


Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School




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From the Commandant



Special Warfare

The assessment and selection of personnel for service in Special Forces has always been a demanding task. The missions that we perform and the environment in which we operate call for soldiers with maturity, integrity and self-reliance, and we cannot afford to wait for a crisis to tell us which soldiers pass muster.

Our SF Assessment and Selection program was designed in 1988 to bring soldiers to the Special Warfare Center and School on temporary duty for a three-week assessment. Cadre members would observe the candidates during a series of assessment situations and select the ones who were best-suited for service in SF. Those candidates who were selected would then return to SWCS on a permanent-change-of-station move to attend the SF Qualification Course. The idea was a good one: SFAS saved money and allowed us to screen candidates prior to their attendance in the SFQC.

But SFAS is only the latest in a series of programs designed to select the right soldiers for service in SF. As our needs changed, those earlier programs were modified or they were abandoned.

It was time for SFAS to change, too. The Army is not the same as it was in 1988. We are a smaller organization, and SF recruits from an Army half the size of the one we had when the SFAS began. Because of reduced training budgets and frequent deployments, the Army no longer trains soldiers as thoroughly as it once did in warrior skills such as marksmanship, land-navigation and living in the field.

If we continue to assess soldiers as we have done over the past 13 years, we might find that we are turning away soldiers who are suitable for SF and who could perform well on SF detachments after receiving additional training. Therefore, we have changed the SFAS to assess not only the suitability of the candidates, but also their trainability.

SFAS cadre members now coach and train



candidates as they assess them. Assessments are not done immediately; in fact, the assessment process continues throughout the SF training pipeline. Students in the SFQC now face a board at the end of each phase of training to determine whether they should progress to the next phase.

The articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* focus on the assessment, selection and training of SF personnel from several perspectives. They should help readers derive a balanced view of the process, and the information in the articles should answer many questions.

One thing that no one should question is the quality of the personnel who complete the SF training pipeline. There were good reasons for changing SFAS, but the changes represent changes of *method*. The *standards* by which we judge and select soldiers for SF have not changed, nor will they. The Special Warfare Center and School is committed, as it has always been, to providing our SF groups with the best-trained and best-qualified soldiers possible.

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SFAS Redesign: An Essential Evolution

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Marrs

On Oct. 12, 2000, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group completed the first iteration of the new Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, program. Although the new curriculum is still in the validation phase, it represents a fundamental shift in SFAS training philosophy and methodology.

Under the former SFAS program, a candidate was assessed primarily for his inherent capabilities. Under the new program, a candidate is assessed on his trainability and suitability for service in Special Forces, or SF. Teaching, coaching, training and mentoring are impor-

tant aspects of the new program.

Some soldiers in the SF community are concerned that the changes in SFAS represent a decrease in standards, that the program will lack the necessary stress events, and that the new SFAS will fail to measure a candidate's ability to function on an SF team. Most of the concerns stem from the warrior spirit and passion for high standards that are characteristic of SF soldiers. Certainly the concerns are legitimate; in fact, they were an important consideration in the redesign process.

Background

For more than a decade, some members of the SF community have cherished the notion that SFAS is the definitive selection method for SF. They view SFAS as the Holy Grail, believing that SF can acquire quality personnel only by means of a stand-alone assessment-and-selection program. But while SFAS does assess many of the qualities needed for success in SF, the idea that it provides the only means of ensuring those qualities is somewhat shortsighted.

Considering that SFAS did not begin until 1988, we must admit that the rather large group of professional soldiers to whom we owe our SF heritage, as well as many of the quality soldiers in today's SF force, never attended a separate assessment-and-selection program.

The new SFAS program emphasizes coaching, training and mentoring candidates in addition to assessing their suitability and trainability.



File photo

So why does SFAS exist? In reality, the 1988 decision to implement SFAS was monetary in nature. High attrition rates in the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, were forcing SWCS to pay high costs for student permanent-change-of-station moves. To manage financial resources more effectively and to ensure the long-term health of the force, SWCS developed SFAS. The new temporary-duty program afforded SF a cost-effective means of assessing a candidate's physical and mental abilities. At the same time, the screening effect of SFAS limited attrition in the SFQC.

Throughout its existence, SFAS has presented its candidates with substantial physical and mental challenges. That aspect of the new SFAS program has not changed. But in the past, SFAS cadre members remained aloof, observing and assessing candidates' capabilities and characteristics. That aspect of the new program *has* changed. The training philosophy of the new SFAS program encourages cadre members to teach, coach, train and mentor students.

SFAS in the 21st century

The personnel strength of today's Army is significantly lower than it has been in the past, substantially decreasing SF's recruiting pool. Changing attitudes and a lack of motivation among some of today's soldiers have further exacerbated the difficulty of SF recruiting. Furthermore, today's Army does not train soldiers in fundamental tasks as vigorously as it once did. With such a radical shift in the character of our recruiting base, the transformation of SFAS became essential.

Recognizing that people are SF's most precious resource, the new SFAS program focuses on each candidate's trainability and suitability. Trainability is defined as the candidate's aptitude for learning, and SFAS employs land-navigation exercises as the primary means for determining that aptitude. Suitability is defined as a candidate's fitness to attend the SFQC and to serve in SF. A candidate's suitability is measured in terms of key attributes identified by Army special-operations forces and by the Army Research Institute. The attri-



File photo

butes include cognitive ability, physical fitness, initiative, moral courage, dependability, maturity, perseverance, judgment, decision-making, team-player ability, persuasiveness and communication. Some of the attributes are more heavily weighted than others, but all of them play a critical role in the assessment-and-selection process.

The new SFAS program is linked to the SFQC in three principal areas. First, SFAS now makes better use of the long-term team dynamics of the SF training pipeline. While SFAS still incorporates a peer-rating system, our analysis concluded that the SFQC, which can take 6-12 months to complete, provides a better measure of team interaction than the former SFAS program did. Accordingly, each of the phases of the SFQC now incorporates a peer-rating system, cadre observations and a board process as key factors in deciding whether to move a candidate into the next phase. To put it simply, the selection process is now continuous throughout SF training.

Second, the extensive use of land navigation by SF soldiers provides a common link between SFAS, SFQC and SF field operations. Third, the frequent land-navigation exercises in SFAS should eventually provide candidates sufficient training in land navigation that the SFQC will be able to focus its efforts on providing additional warrior skills.

Under the new SFAS program, land-navigation training provides the primary means of determining a candidate's trainability.

Eligibility criteria for SFAS

Enlisted applicants

- Must be at least E4 prior to SFAS attendance.
- Must be a high school graduate or have a general educational development certificate.
- Must have a minimum score of 100 on the general/technical section of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.
- Drill sergeants and detailed recruiters may not break their stabilization.
- E7s must have no more than 12 years' time in service and one year time in grade.
- Soldiers on assignment will not be allowed to attend SFAS without their branch's approval. Soldiers on orders to a short-tour area will be allowed to attend SFAS if no deferment is required.
- OCONUS-based soldiers may attend SFAS in a TDY-and-return status at any time during their tour. Upon completion of SFAS, soldiers will be scheduled for the next available SFQC.
- CONUS-based soldiers may attend SFAS in a TDY-and-return status at any time during their tour. Upon completion of SFAS, soldiers will complete at least one year on-station prior to their PCS for attending the SFQC.
- Must have a minimum of 24 months' remaining time in service upon completion of the SFQC.

Officer applicants

- Must have at least a secret security clearance prior to final packet approval and meet eligibility criteria for top-secret clearance.
- Must have completed their officer basic course and have been successful in branch assignments prior to application for SFAS.
- Must have a minimum score of 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery.
- Must have at least 24 months' remaining time in service upon completion of the SF Detachment Officer Qualification Course.

All applicants

- Must score 229 points (under the standards for the 17-21 year-old age group) on the Army Physical Fitness Test.
- Must not have a bar to re-enlistment or be under suspension of favorable personnel action.
- Must have no conviction by court-martial or disciplinary action noted in their official military personnel fiche under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- Must not have been terminated from SF, Ranger or airborne duty for reasons other than extreme family problems.
- Must not have 30 days or more lost time under U.S. Code 972 within their current or preceding enlistment.

For more information, telephone the SF Recruiting Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., at DSN 239-1818 or commercial (910) 432-1818.

The new SFAS program still includes events such as the obstacle course, rappelling, running, and rucksack marches. However, because the land-navigation exercises play such a critical role in the assessment process, candidates receive comprehensive classroom instruction in land navigation early in the program. Several practical exercises, as well as cadre-led terrain walks, help to reinforce the classroom instruction. Although candidates are still assessed points for their performance in each practical exercise, they also receive constant training feedback. At the conclusion of the practical-exercise portion of the training, each candidate must negotiate three increasingly difficult land-navigation tests commonly referred to as STAR examinations. A long-range individual movement, or LRIM, which lasts for several days, follows the final STAR examination.

Maintaining high standards

The 1st Special Warfare Training Group is committed to maintaining high standards during SFAS. An indication of that commitment is the recent increase in the prerequisite score that SFAS candidates must achieve on the Army Physical Fitness Test (up from 206 to 229 points, under the standards for the 17-21 year-old age group). Although some of the former SFAS program's situation-reaction events were demanding, stress-related leadership tasks, many of them had limited direct relevance to success in SFQC and SF. The new program's focus on trainability and suitability provides that relevance. During the SFAS STAR exams, candidates are required to carry their weapon; their load-carrying equipment, or LCE; and a 45-pound rucksack. During the LRIM, candidates are also required to carry their weapon, their LCE and a rucksack, but the weight of the rucksack is increased to 65 pounds. By the time a student completes SFAS, he will have moved more than 180 kilometers while carrying a rucksack.

The new SFAS program uses a comprehensive grading process to evaluate the overall performance of the candidate rather than his performance on individual events.

This methodology is consistent with the “whole man” concept, and it ensures that the program’s standards remain unpublished. Candidates whose performance is marginal must appear before a closed-session commander’s review board.

Several modifications have already been made to the new SFAS program since it began in October 2000. One example is the increase in the distance covered during the LRIM.

Summary

A decline in the recruiting base and the need to link assessment and selection to SFQC have catalyzed the redesign of SFAS. The new program constitutes a significant shift in the philosophy and methodology of SF assessment and selection. In the past, SFAS focused on each candidate’s inherent capabilities; the new SFAS focuses on candidates’ trainability and suitability. Land-navigation exercises provide the primary means for assessing a candidate’s trainability; key attributes provide a benchmark for assessing a candidate’s suitability for SF.

Although the evaluation methodology of the new SFAS is close-hold, in general it uses a comprehensive scoring system that embraces the whole-man concept. Candidates are unaware of the standards for the program; they must simply perform each task to the best of their ability. Validation of the new SFAS program continues, and because we expect the program to undergo several more revisions, we have not finalized the SFAS program of instruction.

The new SFAS program will ensure that we manage and train our most critical resource — people — efficiently. We believe that the new program provides a better measure of a candidate’s ability and quality by determining whether he is trainable and suitable for service in SF. The old SFAS program measured a candidate’s ability by the way he carried buckets of sand or by the way he pushed jeeps. The new program will test his intestinal fortitude for operating under stress and for moving great distances alone and at night.

The new SFAS program promises to provide Special Forces with highly qualified

soldiers from a changing Army. The feedback we have received from those who are enrolled in the new program has been positive, particularly in regard to the program’s methodology, its challenges and the professionalism of the cadre.

Assessment and selection will continue throughout SFQC. The new program is both physically and mentally demanding, and candidates must cope with the added stress of not knowing the program’s standards. Remember, every candidate who completes SFAS will move in excess of 180 kilometers while carrying a rucksack, and he will perform all of the other SFAS requirements as well.

Anyone who wishes to validate the new program is encouraged to volunteer for attendance. All expenses will be paid by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. ✕

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Marrs is commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous SF assignments include commander, Detachment 725, 7th SF Group; chief, SF Development Branch, SWCS; commander, Company A, 3/3rd SF Group; executive officer, 1/3rd SF Group; and chief, Army Policy, Plans and Readiness Directorate of Personnel, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Methodist College and a master’s degree in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.



