Special Warfare

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From the Commandant

It has been just over a decade since the establishment of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command in December 1989, but in that short time USASOC forces have earned a reputation for excellence. To name the various operations in which ARSOF have served — Just Cause, Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Uphold Democracy, Restore Hope, Joint Endeavor — is to recite a litany of service and sacrifice. As the various articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* illustrate, ARSOF stand ready to offer theater commanders a variety of options for swiftly responding to political, military or humanitarian crises or for defusing or resolving problems before they escalate.

In our attempt to maintain that readiness, we face two great challenges that the rest of the Army shares: providing our soldiers with specialized training and providing them with the most technologically advanced equipment.

One way the Army is improving its training is by increasing the use of simulations and virtual exercises. The ARSOF community is making a substantial contribution to this effort through its ARSOF Synthetic Theater of War-Architecture, or STOW-A, exercises. These exercises integrate virtual, simulated and live training to allow soldiers to plan and execute simulated missions in a realistic environment. Working with the National Simulation Center and the U.S. Army Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command, ARSOF have conducted two STOW-A exercises, one in October 1998 and the other in October 1999. The lessons learned from these exercises, and the improvements that our Special Operations Battle Lab has made to the ARSOF version of the One Semi-Automated Forces Testbed, which simulates the activities of ARSOF forces, will benefit future Army virtual training.

In December 1999, SWCS, acting on behalf of USASOC, hosted an exposition in which new ARSOF equipment was demonstrated to other Army branches. Those branches could benefit from the lighter and more powerful ARSOF equipment, and they could save time and money by using equipment that USASOC has already tested and developed.

The establishment of USASOC in 1989 demonstrated the Army's recognition of the value of special operations and the Army's commitment to the ARSOF community. During the decade since, ARSOF have paid a return on that investment not only by serving as the tip of the spear in missions around the world, but also by contributing unique capabilities that can help improve the readiness of the Army overall.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Special Operations Forces in Peacetime

by John M. Collins

Special-operations forces, or SOF, help shape the international security environment, prepare for an uncertain future, and respond with precision in a range of potential crises. Unique training and skills enable SOF to operate in situations where conventional units cannot be used. SOF apply finesse rather than brute force, and they possess overt, covert, and clandestine capabilities not found elsewhere within the armed forces.[1]

No other formations are permanently organized, equipped and trained for foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and other highly sensitive missions. In addition, SOF have unparalleled interagency and international expertise. With their unique, cost-effective, low-profile, and direct as well as indirect measures, SOF can enhance international stability; inhibit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or WMD; combat terrorism; and check illicit drug trafficking in peacetime.

Familiarity with their respective areas of responsibility, or AORs, and their ability to work closely with foreign military forces and various institutions give SOF an advantage over conventional forces in situations that demand cultural awareness. Soldiers in Special Forces; Psychological Operations, or PSYOP; and Civil Affairs, or CA; along with some Navy and Air Force personnel, are regionally oriented. Their knowledge of social, political and economic factors, coupled with language fluency, enables them to establish relationships with foreign military and civilian personnel.

This article is reprinted from the Spring 1999 issue of Joint Force Quarterly. *— Editor*

Peacetime challenges

Foreign internal defense, or FID, operations counter the effects of poverty, ignorance, lawlessness and other ills that undermine the security of a nation. Although it could take years to free a nation of subversion, lawlessness and insurgency, when we do achieve success, it not only promotes peace and stability in that nation but it progressively reduces that nation's reliance on the U.S. Multifaceted SOF units, which keep abreast of developments in their respective areas of interest, are best suited to perform FID.

Several SOF advantages are evident. Small, self-reliant SOF units function effectively under austere circumstances. In pursuit of U.S. interests, PSYOP campaigns mold public opinion, and civic-action programs aid the local citizenry, as evidenced in Haiti, where fewer than 1,200 personnel from the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, became the de facto government. SOF seem to actually hone their skills when participating in nontraditional missions, whereas conventional combat formations gradually lose their edge when assigned similar missions.

U.S. Army photo

Small, self-reliant SOF units, like these PSYOP soldiers in Haiti, function effectively in austere conditions and in nontraditional missions.

The military is often the single most influential institution in developing countries, even in nominal democracies. Foreign armed forces that can deter or defeat external and internal threats without violating international law or resorting to repression serve U.S. interests by maintaining stability, by promoting international peace, and by protecting human rights.

The WMD threat

The acquisition of a relatively few weapons of mass destruction, together with reliable delivery systems, could convert a small, aggressive state into a regional power overnight. Suitcase-size bombs could immeasurably intensify the leverage of terrorists and drug cartels. President Clinton warned that "the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical [NBC] weapons ... constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States." He declared "a national emergency to deal with that threat," but the threat persists despite arms-control agreements and export controls.[2]

Detailed intelligence is essential for counterproliferation policies, plans, programs and operations. But it is hard to obtain because cover, concealment, dispersal and deception are used to mask WMD activity at each stage — from research and development through production, storage and deployment. Clever ploys may fool spies in the sky, as the Indian nuclear testing did in May 1998. And dual-use technology makes it difficult for distant sensors to distinguish between illicit projects and legitimate projects. Not every nuclear reactor, for example, yields weapons-grade plutonium. Facilities that manufacture biological agents may resemble plants that produce vaccines. Modern pharmaceutical plants commonly employ waste-disposal methods that were once used only by chemical-warfare facilities.

Under favorable circumstances, SOF could analyze evidence gathered by other means and fill in the blanks that overhead assets may have overlooked. As directed, SOF could participate in interagency and international intelligence-collection programs to locate, identify and follow NBC ingredients and weapons aboard ships and aircraft en route to and from a probable proliferator. When in the vicinity of suspicious installations, SOF could collect water and soil samples to detect the presence of

radioactive residues that uranium enrichment and plutonium-extraction processes deposit. Clandestine teams could probe for methylphosphonate fingerprints that denote nerve-gas production, or they could augment officially sanctioned searches such as those that were conducted by the United Nations in Iraq.

Black arts

Sabotage involves surreptitious operations designed to damage or destroy enemy supplies, facilities and infrastructure, including matériel associated with WMD. SOF teams experienced in the use of demolitions, incendiary devices and other means could attack confirmed WMD targets when missile or conventional air strikes are inappropriate.

Personnel snatches that undermine nuclear-weapon programs would be far more rewarding than those directed against biological- and chemical-warfare projects, which require less expertise to undertake. Scientists, technicians and program managers who develop WMD constitute potentially lucrative targets. But decision-makers have left these targets untouched, largely because of their noncombatant status in peacetime, even though they could provide an enemy with an enormous capability in war.

Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, which still remains in force, explicitly asserts that "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination. … No agency of the intelligence community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order." That statement applies to such actions regardless of whether they might have been discriminate or economic in terms of force requirements, costs and civilian casualties.

Most counterproliferation options open to SOF are unappealing and risk-laden, but SOF's inaction could allow despots to deploy WMD with destabilizing and even disastrous effects.

Counterterrorism

To promote their sociopolitical causes, terrorists apply public, impersonal, repetitive violence or threats of violence. The efforts to spread dismay and to disrupt community routines can be so severe that compliance with the demands of the terrorists may eventually seem preferable to continued resistance.

Navy SEALs fast-rope from an SH-60H Seahawk helicopter onto the deck of a fast-attack submarine. SOF possess clandestine capabilities not found elsewhere within the armed forces.

Photo by Michael W. Pendergrass

The U.S. has never experienced acts of terrorism on an extensive scale. No individual or group, for example, sought to exploit the explosions that riddled the World Trade Center in 1993, the federal building in Oklahoma City two years later, or the Khobar Towers in 1996. However, terrorists with portable WMD could wreak terrible damage. They might even achieve their political goals with a well-planned hoax. The terrorists' target list could include record centers, information-storage-and-transfer facilities, transport and communication nodes, water supplies, electric power plants, petrochemical factories and nuclear reactors.

The U.S. government actuates programs to combat domestic and transnational terrorism. Although legal limitations, such as the Posse Comitatus Act, foreclose full use of military capabilities inside the U.S.,[3] the president could ease this restriction with the concurrence of Congress and the courts if an extremely perilous threat arose.

USSOCOM is the only DoD component directed by law to plan and conduct counterterrorism operations (offensive countermeasures). Military commanders at every level, along with federal, state and local law-enforcement agencies, share antiterrorism (passive protection) responsibilities. But because SOF units have devised such innovative tactics and techniques, many federal agencies rely on their expertise.

Primary responsibility for terrorism in the U.S. rests with the FBI and with the CIA abroad. SOF units have unique skills that policy-makers may use under certain circumstances, but their routine use could raise suspicions among allies and friends who resent foreign-intelligence intrusion, and it could degrade SOF's ability to perform advisory and assistance missions overseas. Absent reliable intelligence, SOF are unable to conduct pre-emptive strikes against terrorists. Experience gained from actual terrorist operations is limited.

Counternarcotics operations

Active measures to detect, monitor, discourage, disrupt or interdict the production and distribution of illicit drugs form the basis of counternarcotics operations. During fiscal year 1997, in response to requests by regional commanders in chief, or CINCs, area-oriented SOF teams completed more than 190 such missions, most of which helped the militaries of Latin America.

Photo by Douglas J. Gillert

Photo by Douglas J. Gillert

(Left) General Charles Wilhelm, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, samples a native plant while visiting the drug-interdiction training center near Iquitos, Peru. (Below) Peruvians train in ground insurgency operations at the Iquitos training center.

Not all counterdrug duty is hazardous. Reserve officers associated with SOF professional development heighten the threat awareness among senior officers and civilian officials. PSYOP military information support teams conduct classes for school children. A squadron from the Air Force Special Operations Command teaches host-nation aircrews to maintain fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, without which the host-nation could cover only a small fraction of the territory where drug producers and smugglers operate.

Events in Peru recently took a turn when drug traffickers, who were losing aircraft at an unprecedented rate, began using boats to transport large amounts of coca paste to processing centers in Colombia. In response, a 30-man U.S. contingent composed mainly of members of Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs established a riverine training base for local counternarcotics forces at Iquitos, where several navigable mountain streams empty into the

upper Amazon. Instruction on slowing down or stopping the waterborne movement of drugs incorporates lessons learned (some 30 years ago) from the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone in South Vietnam. It is too early to predict whether the blocking operations will succeed, but coca cultivation has already shifted dramatically from Peru to Colombia, partly because drug shipment by inland waterway is too slow for narco entrepreneurs.

Colombian drug cartels, transnational criminals and insurgents collaborate to multiply their respective capabilities. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, in return for an estimated $60 million or more each month, protect coca and opium crops, processing facilities, and airfields from the Colombian military and police. Russian crime syndicates provide cartels and the FARC with weapons in exchange for cocaine, giving the cartels and the FARC more firepower than many armies have. After Colombia was reported to have an unacceptably poor record in counternarcotics efforts, the U.S. decertified the country and terminated the transfer of military equipment to Colombia. The U.S. also suspended most of the training it had been providing to Colombia, although SOF personnel are still allowed to teach intelligence-collection, scouting, patrolling,

SOF Deployments Outside the Continental U.S. (FY 98)

	Authorized SOF Personnel	Total Man-Weeks OCONUS	Average Man-Weeks OCONUS	Total Countries Involved
Special Forces	8,781	53,555	1,030	129
AFSOC Air Wings	10,122	32,395	623	58
Civil Affairs	5,112	16,030	308	82
Navy SEALs	2,707	22,199	427	77
Psychological Operations	3,863	12,568	242	78
Special Boats	2,455	13,086	252	38
Rangers	1,895	5,309	102	5
Special Operations Aviation	1,666	2,700	52	10
Special Tactics	450	1,987	38	24
SOF Headquarters and Special Operations Commands	2,006	8,373	161	66
Total	**39,057**	**168,202**	**3,235**	

SOF Areas of Operation (FY 98)

Unified Command	Missions	Countries
U.S. Pacific Command	699	34
U.S. European Command	766	67
U.S. Southern Command	415	31
U.S. Central Command	261	15
U.S. Atlantic Command	22	3
U.S. Special Operations Command	15	2
Total	**2,178**	**152**

infantry tactics and counterterrorism. However, like other American personnel in Colombia, SOF are forbidden to participate in counterinsurgency operations.

The price of success

The extensive deployment of high-demand, low-density SOF outside the continental U.S. during fiscal year 1998 indicates how valuable the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the CINCs consider SOF's contributions in situations short of war. In fact, SOF are so appropriate for many security problems around the world that there is a tendency to overextend them. Concentrations remain heaviest in Europe and the Pacific region (see tables on page 6).

Even though many SOF personnel hone their skills in the continental U.S., many others are involved overseas in military operations other than war. Army Special Forces, for example, logged one-third of their man-weeks abroad last year. Two active groups bore the heaviest loads, because the other three active groups and the two groups in the Army National Guard are oriented toward areas that have relatively few requirements. The U.S. Army Reserve, which contains 24 of 25 CA battalions and nearly 70 percent of PSYOP assets, shouldered a disproportionate burden. Air National Guard personnel, who comprise a unique broadcast group that supports CINCs around the world, practically met themselves coming and going to the field. This is part of the price of SOF success.

Self-reliant, highly-motivated, superbly-trained SOF, especially those who are proficient in foreign languages and those who have cross-cultural skills, seem ideally suited for many missions that conventional forces cannot perform as effectively or as economically in the twilight zone between peace and war. Low-key training teams, information programs, and civic action can foster goodwill and enhance American influence around the world. Moreover, the president and Congress could relax the political and legal constraints on SOF if an enemy with weapons of mass destruction should pose a threat to the U.S. or its allies.

Several facts about special operations nevertheless caution against overcommitment:

- People are more important than hardware.
- Quality is more important than quantity.
- SOF cannot be mass-produced.
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Experienced SOF constitute a discrete instrument of national power, an invaluable resource that would take years to reconstitute if squandered. U.S. leaders would be well-advised to assign SOF to only those missions that they are eminently qualified to perform in peacetime and in war, while constantly considering the strengths and the limitations of SOF's unique capabilities.

John M. Collins served as a senior specialist in national defense with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress. He is the author of 11 books, including America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future*,* Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years*, and* Green Berets, SEALS and Spetsnaz*. A frequent defense consultant for members of Congress and the U.S. defense establishment, Collins served 30 years in the Army, enlisting as a private in 1942 and retiring as a colonel in 1972.*

Notes:

[1] Title 10, section 167, of the U.S. Code identifies SOF as "core forces or as augmenting forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E." That excludes Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), which are essentially conventional task forces, and Marine Corps Reserve Civil Affairs units, which mainly furnish tactical support for expeditionary forces.

[2] See Executive Order 12938, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," and the accompanying "Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" (14 November 1994).

[3] Title 18, section 1385, U.S. Code, "Use of Army and Air Forces as Posse Comitatus."

Colombia in Turmoil: How the U.S. Could Help

by Ambassador David Passage

During the past two years, Washington has been roiled by the growing debate over what the United States should do to help Colombia confront its menacing twin evils — a booming business in illegal narcotics and a growing internal insurgency.

Our interest, clearly and repeatedly identified by U.S. government spokesmen over the past 10 years, is in curbing the flow of illegal narcotics into the U.S. More than 80 percent of all cocaine entering the U.S. market comes either from Colombia or through Colombia. An increasing share of heroin is also coming from that country, as Colombian drug lords move into a market hitherto dominated by supplies from the "Golden Triangle" and from the Karakorum, Elburz and Caucasus ranges in central Asia.

The most pressing problem for Colombia, on the other hand, is its internal conflict, a national nightmare that has consumed upward of 50,000 lives over the past five decades and that has resulted in more than 40 percent of the national territory falling under guerrilla control. Government forces are currently fighting two major guerrilla movements: the *Fuerza Armada Revolucionario de Colombia*, or FARC, and the *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional*, or ELN.

Colombia has the world's highest rate of kidnapping-for-ransom, and it is among the top contenders for "murder capital of the world." Hundreds of elected officials are

Photo by Felix Garza

U.S. sailors off-load bales of cocaine seized during their ship's counter-drug deployment to the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. The street value of the drugs was estimated to be $165 million.

gunned down each year; thousands of Colombians have quietly moved abroad (many to the U.S.); and many thousands more have been "internally displaced" — forced to move from dangerous areas and to seek refuge elsewhere inside their own country.

The debate in the U.S. over what, if anything, we should do to help Colombia restore order revolves around two issues: the poor human-rights record of Colombia's armed forces and charges of military collusion with civilian "paramilitary" forces; and whether Colombia's armed forces are sufficiently trained and adequately equipped to restore order.

A role for SOF

The purpose of this article is not to judge the merits of the arguments over an increased U.S. involvement in Colombia — those arguments will have to be decided by discussion inside the U.S. government, and by Congress and the American public and media. Rather, this article will examine our national interests in Colombia and what we might do to help that country, if we choose to do so.

Colombia's armed forces have specific shortcomings that the U.S. could help remedy. Given the nature of Colombia's problems with narcotics and with guerrilla insurgency, much of the training we could impart would logically come from U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF.

