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
# **MISSION COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM**

## **Key Observations**



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## Foreword

The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) is the U.S. Army's premier deployable combat training center that is Chief of Staff of the Army directed. It is scheduled by U.S. Army Forces Command through the semi-annual Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference and resourced by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). It is Guided by TRADOC Regulation 350-50-3. Team MCTP consists of four operations groups focused on corps, divisions, and special operations forces training audiences as well as a MCTP staff including exercise control that enables coverage and execution for up to five 10-day Warfighter exercises (WFXs) per fiscal year. The team of teams within MCTP does this by providing doctrinally sound, professional observer/controller, trainers and providing the most rigorous constructive training environment possible framed through the lens of the training units and Army senior leader-approved training objectives. WFXs are professionally rigorous leader development experiences to drive further change and education on warfighting doctrine while enhancing unit readiness.

At the beginning of fiscal year 2024, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) (theater armies) to be the higher commands for corps-level WFXs. The two fiscal year 2024 repetitions were: U.S. Army Europe-Africa as the higher command for V Corps in Warfighter Exercise 24-3 which was further linked to European Command's Austere Challenge 24 in March 2024 and U.S. Army Pacific Command as higher command for XVIII Airborne Corps Warfighter Exercise 24-5 in August 2024. The scope and rigor provided to V and XVIII Airborne Corps with ASCC/theater armies as their higher command is a "sustain" practice to provide the most rigorous combat training center experience in the constructive training environment to facilitate collective training and leader development experiences for commanders and their staffs to plan, prepare, fight, and win in large-scale combat operations.

This publication captures the MCTP observations and learning from the four fiscal year 2024 Warfighter exercises focused on large-scale combat operations. The first chapter captures the MCTP overall observations with six additional chapters that cover observations of the six warfighting functions.

Driving Change and Forging Victory through enabling professional warfighting!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K. Foster'.

Kirk R. Foster  
CSM, U.S. Army

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R. Ikena Jr.'.

Richard J. Ikena Jr.  
Colonel, Field Artillery  
Commanding

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## Chapter 1

### Mission Command Training Program Top Overall Observations

#### **Key Observation 1. Managing Fights from Theater Army to Division Level**

**Observation.** Army headquarters from theater army to division level are successful when they establish a complete operational framework, define fights at echelon, and allocate resources and authorities through command-support relationships.


**Discussion.** The operational framework continues to be one of the lead areas that challenges unit success in warfighting. It is the foundation for effective tactics and provides the entire force a way to geographically understand roles and responsibilities, authorities, and priorities for resources and support in the current fight. At the most rudimentary level, units must establish a deep, close, and rear area, as well as assign areas of operations, zones, or sectors for subordinate commands. These areas should be defined by the problems that need to be solved in each area (e.g., enemy formations) and assessed daily as environmental conditions change.

Once geographic areas are defined, the command can then define the fights and priorities for its subordinate units. Clearly articulating the responsibilities and priorities for support at each echelon operating within the areas assigned by the higher headquarters is critical. The higher headquarters should designate objectives, analyze the force ratios for each objective, and establish a sort of contract with its subordinate commands to detail the conditions required for success and to detail which headquarters is responsible for achieving each condition. These conditions should be established across all warfighting functions (WFFs) and include required enemy strength and friendly combat power required to achieve the tasks.

Commands establish priorities by defining main and supporting efforts and then resource those priorities through task organization, command and support relationships, and employment of key enablers (e.g., intelligence collection, fires, aviation, etc.). Once the contract is established with enemy and friendly conditions necessary for success, it is then incumbent upon the higher and subordinate units to aggressively manage it and monitor those conditions and make decisive adjustments desired effects are not achieved.

**Recommendation(s).** Headquarters at all echelons need to prioritize, clearly articulate the operational framework and define and resource its fights. This starts in planning, informed by mission analysis, and finalized in course of action development and analysis. In execution, it is essential that units continuously monitor conditions and adjust the framework as required. The staff can enable success by monitoring the commander's dialogue about the framework and by displaying it graphically using digital mission command systems. Subordinate commands ensure their operational framework is nested with higher headquarters' framework.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022 provides an operational framework that helps headquarters better organize forces in terms of time, space, and purpose. Units should review this doctrine and determine how to incorporate the key ideas into their planning processes and products. TC 6-0.4, *Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function for Corps and Divisions*, 10 April 2019 does not explicitly incorporate the operational framework into the training methodology. However, leaders should emphasize establishing, assessing, and adjusting the operational framework while executing staff and digital crew training tables.





**Key Observation 2. Fully Integrate the Protection and Sustainment Functions into the Operations Process to Empower the Close and Deep Fight**

**Observation.** Units that fail to effectively integrate and synchronize the protection and sustainment WFFs efforts struggle to maintain tempo and extend operational reach and freedom of maneuver. This increases risk to the force and risk to the conclusion.

**Discussion.** Sustainment and protection functions are often poorly integrated into deliberate and crisis action planning. Staffs' attention on maneuver and fires assumes that sustainment and protection planners adapt available resources to the completed plan. Consequently, we often see sustainment and protection planning horizons collapse to respond to unanticipated requirements, desynchronizing the scheme of sustainment and protection from the maneuver plan. Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities of sustainers and protectors across the main command post and rear command post is often poorly defined, adding friction to integration and synchronization efforts.

**Recommendation(s).** Sustainment and protection planners must have clearly defined roles and meaningful representation in the G-5 and G-3/5 enterprises and across all planning horizons to communicate capabilities and a feasible course of action that sustains the force and reduces risk to the mission and force.

Unit planning standard operating procedures, including the battle rhythms, must be established to include defined roles, inputs, and outputs for the sustainment and protection WFFs to integrate into the unit's planning process from mission analysis through orders production.

**Doctrinal References**

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 4-0 *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

### **Key Observation 3. Decision Dominance**

**Observation.** The achievement of decision dominance relates to the staff's ability to anticipate decisions, plan branches and sequels, and translate the overwhelming amount of accessible data into pertinent assessments linked to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Combining that ability with visual tools, the staff enables commanders and their formations, to understand, decide, and act faster and more effectively than the threat.

**Discussion.** Staffs struggle to support the commander's pursuit of decision dominance. Decision dominance is relative to the threat, and belligerents possess increasing information capabilities to generate decisions and gain the operational initiative. However, leveraging multidomain advantages remains difficult due to numerous gaps throughout the decision-making process.

Gaps include:

- Unclear responsibilities between integrating cells due to decisions spanning across the planning horizons
- Under-developed branch plans
- Insufficient use of CCIR to simplify the information collection, analysis, and decision making
- Assessments process remains ill-defined, and lacks focus on decisions
- Visualization challenges exist due to overwhelming running estimates and common operational pictures, all with data and complexity
- Insufficient use of decision support tools when presenting decisions (plans updates or ad hoc current operations integration cell briefings)

#### **Recommendation(s).**

- Develop decisions during course of action analysis by considering the broad range of enemy actions using the event template.
- Add transition points to the decision support matrix for phases or critical events.
- Categorize decisions by echelon and integrating cells to delineate responsibility and understanding.
- Focus staff members on CCIR with continuous development, refinement, and assessment.
- Apply the priority intelligence requirement model to developing broad friendly force information requirements supported by precise indicators to keep focus on staff running estimates and assessments.
- Develop something such as "decision point cards" to enable a detailed review of status of pertinent CCIR and associated indicators.
- Develop and refine integrated branch plans using touchpoints like the plans working group.
- Focus the staff on CCIR and continuous development and refinement for driving reporting and assessments.



- Tailor to CCIR to improve visualization for common operational pictures and running estimates.
- Assign a conductor for the common operational pictures.
- Establish a standard operating procedure for presenting decisions to the commander, codified in meeting instruction format.




Figure 1-2. Decision Agility, "A Way"

### Doctrinal References

- ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 1 March 2019
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022


## Key Observation 4. Operational Risk

**Observation.** Senior leaders must be invested in operational risk management. The identification of risk by the staff, execution of risk assessments, and description of residual risk to the commander must support decision making.

**Discussion.** The protection WFF provides the commander with risk management and technical risk expertise. The protection chief plays a critical role in this process, as the chief must be able to articulate protection priorities and residual risk to senior leaders. To achieve this, the protection chief must have a deep understanding of the integrated risk across all WFFs and the potential mitigations. This deep understanding allows the protection chief to articulate risk to decision makers which ensures protection efforts are integrated into the overall decision-making process.

Senior leaders play an integral role in enforcing the integration of protection efforts by actively participating in the risk identification and mitigation process. This can be achieved through clear and thorough protection guidance to all WFFs during the planning and execution phases, and by prioritizing the integration of risk management across the staff. Senior leader investment across the protection enterprise ensures risks are identified and mitigated across the operational framework.

**Recommendation(s).** Senior leaders must be invested in the protection efforts and the risk management process. The commanding general and deputy commanding generals should drive an understanding of risk and the importance of the staff in risk identification. This ensures the staff focuses on detailed risk identification within the integrating cells, and that risk decisions are integrated into a decision board.



The protection chief must be in a location that is equitable with other WFF leads so they can directly articulate risk to the commander and receive risk decisions. The protection chief must understand the integrated risks across all WFFs and their potential mitigations, clearly articulating the risk to decision makers. Senior leaders must enforce integration of protection efforts while actively participating to provide guidance to the protection cell and the staff.

**Figure 1-3. Applied Risk Management, “A Way”**

RISK MANAGEMENT				
	STEPS OF RISK MANAGEMENT	OWNER	INTEGRATING FUNCTION	SENIOR LEADER INFLUENCE
Assessment	1. Identify the Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MSC</li> <li>Protection Cell</li> <li>G5 / G35</li> </ul>	MDMP / OPTs	CG / DCG Guidance
	2. Assess the Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MSC</li> <li>Protection Cell</li> </ul>	Protection Working Group	DCG
Management	3. Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protection Cell</li> </ul>	Decision Boards	CG / DCG Led
	4. Implement Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MSC</li> <li>Protection Cell</li> </ul>	Orders Publication	
	5. Supervise and Evaluate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MSC</li> <li>Protection Cell</li> <li>G5 / G35</li> </ul>	Assessment Working Group	DCG

Figure 1-4. Steps of Risk Management

Effectiveness ↑	Decision	Method	Means	WfF	Effectiveness ↑
	Avoid	Forego the activity	Modify plans	Intel / M2	
	Eliminate	Remove or transfer risk	Targeting; Task Org	Intel / Fires	
	Mitigate	Decrease probability of harm	PPL, Task Org	Prot / M2	
	Accept	Act without modification	CDR Decision	C2	

Figure 1-5. Risk Management Considerations

### Doctrinal References

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*, 9 November 2021
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

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## Chapter 2

### Intelligence Warfighting Function

#### Introduction

**K**ey observations within the Intelligence warfighting function highlight occasions to enhance proficiency and efficiency levels within organizations. Synchronizing and coordinating information and processes and delivering relevant information in a timely manner is challenging and complex. Leaders and stakeholders invest in organizations with purpose and determination, seeking to achieve stated objectives and accomplish missions. Leaders seek ways to gain efficiency and improve performance in collective tasks. Intelligence professionals can examine observations and trends to identify opportunities for corps and division G-2s to guide manning, training, and operational decisions.

