Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



PB 80–02–1 Winter 2002 Vol. 15, No. 1

From the Commandant

Winter 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 1

This issue of *Special Warfare* is about changes. We are implementing a number of changes at the Special Warfare Center and School, and we are committed to keeping the special-operations community informed.

Throughout Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism, Army special-operations forces have performed very well. Their skills, adaptability, flexibility and courage are a testament to the outstanding character of the force as well as a validation of our assessment-and-training strategies.

Despite ARSOF's recent successes, we must look to the future in order to anticipate the requirements of the constantly emerging contemporary operational environment. We must adapt to conditions that will affect our ability to recruit and train soldiers.

In the area of Special Forces assessment and selection, we are having to compensate for an ever-shrinking recruiting pool in the Army. We have revised the SFAS strategy to allow our cadre members not only to assess candidates, but also to mentor them and train them in warrior skills. It is true that our soldiers are warrior-diplomats, but we must remember that their influence as diplomats derives from their credibility as warriors. We train first as warriors.

Assessment now continues throughout the entire SF training pipeline. Students in the SFQC must now pass a board at the end of each phase of training in order to advance to the next phase. The number of phases of the SF training pipeline has been expanded to six to incorporate SFAS, language training and the SERE Course. Possibly the greatest change in the revised SF training pipeline is the added emphasis on marksmanship, live-fire exercises, land navigation, urban operations and fieldcraft during Phase 2.

We have also made changes in the advanced individual training for CA and PSYOP. We have significantly increased the number of students who attend those classes each year. The increased number of AIT graduates will help fill shortages of qualified soldiers in the CA and PSYOP MOSs.

The structure of SWCS is also changing, with a focus on keeping the 1st Special Warfare Training Group in the training business and moving as many of the other functions as possible to the Center. Training development, for example, has been consolidated under the Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

General Peter Schoomaker, former commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, once said, "A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change." We must not only keep pace with change, we must stay ahead of it. But amid all the changes at SWCS, there is a core element that remains fixed. While we may change our training strategy, we will not lower our training standards, and while we may change the structure of our organization, we will not change our organization's purpose. Our purpose is to provide Army special-operations units with the best-trained and best-qualified soldiers possible, and that purpose must never be compromised.

Major General William G. Boykin

PB 80–02–1

Contents

Winter 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 1

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Features

Departments

The SFQC Metamorphosis: Changes in the SF Training Pipeline

by Majors Joel Clark, Mike Skinner and Gerry Tertychny

During the past year, the Special Forces training pipeline has undergone fundamental changes in the way that it assesses, selects and trains its students.

The SF pipeline formerly consisted of the three-week Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS; and the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, which was organized into three phases: SF common skills; SF MOS training; and the comprehensive field-training exercise, Robin Sage. Prior to their selection for the SFQC, candidates were assessed during SFAS. Following the SFQC, soldiers received training in foreign languages and in the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, Course.

SF training now begins during the candidates' first contact with the SF cadre. The cadre's assessment of students continues throughout the six phases of the new SF training pipeline: SFAS and SFQC (Phases 1-4), language school (Phase 5), and the SERE Course (Phase 6).

The Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or 1st SWTG, has been reorganized to facilitate

The Journey



Assessment/Training Balance



the changes in the SF pipeline. The responsibility for executing SF training was formerly the mission of the 1st SWTG's 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion now shares that responsibility with three other battalions in the 1st SWTG.

Phase 1

As part of the training revision, SFAS is now identified as Phase 1. SFAS is only the beginning of a soldier's assessment for SF. The SFAS cadre, formerly aloof judges of candidates' performance, now teach, coach, and mentor candidates while they assess candidates' trainability and suitability for continued attendance in the SFQC. Cadre members do not discuss the selection standards with students; instead, they encourage students to do their best. The diagram above represents the changing balance between assessment and training throughout the six phases of the SF training pipeline.

Once a soldier has been assessed as trainable and suitable for continued SF training, he is scheduled for a permanent-change-of-station assignment to Fort Bragg, as a member of the new student company in the 1st SWTG's Support Battalion.

Student Company

Activated in March 2001, Student Company (officially Company D, Support Battalion) is responsible for performing all administrative and support functions for students in the SFQC. Trainer/adviser/counselors, or TACs, from the student company mentor students so that they will have the best possible chance of succeeding in the SFQC.

Another important component of the Student Company is the training team made up of SF NCOs from the active Army and National Guard. The training team conducts the two-phase Special Operations Preparation and Conditioning Course, or SOPC. SOPC is designed primarily to support the new recruiting initiative whereby SF will accept candidates from the civilian sector and from Army initial-entry training. The first phase of SOPC concentrates on physical training, swimming and land navigation in order to prepare students for Phase 1 of the SFQC (the SFAS phase). The second phase of SOPC focuses on physical training, land navigation and small-unit tactics in order to prepare students for Phases 2 and 4 of the SFQC.

The Student Company's permanent-party personnel consist of the company commander and first sergeant; an operations warrant officer and two operations NCOs in the operations section; the TACs; the training team; three civilian personnel clerks; and a supply sergeant. There are approximately 300 soldiers in each SFQC class, and there are typically 1,000 or more students assigned to Student Company at any given time. Personnel from Student Company in-process each class; issue equipment from the Central Issue Facility;

Phase 2 Training Calendar



administer the Army Physical Fitness Test and the Special Forces Swim Test; arrange remedial swim training for weak swimmers; and conduct a basic airborne refresher/airborne operation.

As a class advances through the phases of the SF pipeline, TACs from Student Company serve as MOS advisers to the students. TACs monitor the students' progress, perform liaison with the training companies, assist in student-family readiness, and arrange remedial training for students who must repeat a phase of training. The TACs are the most important factor of Student Company; they serve as role models for the students from the beginning of the course to the end.

Student Company out-processes each class at the end of Phase 4 and passes the students to the 1st SWTG's 3rd Battalion, where they receive language training. During out-processing, Student Company compiles academic-evaluation reports, submits requests for awards for honor graduates, and completes the planning and scheduling for both the regimental supper and the formal graduation exercise.

Mentoring is extended to student families, as well. Another vital factor of Student Company is the student family readiness group, or FRG. Since July 2001, spouses of Student Company's permanent-party personnel have established an FRG for each SFQC class, organizing the students' spouses into semi-independent FRGs. Because family issues are the primary reason that students voluntarily withdraw from the SFQC, the student FRG is important not only for preparing students' families for the demands of the SFQC but also for helping soldiers and their families transition into life in the larger SF family. In addition to publishing a newsletter and maintaining an information office for spouses, the FRG provides guidance to spouses on adjusting to life in the SF community.

By providing the students with positive role models and by teaching them the skills that will help them succeed in the SFQC, personnel of Student Company provide vital support to the SF pipeline. With their help and commitment, the pipeline produces a fully-qualified SF soldier who is supported by

an informed, confident family and is ready to take his place on an SF detachment.

Phase 2

The most dramatic change in the SFQC has occurred in the small-unit training, or SUT, portion. Now known as Phase 2, SUT has evolved into a 46-day program of instruction, or POI, taught at Camp Mackall, N.C., located approximately 40 miles west of Fort Bragg. Phase 2 incorporates invaluable warrior skills, including marksmanship training; military operations on urbanized terrain, or MOUT; and numerous live-fire events, including a platoon movement to contact. When coupled with the small-unit training that each soldier receives during Phase 2, these skills will provide the foundation upon which an SF soldier will draw throughout his career. Phase 2 concludes with a commander's board that assesses the students' progress to that point. 1st Battalion, 1st SWTG, now known as the common-skills training battalion, conducts Phases 1 and 2.

Phase 3

Following Phase 2, soldiers begin the MOS portion of SFQC training. MOS training, redesignated as Phase 3, is conducted by the 4th Battalion, 1st SWTG. Phase 3 trains soldiers in the entry-level skills that are required by the four enlisted MOSs (18B, 18C, 18D and 18E) and SF officers (18A). Although the POIs for the SF MOSs have not changed significantly, each soldier is now assessed throughout his MOS training, and soldiers are recycled or removed from the SFQC if their performance does not meet the minimum requirements. At the end of Phase 3 (as with Phases 1 and 2), a commander's board assesses the students' progress to that point. If a soldier meets all MOS training standards and demonstrates continued development of SF traits, he will complete Phase 3 and advance to Phase 4 and Robin Sage.

Phase 4

Phase 4, conducted by the 1st Battalion at Camp Mackall, is the collective training phase of the SFQC. During Phase 4, students receive common-skills training in the planning and execution of unconventional warfare, or UW. Training remains centered around the field exercise that has stood the test of time, Robin Sage. As the capstone

Phase 4 Training Calendar



New members of the SF Regiment don their green berets at the conclusion of the regimental supper.

File photo

event of the SFQC, Robin Sage continues to test soldiers' capabilities for adaptive thinking in a UW environment. During Robin Sage, as in the other phases of the SF pipeline, students are continuously assessed and given feedback on their performance. Students who fail to meet the standards or who do not pass the end-of-phase commander's board will either be recycled or relieved from the SFQC. Completion of Phase 4 entitles the soldier to attend language school and the SERE Course.

At the end of Phase 4, the student is provisionally qualified as an SF NCO or officer, and he can begin to look forward to his assignment in an SF group. Phase 4 also marks the end of the students' training in the Basic NCO Course, or BNCOC. The common-leader-training portions of BNCOC are taught prior to Phase 2 under the direction of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School NCO Academy. After the student completes Phase 4, he is considered to be a BNCOC graduate in his MOS and to have attained Level 2 of the NCO Education System.

Regimental supper, graduation

As in the past, the regimental supper serves as the formal initiation of new SF soldiers into the SF Regiment. The initiation is structured around a dining-in ceremony during which new members are introduced to the history and the exploits of the SF Regiment and to some of the regiment's distinguished members. The initiation culminates with a speech by a distinguished retired SF NCO and the donning of the soldiers' new green berets. The ceremony serves to emphasize that the soldiers have entered a brotherhood of arms and a new way of life. Their entrance into the elite fraternity is the beginning of a lifelong association.

Graduation gives the provisional SF soldiers the opportunity to celebrate their accomplishments with family members and friends. The ceremony recognizes the distinguished officer, enlisted and allied graduates; introduces the audience to the history of the SF Regiment; and gives the guests an overview of the arduous training that the graduates have recently endured.

Phase 5

Although language school has been a part of SF training for 50 years, it is now a requirement for SF qualification. If a soldier does not possess a language skill, he must attend and pass a language course. The goal of language instruction is to train soldiers to the level of 1/1. The minimum standard is 0+/0+. Most students meet the goal; many surpass it.

SF students share the language-training

phase with Civil Affairs students and Psychological Operations students. For 4-6 months, students from the three specialties are combined into small groups so that they can absorb both the language and the culture of the people in their area of orientation. Language training, taught by contracted civilian instructors and supervised by the cadre of the 3rd Battalion, 1st SWTG, is sophisticated, blending small classes, language software, language laboratories and self-study into a demanding, productive phase of training.

Phase 6

Every SF soldier is now required to attend the SERE Course before he can be awarded an 18-series MOS or branch-transfer into the SF officer branch. The formal requirement for the SERE Course will serve the SF community well in the demanding times ahead. Completion of Phase 6, taught by the 1st Battalion at Camp Mackall, marks the end of the SF soldier's training in the SF pipeline and qualifies him for an 18-series MOS or an officer-branch transfer, an SF Tab and an assignment to an SF group.

Although the addition of the SERE Course and the extension of Phase 2 have lengthened the time that each SF soldier spends in training, the result is a better-trained and better-prepared SF soldier who is ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

The SF pipeline and the 1st SWTG have implemented significant changes during the past 18 months, and both will continue to incorporate changes in order to meet the needs of the SF community. What will not change, however, is the strict adherence to standards, the focused assessment of each individual under stressful conditions, and the application of the four SOF truths: Humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than quantity; ARSOF cannot be mass-produced; and competent ARSOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.

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Major Mike Skinner is an SF officer currently serving in the Ground Branch of Requirements Validation, U.S. Special Operations Command. He was previously the S3 for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Major Skinner has served in a variety of other special-operations assignments in the 3rd SF Group, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He received his commission through ROTC upon graduation from Eastern Illinois University. Major Skinner holds a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in military studies.

Major Gerry Tertychny is the commander of Company D (Student Company), Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. His previous assignments include platoon leader, S3 air and company executive officer in the 1-327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division; detachment commander, 5th SF Group; CA team leader, company operations officer and HHC commander, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; and assistant professor of military science, Virginia Military Institute Army ROTC. He is a 1987 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and has a master's degree from California State University.

SF Selection and Assessment: A Continuous Process

by Sergeants First Class Jeffrey D. Jilson and Colin R. Jorsch

Lately, the Special Forces community has been asking a number of questions about SF Assessment and Selection, or SFAS: Who do we select? How many do we select? Are our standards slipping? The reason for these questions is that SF is making changes in the way it conducts SFAS. The reason for the changes is that SF is faced with a problem: More personnel are retiring from SF than are coming in, and if we cannot fill our ever-increasing vacancies in the SF groups, SF, as we know it, may one day no longer exist.

Solving the problem is tough. If we let more candidates through SFAS in order to fill our vacancies, the quality of the force will suffer. If we refuse to change SFAS, we may continue to lose more people than we gain. Some members of the SF community have suggested eliminating an SF group to reduce the manpower requirement. But all the groups are in high demand, and reducing manpower would not only raise SF's already high operations tempo, it would also lower promotion potential. Eliminating an SF group is not the answer.

