army Doctrine Division is producing three new manuals.

FM 3-05.232, *Special Forces Group Intelligence Operations*, incorporates the intelligence tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, for Special Forces that are not addressed in FM 3-05.102, *ARSOF Intelligence*.

FM 3-05.232 describes the organization and the capabilities of intelligence elements within the Special Forces group, as well as the intelligence structures of theater special-operations commands, joint-intelligence centers, and higher-level agencies, as well as their connectivity with Special Forces intelligence units. FM 3-05.232 provides SF-peculiar TTPs for conducting the intelligence functions needed for SOF targeting and mission planning.

The manual supports the SF capstone manual, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, by providing a consolidated reference for the new SF Intelligence Sergeant's Course taught at SWCS. The initial draft of FM 3.05.232 should be available for review in June 2003. The project officer is Captain Richard Quinby; DSN 239-8689/5393 or commercial (910) 432-8689/5393; e-mail: quinbyr@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.104, *ARSOF Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, provides a baseline reference for planning and conducting ARSOF NEO. The manual outlines the capabilities and the organization of SF, Ranger, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and support units in the conduct of NEO in the joint, multinational and interagency environments. The final draft of FM 3-05.104 should be available for review in July 2003. The project officer is Jim Mong, DSN 239-5393/8689 or commercial (910) 432-5393/8689; e-mail: mongj@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.103, *ARSOF Combat Service Support*, is a revision of and an expansion of FM 63-24, *Special Operations Support Battalion*, dated 1995. FM 3-05.103 will serve as a base document for soldiers who conduct ARSOF CSS operations. It addresses the structure, capabilities and support requirements of ARSOF CSS units, and it provides guidance for planning the employment of joint SOF forces in theater. The final draft is scheduled to be staffed to SOF units in August 2003. The project officer is Captain Michael Gonzales; DSN 239-5393/8689 or commercial (910) 432-5393/8689; e-mail: gonzalmi@soc.mil.

New equipment will help SOF medics save lives

What may be the most revolutionary new weapons in the war on terrorism are being fielded by the U.S. Special Operations Command, but the weapons aren't designed to kill, maim or incapacitate — they're designed to save lives.

Because special-operations forces often operate in remote areas, the nearest hospital may be hundreds of miles away, and if soldiers are seriously wounded, they could die from severe bleeding. Special-operations medics are using two new bandages and a specially-designed, one-handed tourniquet to help ensure that wounded special operators stay alive long enough to receive critical medical attention.

"Our special-operations-forces medics came back from Operation Enduring Freedom last year identifying a need for blood-clotting technology," said Colonel David Hammer, command surgeon for the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM.

Now, Hammer said, special operations medics have been equipped with a "one-handed tourniquet" and two special hemostatic bandages that are capable of stopping bleeding in two minutes or less.

Master Sergeant Michael Brochu, USSOCOM's senior enlisted adviser to the command surgeon, said the one-handed tourniquet could be a critical asset for a special-operations soldier who is wounded while operating alone and has no help available for applying a conventional tourniquet.

Brochu said the two bandages — the chitosan bandage and the fibrin bandage — are made differently but perform essentially the same function. The chitosan bandage contains a derivative from shrimp cells. The fibrin bandage is impregnated with human blood-clotting factors. Both bandages act as a type of artificial scab on victims' wounds. "When applied to the wound, (the bandage) actually

becomes a part of the blood clot," Brochu said. — *Jennifer Whittle, USSOCOM PAO; and SGT Kyle J. Cosner, USASOC PAO*

SWCS assets assist Italy in developing PSYOP unit

Various organizations within the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School are assisting the Italian army in establishing its first psychological-operations regiment.

The new Italian PSYOP unit is scheduled to be fully operational by December 2005, and it will provide additional PSYOP support to NATO missions. The proposed geographic focus of the Italian army's PSYOP regiment will include the Balkans and possibly North Africa and the Middle East.

An Italian army PSYOP capability of such scope, mentored by U.S. Army subject-matter experts, should help ease the burden on U.S. PSYOP forces, which are being strained by a variety of missions worldwide. This PSYOP capability, established with the direct assistance of SWCS personnel, is expected to accomplish the following:

- Ensure interoperability with U.S. PSYOP forces in multinational, combined operations in critical areas worldwide.
- Provide an additional vehicle with which to further the objectives of U.S. national policy.
- Demonstrate the U.S. Army's commitment to supporting other members of the NATO alliance.