Shared understanding is achieved through diligent planning, leader engagement, and situational awareness. Deliberate planning and making decisions related to personnel, processes, and architecture enhances synchronization and coordination across the organization.

Integrating two or more organizations to perform similar and integrated roles and functions introduces a complexity that necessitates leadership to ensure synchronicity throughout many processes in expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB) integration.


Effective information collection relies on planning, coordinating with internal and external stakeholders, and synchronizing with maneuver and fires plans.

Assessments are a key function within corps and divisions. The intelligence section is responsible for battle damage assessments (BDA) of the enemy; however, the assessments process is most effective and informative when it is a comprehensive effort shared across the staff and echelons supported by processes that are codified in appendices and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

The intelligence architecture is critical to mission success and includes personnel and processes as much as the network. The physical layout of the organization; processing, exploiting, analytics, and distribution processes; and the network between systems and domains, data flow, and data storage are all critical elements to the intelligence enterprise. The employment and distribution of the personnel and architecture across multiple command nodes and locations is directly correlated to the overall efficiency of the organization. The following observations provide discussions that incorporate dozens of intelligence-related collective tasks, followed by recommendations to improve proficiency. These are informed through dozens of individual observations that span the intelligence cycle, leadership engagements, and decision making. They highlight that continuous training is integral to the intelligence enterprise.

## Observation 1. Shared Understanding

**Observation.** Corps and divisions lack effective plans and defined processes to achieve shared understanding across the intelligence enterprise.



**Figure 2-1. Cognitive Hierarchy**

**Discussion.** Shared understanding of the enemy is achieved when a G-2 provides an enemy assessment to the commander and subordinate unit G-2s/S-2s concur following deliberate, synchronized, and coordinated processes and discussions throughout the intelligence cycle. Units often struggle to implement processes, workflows, and architecture that enable staffs to develop options, drive planning and operations, and enhance commanders' decision making. Shared understanding is enhanced through effective planning for personnel, processes, and architecture. The current doctrinal framework is limited and needs expansion to help unit G-2s identify critical planning requirements for distributing intelligence capabilities across mission command nodes.

During the planning phases, units are challenged to define roles and responsibilities across multiple command node locations (including talent management), workflows, and architecture which results in inadequate/imbalanced intelligence capabilities or redundancy. Personnel management includes determining sufficient personnel, capabilities, and functions are placed in conjunction with the unit's overall task and purpose of each command node. Current operations that are under resourced typically lack the necessary processes to effectively operate within the current operations integration cell, providing necessary and time-sensitive information to the G-3 which includes managing the common operational picture (COP) and addressing/updating priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). The lack of an established framework within the G-2 can lead to operational failures across the operational environment and missed windows of opportunity to achieve tactical or operational advantages.

**Recommendation(s).** The planning effort requires leaders to be engaged and have consistent touchpoints during the decision-making process. Developing a training plan to address functional roles and responsibilities and synchronizing these efforts ensures proficiency across individual and collective tasks. The G-2/S-2 synchronization meeting is an effective tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) in the battle rhythm to ensure shared understanding. A venue is needed where the senior intelligence officer can lead discussions on the current situation and assessments and ensure all stakeholders are aware of and understand variables across the operational environment. The COP and common intelligence picture (CIP) are visualizations of this collective effort and require constant updates. Develop a process to maintain and visualize timely, relevant, and accurate information to update the staff, support subordinate units and enablers, and provide the commander with options.

Establishing a well-communicated schedule for producing, updating, and disseminating intelligence products (updates, doctrinal and event templates, intelligence summaries, intelligence collection plans, etc.) ensures all contributing units, enablers, and functional teams are synchronized through each step in the intelligence cycle. This further ensures that critical intelligence updates are available before key decision venues (such as targeting meetings, commander's updates, and operational planning sessions). Intelligence staffs should actively participate in cross-functional working groups (fires, maneuver, and targeting). Crosstalk enables shared understanding across the staff, identifies information gaps in a timely manner, and ensures the current intelligence assessments are fully integrated into warfighting function-specific operations.

Knowledge management is a consistent and deliberately planned process. Staffs should maintain current SOPs and battle drills to provide up-to-the-minute assessments and operations. Working groups ensure all stakeholders and organizations understand and effectively synchronize across all warfighting functions. Lastly, integrating noncommissioned officers during the planning process supports effective talent management and ensures training plans align with individual and collective tasks.

### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 2-33.4, *Intelligence Analysis*, 10 January 2020
- FM 3-0 *Operations*, 1 October 2022
- FM 3-55, *Information Collections*, 3 May 2013
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022



**Observation 2. Intelligence Support to Corps and Division Operational Requirements**

**Observation.** Coordinating and integrating two or more organizations to perform an array of roles and functions introduces a complexity that necessitates leadership to ensure synchronicity throughout many processes. This challenging but important effort requires engaged leaders and multiple touchpoints with key decision making throughout the planning process and into the execution phase.

**Discussion.** Effectively integrating an E-MIB, with its organic intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) battalions or general support (GS) military intelligence company (MICO), into corps and division G-2 elements is crucial to the success of the operational mission. Because of the Army's allocation of personnel and assets, and tasked missions and roles, corps and divisions' intelligence requirements cannot be sufficiently addressed without the E-MIB's presence. Therefore, the relationship between the organizations is developed during the competition phase and codified prior to and during the planning phase of specified operations. The same bears true for the relationships between divisions and IEW battalions or GS MICO.

The E-MIB is one of many subordinate commands available and a key enabler for the intelligence warfighting function. The relationship between the two begins with how organizations are aligned within the corps' broader command relationship. One way to visualize this integration effort is to underscore the need to establish Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex C (Operations) before we formalize Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex L (Collection Operations). This simplification captures the need to understand formal, specified, and implied relationships between organizations and assets to perform tasks and functions. Further coordination is codified to understand engagements with external stakeholders (direct authorization). The delineation of roles and responsibilities between the G-2 and E-MIB/IEW battalion/GS MICO commander is critical to effective and efficient processes in support of operations.

**Recommendation(s).** During the planning phase, deliberate conversations are recommended early and often with specific touchpoints between the corps G-2 and E-MIB commander and between the division G-2 and IEW- battalion/GS MICO commander to address how the military intelligence brigade, battalions, and companies are integrated to maximize capabilities and efficiencies. Just as relevant are conversations regarding the physical location of workspaces, line of sight for key personnel, and command locations for the E-MIB/IEW battalion/GS MICO and G-2 leaders. Regardless of the intended process or desired end state, the conversation must occur during planning to ensure personnel and resources are postured to ensure greatest proficiency and efficiency.

**Doctrinal References**

FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023

FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022

FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

### **Observation 3. Intelligence Architecture**

**Observation.** Corps and division G-2 sections lack a defined and flexible architecture plan that encompasses the intelligence cycle and supports specified and implied tasks across multiple command nodes.

**Discussion.** During the planning phases, G-2 sections do not effectively plan for their unit's architecture beyond the primary network requirements for dataflow. The primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan is frequently underdeveloped to establish PACE options involving:

- Multiple classified networks
- Processes and workflows throughout the intelligence and targeting cycles
- Other Army mission command systems (AMCSs)

Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) is the Army's current program of record and sufficiently supports processes throughout the intelligence cycle and transfers data and commands to other AMCSs across multiple classified networks. However, units typically rely on employing the U.S. Army Installation Support Command Cloud Initiative as a solution for data transport, CIP and COP development, and cross-domain solutions. This primary effort does not effectively perform all necessary functions to support intelligence analysts' tasks and processes across the G-2. While the cloud initiative is conducive to correlating and combining intelligence reporting, it is not sufficient as a stand-alone primary option for gathering, analyzing, assessing, and distributing enemy information to support commanders' decisions.

Army Intelligence Data Platform (AIDP) was introduced to Warfighter exercises as the emerging primary intelligence system of record. Corps and division G-2s were introduced to AIDP and integrated its capabilities to varying degrees. Because of the rapid introduction, units had no preexisting SOPs for tactical use of the software, thereby relying on existing common knowledge of processes related to current and legacy program of record, software, and best practices. Single-source functional sections have not developed TTPs to perform key tasks and processes within the AIDP framework. Furthermore, the speed to implement new technologies comes at a detriment in verifying its ability to be interoperative with other AMCSs such as Command Post Commuting Environment (CPCE) and Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).

**Recommendation(s).** An effective architecture plan should be part of the early planning phase and have consistent touchpoints with leaders and key stakeholders. Establishing organizational relationships with the Army service component command and the theater military intelligence brigade assists leaders in navigating the complexities of the architecture. The architecture encompasses personnel, hardware/software, data flow on multiple networks, and TTPs associated with processes and production tasks. Options to retrieve data and information to perform tasks and produce outputs should be incorporated during the military decision-making process (MDMP) and codified in the unit SOP. Integrating AIDP in conjunction with other programs of record and AMCSs should recognize the differences in data management and interactions between the varying software programs. Training each PACE option simultaneously instead of concurrently in sequence of failure may alleviate an interruption of intelligence support to the commander. Using multiple training opportunities to explore TTPs between systems and software is an effective practice to gain proficiency and efficiency with the intelligence

warfighting function. Verify interoperability to transport data and share products and information with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands' systems of command and control. Lastly, establish and codify the PACE plan, reporting mechanisms and formats via the Army orders process to ensure shared understanding and improved data management.

**Doctrinal References**

- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023
- FM 6-02, *Signal Support to Operations*, 19 September 2019

#### **Observation 4. Information Collection**

**Observation.** Information collection plans (ICPs) are rarely refined after initial development to adequately satisfy requirements and synchronize intelligence collection support to targeting and operations. Key elements that lack sufficient oversight and modifications include PIR development and refinement; implementing the intelligence handover line (IHL); updating collection plans across echelons; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assessments; and publishing via fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs).

**Discussion.** Collection managers are vital throughout the intelligence cycle and manage a significant role in the targeting and operations cycles. They ensure sensors, platforms, requirements, and information are coordinated and synchronized to meet information needs in a timely and relevant manner. Units struggle to effectively synchronize and coordinate key intelligence outputs to update the staff and other warfighting functions. Underdeveloped and unrefined PIRs did not reflect changes to the environment across the area of operations as the situation changed. Furthermore, units rarely nested PIRs with commander decision points. The lack of refined and nested requirements resulted in missed collection opportunities, ineffective redundancy, and unsatisfied requirements (all key to informing commanders' decisions). Units struggle to manage the IHLs as an effective coordination line and operational graphic through the operation. Though IHLs are depicted in the initial operations order, they are rarely updated and coordinated through the FRAGORD process. Any lag in managing the graphic control measure highlights desynchronized collection management across echelons which results in gaps in collection and ineffective redundancy in sensor and asset management. Additionally, units rarely publish changes to the ICPs via FRAGORDs. Lastly, ISR assessments across the board were not conducted. ISR assessments ensures the sensors are in the right place and collecting information as expected.