The ideal solution would be to fill the SF groups with highly qualified personnel — people who meet high standards and who are motivated, disciplined, physically and mentally tough, mature and trainable. This is the task for those of us who work in the SF training pipeline. Tough job? Sure it is. Impossible? No. There are still soldiers who want to join SF for the same reasons we did. The problem is that the Army has changed. Because of the high operations tempo and cutbacks in training dollars, the Army can no longer train soldiers in basic warrior skills — land navigation, basic marksmanship, and living in the field for extended periods — as it once did. If SF is to select and train sufficient numbers of soldiers to fill the SF groups, we will have to take a different approach to selection and training.

SFAS was implemented in 1988 to save money by assessing candidates before bringing them to Fort Bragg to attend the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. But in 1988, the Army was twice as large as it is now. We could say, "Here's your task, do it." If the candidate succeeded, he continued the training. If he didn't, he fell by the wayside. Now we don't have the luxury of operating in that manner: Although the demand for new SF personnel is the same as it was in 1988, the pool of candidates is only half the size.

The revised SFAS is designed to coach and teach candidates while we assess their suitability and trainability for SF. That does not mean that all candidates will make it through SFAS. Candidates must still demonstrate the maturity, self-reliance and integrity needed to be an SF soldier. Honor-code and integrity violations have been and always will be a one-way ticket home. Physical fitness is still important; in fact, the PT score in the selection criteria has been raised from 206 points to 229 (under the standards for the 17- to 21-year-old age group). Although the revised

Photo by Amanda Glenn

Although SFAS has changed, candidates must still demonstrate the maturity, self-reliance and integrity needed to be an SF soldier. In the new SFAS selection criteria, the PT scores have been increased.

SFAS is still in the validation phase, results from the first class are encouraging. Furthermore, the revised program compares favorably to similar programs in other countries.

SAS selection

Recently the authors had the opportunity to observe the selection course for the British Special Air Service, or SAS. Most people imagine an SAS trooper as an assault soldier dressed in black, waiting to storm the Iranian Embassy in 1980. In fact, all SAS operators *are* trained in counterterrorism, but that is not their only mission. They conduct various other missions similar to those conducted by U.S. Special Forces: surveillance and reconnaissance; direct action; and support and influence. Support and influence includes operations such as foreign internal defense and Civil Affairs missions.

The SAS's "selection course" is actually the entire training sequence. It is similar to seeing the SF selection process as beginning with SFAS, running through the SFQC, and ending with the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, Course. But unlike our training process, the SAS employs the same cadre from start to finish. We hand our students over to a different cadre at the end of each phase of training, and our SFQC students may complete the course without seeing any familiar instructors from SFAS.

The continuity gives the SAS cadre a tremendous advantage — they get to know the students and can make well-informed student assessments. The SAS can conduct its selection course the way it does because it has lower operational numbers. We have 2,700 slots for personnel on A-detachments; the SAS requires only about 15 percent of that number. The SAS conducts only two courses a year, and each course begins with an average of 150 students. We conduct eight or nine SFAS iterations per year; they begin with an average of 300-350 candidates each.

While the British are able to conduct fewer classes with fewer candidates, their army is beset by many of the same problems that face U.S. Special Forces. The mutual problems include near-constant deployments that leave less time for soldiers to adequately train prior to assessment; soldiers who are out of shape; soldiers who haven't used a compass since they were in basic training; and soldiers who

German KSK

Formed in 1996 and operational in 1997, the German *Kommando Spezial Krafte*, or KSK, provides the German defense architecture with a force that can perform reconnaissance, counterterrorism and direct action. In comparing the KSK to the British SAS and to U.S. Special Forces, we can easily identify similarities in the three units' mission capabilities and in the personnel the units select to execute those missions. It becomes apparent that all three units not only look for the same attributes, they also employ similar methods of assessing them. It is not surprising, then, that the attributes the KSK finds to be most indicative of a soldier's suitability for service are maturity, physical fitness, intelligence and the ability to remain calm under pressure.

Unlike U.S. SF, however, the KSK recruits its members from all branches of the German armed forces, giving it a recruiting pool of roughly 6,000, soldiers, sailors and airmen. Applicants, who must be either NCOs or senior lieutenants, volunteer for a three-week selection program that resembles SF's "old" SFAS. The selection program is conducted twice a year by a permanent-party cadre that is augmented by members of the KSK operational platoons. Classes average 45 men, and the average age of the candidates is 30.

During week one, candidates undergo individual assessments including a physical-fitness test, a road march, a 500-meter swim, an obstacle course, and several psychological tests. The candidates begin week two with 2.5 hours of land-navigation instruction, followed by several day-and-night, land-navigation practical exercises. Week three closely resembles SF's former "team week." Candidates move over the forbidding terrain of the Black Forest in teams of 10-12 men, carrying standard equipment and various other cargo. Students are assessed both for their leadership abilities and for their stamina, and they are under the constant scrutiny of cadre and psychologists. The largest percentage of attrition occurs during the third week. Although selection rates are largely determined by the KSK's force requirements, selection averages 25 percent, or approximately 20 soldiers a year.

The original course structure and the standards for the KSK selection program were established by the KSK's founding members and by psychologists and medical personnel. The KSK continually re-evaluates its selection standards, weighing the input of cadre members and other personnel who assess the course. Nevertheless, the structure of the course has remained largely unchanged for the past five years, and the selection program has proven to be an effective means of determining soldiers' suitability. The KSK admits that it is facing a dilemma with which SF is familiar: Increased operations are making it necessary for the KSK to increase its numbers, but the KSK must do that without lowering its standards. One recommendation (as yet unimplemented), calls for the KSK to form a unit in which all potential candidates would serve prior to attending the selection program. The new unit would train the soldiers in tasks related to the basic skills of a KSK operator — skills that are tested during the selection course. Regardless of how the solutions unfold, and despite the challenges of the future, the German KSK clearly has tasks similar to SF's, proving that the assessment and selection of special-operations forces is critical.

have never been in the woods alone at night. One significant difference between the U.S. and British armies is that many of our conventional commanders and first sergeants do not to fully support their soldiers who volunteer for SFAS, whereas the British fully support their soldiers who volunteer for SAS selection. The explanation may be that many SAS enlisted soldiers and officers complete a three-year tour with the SAS and then return to their previous units. In the U.S. Army, once soldiers enter SF, they do not return to their previous units or to their previous branch.

'Aptitude phase'

The portion of the SAS selection course that we will discuss in this article is the first four weeks of SAS training, the portion that the SAS calls the "aptitude phase." This is the initial filtering phase, and it is the portion of the SAS selection course that most closely resembles our SFAS. The aptitude phase is designed to weed out soldiers who do not really want to be in the SAS or who are not physically capable of handling the subsequent phases of SAS training. However, the SAS cadre members do not refer to the first phase as "assessment" because they feel that they are better able to assess students during the later phases. They use the aptitude phase to bring class numbers down to manageable levels and to pass along only those soldiers who have demonstrated the potential to pass the later phases. The SAS also uses this phase to train and test soldiers in land-navigation skills, which are critical in the second phase.

The SAS selection course and SFAS begin with a test of physical fitness. SFAS begins with the standard Army Physical Fitness Test, and the SAS selection course begins with the Basic Infantry Battle Fitness Test — a 12.8-kilometer road march that students must complete within two hours while carrying a 55-pound rucksack. At this point we can begin to see some differences between the two selection courses. The last SAS selection course began with 144 candidates, out of whom seven (5 percent) failed the test. Our last SFAS began with 213 candidates, out of whom 29 (14 percent) failed the test. After the fitness test, the SAS candidates spend their first week attending land-navigation classes and conducting various rucksack marches that culminate in a cadre-led rucksack march up and down a mountain named Penny Fan (the march is appropriately named the Fan Dance).

The second and third weeks of the SAS selection course consist of various marches designed to build physical fitness and to improve land-navigation ability. During the second week, candidates complete five cadre-led land-navigation events that the SAS calls "marches." During the third week, the candidates again complete five marches, but these are not cadre-led. Candidates begin the week performing their marches in groups of four and then cut to teams of two. They perform their last march alone. On all five marches, candidates are required to maintain a 4 km/hour pace.

Photo by Rick A. Bloom

A member of the British SAS (left) works with an Italian special forces officer to plot map coordinates. The SFAS places a high premium on its soldiers' land-navigation abilities.

During the fourth week of the SAS selection course, candidates must complete various marches at a 4 km/hour pace. The final event of the aptitude phase is the "endurance test," a 64-km march over very rugged terrain. Candidates must complete the march while carrying a 55-pound rucksack and a weapon. Candidates are advised to maintain a 4 km/hour pace, but they have 20 hours in which to com-

plete the course rather than 16. By the end of the aptitude phase, SAS candidates will have traversed more than 445 kilometers (approximately 276 miles) of very nasty terrain.

It is interesting to see the way the SAS treats the candidates during the aptitude phase. Unlike candidates in SFAS, SAS candidates are free to go out every night, no doubt to "carb up" for the next day's event. SAS candidates are thus given more latitude to make mistakes, but if they fail to show up for a formation, they are sent back to their parent units. While the authors don't advocate that kind of latitude for SFAS candidates, it would be interesting to see how an SFAS class would fare if its candidates were given that much freedom. We might definitely learn which soldiers were dedicated enough to continue training.

Another difference in the training methods is that the SAS land-navigation events do not end until every candidate has finished. If SAS candidates fail to maintain the 4km/hour pace during a march, they receive a warning from the regimental command sergeant major. If, after two such warnings, candidates still cannot keep up, they are asked to leave. Our land-navigation events have a "cut-off," or ENDEX, time. At ENDEX, regardless of where the candidates are, they proceed to the nearest road and await pick-up. Again, we are not suggesting that we copy the SAS method. Waiting for every candidate to finish an event would extend the time for many SFAS events, and we would have to delete other events to make up the lost time.

The attributes that the SAS assesses during the aptitude phase are much the same as the ones SFAS is looking for: physical and mental toughness; self-reliance; motivation; and endurance. Both programs are based on the belief that if we can identify candidates who possess those attributes, we will be able to assess the candidates more fully later on and train them to a standard that will enable them to become productive members of operational teams. Both the SAS selection course and SFAS appear to be assessing candidates for their suitability and trainability for similar missions.

There is no one perfect method of assessment. Faced with a changing Army and a diminished recruiting pool, we are seeking a solution that will not only allow us to select the best soldiers for the job but also to sustain the force. The changes we are making to SFAS are designed to help us achieve both goals. Earlier, we spoke of the SF community's questions about the revised SFAS. From the point of view of the training cadre, the most important questions are these:

Do we want to fill the force with the best soldiers available? Without question. By assessing candidates' suitability and trainability, the new program will enable us to select soldiers who possess the necessary attributes and who can learn the requisite skills.

Do we want to assign substandard personnel to our groups? Absolutely not. The SFAS cadre and the SWCS command want nothing but the best for the SF groups. The fact that SFAS has changed does not mean that we have lowered our standards. Under the new program, assessment does not end with SFAS — instructors will continue to assess students throughout the SF training pipeline. A board will assess students at the end of each phase of training to determine whether they should progress to the next phase.

Is the command willing to spend the money to train a soldier and then relieve him at the end of the SFQC? From our observations, if a soldier fails to meet the standard at any point in the training pipeline, the command will not hesitate either to send him back for additional training or to return him to his parent unit.

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Sergeant First Class Colin R. Jorsch is assigned to the S3, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. He was previously assigned to Company G, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, as an instructor/assessor for Special Forces Assessment and Selection. His other SF assignments include assistant operations sergeant, ODA 752, 7th SF Group; and S3-Air, 2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group.

SWCS Reorganization 2001: Transitioning into the 21st Century

by Colonel Joe E. Kilgore

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is continuing its transition into the 21st century.

A comprehensive manpower study that was conducted in 2000 identified the manpower requirements that the Center and School must have in order to train soldiers in the future. Although SWCS recognizes that personnel shortfalls still exist, the resources needed to fill those shortfalls are not yet available. SWCS has, however, acknowledged the manpower requirements and has documented those requirements on the table of distribution and allowances.

In addition to modifying its manpower requirements, the Center and School has evolved. Overall, SWCS has reorganized its staff to better support its day-to-day operations. The staff has been streamlined, and the number of personnel within SWCS has been reduced. For the most part, the Center and School's reorganization is nearly complete.

The 1st Special Warfare Training Group has been streamlined and is now composed of four training battalions and a support battalion. Each battalion has been organized according to its function; overhead expenses have been reduced; and some staff positions have been converted into instructor slots. Although the 1st Special Warfare Training Group headquarters remains essentially unchanged in terms of organization, some of its functions have been realigned to place more emphasis on training. Administrative requirements have been centralized and reduced, and some administrative functions have been transferred to other offices within SWCS. The most significant changes have occurred within the training group's subordinate training battalions.

The 1st Battalion is primarily responsible for the field-training portions of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. The 1st Battalion is headquartered at Camp Mackall, N.C., which is approximately 40 miles from Fort Bragg. The 1st Battalion headquarters is responsible for command and control, resourcing of training, and administrative support. Company A conducts the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course (now Phase 6 of the SF training pipeline), which trains Special Forces and other Army and DoD personnel. Company F conducts Phases 2 and 4 (the field-training phases) of the SF pipeline. This field training includes Robin Sage, the unconventional-warfare exercise that takes place in the Uwharrie National Forest. Company G conducts Special Forces Assessment and Selection, which is now Phase 1 of the SF pipeline.

