

FEATURES

Special Forces Training: New Initiatives to Enhance the Force /	BG James A. Guest	pg.5
Terrorism As An Element of War: A Primer for the SOF Soldier /	LTC Preston L. Funkhouser	pg.13
Rangers: The Long Road to Recognition /	LTC Shaun M. Darragh	pg.19
Cultural Interaction: The Forgotten Dimension of Low-Intensity Conflict /	LTC James K. Bruton LTC Wayne D. Zajac	pg.29
Making the Most of Special Forces Pre-Mission Planning /	CWO Scott S. Herbert	pg.35

DEPARTMENTS

LETTERS	pg.2
---------	------

EDITOR'S NOTE	pg.3
---------------	------

UPDATE	pg.38
--------	-------

- Special Forces Becomes Army's Newest Branch
- New Joint PSYOP Course Begins at Center
- Sniper Course Preparation Encouraged
- SOF Staff Officer Course To Be Offered
- SF Recruiting Campaign Underway
- SWCS NCO Academy Sets First Class
- Former Special Forces Soldiers Being Sought for Reenlistment
- Filmless SOF Camera Under Study By SWCS
- Advanced SERE Training Offered By SWCS
- PSYOP/CA Functional Area Expected Soon

BOOK REVIEWS	pg.42
--------------	-------

The Terrorist Classic: Manuel of The Urban Guerilla Reviewed by: CPT William H. Burgess III/Ft. Huachuca, AZ	Carlos Marighella, Chapel Hill, NC/ Documentary Publications	pg.42
The Iranian Rescue Mission:Why It Failed Reviewed by: Mr. Fred Fuller/JFKSWCS/Ft. Bragg, NC	Paul B. Ryan/Annapolis, MD	pg.65
SOE:An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive Reviewed by: Mr. Fred Fuller/JFKSWCS/Ft. Bragg, NC	M.R.D. Foot/Frederick, MD University Publications of America	pg.43
From OSS to Green Berets:The Birth of Special Forces/Aaron Bank/Navato, CA/Presidio Press Reviewed by: Mr. Fred Fuller/JFKSWCS/Ft. Bragg, NC	pgs.43-44	
Special Operations in U.S. Strategy Reviewed by: Mr. Fred Fuller/JFKSWCS/Ft. Bragg, NC/National Strategy Information Center	Frank R. Barnett/B. Hugh Tovar/ Richard H. Schultz/Washington, DC	pg.44
United States and Soviet Special Operations Reviewed by: Mr. Fred Fuller/JFKSWCS/Ft. Bragg, NC/U.S. Government Printing Office	John M. Collins/Washington, DC	pgs.44-45
Green Berets At War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1856-1975. Reviewed by: Mr. Fred Fuller/JFKSWCS/Ft. Bragg, NC	Shelby L. Stanton/Novato, CA/ Presidio Press	pg.45

Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

Special operations, a capability useful throughout the spectrum of conflict, is seeing a resurgence in response to rapidly expanding and increasingly complex mission requirements. Training our special operations soldiers to meet those missions, both now and for the future, requires a continuing refinement of the way we do business.

One way of doing that is through *Special Warfare*. This professional bulletin is our way of keeping the force alert to new ideas and initiatives in operations, doctrine, materiel and professional development.

The special operations community—Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Rangers and SOF Aviation—has a deep well of experience among its ranks, much of it born of long years of combat or other special actions. We need to draw upon that experience—and the new ideas arising from it—and examine, critique and, if deserving, incorporate them into our doctrine and operations. We are also interested in fresh perspectives on past battles, maneuvers, and command decisions, so that we may continue to learn from our proud history as we move into the future.


Another major area we'll be covering is the progress of special operations doctrine and materiel development. We will tell you where SOF is heading, both in the near future and for the long haul. Lighter, faster, stronger and better all describe the SOF forces of the future. In special operations, "lean and mean" is



not just a popular catchphrase—it's a way of life. Keeping the field up to date on these initiatives will be an important part of this publication.

We will also provide updates on professional development for career fields under the proponency of the Special Warfare Center and School, including Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. These specialties deserve close attention and have been undergoing extensive changes, of which the formation of the Special Forces Branch is a good example.

We hope *Special Warfare* will be valuable as a forum for sharing information, experience, and ideas—the kind of teamwork that is instrumental in honing the edge of the special operations sword.


Brigadier General James A. Guest

Contents


April 1988

Special Warfare

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Commander & Commandant
Brigadier General James A. Guest

Editor-in-Chief
Phillip R. Howell, Jr.



Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special operations forces by providing an open forum for the examination of both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Features

5 Special Forces Training: New Initiatives to Enhance the Force
By Brigadier General James A. Guest

Special Forces missions are as diverse and demanding today as at any time in history. The man responsible for training new Special Forces soldiers outlines new programs to enhance their warfighting capabilities.

13 Terrorism As An Element of War: A Primer for the SOF Soldier
By Lieutenant Colonel Preston L. Funkhouser

Armed conflict is no longer confined to the field of battle. There are people in this world more than willing to carry death and destruction to your doorstep. A revealing introduction to the subject by one of the Army's foremost terrorism experts.

19 Rangers: The Long Road to Recognition
By Lieutenant Colonel Shaun M. Darragh

The issue of Rangers as light-infantry strike units has run hot-and-cold for a long time, but the advent of a special operations command structure may have given these unique forces the recognition they deserve. An informative viewpoint on why it was an uphill battle.

**29 Cultural Interaction:
The Forgotten Dimension of Low-Intensity Conflict**
By Lieutenant Colonel James K. Bruton and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne D. Zajac

In an increasingly sophisticated world, where pride often looms larger than power, defeating the enemy on the battlefield may not be the only path to victory. A thought-provoking view of the down-side of relying on pure military prowess.

35 Making the Most of Special Forces Pre-Mission Planning
By Chief Warrant Officer Scott S. Herbert

Mission success depends on quality planning. The inherent expertise of a Special Forces "A" detachment can provide that quality. A 20-year veteran of Special Forces operations tells how to get the most out of your pre-mission planning.

Departments

2 Letters
3 Editor's Note
38 Update
42 Book Reviews

The Cover: The crossed-arrow insignia of the new Special Forces branch has provided long-overdue recognition that only full-time master craftsmen can achieve the level of expertise necessary to ensure the success of today's increasingly complex unconventional warfare missions. The Special Warfare Center and School is making sure that new Special Forces soldiers measure up to those missions. See Brigadier General James A. Guest's article, "Special Forces Training: New Initiatives to Enhance the Force," on page 5. (Photo by Phil Howell)

Letters

Special Warfare

Dear Sir:

Glad to learn that Special Forces and other special operations units are getting their own magazine. Such a move is long overdue, and will give the community an important training vehicle. It will also give today's special operation soldiers a look at the beginnings of modern unconventional warfare in the 40's and 50's.

The need for Special Forces and other unconventional forces has never been greater, as recent events in the Persian Gulf have demonstrated.

Please put my name down for a subscription. I'm looking forward to the first issue of *Special Warfare*.

Best wishes,
Aaron Bank
COL (USA, Retired)
San Clemente, California

Editor's Note: *For those who don't already know it, Colonel Bank is one of the pioneers of modern unconventional warfare, and played a central role in the formation of the Army's Special Forces program. He served as the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group—the Army's first—and is rightfully considered the "father of Special Forces."*

Dear Sir:

Our membership is most pleased to learn of the publication of *Special Warfare*. Our association is dedicated to maintaining the history and tradition of the First Special Service Force, the American and Canadian unit which was one of the first elite commando units of modern warfare. We look forward to a publication which will be taking a historical look at those early—and important—days of unconventional warfare.

We will encourage our members to submit articles and photos for publication, as we think a careful review of past commando operations can have important "lessons-learned" value for modern-day special operations personnel.

Would you also let us know if sub-

scriptions to the magazine are available, the cost, and where to write for them?

Cordially Yours,
William S. Story
Executive Secretary
First Special Service Force Association
Oakton, Virginia

Dear Sir:

We're looking forward to the publication of *Special Warfare*, as it appears to be an excellent means of circulating valuable special operations training information, as well as a means to heighten already-high levels of esprit de corps.

We are soliciting articles from the combat veterans of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Detachment 101 which will describe some of the important lessons we learned through trial and error during World War II.

Also, is it possible for retirees to purchase a subscription? Having worked closely with Special Forces in Vietnam, and with various Special Forces Groups in Reserve assignments, I would be very interested in subscribing to the publication.

Sincerely,
James R. Ward
LTC (USAR, Retired)
101 Association
Seminole, Florida

For a private subscription, write: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
—Ed.

Dear Sir:

I am extremely pleased to learn of the planned publication of your *Special Warfare* magazine. Our association believes that special operations forces have long needed a publication specifically designed to serve its needs and interests.

The open examination of all aspects of special operations can only serve to strengthen the role of these elite forces, as their vast capabilities become more

widely recognized.

I look forward to the first issue of *Special Warfare* with a great deal of anticipation, and wish you every success in this publishing venture.

Sincerely,
David Hurwitt
Liaison Officer
Merrill's Marauders Association
Lake Worth, Florida

Dear Sir:

My job as the Special Warfare Center and School Historian is to preserve and present the heritage of the Center and School, to include Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations activities. Part of my responsibility is to show how our present activities are affected by our history, and how we can avoid "re-inventing the wheel."

Inherent in that job is the process of collecting, organizing, analyzing and maintaining records of historical value. Many aspects of unconventional warfare activities have not been well-chronicled, and so I'm asking the assistance of your readership, both active and retired, for help. Anyone with memories or written accounts of Special Forces, Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations activities is encouraged to drop me a line. I can be reached at AUTOVON 239-4608, Commercial 919-432-4608. Correspondence should be addressed to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-MH, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000. If personnel happen to be in the Fort Bragg area, they can drop in to see me in Room 112, Bryant Hall, USAJFKSWCS.

Their input could become an important part of the records and heritage of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Sincerely,
Dr. Stanley L. Sandler
USAJFKSWCS Historian



Editor's Note

Special Warfare

Befitting their increasingly important role throughout the spectrum of conflict, special operations forces finally have their own quarterly professional publication—*Special Warfare*.

We've received some excellent articles from the field, and we're looking for more. Many people have called us wanting information on what kind of articles we're interested in—and the best way to put it down on paper. Here's our "writer's guide," which should steer you in the right direction if you're a potential contributor:

Articles should address some aspect of SOF operations, or subjects having an impact on special operations soldiers. Perhaps more than any other "branch" publication, we serve a highly-diversified audience—and the scope of subjects suitable for publication is very wide.

We don't believe in serving a narrow segment of the force, and consider all SOF soldiers—from private to general—potential readers and contributors. Individual articles, of course, may be targeted toward a specific sector of the SOF community.

Articles can cover training, tactical or strategic operations and doctrine, SOF equipment, SOF history, or other articles of general interest to the SOF soldier. The litmus test for any submission should be: "Does this article contribute to making the SOF soldier better-informed and/or better-trained?"

We're particularly interested in articles that have a "how-to-do-it-better" theme. For example, we're not looking for articles telling readers how your unit conducted a routine field exercise. But if you think you have a "new-and-improved" way of conducting a tactical operation, training exercise, or other operational procedure that may prove helpful to other soldiers and units—that's what we need. Such articles should generally come from contributors with first-hand experience with the subject being presented.

Generally, avoid theatrical writing styles like: "It was a dark and stormy night....," or "There I was with the risers wrapped around my legs...." However, graphic descriptions of tactical situations are always welcome if they have relevance to the point you're trying to make with your article.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice.

Articles should be from 2,000 to 4,000 words long, and should be typewritten and double-spaced. Generally, each such page will contain from 200 to 250 words.

Articles containing attributable information or

Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



quotations not referenced within the story should carry appropriate footnotes.

All submissions are subject to editing.


Manuscripts must be original, unpublished, and not under consideration by another publication. Normally, you can expect a reply to your submission within two weeks after we receive it.

Contributors are encouraged to include black-and-white photos, artwork and line diagrams to help illustrate your article.

Include your full name, rank, current unit and job title. Also include a list of your past assignments, experience and education, your full mailing address, and daytime phone number—preferably AUTOVON.

Send your articles to: Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000. Our phone number is AUTOVON 239-5703, Commercial 919-432-5703. If you have any questions about an article you're working on—or considering writing—give us a call.

We look forward to hearing from you.



Phillip R. Howell, Jr.
Editor-in-Chief



Photo by Phil Howell

Special Warfare

Special Forces Training: New Initiatives to Enhance the Force

By Brigadier General James A. Guest

Insurgent activities and low-intensity hostilities are on an upward spiral in many regions of the world, and the mission demands on Special Forces units are seeing a proportionate increase in number and complexity. In recent years, foreign internal defense programs, direct-action and reconnaissance missions, and counterterrorist activities have given Special Forces soldiers their most challenging missions since the Vietnam era.

The expansion of Special Forces over the last few years has done much to allow units to meet those missions. To further strengthen the long-term readiness posture needed by Special Forces, we are fine-tuning the selection and training of SF soldiers. The very nature of Special Forces missions and the intricate, seasoned skills necessary for their execution makes quality of the individual soldier the key to Special Forces preparedness.

The Special Warfare Center and School began implementation last year of three initiatives dedicated to enhancing the warfighting capabilities of Special Forces soldiers. Those initiatives include: (1) a dedicated recruiting program for identifying potential Special Forces candidates; (2) a new selection and assessment program for the Special Forces Qualification Course, and (3) the expansion of the Qualification Course.

The need for upgrading Special Forces capabilities is not new. Since the stand-down of four Special Forces Groups at the close of the Vietnam War, there has been a continuing need for rebuilding the SF force.

The drive to improve SF training to better meet the needs of current and

projected special operations missions began with the recognition that we need to start with the right soldiers; maximize the use of our resources in the training process, and make sure that we're teaching soldiers the appropriate skills for the missions they face.

The missions of Special Forces are as diverse and demanding today as at any time in their history. These missions

“...we are fine-tuning the selection and training of SF soldiers. The very nature of Special Forces missions and the intricate, seasoned skills necessary for their execution makes quality of the individual soldier the key to Special Forces preparedness.”

span *unconventional warfare*, to include guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence, and evasion and escape; *foreign internal defense*, including counterinsurgency, military assistance, and civil actions; *deep reconnaissance* in enemy-held, denied, or contested areas; *direct action*, covering raids, ambushes and sabotage, and *counterterrorist* measures.

In an increasingly sophisticated world, where intense social, political and national sensitivities call for the utmost care in the conduct of these missions, only full-time master craftsmen have the

level of expertise necessary to ensure their success. As a start, SF soldiers must possess well-above-average intelligence, physical strength, agility and stamina. To these traits must be added a foundation of exceptional character, which ultimately is just as important as professional competence. It's not uncommon in a foreign internal defense or military assistance environment for SF soldiers to interface directly with high-level government officials or even heads-of-state. These situations require someone with a high maturity level and absolutely impeccable judgement. A single inappropriate act can be disastrous to the entire U.S. effort in a particular region. To be successful in today's unconventional warfare environment, a soldier must combine extraordinary resourcefulness, adaptability, ingenuity, pragmatism and patience, along with self-discipline and dependability. Applied under the uncommon circumstances of special warfare, even common tasks require uncommon skills.

Finding a mechanism for identifying soldiers with the fundamental aptitude for attaining and successfully applying those uncommon skills was our first goal. To ensure that we start the Special Forces training process off on the right foot, and to effectively meet the demands imposed by the operational expansion of Special Forces, we are implementing substantial changes in the way soldiers gain entrance to the SF Qualification Course.

In the past, soldiers forwarded an application for Special Forces training through their chain-of-command to the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA), formerly MILPERCEN. These applica-

tions were accepted from any MOS, assuming stipulated qualifications were met. This sometimes resulted in soldiers, especially those from unrelated specialties, having unexpected difficulty in meeting the demanding requirements of the Qualification Course. Additionally, meshing the flow of approved applicants—coming from both continental and overseas posts—with available training slots at Fort Bragg presented a time-intensive challenge to personnel managers.

To remedy those problems, the Special Warfare Center and School, working with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, has implemented a new recruiting program designed to refine the selectivity of Special Forces applicants, and ensure a more productive use of available training slots.