**Recommendation(s).** PIRs drive information collection. The ICP should be continuously refined concurrent with the operational progress. Units should develop and incorporate a battle drill to manage the IHL, ensuring it is published through the FRAGORD process. All changes to the ICP to include updated PIRs, IHLs, and instructions should also be published through FRAGORDs. PIR development and refinement should be a deliberate process, informed by assessments and the decision support matrix, then briefed to the commander for guidance and approval. Lastly, dynamic re-tasking of assets/sensors should have a gain/loss analysis described to commander. The collection management team adjusts and updates the information collection matrix to reflect re-tasked assets.


#### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 2-01, *Collection Management*, 17 August 2021
- FM 3-98, *Reconnaissance and Security Operations*, 1 October 2023
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022



## Observation 5. Assessments

**Observation.** Corps and divisions struggle to produce timely and effective BDAs that refine decisions and operations through collection and targeting operations.



**Figure 2-2. Decide/Detect/Deliver/Assess**

**Discussion.** Developing effective BDAs is difficult and complicated. Units often struggle to formalize and standardize TTPs and formats to efficiently retrieve, process, and report on the enemy's loss of combat strength and capabilities. These efforts are a subset of the unit's overall assessment focus. The BDA process is not sufficiently addressed during MDMP and codified to support the targeting cycle.

Roles and responsibilities are insufficiently defined as teams are assigned ad hoc just prior to the exercise. This results in a lack of understanding and inhibits proficiency. BDA working groups rarely meet, leading to a disconnect between echelons and stakeholders on current enemy strength. Units struggle to accurately assess battle damage often relying on single imagery or full-motion video reports of destroyed equipment. This results in either overestimating battle damage (therefore underestimating enemy strength) or underestimating battle damage (thereby overestimating enemy strength). The lack of an established assessment process results in a gap in understanding the enemy to update plans, operations, and the commander's decisions.

The assessment phase of the decide, detect, deliver, and assess process is critical to informing the sequential air-tasking order (ATO)-based targeting cycles. If assessments are insufficient in

measuring the enemy's strength and capabilities, then a channel is created with situational understanding. The next ATO cycle will begin with a misconstrued enemy picture further exacerbating the operational picture. This effort results in a unit being off their plan based on disrupted operations tempo, expended resources with desynchronized resupply, and a desynchronized operational schedule. The more days a unit operates (maneuver, fires, sustainment, and protection) based on assumptions of the enemy, rather than based on systematic assessments, the greater the channel is between being on or the off plan according to the operational schedule.

**Recommendation(s).** The BDA process should be understood at echelon, codified in orders, with standardized formats and reporting requirements. Formats and processes, including collection and dissemination procedures should be formalized and published. Developing a PACE plan for data backup and collection and dissemination procedures. Assigning BDA within the collection plan is effective in the assessment process. An effectively managed process can alleviate data loss, duplications in effort, and double-counted strikes when working with external enablers. Build trust with regular communication such as a BDA working group. Units should understand how the higher units are performing assessments and sharing/passing information to the enterprise, including the air component and external enablers. Clearly define roles and responsibilities at echelon to prevent gaps and duplication of effort.

Trust the team, discuss differences of opinion, agree on an assessment, then collectively update the situational understanding.

### References

- ATP 3-60.1 *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting*, 5 January 2022 (CAC restricted)
- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 1 October 2023
- FM 3-60 *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023

## Chapter 3

### Command and Control Warfighting Function

#### Introduction

According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022, the primary purpose of the warfighting function of command and control is to assist commanders in integrating the other warfighting functions effectively at each echelon and to apply combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The primary way that division and corps staffs execute command and control is by running a battle rhythm that allows for integration across warfighting functions and by charging the current operations (CUOPS) and future operations (FUOPS) as well as the plans cells to integrate. Staffs also execute command and control by maintaining mission command systems that allow for shared understanding across staff sections and echelons.

The fiscal year 2024 key observations of command and control fall into these three categories: First, we observed best practices and challenges with the common, but non-doctrinal “commander’s visualization meeting.” Also, we have recommendations on how corps and divisions can adjust their battle rhythms to match the rhythm of the battle. Second, we observed challenges with how units managed and transitioned efforts across their integrating cells and integrated special operations forces (SOF) into the staff. Finally, we had two key observations with our mission command systems of opportunities and challenges with innovative cloud computing systems and managing increasing demands for bandwidth. For each of our observations, we offer recommendations on how units can maximize their ability to integrate across warfighting functions and echelons.

## **Observation 1. Commander's Visualization**

**Observation.** Units implemented a commander's visualization meeting into their battle rhythm that is effective at driving the operations process. The commander's visualization meeting, a non-standard battle rhythm event, in all observations facilitated open and candid commander-to-commander dialogue and increased coordination across echelons. Although the engagement's potential value is high, it still requires formalization to increase mission command effectiveness from commanders to their staffs.

The commander's visualization meeting is non-doctrinal and yet a high-payoff component of the operations process. As an event, the Army should define it for clarity. As a component of a process, the Army should describe it within the context of information flows to make commander and staff activities more streamlined.

**Discussion.** The commander's visualization meeting provides the commander "a way" to assess the situation or to provide guidance to subordinate commanders. The commander's visualization meeting is effective at increasing coordination, defining conditions and associated risks, and managing transitions for major subordinate commands. The senior commander, through commander-to-commander dialogue, leverages the information and data provided by staff, often using digital tools to visualize and describe the assessment of the situation on a map with basic graphical intent symbols. This discussion subsequently results in actionable guidance to subordinate commanders. This event is best described as an efficient summary of "commander activities" (understand, visualize, describe, and direct) and execution of driving the operations process.

Yet, the commander's visualization meeting also imposes certain risks to the overall mission command process for a couple of reasons. As an observation, the commander's visualization meeting is typically a "closed" session, involving only commanders or a select number of essential primary staff. This has two observed frictions for synchronized planning. First, any output of the commander's visualization meeting is stifled because of the subsequent requirement to translate guidance to the rest of the staff and subsequently into mission orders. Although intuitive, this does not happen uniformly or effectively. An example, following the commander's visualization meeting the chief of staff or G-3 will provide guidance to the G-3/5 team rather than back brief the whole staff. This is a problem because integrated planning is a consistent observational challenge. This means only the "plans" team is working from updated commander's guidance while the rest of the staff continues from previously issued guidance. Secondly, guidance issued during the commander's visualization meeting is often taken as an approved back briefing during the commander-to-commander dialogue. This tacit approval may be acceptable at the individual subordinate unit level, but at echelon, the lack of a coherent back briefing omits a critical check to ensure the plan is:

- Integrated and synchronized with all supporting concepts of support
- Still meets the commander's intent

A common example of this friction is demonstrated where, following the commander's visualization meeting, guidance issued to the plans team results in development of only a selected number of fighting products (synchronization matrix, decision support matrix, base layer concept of the operation) and most of these products are developed in isolation.





<div>  <div>MISSION COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM WARFIGHTERS!</div> </div> <div>CDR VIS 7-Minute Drill</div>	
Commander's Visualization Meeting	
General Information	Participants
<p><b>Title:</b> Commander's Visualization Meeting</p> <p><b>Purpose:</b> Enable <b>commander-to-commander dialogue</b> to gain a better understanding of the operational environment, refine planning guidance, and make decisions.</p> <p><b>Frequency:</b> <b>Daily, following CUB;</b> unless ad-Hoc called by CoS</p> <p><b>Duration:</b> <b>1 hour</b></p> <p><b>Location:</b> Primary: Plans Bay / Alt: Virtual Medium</p> <p><b>Medium:</b> Primary: Cisco CDR VIS Room / Alt: CPCE</p>	<p><b>Staff Lead:</b> G-3</p> <p><b>Chair:</b> Commanding General</p> <p><b>Members:</b>  <b>(Open Forum)</b> All invited; briefers: CG, Major Subordinate Command CGs, Functional CDRs and Primary Staff by exception (G2, G3, FSCoord)  <b>(Closed Forum)</b> Major Subordinate Commanders; Chief of Staff, G-2, G-3, G4, G6, FSCoord, Protection Chief, G35 recorder</p>
Inputs and Outputs	Agenda
<p><b>Inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated running estimates</li> <li>• Enemy SITTEMP and/or COAs</li> <li>• COP tailored to CCIR</li> <li>• Decision Support Matrix with updated CCIR Assessment</li> <li>• Subordinate COP images or concept sketches (as necessary)</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander's Guidance or Decisions</li> <li>• Hand drawn intent graphics</li> <li>• Recorded notes capturing all guidance and decisions for action or adjustment with the context (the why) behind each</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Roll Call</li> <li>• Review Topic List (CG / G3)</li> <li>• Per Topic: MSC CDR feedback, friction and opportunities</li> <li>• Issue Refined Guidance (CG)</li> <li>• Readback</li> </ul> <div> <b>FLUID EVENT!</b>  <b>DO NOT OVER-STRUCTURE!</b> </div>


Figure 3-1. Commander's Visualization, "A Way"



**Figure 3-2. Commander and Staff Information Gap**

Everything we aim to achieve in military operations is predicated upon decision dominance. If we enable our operations process to cycle through information, make decisions, and act faster than the enemy, then a marked advantage is reaped. These advantages are relative offering the ability to better control each engagement, which are then tied together in a series of tactical actions leading toward the achievement of broader goals. The problem we contend with is in the absence of sufficient doctrine encompassing one way in which conceptual information becomes detailed. If it is not tacit knowledge, then it likely cannot be seamless and effective.

This issue has two components. First is term definition where we define things to give meaning and assign value because in the absence of a complete lexicon, we cannot speak clearly on the same path. Second is process description where we describe processes so that the processes' function is understood and used properly. In the absence of adequate description, we can only hope the process is used properly by those that understand it exists.




**Figure 3-3. Conceptual to Detailed Information**

In current doctrine there are no definitions for commander-to-commander dialogues or commander's visualization meetings. There is a definition for commander's visualization, but this is only a mental process which does not offer a means of extracting conceptual input to be transitioned into detailed and executable orders. Conversations between commanders are mostly broached in army design methodology and planning and orders production doctrine. However, it is written, in a context where commanders dialogue between themselves as well as staff, to generate understanding. Contextually, we understand how commanders participate in the operations process. Further, there is a linkage between critical events in high-tactical formation battle rhythm's which is not described adequately.

Commander-to-commander dialogue has been observed as an informal or formal event that can be called by a senior commander to quickly gain an understanding of an event from leaders closest to challenges. It can be planned and routinely implemented in a battle rhythm or be ad hoc based on needs at the time. Most importantly, it can be conducted at any echelon of command with beneficial effects.





**Figure 3-4. Relationship between the Commander's Visualization Meeting and Plans Update**

By comparison, the commander's visualization meeting has been observed typically as a deliberate event conducted at division-and-above echelons to deduce the situation and determine a future way forward. This event can be ad hoc as needed and might be beneficial at division level depending on the pace of operations. In general, corps and divisions have been observed conducting this meeting in one of two tracks. Some conduct it as a commander centric event while others use it as a mechanism to engage just the staff. Most best practices have been observed when it is conducted with major subordinate and functional commanders in attendance while the higher headquarters (hosting) staff deliberately supports the event with products, presence, and follow-on action.