Relations between SWCS and the Italian army officially commenced at the U.S.-Italian staff talks held in October 2001 at Fort Bliss, Texas. Subsequent talks were held in September 2002 in Rome. PSYOP was a key topic for discussion and action at those bilateral meetings.

Contained within the agreed-to-actions document, signed by the heads of the delegations from the U.S. Army and the Italian army, is the U.S. Army's direct support of Italian army attendance at appropriate SWCS PSYOP courses, and the exchange of information on doctrine, personnel qualifications, force structure, capabilities and equipment. The Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD; the DOTD PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division; the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or 1st SWTG; the International Military Student Office, or IMSO; and the Army Special Operations Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, are providing the Italian army with the expertise and the opportunities to accomplish the aforementioned actions.

In September 2002, a delegation from SWCS, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Alfred E. Lunt III, chief of DOTD's PSYOP Division, conducted the first official coordination trip to Rome. Representatives from 1st SWTG, ARSOBL and IMSO provided information on U.S. PSYOP organization and planning, individual and collective training, ARSOBL capabilities, security-assistance procedures for requesting training, personnel-exchange program organization and requirements, and PSYOP equipment.

In September 2003, instructors from the 3rd Battalion, 1st SWTG, will conduct on-site training for the future members of the Italian army's PSYOP regiment. Future commanders of the Italian PSYOP regiment and its subordinate units have already begun attending the Psychological Operations Officers Course, or POOC, and regional-studies courses at SWCS. Italian army officers will continue to attend the POOC on a regular basis. Italy will also send several warrant officers to the advanced individual training for PSYOP specialists.

The overall training scenario will be repeated during fiscal year 2004 and then re-evaluated. The training will provide the Italians with a command overview and technical knowledge. While attending training courses at Fort Bragg, the Italian officers and warrant officers will also have the opportunity to work with subject-matter experts from both SWCS and the 4th PSYOP Group.

For additional information, telephone Lieutenant Colonel Alfred E. Lunt III at DSN 239-5000 or commercial (910) 432-5000, or send e-mail to lunta@soc.mil.

SF Division to publish revised SF manuals

The Advanced Skills Branch, Special Forces Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, is publishing revised editions of various SF manuals.

Since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism, the role of SF during the conduct of unconventional warfare has become more prevalent. Not since the Vietnam War has SF been so aggressively involved in conducting combat operations by, with and through indigenous forces.

SF advanced special operations, or ASO, is the unclassified umbrella term for the classified roles of SF during the conduct of unconventional warfare. FM 3-05.220 (FM 31-26), *Special Forces Advanced Special Operations (ASO)*, dated February 2003, is in print and is scheduled to be distributed to the force. Formerly a one-volume publication, the revised manual has been divided into two volumes to make it more "user-friendly." Both volumes are classified SECRET/NOFORN.

Volume I provides a doctrinal framework for SF ASO. It focuses on the nature of ASO and discusses the evolution of ASO policy, as well as ASO doctrinal and legal considerations. Volume I addresses strategic, operational and tactical roles of ASO, with emphasis on SF missions. It also focuses on strategic levels of authority and on com-

mand-support activities at the operational and tactical levels.

While Volume I addresses ASO theory, operational planning and coordination for general users (operators, managers and staff officers), it also provides detailed guidance for those whose duties require knowledge of the tactical mission capabilities, limitations, organizations and operations of ASO activities (SF commanders, staff officers and trainers at all levels). Volume I also provides detailed guidance for staff officers and unit commanders regarding the administration, management, organization and employment of SF A-detachments or individual SF personnel.

Volume II is intended to be used by ASO operators and trainers. It addresses the tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting ASO and provides specific ASO methodologies and a framework for the procedures used to plan and conduct ASO.

Recent operations have reinforced the requirement for long-range target interdiction by precision rifle fire. Frequently, a mission can be accomplished with a single well-placed shot, thereby reserving expensive and scarce joint-defense aerial munitions for more appropriate targets.