After more than a year of planning and preparation, the program was implemented in March of last year, when a full-time Special Forces recruiting team from USAREC was stationed at the Special Warfare Center and School. The team is now recruiting SF students from "target" MOSs, including 11, 12, 91 and 31-series specialties. The program has

"The new three-week Special Forces Orientation and Training (SFOT) program...will provide final identification of the right candidates for the Q-Course, and allow a focusing of training resources on... soldiers demonstrating needed Special Forces attributes."

the full support and emphasis of TAPA, allowing the team access to all CONUS and overseas Army installations—thereby increasing the potential pool of students.

The team also has computerized access to TAPA personnel files, and is able to conduct advance screening of SF applicants. The team conducts its own advertising program, in conjunction with

the Special Warfare Center and School, and mails advertising and other information materials to these prospective applicants. An extensive on-site recruiting program is also in operation, where recruiting team members conduct well-publicized visits to other Army posts. There, they show a Special Forces recruiting film, and conduct face-to-face interviews with interested soldiers. They also conduct the Special Forces PT and swim tests for applicants.

The recruiting team has the ability to input qualified applicants directly into the Army Training Requirement and Resources System (ATRRS). No DA Form 4187 application is required on the part of soldiers, since their qualifications and availability for training are inputted directly to TAPA through ATRRS. From the ATRRS files, TAPA then cuts the orders on approved applicants to meet available student quotas in the SF Qualification Course. The end result is a better-qualified entry-level student, streamlined personnel actions, and full SF classes.

Officers seeking Special Forces training will continue to use the DA Form 4187 to gain both Branch and TAPA ap-

SPECIAL FORCES ORIENTATION & TRAINING (SFOT)




Fig. 1

proval of their application. However, the recruiting team provides active assistance and information to all officers interested in the program. Once an officer's application is approved, his name is also entered into the ATRRS network for Qualification Course scheduling.

While providing a significant step toward enhancing the effectiveness of the SF training program, an additional refinement of the student selection process for the Q-Course was needed. Traditionally, the course has covered three phases: Phase I, covering basic field skills like patrolling and land navigation; Phase II, providing the specialty, or MOS-producing training, and Phase III, the field training exercise which puts students through an unconventional warfare scenario.

We've found that during Phase I, too much time and resources were being spent on the assessment and selection of students. This detracted from the training value of the critical early stages of the course. More instructor training time needed to be devoted to teaching students the field skills they would need in later stages of the course and, subsequently, in their operational assignments.

The new three-week Special Forces Orientation and Training (SFOT) program, scheduled for implementation this summer, will provide final identification of the right candidates for the Q-Course, and allow a focusing of training resources on those students. By allowing the selection of soldiers demonstrating needed Special Forces attributes, SFOT will enable Q-Course instructors to concentrate more on teaching SF skills—rather than spending an unnecessary amount of time on assessment and retraining. Since SFOT will be a TDY-based program, it will conserve PCS and training program money otherwise lost on unsuccessful students by identifying the right soldiers before they enter the Q-Course. The attrition rate for the current Q-Course runs about 40-50 percent. We expect the rate for SFOT to be 40-50 percent, with a subsequent drop in attrition for the Q-Course to four or five percent.

The SFOT's 21-day training cycle will be focused on two "stress gates" at days 10 and 19 (Fig. 1). Assessment activities up to day 10 will be geared toward individual effort and stress; assessment from day 11 to day 19 will be centered on team-building.

The first two days of SFOT will be



used for in-processing. Days three through 10 are structured to judge the soldier's level of motivation, his mental and physical condition, and his ability to apply concepts and work independently. The last assessment activity prior to soldiers passing through Gate 1 on day 10 will be a forced, 10-mile, 2½-hour road march.

Soldiers who meet the requirements for Gate 1, and are passed by a selection board, will proceed to the second part of SFOT. Days 11 and 12 are used

to provide students with background knowledge necessary for participation in field exercises later in the course. Beginning with day 13, soldiers will be put through a situation and reaction regimen, which will measure their leadership traits and their ability to work with others. On reaching Gate 2 at day 19, each soldier must have successfully completed a 22-mile, 11-hour movement. On day 20, soldiers must be selected by another board before their "right of passage" to the Q-Course is finalized.

The SFOT program, then, will provide an opportunity for the assessment and selection of soldiers who demonstrate the ability to meet the standards of the Q-Course, while providing candidates with a valuable orientation to the basic skills used in SF operations. Even non-selectees will benefit from SFOT, and will return to their units with enhanced physical conditioning and field skills. The program will also allow non-selectees the opportunity to re-enter SFOT at a later date, once they have had an opportunity to correct their identified deficiencies. Additionally, failure to be selected during SFOT will be non-prejudicial to the career of applicants. Since attendance at SFOT is on a TDY basis, non-selection will have a minimal impact on family members, and will conserve PCS costs.

The bottom line of the SFOT program will be the ability of the Special Warfare Center and School to enhance the quality of SF soldiers reaching the field. Using a pool, or "bank," of successful SFOT candidates (Fig. 2), the Center and School can more effectively manage and balance each Special Forces MOS, and respond more effectively to the

"The operational demands on today's Special Forces dictate that only soldiers with the very best training and skills will meet the requirements of increasingly complex and sensitive unconventional warfare missions."

specialty needs of operational units.

While the SFOT program will be demanding, the need for it has been long-standing, and much planning has gone into preparation of the course. Edgar M. Johnston, Technical Director and Chief Psychologist of the U.S. Army Research Institute, said of SFOT: "The resulting program will be much more rigorous and entry into it will require intelligence, dedication, and strength of character. The goal of the Special Warfare Center and of the U.S. Army Research Institute is to join in

identifying and preparing the finest soldiers possible for some of the U.S. Army's most critical missions."

The Center and School's third initiative to enhance the SF force involves the revamping of the Q-Course itself. The Army's concept-based requirements system dictates changes in course structure and program-of-instruction when there exists a significant difference between the skills being taught and the parameters of current or expected operational missions, and the time was right for revision of the Q-Course. The reasons for the revision have already been touched on. They include the need to improve and expand the warfighting capabilities of SF soldiers to allow them to meet changes in the current and projected threat; the need to add joint planning and operations training, and the need to focus increasingly scarce training resources—time, money, and instructor-manpower—where it is most needed.

The Q-Course has been expanded from a little over 20 weeks to 23 weeks. This doesn't include the three-week SFOT, which will be treated as a separate course—though it will be an integral




Fig. 2

SPECIAL FORCES QUALIFICATION COURSE




Fig. 3

part of the SF qualification process. An overview of the old and revised Q-Course (Fig. 3) shows the by-day breakdown of each phase, the total days for each course, and most significantly, the increase in field-training days from 63 to 100. That increase in field time reflects our commitment to get back to a "hands-on" training environment, where soldiers gain much-needed practical experience in the application of unconventional warfare skills.

Also new is the addition of the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course at the end of Phase II. In the past, soldiers who had not yet completed BNCOC would attend the course after completion of the Q-Course and assignment or return to an operational Group. This was a detractor from unit readiness. The insertion of BNCOC within the Q-Course will provide the Groups with a better-prepared soldier, and save personnel down-time.

Similarly, the Center and School has incorporated Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Level-C training for Q-Course students. The Level-C course, designed for high-risk-of-capture soldiers, is a requirement for

Group personnel. Providing that training concurrently with SF qualification saves Group manpower and money, and gives them a soldier who's ready to "hit the ground running." Because of scheduling constraints and facility limitations, the

SERE course will be taught to different groups of students within each course on a rotational basis.

The scheduling of orientation, basic skills, and subsequent assessment and selection during SFOT has allowed us to



Photo by Mike Hartt

concentrate more heavily on advanced skills of navigation, patrolling and other fieldcraft in Phase I (Fig. 4). Added subjects include small boat and airmobile operations.

Moving to Phase II, or specialty training, the first of these, the Detachment Officer Course (18A), needed expansion in several areas. Joint planning and operations were not part of the old curriculum—a critical deficiency in today's special operations environment—and are now an integral part of the course. The role of special operations forces in the Air Land Battle has also been added. A major new addition to 18A training is an exercise known as "Officer's Week." This mini-FTX tasks officer students with a series of SF missions to be performed in a field environment, while moving prescribed distances with real-world loads.

For the Weapons Sergeant Course (18B), the revised Phase II doubles the amount of air defense training, and provides an additional 63 hours of tactics and operations. This training reinforces the ability of the weapons sergeant to teach conventional company-level tactics to indigenous forces, and is a much-

"These Q-Course revisions will directly benefit the operational readiness of the SF Groups . . . Special Forces graduates will . . . have a significantly enhanced capability to execute the full spectrum of Special Forces missions."

The Medical Sergeant Course (18D) has been expanded to include veterinary anatomy, an isolation week with medic-specific tasks, and an airborne operation—again with medic-specific missions in a field environment.

Added instruction for the Communications Sergeant Course (18E) includes expanded maintenance training and forms management. An extensive environmental communications exercise has also been included, which requires students to communicate in mountain, high-water, coastal and urban areas.

Phase III, which includes the ROBIN SAGE exercise (Fig. 5), has been expanded to include additional field events. Aerial resupply and combat targets have also been added, emphasizing our push for performance-oriented field training.

The Q-Course has been restructured and expanded by eight training days. The SFOT adds another 21 days to the Special Forces training program. Significantly, the restructuring of the program and a strong orientation toward a "hands-on" mode has added an additional 37 field-training days.

These Q-Course revisions will directly benefit the operational readiness of the

SFQC PHASE I

OLD

WEEK	1	2	3	4	5	6	
	4	1	9	2	1	3	1
IN-PROCESSING							
LAND NAV ABN OPS				GEN SUBJ ABN OPS SERE PATROLLING	PAT FTX RAPPELLING		ABN OPS

31 DAYS

NEW


SFOT		PHASE I					
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	2	8	2	7	2	14	6
IN-PROCESSING							
MILITARY ORIENTEERING				S/R STAKES L/R MOVEMENT GENERAL SUBJECTS	ADV LAND NAV AIR OPS	SEL BOARD OUT PROCESSING	ADV PAT FTX ADV PAT AIRMBL TECH SMALL BOAT OPS

42 DAYS

Fig. 4

SFQC PHASE III

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


Fig. 5

SF Groups, while maximizing training resources. Special Forces graduates will be fully trained in their specialty MOS skills; possess the capability of planning and operating in the joint arena; have an increased understanding of the Special

Forces role in the Air Land Battle; possess an increased competence in advanced field skills, and have a significantly enhanced capability to execute the full spectrum of Special Forces missions.

The operational demands on today's Special Forces dictate that only soldiers with the very best training and skills will meet the requirements of increasingly complex and sensitive unconventional warfare missions.

The Special Warfare Center and School's initiatives in the Special Forces training program will enhance the war-fighting capabilities of Special Forces soldiers, and enable them to meet those missions. \times



Photo by Craig Beason

Brigadier General James A. Guest is Commander and Commandant of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His extensive background in Special Forces includes command of the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, and command of the 5th Special Forces Group. General Guest served in Vietnam as a combat commander, operations officer and senior military advisor. He holds a master's degree in Personnel Management from Central Michigan University, and is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College.



Terrorism As An Element of War: A Primer for the SOF Soldier

By Lieutenant Colonel Preston L. Funkhouser

There once was a time when war was a rather orderly affair. There were usually two sides to the conflict—give or take a few allies—and common-sense items like different-colored uniforms came in handy to distinguish between friend and foe. Aside from the expected political intrigue, the odd spy or two, and the occasional band of irregulars tossed into the fracas, you could generally count on war being a face-to-face, toe-to-toe slugfest. You at least knew who the enemy was.

Alas, it is no more.

The advent and success of the guerrilla in modern warfare is known to all. What is not so well-known is the role the terrorist plays in fomenting low-intensity conflict, or wars of "national liberation." While the guerrilla and the terrorist can sometimes become so intertwined in purpose and method as to be indistinguishable, it is important for all of us in special operations to have some understanding of the basic tenets of terrorism, so we can better prepare ourselves for what has come to be a standard element of modern war.

Brian Jenkins, a noted terrorism analyst with the RAND Corporation, offered the following observations for the increasing use of terrorism as an accepted form of conflict between nations: "Modern conventional warfare is becom-

ing increasingly impractical. It is too destructive. It is too expensive. Few nations can afford it. The alternative to modern conventional warfare is low-level protracted war; debilitating contests in which staying power is more important than firepower, and military victory loses its meaning as strategists debate whether or not winning means losing—

"Night and day, he (the revolutionary) must have one thought, one aim—merciless destruction. In cold blood and tireless pursuit of this aim, he must be prepared to die himself and to destroy with his own hands everything which stands in the way of its achievement."

—from an anarchist manifesto

Left: Muammar Quaddafi, the Libyan leader who has used terrorism to further his own nationalist goals. French authorities recently intercepted a ship loaded with 150 tons of Libyan weapons bound for the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.

or not losing means winning. These protracted wars seldom end, at least in any clear-cut fashion, though the level of fighting peaks and declines, often seasonally." The years-long, back-and-forth struggle between Iran and Iraq is a good example of a conflict which consumes a frightening amount of men and money—to no apparent end.

Jenkins continues: "Terrorism re-

quires only a small investment, certainly far less than it costs to wage conventional war. It can be debilitating to the enemy." Prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a senior Israeli officer estimated that the total cost in men and money to Israel for all defensive and offensive measures against, at most, a few thousand Arab terrorists, was 40 times the cost of conventional warfare for the Six-Day War of 1967.

"Terrorists could be employed," writes Jenkins, "to provide international incidents, create alarm in an adversary's country; compel it to divert valuable resources to protect itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific acts of sabotage. Governments could employ existing terrorist groups to attack their opponents or they could create their own terrorists....A secret backer of the terrorist can also deny sponsoring them. The concepts of subversion, sabotage, or lightning raids carried out by commandos are not new, but the opportunities are."

Recent events in the Persian Gulf, where responsibility for the random planting of mines has gone unclaimed, and where small commando boats carry out apparently indiscriminate attacks against international shipping, support Jenkins' thoughts on terrorism as an effective alternative to conventional military power.

The Army views terrorism as "The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence, to attain political, religious, or ideological goals through fear, intimidation or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature, and is intended to influence an audience beyond its immediate victims."



A member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) at an anti-British rally in Belfast, Northern Ireland. A recent IRA terrorist bombing in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, claimed the lives of 11 innocent civilians, and wounded over 60 others. Explosives for the bomb were reportedly provided by Libya.

Throughout history, one can find accounts of acts that would meet this definition of terrorism. They have occurred worldwide in every age, in every society. In the last 15 years, more than 60 embassies and consulates have been attacked or occupied; hundreds of government officials, business executives and diplomats have been murdered, tortured, wounded or kidnapped. A president of Egypt, a former chief of the British

defense staff and a former Italian prime minister have been assassinated, and attempts have been made to kill the Pope and General Alexander Haig, past commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. Embassies, military installations and facilities, government buildings, hotels and airport lobbies have been destroyed by terrorist bombs. Since 1968, when official statistics were first recorded, there have been more than 9,000 major ter-

rorist incidents; over 9,000 people have been wounded and nearly 5,000 killed.

The tide of terrorism shows no sign of abating. According to U.S. government figures, the number of attacks rose from less than 200 in 1968, to 1,194 in 1984. The number of attacks that caused death or injury rose from about 25 in 1968 to more than 200 in 1980. As a direct result of terrorist actions, more than 675 deaths occurred in 1983, with another 300 deaths in 1984. A substantial number of these casualties were American servicemen.

Our ability to counter the terrorist threat requires an understanding of the origins of contemporary terrorism and its objectives. The most important facet of a terrorist group is its ideology. Ideology—however vague and inconsistent it may be—is at the heart of the operation of a terrorist group. Ideology provides the basis of the group's motivation and will directly affect its organization, its targets, and its objectives.

The political orientation of terrorist groups, limited largely in the 1960s to supporters of the cause of Palestinian nationalism, is now highly diversified and includes anarchists, national revolutionaries, ethnic terrorists, and those driven by religious beliefs. Political extremists of both the left and right have formed groups with anarchist tendencies, and such a group is exemplified by the German Red Army faction. A variety of national revolutionary groups, usually formed as Marxist-based insurgent or guerrilla forces, use terrorism as one of their tactical options. Ethnic terrorists include the Armenian and Basque extremists whose common objective is the independence or redemption of a traditional homeland. And finally, a group of terrorists which has proven to be particularly destructive and dangerous in the past decade is one that subscribes to the "Jihad," or Muslim Holy War. Some of these are supported by state leaders and some act as independent groups. A common thread among most of these is their "anti-imperialist," or in other words, their anti-American fervor.