The SF Pipeline Review: Voices From the Field

by Dr. Michelle M. Zazanis, Dr. Robert N. Kilcullen, Dr. Michael G. Sanders and Doe Ann Litton

As Special Forces prepares for the future, part of its preparation must include a critical review of its selection-and-training process.

In 1999, the U.S. Army Research Institute, or ARI, in collaboration with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, began conducting a review of the attributes that are assessed during the SF selection-and-training process, known as the SF pipeline.

The purpose of the review, which was called the SF Pipeline Review, was to determine the extent to which the current SF pipeline assesses or trains the attributes that are critical to performance in the field (Table 1) and to identify the attributes that may increase in importance in the future. The attributes that are critical to SF performance had been identified through a prior job analysis.¹

To accomplish the review, ARI and SWCS used three methods: First, they surveyed the cadre and other subject-matter experts, or SMEs, involved with the SF pipeline. Second, they reviewed and analyzed data that indicated the likelihood of a candidate's success in the Special Forces Assessment and Selection program, or SFAS, and in the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. And third, they surveyed SF soldiers in the field to obtain

information on relevant issues. The first two methods were described in detail in an article in the Summer 1999 issue of *Special Warfare*.² The third method is the focus of this article.

Background

Data collected through the SF Pipeline Review's first two methods suggested that SFAS provides a high level of assessment of the physical-fitness attributes, a moderate level of assessment of most of the cognitive and personality attributes, and a low level of assessment of the communication attributes and the cultural adaptability attribute.

Data also indicated that many of the attributes are required during the first two phases of the three-phase SFQC, and that nearly all of the attributes are required during the third phase, the Robin Sage field training exercise.³

Despite the fact that Robin Sage requires such a high number of the critical attributes, SFQC SMEs indicated that soldiers who are deficient in some of the critical attributes could still pass the final phase and graduate from the SFQC. This means that even though most of the candidates may have scored high in the critical attributes, some of the candidates who scored low in some but high in others may still be allowed to graduate

Table 1. Critical Special Forces Performance Attributes & Skills

ATTRIBUTES

Physical Fitness

Physical fitness: ruckmarching, strength and endurance
Swimming ability

Cognitive

General cognitive ability: understanding, remembering and applying information
Judgment/planning: making sound decisions
Adaptability: thinking on your feet, coping with unexpected problems
Creativity: finding new ways of solving problems
Basic math: adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing
Language: speaking a foreign language well
Perceptual ability: attentive to and observant of surroundings

Personality/Interpersonal

Cognitive flexibility: comfortable with uncertainty
Cultural adaptability: modifying own style in new culture
Stress tolerance: remaining level-headed under stress
Autonomy: comfortable working alone
Team playership/dependability: supporting the team effort
Initiative/perseverance: self-motivated, giving 100-percent effort
Moral courage: displaying integrity/honesty in actions
Maturity: displaying appropriate behavior for a situation

Communication

Oral communication: presenting verbal information clearly
Written communication: writing materials clearly
Nonverbal communication: interpreting/using nonverbal behaviors accurately

.....

SKILLS

Land navigation
Small-unit tactics
18A: Military decision-making process
18A: Doctrinal knowledge
18B: Weapons craft – U.S. and foreign weapons
18B: Light-infantry tactics – squad level
18C: Demolitions (improvised and standard)
18C: Engineering (combat and civil)
18D: Combat-medical skills
18D: Long-term-care skills
18E: Assembling/operating comms equipment
18E: Information operations/ADP

and join an SF A-detachment.

The third method used in the SF Pipeline Review was to determine whether soldiers in the field have observed any areas of low proficiency among their teammates or coworkers, particularly those who are recent SFQC graduates. In order to ascertain that information, ARI included pertinent questions in a survey, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command Field Survey 2000, that was to be administered to all active-duty SF soldiers.

In developing the field survey, ARI researchers sought to reduce the number of attributes that the respondents would have to rate. They combined some of the 29 critical attributes from the original

list⁴ when the attributes overlapped (e.g., physical strength, physical endurance and physical flexibility became physical fitness). Researchers removed other attributes that were primarily antecedents for technical aspects of SF MOSs (e.g., auditory ability for SF communications sergeants).

At the request of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, researchers also included the skills listed in Table 1 in order to solicit feedback from the field on graduates' performance in those particular skills. Researchers also added other skills and attributes (included in figures 1, 2 and 3) as a result of input collected from SF focus groups. Researchers interviewed the focus

Table 2. Ratings of Attribute Proficiency of Recent SFQC Graduates

Highest Rating	Physical fitness	83%
	Basic math	83%
	Land navigation	74%
	General cognitive ability	73%
	Team playership/dependability	71%
	Moral courage	69%
.....		
Moderate Rating	Swimming ability	65%
	Cognitive flexibility	64%
	Oral communication	63%
	Initiative/perseverance	60%
	Stress tolerance	59%
	Nonverbal communication	56%
	Written communication	55%
	Small-unit tactics	54%
	Creativity	53%
	Perceptual ability	53%
	Cultural adaptability	53%
.....		
Lowest Rating	Judgment/planning	51%
	Autonomy	49%
	Adaptability	47%
	Maturity	47%
	Language	31%

NOTE: Chart represents the percentage of the enlisted A-detachment leadership who indicated that "many" or "most" recent SFQC graduates are proficient in each attribute.

Table 3. Ratings of MOS Proficiency of Recent SFQC Graduates

Highest Rating	18D: Combat-medical skills	82%
	18E: Assembling/operating commo equipment	82%
.....		
Moderate Rating	18B: Weapons craft	77%
	18D: Long-term-care skills	77%
	18C: Demolitions	74%
	18A: Military decision-making process	73%
	18B: Light-infantry tactics	70%
.....		
Lowest Rating	18A: Doctrinal knowledge	68%
	18E: Information operations/ADP	66%
	18C: Engineering	63%

NOTE: Chart represents the percentage of the enlisted A-detachment leadership who indicated that “many” or “most” recent SFQC graduates are proficient in each attribute.

groups to ensure that the survey would assess the qualities that the soldiers in the field consider to be important.

Data collection

During March and April 2000, the U.S. Army SF Command and the ARI collected survey responses from 2,165 active-duty SF soldiers. Of those soldiers, 275 detachment operations sergeants, assistant detachment commanders, and operations-and-intelligence sergeants had worked with recent SFQC graduates over the past five years. In this article, the discussion of the assessments of recent SFQC graduates will reflect the responses of those 275 members of the enlisted A-detachment leadership.

The survey asked soldiers to specify what percentage of recent SFQC graduates are “adequately proficient” in each of the attributes and skills listed in Table 1.⁵ The respondents were given four choices: Few or none (0-25 percent), Some (26-50 percent), Many (51-75 percent), or Most (76-100 percent). Next they were instructed to rate their coworkers’ skills and their own skills, and to indicate whether any of the

soldiers on their A-detachment were likely to hinder or detract from the mission. Finally, they were instructed to rate the quality of the SFQC as well as the quality of other SWCS training.

Recent SFQC graduates

The enlisted A-detachment leadership indicated that recent SFQC graduates are adequately proficient in some of the critical attributes and less proficient in others. Attributes in which recent SFQC graduates were most often rated as proficient included physical fitness, basic math, land navigation, team playership/dependability and moral courage (Table 2).

Attributes in which recent SFQC graduates were least often rated as proficient included language, maturity, adaptability, autonomy and judgment/planning. Cultural adaptability and the communication attributes, identified as possible areas of deficiency in the first two portions of the SF Pipeline Review, were rated in the moderate range of proficiency.

Most MOS skill areas were rated fairly high, although 18C: Engineering; 18E: Information operations; and 18A: Doctrinal knowledge were rated lower (Table 3). A

USASFC 2000 Field Survey

In the fall of 1999, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command elected to survey active-duty SF soldiers regarding their career intentions, deployments, resources and other critical issues. A similar survey had been conducted in 1995, and the new survey was designed as a mechanism for providing updated information, as well as for identifying any new concerns. Survey responses were collected from 2,165 soldiers during March and April of 2000.

Results were briefed to the commanding generals of the USASFC and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in August 2000, and a summary of the results was provided to each SF group commander. The article titled "The SF Pipeline Review: Voices From the Field," in this issue of *Special Warfare*, is designed to provide feedback to soldiers regarding issues related to SWCS and the SF pipeline. To provide feedback regarding USASFC issues, USASFC and the U.S. Army Research Institute are producing a series of four newsletters that describe the results of the survey, compare the results of the survey to those from the 1995 survey, and explain the actions that the command is taking to address the problems.

The first newsletter, *Special Forces 2000: Reporting from the Field*, was published in October 2000. ARI sent 260 copies to each SF battalion, and provided additional copies to group- and higher-level headquarters. To obtain copies of the newsletter, check with your battalion staff.

few soldiers provided specific suggestions for improving MOS training, such as: "Currently, the 18E [SFQC] Phase II does not teach an adequate amount of computer skills, nor do they teach any of the newer equipment groups now use. I understand that these things take time, but keeping up with technology is now very important."

With respect to the engineer course, one soldier suggested: "The [SFQC] needs to focus on the paperwork involved with supply issues, as well as what it [already teaches]." An 18B suggested: "Each 18B should receive sniper, SOT training ... while in SWCS. ... Those skills are what 18Bs are looked at to train, both [for] A-teams and foreign armies."

Although soldiers did not provide examples of their specific complaints regarding recent SFQC graduates, many conveyed concerns that standards either in the SFAS or in the SFQC are being lowered to meet personnel-manning requirements. One soldier commented: "Quality, not quantity, is what SF needs, not a lot of average soldiers. ... I recently served as a guest cadre in Phase III SFQC and was shocked to learn from the cadre how difficult it is to

stop an individual from graduating."

An NCO who works in the SF selection-and-training programs commented: "People say that they have lowered the standards ... but that's not true; the standards are there, and for most of the soldiers they apply. [They are] waived for that other small percentage."

In summary, responses from the enlisted leadership suggested that recent graduates are strong in attributes such as physical fitness, cognitive ability, team playership/dependability and moral courage, as well as in land-navigation skills and MOS skills. However, recent graduates are not as strong in attributes such as maturity, adaptability, autonomy and judgment/planning, or in skills such as language and small-unit tactics. For this reason, it would be beneficial to continue to improve the assessment and training of those attributes and skills, as well as to help soldiers in the units further develop those attributes.

Coworker and self-assessments

Next, soldiers rated their team members or coworkers in the areas of tactical and technical skills, moral courage, pro-

fessionalism and overall performance. Those ratings were unanimously high (Figure 1). Soldiers' comments also reflected a high level of respect for their coworkers. When the soldiers were asked what they enjoy most about SF, a number of them responded: "The people I work with"; "Having had the opportunity to serve with some truly exceptional people"; and "Quality people." One soldier stated: "Working with men who truly can go anywhere, anytime, to do anything."

About 90 percent of the soldiers rated themselves as "good," "very good" or "excellent" in their primary MOS, field skills, interpersonal skills, teaching others, and mission planning. The one exception to their high ratings was in language skills: Only 42 percent of the soldiers rated their language skills as "good," "very good" or "excellent."

One soldier said: "With all the other commitments and training, it is hard to maintain a language proficiency sufficient enough to say that ... [an] SF soldier speak[s] a language 'well.' Some can; most

are not beyond Level I, including myself." Another soldier suggested: "It is important to have a strong language base, and that is very hard to do [with] CAT IV languages. Most people have only a very basic understanding of the host-nation language. We need to do better with language immersion."

On average, the soldiers gave themselves and their coworkers high ratings on their skills. Even so, about 50 percent of the soldiers from the SF detachments and 42 percent from the non-detachment units indicated that at least one individual on their team or in their unit was likely to hinder or detract from the mission.

When asked to identify that individual's areas of deficiency, respondents from the SF detachments and from the non-detachment units most often selected maturity and interpersonal skills (Figures 2, 3). Respondents from the non-detachment units also cited initiative/perseverance as another area of deficiency. The SF detachments and the non-detachment units cited self-discipline, adaptability and


Figure 1. Ratings of Coworkers' Performance



NOTE: 1. Chart represents the percentage of SF soldiers who rated their coworkers' performance as "good," "very good" or "excellent."

