Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

Last year, the Army Special Forces Command sought to identify SF's core values through an extensive dialogue that involved the entire SF community — active, reserve and retired. The dialogue continued for nearly 18 months and was part of two SF Command commander's conferences and the 1999 SF Conference.

Last summer, the SF Command formally stated a set of seven SF core values: warrior ethos, professionalism, innovation, versatility, cohesion, character and cultural awareness. These core values reflect the collective experience and the wisdom of generations of SF warriors. They provide the foundation for SF, and they must guide all that we do, both individually and collectively.

Indeed, the first value, warrior ethos, may be SF's most defining value. "Ethos" is the fundamental disposition, character or values of a particular group. If there is one characteristic that is common and indispensable to SF soldiers, it is that they are warriors who are determined not to fail in their mission.

From that determination flow the other SF core values, making the warrior ethos critical for success in SF. For that reason, our recruiting, assessment, training and retention must ensure that we build and maintain a force of warriors.

To accomplish that objective, we must develop realistic training, and we must instill the SF core values into the force we have trained. The SF Command recently implemented a realistic training program, the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC, which prepares SF detachments to conduct operations in the urban conditions that we will almost certainly encounter in future operations. SFAUCC's training regimen is rigorous, but the course's

emphasis on collective tasks, combat skills and teamwork produces graduates who have confidence and a well-honed warrior spirit. The course also builds cohesion and team esprit.

To instill the core values into the force, SF leaders must serve as mentors and as examples. I challenge SF leaders at all levels to become strong advocates of the seven SF core values. In doing so, we will not only adhere to the warrior ethos, but we will also help sustain our warrior community and ensure that it is ready for the dangers and the opportunities of the 21st century.



Major General William G. Boykin

PB 80–00–2

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Features

Departments

Warrior Ethos: The Key to Winning

by Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria, Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Reeder and Major James E. Kraft

"Through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purpose, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishments; but you are the ones who are trained to fight."

General Douglas MacArthur,
Speech to West Point Cadets, 1962

The armed forces of the United States exist for the sole purpose of fighting and winning the nation's wars. To fight those wars, an effective military force depends on weapons, equipment and personnel. But intangible factors — unit cohesion, integrity, physical and moral courage, dedication, commitment, and leadership — are equally vital because they make up the "warrior ethos." Without the material factors, we cannot fight. Without the warrior ethos, we cannot win.

Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, defines the warrior ethos as the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American soldier. The Army has forged the warrior ethos on training grounds from Valley Forge to the combat training centers. The warrior ethos has been honed by the realities of battle at Bunker Hill, San Juan Hill, the Meuse-Argonne, Omaha Beach, Pork Chop Hill, the Ia Drang Valley, Salinas Airfield and the Battle of 73 Easting. Developed through discipline, commitment to Army values, and knowledge of the Army's proud heritage, the warrior ethos echoes through the precepts in the Code of Conduct, showing us that military service is more than a job. Winning the nation's wars calls for total commitment, and the core of the warrior ethos is the refusal to accept failure.

The SF soldier

U.S. Army Special Forces is a brotherhood of warriors who are bound by their dedication to mission accomplishment, by their loyalty to one another, and by their moral and physical courage. Regardless of the theater of operations, the mission or the resources available, our warrior ethos is embedded in everything we do.

SF must never forget that quality soldiers are its greatest asset. People, not equipment, are critical. The most sophisticated equipment in the world cannot compensate for the lack of the right people. On the other hand, the right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with whatever equipment is available to them. Through the process of selecting and retaining quality soldiers who have demonstrated exceptional maturity, skill and initiative, SF is able to meet challenges across a broad spectrum of mission requirements.

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

Candidates in an early SF Assessment and Selection work on a problem designed to allow evaluators to assess candidates' ability to work together under stressful conditions.

Volunteers for SF units must have first demonstrated their maturity, intelligence, combat skills and physical toughness in their parent units and then complete the SF Assessment and Selection process. Through this extensive and rigorous process, SF identifies soldiers who are capable of working under the most demanding and stressful conditions, including situations in which the reputation of the U.S. may depend upon the success of an assigned mission.

The desire to become part of a unique military organization that has demanding, uncompromising standards and challenging missions speaks volumes about the character of the soldiers who volunteer for SF. Character is the inner strength and the commitment that inspire one to do what is right, regardless of the operational environment or the circumstances. Character is demonstrated by behavior. SF soldiers must be prepared to deploy to remote regions of the world under the most sensitive political, economic and military conditions. And although SF soldiers often have extraordinary responsibilities, we are fully confident that in all circumstances, they will follow their best judgment regardless of the consequences.

In "A Soldier and His Conscience," General Sir James Glover writes, "A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war. Character is a habit. The daily choice of right and wrong. It is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed in war."[1]

The human dimension is central in war. War is a clash of human wills; it is shaped by the complexities, inconsistencies and peculiarities of human behavior. No degree of technology can overcome the human dimension of war. Any attempt to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is thus inherently flawed. Because of its human dimension, war is an extreme trial of a soldier's warrior ethos. Individuals react differently to the stress of war — an act that may break the will of one may in fact strengthen the resolve of another.

Unit cohesion

SF soldiers must be dedicated to fighting and winning under the most arduous conditions, and they must always maintain their will to win at the highest level. Whether in

Photo by Jonathan Jensen

A soldier from the 3rd SF Group schedules an Antiguan soldier for marksmanship training in Belize during Tradewinds 98, a multinational training exercise.

personal or professional matters, SF soldiers possess a fierce loyalty to their comrades that is unsurpassed in any other community. Teammates work closely with one another every day. Their faith and confidence in each other is a fraternal bond that is developed through rigorous training, challenging deployments, and personal hardships. The courage of one SF soldier, Master Sergeant Charles E. Hosking Jr., clearly illustrates the strength of SF loyalty.

Hosking was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions on March 21, 1967, in Phuoc Long Province, Republic of Vietnam, while he was serving as a company adviser in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Reaction Battalion. His award citation reads:

A Viet Cong suspect was apprehended and subsequently identified as a Viet Cong sniper. While Master Sergeant Hosking was preparing the prisoner for movement back to the base camp, he suddenly grabbed a grenade from Master Sergeant Hosking's belt, armed the grenade and started running toward the command group. With utter disregard for his own personal safety, Master Sergeant Hosking grasped the Viet Cong in a bear hug, forced the grenade against the enemy's chest, and wrestled the prisoner to the ground. Covering the sniper's body with his own until the grenade detonated, Master Sergeant Hosking was killed. By absorbing the force of the exploding grenade with his body and that of the enemy, he saved the other members of his command from death or serious injury.[2]

Integrity

Integrity provides the basis for the trust and the confidence that must exist between SF soldiers. Integrity is sincerity, adherence to a moral code, and the avoidance of deception or expedient compromises. Integrity underlies everything that SF soldiers do; it demands a commitment to the other components of the warrior ethos.

SF soldiers demand integrity from their subordinates, peers and superiors alike. Each SF soldier must therefore internalize and demonstrate integrity. There can be no inconsistency between personal and professional standards. If an SF soldier compromises his personal integrity, he breaks the bonds of trust with his fellow soldiers and with his leaders. Once these bonds are broken, the warrior ethos is weakened, and the SF soldier may be rendered ineffective.

A samurai warrior once wrote, "No matter how lacking a man may be in humanity, if he would be a warrior, he should first of all tell no lies. It is also basic that he be not the least bit suspicious, that he know a sense of shame. The reason being that when a man who has formerly told lies and acted suspiciously participates in some great event, he will be pointed at behind his back and neither his allies nor his enemies will believe him, regardless of how reasonable his words may be. One should be very prudent about this."[3]

In our profession, we are actively engaged on a daily basis with foreign militaries and heads of state, U.S. ambassadors and U.S. country teams, the joint staff, geographic commanders in chief and special-operations commands, the warfighting corps, and other U.S. agencies and service components. We cannot afford a breach of integrity.

Courage

War is characterized by the interaction of physical forces and moral forces. The physical forces are generally easily seen, understood and measured. However, the moral forces are less tangible. Moral forces are difficult to grasp; in fact, it is virtually

impossible to quantify emotion, fear, courage, morale, leadership or esprit. Yet moral forces exert a greater influence on the nature and the outcome of war than do the physical forces. But we cannot slight the importance of physical forces, for they can have a significant impact upon moral forces. For example, the greatest effect of fires on the enemy is generally not the amount of physical destruction, but the impact of that physical destruction upon the enemy's moral strength.

Physical courage and moral courage, synonymous with the warrior ethos, require a synergistic balance in order to maximize their effect. Physical courage is demonstrated by acts of bravery. Part of being a warrior is possessing the innate ability to set aside one's fear of death and to concentrate on the task at hand. Twenty-two ARSOF soldiers have received the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry in action, at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty. The number of undocumented cases would probably fill volumes.

Fear and physical courage alike are contagious. Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall said, "The courage of any one man reflects in some degree the courage of all those who are within his vision. To the man who is in terror and bordering on panic, no influence can be more steadying than that of seeing some other man near him who is retaining self-control and doing his duty."[4] The cohesion of the SF organizational structure, along with the faith, respect and confidence that SF soldiers have in each other, promotes an environment that is conducive to building courageous attributes.

Carl von Clausewitz said, "Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of one's own conscience."[5]

Combat situations that demand physical courage are infrequent, but everyday situations that require moral courage are plentiful. Moral courage is the willingness to stand firm on one's values, principles and convictions. It is as much a part of the warrior ethos as physical courage. Wise SF leaders appreciate and welcome candor from the ranks. SF leaders expect SF warriors to stand up for what they believe is right, and they expect them to accept responsibility for their actions. As strategic assets deployed along the operational continuum in a global environment in support of national objectives, SF soldiers should exhibit the highest levels of personal and moral courage.

Dedication and commitment

Dedication and commitment are hallmarks of the warrior ethos. SF soldiers are dedicated and committed to upholding a standard of excellence that demands the best of their abilities. The SF warrior is

Photo by Carl Fountain

SF frequently deals with foreign military leaders and heads of state, and the integrity of SF soldiers must be beyond question.

dedicated to duty, honor and country and is committed to the mission and to his comrades. The warrior spirit has always been and shall always be an integral part of the SF culture.

German Major General Hasso von Manteuffel said, "Our honour lies in doing our duty toward our people and our fatherland as well as in the consciousness of our mutual obligation to keep faith with one another, so we can depend on each other. We must remember that, even in our technological age, it is a man's fighting spirit that ultimately decides between victory and defeat."[6]

Photo courtesy 7th SF Group

The 7th SF Group's Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course teaches combat marksmanship skills in an urban environment.

Commitment is also the act of dedicating oneself to seeing every task to completion and serving the values of the country, the Army and SF. SF soldiers are members of a team that functions well only when each member of the team accomplishes his individual assignment.

Leadership

It is critical that SF leaders be committed to doing their best to contribute to the Army, to train and develop their units, and to help their soldiers develop professionally and personally. The warrior spirit comes from SF leaders who are dedicated and committed to developing the will to fight and win through realistic and challenging training. SF soldiers who can overcome the physical factors of battle and who can apply the skill and knowledge they learned in training can overcome any opponent in combat. SF leaders can give their soldiers the will to win by setting the example, demonstrating the attitudes, establishing the expectations, and enforcing the standards. They can and must develop the will to win in themselves and in their soldiers.

Urbanization challenge

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. armed forces and their leadership have been contemplating the kind of force structure that will be required in an ever-changing, uncertain world. Will our nation's next war be waged on open deserts where there are relatively clear battle lines and where conventional maneuvers can be decisive? While the possibility certainly exists, it is more likely that our forces will be fighting future battles amid city walls, housing areas, complex road networks and a myriad of other supporting infrastructure associated with urbanization.

By the year 2010, the world's population — currently nearly six billion people — is expected to exceed seven billion. Of that population, approximately half will live in cities; only one-third of today's population does.[7] To make matters worse, approximately 95 percent of the population growth is expected to occur in developing countries, which are already facing financial hardship.

Urbanization places an enormous demand on a country's infrastructure, and it can diminish a country's ability to supply water, energy, housing and transportation. When a country is so weak that it cannot adequately supply basic human needs, its people will inevitably lose faith and confidence in it, and they may express their dissatisfaction through violent means. Because our National Military Strategy emphasizes "engagement" as a means of providing global leadership, maintaining stability and promoting democratic ideals, our armed forces are likely to encounter conflict in urbanized areas.

SFAUCC

One of the steps the U.S. Army Special Forces Command has taken to prepare its soldiers for urban combat is to develop the

Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC. This course prepares SF A-detachments to conduct an urban assault on a single-story, single-entry building consisting of several rooms. Soldiers gain skills from the SFAUCC that are applicable in a variety of SF missions, including direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterproliferation and combating terrorism. It is important to note that the SFAUCC is designed to train detachment collective tasks, not individual tasks.

The SFAUCC's program of instruction, or POI, includes 34 hours of combat marksmanship, 60 hours of advanced urban combat and 26 hours of general subjects. The combat-marksmanship segment provides extensive instruction on target engagement in an urban environment. Students gain proficiency in firing the M-9 pistol, the M-4 carbine and the shotgun. During the advanced urban combat segment, students conduct an urban raid and clear a single-room building, employing the shotgun as an alternate breaching device, and employing special explosives for urban combat. The general-subjects segment enhances the soldiers' ability to interdict designated targets. It includes planning; collecting information and fulfilling priority intelligence requirements; conducting individual searches; managing risk; running vehicle checkpoints; and climbing various types of structures.

Ten detachments from the 7th SF Group recently completed the SFAUCC's first and second iterations. The end-of-course critiques express the heightened morale as well as the warrior spirit among the graduates: *"Without a doubt, the SFAUCC was the best training I have received in 17 years in the Army and 10 years in Special Forces." "In over 17 years in the Army, I have attended many courses (U.S. and foreign), some hooah, some not. This course was by far the best." "It is what I came into Special Forces to do — be a warrior."*

During each course's numerous high-risk, live-fire maneuvers, students fired 110,000 rounds of 9-mm ammunition, 100,000 rounds of 5.56-mm ammunition, 1,375 shotgun shells, and more than 4,000 feet of shock tube. The experienced and highly skilled cadre, combined with an attentive and eager student body, produced realistic, interactive and challenging training that accurately simulates urban-combat scenarios.

