Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



PB 80–01–1 Winter 2001 Vol. 14, No. 1

From the Commandant

Special Warfare

Since its creation in 1952, Special Forces has had the mission of performing unconventional warfare. Even though the responsibility for that mission has not changed, the definition of unconventional warfare *has* changed. In 1952, UW was perceived as the guerrilla- and partisan-warfare operations with which early SF soldiers had been familiar from their World War II experiences. But during the many insurgencies of the 1960s, UW grew to include the concept of counterinsurgency.

Because UW has retained connotations of the warfare of earlier eras of our military history, some soldiers in the SF community have in recent years questioned whether the concept of UW itself was a thing of the past, perhaps more fitting for the discussions of historians than for the plans and operations of modern SF warriors.

But as a result of discussions among the members of the SF community, the concept of UW has been re-examined from many points of view. In the process, the concept has been broadened to take full advantage of its potential and to recognize the realities of the jobs our SF soldiers are doing today.

Our resulting view of UW should not pigeonhole the concept as either partisan, guerrilla or insurgent warfare. Rather, we must see UW as an environment that encompasses all those types of warfare and more — including, but not limited to, subversion, sabotage and unconventional assisted recovery. In fact, UW includes many of the dimly defined situations that our nation will face in this century, and we should see it not as a mission of the past, but as the mission of the future.

The process of defining UW is not over: UW was a subject of discussion at this year's SF Conference, and we will continue to refine the concept and to identify tasks

that require new or additional emphasis.

Does our 21st-century mission require a new kind of soldier to perform it? Interestingly enough, no. While the challenges that we will face require that we train for a variety of tasks, the soldier who will perform those tasks best will be the kind whom we have sought to identify and to develop since SF's beginnings — a soldier who is independent, intelligent, mature and resourceful. We need soldiers who are problem-solvers, not soldiers who can only memorize and apply doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures. They will be selected and trained for a difficult mission — our original mission and the mission that will ensure our relevance in years to come — unconventional warfare.

Major General William G. Boykin

PB 80–01–1

Contents

Winter 2001 Special Warfare Vol. 14, No. 1

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

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Features

2 **Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations**
by Colonel Michael R. Kershner

8 **Special Forces: Our Core Purpose**
by Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, U.S. Army (ret.)

10 **The Confederacy Could Have Won — Unconventionally: A Thought Experiment for Special Warriors**
by Dr. John Arquilla

18 **Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the Present**
by Major Greg E. Metzgar

24 **Unconventional Warfare: SF's Past, Present and Future**
by Captain Robert Lee Wilson

28 **Unconventional Warfare: Questions, Concerns and Proposals**
by CW2 Brian D. Halstead

32 **Is There a Role for CA in Domestic Support Operations?**
by Major Dennis J. Cahill

39 **Army Values: The Epitome — Dick Meadows**

Departments

40 **Enlisted Career Notes**

43 **Officer Career Notes**

44 **Foreign SOF**

45 **Update**

48 **Book Reviews**

Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations

by Colonel Michael R. Kershner

Unconventional warfare, or UW, is quite possibly the most misunderstood form of United States military operations. It is not simply a variant of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, unconventional assisted recovery, information operations and information support, subversion, and sabotage all play roles in UW.

Joint doctrine defines UW as a "broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW encompasses guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape."[1] This broad definition supports the entire spectrum of UW activities.

National Archives

Members of a Jedburgh team receive their mission instructions from a briefing officer in London in 1944.

Colonel Kershner's article appeared in the January-February 2001 issue of Military Review. — *Editor*

The U.S. Army Special Forces Command recently conducted a series of UW seminars to encourage Special Forces, or SF, to return to its roots and to become the world's most relevant special force. UW has always been SF's primary mission; all other tasks are subsets of this overarching mission.

Because of its specialized training, SF is recognized as the Army's most relevant force. As the Army grapples with the structure, doctrine and operations of the Interim Force and of the Objective Force, SF must remain maintain its relevance throughout the 21st century.

The world as a minefield

If today's world is any indicator of the future, tomorrow's world will be volatile, uncertain, complex and dangerous. There will be increasingly ambiguous political and military situations populated by nontraditional enemies, including well-funded narcoterrorists, criminal enterprises, militias and private armies. Racial, ethnic, economic and ideological differences will make effective government increasingly difficult. The weaker a government becomes, the sooner fault lines will affect its ability either to provide for its citizens' welfare or to keep its citizens in subjugation. Dysfunctional governments increasingly lead to porous borders, government corruption and other opportunities for

Photo by R.J. Oriez

Citizens of Mogadishu dismantle a roadblock that had separated the city's opposing clans. The future may see increasing conflict like that in Somalia.

exploitation. As governments fail, anarchy, tribalism and reactionary authoritarian regimes will fill power vacuums.

Although tomorrow's threats are unpredictable, they almost certainly will not come from peer competitors. The likelihood that any nation will couple military ascendancy with dominant economic strength is virtually nil, but that does not mean that the United States is more secure than it has been in the past. The strength of the U.S. and its open democratic society provide opportunities to its enemies. For example, when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein attempted to go toe-to-toe with U.S. forces in terrain similar to that at the U.S. National Training Center, or NTC, other nations watched his inevitable defeat and learned appropriate lessons. Rarely does a nation face such an obliging enemy. The U.S. must not assume that its next adversary will be as cooperative as Hussein was.

The terms *du jour* for describing future threats are "asymmetric" and "asynchronous."[2] What those terms actually mean is "unconventional." The U.S. has the world's premier UW weapon — U.S. Army Special Forces. The mere existence of forces who are trained and prepared to conduct UW serves as a warning and as a strategic deterrent to U.S. enemies.

Today's unsettled environment, which in the future will become even more unsettled, is the milieu in which UW thrives, and it is the environment into which SF will deploy. The Army's last conventional conflict occurred during Operation Desert Storm. During 1999 and 2000 alone, more than 50 identifiable UW incidents occurred, demonstrating the relevance of UW expertise.[3]

Given their broad and complex missions, SF soldiers are arguably involved daily in UW. On any given day, more than 750 soldiers conduct an average of 61 missions in 39 countries.[4] This ubiquitous involvement ensures SF's continued relevance, and it has earned SF soldiers the nickname "global scouts."[5]

Originally, SF was designed for UW of the 1950s era, taking as its model the Office of Strategic Services' Jedburgh

teams that operated during World War II.[6] During the revitalization of special operations during the 1980s, the Army focused on the Soviet threat to Western Europe. To ensure its relevance during the Cold War, SF assumed a large role in direct-action and special-reconnaissance activities.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, direct action and special reconnaissance have been eclipsed by military operations other than war, or MOOTW. SF has assumed an increasing number of foreign-internal-defense missions to support the Army and to shape the strategic environment.[7]

Special forces, special skills

As the world becomes increasingly unsettled and more volatile, SF must be prepared to conduct UW. By law, only the forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, are authorized to conduct UW.[8] Of all USSOCOM forces, SF is the best prepared to conduct UW in its broadest terms, including guerrilla warfare.

Soldiers who conduct UW must be highly trained, skilled and mature. They must possess excellent problem-solving skills, and they must be able to maintain mental agility in the most fluid of situations. Their flexibility and adaptability must be unparalleled. SF soldiers' foreign-language capability, area and cultural expertise, and interpersonal skills complement their base-line requirements. SF soldiers understand the situation of those whom they train or contact, and they comprehend the relevant social, economic and political milieu. SF's primary peacetime purpose in multiple overseas deployments is to ensure that the required expertise is present when crises occur.

An SF soldier's language expertise should not be confused with a linguist's. SF soldiers are trained to exchange ideas and to train others on complex skills in austere environments. By focusing on UW, SF ensures that its soldiers are prepared for their most difficult mission. The ability to conduct special reconnaissance and direct action is embedded in the requirement to conduct UW. Although SF soldiers can conduct these missions unilaterally, so can other DoD forces. It is SF's unique ability to teach direct-action and special-reconnaissance skills to surrogate or indigenous forces that sets SF soldiers apart.

UW skills can be applied in every operational environment, from MOOTW to major theater war. UW also provides the theater commander in chief, or CINC, or the commander of a joint task force, or JTF, flexible options with which to exert pressure throughout the spectrum of operations.

Soldiers from the 1st Special Forces Group train Thai Special Forces soldiers in fast-roping during Exercise Cobra Gold '98.

Photo by Raymond T. Conway

DoD photo

SF soldiers are trained to exchange ideas and to train others in complex skills in austere environments.

SF is discreet; neither large troop formations nor large logistics footprints are required. SF's contributions to information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement and full-dimensional protection support Army Vision 2010, Army Vision 2020 and Joint Vision 2020. SF can make its contributions throughout engagement, crisis response, war-fighting and the transition back to engagement.

While SF uses various methods of gathering information and intelligence, human intelligence is the method that has the greatest impact on information superiority. Through close working contacts and formal relationships, SF fills many gaps in the conventional force commander's situational understanding, particularly in the more complex areas of intention and motivation. Human intelligence aids the conventional force commander in making timely decisions, and it provides the foundation for successful psychological warfare, thus ensuring the most effective use of scarce resources.

The information superiority that SF provides also helps the JTF commander achieve dominant maneuver. Surrogate or indigenous forces that SF has advised can be leveraged to enhance maneuver dominance. Such force multipliers can be extraordinarily advantageous to the maneuver-force commander, whether they are used in deception operations or as full-maneuver units. SF, acting either unilaterally or through indigenous or surrogate forces, can also enhance information superiority in urban terrain, where the effectiveness of massed fires or standoff delivery systems is reduced. SF units or soldiers can limit the collateral damage inherent in such firepower by employing laser target designators and other sensor-to-shooter technologies that permit precise engagement. These technologies lower the risk that delivery platforms and direct standoff ordnance will fail to hit such elusive targets as individual tanks and specific windows. Information superiority also facilitates the precise targeting for psychological warfare.

The contribution that SF makes to full-dimensional protection is embedded in SF's ability to leverage both information and intelligence gathered from indigenous contacts. SF's unique ability to work in, among and through the local populace and resistance movements is indispensable and dramatically increases available intelligence. Direct-action operations, as well as sabotage, subversion, and offensive information operations and information support, provide the JTF commander and the theater CINC with a better understanding of the battle space and make it increasing-

A captain from the 3rd Special Forces Group explains escort security to a Polish platoon leader during an exercise at Fort Polk, La.

Photo by Kenneth Stallings

ly difficult for the enemy to achieve an equivalent understanding. By increasing the enemy's friction and fog of war, SF reduces the speed and the effectiveness of the enemy's decision-making. In fact, the judicious and early application of SF in UW roles might eliminate or greatly reduce the need to commit general-purpose forces.

Cultivating relationships and identifying key personalities is a continual SF mission. The combination of thorough study and boots-on-the-ground presence engages SF every day in prospective UW environments. The U.S. Army Special Forces Command leads the effort to ensure maximum UW support to special-operations commands that support theater CINCs.

Updating UW doctrine

UW's dynamic and versatile nature ensures SF's relevance. However, the misperception that UW is guerrilla warfare and nothing more contributes to the current neglect of UW. UW doctrine is outdated, and UW training is limited.[9] Current doctrine still maintains that UW is conducted in seven phases.[10] That concept should be re-evaluated; it is more appropriate to describe UW in terms of U.S. Army doctrinal phases — engagement, crisis response, war-fighting and return to engagement.

The Army is revising and updating doctrine to reflect current requirements and capabilities. As UW's flexibility and usefulness become increasingly apparent, mission guidance will become more focused, as will training. Lessons learned about UW are not found in training after-action reports; they come from the after-action reports of forces who are actively involved in UW operations. This information reservoir should not be limited to U.S. experiences; it should include Russian operations in Chechnya, Australian operations in East Timor and other UW activities throughout the world.

UW is being revitalized in a number of ways. The Special Forces Qualification Course is re-emphasizing UW. Combat training centers are also integrating UW at the NTC and, to a limited extent, at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.

Tables of organization and equipment for SF groups are based on 1980s missions and must be re-evaluated for current UW missions. SF must be prepared to conduct its share of missions involving counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and information operations.

While technology's potential contribu-

tions to UW are important, UW's essential ingredient is the SF soldier. It is from this highly trained warrior's unique capabilities that all other UW capabilities flow. Diversity makes UW a dynamic discipline. To extract UW's maximum advantage, the Army must focus on the unique soldiers who can achieve that advantage.

The concept that UW is SF's primary mission and the source of all other SF core tasks might seem radical, but it is simply a conceptual framework for analyzing current mission sets. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command mission analysis defines SF core tasks without significantly changing accepted definitions.[11] What is different is characterizing tasks such as direct action, special reconnaissance and foreign internal defense as subsets of UW. Solid UW training will ensure that U.S. Army soldiers remain the world's most relevant and well-prepared asymmetric warriors. ✂

Colonel Michael R. Kershner is director of special operations at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. He was previously the deputy commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the continental U.S., Panama and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Colonel Kershner holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master's degree from Boston University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and of the U.S. Army War College.

Notes:

[1] Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994 as amended through 6 April 1999), 713.

[2] Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead," prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 February 1999, Washington, D.C. (www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990202-hughes.html).

[3] See Major Messing and William Shingleton, "National Defense Council Foundation: World Conflict List 1999" (www.ndcf.org/Conflict_List/World99.html).

[4] Command brief, U.S. Army Special Forces Command [location and date unknown], 2000.

[5] General Peter J. Schoomaker, "Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead" [publishing data not available], 2.

[6] Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), 149-59.

[7] *National Military Strategy*, chapter 2, "The Strategic Environment: Opportunities and Challenges," (www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/strategi.htm).

[8] U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167, "Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces," (www4.law.Cornell.edu/uscode/), January 2000.

[9] See U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1990).

[10] *Ibid*., 9-5.