2. Professionalism is determined by a number of attributes (autonomy, team player-ship/dependability, initiative/perseverance, moral courage, maturity) as well as by tactical and technical skills.

Figure 2. Areas of Deficiency – A-Detachment



- NOTE: 1. Chart represents the percentage of SF soldiers who said that at least one member of their unit is deficient in the area indicated.
2. Interpersonal skills are determined by oral and nonverbal communication, team playership/dependability, initiative/perseverance, and maturity.
3. Self-discipline is determined by team playership/dependability and autonomy.

judgment/planning as additional areas of deficiency.

Some soldiers commented on the difficulty of dealing with soldiers who have these problems. One soldier said: “Recently, we had a soldier that didn’t live up to expectations. ... [The] chain of command responded [that it was] a leadership challenge and [we should] deal with it.”

To summarize, while these results suggested that most soldiers are performing well in the field, there are evidently some soldiers in the units who lack maturity and interpersonal skills. The attributes identified as areas of deficiency for team members and coworkers largely matched those identified as areas of deficiency for recent SFQC graduates — particularly maturity, adaptability and judgment/planning.

SWCS training courses

Regarding the quality of SWCS training, most soldiers rated the SFQC field

training and the SFQC MOS training as “good,” “very good” or “excellent” (Figure 4). One soldier commented: “SF is doing well with ... getting additional training for Q-course grads (SERE, INTAC).” SWCS specialty training (e.g., military free-fall) received high ratings, and operations-and-intelligence training received moderately high ratings.

The two areas of SWCS training that did not receive particularly high ratings were language training (echoing soldiers’ concerns about their language skills) and the NCO Academy. Nearly half the soldiers rated those areas as “fair” or “poor.”

Comments about the language training generally focused on the quantity of training provided, indicating a need for more initial and sustainment training. Comments about the NCO Academy focused on the content and structure of the SF Advanced NCO Course, or ANCOC. Several soldiers suggested that

the operations-and-intelligence training be separated from ANCOC. In order to identify necessary improvements, the SF pipeline would need additional information regarding what soldiers perceived as the strengths and weaknesses of these programs.

Summary and recommendations


In the data obtained during the first portion of the SF Pipeline Review, SFAS SMEs indicated that the physical-fitness attributes were highly assessed in SFAS. Respondents from the field survey concurred. SFAS SMEs also indicated that the team-playership/dependability attribute was fairly well-assessed. Respondents from the field survey concurred. With respect to adaptability and autonomy, SFAS SMEs indicated that they had somewhat fewer opportunities to assess those attributes. Respondents from the field survey identified those same attributes as areas of lower

proficiency for some of the recent SFQC graduates, and respondents identified adaptability as an area of deficiency for some of the soldiers on SF detachments.

SFAS and SFQC SMEs indicated that communication skills were not highly assessed until Robin Sage, the final phase of the SFQC. Apparently, there are not sufficient opportunities to assess the soldiers and help them develop this critical attribute. In the results from the field survey, communication skills were rated in the moderate range for recent SFQC graduates, and interpersonal skills were identified as an area of deficiency for some of the soldiers on the SF detachments. Oral and nonverbal communication skills are two critical building blocks necessary for developing interpersonal skills.


SFAS and SFQC SMEs also indicated that the cultural adaptability attribute was not highly assessed or required until Robin Sage. Field-survey results suggested that recent graduates have a low-to-moder-

Figure 3. Areas of Deficiency – Non-Detachment Units



- NOTE: 1. Chart represents the percentage of SF soldiers who said that at least one member of their unit is deficient in the area indicated.
 2. Interpersonal skills are determined by oral and nonverbal communication, team playership/dependability, initiative/perseverance, and maturity.
 3. Self-discipline is determined by team playership/dependability and autonomy.

Figure 4. Ratings of SWCS Training



NOTE: Chart represents percentage of SF soldiers who rated each type of SWCS training as "good," "very good" or "excellent."

ate range of proficiency in that attribute. In addition, adaptability was also identified as an area of deficiency for some of the soldiers on SF detachments.

The convergence of data collected from the SMEs and from the field survey, both on the physical-fitness attributes and on the team playership/dependability attribute, suggests that the current assessment-and-training process is working particularly well with regard to those attributes. The convergence of data regarding the adaptability, autonomy and communication attributes, on the other hand, strongly suggests that the SF pipeline should improve the assessment and training of those attributes.

Data collected from the SMEs and from the field survey were somewhat divergent with regard to the maturity attribute and the judgment/planning attribute. SFAS SMEs indicated that there were quite a few opportunities in which to assess those two attributes. Results from the field survey, however, identified those attributes as areas of deficiency for recent graduates and for the problem sol-

diers on the SF detachments.

The divergence may reflect the fact that a soldier's immature behavior and poor judgment are less likely to surface in the structured settings of the SF pipeline. Another factor may be that the SFAS/SFQC SMEs see a much wider range of maturity levels than the detachment leadership does (i.e., the SMEs are aware that many soldiers who demonstrate immature behavior are removed during selection and training). Nevertheless, the clear message from the field is that maturity and judgment/planning are two critical attributes in which some detachment soldiers are deficient.

While the SF Pipeline Review will use the information from the field survey to identify possible improvements to the selection-and-training process, unit-level interventions could also be considered. Enhancing the selection-and-training process can improve the future SF force, but unit-level interventions would help maximize the quality of the current force. Team sergeants may need support in identifying and assisting at-risk sol-

diers before problems arise, or in removing soldiers who do not show sufficient improvement.

Language skills

Language skills and language training were rated somewhat low in the field survey. Field-survey results also suggested that the presence of a native-language speaker on an A-detachment during a deployment had a positive impact on the success of the deployment. It is important that SF leaders develop a vision of the role that language will play in future SF requirements and that they determine whether the importance of a foreign-language capability will increase, decrease or remain the same. SF leaders could implement changes that would improve language training in the SF pipeline or that would promote field/sustainment training via distance-learning language programs or intensive immersion programs.

Future requirements

In their article in the Summer 1999 issue of *Special Warfare* magazine, the authors concluded that visions of future requirements seem to suggest an increasing importance in two domains of SF performance. First, soldiers will require more specialized skills in diplomacy-related functions, such as building and maintaining effective relations with indigenous populations, handling difficult interpersonal situations, and using or enhancing language skills. Second, continuous operations in the turbulence of the multinational, interagency and technological environment may demand greater flexibility and problem-solving skills. Consequently, the attributes that may increase in importance are judgment/planning, adaptability, creativity, cultural adaptability, maturity, communication, and language skills.⁶

Considering that the SMEs identified the adaptability, judgment/planning, communication, maturity, and language attributes as possible areas of deficiency

in the current SF pipeline, it is likely that those attributes have already increased in importance since the original selection-and-training system was designed. If that is true, SF leaders have an even stronger reason to explore new ways of enhancing the assessment and development of those attributes in the SF pipeline.

Conclusions

If you were to ask active-duty SF soldiers if they are glad they joined SF, more than 80 percent would answer yes. More than 70 percent say there is a strong sense of pride and professionalism in SF, and 78 percent say that there are more outstanding soldiers in SF than anywhere else in the Army. A significant reason for the high degree of quality in the force is the relentless motivation that propels SF soldiers to improve themselves, their unit and their branch. They hold themselves, their coworkers and their leadership to the highest of standards.

Reviewing the SF pipeline is a continual process. As SF requirements change, the SF pipeline will need to change with them. One of the primary reasons for the success of the SF pipeline in producing high-quality soldiers over the past two decades is the professionalism and the dedication of the cadre personnel who execute the various training programs. This review provides insight into the modifications that may be required in the system to ensure that the cadre has the tools and the opportunities required to accomplish its job. ✕

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evaluation systems for both SFAS and the SF Qualification Course, longitudinal SFAS-SFQC databases, and a variety of performance and manpower modeling analyses. She holds a BA in psychology from the University of Virginia and both an MA and a Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychology from George Mason University.

Dr. Robert N. Kilcullen is a research psychologist in the Selection and Assignment Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Since joining ARI in 1989, Dr. Kilcullen has developed measures of leadership potential, work motivation, adaptability and personal integrity that have been validated for predicting job performance and other outcomes throughout the SF community, in conventional Army units, and in the DA-civilian workplace. He has also developed command-climate and values-climate surveys and administered them to various Army units. Dr. Kilcullen has written numerous scientific papers and has made several presentations at professional conferences and to representatives of foreign countries. He received a BA in psychology from the University of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychology from George Mason University.



Dr. Michael G. Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, Dr. Sanders continued his research on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment and retention. Dr. Sanders has also served as chief of the ARI field unit at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unit performed research on training-technology enhancements for Signal soldiers. He holds a master's

and a doctorate in experimental psychology, with an emphasis on human factors.

Doe Ann Litton is the statistician for the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Since 1991, she has managed the SWCS Research Database. Litton is a graduate of the Women's Executive Leadership Program and holds a BA in biology and a master's in business administration from the University of Missouri-St. Louis.



Notes:

¹ T.L. Russell, J.L. Crafts, F.A. Tagliareni, R.A. McCloy and P. Barkley, *Job Analysis of Special Forces Jobs* [ARI Research Note 96-76] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994).

² M.M. Zazanis, R.N. Kilcullen, M.G. Sanders, and D.A. Crocker, "Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, 22-31.

³ Comments apply to the SFAS program that was in place in 1999.

⁴ Zazanis, Kilcullen, Sanders and Crocker, "Special Forces Selection and Training," 24.

⁵ We chose the term "adequately proficient," recognizing that the SFQC is expected to provide the initial training for these soldiers, while the respective units are expected to increase the soldiers' proficiency through field experience and on-the-job training.

⁶ Two additional attributes, diplomacy/persuasiveness and ability to motivate, were identified as increasing in importance, but they were not included in the field survey because of length restrictions. These attributes were considered to be branches of the communication skills.

Army Values

Selfless Service

Randall Shughart and Gary Gordon

Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart and Master Sergeant Gary Gordon served as sniper-team members with Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. On Oct. 3, 1993, while subjected to intense fire from automatic weapons and from rocket-propelled grenades, Shughart and Gordon provided precision sniper fire from the lead helicopter during a building assault and at two helicopter crash sites.

While providing critical suppressive fire above the second crash site, Shughart and Gordon learned that ground forces were not available to secure the site. Both men unhesitatingly volunteered to be inserted, even though they knew that enemy personnel were closing in on the site. Because of enemy ground fire, they were inserted 100 meters south of the crash site.

Equipped with only their sniper rifles and pistols, Shughart and Gordon fought their way through a dense maze of shanties to reach the critically injured crew members. Pulling the pilot and other crew members from the aircraft, they established a perimeter, placing themselves in the most vulnerable position. Both men poured out continuous protective fire until their ammunition was depleted. Shughart was fatally wounded. Gordon returned to the wreckage to recover a rifle that had only five rounds of ammunition remaining. He gave this weapon to the pilot with the words, "Good luck." Armed with only his pistol, Gordon continued the fight until he, too, was fatally wounded.

The selfless actions of Shughart and Gordon saved the pilot's life at the cost of their own. Their heroism was above the call of duty and exemplify the highest traditions of the military service. Both men were awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. — *Dr. Richard Stewart*



Randall Shughart (top) and Gary Gordon

Special Forces: Ensuring the Quality of Our Future Force

by Major Thomas M. Joyce

Within the United States Army, the Special Forces career-management field, or CMF, is unique for a number of reasons. One of those is the autonomy that SF has in assessing, selecting and training its entry-level personnel.

That autonomy gives SF a distinct advantage over other CMFs, but when there are shortfalls in the SF personnel inventory, that autonomy can become a major disadvantage. Because SF trains its own entry-level personnel, it cannot use Department of the Army funds to increase the number of training slots, as other CMFs can, to quickly correct population shortages.

The responsibility for producing sufficient personnel to fill SF units therefore falls squarely on the shoulders of the SF community. In fulfilling that responsibility, the SF community is hampered by two misperceptions: that the quality of the SF force has been degraded, and that entry-level SF soldiers should be capable of performing at a higher level.

Quantity vs. quality

The first misperception is that the SF-qualification standards have been lowered or compromised in order to produce greater numbers of graduates of the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC.