Moving first to the anarchists, these terrorists seek the destruction of an existing governing authority rather than attempting to replace it. Most of these terrorist groups are currently found in Western Europe (and to some extent in North America and Japan), where well-established, industrialized nations have provided a fairly equitable distribution of

social, political and economic wealth. In these countries, these groups are denied an adequate basis for popular socialist revolution, and they therefore tend to focus on the shortcomings of the government as a political and social institution.

In the mid-1800s, Mikhail Aleksandrovich and Sergei Gennadevich Nechaev co-authored a number of manifestos. Among their many writings is this passage: "We recognize no other activity but the cause of destruction. We would still be of the opinion that the form which that activity might take could be multiplied to an extraordinary degree....Everything in this fight is equally sanctified by the revolution. Night and day he (the revolutionary) must have one thought, one aim—merciless destruction. In cold blood and tireless pursuit of this aim, he must be prepared to die himself and to destroy with his own hands everything which stands in the way of its achievement."

The second classification we call the national revolutionaries. Most of these groups are found in economically underdeveloped countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa. Although there are groups from both ends of the political spectrum within this group, most of them are leftist. They seek to overthrow their existing governments through wars of national "liberation" and the installment of a Marxist-based "popular" government. For most of these groups, the ideological underpinnings of their conduct are found in the writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin and the subsequent modifications made to their writings by Mao Tse Tung, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, Abraham Guillen, Carlos Marighella and Regis DeBray.

Since so many of the world's current terrorist organizations espouse Marx and Lenin as their guiding lights, it is worth expanding somewhat on their reasoning.

Every revolutionary ideology that has been developed since Marx has had to come to terms, in one way or another, with his writings. Marx based his beliefs on the premise that economics underlies all human activity. For those who embrace Marxism and its conclusions, one thing becomes inevitable. Any major changes must be forced through armed revolution, because the dominant class will not peacefully acquiesce to its own destruction. National revolutionaries ascribe to this theory and use it to justify their violent tactics. According to

Marx, the capitalist state is composed of three main groups whose primary function is to maintain capitalist control and suppress the workers. These groups are the military, the police and the politicians. To achieve socialism and ultimately communism, the capitalist state must be destroyed.

Lenin saw several deficiencies in Marx's theories. According to Lenin, the rise of trade unions and the development

of the colonial system pacified the working classes by providing better living and working conditions and higher wages. This, in turn, suppressed their revolutionary tendencies and postponed the revolution. Since the working class was incapable of realizing its role as a revolutionary class, an elite party, the "Vanguard of the Proletariat," was needed to lead the revolution.

Most terrorist groups that follow



A terrorist reportedly linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) forces a crewmember and one of 32 Arab oil ministers off an aircraft in Vienna in 1975. The terrorist and his compatriots were transferring the ministers to another aircraft for a flight to Algeria.

the Marxist-Leninist ideology see themselves as that elite group. This elitist attitude explains in part why the "inner circle," or leaders of a terrorist group, see themselves as heroes. Their ideology sets them above everyone else.

The third group we call "ethnic terrorists." These terrorists seek the restoration or establishment of a sovereign entity based on a common ethnic identity. The most prominent ex-

European-style working class, as Marx and Lenin understood the term. Their societies were essentially rural and agrarian, with the bulk of the population composed of peasants, not urban laborers. Their revolutions would have to originate in the countryside. The ultimate successes of Mao and Ho Chi Minh gave an aura of invincibility to the cause of the guerrilla warrior. From his experiences during the Cuban revolu-

"Some (terrorist attacks) involve literally tons of high explosives, such as those used in the Beirut Embassy and Marine Headquarters bombings. This last example was an extremely large conventional weapons system (12,000 pounds of high explosive)—with a terrorist twist. It was equipped with the most sophisticated guidance system known—a human being."

amples of this kind of group include the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Basques of Spain, the Palestinians, the Kurds of Iran and Iraq, the Armenians in Turkey and the Moros in the Philippines. Although these groups may embrace various political ideologies, their primary motivation is the recovery of their "homeland."

The fourth group, while subscribing to a religious or "holy war" ideology, are in many cases facilitated or supported by sovereign governments or the agents of those governments. In spite of all the religious rhetoric, their real end goal is the achievement of political and military power in their spheres of influence. These "holy terrorists" see the fight against non-believers as ending only in victory. If they happen to die in the conflict—so much the better, because in dying they become martyrs and gain instant access to Allah. From the Western viewpoint, this type of logic is not only hard to understand, it is even more difficult to counter. There is no easy way to combat religious zealots who believe that those who stand and die defending the faith will achieve eternal paradise.

Moving beyond these four basic groups of ideologies, terrorist groups can be further identified as rural or urban-oriented.

The rural insurgents whose writings achieved international readership include Mao, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevara. Basically, these revolutionaries found themselves in societies without a

tion, Guevara formulated what came to be known as the Foco theory. He viewed the guerrilla band as the "foco," or the nucleus from which the revolution would spring. Guevara based his approach to revolution on three principles: (1) the people's forces can win a war against the regular army; (2) it is not necessary to wait until all conditions are favorable to start a revolution—the insurrection itself can bring about the right conditions, and (3) in the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, the basic field of action for armed struggle must be the countryside. Guevara's attempt at rural guerrilla warfare failed, and he was killed, but some Central and South American terrorist groups still ascribe to this theory.

An observer of the apparent failure of revolutionary activity in the countryside was Abraham Guillen, a refugee from the Spanish Civil War who resettled in South America and wrote leftist revolutionary doctrine. Guillen questioned how Guevara's Foco theory of rural guerrillas surrounding and defeating the "enemy" in the cities could succeed in a country like Argentina, where 80 percent of the population lives in the cities—with nearly half in Buenos Aires alone. He reasoned that since the political-economic-military power was concentrated in the cities, that is where the revolutionary battle should be waged. As a strategist, he was the precursor of urban guerrilla warfare—and terrorism—in Latin America.

If Guillen set the stage, then Carlos

Marighella wrote the script for the terrorist's role in urban revolutionary activity. He achieved his greatest fame as a tactician of urban violence. His Manual of the Urban Guerrilla, an explicit handbook on urban guerrilla operations, is a classic of terrorist literature. The failures of the Foco theory had provided the motivation to move the revolution to the cities. Guillen and Marighella provided the strategy—and the tactics—to make the urban option viable. The result has been a dramatic growth of politically-inspired urban terrorism that we are witnessing today throughout much of Central and South America. Many of today's contemporary terrorist groups use Marighella's manual as their bible. For the special operations soldier interested in gaining valuable insight into the terrorist mind, the manual is required reading.

Another facet of terrorism today is the recent emergence of state support for terrorism. This support may be based on a convergence of interests between the group and its patron, or it may be based on the simple exploitation of a terrorist group by a government wanting to use the group's violence as an instrument of policy. This state support provides the group with significantly expanded capabilities. With such support, it can count on a regular supply of sophisticated weapons and explosives, military training, intelligence support, money, access to high-speed military transportation, and enciphered communications services. In 1968, the PLO was the only major entity in the Middle East which sponsored terrorist activities. Since then, a number of radical Middle Eastern states—most notably Libya and Iran—have become heavily involved in training, supporting and even directing the activities of terrorist groups.

Whatever their philosophies or means of support, it is important to keep a couple of generalities in mind about terrorists. First, terrorist groups tend to consider a wide range of target options in planning an attack. The final selection is usually made after extensive intelligence gathering, operational planning and target vulnerability assessment. This is the period when they are the most vulnerable to detection by alert, trained personnel. Secondly, within the constraints of their resources and talents, terrorist groups tend to be flexible in adapting their tactics to the target, and they will usually choose a tactical option that promises the greatest

chance for success while minimizing their risks. With notable exceptions, terrorists are not normally suicidal and expect to escape to strike again another time.

The tactics of terrorist attacks are always carefully calculated to surprise, produce shock and fear, and generate maximum publicity for the cause. In the late 1960s, most terrorist actions centered around the hijacking of aircraft. Now we see, on a depressingly regular basis, random destruction using a whole gamut of incendiary and explosive devices. Many of these devices are armed with sophisticated delay or remote detonators. Some involve literally tons of high explosives, such as those used in the Beirut Embassy and Marine Headquarters bombings. This last example was an extremely large conventional weapons system (12,000 pounds of high explosive)—with a terrorist twist. It was equipped with the most sophisticated guidance system known—a human being.

An analysis of a cross-section of terrorist groups shows them to possess an extremely high degree of proficiency and sophistication in carrying out their operations. They are meticulous planners and excellent practitioners of intelligence operations as well. They have also demonstrated a full understanding and ruthless commitment to operational security.

To be sure, this is only a thumbnail sketch of some of the ideologies and characteristics of terrorism, but it's a good primer toward a full understanding of terrorism and its implications for the special operations soldier. Unlike conventional war, there is no general "area of operations" for the terrorist. The SOF soldier should be prepared for terrorist activity anywhere, anytime. That's a difficult "be-prepared" mission, but that is the strength of the terrorist. By hitting his target when it is least expected, he can paralyze a civilian population with fear, or throw unprepared military forces off balance. He can inflict massive destruction with a handful of people and with minimal logistical and monetary support. And to the terrorist, the end justifies the means. He will spare no one, often including himself, if he thinks their death will serve the cause.

For those of us in special operations, knowledge of the terrorist—his ideology, his base of support, and his methods—is our best defense, and ultimately our

best offense, against this relatively new element of war. 

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and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He has also served as the Chief of Terrorism Policy, Counter Intelligence Directorate, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army. He served two tours in Vietnam as an advisor; holds a master's degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Kansas, and is a Command and General Staff College graduate.



Marines and Lebanese Army soldiers pick through the rubble of the Marine Barracks in Beirut after it was demolished by a suicide bombing. A truck containing 12,000 pounds of high explosive was driven into the main lobby of the high-rise barracks and detonated by the driver.




Photo by Phil Howell

Rangers: The Long Road to Recognition

By Lieutenant Colonel Shaun M. Darragh

The current role of U.S. Rangers as the elite, light-infantry strike units of special operations forces has been a long time coming. Since their birth in World War II, their specialized role has been variously recognized, ignored, applauded or forgotten. Often, the concept of a unique Ranger mission has simply disappeared in a wartime morass of "higher-priority," or "quick-fix" combat requirements for conventional light-infantry support.

Until the advent of a special operations command framework, the Rangers often fell short of being recognized as a unique fighting force—this, in spite of their excellent performance.

The growing number of Ranger-qualified officers in critical command and staff positions has helped carve a distinct Ranger niche in the Army's game plan, especially since the success of their clear-cut role in the 1983 Grenada operation.

But while their position as a necessarily-unique strike force seems more secure than ever, the further development and refinement of special operations doctrine and organization may be crucial to their existence as a truly separate force—rather than a convenient anomaly to be easily converted to conventional infantry.

A look at the historical use of Rangers since their formation may serve to illustrate why their position within the Army's framework has sometimes been a shaky affair.

The original Army Rangers were a pet project of then-Brigadier General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., who in 1941 served as U.S. observer to the British Combined Operations Headquarters, the unit

responsible for commando operations and training.

In 1940, the British formed ten independent companies that evolved into seven army and nine Royal Marine light infantry battalions (designated *commandos*), and a separate special boat section. This marked the re-entry of Great Britain into the amphibious operations field, a field much neglected throughout the twentieth century.

"Until the advent of a special operations command framework, the Rangers often fell short of being recognized as a unique fighting force—this, in spite of their excellent performance."

The commandos were a stop-gap measure to keep the enemy at bay while the British relearned the principles of launching armies from the sea. Commando operations against German installations in occupied Europe, though not always successful, captured the imagination of professional soldiers and had a positive impact upon civilian morale.

Such operations branched out to the Middle East, North Africa, Dakar, and Diego Suarez. As the tempo of operations grew, some viewed the commando concept as the key to the re-emergence of the Royal Marines. This concept—tactical special operations con-

ducted under strategic direction—prodded the British Army to develop the Special Air Service (SAS) when the organization proved too cumbersome for operations in the Middle East.


In January 1942, the U.S. Marine Corps formed marine raider battalions, adopting the commando principle but not its organizational structure. In June 1942, at Truscott's suggestion, the Army did the reverse, incorporating the commando organizational structure but not its principle. Thus began the development of the U.S. Army Rangers.

The adoption of the commando principle by one service and its organizational structure by another seems incongruous until the differing natures of the two services are examined.

The Marine Corps, which had developed a doctrinal basis for modern amphibious war despite a heavy commitment to the Banana Wars, was already conditioned to the independent task force command and structuring peculiar to naval warfare.

Army organization and staff procedures, on the other hand, were more attuned to the mass and rigidity of land warfare. Thus, the Army concentrated on those elements conducive to mobile continental war, such as tank, motorized, and airborne formations. Within the scale of operations envisioned, Army Rangers were simply a variation on the light-infantry formation.

The Ranger infantry battalion was the first of the modern separate infantry battalions that could be attached to conventional regiments or divisions, employed as a separate battalion, grouped into a task force, or broken down and tailored for specific independent tasks.



Brigadier General Lucian Truscott, Jr., the "father" of the Rangers, inspects the 1st U.S. Ranger Battalion at their training camp in Scotland in 1942. Major William Darby, commander of the battalion, is at far left.

Designed for cross-channel raiding in conjunction with naval and air support, it was light to the extreme. Grouped under a small headquarters were six line companies, each with 3 officers and 65 enlisted men for a battalion total of 516 men.

British heritage was most apparent at company level. The company was to have two platoons to facilitate landing boat control in coastal raiding, and two assault sections instead of the conventional three. Six Rangers manned the single 60-mm mortar, 2.36-inch rocket launcher, and .55 caliber Boys antitank rifle that constituted the support section. Each platoon was assigned a sniper, and additional specialized weapons were available from the battalion weapons pool, including Thompson submachine guns and additional 60-mm and 81-mm mortars. This organizational flexibility and variety of weapons underscored the Rangers raider origins. It was too light, however, for sustained infantry combat.

During the summer of 1942, while the 1st "Darby's" Rangers were undergoing commando training in the Scottish highlands, the cross-channel raiding phase drew to a close. On August 19, 1942, six officers and 44 men from the battalion got a brief and dramatic taste of large-scale raiding warfare at Dieppe. It was their sole raiding achievement in the European theater. Even then, amphibious transport, material, and staff

support for further raiding operations were being diverted to prepare for the invasion of North Africa.

Preoccupied American commanders found neither the time nor the circumstance to warrant the use of Rangers on small-scale raids, and large raids were considered too costly in terms of amphibious material. While the British and Free French, using the commando principle, launched the Long-Range Desert Group and Special Air Service on thousand-mile raids across the North African desert, U.S. Rangers prepared to invade the same theater as amphibious infantry.

The basis of the Ranger legend was first established in North Africa. The Rangers' training, motivation, high mobility by conventional standards, and relative lack of flank consciousness compared to infantry made them well-suited for a reserve mission from which they could be launched to reinforce beleaguered units. Furthermore, their separate battalion structure made the Rangers an ideal building block around which land and amphibious task forces could be crafted.

As the war moved to Europe, the Rangers were grouped into larger task forces with amphibious engineers, shore units, 4.2-inch mortar battalions, artillery, and accompanying infantry for launching across what was expected to be the most difficult beach under corps

control. Following such landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, the Rangers were employed under division, regimental, and even battalion control to accomplish basic combat missions.

As Darby's Rangers gave way to Force X, the Special Force, and finally the 6615th Ranger Force, numbering three Ranger battalions, a unique Ranger mission continued to elude Army commanders and staffs.

By training and disposition, the Rangers were suited for independent or supporting combat operations behind enemy lines, for example, infiltration operations to seize critical terrain during crucial phases of a battle or campaign. Such operations, when properly employed, as by Skorzeny in the Battle of the Bulge, could provide the additional fulcrum to tilt an enemy off balance.

