

Toothless DIVARTYs Struggle to Meet Requirements of LSCO

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Over the past decade, the United States Army transitioned its focus from Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations (COIN) and the BCT as the tactical headquarters to Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and the division as the tactical headquarters. However, our DOTMLPF-P, specifically related to fires and Division Artillery (DIVARTY), has not maintained tempo.

Division Commanders and our doctrine require DIVARTYs to provide the fires across the division's area of operations (AO) without the tools to do so. The First Infantry Division's (1ID) execution of NTC Rotation 25-03 highlights the requirement for the division to have the necessary combat power and fire assets to effectively fight across their entire battlefield framework, including the transition zone that merges the division's deep to the division close areas. The DIVARTY must be either organically assigned or task-organized, with at least six fires battalions (BN) (three cannon, two rocket variants, one long-range cannon), one ADA BN to protect the division's Protection Prioritized List, and an increase to the S4 MTOE to support the fires requirements of the division. More importantly, the DIVARTY must have the equipment, personnel, and training to effectively plan the employment of capabilities, process the increased number of fire missions expected in LSCO, and support a large formation.



The IID DIVARTY: Garrison and NTC

25-03

ATP 3-09.90, Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division is the Army's doctrine specific DIVARTYs. However, it requires updates to account for FM 3-0 changes made in 2022. ATP 3-09.90 states:

The DIVARTY is a brigade-level command that plans, prepares, executes, and assesses fires for the division; integrated fires support the division commander's scheme of maneuver (Deliver Fires; Strike; Counterfire; Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses; Deep Fight; Close Support Fires). The DIVARTY is not allocated organic firing units but is task-organized with additional units based on mission requirements. Task organization may include a combination of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), or cannon battalions, as well as other enablers. The DIVARTY, when allocated MLRS or HIMARS units, brings a long-range and precision fire support capability to the division.[1]

Currently, 1st Infantry Division Artillery (DRUMFIRE) is organized with a Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, the Division Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, and two Paladin Battalions (task organized from the ABCTs to DIVARTY, pending official Army Structure changes). During NTC 25-03, TF Danger's DIVARTY consisted of three cannon battalions and two rocket battalions including 1-7 FA (155, SP) and 1-9 FA (155, SP), 1-14 FA (HIMARS), 2-4 FA (MLRS)-replicating a 3x9 construct with the battalion headquarters and one battery at Fort Irwin, California, and the 431st Pirtuni BDE 2S19 battalion.[2] Separately, 6-56 ADA (MSHORAD) provided direct support protection to the Division. TF Drumfire did not have any additional sustainment support task organized. The TF had enough firepower to support the operation, only having two maneuver brigades. However, the requisite knowledge to best employ the different assets, specifically the rocket formations, is not organically resident within the formation.

The DIVARTY relied on SMEs from the task-organized units to support Division and Brigade level planning. Leaders from 2-4 FA worked alongside IID DIVARTY and Division planners to best utilize their sustainment and operational capabilities to employ their assets best and ensure their survivability.

Operating at NTC 25-03

During the planning process for NTC 25-03, the Division task organized all artillery assets to DIVARTY and used support relationships to provide fires to maneuver commanders across the Division's AO. 1-7 FA provided direct support to 2/1 ABCT; the DIVARTY supported TF Longknife (5-4 CAV/2/1 ABCT) a reconnaissance and security element task organized to the Division conducting a guard, with a quick fires net to 1-9 FA. This task organization allowed the Division and DIVARTY to shape the deep fight with rocket fires while delegating the Division close to cannon BNs and the maneuver elements they supported. Despite four battalions of fire assets, the volume of fires made it difficult to weigh the main effort and shape the Division deep, transition zone, and close fight while conducting counterfire and SEAD missions.



[1] ATP 3-09.90: Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division, October 2017 (pgs vii, 1-1, 1-2)

[2] The 431st Pirtuni Brigade was TACON to IID and included a 2S19 BN. Due to the 431st's task organization, the DIVARTY did not establish a command or support relationship with the 2S19, and BN provided direct support fires to the 431st BDE.

Throughout the rotation, IID DIVARTY processed approximately 970 fire missions from the GS Paladin BN, MLRS BN, and HIMARS BN, not including hundreds of missions processed by 1-7 FA in a direct support role to 2/1 ABCT or the quick-fire net between 1-9 FA and 5-4 CAV. Additionally, the 431st Pirtuni BDE had a 2S19 BN in direct support and never requested additional fire support from IID. BDA estimates show Drumfire successfully shaped the enemy in the deep and close to set conditions for the BDE. Fire mission processing time for dynamic targeting and counterfire was reduced from approximately 20 minutes to 5-10 minutes. While IID DIVARTY had a successful rotation, artificialities and false positives must be addressed.