Using the criterion of the number of SF soldiers assigned to standardized mental-cat-

egories, we can compare the intellectual capability of today's SF enlisted force to that of a previous period. Today, 2 percent of the SF population is listed as mental-quality-category IV, compared to the Army's average of 4 percent.¹ In 1987, when the SF population was 7 percent smaller than today's force, SF also had 2 percent of its soldiers listed in mental-quality-category IV.² Today's entry-level SF soldiers therefore appear to be no less intelligent than their predecessors.

The assessment-and-selection process for today's SF volunteers remains demanding. In June 1988, 207 soldiers reported to Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS. Of those, 112 (54 percent) were selected to attend the SFQC.³ In November 1999, 319 soldiers reported to SFAS, and 124 (38.9 percent) were selected to attend the SFQC.⁴ SF candidates continue to meet tough, demanding standards. Those who are selected to attend the SFQC embody physical and mental endurance equal to or superior to that of their SF predecessors.

The academic standards for soldiers who are selected to attend the SFQC continue to be rigorous, as well. In May 1988, attrition for the 18E course was reported on the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, or ATRRs, as 47 percent.⁵ Eleven years later, in the quarter ending in December 1999, 18E attrition was again reported on ATRRs as 47 percent.⁶ The level of MOS proficiency required of the current SF population is

as demanding as it has been at any other time in the history of the SFQC.

The Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, has remained vigilant in maintaining its established training standards, despite the fact that it has had to absorb major personnel reductions. In December 1993, SWCS had 512 CMF-18 NCOs; during FY 1994, SWCS produced 328 SFQC graduates.⁷ In September 2000, SWCS had 361 CMF-18 NCOs, yet during FY 2000, it produced 370 SFQC graduates.⁸ By producing more SFQC graduates with fewer instructors, SWCS demonstrated that it recognizes the increased urgency of producing SF-qualified personnel. And because of its rigorous academic and individual standards, SWCS is able to maintain the highest quality among SFQC graduates.

Statistics for the SF recruiting of active-duty enlisted personnel and for the SFQC graduation rates of active-duty enlisted personnel have shown positive trends since 1994 (see graph on p. 20). More and more active-duty enlisted volunteers have been recruited to attend SFAS. If quality had been compromised in order to produce more graduates, the number of active-duty enlisted SFQC graduates would have greatly increased during FYs 1998 and 2000. In reality, the number of active-duty enlisted SFQC graduates has remained relatively consistent, despite an increase in the number of active-duty enlisted volunteers recruited after FY 1998. Standards of excellence for graduation from the SFQC have remained the same or have improved.

Entry-level performance

The second misperception is that an entry-level SF soldier has been trained to the same level as a seasoned, mid-career SF NCO.

Institutional learning makes up about 30 percent of a seasoned individual's expertise. The remaining 70 percent is developed through a series of professional training experiences with colleagues, mentors and superiors. Trial-and-error accounts for a significant portion of an SF soldier's professional growth. It is through field experi-

ence that entry-level personnel acquire greater skill.

Institutional learning forms only the foundation upon which other professional experiences will be constructed. As an individual grows and matures in a specific profession, and as he faces increasing vocational challenges, his job experience becomes the source of his ideas and solutions for work-related problems. As the individual matures professionally, he relies less on his institutional training and more on his occupational experiences.

An anonymous Army drill sergeant is reported to have said to a group of basic trainees,


Seasoned SF members should have reasonable expectations and should judge the skills of entry-level SF soldiers in the context of SFQC training. Organizations should not expect entry-level SF soldiers to be as effective in interpersonal relations, MOS expertise and organizational skills as senior SF NCOs would be.

"What I will teach you will help you survive in combat for about three minutes. The rest is OJT." The story underscores the importance of experience that an individual gains *after* his institutional training has taught him basic theory and simple application.

Seasoned SF members should have reasonable expectations and should judge the skills of entry-level SF soldiers in the context of SFQC training. Organizations should not expect entry-level SF soldiers to be as effective in interpersonal relations, MOS expertise and organizational skills as senior SF NCOs would be.

The "quantity vs. quality" and the "entry-level performance" misperceptions directly affect the recruiting and training of new volunteers and the retention of SF-qualified soldiers. Perceptions frequently form the basis of organizational norms. Negative perceptions can inadvertently degrade the self-worth of individual members of the organization's population. If seasoned members perceive that the professional

SFOC and SFAS Rates of Attendance



NOTE: 1. SFQC graduation rate statistics are provided by the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office.
2. SFAS attendance rate statistics are provided by the SWCS Special Operations Recruiting Company.

standards have been lowered, the value that they see in being associated with the organization may also decline, and they may terminate their membership in the organization early. Misperceptions of degraded quality can also be an impediment in attracting new volunteers for SF.

Strongest skills

Since 1994, the population of the SF force has been shrinking. If the trend continues, the number of command and leadership positions in SF will decline, and enlisted and officer personnel will lose a significant number of opportunities for career progression. Leaders of the SF community are aware of the personnel-inventory problem and are working to find a remedy.

In the past, unrealistic expectations have caused SF to lose many quality volunteers who were motivated, trainable and probably worthy of consideration for service in SF. SF lost these soldiers because the community failed to optimize and leverage its greatest competencies: training, coach-

ing and mentoring. SF units regularly train soldiers of other nations; however, the SF community has largely failed to recognize the necessity of coaching and mentoring other soldiers who want to join SF.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School, SF's institutional component, has recently modified the SFAS to include mentoring and coaching in the assessment philosophy of the SF training pipeline. The larger SF community, however, has largely ignored mentoring and coaching as a means of improving the skills of recent SFQC graduates.

The future of the SF community is contingent upon the willingness of its members to train, to coach and to mentor SF candidates and entry-level soldiers. The SF community can continue to ignore the declining population trend and allow it to continue, or it can begin an organizational retransformation that includes the following objectives:

- Recognize that we have ample volunteers who have the ability to become SF soldiers after appropriate training.
- Acknowledge that the current assess-

ment, selection and qualification process has superior standards and that it produces quality graduates with a baseline training skill set.

- Demonstrate SF's premier teaching competencies by training, coaching and mentoring at every opportunity.

SF soldiers who are committed to success and who have a strong sense of leadership have one other opportunity to enhance the quality of the SF population. They can volunteer to serve at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, where they can train, coach and mentor future Special Forces soldiers. For additional information, telephone Master Sergeant Jeff Wright or Phellicia Sorsby at DSN 221-8832/7768 or commercial (910) 432-8832/7768. ✂

December 1983.

⁸ Career Management Field Review; Unit Wraps: September 2000.

Major Thomas M. Joyce is chief of the Special Forces/Psychological Operations Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, Total Army Personnel Command. His previous enlist-ed/officer assignments in Infantry and in SF units include the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), the 82nd Airborne Division, the 10th Special Forces Group and the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. He received his commission through ROTC and re-entered active duty in 1987 upon his graduation from St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas. Major Joyce also holds master's degrees from Syracuse University and from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.



Notes:

¹ Career Management Field Review; CMF 18 Quality of Force: September 2000.

² Career Management Field Review; CMF 18 Quality of Force: November 1987.

³ USAJFKSWCS Total Attrition Excel spreadsheet, p. 1.

⁴ USAJFKSWCS Total Attrition Excel spreadsheet, p. 1.

⁵ Career Management Field Review; CMF 18: 18E: 19 May 1988.

⁶ Career Management Field Review; CMF 18: 18E: September 2000.

⁷ Career Management Field Review; Unit Wraps:

Case Studies in Selection and Assessment: The First Special Service Force, Merrill's Marauders and the OSS OGs

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson and Dr. C.H. Briscoe

For thousands of years, armies have explored ways of identifying soldiers who are uniquely qualified to perform the most dangerous and demanding missions.

Gideon, the most famous of the early Jewish warriors, is considered to have been the father of commando forces in Israel. In 1100 B.C., after unifying the independent tribes of Israel, he faced the task of selecting, from 10,000 volunteers, a small force to defend against an attack by the Midianites.

And the Lord said unto Gideon, The people are yet too many; bring them down unto the water, and I will try them for thee there: and it shall be, that of whom I will say unto thee, This shall not go with thee, the same shall not go.

So he brought down the people unto the water: and the Lord said unto Gideon, Everyone that lappeth of the water with his tongue, as a dog lappeth, him thou shalt set by himself; likewise every one that boweth down upon his knees to drink.

And the number of them that lapped, putting their hand to their mouth, were three hundred men; but all the rest of the people bowed down upon their knees to drink water.

And the Lord said unto Gideon, By the three hundred men that lapped I will save you, and deliver the Midianites into thine hand: let all the other people go every man unto his place.

(Judges 7:4-7)

The assessment was based on a warrior's alertness to surprise attack even while he was drinking. The simple test proved effective in identifying the best warriors for the mission, and Gideon's select force defeated the invading Midianites.

U.S. Army Special Forces, created in 1952, has tangible historical ties to the special-operations units created to perform hazardous and demanding missions during World War II. In order to identify common methods of evaluation that special-operations units have employed and personal traits that they have traditionally valued, it is appropriate that we look at the assessment-and-selection processes used by some of those World War II units.

This article will examine the processes used by three of those units, the combined Canadian-American First Special Service Force, or FSSF; the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), code-named Galahad, but commonly known as Merrill's Marauders; and the operational groups, or OGs, or the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS.

FSSF

In 1942, Geoffrey Pyke, an eccentric British scientist, convinced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British chief of combined operations, that mobile commando forces, using lightweight, over-snow vehicles, could conduct strategic winter raids and sabotage

against vital German facilities — hydroelectric stations in Norway and oil refineries in Romania. Pyke estimated that up to a half-million German troops would be diverted from the main fronts to defend against the attacks. The U.S. and Canada jointly agreed to supply the men for the force, code-named Operation Plough, which was later designated as the FSSF.

When the U.S. and Canada called for volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the American commander, specified only that U.S. volunteers should be single men between the ages of 21 and 35 who had three or more years of grammar school and who had backgrounds as lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, cowboys, game wardens, prospectors, and other outdoor workers.¹

The Canadian Army established more exacting standards for its volunteers: they

had to be willing to undergo parachute training; they had to be physically fit; they had to have prior infantry training; they had to have a knowledge of internal-combustion engines; they had to be NCO material; and they had to have experience as mountaineers, skiers or woodsmen (or they had to have some other kind of winter training).²

Thus, from the start, the Canadian soldiers were of higher quality and motivation. In contrast, many of the American “volunteers” came unwillingly. Sergeant John Yoder Jr., stated that he was “volunteered by his first sergeant.” Yoder returned from training one day and found his orders for Helena, Mont., atop his footlocker. (Fort Harrison, near Helena, was the site of FSSF training.) The initial American component of the FSSF also included a large percentage of jailbirds, ne’er-do-wells and dissenters, as unit and post



Photo by Lew Merrim

Members of the First Special Service Force practice cross-country skiing in Montana.



Photo by Thomas W. Hope

Members of the First Special Service Force practice rappelling in the rocky terrain of the Continental Divide.

commanders took the opportunity to rid themselves of troublemakers. Although many of those “disreputables” were rejected, a substantial number of them were accepted, because Frederick was looking for rugged and somewhat reckless characters.

Eventually, Frederick assembled a force of individualistic, physically tough American fighting men who were steadied by the influence of the older, more disciplined and initially, better-trained Canadians. While the Canadians numbered only one-third of the FSSF’s soldiers, they occupied about one-half of the leadership positions. Most of the battalion commanders and senior sergeants were Canadians, and most of the junior officers were Americans. A strong spirit of rivalry emerged between the Americans and Canadians, but national distinctions quickly disappeared as the FSSF jelled into an effective fighting unit.

The intense, difficult training that the soldiers were required to undergo built strong unit cohesion and spirit. It also raised their confidence and instilled within them a willingness to take calculated risks and to endure physical hardship. The average age of the men in the FSSF during its initial year of training was 26 — considerably older than the average age in regular U.S. Army units. The FSSF executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Paul D. Adams, attributed the unit’s rapid cohesion to the age factor.³

Frederick established two basic individ-

ual training goals: Every soldier had to achieve an unusually high level of physical fitness and stamina, and every soldier had to become a consummate infantryman.⁴ All members of the FSSF, including the officers, were required to meet the demanding standards, an impossible task for the aged and unfit. Soldiers who failed to measure up were shipped back to their old units.