Although the skills that the students acquired from the SFAUCC are important, the importance of the warrior spirit displayed by the students cannot be overstated. Without a doubt, the SFAUCC prepares SF detachments to meet the challenges of urban combat, and it gives them the confidence to lethally and discriminately engage any adversary. Sun Tzu says that the ancient Chinese described a clever fighter as one who not only wins, but who excels in winning with ease.[8]

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, regional instability has been the greatest threat to global security; in the future, this threat will grow, not diminish. As the U.S. and other countries face new challenges, SF will play an active role in maintaining regional stability and in deterring war.

But if deterrence should fail and our country calls on SF to help fight and win its wars, we will prevail because we will accept nothing less than victory. As General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said, "It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win it."[9]

Our warrior ethos is at the heart of our most valuable resource — quality soldiers. Preparing these soldiers through challenging and realistic training has always served SF well, and it will be our recipe for success in the future. The SFAUCC is the most recent example of such training. Not only does the SFAUCC hone soldiers' ability to engage adversaries in an urban environment — it nurtures the warrior spirit that motivates SF to focus on the U.S. military's core mission: to fight and win the nation's wars.

Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria is commander of the 7th SF Group. His other assignments include rifle platoon leader, mortar platoon leader and company executive officer in the 24th Infantry Division; A-detachment commander in the 10th

SF Group; assistant S-3, company commander and battalion executive officer in the 8th Battalion, 2nd Infantry Training Brigade; operations officer and chief of current operations in the 1st Special Operations Command; policy and strategy officer in the U.S. Special Operations Command; commander of the Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; G3 of the U.S. Army SF Command; and speechwriter/strategic analyst for the deputy chief of staff for operations, U.S. Army. Colonel Cambria is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, the SF Qualification Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Air War College. He holds a bachelor's degree in biology from Northeastern University, Boston, Mass., and a master's degree in business from Webster University.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Reeder is the deputy commander of the 7th SF Group. Commissioned through ROTC as an Infantry officer, he has served as an SF detachment commander, company commander, battalion S3, group S3, and group XO in the 7th SF Group. He also served as an adviser in El Salvador, as an operations officer in the Joint Special Operations Command, and as chief of J3 plans in the Joint Interagency Task Force-South. Lieutenant Colonel Reeder is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses and the Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor's degree from Appalachian State University and a master's degree from Central Michigan University.

Major James E. Kraft is the executive officer for the 7th SF Group. Commissioned through ROTC as an Infantry officer, he has served as an SF detachment commander and has commanded three companies in the 7th SF Group. He has also served as a JCS intern in the Special Operations Division and as a special-operations personnel systems and staff officer in the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He holds a bachelor's degree in general studies and law enforcement; and a master's degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College.

Notes:

[1] General Sir James Glover, "A Soldier and His Conscience," *Parameters*, September 1983, pp. 53-58.

[2] USSOCOM Public Affairs Office, *Special Operations Recipients of the Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross* (MacDill AFB, Fla.: U.S. Special Operations Command), p. 64.

[3] Soteki Waki, *Ideals of the Samurai: Writings of Japanese Warriors*, translation and introduction by William Scott Wilson, edited by Gregory N. Lee (Burbank, Calif.: Ohara Publications, 1982).

[4] Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1950).

[5] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[6] Major General Hasso von Manteufflel, as quoted in Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, *German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977).

[7] Remarks by John Gannon, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, to the Washington International Corporate Circle, 31 October 1997, "Global Economic Intelligence."

[8] http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.

[9] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Address to the Republican National Convention, 7 July 1952.

SF Core Values: The Final Cut

In the book *Built to Last*, James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras define core values as "The organization's essential and enduring tenets." That definition is the basis for the seven core values that have been approved for Special Forces by the commander of the Army Special Forces Command. The SF core values are the product of extensive dialogue within the SF community, including the 1999 SF Conference and two USASFC commander's conferences. With the approved list, SF commanders and leaders at all levels should strive to ensure that they and their subordinates exemplify these values in all their activities.

Special Forces Core Values

Warrior Ethos. Special Forces is a fraternity of warriors, the ultimate professionals in conducting special operations when the cause of freedom is challenged. The SF warrior tradition originates from SF's early roles in unconventional warfare and is exemplified by the SF motto, "De Oppresso Liber."

Professionalism. Special Forces soldiers provide the nation with a broad range of capabilities to address challenges to our national security and national interests. SF soldiers interface with high-level military commanders, country teams, ambassadors and heads of state. Through their actions and their range of technical and tactical skills, SF soldiers serve worldwide as operational and strategic assets.

Innovation. Special Forces soldiers are creative and inventive in accomplishing their missions through the judicious application of conventional and unconventional problem-solving. They solve problems imaginatively, developing the right solutions outside the constraints of institutional norms.

Versatility. Special Forces soldiers adapt quickly to rapidly changing environments, consistently operating and easily transitioning across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peace to war. SF is truly a capability-based organization, providing the widest range of capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.

Cohesion. The cohesion within an SF detachment enables it to withstand the most violent shocks and stresses of combat and to perform its duties under demanding circumstances, without definitive guidance, while accomplishing the commander's intent.

Character. SF soldiers understand the operational environment. They can be trusted to do the right thing and never to quit. SF soldiers recognize the political implications inherent in their missions. Knowing the cost of failure, they succeed against all odds.

Cultural Awareness. SF soldiers use interpersonal skills to work with all foreign cultures, gaining the trust, confidence and cooperation of the people by winning their hearts and minds. SF soldiers have a situational awareness that enables them to deploy worldwide and accomplish their missions in ambiguous and complex situations.

SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forces

by Colonel Michael Findlay

The nature of modern warfare and the theater-engagement plans of the United States demand that U.S. forces know how to operate as a joint team. No other forces require this particular knowledge more than U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF.

Even before a crisis occurs, SOF may be in the crisis area, and SOF may be part of whatever force is called upon to resolve the crisis, whether that force is a unilateral U.S. joint team or a multinational, interagency one. All of SOF, from Special Forces A-detachments to theater special-operations commands, should understand the issues facing decision-makers and the commanders and staffs of joint task forces, or JTFs. Understanding joint perspectives and joint requirements will enable SOF to better advise commanders on SOF considerations and to better support the operation.

SOF now has a joint command focused on supporting joint training in special operations. The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, or SOCJFCOM, supports both the training of conventional joint commanders and staffs in the employment of SOF, and the training of prospective commanders and staffs of joint special-operations task forces, or JSOTFs. SOCJFCOM has recently reorganized to form a SOF Joint Training Team, or SOF JTT, to support these training activities.

Located in Norfolk, Va., near the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, or JWFC, which supports the training of CINC staffs and JTF commanders and staffs, SOCJFCOM is well-situated to integrate SOF operations into the training of potential joint-force commanders and staffs. The SOCJFCOM can also support the training of JSOTFs and other joint SOF headquarters, and it can collect and share lessons learned in tactics, techniques and procedures from joint SOF operations worldwide.

In July 1998, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, requested that USJFCOM facilitate the USSOCOM mission of providing joint training to SOF headquarters and units. USJFCOM agreed, and now SOCJFCOM responds to the training needs identified both by conventional joint-force commanders and by joint SOF commanders.

USJFCOM responsibilities outlined in the USJFCOM Unified Command Plan and USSOCOM responsibilities outlined in Title 10, U.S. Code, thus establish the four major activities of SOCJFCOM:

- Support the training of joint-force commanders and staffs in SOF employment (responsibility of USJFCOM).
- Support the training of the commanders and staffs of JSOTFs, and in the future, of joint psychological-operations task forces, or JPOTFs (responsibility of USSOCOM).
- Provide realistic joint-training envi-

USJFCOM & USSOCOM Similarities



ronments within the continental U.S., or CONUS, for training of SOF (responsibility shared by USJFCOM and USSOCOM).

• Support joint integration through improved activities that blend doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and personnel, or DOTMLP, from the different military services in order to improve service interoperability and joint experimentation (responsibility shared by USJFCOM and USSOCOM).

Training JTF commanders

The SOF JTT works hand in hand with the JWFC, which annually supports approximately 15 joint exercises worldwide, within the priorities established by the respective regional CINCs. SOCJFCOM supports CINC staff and JTF headquarters training by providing academic seminars on SOF capabilities, limitations and employment considerations. It also provides observer-trainers who furnish additional training and feedback during the exercises or operations.

The SOF JTT's academic seminars give a brief overview of SOF capabilities and limitations before focusing on JTF considerations for SOF employment. SOF may be the primary means by which a regional CINC can achieve success in his theater-engagement plan. While the seminars recognize that SOF may be the CINC's force of choice for quickly responding to a crisis, training focuses on scenarios in which SOF is subordinate to a conventional JTF — these are the situations for which there is a need for more training. Training emphasizes the absolute applicability of joint doctrine in the employment of SOF by a joint-force commander, or JFC.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, identifies the four authorities of the JFC: the authority to assign missions; the authority to organize the force; the authority to organize the joint-operational area, or JOA; and the authority to direct required coordination. These four authorities constitute the legal basis for the JFC to employ SOF and all of his other forces. These authorities, however, are not absolute. A JFC's higher commander, normally a geographic CINC, can limit these

SOF JTT Primary Training Audience: JFCs and Staffs



authorities through numerous control measures. Rules of engagement (based on mission, policy and legal considerations) are a common control measure. Other control measures include the specifying of certain JTF task organizations (such as a JSOTF); retaining CINC-level control of certain forces or activities (e.g., SOF and some compartmented intelligence activities); and retaining mission-approval authority for certain activities. While the extent of each authority varies with the situation, SOF JTT training addresses all four authorities in their absolute sense in order to provide a less complex operational construct.

Authority to assign missions. JTFs are normally established by a geographic CINC for the conduct of major operations, such as offensive and defensive operations, air interdiction, and theater missile defense. The JFC's concept of operations arranges these major operations either sequentially or simultaneously. SOF may be a key player (or possibly the main player) during the early phases of an operation. However, JTT training focuses more on the ways that SOF can support the JFC's concept of operations than it does on unilateral SOF missions. In discussing what SOF can do to complement the JFC's major operations, the SOF JTT emphasizes feasibility — the principle of not allowing enthusiasm to override a realistic appreciation of what SOF *can do* within its capabilities.

Authority to organize the force. The SOF JTT training emphasizes that when the JTF commander organizes the JTF, he must consider two factors above all: task organization and command relationships.

In turning a force list into a task organization, the JTF commander must make several key decisions. SOF JTT training concentrates on the SOF-specific decisions by:

- Emphasizing that SOF are normally task-organized and that they are located throughout the JTF organization.
- Noting the advantages in placing most Civil Affairs and tactical psychological operations, or PSYOP, units under the operational control, or OPCON, of the ground-force commanders — Army forces and Marine forces — and of establishing JPOTFs subordinate to the JTF.
- Highlighting the role of Naval Special Warfare task units (SEALs and special-boat assets) that habitually support carrier battle groups and amphibious-ready groups.
- Pointing out that AC-130s and other SOF aviation assets may temporarily fall under the tactical control, or TACON, of the joint-force air-component commander, or JFACC, for specific missions, such as close air support and joint combat search and rescue.
- Noting that, almost without exception, the JFC forms a JSOTF in order to provide centralized control of special operations.

The second factor that the JTF commander must consider in the organization

of the JTF is command relationships. During the past five years, the appreciation for the value of supported and supporting command relationships has grown significantly, both in joint doctrine and in real-world operations. Guided by joint doctrine and lessons learned, SOF JTT training emphasizes that in order to achieve effective, synergistic joint operations, JFCs should consider all possible command relationships, including the relationship between the supported commander and the supporting commander.

Appreciation of the relationship between the supported commander and the supporting commander has allowed U.S. forces to advance the concept of joint warfare beyond an elementary and fractured component-warfare perspective (with continual changes of OPCON and TACON) toward a more coherent perspective of a single force in which all components work together to accomplish the mission.

This coherent perspective takes full advantage of the services' core competencies. It also reinforces a precept of joint warfare: It is better to allow the services to employ their own forces than it is to fragment those forces or to place them under the operational control of commanders who may not have the expertise to employ them to their full potential. The perspective also supports a SOF principle noted in Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*: Employ SOF through a SOF chain of command in order to maintain expertise in planning and execution.

The keys to successfully maintaining the relationship between the supported commander and the supporting commander lie in the details. From the outset, the JFC must clearly establish:

- The scope of the support and of the authority of both the supported commander and the supporting commander;
- The reporting and liaison requirements of the supported commander and the order in which the supported commander will prioritize his mission needs;
- The means by which the supporting commander will ascertain and fulfill the mission needs of the supported commander.

There are two key enablers to the relationship between the supported commander and the supporting commander: the liaison officers who help identify the supported commander's needs, and elements such as the special-operations command-and-control element that facilitate support and enable responsive reporting to a supported commander.

The designations "supported commander" and "supporting commander" may change from one phase of an operation to

Photo by Willis Pelton

A soldier from the 10th SF Group administers first aid to a civilian role player during an exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La.

SOF JTT Secondary Training Audience: JSOTFs and JPOTFs



another, or even during the phases and specific activities. But if the JFC establishes a clear understanding of his intent and his priorities, he will be able to bring the full capabilities of the joint force to bear on mission accomplishment.

The emphasis on the relationship between the supported commander and the supporting commander does not, however, rule out the exercise of TACON of SOF by non-SOF commanders. When the situation warrants, either the JFC or the JSOTF commander may place SOF under the TACON of another commander. For example, the JFC or the JSOTF commander may change control of SOF if the gaining commander has a long-term need for the SOF support; if the gaining commander has the requisite expertise to control the SOF; or if the mission does not require additional SOF support or centralized SOF control. The bottom line is that the JFC has the authority to organize his joint force as he deems necessary.

Authority to organize the JOA. The SOF JTT training briefly addresses the fact that a JFC has the authority to establish joint special-operations areas, or JSOAs, in much the same way that he establishes areas of operation, or AOs, for the land- and naval-component commanders.

Authority to direct required coordination. The JFC's authority to direct required coordination entails establishing any boards and centers that are needed for planning and controlling operations and for establishing a battle rhythm. The JSOTF commander's involvement in the JFC's planning process is critical to ensuring that SOF is responsive to the operations of the JTF. SOF JTT training emphasizes that early SOF involvement in the planning process helps clarify priorities and levels of mission-approval authority, thereby enhancing the JSOTF's support of the JTF.