The 2nd Battalion, headquartered at Fort Bragg, is responsible for SF advanced-skills training. Company A conducts all warrant-officer training, the Advanced Special Operations Course, the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course and the Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification

1st Special Warfare Training Group Organization



Course. Company A's cadre will also teach the new SF Intelligence Sergeant Course, scheduled to begin in September 2002.

Company B, located at Yuma, Ariz., conducts the Military Free-Fall Course, the Advanced Military Free-Fall Course and the Military Free-Fall Jumpmaster Course. Company C, located at Key West, Fla., conducts the Combat-Diver Qualification Course, the Waterborne Infiltration Course, the SF Diving Medical Technician Course and the SF Combat Diving Supervisor Course. Company D conducts the Target Analysis and Exploitation Course, the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, and training in SF advanced reconnaissance.

The 3rd Battalion, headquartered at Fort Bragg, is responsible for Civil Affairs, or CA, training; Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, training; and language training. Company B conducts CA and PSYOP officer training. Company C conducts language training, and Company D conducts the advanced individual training for CA and PSYOP enlisted soldiers.

The 4th Battalion is responsible for the training of SF military occupational specialties, or MOSs. The 4th Battalion is located at Fort Bragg, but it uses several off-post training sites. Company A trains SF officers (18A) at Fort Bragg as well as at Camp Pickett, Va. Company B trains SF weapons sergeants (18B), SF engineer sergeants (18C), and SF communications sergeants (18E). Company B conducts training at Fort Bragg, at Camp Mackall and at Camp Gruber, Okla. Company D trains SF medical sergeants (18D) and other SOF combat medics. Company D conducts training at Fort Bragg as well as in hospitals in New York City; in Tampa, Fla.; and in other cities around the country.

The Support Battalion is responsible for the administrative and logistics support for the entire Center and School. Company A mans the permanent-party personnel action center and the student personnel action center, and it maintains student records. Company B provides all the logistics support to the Center and School, and Company C provides all sustainment services. Company D, the student company, consolidates the administrative support for all of the SFQC students into one organization. This new organization greatly reduces the

processing requirements for the training battalions by allowing the students to in-process and out-process one time rather than in-process and out-process for each phase of training.

Within the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, a new division, the Training Development Division (formerly the Analysis and Evaluation Division), is responsible for updating the programs of instruction used in SWCS training courses. The division is also responsible for completing all training documents, including those dealing with course design and development, as required by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Three new activities have been created within the command section of SWCS; all three activities report to the assistant commandant. The Quality Assurance Division, or QAD, is responsible for inspecting SWCS resident and nonresident training, and for maintaining accreditation of all SWCS courses. QAD manages the functions that were once performed by the SWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Standards. The SWCS Historical Branch consists of the SWCS historian, the SWCS archives, the Marquat Library and the Special Warfare Museum. The SWCS Department of Education certifies all SWCS instructors and is responsible for all faculty training.

The future holds great promise for the Center and School and for the students it trains. The commanding general of SWCS, Major General William G. Boykin, is developing the ARSOF School of the Future, an innovative concept designed to ensure that SWCS instructional facilities and techniques will meet the challenges of the 21st century. The SWCS Special Forces Evolution Steering Committee is developing a road map to facilitate the transformation of the Special Forces Branch. Improvement plans for both CA and PSYOP have been approved, and those plans are scheduled to be implemented beginning in FY 2002.

A construction program has begun, and it will continue through fiscal year 2009. Significant improvements in SWCS training are already evident: Fewer soldiers are being recycled, and the manpower strength in MOSs 18E and 37F is increasing. Efforts to make other training improvements are under way, including a plan to double the number of enlisted students attending advanced individual training for both CA and PSYOP.

As SWCS works to remedy personnel shortfalls in the field, its personnel are proud that they are training the best soldiers in the world and that they are holding them to the highest training standards.

Colonel Joe E. Kilgore is the assistant commandant of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include service as the chief of staff, SWCS; commander, CJSOTF, SFOR, in Sarajevo; commander, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group; plans and operations officer, U.S. Army Western Command Special Operations; company commander, battalion executive officer and group executive officer, 1st SF Group; detachment commander, company executive officer and company commander, 7th SF Group; and antitank-platoon leader and rifle-platoon leader, 101st Airborne Division. Colonel Kilgore is a graduate of the Army War College and of the Naval War College Command and Staff Course. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, a master's degree in systems management from the University of Southern California at Los Angeles, a master's in international relations from Salve Regina College in Newport, R.I., and a master's in national security and decision-making from the Naval War College.

The Renaissance of Unconventional Warfare as an SF Mission

by Major Mike Skinner

In the fall of 1998, Major General William Boykin, then-commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, directed his SF-group commanders to examine the relevance of unconventional warfare, or UW, as a Special Forces mission. He issued the directive because many members of the SF community had expressed doubts about the value of UW in modern military operations.

Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone presented the 3rd SF Group's response in the Summer 1999 issue of *Special Warfare*. In their article, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," they argued that even though UW had been SF's *raison d'être* since 1952, the skill sets required to perform the UW mission had atrophied in the operational force. The authors contended that the dated and vague doctrinal definition of UW then in use exacerbated the situation, causing SF detachments to be far more comfortable performing special-reconnaissance and direct-action missions than they were performing the complicated and ill-defined mission of UW.[1]

The Jones/Tone article marked the beginning of a UW renaissance in the SF community. While we have come a long way in the past three years, our journey is not yet complete. The impact of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, has strengthened the argument for the relevance of UW. Geopolitical realities limit our ability to deter or respond to the terrorist threat by nuclear or large-scale conventional means, making UW the mission of choice, and SF is the force of choice for the UW mission. However, there is still confusion in our own ranks as to what UW is and what it is not. To eliminate that confusion, we must quickly scan our back-trail, perform a map check and then plot a new course.

Our back-trail

Shortly before World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan director of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, or COI. Once war broke out, Roosevelt transformed the COI into the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS.[2]

Roosevelt tasked Donovan to visit Great Britain and report on its ability to resist Nazi Germany, and in an effort to secure much-needed American aid, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill granted Donovan unprecedented access. One of the organizations that impressed Donovan was the British Special Operations Executive, or SOE. SOE's mission was to conduct subversion and guerrilla activity in occupied Europe. The SOE mission was similar to Donovan's own vision of "an offensive in depth, in which saboteurs, guerrillas, commandos, and agents behind enemy lines would support the army's advance."[3]

One of the integral parts of the OSS was

National Archives

Members of a Jedburgh team prepare to board a B-24 bomber in 1944. Teams jumped at night to infiltrate Nazi-controlled territory in France.

the Special Operations Branch. In conjunction with its close British cousin, the SOE, the SO Branch was responsible for fielding the three-man Jedburgh teams. These teams infiltrated occupied France in 1944 to link up with French resistance forces.[4] It was on one of those teams that Colonel Aaron Bank, the father of SF, gained his first experience in UW. The SO Branch's Detachment 101 conducted other successful UW operations in Burma, where about 120 Americans recruited and trained more than 11,000 Kachin tribesmen to fight Japanese occupation forces.

The OSS also formed the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional). This unit fielded numerous operational groups, or OGs. The OGs, composed of two 15-man squads, were designed to conduct UW and unilateral DA missions. Integrated with partisan fighters in France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, Malaya and China, the OGs helped tie up numerous enemy formations that otherwise could have been committed to frontline combat. The OGs thus made an impact that far exceeded their small size.[5]

The experience that the OSS gained was almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare, or GW, which comprises operations taken against an occupying enemy power. Those GW experiences would heavily influence and shape the organization and the tactics, techniques and procedures of the original SF units.[6]

Following World War II, the OSS was unceremoniously disbanded. Some parts of it were transferred to civilian agencies, but

The experience that the OSS gained was almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare. ... Those GW experiences would heavily influence and shape the organization and the tactics, techniques and procedures of the original SF units

the Army divested itself of any UW capability. The absence of that capability would soon haunt the Army. During the summer of 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, the U.S. became involved on the Korean peninsula, and it keenly felt the

lack of a dedicated special-operations capability. After prodding by the Secretary of the Army, the Army appointed Brigadier General Robert McClure chief of the Army Psychological Warfare Staff. Two key staff officers, Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann, were assigned to McClure's fledgling office.[7]

Soon Bank was selected to command the 10th SF Group, and his first task was to organize the unit. In structuring the original SF A-detachment, Bank used the OG squad as a model.[8] The 10th SF Group was soon operational, and its charter was to "infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy-controlled territory and to stay, organize, equip, train, control, and direct the indigenous potential in the conduct of Special Forces operations." SF operations were further defined as "the organization of resistance movements and operation of their component networks, conduct of guerrilla warfare, field intelligence gathering, espionage, sabotage, subversion, and escape and evasion activities."[9]

It is important to note two things about the 10th SF Group's charter: (1) UW was the sole mission proposed for SF. (2) The type of UW envisioned was a military campaign conducted against an occupying power, which clearly reflects the GW experience of the OSS during World War II.

In the decade following the creation of the 10th SF Group, numerous communist-inspired insurgencies erupted around the world. President John F. Kennedy issued his famous challenge and charged SF with the responsibility of countering those insurgencies. By 1969, insurgency, in addition to GW, was listed as part of SF's UW mission. The February 1969 version of FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, stated, "Unconventional warfare consists of military, political, psychological or economic actions of a covert, clandestine, or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and avoid formal military confrontation."[10] In addition to including insurgency in the UW mission, the 1969 manual also introduced the concept of SF

In this 1969 photo, a U.S. Special Forces soldier advises the commander of a South Vietnamese Civilian Defense Force (holding map) on the development of his troops.

U.S. Army photo

working unilaterally in UW.

Unfortunately, SF's ability to perform insurgency was purely theoretical. The OSS's World War II experience was almost exclusively in GW. Furthermore, insurgency was a new (and somewhat distasteful) concept to Americans. Instead of opposing an occupying hostile military power, as in GW, insurgency seeks to overthrow an indigenous government that enjoys at least a residual amount of popular support from the native population.

During the late 1960s, the SF community's estimation of the "relevance" of UW appears to have declined, partially because of decisions made during the Vietnam War. Early on, the U.S. decided not to use SF in an insurgency role in North Vietnam. Instead, the U.S. made unsuccessful insurgency attempts using indigenous Vietnamese forces. SF was used in counterinsurgency, training and advising South Vietnamese village militias and paramilitary forces. Selected SF soldiers were also employed in strategic reconnaissance as part of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group.

The decade following the Vietnam War found SF further adrift from its core mission. The Army again focused on fighting a large-scale conventional conflict in Europe, but unlike World War II, which lasted six years, the potential conflict would last only a matter of weeks. The prospect of developing a viable UW campaign that could influence events in such a short time was considered to be almost nil. In order to remain relevant during that period, SF pursued other missions.[11] Unilateral special reconnaissance, or SR; direct action, or DA; and FID became firmly entrenched as primary SF missions. As UW became more unlikely, it slipped even further in SF's priorities, and generations of SF officers and NCOs knew UW only as a passing acquaintance.

Unfortunately for the SF community, our association with SR, DA and FID has been an unhappy marriage, because other organizations can also execute those missions. That realization, in addition to SF's quest for future relevance, has brought us full circle. We are now searching for our roots in order to chart a course for our future.

Map check

Much has happened since General Boykin directed SF to examine the relevance of UW. In writing the article mentioned earlier, Colonel Jones and Major Tone did yeoman's work in establishing UW as SF's core mission. They also clarified the UW mission by bringing SF's World War II concept of UW into the current age. Their article provided an excellent starting point for further discussion during subsequent conferences and symposiums.

The Winter 2001 edition of *Special Warfare* focused on articles related to UW. In his introduction to that issue, General Boykin stated, "We should see [UW] not as a mission of the past, but as the mission of the future." His charge clearly gives us a solid foundation upon which to build.

Unfortunately, SF's ability to perform insurgency was purely theoretical. … Instead of opposing an occupying hostile military power, as in GW, insurgency seeks to overthrow an indigenous government that enjoys at least a residual amount of popular support from the native population.

The new FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations,* published in June 2001, incorporates a clearer definition of UW. In this manual, UW is clearly in ascendancy as an SF mission, and the work of Jones and Tone is evident.

We have also incorporated changes into the institutional training for SF soldiers. The Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, or ASOT, is ramping-up to reach its goal of 44 students per class, which will be more than twice the size of the original class. This is remarkable progress for a course that was considered almost obsolete a few years ago. ASOT training has also been expanded in the 18A and 180A courses. The training for Career Management Field 18F, SF intelligence

USASOC PAO

Students in the Special Forces Qualification Course conduct a night raid as part of the Robin Sage unconventional-warfare exercise.

NCO, is undergoing a substantial revision. Our goal is to restore 18F to its former preeminence and to expand its capabilities.

Robin Sage, the culminating exercise of the Special Forces Qualification Course, has become more unconventional. While the instruction for Robin Sage has remained virtually unchanged for many years, the instructional methods for the exercise have evolved. Students are strongly encouraged to think "outside of the box." Exercise scenarios are allowed to vary, based on the students' actions. Thus, the actions of each student A-detachment can produce a unique Robin Sage experience.

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The journey continues

Although we have made much progress, our journey is far from complete. The process is slow but deliberate. We must plot several new waypoints as we continue our journey. By reaching these points and continually rechecking our course, we will succeed in our quest.