In August 1943, during the Aleutians campaign, the FSSF was chosen to lead the assault on Kiska Island. Before the assault, U.S. Army ground-forces inspectors applied the latest combat standards for training, equipment readiness and physical fitness to the FSSF. The FSSF soldiers averaged 125 percent in all areas (on some tests, they scored 200 percent), and they were rated the best-trained infantry in the Army. All of the inspectors were impressed by the high levels of confidence that the soldiers displayed in themselves and in their comrades.⁵

After the Kiska operation, the FSSF was shipped to Italy in November 1943, to reinforce the Fifth Army’s winter offensive. Two months of fierce combat in the Italian mountains reduced the 1,800-man FSSF to 400 combat-effective soldiers, and the unit moved to the town of Santa Maria to recover, train replacements and refit for combat.

The FSSF’s refit training focused on the problems associated with the control of night fire and movement. The unit trained to anticipate enemy actions; it practiced quick-reaction fire-and-maneuver drills at night; it enforced strict firing discipline; it prepared simple plans that could be understood by all; and it stressed constant supervision by leaders. Because local guides often became lost, everyone in the FSSF refreshed their night-navigation skills. Leaders worked to ensure success by emphasizing thorough map studies before an operation, daylight reconnaissance, and regular reference to compasses and maps during movement.⁶

When the FSSF was assigned to a section of the beachhead at Anzio in February 1944, the intense refresher training paid off. During three months on line, the FSSF lost only 54 killed in action, 279 wounded and 51 missing in action. Replacements consisted of FSSF soldiers who had recovered from

wounds and injuries, specially trained recruits from Canada, U.S. Rangers from the recently disbanded 1st and 3rd Ranger battalions, and American soldiers carefully selected from the personnel depots.

Following the June 1944 liberation of Rome, the FSSF was alerted for its next mission — spearheading the invasion of Southern France. The invasion was to take place on the beaches between Cannes and Toulon. The FSSF's job would be to make night amphibious assaults against the two islands, Port Cros and Levant, that flanked the invasion beaches.

To prepare for the invasion, the FSSF conducted six weeks of intense training near a small fishing village in southern Italy. Soldiers of all ranks refreshed their infantry skills and practiced marksmanship. Replacements received instruction in the use of all the unit's weapons (individual and crew-served); they practiced quick-reaction tactical drills; and they learned the unit's standing operating procedures, or SOPs, for combat.

FSSF commanders realized that once their forces were committed to combat operations, their high levels of physical fitness deteriorated rapidly. Consequently, unit leaders insisted that soldiers exercise during rest periods to renew their physical strength and stamina.⁷

In August 1944, the entire FSSF conducted preinvasion assault and amphibious

training. Their preparations concluded with several full-dress-rehearsal night amphibious assaults against two islands south of Naples. As always, the FSSF's operations emphasized surprise, shock, tenacity and leadership.⁸

The FSSF did not recognize leadership based on rank alone. Leadership was a privilege, and leaders earned the respect of their soldiers, first in training and then in combat. Frederick personally set the standard for all to emulate.⁹ The FSSF leaders had to be as hardy, as fit and as proficient in infantry skills as those they led.

Considered to be the most highly trained of all the special-operations units created during World War II, the FSSF benefitted from having almost a full year to train as a coherent organization before it was committed to combat.¹⁰ Together, the cohesion, rigorous selection and hellishly intense physical training produced an extraordinary fighting element that was competent, confident, closely knit and full of esprit.

5307th Composite Unit

The decisive campaign of the Allies' long land war against the Japanese in Burma for control of the eastern gates to India concluded with the battle of Imphal-Kohima (March-June 1944). That major operation pitted British Field Marshall William



National Archives

Members of the First Special Service Force move supplies up a mountain in Italy. Their operations demanded high levels of fitness and stamina.

Soldiers of Merrill's Marauders marched an average of 10 miles per day on the Ledo Road in Burma.



U.S. Army Signal Corps photo

Slim's 14th Army against Japanese Lieutenant General Kawabe's Burma Area Army. While the conventional forces faced off at Imphal-Kohima, 20,000 specially trained jungle fighters, operating some 200 miles behind the front lines, attacked Kawabe's lines of communications and rear supply areas. This behind-the-lines harassing force consisted of 17,000 British Chindits and 3,000 U.S. Army volunteers of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional).

The Chindit War, as it was later referred to, was high drama at its best, and it involved exhilarating triumph as well as bewildering tragedy. Casualty tolls for both units proved to be unsustainable. American Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell used the Marauders to achieve his most notable success — the capture of Myitkyina airfield — yet he destroyed the force in the process. The five British Chindit brigades in Burma likewise suffered, sustaining 50-90 percent casualties.¹¹

In August 1943, the U.S.-Great Britain Quebec Conference established the Allied strategy for Burma in 1944. An American

brigade and six British brigades would be organized, trained and committed as long-range penetration groups, or LRPGs. They were to be modeled along the lines of British Major General Orde C. Wingate's revolutionary 77th Infantry Brigade (the Chindit I of 1943). Despite its high casualties, Chindit I had provided an undeniable morale lift to the British and Indian forces that had been driven rudely and rapidly out of Burma in 1942.¹²

The U.S. Army's brigade (3,000 men) was designated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), but it was popularly referred to as Merrill's Marauders, after Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, who took command of the unit in January 1944. The Marauders were created from 950 volunteers from the Pacific, 950 from the Caribbean Command, and the remainder from stateside units. Most had combat experience or training in jungle warfare. All of the soldiers volunteered for an undefined 90-day mission full of hazards and danger. Even the War Department had predicted an 85-percent casualty rate before

the unit's formation; hence, its "provisional" status.¹³ However, the knowledge that the 90-day mission would fulfill a soldier's combat service requirement was a major incentive for the volunteers. The 90-day duration of the mission was also the excuse given for the poor quality of rations provided to the Marauders. The temporary U.S. Army Air Force unit that was formed to support Wingate and Merrill, the No. 1 Air Commando, was likewise programmed to disband after 90 days.¹⁴ Later, Merrill emphasized the 90-day duration in an attempt to motivate the over-stressed fighters during hard times.

When the Americans arrived in India for training, they were placed under Wingate's command. There were two primary themes to Wingate's Chindit training. The first theme was physical endurance. In Wingate's "trials by ordeal," the pace, duration and intensity of the training produced and maintained an ultra-high level of physical stress on all the soldiers. The second theme was Burmese jungle craft. The Marauders received intense training in all the skills needed to operate behind enemy lines in trackless jungle. In particular, the men had to become experts in map reading and in land navigation.

Both Wingate and Colonel Charles N. Hunter, the U.S. commander originally charged with forming the 5307th, insisted on extensive cross-training: All soldiers trained on every unit weapon. Platoon leaders and NCOs learned artillery and mortar observation and radio communications.

Both the Marauders and the Chindits chose their best soldiers for their reconnaissance units, because they were responsible for providing critical intelligence and the early warning needed to prevent surprise Japanese attacks.¹⁵ However, the 5307th did not have a formal assessment-and-selection process. The unit's volunteers were not screened, nor were they always elite soldiers. Instead they were a mix of professional soldiers, authors, intellectuals, students and criminals. Nineteen-year-old Lieutenant (later Lieutenant General) Samuel V. Wilson emptied the guardhouse at the Marauders' California staging base in order to choose the "volunteers" for

his intelligence-and-reconnaissance platoon. Lieutenant Logan E. Weston, an unordained minister, selected his recon force by engaging volunteers in deep, philosophical discussions concluded by a prayer.¹⁶

Hunter stressed platoon tactics, believing that, in the jungle, the tactically proficient platoon would eventually decide every contact or operation. The Marauders developed detailed SOPs for frequent operations, such as crossing rivers, creating drop zones for aerial resupply, building airstrips for medical evacuations, securing rest areas, initiating immediate fire-and-maneuver actions upon contact with the enemy, and establishing trail blocks. Units drilled on the immediate tactical actions until they achieved clockwork precision: A few well-chosen words would initiate a series of integrated individual and team actions.¹⁷

Above all else, however, Hunter stressed marksmanship and fire discipline as the keys to success. Accurate fire by the American marksmen took a heavy toll on the Japanese, who were poor shots with individual weapons. After the war, Hunter said that superior American marksmanship was the single most important factor for



Members of Merrill's Marauders make a steep climb in the Burmese jungle.

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo

OSS candidates tackle "The Wall," an assessment situation. The OSS conducted the most thorough assessment program of any special organization during World War II.



Courtesy USASOC Archives

success in the Burmese campaign.¹⁸

Before the start of the Burmese campaign, Stilwell had wrested control of the Marauders away from Wingate. In Stilwell's supporting campaign plan, the Marauders' objectives were not to be as deep as those of the British Chindits (at least initially), and they were to be more closely coordinated with the advances of Stilwell's First Chinese Army. The mission called for a series of deep-envelopment operations during which the 5307th would secretly march around the Japanese right flank and establish several blocking positions directly athwart the single main road in the enemy's rear. By placing the Marauders near enough to the forward Japanese defenders to pose a short-term threat and then attacking with his Chinese forces, Stilwell hoped to crush the Japanese in a classic hammer-and-anvil envelopment.¹⁹

As a final preparation for combat, Hunter marched the Marauders the final 140 miles to their jump-off point near Ledo. Although Hunter's decision was highly unpopular, the march completed the conditioning of the men and animals; it allowed the mule drivers and their animals to adjust to one another on the trail; it allowed the pack animals to "sweat in" their pack saddles; and it served as a final culling of those men who were physically unfit for combat. Hunter later remarked, "More than any other single part of Galahad's training, the hike down the Ledo Road, in my professional judgment, paid the highest dividends."²⁰ After

completing the arduous march over difficult mountainous terrain, primarily at night, the Marauders were confident in their ability to meet the physical demands of combat.

As a result of their rigorous training, the Marauders had high levels of morale and esprit. The skills that they had acquired gave them confidence that they would succeed. The assurance that air evacuation stood ready should they be wounded or hurt further strengthened their morale. And the knowledge that they were participating in a unique operation that they alone were fit to conduct instilled confidence.²¹ Their high state of training, coupled with assurances that the mission would last only 90 days, spurred the Marauders to exceptional performances that culminated in the capture of Myitkyina airfield.

But when Stilwell refused to honor the 90-day employment promise after the capture of Myitkyina, morale fell sharply among the 200 Marauders who were still capable of bearing arms.²² It was the final straw for men who had overcome arduous conditions, endured the daily stress of behind-the-lines combat, survived on short rations and been ravaged by a variety of endemic diseases. The 5307th ceased to exist as a viable fighting force.

The Marauders serve as an example of the fact that a group of generally unexceptional volunteers, given intense physical and tactical training, can, for a short period, perform at exceptional levels and

accomplish seemingly impossible tasks.

But for units that have open-ended and ambiguous missions or small teams, not all volunteers would be suitable, and those units must be careful to select only the most suitable soldiers. The World War II unit that had the toughest selection challenge and the best selection procedure was the OSS.

OSS OGs

One of the missions of the OSS was to insert individuals and units behind enemy lines, where they would work with resistance organizations and conduct sabotage against the enemy's rear elements. The OSS participated in all theaters of the war, employing indigenous peoples as well as U.S. citizens.

The OSS conducted the most thorough formal assessment-and-selection program of any of the special units created during World War II. It used comprehensive psychological evaluations of candidates to develop a profile of the men and women who were capable of performing highly classified, extremely hazardous missions behind enemy lines. The criteria of compatibility, integrity and stability were accorded great weight throughout the assessment process. The OSS used teams of War Department psychiatrists and psychologists to evaluate all candidates individually and as group members. Of the 5,391 can-

didates who were assessed at various OSS recruiting sites in the U.S. and overseas, only 1,187 were selected for overseas duty.²³

The OSS had two different behind-the-lines missions in Europe: the three-person teams of mixed nationality called Jedburghs, and the larger, country-oriented teams of U.S. soldiers called the operational groups. In order to create country-specific teams for deployment into Axis-occupied countries after the theater invasion on D-Day, the initial OSS screening of candidates for European OGs focused on military personnel who had linguistic skills and relevant cultural backgrounds.