Training JSOTFs

Because the theater SOCs have the responsibility and the expertise to form and to operate JSOTFs, the SOF JTT focuses on satisfying the training requirements of the theater SOCs. With the support of General Peter Schoomaker, commander in chief of USSOCOM, the SOF JTT has familiarized the theater SOCs with the JSOTF-training mission. In turn, the SOCs have identified their training needs and have

contributed their ideas about how and when SOCJFCOM might support their training requirements.

SOF JTT emphasizes the concept of nesting JSOTF training within existing CINC exercises — at both the CINC and the JTF levels. The JWFC provides a range of support to CINC exercises, from minimal assistance in exercise development to a full support package that provides the CINC staff with help in designing the exercise scenario, setting up planning conferences, developing the exercise script, managing the exercise control group, and conducting an after-action analysis. The SOF JTT provides experienced SOF personnel to augment the JWFC training team. During the exercise, SOF personnel help train conventional-force commanders and staffs about SOF capabilities and the best methods of employing them — in essence, they provide a SOF user's manual for the exercise. SOF augmentation also provides conventional forces with a better understanding of SOF and allows SOF personnel to work as a JSOTF with the conventional components of a JTF during a joint exercise. All of this assistance requires a minimal investment of SOF resources. The training-team concept not only ensures that the JSOTF is operating in a realistic environment, it also facilitates the further integration of SOF into the joint, multinational and interagency environments.

SOCJFCOM is not yet fully capable of providing an entire menu of JSOTF training; it is still developing academic seminars and staff exercises, and gaining experience in training. However, with the aid of lessons learned and with the input from the SOCs, SOCJFCOM has identified several areas of JSOTF training that can enhance SOF operations:

• *An understanding of joint warfare from the JTF perspective*. How better to succeed than by understanding your boss's concerns, priorities and perspectives? JSOTFs should know how to operate within the battle rhythm of a JTF headquarters, with its associated joint boards (e.g., the joint target-coordination board and the intelligence-collection synchronization board), its groups (such as the joint planning group), its centers and its cells.

• *Component requirements*. JSOTFs must understand the needs of the other compo-

Joint Special Operations Task Force Training Capability



Fake SCUD missiles await the start of joint-service exercise Roving Sands 97. The exercise included a search for SCUD missile sites.

Photo by Marv Lynchard

nents of a joint force. Components such as the JFACC and the Army forces may often be designated as supported commanders.

• *Mission planning*. SOF mission planning can responsively support the needs of both the JFC and the supported commanders. SOCJFCOM is involved with USSOCOM's Missions, Planning, Analysis, Rehearsal and Execution Initiative, and with other joint-planning initiatives, in an effort to improve the joint-planning process.

• *Information management*. We must ensure that knowledge is shared efficiently and effectively throughout the JSOTF. To that end, SOCJFCOM is pursuing initiatives of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence. It is also developing a JSOTF web page that will be much like the web pages developed by the JWFC, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force.

Providing CONUS joint training

The best joint training of SOF occurs in JCS exercises led by geographic CINCs. In these exercises, SOF operates under a realistic chain of command in a realistic environment. However, real-world operations, cost prohibitions and scheduling conflicts may prevent some CONUS SOF units from participating in JCS exercises on a regular basis. These units maintain their proficiency by participating in CONUS joint SOF training.

In addition to the CONUS joint SOF training provided by the services (the Battle Command Training Program, the Air Force's Blue Flag theater exercise series, and exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center), USJFCOM sponsors several joint command-post exercises, or CPXs, and field-training exercises, or FTXs, each year. CPXs such as the Unified Endeavor, or UE, series are simulation-driven JTF and component training exercises. The UE series offers excellent opportunities for theater SOCs to exercise their JSOTF skills in a demanding and realistic environment.

USJFCOM also sponsors three joint FTXs each year. These FTXs, which include Roving Sands (a theater-missile-defense simulation exercise) and the series of JTF exercises sponsored by the Navy's 2nd Fleet, provide CONUS SOF with a realistic joint environment. SOCJFCOM is resourced to form and to operate a JSOTF in one of the exercises each year. However, in hopes of providing for additional SOF-unit participation in the other two exercises, SOCJFCOM is researching an option that would allow it to train and to augment selected CONUS SOF units in basic JSOTF headquarters procedures. This training, if implemented, would not be used to validate the unit's proficiency to operate as a JSOTF. Instead, it would provide an efficient and effective means of increasing the opportu-

nities for SOF to receive joint training in CONUS. As a by-product of the training, a pool of SOF personnel would be available to augment an operational JSOTF headquarters when necessary.

SOCJFCOM is already supporting the efforts of the Naval Special Warfare Group-Two, or NSWG-2, to increase the opportunity for Naval special-warfare personnel to become more proficient in joint operations before they deploy to theater. SOCJFCOM has agreed to train the NSWG-2 headquarters personnel and augmentees in basic JSOTF headquarters procedures; to assist the NSWG-2 staff by providing joint expertise; to assist in the designing of and the controlling of exercises; and to provide observer-trainers during the exercises. Army and Air Force SOF could benefit from the same kinds of pre-deployment training initiatives.

Supporting joint integration

The unified commands are responsible for ensuring interoperability and jointness of their forces. SOCJFCOM's perspective, gained from working with prospective commanders and staffs of both JTFs and JSOTFs, can contribute to this effort.

One of the most important aspects of interoperability is joint experimentation — the process of collecting, developing and exploring concepts in order to identify and recommend DOTMLP solutions that may achieve significant advances in joint operational capabilities. In seeking to increase the effectiveness of the joint force, USJFCOM and USSOCOM share a common experimentation objective: that of improving the concepts of situational awareness and the common relevant operational picture; joint interactive planning; and attack operations against critical mobile targets.

SOCJFCOM reviews all of USJFCOM's conceptual documents; possesses a working knowledge of the ongoing USJFCOM experimentation program; and is heavily involved with the multiservice, collaborative-planning-tool experiment Millennium Challenge. SOCJFCOM assists USJFCOM and USSOCOM experimentation programs by sharing a user perspective on a project's effectiveness for the joint force.

Conclusion

The SOF community and the joint community are making great strides toward achieving more efficient joint warfighting. Both communities recognize the requirement for even more coherent warfighting, not only in the joint world, but also in multinational and interagency operations. Thanks to the vision and the cooperation of the commanders of both USSOCOM and USJFCOM, SOCJFCOM is in the right place at the right time to support our war fighters — the CINCs, the SOCs and the conventional JTF commanders.

Colonel Michael Findlay is commander of the Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command, located in Norfolk, Va. His previous assignments include commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group; and senior SOF observer-controller for the Army Battle Command Training Program. Colonel Findlay is a recent graduate of the Army Fellowship Program at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

ARSOF War Game IV: Assessing ARSOF's Contribution to Regional Engagement

by Charles C. Faulkner III

In January 2000, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School conducted Army Special Operations Forces War Game IV as part of a continuing effort to understand the challenges that ARSOF may face in the future.

An integral part of the Army After Next, or AAN, project, ARSOF War Game IV provided a means of studying the ways that ARSOF will interact with Army conventional forces in future peacetime-engagement, crisis-response and war-fighting operations.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, initiated the AAN project at Fort Monroe, Va., in February 1996 to guide the Army's thinking into the mid- and long-range future. AAN was designed to take a conceptual look at the strategy, technology, organizations and military art that might influence national defense and the Army between 2010 and 2025.

New Army vision

In October 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army published a new vision for the Army. The Army Transformation vision describes an Army force that will be responsive, deployable, agile, sustainable, versatile, lethal and survivable. The future Army force will have the following:

- The ability to deliver a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours; a division in 120 hours; and five divisions in 30 days.
- A common design for all divisions; and internetted capabilities for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or C^{4}ISR.
- A systems-of-systems approach to logistics, as well as a reduced logistics footprint.
- An Army service-component command capable of serving as commander of the Army forces, or ARFOR, and as the joint-force land-component commander, or JFLCC; Corps headquarters capable of serving as the headquarters for the JFLCC, ARFOR and joint task force.
- Common vehicle platforms that are 50- to 70-percent lighter and capable of surviving fighting in the fore and close battle areas.
- The ability to transition rapidly through the full spectrum of mission requirements without a loss of momentum.
- "Reach-back" capabilities that will provide CONUS-based support for forward-deployed forces.

The Army Transformation strategy focuses on the concepts and design necessary to transform the current Army force into an interim force and finally into the objective force with the capabilities stated in the Army vision.

ARSOF War Game IV

The purpose of ARSOF War Game IV was to assess the ways that ARSOF might interact with the far-term Army force in

regional engagement (see *Special Warfare*, Fall 1998). To help focus the analysis, the Army Special Operations Battle Lab developed the following research questions:

- How might ARSOF support the operations of the far-term force in 2025?
- How might ARSOF help the far-term force attain information superiority?
- How might ARSOF help the far-term force enter a theater of operations?
- How might ARSOF help the far-term force better coordinate with allied and coalition forces?

ARSOF War Game IV differed from its predecessors in two ways: First, it was conducted at Collins Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., rather than at Fort Bragg.

Second, its scenario was the same one used during the spring 1999 AAN War Game — a major theater of war circa 2020-25. The scenario for ARSOF War Game III (see *Special Warfare*, Winter 1999) focused on an intrastate conflict.

The 60 players who attended ARSOF War Game IV represented various military and government agencies, including U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S. Army Special Operations Command; TRADOC; U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command; U.S. Army Special Forces Command; 75th Ranger Regiment; Department of the Air Force; Department of State; U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency; U.S Marine Corps; Navy SOF and Air Force SOF. Several retired ARSOF and conventional-force general officers also attended.

ARSOF War Game IV was a seminar war game. For the first two days, the blue (friendly) team developed the theater SOF plans. On the first day, the blue team focused on the theater-engagement plan. On the second day, it focused on the theater battlespace-preparation plan.

On the third and fourth days, seven gray teams (representing SF; CA; PSYOP; reserve components, or RC; intelligence, regional-engagement forces, and interagency concerns) used the blue team's plans to identify issues and to develop proposals for future changes in the areas of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldiers, or DTLOMS. The gray teams' proposals include the following:

Special Forces. Leader-development training for SF soldiers needs to be more sophisticated. In addition, future operations will require SF to work with an increasing variety of government and nongovernment agencies. SF soldiers will require additional knowledge and skills, which they could acquire from various sources, including an SF advanced course, nontraditional schooling, embassy assignments and interagency internships.

SF units must be capable of supporting the overall information-operations, or IO, campaign and of being integrated into the intelligence-fusion, or IF, process. SF should examine the training requirements for IO, IF, computer network attack/defense and systems engineering.

Future operations will require SF to work with an increasing variety of government and nongovernment agencies. SF soldiers will require additional knowledge and skills, which they could acquire from various sources, including an SF advanced course, nontraditional schooling, embassy assignments and interagency internships.

Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs elements must possess a flexible information architecture that can accommodate interagency forces and coalition composite forces. Information-sharing will be essential in developing synergy among nontraditional civil, political and business elements.

Civil Affairs elements must be capable of planning, budgeting and expending funds in support of civilian-sector relief and in support of development projects across the operational spectrum. CA elements can make a significant contribution to regional engagement if they are fully and pragmatically integrated into the strategies for IO and for joint targeting.

Psychological operations. The demand for PSYOP support will increase during regional-engagement activities. The design

and structure of the current PSYOP force may be inadequate to support future regional-engagement operations. The U.S. should consider developing strategic-level PSYOP planners for IO integration.

Reserve components. Manning for regional-engagement activities requires an innovative use of RC personnel. RC issues include the accessibility of RC forces for peacetime engagement; information management and connectivity with RC forces; multi-component teams; and the use of reach-back support to provide expertise to deployed RC forces.

The ARSOF War Game IV revalidated the observations made during ARSOF War Game III: Namely, that forward-deployed engagement forces provide the theater commander in chief with the capability to strategically shape the operational environment. Forward-deployed forces can also provide information about hostile forces, and they can provide a means of facilitating the introduction of ground forces into the area of operations.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School input lessons learned from ARSOF War Game IV into the Army Transformation War Game in May 2000. SWCS will continue to participate in the Army's AAN project and will continue to conduct analyses and to identify issues and insights for ARSOF DTLOMS. Through these efforts, we are committed to providing ARSOF with the capabilities that will ensure their dominance in future operations of peacetime engagement, crisis-response, and war fighting.

Charles C. Faulkner III is chief of the Concepts and Capabilities Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Army Special Operations Battle Lab. After retiring from the Army as an Infantry officer in 1984, he served in the Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, at SWCS until October 1992. From October 1992 until June 1995, he was chief of the Concepts and Studies Branch, Concepts and Plans Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. From June 1995 until June 1996, Faulkner served as chief of the Plans, Assessment and Requirements Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration, USASOC.

Army Values

Integrity

Ray Peers

William R. "Ray" Peers demonstrated unwavering integrity and superb leadership as the commander of Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services in China and Burma during World War II. He was responsible for thousands of U.S. and Burmese soldiers and guerrillas during the most successful guerrilla war ever conducted by Americans.

Trusted with huge sums of cash and equipment by the OSS, Peers made the most of every asset given him in order to pursue his mission: to drive the Japanese out of Burma. His men trusted him implicitly.

Near the end of his distinguished military career, Lieutenant General Peers faced the greatest challenge to his integrity while serving as chairman of the commission investigating the alleged massacre of South Vietnamese villagers by U.S. soldiers at My Lai. Under considerable pressure from both the media and the military hierarchy, Peers was unwavering. He was determined to discover the truth, no matter who was implicated, and to present his recommendations to the Army. Peers let the chips fall where they might, naming dozens of Army officers and soldiers whom he believed should be held accountable for their actions. After the investigation, even those who disagreed with his recommendations never questioned his integrity.

Peers retired shortly after the commission adjourned, confident that he had lived up to his own sense of integrity and that he had told the truth, regardless of the cost to the Army or to his own career. — *Dr. Richard Stewart*

Courtesy USASOC Archives

Ray Peers

The 2000 Special Forces Conference: Looking Back to Chart the Future

In March, the Special Warfare Center and School hosted the 2000 Special Forces Conference and Exposition in Fayetteville, N.C., bringing together members of the SF community to chart SF's vision of the future.

The SWCS commander, Major General William G. Boykin, intended for the conference's symposiums and workshops to yield recommendations that will contribute to the continuing process of change and evolution in Special Forces. This year's conference was a joint effort by SWCS; the National Defense Industrial Association, or NDIA; the Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC; and the Special Forces Association.