Colombia's armed forces are still largely made up of units trained and equipped for conventional warfare — they are woefully unprepared and ill-equipped for rapid reaction to high-intensity but small-scale tactical developments, particularly at night. U.S. SOF, however, have dealt with smaller, highly localized conflicts during a number of peacemaking and peace-enforcement engagements over the past decade.

Finally, the Colombian military has yet to demonstrate that it understands the powerful impact its actions can have — pro or con — on the local populace. In Vietnam, American forces learned the importance of Chairman Mao's dictum that the people are the sea in which the "fish" (i.e., the guerrilla armies) swim. In insurgency warfare, the guerrillas pick the times and the places for their attacks — while the defending forces have to protect *all* the places *all* the time. If the defending forces (in this case, Colombia's military and police forces) aren't able to win popular support — or worse, if they alienate popular support — they will start out at a profound disadvantage. U.S. SOF, particularly Special Forces, are well-schooled in the importance of winning the support of local populations.

The U.S. stake in Colombia

The U.S. national interest in Colombia is based on four issues: economic interest, illegal migration, illegal narcotics and Colombia's guerrilla insurgency.

Colombia's armed forces are still largely made up of units trained and equipped for conventional warfare — they are woefully unprepared and ill-equipped for rapid reaction to high-intensity but small-scale tactical developments.

Economically, Colombia ranks about 25th on the list of our most important trading partners — squarely in the second tier. It is our fourth most important customer in Latin America (after Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela). More than 400 of the U.S.'s Fortune 500 companies conduct business in Colombia. More than 25,000 American citizens live and work in Colombia, and although a certain percentage of them are dual-nationals, they *all* have a valid expectation that the U.S. would protect their rights, and that in an extreme situation, they would have a legal right to admission to the U.S.

Colombians may well comprise the second largest group of illegal migrants in the U.S., after Mexicans. Their numbers have ebbed and flowed over the past decade, partly as a result of changing patterns of narcotics trafficking and other illegal activities, partly as a result of the perception of greater economic opportunity in the U.S., and partly as a result of the growing level of violence inside Colombia. Violence poses the greatest threat of large-scale ille-

gal migration: We are already recording increasing numbers of middle- and upper-class Colombians moving their assets and family members to safety outside the country. In mid-1999, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota reported that its visa-application workload had nearly doubled over the preceding year, to 35,000-40,000 per month.

Our interest in the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics should not require much elaboration. Despite our 10 years of assistance to Colombia's counternarcotics police and national police, we have seen the narcotics production in Colombia expand, not shrink. Cultivation of coca, the raw product for the production of cocaine, has shifted significantly from Bolivia and Peru to large plantations in the jungles and plains of southeastern Colombia. The considerable eradication efforts of both Colombia and the U.S. have had no impact whatsoever on the overall supply of cocaine to the global market. Despite the breakups of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the destruction of hundreds of illegal narcotics laboratories, the pouring of thousands of barrels of precursor chemicals into the headwaters of the Amazon and Orinoco rivers, and the arrests of hundreds of narcotics traffickers, the supply of illegal narcotics to consumer countries remains undiminished.

Our interest in the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics should not require much elaboration. Despite our 10 years of assistance to Colombia's counternarcotics police and national police, we have seen the narcotics production in Colombia expand, not shrink.

And finally, despite the considerable effort on the part of Colombia to avoid acknowledging the ties between its guerrillas and its narcotraffickers, it is now obvious to all but the most deliberately and willfully obtuse observers that there is a *symbiotic relationship* between the two. Guerrillas earn money to buy arms and ammunition by protecting narcotics-producing facilities. The narcotraffickers profit because the guerrillas protect them from Colombia's police and military.

U.S. objective

The U.S. should want to see a strong and democratic Colombia led by a freely elected government that can:

- Exercise effective control over its national territory;
- Safeguard the human rights and civil liberties of all its citizens;
- End human-rights abuses by its police and its armed forces, as well as by others such as paramilitaries and guerrillas;
- Curb the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics; and
- Enjoy the support of all its citizens as it tackles the serious political, social and economic problems in Colombian society.

For the Colombian government to operate effectively, its military and police forces have to be sufficiently professional and well-equipped to curb the disobedience to Colombia's laws and the armed challenges to government authority, whether from the FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, narcotraffickers or other criminal elements.

Where to begin

Despite the fact that the Colombian military has had more experience than any other military force in this hemisphere in dealing with guerrilla insurgents, its track record over the past two decades has not been impressive. A number of recent studies of the Colombian military's professional competence have been conducted by Colombians and foreigners, and virtually all of the studies reveal a number of serious shortcomings.

Critiques question the Colombian military's competence at the top, charge corruption at virtually all levels of leadership, and cite ignorance and fear among the ill-trained, inadequately equipped, and poorly led conscripts.

Role for the U.S.?

Many of the changes necessary in the Colombian army can be brought about only as a result of a wholesale housecleaning.

Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt

A U.S. Special Forces soldier instructs Salvadoran soldiers in small-unit operations. Colombia's army could benefit greatly from similar instruction.

The army is increasingly realizing the seriousness of its predicament, and the process of change has begun, although it still has a long way to go. Colombian President Pastrana has installed General Fernando Tapias as head of the armed forces, and General Tapias has removed or replaced a number of high-ranking military officials (including Major General Ivan Ramirez, commander of the 20th Intelligence Brigade) in an effort to improve the army's professionalism and its collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence.

Other changes are needed, some of which could be assisted by Colombia's friends. At the very least, a carefully designed program to provide a modest amount of training and military equipment could increase the speed at which the military improves its professionalism and cleans up its record of human-rights abuses. The most important areas for improvement of Colombia's military include:

• *Development of strategy*. The Colombian army needs a viable, comprehensive strategy for dealing with the guerrillas and paramilitaries and for restoring the government's control over its national territory.

• *Training and doctrine for small-unit operations*. The Colombian army is woefully unprepared to engage in small-unit combat operations. U.S. SOF, on the other hand, are organized and trained to conduct small-unit operations.

• *Training and doctrine for joint operations*. The Colombian military is only beginning to develop a doctrine for joint operations, using assets of the army, air force, navy and national police to reinforce strengths and to compensate for weaknesses. American SOF, on the other hand, practice "jointness" as a way of life.

• *Training and equipment for night combat operations*. Until recently, night combat operations were virtually unheard of in Colombia. At sundown, the army repaired to its *cuartels* and hoped the guerrillas wouldn't attack that night. Night combat operations are a SOF specialty.

• C*ollection, evaluation and dissemination of usable operational intelligence*. The Colombian military's collection and evaluation of intelligence is best described as primitive. Dissemination of usable, actionable intelligence is virtually impossible because of rivalries and distrust between army units and their leaders. The need for improvement is so acute that the U.S. Southern Command has already begun working on it.

• *Quick-reaction capabilities*. When four American bird-watchers (along with numerous Colombian citizens) were kidnapped at a guerrilla roadblock in Boyaca in 1998, it took more than eight hours for an army unit to react — despite the fact that the roadblock was less than 10 km from the nearest Army outpost.

• *Creation of an airborne strike force to react rapidly to developing tactical situations and opportunities*. In 1985, the U.S. helped the Salvadoran military create a heliborne immediate-reaction force named *Relampago* (Lightning), designed to launch a reaction within 15 minutes after having received actionable intelligence. In one of its first operations, *Relampago* captured Nidia Diaz, a senior *comandante* of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN, when Diaz and a small group stopped to rest after conducting a raid. Colombia needs to create just such a force that can react immediately to intelligence about high-value targets.

• *Logistics supply and repair capabilities*. All three military services need significant improvements in the way they maintain their logistics-repair facilities. Logistics and repair skills are not unknown in Colombia: Avianca, the national airline (oldest in the Americas and second oldest in the world), has first-class maintenance and logistics services, which are critical in operating a major international airline.

This year, U.S. assistance to Colombia should reach $289 million. We should not be under any illusions about the likely impact of that assistance: all but $40 million … is earmarked for the effort to halt the production and export of drugs.

• *Spare-parts inventorying and anticipation of need*. Until very recently, the Colombian military had no spare helicopter rotor blades. When the need for rotor blades arose, the military sidelined or cannibalized helicopters until replacement blades could be ordered and shipped from the manufacturer, a process that usually took weeks, sometimes months.

• *Transport capability and lift*. Colombia needs trucks and other vehicles on the ground, and rotary and fixed-wing aircraft in the air.

Criticism

Those who criticize proposals for U.S. military assistance to Colombia make three basic charges: First, the U.S. would risk starting down a slippery slope that could ultimately lead to our being trapped in a Vietnam-type civil war (with similarly disastrous consequences). Second, the Colombian military's human-rights performance is so poor that the U.S. should not intervene. And third, the magnitude of the problem in Colombia is so great that any viable U.S. training and equipment program there would be unacceptably costly.

Vietnam and El Salvador

Some of the saddest results of our involvement in Vietnam are how resistant we have been to learn from it, how traumatized we remain by it, and how paralyzed our national decision-making process is by the specter, however implausible, that the U.S. might become involved in another such experience. The anonymous and obviously hostile congressional staffer who described U.S. military and police training programs in Colombia as "a perfect model of [U.S. activities] in Vietnam in 1964" (*Time*, Aug. 9, 1999) obviously knows nothing about Vietnam or Colombia. There are a number of valid lessons to be learned from our experience in Vietnam. Refusing to attempt to influence (in a positive manner) developments in countries of importance to the U.S. shouldn't be one of them.

Those who were involved in the U.S. effort to help El Salvador bring its civil war to a negotiated settlement applied lessons learned from Vietnam. For the sake of brevity, let me condense these lessons to three:

1. The U.S. made clear that it was El Salvador's war — not ours — and that the war was going to be won or lost by Salvadorans, not by Americans.

2. The U.S. agreed that we would help train El Salvador's armed forces, but that we would not participate in combat operations, and that we would limit our involvement to 55 trainers (not "advisers").

3. The U.S. used all the pressure at its disposal to compel the Salvadoran government to make significant internal reforms: to end human-rights abuses by the military; to eliminate the paramilitary "death squads"; to draw up a new constitution and hold clean, free and fair elections; to end the oli-

garchy's monopolies over the major cash crops (e.g., sugar, coffee, cotton, rice, shrimp, etc.); to implement land reform; to provide economic assistance to the *campesinos*; and to start the process of building a true democracy. (The U.S. forced none of these reforms on the Saigon regime.)

As a result of lessons learned, our involvement in El Salvador ended quite differently from our involvement in Vietnam. Even after all other factors are taken into account, the incontrovertible fact remains that with a modestly designed and simple U.S. assistance program using the key lessons from Vietnam, El Salvador's armed forces improved their military performance to the point that the FMLN ultimately decided that it should negotiate a peace agreement or risk being wiped out.

Ditching the myths

With respect to costs, the U.S. spent nearly $6 billion to help turn the tide in El Salvador — but El Salvador was an impoverished country that had been through years of debilitating civil war. To see the situation in El Salvador reversed, the U.S. had to provide most of the resources itself.

But that's not the case in Colombia. Colombia is rich in resources and talent. Colombia's problem is not a lack of resources — it's a misapplication of those resources (and a still-considerable degree of corruption within the military in the procurement process, payroll, contracts, etc.). Colombia spends too much money on things it doesn't need and doesn't spend enough money on the things it does need.

Colombia's air force would like to have F-16s to replace its aging Mirages and Kfirs. What the air force needs are ground-attack, close-air-support aircraft and a lift capability, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing. The Colombian navy still dreams of destroyers, frigates and submarines to maintain a "blue water" capability. What it needs are coastal patrol and inland riverine craft to regain control of Colombia's territorial waters and rivers from smugglers and narcotraffickers.

The army would like expensive high-tech equipment it doesn't need to chase bands of guerrillas around in the mountains. It needs increased mobility; improved communications equipment; training in small-unit operations; training in night combat operations; improved intelligence-gathering, evaluation and dissemination; and improvement in leadership capability.

This year, U.S. assistance to Colombia should reach $289 million. We should not be under any illusions about the likely impact of that assistance: all but $40 million of the $289 million is earmarked for the effort to halt the production and export of drugs.

Although Colombian Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramirez traveled to Washington, D.C., in July 1999, to request an additional $500 million in assistance,

Photo by Tyler J. Mielke

Boats like this U.S. Marine riverine assault craft would allow the Colombian navy to regain control of Colombia's rivers from smugglers and narcotraffickers.

Colombian Minister of Defense Luis Fernando Ramirez (far right) and other members of the Colombian delegation meet with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen (left) in 1999.

Photo by R. D. Ward

Colombia's defense budget is large enough to buy the equipment its military needs. In his State of the Union speech on Jan. 27, 2000, President Clinton appealed to Congress to support his two-year $1.6-billion package to help Colombia, and tied the U.S. aid specifically to support for Colombia's democracy as well as for the counterdrug war.

The Colombian military has an adequate force structure, but that force structure needs to be re-torqued so that it can deal with small but highly mobile guerrilla bands instead of invading armies. It needs help drawing up tables of organization and equipment tailored to counterinsurgency warfare, not to traditional classical-maneuver warfare. Colombia's military also needs to re-examine some of its practices, such as exempting high-school graduates from combat.

Unlike El Salvador, which was genuinely on the ropes by 1984-85, Colombia is not in imminent danger of collapse or of defeat by the FARC or ELN. Neither one of those organizations is likely to come storming down from the mountains to seize Bogota. It isn't necessary to throw resources at Colombia's problem in a panicked fashion in order to deal with it. It *is*, however, increasingly necessary to take the problem seriously — which few have done until now.

There is no reason why a viable military-training-and-assistance program couldn't be accomplished with a relatively small number of U.S. uniformed personnel, perhaps even fewer than the legendary 55 used in El Salvador. The U.S. had to help the Salvadoran armed forces develop skills in virtually every facet of military operations: logistics, spare parts, uniforms, messing and rations, medical care, pay and payroll, motor vehicles, weapons and ammunition, housing — the works. Colombia's military, however poor its performance until recently, is nonetheless a good deal more capable than El Salvador's was in the early 1980s. And in El Salvador, the U.S. sent trainers out to battalion-level headquarters, something which would not necessarily be required in Colombia.

There is no *a priori* reason why a U.S. military-assistance program to Colombia would have to be large to be effective, why it should be costly, or why it should lead to a deeper U.S. involvement in Colombia's internal conflict.

But it is probably worth restating the criteria we used for the U.S. training and assistance program in El Salvador, and changing that criteria so that they apply to Colombia:

1. This is Colombia's conflict. The U.S. isn't going to fight it for Colombia. Colombian government forces are going to have to fight it and win it — or they will lose it.

2. The U.S. can help the Colombian armed forces evaluate their shortcomings

and overcome them through organization and through training — but only if they want our help, are willing to apply lessons learned elsewhere and are willing to make the improvements necessary to remedy the situation in their country.

3. Finally, the Colombian military and police forces need to fundamentally change the way they deal with their civilian population. They need to end — definitively — the human-rights abuses that have marred their interaction with their own civilian population, remove the abusers from military and civilian ranks, and prosecute in civilian courts those who are charged with civil crimes and abuses.

Bottom line

Although Colombians need to make most of the decisions and fight most of the battles that will determine the fate of their country, the U.S., too, needs to decide what it would like to see happen and what it is prepared to do to influence the outcome of Colombia.

If the U.S. is serious about achieving a reduction in the production of and trafficking in illegal narcotics, it needs to accept the fact that no reduction is likely until the Colombian government regains control of its national territory and is able to deal with narcotraffickers on the basis of law. That is the *sine qua non* for any positive impact on the cultivation of the agricultural stock (coca and opium poppies) for illegal narcotics; on their transformation into usable raw material (e.g., coca HCD and poppy gum); on conversion into cocaine and heroin; and on packaging and shipment to consumer countries.

And if the U.S. is serious about helping Colombia reduce its human-rights abuses, we should offer training programs to Colombia's police and military forces. Through carefully designed training, the police and military forces could learn to enforce Colombia's laws and to maintain public order without having to resort to the abuse of human rights and to the denial of civil liberties.

This hemisphere is our neighborhood. We have an interest in both the fate and the future of our neighborhood and of our neighbors. Colombia is one of those neighbors. Its house is on fire. It needs our help, it deserves our help, and it has asked for our help. The appropriate U.S. reaction is not to wash our hands and walk away (on grounds that we don't want to become involved in a Spanish-speaking Vietnam, or that Colombia's human-rights record is not spotless) — but to roll up our sleeves, pitch in, and help.