Because the men of the OGs were to be assigned to military operational units rather than to intelligence units, they needed to be trained infantrymen and engineers. Formed into 30-man, country-specific groups, the OGs were generally capable of operating as two 15-man teams. During their interviews, the men were given the opportunity to volunteer for "extra hazardous duty behind enemy lines." Physical condition, military tactical qualifications, and linguistic ability were the primary criteria for these soldiers.²⁴

Once the soldiers were in training, the psychological staff continuously evaluated them on their ability to work harmoniously with the group, and they rated each candidate's initiative and creativity when confronted with new problems. Working in



Courtesy USASOC Archives

The OSS used testing measures such as the "Bridge Construction" situation to evaluate candidates' creativity and ability to work as part of a team.

teams, the candidates were required to solve a series of situational problems, such as crossing a pool of “acid,” breaching a barbed-wire roadblock, or retrieving a delicate piece of equipment from the middle of a pond. In all cases the candidates performed under time constraints and with a minimal amount of equipment. Often, members of the assessment staff “role-played” to evaluate the candidates’ interpersonal skills and their ability to recruit.

The goal was to select candidates who, as part of a team, best fit the mission profile developed by the operational planners. Caesar Civitella, a former OG sergeant, said that the assessment process placed a premium on individual integrity and compatibility. Regular peer evaluations sorted out the misfits.²⁵ Being able to rely unconditionally on one’s comrades proved to be of paramount importance in the high-stress environment of operating behind enemy lines.

To ensure mission success, the OGs relied less on a formal, rank-oriented military chain of command and more on individual leadership qualities and the individual’s technical and tactical proficiency. Sometimes, the most junior member of the team, by virtue of his language capability or special skills, became the *de facto* operational leader. Thus, the strengths and the talents of individuals were more important than seniority. The OSS assessment-and-selection program highlighted the need for establishing qualification standards after a thorough analysis of the mission had been conducted.

Conclusion

The FSSF, the Marauders and the OSS OGs conducted different types of special operations during the World War II. The FSSF, originally organized and trained to conduct winter raids in northern Europe, fought as an elite infantry unit in conventional battles on the southern flank of the continent. The Marauders conducted long-range raids and interdicted lines of communications deep behind enemy lines in the fluid, hostile jungle environment of Burma. The OGs were inserted,

by invitation only, into those occupied European countries that had established resistance movements. OGs were trained to conduct classic guerrilla warfare, organize resistance forces and perform sabotage operations.

Each of the three units used a process of assessment and selection that stressed technical and tactical skills related to the unit’s mission. The FSSF and the Marauders placed great emphasis on rugged physical training and on the mastery of infantry skills. The OGs, focusing on the relationship of individual strengths and weaknesses to the effectiveness of the team, developed a comprehensive psychological screening process. In each case, the nature of the mission and the time that was allotted to organize and train dictated the type of assessment-and-selection program that the unit employed.

In summation, although these special-operations units were organized for unique missions in widely differing environments, certain assessment-and-selection factors were common for two or more of these units. The FSSF and the Marauders sought soldiers with experience in mountain and jungle environments. The FSSF and the OGs wanted double volunteers because they needed parachutists. While all three of the units trained their personnel on every unit weapon, the FSSF and the Marauders emphasized expert marksmanship, while the OGs trained extensively on techniques of instinctive marksmanship. The FSSF and the OGs sought branch-qualified soldiers. Only the OGs employed psychological testing, peer reviews and problem-solving situations to assess individual integrity, stability, personal initiative and team compatibility.

However, more important were the factors that were common to all three units. First, the units sought volunteers from all ranks of the Army. Those who responded were adventure-seekers and risk-takers, and they did not volunteer for monetary reward. Some sought the notoriety associated with elite units (as General George S. Patton said, “So that someday you won’t have to tell your grandchildren that you shoveled manure in Louisiana during the

Second World War”); others simply wanted to fulfill their patriotic obligation as quickly as possible. Second, the units were more interested in candidates who had above-average intelligence than in those who had extensive formal education. Third, the units required all personnel to be cross-trained in a variety of military skills. Fourth, unit members had to be proficient in map-reading and land navigation; relying on local guides was considered foolhardy. And last, but most important, all of the units stressed physical fitness. Physical conditioning built individual and collective confidence during training, restored order and discipline after combat, and later preserved unit integrity by eliminating unfit replacements — officers, sergeants and enlisted soldiers alike. These common factors continue to be critical in the assessment and selection of today’s Special Forces soldiers. ✕

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⁴ McMichael, 172.

⁵ McMichael, 174, and Burhans, 58.

⁶ McMichael, 205.

⁷ McMichael, 173-74.

⁸ McMichael, 202.

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¹⁰ McMichael, 210.

¹¹ McMichael, 1.

¹² Christopher Sykes, *Orde Wingate: A Biography* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1959), 432; William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (New York: David McKay Co., 1961), 135; and Herbert A. Mason, Randy G. Bergeron and James A. Renfrow, *Operation Thursday: Birth of the Air Commandos*, Air Force History and Museum Program, 1994, 11. Also McMichael, 4.

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²⁰ McMichael, 18; and Hunter, 20.

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²⁴ Emilio T. Caruso, “Italian-American Operational Groups of the Office of Strategic Services,” in records of the International Conference of Historical Studies on the theme: “The Americans and the War of Liberation in Italy - Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) and the Resistance” Venice, Italy, 17-18 October 1994, sponsored by the Volunteer Corps of Liberty (Venice, Italy: Department of Information and Publications, 1995), 218.

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Delegation and Decentralization: A Command Philosophy

by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

When an organization retains its authority and responsibility at the higher levels, it is said to be centralized. When an organization delegates its authority and responsibility to the lower levels, it is said to be decentralized. In a special-operations-forces organization, the degree of centralization or decentralization is determined not so much by the specific manner in which the commander has organized his subordinate units as it is by the policies that he has established to guide his operations.

Thus, two units may be organized identically, yet one can be highly centralized and the other highly decentralized. The degree of centralization is determined solely by the policies established by the unit commander.

The commander influences the degree of centralization within an organization through the organizational relationships that he establishes and by the missions that he assigns to his subordinates. Special-operations organizations have long appreciated the requirement for flexibility in control, and they have developed gradations in the delegation of authority to accommodate complex command relationships.

Delegation of authority is the process by which the leader subdivides his overall authority and allocates portions of it to his subordinates. Delegation of authority does not imply that the leader is relinquishing any part of his *responsibility*. It simply means that he is appointing subordinates

to assist him in carrying it out.

The commander's goal should be to delegate authority to the lowest possible level at which decisions can be made intelligently. The commander must give his subordinates the necessary authority to perform their jobs, and he must support them to the fullest extent possible. In so doing, the leader must also hold his subordinates responsible for producing results.

Delegation of authority reduces the workload on the leader and enables him to more effectively supervise and control his organization. Delegation of authority provides subordinates with a highly effective means of developing leadership skills: It requires them to resolve complex problems at an early stage of their careers; it allows them to make decisions and to carry them out; and it enables them to learn from their mistakes. In short, it prepares subordinates for some of the issues that they will encounter at a higher level by allowing them to develop problem-solving techniques, and it instills in them the confidence that they will need as leaders. Finally (but of no less importance), when subordinates are placed in a position of authority, they often demonstrate increased initiative, more enthusiasm and wholehearted cooperation.

It is fine to speak of delegation on a purely intellectual level and to point out the inherent advantages accruing from it; however, delegation is accomplished by people, and the success or failure of its use

depends on whether the people who are involved — the subordinate leader and the commander — understand the process.

Successful delegation of authority and acceptance of responsibility demand secure relationships between leaders and subordinates. It is especially important that subordinates demonstrate a willingness and a commitment to accept responsibility. The leader is responsible for developing and maintaining a feeling of security among his subordinates, and he must stimulate their increasing desire to help run the organization.

No one can feel secure in undertaking a responsibility unless he believes that he is fully capable of discharging his authority. The skillful leader, therefore, wisely provides sufficient training to his key personnel so that they can develop the confidence to execute their professional duties. As the subordinates become more self-confident, the leader can delegate greater authority. The human motives for dignity, success, stature and pride of accomplishment greatly facilitate the leader's task in developing this desire for increased responsibility.

In the process of delegating authority to subordinates, the leader must exercise patience and self-control. Rather than giving someone an answer to a specific problem, the skillful leader will make an effort to guide the person and help him develop a sound solution of his own. As a result, the person becomes more confident and seeks more responsibility. To stand aside and watch someone make a mistake is a frustrating experience, yet we know that a person learns from his mistakes. Control that is too tight inhibits the development of subordinates. If a person is denied his own method of accomplishing a task, he may go to his grave believing that his method was the right one. Furthermore, he might have performed better had he been allowed to use his own method. In most cases, people discover their own mistakes before severe damage occurs.

The leader's personality may produce psychological barriers to delegation. First, the leader's lack of faith in his subordinates — the feeling that no one can do the job as well as he can — can present a real stumbling block.

Second, the leader may be affected by a feeling of insecurity. He may fear that if he delegates too much authority, his subordinates will outshine him. The leader's fear that he may lower the importance of his position is also a strong motivating force. The leader may reason that if he delegates too much authority, his superiors will conclude that his position is not vital. In any case, the environment that a commander creates will influence the activities of his subordinates, and a strong commander will provide a situational environment that is most conducive by effecting the orderly development of his subordinates.

Delegation is not without risks. The recipient of the delegated authority may fail, and his failure will reflect on the leader. However, that risk can be easily exaggerated. The pride and the spirit of competition that the subordinate unit develops as a result of delegation not only lessen the risk of failure but also contribute to the effectiveness of the larger unit to a degree that it is not possible to achieve in centralized organizations. Thus, in an effective organization, the sum of the parts may be greater than the whole.

Control is manifested through delegation. In this complex age, it is axiomatic that the leader must employ assistants to control his organization. The axiom is clear, but the human problems of delegating authority and making sure that subordinates accept such authority are always present. ✕

Major General Sidney Shachnow's commissioned service spanned more than 30 years, during which he served as either a commander or a staff officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airmobile, airborne, and Special Forces units. He served as commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, of the Army Special Forces Command, and of U.S. Army-Berlin. Shachnow holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska and a master's degree from Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from the Army in August 1994.



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Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Mexican army to retain counterdrug role

Mexico's new president, Vicente Fox, plans to keep the Mexican army involved in counterdrug operations, even though counterdrug functions may eventually be transferred to a new police force. The Mexican military's role in law enforcement has been controversial over the last few years, but it is deemed necessary by many. Counterdrug functions also fall to a number of Mexican police agencies, including the Federal Preventive Police, or PFP. The PFP, one of the most ambitious law-enforcement initiatives undertaken by the Mexican government, is responsible for the enforcement of Mexico's drug laws. The PFP combines many of the functions of the Federal Highway Police, the Federal Fiscal Police and the Federal Immigration Police. Its composition also includes strong components for military-police and intelligence roles. Still, it appears that the PFP itself may some day be subsumed under a new police force. Fox's advisers continue to express interest in withdrawing the military from all police functions and establishing a national combined police force that would include the PFP.

North Korea criticizes Japanese antiguerrilla units

North Korea is concerned about the increased development in Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, or GSDF, particularly in the conventional and special units that Pyongyang asserts are oriented against it. North Korea further asserts that Japan is moving toward a more offensive force — one capable of invasion. The North Koreans point in particular to Japan's plans to purchase a fuel tanker for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, but their strongest rhetoric is focused on the establishment of GSDF antiguerrilla units, which they say will comprise five 200-member companies equipped with high-mobility vehicles, helicopters and short-range ground-to-air missiles. The North Korean government has been particularly critical of the antiterrorism aspect of Japan's long-term force-modernization plan, even though North Korea is purported to be the most likely country to generate terrorist or guerrilla attacks against Japan.