The four organizations synchronized their efforts to appeal to SF personnel in all grades, to SF-qualified personnel in non-SF units, and to SF retirees. As in 1999, the conference was held at a large hotel/convention center in Fayetteville, which provided an ideal facility for the conference's diverse activities.

A number of Army and SOF senior leaders, both active-duty and retired, attended the 2000 conference. Among the key speakers were Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Brian Sheridan, who spoke on "Special Forces: A Viable Relevant Force in Support of National Policy"; John Rendon, chief executive officer of the Rendon Group, who spoke on "Information in the Information Age"; Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., commandant of the Army War College, who discussed "Revolution in Military Affairs and Future Warfare Trends"; Major General Geoffrey Lambert, director of the U.S. Special Operations Command's Center for Operations, Plans and Policy, who spoke on "The Future of Special Forces"; and Retired Brigadier General Wayne Hall, who spoke on "Future Warfare Information Operations and Technology."

Also in attendance were Lieutenant General William Tangney, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, who spoke on "The Future of Army Special Operations"; and Brigadier General John Scales, acting commander of the Army SF Command, who spoke on "Keeping Special Forces Relevant in a Changing Army."

Activities began on March 13 with the Special Forces Open Classic golf tournament. During the next three days (March 14-16), the conference conducted a number of concurrent activities: three symposiums, two workshops and the NDIA exposition.

The symposiums supported the conference theme, "Looking Back to Chart the Future." The first symposium, "Historical Validation of Special Forces Combat Skills, Values, Attributes and Organization," sought to identify, through historical examples, the skills, attributes and organization that have made Special Forces the unique entity that it is today. The second symposium, "Defining the Future of Special

Forces in a Changing Global Environment," sought to develop the intellectual foundation for SF during peacetime engagement, during crisis-response situations and in war-fighting operations; and to define the operational capabilities that SF may require during the period 2005-20. The third symposium, "Augmenting Special Forces Capabilities Through Technology Integration," sought to examine the impact of technology on SF and to define SF's future technological requirements.

All three symposiums followed the same agenda: A briefing presented by the moderator or a speech delivered by one of the guest speakers served as a catalyst for discussion. Following each symposium, the moderator fielded comments from the audience and directed questions to a panel of active-duty and retired members of the SF community.

The workshops, conducted March 14 and 15, were designed to gain input from SF personnel in the grades of staff sergeant through master sergeant, WO1 through CW3, and captains and majors. The first workshop, "Impacts on Special Forces Readiness by the Emergence of Knowledge Management," sought to develop a vision of the way SF will employ information-technology systems and how SF will operate in the knowledge-management era. The second workshop, "Retention and Recruiting: Keeping Soldiers in Past 20," brought together current SF command sergeants major and SF-qualified former sergeants major of the Army to discuss the Branch's difficulty in retaining senior NCOs past their 20-year point. Workshop participants sought to develop recommendations and incentives that SF might adopt to encourage senior enlisted personnel to remain on active duty more than 20 years.

The NDIA exposition, which required no soldier support from SWCS, featured the displays of 85 vendors. Conference attendees were also invited to participate in a vendor-sponsored live-fire of selected weapons, held on Fort Bragg's Range 44.

Each day of the conference ended with a social event: On the first evening, the NDIA hosted a social for all conference participants. The SF Association hosted a barbecue on the second evening. And on the third evening, the conference concluded with the SF Ball.

The 2000 SF Conference continued the standard set by the 1999 conference. Like its predecessor, the 2000 SF Conference focused on complex issues and developed recommendations that may benefit the entire SF community in the future. With its relevant agenda, the inclusion of the experiences and opinions of current and former SF operators, and the professional advice offered by senior leaders in military and government circles, the 2000 SF Conference made a valuable contribution to the ongoing and critical evolution of Special Forces.

This article was prepared by the staff of Special Warfare.

SATMO: Valuable Part of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program

by Major William Nase

On any given day, the United States has approximately 200 personnel deployed worldwide on security-assistance missions. Security assistance, designed to achieve global security by providing advice and equipment to developing nations, is a valuable part of the overall U.S. foreign-assistance program. Since the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization, or SATMO, has assembled, prepared, deployed and supported security-assistance teams, or SATs, operating outside the continental U.S., or OCONUS.

SATMO is the single source for providing SATs and training-related support to U.S. security-assistance organizations, such as military groups and offices of military cooperation. These organizations carry out U.S. foreign and national-security policies by providing military assistance, equipment and training to developing nations to help them become self-sufficient.

SATMO is an element of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, which is headquartered at Fort Monroe, Va. SATMO and the Security Assistance Training Field Activity, or SATFA, make up TRADOC's Security Assistance Training Directorate. SATFA is responsible for all security-assistance training in the continental U.S., or CONUS, and has overall financial management responsibility for all Army security-assistance training. SATMO is attached to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, which provides SATMO with operational oversight as well as administrative and logistics support.

SATs are composed of soldiers and civilians drawn from Army organizations located within CONUS. In assembling the teams, SATMO is authorized direct coordination with CONUS and overseas commands and has broad tasking authority over all CONUS-based Army assets.

From Jan. 1, 1999, through November 1999, SATMO deployed 297 SATs (involving 634 personnel) to 47 countries. Of the 297 SATs, 34 were Special Forces-specific and required 103 SF soldiers.

Funding

Funding for SATs is provided in part through U.S. government programs such as the Foreign Military Financing Program, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the International Military Education Training Program, and the 506A2 Presidential Drawdown. These programs provide funding to eligible countries to assist them in self-defense, in counterdrug operations, and in promoting democracy and human rights. With the exception of 506A2, the funding is provided by congressional allocation. Under the authority of 506A2, the U.S. president can direct an organization to provide equipment, sup-

The Security Assistance Training Management Organization



plies and personnel to a foreign government. The losing organization is responsible for the associated costs.

Another source of funding, Foreign Military Sales, is a nonappropriated program through which eligible foreign governments can purchase defense equipment and request training assistance from the U.S. government. The purchasing government pays all costs associated with a sale, including the cost of the training-assistance teams.

Restrictions

In accordance with U.S. public law, all U.S. government personnel performing security-assistance tasks and functions in a foreign country are under the direction and supervision of the U.S. ambassador in that country. SAT personnel are not issued combat gear or weapons. Federal laws and agreements with foreign governments prohibit SAT personnel from participating in combat operations or in cross-border deployments.

Organization

SATMO is divided into a command section and two divisions: the Security Assistance Support Division, or SASD, and the Security Assistance Training Division, or SATD.

The SASD develops, coordinates and executes support operations in order to provide each deploying team with funding, supplies, equipment and an information-management capability.

The SASD consists of a personnel-management section, the Resource Management Branch, the Logistics Branch and the Information Management Branch. The Resource Management Branch manages SATMO's annual budget, which includes $25 million allocated for SATs and approximately $700,000 allocated for administrative costs.

The Logistics Branch manages SATMO's property at Fort Bragg and ensures that deploying soldiers have all required equipment, uniforms, training aids, etc.

The Information Management Branch maintains dozens of telephone lines, several message servers, a large amount of automation equipment, and a database that can be accessed at a moment's notice by multiple users.

The SATD is responsible for the overall management of the training missions. It assists SATMO's "customers" with their mission analysis; it also forms, prepares, deploys and redeploys SATs. SATD's SAT managers are involved in every aspect of a mission. They fulfill the roles of planners, trainers, logisticians and politicians. Their goal is to make sure that the training missions run smoothly. The role of a SAT manager begins when he receives a projected SAT request from the security-assistance

officer, or SAO, in a foreign country. (The SAO is the senior U.S. military person assigned to a foreign country.)

Notification

As the duties of SAT missions vary, so does the time required for their completion. Some missions, such as extended training service specialists and technical-assistance field teams, require more than 180 days to complete and involve permanent-change-of-station, or PCS, assignments. Other missions, including mobile training teams, requirements-survey teams, technical-assistance teams, and predeployment site surveys, can be performed in 180 days or less and involve temporary-duty, or TDY, assignments.

File photo

Since the 1970s, SATMO has been deploying security-assistance teams worldwide to provide training in support of U.S. national-security policies.

The SAO submits a request for a projected PCS mission 18 months prior to deployment; for a projected TDY mission, the SAO submits the projected SAT requirement 12 months prior to deployment. After receiving the request, the SAT manager begins to develop the mission-cost estimate that he will provide to SATFA. SATFA uses the estimate as a guide in preparing the letter of offer and acceptance, or LOA. The LOA is the contractual agreement between the U.S. government and the country requesting the SAT.

At a later date, the SAO transmits a call-up message, either to SATFA or to SATMO, formally requesting a SAT. A thoroughly prepared call-up message includes a detailed mission statement and a list of the training goals. The message states the duration of the SAT mission and the date on which the SAT is to be in country. It outlines what the team's composition should be; any special qualifications the team should have; and whether the team members should be of a specific rank. It also addresses the training locations; transportation; who is to be trained; the support that the host nation will provide; uniform and equipment requirements; the availability of quarters; provisions for medical and dental support; and any restrictions that will be placed on the team.

If the SAT mission involves a PCS assignment, the call-up message is transmitted nine months prior to deployment. If the mission involves a TDY assignment, the call-up message is generally submitted six months prior to deployment.

After the SAT manager receives the call-up message, he coordinates with the SAO to ensure that all requirements — training aids, publications, equipment, materials, billeting, transportation, training locations and necessary translators — have been identified and will be provided prior to the deployment date.

SAT requests can sometimes be complex, and the SAT manager must ensure that every aspect of the mission has been resolved before the team deploys. For example, the SAO in a foreign country may request a technical-assistance team to conduct technical inspections of all the country's wheeled and tracked vehicles. The country may have 1,000 vehicles in its inventory and may be asking for four personnel for 10 days. The SAT manager must contact the SAO to ascertain vehicle densities, vehicle locations, travel times between sites, and the focus of the inspection.

Next, the SAT manager contacts subject-matter experts at various locations throughout CONUS to determine whether the team's composition is appropriate, based on the length of time that has been allotted for the mission. Once the team's composition and the duration of the mission have been established, the SAT manager, with assistance from SATFA, performs a cost analysis. The SAT manager determines the costs of all elements of the mission, including expenses that may not have been consid-

ered in the cost estimate, such as itinerary changes, requirements for extra manuals or equipment, or additional host-nation support. Once completed, the cost analysis is sent to SATFA for inclusion in the LOA.

SATMO cannot authorize any expenditure of funds until the LOA has been signed and SATMO has received the funding-obligation authority. Once the mission has been funded, the obligating authority is passed from the Defense Finance Accounting System through SATFA to SATMO. This process normally takes 3-6 weeks after the funds have been deposited and the program data have been received at TRADOC.

Personnel selection

To meet a TDY SAT requirement, SATMO is authorized to task all CONUS major commands (e.g., TRADOC centers and activities, the Army Special Operations Command, the Army Forces Command). If a command is unable to support the tasking, a general officer at the major-command level must approve the notification of nonsupport. If none of the commands can support the tasking, the tasking is submitted to the Department of the Army for a decision. PERSCOM nominates personnel for PCS SAT assignments and provides the information to SATMO.

After SATMO receives the nominations, the SAT manager contacts and interviews each soldier, selects the most qualified ones, and notifies all of those selected.

Once SATMO receives the funding-obligation authority from SATFA, the SAT manager provides deployment instructions to the team members' units and installations for the preparation of TDY orders. For the preparation of PCS orders, the SAT manager provides deployment instructions to PERSCOM. Deployment instructions include passport and visa requirements; special authorizations; financial, transportation and medical instructions; and any training requirements that the SAT members must meet prior to their deployment.

Training

The Department of the Army has directed that all SAT members must attend the Security Assistance Team Training and Orientation Course, or SATTOC, at Fort Bragg. During this three-day course, SAT members attend a country orientation, intelligence-and-threat classes and briefings on various mission considerations — public affairs; legal matters; fraud, waste, and abuse; and medical concerns. They also receive Code of Conduct training and instruction in survival, evasion, resistance and escape. SAT members who are deploying to high-risk areas may be required to attend a weapons orientation and range firings.

SAT managers must have a definitive understanding of the specific rules and guidelines that apply to passports and visas. Some of the soldiers who are deploying on a PCS assignment may be required to travel with a diplomatic passport, while others may be required to travel with an official passport. Soldiers may need to apply for these documents weeks or even months prior to deployment. In many cases, these documents are delivered directly to SATMO and are distributed to the soldiers upon their arrival at Fort Bragg.

After returning from a mission, SAT members usually prepare an after-action report, in which they discuss the conduct of the mission, the degree of mission success, the number of personnel trained, any problems encountered during the mission, and whether the team received its required support. After completing the after-action report and submitting it to the SAO, the SAT members either return to their home stations or deploy to their next assignment.

In support of foreign-policy objectives, the U.S. may deploy military teams to assist developing nations by providing equipment and training. These teams may be of various sizes; the length and the intent of their missions may vary greatly; and they may be found in parts of the world as disparate as Saudi Arabia, Honduras, Estonia, Egypt, Colombia or Kuwait. Yet despite their differences, these teams have one thing in common: They have been assembled, trained and deployed by SATMO, which for nearly 30 years has been a valuable, if little-known, part of the U.S. foreign-assistance program.

Major William Nase is a security-assistance team manager in SATMO.

Review Essay

MACV SOG: New Books Reveal Vietnam's 'Secret War'

by Colonel J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.)

The Studies and Observation Group, or SOG, of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, operated in secrecy for eight years during the Vietnam War. At its height, SOG had a strength of some 2,000 Americans. Despite the considerable number of soldiers who cycled through SOG, the existence of the unit and its specific activities remained, if not secret, at least largely unknown.[1]

Recent declassification of SOG's surviving records has allowed researchers to delve into SOG's history, and four recent books help to dispel some of the fog surrounding SOG's activities.

Although SOG was a joint organization, its leaders and its largest component were Army. Overwhelmingly, the Army component was composed of Special Forces soldiers, who were for most of SOG's existence assigned to the 5th SF Group for purposes of administration and cover.