Understanding the above-listed events is critical when considering their placement (or lack thereof) in a battle rhythm. FM 1-02.1, *Operational Terms*, 28 February 2024 defines the battle rhythm being, "a deliberate cycle..." We must also acknowledge that this cycle is conducted by following a process. This process represents the flow of information as it moves from data to information to knowledge and finally to understanding in continuous loops. As the commander's visualization meeting has been observed to produce tremendous impacts in unit operations, the staff must be clever with regard for where that event occurs in time so that products and meeting attendees are most prepared for the articulation of creativity and judgement.

An observed best practice has been to view the commander's update brief and the commander's visualization meeting as related commander-centric activities. When the commander's update brief occurs just prior to the commander's visualization meeting, commanders have an opportunity to acquire a facts-driven light assessment for critical thinking in the current operations planning horizon. This permits the same commanders to participate in a subsequent commander's visualization meeting which naturally escalates into major application of judgement and creativity, temporally focused on the future operations planning horizon or 48-72 hours out. Conversely, once staff officers receive decisions or guidance from the commander's visualization meeting, they are permitted to fully engage in related staff-centric activities (the battle update brief and plans update). Yet again, best practices have been observed when the battle update brief is conducted prior to the plans update brief. The battle update brief, a different facts-driven assessment, offers the whole staff a chance to think critically together on the current operation. The plans update is the battle update brief-subsequent venue where a commander can participate with the staff in a second, albeit staff centric, major application of judgment and creativity on the future operation.

Taken together, the commander's update brief and commander's visualization meeting followed by battle update brief and plans update, form a cyclical pattern where information is continually adjusted and adapted. Staffs use tools to aid commander's visualization in the commander's visualization meeting with those same tools being shaped afterward into products with new guidance or decisions. The products ultimately become the embodiment of conceptual information which began in the commander's mind.

Staffs that cannot understand this cyclical flow of information between conceptual and detailed information will assume risk in two areas. First, the staff will not be prepared to receive guidance or decisions from the commander's visualization meeting. As an example, if guidance issued in the commander's visualization meeting is stove piped in the G-3/5 and doesn't reach the broader staff, then an information gap develops which then disrupts synthesis at the following battle update brief. Staffs must work together to turn tools used in the commander's visualization meeting into cohesive products which can be used to extend the commander's intent throughout the total organization. Second, the staff will not use those products adequately in the commander's update brief to posture commanders with necessary details about the current situation. As doctrine clearly states, commanders must first understand before they can visualize. In this instance, the staff's collective inability to generate products for the commander's update brief and tools for the commander's visualization meeting will hinder the ability of commanders to apply creativity and judgement.

**Recommendation(s).** Operationalize the commander's visualization by doing the following:

- Codify the meeting instructions for the commander's visualization meeting. For attendees, include all commanders and functional commanders by exception and critical staff primaries (G-2 and G-3 at minimum). Be deliberate on determining open versus closed forum.
- The staff anticipates, recommends, and maintains a projected schedule of potential commander's visualization meeting topics to better support the commander's dialogue.
- Conduct deliberate integration of visualization tools (proper tailoring of a common operational picture images and use of a concept sketch, if necessary).

- Implement an interoperable collaboration tool to maintain a shared vision and ability to draw ideas on common operational pictures/sketches (often command post computing environment or shared screens as a method due to technical limitations).
- Assign a recorder to capture the guidance and decisions and readback information to close the meeting to validate accuracy and disseminate timely to the staff. A way to do this would be a G-3 representative serving as the recorder, publishes notes in the fragmentary order, and briefs during an operations synchronization within three hours of completion of the commander's visualization meeting.
- Align commander's visualization meeting within the battle rhythm and staff shifts. Create a critical path through the following:
  - Battle update briefings (staff understanding of the operational environment)
  - Plans updates (staff assessment and proposed concepts)
  - Commander's update briefs (commanders understanding of operational environment)
  - Commander's visualization meeting (dialogue on assessments and concepts)
  - Operations synchronization (disseminate, coordinate, and implement commander's guidance and decisions)
- Identify and delineate temporal focus between the commander's update brief and the commander's visualization meeting. Ideally, the commander's update brief is focused on the current operation while the commander's visualization meeting is focused on what comes next.
- Expand the importance of the chain of command and commander-to-commander dialogue in our tactical doctrine. Specifically, what is the definition or process of commander-to-commander dialogue in combat?
- Add the technique of the commander's visualization meeting in ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017 as a method to conduct commander-to-commander dialogue in a routine manner. Add historical vignettes of successful commander's conducting war councils prior to decisive tactical operations. In addition, highlight historical examples of senior and subordinate command relationship and collaboration enabled successful tactical operations.

### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 3-91 *Division Operations* 2014
- ATP 3-92 *Corps Operations* 2016
- ATP 6-0.5 *Command Post Organization and Operations* 2017
- FM 5-0 *Planning and Orders Production* 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* 2022



## Observation 2. Battle Rhythm and Rhythm of the Battle

**Observation.** Trends indicate that units rigidly interpret existing doctrine, especially doctrine specific to each warfighting function, and therefore believe a robust and rigid battle rhythm is necessary to allow for shared understanding, synchronization, and decision making. FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023; FM 4-0 *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019; and ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024 are among the doctrinal publications advocating for working groups and boards to enable effective operations.

**Discussion.** Figure 3-5 (Battle Rhythm) depicts a full cycle of a military decision-making process (MDMP) overlaid with functional inputs, outputs, and meetings or touchpoints. Note the lack of times associated with the sequence of events on the chart. This cycle could take place over a period of 24 hours, 96 hours, or just two hours. Further, at any given time the enemy or higher headquarters could introduce commander's critical information requirements into the daily schedule. For example, most division battle rhythms involve MDMP during the day and execution of operations during limited visibility hours. This rhythm is unable to rapidly adjust to enemy actions taking place during limited visibility when most decision makers are in a rest cycle.

If the enemy unexpectedly counterattacks and the unit has no plan for this, what should it do? Does the staff wake up the commanding general? Does the unit allow a deputy commander to make an adjustment decision immediately? Does a key leader assemble the night shift staff for the rapid decision and synchronization process and then decide what to do?

This all depends on how much time is available and when in the daily cycle this type of event occurs. Regardless, there must be a system (running estimates) in place to understand the situation, a decision maker with authority in the right place at that time, and the requisite talent available to process the developing situation into decision worthy information in the available time frame.





Figure 3-5. Battle Rhythm, “A Way”

**Recommendation(s).** During periods of low activity, a division can effectively conduct the full suite of meetings and detailed planning, but it is not sustainable to do so during periods of high activity. The chief of staff will have to plan and direct the staff to conduct necessary meetings and to do without them when not needed. Units should plan and publish orders and products by phase. In execution or high-tempo periods, units conduct only necessary commander and staff touchpoints to maintain situational understanding and adjust or re-synchronize through operations synchronization. In doing so, divisions will have to use published orders and exercise

mission command to allow leaders at all echelons to make decisions with the published end state in mind. This decentralized decision-making system will move up and down within the rhythm of the battle. The commander may be able to provide detailed guidance at times and at other times must simply trust and empower others. What follows are some specific recommendations for consideration.



**Figure 3-6. Adjusting to the Rhythm of the Battle, “A Way”**

To achieve battle rhythm agility and outfight the enemy, think of battle rhythms on a red (high operations tempo), amber, and green (low operations tempo) scale. Use low-tempo periods to maximize meetings and planning. When the situation does not allow all those meetings, identify and conduct the essential meetings and fill gaps with shorter and more efficient synchronization meetings and commander-to-commander dialogue.

### Doctrinal References

- ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014
- ATP 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 April 2016
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

### Observation 3. Integrating Cells

**Observation.** U.S. Army doctrine outlines a framework consisting of three integrating cells within a command post. These cells are plans, FUOPS, and the current operations integrating cell (COIC). In fiscal year 2024, most units were structured to accommodate these three integrating cells either within a single command post or spread across multiple posts; however, some units consolidated into a two-integrating cell model of FUOPS and COIC. While the COIC was frequently noted for its effectiveness and integration in both the two- and three-cell model, the same level of cohesion was not observed in the plans and FUOPS cells.

**Discussion.** The plans and FUOPS integrating cells often struggle to perform effectively during Warfighter exercises (WFXs) because of personnel and resource limitations. Units that attempt to equally organize, staff, and equip both cells frequently find that neither can fulfill its assigned roles and responsibilities. This results in significant gaps in the operations process, particularly impacting the FUOPS cell's ability to consistently provide coherent and detailed plans to the COIC. A disciplined handoff between the FUOPS and COIC is crucial for successful execution, yet this process typically falters when the FUOPS cell is inadequately staffed and poorly integrated.




Figure 3-7. Warfighting Function Cell Integration Friction

The lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities within the plans and FUOPS cells poses significant challenges for headquarters. This confusion is exacerbated by rigid temporal frameworks described in Army doctrine, which fail to support mission accomplishment as planning horizons shorten. These frameworks often lead to a desynchronization between the Plans and FUOPS cells and the integrating cells of subordinate and higher headquarters. Typically, the temporal frameworks at different echelons do not align, resulting in a poor understanding of each cell's planning efforts. This misalignment hampers parallel planning and has the most notable impacts on subordinate units, which struggle to identify the priority planning efforts at their higher headquarters and the primary integrator for those efforts. Ultimately, this confusion results in wasted planning resources, a lack of focus on critical execution tasks, and diminished shared understanding.

To solve the problem posed by handoffs and unclear roles, as discussed above, a few units attempted to align planning efforts with the 24-hour air-tasking order cycle as a framework for responsibility transition across the operations enterprise. Caution should be taken with this approach, since this model was often observed as an ineffective framework. Although this approach enables production of by-day fighting products, the challenge of maintaining dynamic integration across air-tasking order days proves challenging. In addition, rather than having each planner continuously plan, coordinate, and synchronize specific pieces of an operation, each of the four air tasking order planners need breadth and depth in competency plus the established relationships to do those activities with staff sections within the headquarters and subordinate units.

**Recommendation(s).** Units employ different integrating cell models based on personnel and resource limitations, command post design and structures, and commander priorities. Regardless of the organizational model a unit employs, clearly identifying responsibilities, by individuals rather than cell, for the following requirements will help units leverage the integrating cells focused on planning:

- **Conduct the MDMP.** Develop or refine branches and sequels.
- **Assessments.** Develop, refine, and evaluate commander's critical information requirements and options to inform decisions.
- **Operational Framework.** Conduct continuous refinement of the operational framework.
- **Operations schedule, graphics, and other fighting products.** Update based on results of operations to maintain coherence of the current operation. Do not neglect challenged areas of terrain management as well as what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization refers to as battlespace management (close operations).
- **Integrate maneuver with the targeting process.** A planner who understands the maneuver plan facilitates the understanding and visualization of the friendly maneuver plan, priorities, and disposition of forces (deep operations) during targeting meetings.
- **Coordinate shifting the rear operations and boundaries.** Develop a template and plan the execution of shifting the rear operations, connecting the plans/FUOPs cell (sustainment and protection functions) with the rear command post (rear operations).
- **Publish fragmentary orders.**

Since it is difficult to maintain an understanding of which planner or integrating cell is working on which planning priority, we recommend maintaining a planning synchronization estimate.