On September 14, 1943, U.S. commanders tried such an operation at Salerno. Since the Rangers (beefed up to an incredible 8,500-man force) were heavily committed at Mount Chiunzi, the mission went to the 2nd Battalion, 509th Infantry. Besides requiring infiltration and operations behind enemy lines, the mission called for an airborne insertion. Rangers then, were not the only troops viewed as available for such operations. The 509th made the drop at night. Dispersion of jumpers and problems with drop zone identification contributed to failure of the mission. Another contributing factor, according to the after-action report, was "overburdening of troops with five days ammunition and ration." The unanswered question was: If a five-day combat load was too much for a parachute infantry battalion to jump with, what was a reasonable independent combat radius for Ranger forces who had to carry everything they consumed while on the march? Obviously, that radius was small. Nevertheless, infiltration continued to play an important role in the search for a uniquely-Ranger function.

At Anzio, the Fifth U.S. Army failed to push inland fast enough to properly secure the beachhead, which allowed the Germans time to reinforce the area. Resistance soon crystallized around the towns of Cisterna and Camplone. Cisterna was the 3rd Infantry Division's objective. And after some particularly heavy fighting, the Division was reinforced by the 6615th Ranger Force, which had made an unopposed landing further up the beach.

The 3rd Infantry Division was commanded by now-Major General Truscott, father of the Ranger project. The Rangers were under Darby's command. These minor facts are important to dispel the myth that those who planned the Ranger's greatest failure were unsympathetic commanders and ignorant staffs.

The plan to take Cisterna was theirs. It called for two Ranger battalions, the 1st and 3rd, to cross the Mussolini Canal under cover of darkness, infiltrate through German lines via a solitary, half-filled irrigation ditch, and seize the town at dawn. A follow-on force consisting of the 4th Rangers and an equally battle-hardened battalion from the 15th Infantry would then attack through the Germans to effect a link-up.

On January 30, 1944, in the early hours, 767 Rangers slipped across the canal and crawled up the ditch. The enemy, recently reinforced in section with Panzergrenadiers, detected their movement. Only six men from the 1st and 3rd Rangers ever made it back, while the 4th Rangers suffered 50-percent casualties in a desperate attempt to extract their comrades.

With the battle of Anzio barely underway, the 6615th Rangers ceased to exist as an effective fighting force. The Germans had won a significant military and propaganda victory.

If the Army ever made a serious study of the Rangers' failure at Anzio, it has

"When the Rangers moved in from the (D-Day) beach, they were to spend the remainder of the European campaign fighting as conventional infantry. . . . the tempo of operations deterred their use on raids or strategic strike operations."

not come to light. Perhaps the failure lay, as some opponents of Ranger units suggested, with the concept of a separate Ranger organization. More likely it lay with the plan of attack within the context of that particular battle.

The Ranger plan was similar to those used successfully in World War I by German and Austrian storm troops. Like the Rangers, the storm troops were specially selected, conditioned, and trained infantry. They were most successfully employed on a wide front where the number of storm troops within each division varied depending upon that division's mission and objective.

Some divisions had only a platoon, while others had battalions. The impor-

tant points are: all attacking divisions had such units, their attacks took place on a relatively wide front, and they were supported by artillery and other weapons. This allowed the storm troops to advance along a planned axis and bypass points of resistance to reach their objectives. These elements appear to have been missing at Cisterna. Why then, were the Rangers employed at all? The answer to this is obvious, but underscores an organizational dilemma inherent in Ranger forces.

The Rangers were initially employed at Anzio in a spearhead role because—to borrow a mission statement from the then recently-deactivated USMC raider regiments—they were capable of "spearheading amphibious landings by larger forces across beaches generally thought to be inaccessible."


Once ashore, they were infantry. As the landing went sour, commanders found themselves in desperate need of infantry forces. This outweighed any strategic need for specialized infantry strike forces. Rangers were used simply because they were available. Cisterna then, was an attempt to marry unique Ranger capabilities to the mission at hand.

The Army continued to plan for the use of Ranger forces. Two battalions, the 2nd and 5th Rangers, were based in England where they were attached to the British Combined Operations Headquarters for use on raids and strike operations. At least two such operations were planned against Calais and Herm Islands in the English Channel in late 1943 and early 1944. Both were canceled because of weather, light, and tide conditions.

As D-Day approached, the need for conventional infantry forces once again deterred holding the Rangers in reserve as a strategic strike force. They were formed into a Ranger group and attached to the 29th Infantry Division's 116th Infantry for the landing at Point du Hoc.

The plan called for three companies of the 2nd Rangers to land under cover of naval gunfire, scale vertical cliffs, and take out coast artillery positions that threatened the landing. The preparation for this mission was as intensive as any ever given a Ranger or commando battalion. Rehearsals were conducted in adverse weather and led by experienced commandos who had operated across similar beaches in France and Norway.

The mission was not just a raid; it



Rangers practice beach-landing operations on the coast of England in preparation for D-Day. Such training was often conducted with the assistance of British commandos who were veterans of missions across beaches in Norway and France.



Lieutenant Colonel Darby, left, commander of the 6615th Ranger Force in Italy, briefs one of his battalion commanders in preparation for the U.S. assault on the town of Cisterna.

was a full-scale invasion. The three Ranger companies made it up the cliffs, but found that the guns had already been dismantled. They were then pinned down by the Germans. While casualties mounted, the remainder of the Ranger group was ordered to follow the 116th Infantry ashore. The 29th Division now had the additional mission of relieving the Ranger companies at Point du Hoe. That effort took several days.

When the Rangers moved in from the beach, they were to spend the re-

mainder of the European campaign fighting as conventional infantry. Even in this sphere they occasionally found opportunity to exploit their capabilities by employing unique methods of operation, such as at Aachen in late 1944, when selected German-speaking Ranger units were employed on tactical operations under Office of Strategic Services (OSS) control. Nevertheless, their organization and the tempo of operations deterred their use on raids or strategic strike operations. This left the task of

validating any uniquely Ranger function to the Pacific theater's 6th Ranger Battalion.

The 6th Ranger Battalion's entry into combat was inauspicious. During the invasion of the Philippines, it assaulted the islands in Leyte Gulf only to find an occasional Japanese straggler. With this accomplished, it reverted to the role of conventional infantry.

In January 1945, however, it became the only Ranger-designated unit of the war to conduct a successful raid. A reinforced company slipped some 30 miles behind Japanese lines to liberate over 500 prisoners of war interned at Cabanatuan. Yet it failed to establish such raids as an exclusively Ranger function.

The Sixth Army's Alamo Scouts, one of whose teams guided the Rangers to Cabanatuan, had performed several such missions, and just weeks later the 11th Airborne Division executed a far more complex raid involving amphibious, airborne, and land-infiltrated elements to liberate over 2,000 civilian internees from the camp at Los Banos.

At the end of World War II, the few remaining Ranger battalions were deactivated and the Ranger experience was reappraised. Although the Ranger legend grew, no thorough analysis of Ranger operations justified keeping such formations in the postwar Army structure.

The Rangers were very good. No one denied that. But they were specialized infantry formations that had never established a unique specialty. Had the Army established a command responsible for special operations, things might have been different. As it was, even the OSS fell by the wayside. The Rangers' problem was that they were infantry, and were therefore evaluated from a purely infantry perspective.

Legend aside, the Rangers had seen no more combat than other infantry units; had inflicted, proportionately, no greater casualties upon the enemy; and had suffered no significantly greater casualties than the infantry.

Viewed in the vacuum of the "Ranger legend," they were awe-inspiring. Viewed in the context of the 1st Infantry Division's 16th Infantry, or the 3rd Infantry Division's 15th Infantry, or the 100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry, they were less so.

In the immediate postwar period, two schools of thought emerged. One held that the Rangers, although failing to

establish a uniquely Ranger function, had proven the separate infantry battalion to be the basic combat force for a modern Army. They had also proven that Ranger training and techniques were beneficial to the infantry as a whole. A minority agreed with the latter part of this thesis, but argued that there was still a need for organized Ranger forces.

Consequently, in 1947 the Army established what was to become the Ranger School, and in 1948 it activated its first separate infantry battalions in Panama. These two units were subsequently disbanded, but their Ranger heritage was formally recognized in certificates of lineage.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, immediate consideration was given to the formation of Ranger units for operations behind the lines. Actions were taken within the United States to form separate airborne Ranger companies, and the Far East Command tasked Colonel John H. McGee to screen and recruit personnel suitable for "commando" operations. Colonel McGee proposed the formation of a division within the operations staff to oversee both partisan and Ranger operations. Its name would be Miscellaneous Division. His proposal included a concept for a raid by Ranger forces that would land on the west coast of North Korea, infiltrate overland to block a railroad tunnel, and liberate prisoners of war being transported north by train. Once again the tempo of war outdistanced efforts by planning staffs.

Upon arrival in Korea, Colonel McGee found little evidence that his plans for guerrilla operations against the North would find the necessary partisan support. He was ordered, however, to organize a Ranger unit for strategic ground reconnaissance operations in the Pohang Pocket. Since the numbered airborne Ranger companies had yet to arrive in Korea, Colonel McGee set about organizing the 8213th Army Unit (Ranger Company) along World War II modification table of organization and equipment lines. The training of this unit precluded its use as originally envisioned, and when it finally entered combat, it was in action against Chinese forces as part of Task Force Dolvin.

In the meantime, six of the newly organized airborne Ranger companies had arrived in Korea. These new Ranger companies, which numbered 105 men per company, had a more traditional three-platoon infantry structure

that distinguished them from their Ranger predecessors and from the Eighth Army Ranger Company. Two of these companies participated with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in the combat jump at Munsan-ni. The other four companies were parceled out to the divisions. Here the shortage of trained infantry companies created demands upon division and regimental staffs as acute as those at Anzio and Normandy.

The result was foreseeable. Ranger companies and platoons were piecemealed into hastily assembled task forces or attached to understrength regiments and battalions in critical sectors. Such was not without protest. At Chipyong-ni the Ranger company commander accompanied a platoon attached to Company G of the 23rd Infantry. His

"(In Korea) Ranger companies and platoons were piecemealed into hastily assembled task forces or attached to understrength regiments and battalions in critical sectors. Such was not without protest."

insistence that the unit take orders only from the regimental commander created more confusion and did little to endear the Rangers to their more conventional brethren. This situation may have been a key in the decision to disband the Ranger companies before they had been in existence a year.

Concurrent with problems at Chipyong-ni was the discovery of an anticomunist guerrilla movement centered in the Yellow Sea (Hwang-Hae) province of North Korea that tied up the Miscellaneous Division's attention for some time. While Ranger actions, under the guidance of the Penetration Operations Section, were considered, it was clear from the emerging nature of the war that any action would be either indigenous efforts or unilateral operations conducted by small U.S. teams.

The first of these actions included the formation of an indigenous marine raider unit used for coastal raiding and as a base defense force. It also proved useful for quieting quarrels among rival guerrilla factions. The latter effort

blossomed into a classified detachment based at Yang Yang, which operated against the eastern lines of communication of North Korea by calling in air strikes and naval gunfire against targets of opportunity. Neither was as large as the developing guerrilla campaign on North Korea's west coast, and neither required the employment of U.S. Ranger companies.

Denied the opportunity of operating at the strategic or high operational level under a special operations command, the Rangers continued to play a small, unheralded, but important part in the Korean War by conducting tactical raids in support of conventional infantry objectives, notably at Changmal, Hwachon Dam, Hill 383, and Topyong-ni. When the airborne Ranger companies were disbanded in September 1951, some Rangers volunteered for duty with the United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, while others returned to conventional infantry units.

The logical successors to the Rangers were the long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) companies organized in Europe a few years later in response to the need of corps and higher commanders for accurate and timely ground intelligence. The LRRPs, however, differed from the Rangers in more than organization. Rangers had always been conceived as a combat force capable of infiltration behind enemy lines to attack communications centers, command posts, and logistical centers. While such missions could have been assigned to a LRRP unit, given the thin line that sometimes separates reconnaissance from combat patrolling, intelligence production was its primary purpose.

At 214 men, the LRRPs were half as large as the World War II Ranger battalion and over twice the size of the Korean War Ranger companies. Like Rangers, they were required to infiltrate enemy lines and rely upon Ranger tactics and techniques to survive. While the Army insisted that the LRRPs were not Rangers, it was axiomatic that no one could aspire to any level of combat leadership in the company without first undergoing the formality of completing the Ranger course. The Marine Corps adopted this same structure with slight modification under the name Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance Companies.

The theory that LRRP members were combat support troops whose weapons were meant for self-defense did not long



Rangers from the 75th Infantry, now the 75th Ranger Regiment, conduct a road march following the invasion of Grenada in October, 1983. The highly successful operation was viewed as a victory for the concept of Rangers as a special operations light-infantry strike force.

survive the test of Vietnam, where LRRP companies were committed at separate brigade, divisional, and field force (corps) levels. Despite the fact that the LRRPs had a designated function, the very nature of the war called into question the role of a parachute-delivered LRRP company. Since those areas in which the LRRPs might best have been employed were under the control of Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Special Operations Group (MACV-SOG), whose specialized reconnaissance forces included indigenous personnel with the necessary language, appearance, and area orientation, a larger combat role for the LRRPs was inevitable.

While MACV-SOG did send out reconnaissance patrols, this was a war characterized by patrol actions. Reconnaissance patrols not only indicated the most likely areas for combat patrols, they drew the enemy into contact. To respond to these contacts, task organization and attachment was required. Machine gun squads supported ambushes and provided suppressive fire during extraction. Mortars were needed for illumination and indirect fire, as well as combat platoons for maneuver and reinforcement. By the time the LRRP companies were redesignated separate Ranger companies of the 75th Infantry in 1969, many had already evolved into

specialized combat task forces.

In conjunction with the revival of the Ranger designation under the colors of Merrill's Marauders, Company A of the 75th Infantry was reassigned to Project MASSTER at Fort Hood, Texas, to undergo testing. It arrived as a strict LRRP company and soon developed a more conventional combat appearance. Whether or not this was related to any comparison of its capabilities with the myriad other intelligence-gathering agents then under review is unknown.

In any event, the Army announced plans for returning to a combat configured Ranger light infantry battalion shortly after the tests were completed. In doing so, they came up with an organization strikingly similar to the Marine raider battalions of World War II fame, and revived the old search for a uniquely Ranger function.¹

In 1974, the activation of two modern Ranger units, configured as light airborne infantry battalions, signaled both the return of the Ranger development cycle to its point of origin and the resolve of the administration and Army staff. In structure they were pared-down light infantry battalions capable of in-

¹ For a comparison of the Marine raiders with the modern Rangers, see "The Raider Experience," *Infantry*, Mar-Apr 79, by the author.

dependent operations under a command capable of providing the support that allowed the Rangers to deploy at their maximum 575-man strength.

It had taken three wars for the Rangers to return to this basic infantry concept of three squads, three platoons, and three rifle companies with appropriate light infantry supporting arms. What had changed was that the Rangers had now found a function. While the mission statement was initially rather broad, speaking of their ability to "support national policy and objectives," it has since been distilled into the term "strike operations."

Strike operations is a broad term. It includes raids, strategic reinforcement as a show of force, and the seizure of airfields or other objectives for use by follow-on forces or specific short-term tasks. They are generally characterized by intense, short-notice planning; surprise; high-speed insertion; violent action on the objective, and quick withdrawal of the delivered force. While other units are capable of such operations, notably the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy SEALS, and Army Special Forces, they are usually the province of elite forces. This, in turn, underlines one of the basic characteristics of American elite forces.

Much of the writing concerning elite forces has focused on the physical characteristics of these forces themselves and ignored their underlying doctrine. There are, in fact, two types of military elites: hierarchical and functional.

The hierarchical elites are units organized much like other service forces, but given priorities in personnel, equipment, and training funds for political reasons. The British Guards regiments, Russian Guards formations, and the Waffen SS are examples of the hierarchical elite. Past service to the state or party is usually the determinant criteria.

American military experience has been hostile to hierarchical elites, preferring instead to focus on present or future utility as an armed force. At issue is more than a particular headgear or badge and it goes to the core of service dynamics, i.e., priorities for funding, method and means of employment, and, ultimately, who is—and is not—on the inside track for promotion and further command.