Russians establish counterterrorist center in Chechnya

In late January 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Presidential Edict No. 61, entitled "On Measures to Combat Terrorism on the Territory of the Russian Federation's North Caucasus Region." The edict established an "Operational Headquarters for the Command and Control of Counterterrorist Operations on the Territory of the Russian Federation's North Caucasus Region." The headquarters, which is under the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, or FSB, involves representatives and forces of essentially every major security-associated organization of the Russian state. The Regional Operations Staff, an element within the headquarters, is headed by the FSB deputy director, Vice Admiral German Ugryumov. According to Russia's FSB press, the Regional Operations Staff will be primarily responsible for the management of "special forces and means during the final stage of the anti-guerrilla operation in Chechnya." However, it is far from clear to most specialists whether Russia's Chechnya campaign is in its "final" stage. Russian military and internal-security

Indonesian special forces to reorganize

ty forces continue to suffer relatively small, but frequent losses to Chechen fighters. The new Russian command-and-control entity will face immediate challenges and is likely to undergo leadership and organizational changes in the months ahead as Russia seeks to find the correct approach and the right combination of forces needed to pacify a region that continues to assert its independence from the Russian Federation.

Early this year, the Indonesian military announced that its army's special forces, Kompassus, will be reduced in size and reorganized. Execution of the reorganization plan is awaiting approval by the Indonesian military headquarters. Specifically, reports attributed to the chief of the Indonesian army staff indicate that Kompassus will likely be reduced from 7,000 to 5,000 personnel and that it will be realigned to more effectively meet the demands of the security environment of the future. Indonesian assessments postulate that the future environment will face more internal domestic threats than regional ones, and they emphasize that Kompassus elements will be used only for operations of special complexity or when police forces are unable to deal with internal challenges. With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, Kompassus is headed by Major General Amirul Isnaini. Under the reorganization plan, Isnaini's five special-forces groups will be reduced to three, and excess personnel will be dispersed throughout the rest of the army. The new organization will comprise two combat groups, one intelligence group, an antiterrorism unit, and a special-forces training center. The army chief has denied that foreign pressure played a role in the decision to reorganize Kompassus.

Italian 'Carabinieri' assesses Islamic extremists

The special-operations section, or ROS, of the Italian paramilitary organization Carabinieri has assessed that Islamic militant organizations are likely to increase their attacks on targets in Italy during the early years of the 21st century. In particular, ROS counterterrorism specialists point to "Al Qaeda," headed by Usama Bin Ladin. According to U.S. sources, "Al Qaeda's mission allegedly includes killing members of the American military stationed in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; and killing American civilians worldwide, in an effort to influence, through terrorist acts, the foreign policy of the United States." ROS believes that Italy, because of its association with both the U.S. and NATO, and because of its major roles in international affairs, is a prime target for an organization determined to disrupt the international system in order to advance its extremist goals. Al Qaeda cells have been present in Italy for some years and are quite well-established. ROS specialists also point to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, which is present in Italy and in other parts of Europe; Al-Gamma'at al Islamiya, still active after suffering heavy losses in Egypt; the Hizballah (Party of God), now seeking logistics-support bases in Italy; and a number of other Islamic extremist organizations that all pose a direct threat to Italy in the years ahead. The concerns of ROS rest substantially on the potential of Usama Bin Ladin's planned "International Islamic Front," given that so many Islamic extremist groups have established a presence on Italian territory.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

New DA Pam 611-21 updates duties of 18Es

The most recent revision of DA Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, has revised the major duties of the SF communications NCO (18E):

a. *Major duties.* Recruits and organizes indigenous forces. Trains, advises and supervises them in the installation and operation of radios and networks in Army SF units up to battalion level. Plans, manages and advises the commander on C4I architecture to the forward-operating-base, or FOB, level.

(1) *MOSC 18E30.* Employs ODA communications equipment, to include HF, VHF and UHF/SHF radio communications systems, to transmit and receive radio messages in voice, continuous wave and burst radio nets. Plans, manages and advises the commander on C4I architecture, communications matters and communications security to the advanced-operating-base level.

(2) *MOSC 18E40.* Advises the commander on C4I architecture, communications matters and communications to the FOB level. Prepares communications plans and annexes. Prepares signal operation instructions/communications electronics operation instructions. Serves as communications-electronics NCOIC for FOB communications systems and operations.

New staff assignments will improve opportunities for CMF 37 soldiers

During FY 2002, CMF 37 soldiers will begin filling corps- and division-level staff assignments at CONUS and OCONUS locations. The SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM has already identified personnel to fill these career-enhancing senior-NCO positions. The branch, in compliance with its policy of making no assignments from one TDA slot to another TDA slot, will fill most of the positions with soldiers from the 4th PSYOP Group. While the 4th POG's authorizations remain constant, the increase in the number of CMF 37 senior-NCO positions will give more CMF 37 soldiers opportunities for career progression. For additional information, telephone SFC Mike Vigh, CMF 37 career adviser, SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch, at DSN 221-8901 or commercial (703) 325-8901.

Language training, SERE part of SFQC

A change to AR 614-200, *Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management*, and to DA Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, now lists the Basic Military Language Course, or BMLC, and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, Course as part of the Special Forces Qualification Course. Under the new guidelines, soldiers are required to complete the BMLC (this requirement may be waived if soldiers are proficient in at least one language) and the SERE Level-C Course. The service-remaining requirement of 24 months will begin once the soldier has completed these courses.

SWCS working on CMF 37 initiatives

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office is working on two initiatives to enhance Career Management Field 37, Psychological Operations. The Total Army Personnel Command has already approved the first initiative, a request to incorporate the Basic Military Language Course, or BMLC,

into the training of initial-entry CMF 37 soldiers. The BMLC will be incorporated into the training on or about Oct. 1, 2001. The CMF 37 training curriculum will then be as follows: Basic Combat Training, 37F Advanced Individual Training, Army Airborne School and the BMLC. After completing this training, CMF 37 soldiers will be assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group.

With regard to the second initiative, USASOC and SWCS have requested an exception to policy that would allow a limited number of personnel from the 9th PSYOP Battalion who are in 37F-coded positions to attend the Army Ranger School.

Promotion boards for 2001 announced

Two promotion boards have been scheduled for 2001:

Board	Date	Results to be released
SFC	May 30-June 29	September 2001
CSM/SGM	October 2-24	January 2002

Questions or comments regarding special-operations proponency can be addressed to MSG John A. Condroski, CMF 37 senior career manager; or to MSG Brian Nulf, CMF 18 senior career manager, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-9002 or commercial (910) 432-9002.

PERSCOM points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces and Psychological Operations Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

MAJ Tom Joyce	SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch chief
MSG Jeff Wright	Senior career adviser
SFC Lance Glover	CMF 18 professional-development NCO
SFC Mike Vigh	CMF 37 professional-development NCO
Mrs. Faye Matheny	Career-branch integrator
Ms. Phellicia Sorsby	CMF 18 CONUS assignment manager
Mrs. Dyna Amey	CMF 18 OCONUS assignment manager
Mr. James Johnson	SFAS/SFQC manager

Assignment-related questions should be directed to your assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to either your professional-development NCO or your senior career adviser. SFQC students who have questions about their assignments should contact their student personnel and administration center, company first sergeant or sergeant major. NCOES questions should be directed to the unit's schools NCO. For telephone inquiries, call DSN 221-8899 or commercial (703) 325-8899. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454. The e-mail address is epsf@hoffman.army.mil. The SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch's web site is http://www.perscom.army.mil/epsf/sf_ltr.htm.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

**Colonel promotion board
selects 22 SF officers**

The colonel promotion board for FY 2000 selected 22 officers from the Special Forces Branch. SF's selection rate of 28.1 percent exceeds the Army's selection rate of 21.8 percent. All of the selected officers are former battalion commanders and are either graduates of senior-service colleges or have been selected to attend senior-service colleges. The 22 officers will receive their career-field designations in the near future. Promotion statistics are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	% selected
SF (Above zone)	34	3	8.8
Army (Above zone)	799	76	9.5
SF (Primary zone)	25	18	72.0
Army (Primary zone)	711	370	52.0
SF (Below zone)	28	1	3.6
Army (Below zone)	951	36	3.8

**FA 39 exceeds Army's
selection rate for CSC**

The selection rate for FA 39 officers during the FY 2000 command-and-staff college board was above the Army's average. All FA 39 officers selected have either functional-area training or utilization experience. The SF selection rate was equivalent to the Army's average. The FY 2000 board was the second to convene under the new command-and-staff college selection system. Under the new system, the board will consider each year group twice, but only 50 percent of each year group will be selected for resident schooling.

**Board selects nine
SF officers for SSC**

The FY 2000 senior-service college board selected nine SF officers, giving SF a selection rate of 6.7 percent, slightly lower than the Army's selection rate of 7.4 percent. The reason for SF's lower selection rate is that SF has a larger population of eligible officers, while the number of SF selections has remained constant. As year groups become progressively larger under OPMS XXI, the percentage of officers selected will likely remain low. Selection statistics are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	% selected
SF	135	9	6.7
Army	4359	322	7.4

**Forty-nine officers CFD'd
into FA 39 during FY 2000**

During FY 2000, 49 officers from three year groups received their career-field designation into FA 39: 10 from YG 1982, 12 from YG 1983 and 27 from YG 1988. All of the officers from YG 1982 have FA 39 training and utilization experience. Nine of the officers from YG 1983 have FA 39 training and utilization experience; the other three have neither. All of the officers from YG 1988 have FA 39 experience: 17 are FA 39Bs and 10 are FA

39Cs. Gaining experienced officers is advantageous for the FA, because those officers can commence their utilization without any delay for training. Officers who receive their CFD into FA 39 without having had any FA 39 training limit their chances for success in FA 39 because they must complete an extensive train-up period before they can compete for higher FA 39 positions. The train-up period will reduce the time they have available for branch-qualification. For more information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann, FA 39 manager, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

SF officers CFD'd during 2000

Three boards convened during FY 2000 to select officers for career-field designations under OPMS XXI. The distribution of the SF-officer CFD selections is shown below:

	YG 88	YGs 82/83
18 (SF)	59	54
FA 39 (PSYOP/CA)		1
FA 34 (Strat. Intel.)	2	
FA 45 (Comptroller)	2	
FA 48 (Foreign Affairs)	10	2
FA 49 (Opns. Research/Syst. Analysis)	2	
FA 53 (Systems Automation)	1	
Total	76	57

FA 39 SSC selection rate exceeds Army's average

The FY 2000 senior-service college board selected three FA 39 officers and revalidated two, giving FA 39 a higher selection rate than the Army's average. On average, FA 39 officers are selected for senior-service college on their third consideration by the board.

Four FA 39 officers selected for promotion to colonel

The FY 2000 colonel promotion board selected four of the 10 FA 39 officers who were in the primary zone. FA 39 now has a promotion-selection rate of 40 percent, slightly below the Army's primary-zone selection rate of 52 percent. Two of those selected are Civil Affairs officers, and their promotions will help FA 39C fill its authorizations for colonels. The four officers who were selected for promotion are former battalion commanders and have graduated from senior-service colleges or have been selected to attend senior-service colleges.



Update

Special Warfare

SWCS to host 2001 SF Conference

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will host the 2001 Special Forces Conference April 3-5.

The conference is being organized as a cooperative effort by the SWCS and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. The theme for the 2001 conference is "Unconventional Warfare."

The conference will consist of a series of discussion panels attended by SF group and battalion commanders, their sergeants major and designated staff members. Other conference activities include a golf tournament; presentations by guest speakers; a ceremony to present the Presidential Unit Citation to members of MACV-SOG; and the annual SF Ball.

For more information, telephone Captain Patrick D. Marques at DSN 239-6939 or commercial (910) 432-6939; or send e-mail to marquesp@soc.mil.

USASOC headquarters named for Robert McClure

On Jan. 19, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command dedicated its headquarters building to Major General Robert A. McClure, the man who has been called the forgotten father of special operations.

During the dedication, Lieutenant General Doug Brown, USASOC commander, cited McClure's contributions to Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, and his 1952 selection of Colonel Aaron Bank to command a new unit called the 10th Special Forces Group, the forerunner of today's Special Forces.