[11] U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "Mission Area Analysis for POM FY 02-07" (Fort Bragg, N.C.: January 1999).

Special Forces: Our Core Purpose

by Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, U.S. Army (ret.)

In 1997, members of the Special Forces community began the process of identifying SF's core ideology. Although the process has led to much thought, discussion and debate, after four years, the task remains unfinished.

According to James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras,[1] an organization's core ideology is its enduring character — what the organization is and what it stands for. Core ideology transcends leaders. It is determined by the people who are inside the organization. We do not create a core ideology; we identify it. Often, the success or the failure of an organization can be traced to how well the organization identified its core ideology and how well it cultivated the energies and talents of its people.

Core ideology has two components: core values and core purpose. By identifying those components, the organization defines who its members are.

Core values

Core values are essential and enduring tenets. Core values are clear and powerful, and they provide substantial guidance with piercing simplicity. After three years of debate, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command reached a consensus on SF's core values, and the values were published in the Spring 2000 edition of *Special Warfare*.[2] The SF core values are warrior ethos; professionalism; innovation; versatility; cohesion; character; and cultural awareness.

What remains to be resolved is SF's core purpose. Of the two components of core ideology, core purpose is the more important. It is the organization's fundamental reason for being. Unlike goals or strategies, a core purpose does not change — it inspires change. An organization can evolve into new areas, but it will continue to be guided by its core purpose.

Core purpose

SF's core purpose is to achieve our nation's objectives and to conduct our SF missions through, with or by surrogates, indigenous organizations or indigenous populations. That defining purpose sets SF apart from all other organizations. SF can conduct unilateral missions, and we can conduct them superbly, but we should conduct unilateral missions only as a last resort. They are inconsistent with our core purpose.

SF was organized as a force multiplier that would conduct unconventional warfare. Conducting UW is still SF's purpose. SF soldiers are trained to operate through, with or by an indigenous population to accomplish the mission. In so doing, they enfranchise the indigenous population, making possible a long-term indigenous solution rather than a short-term U.S. solution. The solution has enormous potential, and it is a potential that only SF can offer.[3]

Numerous organizations are organized, equipped and trained to conduct unilateral missions. U.S. unilateral SOF units include Army Rangers, special-mission units, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Psychological Operations units, Navy special-warfare units, and Air Force special-operations units. The U.S. Marine Corps is a non-SOF organization that has a unilateral focus.

Furthermore, one of the U.S. Army's stated goals is to become more SOF-like. The Army's values are mirrored in SF's core values. The Army and other organizations are rapidly closing the gap in accomplishing missions "faster, further, with more precision." The capabilities of the Army's future objective force, as stated in TRADOC Pam 525-66 (Draft), will include "soldiers of above-average maturity," who are "multiskilled, multifunctional, agile, versatile, flexible," and who have the capability of "rapid mission tailoring; C2 on the move." In the future, "smaller, faster, lightweight, modular, more lethal" will not be capabilities and characteristics that significantly distinguish SF from other organizations.

What will distinguish SF is its ability to operate through, with or by surrogates, indigenous populations and indigenous organizations. That ability is our reason for being. It is the singular purpose that sets SF apart from all other organizations — in the past, in the present and in the future.

Colonel Mark D. Boyatt retired from the Army in January 2000 as the assistant commandant of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Commissioned in Infantry, he served as an Infantry platoon leader, as a company executive officer and as a company commander. His SF assignments include detachment commander and group operations and training officer in the 5th SF Group; action officer in the Army Special Operations Agency, Pentagon; commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group; chief of staff for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; commander of the 3rd SF Group; and deputy chief of staff for operations for the Army Special Operations Command. A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and of the Army War College, he also holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Colonel Boyatt is also the president of the JFK Special Warfare Special Forces Branch Historical and Memorial Museum Association.

Notes:

[1] James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997).

[2] "SF Core Values: The Final Cut," *Special Warfare*, Spring 2000, 9.

[3] Civil Affairs also conducts missions through, with or by indigenous populations; however, the difference is the mission set. SF accomplishes combat mission sets; the CA mission set is combat support, combat-service support, humanitarian assistance, infrastructure rebuilding, etc.

The Confederacy Could Have Won — Unconventionally: A Thought Experiment for Special Warriors

by Dr. John Arquilla

The American Civil War was the world's first conflict to be largely shaped by the Industrial Revolution. Weapons, especially rifles, were mass-produced; millions of soldiers were mobilized and moved to the battlefield by rail; and command and control over a theater of war the size of Western Europe was maintained by telegraph.



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Allan Pinkerton (left), President Abraham Lincoln and General John A. McClernand meet near Antietam, Md., in October 1862.

Yet this was also a conflict in which preindustrial concepts of strategy remained dominant, particularly those of Baron Jomini. Union and Confederate generals alike strove to uphold Jomini's precepts about offense dominance, massing and interior lines.[1] New technologies were thus married to old concepts of operations, with disquieting results: Field maneuvers of Napoleonic boldness were regularly defeated by rail mobility, and massed charges were repulsed by increasingly accurate, far-ranging rifle fire. The overall outcome of the war was driven by attrition rather than by military genius, and the greater resources of the North won out.[2]

Was the outcome inevitable? If not, how could the South have won? The most likely possibility of Southern victory would have come from intervention by Britain (and possibly other European powers), much like the alliance with France that had led to the success of the American Revolution. Despite some dicey moments, however, Britain withheld its support, partly because British leaders had for so long inveighed against slavery that they found it difficult to rally their public in support of a "confederacy of slavers." Also, Russia, which was engaged in a wide-ranging "cold war" with Britain (what Kipling called "The Great Game"), worried that the breakup of the United States would leave no countering power on Britain's western flank. Russia made it clear that its cold war with Britain might intensify if Britain were to help the South.[3]

The only other realistic possibility[4] of Southern victory would have come from what James McPherson refers to as the "power of contingency." McPherson argues that the outcome of the war, Britain's non-intervention, and even Lincoln's re-election in 1864 were all contingent upon the interaction of other events.

McPherson points out that the slow progress of the Union forces during the summer of 1864 posed a threat to the North's victory: "If the election had been

held in August 1864 instead of November, Lincoln would have lost. He would have gone down in history as an also-ran, a loser unequal to the challenge of the greatest crisis in the American experience."[5] McPherson's theory implies that if the South had slowed the North's progress for three months or more, the South could have won.

A delay of three months could have been achieved only if the military leadership of the South had cultivated an alternative concept of operations, composed of two parts. First, instead of being wedded to the ever more costly tactical offensive in conventional battles, the Confederates should have taken the defensive, as the North would surely have attacked them. Second, the South had one incomparable advantage over the North: its irregular raiding forces, who were led by some of the finest soldiers of the war, from John S. Mosby in the east to Nathan Bedford Forrest in the west. Although those forces performed admirably during the war, they could have been used more skillfully and more systematically to disrupt Northern offensives and to slow the Union's overall progress (almost certainly by three months).

This two-part concept of operations has clear antecedents in earlier American (and even British) military experience. During the Revolution, Nathaniel Greene cleverly chose a well-integrated mix of conventional and irregular forces for his campaign in the South — a decisive campaign that ended with Cornwallis falling back on Yorktown, where he and his remaining forces were bottled up and captured.[6] Thirty years later, the Duke of Wellington pursued a similar approach while fighting a vastly superior French force in Iberia. He took the tactical defensive in his pitched battles and relied on Spanish guerrilla forces and commando-style Royal Navy forces to conduct offensive operations. The result was a masterpiece of blended warfighting by regular forces and "special" (for their time and place) forces.[7]

Why didn't the South see the possibilities in this kind of special warfare? Who stood in the way of the South's cultivating such an approach?

First of all, the general mindset of Southern military leadership was overwhelmingly steeped in conventional offensive notions. Aside from forming a central part of the appeal of the Napoleonic/Jominian influences, the conventional offensive also exerted a powerful cultural pull on the Confederate commanders who saw it as a more honorable form of warfare.[8]

As to why unconventionally offensive strategies and tactics were not well-cultivated, one need look no further than to Robert E. Lee, who said of irregular ways of conducting war: "I regard the whole system as an unmixed evil."[9]

National Archives

During the American Revolution, General Nathaniel Greene used a mix of conventional and irregular forces.

These are the reasons, then, why the South didn't generally pursue a "special approach" in fighting the war. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the South did conduct a considerable amount of special warfare, from extensive guerrilla operations to horse-mobile deep strikes behind

Union lines. Those unconventional operations highlight the fact that the new transportation and communications technologies were vulnerable to disruption.[10] And even though the South carried out guerrilla operations and strikes in both the eastern and the western theaters, it was in the western theater (which was more expansive geographically) that special warfare had a greater influence and seriously impeded the North's progress.



National Archives

Irregular forces under General Nathan Bedford Forrest sometimes harried Union forces to the point that they were forced to retreat.

At times, Forrest and John Hunt Morgan caused such chaos that the Union forces were compelled to retreat, as Don Carlos Buell did in his campaign against Chattanooga. The Confederate raiders also became powerful "force divisors" because of their ability to strike almost anywhere and at any time. For example, at the outset of the crucial Atlanta campaign, General William T. Sherman's forces numbered approximately 180,000, but he held back 80,000 of them to guard his rear areas against the Confederate raiders.[11] Sherman's decision dramatically reduced his numerical superiority over Joseph E. Johnston's force of some 60,000, and it accounted for Sherman's slow progress during the campaign.

At least one major strategic thinker, B.H. Liddell-Hart, recognized the potential in skillfully blended conventional and special operations. Liddell-Hart, the British proponent of the "indirect approach" to war (which was intended to minimize the necessity of pitched battles), saw unique possibilities in the Confederate raiders, whose operations he studied closely.[12] Liddell-Hart was one of the few Europeans who drew deep lessons from the Civil War.[13] His research, however, only begins to imply what might have happened had the Confederates more fully integrated special operations into their conventional maneuvers.

The question remaining, then, is: "What would have happened had the South taken a conventional tactical defensive whenever possible, and an unconventional strategic offensive using the guerrilla and raiding forces at its disposal?" To answer this question, one must develop a sense of the losses that each side incurred and a sense of the offense-defense balance that existed during the war. While there will always be some uncertainty about the exact losses, there is a consensus that the North suffered 360,000 battle deaths and that the South suffered 260,000. There is also wide agreement on the number of various casualties (killed, wounded, missing, prisoners) that each side suffered during specific battles.[14]

The offense-defense balance is somewhat more difficult to calculate. However, after having performed a detailed analysis of the offense-defense statistics, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones found that the defense won 17 of the 26 major battles of the war (about two-thirds).[15] The South took the tactical offensive just under half the time, with an even distribution of its attacks from the beginning of the war until the end. Hattaway and Jones also found that the Union's combat effectiveness on the attack was only half



National Archives

Union soldiers man a captured Confederate fortification. Had the South relied more on the tactical defensive, it might have greatly slowed the Union's progress and inflicted greater casualties.

that of the Confederacy's.[16]

Considering that the North's battle deaths were nearly a third higher than the South's, it is clear that if the South had not made costly attacks (such as those at Shiloh, Gettysburg and Chickamauga or, perhaps worse, at Atlanta and Franklin, where Hood's army was totally squandered), the North would have suffered even more severely.

A Southern tactical defensive at the conventional level, coupled with "rebel raiding" on the strategic offensive, would have greatly slowed the North's progress. It would have also contributed to the rising political opposition to the war and to the ever-growing losses suffered by the Union. Perhaps the Confederacy's improved performance would have also increased the possibility of European intervention. While this scenario is hypothetical, it is well-grounded in two key concepts: (1) Defensive operations were dominant throughout the war. (2) The South had generous resources with which to engage in special warfare against an enemy whose rail transport system and communications system were highly vulnerable to disruption. Simply put, the South could have won.

Why should special operators be interested in such historical matters? Basically, there are four central insights that the special-operations community should draw from a "thought experiment" such as this one that reanalyzes the Civil War.

First, the value in studying military history is reaffirmed. For just as this reconsideration of the Civil War has unearthed the powerful potential of special warfare during the 19th century, one will find that there has been a "special" aspect in most other conflicts throughout history (from the Peloponnesian War to the Second Chechen War).

A study of special warfare throughout history will illuminate the strategic importance of irregular operations, and it should also sound a cautionary note that these kinds of operations can be neglected only at the risk of failure and ruin.

Second, the current mindset of the American military, which seems to have a fixation for conventional operations and the offensive, is based on the military's response to industrialization some 150 years ago. That mindset governed the military's strategy not only during the Civil War but also throughout our subsequent major wars.[17]

That fixation is unfortunate, because American military culture has deep roots in irregular warfare. From the Rangers who helped guide conventional forces during the invasion of Canada in the French

William T. Sherman

Joseph E. Johnston

and Indian War; to the raiders of Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens and Thomas Sumter who enabled General Nathaniel Greene to weaken Cornwallis and to set the stage for victory at Yorktown, early American history is replete with special warfare.[18] But since the Civil War, those who have had ideas about unconventional approaches to war have had to struggle to be heard in the high councils of the American military.

In Europe, for example, the "stay behind" idea that led to the creation of Army Special Forces 50 years ago soon gave way, largely, to visions of a climactic armored clash in the Fulda Gap. In Vietnam, the unconventional approach was tried briefly, and then supplanted with the "big unit" concept of operations. In the Gulf, Special Forces was relegated largely to coalition support. And in Kosovo, an unconventional approach was readied but then rejected (in favor of a conventional air war), a decision that led to unfortunate consequences. Innocent Kosovars, for whose welfare we were ostensibly fighting, were subjected to the worst kind of unfettered Serb barbarism.[19]

The examples above show a trend that began during the Civil War, and that trend will continue unless we acknowledge the unwisdom of allowing our strategic culture to undervalue the much-needed unconventional complement to our conventional operations. We must hope that our appreciation for the special effect of irregular operations will deepen as we move into an era in which the number of irregular conflicts is likely to increase.