The functional elites are units whose status relies upon a particular combat role or function. Inherent in the




Fig. 1




Fig. 3




Fig. 2




Fig. 4

The evolution of Ranger unit organization, from the top: World War II Ranger Infantry Battalion (Fig. 1); Korean War Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) (Tentative) (Fig. 2); Vietnam War LRRP and Separate Infantry (Ranger) Company (Fig. 3), and the modern-day 75th Ranger battalion configuration (Fig. 4).

organization and designation of functionally-elite forces is the tension and competition between traditionalists and visionaries. More to the point, it is those who would fight the next war with updated equipment and last war's rules, versus those who think that new means and methods are called for. But as the American political experience is one of compromise, the adoption of changing visions is often accomplished in fits and starts. Units will be formed only after acrimonious debate as to their utility. Doctrine will then be formulated and tested.

After further blood-letting between traditionalists and visionaries as to what the results were (for the futures of both are at stake), and if the utility of such forces can no longer be denied, a command will be formed to employ them. Such is the history of U.S. air, armored, and airborne forces—visions that have endured to become tradition.

The resurrection of the Rangers, then, was evidence that this process was alive and well, despite the demands and trauma occasioned by the Vietnam War. It was also a signal by the administration that, whatever the purported lessons of that war, the United States was prepared to use judicious force, when necessary, to further its objectives.

Rather than returning to stateside posts to brood over some enormous future European conflagration, certain elements of the infantry, special operations, and aviation communities reappraised their skills in light of the world beyond.

The new Ranger battalions were one part of this evolution. As a basic infantry formation, they represented a cautious step forward. If special operations failed to establish itself in the post-Vietnam era, or if a European war intervened, they could readily be converted to conventional infantry. There were even those who saw in the new Rangers the end of Army Special Forces.²

Some initial confusion as to the role of modern Rangers was inevitable. If the Army gave them a broad strategic mission, they begged the question of who, exactly, the Rangers would perform this mission for. Corps commanders viewed the Rangers as a strategic asset avail-

able for immediate reinforcement of their Corps, or as an additional asset for contingency operations.

As special operations doctrine developed, however, a gravitational pull asserted itself between Ranger and special operations commanders, which culminated in the assignment of the Ranger Regiment to the 1st Special Operations Command. This was itself confirmation of the employment of Ranger forces under Special Operations Command in the April 1980 attempt to free hostages in Iran. While it represents a historic culmination in the Ranger search for a command which can plan for, employ, and sustain operations by Ranger forces, it is not a final arbitration of the issues.

*“...in 1983 at Point Salines, Grenada...
Rangers were alerted to seize the airfield for follow-on forces and rescue potential American hostages....
by training, caliber, and orientation, they were the best forces available for the job.”*

Beyond the sphere of special operations, one basic structural dilemma remains. The Rangers, unlike other special operations functional elites, are a dual purpose force. As a *specialized* infantry force, the Rangers can expect to remain under a special operations command, be it with 1st SOCOM or some theater special operations command, only as long as two conditions exist.

The first of these is the plan for, or conduct of, a special operations campaign that exploits the capabilities of Ranger forces. The second of these is the lack of a compelling superior requirement on the part of corps or higher conventional commanders for infantry forces. Once the latter occurs, as in World War II and Korea, the Rangers will cease to exist as a unique special operations force. What, then, are the responsibilities of special operations commanders?

Since special operations commanders

operate at the strategic and high-operational level, they are in a unique position to continually re-evaluate and validate requirements for Ranger forces. Since they work for the theater commander and enjoy appropriate rank in wartime, they will be well-placed to advocate these requirements. To allow them to do so, special operations staffs must remain both flexible and realistic. They will have to judge present and future requirements for Ranger forces with overall theater needs, at times recommending the transfer of operational command over Ranger forces to conventional commanders for specific missions, and monitor the state of Ranger forces as the situation requires.

To do so successfully will require the highest caliber of staff expertise, for mere doctrine (for example, that such is not a “Ranger” mission) will not impede the realities of combat requirements. From a special operations viewpoint, planning will be as critical as command and control for maintaining contact with deployed Ranger forces.

This was essentially what happened in October 1983 at Point Salines, Grenada. Rangers were alerted to seize the airfield for follow-on forces and rescue potential American hostages, not because it was a uniquely special operation—it wasn’t—or because it was a peculiarly “Ranger” mission, but because by training, caliber, and orientation they were the best forces available for the job.

Planning was initiated under the aegis of the 1st Special Operations Command. At the appropriate moment, operational control of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 75th Infantry was “chopped” to the commander responsible, and the Rangers were launched. The 1st Special Operations Command, meanwhile, continued to monitor developments. Once the Rangers had completed their missions, they were withdrawn from theater and operational control was returned to the 1st Special Operations Command. Had other requirements presented themselves, Ranger forces would have been available for employment worldwide. This was not only a decided victory for the concept of Ranger forces, but a return to an earlier doctrinal concept for airborne force employment.

The early days of the Second World War also saw much intellectual ferment over the role of airborne forces. Those who foresaw their utility as specialized airborne raiding and penetration forces,

²See “Special Forces and Rangers: ‘two edges of the same dagger,’” *Army*, Dec 77, by the author.



Photo by Phil Howell

e.g., parachute commandos or Special Air(borne) Service, found themselves at odds with fellow paratroopers who stressed the infantry and other conventional-branch utility of air-delivered combat forces.

Like the Rangers, the tempo of operations in that war soon eclipsed proponents of the former. Airborne operations, at least in the American experience, increased in size and scope to the point where we could launch entire airborne armies. What disappeared in this expansion, much like the Ranger battalions, was the realization that there was still a place in warfare for the airborne light-infantry battalion. The French SAS and *Choc* battalions, who found themselves reassigned to Indochina following the war, soon rediscovered their utility as airborne Ranger forces and bequeathed their maroon beret, inherited from the World War II British SAS, to the colonial

parachute battalions who followed. In our own Army, such formations merely disappeared.

Grenada, then, was one point marking the U.S. Army's return to this earlier airborne strike doctrine, and it was fitting that the forces chosen were designated "Rangers." For once, employment of Rangers was limited to those tasks originally envisioned as calling for their expertise. Thus, they were inserted at the moment of greatest risk to the overall operation—its inception—and withdrawn when they had accomplished their objectives.

This return of the Ranger battalions to the continental United States in lieu of "chopping" them to conventional airborne commanders for sustained patrolling operations in the interior of the island represented a seemingly minor but important coming-of-age for both Ranger and special operations doctrine. It should be noted, however, that there

was a fairly large contingent of forces available for the follow-on missions. This point should not be overlooked by future special operations commanders and staffs.

Special operations commands can, and will, employ Ranger forces across the full spectrum of conflict. Within that sphere there will exist requirements for airborne light-infantry strike forces beyond those traditionally associated with the term "special operations." As the level of conflict inclines toward the general war atmosphere, increased requirements will periodically demand that Rangers perform more conventional missions outside the special operations sphere. The duration of any such war could again call the existence of specialized infantry units into question. This is, however, a lesser possibility than their employment on contingency or low-intensity conflict operations.

The Rangers, then, are a more permanent part of the Army force structure than they have been at any time in the past forty years. For the first time, their future lies with special operations commanders and staffs trained in their employment. \times

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Cultural Interaction: The Forgotten Dimension of Low-Intensity Conflict

By
Lieutenant Colonel James K. Bruton
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No one has to be reminded that we're supposed to win on the battlefield. Tactical victory, throughout the spectrum of conflict, drives the training machine. If enough battles are won, the prevailing logic has it, the war is won.

It may not be so.

In the socio-political arena of low-intensity conflict (LIC), we do not adequately prepare our soldiers for positive cultural interaction with allied populations—and the failure to do so presents the potential of turning American military victory to defeat.

The position to be presented here is that all U.S. Army soldiers deployable to a LIC environment—especially light infantry units—should undergo specially designed psychological and political preparation, to be described herein. This preparation must highlight the extraordinary nature of LIC, and emphasize the essential need for positive cultural interaction with the indigenous people.

A recent analysis of LIC by an Army study group amplifies this point: "...(a) genuine requirement exists for appropriately educated and experienced regional experts who are sensitive to the cultural, social and political nuances of an area of operations. Operational elements must share this expertise as well. Many have expressed concern that the Army's light infantry divisions, with an officially sanctioned low-intensity conflict mission, may not possess the organic capability to support the socio-political aspects of this mission."¹

The term LIC environment here refers primarily to a counterinsurgency condition in a developing country. Under that concept, the United States, using varying proportions of economic, technical

and military assistance, aids the allied nation in overcoming an armed insurgent movement seeking to overthrow the government and/or socio-economic structure.² The insurgent movement may have varying amounts of external support. Typically, it seeks political legitimacy by winning popular support, starting with the most disaffected group—usually the rural poor.

Almost any realistic situation involving low-intensity conflict and a decision to deploy sizeable U.S. military combat forces could eventually mean the commitment of the Army's light infantry divisions or portions thereof.³ The primary role for the Army's light divisions is the LIC mission, a point clearly stated in General John Wickham's 1984 White Paper on Light Divisions: "Especially in low-intensity conflict, they (light divisions) will be able to seek out and destroy the enemy on his terrain, using initiative, stealth and surprise."⁴

The Army's LIC doctrine manual almost mandates the use of light divisions in the tactical aspects of LIC missions: "Light infantry is usually the ideal force to counter guerrilla activities. Light infantry units are organized, trained, and equipped to operate in the same environment that is favorable to guerrilla operations. By taking away the advantages the guerrilla gains by operating in dense, difficult terrain and during periods of limited visibility, light infantry is capable of disrupting and destroying guerrilla forces both physically and psychologically."⁵

A LIC mission is unlike any other military operation. Every LIC situation is unique, ranging from civil disorders

and terrorism—almost commonplace in many countries—to Phase III guerrilla warfare. Recognizing the uniqueness of each LIC situation, Army doctrine specifies that "...the commander must adapt the doctrine to a specific situation within a low-intensity environment....Principles, policies and programs applied successfully in one situation may be unsuitable if applied in the same manner in another situation."⁶

Let us assume that a light infantry division is assigned a LIC mission. For purposes of this discussion, let us also assume a notification alert to the division of approximately three months prior to the deployment date. Some may question the validity of three months notice, but given the world situation and our high intelligence capability, such notice is within the realm of possibility.

The division commander must ensure his soldiers meet the high standards and selectivity required by LIC doctrine. A comprehensive training program would include the honing of specific military skills, plus an equally important program of training that emphasizes the psychological, cultural, economic and political implications of U.S. military efforts in general, and of the light division in particular. We shall focus on the necessity for this latter training program, which trains the soldier to recognize the significant impact of the U.S. presence on the host nation—which often transcends pure military prowess.

Historically, when U.S. troops have been deployed to an overseas environment, the commanders have generally concentrated only on the military aspects of their mission. While there has almost always been some command

guidance concerning interactions with host nation personnel (usually in the form of "thou-shalt-nots"), such guidance is often perfunctory, and has little lasting effect. Too, such interactions are often seen as falling purely within the area of command discipline, rather than being an essential component of a successful mission. Contrast this with Mao Tse-Tung's often-quoted principle of unity between guerrillas and the people: "...Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals a lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live."⁷

Both active and reserve U.S. units have recently conducted a variety of missions in LIC environments. They've built and repaired runways and roads, conducted medical and dental assistance missions, participated in joint tactical missions, and have performed their mission well. What may have been overlooked is the collective impact—or perception of impact—of U.S. soldiers on the social, political, and economic fabric of the host nation. Soldiers will be soldiers, and seemingly innocent off-duty pursuits may give rise to a more contemporary—and perhaps more bitter—version of the old complaint of American soldiers being "over-paid, over-sexed, and over here." Such behavior does not necessarily have to fall into the criminal category. A soldier who makes loud, boastful and disparaging comparisons between American and host-nation society; throws his money around too freely, and fails to display at least a modicum of deference to local customs may be perceived as an arrogant, swaggering foreigner who should go back to his own country. Bad feelings which are the result of insults—perceived or otherwise—are part of human nature, and these feelings may surface in spite of the larger good we may be doing in the areas of military or economic assistance.

The cumulative effect of these actions may serve to undermine the tenets of LIC doctrine which require the support of the host nation populace as an essential objective in winning a LIC cam-

paign. The LIC commander who fails to aggressively pursue an active cultural interaction program may fail to recognize that "...the intangible factors of ideas, psychology, attitudes, impressions and behavior are likely to be a greater influence on the decision of people as to which side they will support in low-intensity warfare,"⁸ than simple military superiority.

Units currently being deployed abroad receive varying degrees of background orientation. Some get very good area briefings and intelligence updates. Others less so. On the subject of U.S./host nation relations, Army LIC doctrine says, "U.S. personnel must understand and be tolerant of alien

"Bad feelings which are the result of insults—perceived or otherwise—are part of human nature, and these feelings may surface in spite of the larger good we may be doing in the areas of military or economic assistance."

political, economic, social, religious, and cultural systems to ensure a proper relationship with indigenous personnel."⁹ This mandates a program that instructs personnel as to the implicit psychological and political objectives in U.S. military efforts and how their individual or collective attitudes and conduct can contribute to—or cripple—those objectives. The purpose of such a training program is to instill in soldiers a lasting sense of individual responsibility and realization that successful mission accomplishment may depend as much on their intercultural sensitivity and interpersonal skills as it does on their fighting ability.

Today the integration of this fundamental LIC precept into our institutional consciousness is meeting with only slow progress, outside of special operations and light infantry communities. The principles of counterinsurgency and internal defense and development are as accessible today as they were during the Vietnam era. During the Vietnam War, those principles

received much lip service, but were largely ignored by much of the conventional military establishment.¹⁰

Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units, are more closely attuned to the socio-political dimensions of LIC. Though to date, the potential contribution of these units is not fully recognized or developed, these units present highly-skilled pools of country and region-specific expertise that can contribute significantly to formalized programs of cultural interaction training.

Such training in the past has focused on cross-cultural communication and on the value system and cultural characteristics within a given country. The Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course at Fort Bragg in the 1960s offered its participants excellent preparation for Vietnam. Though no empirical evidence from any studies has come to the authors' attention, it is often contended that U.S. soldiers who had been trained in the Vietnamese language and customs, and served in Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations positions, adjusted to Southeast Asia far more readily than those without such training, and contributed significantly to positive cultural interaction with the Vietnamese people.

In the early 1970s, U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand, required all Army personnel under its command to attend a seminar called Project TARGET (To Achieve Recognition, Get Equal Treatment). This program represented a positive step in helping soldiers acculturate to Thailand, and deal honestly with aspects of Thai culture often misunderstood by American soldiers, including family structure, the role of the king, and the influence of Buddhism in daily life. The theme of Project TARGET was based on the exploration of the term "equality," and pointing soldiers toward recognizing and treating the Thai people as equals—that is, valuing Thai lives, family and culture as much as they did their own. The project was developed by Robert L. Humphrey of the International Research Institute under contract to the Army. Mr. Humphrey has written, "Why should the military man initiate the effort for change? The military may be the only institution in our society with the organization and manpower at home and abroad to be the catalyst

for social reform. The military has the competence to improve human relations."¹¹


The matter of U.S. troop presence and deportment in a LIC environment must be candidly addressed. Some critics of U.S. efforts in Vietnam have suggested that an often general callousness toward the Vietnamese and their culture may have created more Viet Cong than were killed on the battlefield. The post-mortems on the Vietnam War by American and Vietnamese commanders make little mention of the matter of U.S. troop attitude and behavior toward the Vietnamese. Their critiques generally center on the varying levels of American troop morale and discipline. One scholar of the war posed the question: "Would it have made a difference...to give the American soldier any kind of positive identification with a culture and society so culturally and socially different from ours?"¹²

The answer then, as it must be now, is a vehement "yes." In an increasingly sophisticated world, where developing nations are understandably sensitive to being viewed as a "poor relation" to a "rich uncle," turning a blind eye to soldier conduct which aggrevates such a perception is inviting host-nation disaffection and resentment—and undermining our own LIC doctrine. Such supra-military considerations come second nature to many special operations units, but generally fall outside conventional operational thinking.