Ambassador David Passage recently retired from the State Department after serving 33 years in the Foreign Service. He served overseas in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. At the time of his retirement, Passage was director of Andean affairs in the Latin American Bureau of the State Department. Most of his professional service involved politico-military affairs and national-security strategy. During the Vietnam War, he served as a pacification officer assigned to the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. During the height of El Salvador's civil war in the mid-1980s, he served as deputy chief of mission and as chargé d'affaires *at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. He served on or led U.S. delegations negotiating the removal of Cuban forces from Angola and Mozambique during the period of "constructive engagement" in Southern Africa at the end of the 1980s, and he was a member of the National Security Council staff at the White House under President George Bush. After serving three years as U.S. Ambassador to Botswana, Passage became the political adviser to the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Fla., under Generals Wayne A. Downing and Henry H. Shelton. Passage holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Denver and a master's degree from Georgetown University. A graduate of the National War College, he is also a frequent guest speaker and guest lecturer at U.S. military schools, including command and staff colleges and senior service war colleges.*

Panther Leap: Joint Tactical Mission in a Synthetic Environment

Special-operations forces, or SOF, are called upon to perform strategic and operational missions in support of the National Command Authorities and the geographic commanders in chief, or CINCs. These missions require a combination of specialized personnel, state-of-the-art equipment, and unique tactics and training. SOF training is more complex than that of conventional forces because SOF must be able to conduct operations during periods of limited visibility and darkness.

No aviation unit is better at conducting night operations than the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Headquartered at Fort Campbell, Ky., the 160th SOAR, nicknamed the Night Stalkers, employs state-of-the-art equipment and superbly honed flight skills to provide the ground-force commander with precision helicopter-assault capabilities and helicopter-attack capabilities. Maintaining precision requires constant training and mission rehearsal.

In October 1999, the 160th SOAR, elements of the 1st Special Forces Group, elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment, and elements of the Air Force Special Operations Command's 19th Special Operations Squadron participated in Exercise Panther Leap. Panther Leap was the second iteration of a new form of joint training: the Synthetic Theater of War – Architecture, or STOW-A. STOW-A employs a unique mix of real-world equipment, high-fidelity simulators and constructive simulations that create an integrated live and synthetic environment in order to simulate a joint tactical SOF mission involving air and ground operations. STOW-A also allows units to rehearse a simulated contingency mission on geographically specific terrain that may be inaccessible in the real world.

The mission during Panther Leap was to conduct a Ranger-company raid using air and ground assets. The mission required all elements of the exercise to perform joint coordination, joint planning and joint execution.

Panther Leap was conducted mainly in the 160th SOAR's Simulation and Mission Rehearsal Facility at Fort Campbell, Ky. The simulation facility incorporates a local-area network of combat-mission simulators, or CMS; a mission-rehearsal operations center, or MROC; a tactical and administrative communications system; and temporary facilities to support mission planning, briefing and logistics requirements. Observers were able to monitor the exercise from the MROC, which also served as the joint-operations center and housed the stations that produced the computer-generated aviation forces and threat forces.

During Panther Leap, the Ranger and Special Forces elements occupied individ-

U.S. Army photo

Observers in the mission-rehearsal operations center monitor the progress of the Panther Leap exercise.

U.S. Army photo

Ranger and Special Forces elements occupied individual-combatant workstations during the simulation.

ual-combatant workstations in the simulation facility. The Night Stalkers' flight crews operated the MH-60K Blackhawk Combat-Mission Simulator and the MH-47E Chinook Combat-Mission Simulator, both of which are housed in the simulation facility. The simulators employ actual components and systems of live aircraft — including radar, forward-looking infrared radar and avionics — to provide realistic tactical training.

The MC-130E Combat-Talon Simulator, located at Hurlburt Field, Fla., was included in the exercise by means of a secure communication link. One "live" MH-60L helicopter flew overhead at Fort Campbell during the exercise. It served as the command-and-control helicopter, from which the air-mission commander and the ground-force commander controlled and monitored the tactical mission.

During the mission-planning phase, pilots, aircrews and battle commanders were able to use a mission-preview system to familiarize themselves with the terrain of the objective and to rehearse the mission. The system acquired data from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to produce high-resolution, three-dimensional terrain imagery. In addition, the system interfaced with the mission-planning system and supported course-of-action analysis. The system also provided an out-the-window virtual environment for the MH-47E Combat-Mission Simulator.

To replicate threat elements as well as SOF air and ground components, Panther Leap used a SOF version of the One Semi-Automated Forces Testbed, or OTB, which was provided by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Army Special Operations Battle Lab. Semiautomated forces are computer-generated forces. During simulations, they mimic the behavior of actual forces or other entities, and they can react to some situations automatically. The Panther Leap SOF OTB created several new entities, including fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, Infantry, Rangers, SF, and precious

cargo. It also included information about recent modifications to the forces' aerial mounting and dismounting behavior, as well as modifications to the dynamics of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Through its three-dimensional viewport feature, the OTB also provided three-dimensional views of the terrain. All of these improvements have become part of the OTB and will contribute to the future development of One Semi-Automated Forces simulation, which is scheduled to be fielded to the Army in fiscal year 2004.

Using internal communication that simulated radio communication, the simulators, role players, ground force, and joint operations center communicated with one another. They were also linked to live radios that allowed them to communicate with the MH-60L command-and-control helicopter. Intelligence updates and critical mission data were transmitted between the airborne commanders and the joint operations center.

The planning phase for Panther Leap began when the exercise tasking message was released. The 1st SF Group soldiers were alerted and went into isolation to plan their special-reconnaissance mission. The 75th Ranger Regiment began developing its tactical plan for an air assault on the target area. Once the tactical plan was set and approved, personnel in the simulation center integrated the plan into the synthetic environment of simulators and workstations.

The execution phase began with the simulated insertion of the 1st SF Group soldiers into two locations in enemy territory: the target area and the transload airfield. The SF soldiers provided critical real-time intelligence on the location and strength of enemy forces, and on the status of the target area. The information greatly assisted the air- and ground-force commanders as they completed tactical planning and rehearsals. All virtual and

Flight crews operated the two combat mission simulators housed in the 160th's Simulation and Mission Rehearsal Facility.

U.S. Army photo

U.S. Army photo

A mission-preview system using computer generated imagery allowed crews and planners to preview routes and mission areas prior to mission execution.

constructive fixed-wing assets of the Air Force were launched prior to H-Hour to provide fire support, airfield security, cargo transload and extraction.

Just prior to H-Hour, a pair of MH-60L Blackhawks flew out ahead of the assault flight to destroy known enemy positions and to lay down suppressive fire. During the execution phase, the Rangers boarded MH-47E Chinook helicopters for the flight to the target. En route, the assault force circumnavigated enemy air-defense units and observation posts to avoid detection. Once they reached their objective, the Rangers secured the target, clearing all buildings methodically. At the same time, a second Ranger force seized and secured the transload airfield. The members of the joint staff were able to trace the assault force's progress on a two-dimensional map located in the MROC. The ground-force commander, using the OTB's three-dimensional viewport, monitored the Rangers' actions. A combat-sound generator simulated the sounds of combat, thereby creating the illusion that the soldiers were immersed in battle.

Once the mission was complete, the Rangers called the MH-47Es back to the target for extraction. The aircraft then flew to the transload airfield, where crew members loaded their cargo onto the MC-130 Combat Talon for transfer to U.S. control.

Following the exercise, the participants conducted an after-action review in the MROC to discuss the training mission, how well it had been conducted, and how it could have been executed more effectively.

The combination of STOW-A's virtual, live and constructive simulation tools, including actual aircraft and simulators, produced a realistic training environment. Participants took part in the planning and execution of a complex mission in a synthetic environment that posed no risk to soldiers or to equipment.

The benefits of realistic training cannot be overstated. The integration of live and synthetic tools provides Rangers, Special Forces, Night Stalkers, and Combat Talon crews with a realistic environment in which to conduct joint tactical mission planning and execution under simulated combat conditions. Training under simulated conditions is key for the modern, well-trained war fighter. ✂

This article was prepared from materials written by CW 4 Mike Durant of the Systems Integration and Management Office, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; and by Alesya Paschal, a systems engineer with the Army Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command, Orlando, Fla.

A Vision for PSYOP in the Information Age

by Major Paul R.M. Brooks Jr.

Numerous U.S. military operations around the globe have heightened public awareness of the value of psychological operations, or PSYOP. PSYOP's past accomplishments are indicative of its future relevance; however, the prospects for PSYOP's continued success will depend upon whether PSYOP recruits and retains quality people, procures modern technological capabilities, and maintains an organizational structure responsive enough to compete in an extraordinarily challenging global information environment, or GIE.

In the future GIE, military operations will be radically different from current operations. The intent of this article is to outline what PSYOP must be capable of doing by the year 2010 and beyond, and to describe some of the challenges that PSYOP must overcome.

Global information environment

During the days when the Soviet Union served as a foil to the interests of the United States, the threat of using traditional military power was sufficient to maintain global stability. But the political, military, economic, physical and social environment of the future will not present a clearly defined, easily recognizable threat. Rather, we will be faced with "asymmetric" multi-echeloned adversaries.[1]

Ethnic and religious separatism, regional environmental disasters and economic imbalances will cause strain in traditionally stable political systems, and they will foment instability in less secure ones. Nation-states will encounter adversaries both outside and inside their national borders. Their internal adversaries will emerge from traditional economically disfranchised groups at one end of the spectrum, and at the other end, from groups that feel greater loyalty to a corporate logo than to a flag. As worldwide economic activities become more transnational in nature, information technology will gain even greater prominence.

Future U.S. adversaries will be more likely to attack our interests using information technology rather than traditional military means. Opponents may attempt to manipulate policy- and decision-makers by attacking our information infrastructure through selected, discriminate releases via both legitimate news organs and nontraditional means. The most powerful state or entity will be the one that controls and manages information the most effectively.

PSYOP offers the national command authorities, or NCA, and the military a vehicle for promulgating policy, diminishing confusion, supporting allies and attacking adversaries. PSYOP enables policymakers to maintain a small footprint in a region, while magnifying the influence of the political and military forces there. Another capability of PSYOP is that it could help the U.S. defend its position as the world's superpower.

Photo by Angel Clemons

A U.S. PSYOP soldier distributes voter-registration leaflets in Tojsici, Bosnia. PSYOP requires quality soldiers who are language-qualified and culturally attuned.

PSYOP-trained personnel must be included in key civil and military staffs and agencies. Their role will be to promote information dominance at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in support of U.S. policy and concomitant objectives. To ignore the threat of information warfare and the capabilities that PSYOP provides to assuage that threat discounts the great value of this tool.

PSYOP 2010 and beyond

Joint Publication 3-53, *Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine*, defines PSYOP as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP is a vital part of the broad range of U.S. political, military, economic, and informational activities." PSYOP is the military commander's primary tool for communicating with foreign target audiences. It is a combat and diplomatic multiplier, and it is also a combat reducer. PSYOP has been, and will continue to be, a great policy instrument throughout the continuum from peace to war.[2]

PSYOP soldiers of the future must be able to provide support to other Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF; to conventional U.S. forces; and to coalition forces. They must be able to produce state-of-the-art PSYOP products and disseminate them through a variety of media[3] anywhere in the world. At the same time, they must project the smallest possible footprint forward by moving information, not people. To maintain these capabilities, PSYOP must:

- Select and retain quality people.
- Provide quality training.
- Focus on core PSYOP capabilities.
- Ensure a seamless information effort by designing an organization that can coordinate PSYOP efforts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Quality people

Like all ARSOF, PSYOP is special because of the qualities of its soldiers. ARSOF soldiers are independent, mature, adaptable, creative, conscientious, self-motivated, self-disciplined and tolerant. DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, stresses that PSYOP soldiers are "regionally aligned, culturally attuned and language qualified … capable of supporting tactical, operational and strategic level requirements in peace and war."

PSYOP soldiers of the future will need a common, solid ARSOF foundation. In addition, PSYOP soldiers will have to be adept in cross-cultural communications and in the use of local infrastructural media resources. They will have to be proficient in multimedia marketing techniques and planning; they will have to be familiar with using polls and focus groups to provide scientifically based measures of effectiveness; and they will have to be skilled at integrating the PSYOP effort with the commander's campaign plan. They will have to be accomplished at synthesizing activities with other components of information warfare and information operations, or IO, in order to achieve the objectives of the supported commander and of the nation. Finally, they will have to be experts in disciplines that capitalize on applying a scientific methodology to survey and analyze cultures and subcultures.[4]

Active- and reserve-component PSYOP units must receive the same training and equipment. Particularly in the case of protracted military operations, RC PSYOP forces must be capable of reinforcing AC units that deploy initially to the area of operations.

The recruiting and selection processes for PSYOP soldiers must be augmented by programs designed to retain quality individuals. Some individuals will excel in particular aspects of the development or production cycles, and we must seek to retain those professionals. If we are to compete with the civilian sector for highly qualified personnel, we must be able to offer them comparable prestige and pay. Appealing to their sense of patriotism, alone, will not be sufficient incentive to retain the people we will need in the future.

Quality training, education

Training must continue to be physically and mentally challenging, with an emphasis on advancements in simulation and in communications technology. Institutional training must focus on a broad spectrum of PSYOP skills. Selected individuals may pursue follow-on training-with-industry programs. Such training could help them develop and maintain state-of-the-art information-operations techniques, such as the "reality manipulation" skills sought by civilian marketing and advertising firms.[5] PSYOP personnel must also receive more comprehensive training in conducting polls and surveys used to validate PSYOP programs and products or to identify a need for adjustment in focus.

Core capabilities

Future PSYOP forces must be capable of gaining and maintaining information dominance and perception-management superiority.[6] The capabilities provided by PSYOP will enable the NCA, the regional commander in chief or the joint-force commander to respond correctly to rapidly changing situations. "In the future PSYOP environment, time will be of the essence. Incidents around the world will be reported in real-time. … As a result, U.S. government decision-makers may be pressured to respond immediately. … Clearly, it will be essential that we provide NRT [near-real-time] analysis of the psychological impact of events happening anywhere in the world."[7]

PSYOP forces must have access to PSYOP-relevant intelligence at all levels. In addition, PSYOP analysis must be integrated at all levels of command (from the NCA to the joint-force commander), and that analysis must be continuous, so that PSYOP can respond to behavioral changes in the target audiences. PSYOP planning must be conducted early. Developing effective PSYOP products will require even greater regional knowledge, cultural awareness and marketing expertise. Production requirements will include state-of-the-art audio, audiovisual, and print technologies linked by sophisticated, broad-band communications systems. PSYOP products will be disseminated through methods ranging from the most sophisticated electronic means to face-to-face discussions.

To maximize the impact of our psycholog-

ical operations, we must synchronize operations with every other aspect of political, civil, economic, cultural and military power. "In some cases, the military objective may be relevant only in terms of the psychological effect."[8] Synchronization can be achieved only through the seamless integration of PSYOP throughout the political/military spectrum.

Seamless integration

To ensure that PSYOP is integrated into all operations and at all levels, PSYOP forces will have to foster active and habitual relationships between agencies, between services, and between the active and reserve components.

The successful execution of PSYOP will require the establishment of a formalized, structured command-and-control relationship with interagency groups that are involved with intelligence and information. In times of crisis and war, this relationship will help PSYOP planners focus on target sets and on methods of discrediting the leadership of an adversary, while bolstering allied and neutral behavior. Continual interface with agencies that focus on human intelligence and human factors will help coordinate efforts in peacetime and help diminish day-to-day friction between and among allies and adversaries, alike.

Today, IO is considered to be a revolutionary concept. But as military forces continue to train for and to execute joint missions, IO doctrine will evolve to the point that IO planning and execution will be routine, and IO will be incorporated as a normal function of the operations section. Because current IO doctrine focuses on IO as an organizational strategy and not as a function, PSYOP will continue to serve as a focal point for the execution of IO, and it will play a pre-eminent role in promoting joint interoperability in the future.

Active- and reserve-component PSYOP units must receive the same training and equipment. Particularly in the case of protracted military operations, RC PSYOP forces must be capable of reinforcing AC units that deploy initially to the area of operations. Training events must incorporate AC and RC PSYOP forces to ensure that the expertise and readiness of both components are consistent. PSYOP forces, whether AC or RC, must be similarly outfitted with state-of-the-art equipment. Because electronic media, rather than traditional weapons systems, may very well dominate the battlespace of many future operations, emerging technologies must be available to all PSYOP units.

Achieving the vision

This vision will not be achieved without difficulty. PSYOP will have to be diligent in identifying requisite capabilities, in planning force structure and in defining requirements. Fully integrating PSYOP planning and execution into the joint and interagency arenas will be a daunting venture. Identifying and acquiring the systems needed for executing PSYOP missions will demand diplomacy at the highest political levels. Training PSYOP forces to

Photo by Tyler R. Long

A PSYOP soldier makes a loudspeaker broadcast during an exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La.

meet the challenges of combat and peace operations in the future GIE will require thoughtful accessions and education. All of these activities will be challenging, but they are critical in building the PSYOP force that will be necessary if the U.S. is to maintain its position of strength.