To enhance the force's ability to train and employ SF snipers, the Advanced Skills Branch has updated FM 3-05.222 (TC 31-32), *Special Forces Sniper Training and Employment*. The updated manual concentrates on advances in equipment, in training and in techniques that improve the capabilities of the SF sniper.

New to FM 3-05.222 are a critical task list and an example of a Level II unit-training program. These two additions make the revised manual a better training tool for units that are seeking to improve their capabilities. Other significant changes include improvements in the discussion of night-vision devices and the addition of ballistic charts for 5.56 mm (77 grain), 7.62 mm, .300 Win mag, and .50-cal. ammunition. Individual shooters will benefit from the enclosed sniper data book. The data book is conveniently sized, and it can be reproduced as needed. Commanders and shooters alike will appreciate the new manual for its usefulness in improving a unit's marksmanship and fieldcraft skills.

The geographic realities of ongoing operations emphasize air-infiltration and overland-infiltration techniques. Waterborne operations, the third "lightning bolt" of the SF infiltration triad, is another core capability that is receiving renewed emphasis with the preparation of FM 3.05-212, *Special Forces Waterborne Operations (Initial Draft)*.

Because of the emerging requirements in the global war on terrorism, particularly throughout the Pacific Basin and Latin America, mission planners must place additional emphasis on developing and refining waterborne capabilities. To assist commanders and waterops teams in meeting their mission requirements, the rewritten manual focuses on planning for waterborne missions, on waterborne infiltration techniques, on waterborne capabilities and on waterborne training.

FM 3.05-212 concentrates on SF-peculiar skills that are not adequately covered by other publications. The manual contains chapters on combat rubber raiding craft and SF diving operations. It reintroduces riverine operations, adds a chapter on underwater searches, and restates the training requirements for maintaining diving proficiency. It also places increased emphasis on closed-circuit diving, and it includes additional technical data on the Mk 25 Mod 2 (LAR V).

Military free-fall operations are another of the many options available to a commander who must infiltrate SF personnel into a designated area of operations. SF teams depend on MFF operations because they are ideally suited for, but not limited to, the infiltration of operational elements, pilot teams, assets and personnel replacements. FM 3-05.211 (FM 31-19), *Military Free-Fall Parachuting Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, is being revised to meet evolving requirements. Once revised, the manual will be more useful to commanders, detachments and mission planners who depend on an MFF capability for accomplishing their missions.

A major change is the rewrite of Chapter 1, which will become a commander's overview of MFF operations and MFF planning considerations. The revised manual will also add rigging procedures for additional weapons systems (AT-4, Carl Gustov, M-224 60 mm mortar, and the M-249) and the parachutist drop bag. It will contain operating instructions for the AR-2 calculator; provide new cutaway procedures; list delay times for high-altitude, high-opening parachute operations; and revise the procedures used for drop-zone survey reporting. Other enhancements to FM 3-05.211 include formatting changes and the consolidation of common material that was previously covered in separate chapters.

The proponent for these publications is the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Recommended changes should be listed on DA Form 2028 and submitted to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, Attn: Special Forces Doctrine Division, Advanced Skills Branch (AOJK-DT-SFA), Fort Bragg, NC 28310.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. *By Max Boot. New York: Basic Books, 2002. ISBN 0-465-00720-1. 428 pages. $30.95*.

Max Boot, the Olin senior fellow of national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a former editorial-features editor for the *Wall Street Journal*, has written a timely book that looks to the future of undeclared wars and military interventions abroad.

Boot's 15-chapter, three-part survey includes the "blunders and bravery, low cunning and high strategy, nobility and savagery" of the 100-plus "small wars," "low-intensity conflicts" and "military operations other than war" that involved the U.S. from 1801 through 2002. He shows how "limited objectives with limited means" have profoundly shaped military strategy, military posture and security strategy to a far greater extent than have the few declared wars in U.S. history.

The title of the book alludes to the concept of *noblesse oblige* expressed in Rudyard Kipling's morose 1899 poem, "The White Man's Burden":

> *Take up the White Man's burden —*
> *The savage wars of peace —*
> *Fill full the mouth of Famine,*
> *And bid the sickness cease;*
> *And when your goal is nearest*
> *(The end for others sought)*
> *Watch sloth and heathen folly*
> *Bring all your hope to nought.*

Boot concedes the cost of neocolonialism in human lives, defense and humanitarian expenditures,



and diplomatic capital or "good will," but he points out that the cost of inaction may be far greater and longer lasting.