What type of approach can reduce—or preclude—strains between the U.S. military and the host-nation populace? Can U.S. military presence make positive contributions to LIC objectives that go beyond the strictly defined and mandated military functions? The pre-deployment, three-part training to be proposed here is designed specifically to attune soldiers to the non-military—or more precisely, the non-tactical—political and psychological aspects of LIC. It would be presented in a seminar format similar to the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS), and would span two to three days. Trainers would be selected from among soldiers with previous intercultural experience who possess superior teaching abilities and have strong interpersonal skills. The selection of trainers would logically look, but not limit itself, to personnel with Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations or Foreign Area Officer backgrounds. These

trainers would make up mobile training teams which would conduct the cultural interaction training for deployable units. Participation and task accomplishment would be the focus of training, rather than the number of hours of instruction. The program would be built around the progressive stages of an effective intercultural training program, as seen by Dr. V. Lynn Tyler of the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham Young University. The pro-

gram includes: (1) orientation—providing participants exposure to the subject; (2) education—more intense information sharing; (3) training—leading to usable skill and experience; (4) research—interactive discovery and sharing; (5) practice—integrated experience; and (6) promotion—enhanced reality, or living in light of larger perspectives and perceptions. Realistic constraints probably allow development of this program for light infantry to just the third, or training stage.



The relevance and importance of this program is apparent in its three goals: (1) enhanced LIC mission accomplishment in terms of individual unit objectives, and in terms of overall U.S./host-nation objectives on the political, psychological and tactical levels; (2) accelerated acculturation, or adjustment to the foreign environment with reduced culture shock and increased ability for crosscultural communication,¹³ and (3) greater personal satisfaction and higher morale resulting from positive intercultural experiences.¹⁴


The first part of the program would describe LIC as a combined civil-military and U.S./host-nation endeavor. LIC would be presented, not as a scaled-down version of a conventional mid-intensity war, but as a different type of war altogether. In it, the military role is unquestionably important, but it may share priority with political, economic or psychological forces.¹⁵ This first part would focus on what our Communist adversaries have recognized for years. They consider all military actions to have psychological and political implications for the enemy, for the civilians in the conflictive areas, and for domestic supporters. As Mao said of his own forces, "This army has built up a system of political work which is essential for the people's war and is aimed at promoting unity in its own ranks, unity with friendly armies, unity with the people, and at disintegrating the enemy forces and ensuring victory in battle."¹⁶ Vo Nguyen Giap, too, considered socio-political preparation essential to final battlefield victory: "In the early years, as the political movement of the masses was not strong enough and the enemy's forces still stable, the political mobilization among the masses had all the more to be considered as the main task for the preparation of armed insurrection....The most appropriate guiding principle for activities was armed propaganda...political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda..."¹⁷

Examples of their success in carrying through with this philosophy reinforce the point. During the Chinese Civil War, 1927 through 1949, excluding the Japanese occupation, the smaller Communist forces of Mao out-organized and eventually defeated the numerically superior Nationalist army. In Vietnam, from 1957 to 1965, an initially small Communist cadre went from nuisance

Phase I operations, to Phase III maneuver warfare, controlling over two-thirds of the country.

In each instance, the Communists outperformed their Nationalist opponents using two persuasive psychological appeals to engage the commitment of revolutionary leaders and attract willing followers.

The first appeal was in their power to hold convictions, and to act firmly upon them. The tie that binds Communists "across the frontiers of nations, across barriers of language and differences of class and education, in defiance of religion, morality, truth, law,



honor...even unto death, is a simple conviction: It is necessary to change the world...It is a simple, rational faith that inspires men to live and die for it."¹⁸

The second appeal the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists could generate rested in their ability to develop from among peasants, workers, and villagers a grass-roots network of revolutionary leaders. The Party identified a potential leader, stimulated his sense of participation in the decision-making process and his involvement in a cause of national magnitude, and gave him a feeling of having some stake in the outcome of his efforts. Within such a context of revolutionary warfare, the actions of U.S. and host-nation military personnel in the aggregate, and at the individual level, can be shown to carry tremendous importance as to the success or failure of U.S./host-nation objectives.

The second part of the program would cover the notion of ethnocentrism and crosscultural communications.¹⁹ The objective would be to recognize that people in a foreign society with a different culture, mores, values, and economic conditions may strike us as threatening, incomprehensible, or inferior. Yet we must understand that different does not mean inferior.²⁰ Beneath surface differences is a discoverable and exciting commonality that can serve as a basis for greater self-awareness and presents new possibilities for intercultural understanding.

The third part of the program would be culture and country-specific. It would highlight political, sociological and cultural characteristics of the country in question, and do it as realistically as possible. Using a role-playing, participatory methodology, soldiers—from the viewpoint of a cross-strata of the host nation (from tenant farmer, to middle-class businessman, to political activist)—would learn to empathize with host-nation inhabitants, and to understand why some of them may have reason to dislike Americans, or why they might even find reason to support an insurgent movement. Armed with this awareness, the individual soldier could see how his attitude and actions might make a difference in the ultimate outcome of the struggle. He would then be better able to gauge the effect of his conduct on the people of the host nation, and conduct himself in a way that supports our LIC objectives.

Initially, such a preparatory program for LIC-bound soldiers will not be easy

to develop or "sell" to hard-charging officers and high-spirited soldiers eager to get on with the "primary" fighting mission. Many may view it as "just another damned program" to be jammed into already limited training time.

However, much of the expertise needed for such a program is already present in our Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units—both active and reserve component. That expertise can and must be distilled and expanded to benefit all LIC-bound or LIC-oriented units.

If we fail to embrace positive cultural interaction as an integral part of our low-intensity conflict operations, we may find ourselves defeating the insurgent on the battlefield, while alienating the allied population. ✕

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Lieutenant Colonel Wayne D. Zajac is an Army National Guard officer assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, 29th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He is a graduate of Gettysburg College and the Command and General Staff College.

Notes

¹ *Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report Volume I: Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict*, prepared by the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Aug. 1, 1986, p 8-6.

² *Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report: Executive Summary*, prepared by the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Aug. 1, 1986, p 3.

³ *Joint LIC Project Final Report Volume I*, op. cit., p 9-7. It is recognized that on an ideal level, successful LIC operations usually preclude introduction of U.S. combat troops, as this can become counter-productive. As the work indicates: "The introduction of combat forces in a low-intensity conflict environment should be a last resort and, in the case of foreign internal defense, must clearly be in support of the host country effort."

⁴ General John A. Wickham, Jr., *White Paper on Light Divisions*, reprinted in Army Times, May 7, 1984, pp 10-12.

⁵ Field Circular 100-20, *Low-Intensity Conflict*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July, 1986, p G-5.

⁶ Ibid., p V.

⁷ Mao Tse-Tung, *Basic Tactics*, as quoted in *War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History*, Robert B. Asprey, Doubleday and Company, New York, 1975, pp 391-392.

⁸ Sir Robert Thompson, "Civic Action in Low-Intensity Warfare," a prepared statement in *The Proceedings of the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference*, January 14-15, 1986, sponsored by Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., p 76.

⁹ Field Circular 100-20, op. cit., p H-1.

¹⁰ For an excellent analysis of the resistance of some Army leaders to President Kennedy's directives on adapting to counterinsurgency missions, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986.

¹¹ Robert L. Humphrey, "Destroying the Ugly American," Veritas, U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, July-August 1973, p 23.

¹² Professor Samuel L. Popkin, "The Impact of Vietnam on the U.S. Army," as a discussion issue in *The Second Indochina War Symposium, Papers and Commentary*, edited by John Schlight, U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington D.C., 1986, p 267.

¹³ See Richard W. Brislin, Kenneth Cushner, Craig Cherrie and Mahealani Young, *Intercultural Interactions: A Practical Guide*, SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1986.

¹⁴ Some functional definitions are in order. The term *anthropology* refers to studying a given culture in depth. *Crosscultural* compares similar aspects of different cultures and suggests means of bridging differences. *Intercultural* refers to the dynamics of interaction between two or more cultures; of something new, a synergy, that emerges over time (and also involves a perceptual shift within the psyche of the participants).

¹⁵ Sara Miles, "The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," *North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas*, April-May 1986, p 19.

¹⁶ Mao Tse-Tung, "On Coalition Government," (April 24, 1945) in *Selected Works Volume III*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, p 265.

¹⁷ Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*; Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962, pp 78-79.

¹⁸ Whittaker Chambers, *Witness*, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1952, p 9.

¹⁹ See "Towards Ethnorelativism: A Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity," by Milton V. Bennett, and "The First Step in Cross-Cultural Orientation: Defining the Problem," by Kristin A. Juffer, in *Cross-Cultural Orientation: New Conceptualizations and Applications*, edited by R. Michael Paige, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1986. Also see L. Robert Kohls, *Developing Intercultural Awareness*, The Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research, Washington, D.C., 1981.

²⁰ L. Robert Kohls, *Survival Kit for Overseas Living*, Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, Maine, 1984, pp 12-16.



Photo by Craig Beason

Special Warfare

Making the Most of Special Forces Pre-Mission Planning

By Chief Warrant Officer Scott S. Herbert

Special Forces has long been known for the intensity and quality of its operational planning, due in large part to the depth of experience and training of its soldiers. The members of an "A" detachment—when properly utilized—can constitute the ultimate in mini-staffs, and provide critical input to the creation of a successful operations plan.

In recent years though, while we continue to excel in an expanding array of worldwide missions, there has been a tendency to set aside some of our time-tested methods. This is especially true in the way we do our mission planning. In some cases, the detachment commander and the operations sergeant plan a mission largely by themselves, and then present it to the rest of the team.

I submit that this is not the best way to do business. It tends to short-circuit the vast experience and talent of detachment members, and deprives the mission plan of its full potential. Maybe it's time to take a cue from Special Forces history, and relearn the value of the mission-planning process.

For Special Forces, mission planning means being isolated from all outside distractions, and concentrating on nothing but the mission. This "isolation" is designed to provide the atmosphere necessary to develop the plans needed for the mission. By definition, isolation removes a unit from all external distractions and provides an enhanced security environment. Properly done, an isolation consolidates the staff and support resources of the forward operational base (FOB) to facilitate detachment mission preparations.

One of the keys to successful mission planning is preparing everything ahead

of time. Your detachment's internal organization, your standing operating procedures (SOPs), and your rehearsals are all designed to simplify the planning process and ensure the success of your mission.

How you internally organize your detachment is extremely important. Regardless of mission, an "A" detachment is easily structured into the required "staff" elements. Lest we forget, one of our principal requirements is a thorough knowledge of staff functions so that we may teach them to others. Certainly, the exact breakdown of personnel varies with each detachment depending upon the experience and expertise available within the detachment. No single recommended structure can fit every need; what follows is *one* way of organizing your detachment.

A full-strength detachment is easily divided into three planning cells: the command element, the support element, and the special staff element (exact titles are unimportant here).

The command element consists of the detachment commander, detachment technician, operations sergeant, and intelligence sergeant. The commander provides guidance and gives direction to the detachment, oversees the efforts of the command element, and makes the final decisions. The technician works within the command element, provides input to the mission planning process, coordinates and facilitates the efforts of the staff, and oversees the support and special staff elements. The operations sergeant (commonly called team sergeant) is the detachment S-3. He develops the operational plans with the commander and directs the efforts of

the intelligence sergeant. The intelligence sergeant is the detachment S-2. He evaluates the available intelligence, processes the intelligence, and determines the information requirements for the detachment. He is also the individual tasked with ensuring the security of the detachment.

The support element consists of the detachment's S-1, S-4, and S-5. One of the weapons sergeants becomes the S-1. (Normally, the weapons men have less to do during mission planning than most of the other members of the team.) The S-1 handles all the administrative necessities for the detachment. Historically, one of the engineers is the S-4. Like the S-1, this a somewhat arbitrary assignment. The S-4 handles the logistical needs. The job of the S-5 is often overlooked today but plays an extremely important role in FID/IDAD/UW operations, and should be practiced at every opportunity. Since a medic's duties lend themselves to influencing the local population in a positive manner, he is the ideal S-5.

The special staff element includes the radio operators, one of the medics, and the demolitions man (depending on the mission). Both radio operators will always be kept busy, one medic has a specified requirement, and, if needed, the engineer prepares a demolitions plan.

While recognizing that this recommended breakdown is one man's opinion, I can also say that I learned and used it over twenty years in Special Forces and assure you it works well. An excellent technique is to use the same men to perform the various "staff" functions in garrison, in an isolation, and



Photo by Craig Beason

operationally.

It's tough to ask someone to be flexible and at the same time say stick to the SOPs, yet that's exactly what you should do. If you can follow an SOP, then use it, but ensure you develop SOPs that are general enough to give guidance without locking you in concrete. A common error is to write an SOP you can't live with—to dig your own grave, so to speak.

While everything that should be standardized can't be listed here, what follows are some common SOPs:

- The tactical organization of the detachment.
- Formations for movement and movement techniques.
- Cross-loading plans (fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, boat, etc.).
- Location of special and team equipment. Consider mandating the exact location of equipment/supplies on the load-carrying equipment (LCE) and in the rucksack.
- Communications and crypto procedures. Include who carries the pads and where—there are no “safe pockets” in the real world.
- Base camp/remain overnight (RON) procedures and organization.
- Rally point procedures. Include both the technique and the methods of selecting rally points.

- In-flight/enroute abort plans.
- Drop zone (DZ), landing zone (LZ), beach landing site (BLS) assembly plans.
- Immediate action drills (IAD) and methods for crossing danger areas.
- Hand and arm signals.
- Organization and procedures for an isolation.
- Organization, setup, and procedures for briefback.

Build an isolation kit. Include not only the administrative supplies you need, but any other documents or manuals you require; design and include planning checklists for each member of the detachment; and bring your mission planning “test” (I’ll talk more about the “test” later). I personally have no use for pretty charts (they’re time wasted on “eyewash”), but if you must use them, prepare them in advance and include them in the isolation kit.

Have a practice mission planning session. Use the exercise to develop and refine your SOPs and procedures. No one does a good job the first time out!

The bottom line is that the more routine your mission planning, the more likely you won't forget something important, and the better your chances of success.

After entering isolation, don't start planning the mission until you have carefully considered what needs to be done. It's important to organize the

physical layout of your isolation area. You must also schedule your daily activities, conduct a mission analysis, and disseminate information to everyone on the team. In most detachments, only one part of this is ever done—the operations sergeant's isolation schedule.

Try to divide your isolation area into three or four separate areas, the first of these being the general study area. Here, the support and special staff elements work collectively. Detachment briefings are held here and your briefback may be held here. For security reasons, this is the only place visitors should be allowed, except for the liaison from the area specialist team.

The command planning area is next. The command element should be separated from the rest of the detachment so they can devote all their time to refining the intelligence and operations plans in a high-security environment.

The third area is the information and testing area. Here is where you have the “isolation test” I mentioned earlier. This is a test you prepare in advance to find out if the members of the detachment have memorized critical information like rally points, azimuth to base station, crypto procedures, locations of equipment, code words, key personalities, and so on. The list is quite long. In this area, post a map with all the critical information and post any other required data near the test. Before the briefback, each member of the detachment must pass the “test” by demonstrating his knowledge to another member of the team. This is an excellent tool to assist you in learning the mission.

The fourth area I refer to is a separate area in which to sleep and secure your equipment. Most isolation areas don't have the room, but if you can get it, use it!

Almost every team makes some sort of an isolation schedule, but few go as far as they should. Some of the things often forgotten include:

- Time for physical training every morning.
- “Breaks” throughout the day.
- Detachment update briefings. At these times, sharpshoot your own plans and ensure your priorities are being followed and met.
- Time to practice your briefback—not just the morning prior to giving it, but frequently during the mission planning process. The whole team learns about the mis-

sion during these rehearsals.

- Quit work at a reasonable hour in the evening (2000 or 2100) and plan for lights out no later than 2300. Tired people make mistakes. Working all night won't help your operation.

The usual comment one hears when a detachment gets its mission briefing goes something like, "They want us to do what?" We then rush helter-skelter to make the plan, frequently skipping key elements or, if we are lucky, catching them purely by accident.

As soon as you receive the operations order, break it down and have everyone read it. Break the mission up into "bite-sized" chunks and analyze each portion. Make sure the entire detachment is aware of the elements of the mission and the priorities for planning. The briefback guides printed by the various Special Forces Groups are excellent planning checklists and shouldn't be forgotten.

Don't forget the old standby of "KISS" (Keep It Simple Stupid!). Everything you plan should be memorized, so make all your plans as simple and uncomplicated as possible. A helpful technique is to plan to give your entire briefback from memory; this ensures simple, easy-to-remember plans and operations. My experience has been that complicated plans and risk of failure go hand-in-hand.