Major Paul R.M. Brooks Jr. is the PSYOP Branch chief for the 3rd U.S. Army (ARCENT), Fort McPherson, Ga. He is responsible for planning, coordinating and synchronizing PSYOP in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. He was previously assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, where he served in the Concept Development Division and in the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division. His other assignments include company commander in the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group; assistant professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy; and company commander in the 1/17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division. Brooks holds a master's degree in history from New Mexico State University.

Notes:

[1] For additional information about the future threat environment, see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, 1 August 1994; *Joint Vision 2010*; Charles C. Faulkner III and Edward C. Sayre, "Focusing on the Future: ARSOF XXI and ARSOF Vision," "ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century," and "Army Special Operations Forces: Vision 2010" in *Special Warfare*, Fall 1997.

[2] See also Joint Pub 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*, 31 May 1996. PSYOP and CA are the two main pillars of this doctrine. The pub is available on the Internet at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm.

[3] These media systems must include traditional systems (TV, radio, newspapers and magazines, pamphlets, leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts), as well as cyber technology, such as the Internet and any newly developed family of communications.

[4] Two areas of interest are social psychology and cultural anthropology.

[5] General Peter J. Schoomaker, "Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead," *Special Warfare*, Winter 1998, p. 7.

[6] For some, "perception management" (all efforts that are intended to shape the attitudes and the behavior of a specified audience) is a more acceptable term than "PSYOP" — especially when the media-dissemination effort broadens to areas outside the control of the military. The Army After Next war games held over the last several years have established conclusively the vital contribution that perception management will make to the future implementation of U.S. foreign policy. See Robert B. Killebrew, "Learning from Wargames: A Status Report," in *Parameters* (Spring 1998).

[7] "ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century," *Special Warfare*, Fall 1997, p. 28.

[8] *Ibid*.

Army Values

Honor

Rocky Versace

Captain Humbert "Rocky" Versace's unflinching dedication to his God, to his country and to his fellow soldiers during his 1 1/2 years in a Viet Cong prisoner-of-war camp exemplifies the highest standard of honor.

Versace, along with 1st Lieutenant Nick Rowe and Sergeant First Class Daniel Pitzer, was captured on Oct. 29, 1963, in the Thoi Bin District, Republic of Vietnam. At the time of his capture, Versace was already badly wounded and was unable to see because his glasses had been knocked from his face. Versace resisted capture as long as possible, relying on a fellow soldier to serve as his eyes, while he continued to engage the enemy with his few remaining rounds.

Once in captivity, Versace underwent a nearly continuous program of indoctrination. In addition, his captors denied him adequate food and medical treatment. Versace, a devoted Christian and a patriot in the truest sense of the word, never wavered in his convictions or in his loyalty.

Constantly in verbal combat with his foes, Versace became the focus of the enemy's animosity. But even when faced with overwhelming pressure, Versace continued to resist his captors. Ever faithful to his oath as a U.S. Army officer, Versace provided his fellow POWs with inspirational leadership that helped carry them through the dark days of captivity.

Versace was executed after all methods of indoctrination had failed to break his indomitable spirit. Rowe afterward said of Versace, "He not only risked his life, he knowingly gave his life after suffering for an extended period of time under the most adverse conditions. This, rather than compromise his principles and honor." — *Dr. Richard Stewart*

Rocky Versace

Judicial Intervention in Haiti: The CA Ministerial Advisory Teams

by Colonel Daniel L. Rubini and Colonel Michael J. Cleary

In the summer of 1994, the United States was anticipating a new crisis — Haiti. The news media were saturated with images of the "boat people," Haitian immigrants to the U.S. who were willing to risk death at sea in order to escape brutality and death in Haiti.

Behind the headlines were intense military preparations, including substantial planning for civil-military operations in Haiti. In September 1994, as part of that planning, President Clinton mobilized the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade under the Presidential Select Reserve Call-up Authority. Initially, the 358th was to provide:

U.S. Army photo

U.S. Ambassador to Haiti William L. Swing (left) meets with Brigadier General Bruce Bingham (right), who commanded the first CA MAT to Haiti.

- A civil-military operations center, or CMOC.
- Functional teams for public health, public safety and public facilities.
- Civil Affairs direct-support teams, or DSTs.
- Civil Affairs tactical-support teams, or TSTs.

In cooperation with both the American Embassy in Haiti and the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, the 358th formed a CA ministerial advisory team, or MAT, to assist U.S. Ambassador William L. Swing in advising the Haitian government during its recovery effort.

The objectives of the MAT were, in the broadest sense, to promote the accomplishment of U.S. foreign-policy objectives. Specifically, the MAT pursued the objectives of the U.S. ambassador and of the military commander: to maintain a safe and secure environment, and to promote conditions for economic growth.

More than 20 CA professionals were assigned to the first CA MAT, commanded by Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, now commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. They were reserve-component soldiers who in civilian life were urban-development specialists, environmental scientists, educators, engineers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, business leaders, and law-enforcement experts. For more than five months, they used their years of civilian experience to generate the momentum needed to restart and reform the Haitian government.

CA was the U.S. military's executive agent in working with the Haitian ministries. The CA MAT performed assessments on the Haitian ministries of Justice, Finance and Banking, Education, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Health, Public Works, and Interior. In cooperation with USAID, the CA MAT worked with all the Haitian ministries and served as the bridge between the U.S. and Haitian governments until development programs of both the

USAID and the Department of State, or DoS, could begin.

But the U.S. military was needed in Haiti long after DoS and USAID had begun their agency programs. Law and order can be achieved only when the police forces, the courts, and the prisons are competent, honest and subordinate to civilian control. Through 1995 and beyond, the U.S. still had a long way to go in order to establish stability in Haiti.

CA MAT-Justice

A report for the World Peace Foundation describes the situation in Haiti in 1994:

For two hundred years, Haiti endured a classic predatory state. The state preyed on its people without providing political or economic goods. Lacking accountability, governments used their power in a negative manner to destroy rather than create. … To dismantle the predatory state and create a democratic one requires … a universal respect for the rule of law. The underlying problem in Haiti is that the judicial system is completely dysfunctional and distrusted by people and that the security provided by the [Multi-National Force] and UNMIH … is artificial.[1]

This was the atmosphere that the CA soldiers of the MAT-Justice found when they arrived in Haiti.

The CA MAT advisers to the Haitian Ministry of Justice became an integral part of the Interagency Task Force, or IATF, formed by the U.S. ambassador. The task force consisted of all U.S. civilian and military agencies involved in justice reform in Haiti, including the USAID; the U.S. Embassy political/military adviser; the representative of either the Multinational Force or the United Nations Mission in Haiti, or UNMIH; the military liaison officer; and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (from the Department of Justice).

The MAT-Justice advisers traveled throughout the country, exploring Haitian police headquarters, courts and prisons. They worked with the Haitian government to reshape and reform the court system. They interviewed judges and prosecutors to find out how they had survived and operated in the 200-year-old system of corruption and brutality. They found that not all of the judges and prosecutors were "bad guys" — they simply would not prosecute or rule against persons who would kill them. The CA teams learned about the rule of law in Haiti through a Creole proverb, "Law is paper. Bayonet is steel."

When Haitian Minister of Justice Guy Malary was assassinated in October 1993, the ministry had been effectively shut down. Civil Affairs soldiers of the United Nations' Haiti Advisory Group were then in-country. The Haitian judiciary abdicated its role as guardian of the rule of law and deferred to the Haitian army, or FAdH. The police and prisons became nothing more than FAdH institutions. Understaffed, poorly trained and poorly paid, the judiciary was subject to corrupt political influence. It remained a weak and corrupt "vestigial" branch of government, even after the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the resurrection of constitutional rule.

The MNF, and later the United Nations, became the guarantor of a "safe and secure environment" in Haiti. One key factor in bringing about that kind of environment was the establishment of independent and functioning police forces, courts and prisons — the elements that comprise the "triad," which is at the heart of any criminal-justice system. Collectively, the elements of the triad share responsibility to act on citizen complaints; to investigate crimes; to issue arrest warrants; and to exercise discretion in deciding which cases will go to trial. The second factor critical to a safe and secure environment was the interoperability of the triad components.

One of the duties of the CMOC was to deploy its public-safety team to jurisdictions outside Port-au-Prince to gather information on the status of the triad. The MAT-Justice advisers helped determine the viability of the triad by using a technique outlined in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*. Using reports prepared by Special Forces teams and by CA direct-support teams throughout Haiti, the MAT-Justice advisers developed a collection plan and distilled the collected information into a matrix of indicators that could be used to gauge the performance of the judicial sys-

Brigadier General Bruce Bingham (far right) meets with members of the CA ministerial advisory team in Haiti.

U.S. Army photo

tem. Thus, before the public-safety team deployed to the various jurisdictions, its members already had an idea of what to expect. The reports provided by the SF teams and by the DSTs proved to be accurate as to the functioning of the police forces, the courts and the prisons. The MAT-Justice advisers and the public-safety team produced analyses that would be valuable in later missions.

By November 1994, the assessments of the public-safety team were complete. The reports established the effectiveness of the judicial system at the grassroots level; e.g., the justice-of-the-peace courts, the local police and the prisons. The MAT's report concluded that security is the keystone of judicial activism, and that Haitian judicial/prosecutorial decision-making was affected by a real concern for the safety of the judiciary. Hence, for the judiciary to operate by the "rule of law," U.S. Special Forces would need to continue to maintain law and order in the countryside. A further mission analysis indicated a need to monitor the triad. Follow-on MAT missions could monitor the justice system and advise judicial officials.

From February to May 1995, a second CA MAT, MAT-II, deployed to Haiti to focus specifically on the judiciary. MAT-II was led by Major General Donald F. Campbell, formerly commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command and a trial court judge in civilian life. MAT-II consisted of 16 lawyers and two judges — all CA reservists. The team deployed to Haiti at the request of the Haitian government. MAT-II was assigned to the joint task force and attached to the U.S. Embassy. MAT-II's mission was to assist the Haitian government in assessing the judicial system, to identify weaknesses, to recommend solutions and, wherever possible, to assist in implementing improvements and reforms. MAT-II served as a link between the U.S. government and the Haitian Ministry of Justice while the USAID and the ambassador's IATF-Justice were developing their administration-of-justice programs.

From MAT-II's report of findings, a judicial evaluation team from the 358th determined that mission success could be guaranteed only through further coordination with the U.S. ambassador's IATF-Justice.

At MAT-II's recommendation, CA MAT-III deployed to Haiti in October 1995 to conduct a bilateral evaluation and training survey of the justice-of-the-peace courts.

MAT-III continued the momentum of judicial reform consistent with the ambassador's priorities and with the military mission to establish a safe and secure environment. Like the other MAT teams, the MAT-III team consisted of CA reservists who were civilian lawyers, judges, law-enforcement officials and prison officials. Accompanied by field inspectors from the Haitian Ministry of Justice and by Haitian lawyer/interpreters, MAT-III concentrated on the justice-of-the-

peace courts outside Port-au-Prince. Like its predecessors, MAT-III became an integral part of the ongoing USAID/DOJ administration-of-justice program.

The SF connection

A key element in the success of the MAT missions was the close working relationship between the CA reservists and the PSYOP and Special Forces teams located in the remote provinces. As MAT field teams and officials of the Haitian Ministry of Justice traveled throughout the country, they met and conferred at length with the SF and PSYOP soldiers before interviewing the local judicial officials.

SF support to the MAT field teams was essential. The SF soldiers had lived on-site, had maintained law and order, and were consistently well-informed about the conditions of local government. The impact of their information cannot be overstated. They provided valuable insights into local politics, personalities and culture. They provided the CA soldiers with a solid base of orientation as to the local conditions of the triad. They also provided a dose of reality for the visiting representatives of the Haitian Ministry of Justice, most of whom had never traveled outside Port-au-Prince. The representatives came to the provinces knowing little about conditions there, but the SF soldiers' honest and fact-based perspectives gave them a first-class education.

MATs' impact

How can foreigners help build a stronger and fairer criminal justice system? They can provide:

- Technical advice.
- Financing for the development of needed human and natural resources.
- Hope and energy to a system that is despairing and immobile.
- International and domestic pressure on local elected officials and, if necessary, on military leaders.[2]

The Haitian people believed that visible U.S. assistance in meeting their basic human needs would ensure long-term stability of the Haitian infrastructure and government.[3] The low-key U.S. participation in the Haitian ministries and in the countryside was more than "presence." The MAT-Justice mission promoted the rule of law, judicial vitality and government stability without giving the appearance of being part of a U.S. "occupation." Officials and lawyers of the Haitian Ministry of Justice who worked with MAT-III wrote about the value of both the MAT mission and the SF experience:

We learned a great deal from the dedication toward their work that characterizes the Americans. Their sense of duty, their determination and their professionalism motivated us to become more active in our work:

- *as a team and to make honest contributions*
- *as to the importance of mutual respect*
- *as to a sense of responsibility*
- *as to a better understanding of our [Haitian] system and its weaknesses.*

The initiative is not [only] necessary; it is indispensable. It is by strength of repetition and frequent visits that we will succeed in inculcating the proper concepts of jurisprudence to new judges as well as old.[4]

The MAT missions defined the significant issues of Haitian justice-system reform: physical security, corruption, job security, judicial misconduct, criminal procedure, interoperability of police and prisons with the courts, salaries, physical

U.S. Army photo

Special Forces soldiers maintained law and order in the Haitian countryside. The information they provided on local conditions was invaluable to the MAT field teams.

Photo by Tracey L. Hall-Leahy

Members of the present-day Haitian National Police work in their headquarters in Port-au-Prince.

plant, and the Ministry of Justice's logistics support. The MAT missions trained the trainers and developed human resources. MAT field teams reinforced USAID judicial training programs on-site. MAT interaction with the Ministry of Justice inspection team established a corps of inspectors experienced in judicial management and supervision. MAT interaction with the Haitian lawyer/translators established a pool of trained attorneys capable of backing up Ministry of Justice inspectors and of working in judicial training programs.

Within the U.S. military, the MAT missions achieved a critical interface with SF. MAT missions proved the desirability and the feasibility of reservists conducting their annual-training missions in Haiti. The scope of the MAT missions made the resources of any single CA command insufficient. To achieve the necessary depth of experience, the MATs solicited troops from the entire CA force. MAT missions established nationwide recruiting as the desired means of assembling a balanced team of professionals from within the CA force. That such a team can be recruited nationwide is a sign of strength, not of weakness.

The three MAT missions (and the MAT-IV, -V and -VI missions conducted during 1996 and 1997) were a force multiplier and a great asset to the U.S. commander, the U.S. ambassador and the USAID. They helped dismantle the predatory state and break up the cycle of retribution and violence that Haiti had experienced throughout its history. But in the end, only Haiti can save Haiti.[5]

The debate continues

During World War II, the U.S. was faced with the critical need for experts with civilian skills to exercise control over conquered and liberated areas. President Franklin Roosevelt favored using civilian agencies for the mission. After all, he reasoned, wasn't that State Department business? But political preferences could not long resist the course of the war. There was an immediate need for those experts, and civilian agencies did not have the capability to deploy. The Army did. Besides, only soldiers could operate in war-devastated areas, and only soldiers could deal with the complex issues that had military and civilian consequences. Necessity prevailed, but the debate over the mission continued. Contrary to the opinion held by many in the Regular Army at that time, the mission was much greater in scope and complexity than merely "controlling" or sustaining foreign civilians.

For 50 years, the debate has revived during every major deployment, but we can be sure that necessity will always propel policy. The Executive Branch will direct the U.S. military to "restore the legitimate government of —" or to "establish a safe and secure environment and promote conditions for economic growth in —," and the Army will comply.[6]

Military government of an occupied nation remains CA's priority post-war mission. CA's civil-administration mission — helping to avoid war by assisting in the establishment of a stable government — is the peacetime equivalent of the wartime military-government mission. CA operators coordinate their mission with the objectives of the U.S. ambassador and USAID, but they do not duplicate or subsidize the work of other agencies. Working with various nongovernment organizations and private volunteer organizations, CA forces provide stability until civilian agencies can begin their development programs.

Recommendations

When Operation Joint Forge began in Bosnia in 1998, the U.S. again used the MAT concept in helping the Bosnian government build common institutions that might bind the country's vari-

ous ethnic groups into one multiethnic, self-sustaining country. Fourteen CA officers, many of whom had MAT experience from Haiti, deployed to Bosnia to assist a number of ministries, including Justice, Finance, Education, Health, Trade and Tourism, Transportation and Communication, Waste Management, Agriculture, Forestry and Social Affairs.