Boot categorizes the small wars that he examines into four groups: punitive (to punish attacks on American citizens or property; protective (to safeguard American citizens or property); pacification (to occupy foreign territory); and profiteering (to grab trade or territorial concessions). He further divides the events into three historical periods.

The first period, commercial power (late 1700s to 1890s), shows the U.S. as a maturing economic power but nevertheless an immature military power. During this period, as the U.S. worked to enforce its freedom of navigation and to open markets for itself and for Great Britain, it fought small wars against the Barbary States in North Africa and resisted incursions from Sumatra to Samoa.

The second period, great power (1898-1941), is marked by longer and more ambitious American interventions and "wars of territorial conquest," including the Philippine War, the multinational intervention during the Boxer Rebellion, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean, the crushing of the "Villistas" in Mexico, and the opposition to the Bolsheviks in Siberia and northern Russia. During this period, continued interventions in both the Caribbean and Central America, along with continued peacekeeping in China, balanced "dollar diplomacy" with "gunboat diplomacy."

The third period, superpower (1941 to the present), begins with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. While other observers might see this period as the beginning of a new era, Boot calls it "the end of an era of small wars."

Boot claims that American expertise in unconventional warfare, as well as the Marine Corps' seminal 1940 publication, *Small Wars Manual*, fell into oblivion as the U.S. prosecuted the Vietnam conflict with large-scale conventional efforts against opposing forces that were adept at unconventional warfare. Boot asserts that the Vietnam conflict might have turned out more favorably had the U.S. pursued pacification rather than subjugation.

Drawing to his conclusion, Boot repudiates the conventional wisdom of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine for conflict. He asserts that with the exceptions of the failed 1980 Desert One Iran hostage-rescue attempt, the 1983 loss of the

Marines in Lebanon, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and the 1989 invasion of Panama, small wars are better guides to successful applications of limited force.

Despite the 1992-93 use of special-operations forces, or SOF, in Somalia for an unsuccessful "short cut to success," Boot champions SOF (and the Marines) as the premier small-war force, given their focus on people, not weapons, and their emphasis on flexibility and initiative.

After recounting 200-plus years of small wars, Boot debunks the notion that the U.S. military faces new prospects for wars in the 21st century and beyond. U.S. history has been replete with undeclared wars; wars without exit strategies; wars fought less than "wholeheartedly"; wars in which U.S. soldiers acted as "social workers"; wars in which America became involved in other countries' internal affairs; wars without a "vital national interest"; wars without significant popular support; and wars in which U.S. troops served under foreign commanders.

The U.S. has accomplished, and could continue to accomplish, its objectives in small-war missions, even when the desired outcome was to punish, to pacify, to preserve the status quo, or to prevent the decline of law and order in another nation.

Boot points out that the price of nonintervention can be revolution and decades of after effects, as demonstrated by the 1925 withdrawal of the Marines from Nicaragua, and by the too-little, too-late U.S.-British intervention into the Bolshevik Revolution of 1918-19. Boot recognizes the costs in lives and in dollars for such small-war interventions, but, he says, "If the U.S. is not prepared to get its hands dirty, then it should stay at home."

Boot closes with predictions that the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. territory are only a taste of what the U.S. can expect in the future and that punitive and protective missions will be required in order to safeguard American citizens and to punish those who attack them.

As to whether the U.S. should involve itself in the civil wars of other countries, Boot says that it makes sense for the U.S. to use nonmilitary means, wherever possible, to achieve its objectives, but that the U.S. should, if necessary, threaten the use of force or actually employ it. Predictive of current and upcoming stability-and-support operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Boot doubts whether the U.S. could or should unilaterally occupy countries "for as long as it once did."

Boot offers as an example for emulation the League of Nations' "mandates" during the 1920s for European states to run various colonies. Inexplicably, he fails to mention that those very same artificial, political divisions of the League of Nations gave impetus decades later to other small wars of the late 20th century.

Boot also gives an unstated endorsement of Sun Tsu's axiom, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles" in his bold advocacy for less apology, hesitation and humility in future deployment of power, so that the U.S. might fight "the savage wars of peace" if necessary in the future to enlarge the "empire of liberty."