At the first waypoint, we should examine the new FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations.* A quick reading of Chapter 2 reveals that in spite of the UW renaissance, the principal SF missions have increased from five to seven. In addition to UW, they are: FID; DA; SR; combating terrorism, or CBT; counterproliferation, or CP; and information operations, or IO.[12]

Increasing the number of missions is definitely taking SF down the wrong path. As we have seen, the inclusion of any mission besides UW has always produced an unhappy marriage at best. While SF needs a capability for DA and SR, teams that will conduct DA and SR missions should be distinctly identified, trained, organized and equipped. The idea that all SF teams can perform all seven primary missions is ludicrous. If SF teams attempt to perform all seven missions, they will dilute their ability to perform the primary mission of UW.

We must review the definition of UW presented in the new FM 3-05.20. The UW definition in this work is fairly good, and it is almost a restatement of the definition that Jones and Tone proposed in their article. One concern with the definition is that it fails to address the classic seven phases of U.S.-sponsored insurgency in favor of the five phases contained in the joint doctrine of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System,

or JOPES. While it is true that the classic seven phases can be fitted into JOPES's five joint phases, FM 3-05.20 does not clearly define how the phases are related. Those traditional seven phases of a UW operation are to be covered in the yet-to-be published SF UW manual, but they should at least be mentioned in our capstone manual, FM 3-05.20.

The second concern with the new definition is that it includes coalition support as a type of UW. SF soldiers are uniquely qualified to perform coalition-support operations because of their language capabilities and their regional orientation. Many of SF's UW skills are exercised in coalition-support operations; however, SF can also use those UW skills in FID operations. Both FID and coalition-support operations allow SF soldiers to practice and enhance their UW skills, but both must remain ancillary to the main mission of UW.

At the second waypoint, we should re-examine the Robin Sage exercise. Robin Sage is firmly rooted in the GW experience of World War II. The exercise should be updated to reflect the new environments that we will encounter in UW campaigns worldwide.

At the third waypoint, we should revisit the work of Jones and Tone. In their article, they dismiss insurgency as an unlikely scenario because of a lack of U.S. political will. While that may have been true when they wrote their article, the attacks of Sept. 11 have reignited the national will to remove and replace governments that sponsor terrorism. In fact, in the present environment, insurgency may be the most likely UW scenario that we face.

Almost 60 years ago, SF's predecessors in the OSS conducted UW in the greatest conflict that our nation had ever seen. Since then, we have continued their journey. True, we have sometimes lost our way and have had to backtrack, but we have always returned to our original course. As our nation fights one of its most difficult and complex wars ever, it is essential that SF fully embrace UW as its primary mission.

Editor's note: The SF Doctrine Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine published an initial draft of a long-awaited UW manual, FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, in November 2001. The manual was sent to the field with the caveat that it was an "expedited version," and DOTD requested critical feedback and constructive criticism from all sources. To date, DOTD has received little feedback. Interested persons can provide feedback or request additional copies of the manual by telephoning the SF Doctrine Division at DSN 239-5333 or commercial (910) 432-5333.*

Major Mike Skinner is an SF officer currently serving in the Ground Branch of Requirements Validation, U.S. Special Operations Command. He was previously the S3 for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Major Skinner has served in a variety of other special-operations assignments in the 3rd SF Group, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He received his commission through ROTC upon graduation from Eastern Illinois University. Major Skinner holds a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in military studies.

Notes:

1 Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, 5-7.

2 Public Affairs Office, Central Intelligence Agency, *The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 6-8.

3 *Ibid*., 16.

4 *Ibid*., 16-18.

5 *Ibid*.

6 United States Army Special Operations Command, "To Free from Oppression: A Concise History of U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School," 1996, 15.

7 Colonel Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 154-56.

8 *Ibid*. 179. An OSS OG was composed of two 15-man detachments. It was common practice to deploy them in the squad configuration vs. deploying the entire 30-man OG.

9 *Ibid*.

10 Jones, 6.

11 "To Free from Oppression," 11-12.

12 FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2001), 2-1.

Feedback from the Field: The SF Field Performance Project

by John "Jat" Thompson, Dr. Mark A. Wilson and Dr. Michael G. Sanders

On Jan. 7, 2002, the front page of *USA Today* featured an article headlined, "Green Berets outfought, outthought the Taliban." The article, written by Kirk Spitzer, described Special Forces as trained to "operate behind enemy lines, work with local forces, conduct humanitarian missions and perform sensitive assignments." The article quoted one SF soldier as saying, "Our mission is not necessarily to outfight the enemy, although we can do that if we have to. We would rather outthink them." Recent research provides compelling evidence that SF soldiers are able to do just that.

In 2001, members of the Army Research Institute, or ARI, conducted the SF Field Performance Project to assess the skills of SF soldiers in the field and to determine whether SF training is producing the most effective soldier for SF missions.

Process

The SF Field Performance Project sought to answer a number of questions: How certain are we that soldiers who perform well in training will also perform well in the field? What skills do SF soldiers have? What skills do they lack? What skills do SF soldiers consider to be important for good performance?

Before researchers could begin collecting data to answer those questions, they had to design an effective questionnaire. The project would survey a variety of soldiers: company commanders, company sergeants major, team leaders and team sergeants. The questionnaire needed to be organized in a format that would get the maximum utility from each SF soldier's input. In order to conserve respondents' time, the questions needed to be clear and concise, and the questionnaire needed to fit on the front and back of one page. The questionnaire also needed to request data that SF soldiers would find relevant, and researchers wrote questions that referred to job-specific behaviors that SF soldiers themselves had identified during earlier ARI research. The questionnaire was pilot-tested on three groups of active-duty SF soldiers and reviewed by several SF senior leaders. The feedback from the pilot groups and reviewers was incorporated into the final design of the questionnaire.

In order to compare a soldier's performance in the field to his performance in SFAS and the SFQC, researchers needed to identify each soldier who was rated in the Field Performance Project. The individual ratings, however, would have to remain confidential. It was important that the SF leadership understand that the data from the project would in no way be used to single out individuals. Input would be used to improve SFAS and SFQC, and to provide the SF Command with feedback on the readiness of the force.

Before the questionnaire was fielded, behavioral scientists from ARI traveled to the headquarters of each SF group (and to other locations where there were large con-

centrations of SF soldiers) to describe the purpose of the Field Performance Project and to answer soldiers' questions. At the same time, they delivered copies of the questionnaire to the person designated as the point of contact for each SF group.

Table 1 shows the number of respondents from each of the active-duty SF groups. The 2,744 forms returned to ARI contained ratings of approximately 60 percent of the active-duty SF soldiers serving on A-detachments. The data in Table 2 show the length of time that soldiers had served on a particular A-detachment. That information will help researchers determine how experience affects performance, and it will give researchers an understanding of how familiar a rater might have been with the soldier whom he evaluated (soldiers who had served longer on a detachment would have had more opportunities to perform their jobs).

Table 1: Number of Respondents per SF Group

Group	No. returned
1st	596
3rd	278
5th	390
7th	828
10th	652

Table 2: Soldiers' Time on Team Rated by Officer or NCO

Time on Team	Officer	NCO
Not indicated	158	192
1 Month or less	12	7
1-6 Months	300	216
6-12 Months	271	272
12-18 Months	244	210
18-24 Months	192	166
24-36 Months	136	132
More than 36 Months	118	118
Total	1431	1313

Form

The performance-evaluation form was designed so that SF leaders could rate each soldier under their command (or on their A-detachment) on specific behaviors. During previous SF job-analysis research by ARI, those behaviors had been identified by SF soldiers as critical to SF missions.

The SF leaders rated the soldiers in three primary-skill areas: soldiering skills, SF-specific skills and team-member skills. Soldiering skills included warrior spirit, the ability to navigate in the field, the ability to troubleshoot and solve problems, and the ability to plan and prepare for missions. SF-specific skills included the ability to use and enhance language skills, the ability to teach, and the ability to build effective relationships with indigenous populations. Team-member skills included demonstrating initiative and extra effort, dealing with interpersonal situations and contributing to the team effort and morale. Finally, SF leaders were instructed to rank each soldier under their command or on their A-detachment.

Spreading the word

Several respondents expressed concern that they would never learn the results of the Field Performance Project and that their time was being wasted. ARI researchers understood their concern and took steps to ensure that feedback would reach the field. First, the researchers presented their findings to senior leaders at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Second, they created for each SF group a customized CD-ROM that contained an interactive presentation of the research data pertaining to that group. The presentation data were also formatted as two slide briefings — one long (72 slides) and one short (20 slides). The CD also contained a slide briefing to assist viewers in interpreting the presentation. Researchers will continue to communicate their findings through articles to be published in future issues of *Special Warfare*.

Preliminary findings of the SF Field Performance Project indicate that SF officers and NCOs agree on three characteristics that determine a soldier's performance or a soldier's ranking on a team (see Table 3). SF leaders (officers and senior NCOs) ranked highly those soldiers who dedicate the necessary time and effort to get the job done, those who motivate other team members through words and actions, and those who

Table 3: The Characteristics of a Highly Effective SF soldier

Behaviors considered by officers and NCOs to be good predictors of performance:

- Develops plans that are technically sound and well-coordinated.
- Makes an effort to motivate other team members through actions or words.
- Dedicates the necessary time and effort to get the job done.

Behaviors considered only by officers:

- Completes tasks and assignments to standard and in a timely manner.
- Uses available resources to resolve problems and to construct needed items.
- Places self-interest and own priorities above welfare of the team.
- Lacks resourcefulness.
- Arrives at destination on time.

Behaviors considered only by NCOs:

- Is inappropriately argumentative and confrontational.
- Is proficient in performing the duties of his SF MOS.
- Makes promises or commitments to host-nation government that he cannot deliver.

develop technically sound and well-coordinated plans. Officers also valued soldiers who arrive on time, who complete tasks on time and who use resources wisely. NCOs gave high rankings to SF soldiers who are proficient in performing their duties.

Respondents also listed behaviors that they felt adversely affect a soldier's ranking on the team. Officers downgraded soldiers who place self-interest first or who lack resourcefulness. NCOs downgraded soldiers who are inappropriately argumen-

The Three Dimensions of Performance



tative and who make promises or commitments to the host-nation that they cannot deliver.

Good news

Overall, the findings of the ARI's research have been extremely positive. Officers and NCOs rated the majority of SF soldiers as either "effective" or "high" in the three primary skill areas (page 24). Between 96 and 99 percent of the SF soldiers were rated as either effective or high in their soldiering skills and in SF-specific skills. The ratings for team-member skills were only slightly lower — approximately 95 percent of SF soldiers were rated as either effective or high.

Although the results are promising, there is always room for improvement, especially in SF, which maintains the highest of standards. Therefore, SF needs to devote special attention to the 2-5 percent of soldiers who were rated low. SF should also try to minimize the number of SF soldiers who are rated as only "effective" in their primary skill areas.

The most promising results have been the ratings of SF soldiers' proficiency in performing MOS duties. Between 85 and 90 percent of the SF soldiers were rated as always proficient in performing their duties. The ratings indicate that SFAS is selecting the right personnel and that SFQC is training soldiers in the skills necessary for performing their duties. Approximately 1 percent of the SF soldiers were rated as never proficient in performing their duties.

Also promising are the ratings of SF soldiers' ability to navigate in the field. More than 75 percent of all SF soldiers received high ratings on their ability to navigate, indicating that soldiers who complete the SFQC are well-trained in navigation. As might be expected, navigation skills appear to improve the longer a soldier serves on an SF team.

Opportunities for improvement

Findings from the project indicate that some areas call for improvement. The first area is leadership development. A signifi-

Proficient in performing the duties of their SF MOS



Gets from place to place without errors and on time



Creates novel approaches that hold audience attention



Puts self-interest above the team



cant number of soldiers believe that team leaders could do better at improvising, or thinking on their feet. A large number of team leaders were rated as needing some improvement in their ability to develop technically sound plans and in their ability to teach others. Several team leaders were also rated as being self-oriented.

A significant number of SF soldiers were rated as needing to improve their teaching skills. That opinion was common among both officer and NCO responses. Data indicated that 60 percent of the SF soldiers rated always create novel approaches that capture and hold the audience's attention; the other 40 percent need to improve. One way of improving soldiers' teaching skills would be to provide more opportunities during the SFQC for SF candidates to practice their teaching techniques.

Data from field soldiers appeared to dispel the belief that "new guys" put self-interest ahead of the interests of the team. Data indicated that approximately 70 percent of the SF soldiers never place self-interest above the team's welfare, that about 18 percent sometimes put self-interest first, and that close to 10 percent always put self-interest first. The focus on self-interest does not appear to change significantly with the amount of time that an SF soldier serves on an A-detachment.

The ratings of soldiers' language skills indicated a possible area for improvement (page 27). One of the characteristics that distinguish SF soldiers is their ability to speak a foreign language. However, as the data indicated, a significant number of soldiers are not proficient in their language skills. It appears that a majority of SF soldiers learn only the basic lexicon. There are several possible explanations for the lower language proficiency: (1) Some languages are more difficult to learn than others. (2) Because of mission demands, soldiers may not have sufficient time to enhance their language skills. (3) Many soldiers do not appreciate the importance of achieving proficiency in a for-

eign language early enough in the training process to adequately acquire the necessary language skills. (4) SF senior leaders place a higher priority on MOS proficiency than on language proficiency. (5) It is possible, depending upon the demand for a particular MOS, that an SF soldier could be assigned to an SF group whose designated language is one that he has not been trained to speak. The Army Special Operations Command is exploring ways of identifying processes and practices that will facilitate the enhancement of SF language training.