One unit successfully used this as a method to maintain shared understanding by clearly outlining who is responsible for each planning effort as well as to highlight key future actions and milestones associated with those efforts. Briefing this estimate routinely in plans and operations synchronization meetings and during appropriate boards will increase understanding throughout the headquarters and at echelon.

To ensure an effective and seamless transition between integrating cells, specifically when operations handoff to the COIC, units must focus on structured transition. The operations synchronization meeting, as described in ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017, can serve as a structured transition between FUOPS and the COIC every 24 hours, facilitating continuity and clarity of operations. When units were observed executing a disciplined handoff of operations to the COIC, it is often correlated with a formal and routine handover scoped to the next 24 hours.

When a unit maintains defined plans and FUOPS integrating cells it should use designated meetings, such as the plans synchronization board, to enable structured handovers and continuity of planning. This formal transition is crucial as it enables the FUOPS cell to fully understand ongoing plans, anticipate resource requirements, and align their efforts effectively as planning progresses toward execution.

Separately, and prior to warfighting, the FUOPS cell should apply efforts to building templates for common operations. Incorporating these templates into the planning standard operating procedure will accelerate execution. Examples of common operations include passage of lines, wet gap crossings, and similar complex maneuver efforts.

### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014
- ATP 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 April 2016
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

#### **Observation 4. Command Post Operations**

**Observation.** One of the Army's operational imperatives according to FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022 to "account for being under constant observation and all forms of contact" has created direct attempts to achieve greater command post survivability. Exercise scenarios assume units operate as tactical headquarters, in conflict. Because of this, units employed multi-nodal distributed command posts to achieve survivability, blending command post doctrine with new techniques such as establishing reach-back capabilities. These efforts leveraged and stressed communications networks and challenged personnel management. In doing so, units achieved redundancy and increased some practices of survivability; however, remain challenged to overcome mobility shortcomings that survivability measures require. Observations of unit's techniques on distributing command posts provides insight into possible ways to improve survivability. It remains unclear as to what extent the modifications improved survivability while attempting to minimize impact on effectiveness. Challenges will persist until organization, manning, and equipment operations better align to distributed command post requirements.

**Discussion.** Doctrine states that corps and divisions have the potential to employ three to four separate command posts (main, tactical (TAC), rear, and mobile command group). Most modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) limit employment of the doctrinal construct. Furthermore, doctrine poorly describes that the creation of additional command posts (like the TAC, mobile, or early-entry command posts) come at the expense of removing resources from existing command posts, habitually the main command posts.

Every unit is experimenting in some manner for how to employ command posts. All units continue to employ a rear command post, proven to be essential. However, the balance of functions between the main and TAC command posts varies greatly between units. In practice, all employed TACs are intended to fulfill some degree of COIC functions. For example, some units employed a TAC for a finite time and purpose. Although this is doctrinally correct, it arguably damages rather than enhances command and control. Others employed a permanent TAC to manage all current operations with the intent of improving survivability at cost to the main command post's effectiveness.

Another effort to achieve survivability is the employment of home-station mission command nodes. Some units employed this concept under the premise that their reach-back capability is more survivable out of threat contact, specifically with the intelligence section's analytical capability. For example, intelligence teams often split their ability to execute collection management, assessment of battle damage, and all-source fusion between home-station mission command and main command posts. Each function performs similar duties at each node, sacrificing capacity for capability. This creates limited redundancy, but the need for constant crosstalk to maintain a common intelligence picture consumes time and manpower. The capacity to conduct analysis is overcome by the need to synchronize. In practice, units who have implemented home-station mission command concepts have not provided increased quality to commander's update briefings. Implementation of persistent TACs and home-station mission command nodes have yielded some redundancy while adding complexity within the human dimension and created more reliance on technology. It is difficult to determine which methods are optimal about the anticipated operating environments.

In general, units are improving on enhancing survivability through technical and structural techniques. Units are attempting to "hide in plain sight" so to speak, implementing cover and



concealment through camouflage and use of existing structures. Additionally, most units continue to experiment with old and new communications capabilities that allow command and control networks to operate at greater ranges across multiple time zones and continents.

Lastly, the multi-nodal concepts have placed distance as the prime mechanism for survivability, creating two separate challenges:

- Mobility
- Battlefield circulation

The dispersion impacts mobility because of shared use of capabilities. It is likely that units have conducted less command post displacements because of these mobility challenges. However, command post displacement is also not a frequent focus for units, especially when multinational operations create a natural priority to focus on continuous communication and interoperability. Regardless, increasing the number of command posts creates competing demands for a headquarters for which there is currently no organic solution without mobility augmentation. Subsequently, the scale of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) increases dispersion requirements which further highlight the challenges and risk of conducting battlefield circulation. Do not confuse battlefield circulation from counterinsurgency with battlefield circulation in LSCO. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022 stresses the importance of the criticality regarding the human dimension in conflict and of its importance for the commander to gain a detailed on-the-ground understanding of conditions, whether it is the commander with subordinate commanders and Soldiers or dispersed staff sections.

Doctrine has adjusted to the evolution of the operating environment, but it has not accounted for the different tactical considerations at echelon to better achieve these purposes in materiel or personnel requirements. As a result, unit commanders' efforts to experiment using nodal constructs have created redundancy with questionable impact on survivability. Because units lack additional resources, every unit is different in how they balance survivability and effectiveness, and it is difficult to determine which is optimal.

#### **Recommendation(s):**

- Review U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) business rules and training guidance to reassess tactical requirements for corps and divisions. Mission command training program (MCTP) provides different training scenario environments, each of which creates different tactical mission considerations and requirements as displacement of unit command posts remains inconsistent with unrealized potential.
- Review FORSCOM business rules and training guidance and recommend against units implementing home-station mission command nodes at home station. There are human and technical risks associated with keeping Soldiers at home station not replicated during exercises. We recommend units train with a simulated in-theater reach-back capability instead.
- Review corps and division MTOE. Key billet disparities exist related to the functions and purposes between command posts that must be reconciled. For example, rear command posts lack operations integrating functions or analytical capacity to serve as alternate main command posts. Additionally, corps and divisions joint air-ground integrating cell functions remain as a gap in corps headquarters' capabilities. Major tactical commands

must possess primary and alternate means of mission command information system and personnel for key functions they are expected to command and control.

- Employ the TAC to facilitate relocation of the main command post rather than to control a critical event.
- Conduct battlefield circulation during the exercises to achieve three purposes:
  - Increase commanders' situational awareness to reinforce the human dimension of war.
  - Train staff to operate based on commanders' intent without direct battle rhythm involvement.
  - Train on mobile command group capabilities.

PAST OBSERVATIONS	MAIN	REAR	TAC	HOME STATION	CONTEXT OF COMMAND POST EMPLOYMENT	SURVIVABILITY & EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT
EXERCISE A Closest to doctrine with temporary TAC, added Home Station Node	X	X	X	X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aligned closest to doctrinal purpose of the command posts</li> <li>Temporary TAC performed limited COIC functions</li> <li>Permanent Main performed continuous FUOPS/Plans functions</li> <li>Traditional Rear Command Post</li> <li>Home Station CP retained minimal essential functions with intel functions (Analysis and Control Element / ACE) and redundant plans team</li> <li>Used both unit equipment &amp; buildings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although doctrinal, employment of TAC to control a critical event did not enhance C2</li> <li>TAC conducted one displacement during exercise</li> <li>Physical security measures implemented</li> <li>Use of cover &amp; concealment</li> <li>Use of existing structures to "hide in plain sight"</li> </ul>
EXERCISE B Permanent TAC with full COIC detached from Main	X	X	X (+)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain a permanent second command post, providing redundant capabilities to a limited extent</li> <li>Permanent TAC performed COIC functions</li> <li>Main without COIC challenged to maintain current operations awareness</li> <li>Used primarily established buildings and an identified hardened structure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TAC conducted one displacement during exercise</li> <li>Survivability achieved thru cover and concealment</li> <li>Use of existing structures to "hide in plain sight"</li> <li>Use of hardened structure increased survivability</li> </ul>
EXERCISE C Consolidated command posts into single, prioritized "TAC" CP		X (-)	X (+)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"TAC" employed all Main CP functions, and included significant portion of Rear CP functions</li> <li>Reduced Rear CP footprint</li> <li>Used primarily established buildings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Simplified staff C2 at cost of distributed survivability</li> <li>Use of existing structures to "hide in plain sight"</li> </ul>


**Figure 3-8. Command Post Employment Examples**

### Doctrinal References

- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

## Observation 5. Functional Coordinators

**Observation.** Some corps have applied the concept of the fire support coordinator to other areas such as aviation and air defense. The units that identified and empowered these coordinating officers enhanced operations in those areas because of their advice to corps senior leaders and by synchronizing their functions at echelons while simultaneously addressing personnel shortfalls.



**Figure 3-9. Coordination Officer Example**

**Discussion.** The fire support coordinator is the senior field artillery commander for the theater, corps, and division brigade combat team who is the maneuver commander's primary advisor to plan, coordinate, and integrate field artillery and fire support in the execution of assigned tasks (FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024). This concept can be expanded to other specialties.

During combat operations, corps staff often face overwhelming demands including coordinating fires and overseeing airspace, coordinating aviation operations across numerous combat aviation brigades, and ensuring there is one seamless air defense plan for the entire area of operation. This work can be extremely specialized, and it requires a great deal of expertise. Matters are more challenging if these corps staff sections are not fully manned. There are often junior officers and noncommissioned officers serving in positions for higher ranks. Consequently, these personnel usually do not have the requisite experience, expertise, or influence on planning, coordinating,

and integrating corps operations or advising the commanding general, deputy commanding generals, and the corps staff.

To address these challenges, units have designated coordinating officers for specialized functions. FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024 identifies the fire support coordinator as the primary advisor for fire support, this concept can be expanded to include roles such as an aviation coordinating officer and an air defense coordinating officer. Although corps staff already includes aviation and air defense officers, these positions are often unfilled or lack personnel with sufficient experience and influence. Establishing functional coordinating officers does not replace these staff roles but instead enhances them. These coordinating officers are senior officers who are uniquely positioned to advise the corps commanding general, deputy commanding general, and staff drawing on their expertise and experience.