U.S. operations in Panama in 1989, Kuwait in 1991, Haiti in 1994-97, and in Bosnia have proven that the need for ministerial advisers is not a fluke. Strategically oriented MAT missions will be needed regardless of whether the crisis is a war, a natural disaster, or a political upheaval. Even in the absence of any conventional military force, MATs may be a necessary part of interagency operations. To prepare for future MAT missions, CA commands must:

- Actively seek interagency relationships and broaden CINC staff contacts.
- Maximize interagency participation and contribute to IATF contingency planning for roles to be assumed by the military. The CINC's CA commands are the executive agents, and they would implement this effort.
- Integrate the capabilities of non-DoD organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations and private-sector organizations into plans, training and exercises.
- Recognize that the CA MAT mission demands more special expertise and funding than any single CA command can provide. The CINC's CA unit that is responsible for managing the mission will need to procure resources throughout SOF.
- Incorporate the benefit of the Haitian experience in evaluating the desirability and the feasibility of MAT missions in a particular area of operations. (After six MAT missions to Haiti, there is a wealth of deployment experience throughout CA.)
- Remember that the desired end state of a peace operation is *stability*. Without long-term military involvement, especially CA involvement, the crisis state may return to the situation that prompted the MAT mission.

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Colonel Michael J. Cleary is the deputy brigade commander, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade. In civilian life, he is an assistant district attorney for the city of Philadelphia. In June 1998, Colonel Cleary served as commander of the Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force for Operation Joint Guard (Bosnia). He served as a Civil Affairs staff officer during the Haiti Assistance Mission in 1993. During Operation Uphold Democracy, he and Colonel Daniel Rubini served as advisers and team chiefs for the various Ministerial Advisory Team missions from 1994-97. Colonel Cleary earned his bachelor's degree from LaSalle College, Philadelphia, Pa. He received a master's degree in political science from Villanova University and a Juris Doctor degree from the Delaware Law School.

Notes:

1 Jennifer L. McCoy, "Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction," World Peace Foundation Report, November 1995, 10:1, 19.

2 Phillip B. Heymann, "Creating Democratic Law Enforcement Institutions in Europe, Latin America, and South Africa," unpublished presentation to Alan Fortunoff Criminal Justice Colloquium, NYU Law School, 1992, pp. 17-18.

3 Carol Ann Robbins, *Wall Street Journal*, 30 October 1996, p. 34.

4 After-action report of Haitian Inspector General team member assigned to MAT-III, October 1995. "Report of Findings-MAT-III," December 1995.

5 Donald E. Schultz, "Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?," *Parameters*, Winter 1997-98, pp. 73-91.

6 Discussion in this and the subsequent paragraph is taken from the following: Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, "Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors," in *U.S. Army in World War II - Special Studies* (1964); Karl F. Ziemke, *Army Historical Series - The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-46* (1975); Paul Y. Hammond, *American Civil-Military Decisions-Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy* (1963); and Major James McNaughton, "Half the Battle: Civil Affairs in Haiti," unpublished draft, 15 March 1995, p. 37.

The 1999 SF Branch Conference: Providing a Catalyst for Discussion

by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein

As reported in the Fall 1999 edition of *Special Warfare*, the 1999 Special Forces Conference and Exposition, held in April, was a hallmark event. More than 500 members of the SF community came together to celebrate the past, to discuss the present and to plan the future. On the eve of the 2000 SF Conference, it may be useful to summarize the results of last year's event.

This article provides a synopsis of the three symposiums and the 10 workshops that were conducted during the conference. All three symposiums were conducted in a similar manner. The moderator convened a panel composed of active-duty and retired members of the SF community. To provide a catalyst for the discussions, the moderator either presented a briefing or introduced guest speakers. Following the moderator's briefing or the guest-speaker presentation, the moderator fielded the audience's questions and comments, directing them to the appropriate panel members.

The first symposium, "Special Forces Core Ideology," was moderated by Colonel William Harris, director of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School; and by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Celeski, chief of staff, U.S. Army Special Forces Command. The objective of the first symposium was to elicit from the participants their views on what the SF core ideology should be. Those views were to serve as a starting point for the SF community in its efforts to develop a definitive statement of SF's core ideology and to establish a corporate identity.

Core ideology

In the book *Built to Last*, James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras define core ideology as "A set of basic precepts that plants a fixed stake in the ground: This is who we are; this is what we stand for; this is what we're all about."[1] According to Collins and Porras, core ideology is a succinct statement of an organization's core values and core purpose. Collins and Porras define core values as "The organization's essential and enduring tenets."[2] Core purpose is defined as "The organization's fundamental reasons for existence."[3] Discussions during the core-ideology symposium focused largely on SF's core values. While the SF community appeared to have reached a consensus regarding the proposed SF core values, its efforts to reach a consensus on the definition of SF's core purpose were more problematic. In fact, notably different views on the subject have been expressed in articles published in *Special Warfare*, and those opposing viewpoints were echoed during the symposium.

Core values

Early in the symposium, the participants accepted the Army values as the founda-

tion for the SF core values. There appeared to be general agreement regarding the following values: integrity, trust, initiative, ethics, versatility, self-discipline, relevance, responsibility, agility, patriotism, maturity, honor, esprit, moral character and honesty. Lieutenant Colonel Celeski proposed that SF adopt the Army values as its core values (see chart below). Retired Major General Sidney Shachnow proposed that the list be narrowed to four solid core values. Not surprisingly, the SF Command and SWCS had already acknowledged that the participants probably would not reach a consensus on what the final SF core values should be, and that the debate over this issue would continue after the symposium had ended.

Core purpose

The discussion of the SF core purpose focused mainly on two points of view. The first one is expressed in Colonel Mark Boyatt's article, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?" (*Special Warfare*, Summer 1998). The second point of view is expressed in retired Colonel Scott Crerar's article, "Special Forces' Core Purpose: A Second Opinion" (*Special Warfare*, Winter 1999).

Colonel Boyatt's proposed statement of the SF core purpose is, "To accomplish Special Forces missions through, with or by indigenous populations."[4] The corollary to Boyatt's statement is that SF's core purpose is *not* to conduct unilateral operations; e.g., direct-action operations.

In contrast, Colonel Crerar expresses the view that SF's purpose is to support the regional commander in chief, or CINC, or the National Command Authorities, whether that means conducting unilateral operations or working with indigenous forces. Like the discussion on the SF core values, the discussion pertaining to SF's core purpose revealed insightful information and served as a starting point.

REF symposium

The second symposium, "The Regional Engagement Force," or REF, was moderated by Colonel Hy Rothstein of the SWCS Concepts Development Directorate (now the Special Operations Battle Lab). The objective of the second symposium was to solicit information from the participants that would facilitate the Battle Lab's ongoing efforts to develop the REF concept.

The REF concept is a model that CINCs would be able to use in the future to conduct "regional engagement." The JFK Special Warfare Center and School envisions regional engagement as the military component of interagency peacetime engagement. Peacetime engagement is defined as those activities performed by the U.S. in order to advance its interests and to minimize the potential for armed conflict. Forward-deployed Army SOF would provide the core forces around which to build task-

Proposed Special Forces Values

- Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.
- Duty: Fulfill your obligations.
- Respect: Treat people with dignity and respect.
- Selfless service: Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.
- Honor: Live up to the Army values.
- Integrity: Do what's right, legally and morally.
- Personal Courage: Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral).

Special Forces Attributes

Most Important Attributes

- Team-player
- Maturity
- Trustworthiness
- Judgment
- Decisiveness
- Physical fitness

Additional Attributes

- Mentorship
- Tolerance
- Interpersonal skills
- Cognitive abilities
- Heart, brains, and courage
- Cognitive flexibility
- Adaptability to change
- Dependability
- Command of language
- Warrior spirit

force organizations for the conduct of regional-engagement activities.

As a result of the symposium discussions, the participants were able to agree on the following issues:

- Joint and service doctrine should embody the principles of a regional manager and establish requirements and procedures for regional-engagement campaign planning.
- The REF concept should provide specific information on the roles, missions and capabilities of the global scouts, strategic shapers and operational ARSOF combat outposts. It should also include information about their corresponding functions: situational awareness, war avoidance and battlespace preparation.
- The REF concept should describe how technology will be leveraged. Specifically, it should address habitual relationships; virtual organizations; digitization of command, control, computers and intelligence; and the impact of digitization on "the tyranny of distance."
- The REF concept should further address the nature of regional engagement, as well as the REF's multinational and interagency context.
- The REF concept should readdress the hand-off between the REF and contingency joint task forces, in terms of principles and considerations (capabilities) vs. the size of forces/units.
- The REF concept should assess/consider the role of civilians and contractors in regional-engagement logistics.
- The REF concept should clearly address the "continuous" nature vs. the "contingency" nature of regional operations and military and interagency organizations.
- The REF concept should clarify the discussion of the structure of regional-engagement forces and their mutually supporting nature with other force-projection forces. Specifically, the concept should address strategic maneuver and strategic preclusion or pre-emption.
- A marketing strategy should be developed that can be used to:
  - Educate the SOF community on the REF concept and on the concept's long-term implications for SOF force structure;
  - Define the implications of the REF on the command-and-control relationship between the SOC and the REF; and
  - Further define how the REF supports the regional combatant CINC.

For a detailed discussion of the REF concept, see "Regional Engagement: An ARSOF Approach to Future Theater Operations" (*Special Warfare*, Fall 1998).

SF training pipeline symposium

The third symposium, "The SF Training Pipeline," was moderated by Colonel Remo Butler, commander of SWCS's 1st Special

Warfare Training Group, or 1st SWTG; and LTC Manuel Diemer, commander of 1st Battalion, 1st SWTG. The objectives of the third symposium were to educate the participants on the 1st SWTG's training methodology and to seek their opinions as to how the azimuth of SWCS's training pipeline should be corrected for the 21st century. Discussions focused on Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, and the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC.

SFAS

The participants agreed that SFAS should assess candidates for the attributes that are important in SF. The participants concurred with the attributes that have already been identified by SWCS as most important for SF soldiers (see chart on page 34), and they recommended additional attributes not previously identified in any SWCS documents. All participants agreed that SFAS must continue to be physically and mentally demanding, so that ARSOF can assess the candidates to determine whether they possess the values and the traits that remain important.

The participants also agreed that if SWCS could increase the training value to the soldiers attending SFAS, both the Army and SF would benefit by having better-trained soldiers (selectees and nonselectees).

SFQC

The SFQC discussions focused on two schools of thought. Some participants favored a longer SFQC that would include training for selected advanced skills such as Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat, Advanced Special Operations Techniques, military free-fall parachuting, and additional language training. A longer SFQC would demand more resources — including cadre, facilities, equipment and billeting — and would require a longer

Conference Workshop Recommendations

Recommendations for Action outside of USAJFKSWCS

- **Antiterrorism and Force Protection**
  1. Define AT/FP officer/NCO skills needed at ODA and ODB level.
  2. Study and validate the issue of differing AT/FP report formats from different agencies for the same mission.
  3. Establish reliable 24-hour commo links within the combatant command.
  4. Extend the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNET, to the ODA level.
  5. Review AT/FP plans and threat-value analysis/assessment format to ensure standardization and that they address SF specific requirements.
  6. Develop and validate AT/FP equipment requirements.
- **Simulations**
  1. Identify the full requirement for the Engagement Skills Trainer.
  2. Ensure that units can acquire the right operating systems and software to support SOFPARS-G software fielding.

Recommendations for Action by USAJFKSWCS

- **Antiterrorism and Force Protection** (*Not yet validated by a critical-task selection board*)
  1. Develop a standard exportable Level II AT/FP POI, preferably CD-ROM, for soldiers at the SF-group level and below.
  2. Establish an AT/FP Level II course.
  3. Incorporate Level II training into other courses, including SFQC and BNCOC.
- **Simulations**
  1. Involve unit reps in the One Semi-Automated Forces Testbed.
  2. Disseminate simulation workshop information through *Special Warfare*, *Sine Pari* and *The Rucksack*.

post-SFQC active-duty service obligation from SF soldiers.

Other participants favored a shorter SFQC, and they recommended that the SF groups assume responsibility for providing training and certification of certain SF skills. Those who favored a shorter course recommended that students access some of their instruction by means of distance-learning technology. One participant recommended that the SF groups adopt a program in which soldiers would be required to complete distance-learning courses in accordance with a predetermined schedule, similar to the program that SF medical sergeants are using to maintain their medical-training credentials.

The 1st SWTG has incorporated portions of the symposium discussions into a pending re-engineering initiative for SFAS and SFQC.

Workshops

In addition to sponsoring the three symposiums, the 1999 SF Branch conference also hosted 10 workshops that were conducted by subject-matter experts from throughout USASOC. The workshops provided a forum in which junior and mid-grade SF NCOs, warrant officers and company-grade officers could express their concerns to the SF community. In accordance with the intent of the SWCS commanding general, the chief of each workshop provided recommendations to the SWCS senior leadership for possible implementation by SWCS, USASFC or the staff of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The SWCS command group concurred with the recommendations that will require action by higher headquarters outside of SWCS (see chart on page 35). SWCS will coordinate with USASOC to effect those recommendations. The chart also lists recommendations that have been approved for implementation by SWCS.

Conclusion

As outcome-based forums with broad community participation, the symposiums and workshops marked a turning point in the history of annual SF Branch conferences and captured the interest of all ranks throughout the force. Perhaps most important, they will provide the catalyst for actions by the SF community during the months and years ahead.

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein is director of the Special Operations Proponency Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In 1999 he served as the officer in charge of the Special Forces conference. Commissioned as an infantry officer, Adelstein served as a rifle-platoon leader with Company C, 4/9th Infantry in Alaska, and as commander of Company C, 2/4th Infantry in Germany. His SF assignments include detachment commander, ODA 573, and commander, Company A, 1/5th SF Group. Adelstein holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master's degree in history from Ball State University.

Notes:

[1] James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 54.

[2] Collins, p. 73.

[3] Collins, p. 73.

[4] Mark Boyatt, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?" *Special Warfare* (Summer 1998), pp. 36-37.

Commentary: Some Thoughts On Unconventional Warfare

by Colonel J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.)

Two recent articles in *Special Warfare,* "Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definition," by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Ivosevic (Spring 1999); and "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," by Colonel Gary Jones and Major Chris Tone (Summer 1999), offer numerous challenges for thought, evaluation and comment. Although of markedly different character, both articles provide valid contributions to the ongoing discussion, "Whither Special Forces?"

One subject common to both articles is unconventional warfare, or UW, an activity that has been a central element of SF training, character and ethos since the inception of SF. I agree with Colonel Jones' and Major Tone's solid and extensive reasons for rejecting the term "unconventional operations," or UO, as a substitute for the long-used term "unconventional warfare." And I would add another reason: The two terms describe markedly different activities. Substituting UO for UW suggests a major change in mission orientation – a shift from a clearly offensive mode to an indeterminate one, and a shift of viewpoint from the strategic and operational levels of war to the analytical level.

More specifically, UO describes *events*, whereas UW describes a *form of conflict*, with its inherent goals, activities and operational environment.[1] Comparing UO to UW is analogous to comparing a single brick to a brick wall. We can analyze an unconventional operation in isolation (e.g., Operation Eagle Claw) and determine its degree of success by measuring its casualties, costs, effects and degree of mission accomplishment.

In contrast, we determine the degree of success in unconventional warfare by measuring the sum of its concurrent, successive and interrelated activities and their effects upon the opponent. These effects include the physical destruction, the number of opposing forces tied up in long-term security roles, the opponent's assets and energies wasted in pursuing elusive UW forces, the opponent's resulting domestic and international embarrassment, and the opponent's reactions that affect his control of the populace. Adopting the term "unconventional operations" would ignore the combined impact of these activities and effects to focus on the minutiae of specific operations.

While I am in hearty agreement with Colonel Jones' and Major Tone's conclusions, in some areas I am at odds with their thought processes. I have no doubt that the authors recognize the difference between UW and guerrilla warfare, or GW, but their statement, "Over the years GW terminology has been replaced by UW, but the concept has remained constant," could be interpreted as meaning that the authors consider the terms to be interchangeable. I pose two objections to the facile slide from GW to UW. First, UW includes GW, so it would be illogical to use the terms interchangeably. Second, and more important, UW also includes subversion and sabotage. These are actions taken against a controlling authority, and they put UW in the realm of political warfare, a more extensive and complex activity than GW.

Another area in which I disagree is the discussion of current doctrine. The authors describe GW and insurgency as two different missions: "GW is part of a larger war. GW consists of operations conducted by small units that work in conjunction with resistance movements behind enemy lines and in occupied territories." "Insurgency

is not part of a larger war. Insurgency is a mission of longer duration whose continued operation does not depend on the outcome of a conventional war."

I contend that GW and insurgency are not two different SF missions. Specifically, insurgency is not a mission but an *environment*. That environment is created by popular resentment against an authority, and it is characterized by popular consensus, by some degree of organization, and by numerous acts of resistance to the authority. The authority targeted by insurgency may be a conquering army (as in Europe and in the Philippines during World War II) or a domestic government (such as the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government in Kosovo, against which the ethnic Albanian dissidents struggled).

GW consists of the military or paramilitary *operations* taken against such an authority. It is difficult to conceive of GW occurring outside the protective and supportive environment of an insurgency.[2] On the other hand, insurgency, even extensive insurgency, might not include guerrilla operations, either because of the emerging nature of the insurgency, a lack of public support for violent actions, effective suppression by the authorities, or insurgent success without recourse to violent actions.[3]

I also do not accept the idea of GW being limited to "occupied territories." GW exists wherever people organize to conduct armed operations against an authority. Another factor in my disagreement with the authors' descriptions of GW and insurgency is the subordinate contention that the terms reflect whether or not the United States is at war.