Conclusion

Feedback from the SF Field Performance Project is providing the Special Warfare Center and School with information that is critical for improving SF training. The data are also a testament to the desire of SF leaders (officers and senior NCOs) to maintain and improve the force. The fact that the SF senior leadership was willing to support the project and to commit personnel to help acquire the information demonstrates the leadership's focus on improving SF's operational capabilities. Responses from the field clearly indicate that SF soldiers, on the whole, are well-trained and capable. The findings, while validating many opinions about SF's strengths, also identified areas that need improvement. In future research, ARI will use the data gathered during the Field Performance Project as the empirical basis for recommending improvements to the SF assessment-and-selection process. The data will also help SF recruiters to identify target groups for recruiting. Future articles in *Special Warfare* will address, in greater detail, additional findings from the SF Field Performance Project.



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Dr. Michael G. Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the ARI since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, Dr. Sanders continued his research on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment and retention. He holds a master's and a Ph.D. in experimental psychology, with an emphasis on human factors.

Implementing Plan Colombia: Assessing the Security Forces Campaign

by Major George Franco

Plan Colombia, the integrated strategy that Colombia has developed to meet its many pressing needs, rightfully recognizes the political, social and economic aspects of the country's ills. However, the military campaign in Colombia has thus far been poorly tailored to facilitate or complement the Colombian government's nonmilitary initiatives.

Specifically, the Colombian security forces have pursued a *raiding* strategy against Colombia's intractable foes: the insurgency, the reactionary paramilitary groups, and the drug trade. By contrast, a *persisting* strategy, one that emphasizes the long-term security of the population, is more likely to achieve synergy with the nonmilitary aspects of Plan Colombia.[1] Only a persisting strategy will bring stability and the rule of law to Colombia. A limited advisory effort sponsored by the United States could bring about the necessary course correction in Colombia's security-forces campaign.

Plan Colombia seeks to strengthen the Colombian state and to secure peace and prosperity for the Colombian people. Its aim is to reduce the incentives for unlawful behavior while simultaneously strengthening the state's enforcement mechanisms. To that end, Plan Colombia seeks to produce economic growth, a more capable judiciary, greater government accountability, respect for human rights, alternative crop development, curtailment of the narcotics trade, and a more effective security-forces campaign.[2] Until recently, the plan also included a controversial negotiations track with the insurgency, which was largely the result of domestic political calculations and international pressure. Plan Colombia is a broad statement of political objectives rather than a detailed plan of action showing how those objectives will be accomplished.

The Colombian concept

Despite four decades of insurgent conflict, the Colombian army retains what is, in essence, a conventional approach to warfighting. The Colombian army's organization, doctrinal foundations and officer development are similar to the U.S. Army's. In fact, Colombia sent more officers to the former U.S. Army School of the Americas than any other country in the hemisphere.[3] Colombian military personnel also participate in a number of exchange programs with the U.S. The best Colombian officers, like their American counterparts, are ingrained with an offensive mindset and fighting spirit.

Colombian military officials have for years attempted to counteract insurgent hit-and-run tactics through the application of superior firepower and mobility. Progress in the war has been measured in terms of the attrition of guerrilla forces. The Mobile Brigades (*Brigadas Moviles*) serve as the main effort in the Colombian army's campaign against the insurgency.

Photo courtesy George Franco

Colombian soldiers and members of the U.S. 7th Special Forces Group board a UH-1H helicopter during air-assault training in Colombia.

These units are often moved from one end of the country to the other so that they can conduct search-and-destroy operations in areas that otherwise remain outside the government's sphere of control. Colombian military planners see mobility as the key to quickly massing the superior firepower that is needed to defeat the insurgent forces. Within this context, the Colombian armed forces see the acquisition of additional helicopters as their greatest strategic imperative.

The Colombian army has achieved some isolated successes with its mobile approach, such as the battle in the town of Juan Jose, 250 miles north of Bogota. This action against elements of the country's largest rebel group, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,* or FARC, occurred July 31, 2001. During that engagement, soldiers transported by helicopter, and aided by close air support, battered a guerrilla force that was attacking a government installation.[4]

The action in Juan Jose, and the action in a similar battle fought during August and September 2001 near San Jose de Guaviare, were not the result of government search efforts. They were the consequence of overly ambitious guerrilla operations that had failed to consider the Colombian army's recent improvements in mobility and in firepower. Yet despite these successes of the Colombian army, its effort to defeat guerrilla forces through maneuver battles alone is not likely to succeed in the long run.

The guerrillas in Colombia have been generally successful in avoiding unintended engagements with the Colombian army. They are familiar with Colombia's vast and difficult terrain, and they rely on a network of informants that can quickly provide them with advance notice of the army's movements. Because the Colombian army rarely operates in elements smaller than 140-man companies, the guerrillas can detect and track the army units with relative ease. When chance engagements do occur, the guerrillas seldom choose to fight pitched battles. Contacts are often fleeting, inconclusive and frustrating for the army. The army's frustration is compounded by the guerrilla's widespread use of mines and improvised explosive devices. As a result, the Colombian army is hard-pressed to win a war of attrition in which the guerrillas control the engagement tempo.[5]

Guerrilla attacks on isolated government outposts have prompted the Colombian security forces to consolidate their personnel into larger bases. Military leaders, thus far, have failed to harden the defenses of smaller outposts to withstand attacks, and until recently, they had also failed to develop the procedures for providing timely and effective reinforcement. (The recent successes in Juan Jose and in San Jose de Guaviare notwithstanding.) The pattern of consolidating forces has been especially evident among the police, who in recent years have completely terminated their presence in 190 of Colombia's 1,100 municipalities.[6] With the departure of security forces from the smaller towns and villages, government institutions and private businesses (and anyone else with the ability to relocate) have also taken flight. Those who cannot leave are at the mercy of the insurgent and paramilitary groups.

With the departure of security forces from the smaller towns and villages, government institutions and private businesses ... have also taken flight. Those who cannot leave are at the mercy of the insurgent and paramilitary groups.

The plight of Peque, a town in the Department of Antioquia, is typical of the plight of many rural communities throughout Colombia. After the police ended their presence in the area, the town's 10,000 inhabitants spent three years acquiescing to the influence of FARC. That is, until the day paramilitary forces from the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, or AUC, looted the town and established a deadline for all inhabitants to either leave the area or risk execution.[7] The action was apparently part of the AUC's effort to empty the Colombian countryside of real or potential FARC supporters. After several delays and a public outcry, the Colombian military established an outpost in the town, and the inhabitants were reassured that they could ignore the AUC's ultimatum.

Nowhere has the government's abandonment of the rural population been more dramatic than in the demilitarized zone, an area that, until recently, the Colombian authorities had ceded to FARC as a precondition for peace negotiations with the rebel group. Within this area, the guerrillas trained and reorganized their forces in a completely unfettered manner. As in other parts of the country that are under their influence, the guerrillas obtained support and resources from the local population, and they taxed and otherwise participated in the narcotics trade. Although political concessions can be an effective tool in the process of negotiating, the demilitarized zone provided tangible benefits to the guerrillas. The sanctuary, in effect, removed pressure from the insurgents to negotiate in good faith.

The U.S. role

The U.S. has sought to avoid entanglement in Colombia's war against the insurgency. The primary U.S. objective in Colombia has been to reduce the flow of narcotics. The U.S. approach to reducing the narcotics problem has largely consisted of working with Colombian authorities in four areas: arresting and prosecuting key drug barons, interdicting narcotics shipments, eradicating illicit crops from the air, and raiding drug-processing facilities in Colombia's interior. However, despite the steady increase in U.S. assistance, the narcotics problem in Colombia and the war against the insurgency continue to worsen.

Over the last three years, U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers have trained three Colombian army battalions to carry the counternarcotics fight into the most contested areas of the country. These areas have long been FARC strongholds. The U.S.-trained Colombian army battalions have conducted several successful incursions against remote drug-processing facilities. Nevertheless, those battalions are not likely to be decisive in reducing

the flow of narcotics or in denying narcotics (as a source of revenue) to the insurgency.

New body count

U.S. officials have routinely measured the effectiveness of the counternarcotics campaign in terms of the number of drug labs destroyed. In other instances, U.S. officials have been quoted highlighting the tonnage of seized narcotics as proof of at least marginal success. Unfortunately, both of these measures of effectiveness are often as meaningless as the Vietnam-era body counts were. For example, if the number of drug labs created during a period of time exceeds the number of drug labs destroyed, then conditions are getting worse, not better. Furthermore, the current measures of progress in Colombia are often exaggerated or inflated for various reasons, and they contribute to a way of thinking that erroneously equates increased activity with increased effectiveness. Even with the addition of the U.S.-trained battalions, there is little evidence that the current strategy will achieve the "crossover point," the point at which the number of drug labs being destroyed will surpass the number being created.

By narrowly focusing on the drug-processing and drug-transportation infrastructure within Colombia, U.S. authorities have, in some measure, contributed to Colombia's flawed raiding strategy. The approach has done little to help establish a lasting government presence in the more remote areas of the country or to facilitate the nonmilitary components of Plan Colombia. Illegal drug production is but one of the many symptoms of the Colombian state's failure to impose the rule of law throughout its national territory. Alternative development programs, judicial reforms and improvements in the economy brought about by Plan Colombia will have little effect on those parts of Colombia that remain isolated and without a permanent security presence. Narcotics activities and the insurgency will inevitably continue to flourish in those areas.

The Colombian raiding strategy also contributes to a dynamic in which the only contact many rural inhabitants have with the government occurs when their illegal crops and their livelihood are destroyed by government security forces. This brief government intrusion into the lives of those who live in the more remote areas of the countryside fails to deliver any benefits whatsoever. Such a pattern of interaction can only encourage further collaboration between the coca growers and FARC, both of whom seek to profit from illegal narcotics activities.

For many individuals, the decision to participate in the drug trade is based upon cost and benefits. To influence the

Photo courtesy George Franco

An SF NCO from the 7th SF Group keeps a watchful eye as Colombian soldiers occupy a support-by-fire position during a live-fire exercise in Colombia.

Photo courtesy George Franco

NCOs from the 7th SF Group train Colombian medics in life-saving techniques during advanced-skills training in Colombia.

decision-making of those individuals, the government of Colombia must raise the price of participating in the drug trade and provide conditional incentives for not participating in it. These initiatives will be possible only when Colombia can provide a continuous security presence at the community level and when the government has gained greater control over the movement of individuals in and out of contested areas. The only relevant measure of effectiveness is one that tracks the progressive pacification of the country and the systematic expansion of the government's sphere of control.

Elements of counterinsurgency

In many respects, the Colombian army's current approach to the insurgency bears a resemblance to America's early efforts to employ ground troops in Vietnam. The U.S. campaign in Vietnam sought to destroy enemy forces through the conduct of maneuver battles.[8]

Rather than focusing exclusively on a war of movement against guerrilla forces, the Colombian army would do well to emphasize the classical elements of counterinsurgency strategy: clear-and-hold operations, civic action, human-intelligence activities, political mobilization of the population, and the organization of self-defense forces.[9] These activities would require the cooperation of various state institutions and would seek to deny the insurgents access to the population. Access to the population is vital to the insurgents because it provides a source of intelligence, logistics, finance and recruitment. In the long run, Colombia would need to seek the rural population's support in the struggle against the insurgency, against the paramilitary groups and against the drug trade.

Clear-and-hold operations. In clear-and-hold operations, the Colombian army would first deploy soldiers to an area that lacked security forces. The soldiers would saturate the area, displacing any overt guerrillas or members of other illegal groups. Security forces would then construct hardened outposts in order to stake out a permanent presence in the community. The soldiers would seek to have a beneficial impact on the local inhabitants through an effective civic-assistance campaign.

Civic action. Under an umbrella of secu-

rity, government programs and services would strive to improve the living standard of the inhabitants. Government programs could offer the communities alternatives to the narcotics economy, which, contrary to myth, is often less than generous to the rank-and-file coca growers.

Human-intelligence activities. Human-intelligence activities would seek to identify and neutralize clandestine elements that the insurgents and other illegal groups might have left behind. Human-intelligence activities could also provide early warning to the security forces of an impending attack.

Political mobilization of the population. A government information campaign would highlight the benefits of increased security and development programs. Gradually, the Colombian authorities would mobilize the population to cooperate with and assist the security forces. In time, the community would assume greater responsibility for its own defense, allowing the security forces to shift their emphasis to other areas.

While the Colombian armed forces must be prepared to meet any tactical challenge from the insurgency, their primary objective should be to create conditions that do not allow the insurgency to mobilize and sustain field forces. This indirect approach would also seek to restrict the operating space of all illicit groups as much as possible.

Self-defense forces. In a study on Colombia published by the Army War College, Colonel Joseph Nunez argues that authorities will eventually need to organize a self-defense constabulary that can operate under strict control of the government security forces. Once organized, the new force, much like the *Rondas Campesinas* of Peru, would draw its members from the rural population and would help protect the secondary towns and villages throughout the countryside.[10] The concept of a self-defense constabulary is similar to that of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces that were employed in Vietnam.