A high percentage of the SF soldiers who were awarded Medals of Honor during Vietnam were operators in SOG. The organization also included a disproportionate number of the SF operators who were killed or wounded in action, and of those who still remain in the missing-in-action/body-not-recovered category.[2]

SOG's principal mission, cross-border reconnaissance, was at the time unique, and it was new to SF. Largely as a result of SOG's achievements in Vietnam, deep reconnaissance has become part of the SF mission lexicon.[3] Because of the size and the long duration of the SF commitment, and because of the later migration of the reconnaissance mission, the histories of SOG and SF are forever intertwined. The history of SOG would not be complete without recognizing the major SF contribution, and the history of SF in Southeast Asia would not be complete without including the SOG experience.

During its existence, SOG drew SF personnel from all grades and from all the SF groups. The collective combat experience of SOG was extensive: A few of the senior officers and NCOs had World War II experience; a sizable number had Korean War service; a large majority had served in Laos or in Vietnam during earlier tours. Not all of its members, however, were salty veterans. As early as 1966, the reconnaissance teams could boast of a couple of very junior soldiers, Specialists Four Goth and Keller. Later, SOG's ranks would include Captain William P. Tangney and 1st Lieutenant Kenneth R. Bowra.

Most SOG soldiers had signed affidavits to be silent about the organization and its operations, and long after SOG had ceased to operate, they remained silent save amongst themselves. Even after the end of the war, accounts of their operations rarely appeared in print, except for one not widely popular novel. Surprisingly, SOG remained obscure despite the efforts of hostile congressmen intent on exposing it to the media in order to embarrass the administration. The intensity of the congressmen's hostility was matched only by their lack of concern for the lives of the soldiers they sought to expose.

For many years, SOG veterans, particularly those who had served in the few sensitive positions that permitted them to peer into the organization's numerous isolated compartments, wanted to see the history of SOG written. The motivations for their desire varied.

Some wanted to see their dedicated and often heroic service recognized. Others wanted to see the historical records culled for operational lessons that would be applicable in current or future conflicts. Still others undoubtedly just wanted to show their families what they were part of during their war service. The desires of the veterans were frustrated by the classification of SOG's surviving records and by the scarcity of authors who were sufficiently interested in the subject to fight for declassification of the hoary records.[4]

John Plaster's widely acclaimed book of three years ago, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam*,[5] created a degree of public awareness of and interest in SOG that had not existed earlier.

This year, three other books have followed Plaster's seminal work. Between them, they largely dissipate the fog that has surrounded SOG. One, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, by Richard Shultz,[6] is an overall analysis of SOG and its activities. The other two present narrower views of SOG. *Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam*, by Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andradé,[7] concentrates, as its title indicates, strictly on operations into North Vietnam. Plaster's *SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars*[8] largely follows the pattern of his earlier book. It presents a general view of SOG and its operations, giving its most generous and detailed treatment to the reconnaissance operations in Laos and Cambodia. Incidentally, the reader should not be misled by the title. Although the book contains hundreds of pictures and can be quite properly described as a photo history, it also contains extensive, informative text.

Shultz seems to have left no cranny unprobed, nor should his sense of timing be faulted. He wrote his book while many of the principals, including most of those who carried the title "Chief, SOG" were still available to provide the depth and details needed to flesh out the fragmentary and often cryptic written records. During the same period, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, enjoyed a succession of commanders, beginning with Lieutenant General Jerry Scott, who encouraged and supported Shultz's efforts. USASOC's support was particularly helpful in the effort to declassify the surviving SOG records.



Despite the fact that the four books have the same general subject, there is little redundancy in them. They are largely complementary, addressing the many facets of SOG from different aspects and with different levels of detail and emphasis. While Shultz includes the efforts in North Vietnam and the reconnaissance programs, his book does not cover those operations in as much detail of the other works do. It does, however, present a wider, more extensive picture, describing SOG's birth, organization, programs and struggles at the theater, regional, and national levels.

As described by Shultz, SOG's problems were manifold, massive and generally insoluble by most of those who had to address them. SOG's initial problem (one that the organization could never overcome) could be described as a bastard birth, followed by a poor upbringing by a distracted, single parent of limited capability — an unprepared Department of Defense, or DoD, which was increasingly focused on fighting a conventional war. The other parent was an impatient and fickle administration. Conception was the result of President Kennedy's demand that the U.S. generate an insurgency in North Vietnam similar to the one that the North Vietnamese government was creating and supporting in South Vietnam.

The presidential directive reflected the administration's complete lack of recognition of the amount of time, effort, resources, skills, and above all, patience required to develop an insurgency under even the best of conditions.[9] The administration,

annoyed by what it perceived as the dilatoriness of the CIA, placed the insurgency effort under the direction of DoD, a decision that was rife with mischief. The CIA, fenced out of what it considered not only a part of its founding charter but also a part of its patrimony from the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, became, at best, a lukewarm supporter. Because the CIA was concurrently conducting a "private war" in neighboring Laos, it was by no means a disinterested party.[10] For the most part, the CIA was a powerful opponent who had the advantages of agency status, more responsive communications and command structures, and the ability to obstruct at the national level.

DoD neither wanted the insurgency program nor did it have any particular competence to apply to it.[11] Fomenting insurgency was not an assigned DoD mission. Further, the great guerrilla operations of World War II had taken place before DoD was created, so the organization had no institutional memory to guide it.

The Army, the service with the most cogent interest in insurgent operations, had little applicable direct experience in fomenting, organizing, supporting and directing insurgencies. Its largest and most unilateral insurgency experience, the World War II Philippine guerrilla movement, had been almost entirely self-generating, self-organizing, and self-supporting until late in the conflict. Guerrilla-warfare experience in Europe largely belonged to the OSS and the British Special Operations Executive, which sustained guerrilla operations essentially as a service in support of the Allies' senior military commands.[12] During the Korean War, changes in the political environment had quickly forced incipient guerrilla warfare to evolve into coastal raiding.[13]

Both DoD and the services lacked what would now be called a special-operations structure above the Army SF groups and the seminal Navy SEAL units. Despite understandable misgivings, resentment of the misguided presidential direction, and the lack of precedent and experience, DoD made a more than commendable effort. It formed a joint organization under the hopefully obscure title "Studies and Observation Group." Although the organization's structure was adequate, it was an ad hoc reflection of assigned functions rather than a reflection of the doctrinal joint unconventional warfare task force, or JUWTF.

The Army assigned its most experienced special operators to SOG. Two of the five colonels who held the position "Chief, SOG" had previous guerrilla-warfare experience: Colonel Donald Blackburn had served as a guerrilla leader in the Philippines,[14] and Colonel John Singlaub had served as an OSS operative in France and in China.[15] While the value and the applicability of their experiences as company-grade officers 20 years earlier might be debated, Blackburn and Singlaub were the best officers available. Blackburn and two other chiefs, Colonel Clyde Russell and Colonel Steve Cavanaugh, were former SF group commanders.

Finally, DoD established an organization in the Pentagon — the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, or SACSA — to provide SOG with connectivity, national-level entrée, and oversight. Shultz implies that SACSA was also expected to restrain SOG. If so, it was singularly inefficient at the task: In addition to the many other duties SACSA acquired in the course of coordinating SOG's authorities with Washington-area agencies and offices, it became a strong SOG advocate. Although Shultz perceives a basic DoD hostility toward SOG, that hostility appears to be overstated. There were undoubtedly some who resented a secret organization to whose mysteries they were not privy, but the number of such malcontents was not large.[16]

Following some rough start-up experiences, DoD supported SOG with personnel, equipment, fund-

ing and, most important, the requisite priorities to assure that in-country headquarters provided the cooperation and the assets necessary to support specific operations. The support to SOG continued essentially unabated while DoD and the services were heavily engaged in building up the armed forces and conducting a constantly expanding war.

As the war expanded and as the number of American units in-country increased, the president's and the Secretary of Defense's interests in SOG declined. As presidential interest waned, the Department of State became more active in its opposition to the operations of and (as was often suspected) the existence of SOG. Thereafter, regardless of how egregious the actions of the North Vietnamese government, DoS could be counted on to introduce evidence of some conciliatory motion or pending North Vietnamese peace initiative as a basis for opposing operations proposed by SOG.[17] The North Vietnamese, of course, could pull DoS's chain by having a spokesman state that peace negotiations could begin as soon as the Americans ceased whatever was annoying the North Vietnamese at the moment.

In the not necessarily unprejudiced minds of senior SOG members, the basis of DoS's opposition was often suspect. There was a frequent suspicion that DoS's obstructionism was in support of the American Embassy, Vientiane's protection of the CIA's monopoly of operations in Laos. Suspicion and hostility were in no way reduced by what was seen as a variable standard espoused by Ambassador William Sullivan in Vientiane, Laos. While Sullivan interposed numerous obstructing objections to small ground operations as violating Laotian neutrality and the 1954 Geneva Accords, he demanded American in-country air support for indigenous operations and even demanded that he have a part in allocating B-52 strikes.

Apparently DoS, the American Embassy in Vientiane and, later, the Johnson administration, wanted to avoid any action that might annoy the North Vietnamese. Although their attitude would have been a prudent prelude to surrender, it was an exceedingly poor basis for fighting a war. Few among the three groups seemed to recognize the absolute criticality of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system to the North Vietnamese conduct of the war.



SOG operated under the disadvantage of having to seek approval from three agencies in Washington for its operational authorities and for its specific operations. Unfortunately, two of those agencies were basically opposed to SOG's existence. At times the White House also joined the opposition. Even the presidential administration that had demanded that the U.S. foment guerrilla warfare in North Vietnam backpedaled when it came to action. Although the demand for SOG to achieve near-term results continued, the authority to conduct operations against North Vietnam was slow in coming and, when granted, was greatly restrained and caveated, to the point of making the mission impossible to fulfill.

Despite all of the restrictions placed on SOG and the growing list of naysayers, the SOG chiefs struggled to accomplish as much as their hotly negotiated and heavily restrained authorities permitted. Their efforts evolved into three programs: attempts to create an insurgency in North Vietnam; small-scale seaborne raids on North Vietnam's coasts; and reconnaissance, backed by air strikes, against North Vietnamese forces crossing first Laos and later Cambodia. Each program had its own set of frustrations, almost all of which were American-made.

Insurgency

Because American participation in ground operations in North Vietnam was forbidden, SOG was limited to inserting singletons and small teams of indigenous agent volunteers. The

restrained operational authorities, coupled with the lack of time, poor area preparation, lack of a qualified support structure, and limited border access to North Vietnam, precluded developing an insurgency there. It is arguable whether an insurgency could have been developed even without those restraints.

Conditions then extant in North Vietnam would have made success in fomenting and supporting an insurgency there highly unlikely. Large numbers of the only Vietnamese minority that might have formed a basis for resistance, the Catholics, had been evacuated to South Vietnam in 1954, at the end of the First Indochina War. Although the communist government was undeniably dictatorial, few Vietnamese had ever known anything better. Above all, it was a Vietnamese government, and it *had* defeated the French only a decade earlier, ending nearly a century of colonial rule and a grueling eight-year war for independence. In fact, the memory of French rule was still vivid, and it is unlikely that without long and extensive political and psychological preparation, the North Vietnamese populace would have accepted the rhetoric and the agendas of a new set of Caucasian strangers. Given the conditions, the prohibition against American operations in North Vietnam may have been an unappreciated mercy.

Unable to create and sustain an insurgency, SOG, recognizing the paranoia of totalitarian — particularly communist — governments, instituted a grand deception program to create the perception of disaffection, subversion and incipient insurgency. The expectation was that even if the program achieved only minor successes, a significant number of enemy forces would be tied down performing security roles, such as guarding facilities, searching for nebulous insurgents, and instituting repressive controls. SOG's deception program had the potential of becoming even more valuable than anything achievable by the originally intended insurgency.

In an effort to cajole the North Vietnamese into peace negotiations, the Johnson administration cut off all air operations over North Vietnam. Consequently, the aircraft that had been sustaining the "insurgency" with simulated agent insertion and resupply drops were also grounded. As a result, the credibility of the SOG's deception program was undermined. Thereafter, operations in North Vietnam were limited to radio play (intended primarily to extend the lives of captured agent radio operators), occasional brief forays for limited goals (such as the recovery of air crews), and the prisoner-rescue effort at Son Tay.

Conboy and Andradé's *Spies and Commandos* is particularly valuable in understanding these SOG operations. Although rather critical in tone, the book is well-researched and well-written, and it addresses programs (such as the Vietnamese Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition Teams, often known as STRATA) that are not covered well elsewhere.

Seaborne raids

With its long coast, North Vietnam was a natural target for a coastal raiding program that could attenuate and harass the North Vietnamese forces. Again, the Johnson administration, represented by the Secretary of

Defense Robert S. McNamara, expressed great interest in such a program and demanded early results. However, the administration not only limited the operations geographically, it also limited mission authorizations, and it restricted American participation. The political restrictions, along with the poorly motivated Vietnamese operators, the range limitations of the raiding craft (even the outstanding Nasty-class patrol boats), and the small number of productive targets in the coastal areas, resulted in a program of limited effect. A burgeoning naval-air-attack program rendered the results of the coastal raiding program insignificant.

Reconnaissance

Even the reconnaissance program conducted against the backbone of the North Vietnamese war effort, the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in Laos, suffered crippling restraints. The American Embassy in Vientiane, citing the widely discredited 1962 Geneva Accords (that the enemy had blatantly violated since their signing), constantly raised objections to SOG operations. For the reconnaissance program, this meant an effective limitation of 20 kilometers into Laos. The pattern of contacts soon made the 20-kilometer limitation evident to the enemy, making it easier for him to protect critical targets and drastically increasing the hazards to the reconnaissance teams.

Although the depth limitation was sometimes relaxed to permit the recovery of American air crews, the requirement to coordinate the recovery with the American Embassy in Vientiane often delayed SOG until it was too late for the recovery efforts to be effective.[18] Plaster's *SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars* exhaustively covers this aspect of SOG's activities in both word and picture. It is not, like most photo collections, a coffee-table decoration, but the single best description of SOG's reconnaissance program extant, surpassing even Plaster's earlier work.

Following a recent presentation by Shultz on *The Secret War Against Hanoi* at the National Defense University, a noted military historian asked, "Did SOG have a strategy? What was it?" These questions beggar reality. The U.S. military practice, both doctrinal and historical, is that a military special-operations organization supports the strategy of the command fighting the war. Although the SO command might have its own organization, equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures, it would not have its own strategy, any more than the Artillery Branch or the Engineer Branch would have separate strategies.[19] Shultz contends that SOG operations were not an integrated facet of MACV's strategy but that they occurred in parallel isolation. The validity of this argument would seem to depend on whether MACV itself had a strategy. The late Colonel Harry Summers argued strongly that it did not.[20]

Lessons

What are the lessons of the SOG experience? For the combat soldier, they are few. Warfare has so changed in the intervening years that only exceptional circumstances would create an operational environment in which the combat lessons of SOG would apply.