Insurgency is an environment that often can be externally fostered and supported, and insurgency provides an environment in which GW can thrive. Therefore, it seems axiomatic that a knowledge of the causes, psychology, practices, techniques, strengths, limitations and vulnerabilities of insurgency would be critical to the training of SF personnel. If the authors are correct in saying, "Today's SF does not train for insurgency. There are no training materials to support insurgency training," then there is a critical gap in SF training, and SF would appear to have lost part of its doctrinal basis.[4]

It seems axiomatic that a knowledge of the causes, psychology, practices, techniques, strengths, limitations and vulnerabilities of insurgency would be critical to the training of SF personnel.

Having described my principal exceptions to Colonel Jones' and Major Tone's work, I find pleasure in indicating where I agree with them. The essence of that agreement is that UW, because it is intended to undermine and destroy an authority's control, is political warfare. The political character of UW may be anathema to some members of the SF community, but that political character is nevertheless a reality, and it should be frankly addressed in SF doctrine and training.

SF doctrine should form a solid basis for UW training. SF soldiers should be trained to operate directly or through surrogates, and at all levels of UW, from distantly supporting an incipient insurgency to controlling or influencing late-stage guerrilla operations. While I could recommend subjects for inclusion in UW training, I believe that an extensive analysis should be performed, not only to determine required subjects, but also to determine who should receive the training and at what point in their careers. Because of the uncountable potential differences, factors and aspects of UW, teaching specific possibilities would be impossible. Training therefore must imbue the basics[5] and teach the SF soldier how to think in the environment.

In essence, the SF soldier must learn to think and to operate as if he were in a chess game: always thinking about the probable effects of each of his possible moves and of the opponent's possible reactions. Political warfare, however, is unlike chess in one major respect: The soldier must gauge the effects that his moves and those of his opponent will have upon the populace.

Because the U.S. has not been involved in a major UW campaign in a number of years, some consider a discussion of the subject as pointless as medieval disputations on how many angels can stand on the head of a pin. Too often in recent times, the acceptance of UW has stopped with the recognition that it is an outstanding training vehicle: "If you can do UW, you can do anything." While I strongly endorse the training efficacy of UW, I would also suggest that it has considerably greater value and relevance than its critics usually admit.

UW's value did not decline with the end of the Cold War; rather, it increased. Its value is derivative of the current national strategic environment. The U.S. is entering an era of international instability in which our nation, because of alliances and worldwide percep-

tions and domestic expectations, must play a central role that is in some ways analogous to the roles played by ancient Rome and 19th-century Britain.

The U.S. is addressing this monumental task with armed forces that are at their lowest level since World War II. In these straits, UW provides the nation with one more operational option: UW may, primarily in secondary operational areas, buy time, create diversions, achieve political objectives or, as a minimum, preclude the further attenuation of limited conventional forces.[6] If more than two major theater wars should occur simultaneously, or if one of those wars should require more national resources than expected, the low-casualty, low-cost option of UW would be valuable.

A final benefit of UW is its deterrent or political value. While our UW capability is not unique among nations, it is rare.[7] Because of the inherent political cast of UW – the deliberate undermining of a ruling authority – and the difficulty in forecasting political end states, our decision to employ UW may be as intimidating to other nations as is our ability to initiate more readily controlled and predictable conventional operations.

Another negative influence on the employment of UW is our nation's and the administration's (regardless of party) impatience for quick solutions to international conflicts. It is arguable whether any administration will have the political will and the patience to employ UW in any situation short of the desperation born of military overcommitment.

The fact remains that the U.S. has the capability to conduct and to support UW, and other nations are aware of our capability. Because many potentially hostile nations have UW vulnerabilities in the form of unhappy and possibly dissident ethnic, religious, political, cultural or economic groups, our UW capability can maximize our effectiveness wherever the need may arise.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Ivosevic is to be commended for his efforts to generate greater participation among the SF community in the doctrinal effort. Colonel Jones and Major Tone are to be thanked for the time and effort they put into their thought-provoking article. It is my hope that the contributions of all three authors and the commentary their work generates will encourage discussion and comment by SF soldiers, wherever they are assigned.

Colonel J.H. Crerar served 23 years in Special Forces units and in service, joint and combined staff positions. As a member of the 3rd, 5th, and 10th SF groups and MAC-V SOG, he enjoyed wide experience in Special Forces mission areas, primarily in Southeast Asia. Colonel Crerar is a graduate of the SF Qualification Course, the PSYOP Officer Course and the Civil Affairs Officer Course. He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy and has graduate degrees in engineering and management. He is employed as a military analyst with a primary focus on future equipment and trends.

Notes:

[1] The definition of UW used is: "A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature." (Vintage unknown.) The writer employs other terms according to his understanding of them. He believes his usage to be in accordance with doctrinal definitions, but his language may not strictly reflect the wording of those doctrinal definitions.

[2] While one might cite the operations of the U.S.-led Korean units in North Korea during the last half of the Korean War or the CIA-supported Hmong (Meo) organizations in Laos during the Second Indochina War as guerrilla warfare without a significant supporting insurgency, both operations would be more accurately characterized as operations by irregular forces.

[3] For example, noted military author John Collins alludes to the student-led ructions in the United States in the 1960s as an insurgency that ended largely because the U.S. government instituted changes that obviated their causes.

[4] The writer is too far removed in time and distance to have specific knowledge of current SF institutional or unit training. His remarks are therefore not a criticism of what this training currently is, but a commentary on what the writer believes it should be.

[5] Basics would include such subjects as government, police and control systems, psychological operations, and social communications. All of these, of course, would enhance the SF value to the CINCs in addressing the highly political complexities of many operations other than war. Again, this would be fertile ground for serious analysis.

[6] Note that none of these posited UW contributions are closely related to the operations of conventional forces. While Special Forces has repeatedly demonstrated that its employment can add significantly to the success of conventional forces' operations in regional war and in operations other than war, this symbiotic relationship could hardly occur in the UW mode. Because the Army's doctrine and, to a great degree, its maneuver-force structure have concentrated on fast-paced operations at greatly extended depths, and because the development of UW is unalterably slow-paced, the potential role of the UW force as a combat auxiliary to major conventional operations (e.g., World War II guerrilla operations in France) has been greatly reduced. Additionally, few potentially opponent nations have the geographic depth that would permit concurrent UW and highly mobile conventional operations.

[7] In general, nations maintaining a UW capability have a defensive, stay-behind, GW-oriented capability, often representing historical experience. Most nations' special-operations forces do not essay UW; they concentrate on direct action, counterterrorism, deep reconnaissance, or some combination of these missions.

The SWCS TASS Accreditation Program: A DOTD Perspective

by Captain Kent Daniel

Are the ranks of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, being filled with soldiers who have been properly trained? How do trainers modify their lesson plans to reflect doctrinal revisions? When should doctrine writers and instructional systems specialists modify a unit mission training plan, or MTP? Do instructors have the necessary tools to deliver the best possible training for ARSOF soldiers?

ARSOF units and their soldiers should have doctrinal tools that provide the basis for what they do and how they do it. Doctrine and training are closely related: Doctrine provides the principles that guide the training. Yet doctrine sometimes leaves a gap in its quest to provide those guiding principles. Doctrinal developers who have a comprehensive understanding of how their product is used can facilitate the training-development process and help close the gap in training materials.

The mission of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD,[1] is to ensure that ARSOF soldiers have a sound doctrinal foundation on which they can build the skills required to accomplish the ARSOF mission. DOTD's mission calls for an analysis of the relationship between user needs and published doctrine. In other words, DOTD must continually assess trainers and units to determine whether they have timely, relevant doctrinal materials that will enable them to produce soldiers who can accomplish missions in the operational environments of today and tomorrow.

DOTD is organized into divisions that facilitate training-and-doctrine development for U.S. Army Special Forces, or SF; Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP. The Analysis and Evaluation, or A&E, Division is responsible for conducting independent analyses, performing training inspections, and providing oversight of the SWCS master task-list database to ensure quality control and standardization. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, calls for the A&E Division to validate and accredit the schools within the Total Army School System, or TASS, that provide training in ARSOF military occupational specialties, or MOSs.[2]

TASS is a composite school system that provides standard training courses through the institutional training systems of the active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve. TASS training battalions are arranged in regions. Training battalions provide training in specific disciplines and are functionally aligned with the proponents of the training they provide.

Validations

The A&E Division must determine whether TASS schools have the proper resources and whether TASS instructors are conducting the training required to

TASS Training Regions in CONUS



NOTES:

1. Shaded areas represent the five TASS training regions in CONUS training CA soldiers.
2. Regional coordinating elements or integration elements, identified in each region, coordinate and provide resources to training units in their respective region.
3. The TRADOC coordinating element or the Deputy Chief of Staff for Education, located at Ft. Monroe has overall responsibility for TASS.

produce quality soldiers. For example, five of the seven training regions located in the continental U.S. have training battalions that are responsible for providing training in MOS 38A (Civil Affairs specialist). A&E accreditation teams assess the schools in all five training regions to determine whether they are conducting the training required to produce quality CA soldiers and whether they are in compliance with the provisions of TRADOC Regulation 351-18, *Total Army School System (TASS)*.

The A&E accreditation team is composed of a team chief, a senior ARSOF NCO, and various subject-matter experts, or SMEs, from DOTD. In our 38A example, an SME from DOTD's CA Division would serve on the accreditation team that evaluates a TASS battalion charged with teaching CA courses. In order to qualify for the team, the SME must have graduated from the Total Army Instructor Training Course, must have taught at the SWCS, must have completed the course(s) being evaluated, and must have at least 24 months of experience in a variety of real-world missions.

The SME examines the program of instruction, or POI, to ensure that it delivers the most current training literature. Each POI must meet the requirements outlined in the course management plan, or CMP.[3] The SME works with instructors, senior course managers, Title XI soldiers,[4] TASS battalion command sergeants major, and battalion commanders and their staffs to look for discrepancies between course instruction and correct doctrine. The SME's evaluation is instrumental in determining which tasks in the POI are critical and which tasks are superfluous.

Trainers require up-to-date instructional materials that reflect the operational environment that their course graduates will enter. Many graduates of reserve-component 38A MOS training, for example, will deploy to an area of operations immediately

after their training. Those who have not been exposed to the technology and the doctrine that are being used there will require more time to adjust to their new surroundings. Trainers who close the gap between what is being taught and what is being practiced increase the likelihood that their students will make relevant contributions.

Total Army integration

In September 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen called for the services to eliminate all cultural and residual barriers between their active and reserve components. Through the concept of Total Army integration — "One Team, One Fight, One Future,"[5] — the Army is committed to leveling the playing field. Total Force integration requires four elements:

Accreditation teams also found that the instructors are key in providing quality training, even under the most austere conditions. Even when using bed sheets for screens, poor-quality viewgraphs as training aids, and borrowed overhead projectors, reserve-component instructors are performing well.

- A clear understanding by the senior leaders of the active Army, National Guard and Army Reserve that they are responsible for the ownership of the total force.
- A clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each component (active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve) in Army operations and in joint/combined operations, both in peace and in war.
- Leadership by the senior commanders of all three components to ensure Total Army readiness.
- A commitment by all components to provide the resources needed to accomplish their assigned missions.

According to the concept of Total Army integration, there should be no distinction between the training of active- and reserve-component forces. Accreditation seeks to fulfill that concept: More than 50 percent of the accreditation process is directed toward ensuring that the school has sufficient resources to support training.

Assessments

During a visit to a training region, the accreditation team must assess the following:[6]

- Student records.
- Student guides.
- Test-control procedures.
- Procedures for forecasting and requesting required equipment and prescribed training aids.
- Number of instructors required to accomplish the training mission in accordance with established instructor/student ratios.
- Billeting.
- Off-duty study facilities for students.
- Classrooms (size, lighting, climate control, and furnishings).

The accreditation team must ask the following questions in order to determine the quality of training being provided:

- Are instructors in compliance with techniques and methods of instruction prescribed in the training-support package, or TSP, and in the lesson plans?[7]
- Do the instructors have the required documents available in the classroom?
- Do the training schedules reflect all required lessons, prescribed hours of instruction and mandatory training sequence?
- Are current lesson plans available? Are they being used to teach the course?
- Are the task standards identified in the TSP and in the lesson plans? Are they being used in the training and in evaluating the training?
- Does the school have the required training aids? Is it using them as prescribed?
- Does the school have the required training-support materials and references? Is it using them as prescribed?

The accreditation team uses a comprehensive checklist to determine whether a TASS training battalion is in compliance with the standard. There is no room for evaluator interpretation. Serving as the eyes and ears of the SWCS commanding

U.S. Army photo

U.S. Army photo

Lacking the modern facilities of the Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Academic Facility (left), some TASS instructors must improvise in the classroom, using overhead projectors and bed sheets as training aids (above).

general, the accreditation team must determine a school's ability to meet the spirit of the Total Army concept, and the team must verify the school's adherence to TRADOC regulations.

Results

During the past year, for example, A&E accreditation teams have found that TASS battalions were doing everything possible to produce 38A soldiers who could perform their duties to standard. Preliminary findings from gaining units suggest that the active- and reserve-component soldiers possess the skills required to accomplish their tasks.

Accreditation teams also found that the instructors are key in providing quality training, even under the most austere conditions. Even when using bed sheets for screens, poor-quality viewgraphs as training aids, and borrowed overhead projectors, reserve-component instructors are performing well. Considering these and other resource issues, such as poor-quality training materials, the lack of training devices, incomplete courseware, or doctrinally incorrect student handouts, the difficulty of the instructors' workload can be overwhelming.

Instructor-to-student ratios are being met, but in many situations, there are no secondary or assistant instructors. Most reserve-component instructors must spend many hours preparing to deliver instruction. That preparation takes valuable time — time during which instructors are not training their soldiers.

Reserve-component instructors must also juggle civilian job requirements, family responsibilities and a myriad of other commitments. Those who instruct do so because they enjoy it and because they believe in what they are doing. Yet, there is no wonder that the current instructor fill is below 70 percent and that it is difficult to recruit instructors.[8]

Site report

The chief of the accreditation team reviews each team member's checklist to complete the accreditation site report. The primary purpose of the report is to provide the SWCS commanding general with a recommendation either to withhold or to grant accreditation (the latest change to TRADOC Regulation 351-18 will also allow for accreditation probation). The report also includes information that several key players (Title XI soldiers, course managers, courseware developers, and doctrine writers) need in order to do their jobs.

Consider the following example: An SME on the accreditation team finds that POI No. 5585 (Introduction to CA Concepts and Principles) for the 38A Reserve Component Reclassification Course contains outdated information: The POI states there are 20 CA specialties; in fact, there are now 16. The

correct number of CA specialties is reflected in the revised FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, and in updates to unit Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment. Students and instructors alike must be informed of the change.

Once the report has been filed, the following key personnel accomplish several simultaneous actions to update the POI:

- The Title XI soldier requests approval from the SWCS G3 to integrate interim changes into existing POIs.
- The senior course manager distributes updated training-support packages to instructors and, if necessary, makes adjustments to the training schedule.

When doctrinal changes affect critical tasks, units and instructors must have the necessary information to train their soldiers. Leaders must provide quality resources and hold the personnel who are in charge of those resources accountable to the training standard.

- Doctrine writers confirm that the changes are included in forthcoming doctrine. They determine whether the changes are reflected in current or planned operations, and they contact CA leaders to determine whether to reallocate or redistribute resources because of the changes.
- Instructional-systems specialists update mission training plans with new supporting critical tasks.
- Training-development specialists determine how the doctrinal changes will affect the 38A MOS training strategy.
- The courseware contractor provides interim supplements to units using the current POI (within the scope of the statement of work from the original contract). He also integrates the changes into courseware that may be under development.

Finally, as TASS leaders review accreditation reports, they must consider the issues documented in the reports before they complete their training plans. For example: Is there sufficient time on the training schedule to meet the standards required in the POI? Does the current risk assessment cover recommended changes to a training event? Are instructors prepared to provide the best possible training in conditions that foster and invigorate soldier learning?

Conclusion

The ranks of ARSOF units must be filled with soldiers who have been properly trained to perform their duty MOS. When doctrinal changes affect critical tasks, units and instructors must have the necessary information to train their soldiers. Leaders must provide quality resources and hold the personnel who are in charge of those resources accountable to the training standard.

Although TASS units and instructors are working diligently to equip today's soldiers with up-to-date information and the best training, there are still issues that require discussion and action.

- Innovative instructors remain the key to quality training. Unfortunately, instructors who do not have access to modern training facilities, multimedia training aids and automation equipment must spend vital time preparing to instruct. This time could be better spent in refining training techniques or in helping soldiers grasp the complexities of special operations.
- Improving instructor-to-student ratios must be a command priority.
- Units should challenge their best NCOs to become TASS instructors. The return on the investment will pay dividends for years to come.