Colombia's previous experience with self-defense forces was unsuccessful. The early Colombian self-defense forces, the so-called *Autodefensas*, failed because they were primarily the venture of private citizens, and the government failed to exercise adequate control of them. Many of the forces later became embroiled in abuses and criminal activities, and in 1989 Colombia outlawed the *Autodefensas*.

In 1994, the Colombian government organized the *Convivir* community-watch groups to assist authorities in curtailing insurgent activities. Despite the effectiveness of the *Convivir* groups and the fact that the Colombian Constitutional Court had ruled that they were legal, the project became mired in political controversy. As a result, the government dropped the initiative altogether.[11]

Public dismay and frustration with the insurgency and conditions of lawlessness may indicate that Colombia is willing to reconsider some form of civil defense that would protect communities in contested areas. In many parts of Colombia, however, the population may be far from ready to join the authorities in the struggle against the insurgency and other outlawed groups. Nevertheless, Colombia will require support from the population and the formation of some type of irregular force that can help extend the reach of the Colombian military. During past negotiations, FARC has repeatedly stated its opposition to any form of civil defense in Colombia.

While the Colombian armed forces must be prepared to meet any tactical challenge from the insurgency, their primary objective should be to create conditions that do not allow the insurgency to mobilize and sustain field forces.

Refining U.S. policy

Ambassador David Passage states that the U.S. can do more to assist Colombia. He says that the U.S. could provide training and military assistance for Colombia in

Colombian soldiers assault an objective during training with the 7th SF Group in Colombia.

Photo courtesy George Franco

much the same way that it did for El Salvador.[12] But what Colombia needs most is a reassessment of its overall conduct of the security-forces campaign.

A limited U.S. advisory effort could help Colombia implement changes and develop a persisting strategy. An advisory effort could also help Colombia develop the measures necessary for ensuring the long-term security of the population. Such an effort should begin at the national level in Bogota and progress down the Colombian chain of command into the various state institutions.

Unfortunately, the recent tactical successes that Colombia has achieved are not likely to produce an internal reassessment of its broad military strategy. But the U.S. may be well-positioned to bring about just such a review.

The U.S. should learn from the Pentagon's ineffective attempt to contract civilian advisers for the Colombian armed forces.[13] Success in the future will hinge on employing the right people as advisers: individuals who can speak the local language; who have knowledge of the local history and culture; and who have a full understanding of counterinsurgency activities. Short-duration training missions are not sufficient to effect the changes required in Colombia — changes in strategy and in mindset. Advisers could target the efforts of training teams, seek broader interagency cooperation, promote joint operations, and encourage respect for human rights.

A limited advisory effort is both politically viable and sustainable over the long term. In considering their options, U.S. officials should weigh the consequences of continued ineffectiveness in Colombia. Gaining domestic U.S. support for a refined American policy may not be easy, but it is a goal worthy of the effort. In the aftermath of the events of Sept. 11, 2001, a change in U.S. policy may be more feasible now than at any other time.

While it is clear that Colombian military strategy requires reorientation, it is also clear that the security forces have too often been wrongly maligned. Critics minimize the good; they exaggerate the bad; they are frequently politically motivated; and they fail to understand that the security forces are the *only* alternative that can bring an end to the violence and lawlessness in Colombia. The military and the police have made enormous sacrifices, and their continued service under extremely difficult conditions is proof of their many fine qualities.

While a large number of individuals in Colombia seek to profit from the government's lack of effective control, many more are crying out for the authorities to fulfill their responsibility of guaranteeing law and order. Inhabitants in contested areas are weary of living under the oppression of outlaws, and they are demanding a long-term commitment by

their government. The U.S. can play a more effective role by addressing the fundamental dynamics of the conflict in Colombia.

Conclusion

Plan Colombia recognizes the multidimensional nature of Colombia's problems, but until now, the various initiatives taken by the Colombian government have been poorly synchronized. The military campaign, in particular, must be reoriented if it is to achieve synergy with the nonmilitary components of Plan Colombia.

In order to reorient the military campaign, the Colombian security forces must move away from the current *raiding* strategy and pursue a *persisting* strategy. Such an approach would attempt to establish a lasting security presence in each community, and it would seek to promote the rule of law for all Colombians.

The U.S. can help bring about that change in strategy. The only measure of effectiveness that matters in Colombia is one that progressively tracks the pacification of one area after another within the country's borders. ✂

Major George Franco is commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. Major Franco has served in a variety of positions as an Infantry officer in the 10th Mountain Division and as an SF officer in the 7th SF Group. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1988 and from the USSOCOM-sponsored Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2000.

Notes:

[1] I have heard Professor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School use the term "persisting strategy" as the opposite of "raiding strategy" in his classes on the future of warfare. To my knowledge, he has not used this term in association with a counterinsurgency campaign.

[2] Gabriel Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives" (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2001).

[3] As of December 2000, Colombian security-forces personnel accounted for 10,417 of the 61,967 students who had attended the U.S. Army School of the Americas since its creation. Colombia has sent more students to the School of the Americas than any other country, including El Salvador. Source: USARSA Academic Records.

[4] A. Selsky, "Colombian Army Kills More Than 60," Associated Press (2 August 2001). Available at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010802/wl/colombia_violence_5.html.

[5] I base these observations on several conversations and combat debriefings with Colombian military personnel in southern, eastern and northern Colombia, primarily between 1997 and 2001.

[6] "190 Municipalities Without Police Presence," *El Pais* (Cali, Colombia), 11 August 2000; Daniel D. Tomlinson, "Civil Defense in Colombia During Internal Conflict" (San Diego, Calif.: University of California, 2001).

[7] "Ocho Dias de Angustia," *Semana* (Bogota, Colombia), 16 July 2001.

[8] Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986). Also Lewis Sorely, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt, Inc., 1999).

[9] These elements of counterinsurgency strategy are a modification of those outlined by Andrew Krepinevich in his book, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[10] Joseph R. Nunez, "Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace" (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2001).

[11] Tomlinson.

[12] Ambassador David Passage, "Colombia in Turmoil: How the U.S. Could Help," *Special Warfare* (Winter 2000), 8-15.

[13] David Adams and Paul de la Garza, "Contract's End Hints Of Colombia Trouble," *St. Petersburg Times*, 13 May 2001.

Historical Vignette: The First Special Service Force at Villeneuve-Loubet

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

In the history of the First Special Service Force, or FSSF, the picturesque French village of Villeneuve-Loubet figures prominently, not only as the scene of a critical battle in August 1944, but also as the location of the FSSF's disbanding ceremony.

Photo courtesy Kenn Finlayson

Marius Bardonna, center, stands with (left to right) CSM Denzil Ames, retired COL Robert S. Moore, BG Frank Toney and retired BG Edward Thomas during a memorial ceremony for the FSSF in Villeneuve-Loubet in 2001. Bardonna led the FSSF around German positions in 1944.

Located in a valley that opens to the sea at the Baie des Anges, Villeneuve-Loubet sits on the banks of the Loup River and straddles the highway between Cannes and Nice, a route that is flanked by the Mediterranean to the south and by the Alpes Maritimes to the north. High ground around the village allows superb observation of the area, particularly from the Chateau des Comte de Provence, a 12th-century castle that dominates the valley from its position on the south side of the village.

During Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944, Villeneuve-Loubet was a key location on the FSSF's drive eastward along the Riviera. With the Loup River forming a moat on its western side, the German-occupied chateau represented a formidable obstacle to the FSSF's progress toward Nice. It would take all of the FSSF's combat skill and more than a little luck to secure the area.

On Aug. 24, the FSSF's 2nd Regiment was moving eastward on the outskirts of Villanueve-Loubet when German mortar fire hit the lead elements and signaled the start of stiff German resistance. Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Moore, commander of the 2nd Regiment, halted his forces until evening and then conducted a reconnaissance of the village. The German defenses included several machine guns, arrayed around the chateau, that overlooked the avenues of approach to the town. Neutralizing the Germans around the chateau would be key to securing the town.

That evening a French civilian, Marius Bardonna, appeared at the 2nd Regiment's headquarters to offer his services. Bardon-

na, the gamekeeper for the chateau, possessed an intimate knowledge of the trails and pathways in the area. That night, Bardonna and his young assistant led Captain Lawrence J. Piette and the 2nd Regiment's 6th Company around the chateau.

Attacking from the rear, the 6th Company rolled up the German machine-gun positions one by one. So stealthy was the company's approach that some of the Germans thought the FSSF soldiers were their cooks bringing up the evening meal. As the 1st Battalion attacked from the western side and the 2nd Battalion attacked from the north, 6th Company stormed the castle and secured the position, opening the way for the FSSF's investiture of the town.

The village fell at 6 a.m. Aug. 26, and the FSSF captured 73 German prisoners. Supported by the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion, whose spotters occupied the chateau's towers, the FSSF repulsed several counterattacks throughout the day. The FSSF's 1st and 3rd regiments bypassed Villeneuve-Loubet and drove north and east toward Nice. German resistance east of Villenueve-Loubet crumbled.

Photo courtesy Kenn Finlayson

The Chateau des Comte de Provence, a 12th-century edifice, dominates the village of Villeneuve-Loubet.

Photo courtesy Kenn Finlayson

With spotters from the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion occupying the chateau's towers, the FSSF was able to repulse several German counterattacks.

The combination of Bardonna's intimate knowledge of the terrain around the chateau and the FSSF's combat prowess allowed Moore to seize the moment and to initiate an assault on the German defenses. The combination of stealth and surprise, trademarks of FSSF operations, eliminated a strong defensive position and precluded a bloody battle.

The next time the FSSF saw Villeneuve-Loubet was in December, when the unit, which was being disbanded, held a parade on the banks of the Loup River and then furled its colors for the final time.

Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the command historian for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Soldiers can update assignment preferences online

Through a newly developed Web application, soldiers can monitor and update their assignment preferences and their contact information from anywhere in the world. Assignment Satisfaction Key, or ASK, allows soldiers who have Army Knowledge Online accounts to access their information that is on file with the Army Personnel Command, or PERSCOM. PERSCOM's goals are to meet one of a soldier's top three preferences for assignment and to inform the soldier as to the location and the reporting date of his next assignment as much as a year out. If a branch is unable to meet a soldier's preference, ASK will facilitate personal communication between the enlisted branch manager and the soldier by providing the branch with accurate contact data on the soldier.

SF enlisted SDAP to double in FY 2003

Special-duty assignment pay, or SDAP, for Special Forces enlisted soldiers will increase in fiscal year 2003 from $110 per month to $220 per month. SDAP is an incentive to encourage soldiers to qualify for and to serve in positions that are extraordinarily demanding and that carry an unusual amount of responsibility.

ASVAB score requirements for MOSs 37F and 38A clarified

A new Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB, implemented Jan. 2, 2002, changed the method for computing individual line scores and made adjustments in score requirements to account for the differences between the old ASVAB and the new one. For example, for MOS 37F, the ST line score of 105 on the old test is equivalent to an ST score of 102 on the new test. The old ST requirement of 100 for MOS 38A is equivalent to 96 on the new test. The new line-score requirements apply only to soldiers who test under the new ASVAB. Thus, soldiers who are applying for reclassification into 37F or 38A and who took the previous ASVAB must either meet the previous ST minimum line-score requirements (105 for 37F or 100 for 38A) or take the new ASVAB and score at least 102 for 37F or 96 for 38A. For additional information, telephone MAJ Chuck Munguia or SGM Eric Scheib in the JFK Special Warfare and School's Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102.

New program will allow SF off-the-street recruiting

Individuals enlisting in the Army will soon be able to sign up for Special Forces and a slot in the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. Similar to the "SF Baby" program, which was in effect from the 1950s through 1986, the new program will allow civilians who meet stringent SF recruiting standards to enlist directly for SF. The initial enlistment term will be five years, which will allow enlistees sufficient time to complete the SF training pipeline and then serve three years on an SF A-Detachment. The enlistee will begin his training by attending One Station Unit Training as an 11B, infantryman. The soldier will then attend Airborne School before coming to Fort Bragg. Once he arrives at Fort Bragg, he will attend the

Special Operations Preparation and Conditioning Course, or SOPC. SOPC is designed to introduce the soldier to SF and to prepare him physically, mentally and emotionally for success in the SFQC and for his future as an SF soldier.

SWCS NCO Academy to teach PLDC

The Primary Leadership Development Course, or PLDC, is a four-week course in which sergeants and promotable specialists learn basic leadership skills. PLDC, along with the common leader training, or CLT, portion of the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, or BNCOC, is a prerequisite for the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. Currently, SF candidates who do have not met the PLDC and CLT prerequisites attend PLDC at the XVIII Airborne Corps NCO Academy before they begin the SFQC. Immediately following PLDC, they attend the two-week CLT portion of BNCOC at the Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy. The SWCS NCO Academy will soon offer a three-week course that includes PLDC and the CLT portion of BNCOC. The new course will save three weeks of training time and eliminate any redundancy that existed between PLDC and BNCOC. Soldiers will receive credit for PLDC when they complete the small-unit-tactics portion of the SF training pipeline (Phase 2), and they will receive credit for BNCOC when they complete the Robin Sage exercise (Phase 4).

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

FA 39 expects shortage of LTCs for next few years

As OPMS XXI enters year 2002, Functional Area 39 continues to shape into a healthy career field. Now that all year groups that have officers above the rank of captain have undergone career-field designation, or CFD, FA 39's promotion rates to lieutenant colonel and colonel should equal or exceed the Army's average. FA 39 has been critically short of captains for the last few years, but its captain strength should improve to more than 90 percent by mid-FY 2003. The results of the CFD board for YGs 84 and 85 show that several dual-tracked and untrained lieutenant colonels in FA 39 elected to remain in their basic branches. As a result, FA 39 anticipates a slight shortage of trained lieutenant colonels for the next couple of years. That shortage will present several opportunities for FA 39 majors to perform in positions that are above their pay grade.