Even though the chiefs of SOG had theater-wide responsibilities, they were mere colonels among a wealth of senior generals whose interests and agendas were often in conflict with SOG's. To perform their missions, SOG leaders struggled against impediments created by the diplomatic, intelligence and political elements of government. They also had to struggle against multiple, often uncomprehending, military levels. Given what SOG leaders achieved under trying conditions, it would be hard to fault them.

SOG's legacy is not so much one of lessons-learned as it is one of example. For eight years, despite difficult conditions and impediments at all levels, the SOG Special Forces soldiers, the smaller number of sailors and airmen, and the greater number of indigenous warriors, did their jobs with unfailing dedication, tenacity and, all too often, fatal courage.

The real lessons of SOG are those of the greater Vietnam experience. They are applicable not in special-operations organizations, but at the higher political and military levels. The chief lesson is that national leaders would do well to recognize (Clausewitz not withstanding) that although war pursues political ends, it is not a precise machine that can be turned on and off, run by exact rules, or fine-tuned to pursue political goals. Any attempt to treat it so will surrender political and military initiatives to a determined enemy and waste the military instrument of power.

From that primary lesson, we can derive others:

- Limiting major combat operations to a single country while the opponent operates essentially unfettered in every adjoining country surrenders critical advantage to the enemy.
- Sending troops deep enough into enemy territory that they cannot be readily supported, but

not deep enough to seriously hurt the enemy, challenges command responsibility.

• Continuing the above practice after the enemy has determined the limits of penetration and when almost every mission requires early extraction under fire defies logic.

Given the limitations on operations, the increasing difficulty of penetration, and the repeated loss of brave men, one might wonder why the MACV commanders did not terminate the operations, or if that decision was beyond their authority, why they did not request that the operations *be* terminated. It is hardly conceivable that such a request would have been refused.

Although MACV commanders were well-informed of the problems in SOG operations,[21] they apparently valued the intelligence on enemy movements in Laos and in Cambodia that, because of the political limitations and the jungle cover, would not otherwise have been available to them. The fact that the intelligence was largely employed for defensive uses did not mean that it was not important. The MACV commanders probably also valued the opportunity that the reconnaissance teams gave them to strike at the enemy in Laos, an area generally outside their operational authorities.

Shultz, Plaster, Conboy and Andradé have all done an excellent job of dispelling the mists of classification and time that have long hidden SOG. Each of their works tells its tale well, with adequate indexes, end notes and references for those who wish to delve farther. *Spies and Commandos* will appeal most to the intelligence operators. The SF soldier will most enjoy *SOG: A Photo History*.

Shultz's *The Secret War Against Hanoi* is particularly recommended to those who are interested in the nation's political-military decision processes and in the histories of the Second Indochina War, of Southeast Asia, and of the era. On a professional level, the book is recommended to diplomats, politicians, intelligence officers, foreign-area officers, and joint special-operations personnel of all grades. It is not recommended to the survivors of SOG reconnaissance teams. They might have too many awkward questions as to why their most damaging enemies were not on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but in Washington and in an American embassy.

Colonel J.H. Crerar served 23 years in Special Forces units and in service, joint and combined special-operations staff positions. As a member of the 3rd, 5th and 10th SF groups and MACV SOG, he enjoyed wide experience in Special Forces mission areas, primarily in Southeast Asia. Colonel Crerar is a graduate of the SF Qualification Course, the PSYOP Officer Course and the Civil Affairs Officer Course. He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy and has graduate degrees in engineering and management. He is employed as a military analyst with a primary focus on future equipment and trends.

Notes:

[1] Steve Sherman, Special Forces' respected accumulator of Southeast Asia personnel records, estimates that approximately 4,000 SF personnel passed through SOG during its eight-year existence. This number included many who were on their second and third volunteer tours.

[2] Approximately 250 personnel were KIA and 57 MIA/BNR. Because the only two SOG prisoners of war who survived and returned were captured within South Vietnam, there is a suspicion that the North Vietnamese had initiated a local program equivalent to Hitler's infamous *Kommando Befehl*, which directed the execution of any Allied special operators, whether uniformed or not, captured in German rear areas.

[3] Although the modern Special Forces mission is an outgrowth of the SOG experience, the changes in technology in the last quarter century virtually guarantee that modern special-reconnaissance operations will have little similarity to those of the Vietnam era.

[4] The continued classification was not a matter of excessive government secretiveness but of indifference. SOG and its Washington oversight organization, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, or SACSA, had ceased to exist. There were few who were interested in or who had knowledge of what records existed, where they were, and what, if anything, was still sensitive. The lack of interest, the reduced manning of peacetime, and the lack of a requirement to declassify the material all supported the status quo. In one Pentagon office, a fortunate series of staff officers who had a sense of history saved the SOG papers in their files from the periodic efforts of DoD to reduce its store of inactive documents.

[5] John Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

[6] Richard H. Shultz Jr., *The Secret War Against Hanoi* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

[7] Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andradé, *Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

[8] John L. Plaster, *SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, 2000).

[9] Even with the impetus of hardships, national embarrassment, and the presence of the thoroughly hated German invaders, it took the parallel efforts of SOE and the Free French four years to develop the French underground and to prepare it for the D-Day uprising. In comparison, the North Vietnamese had an underground in South Vietnam going back at least to the 1930s.

[10] The CIA's war in Laos is well-described in Roger Warner, *Shooting At the Moon*

(Steerforth Press, 1996); and in Kenneth Conboy, *Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos* (Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, 1995).

[11] The CIA did have applicable experience. Many OSS veterans joined the new CIA, which had supported dissidence in post-War Eastern Europe as well as in Tibet, Iran, China and elsewhere. The Bay of Pigs fiasco could be seen as an aberration wherein the CIA conducted hasty conventional operations, in which it had little experience, in lieu of slower, long-term insurgency, in which it had solid if not always successful experience.

[12] World War II OSS guerrilla efforts are broadly described in Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS* (Walker, 1975). More personal accounts are to be found in William B. Dreux, *No Bridges Blown* (Notre Dame Press, 1971); Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons In the Night* (Stanford University Press, 1993); Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986); and Max Corvo, *OSS in Italy* (Praeger, 1990).

[13] An excellent description of the Korean War's special-operations experience can be found in Ben Malcom, *White Tigers* (Brassey's, 1996).

[14] See Philip Harkins, *Blackburn's Headhunters* (Norton, 1954).

[15] John Singlaub and Malcolm McConnell, *Hazardous Duty* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

[16] One, however, rose to be a four-star commander in chief, continuing to snipe at an organization to which he had been deprived access. See *Parameters*, Summer 1992, pp. 109-12; and Winter 1992-93, pp. 106-07.

[17] This delusional pattern was to be repeated during the Teheran hostage crisis of 1980. At that time, each Iranian mullah newly on the scene was described as a budding moderate to whom the U.S. should be obsequious.

[18] For those who are interested in SOG's personnel recovery efforts, see George Veith, *Code Name Bright Light* (Free Press, 1998); and Daryl Whitcomb, *The Rescue of Bat 21* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998). The first contains extensive detail on the difficulties imposed by the American Embassy, Vientiane.

[19] As the Department of Defense discovered during the Korean War and confirmed in Southeast Asia, this orientation does not necessarily hold true for another agency's unconventional warfare efforts, regardless of pre-war agreements.

[20] Harry Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).

[21] COMUSMACV was formally briefed weekly on SOG operations. Reconnaissance-team leaders ("one-zeros") were debriefed at MACV J2 after each SOG mission. General Abrams, not widely known as an advocate of special operations, at least twice commented favorably on the accomplishments and exceptional courage of the SOG reconnaissance personnel.

Letters

Author comments on review of his book

I would like to comment on the review of my book, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action* (*Special Warfare*, Winter 2000). Normally, I do not reply to reviews, especially favorable ones. However, because this one was the closest thing to a negative review the book has received, and because the review was published within the special-operations community, I hope the reviewer will not be offended by my taking issue with a few of the points he raised.

First of all, the reviewer contends that the book is actually two separate books. Rather, the first chapter is the introduction, and the last one is the conclusion. The first chapter sets forth the basics for the uninitiated, and it specifies the themes to be discussed throughout the remainder of the book; for example, the tendency of various "special" units to drift back toward conventional functions. Having been thus alerted, the reader understands why that theme keeps emerging throughout the following nine chapters.

Secondly, there are a number of specific minor criticisms, some of which are well-taken (such as the misspelling of Roger Pezzelle's name), and they will be corrected in future editions, if there are any. There are some criticisms, however, with which I do want to take issue.

The reviewer contends, "The U.S. Cavalry's last horse-mounted campaign was not the 1916 Punitive Expedition but the 1941-42 Defense of the Philippines, ending with Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey's gallant last charge at Morong, Bataan." The Ramsey to which the reviewer refers is presumably Edwin Price Ramsey, formerly a 1st lieutenant and platoon leader with the 26th Cavalry Regiment, Philippine Scouts. The reviewer's belief that the Scouts were a U.S. unit is probably based on President Roosevelt's 1941 order incorporating Philippine Army Units into the U.S. armed forces. But later, under Public Laws 79-301 and 79-391, Congress determined "military service of the organized forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines … shall be deemed not active service in the armed forces of the U.S." In recent years, Ramsey has been active in seeking to restore the position of the Scouts. It is also arguable that the mounted Philippine Scouts were mounted infantry rather than cavalry per se. On the other hand, the status of the 10th U.S. Cavalry as a horse-mounted unit of the American Army that did engage in combat and that did fight from horseback during the period 1916-17 is unchallenged.

The reviewer further states that my account of some actions differs from that of the participants. It is difficult to know what to make of this, for I was personally present for some of the incidents. And whenever possible, I used official records, first-hand accounts and interviews with participants for the others. For example, former members of MACV SOG reviewed the account of that organization.

The reviewer also states, "Jedburgh teams were neither civilian nor intended to appear as such." In fact, I identify the teams on page 37 as " 'civilian' (paramilitary)" in nature, meaning, as stated in the text, that they were part of the OSS (a civilian agency) and not a part of the War Department. The War Department and the theater commanders (especially MacArthur) were opposed to the idea of having forces who were not explicitly military assigned to a military theater of operations.

The reviewer contends that Roger's Rangers were not in the SF lineage. According to DA Directive AGAO-322, dated 13 October 1960, they were.

The reviewer further names as a "substantive fault" the book's alleged "overidentification" of Special Forces with the Phoenix Program. In fact, the program was clearly identified as a program sponsored by the government of Vietnam under GVN Decree 280 (1 July 1968) and supported by the CIA and MACV intelligence assets. "Special Forces" are identified only as having been one source of advisers, along with Navy SEALs, the USMC, Army MI and others. At no point is it stated or implied that Phoenix was wholly or partially an SF program.

On the other hand, the reviewer is correct in stating that naval fighters did not destroy the abandoned helicopters in Operation Eagle Claw. My mistake: President Carter personally countermanded the order to do so, and the strike

never went in. I don't know what I was thinking of.

Thomas K. Adams
Fayetteville, N.C.

'Ranger Personnel Recovery' ignores SF capabilities

The USAJFKSWCS Publication 525-5-14, *Unconventional Assisted Recovery*, featured in the Spring 1999 *Special Warfare*, is an interesting product that clarifies some issues of terminology and roles associated with unconventional assisted recovery, or UAR. However, I have a fundamental disagreement with the inclusion of Appendix K of that document.

Appendix K outlines a specific subset of UAR that is referred to as "Ranger Personnel Recovery Operations." In my opinion, this particular appendix inappropriately correlates a specific element of the Army's special-operations forces, or ARSOF, to the conduct of one particular aspect of UAR. To attribute the planning, organization, execution and extraction capabilities outlined in Appendix K of the document solely to the Ranger Regiment is flawed and inaccurate. This doctrinal misrepresentation could lead to uninformed decision-making by senior leadership when they consider the available personnel-recovery options.

In fact, in some instances, the Ranger option may carry with it a large operational footprint, operational-security constraints, and time/distance limitations. Additionally, the employment of a Ranger element would most certainly dictate the use of at least company strength, because of associated command-and-control requirements. Finally, in some cases, the exclusive employment of a Ranger force for conducting personnel recovery, while certainly one course of action, may not necessarily subscribe to the SOF imperative of "engage the threat discriminately."

There are clearly other forces within the ARSOF arena, including Special Forces, who have the prerequisite training, equipment, organization and capabilities to perform personnel recovery of a unilateral, direct-action nature. Additionally, while such a mission profile could emerge within the parameters of a combat-search-and-rescue mission or a noncombatant-evacuation operation, the mission profile is certainly not limited to those operations.

My intent is not to slight my Ranger brethren, but to point out that Appendix K of USAJFKSWCS Publication 525-5-14 incorrectly excludes other capable and doctrinally mandated ARSOF forces with regard to the conduct of certain planned UAR options. It is important to ensure that the label of *unconventional* assisted recovery is not misconstrued and steered too far toward unconventional warfare, to the detriment of other available options and capabilities within Special Forces.

MAJ Scott A. Morrison
Columbia, S.C.

SF enlisted soldiers eligible for Thuma scholarship

I am pleased to announce the establishment of the Master Sergeant David K. Thuma Memorial Scholarship at Regents College.

The scholarship is designed to reduce or eliminate the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by soldiers in CMF 18 who enroll in Regents College. The scholarship honors one of our finest soldiers, Master Sergeant David K. Thuma, a former team sergeant in the 3rd Special Forces Group, who died in 1998 while serving his country. Information about the scholarship is available by logging on to our web site at http://go.to/thumascholarship.

Anyone wishing to contribute to the fund can either download the contribution form from the web site or send an e-mail message to bigsargeusa@netscape.net.

I am currently working with Regents College to establish a degree program that will capitalize on the experience of Special Forces soldiers. The goal is to tie the program into the timeline of the NCO Education System, so that soldiers will be able to earn their associate's degree upon graduation from ANCOC and to earn a bachelor's degree before retirement.

CSM Michael W. Jefferson
U.S. Army (ret.)