For example, during a Warfighter exercise, the corps designated the senior combat aviation brigade commander as the aviation coordinating officer and the air defense brigade commander as the air defense coordinating officer. These officers significantly augmented the junior corps staff by providing the necessary expertise for corps-level operations. Their involvement lent legitimacy to the recommendations and orders produced by the staff. In particular, the brigade commander of combat aviation, acting as aviation coordinating officer, successfully performed five critical functions:

- **Facilitated combat aviation brigade commander-to-commander dialogue:**
  - Organized discussions between aviation brigade commanders (combat aviation brigades assigned to divisions) 30 minutes before the corps commander's update brief, enabling the corps combat aviation brigade commander to characterize corps aviation operations
- **Advisor to the corps commander and his deputy commanding generals:**
  - Provided advice on aviation operations and risk mitigation across the corps beyond the scope of the commander's update brief
- **Integrated into the corps battle rhythm:**
  - Participated in key events such as the targeting working group and targeting decision board
- **Key participant in synchronization meetings:**
  - Played a central role in corps-level aviation synchronization meetings
- **Established standardized procedures:**
  - Helped develop standardized aviation practices such as flight altitudes, shared air pictures, and common communication frequencies which streamlined processes and enhanced survivability and lethality

**Recommendation(s).** Corps should establish functional coordinator roles for aviation and air defense to assist with planning, coordinating, and integrating operations at the corps level. These officers would remain in their current positions (e.g., brigade commanders) while also supporting the corps staff. They would have direct access to the corps chief of staff, commanding general, and deputy commanding generals providing their expertise and influence during working groups, commander's update briefs, and targeting refinement and synchronization meetings. By leveraging their experience and authority, these functional coordinators would improve coordination across echelons and ensure the corps operates more effectively.

## **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014
- ATP 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 April 2016
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

## **Observation 6. Special Operations Integration with Corps and Division Headquarters**

**Observation.** SOF Integration is needed within corps and division headquarters.

**Discussion.** Corps and division headquarters should integrate SOF liaisons into their staff processes. Army elements conducting LSCO must anticipate special operations forces conducting operations within their area of operation prior to the introduction of conventional forces. SOF within the area of operation will fall under a combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF) under the special operations component command/special operations joint task force or working directly for the joint task force commander with general support to the senior tactical maneuver element under the coalition forces land component command. The direct link between the corps or division generally comes in the form of CJSOTF liaisons, which if leveraged correctly, can greatly increase the conventional forces' understanding of the operational environment, enemy forces composition and disposition, integration of operations, and support to targeting through conventional forces/SOF interdependence. MCTP has observed a variety of relationships between conventional land forces and SOF, ranging from minimal integration to request for tactical control of SOF forces within a corps area of responsibility. Units who plan for and leverage SOF gain valuable reporting on observed enemy maneuver and find ways to leverage SOF effects to support their ground maneuver. Additionally, SOF units that provide the right personnel as liaisons to corps and divisions maximize their ability to shape the LSCO battlefield in support of ground maneuver forces and are better poised to achieve the joint task force's desired end state. As conventional forces maneuver across the battlefield, the CJSOTF will have to rely on conventional forces for fires and sustainment support.

**Recommendation(s).** Deliberately plan for SOF integration at the corps and division level. The senior tactical command (corps or division) should expect some exchange of liaisons with a CJSOTF operating in their area of responsibility. Deliberate planning to include SOF planners in key battle rhythm events is critical to fully leverage SOF capabilities toward achieving the joint task force's end state. Additionally, the CJSOTF must select personnel with the right knowledge, skills, and behaviors to serve as liaisons to maximize SOF value to tactical maneuver units. Additionally, SOF units must learn the conventional forces ground maneuver plan to best support maneuver and anticipate where and when SOF effects should be leveraged to achieve the commander's end state.

### **Doctrinal References**

- FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations*, January 2014
- FM 6-05, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*, 1 January 2022 (CAC restricted)



## **Observation 7. Cloud Technology**

**Observation.** The use of cloud technology in corps and divisions headquarters offers significant advantages in terms of scalability, enhanced coordination, redundancy in data, integration of automated process, and use of artificial intelligence analytics. Cloud technology use also presents challenges to security, connectivity, and integration in LSCO.

**Discussion.** The use of cloud technology by corps and division headquarters are initiatives to support commanders and staffs improve operational efficiency and enhance a greater understanding of the operational environment and threats. These include:

- Palantir Maven Smart System
- Army 365 with Microsoft Team on nonsecure and secure internet protocol routers (NIPR and SIPR)
- Intelink hosted SharePoint
- Amazon Web Services
- Microsoft Azure
- Google Cloud Platform

Cloud technology has significant benefits in terms of scalability based on demand and has the flexibility to quickly deploy and reconfigure based on mission requirements. It provides enhanced collaboration for real-time data sharing and improving situational awareness and understanding. It is globally accessible from anywhere with an internet connection, enhancing communications and coordination across a geographically dispersed operational environment. The risk of data loss has become minimal with automatic data backups and built-in redundancies. Automated processes along with integration of artificial intelligence have provided powerful tools for data analytics and targeting and predictive modeling base on correlations of forces and means. However, cloud technology is dependent on the major assumption that forces in LSCO will have the internet connection they need to access the information they require in the cloud.

Cloud services rely on stable internet connections, which can be a challenge in remote or contested environments. Depending on the location to services and the type of transmission asset that is being utilized, high latency and bandwidth limitations affect the performance to determine usability, accessibility, and real-time collaboration. All of this is critical to operations of command and control. Dependency on sole providers has created interoperability concerns.

Reliance on tools to solve problems instead of trained and proven processes often creates an environment that brings more confusion than awareness in the short term.

Cloud technology is a modernizing initiative that has a range of potential services including data storage, computing power, advanced analytics, machine learning and improved data management. However, without edge computing at the local command post to continue work, the service is only as good as the internet connection the command post has available. While internet access is becoming increasingly important, the availability of the internet in LSCO is not guaranteed.

**Recommendation(s).** Services made available through the cloud must also be available locally as a redundancy. Evaluating the available signal support includes considering the capabilities and limitations of supporting signal systems (Signal Staff Estimate of FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff*

*Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022). The key to a good primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plan is to establish redundancy, so some means of communication is always available. Leaders and planners must understand their organization's authorized and available communications capabilities and limitations as well as the personnel and logistic requirements to employ and sustain the capabilities. In a LSCO environment where internet is not guaranteed, local edge computing will always be a requirement locally to ensure staffs have a fallback method to continue operations. Critical information should have backup systems to ensure that critical information can still be transmitted even if primary networks are compromised.

### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-02, *Signal Support to Operations*, 19 September 2019

## **Observation 8. Bandwidth Requirements**

**Observation.** The understanding of bandwidth requirements may be evolving as commanders and staffs increasingly rely on data-intensive applications, advanced sensors, and real-time communication; however, an answer to use fiber provides an unrealistic reality possibility to military operations in LSCO.

**Discussion.** Sufficient bandwidth is essential to military operations. It enables real-time communications, data sharing, and situational awareness to enable commanders' visualization and the staffs' awareness of the operational environment. Commanders and staffs appreciate the importance of bandwidth. However, units do not train realistically to ensure processes are in place when bandwidth for all operational needs cannot be met.

Instead of treating and operating bandwidth as a limited resource, headquarters have resorted to the use of fiber to increase the bandwidth available from megabytes to gigabytes. Where encryption devices that limit bandwidth to 100 megabytes per second, units upgrade these devices to enable gigabytes per second. Existing fielded tactical transmission devices such as the Satellite Transportable Terminal are being replaced with commercial off-the-shelf equipment like the Starlink, 5G Networks, and other mobile cellular networks or the use of fiber to increase bandwidth.

Units tend not to monitor bandwidth use or conduct trend analysis. Units struggle to identify bottlenecks to optimize the network. Critical applications and services are not monitored to ensure optimal quality of service. Units do not account for historical trends when planning for capacity requirements or bandwidth allocations.

**Recommendation(s).** Practice operations in a constrained bandwidth environment using only tactical communications assets for an extended period.

Develop guidelines and best practices based on the available bandwidth. The transmission source determines the available bandwidth and in a contested LSCO environment, staffs must be prepared to operate in a reduced bandwidth environment.

Users and tasks must be prioritized to determine essential and nonessential activities based on bandwidth available. Various means of communication must be set based on the transmission source that is available, matching the most appropriate application to the prioritized user for the essential task that needs to occur. Common business rules must be practiced, such as:

- Establishing times for updates
- Reducing media consumption like streaming video for unmanned aircraft systems to key personnel
- Compressing files before sending them
- Closing unnecessary applications and browser tabs that may consume bandwidth
- Determining which files are stored locally and which files are uploaded for collaboration

### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-02, *Signal Support to Operations*, 19 September 2019

## **Observation 9. Legal Considerations**

**Observation.** Army service component commands, corps, and division training environments continue to mimic conditions experienced through much of the Global War on Terror regarding robust staff support, particularly when it comes to advice and input from legal advisors. Commands should prepare for little to no judge advocate presence in LSCO, particularly in forward or dispersed command and control nodes.

**Discussion.** The conditions in LSCO will result in a battlefield that is different than the one experienced during previous conflicts. Dispersed command posts degraded, non-existent communications, effective enemy fire, and severe time constraints will create an environment in which commanders at all echelons will need to make immediate decisions without the resources that were commonplace during the Global War on Terror. This includes the presence of a judge advocate to provide real-time legal advice on issues such as deliberate or dynamic targeting, among other issues. The conditions in LSCO will likely result in limited or no on-hand judge advocate presence during situations that previously would necessitate legal analysis, review, and recommendations to the command. That type of legal support in combat, at least at the brigade level and above, was typical during much of the Global War on Terror. As such, it became essentially a standard condition as headquarters executed their missions. In LSCO; however, commanders and staff will be required to make rapid decisions concerning the laws of armed conflict without their attorney present. Commands should prepare and train for this reality.

**Recommendation(s).** Commands should not only know and understand Laws of armed conflict, but also effectively communicate commander's intent and the appetite for taking risks in combat to ensure dispersed units are executing the mission within the law and the command's directives. This should include training with minimal legal support.

### **Doctrinal References**

FM 3-84, *Legal Support to Operations*, 1 September 2023

FM 6-27, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*, 9 August 2019

### **Observation 10. Authorities and Interoperability**

**Observation.** Achieving interoperability between coalition partners is often hampered by various authorities, often at odds with national caveats, processes, and interpretations. The result is often a complex attempt at deconfliction and coordination on issues such as rules of engagement, employment of certain weapon systems, logistical support, and detention operations.

**Discussion.** Multinational exercises have highlighted the friction that commonly occurs between nations on a variety of issues concerning authorities. Examples include different interpretations of and restrictions on rules of engagement, limitations on the employment of weapon systems (particularly regarding mines), national caveats and requirements regarding the freedom of movement within sovereign nations, and requirements and sensitivities about detention operations. As these issues arise, different processes, approval levels, and constraints have periodically led to friction that directly impedes interoperability. Delays in achieving interoperability will negatively impact overall operations, particularly in a time-sensitive LSCO battlefield.

**Recommendation(s).** Commands should coordinate and deconflict with coalition partners early, particularly well before training exercises, to set the conditions for a shared understanding of authorities, limitations, and opportunities for interoperability.