A note for the "patrol leaders" among us: Before you make the plan and

present the "order" to your detachment, consider the quality of experience of its members and don't ignore their input. Never forget that when the members of the detachment have a hand in the design and development of the plan, they have a vested interest in its outcome—and will work even harder to ensure its success.

The purpose of a briefback is to demonstrate to the commander that you have adequately planned for the mission, and to show him that you *know* the mission. The commander knows that you can read and write, so reading him what you have written probably won't demonstrate your knowledge. In other words, memorize your briefback!

When you set up the briefing area (if you have the option), I recommend you place your maps in the center and seat your detachment in a semicircle facing the commander. This arrangement facilitates both the conduct of your briefing and questions and answers. Seat the commander close enough to the maps so he can see what you're referring to.

Normally the order of briefing is dictated by the FOB. If it isn't, brief in this order: detachment commander, S-2, S-3, S-1, S-4, S-5, communications, medical, demolitions, and, finally, the commander again.

Prepare a "commander's book." In this loose-leaf folder, place your detachment SOP and any other charts or lists you want the commander to see. Once again, just like artful charts and "reading" your briefing, the commander

knows you are capable of fine work so don't waste your time making these things fancy. Most often, time spent making elaborate charts and diagrams could be better used learning the mission.

When you present the briefback, concentrate on the most critical parts of the mission and minimize those areas of lesser importance. This is just one more way of showing that you understand the mission from top to bottom.

As part of your post-mission responsibilities, it's important to ensure you are debriefed as soon as possible after you return from your mission, and you should plan for that debriefing. Make sure a map is present, have a comfortable environment for the detachment, and be certain the required FOB personnel are present.

After the mission, update your SOPs with the latest "lessons learned." Only the Ten Commandments were written in stone, so learn from your mistakes. Train to correct your identified deficiencies, and be prepared for the next time.

Before you pat yourself on the back and tell yourself how well you've done the job in the past or before you say "we never did it that way back..." ask yourself if you could do it just a little better. I'm not going to tell you that this is the only way (this is strictly my opinion after all), but I will tell you that most of our teams could do a better job in mission planning.

The quality of experience and training of our Special Forces soldiers is far too valuable to waste, and should be incorporated into all levels of mission planning. So when you go into an isolation, take a cue from a "tried-and-true" Special Forces technique that will take full advantage of detachment resources. Both the mission and the soldiers will be better for it. 



Photo by Craig Beason

Chief Warrant Officer Scott S. Herbert is the Warrant Officer Manager for the Special Operations Proponency Office at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Mr. Herbert attained the rank of Master Sergeant in Special Forces before being appointed in 1984 as a Special Operations Technician. Mr. Herbert has served with the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 10th Special Forces Groups, and the U.S. Army Parachute Team. His last assignment was as an "A" detachment commander in the 1st Special Forces Group.

Update

Special Warfare

Special Forces Becomes Army's Newest Branch

Special Forces became the Army's newest branch last year when the official activation order was signed June 19 in Washington, D.C. The formal activation ceremony was held September 11 at Fort Bragg, where Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., formally presented the order to Brigadier General James A. Guest, commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

The Special Warfare Center and School is the proponent for the new branch, and directs Special Forces programs for personnel, doctrine, materiel and force structure.

The group most affected by the creation of the new branch is commissioned officers, according to the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA), formerly known as MILPERCEN. Special Forces warrant officers and enlisted soldiers have been managed in a separate personnel program since 1983.

TAPA started selecting commissioned officers for transfer to the branch in June of last year. Officers who hold

Special Forces (Functional Area 18) as their primary functional area were automatically incorporated into the branch. Officers with Special Forces as a functional area are being given the opportunity to transfer to the new branch if they are administratively, medically and physically qualified for the move. Officers in this category should have received a letter from TAPA last summer outlining their career options.

Officers with the additional skill identifier of 5G were also sent branch-option letters, and will be required to submit a formal branch-transfer request. Officers who have a functional area of Special Forces, but have not completed the qualification course must submit a request for Special Forces training in accordance with AR 614-162.

Special Forces is a non-accession branch, according to TAPA officials. Officers will be eligible to request Special Forces training between their fourth and seventh year of commissioned service, following completion of their accession-branch advanced course.

Special Forces officers will be considered branch-qualified upon completion of their accession-branch advanced course, the Special Forces Qualification Course, and successful command of an operational "A" detachment.

According to TAPA personnel, promotion opportunities for Special Forces officers will be comparable to other combat arms officers. Command opportunities for Special Forces captains and majors will be the best in the Army, and lieutenant colonel command opportunities will be comparable to those of infantry lieutenant colonels.

The new branch will not affect the way Army Reserve components access, train and manage their Special Forces personnel, according to TAPA.

For more information, call Captain Matthew Carr, USAJFKSWCS Special Operations Proprietary Office, AUTOVON 239-2415/5559, commercial 919-432-2415/5559, or write Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-SP, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

New Joint PSYOP Course Begins at Center

The Special Warfare Center and School held its first Joint Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Staff Planner's Course last November. The course, conducted by the Psychological Operations Department, is the first joint-services course offered by the Center and School under the Department of Defense Master Plan for Psychological Operations.


The two-week course offers an intensive, "hands-on" program of instruction that enables graduates to coordinate Psychological Operations activities in support of a joint-services or unified command. The course is open to both military and civilian personnel from the Department of Defense, and civilians from other government agencies.

The new resident course is a graduate-level effort, and is designed to broaden participants' understanding of multi-service and foreign military organizations, doctrines, plans and policies. The training enables personnel to apply Psychological Operations more effectively in a joint-services planning arena, according to Major Robert Tiffany, project officer for the course.

"Guest speakers from both military and civilian Psychological Operations communities discuss PSYOP assets, agencies, doctrine, and techniques," Tiffany said. "Those discussions also include the appropriate use of PSYOP in peace, crisis, and war, and use historical examples to illustrate those topics."

Special emphasis is given to the Joint Operation Planning System, according to Tiffany, which covers the time-sensitive planning requirements of a joint-military environment. Instruction includes preparation of an operational PSYOP estimate and plan.

Students are also taught how to integrate psychological operations into J-3 operational plans in order to influence enemy, neutral or friendly audiences in support of U.S. political and military objectives.



While not a requirement for the course, the Center and School recommends that personnel attending the course have previous operational PSYOP experience, or have completed one of the following courses: PSYOP Officers Course at the Special Warfare Center and School; the Joint PSYOP Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida; the Army PSYOP Officers Correspondence Course, or an equivalent noncommissioned officers course.

For further information, contact Major Sol Greear, AUTOVON 236-9172, commercial 919-396-9172, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-TD-PO, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

Sniper Course Preparation Encouraged

Soldiers planning to attend the Target Interdiction Course at the Special Warfare Center and School should practice their marksmanship before arriving at Fort Bragg, according to the Center and School's Advanced Skills Department.

The six-week course, which teaches advanced marksmanship, concealment, observation and target-stalking, requires students to pass an evaluation shoot on the first day of training. Students who fail the evaluation are removed from the course, says Master Sergeant Richard Boucher, NCOIC of the program.

Students fire an M-21 "iron sight" rifle (rear peep sight and blade front sight) for the evaluation, according to Boucher. To achieve a passing score, students must meet the following standards: (1) from 25 meters, fire five three-round groups—at least three of the groups must be one inch or less in diameter; (2) from 300 yards, fire 10 rounds in one minute from any position—scoring 70 out of 100 points, and (3) from 400, 500 and 600 yards, fire 10 rounds in 10 minutes at each distance, from any position—scoring 70 out of 100 points for each target.

While the course already requires that applicants be qualified as "expert" with the M-16, Boucher says a number of students regularly fail this evaluation shoot.

Boucher says students must start the course as competent shooters because training quickly progresses to advanced marksmanship and fieldcraft. Sixty percent of the instruction takes place on the firing range, 35 percent in the field, and only five percent in the classroom.

During the course, students must also pass nine critical tests to continue training. Students who fail a test are given one chance to retest, says Boucher.

The course is open to active and reserve Special Forces, Ranger, and other U.S. Armed Forces Special Operations units. Applicants must be in grades E-4 through E-8, WO1-3, or O-2 through O-4, and have nine months retainability after completion of the course.

Prerequisites for the course are extensive, and include: (1) GT score of at least 110; (2) completion of an MMPI or CPI psychological evaluation report; (3) commander's certification of passing APRT within last six months; (4) air-



borne qualified and on jump-status; (5) no physical profiles; (6) no history of drug or alcohol abuse, and (7) no court-martial during current enlistment. None of these prerequisites are waivable, according to Boucher.

Soldiers interested in the course should submit a DA Form 4187 to their unit training officer. For more information on the course, call Master Sergeant Richard Boucher, AUTOVON 239-3644, commercial 919-396-3644, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-TD-AS-R, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

SOF Staff Officer Course To Be Offered

The Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Special Warfare Center and

School has developed a Special Operations Staff Officer Course, scheduled to begin this month. The new resident course of instruction is designed for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations field-grade officers who are assigned to a SOF unit or staff position and require an expanded knowledge of special operations.

The course will cover special operations missions, organizations, and capabilities. Other subjects will include the national military command and control structure; joint deployment and campaign planning; crisis action management; the national intelligence system; resource management processes, and regional studies. The course will also include a command post exercise designed to apply these skills to a simulated theater crisis.

Course length is currently scheduled for six weeks. While instruction will initially be open only to Army officers, plans are being considered to include selected civilians, and officers from other services in subsequent courses.

For further information on the Special Operations Staff Officer Course, contact Captain Bernard Flaherty at AUTOVON 239-1652/1654, commercial 919-1652/1654, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-DT-IT, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

SF Recruiting Campaign Underway

An Army-wide recruiting campaign for potential Special Forces soldiers is being conducted by a new recruiting team located at the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

The team, from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, has world-wide responsibility for finding potential candidates for the Special Forces Qualification Course, conducted by the Special Warfare Center and School. The team is combining extensive use of Army computer systems with on-site visits to Army installations in their search for qualified soldiers.

"We're using computers to search the Army system for candidates who meet basic requirements for the program," said Major Randel Weikle, commander of the recruiting team. "We'll also be visiting installations throughout the United States and in overseas locations. We're looking for soldiers who are highly motivated, independent and innovative. And there's a strong emphasis

on the program. If a qualified soldier volunteers for Special Forces, he can usually start his training with the next available class."

Applications for Special Forces training are being accepted from enlisted male volunteers for four specialty areas: Weapons Sergeant (18B); Engineer Sergeant (18C); Medical Sergeant (18D), and Communications Sergeant (18E). Personnel in grades E-5 through E-7 who are graduates of the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) can apply for any of the four specialties,



regardless of their current military occupational specialty (MOS). Additionally, Specialists Four who are PLDC graduates, and hold a 91-series MOS, can apply for the Medical Sergeant specialty.

All candidates must be United States citizens, be high school graduates or hold a GED certificate, and have a GT score of at least 110. Volunteers must hold or be able to obtain a secret security clearance, and be airborne-qualified or volunteer for airborne training.

Candidates must also pass a physical readiness test, including a 50-meter swim wearing boots and fatigues, and pass a medical examination.

For more information on the Special Forces recruiting program, call Sergeant First Class Wil Nason, AUTOVON 239-1818/5083, commercial 919-432-1818/5083, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-SP-R, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

SWCS NCO Academy Sets First Class

The Special Warfare Center and School Noncommissioned Officers Academy began instruction February 29, with the pilot class for the Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC).

The newly-formed academy will eventually provide basic and advanced NCO courses for both Special Forces and Psychological Operations soldiers, according to Sergeant Major Henry Bone, commandant of the academy.

"After the pilot course for Special Forces ANCOC, we plan to hold our first basic NCO course (BNCOC) for psychological operations soldiers in June," said Bone. "Later this year, we'll also start instruction for Special Forces BNCOC."

The academy currently has 10 instructors and operations personnel, and will expand later this year to a staff of 22.

The pilot course for Special Forces ANCOC will have 44 students, according to Bone, who were identified by a DA selection board.

The course consists of three phases. The first, lasting four weeks, covers Common Leader Training, which includes advanced leadership techniques, counseling, Air Land Battle doctrine, and infantry tactics. The second phase of the course, lasting three weeks, will cover Special Forces Common Skills, including Special Forces detachment operations, communications, and intelligence gathering. The third phase, which is three weeks long, will divide students into their respective MOS group, and provide advanced training in each of the specialty areas. The course will culminate in a week-long FTX/CPX, which will reinforce and test course instruction.

A feature of the academy's instruction, according to Bone, will be the incorporation of the Small Group Instruction (SGI) concept into all courses.

"Under that concept," said Bone, "which has been in use in most NCO academies and some officer advanced courses for several years, a cadre member will be assigned to a group of about 10 students. Instead of spending his time talking from a platform, the cadre member will act as the group's mentor in planning and executing its own program of instruction. We believe that such an arrangement will allow closer

contact between teacher and student; allow the students more opportunity to show their initiative and abilities, and give the students the benefit of having an experienced cadre member with them at all times to guide them through their training objectives."

Soldiers desiring more information on the Special Warfare Center and School NCO Academy can call Sergeant Major Henry Bone at AUTOVON 236-2944, commercial 919-396-2944, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-NCO-A, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

Former Special Forces Soldiers Being Sought for Reenlistment

Former Special Forces soldiers who have left the Army are being encouraged to reenlist, according to the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA). Personnel who held the rank of specialist four through sergeant first class, and are qualified Special Forces soldiers, are eligible for the program.

Career Management Field 18, Special Operations, has been growing rapidly, particularly since the Army recognized Special Forces as a separate branch last year, according to Sergeant Major Walter Hennix, Professional Development NCO for TAPA's Enlisted Special Forces Branch.

"The creation of the 3rd Special Forces Group and the Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course reflect the growth of, and increasing emphasis on, Special Operations," said Hennix. "We need more trained Special Forces soldiers because of that growth, and one of the best ways to acquire them is to reenlist former Special Forces soldiers."

Currently, Army regulations allow former Special Forces soldiers to return to active duty within 36 months of their separation date without any loss of rank.

Former Special Forces soldiers who may be interested in the program should contact Major Randel Weikle, or Sergeant First Class Wil Nason, at the Special Forces Recruiting Office at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Qualified soldiers may call him at AUTOVON 239-1818, or (collect) commercial at 919-432-1818.

Interested personnel can also write:

Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-SP-R, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

Filmless SOF Camera Under Study By SWCS

Special operations soldiers may soon have a high-tech addition to their intelligence gathering capabilities, according to the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Combat Developments.

An electronic "filmless" camera, currently under study in a joint project with the Army Materiel Command, is expected to give SOF soldiers the ability to take electronic photo images in distant locations—even deep within enemy territory—and transmit them directly to their headquarters for analysis.

The proposed system would be similar in size and weight to a portable video camera, according to Captain John Supplee, Jr., the program's project officer. The camera would be capable of converting a photo image to a digital electronic signal, which is stored on a magnetic disk. The digital image could then be transmitted over standard SOF radio systems, or by telephone.

Acquisition of the camera from "off-the-shelf" commercial sources is expected to meet immediate SOF needs. A concurrent Army research and development program is expected to provide a standardized Army system by 1995.

For more information on the "filmless" camera concept, call Captain John Supplee, AUTOVON 239-7007 or commercial 919-432-7007, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-CD-ML, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.


Advanced SERE Training Offered By SWCS

Soldiers in a high-risk-of-capture category are encouraged to take advantage of the Special Warfare Center and School's Level-C training in Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE). This high-risk category includes Special Forces, Rangers, long-range reconnaissance, aviation, and other selected soldiers.

The course, conducted by the Center and School's SERE and Counter-Terrorism Department, trains soldiers to survive isolation from their own forces and evade capture, or if captured, to resist exploitation and plan an escape.

Training is conducted in three phases. First, soldiers receive classroom instruction on techniques of survival, and resistance to interrogation and exploitation. The second phase is conducted in a field environment, where students undergo practical application of academic instruction. The last part of the course is conducted in the Center and School's Resistance Training Laboratory (RTL), which realistically simulates the harsh environment of a prisoner-of-war compound.