Artificialities and False Positives

The 431st Pirtuni BDE, with direct support 2S19s, was the only maneuver formation live in "The Box", with the remainder of the maneuver formations replicated in a constructive environment from Fort Riley. TF Longknife's quick-fire net operated via Upper Tactical Internet (U/TI) chat by pucksters and provided quick, responsive fires within seconds to minutes. U/TI may be a part of the PACE plan, but quick-fire nets would be over FM or HF greatly increasing fire mission processing time. The live kill chain provided fires in five to fifteen minutes, which is not timely enough.

Additionally, had all BDEs and counterfire radars been in the dirt, the establishment of a fires architecture would have been further complicated by the limited availability of U/TI, number of radio systems, and retransmission teams available to the BDEs and Division.

Another misleading statistic is the low level of attrition sustained by the Division's counterfire radars and delivery systems. The HIMARS BN executed hundreds of missions, never moved, and received zero attrition. At change of mission, IID DIVARTY's combat power was 5/6 Q-53s, 6/36 Paladins, 16/16 HIMARS, and 22/27 MLRS, representing an unrealistically high survivability rate. The low attrition of Q-53s and rocket systems resulted in almost zero degradation to counterfire operations and targeting operations. Enemy forces will target relatively static and easily detectable counterfire radar systems, leading to greater attrition.



The final artificiality of the Division in the Dirt rotation was the lack of a requirement to physically sustain the four fire battalions and one ADA battalion across the depth and breadth of the AO. LSCO requires the firing units to conduct frequent survivability moves to prevent enemy targeting and large amounts of ammunition to support the number of fire missions. The simulation allowed for quick resupply of CLIII and CLV to the firing units. DIVARTY does not have sustainment assets to support the required resupply operations. To remedy this sustainment challenge, the DIVARTY must add another Captain, Maintenance Warrant Officer, and Ammunition Warrant Officer to the MTOE.[3]

More over, divisions need to maximize ESC (Corps) throughput of CL V to FA BNs, utilize the BSBs of the BCTs when FA BN command support relationships change to direct support, and FA BN FSCs need to utilize supply points instead of unit distribution.

Recommendations by DOTMLPF-P to Support LSCO

As the Army continues its paradigm shift to preparing for LSCO, so must the DIVARTY. IID DIVARTY’s lessons learned during NTC 25-03 identified several recommended changes to the Army’s DOTMLPF-P.

Doctrine

While FM 3-09 was updated last year, the more detailed DIVARTY specific, ATP 3-09.90, has not been updated in eight years and needs updating to keep pace with changing requirements to support division operations.

Organization

DIVARTYs need to be organized through the organic assignment or task organization of six FA BNs to support the division fight across its battlefield framework.

This task organization should include three cannon battalions to support maneuver in the division close, one long-range cannon battalion (or similar future capability), a HIMARS battalion, and an MLRS battalion. Additionally, the DIVARTY must be organized with additional sustainment assets. The DIVARTY must have another Captain, a Maintenance Warrant Officer, and an Ammunition Warrant Officer added to the MTOE to support the larger CLI, III, and V requirements of LSCO.

Training

As DIVARTYs across the Army execute operations with rocket formations more often, they require more rocket subject matter experts in their formation. Assigning organic rocket BNs to the DIVARTY instead of being task-organized before mission execution will remedy this issue.

SUSTAINMENT OFFICER	O4	90A00 (1)
ASSISTANT S4	O3	90A00 (1)
SR SUPPLY SGT	E8	92Y5O (1)
AMMO SUPPLY SGT	E6	89B3O (1)
SUPPLY NCO	E5	92Y2O (2)

11D DIVARTY deployed to NTC 25-03 with (1) O4, (2) O2s, (1) E7, and (1) E8, who was a liaison at the Rear Command Post.

Materiel

Increasing the number of firing battalions in the DIVARTY requires a transition to a software/application-based system to proliferate the ability to process fire missions, mitigate potential choke points in the kill-chain, specifically in the DIVARTY Fire Control Element, and enable counterfire capabilities during TAC/TOC jumps. The AN/TPQ-53 communications PACE requires a U/TI option to communicate over distance and not be degraded by terrain.

[3] IID DIVARTY MTOE, dated 16OCT24

Leadership and Education

Adjusting the Program of Instruction at the FA Basic Officer Leaders Course and FA Captains Career Course to include more training on Rocket system employment will benefit the individual and the organizations to which they move following the training. Adding a day of academics from MCTP during Warfighter and NTC training progressions would also be beneficial.



Lessons from Division in the Dirt: Scaling Fires for LSCO

The Big Red One's Division in the Dirt rotation informed many lessons observed for the IID DIVARTY. Mainly to prepare for LSCO, the Army must increase the fire formations allocated to the tactical echelon and adjust numerous DOTMLPF-P facets to be best postured to execute and win the Nation's wars against peer/near-peer threats of the 21st Century.

Author Biographies

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