#### **Doctrinal Reference**

- FM 6-27, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*, 9 August 2019



## Chapter 4

### Protection Warfighting Function

#### Introduction

Seamless integration of the protection warfighting function is needed. Integration and synchronization of the warfighting function of protection is critical as it applies to everyone within the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs integrate, synchronize, and employ protection capabilities to effectively and proactively mitigate threats across the battlefield. Vital to maneuver planning, protection is based on a unified effort with the other warfighting functions to execute planning and provide freedom of movement and the preservation of combat power for the force.

Protection personnel rarely work as a team. Protection cell integration is critical to ensuring decreased stress on the organization for planning during command post exercises and Warfighter exercises. Proper utilization of the protection cell ensures that updates to assessments are accurate, and they are prioritized systems (reflected on the protection prioritization list), they are protected using organic, task-organized and requested resources and effects. It is important to recognize that as units plan and train for large-scale combat operations, extensive effort must be made to synchronize efforts and preserve capabilities identified on the protection prioritization list.

Know what air defense artillery capabilities you have. High to medium altitude air defense in support of maneuver has been observed as not being well understood or utilized, resulting in decreased effectiveness of those assets. Leveraging organic air-missile defense capabilities, with thorough understanding of their effects, will provide the staff an opportunity to integrate effectively. The protection cell, when understanding the capabilities, provides appropriate risk assessment of capabilities resulting in articulating to the commander what the risks on the battlefield include.

Have a way to conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) with your enablers and staff. As formations for 2030 see changes due to the recent Army structure, the transformation of units to meet the demands of future warfare require organizations to identify gaps and develop effective solutions. While some formations have lost key enablers, there are units that are transforming to be effective in the future fight. Identifying the risks associated with the loss of these key enablers (e.g., brigade engineer battalions, military intelligence companies, military police battalions) can inherently put formations and critical assets in a position of unacceptable risk in combat.

## **Observation 1. Protection Cell Integration**

**Observation.** The protection team must be synchronized across integrating cells and command posts and aggregate staff processes to adequately preserve combat power, enable tempo, and identify and address risks to mission and the force. The protection leaders must ensure that the proper staff leads are identified and attend protection-focused planning events to enable the protection tasks throughout the operation.

**Discussion.** Protectors, like many other warfighting function members and integrating cells and staff sections, are prone to planning in a vacuum as opposed to being fully incorporated into staff sections and integrating cells across planning horizons. The three significant causes of this are:

- The protection team's unfamiliarity with planning and executing tasks to support large scale combat operations
- Senior leaders at echelon not delegating authorities to support agile and detailed Protection decision making
- Staff reluctance to attend, participate, and incorporate outputs of protection events and products such as the protection working group, protection prioritization lists, scheme of protection, and risk matrix


Managing the protection team is difficult because there is rarely a plan for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) at echelon. This causes organizational stress when the team is assembled for a command post exercise or Warfighter exercise where they must synchronize efforts in stark contrast to their daily duties with staff. Highly functioning protection teams have a standard operating procedure (SOP) to articulate duties and responsibilities for mission and members. These teams typically have a manning document or roster which outlines responsibilities for planning at echelon by command post and archived and sanitized templates for boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning team (B2C2WG&OPT) events. It is critical that protectors understand the inputs and outputs of battle rhythm events and how they positively affect those events with an understanding of the concept of the operation.

It is imperative that the protection team has a senior leader who is responsible for taking outputs from key B2C2WG&OPTs and elevating them to the decision-making authority at echelon. We see significant lag in protection capabilities when senior leaders retain all decisions at the commanding-general level or do not have any delegation lower than the deputy commander for support. Organizations who clearly understand the internal and external flow of information and who have created a detailed decision authority matrix are able to operationalize the protection critical path and adjacent staff battle rhythm events.

FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022 states a working group is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordination, and recommendations for a particular purpose or function. One of the most consistently observed issues concerning protection integration is the lack of protection working group attendance by non-protection staff. Protection drives maneuver through the preservation of combat power and mitigation of risk. This effort cannot be fully synchronized without input from the remainder of the staff during planning events and the protection working group (PWG). Organizations who have consistently high staff presence at the PWG tend to have more comprehensive schemes of protection and protection prioritization lists.

**Recommendation(s).** This is a leadership and training issue. While professional military education addresses how to plan as a staff, the protection staff rarely plans for LSCO alongside and integrated with other staff sections and integrating cells. Protection teams need to spend time analyzing the current fight to assess if their plan (protection prioritization list, scheme of protection, and risk matrix) is working or not. Senior leaders appear to discount the protection team if they are not able to fully integrate within the other staff sections to provide value to the plan and execution.

The protection team should hold iterative PWGs and SOP reviews to maintain their proficiency with actions supporting the warfighting function. Protectors, like all staff, should hold periodic professional development and other training events to learn and hold discussions about the rigor required to plan for LSCO. Protection leaders need to establish a battle rhythm event where they can brief senior leaders to build shared understanding and receive guidance. A decision authority matrix should be created for the protection enterprise to ensure decisions can be made quickly and with the support of the appropriate leaders. The first PWG is held during the first step of the receipt of mission of the military decision-making process. This gives the staff a chance to integrate with the protection team and provide initial input to the protection plan before mission analysis. The chief of staff can ensure staff representatives are present for battle rhythm events and are attending with the required inputs to meet the required outputs.



**Figure 4-1. Warfighting Function Integration**

#### Doctrinal References

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

**Observation 2. Integration of Non-organic Units into Warfighting**

**Observation.** Maneuver enhancement, engineer, chemical, air defense, and military police brigades and battalions are difficult to integrate at corps and division. These levels train with organic elements and use functional branch leads (air-missile defense chief; division engineer; division provost marshal; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high explosive chief; division surgeon; etc.) to conduct planning needed to fill gaps. Stress on an organization increases when the training audience receives brigades or battalions of these specialties for their Warfighters as they already planned for those competencies. Composition 2 and 3 (Reserve and Guard) units are rarely as involved with an exercise lifecycle as needed and are difficult to receive and incorporate into the higher echelon processes.

**Discussion.** Recent Army structure changes have adjusted what we will see in our formations for 2030. While some formations have lost key enablers (brigade engineer and military police battalions, military intelligence companies, etc.), others are seeing a transformation of units to meet the future fight. Corps and divisions usually have SOPs addressing specific topics, but the RSOI of functional formations is rarely covered. The training program builds to the Warfighter through home station field and command post exercises. Few of these events involve non-organic battalions and brigades. The staff has little time to build a relationship with these organizations and it's sometimes hard to understand the level of detail provided with another commander and staff.

The rapid incorporation of external elements allows the corps and division to create detailed plans, freeing the senior staff counterparts to focus on integrating and liaising with corps or division leaders. This is more crucial when receiving a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). The MEB gives the commanding general a commander and staff to manage the rear area and support area cluster without burdening other commanders, specifically support and fires Brigades, with tasks of receiving units and assigning them with areas of responsibility for the base cluster within the support area. The MEB is typically placed in charge of external units (engineer, military police, air defense, chemical, explosive ordnance disposal, and other enablers) to provide protection resources to maintain combat power and assist the rear command post with force flow from the rear to close fights. MEBs, being Composition 2 or 3 (Reserve and Guard) units, does not have the ability to take part in all command post exercises or home station training for the corps or division. MEBs are usually brought by command post exercise 2 or 3 with a small team which usually expands for the Warfighter exercise. The active-duty units plan for the MEB staff during other exercises and then relinquish responsibility of that plan to enable the MEB to meet training objectives and exercise systems and processes as a unit. This typically takes a few days and can cause undue organizational stress.

**Recommendation(s).** Composition 2 and 3 units should have a relationship with corps and divisions including funding and days necessary to attend more training with their active-duty counterparts. This relieves stress on higher staff and enables them to understand the level of detail needed to plan operations. The RSOI process needs to be in SOPs and a "welcome packet" should be distributed to incoming units to understand how the higher echelon.

### **Doctrinal References**

- FM 3-81, *The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade*, 9 November 2021
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

### **Observation 3. Informing Protection Planning and Risk Decision Making**

**Observation.** PWGs are inhibited from generating informed risk management decision options for the commander because of a lack of shared understanding of friendly and enemy activities across time and space.

**Discussion.** Units struggle to identify, articulate, and assess risk to the force and risk to the mission across time and space during PWGs. Failing to understand the unit's scheme of maneuver over multiple planning horizons and across the breadth of the operational framework, hinders the protection cell's ability to identify, understand, and articulate risk. This inability to fully understand risk prohibits the commanding general's ability to make informed decisions that incorporate all available risk management decisions. Additionally, divisions lack a formal tool and process to assess the effectiveness of protection efforts during the PWG or the assessment working group.

**Recommendation(s).** A representative from the G-3/5 must participate in the PWG to ensure a shared understanding of the operational framework and the unit scheme of maneuver at least 96 hours out. This input enables PWG participants to understand and assess criticality and vulnerability of division capabilities across the battlefield. To compliment understanding of friendly operations, a representative from the G-2 must provide an assessment of anticipated enemy activity and targeting to compliment understanding of friendly operations, a representative from the G-2 must provide an assessment of anticipated enemy activity and targeting objectives against the same planning horizons. Establishing a shared understanding of friendly and enemy activities across both time and space provides a baseline for protection planning and risk decisions for protection planners, division staff participants, and subordinate units.

Updated running estimates, including thorough risk assessments, must be incorporated in the PWG by all warfighting functions. Understanding risk management beyond the mitigation efforts of the protection cell is critical to understanding the overall risk to the unit and provides options for the commanding general to preserve combat power. During the PWG, participants must identify how decisions to avoid or eliminate risk are further refined during other B2C2WG to be presented to the appropriate decisions authority.

The protection cell must develop a product and process to assess the effectiveness of protection planning and risk decisions. During either the PWG or the assessment working group, units must identify enemy effects on critical friendly assets and capabilities and determine the effectiveness of previous risk decisions to reduce that risk. Without a formal process to assess the effectiveness of protection efforts, units fail to maintain a dynamic approach to risk decisions that evolve with the operational environment.

#### **Doctrinal References**

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- ATP 5-19 *Risk Management*, 9 November 2021



## Chapter 5

### Sustainment Warfighting Function

#### Introduction

The warfighting function of sustainment must enable the commanders with freedom of action, extending operational reach, and prolonging endurance. Sustainment in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) must meet these requirements in an operational environment complicated by challenges with distributed command and control, scarcity in supply and transportation, and evolving enemy capabilities that drive requirements for reconstitution not seen since the Korean War. Sustaining the Army in a contested logistics environment requires planners in all warfighting functions to anticipate and communicate requirements to meet sustainment planning prospects. Schemes of support must be integrated and synchronized with schemes of protection and maneuver to ensure survivability of sustainment at the right time, the right place, and in the right amount.

Precision sustainment favors responsiveness over flexibility. FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019, says that precision sustainment provides responsiveness to the point of need by leveraging predictive logistics. That is, anticipating requirements allows planners to set sustainment conditions synchronized in time, space, and purpose. LSCO is a resource-constrained environment that demands sustainers must anticipate requirements and seek economy to meet the demands of a formation in combat. When seeking economy, there are inherent tradeoffs with flexibility. As an example, a unit that begins an operation with one day of supply of fuel can be as responsive as a unit with three days of supply of fuel, but have less flexibility in delivery locations, timing, and quantity than a similar formation with three days of supply. Striking the balance between responsiveness and flexibility can only be achieved if requirements are anticipated. Non-forecasted requirements, including combat losses of sustainment, disrupts the ability to provide precision sustainment and increases both the risk to mission and risk to the force.