FA 39 command opportunities promising

The small size of the FA 39 community has traditionally limited the number of command opportunities for FA 39 officers. But during the last two years, two officers in FA 39C (Civil Affairs) have been selected for brigade-level commands outside the Army Special Operations Command — one at the Army Recruiting Command and the other at Camp Red Cloud, Korea. In both cases, the Army recognized the special skills and the operational and leadership experience of FA 39 officers and selected them over officers from combat and combat-support career fields. The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office will continue to pursue additional command opportunities for lieutenant colonels and colonels in both the institutional and the tactical-service-support categories.

Proposal would change PSYOP, CA officer codes

The Chief of Staff of the Army recently directed the Total Army Personnel Command to make all two-digit officer area-of-concentration codes and enlisted branch codes consistent. In response to the CSA's guidance, the Special Operations Proponency Office submitted a proposal to change its officer codes to match those of the corresponding enlisted career fields. If the proposal is approved, FA 39 will be divided into FA 37 (Psychological Operations) and FA 38 (Civil Affairs) some time during FY 2002. Enlisted career-management fields 37F and 38A will remain unchanged. Although PSYOP and CA officers would have to endure a "re-labeling" if the proposal is approved, the new codes might help others in the Army distinguish between the two unique missions within FA 39.

FA 39 colonel selection rate exceeds Army average

The 2001 colonel promotion board considered 10 FA 39 lieutenant colonels who were in the promotion zone and selected six, giving FA 39 a promotion-zone selection rate of 60 percent, six points higher than the Army's promotion-zone selection rate of 54 percent. Especially good news was the selection of one FA 39C officer who had never served as a battalion commander. This is an indicator that officers are being promoted based upon their performance in their career field rather than in their basic branch.

Regulations govern length of warrant-officer service

Special Forces warrant officers and soldiers who are thinking of applying to become SF warrant officers need to be aware of the length of time they may serve as Army warrant officers. The SF warrant-officer program recruits SF NCOs who have 12 or more years of active federal service, or AFS. If an NCO becomes an SF warrant officer when he has 12 years AFS and receives timely promotions, he can attain the rank of CW5 just prior to his 30th year of AFS. Soldiers who have more than 12 years AFS when they apply for the SF warrant-officer program will not have time to make CW5 prior to their 30th year of AFS.

Section 1305, Title 10, U.S. Code, states:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a regular warrant officer (other than a regular Army warrant officer in the grade of chief warrant officer, W-5) who has at least 30 years of active federal service that could be credited to him under Section 511 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended (70 Stat. 114) shall be retired 60 days after he completes that service, except as provided by Section 8301 of Title 5.

(2)

(A) A regular Army warrant officer in the grade of chief warrant officer, W-5, who has at least 30 years of active service as a warrant officer that could be credited to him under Section 511 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended (70 Stat. 114), shall be retired 60 days after the date on which he completes that service, except as provided by Section 8301 of Title 5.

(B) A regular Army warrant officer in a warrant officer grade below the grade of chief warrant officer, W-5, who completes 24 years of active service as a warrant officer before he is required to be retired under paragraph (1) shall be retired 60 days after the date on which he completes 24 years of active service as a warrant officer, except as provided by Section 8301 of Title 5.

Section 8301, Title 5, U.S. Code states:

The Secretary concerned may defer, for not more than four months, the retirement under subsection (a) of any warrant officer if, because of unavoidable circumstances, evaluation of his physical condition and determination of his entitlement to retirement or separation for physical disability require hospitalization or medical observation that cannot be completed before the date when he would otherwise be required to retire under this section.

Under such regulations as he may prescribe, the Secretary concerned may defer the retirement under subsection (a) of any warrant officer upon the recommendation of a board of officers and with the consent of the warrant officer, but not later than 60 days after he becomes 62 years of age.

Concerning the uniform retirement date, Section 8301, Title 5 states:

(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided by this title or other statue, retirement authorized by statute is effective on the first day of the month following the month in which retirement would otherwise be effective.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the rate of active or retired pay or allowance is computed as of the date retirement would have occurred but for subsection (a) of this section.

Regarding warrant officers with more than 30 years of AFS who have not attained the grade of W5, the Army deputy chief of staff for personnel stated in a Nov. 6, 2001, memorandum, Subject: Mandatory Retirement for Maximum Service of Special Forces Warrant Officers, "We are in the process of conducting a special selective continuation board to consider those warrant officers with over 30 years AFS. The soldiers selected for continuation will be allowed to continue for one year following approval of the results by the Secretary of the Army."

FA 39 qualification could affect promotion eligibility

Captains who are best-suited for career-field designation, or CFD, into FA 39 are those who have completed the FA 39 qualification program (the Psychological Operations Officer Course or the Civil Affairs Course, the Regional Studies Course, and language training) and who have served in an FA 39 utilization assignment. Officers who have not completed the qualification program may still CFD into FA 39. Preference will be given to those who are airborne-qualified, who can demonstrate a foreign-language capability or who have a master's degree compatible with the functional area (as listed in DA Pam 600-3, *Officer Professional Development*). Officers should ensure that their DA Form 67-9, Officer Evaluation Form, Part Vc, states that they are best-suited for OPCF FA 39. Officers who CFD without having completed the FA 39 qualification program should be aware that they may be jeopardizing their chances for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Before a newly CFD'd major can become branch-qualified, he or she must attend the initial FA 39 qualification training (9-11 months) prior to being assigned to an operational unit. If the officer is later required to attend the resident Command and General Staff Officer Course and Intermediate Level Education, the time available for serving in branch-qualifying jobs will be limited. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann in the Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

Officers may apply to study at Harvard

Each year, the Army selects three or four officers to participate in the Harvard Strategist Program, which is conducted at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Officers are selected based on their academic records, performance and demonstrated potential for service in higher-level positions. In FY 2002, officers selected were from the following branches: Special Forces, Infantry, Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery. Graduates are awarded a master's in public administration from Harvard. After graduation, the officers serve a two-year assignment working with issues related to strategic plans and policies. Interested officers should contact their captains' assignments officer at SF Branch or visit the PERSCOM Web site for additional information about the Army's graduate programs.

SWCS allows constructive credit for CAOC

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School Policy 600-5 allows constructive credit for Packet I, Phase I of the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course, to be given to officers who are graduates of their advanced course or who are graduates of the Captain Career Course. To request constructive credit for Packet I, Phase I, Army Common Core or Captain Career Course, submit DA Form 4187 through the Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Attention: AOPE-RPB (Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Reserve Personnel Division), to Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Attention: AOJK-SP (Special Operations Proponency Office). Be sure to attach verification (i.e., the course-completion certificate or the academic evaluation report) to the DA Form 4187. Approved requests will be sent to the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, 3rd Battalion, Nonresident Training Branch, authorizing an officer's enrollment in Packet II, Phase I of the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course. For additional information, telephone MAJ Chuck Munguia or Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102, or send e-mail to: munguich@soc.mil or goldmanj@soc.mil.

Foreign SOF

Norwegian special forces developments

The Norwegian defense minister, Sigurd Frisvold, recently highlighted Norway's defense requirements, shortfalls in resources and readiness, and programs for the modernization of the armed forces. The development of Norwegian special forces, whose services are one of the country's major contributions to NATO, will receive particular emphasis. Norway sees the development of its special forces as a means of ensuring that the Norwegian defense establishment will possess the flexibility, readiness and quality needed for dealing with the operational environment. The program will improve not only the manpower of Norwegian special forces but also the quality and command-and-control aspects of the force.

Brazilian security initiatives, crime, and Colombian narco-guerrillas

Colombian and regional insurgents, together with narco-traffickers, continue to be the focus of Brazil's military and police establishments. According to recent reports, guerrilla groups better known from an earlier age — notably the Chilean Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left — are attempting to carry out kidnappings and other criminal activities in Brazil. The guerrilla groups use the proceeds from those crimes to support themselves, the large and dangerous Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (with whom the guerrillas have a long relationship), and perhaps the Colombian National Liberation Army. The Brazilian military maintains a vigilant presence on the nation's borders and has pioneered the use of military forces to counter organized drug organizations and other criminal groups whose capabilities exceed those of the police. A notable example is Operation Rio, which took place in the mid-1990s. More recently, at least two state governors have been pressing the Colombian government to develop a clear set of guidelines for the army and other military components to play an active role in combating drugs, arms-smuggling, and kidnappings on the border.

Terrorism and al-Qaeda links in Bangladesh

A number of transnational Islamic terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda, have established a presence in Bangladesh in alliance with various fundamentalist organizations in the country. The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, or HuJI, was established in 1992 with the aid of Islamic militant Osama bin Laden and is led by Shawkat Osman (aka Sheikh Farid), with Imtiaz Quddus as the general secretary. The HuJI with an estimated strength of 15,000, seeks to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh by waging war and killing progressive intellectuals. The covert activities of both Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda came to the fore during President Bill Clinton's visit to Bangladesh in March 2000. According to news reports, one of the reasons for the cancellation of President Clinton's scheduled visit to Joypura village and the national memorial at Savan was threats from the al-Qaeda. The HuJI reportedly maintains six camps in the hilly areas of Chittagong, where the cadre train in the use of weapons. Several hundred recruits have also received training in various camps throughout Afghanistan. The cadre are recruited mainly from the student bodies of various *madrassas* (religious seminaries), and they call themselves the "Bangladeshi Taliban." HuJI activists regularly cross over into sev-

eral Indian states to maintain contact with "sources" there. They also maintain links with terrorist groups in India, including the United Liberation Front of Asom, or ULFA. Since the late 1980s, the ULFA has been involved in a number of killings and abductions of government officials, security-forces personnel, industrialists, businessmen and local politicians. The ULFA has reportedly established a strong base in Bangladesh and runs several training camps there. HuJI's links to other terrorist groups and its practice of purveying cross-border terrorism in the name of Islamic rule make HuJI worthy of the closest international scrutiny.

Chinese airborne unit development

A February 2002 Chinese article provided substantial background information on the People's Liberation Army's airborne force — formed in 1950 as a brigade, for the purpose of "liberating Taiwan" from the Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist forces — and highlighted China's continuing interest in airborne employment. According to the article, Chinese airborne personnel helped solidify Communist control of mainland China in battles against "bandits" there, and they were heavily engaged against U.S. and allied forces during the Korean War (when they were integrated into the Chinese "volunteers" who were dispatched to Korea). They also took part in fighting with the Vietnamese from 1978 to 1982. The article devoted particular attention to the airborne's "special reconnaissance battalion," which it characterized as the "fist" of the airborne force. The battalion serves as a quick-reaction force. In future wars, it is expected to "fight battles that have never been fought." In preparation for those battles, the battalion has amassed large holdings of data on the nature of future war, including data pertaining to the use of high-technology weapons in local wars.

Evidence of renewing Mexican guerrilla activity in Guerrero state

The Costa Grande highlands of Mexico's Guerrero state have in recent years been a center of activity for the People's Revolutionary Army, or EPR, and other groups. Ambushes and clashes with military and police forces have occurred there frequently. After a period of decreased visibility, the EPR has engaged in several actions during the last six months. In November 2001, an EPR column seized two headquarters of the Guerrero State Judicial Police Command and held them for several hours — the action commemorated the death of two EPR fighters during a 1997 clash with the police. In December 2001, EPR issued a declaration that accused Mexican government officials of terrorism for alleged human-rights violations and accused the Mexican military of collusion with drug traffickers. More recently, EPR representatives surfaced near the Guerrero town of Atoyac, where they held a memorial for Lucio Cabanas, the legendary leader of the guerrilla group "Party of the Poor," who was killed in a 1974 engagement with Mexican military and police. The EPR claims a lineage to the Party of the Poor, and in January and February, it reportedly stepped up its recruiting activities in the Guerrero mountains. Mexican military patrols have been increased, and strong counterdrug actions by the Vicente Fox administration are reportedly forcing Mexican drug traffickers and their Colombian associates to smuggle drugs by sea routes.

Antiterrorism police force established in Shanghai

A new heavily armed paramilitary mobile unit intended for actions against terrorists has been established in Shanghai. The unit is reported to be the first of its kind in China, and it will operate within the so-designated Shanghai Armed Police. The new unit has 67 initial recruits, who will be joined by others in about six months. Training will focus on methods of countering terrorist attacks involving the use of explosives, poisonous gas or other means to inflict heavy

casualties. The mobile unit will use modern helmet-mounted communications systems. The unit is reportedly armed with a range of automatic and specialized firearms as well as exotic weapons like crossbows. Helicopters will provide the unit with additional mobility.