Third, the Civil War was waged early in the industrial age, when a revolution in military affairs, or RMA, was under way. At that time, the range of fire, the accuracy of fire and the rate of fire were vastly increasing. In addition, advances in manufacturing, in communications and in transportation were making it possible to create, supply, move and control large field forces. Yet the Confederates and the Federals failed to develop new concepts of operations. Senior military leaders on both sides relied on the ever-less-relevant Napoleonic paradigm, assuming that all changes would reinforce the timeless "principle" of the offensive.

Simply put, military leaders misjudged the effects of the RMA on the offense-defense balance. The results of early bat-

tles did little to stimulate innovative thinking about the value of unconventional warfare. As a matter of fact, military leaders clung ever more dearly to the old paradigm. They were not alone in their reluctance to change. Fifty years later, the massed frontal assaults of World War I reflected the failure of European armies to learn lessons from the American Civil War.

The fourth lesson one can draw from the Civil War is that it is difficult to predict the effects of RMAs at the outset. For this reason, militaries have had a tendency to incorporate new technologies into earlier concepts of operations. For the Confederacy, that tendency proved fatal. Even though the battle results clearly demonstrated the weakness of the old paradigm and the strength of the irregular-warfare approach, the South remained yoked to a doctrine that would eventually bleed it white.

Today, technological advances are once again improving both the accuracy of fire and the range of fire, and they are enabling the full networking of command and control in hitherto undreamed of ways. Unfortunately, these technological leaps are reinforcing the existing paradigm of modern maneuver warfare idealized by the aging AirLand Battle doctrine. The military's dedication to the existing concept of operations persists despite the contradictory information revealed by recent battles. For example, irregular Hezbollah forces drove the Israelis from southern Lebanon; and twice, swarming bands of Chechen fighters have handled the Russian army roughly. Clearly, an unconventional strain of military thought is on the rise — one that the U.S. military, overall, is failing to perceive.[20]

If we can reflect on earlier periods of great change and see the possibilities of the alternative approaches that existed then, perhaps we can bring our thoughts back to the present, refreshed and primed with new insights that will help us visualize innovative ways of war that might emerge in a new era.

During the Civil War, the Confederates could have won if they had taken the conventional defensive and an unconventional offensive. Pursuing this tack would have allowed the Confederates to take advantage of an RMA that not only advanced the rate and the accuracy of fire, but also made military forces vulnerable to disruption of their transportation and information infrastructures. There would have been little the North could have done in response to such an approach. In order to restore the Union, the North had to take the offensive against the Confederacy. Operating in Southern territory, where the local populace opposed "Yankees" implacably, the North had little chance of successfully emulating the South's unconventional tactics.

This in-depth reconsideration both of the

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Dead soldiers on the battlefield at Gettysburg. Fifty years later, European armies repeated the mistake of making massed frontal assaults.

Civil War and of the impact of industrialization may prove to be of particular analytic value: Our current "informatizing" RMA is providing similar beneficial effects for fire, but it may also may suffer disruption both in the logistics realm and in the command-and-control realm. If so, the RMA may provide a world of opportunity for the irregularization of warfare — an opportunity we ignore at our increasing peril. ✂

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Notes:

[1] There is some debate about Jomini's influence. T.H. Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," in David Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), argues that his ideas loomed large. Archer Jones, "Military Means, Political Ends," in Gabor Boritt, ed., *Why the Confederacy Lost* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), especially p. 50, sees his role more as an expositor of Napoleonic thought — with which generals on both sides were indeed enthralled. The West Point translation of Jomini's *Art of War* (New York: Lippincott, 1862) sums up the view at the time in its translators' preface (p. 7): "Jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this or any other day."

[2] There is also a view suggesting that the South lost from "lack of will." See R. Beringer, H. Hattaway, A. Jones and W. Still, *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), especially p. 64. Of course, one must not dismiss Edwin Pollard's 1866 diatribe against Confederate political and managerial incompetence, *The Lost Cause*, a point of view that still has adherents. James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 854-59, takes both of these theories to task, noting that loss of will did not occur until after four years and many decisive defeats in the field; and that Confederate bureaucratic mismanagement was more than matched by Northern displays of incompetence.

[3] Norman Graebner, "Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality," in Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War*, makes both of these points convincingly.

[4] This stricture about realism compels us to rule out the idea that time-traveling South African Bröders armed with AK-47s might have come to the South's assistance, as Harry Turtledove speculated in his epic *Guns of the South*.

[5] James McPherson, "American Victory, American Defeat," p. 39, in Boritt, ed., *Why the Confederacy Lost*.

[6] On this campaign, see Russell Weigley, *The Revolutionary Transformation of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

[7] Wellington's approach to the Peninsular war is chronicled in detail by Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: *Years of the Sword* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

[8] This theme is nicely developed in Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson, *Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage* (Montgomery: University of Alabama Press, 1982). Paddy Griffith, *Battle Tactics of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) focuses more on the Confederate idée fixe with Napoleonic ways. J.I. Harsh points out why Clausewitz's notion of the superiority of the defensive was, at this point, still unfamiliar, in his "Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 38, 133-38 (December 1974).

[9] Cited in Bruce Catton, *The Civil War* (New York: American Heritage, 1961), 177.

[10] On guerrilla operations, see Thomas Goodrich, *Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-65* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). J.D. Brewer, *The Raiders of 1862* (London: Praeger, 1997) provides detailed case studies of three of the most spectacular raids of the war in the West, all of which had very significant operational effects.

[11] Sherman became obsessed with catching "that devil Forrest," because of all the damage he was inflicting. See John Allan Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). For coverage of both coup de main raids and guerrilla operations in the eastern theater, see J.D. West, *Mosby's Rangers* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1991).

[12] B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Analysis of Cavalry Operations in the American Civil War, with Special Reference to Raids on Communications" (written in May 1935). This is one of Liddell-Hart's lesser-regarded essays, yet in many ways it easily serves as a blueprint for the sort of Southern concept of operations that I am suggesting could have won the war. See also his *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Macmillan, 1954) for a fuller exposition of his ideas. His original essay appears as an appendix in Jay Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 237-44.

[13] This is a central argument of Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War*.

[14] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 854. The most comprehensive dataset of battles and casualties is still Colonel T.L. Livermore's *Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America: 1861-65* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1901).

[15] H. Hattaway and A. Jones, *How the North Won* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 723-24.

[16] *Ibid*., 728-30. The authors arrive at this figure by extensive study of numbers and losses in all battles, as well as of the respective ratios of forces confronting each other in every battle.

[17] Russell Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings Through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 410, notes that an internal tension existed as early as the debate between George Washington and Charles Lee about how to fight the British. He observes that Washington "accepted European tutelage in virtually every aspect," while Lee "believed that a war fought to attain revolutionary purposes ought to be waged in a revolutionary manner."

[18] On the role of special warfare during the French and Indian War, Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), gives full credit to the Rangers' activities as raiders and providers of what we now call "ground truth." On Greene's willingness to use special warfare in an integrated way, see especially Martin Treacy, *Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign of Nathaniel Greene, 1780-81* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

[19] On the big-unit war in Vietnam, see Andrew Krepinevich, *The U.S. Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See J. Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Need for Networked High-Tech Cyberwar," *Los Angeles Times*, June 20, 1999, M1-M6, for a description of how special-operations forces were readied for use — and could have won the Kosovo War decisively and quickly.

[20] On the difficulty of understanding the true implications of technological change, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 71-104. On the special-warfare paradigm that may well be emerging, see J. Arquilla and T. Karasik, "Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1999), 207-29.

Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the Present

by Major Greg E. Metzgar

In light of the ongoing discussions of the nature and definition of unconventional warfare, it might benefit the members of the Special Forces community to look at the evolution of the definition of UW in doctrinal publications and professional journals since 1950.

"Partisan Warfare," *Dictionary of United States Army Terms* (August 1950):

Activity carried on against an enemy by people who are devoted adherents to a cause, but who are not members of organized and recognized military forces. It includes guerrilla action, passive resistance by underground groups, espionage, sabotage, and propaganda." (Special Regulation 350-5-1).

(George T. Metcalf, "Offensive Partisan Warfare," *Military Review*, April 1952, 54.)

FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* (October 1951):

Guerrilla warfare is defined in [Special Regulation] 320-5-1 as operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting military operations of the enemy. The term is sometimes limited to the military operations and tactics of small forces whose objective is to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy rather than to seize or defend terrain; these operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise and the emphasis on avoidance of casualties. The term … includes organized and directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage and propaganda, and, in some cases, ordinary combat. Guerrilla warfare is ordinarily carried on by irregular, or partisan forces; however, regular forces which have been cut off behind enemy lines or which have infiltrated into the enemy rear areas may use guerrilla tactics.

(As cited in Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, 4.)

"Guerrilla Warfare" (April 1957):

According to FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare*, March 1955, the broad aims of guerrilla strategy are to: lessen the enemy's combat effectiveness; delay and disrupt operations of the enemy forces; and weaken the morale and will to resist of a hostile military force.

(Richard L. Gruenther, "Guerrilla Warfare," *Military Review*, April 1957, 61.)

"Guerrilla Warfare" (September 1957):

This is the major lesson from the past; more specific lessons which have emerged are:

1. The need for training the regular army in both guerrilla and antiguerrilla measures now.

2. The preparation and planning in peace of an organization to control, equip, and support guerrillas before hostilities commence so that guerrilla forces can go into

action at the outset.

3. Coordination of the activities of guerrilla units so that their efforts are directed to the attainment of the aim of the regular forces' commander.

4. The necessity for ensuring the loyalty and support of the civil population for the guerrillas; and a corollary in the case of enemy occupied territory, not to involve the civil population directly in case of reprisals against them.

5. The value of air support in delivery and evacuation of guerrillas and the maintenance of forces.

(C.H.A. East, "Guerrilla Warfare," *Military Review*, September 1957, 99.)

***Nature of Unconventional Warfare* (October 1959)**:

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is a general expression which designates all those resistance activities conducted within the enemy's sphere of influence primarily utilizing indigenous personnel and resources in furtherance of military, political, or economic objectives. The major components are guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare as it pertains to all phases of unconventional warfare, sabotage, subversion against hostile states, and evasion and escape. These resistance activities may be completely overt, completely covert, or something in between these two extremes, depending upon the effectiveness of the enemy's countermeasures.

Resistance begins with individual resentment toward an established regime — dissatisfaction with things as they are and a desire for change. The individuals who feel this bitterness toward the government or occupying power have no collective plan of action initially, although they may be performing individual acts of resistance. Organization of the resistance movement may develop spontaneously under initiative of a strong natural leader, or it may be through the efforts of a representative of an outside sponsoring power which is hostile to the occupying power. In either case, the development of a resistance movement is influenced by certain factors, such as the national character of the people, the geography of the area, the civilian support, outside support, and whether or not the enemy's conventional forces are otherwise engaged.

- Unconventional forces may have political aspirations inimical to our own.

- Unconventional Warfare may be spontaneous, with no outside sponsorship, or may not be responsive to friendly control or direction.

- Unconventional operations are most effective when coordinated with conventional operations.

- The tactical value of unconventional forces becomes increasingly important as offensive operations approach the guerrilla area.

(Frank A. Gleason, Jr., "Unconventional Forces — The Commander's Untapped Resources," *Military Review*, October 1959, 25-31.)

***Objectives* (May 1960)**:

In studying the historical precedents of guerrilla warfare and its forms of employment, it can be concluded generally that guerrilla warfare is adopted for one or more of the following reasons:

1. To assist the regular armed forces in operations.

2. To defend the country as a last recourse when the regular armed forces have been routed.

3. To instigate a national action to regain the liberty of a country subjugated by the enemy.

4. To overthrow a dictatorial or tyrannical form of government.

5. To harass and weaken the existing government causing it to fall so as to permit the establishment of a new government.

(George B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare," *Military Review*, May 1960, 52.)

FM 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces* (May 1961):

The term irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, and counterirregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods.

Irregular activities include acts of military,

political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or occupying power, and using primarily irregular and informal groupings and measures.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces*, May 1961, 3.)

FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* (September 1961):

Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conducted in enemy controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, September 1961, 3.)

***Special Warfare: "Use the Right Word"* (1962)**:

Special Warfare is a term used by the U.S. Army to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations.

Unconventional Warfare includes the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and resistance. Such operations are conducted in enemy-held or controlled territory and are planned and executed to take advantage of or stimulate resistance movements or insurgency against hostile governments or forces. In peacetime the United States conducts training to develop its capability for such wartime missions.

A *Resistance Movement* is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power. Initially such resistance may consist of subversive political activities and other actions designed to agitate and propagandize the populace to distrust and lose confidence in the legally established government or occupying power. If not suppressed, such resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces.

- *Insurgency* is a condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection against duly constituted government or occupying power wherein irregular forces are formed and engage in actions which may include guerrilla warfare, that are designed to weaken and overthrow that government or occupying power.

- *Guerrilla Warfare* is the conduct of combat operations inside a country in enemy or enemy-held territory on a military or paramilitary basis by units organized from predominately indigenous personnel. The aim is to weaken the established government of the target country by reducing the combat effectiveness of the military forces, the economic means, and the overall morale and will to resist.

- *Irregular Forces* refers in a broad sense to all types of insurgents, to include partisans, subversionists, terrorists, revolutionaries and guerrillas.

- *Paramilitary Forces* are those existing alongside armed forces and are professedly nonmilitary, but formed on an underlying military pattern as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization.

- *Evasion and Escape* are those operations whereby friendly military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from enemy-held or unfriendly areas to areas under friendly control.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 1962, 8.)

FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations* (February 1969):

Unconventional warfare consists of military, political, psychological, or economic actions of covert, clandestine, or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and avoids formal military confrontation.