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army selects 13 SF soldiers for promotion to SGM

The 1999 sergeant-major promotion-selection board selected seven master sergeants from career-management field 37, Psychological Operations. The CMF 37's selection rate was 46.7 percent, vs. the Army's average of 15.2 percent. Six of the selectees were from the primary zone, and one was from the secondary zone. The statistics are as follows:

	TIS	TIG	Education	Age
CMF 37 (PZ)	16.2	3.6	13.8	37.3
Army (PZ)	20.5	3.8	14.1	40.7
CMF 37 (SZ)	17.0	2.3	15.0	40.0
Army (SZ)	18.3	2.4	14.1	39.0

The CMF 37 soldiers who were selected had successfully completed a variety of assignments in the field and had served in leadership positions. Because of the high number of CMF 37 soldiers selected by the 1999 board, promotions over the next few years should be at the Army's average or below.

Medical sergeants eligible for re-enlistment bonus

The Army has recently implemented a C-zone selective re-enlistment bonus for SF medical sergeants (18D) who have 10-14 years of service. Current SRBs for CMF 18 soldiers are 18B — 1A/1B; 18C — 1A/1B; 18D — 2A/3B/1C; and 18E — 2A/3B.

CMF 37 SGM selection rate exceeds Army average

The 1999 sergeant-major promotion-selection board selected 13 master sergeants from CMF 18, Special Forces. The CMF 18's selection rate is 4.9 percent, vs. the Army's average of 15.2 percent. Nine of the selectees were from the primary zone, and four were from the secondary zone. The statistics are as follows:

	TIS	TIG	Education	Age
CMF 18 (PZ)	18.2	4.2	14.4	38.1
Army (PZ)	20.5	3.8	14.1	40.7
CMF 18 (SZ)	16.8	2.3	15.0	41.3
Army (SZ)	18.3	2.4	14.1	39.0

The following comments are excerpts from the board's review and analysis of the CMF 18 records:

- Senior SFCs and junior MSGs are making sure that they are on the right career path by accepting leadership positions, such as team sergeant and first sergeant.
- Commanders and command sergeants major should ensure that junior master sergeants are assigned to team-sergeant positions at the earliest possible time and that they remain in those positions for

at least two years.

- If commanders and command sergeants major must reassign master sergeants into nonleadership positions, they should not do so prematurely.
- Staff positions, instructor positions, AC/RC positions, and JRTC positions should be filled only by senior master sergeants who have completed leadership assignments.
- Confusing terminology was used in the NCOERs to describe principal duty titles, daily duties, and scope. For example, an SF team sergeant was variously referred to as an "operations NCO," as a "detachment NCO," as a "detachment operations NCO," and as a "senior sergeant." The multiple duty titles and the vaguely written duty descriptions made it difficult to determine the scope and the level of a soldier's responsibility. Duty titles should be annotated on a soldier's NCOER in accordance with DA Pam 623-205.
- The numerical ratings given by some of the senior raters did not correspond with the bullet comments. Senior raters should clearly identify their top-quality performers with precise comments, such as "Best of six team sergeants," "Number 2 in the battalion," or "Promote ahead of peers."

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF officers in three year groups receive CFD

SF officers in three year groups recently received their career-field designations. The results are as follows:

- *Year group 1981*. Twenty-four officers will single-track in SF, and two will single-track in FA 39.
- *Year group 1987*. Sixty-one will single-track in SF; one will single-track in FA 45; seven will single-track in FA 48; and one will single-track in FA 59.
- *Year group 1989*. Fifty-five officers will single-track in SF; one will single-track in FA 24; one will single-track in FA 30; four will single-track in FA 39; one will single-track in FA 46; 11 will single-track in FA 48; one will single-track in FA 52; and one will single-track in FA 53. For additional information, telephone Paula Stewart at DSN 239 6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102.

108 FA 39 officers selected for promotion to major

The FY 1999 major promotion-selection board considered 292 FA 39 officers and selected 108. The statistics are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	Percentage
FA 39 (AZ)	31	8	25.8
Army (AZ)			19.0
FA 39 (PZ)	127	94	74.0
Army (PZ)			78.1
FA 39 (BZ)	134	6	4.4
Army (BZ)			3.7

16 CA officers selected for promotion to colonel

The FY 2000 reserve-component colonel promotion-selection board considered 161 officers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 16 (a 10 percent selection rate). Twelve of the officers selected were being considered for the first time.

SF warrant officers can have lasting impact

The 180A SF warrant-officer recruiting program has met its goal of 25 for FY 2000. The program's recruiting goal for FY 2001 is 37. Reaching that goal will require a concerted effort on the part of every SF group. In order to produce the highly trained, technically and tactically sound warrant officers who will be needed in 2010, we must access the most talented and the most dedicated NCOs. While the demands upon qualified candidates are great, the fruits of their endeavor can be boundless. The Special Operations Proponency Office urges experienced SF NCOs, E-6's and above who have at least three years' team time and who have less than 12 years' active federal service, to become the continuity factor for the SF A-detachment. The 180A can serve either as the assistant detachment commander, or as the ODA commander in the absence of the commander. He can provide the commander with technical and tactical expertise in the areas of administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, CA and PSYOP. The 180A can develop, direct, supervise, and conduct

training for U.S forces, for foreign military forces, and for paramilitary forces. He can provide the commander with advice on the conduct of DA, SR, UW, FID and CT missions. He can advise the commander on ASOT and civil-military activities. And he can advise the commander on collateral missions in support of joint, combined or unilateral operations. A WO1 or a CW2 can expect to serve on an ODA 6-8 years. Senior warrant officers can expect to serve at various levels: ODB, battalion, group, theater SOC headquarters, or special-operations-command. The duties and the responsibilities of the SF warrant officers are demanding. With their extensive MOS proficiency, operational experiences, and intensive 180A training, SF warrant officers can have a lasting impact upon SF. Commanders should be proactive in their efforts to identify NCOs who have demonstrated the potential of becoming exceptional SF warrant officers. For details on applying for WO candidacy, NCOs should consult with the senior warrant officer either in their battalion or in their group. NCOs can also telephone the SWCS SOPO at DSN 239-1879 or commercial (910) 432-1879; or they can access the Army Recruiting Command's warrant-officer home page at http://www.army.mil/adsxxi.

100 CA officers make LTC

The FY 2000 reserve-component lieutenant colonel promotion-selection board considered 157 officers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 100 (a 64-percent selection rate). Eighty-one of the officers selected were being considered for the first time.

SF major-selection rate favorable indicator

During the FY 1999 major promotion-selection board, the Special Forces Branch achieved an overall select rate of 92 percent, vs. the Army's average of 87 percent. The branch's favorable select rate indicates that SF officers continue to be competitive for promotion to major.

Officers designated as FA 39

Under the provisions of the Army's Officer Professional Management System XXI model, officers in two year groups were recently designated as FA 39:

- *Year group 1981*. Fourteen officers were designated as FA 39 — 10 of whom possess FA 39 training and utilization experience.
- *Year group 1987*. Twenty-five officers were designated as FA 39 — 22 of whom possess FA 39 training and utilization experience. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann, FA 39 manager, at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102.

FA 39 exceeds Army's average on FY 1999 boards

Officers in FA 39 fared well on FY 1999 selection boards, exceeding the Army's average in the following cases:

- During the FY 1999 colonel promotion-selection board, FA 39 achieved a selection rate of 66.6 percent. The Army's average was 49.6 percent.
- During the FY 1999 senior-service college-selection board, FA 39's selection rate was 8.4 percent. The Army's average selection rate was 7.4 percent. The majority of the FA 39 officers who were selected were being considered for the third time.
- During the FY 1999 Command and Staff College selection board, FA 39's selection rate was 21 percent. The Army's selection rate was 20 percent.

Foreign SOF

Indian special-ops force proposed for Kashmir duty

A former director-general of India's Indo-Tibetan Border Police has proposed the creation of a special-operations force to deter cross-border terrorism in hostile, remote and culturally sensitive areas. The former director-general reviewed the advantages he had seen in special forces around the world, especially "in low-intensity conflicts because [they are] a relatively low-cost and more effective option, compared with fielding large conventional forces." He indicated that despite the fielding of various specialized military and police units, India has "never seriously considered creating an elite counterinsurgency (force)." He believes that a special-operations force (along with combined, strong border-fencing programs) could help India deal with its terrorism, trafficking in drugs and arms, smuggling and other transnational issues. In addition, India would be better able to meet its security needs, especially in Kashmir. During the first four months of 2000, 65 foreign militants were among 227 militants killed in antimilitancy operations in the Kashmir valley. From India's perspective, these statistics indicate that the problem is not only a local one.

Montenegro reportedly trains police snipers

Western reporting indicates that a Montenegrin "secret program" is training an "elite team" of police snipers to target senior Yugoslav military officers in the event of a war between Montenegro and Serbia. These police snipers, along with other members of the 20,000-strong police force, could form part of an eventual Montenegrin army. Increased tension between Serbia and Montenegro established the setting for the local Montenegrin elections held in June, during which backers of Montenegro President Djukanovic's party and pro-Milosevic opposition supporters confronted each other.

North Korean officers train Congolese special forces

A special forces unit that is being formed in the Democratic Republic of Congo may be receiving training from North Korean officers. The new unit, the 10th Special Infantry Brigade, consists of several thousand troops and supposedly has a combined-arms composition — including reconnaissance, infantry, and artillery elements. The unit's primary purpose will be to fight rebel forces that have been active for the last two years in a conflict that now involves several neighboring states. A television program featuring the graduation of 10th-brigade soldiers showed a number of North Korean officers in attendance.

Papua New Guinea proposes to merge defense force, constabulary

The prospect of establishing a unified military and police force in Papua New Guinea, or PNG, has been advanced by a PNG cabinet committee. Under the proposal that was being considered in early May 2000, a paramilitary force would be established by combining the troubled PNG Defense Force (which is widely viewed as corrupt and inefficient) and the Royal PNG Constabulary. Tensions between the two

organizations have been evident for some time, and a merger could provoke a strong reaction or revolt from the Defense Force. In the view of some Western observers, this move could also have serious implications for the situation along the PNG-Indonesian border, where Indonesian Army Special Forces, or Kopassus, have reportedly organized militias inside PNG and have attempted to create internal problems centered on independence aspirations in West Papua. An even more weakened Defense Force would further reduce PNG's capabilities to respond to trouble in West Papua and elsewhere. Kopassus is facing its own challenges. Earlier this year, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid visited the headquarters of both Kopassus and the Air Force Special Forces, or Paskhas. In late April, he inspected elements of the Strategic Reserves Command, or Kostrad, and visited Army special-operations components in West Java. At the same time, some foreigners were demanding that Kopassus be disbanded. Although the Kopassus commander asserted that no such plan had been decided, Indonesia is conducting a study to determine whether some military roles should be reduced.

Romanian airborne, special-ops units resubordinated

In May 2000, Romania announced force-restructuring plans that would transfer parachute units and associated special-operations units from the air force to the ground forces by September 2000. Romanian military officials noted that the units designated for transfer are primarily land forces and that once the transfer occurs, the air force will be responsible only for transporting the units to their areas of employment.

Mexican police unit focuses on paramilitary forces

Faced with continuing violence by paramilitary groups in some Mexican states, Mexico's Attorney General's Office has formed a new unit designated the "Special Unit for Dealing With Crimes Committed by Suspected Armed Civil Groups." The new unit focuses on paramilitary groups, not on insurgent groups like the Zapatista National Liberation Army, the People's Revolutionary Army and the People's Revolutionary Insurgent Army. Many of the paramilitary groups are suspected of having affiliations with political, police and military components, and they have been responsible for murders and intimidation in Mexican states, including Chiapas and Guerrero. The new unit has investigatory powers and consists of 40 judicial agents, six agents from the Public Prosecutor's Office, and other key personnel needed to support the unit's agenda.

Colombian paramilitaries may be gaining strength

By some estimates, the number of Colombian paramilitary combatants engaged against guerrilla forces has doubled to 7,000 in recent years. The paramilitary combatants operate as part of declared umbrella organizations, such as the Peasant Self-Defense Units of Cordoba y Uraba and the Self-Defense Units of Colombia. In the spring of 2000, the Colombian military reported an increase in the kidnaping and extortion activities of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. In the view of some specialists, FARC is now changing its tactics, reportedly moving its kidnaping activities away from its traditional rural areas into urban areas like Bogota. The change in tactics could be driven by a need for greater financial resources, since kidnaping and extortion are the FARC's chief sources

of income. It could also mean that the FARC would rather take on the Colombian police authorities than the paramilitary forces, with their strong ties to the military. In recent months, the paramilitary forces have boldly carried their military objective beyond the Colombian international borders into neighboring countries. In September 1999, a prominent paramilitary chief warned that his organization would attack any Panamanian or Venezuelan military unit found to be assisting Colombian guerrillas.

Belgium combines pathfinder, recon units

Two Belgian army special-operations units, the Pathfinder Detachment and the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment, have been combined into an 80-man special forces company. The newly created company is a subdivision of the 3rd Lansiers Paratrooper Battalion, which is the reconnaissance battalion of the army's paratrooper brigade. According to press reports, elements of the Pathfinder Detachment typically operate in teams of six to prepare drop zones and landing areas for follow-on forces. Elements of the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment typically operate in teams of four to gather intelligence in enemy rear areas. Although the new special forces company is subordinate to the 3rd Lansiers, it will continue to perform special duties and will not be subsumed by the paratrooper brigade.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Ernerst Guerra Jr., USAR, of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

SWCS NCO Academy dedicated to fallen NCO

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School dedicated its NCO Academy to the memory of a Special Forces NCO April 14.

Master Sergeant David K. Thuma, a 14-year veteran of Special Forces, died June 18, 1998, while deployed to Kenya as a member of the 3rd SF Group. "There are not enough words in his biography to say what a great soldier he was," said Command Sergeant Major Charles Blake, commandant of the NCO Academy. "We in the academy here today and in the future will see this memorial and remember all that he stood for."

Thuma, a native of Troy, Ohio, entered the Army in 1980. In 1983, he earned a Bronze Star during Operation Urgent Fury. In 1984, he attended the SF Qualification Course. Thuma served in various SF units and at the SWCS NCO Academy, where he was an instructor in the SF Advanced NCO Course until his assignment to the 3rd SF Group. — *Specialist Jon Creese, USASOC PAO*

Toney new leader of Army SF Command

Brigadier General Frank J. Toney took command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command July 6 in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Plaza.