Potential terrorist entry to U.S. along SW border

Mexican immigration personnel and other Mexican law-enforcement agencies will join their U.S. counterparts in seeking to identify potential terrorists among legal and illegal immigrants from Mexico. Al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups are now attempting to recruit Muslims who do not appear to be of Middle Eastern origin to perform terrorist acts or reconnaissance missions in the U.S. Mexico has its own native followers of Islam (e.g., the Mayan Muslim converts in Chiapas who have requested passports for traveling to Saudi Arabia in order to perform the Hajj in Mecca). Terrorist recruits would probably be smuggled into the U.S., but if they are able to exploit Mexican immigration laws, which can be complex, their entry into Mexico could be entirely legal. Alien smugglers have been procuring Mexican immigration documents for their charges since before Sept. 11, 2001. The immigration documents are normally obtained for non-Arabic or non-Hispanic illegal immigrants. Once on Mexican territory, terrorists who possess such documents would be able to infiltrate the U.S. via established human-smuggling routes. Because of their non-Arabic, non-Hispanic appearance, these individuals would not fit the illegal alien/terrorist profile and might enjoy great freedom of movement within the U.S.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., CW4 Thomas Davidson and SSG Merle Miyasato of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

PSYOP Division helps write multiservice manuals

The Psychological Operations Division of the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine is assisting in the development of two multiservice publications: *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (MTTP) for Peace Operations*; and *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (MTTP) for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)*.

The Air Land Sea Application Center, or ALSA, the proponent for multiservice publications, is responsible for writing the manuals. The PSYOP Division is writing those portions of the manuals that pertain to psychological operations.

The new publications will explain the fundamental principles that guide the actions of PSYOP decisionmakers and forces in support of U.S. national objectives worldwide. The publications will describe the basic tactics, techniques and procedures for implementing U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine when PSYOP forces are engaged in peace operations or when they are using nonlethal weapons.

MTTP for Peace Operations will be used at the tactical level for planning and conducting joint or multiservice operations and training. The publication will guide readers to existing manuals, and it will provide additional doctrinal information where gaps exist. The manual will address the following aspects of peace operations:

- Fundamental concepts.
- Activities not covered in detail in other publications.
- Activities validated by peace operations' after-action reports but not incorporated into other publications.
- Activities in which the military is normally the lead agency.
- Activities in which the military is a supporting agency.
- Techniques for promoting legitimacy, cooperation, consent and transition.
- Techniques for establishing a secure environment.
- Force-protection considerations.

The publication will supplement established doctrine and provide a source of reference material to assist in planning and coordinating tactical operations as well as joint and multiservice training and education.

MTTP for Peace Operations will apply to all elements of a joint or multiservice force (including commanders, their staffs and operational elements) that plan and conduct peace operations.

The publication will supplement Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*; and Allied Tactical Publication 3.4.1.1, *Peace Support Operations Techniques and Procedures*.

MTTP for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons will be used at the tactical level for planning and conducting joint or multiservice operations. Its target audience will be primarily warfighting personnel and tactical unit leaders who use nonlethal weapons, or NLW, during training and tactical operations. The publication will supplement established doctrine and TTP for NLW, and it will also provide a source of reference material to assist commanders and their staffs in planning, coordinating, and conducting training and tactical operations.

The new publication will also promote an in-depth understanding of the complexities of operations requiring NLW. It will incorporate lessons learned from recent operations and training, as well as TTPs from various sources.

The new publications are expected to be available from ALSA in January 2003.

For more information, telephone Stephen Childs at DSN 239-7257/7259, or commercial (910) 432-7257/7259, or send e-mail to childss@soc.mil.

Officers may be able to change to FA 39

Officers who are interested in the Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs functional area, FA 39, but who already have a different FA, may still be able to change.

FA 39 has a shortage of captains, and recent events have increased the worldwide demand for qualified FA 39 officers. Officers in year group 1993, 1994 or 1995 who have not begun their FA training or assignment may still be eligible for FA 39.

As part of their training, FA 39 officers attend either the Psychological Operations Officer Course or the Civil Affairs Course, the regional studies course and language training. After completing the training, which takes about a year, officers will be assigned to either the 4th PSYOP Group or the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, both of which are based at Fort Bragg. In either of those units, the FA 39 officers will lead soldiers and NCOs in support of conventional and special operations. On any given day, soldiers from the two units are deployed to more than 25 countries, participating in valuable

training or in real-world contingencies. FA 39 officers learn unique skills, lead highly trained soldiers, deploy to challenging places in the world and significantly affect the operational environment. For more information, telephone the PERSCOM FA 39 Branch representative, Captain Kyle Kouri, at DSN 221-5790.

New 18F course to produce SF intel sergeant

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is changing the way it conducts its training for MOS 18F, "Special Forces assistant operations and intelligence sergeant."

Soldiers currently receive training for MOS 18F during the Special Forces Advanced NCO Course, taught at the SWCS NCO Academy, and they receive the 18F MOS upon graduation. Beginning in September 2002, the 18F instruction will be presented as an independent course, the 13-week SF Intelligence Sergeant Course. Only graduates of the new course will be awarded the MOS 18F, and they will be assigned to 18F billets after graduation. MOS 18F will also have a more descriptive title: "SF intelligence sergeant." The assistant-operations-sergeant function will become an additional duty for selected NCOs assigned to SF A-detachments.

The 18F course is being created in response to a changing threat environment, the evolution of SF doctrine and technology, and intelligence-training shortfalls identified in SF field units.

The new course will expand the 18F instruction to include the following:

- Enhanced analytical skills.
- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Advanced special-operations techniques (Level II).
- Force protection (Level II).
- Personnel recovery.
- Interrogation.
- Biometrics.
- Digital photography.
- Interagency operations.
- SOF intelligence architecture.

The SF Intelligence Sergeant Course will run three classes per year. The first class is scheduled to begin Sept. 9, 2002, and will contain 20 students. The size of the classes will gradually increase to the maximum size of 40 students. Students will consist of SF active-duty and National Guard NCOs. Because 18F qualification is a prerequisite for SF warrant-officer training, warrant-officer candidates who do not meet the prerequisite will also be scheduled to attend 18F training.

To bridge the gap in 18F training until the new course begins, SWCS is deploying 18F mobile training teams, or MTTs, to SF units in the field. The MTTs will conduct 10-day seminars that emphasize intelligence analysis in an unconventional-warfare environment. Training will be tailored to a unit's area of responsibility, incorporating the latest area intelligence as well as briefings by subject-matter experts from other Army major commands, other intelligence organizations and other government agencies.

Follow-on training envisioned for 18F soldiers includes internships with other Army and DoD agencies. Follow-on training will enhance the skills, knowledge and abilities of 18F soldiers, enabling them to progress from the apprentice level to the master level.

The objective of the 18F course and the follow-on training is to produce the 18F NCO envisioned by the SWCS Special Forces Evolution Steering Committee: "A combat leader capable of conducting combined, joint, and interagency conventional and unconventional intelligence activities; and security and force protection operations, unilaterally and through, with, or by indigenous personnel."

Graduates of the new SF Intelligence Sergeant Course will possess the advanced intelligence skills that will enable them to tap into the intelligence resources of both SOF and the joint intelligence community in order to support SF mission requirements.

SF soldiers win Bronze Stars for Operation Anaconda

Two Special Forces soldiers who participated in combat during Operation Anaconda were awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device in a ceremony held at Fort Bragg March 20.

Staff Sergeants Caleb M. Casenhiser and Larron B. Wadsworth, both of the 3rd SF Group, received the awards for valorous actions in combat against Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan March 2.

The Bronze Star Medal with the "V" Device is awarded to members of the military who distinguish themselves by heroic actions in combat against an armed enemy.

Both soldiers received the Purple Heart for wounds sustained in the action, which left their assistant detachment commander, CWO 2 Stanley Harriman, dead. Harriman was buried in North Carolina March 15. — *SFC Brian C. Sutton, USASOC PAO*

SWCS plans to recruit from underrepresented groups

The U. S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has developed an aggressive three-year plan that will target underrepresented racial and ethnic groups.

SWCS's goal is to fill the ranks (officer and enlisted) of special-operations forces with linguistically and geoculturally talented volunteers who want to serve their country in Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units. Soldiers who are interested in accompanying recruiters as role models or in becoming long-term mentors should telephone the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-6404/9002 or commercial (910) 432-6404/9002.

Book Reviews

Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy. *By Stephen J. Cimbala. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2001. ISBN: 0-275-96951-7 (hardback). 228 pages. $65*.

In *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy*, Stephen J. Cimbala, distinguished professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University and a long-time specialist on military affairs, performs a singular service by expanding our knowledge of "friction" in the conduct of military affairs.

Friction is a concept put forward by Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, the most famous soldier-philosopher of his generation. Despite the passage of time, Clausewitz's work still has a significant impact in modern-day military circles.

One of Clausewitz's more trenchant quotes concerning friction is: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war." Veterans of combat know the truth of this statement. Friction is real. Friction reflects human frailty and uncertainty. Friction is the element of chance. Friction exists at all levels of American military decision-making and operations — from the rarified air of the White House down to the foxhole.

Cimbala makes his excellent points through an examination of a series of American political-military events, which include the Cuban Missile Crisis, nuclear crisis management during the Cold War, and Operation Desert Storm. He



also postulates on the effects of friction in peace operations and in information warfare. In his conclusion, Cimbala provides a brief but superb elucidation on the war against Yugoslavia. The effects of friction on each event are brought to light in sterling fashion.

Cimbala points out that contrary to some popular opinion, Clausewitz's *Vom Kreig* (On War) is still valuable, and that those who say Clausewitzian theory is irrelevant on a technology-dominated battlefield are clearly mistaken. Technology is merely a tool. The essential human elements of war and battle have not changed since man picked up the first rock and threw it with malice aforethought at an adversary. The human element in war still reigns supreme. Politicians and senior military officers who are seduced by emerging military technologies ignore the nonlinear and often irrational element of friction at their hazard.

Clausewitz was not perfect, and neither are his theories. The dean of British military historians, John Keegan, claims to have discredited one of Clausewitz's most quoted statements: "War is politics by other means." Keegan rightly points out that the statement was true only within the context of Central Europe, and only during the time in which it was written. Still, within the context of today's 189 nation-states, the remark has considerable validity, and it would be imprudent to ignore the wisdom of those few well-chosen words. Cimbala recognizes Clausewitz's limitations, but he suggests that we should "Build on his foundation laid down in the first half of the 19th century, but not rest there."

According to Clausewitz, there are eight sources of friction:

1. Insufficient knowledge of the enemy.
2. Rumors (information gained by remote observation and spies).
3. Uncertainty about one's own strength and position.
4. Uncertainties that cause friendly troops to tend to exaggerate their own difficulties.
5. Differences between expectations and reality.
6. The fact that one's own army is never as strong as it appears to be on paper.
7. Difficulties in keeping an army supplied.
8. The tendency to change or abandon well-thought-out plans when confronted with the vivid physical images and perceptions of the battlefield.

Cimbala may have made a signal

contribution to our understanding of Clausewitzian friction by applying its tenets to an examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis. For perhaps the first time in American history, a U.S. president was compelled to act in a role similar to that of a battlefield commander. The presence of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba forced President John F. Kennedy to make immediate decisions that could have affected the future of the Western world. The crisis was characterized and defined by friction.

Cimbala's work may contain a not-too-subtle warning that we should consider: Those who rely on superior military technologies, which America has in abundance, may well be ultimately defeated because of their dependence on them. America's political and military leaders may have learned the wrong lessons from the lopsided victories of Operation Desert Storm and the war against Yugoslavia. The most important objective of the war against Yugoslavia, halting the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, was not achieved, and at this writing, Saddam Hussein is still in firm control of Iraq.

Friction has been responsible for more misunderstanding and confusion concerning military policy formulation, operations and battles than any other single source in the history of humankind. Friction is perhaps best described in the nonacademic vernacular as Murphy's Law. A similar U.S. Army maxim says: "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Historical analysis suggests that friction is unavoidably connected to all military endeavors. Soldiers of all ranks could benefit from a better understanding of the Clausewitzian multidimensional concept of friction, and Cimbala's work is highly recommended.

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

Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower. *By H. John Poole. Emerald Isle, N.C.: Posterity Press, 2001. ISBN 0-9638695-5-8. 338 pages. $14.95*.

Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel H. John Poole has written his third book for warriors. His previous books are *The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare* (reviewed in the Fall 1997 issue of *Special Warfare*) and *One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War*. First as an NCO and then as an officer, Poole served as a Marine Corps infantryman for more than 28 years. His service included multiple tours in Vietnam. His passion remains small units and small-unit tactics.

Phantom Soldier is based on Poole's study of Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese writings and tactics. Most special-operations soldiers have studied Sun Tzu, Mao and other great Chinese military writers. Poole has analyzed these writers from an infantry soldier's level and has deduced truths for asymmetrical warfare. When the techniques and tactics that a primitive foe might use are explained with the simplicity that Poole employs in this book, the reader will find them easy to comprehend.

By understanding the enemy's tactics, we can develop methods of defeating them. Poole proposes a bottom-up approach in the fight against nontraditional enemies.

Although Poole's book was written prior to Sept. 11, 2001, much of its content is prophetic for the battle being waged in Afghanistan today. Poole describes the low-tech threat against conventional forces, including those of the U.S. and of Russia, in a manner that makes it easy to understand the terrorist threat we face today. He discusses the caves and tunnels that the Japanese used during World War II and explains how the Army and the Marines countered those threats.

Much of the material in *Phantom Soldier* is not new to SF soldiers: The combat techniques of Eastern soldiers have long been taught in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's instruction on unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare.

Since Desert Storm, the low-tech threat has emerged as a counter to the U.S. military's unmatched technological capability. As the enemy has learned his lessons, so must we. This book lays out the basis for the exploitation of conventional forces by a force that cannot compete technologically with the superpower military establishment. By understanding the enemy, we can select tactics that will offset his advantages. Poole's book can help every infantryman become better prepared for dealing with asymmetric conflict.

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Special Warfare

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