Concept. UW is conducted to exploit military, political, economic, or psychological vulnerabilities of an enemy. It is implemented by providing support and direction to indigenous resistance forces where

appropriate, or by unilateral operations of U.S. UW forces. Its conduct involves the application of guerrilla warfare and selected aspects of subversion, political warfare, economic warfare, and psychological operations in support of national objectives.

Unconventional Warfare Operations. Unconventional warfare operations may be covert, clandestine, or overt in nature. Covert operations are conducted in such a manner as to conceal the identity of the sponsor, while clandestine operations place emphasis on concealment of the operation rather than the identity of the sponsor. Overt operations do not try to conceal either the operation or the identity of the sponsor. In an established theater of operations in which significant ground operations by conventional U.S. military force will be undertaken, UW is conducted primarily to complement, support, or extend conventional operations. Within geographical areas under enemy control or influence, to which conventional U.S. forces will not be deployed, UW may be conducted as an economy of force measure, and to reduce or dissipate the enemy potential.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, February 1969, 3-1.)

FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations* (December 1974):

Unconventional warfare is defined as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy, enemy held, enemy controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct action missions and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, December 1974, 3-1.)

FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (April 1990):

Unconventional warfare — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, April 1990, Glossary 12.)

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (April 1998):

Unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).

SOF support strategic and operational goals with the capability to advise, assist, organize, train, and equip indigenous forces and resistance movements. Working in local languages, SOF assist indigenous forces with training, intelligence, communications, PSYOP operations, civic action projects, and medical support. These activities can be conducted either in support of conventional forces — acting as a force multiplier in an integrated theater campaign — or as part of a stand-alone unconventional operation. UW includes the following.

- Guerrilla warfare — military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities.

- Subversion — activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

- Sabotage — an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and material.

- Support to E&E Networks — an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to: move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control; avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control; and once captured, escape.

(Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, April 1998, II-6-7.)

FM 31-20 (Initial Draft) *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (December 1998):

UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR). UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. UW is thus a protracted politico-military activity. SF units do not create resistance movements. They provide advice, training, and assistance to indigenous resistance movements already in existence. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain the supported insurgent or resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. When conducted independently, the primary focus on UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. Military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or an occupying power. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. The political and psychological implications remain, however.

Contemporary UW is significant for several reasons. Historically, SF has focused on UW as an adjunct to a major theater of war. The new strategic environment, however, requires SF to focus on UW during MOOTW, especially as it relates to UAR. Moreover, global urbanization dictates a shift in SF emphasis from rural guerrilla warfare to all aspects of clandestine UW.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20 (Initial Draft), *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, December 1998, 2-1, 2-2.)

"Unconventional Operations Proposal" (Spring 1999):

The conduct of missions and operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements throughout the operational continuum. Unconventional operations include, but are not limited to, a broad spectrum of operations that can be of long duration. UO are conducted by elements that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, or directed in varying degrees by external sources. UO are characterized by their joint and interagency complexion and are either overt, covert, or clandestine. Examples of UO include stability operations; guerrilla warfare; subversion; sabotage; information and intelligence activities; evasion and escape; special reconnaissance; underground operations; auxiliary operations; establishing support systems; establishing command and control systems; and direct action conducted by indigenous or surrogate elements.

(Michael J. Ivosevic, "Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definition," *Special Warfare*, Spring 1999, 39.)

"Proposed definition for unconventional warfare" (Summer 1999):

Unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations that are not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating the enemy's military forces in combat. It includes subversion, sabotage, intelligence-

collection, training and employing surrogate forces, offensive information operations, and offensive command-and-control warfare. These operations may be conducted in peace, conflict or war, and they may be overt, covert, or clandestine in nature. If these operations are conducted when our nation is not at war, their success, failure and even exposure are politically sensitive and carry strategic implications.

(Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, 9.)

Conclusion

Dr. Tom Marks, a keynote speaker at the April 2001 Special Forces Conference, stated, "A problem that invariably looms with definitions of unconventional warfare is that they are historically bound." This anthology is a case in point. In the early 1950s, the framers of UW envisioned its application in a European scenario against an invading hostile Soviet force. Many have called this "partisan actions." However, by the early 1960s, definitions began to take more of an "insurgent" nature, whereby UW expanded to include "forces [that] may have political aspirations inimical to our own." The change to this idea can be found in the February 1969 issue of FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*.

After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and until the end of the Cold War, UW definitions took on much of their original connotation, in support of the AirLand Battle. Doctrinal reflection, with the exception of a few advocates, did not take place until Brigadier General Frank Toney's charge in August 2000 that Special Forces revitalize to train under the "UW umbrella."

However, the world has changed from the days of the Cold War, as has the lens through which the writers of early UW doctrine peered to complete their analysis. The SF community must re-examine its roots to adjust for change. We must ponder what is written in Colonel Wray Johnson's recent publication, *Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars*: "A major shift in doctrine can result in a dramatic realignment of roles and missions assigned to different military services, and can prompt determined resistance from those with a vested interest in maintaining the bureaucratic and institutional status quo." Johnson says further: "The key is analysis, applied to present and future requirements. But analysis is hampered by the interpretative lens employed by each generation and therefore by the inherently biased application of lessons learned to present and future challenges."

In order for SF and UW to have any chance of success in the 21st century, four things must occur. First, SF must re-establish an organization to revitalize and develop UW doctrine. Second, SF must foster an attitude of creativity, and, more importantly, it must put doctrinal debates into the open and allow those responsible for executing doctrine to have a say in shaping it. Third, SF must perform strenuous simulation and testing, and that requires more than a computer simulation or a "panel of experts" review. Fourth, we must accept the fact that failure will be inevitable in the process. Failure can be borne, but only as long as we accurately determine what went wrong, why, and how we will fix it. The tasks we face are difficult; nevertheless, as in the past, we can and will establish a force that will lead the Army and the nation into the 21st century in a manner suiting our charge.

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Unconventional Warfare: SF's Past, Present and Future

by Captain Robert Lee Wilson

The United States Army Special Forces Command recently began pursuing a series of initiatives to ensure the relevance of SF during and after the Army Transformation. The most dramatic of those initiatives thus far has been the reassertion of unconventional warfare, or UW, as the primary mission of SF. At the same time, the command has embraced the joint definition of UW and has broadened the scope of SF mission sets, capabilities and training requirements.[1] In order to plan for and to train for this complex mission, SF soldiers at all levels must understand how UW is defined.

Defining UW

Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines UW as a "broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces, who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape."[2]

The April 1990 edition of FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, used the same definition for UW that Joint Pub 1-02 used[3]; however, in explaining SF's role in UW, FM 31-20 focused almost exclusively on guerrilla warfare. Until recently, almost any discussion of UW operations evoked images of the Office of Strategic Services' Jedburgh teams or the Robin Sage UW exercise in which all SF soldiers participate during the Special Forces Qualification Course. The soon-to-be-published FM 3-05.20 (formerly FM 31-20) also uses the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, but it gives that definition a much broader interpretation.

Although guerrilla-warfare operations are unconventional, they are merely one of the many types of missions covered under the broad joint definition of UW. Recent UW seminars conducted by the Army SF Command have further widened the definition by aligning UW operations with the phases of Army Visions 2010 and 2020 — engagement, crisis response, warfighting, and return to engagement — rather than with the seven phases of UW detailed in FM 31-20.[4] Under the new definition, many missions of foreign internal defense, or FID, are better classified as UW. Coalition support and counterinsurgency missions also fall under the UW umbrella.

Relevance

The UW discussion is more than wordsmithing; by redefining the core mission and the core purpose of SF, the Army SF Command has highlighted the reason why SF units are and will continue to be relevant as the entire Army attempts to transform into a more agile and lethal force.

File photo

Until recently, any mention of UW evoked images of the Robin Sage exercise in which all SF soldiers participate during their training.

Other units within the military can and do perform some of SF's missions. There are units within the Army and other services that are tailored to conduct unilateral direct-action missions. Likewise, an increased investment in high-technology platforms — coupled with the nation's aversion to risking lives — indicates that special-reconnaissance missions will increasingly be executed by unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites and miniature robots.[5]

Forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, are the only ones authorized by law to conduct UW operations,[6] and SF is the only force within USSOCOM specifically created and designed to conduct UW across the spectrum of conflict. UW is our mission; it is the only mission that is unequivocally ours. While other special-operations and conventional units may assume a larger role and perform many of the missions that SF has traditionally conducted, no other unit can conduct UW on the scale that SF can, or with SF's expertise.

Broadening the definition and the scope of UW highlights the capabilities of today's SF units. SF soldiers conduct FID missions in many places where violence or instability could quickly escalate beyond engagement and require direct U.S. involvement in hostilities. Numerous troubled areas across the globe threaten vital U.S. and allied interests. In many regions, fierce economic competition, tribal or ethnic conflicts, narco-trafficking or vast ideological differences exist. They can flash in an instant to open hostility. These threats are of a smaller scope and scale than those the U.S. encountered during the Cold War. Most are regional, and they typically do not involve peer competitors who can engage our general-purpose forces. They are, to describe them more precisely, unconventional threats, and to deal with them effectively, we require an unconventional force.[7]

A unique and inherent ability to work with indigenous forces is the essence of what makes SF a relevant force, today, tomorrow and in the long-term. While the rest of the Army attempts to transform to meet the varied threats of today and of the future, SF units are engaged across the

globe on any given day. The ability of SF to work with indigenous or surrogate forces to pursue our national interests is of particular value to our Army, which is dependent on early and rapid deployment. Early intervention by SF can eliminate the need to deploy a general-purpose force.

Preparing for the Future

While UW doctrine is being revised to reflect the widened scope of the UW mission,[8] the Army SF Command is identifying critical tasks that SF units will perform during UW. As higher echelons thus refine doctrine and tasks, subordinate units and individual SF soldiers should take the initiative and embrace UW as the core mission of SF. Our actions right now should be threefold:

• *Hone combat skills through intense training*. SF soldiers must be peerless combatants on the battlefield. They must be able to fire their weapons with precision, and they must be masters of small-unit tactics, because in UW operations, they may be required to train and advise foreign militaries in combat operations. The Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC, is an excellent example of a training initiative that units can take. By adopting a program of marksmanship and small-unit offensive operations tailored specifically to the group's regional area of responsibility, or AOR, units can rapidly elevate the combat proficiency of their SF detachments.

SFAUCC provides an excellent start, but SF groups can go farther. SF soldiers should be proficient at employing heavy weapons, such as mortars and crew-served weapons. Nearly half of all new SF soldiers come from non-combat-arms units, so it is imperative that units develop intensive training programs to build these skills. Groups must find innovative ways of sustaining levels of tactical proficiency as well, since SF's high optempo and support-cycle requirements constantly challenge SF leaders to manage time effectively.

• *Sharpen cultural skills and regional focus*. SF soldiers should be experts regarding their group's AOR; they should have a thorough understanding of the cultures, demo-

Deploying to other countries and working with host-nation personnel enable Special Forces soldiers to build language capability and cultural sensitivity.

File photo

graphics, political situations, military capabilities and geography of the countries for which their group is responsible. SF soldiers must possess the language capability and cultural skills to operate effectively in their AOR. A great deal of regional orientation comes from experience. Deploying to the AOR and working with host-nation personnel expands the knowledge base, the language capability and the experience level of SF soldiers.

SF units can do even more to build expertise, however. Whenever possible, units should provide language instruction to SF soldiers; this training should be a command imperative. While SF soldiers need not be linguists to perform their duties effectively, language proficiency is a force multiplier for any SF soldier deployed in his AOR. Units should also leverage technology to bring regional information to the fingertips of all SF soldiers. Most SF groups are equipped with local-area networks, or LANs. Unfortunately, the majority of the information passed across the LAN is administrative and does little, if anything, to prepare soldiers for operational missions. The group information-management officer can work in conjunction with the S2 to build databases that SF soldiers can easily access on the LAN. The technology exists to create a database of detailed maps, political information, and unit experience that would be available instantly to every soldier in a group.

• Maximize individual knowledge and capability. Each SF soldier must work to develop and sustain his personal skills in three areas. The first is physical training, or PT. PT is a personal responsibility, and soldiers must go beyond what is detailed in FM 21-20. SF soldiers should incorporate combatives or martial arts training into their individual PT plans, and they should work as much on cross-country rucksack marches, long-range swims and upper-body strength as they do on cardiovascular training.

Second, soldiers should study unconventional conflicts across the globe, gleaning all they can from current operations in places such as Chechnya and Sri Lanka, as well as reading up on past UW operations.

Third, soldiers should stay abreast of Army doctrine. According to current SF doctrine, an SF detachment must be able to develop, organize, train, advise and assist a surrogate force up to battalion size.[8] To perform these tasks effectively, detachment members must understand battlefield operating systems and light-infantry tactics up to and including the battalion level. Soldiers can increase their knowledge of Army doctrine and tactics by reading field manuals, professional journals and books.

Conclusion

It is important that SF soldiers maintain proficiency in all their doctrinal missions, but it is especially important that they maintain proficiency in UW, the core mission of SF. UW is the only SF mission that no other U.S. military unit is capable of conducting. SF's unique ability to work directly with indigenous or surrogate forces across the spectrum of conflict is a vital capability for the U.S. in today's rapidly changing world. Regardless of how UW is ultimately defined, SF's UW focus will ensure our relevance as the Army transforms around us. ✂

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Notes:

1 Michael R. Kershner, "Special Forces in Unconventional Warfare" *Military Review*, January-February 2001, 84.

2 Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994, as amended through 6 April 1999), 713.

3 FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1990), 3-1.

4 Kershner, 85.

5 Discussed during USASFC Unconventional Warfare Seminar, August 2000.

6 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167, "Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces" (www4.law.Cornell.edu//uscode/), January 2000.