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Headquarters in the Brush: Blazer's Independent Union Scouts. *By Darl L. Stephenson. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2001. ISBN: 0-8214-1381-3. 355 pages. $29.95*.



Too often, guerrilla operations during the American Civil War are associated either with the lawlessness of "Bloody" Bill Anderson or with the embellished exploits of Confederate John Singleton Mosby. The former has rightly been vilified. The latter has been so romanticized that he and his partisan rangers were the subject of a 1957 television series entitled "The Gray Ghost." While Mosby's operations are closely related to the present-day definition of guerrilla warfare, those operations have been highly colored by many historians. Union unconventional operations have received virtually no attention.

Stephenson has changed that. He presents a well-researched history of a small Union unit that numbered no more than 81 men in the field and merited only four entries in the 128 volumes of the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Using extensive primary-source documentation, the author has recorded the little-known operations of the unit. By examining morning reports, regimental rosters and other materials, Stephenson details the exploits of the man referred to by Mosby's Rangers as "Old Blaze" and his company of scouts.

In September 1863, Union Colonel Carr White organized one company of scouts. Lieutenant Richard Blazer soon became the

company commander. Although the company was disbanded in November 1863, in February 1864, Brigadier General George Crook ordered that an 80-man mounted company of scouts be organized, with Blazer in command. Their mission: "to clean out guerrillas." In November 1864, Mosby defeated Blazer's command and captured Blazer. Imprisoned in Richmond, Blazer was exchanged in February 1865 and served the remainder of the war as provost marshal in Winchester, Va. His scouts had been officially disbanded in January 1865.

During the Civil War era, there was no codified definition of guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare or partisan warfare, and there was no professional schooling for officers to study war. Although West Point graduates would have studied Napoleon's campaigns against Spanish guerrillas, their practical experience with guerrilla or partisan operations would have been gained during the Mexican or Indian wars.

Stephenson rightly points out White's service during the Mexican War and West Pointer Crook's service in the Northwest. He concludes that their service influenced their creation and use of the scouts — as well as the use of scouts against the Indians after the war — but he is unable to draw a direct connection.

Unfortunately, neither Crook nor his superior, Phil Sheridan, mention Blazer in their memoirs, so the author is left to surmise and to couch his argument in terms such as "probably," "may," "likely" and "possible." Given the lack of archival documentation, Stephenson has drawn several tantalizing conclusions, but they are conclusions that nevertheless cannot be established as fact.

Although Stephenson has done yeoman service in documenting the service of Blazer's command, he has attempted to go beyond historical fact to reach certain conclusions. Unfortunately, his links are tenuous at best. For example, he states that the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu recognized the importance of knowing the enemy. He then concludes that "perhaps" White and Crook learned the requirement of knowing the enemy from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. This is a leap of epic proportions. There is no evidence in any literature that either White or Crook had ever read Sun Tzu. In fact, *The Art of War* was not translated into English until 1905.

In another case, Stephenson surmises that Harrison Otis, a former Blazer scout who was commissioned a brigadier general during the Spanish-American War, "may" have influenced future Medal of Honor recipient Major General Frederick Funston. Without evidence, Stephenson surmises that the two "must have" sat around campfires and discussed the Civil War. Stephenson thrice uses the word "probably" to draw the link between Blazer's scouts and a similar unit created by Funston in the Philippines. In his memoirs, Funston makes no reference to Blazer.

Stephenson twice attempts to forge a link between Blazer's scouts and today's Ranger and Special Forces soldiers. One can find parallels between Blazer's operations and some of today's special-operations missions, such as conducting raids and gathering intelligence. Unfortunately, because Stephenson does not examine the specific characteristics of today's special-operations forces, he cannot clearly establish that link or back up his claim that the scouts were "special forces in the truest sense." He also uses such terms as "counterinsurgency" to characterize Blazer's operations and to try to link them to current special operations. Only the most revisionist historian would characterize the Confederacy as an insurgency.

Unquestionably Stephenson has added to the body of knowledge by presenting this detailed unit history. The only weaknesses are his attempts to make the unit a predecessor of today's special-operations forces and his overuse of conditional terms, such as "probably," to reach his conclusion.

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Special Warfare

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