Captain Kent Daniel is a Civil Affairs doctrine developer for the USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Commissioned through ROTC as an Engineer officer, he has served as a team leader in the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and as an Engineer company commander, executive officer and platoon leader. Daniel holds a bachelor's degree in political sci-

ence from Campbell University and a master's degree in international relations from Troy State University.

Notes:

[1] DOTD's mission is to advise the USAJFKSWCS commanding general on the development, management, coordination, integration and review of all doctrinal and training literature; advanced skills doctrine; and life-cycle training management for USASOC. The DOTD manages audiovisual and multimedia production; determines doctrinal requirements for future Army special-operations forces; formulates doctrine-management strategies; establishes goals and objectives; and identifies critical tasks required for the accomplishment of the ARSOF mission.

[2] Validation is the process of determining whether new and revised courses and training products and materials accomplish their intended purpose. Training validation and training revision are continuous actions in the process of training improvement. Validation of training products and materials involves:

- Verification of the effectiveness in training the objective.
- Determination of improvements in the quality of training products and materials.
- Identification of training-product deficiencies.
- Improvement of the efficiency, effectiveness and utility of training objectives, structure, sequence, products and materials. In the "testing" context, verification is the process of determining the validity of a measuring instrument (e.g., skill-qualification tests, end-of-module tests, and end-of-course comprehensive tests).

Validation is performed on the training products, not on the training site. Accreditation is the recognition afforded an educational institution that has met accepted standards of quality applied by an accepted professional accreditation agency.

[3] The course-management plan is a document that provides the course managers and instructors with the information required to manage and to conduct the course. The plan is required for exported training courses, phases or modules.

[4] Title 11 personnel are active-component soldiers in a congressionally mandated program who provide AC support to the RC. Congress funds Title XI assets to increase the readiness of the RC and to enhance the effectiveness of the Total Army. In support of RC training within TASS, TRADOC's Title XI personnel assist in training development, accreditation and standardization, and instructor certification.

[5] General Dennis J. Reimer, "One Team, One Fight, One Future." General Reimer describes a concept for achieving Total Army integration, thereby maximizing the contributions of the U.S. Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve and the active Army. The concept seeks to merge the Army's three components into one fully integrated, seamless service. Most important, it is a vision for maintaining a quality, trained and ready force.

[6] TRADOC Regulation 351-18, March 31, 1999.

[7] The training support package, or TSP, is a complete, exportable package integrating training products, materials, and/or information necessary to train critical tasks. Its contents will vary, depending on the training site and the user. A TSP for individual training is a complete, exportable package integrating training products and materials necessary to train critical individual tasks. A TSP for collective training can be used to train critical collective tasks and supporting critical individual tasks (including the training of leaders and battle staff). There are various uses of TSPs that fall under the following categories:

- *Common or shared individual task TSP*. A TSP for common or shared tasks.
- *Lane-training TSP*. Contains material used to plan, execute and assess lane training.
- *RC3 TSP*. Contains course training material configured from AC resident courses. (TATS Course TSPs will replace RC3 TSPs.)
- *TADSS TSP*. Integrates all training products and materials necessary to train individuals in the operational use and maintenance of a TADSS. A TADSS TSP may be an exportable package used by units to "train the trainer"; or it may be a package used by an institution to train instructors or students on the utilization of the TADSS. The primary TADSS TSP has been approved and validated. It contains all material required to implement the training at the unit or at the institution. The contents of the TSP will vary, depending on its type and use.
- *Training/TATS Course TSP*. Contains guidance and materials for training all critical tasks of a particular course to the Total Army.
- *TSP for collective tasks trained in the unit*. Prepared by or approved by the proponent school for unit training of critical collective tasks.
- *TSP for individual tasks trained in unit*. Prepared by the proponent school for a critical individual task selected during the media-selection process for training at the unit. It contains all guidance and material for training the task.

[8] The TASS-instructor fill rate was 72 percent in July 1999. Master Sergeant J.D. Payne, TASS Readiness Report - 3rd Quarter FY 99 - TASS School Data.

Letters

Article on McClure brought back memories

As a former member of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, I was interested in your article about General Robert McClure (Fall 1999).

I was assigned to General McClure's staff shortly after OCPW was formed. I reported in mid-January 1951, after having completed a master's program at the University of Virginia. I hadn't the slightest idea what PSYWAR was, but General McClure assured me that my being assigned there was in response to his request for "top-notch young officers." From the beginning, I admired General McClure and his work. He never let us forget how important our job was.

Shortly after the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School and Center at Fort Bragg, General McClure sent me there for a week as a student, with instructions to pay attention and to report back to him with my observations. I did, and several of my suggestions were adopted by General McClure and passed back to the Center for implementation.

I must admit that I was concerned that I was out of the mainstream by serving in a special-staff assignment instead of in a general-staff assignment. In fact, I told General McClure of my concern regarding my career. Although he agreed with me and sympathized with me, he told me that he had an important job to be done and that he needed the best help he could get. Early in 1953, when General McClure learned that he was being reassigned to Iran, he called me into his office to tell me that he had arranged for me to transfer to the G3 Plans Division.

Your article about this very fine man brought back many memories of my service with him and of my admiration for his contribution to a very special cause. General McClure's legacy has lived on for all these years. Thank you for bringing it to the attention of others.

BG Michael J.L. Greene
U.S. Army (ret.)
Washington, D.C.

Y2K article: Setting the record straight

The article "Armageddon 2000: Military Implications of the Y2K Problem" (Fall 1999), by Dr. James J. Schneider, might have been valid 2-3 years ago, but it is definitely not in touch with current policy of the Department of Defense.

To resolve the Y2K problem, DoD used a five-phase approach: awareness, renovation, assessment, validation and implementation. All five phases were completed by Dec. 31, 1998.

Testing of Y2K-renovated systems involved three phases: individual system certification, functional end-to-end testing and operational evaluation. Individual system testing was done by the various program managers, normally through bench testing. Functional end-to-end testing, conducted at the major-subordinate-command and unit levels, ensured that individual systems, themselves Y2K-compliant, could correctly interface with other systems. After successful end-to-end testing, systems were ready for an operational evaluation, or OPEVAL.

OPEVALs evaluated the ability of Y2K-compliant systems to support joint and combined operations under conditions approximating the year-2000 environment. During OPEVALs, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, cross-referenced its nine core missions with the Universal Joint Task List, or UJTL, to identify those missions as UJTL tasks. After identifying the equipment and systems critical to each UJTL task, USSOCOM evaluated the effect that the failure of each of those systems and equipment items would have upon mission accomplishment. OPEVALs thus verified the CINC's ability to execute his mission in the Y2K environment.

USSOCOM conducted five OPEVALs. OPEVAL 5 evaluated 21 systems. It was the first time many of those systems had been integrated into a unified-command OPEVAL.

Dr. Schneider said that the Army was not conducting any contingency planning. As required by the DoD Year 2000 Management Plan, CINCs and their components tested viable system-centric Y2K system contingency plans for every mission-critical system. A Y2K system contingency plan focuses on restoring the system. Components were also required to have Y2K operational contingency plans, which focused on how to complete a mission or function without mission-critical support systems.

Many units had primary, alternate, contingency and emergency back-up plans in place.

The Army Y2K Transition Operations Cell is a subcomponent of the Army Operations Center. Its purpose is to maintain situation awareness by receiving, processing and responding to Army reports of Y2K events around the world. Major commands, program managers, and Army Reserve and Army National Guard units report through secure means. The Y2K Transition Cell was fully staffed during peak times (Dec. 28, 1999-Jan. 4, 2000) and during the leap-year rollover (February to March 2000).

Y2K-response options included using Director of Military Support procedures for military support to civilian authorities; having program-manager response teams on call for key mission-critical systems; and using Army network security monitoring to ensure that Y2K was not used to mask any intrusions into Army and DoD networks. The Army Transition Operations Cell reports the Army's Y2K status to the National Military Command Center. The bottom line is that the Army Ops Center monitors the Army's worldwide Y2K situation, ensuring Army mission capability and the safety and security of soldiers, civilians and their families. USSOCOM has similar organizational and reporting responsibilities.

Comparing Y2K with *The Day the Earth Stood Still* implies that DoD's head was in the sand. Contrary to Dr. Schneider's picture of doom and gloom, a lot of work, money, time and resources were spent to ensure a smooth transition into the new millennium. There is one word to describe the DoD effort and commitment to the Y2K problem — confidence. The U.S. military set the pace and the standard. It remains ready to respond on a moment's notice.

Deborah Hartzel
USASOC Y2K Task Force
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The author replies

In her letter, Deborah Hartzel raises three issues concerning my article, "Armageddon 2000: Military Implications of the Y2K Problem." I will attempt to address each in turn.

First, she writes that the article "might have been valid 2-3 years ago, but it is definitely not in touch with current policy of the Department of Defense." Here Ms. Hartzel assumes that "current policy" equals executed policy. There is often a huge gap between stated policy and the implementation of that policy in actual fact. Even as late as September 1999 (*Kansas City Star*, Nov. 7, 1999), the U.S. Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem had given the government a letter grade of "C" in its Y2K implementation efforts. As late as the summer of last year, a study by the Office of Management and Budget noted that DoD still had 161 automated systems left to fix.

Ms. Hartzel points out that federal agencies conducted successful OPEVALs. Still, the *European Stars and Stripes* (Jan. 4, 2000) reported minor Y2K problems at EUCOM, Sigonella (Sicily) Naval Air Station and elsewhere. *CNN* (Jan. 5, 2000) also reported various Y2K glitches, including a data-transfer problem at Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Y-12 nuclear weapons plant. (See *Time*, Jan. 17, 2000, for other Y2K problems.)

Second, Ms. Hartzel says I claimed "that the Army was not conducting any contingency planning." Actually, I pointed out that the Army National Guard was indeed preparing for Y2K contingencies. This is the same point Ms. Hartzel herself makes. However, I found little evidence from my former students who are now serving at corps and division levels that the tactical Army was preparing generally for Y2K contingencies. Instead, the tactical Army was focused on daily training and operations.

Third, Ms. Hartzel asserts that my *The Day the Earth Stood Still* metaphor "implies that DoD's head was in the sand." As a reader, Ms. Hartzel is free to infer whatever she wishes from my article, but her inferences are not my implications. The movie metaphor was simply a shorthand way of describing the potentially extreme consequences of the Y2K problem and was not meant to imply that DoD had its head in the sand — or anywhere else.

Personally, I am grateful to Ms. Hartzel, to her task force and to countless others who turned the Y2K problem into what was largely a nonevent. She writes, "There is one word to describe the DoD effort and commitment to the Y2K problem — confidence." Certainly this is true, but it is also true that only a small step separates confidence from complacency. The recent Y2K-like "denial of service" attacks launched against major web sites should caution us that unless confidence is leavened with diligence and vigilance, we are left with complacency and impotence.

Jim Schneider
SAMS / USACGSC
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

YG 94 officers to receive functional-area designation

Officers in year group 1994 who have a date of rank to captain between Oct. 1, 1997, and Sept. 30, 1998, will receive their functional-area designation in April 2000. The officer's preference statement, academic background, experiences, and the needs of the Army are considered during the designation process. PERSCOM also considers goals developed by the Special Warfare Center and School, which is the personnel proponent for Special Forces and Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs).

YGs 88, 90 should submit career-field preference

A career-field designation board will be held May 31-June 9, 2000, for officers who are in year groups 1988 and 1990. Officers should not confuse this board with the functional-area designation board. The career-field designation board determines how officers will serve the Army after their 10th year of service. Individual preference statements are the most heavily weighted factor; therefore, each officer should submit his preference for the board's use in determining his future service.

1999 CSC selection board applies new Army policy

The August 1999 Command and Staff College, or CSC, Selection Board marked the first time officers were selected for resident attendance by their new OPMS XXI functional area. To provide a common educational experience across the broadest cross-section of the officer corps, the Army approved a new CSC-selection policy effective Aug. 19, 1999: Select 50 percent by branch and 50 percent by functional area. This policy is effective for year group 1989 and for all subsequent year groups. The Army also approved another CSC-selection policy: a two-year look, vs. a four-year look. This policy will mean that the Army will select 20 percent of the officer year group the first year and 30 percent the second year. The number of officers selected within a year group will remain the same as under the four-year look. However, under the two-year-look policy, officers will be able to attend CSC earlier, which will permit them to spend a longer period of time in critical branch-qualifying major positions prior to their being considered for promotion to lieutenant colonel. The effect on the year groups under consideration by the board is summarized below:

- YG 1986 — Select remaining officers to bring the YG to 50 percent (by branch) and close out CSC look.
- YG 1987 — Select remaining officers to bring the YG to 50 percent (by branch) and close out CSC look.
- YG 1988 — Select remaining officers to bring the YG to 50 percent (by branch) and close out CSC look.
- YG 1989 — Select 20 percent of the YG (by branch and functional area).

SF to conduct accession board for YG 97 officers

The SF Branch will conduct the Year Group 1997 Army Special Forces Accession Board May 22-26, 2000. Officers in YG 1997 who plan to volunteer for Special Forces training should complete their applications as soon as possible.

SF officers selected for senior service college

The following Special Forces officers have been selected to attend senior-service college:

Army War College:

COL James L. Dunn	LTC (P) Elisha L. Ballard
LTC (P) Charles T. Cleveland	LTC Manuel A. Diemer
LTC (P) Kurt A. McNeely	LTC Ronald A. Newton
LTC Juan L. Orama	LTC Jeffrey L. Putz
LTC (P) Larry D. Ruggley	LTC Joseph M. Smith

National War College: LTC Christopher Perkins

Naval Postgraduate School: LTC Gary A. Longhany

Selection boards scheduled for 2000

The following selection boards are scheduled for 2000:

LTC Army/MAJ SELCON	Feb. 29 -March 31, 2000
CPT Army	March 7-21, 2000
SSC Army	April 4-28, 2000
MAJ Army	April 18-May 29, 2000
CWO 3/4/5	May 2-26, 2000
CFD (YGs 1988/1990)	May 31-June 9, 2000
JSO	June 12-16, 2000

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SWCS tour shortened from 48 to 36 months

A memorandum dated Oct. 15, 1999, signed by Major General Kenneth Bowra and Lieutenant General William Tangney, shortened the tour length of CMF 18 soldiers assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School from 48 months to 36 months. The 36-month tour length will still provide the 1st Special Warfare Training Group with adequate personnel utilization and will afford more CMF 18 soldiers the opportunity to experience a tour at SWCS. Soldiers who wish to extend their SWCS tour to four years can submit a request for extension after serving two years of their tour.

1999 SFC selection board provides analysis

The 1999 SFC promotion-selection board has provided a review and analysis of the CMF 18 records that the board reviewed. Below are excerpts from the panel's memorandum:

1. Component assessment (primary and secondary zones):
   a. *Performance and potential*. The most important factor in selecting a soldier for promotion to SFC was successive assignments reflecting excellent performance.
   b. *Training and education*. Exceptional performance, such as earning the distinction of honor graduate or being named to the commandant's list, received favorable consideration. Qualifications such as Jumpmaster, Ranger, SCUBA, Military Free-Fall, SFARTAETC, and SOTIC were considered in the whole-soldier concept. EIBs and EFMBs also received consideration during the evaluation process. Language qualification was considered a requirement, while multiple qualifications and higher DLPT ratings were considered favorably. Civilian schooling reflected the NCO's desire to improve his overall education. However, neither schools nor qualifications outweighed exceptional performance in critical troop assignments.
   c. *Physical fitness*. Many CMF 18 NCOs exceed the height/weight limits but remain within the body-fat standards. To demonstrate to the board that these soldiers are fit, raters often included the NCO's APFT score. Many DA photos were outdated, and many files did not contain photos.
2. CMF structure and career-progression assessment:
   a. *Assignment and promotion opportunity*. Assignment to an SF A-detachment (critical troop time) was considered a requirement and, along with excellent ratings, was a key discriminator.
   b. *Overall health of the CMF*. All panel members were impressed by the overall high quality of the SF files.
3. Recommendations:
   a. Panel members who lacked an SF background had difficulty discerning SF ODA assignments from other assignments. Highlighting the

the detachment's senior and junior positions will assist panel members in determining which NCOs are filling SFC positions.

b. An assignment outside an SF ODA should be followed by a return to the operational level.

c. Bullet comments:

(1) The comment used in each block to justify excellence should appear first.

(2) An excellence block should be clearly supported by a well-articulated, quantifiable bullet comment that distinguishes the NCO from his peers.