7 Kershner, 84.

8 Discussed during USASFC Unconventional Warfare Seminar, August 2000.

Unconventional Warfare: Questions, Concerns and Proposals

by CW2 Brian D. Halstead

The world is a vastly different place from the one that saw the development of the United States Army's original doctrine on unconventional warfare, or UW. Before we can attempt to develop new doctrine on UW, we must analyze what UW is and assess our role in it.

In the "total war" definition of conventional warfare (in which nation states battle in open confrontation), the success criteria are clear — winners and losers. In the total-war model, the defeated, unable to continue military resistance, are forced to abide by the political will of the victors. But because UW is more involved with political considerations than with military ones, the success criteria are more difficult to define.

The definition of UW in Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (April 1988)* is:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).

If the purpose of UW were simply to aid conventional forces in the conduct of open war, as it was 60 years ago, then the definition in Joint Pub 3-05 would be a good one. But we need a definition of UW that will take into consideration not only the technical advances of the past half-century, but also the changes in the type and in the nature of our current and future opponents.

Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone have suggested the following definition of UW: *"A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, that are not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating the enemy's military forces in combat. It includes subversion, sabotage, intelligence-collection, training and employing surrogate forces, offensive information operations, and offensive command-and-control warfare. These operations may be conducted in peace, conflict or war, and they may be overt, covert or clandestine in nature. If these operations are conducted when our nation is not at war, their success, failure and even exposure are politically sensitive and carry strategic implications."*[1]

According to this definition, SOF would have the latitude to conduct UW in situations throughout the operational continuum. UW is political in nature, and its desired end state is not so much a defeated military as it is a changed political system. If the desired change can be brought about by efforts short of conventional war, then UW would be a desirable option.

The two most common questions regarding UW are: "In this era of shrinking budgets, can we and should we train for this

National Archives

View of the city of Nuremberg at the end of World War II. In conventional war, the loser is the one who is unable to continue resistance. In UW, winners and losers are more difficult to define.

mission?" and "Isn't UW an improbable mission, and shouldn't UW training be a low priority? The answer to the first question is a resounding yes. There is no mission with a higher payoff than a well-executed UW operation.

The answer to the second question is a complicated but unequivocal no. The most casual observer of the news is aware of dozens of belligerent parties, pockets of discontent, and regions of instability around the world. It is in America's interest to achieve change, without massive U.S. involvement, in areas where there is turmoil. UW could be an invaluable tool for achieving peace and stability in regions of unrest and in defeating non-nation enemies such as drug cartels. We need doctrine that will allow us to use all our UW options. And we need to look far enough into the future to plan for years of continuous operations.

If we agree that UW is a likely mission and that UW training is important, then what do we train our soldiers and leaders to do? Let's examine the tasks specified in the proposed definition.

Subversion. To subvert is to destroy completely or to undermine character, morals or allegiance. Subversion can be accomplished by attacking the target's ability to control its infrastructure and populace. We could demonstrate to the indigenous population that our point of view is better for them, or we could destroy the target's ability to control the populace by eliminating the power base. The first approach is a CA/PSYOP mission; the second approach is a direct-action mission.

While the national command authorities are responsible for target selection, the soldiers at the action level must be ready to execute the mission. The area in which we are least capable is in blending with the local populace. "Blending in" involves more than getting a civilian haircut — our men need to learn techniques that will allow them to present a less distinct profile. If we wish to be able to conduct covert and clandestine operations, we must cultivate the skills that will allow us to blend in with various populations.

Sabotage. Sabotage is DA, whether it is conducted unilaterally or through surrogate forces. Our current DA exercises seldom allow us to plan and execute a mission outside the established scenario. Such

restrictions limit the SF detachment's opportunity for unconventional thinking. To truly disrupt an area, we must first understand the attitude and the reaction of the local populace. That information is critical in planning an operation.

Intelligence collection. Because the rules that apply to intelligence-collection can be confusing, we have limited our intelligence-collecting activities to casual contact with an unwitting source. We need to strengthen intelligence training for the 180A, for the 18F, and for the team as a whole. On any UW mission, we should have an intelligence-collection plan and a dedicated intelligence manager. Over the years, as teams were performing other missions, such as DA and SR, the 18F became the team sergeant's assistant. If someone else on the team were designated to help the team sergeant, the 18F would be able to perform his job as the intelligence manager.

Training and employing surrogate forces. The task of training and employing surrogate forces is a FID mission. We perform this task almost every day somewhere in the world. In order to be prepared to train and to employ surrogates throughout the operational continuum, SF should remain on the ground for a longer period of time. In many parts of the world, a familiar face is infinitely more important than any amount of credentials. Whether we achieve familiarity through rotations (as we did in Bosnia and in Kuwait), or by increasing the duration of our FID missions, we must be willing to remain in the region long enough to gain the trust of those with whom we may need to work later.

Offensive information operations. Information operations represent the area of greatest change since our original UW doctrine was developed. We are in the information age, and most of our probable enemies lag far behind us in their information capabilities. Although information operations seem to refer more to CA and PSYOP missions, we might make ourselves more relevant by incorporating computer classes into the SF Qualification Course.

Offensive command and control warfare. In an era in which our enemy is likely to be an organization rather than a sovereign state, UW may become an increasingly important tool for achieving our national goals. SF can clandestinely infiltrate areas

SF soldiers learn to use camera equipment while training to become SF intelligence NCOs. The intelligence NCO serves as the intelligence manager for the SF detachment.

U.S. Army photo

that are denied to other forces. This capability is extremely important if our mission is to strike a target within the borders of a neutral nation or of a friendly nation that cannot act unilaterally because of domestic political concerns. Language skills distinguish SF from all other forces, and during years of performing FID missions, SF has developed cultural sensitivity and cross-cultural communication skills. By working and living in troubled areas, we have in many cases already built a rapport with potential surrogate forces.

Once we resolve our definition of UW, we must turn our attention to doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldier skills. Doctrine will establish our relevance for the future. As we refine our doctrine, we should also identify critical soldier skills and develop training. How can we accomplish these tasks simultaneously? We can train on the aspects of UW that have remained unchanged. We can increase our training emphasis in two areas: battle-focus analysis and autonomy. We must be able to exploit an entire region, not merely an assigned country. In order to achieve the maximum effect with the minimum expenditure of assets, we must assess the center of gravity of each target. Elements at the lowest levels must be able to plan operations. How do we prepare our soldiers to identify, organize, train, equip, and lead indigenous forces in war? By sending those soldiers to infiltrate denied areas; establish contacts; and equip, train and lead indigenous groups during peace.

Autonomy in action is equally important. Some areas in the world run on trust. If we train indigenous groups, we should also be willing to lead them. Otherwise, they will think we are turning our backs on them, and they will devolve back into a mob at the first contact with the enemy. We need to have the moral courage to state the purpose of our presence in an area, and the fortitude to stick to that purpose.

Clear wording of our UW doctrine is important. SF operators are capable of understanding complex issues, but one of the greatest enemies they may face in UW is ambiguity. SF is the most intelligent fighting force in the world. We owe SF soldiers training that will enable them to achieve their objectives, doctrine that clearly states the purpose of their activities, and a purpose that is worthy of the sacrifices we are asking them to make.

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Notes:

[1] Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, 9.

Is There a Role for CA in Domestic Support Operations?

by Major Dennis J. Cahill

In the mid-1990s, threats to America's homeland from natural disasters and terrorist incidents prompted the United States to begin developing policies and programs aimed at protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring disaster preparedness and managing the consequences of both natural and man-made disasters.

As part of these efforts, the Department of Defense, or DoD (in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, the Department of Justice and other federal agencies), introduced several initiatives to streamline the military's response to domestic emergencies.

Although DoD has always maintained a strong role in national-security emergency preparedness, it is now developing innovative ways of supporting local, state and federal agencies during any kind of domestic emergency. Throughout the 1990s, DoD updated doctrinal materials pertaining to domestic-support operations, or DSO (also known as military support to civil authorities, or MSCA); military assistance for civil disturbances; and military assistance to civil authorities.[1] In addition to establishing the Directorate of Military Support and the DoD Resources Data Base, DoD reorganized the response system that manages DoD assets in DSO. This response system consists of a defense coordinating officer and emergency preparedness liaison officers, or EPLOs. During the late 1990s, DoD conducted studies to determine the best strategy for integrating the DoD reserve component, or RC, into "emerging" homeland-defense responsibilities.[2] In addition, DoD created organizations and teams to help strengthen its domestic preparedness against weapons of mass destruction, or WMD.[3]

DoD Directive 3025.1 governs the MSCA activities of all DoD components in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S. ter-

Photo by Stan Parker

Major Steven Watters, 448th CA Battalion, prepares an injection for a Thai villager's pig during Exercise Cobra Gold 2000.

ritories and possessions. Under the provisions of this directive, "DoD components shall augment staffs responsible for MSCA, as appropriate, with personnel from reserve components of all military services who are specifically trained for civil-military planning and emergency liaison duties." The reference to "specifically trained" personnel could include the EPLOs mentioned above, as well as personnel who are assigned to active- and reserve-component Civil Affairs units. Yet CA continues to be largely left out of the planning and organization for DSO. It is time to make a case for including CA in DSO.

In this article, we will use the special-operations mission criteria to analyze the employment of CA in DSO. We will also discuss the activities that CA could perform during each of the four phases of comprehensive emergency management. We will then discuss recommendations for integrating CA into the Army's role of support to domestic preparedness.

Photo by Michelle Labriel

1st Lieutenant Steven Hart, 358th CA Brigade, works with a local well repairman in Timehri, Guyana, during a disaster-relief exercise, Exercise Tradewinds 1999.

SOF mission criteria

The special-operations mission criteria were developed in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, to ensure that assets of special-operations forces, or SOF, would be committed only to appropriate missions. SOF commanders and planners at all levels still use the five criteria to assess any proposed use of SOF. These criteria, as they relate to CA, are outlined in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*:[4]

- Is the mission appropriate for CA?
- Does the mission support the regional commander in chief's campaign plan?
- Is the mission operationally feasible?
- Are the required resources available for conducting the mission?
- Does the expected outcome justify the risk of employing CA?

What follows is an explanation of how the mission criteria apply to CA's employment in domestic operations.

Is the mission appropriate for CA? CA forces have acquired specialized skills and capabilities through years of training and experience. Some of the personnel in CA's active-component, or AC, units, such as dentists, physician's assistants, construction engineers, veterinary-service officers, and preventive-medicine officers, have skills that are found elsewhere in the Army. But personnel in CA's RC units are skilled in fields unique to the civilian sector — such as public health, public transportation, public works and utilities, food and agriculture, emergency services, environmental management and the management of dislocated civilians.

CA soldiers, whether AC or RC, are experienced in applying their skills to disaster situations throughout the world. They have participated in foreign humanitarian assistance, military civic actions, emergency services, support to civil-administration operations, and exercises at the national, regional, provincial and local levels.

Before CA forces can be employed in a DSO mission, we must determine whether the mission calls for CA's unique skills and capabilities and whether the mission is of adequate strategic or operational importance to justify the use of CA. Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines DSO as "Those activities and measures taken by the DoD to foster mutual assistance and support between the DoD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies."[5]

DoD's emergency-preparedness responsibilities are clearly defined in Executive Order 12656: to devel-

op and maintain damage-assessment capabilities; to coordinate emergency water-resource planning at the national, regional, state and local levels; to support the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the development of plans to restore community facilities; to assist the Secretary of State in the formulation and execution of economic measures that affect other nations; and to coordinate with the director of FEMA on the development of plans for mutual civil-military support during national security emergencies.[6]

During the last two decades, CA forces have performed activities similar to those outlined in Executive Order 12656 in Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result of their extensive training and experience, CA personnel can plan and conduct interagency coordination; mass-care activities; civil-defense training; and the steps required to transition from military control to civil control. The skills of CA forces are applicable regardless of the location or the cause of a disaster. CA could even assist the Secretary of Defense in meeting his domestic responsibilities.

A point of clarification may be necessary here with respect to recent DoD initiatives that govern the response to WMD incidents. "Crisis management" is the term used to describe the graduated, flexible response to a range of terrorist-related incidents. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead agency for crisis management. "Consequence management" is the term used to describe the coordinated response that would be required if an act of terrorism were to result in substantial injury, death or collateral damage. Under these circumstances, the consequence-management response would be similar to the response to a major domestic disaster. FEMA is the lead agency for dealing with consequence management. CA forces could make a valuable contribution in planning and supporting the transition from crisis response to consequence management.

Photo by Angel Clemons

Major Jim Reed (left), 486th Civil Affairs Battalion, and Paul Hacker (second from right), a U.S. economics professor, meet with Bosnian businessmen to assist in rebuilding the Bosnian economy.

Does the mission support the regional commander in chief's campaign plan? Although the commanders in chief, or CINCs, of several unified commands are charged with domestic responsibilities,[7] FEMA is the primary agency responsible for "coordinating federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions."[8] FEMA develops a federal response plan, or FRP, which serves as a blueprint for FEMA's coordination activities.[9] DoD, which has a supporting role in the FRP as a force provider, normally provides support "only when other resources are unavailable, and only if such support does not interfere with its primary mission or ability to respond to operational contingencies."[10]

An example of a unified commander's plan to conduct MSCA in support of the FRP is shown in Functional Plan 2501–97 of the U.S. Atlantic Command (now U.S. Joint Forces Command), published Feb. 2, 1998.[11] The plan's Annex G, Civil Affairs, provides guidance for planning and conducting CA operations during a domestic disaster-relief operation. Among the plan's assumptions are that two of the Army's four CA commands will be available to assist two designated regional joint task forces/response task forces in planning domestic disaster-relief operations.[12] The plan also calls for AC CA forces to provide initial support until RC CA forces can be mobilized.

Is the mission operationally feasible? The CA commander must realistically evaluate his force during the mission analysis. CA is not structured to perform unilateral operations and should not be assigned any mission that is beyond the scope of its capabilities.