Toney pledged to uphold the SF Command's warrior spirit and to ensure that his soldiers are equipped, resourced, trained and prepared to fight, win and survive in combat.

Photo by Pamela Smith
BG Frank Toney (left) accepts the colors of the Army SF Command from LTG William P. Tangney.

Toney was previously commanding general of the Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. His other assignments include commander, 10th Special Forces Group; and commander, 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group during Operation Desert Storm. He has also served in the 7th PSYOP Group, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 1st and 5th SF groups.

Toney replaces Brigadier General John R. Scales, who will remain with the SF Command as its deputy commander. Scales had been acting commander of the SF Command since the departure of Major General William G. Boykin in March. Boykin is now commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

'SF pipeline' research needs soldiers' input

Over the next few months, Special Forces detachment commanders and team sergeants will have an opportunity to contribute information that will be critical to improving the selection and training of future SF soldiers.

As part of a project being sponsored by the Army Special Operations Command, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and the Army Special Forces Command, detachment commanders and team sergeants are being asked to provide field-performance ratings on the members of their detachments.

The ratings will be used to study ways that Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, and the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, are related to the performance of SF soldiers in the field. The ratings will be linked to existing data on SFAS and SFQC, and all data will be analyzed to find ways of improving SF selection and training.

The field-performance ratings collected during the project will be used solely for "SF pipeline" research and will be confidential, according to Dr. Mike Sanders of the USASOC Psychological Applications Directorate, or PAD. No individual ratings will be disclosed.

To ensure the confidentiality, integrity and validity of the data, Sanders said, all data will be warehoused in a secure, independent database at PAD. Psychologists from the Army Research Institute, N.C.

State University and the PAD will conduct the research and analysis.

For more information, telephone Dr. Mike Sanders at DSN 239-7411 or commercial (910) 432-7411.

SOF units to receive machine gun telescope

This summer the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Army Special Forces Command, and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School will begin receiving a new telescope.

The M-145 Machine Gun Power Telescope will offer machine gunners an improved capability of identifying and acquiring targets at extended ranges, by day or by night. It features 3X and 4X magnification and a wide field of view. The M-145 also contains a reticle, or grid, that allows the gunner to scale and adjust the sight picture so that point of aim equals point of impact. The telescope also has azimuth and elevation adjustments for zeroing the weapon.

The telescope is designed for use on the M-60, M-249, and M-240B machine guns. It is also designed to function in the same mission and climate scenarios as the machine guns do.

Fielding the M-145 Power Telescope is the responsibility of the Force Modernization Branch, Combat Development Division, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration. For more information, telephone Jonathan James, chief of the Force Modernization Branch, at DSN 239-6144 or commercial (910) 432-6144.

Eye surgery may bar soldiers from SF schools

Soldiers who receive an eye-surgery procedure that has not been approved by the Army Surgeon General could be disqualifying themselves from attending Special Forces schools.

Since the late 1980s, laser surgery has been used to correct defective vision. Two common procedures are photorefractive keratectomy, or PRK; and laser in-situ keratomileusis, or LASIK. PRK has been approved by the Army Surgeon General, but LASIK has not.

"PRK involves reshaping the cornea using laser surgery," said Major William Corr of the Army Special Operations Command Surgeon's Office. "It takes a couple of layers of cells off the outside of the cornea."

"In the LASIK procedure," Corr said, "a surgeon cuts a flap on the cornea, flips the flap up, recontours the inner layer of the cornea, then puts the flap back down. The flap heals around the edges, but not in the center."

File photo

The M-145 Machine Gun Power Telescope.

"We're not sure that the LASIK procedure will stand up to the rigors of military service and training, such as the wind encountered during military free fall or the pressure of underwater diving," Corr said.

Because PRK has been approved, soldiers who have had PRK may be accepted for SF initial or advanced-skills training if they have been granted a waiver by the USASOC Surgeon's Office. No waivers are being granted for soldiers who have had LASIK.

For more information, telephone the USASOC Surgeon's Office at DSN 239-5408 or commercial (910) 432-5408.

SWCS producing ARSOF CS, CSS, TTP manuals

The Special Warfare Center and School is developing or revising seven publications oriented toward ARSOF combat support, or CS; combat service support, or CSS; and tactics, techniques and procedures.

These publications are being produced by the Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Joint and Army Doctrine Division. They will supplement the 1999 ARSOF capstone manual, FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*.

FM 1-108, *ARSOF Aviation Operations*, is a revision of FM 1-108, *Army Special Operations Aviation Forces*, dated 1993. The revised FM will describe command and control, employment, CS, and CSS for ARSOF aviation operations and will include the organization of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. FM 1-108 is complete and is scheduled for fielding in August 2000. The project officer is Fred Funk; DSN 239-4427; e-mail: funkf@soc.mil.

FM 31-18, *MTTP for SOF Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Operations*, is a revision and an expansion of FM 3-18, *Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team)*, dated 1993. The U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla., is responsible for developing this multiservice publication. The project officer at SWCS is Captain Byron S. Hayes; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail:

hayesb@soc.mil.

FM 24-31, *ARSOF C4*, is a new publication that will cover command, control, communications and computers for all ARSOF units. It will include the organization of the 112th Signal Battalion. The manual will describe the architecture of command-and-control, or C2, in operational commands and the information flow from ARSOF operational units to C2 systems at the special-operations-command, theater and national levels. FM 24-31 was published in July 2000. The project officer is Major Alexander Fletcher; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: fletchea@soc.mil.

FM 34-31, *ARSOF Intelligence*, is a revision of FM 34-36, *SOF Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, dated 1991. FM 34-31 will describe the organization and the capabilities of intelligence elements within ARSOF units. It will also describe the intelligence structures of theater SOCs, joint intelligence centers, and higher-level agencies, as well as their connectivity with ARSOF operational units. The initial draft of FM 34-31 is being staffed by SOF units. The project officer is Captain Martin Glynn; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: glynnm@soc.mil.

FM 63-31, *ARSOF Combat Service Support*, is a revision and an expansion of FM 63-24, *Special Operations Support Battalion*, dated 1995. FM 63-31 will provide users with a base document for determining future CSS doctrine and procedures. It will address ARSOF CSS structure, capabilities and support requirements. FM 63-31 will offer guidance on operational planning and on educating personnel; and it will include the structure of both the Special Operations Support Command and the Special Operations Support Battalion. The project officer is Major Alexander Fletcher; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: fletchea@soc.mil.

TC 31-25, *Special Forces Waterborne Operations*, dated October 1988, is being converted into a field manual. The new publication, FM 31-25, is titled *Special Forces Waterborne Operations*. Areas of expanded information will address the duties of diving supervisors and of dive medical technicians; small-boat navigation techniques; infiltration techniques; principles of open- and closed-circuit diving; and planning for waterborne operations. FM 31-25 is intended for use with FM 20-11-1, *Military Diving*. The project officer is Master Sergeant Sean Fleenor; DSN 239-5952; e-mail: fleenors@soc.mil.

ST 31-184, *U.S. Army Special Forces Forward Operational Base Field Standing Operating Procedures*, dated 1976, is being revised. The special text will serve as a basis for the establishment and operation of an SF battalion forward operational base. ST 31-184 is intended for use with FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Army Special Forces Operations*. The project officer is Ed Sayre; DSN 239-8689/5255, email: sayree@soc.mil.

Drafts of the publications will be posted on the DOTD web site (http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd), and they will be available through TRADOC's Automated Systems Approach to Training.

3rd SF Group gets new commander

Colonel Mark V. Phelan took command of the 3rd Special Forces Group from Colonel Gary M. Jones during a ceremony held at Fort Bragg's Meadows Field July 7.

Phelan was formerly the deputy chief of staff for personnel for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. His previous SF assignments include detachment executive officer, detachment commander, company commander, battalion executive officer and battalion commander with the 5th SF Group. He also served at the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla., where he established the Special Operations Forces Personnel Monitorship Division.

Jones is now the USASOC deputy commander.

Videotape to serve as PSYOP doctrine

A new videotape is being produced by the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, for students and soldiers in psychological-operations units.

The videotape will provide users with an introduction to the PSYOP development process. It will outline the process from target analysis through test and evaluation, and it will include an overview of the functions of both the joint PSYOP task force and the PSYOP task force.

The videotape's primary target audience will be PSYOP soldiers who are attending advanced individual training at SWCS; however, the videotape will be distributed to all active and reserve PSYOP units and will serve as doctrine until FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*, is published.

The videotape is being produced through the collaborative efforts of two offices within the SWCS: the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division and the Audiovisual Branch.

It is scheduled for distribution in the fall of 2000. It will also be available (production number 711195) at no charge through the Defense Visual Information web site (dodimagery.afis.osd.mil).

Book Reviews

Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph? *By Ralph Peters. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1999. ISBN: 0-8117-0651-6 (hardback). 210 pages. $19.95.*

Ralph Peters is quite frankly the most gifted military theorist of his generation. He is a genuine forward thinker who is brutally honest, thoroughly believable, and very often profound. Peters ferrets out truths that many others would find difficult to articulate. A best-selling novelist and a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer and foreign-area specialist, Peters writes with conviction, integrity and unusual artistry.

Fighting for the Future is a compilation of 12 superb essays on the future of warfare. In these essays, Peters critically examines warfare and culture, combat in cities of the future, nationalism and fundamentalism, military ethics, future armored warfare, and ways of fighting and winning the battles that America is likely to face in the next millennium. His analyses are solidly grounded in the facts of the present, even when he is projecting some alternative and very nasty futures.

By combining political, cultural, economic and military analyses, Peters is able to paint extraordinarily credible pictures of likely future American combat. Joltingly realistic, the scenarios are frightening because today's Army is largely ill-equipped and ill-trained to handle them.

The author rightly points out that the next millennium is likely



to be characterized by urbanization on a massive scale. America's likely future adversaries may use these cities and their civilian populations as shields for their activities. No current world army would wish to face the American Army on a traditional battlefield: Our military technological superiority is too overwhelming. Peters predicts that potential adversaries will desert the traditional battlefield for the urban jungle, where America's massed firepower will be of extraordinarily limited utility. The power of cruise missiles, stealth bombers, multiple-launch rocket systems, conventional artillery, and the combined might of America's air forces will all be horribly truncated in cities.

Collateral damage (civilian deaths) is much more likely to occur on a battlefield that can be described in terms of concrete, brick, and steel. The urban scenario creates terribly complex moral and ethical dilemmas for combatant commanders and for individual soldiers. Potentially, millions of noncombatants could be crowded into an area the size of six or seven city blocks. Among these noncombatants could hide an urban Army that will not fight by any recognized rules.

The U.S. Army is neither trained nor equipped for urban combat. Moreover, our nation is not psychologically prepared for this often-brutal warfare — warfare in which women and children could easily become casualties by merely rounding a street corner at the wrong time.

Peters also speaks of what we call asymmetrical warfare. In this kind of warfare, our potential enemies will not be wearing uniforms. Villains such as drug lords, petty warlords, international criminal organizations, terrorist cells, corrupt governments and their leaders will not present the American military establishment with clear-cut "legal" targets.

The ambiguity created as a result of our legal system serves to hamstring our efforts against such antagonists. The author asks the long-overdue question, "Why is it acceptable to slaughter — and I use the word advisedly — the commanded masses but not to mortally punish the guiltiest individual, the commander, a man stained with the blood of his own people as well as that of his neighbors?" Peters asks good questions. Many of his questions go to the heart of our morality, which the author suggests that

we adapt to emerging realities.

Peters is a loyal fan of special-operations forces. For the better part of a decade, he has championed the cause of multiservice Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

In his view, only SOF and the U.S. Marines are adequately trained and sufficiently adaptable to succeed against the new realities of future warfare. Every SOF soldier will benefit from a close and careful reading of Peters' essays.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.
U.S. Army (ret.)
Sana'a, Yemen

Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam. *By Al Hemingway. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. ISBN: 1-55750-355-9. 189 pages. $25*.

Our War Was Different chronicles the mission and the accomplishments of the U.S. Marine Corps' Combined Action Program in Vietnam from 1965 through 1971. The story is told by Marines who describe what they did and what they saw. It is not an official history; rather it is an intimate look at life in the villages, as experienced by members of the different Combined Action Platoons, or CAPs, in the I Corps area of operations. The Marines, who were all volunteers, were enthusiastic about the program, and they empathized with the popular forces and the villagers whose confidence they sought to win.

The basic goal of the Combined Action Program was to bring peace to the Vietnamese villages by integrating the local knowledge of the popular forces with the professional skill and superior equipment of the Marines. The Vietnamese knew who the guerrillas were and where they hid; the Americans knew how to defeat them.

Although the U.S. Army employed soldiers as advisers, it had no organization quite like the Marine CAPs. Led by Marine NCOs, CAPs consisted of a Marine rifle squad and 35 Vietnamese soldiers. Army mobile advisory teams consisted of two U.S. officers, three U.S. enlisted men and a Vietnamese-army interpreter. Special Forces A-detachments were composed of 12 men.

The SF detachments had several advantages over the CAPs: long stateside training, the presence of officers and senior enlisted men, reinforcements of Montagnards or Chinese Nungs, and language skills. In fact, language was one of the CAPs' two major problems. As CAP Marine Michael Peterson states, "There was no real attempt to systematically utilize enlisted graduates from the Defense Language Institute." The other major problem was the selection process: All CAP Marines were supposed to have six months of in-country experience; such was not always the case.

The Combined Action Program was also not fully supported by the Marine Corps. There were approximately 80,000 Marines in Vietnam at the height of the war, but the CAPs never had more than 2,500 assigned Marines — less than four percent of the total USMC force.



In spite of the disadvantages, the CAPs were highly successful. No village captured from the Vietcong was ever retaken, and 60 percent of the CAP Marines volunteered to extend their time with the program.

Today, as U.S. war fighters are increasingly being tasked to perform peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions for which they are ill-trained, the lessons of the Combined Action Program may be relevant. The transition from war fighter to peacekeeper has never been easy, but in Vietnam, the Combined Action Program helped ease that transition. *Our War Was Different* will cause readers to consider whether similar programs might work in other countries and in other conflicts.

In the words of Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (ret.), "This book serves as a series of guideposts, with its credible examples of right and wrong in the critical task of winning the support of the people. Without their support, as Vietnam taught us, victory is out of reach."

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Special Warfare

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