In the RTL, soldiers are subjected to



the grueling mental and physical punishments of captivity. Here, they gain valuable experience in gauging—and expanding—the limits of their endurance, and learn how to resist various techniques of manipulation that a captor might use.

While general SERE training is a unit responsibility in the Army, such intense application of resistance techniques is only provided by the highly-trained SERE instructors of the Special Warfare Center and School.

The course is open to both active and reserve members of the armed forces who have a secret clearance, and meet the eligibility criteria of AR 350-30. Applications for class quotas should be forwarded on DA Form 4187, and sent to TAPA (formerly MILPERCEN) through the unit training officer. For more information on the course, call Major Steven Slade, AUTOVON 239-1603/2021 or commercial 919-396-1603/2021, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN:

ATSU-TD-S, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000.

PSYOP/CA Functional Area Expected Soon

Officers interested in pursuing a career in Psychological Operations or Civil Affairs are expected to have their own functional area soon, according to officials at the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA), formerly the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). The new career program, tentatively designated Functional Area 39, will have areas of concentration for both CA and PSYOP. Propriety for the two fields will continue under the Special Warfare Center and School.

Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs officers were formerly assigned to Special Operations Functional Area 18. With the activation last year of the new Special Forces Branch, which took the designation of Functional Area 18, PSYOP and CA officers were left without their own career track. The new program will provide these officers with a formalized career program designed to significantly enhance PSYOP and CA assignment, promotion and command-position management.

While the training and professional development program for Functional Area 39 is still under development at the Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Propriety Office, proposals for the program include language training, in-depth regional studies and increased opportunities for graduate schooling. Work on the program is expected to be completed this month and is scheduled to be included in Update 12 of DA PAM 600-3.

Officers wanting more information about the new program should call Major Robert Adolph, USAJFKSWCS Special Operations Propriety Office, AUTOVON 239-9002/5559, commercial 919-432-9002/5559, or write: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-SP, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000. Officers may also call Captain Gary Harter, PSYOP and CA Assignments Manager, TAPA, AUTOVON 221-3122/3119, commercial 703-325-3122/3119.



Book Reviews

Special Warfare

The terrorist classic

Manual of The Urban Guerrilla



The most widely
read and translated
terrorist book in
modern history

by Carlos Marighella

The Terrorist Classic: Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. By Carlos Marighella. *Introduction, translation, and bibliography* by Gene Hanrahan. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1985. ISBN 0-89712-204-6. 110 pages. \$19.95.

Carlos Marighella died in a police ambush on the streets of Sao Paulo, Brazil on November 29, 1969, less than a week short of his fifty-ninth birthday. A notorious communist terrorist leader and theoretician, Marighella had just published his masterpiece, *Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Although his violent death signaled the passing of large-scale urban communist terrorism in Brazil, his manual assured his place in the modern international terrorist pantheon alongside such personalities as Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and Che Guevara. Translated into dozens of languages and circulated in scores of countries, Marighella's manual has become a significant force shaping the doctrines and tactics of virtually every major contemporary terrorist organization.

Although there have been innumerable translations of varying quality of the Marighella manual, Gene Z. Hanrahan's *The Terrorist Classic: Manual of the*

Urban Guerrilla is the best treatment of the subject to date. While Hanrahan's translation has errors, such as presenting only six of "The Seven Sins of the Urban Guerrilla" (Hanrahan omits the second, concerning the boasting about actions the guerrilla has completed), the overall flow is smooth and very readable. Adding to clarity and understanding, Hanrahan has included with his translation of the manual a 21-page essay about the life and beliefs of Marighella and a six-page Marighella bibliography.

Hanrahan's book is worthwhile reading for any intelligence or special operations soldier with an interest in how "hard-core" terrorists think, organize, and act in an urban environment. While the book is in essence a case study of Marighella the dogmatic communist extremist, it is also an exposé of basic terrorist doctrine and tactics. For the new student of terrorism counteraction, it is an excellent primer on urban guerrilla strategy (including Marighella's version of the Principles of War), logistics, finance, tactics, intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP), and many other facets of urban insurgency.

For those with a more generalized interest in terrorism, Hanrahan's book is above all a warning. It shows the level to which terrorist operational art can be raised by a single, intelligent monomaniac with a mission. Although Marighella had only limited technical understanding of military operations (his manual reflects such basic errors in unconventional warfare strategy as the beliefs that a successful insurgency can develop in the cities before it develops in the countryside and that the guerrilla cells should initiate their own actions without superior command and control), his work is impressive in its breadth and depth: Marighella's attention to detail includes exhortations that the urban guerrilla should take every chance to practice shooting, even using amusement park arcades; recommendations for the use of "black" and "gray"

psychological operations and deception; and advice that horse-mounted police are vulnerable to ropes strung across narrow streets and marbles strewn on the roadway. Marighella's manual is testimony that refinements in modern terrorism are limited only by the imaginations of the terrorists and their dedication to their beliefs.

CPT William H. Burgess III
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

The following reviews were written by Mr. Fred Fuller, reference librarian for the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Library.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION

Why It Failed



By Paul B. Ryan

The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed. By Paul B. Ryan. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985. ISBN 0-87021-321-0. 185 pages. \$13.95.

The collapse of Operation Eagle Claw in the Iranian desert on April 24, 1980, resulted in the death of eight U.S. servicemen and the loss of several of the aircraft involved. As a result, the

hostages were moved, criticism was heaped on the Carter administration from at home and abroad, and the capabilities of the U.S. armed forces to execute such a mission were questioned.

Paul B. Ryan, a retired U.S. Navy captain, brings together a great deal of information on the planning, execution and aftermath of the mission. This capable and well-known author succeeds in presenting a well-documented (from open sources), fair-minded summary of the events culminating in Desert One. No attempt is made to place blame beyond that which appeared in the unclassified version of the Holloway Report. The report was prepared by the group appointed by General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review the mission.


The book opens with a summary of the events leading up to the mission. In discussing the planning and preparation for the raid, the author points out the obsessive concern with secrecy and compartmentation which resulted in the lack of a full-scale rehearsal, imposed radio silence while the mission was underway, and caused confusion about command responsibility on the part of some of the participants. His account of the launch of the raid and the arrival at Desert One culminates with a detailed description of the fiery collision that caused the site to be abandoned, leaving some helicopters (with classified documents aboard) intact. He concludes with a discussion of the aftermath of the raid and the renewed emphasis on special operations that resulted.

The standard of comparison for books regarding special operations is Benjamin F. Schemmer's *The Raid*, which covers a 1970 mission to rescue American PWs in North Vietnam. Ryan's book comes up somewhat short of this standard and could have been improved with more attention to detail. Despite this relatively minor criticism the book is quite readable and a good study of the subject.

SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-46. By M.R.D. Foot. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1986. ISBN 0-89093-673-0. 280 pages. \$24.00.

SOE was a small, short-lived British secret service with an impact far greater than its size. Foot's most recent work tells its story admirably. Michael R.D. Foot has a reputation as the "historian

of the Resistance." Commissioned by the British Foreign Office to prepare an official history of SOE's activities in France (*SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-44*), his other works include *M19: Escape and Evasion, 1939-45; Resistance*; and *Six Faces of Courage*. Though not a member of SOE, Foot served with the Special Air Service in Brittany during the war. He taught politics and history at Oxford, and for six years was professor of modern history at Manchester.



As many of his works indicate, Foot has long been interested in the unconventional aspects of the war in Europe. SOE provides a brief but by no means shallow introduction to the organization and work of this small British secret service. The first few chapters are devoted to explaining what SOE was, how it came about, who ran it, who worked in it and what they did. Only after this background is given does the author progress to the actual work of SOE. Subsequent chapters cover SOE's activities in various countries and evaluate the organization's effectiveness.

Released in conjunction with the excellent BBC series on SOE, this small book is an outstanding achievement by a capable historian. It provides an objective evaluation of SOE's accomplishments by an individual with the training of a historian, and military experience to appreciate and fully understand his sub-


ject. It serves as an excellent primer for anyone embarking on a study of the "shadow war," and those familiar with the history of SOE will find it very useful as a reference.

From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces. By Aaron Bank. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986. ISBN 0-89141-271-9. 216 pages. \$16.95.

One of the best-known figures in Special Forces history, Colonel Aaron Bank was literally present at the creation of the U.S. Army's unconventional warfare capability. Not only did he serve as the commander of the Army's first Special Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group, he was heavily involved in the planning and preparation for activation of the Army's Special Forces program. He is rightly considered the "father of Special Forces."

Bank's credentials for this role are impressive. Volunteering for duty in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) early in World War II, he was trained for behind-the-lines missions as a member of the famed Jedburgh teams. His unconventional warfare training and experience in Europe prepared him well for later missions in Indochina before the war's end. Early in 1951 he was called to Washington from Korean combat duty to work in the Special Operations Division of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). Under the able command of BG Robert McClure, Bank worked with other veterans of guerrilla warfare in laying the groundwork for Special Forces. He served as 10th Group's commander from its activation on June 19, 1952, until he rotated to a Seventh Army staff position in late 1954.

Bank's book will provide instructive reading for anyone interested in Special Forces. His background and experience qualify him as the most credible living spokesman regarding the concept and origin of Special Forces. Those involved in planning for today's special operations forces would do well to study Bank's description of the planning which took place from 1951 until the formation of Special Forces in the summer of 1952. The handful of unconventional warfare veterans at OCPW's Special Operations Division wrestled with a number of issues in establishing the organizational structure, command and control, mission and personnel requirements for Special



FROM OSS TO GREEN BERETS

The
Birth of
Special Forces

AARON BANK
Col. USA (Ret.)

Forces. Bank's discussion of such controversies as the differences in organization and missions between Rangers and Special Forces, the Army's role in unconventional warfare in relation to the other services and the CIA, and the basic structure and function of Special Forces helps clarify many often-asked questions—most of which were first answered 35 years ago.

The case which Colonel Bank makes for recognition of the role of OSS as a predecessor of Special Forces is also well stated. The official lineage of Special Forces credits the First Special Service Force and the World War II Ranger battalions, but these organizations differed significantly in structure and mission from Special Forces.

It is an unfortunate fact that Special Forces units have not been more careful in keeping track of their history. Restrictions imposed by security considerations bear some responsibility for this, along with some misinformation perpetrated by the media. Bank's book is a valuable contribution, and does much to set the record straight.

Special Operations In U.S. Strategy.

Edited by Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz.
Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1984. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 20402. Order Number: SN 008-020-01011-1. 326 pages. \$4.25.

This book is a compilation of the information presented and discussed at a two-day seminar held in Washington, D.C., March 4-5, 1983. The seminar, entitled "The Role of Special Operations in U.S. Strategy for the 1980's," was sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center, the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and the National Defense University. Its stated purpose was twofold: to determine roles for special operations as a complement to "conventional" defense capability, and to examine the means by which special operations could be established as a critical element of national security policy.

Many of the leading figures in the area of special operations as well as professionals from government, academia, and the media participated in discussions. Readers of this book are forewarned, however, that seminar participants made no attempts during these discussions to reach a consensus. This lack of a consensus in no way detracts from the value of the book. Participants were in general agreement on many issues, though they had different opinions on how to reach stated objectives. The papers presented and subsequent discussions reflect the ongoing controversies regarding the development, roles, and employment of special operations forces.

The book outlines discussions on such basic issues as the proper definition of special operations; the development and

use of special operations capabilities in regard to current threat to U.S. interests; the limitations to the use of force imposed by American moral, legal, political, and cultural restraints; and the proper place of special operations within existing civil and military structures. Also included is a reasonably detailed discussion of the Soviet approach to special operations.

This small book is an excellent summary of the complex issues that the policymakers and special operations community face in the development and use of special operations forces. Many of the questions it addresses remain to be answered at the highest levels of the civil and military establishment. This book should be considered "required" reading for anyone concerned with special operations.

United States and Soviet Special Operations. By John M. Collins.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. GPO Stock Number 052-070-06304-1. 174 pages. \$5.50.

Prepared at the request of the House Armed Services Committee's Special Operations Panel, this document promises to be an important landmark in charting the course of special operations forces (SOF) in the United States. Collins, who is the Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, has prepared a report which will be used by policymakers at the highest levels of government and defense. Released in unclassified form, the report should find wide readership among military professionals and interested civilians as well.

The Collins report provides a lengthy and sometimes surprisingly detailed appraisal of the organization, purposes and capabilities of United States and Soviet special operations. The report was requested in order to compare U.S. and Soviet special operations competence, to isolate U.S. problems relating to special operations, and to establish objective standards for improvement. A number of people in the special operations community assisted and advised the author in the preparation of his report. These included civilians from defense and intelligence organizations, active-duty officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as some members of the Department of Defense Special Opera-

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS
IN US STRATEGY**

Edited by


Frank R. Barnett B. Hugh Tovar Richard H. Shultz

National Defense University Press
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

tions Advisory Group (SOPAG).

The author pulls very few punches. Stating that "virtually every U.S. macro command/control, planning and SOF force posture problem derives mainly from misunderstandings," he explains how these arise and suggests possible corrections.

The author's points are well made. Collins points out that only a relative handful of individuals in government or in the military establishment fully



appreciate special operations threats, capabilities, limitations and relationships with the rest of the nation's security apparatus. He identifies problems which exist in command and control, planning, budgeting, programming and employment of U.S. special operations. In suggesting changes, Collins readily admits that the "best" way to improve U.S. special operations posture is a subjective matter. He identifies several important starting points, including the strengthening of command and control (beyond changes caused by recent amendments to Title 10, U.S. Code), increasing the level of understanding regarding special operations among top civilian and military leaders. He also recommends strengthening special operations forces through emphasis on stringent personnel standards, superlative training, providing needed resources, and properly deploying forces.

Taken as a whole, the Collins report serves as an excellent introduction to special operations forces—what they are, what they do and how they differ from conventional forces. Three annexes, a glossary and extensive source notes add to the document's usefulness. The text is well written, and a number of charts, diagrams and maps are included.

Copies of the Collins report are available from the Superintendent of Documents, and Pergamon Press is publishing it commercially under the title *Green Berets, Seals and Spetsnaz: U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations*.


Green Berets At War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975. By *Shelby L. Stanton*. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1985. ISBN 0-89141-238-7. 360 pages. \$18.95.

In the 35 years since the beginning of Special Forces, a great deal of material has appeared in print about this unique military force. This material has ranged from comic books to doctoral dissertations. All too much of it has been shallow, inaccurate, uninformed or downright untruthful. In recent years, this situation has begun to change for the better. The most commendable example of that change is this book by Shelby Stanton.

The quality of research and writing exhibited in Stanton's earlier works (*Rise and Fall of An American Army, Vietnam Order of Battle*, etc.) is continued here. A former Special Forces officer and recon team commander in Laos, and now a full-time military historian, Stanton is well-qualified through experience and education to speak with authority on his chosen subject.

This book has been carefully researched and extensively documented. It's 15 chapters cover early assignments in Indochina, including Operation Switchback, frontier security, special reconnaissance projects, mobile guerrilla forces and more.

The notes which conclude each chapter cite the author's sources or provide further detail to the text, and are extremely helpful. The material included at the back of the book will make it a valuable reference for years to come. There is a detailed index, and there are several pages of detailed maps prepared by the author. Appendices include lists of all SF MIA's and Medal of Honor



recipients. To top it off, the text is so well written that the book is a pleasure to read.

Obviously, many of the stories about Special Forces in the war in Southeast Asia will never be told because of security considerations. Even if it all could be told, a single volume would be inadequate to contain them. These facts notwithstanding, Stanton's book establishes itself as the definitive work on the role of Special Forces in Southeast Asia. It is wider in scope and more detailed than Francis J. Kelly's *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*, though Kelly's book is still useful.

I have only one criticism, and that will probably be considered minor. The one fault I find with the book is its title, and I'm not sure that was the author's doing. Despite Barry Sadler songs, John Wayne movies and decades of misuse, a "green beret" is still a hat, not a soldier.



Book reviews from readers are welcome, and should address subjects of interest to special operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced, typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably AUTOVON), and your mailing address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28307-5000.



Two instructors from the Special Warfare Center and School's Combat Diver Course exit the water on a beach at Key West, Florida. The course, conducted by the Center's Underwater Operations Branch in Key West, teaches long-range underwater operations, scout-swimming techniques, and other Special Forces diving skills. (Photo by Phil Howell)