Certain legal constraints also

apply in DSO. Except in an immediate-response situation, during which military commanders are authorized to take immediate action to save lives, to prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage, federal military forces have no legal authority to initiate MSCA operations without the approval of the national command authorities. As a federal force, CA cannot enforce civil law. Doing so would be a violation of U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1385 (the Posse Comitatus Act).

Finally, U.S. law and DoD policy strictly limit the use of military-intelligence assets in collecting or maintaining information about U.S. individuals, associations and corporations. CA activities in DSO must be closely coordinated with the staff judge advocate.[13] However, as long as planners adhere to the legal constraints outlined above, the use of CA forces in domestic operations would be operationally feasible.

Are the required resources available for conducting the mission? Should CA forces be employed to complement and enhance existing activities, the organization that is being assisted would be responsible for protecting, integrating and sustaining the CA forces. Required resources may include airlift, intelligence, communications and logistics. Time is another important consideration. Depending on the nature of the situation, AC CA forces may be able to respond to a situation more quickly than RC forces could, or because their time is not limited, they may be better prepared to conduct missions of longer duration.

In most cases, military support for DSO is provided on a cost-reimbursable basis. Unless CA assets have been committed to an immediate-response situation, the requestor's inability or unwillingness to reimburse the costs of the support may preclude the use of CA in DSO.[14]

Does the expected outcome justify the risk of employing CA? The objectives of DSO are twofold: to quickly and efficiently alleviate human suffering and to restore basic facilities and services to normal operations as soon as possible. CA could provide soldiers whose knowledge, skills and abilities are suited to efficiently achieving the objectives of DSO. The "risk" in DSO becomes clearer when we consider observations made during the DoD responses to hurricanes Iniki, Andrew and Hugo: "Until the Civil Affairs assets deployed into the operational area, their normal mission activities were conducted by the (conventional) units' staffs and leaders … (who) lacked the special skills and experience of Civil Affairs personnel."[15] The risk, therefore, is that DSO will be performed by soldiers who are either unqualified or inefficient. The employment of CA, on the other hand, would mitigate the inherent chaos of disaster operations and decrease the likelihood that other organizations would provide redundant capabilities.[16]

After having applied the five special-operations mission criteria to assess the employment of CA in DSO, we can see that the mission is appropriate; the mission can support the theater campaign plan; the mission is operationally feasible; the required resources are available for conducting the mission; and the expected outcome justifies the risk of employing CA.

Employment in DSO

We will now look at the activities that CA could perform during each of the four phases of comprehensive emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Mitigation phase. During the mitigation phase, CA could perform

Photo by Tyler Long

In Kosovo, soldiers of the 415th CA Battalion detain an Albanian man alleged to have attacked a cab driver. The soldiers are waiting for U.N. police to arrive.

Photo by Keith Butler

Soldiers from Civil Affairs Task Force 489 assess property damage in southern Florida following Hurricane Andrew.

activities to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of a disaster or the severity of its effects. The identification of hazards and the analysis of vulnerabilities (which are major activities of the mitigation phase) are essential in planning the other phases.

Predeployment area studies and post-deployment area assessments have long been major focuses of CA's initial training and sustainment training. Many CA units conduct disaster-preparedness planning surveys, or DPPS, for the U.S. Pacific Command, for the U.S. Southern Command and for the U.S. European Command. The DPPS identifies the critical vulnerabilities of foreign populations and infrastructures and then assesses the emergency-response capabilities of host-nation civil-defense structures and of international and nongovernment organizations.

CA's mitigation training could be employed at the local, regional and national levels. For example, CA forces could assist agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in conducting assessments of flood-prone areas to determine the impact of proposed mitigation plans on local communities. CA forces could also conduct modified DPPSs for emergency-management officials who are creating, validating or updating their own emergency-preparedness plans.

Preparedness phase. In the preparedness phase, CA could review DoD emergency-management plans to identify situations in which CA's expertise could be applied. Incorporating CA's expertise would reduce the redundancy of training other soldiers to perform disaster-related tasks. Including CA forces in emergency-preparedness exercises would further promote CA's capabilities and foster the Army's goal of cultivating teamwork among Army components.

CA could support the readiness training of emergency-response personnel by performing observer/controller duties during emergency-preparedness exercises. In return, CA forces would benefit from the training opportunity, and they could provide inexpensive consulting services to government agencies.

Response phase. The response phase occurs during and immediately following a disaster. Response activities provide emergency assistance to victims of disaster, and they reduce the likelihood of secondary damage. The five stages of the response phase are notification/warning, immediate public safety, property security, public welfare, and restoration.

Because of the length of time that is required for CA forces to respond to an emergency (unless those forces are already in a position to provide immediate response following a disaster), they most likely will become involved during the public-welfare and restoration stages. During the public-welfare stage, CA forces could assess the damage caused by the disaster and then provide assistance and care for disaster victims. During the restoration stage, CA could plan and synchronize the activities of the various agencies that are repairing basic facilities and restoring services.

A case in which CA provided immediate response occurred in upstate New York in January 1997. Severe ice storms had knocked out the electrical power and had created treacherous road conditions, stranding travelers. At the request of local authorities, CA personnel set up generators at critical facilities, loaned cots to emergency shelters, and transported civilian medical personnel from their homes to local hospitals.

A vignette from FM 41-10 provides an example of CA activities during the public-welfare and restoration stages. "In the aftermath of the disaster leveled on southern Florida by Hurricane Andrew, Civil Affairs teams were deployed to begin assessing the damage. Working in close coordination with local, state, and federal agencies, the teams established a

civil-military operations center, or CMOC. The CMOC provided the critical interface between the joint task force and the numerous government agencies, civilian organizations and local volunteers."[17]

CA could also assist nongovernment agencies, e.g., the American Red Cross, in running mass-care operations. CA forces, both AC and RC, were instrumental in providing support during Operation Provide Refuge, the mission that cared for and processed ethnic Albanians from Kosovo at Fort Dix, N.J., from May to July 1999. Like their predecessors who had worked with displaced Panamanians in Panama City, Panama, and with Haitian refugees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a few years earlier, CA personnel assisted in setting up and organizing the refugee camp, chaired meetings with the camp inhabitants, and resolved sensitive interagency issues.

Recovery phase. Even though some recovery efforts are performed during the response phase, those efforts are short-term and are directed at restoring basic facilities and services only. Long-term recovery operations are performed during the recovery phase, the final phase of the emergency-management cycle. Long-term recovery operations may continue until all systems and the entire disaster area have been returned to normal, or until the area has been redeveloped for different uses. Long-term recovery efforts may go on for years.

CA activities during the recovery phase would be limited. During this phase, the objective is to turn operations over to local civil authorities as soon as possible. Normally, CA support would end when the situation had improved to the extent that state and local assets could continue the mission. In the past, CA forces have been instrumental in identifying and setting the conditions for, and facilitating the conduct of, the transition from military control to civilian control.

Summary

DoD forces are more likely to be employed in some types of domestic disasters than in others. The factors that determine whether they will be employed are the nature of the disaster; the extent of the damage; and the ability of local, state and federal emergency-management agencies to manage the disaster. Because of their specialized experience and capabilities, CA forces are invaluable in DSO. The employment of CA would allow other DoD elements to focus on their core competencies and to concentrate on their specific part of the operation.

CA's experience and expertise could be applied to domestic emergencies, but CA personnel are not being fully used either in the planning of or in the execution of DoD preparedness initiatives. Employing the capabilities of CA for domestic-support operations would allow other military components to become better prepared to defend U.S. territory and the U.S. population against emerging asymmetric threats as well as man-made and natural disasters.

As budgets and force structures shrink, the Army must avoid redundancy in its contingency-related capabilities. The importance of incorporating CA into DSO planning and exercises should not be overlooked. The involvement of CA would be a cost-saving measure; it would allow the Army to capitalize on an existing asset; and it would enable the Army to expand its emergency-response capabilities against all disasters.

DoD photo

Soldiers assist in distributing supplies to Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. CA assisted in organizing the refugee camp and in resolving interagency issues.

Major Dennis J. Cahill is chief of the training branch of the CA/CMO Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In prior assignments, he has served in Company C, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, SWCS, the 354th

Civil Affairs Brigade, and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. He holds an additional skill identifier as a Civil Defense Officer. Major Cahill is a graduate of both the Command and General Staff College and the Army Management Staff College. He holds a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Notes:

[1] The Army instituted regulations to deal with domestic-support issues prior to the 1990s (e.g., AR 500-50, *Civil Disturbances*, 21 April 1972; AR 500-60, *Disaster Relief*, 1 August 1981; and AR 500-70, *Military Support of Civil Defense*, 1 October 1982). DoD had published directives such as DoD Directive 3020.36, *Assignment of National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD Components*, 2 November 1988. In the early 1990s, however, with a new focus on military operations other than war, now known as stability and support operations, DoD began publishing additional directives to further clarify its roles, such as DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*, 15 January 1993; DoD Directive 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*, 4 February 1994; and DoD Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance for Civil Authorities (MACA)*, 18 February 1997. The Army followed suit with doctrinal manuals such as FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, 1 July 1993.

[2] DoD conducted studies such as the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, and the Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.

[3] In 1999, 10 rapid assessment and initial detection teams, made up of full-time National Guard soldiers, were created to support local, state and federal agencies responding to a WMD incident. The Joint Task Force for Civil Support was created in October 1999 to oversee all DoD support to lead federal agencies during consequence-management operations.

[4] U.S. Army, FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, February 2000, 1-11.

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. DoD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, takes this definition verbatim and applies it to the term MSCA.

[6] Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," was signed by President Ronald Reagan 18 November 1988 and amended by Executive Order 13074, signed by President William Clinton 9 February 1998. DoD responsibilities are found in Parts 1, 2 and 5 and in the amendment.

[7] The CINC, U.S. Joint Forces Command, serves as the DoD principal planning and operating agent for military support to civil authorities for all DoD components in the 48 contiguous states and in the District of Columbia. The CINC, Southern Command, does the same for U.S. possessions and territories in the Caribbean, while the CINC, Pacific Command, is responsible for Alaska, Hawaii and U.S. possessions, territories and protectorates in the Pacific area of operations. See FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, 1 July 1993, 2-5. Note: Since the publication of this manual, DoD has realigned geographical CINC responsibilities. Joint Forces Command now has responsibility for the areas formerly assigned to Forces Command and Atlantic Command.

[8] This responsibility was delegated to FEMA under the Stafford Act and Executive Orders 12148, Federal Emergency Management, and 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. FEMA also has been delegated responsibility for establishing federal disaster-assistance policy. In this stewardship role, FEMA has the lead in developing and maintaining the FRP.

[9] As stated in Introduction to the Basic Plan of the Federal Response Plan, April 1999, "The Federal Response Plan (FRP) establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of Federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.)." It also contains a terrorism-incident annex, which is the first in a series of anticipated annexes that are incident-specific.

[10] *Concept of Operations from the Basic Plan of the Federal Response Plan*, April 1999, paragraph 1.D.3., "Military Support."

[11] U.S. Atlantic Command was redesignated and reorganized as U.S. Joint Forces Command in October 1999.

[12] USCINCACOM Functional Plan 2501-97, 2 February 1998, Annex G, Civil Affairs.

[13] *Ibid*., viii.

[14] DoD Directive 3025, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, 15 January 1993, paragraphs D.4.g. and D.5.b.

[15] Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Disaster Assistance."

[16] The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Volume 1 Study Report, 29 July 1999, p. 4, retrieved 3 February 2000, from the World Wide Web, www.fas.org/man/docs/rces2005_072299.htm, wrestled with the question of "whether selected RC units could be assigned homeland defense-related missions in addition to their existing mission of fighting the nation's wars." The study notes that RC units organized for NBC-related tasks are all apportioned to overseas theaters in the event of MTW. Thus, while they could be made available in peacetime to provide WMD consequence-management support at home, they might be unavailable for this mission if a WMD attack occurred while they were engaged in an overseas conflict. The same can be said for CA units with respect to DSO if they are mobilized for MTW. The study concluded that "it may be impractical and costly to maintain skills for both warfighting and specialized homeland defense missions in a large number of RC units." It recommended that certain RC units be remissioned or restructured to focus solely on specialized homeland-defense tasks. This article should demonstrate that current CA missions and structure are appropriate for both war-fighting and DSO.

[17] AAR, Hurricane Andrew, used as a vignette in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-4.

Army Values

The Epitome

Dick Meadows

The story of Richard J. "Dick" Meadows is one of dedication.

After enlisting in the Army in August 1947 at the age of 16, Meadows served in Korea with distinction, and at age 20, he became the youngest master sergeant in the Korean War.

Meadows volunteered for Special Forces in 1953 and later served three tours of duty in Southeast Asia. His first tour was with Operation White Star, advising and assisting Laotian government forces in counterinsurgency operations. His second and third tours were with the Military Assistance Command,Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, or MACV SOG, conducting covert intelligence-gathering and direct-action missions in enemy-controlled areas throughout Southeast Asia. While Meadows was serving his first tour with MACV SOG, General William C. Westmoreland, the senior U.S. commander in Vietnam, recommended him for a battlefield commission, the first of the Vietnam War. In 1970, Meadows served as the assault-element leader for the raid on the Son Tay prison camp near Hanoi.

After retiring from the Army in 1977, Meadows continued to serve as a civilian consultant for the organization and the establishment of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta. In 1980, he helped plan Operation Eagle Claw, the mission to rescue 53 Americans held hostage in Iran. Prior to the rescue attempt, Meadows worked undercover in Iran, conducting mission-support activities. After Eagle Claw, Meadows continued to help organize other special-mission units, and he also served as a consultant in U.S. efforts to thwart criminal drug trafficking.

As an NCO, as an officer and as a civilian, Dick Meadows was highly respected as a thorough professional. His extraordinary service to the United States spanned more than three decades and epitomized the Army values of personal courage, selfless service, loyalty, duty, honor, integrity and respect.

Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Captain Dick Meadows during the Vietnam War.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

CMF 37 exceeds Army's promotion rate to E9

The selection rate for soldiers in CMF 37, Psychological Operations, during the 2000 sergeant-major promotion board was 28 percent, well above the Army's average. Of the master sergeants who were considered for promotion and for attendance at the Army Sergeants Major Academy, two were selected for promotion, and one of those was selected to attend the academy. From the board's review and analysis of all the records considered, the following information applies to the records of CMF 37 soldiers:

- While the overall comments regarding individuals' records were favorable, a number of duty descriptions were vaguely written, incorrectly portraying staff positions as leadership positions. As a result, the board had difficulty determining the scope and the level of responsibility for some of the positions.
- The most important discriminator for an individual's promotion to E9 was an assignment of at least 24 months as a first sergeant. A soldier who had less than 24 months as a first sergeant was less competitive.
- Other deficiencies were consistent with the reports of previous selection boards: inaccurate records, records not reviewed and updated, missing or outdated DA photos, and lack of jumpmaster qualification.

Future CMF-37 selection rates for promotion to E9 will be below the Army's average, but selection rates for the academy will be near the Army's average. For more information, telephone the senior CMF 37 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, MSG John A. Condroski, at DSN 239-9002 or commercial (910) 432-9002.

SF establishes Prior Service Accessions Program

The Special Forces Prior Service Accessions Program has established procedures for evaluating and accessing CMF-18-qualified NCOs who had previously served on active duty or in the reserve component and who are interested in re-applying for SF service in the active component. Those who are eligible include prior-service personnel, SF reserve-component personnel, and active-duty soldiers who are SF-qualified but are not serving in a CMF-18 skill.

Applicants will be accessed for a minimum of three years on active duty under a conditional contract. The contract specifies that if soldiers are selected by the assessment-and-review board, they will serve on active duty in CMF 18. Soldiers who do not meet the assessment prerequisites or the board criteria will be reclassified into another MOS as directed by the Total Army Personnel Command, or TAPC, consistent with the needs of the Army. Applicants who are members of the Army National Guard must have their state adjutant general's approval before they can volunteer.

The Special Warfare Center and School will evaluate an applicant's physical ability, duty performance, psychological stability and security clearance prior to the applicant's appearance before the assessment-and-review board. Evaluation criteria include a complete physical examination, the Army Physical Fitness Test, psychological testing, and a 12-mile road march.

The assessment-and-review board will convene at Fort Bragg once the candidates have completed their assessment-and-evaluation criteria. Applicants who are selected by the review board will be accessed into active-duty SF in accordance with the guidelines of both TAPC and the Army Recruiting Command. Applicants who are not selected will not be re-evaluated for at least 12 months.

Soldiers who are interested in the program should ask their local recruiter about the prior/former Special Forces enlistment option (USAREC message 97-034). Soldiers who were trained in a CMF-18 MOS while in the reserve component may also be eligible for the broken-service selective reenlistment bonus. For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

Initiative would allow PSYOP soldiers to attend Ranger School

The Army Special Operations Command and the Special Warfare Center and School have requested that selected CMF 37F soldiers assigned to the 9th PSYOP Battalion be allowed to attend Ranger School under the Ranger Indoctrination Program. The request is awaiting review and approval by the Department of the Army and by the Infantry proponent. If the request is approved, a limited number of the 9th Battalion's 37F authorizations would be designated as the Ranger Tactical PSYOP Detachment and would be coded "V" (Ranger parachutist). Male PSYOP soldiers in those positions would be given the opportunity to attend Ranger school, where they could enhance their leadership ability and acquire advanced skills. If approved, the initiative would dramatically improve the 4th PSYOP Group's support-and-training relationship with the 75th Ranger Regiment. The 9th PSYOP Battalion would conduct quarterly assessments to identify candidates for assignment to the Ranger Detachment. The assessments would evaluate candidates in the Army Physical Fitness Test, 12-mile rucksack march, five-mile run, combatives, obstacle course, swim test and weapons qualification. The assessment would also serve as a prerequisite for soldiers to attend the Ranger Indoctrination Program. PSYOP soldiers who are interested in applying for the Ranger Tactical PSYOP Detachment should telephone the 9th PSYOP Battalion at DSN 236-2965/8819 or commercial (910) 396-2965/8819.

Promotion board assesses CMF 18 candidates

The 2000 sergeant-major promotion board provided a review and analysis that contains important information for soldiers in CMF 18. Listed below are excerpts from the board's analysis:

- *Performance and potential*. For the most part, rater and senior-rater portions of NCOERs were well-written and had appropriate bullet comments. A soldier's APFT score and specific comments on his level of fitness can be positive discriminators.
- *Utilization and assignments*. An SF team-sergeant assignment was by far the most important discriminator. If the soldier had less than 24 months as a team sergeant, his competitiveness was limited. Master sergeants who had served as team sergeants for at least 24 months and who also had served as first sergeants or as cadre team sergeants stood out. As a rule, the more time that one had served in a team-sergeant position, the better.
- *Training and education*. The lack of a jumpmaster rating was a negative discriminator. Many of the soldiers' files had not been updated and did not reflect soldiers' most current military schools and civilian education. Many photos were more than five years old and did not accu-

rately represent the awards and badges that the soldier had earned.

- *CMF structure and career-progression assessment*. Although the overall quality of CMF 18 is extremely high, the CMF does not have enough E9 slots to allow its soldiers to be promoted to E9 at the Army's average rate. The panel took great care to review the files of soldiers who are in special-mission units. Overall, the files and the photos of soldiers in those units were more current and better-prepared.

Some CA, PSYOP soldiers ineligible for E9 without NCOES Phase II

Some soldiers in Army Reserve troop-program units, including CMF 37F and 38A soldiers, who completed RC NCOES Phase I before Phase II was offered, received the ANCOC-RC Phase I waiver for promotion to sergeant first class. Under current regulations of the Department of Army and of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, those SFCs are not considered to be NCOES-qualified, nor will they be qualified for promotion to master sergeant if the Phase II portion is available when they become eligible for promotion (Phase II became available in 1995).

TRADOC Reg 351-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education,* para 2-16c, states: "Active and RC soldiers promoted to their current rank prior to 1 October 1992 are considered NCOES-qualified commensurate with their current rank. These soldiers are grandfathered and are not required to attend ANCOC or BNCOC Phase II because they are considered NCOES qualified. Soldiers completing ANCOC or BNCOC Phase I (common core) after 1 Oct 92 must complete the Phase II portion to be considered NCOES qualified."

AR 140-158, *Army Reserve, Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion, and Reduction,* para 8-3b, states that soldiers who completed RC-NCOES Phase I course prior to Phase II being offered were considered NCOES-qualified only for promotion to the next higher grade. Before these soldiers can attend the next level of NCOES or receive another promotion, they must attend NCOES Phase II. These soldiers have two options:

- Attend Phase II. According to TRADOC Reg 351-10, paragraphs 5-4 and 5-5, soldiers must start Phase II within 24 months after they complete Phase I. Soldiers who have cogent reasons for extending the deadline to 36 months must forward their waiver request to the first general officer in their chain of command. Requests for more than 36 months must be forwarded to: Commander, TRADOC; Attn: ATTG-ILN; Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. The point of contact is MSG Boyd, DSN 680-5677 or commercial (757) 788-5677.
- Apply for constructive credit, as outlined in TRADOC Reg 351-10, para 2-16a(1), through the proponent for the NCOES course. The proponent for 37F40, 38A30 and 38A40 Phase II is the commanding general of SWCS. Mail applications to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-SP, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. The criteria that are considered in awarding constructive credit are the soldier's duty-assignment history and the soldier's education.

TRADOC Reg 350-10 (to be published), which will supersede TRADOC Reg 351-10, will further clarify this issue. For additional information, telephone MAJ Charles R. Munguia, the Civil Affairs Branch chief in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-9002 or commercial (910) 432-9002.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

LTC promotion board selects 80 CA officers

The 2000 reserve-component lieutenant-colonel promotion board considered 173 Civil Affairs officers and selected 80. Promotion statistics are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	% selected
USAR (previously considered)	1440	116	8.1
CA (previously considered)	37	5	13.5
USAR (first consideration)	2795	1006	36.0
CA (first consideration)	136	75	55.1
USAR (total)	4235	1122	26.5
CA (total)	173	80	46.2

The selection rate for the Civil Affairs branch continues to be higher than the average for the Army Reserve. In fact, during the last six years, the selection rate for CA officers has averaged 24 percent higher than the overall selection rate for the Army Reserve.

SF Officer Branch points of contact

SF Officer Branch chief	LTC Pat Higgins DSN 221-3173 higginsp@hoffman.army.mil
Lieutenant colonels' assignments	LTC Ed McHale DSN 221-3169 mchalee@hoffman.army.mil
Majors' assignments	CPT (P) Ron Tuczak DSN 221-5739 tuczakr@hoffman.army.mil
Captains' assignments	CPT Josh Noble DSN 221-3175 noblej@hoffman.army.mil
Future readiness	CPT Roy Douglas DSN 221-3178 douglasr@hoffman.army.mil
Field-grade tech	Ms. Sandra Bryant DSN 221-7915 bryants@hoffman.army.mil

The commercial telephone prefix for the numbers listed above is (703) 325-. The Branch's fax extension is -5463. Address correspondence to Department of the Army; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414.

Foreign SOF

FARC denies trafficking activities in Mexico

The guerrilla conflict in Colombia, along with its clear affiliation with international drug trafficking, continues to be a focus of U.S. initiatives in foreign policy and security assistance. The guerrilla conflict is also a concern to other states in the region, particularly those that border Colombia: Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil. Most recently, Colombia's largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, has become directly involved with the activities of one of Mexico's largest drug-trafficking organizations, the Tijuana Cartel, which is also called the Arellano Felix Organization, or AFO. Mexican law-enforcement officials have reported that the FARC is negotiating extensively with the AFO to make cocaine-trafficking deals. According to Mexican officials, in December 1999 the FARC proposed sending cocaine to Mexico in return for arms and money, and the transactions began in 2000. For its part, the FARC adamantly denies the allegations and asserts that it has never been involved in drug-trafficking activities. Evidence cited by the Mexican authorities, however, is far more compelling, and Mexico's Attorney General's Office is hopeful that arrests made in connection with this operation have disrupted the FARC-Mexican trafficker ties.

Russian special-ops unit nears 25th anniversary

The well-known Russian Vityaz' (Knight) special-operations unit is approaching its 25th year of existence. Established in December 1977 as part of the Soviet Ministry of Interior, or MVD, Internal Troops, Vityaz' had the specific mission of countering any terrorist activity during the 1979 Moscow Olympics. Fortunately, no such terrorist acts occurred during the Olympics, but Vityaz' was heavily employed throughout the late Soviet period. Today, Vityaz' operates under the Russian MVD. During the past 15 years, elements of the unit have been active in combatting ethnonational conflicts and armed criminal activities throughout the Russian Federation. Elements of Vityaz' that are based in Chechnya are scheduled to be withdrawn during 2001.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

MACV SOG awarded Presidential Unit Citation

Veterans of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observation Group gathered at Fort Bragg's Bull Simons Memorial Plaza April 4 for a ceremony in which MACV SOG was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

During the Vietnam War, personnel assigned to MACV SOG worked with indigenous troops to conduct highly classified, cross-border, unconventional-warfare activities in North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and southern China. They operated in secret, and when the war was over, they told no one of their experiences, because until recently, the missions had remained classified.

Lieutenant General Doug Brown, commander of the U. S. Army Special Operations Command, described the men of MACV SOG as, "men who contributed so greatly in the most dangerous possible environment."

"But there is in my opinion a bigger contribution, and that's the guile and audacity to take the war where the enemy lived, to get at his sanctuary, to make him react, to take away his safe and secure environment. … It takes men of steel, willing to take risks, willing to make the trip. … All of us today in SOF are better because of the work done by these men," Brown concluded.

The Presidential Unit Citation, the U.S. military's highest unit award for heroism, is awarded to units that display extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy.

Lieutenant General William Tangney, the highest-ranking MACV SOG veteran still on active duty, accepted the citation on behalf of all MACV SOG members. Tangney is deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla. In accepting the award, he expressed the group's gratitude to retired Major John Plaster, another veteran of MACV SOG, who worked for two and a half years to get the award approved.

Photo by Amanda Glenn

Veterans of MACV SOG stand at attention during the awarding of the Presidential Unit Citation.

"I served with such brave men — many of whom were killed or badly wounded, and they never got recognition. … To me, this is a final justice, a final vindication," Plaster said.

Established Jan. 16, 1964, MACV SOG ceased operations March 31, 1972, and was deactivated a month later. At its peak, MACV SOG and its subordinate commands comprised 2,000 American special-ops personnel from all services, and more than 8,000 indigenous soldiers. Unit members received more than 2,000 individual awards for heroism, including 10 Medals of Honor and 23 Distinguished Service Crosses. During MACV SOG's history, 10 teams were lost, 14 teams were overrun and destroyed, and more than 300 personnel were recorded as either killed or missing in action. Fifty are still listed as MIA. — *SSG Amanda Glenn, USASOC PAO*

New SF manual reflects updated missions

A new field manual prepared by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School updates and expands Special Forces doctrine to prepare SF soldiers and their counterparts for operations in the 21st century.

FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, was previously known as FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*. The new manual, renumbered to conform to the numbering system of joint publications, is a guide for personnel conducting SF operations while employed either in training or in combat situations. Although primarily designed for SF personnel, FM 3-05.20 will also serve the rest of the Army and other services by familiarizing users with SF capabilities and SF's possible interactions with other forces.