For more information, telephone the CMF-18 career manager, MSG Brian Bernard, at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

Foreign SOF

Japan to create special forces

Japan's continuing interest in nontraditional warfare is reflected in newly announced plans to establish a special-operations force within the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force, or GSDF. This force-structure change follows increased anti-guerrilla and rear-area-security exercises conducted during the last year, and it highlights Japan's stated concerns over defending Japanese territory. According to media reporting in late January, a small force will be established in the GSDF region that includes Tokyo; other units would be later be established at various points around the country. Unit tasks will include reconnaissance aimed at preventing guerrilla or terrorist actions in urban areas, and surveillance of likely infrastructure targets. While these missions are to take place during periods of crisis, conflict or war, there is some thought that the planned special-operations units might also support the police in peacetime contingencies. Such support would broaden the role of the GSDF in internal policing — a controversial issue — and would require that changes first be made to existing Japanese laws.

Outside support critical for Chechen forces

The withdrawal of Chechen fighters from Grozny in February 2000 and the probability of a sustained guerrilla conflict in Chechnya's southern mountains has made outside support important for Chechen elements. Just weeks before Russian forces occupied the Chechen capital, Afghanistan's Taliban regime had recognized the Chechen-Ichkeria Republic and had pledged military support if it was requested. A Chechen embassy has also been established in Kabul. Reports that Chechen representatives in Kabul have met with the terrorist Osama Bin-Ladin may be disinformation leaked by Russia to discredit the Chechen cause and to brand the Chechens as terrorists and bandits. However, the potential for greater Afghan support to Chechen fighters is real. The Taliban government has indicated that it will meet with Chechen representatives to discuss the issue of military assistance to Chechnya. While Muslim mujahedin and other volunteer fighters have assisted Chechen struggles against the Russians since the mid-1990s, the Russians claim to fear the establishment of what some have called a Chechen-Taliban "fundamentalist axis" that would attract like-minded Islamic fighters. Russian commentators — who are far from being from unbiased — assert that a Chechen support effort being conducted throughout the Arab world is raising substantial funding and significant numbers of recruits. There are reports that Yemeni volunteers are joining several hundred Afghan Taliban fighters who have infiltrated into Chechnya. Reports also indicate that Lebanon's radical Hizbollah Muslim militia may be supporting the Chechens by providing fighters and training. The Russians have asserted that Georgia is a key route into Chechnya — a charge that Georgia denies unconvincingly. The Russians have long been worried about Taliban influence in Tajikistan, where Russian border troops and the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division have for years suffered steady losses to Tajik

opposition forces, cross-border Afghan supporters, and smugglers of drugs and arms. Taliban fighters may now be able to confront Russian forces in Chechnya and in the Caucasus in a more significant way.

Kyrgyzstan establishes counterterrorist force

The Central Asian state of Kyrgyzstan has established a special unit organized along the lines of the Russian "Alfa" counterterrorist force. The forerunner of the new force was a Ministry of National Security organization — the Operations-Combat Group, or OBG — that was created in 1992. OBG performed a range of security duties, including operations against organized crime. In 1997, the OBG formed the Kyrgyz "Kalkan Counterterrorist Center," which operated under "broad authority" and performed "extensive functions" for two years before it was transformed into the Alfa special-operations section. Alfa reportedly engages in regional cooperation with the security organizations of other states, in addition to operating independently. It plays a role in counterdrug operations, in hostage rescue, in security and protection activities, and in counterguerrilla operations against "commandos of Islamic armed formations." Detachment members are said to be skilled in weapons, sapper operations, dog handling, helicopter landings, and sniping.

ROK to reorganize special forces

The Republic of Korea, or ROK, recently announced that it is restructuring and re-equipping its Army Special Warfare Command in response to anticipated security requirements of the 21st century. While the seven existing airborne brigades will be reduced to six, one of the brigades will double in size (to 4,000 men), and the brigades will be equipped with more advanced systems, including special-operations helicopters. Although funding limitations prevent the purchase of new special-operations helicopters, the ROK plans to equip existing UH-60s with all-weather capabilities. At the same time, the ROK navy hopes to strengthen its special-operations forces by creating a brigade similar to its current force of underwater demolition teams. Plans for the new brigade are being staffed through the Ministry of National Defense. The range of emerging threats in the 21st century, the potential for undertaking international support missions requiring special forces, and the continued threat from North Korea (in particular, the likelihood of future infiltration by North Korean special units) are clearly factors in the modernization of ROK special-warfare units.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

SWCS welcomes Boykin as new commander

Major General William G. Boykin took command of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School from Major General Kenneth R. Bowra at the SWCS Memorial Plaza March 1.

Major General Boykin, formerly commander of the Army Special Forces Command, has spent the majority of his 28-year Army career in Special Forces. His assignments include various positions within the U.S. Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff and the Army Staff.

Major General Bowra has been assigned to Pristina, Kosovo, to serve as deputy commander of Kosovo Force 3. There are approximately 30,000 soldiers from 28 nations currently assigned to KFOR.

SOF units receive demolition kit

Special Forces groups, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School have recently received a kit designed to improve the demolition capabilities of special-operations forces.

The Special Operation Forces Demolition Kit includes inert warheads, charge containers, attachment devices, and hardware. These devices can be used to tailor demolition charges and to attach the charges to various targets.

Because of the diversity of SOF missions, the SOF Demolition Kit will be useful to units operating in Third World countries and in highly developed urban areas. It will expand the capabilities of units throughout the operational continuum. The kit is also flexible enough to allow units to adapt to future improvements in demolition technology.

The Force Modernization Branch, Combat Development Division, USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration, is responsible for planning, coordinating and managing the fielding of the SOF Demolition Kit. For more information, telephone Jonathan James, chief of the Force Modernization Branch, at DSN 239-6144 or commercial (910) 432-6144.

USASOC announces NCO, Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has announced the winners of its competition for 2000 NCO and Soldier of the Year.

The NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Shaun Vincent of Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist Dale A. Nelson of Company A, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

SWCS to host 2000 SF Conference

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will host the 2000 Special Forces Conference and Exhibition in Fayetteville, N.C., March 13-16.

The conference is being organized as a cooperative effort by the SWCS, the Army Special Forces Command, the Army Special Operations Command's deputy chief of staff for personnel, the National Defense Industrial Association, and the Special Forces Association.

Conference activities will include a golf tournament, an airborne operation, a live-fire demonstration and the annual SF Ball.

For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Phil Provencher at DSN 239-7510 or commercial (910) 432-7510; or send e-mail to provencp@soc.mil.

SWCS publishes new CA field manual

The Civil Affairs community will soon receive a newly revised version of Army Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

The new manual will provide commanders and staffs at all levels with an understanding of the way CA forces are integrated into the planning and the conduct of civil-military operations. FM 41-10 also addresses CA support to interagency coordination and to joint-force operations.

In addition to identifying CA missions, roles and capabilities, the new manual explains the latest changes in the definitions and in the application of CA activities and forces. It provides an in-depth guide for planning, coordinating and task-organizing CA forces in the full spectrum of operations.

While CA forces retain their traditional capabilities, they have been restructured to better support a variety of contingencies and task organizations. The redesigned CA battalion now has more options for allocating its assets. Although there are two new CA functional specialties (emergency services and environmental management), other specialties have been consolidated. Overall, the number of CA specialties has been reduced from 20 to 16.

FM 41-10 provides the cornerstone of a comprehensive doctrinal hierarchy that tackles the complex task of integrating nonmilitary agencies with Army forces. Upcoming companion manuals, such as FM 41-10-1, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, will address specific CA activities and the ways CA soldiers support conventional and unconventional operations.

SWCS conducts special-ops equipment expo

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently hosted an exposition to acquaint other Army branches with new equipment being developed for Army special-operations forces.

Representatives of the Signal, Aviation, Armor, Military Police, Finance and Adjutant General branches visited SWCS Dec. 10, 1999, to learn how SOF-specific equipment could be useful to their branches as they convert to the Army Chief of Staff's vision of a medium-weight force.

SWCS hosted the event on behalf of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The exposition was conducted by representatives of the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration, or DCSFIDI, and by soldiers from the 5th and 7th Special Forces groups, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and SWCS.

DCSFIDI conducts research, development, testing and evaluation for USASOC, which is the Army component of the U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. As the SOF executive agent for acquisition and program management, USSOCOM oversees the development, acquisition and fielding of Army SOF equipment.

Army equipment may be of two types: branch-specific and Army-common. When units need new equipment, the Army conducts intense research and testing before fielding the equipment to ensure that it will be effective. By using equipment that USASOC and USSOCOM have already researched, tested and developed, the Army and the various branches could save time and money. The exposition also provided a forum for greater communication between the combat branches.

Branch representatives had an opportunity to test 12 ARSOF equipment systems, including:

- The 35-pound Penetration Augmented Munition, which may replace 220 pounds of C4 explosive on specific targets.
- The MH-60L or MH-47D Communications and Navigations Upgrade program, which will modernize the avionics architecture of the MH-60L, UH60H, MH47D and CH-47F helicopters, preparing them for use on the digital battlefield.
- The 2.6-pound Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio, which will replace the heavier AN/PRC-126 radio.
- The Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher, which weighs only 58 pounds and offers increased lethality and precision.
- The Special Operations Peculiar Modification M-4 Carbine Accessory Kit, which allows operators to adapt the M-4 for use during day, night and close-quarters operations.
- The SOF Demolition Kit.
- The SOF Personal Equipment Advance Requirement.
- The MH-60 Improved Exhaust Suppressor.
- The Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System. — *Staff Sergeant Amanda C. Halford, USASOC PAO*

On-line computer training offers expanded options

A free on-line computer training program for Army soldiers and civilian employees has been extended and expanded.

A new blanket purchase agreement with SmartForce, formerly CBT Systems, began Sept. 30, 1999, and provides a variety of options for computer-based training on computers and information systems.

The program offers more than 1,000 courses, ranging from basic software programs to network engineering. Once students register from an Army-domain computer — an "army.mil" site — they can access courses from their homes or from other locations.

Students can register at http://www.armycbt.army.mil. Once a student completes a course, SmartForce will provide a training record for the student's civilian or military personnel records. — *TRADOC News Service*

AUSA to conduct essay contest

The Association of the United States Army is conducting an essay contest to develop concepts for a "mobile protected fighting space" system.

The contest is designed to promote conceptual thinking about the design and development of a new Army ground combat system for use around the year 2025. First prize is $5,000; second prize is $1,000; and third prize is $500. The three winning essays will be published in *Army* magazine and presented at the AUSA annual meeting.

Essays must be original compositions of not more than 2,000 words. Submissions must be postmarked by July 30, 2000. Mail entries to: Institute of Land Warfare; Association of the United States Army; MPFS Essay Contest; 2425 Wilson Blvd.; Arlington, VA 22201.

For more details, telephone the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare at 1-800-336-4570 or (703) 841-4300, ext. 229 (e-mail: vcable@ausa.org).

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the Front Line is Everywhere. *By James Adams. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. ISBN 0-684-83452-9. 366 pages. $25*.

The Next World War is a broad yet insightful survey of developments that will affect conflicts in the not-too-distant future. The book's subtitle "Computers are the weapons and the front line is everywhere," is somewhat misleading. Although the book addresses the use of computers in warfare, it covers a variety of other subjects, including "cyber attacks," perception management and less-than-lethal weapons systems.

Adams analyzes the conflicts in which America has taken part during the last 10 years, especially how those conflicts influenced and were influenced by the technical and societal developments of the era. Adams examines the Gulf War and shows that it was a masterwork in the implementation of hi-tech weapons and in the use of public information. He feels that the real hallmarks of the conflict were the surgical application of overwhelming mass and the use of public affairs to garner popular support.

Adams argues that the low casualty rate of the Gulf War and the dazzling display of hi-tech weapons set too high a level of expectation — a level of expectation that, combined with the media coverage that was so important in the Gulf War, became a detriment in Somalia. The new political reality is "cautious interventionism" — conflicts in which no one gets hurt. Cautious interventionism calls for new technologies and new ways of thinking about warfare.



Some argue that there will be a radical change in warfare because of rapid changes in technology. Attacks will be made through cyberspace, attacking the enemy's infrastructure, power grids, air-traffic-control systems, and communications networks — the basic facilities that make a modern society run.

Cyber attacks will be complemented by the physical destruction of key targets by smart weapons with long ranges. There will still be soldiers in the field, but they will be filling the gaps that cyber attacks and smart bombs can't reach. These soldiers will be equipped with personal, insect-sized unmanned aerial vehicles; palmtop computers; and uniforms that will monitor their vital signs and send the information back to headquarters. They will also have a variety of lethal and less-than-lethal weapons at their disposal.

The basic question of *The Next World War* is: Will the technical and societal changes lead to a paradigm shift in the way conflicts are waged? In other words, will they fundamentally change the way we wage war, or will they only enhance the way we already wage war? Although Adams lets the reader draw his own conclusions, he maintains that future war will see the same interdependence of technology and raw nerve that has existed since the beginning of warfare.

Adams also emphasizes that the United States does not have an exclusive edge in technology. There is a great deal of off-the-shelf technology that can be purchased and modified by competing nations or groups. We are a nation heavily that is dependent on information systems, making our infosphere a high-priority target. As we have seen in recent months, we are vulnerable to having our secrets stolen and to having our information systems hacked.

Adams makes two other important points: First, the apparent ability of new weapons to win conflicts with minimal casualties does not lessen the rigor of our moral considerations in deciding whether to go to war. Attacking the physical and information infrastructure of a nation is analogous, although possibly less extreme, to burning the nation's crops and slaughtering its buffalo. Second, the greatest challenges the military will face in the information age will be doctrinal and organizational, not technological. How will we take advantage of the coming changes instead of being made vulnerable by them?

The Next World War should be

read by anyone who is interested in the various components of information operations, or by anyone who is interested in the role that societal and technological changes will play in future conflicts.

MAJ Bill Gormley
14th PSYOP Battalion
Moffett Federal Airfield, Calif.

U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare. *By Thomas K. Adams. Portland Ore.: Frank Cass & Co., 1998. ISBN 0-7146-4350-5 (paperback). 360 pages. $27.50.*

U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action is really two books: Book One consists of the first and last chapters and contains an outline of where special-operations forces (most specifically, Special Forces) are, where the author believes they have gone astray, and where he believes they should be going. SOF soldiers with an inquiring mind about their profession and their branch should read these chapters in isolation at least once. They are by themselves worth the price of the book.

Not everyone, maybe not even a few, will agree with all of Adams' contentions. Even those who might agree on SOF's faults may not agree with Adams' proposed cures. The author has some strong convictions that he states forthrightly, clearly and unapologetically. They are likely to make numerous groups uncomfortable. Among the disgruntled will be those who believe Army SOF have achieved organizational perfection, those who advocate increased SOF integration into the services, those who champion expanded roles for special-mission units, and those who favor the foreign-military-liaison mission that was so ably performed by the 5th SF Group during the Gulf War. Despite any annoyances generated by these subjects, the reader will recognize that Adams has thought deeply, researched widely, organized his material well and stated his positions clearly.

Book Two, the middle nine chapters, is essentially a modern history of SOF, again with heavy emphasis on SF. These chapters should be read with care. While the broad sweep of the history is solid and, with few exceptions, the specific details are right, there are some pitfalls. The first is that the author's definition of unconventional warfare varies significantly from the Army's. He is forthright in declaring this variation in the book's opening paragraphs, but in subsequent chapters, it is not always clear which definition he is using.

Another pitfall is the author's statements of why events happened. These statements may reflect what the author found in his research (and his 37 pages of references are impressive), or they may reflect his personal conviction of why events happened. They are presented dogmatically but are not always in line with the memories of some of the participants. Too often, they amount to an undeclared editorial insertion.

There are some niggling mistakes of fact and a few mechanical slips. None of these are serious but they are annoying. A few: The U.S. Cavalry's last horse-mounted campaign was not the 1916 Punitive Expedition but the 1941-42 defense of the Philippines, ending with Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey's gallant last charge at Morong, Bataan. Jedburgh teams were neither civilian nor were they intended to appear as such. There were not 17 Ranger companies in the Korean War. The New England independent companies of rangers (some commanded by Robert Rogers) are not in the SF lineage. Navy fighters did not destroy the Operation Eagle Claw (JTF 1-79) helicopters at Desert One. Probably the most substantive fault is an over-identification of SF with the CIA's Phoenix program in Vietnam. The fact that there were a few SF-trained personnel in Phoenix did not make Phoenix an SF program. Neither did the much larger presence of infantry, Navy and Marine personnel make Phoenix a part of those organizations.



Misspelled names are an egregious fault: the 6th Ranger Battalion's commander at Cabanatuan was *Mucci*. The founder of the Chindits was *Orde* Wingate. Early SF stalwarts were Caesar *Civitella*, Roger *Pezzelle*, and Herb *Brucker*. Commanders at Son Tay were Arthur "Bull" *Simons* and Elliot "Bud" *Sydnor*. And the dozens of references to "Psyops" set the teeth of this old Maoist PSYOP practitioner on edge.

These minor faults not withstanding, this is a good, solid, professional book. Read it for its scan of SOF history. Read it for its view of the profession. Or read it just to stimulate your brain cells in formulating your arguments why you think the author is wrong.

COL J. H. Crerar
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Special Warfare

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