During the early years of World War II, McClure led the develop-

ment of psychological warfare and military government (later called Civil Affairs) in both the Mediterranean and European theaters. Later, McClure organized the Army's first formally recognized special-warfare units.

McClure's contributions went unrecognized for nearly 20 years, according to Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr., who is writing a biography of McClure.

Paddock credits McClure with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 at Fort Bragg. The PSYWAR Center, forerunner of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, tested methods and doctrine in almost every aspect of Army special operations.

USASOC officials dedicated a plaque and a portrait of McClure in the building's lobby and unveiled three-foot-high letters, "MG Robert A. McClure Building," above the front entrance. — *Bob Porreca, USASOC PAO*

SWCS reinstituting Waterborne Infil Course

The Special Warfare Center and School is reinstituting the Waterborne Infiltration Course, or WIC, to teach special-operations soldiers to train others in the various techniques of waterborne infiltration.

The four-week course, to be taught by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, will be a "train the trainer" course. Graduates will be able to return to their units and conduct WIC training.

The WIC pilot course is scheduled for May 2001, and the validation

course is scheduled for November-December 2001. WIC will then be taught once a year during November or December. Class size will be 36-42 students.

For more information, telephone the S3, 2nd/1st SWTG, at (910) 432-4011 or DSN 239-4011.

SWCS producing ARSOF CS, CSS, TTP manuals

The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Joint and Army Doctrine Division completed two field manuals during FY 2000: FM 3-05.101 (24-31), *ARSOF C4*, and FM 3-05.60 (1-108), *ARSOF Aviation Operations*.

The division is developing five other field manuals and one special text that will supplement the 1999 ARSOF capstone manual, FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*.

FM 3-05.105 (31-18), *MTTP for SOF Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Operations*, is a revision and an expansion of FM 3-18, *Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team)*, dated 1993. The U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla., is responsible for developing this multiservice publication. The completed manual will be available in July 2001. The project officer at SWCS is Captain Byron S. Hayes; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: hayesb@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.102 (34-31), *ARSOF Intelligence*, is a revision of FM 34-36, *SOF Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, dated 1991. FM 3-05.102 will describe the organization and the capabilities of intelligence elements within ARSOF units. It will also describe the intelligence

structures of theater SOCs, joint intelligence centers, and higher-level agencies, as well as their connectivity with ARSOF operational units. The final draft of FM 3-05.102 is scheduled to be staffed to field SOF units during the spring of 2001. The project officer is Captain R. Keith McClung; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: mcclungr@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.103 (63-31), *ARSOF Combat Service Support*, is a revision and an expansion of FM 63-24, *Special Operations Support Battalion*, dated 1995. FM 3-05.103 (63-31) will provide users with a base document for determining future doctrine and procedures for combat-service support, or CSS. It will address ARSOF CSS structure, capabilities and support requirements. FM 3-05.103 (63-31) will offer guidance on operational planning and on educating personnel; and it will include the structure of both the Special Operations Support Command and the Special Operations Support Battalion. The initial draft is scheduled to be staffed to SOF units in July 2001. The project officer is Captain Nadine Lief; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: liefn@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.106, *ARSOF Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, is a new publication still under development. It will provide a basic reference for planning and conducting ARSOF noncombatant evacuation operations, or NEO. The manual will outline the capabilities and organization of Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and support units in the conduct of NEO in joint, multinational and interagency environments. The project officer is Major Alexander Fletcher; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: fletchea@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.232, *Special Forces Group Intelligence Operations*, is another new publication that is being developed. It will describe the capabilities of the SF group's intelligence organization and the techniques that organization uses to support the missions of SF teams. It will also explain the

management of the intelligence cycle and the intelligence-communications architecture of the SF community. The project officer is Captain R. Keith McClung; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: mcclungr@soc.mil.

ST 31-184, *U.S. Army Special Forces Forward Operational Base Field Standing Operating Procedures*, dated 1976, is being revised. The special text will serve as a basis for establishing and operating an SF battalion forward operational base. ST 31-184 is intended to be used in conjunction with FM 3-05.20 (31-20), *Special Forces Operations*. The final draft was staffed to field ARSOF units for comments in January 2001. The project officer is Ed Sayre; DSN 239-8689/5255; e-mail: sayree@soc.mil.

Drafts of the publications will be posted on the DOTD web site (<https://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/DOTDpage.htm>), and they will also be available through TRADOC's Automated Systems Approach to Training.

SWCS revising PSYOP TTP manual

The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Psychological Operations Division is revising the manual that describes basic PSYOP tactics, techniques and procedures for implementing U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine.

Army Field Manual 3-05.301 (FM 33-1-1), *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, explains the fundamental principles by which PSYOP decision-makers and forces perform their actions in support of U.S. national objectives worldwide.

Essentially, the manual is a comprehensive, step-by-step "how to" publication that focuses on critical PSYOP tasks, duties and responsibilities. The revised manual will give PSYOP soldiers information and analyses that they can use in conducting effective PSYOP across the entire conflict spectrum.

The timeliness of the revised

manual is critical. The pervasive and fluid media environment presents complex challenges as the demand for PSYOP accelerates. The manual is unique in that it presents operational guidelines based not only on recent challenges the Army has faced, but also on advances within the highly technical, global information arena.

A new videotape, *Introduction to the POTF and the PSYOP Development Process*, introduces viewers to the PSYOP development process. The tape will serve as interim doctrine until FM 3-05.301, (FM 33-1-1) is published. Units can obtain the tape (production number 711195) at no charge through the Defense Visual Information web site (dodim-agery.afis.osd.mil).

SWCS to conduct ARSOF writing-awards program

The Special Warfare Center and School will conduct a writing-awards program to promote quality writing that supports the professional development of Army special-operations forces.

The theme for the 2001 ARSOF Writing Awards Program will be "ARSOF and Peacekeeping." Topics may include national-defense policy; tactics and strategy; education and training; weapons; communications and equipment; logistics; task-force organization and doctrine; leadership; foreign military forces; or history.

Submissions must be original, type-written compositions of not more than 5,000 words. Awards will be given in three categories: officer, senior NCO, and E6 and below. Winning essays will be published in *Special Warfare*. Deadline for submissions is July 17, 2001.

For details, telephone the SWCS Directorate of History, Archives, Library and Museum at DSN 236-3911 or commercial (910) 396-3911.



Book Reviews

Special Warfare

You Can't Fight Tanks With Bayonets: Psychological Warfare Against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific. By Allison B. Gilmore. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. ISBN: 0-8032-2167-3. 226 pages. \$45.

Allison Gilmore has written the best book to date on psychological operations in the southwest Pacific during World War II. What makes her volume better? It is readable and chock-full of meaningful and well-researched data and interesting stories concerning PSYOP in its infancy.

As a former PSYOP officer, this reviewer was consistently surprised to find that PSYOP practitioners during World War II faced some of the same problems that their counterparts face today: lack of credibility (in the early war); the initial reluctance of aircrews to fly PSYOP missions; difficulty in finding the right people for critically important missions; a shortage of qualified linguists; and difficulty in dealing successfully with their coalition partners (the Australians).

Gilmore writes with authority and clarity, and she has done her homework. Although her book is not exhaustive, it is thoroughly academic and contains useful end notes. It is an excellent source book for researchers.

Gilmore tells why many Japanese soldiers chose death before the dishonor of surrender and why others, clutching PSYOP-produced and PSYOP-disseminated surrender leaflets, chose not only to surrender, but also to cooperate fully



with American and Australian intelligence officers.

The author explains why PSYOP was so unexpectedly successful in the southwest Pacific theater: Particularly near the end of the war, the Japanese high command began lying to its soldiers about Japanese tactical and operational losses. Disheartened, Japanese soldiers turned to PSYOP-produced leaflets for the truth about the war. Before long, Japanese soldiers came to trust the U.S. PSYOP leaflets more than they trusted their chain of command. Leaflets were commonly found on the bodies of slain or surrendering Japanese soldiers, even though possession of the leaflets was tantamount to treason in the Japanese army and was punishable by death.

As a result of the effective PSYOP campaigns, the U.S. gained a regular flow of intelli-

gence from surrendering Japanese soldiers, and the information proved to be a bonanza for operational commanders. Because Japanese soldiers were expected to die in the conduct of their duty, they were not taught how to conduct themselves if captured.

Because of Japanese cultural indoctrination, the soldiers who did surrender felt that they could never return home to face the shame of surviving. Those prisoners therefore felt free to "join" Allied forces and to cooperate fully. Many captured soldiers were so anxious to please their American and Australian interrogators that they volunteered tactical information. Eighty-eight percent of Japanese prisoners expressed no desire to return home after the war.

Gilmore discusses other successful PSYOP themes in the southwest Pacific theater, including those now well-understood themes that directly address the concerns of the soldier and his place on the front lines. It has been proven time and again that themes using grand, patriotic generalizations ultimately impress few combat-hardened veterans.

Gilmore's book reminds us that everything old is new again; that the most effective PSYOP tells the truth; that PSYOP must be practiced in peacetime in order to be effective in conflict; that culturally sensitive and linguistically competent PSYOP personnel cannot be created overnight; and that, unfortunately, commanders at all levels seemingly gain a genuine appreciation for PSYOP only

when it is demonstrated.

You Can't Fight Tanks With Bayonets is recommended reading for anyone who has an interest in psychological operations.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.
U.S. Army (ret.)
Sana'a, Yemen

Military Geography for Professionals and the Public. By John M. Collins. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998. ISBN: 1-57906-002-1 (paperback). 461 pages. \$39.

The very word "geography" intimidates some people, particularly those who grew up in an era when geography was a required subject during the last two years of grammar school and was usually taught by a demanding, no-nonsense teacher. John Collins has so ably addressed the subject in a military context that even the members of mature generations who have painful memories of geography will enjoy his book and learn from it. Those of more recent education, many of whom missed the joys, pains and scars of this once-obligatory subject, should find the book a delightful way to fill an educational gap and to expand their professional knowledge.

This is not geography as it was once taught — the travails of Baffin Islanders (grade school), the various forms of desert (high school), or the ocean currents and steppe soils (college). This is geography as it affects the planning and the conduct of military operations, and Collins shows how the physical world influences, limits and sometimes frustrates those operations.

Collins has not restrained himself by adhering only to the physical or land-forms definition of geography. He delves deeply into the works of man, continuing human follies, and the effects of those

works and follies on military operations. There are generous sections on cultural geography, on political-military geography, and on (what should warm the cockles of any 18F's heart) area analysis. Individual chapters cover subjects as varied as natural resources, urbanization, and fortresses and field fortifications. Even space, and its impact on operations, receives a review. Collins earlier published a book on the military influences and use of space, and his chapter on that subject is interesting, informative and authoritative.

In reading *Military Geography*, some readers will undoubtedly find passages that will cause them to say, "I knew that." But those same readers will probably find numerous other passages that will open their eyes to aspects of the world that had previously gone unnoted.

The area-analysis section contains discussions of two major excursions, Operation Neptune and Operation Plan El Paso, that, by themselves, are worth the price of the book. Here, the reader is shown not only what was, and why, but also what was not to be, and why not. The El Paso plan should engender some discussion and possibly some second thoughts among those who think that the results in Southeast Asia would have been


different had there been a different strategy.

The text is sprinkled with modern historical examples that illustrate the impact of the various aspects of geography. Collins cites the appreciation (or the lack of appreciation) for geography in various military triumphs, frustrations and disasters.

Collins contributes the knowledge and the skills he acquired in careers as an Army officer who served in three wars, as a war-college instructor, and as a long-time senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress. *Military Geography* is well-organized, the points are well-stated, the style is clear, and Collins' comments are thoroughly soldierly. If there is sometimes a faint note of dogmatism, it can be justified by Collins' masterful assemblage of facts, by his meticulous organization and thorough analysis, and by the reality that there is little that is subjective in the physical world.

There are many books that could earn a place on the professional special operator's shelf for their illustrations of the way particular operations were conducted. There are a much smaller number that qualify as works that should be retained for future reference. *Military Geography* is one of those few. It should stand next to the U.S. Military Academy's military atlases of America's wars, the *Manual for Courts-martial*, and quite possibly, some of Collins' other exceptional works.

COL J.H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.



Special Warfare

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