The new manual reflects the changing mission requirements for SF, and it addresses the full scope of SF liaison activities. In 1990, FM 31-20 listed SF's principal missions as unconventional warfare, or UW; foreign internal defense, or FID; direct action, or DA; special reconnaissance, or SR; and counterterrorism. FM 3-05.20 lists SF's principal missions as UW, FID, DA, SR, combatting terrorism, counterproliferation and information operations.

FM 3-05.20 is scheduled to be released during the summer of 2001. Once published, it will also be available through the Army Training and Doctrine Command's Reimer Digital Library. For more information, telephone CW3 Roland M. Shackford at DSN 239-8286/7690 or commercial (910) 432-8286/7690, or send e-mail to: shackfor@soc.mil.

USACAPOC welcomes new commander

Major General Herbert Altshuler took command of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command April 28 during a ceremony held at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Plaza.

Altshuler, formerly commander of the 89th Regional Support Command, Wichita, Kan., replaced Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, who retired from the Army Reserve after 33 years of service.

Altshuler's previous positions in USACAPOC include operations officer, 14th PSYOP Battalion; chief of the operations and plans division, 351st Civil Affairs Command; and commander, 7th PSYOP Group. Altshuler served in Bosnia in 1995 as commander of the Combined Joint Psychological Operations and Implementation Force Information Campaign Task Force.

SWCS courses evaluated for academic credit

Evaluators from the American Council on Education visited the JFK Special Warfare Center and School April 9-10 to evaluate 44 SWCS courses for civilian academic credit.

A nine-member team from the ACE's Military Evaluations Program assessed courses that included Special Forces basic and advanced skills, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, language training, and instructor training. Evaluators reviewed each course's curriculum outline, program of instruction and instructional materials to determine whether a course's content is equivalent to college-level work, and if so, the amount of credit that the course might deserve.

The ACE's Military Evaluations Program provides civilian academic institutions with a basis for recognizing military educational experiences in terms of civilian academic credit. ACE evaluators are either faculty members or administrators from accredited colleges and universities.

According to the ACE, 78 percent of U.S. colleges and universities recognize the ACE recommendations in granting credit or advanced standing to military and veteran students.

Photo by Bob Porreca

Major General Herbert Altshuler accepts the colors of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

112th SOSB to celebrate 15th anniversary

The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion will celebrate its 15th anniversary during the first week of September, in conjunction with the Army Special Operations Command's C4I conference.

Anniversary activities will include a golf tournament on Sept. 6, and the Alumni Anniversary Ball on Sept. 7 at the Fort Bragg Officers Club. Anyone who has served or is serving in the 112th Signal Battalion is invited to attend. Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Bell Jr., commander of the 112th, especially encourages World War II veterans of both the 512th Airborne Signal Company and the 112th Airborne Signal Battalion to attend the anniversary celebration.

To be added to the alumni database or to receive information about the celebration, e-mail Captain Brian Overstreet at overstrb@soc.mil, or telephone him at DSN 239-5401 or commercial (910) 432-5401.

SF ANCOC reminds soldiers of admin requirements

Soldiers scheduled to attend the Special Forces Advanced NCO Course at the Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy should be aware of the recent changes to the SF ANCOC administrative requirements:

- Soldiers who are not permanently assigned to Fort Bragg are required to stay in government quarters, which cost $32 per day. Soldiers should make billeting reservations at least 14 days prior to their reporting date. Reservations can be made by telephoning the SF ANCOC branch chief at DSN 239-3750 or commercial (910) 432-3750.
- Soldiers who have reserved slots must attend the course, or they will automatically be removed from the promotion list. Cancellations must be made at least 14 days before the reporting date.
- Active-duty graduates of SF ANCOC may not attend the SF Operations and Intelligence Sergeant's Course unless they have been selected for the SF Warrant Officer Course.
- SF ANCOC consists of two courses: Phase I (common core) and Phase II/III (distance learning/proponent training). Students receive a separate academic evaluation report for each course.
- Students should report with a completed pre-execution checklist. Students who have not completed the pre-execution checklist by Day 3 will be returned to their unit.
- Students who are on temporary profiles will not be allowed to

enroll in SF ANCOC.

• Expenses for rental vehicles and excess baggage are the responsibility of the soldier's unit.

• Students who are over 40 must report with a completed DA Form 4970E, *Cardiovascular Screening*, or they will be returned to their unit.

For more information, telephone the SF ANCOC branch chief.

Risher takes reins of 353rd CA Command

Colonel Paulette M. Risher took command of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command May 5 during a ceremony held at New York City's Robert P. Patterson Army Reserve Center.

Risher, formerly the deputy commander of the 350th Civil Affairs Command in Pensacola, Fla., is the first woman to be appointed to a one-star general's post in a U.S. Army special-operations unit. She replaced Brigadier General Sam Gibson, who will remain in the Army Reserve on inactive status.

Risher received her commission in 1972 and served on active duty for several years before joining the Army Reserve. As a reservist, she served with the 361st CA Brigade for 16 years, deploying during Operation Just Cause in 1989, Operation Safe Haven in 1994 and Operation Joint Guard in 1996. Risher also commanded the 348th Personnel Group, 90th Reserve Support Command, for three years. — *Bob Porreca, USACAPOC PAO*

Ceremony recognizes SF veterans of Korean War

On March 26, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the United Nations Partisans Infantry Korea honored 19 American Special Forces veterans who served either in the 8240th Army Unit or in the 8007th Army Unit during the Korean War.

Until recently, classification of the units' missions prevented the soldiers from receiving any official recognition for their contributions.

During the award ceremony, held in the headquarters of the Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, each of the veterans was awarded the United Nations Partisan Forces Honor Medal and a certificate of appreciation from Brigadier General Frank Toney, commander of the Army SF Command.

In January 1953, 60 officers and 15 enlisted soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group were levied for assignment to special-operations units in Korea. Their mission was to train South Korean troops in special operations.

Those South Korean soldiers later became members of guerrilla, partisan and aviation units. By posing a constant threat to North Korea's rear areas, the South Korean soldiers helped tie down more than 75,000 North Korean security forces.

Number of CA MTPs to be reduced

The Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine is reducing the number of Civil Affairs mission training plans, or MTPs, from eight to three.

The proposal to reduce the number of CA MTPs originated during a collective-task selection board held at Fort Bragg in 1996.

The original MTPs, which were published in 1992 and 1993, no longer reflect current CA doctrine or CA unit organization. The replacement MTPs will be founded on the concepts of FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, published in February 2000.

The first manual, ARTEP 41-701-10 MTP, approved and published in September 2000, is written for CA generalists. It contains collective tasks common to all CA teams.

The second manual, ARTEP 41-710-35 MTP, scheduled for publication in March 2002, will be written for the headquarters and headquarters companies, or HHCs, and for the detachments of CA battalions, brigades and commands. This MTP will focus on the staff functions that are common at all levels of command.

The third manual, ARTEP 41-701-60 MTP, scheduled for publication in April 2002, will explain the tasks required to perform the 16 CA functional specialties. This MTP will focus on the specialty teams in the HHC of the CA command, in the HHC of the CA brigade, and in the functional-specialty company of the Army Reserve CA battalion. The MTP will also address the civic-action team in the CA company of the special-operations CA battalion.

The current eight manuals will remain in effect until all of the new MTPs have been approved. Once all of the new MTPs have been published, they will be available through the Army Training and Doctrine Command's Reimer Digital Library.

Questions regarding the MTPs should be directed to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-DT-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5200.

160th SOAR to celebrate 20th anniversary

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment will celebrate its 20th anniversary Oct. 11-13, 2001, at Fort Campbell, Ky.

Activities that are being planned for the celebration include an air-operations symposium for senior personnel of the 160th; a regimental social; and, for all former members of the regiment, a 160th SOAR update briefing, an open-house tour of the 160th's facilities, and static displays of the regiment's equipment. For additional information, visit the "Night Stalker" web site (www.nightstalkers.com).

Book Reviews

The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon. *By Bernard Norling. Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999. ISBN 0-8131-2118-3. 304 pages. $25.*

The European aspect of Special Forces' World War II heritage, as represented by the activities of the Office of Strategic Services' operational groups and Jedburgh teams, is well-known. It is debatable whether that is because of our national inclination toward things European; or because the operational groups contributed to so much of SF's initial organization, training and mission; or because the European operators, particularly the generally well-educated and often socially prominent Jedburghs, wrote their accounts early and wrote them well.

The Pacific aspect of SF's World War II heritage deserves at least equal attention. It should be recalled that of the trio of guerrilla-warfare veterans who worked for Brigadier General Robert McClure in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare during the effort to create SF — Colonels Bank, Volckmann and Fertig — the last two had been prominent guerrilla leaders in the Philippines.

The very dimensions of the Philippine guerrilla operation command our attention. It was the longest and largest American guerrilla campaign. While the guerrilla-support operations of the operational groups extended to 10 months in Italy (August 1944-May 1945), and the Jedburgh operations in France lasted from a few days to a couple of months, the Philippine guerrilla effort lasted



43 months (January 1942-August 1945). In comparison, the entire northern European campaign, from D-Day in Normandy to the German surrender, lasted 11 months.

The Philippine operation eventually encompassed dozens of local command organizations and had an eventual cumulative strength of almost a quarter-million personnel. Unlike the OSS organizations that were the harbingers of advancing victorious Allied forces, the Philippine and American leaders of the Philippine guerrillas began their operations in the days of defeat and disaster. A highly individualistic group who exempted themselves from the surrender of Philippine-American forces in April-May 1942, they did not have the personnel, intelligence, communications and logistics support typical of OSS organizations. They also lacked training, experience and even a doctrinal basis for guerrilla warfare. Initially, they could not even contact distant American forces to tell them that they continued to fight. (Months later, when the guerrillas established long-range communications with San Francisco using a homemade radio, they received not material support, but external direction and requests for intelligence.) The Philippine guerrillas' efforts to continue the war despite enormous disadvantages richly deserve historical recognition and personal admiration.

Bernard Norling does an excellent job of relating the experiences of a number of these groups, concentrating on one that was of considerable duration: Troop C, 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts. Norling portrays their hardships, hopes, frustrations, successes and failures in as much detail as can be supported by the fragmentary records and by the accounts of the few survivors.

The Philippine operation encountered almost every problem of guerrilla warfare — military, legal, morale, political, psychological and logistics. The leadership's efforts to resolve the problems under demanding conditions are well-limned. Because the guerrilla leaders were strong characters who faced their problems in isolation, their solutions were varied and, at times, contentious.

Norling is not a completely detached recorder. Possibly influenced by his research for his earlier books on the Philippine guerrilla experience (*Behind Japanese Lines* and *Lapham's Raiders*), Norling repeatedly sides with those who championed (their own) independent operations vs. those (including Volckmann) who sought to establish a uni-

fied guerrilla command. Given the geographic and communications realities of the time, the "independents" might well have been right; however, the SF schoolhouse may have reservations on this subject. The book has only a single map (mounted on the inside covers) but because this is a story primarily of character, courage and endurance, not of maneuver, one map is adequate. *The Intrepid Guerrillas* is an outstanding book of guerrilla-warfare history. It should be welcomed by the readers of *Special Warfare*, particularly those in the SF and PSYOP communities.

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Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Modern Warfare. *By John Alexander. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. ISBN 0-312-19416-1. 227 pages. $24.95*.

Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Modern Warfare is a comprehensive look at nonlethal weapons, how they have been used by military and law-enforcement agencies in recent years, and how they can play a greater role in the future.

Nonlethal weapons are designed to incapacitate personnel and materiel while minimizing fatalities and permanent injuries. Nonlethal weapons have been used in law-enforcement for several decades, but they have only recently received serious attention from the military.

John Alexander argues that there is a growing need for nonlethal weapons in war and in military operations other than war. The goal of war is to impose one's will on the adversary, not necessarily the physical destruction of the adversary. Physical destruction may actually be counterproductive to one's long-term goals. Lethal action may accomplish our immediate objectives, but it may also begin a cycle of violence that will perpetuate long-term problems.

Changes in the international political landscape during the post-Cold War era are affecting the way the U.S. looks at war and conflict. During the Cold War, our objective was clear: national survival. But with the gray area between war and peace growing wider, our objectives are more limited, and nonlethal weapons can help us accomplish them.

Future War surveys the vast variety of nonlethal weapons and explains how they can be employed at the various levels of conflict. For example, at the tactical level, low-kinetic-impact weapons, such as tennis-ball guns, concussion grenades or acoustic weapons, can be used to restrict collateral damage. At the operational level, microbes can be used to eat an enemy's petroleum supplies, or chemical depolymers can be used to destroy tires. Both weapons can delay the entry of an enemy's second-echelon force onto the battlefield.

At the strategic level, attacks on computer networks can disable communications and cause the enemy's leadership to question its situational awareness. Psychological operations can persuade enemy leaders to follow a course of action that is consistent with U.S. national interests.

The bottom line is that nonlethal weapons provide options that make it easier for commanders to take decisive action. Commanders are no longer limited to choosing only whether or not to use force; now they can choose the type of force and the combination of weapons that will accomplish their objective.

Alexander emphasizes that nonlethal weapons will not completely replace lethal weapons, and that they are not without their own problems. For example, a shot from a low-kinetic-impact weapon that would temporarily disable a 200-pound man may be lethal to a teenager. Nonlethal weapons can also be lethal if they are misused. There is also legal and moral opposition to their use. Some nonlethal weapons that are chemical and biological in nature may be perceived as unethical, and their use may violate existing laws and treaties.

Alexander is uniquely qualified to write on nonlethal weapons. During his military career, he commanded Special Forces units in Vietnam and assisted in the development of advanced weapons systems. After retiring from the Army, Alexander served as a deputy sheriff in Dade County, Fla., and he has conducted research on nonlethal weapons at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Future War will be of interest to all members of the special-operations community. Nonlethal weapons are consistent with the special-operations imperatives, and they have a growing role in all of our future operational environments.

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Special Warfare

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