Running estimates are the foundation of the sustainment battle rhythm. The sustainment battle rhythm must provide a shared understanding of capabilities, requirements, and approved courses of action. This process begins and ends with running estimates in every element of sustainment, including commodity and field service managers maintain a running estimate. The quality of their work will determine whether the sustainment battle rhythm enables precision sustainment or if the staff's energy will be focused on managing non-forecasted requirements and emergency solutions.

Sustainment planners must integrate with the other warfighting function (WFF) battle rhythm events to ensure requirements are understood and their running estimates are updated, enabling planners to project requirements far in advance. The use of professional judgment and experience to anticipate requirements empowers sustainment planners to set conditions for precision sustainment. In turn, when participating in battle rhythm events sustainers must advocate their understanding of sustainment constraints to enable planning of supportable operations. Running estimates are also an assessment tool that enable planners to validate if their projections are correct or identify changes to the operational environment and update their products accordingly.

Integration and synchronization are important to survivability in a modern battlefield that is transparent and lethal. This change is especially felt in the rear areas. It is widely acknowledged


that distance from the forward line of troops does not provide protection, but planners must embrace this change when planning rear area movements and choosing the location and duration of sustainment nodes.

Protection, intelligence, fires, command and control, and maneuver elements all have a role to play in sustainment planning. Whether as a consumer of sustainment, or in support of sustainment, each WFF's activities must be synchronized in time and space with the purpose to reduce the risk of enemy effects. It is no longer acceptable to be late to the logistics release point or establish enduring nodes as the risk of discovery and destruction is high. Integration and synchronization of sustainment with the other warfighting functions is essential to survivability. Just as the force risks culmination if sustainment is not provided at the point of need, so does sustainment risk destruction by the enemy if it is not protected and secured.

### **Observation 1. Battle Rhythm Fails to Support Sustainment Planning and Execution.**

**Observation.** The sustainment WFF struggles with understanding and applying the cognitive hierarchy and processing data into understanding during their battle rhythm events within the rear command post (RCP) resulting in poorly developed orders, unanticipated requirements, and diminished advantage in decision dominance for leadership.

**Discussion.** Sustainment staff within the RCP struggle to apply the cognitive hierarchy to validate data and organize information when producing an understanding of the sustainment picture for the commander. Sustainers within the RCP often spend their time in unproductive battle rhythm meetings that do not adhere to established purpose, inputs, or outputs. Poor understanding of who the key attendees should be in each meeting also results in over participation of the RCP staff, overwhelming each meeting with irrelevant information. Failure to execute a disciplined battle rhythm not only wastes staff planning time but contributes to an inability to understand the current logistics common operational picture and project future requirements with enough detail to enable further planning. The inability to move from data to information to knowledge and provide understanding for the deputy commanding general of sustainment results in the inability to present timely decisions for leaderships input into the corps or division order.



**Figure 5-1. Sustainment Planning Horizons, "A Way"**

**Recommendation(s).** Develop a critical path using the cognitive hierarchy in the RCP ensuring running estimates and LOGSTATs to feed the working groups and boards. Each meeting or battle rhythm event should utilize the seven-minute drill identifying a chairperson, key attendees, purpose, inputs, and desired outputs. Each meeting must support shared understanding between staff entities and result in feasible, suitable, and acceptable courses of action to sustain the divisions freedom of action, operational reach, and prolonged endurance. An effective battle rhythm enables staff to present timely analysis and decisions to the deputy commanding general of sustainment resulting in detailed orders for execution.

Utilize the time between unit training events and annual training requirements to develop a critical path that makes sense for the division staff. Once developed, keep this in the unit tactical standard operating procedures for future reference and refinement.


**Doctrinal References**

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

## Observation 2. Casualty Tracking

**Observation.** The sustainment enterprise often fails to effectively integrate human resources, health service support, and mortuary affairs into a unified contribution to the corps' and division's combat power analysis.

**Discussion.** Combat power is tracked in the current operations cell but is largely maintained by the sustainment WFF in terms of maintenance. However, the personnel aspect of combat power is an essential ingredient to every fighting formation. Failing to appropriately forecast casualties or effectively plan for medical evacuation and treatment, mortuary affairs, and personnel replacements, leads to an erosion of the personnel support combat power. Human resources, health service support, and mortuary affairs require similar transportation capabilities to meet their respective requirements. However, units frequently fail to allocate or request enough platforms which leads to inefficient tasking of ground, sea, and air assets. In turn, this hampers the organizations' ability to maintain 72-120 hours planning horizons for movement of casualties and replacements.



**Figure 5-2. Medical Integration as a Process, “A Way”**

**Recommendation(s).** Integrate health service support, human resources, and mortuary affairs staff under a coherent construct of personnel combat power contributors. Combining the casualty estimates against return to duty, patient evacuation demands, human remains processing, and Soldier replacement throughput allows for visualization of personnel combat power requirements. This apprises commanders of risk and allows staff to understand the combat effectiveness of the organization. These sections must be aligned across the respective command posts to effectively communicate and shape the overall understanding of personnel contributions to combat power.


## Doctrinal References

- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- FM 4-0 *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019

### **Observation 3. Integration between Rear Command Post and Main Command Post**

**Observation.** The rear command post is not integrated with the main command post for future planning efforts resulting in a lack of synchronization of the sustainment WFF with the scheme of maneuver.

**Discussion.** The RCP and main command post (MCP) planners must integrate information sharing and operational activities with the main command post's integrating cells to support planning, targeting, and other processes. The RCP, and specifically the sustainment and protection WFF leads, must be synchronized into the planning element (plans/future operations) in the MCP for a shared understanding of full-depth sustainment requirements and transitions for future maneuver operations, operational framework transitions, rear area boundary shifts, and corps and division support area displacements.




**Figure 5-3. Sustainment Planning**

Commanders may use the RCP to provide command supervision and general officer oversight for:

- Conducting division support area operations
- Performing terrain management and movement control
- Defeating threats
- Enabling sustainment operations
- Coordinating and synchronizing protection
- Enabling stability operations
- Enabling transitions

**Recommendation(s).** Establish the sustainment cell early by planning and consistently training the cell together. Account for sustainment cell manning in the standard operating procedures (SOPs) with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. The sustainment chief should attend relevant executive meetings at corps and division to synchronize sustainment efforts. Establish a sustainment working group that nests with other operational meetings (including subordinate and higher echelon meetings) that supports the commander's decision dominance.





**Figure 5-4. Cross-functional Sustainment Integration**


The sustainment working group must validate all sustainment requirements by phase of the operation ensuring a shared understanding between the RCP and MCP. Units must codify roles and responsibilities in both RCP and MCP to avoid duplication of effort and ensure shared understanding.

#### Doctrinal References

- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 March 2017
- FM 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations*, 23 July 2021
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

### Observation 4. Execute Predictive Religious Support

**Observation.** Plan to surge religious support (RS) personnel to Role 2 brigade support medical companies to provide sustained casualty ministry at echelon (SCME).



**Figure 5-5. Religious Support in Large-scale Combat Operations**

**Discussion.** The sustained casualty ministry at echelon requires close management of RS personnel in support of the division effort to provide area versus organic RS to Soldiers and authorized civilians in LSCO. ATP 1-05.05, *Religious Support and Casualty Care*, 28 August 2019 directs the division chaplain section to develop the RS plan for casualty care across the area of operations. Paradigms developed in two decades of counterinsurgency consider mass casualty operations as primarily occurring for limited duration. Therefore, planners have maintained a bias for organic RS. RS planners in LSCO consider mass casualty operations as a state of persistent casualty flow that will routinely overwhelm organic RS assets, especially during critical operational phases. With limited assets, RS planners must prioritize RS to area-based Army Health System operations. Almost all RS doctrine considers the primacy of organic religious support. In the recently published Center for Army Lessons Learned article, *Religious Support During Large-scale Combat Operations*, 19 August 2024, sustained casualty ministry at echelon is coined to address this shift in thinking and planning.

**Recommendation(s).** Sustain RS planning that demonstrates careful consideration of the demand for sustained casualty ministry at echelon. Division chaplain section planners should include this consideration in the development of initial running estimates and provide advisement to commanders no later than the mission analysis briefing.

**Doctrinal Reference**

- ATP 1-05.05, *Religious Support and Casualty Care*, 28 August 2019

## **Observation 5. Execute Predictive Sustainment Operations**

**Observation.** Successful corps and divisions leverage the battle rhythm to capture or forecast future sustainment demands and use assessment methodologies to measure the performance and effectiveness of their concept of support.

**Discussion.** Divisions require improved assessment methodologies to support predictive sustainment planning by addressing issues with redundant requests and ineffective resource prioritization. Current processes, which rely on repetitive data in daily fragmentary orders and carryover requests from previous air tasking order cycles, lack the comprehensive analysis needed for accurate forecasting. To enable predictive sustainment, divisions must develop precise assessment tools to continuously refine running estimates. These assessments will allow commanders to accurately predict future needs based on both current and historical data, ensuring efficient resource allocation and prioritized sustainment in resource-constrained environments.

**Recommendation(s).** The G-1, surgeon's cell, G-4, and support operations officer must produce detailed running estimates that enable future planning and account for current and anticipated changes to the operational environment to including both friendly and enemy actions. Detailed estimates should also be leveraged as assessment tools to identify unanticipated changes to the operational environment or gaps in the scheme of support. Both detailed running estimates and accurate assessments are crucial for predictive sustainment and precision logistics.

Corps and division staffs must prioritize development of running estimates that anticipate requirements beyond 96-120 hours. Sustainment battle rhythms must incorporate deliberate assessments as part of their sustainment battle rhythm to validate current running estimates and to identify and incorporate changes to the operational environment in future planning.


Corps and divisions need advanced planning tools to enable predictive logistics by rapidly providing better accuracy and detail in reporting that supports running estimates that are continuously updated. Corps and divisions need real-time assessments critical for divisions to perform predictive logistics and precision sustainment operations as described in FM 4-0 *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019.

### **Doctrinal References**

- FM 4-0 *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

## Observation 6. Reconstitution is an on-order Mission in Large-scale Combat Operations

**Observation.** Corps and divisions are challenged to resource and execute reconstitution operations. Contributing factors to this include inadequate or non-existent planning products to support an operation that requires support from all WFFs and oversight by the division or corps headquarters. Reconstitution is a complicated and resource-intensive operation that demands commander guidance to support deliberate planning prior to execution.



**Figure 5-6. Reconstitution**

**Discussion.** In LSCO it should be anticipated that casualties and combat losses of equipment will require deliberate reconstitution to maintain an effective fighting formation. Battle drills and SOPs can be useful products to identify when reconstitution must occur and provide initial planning guidance; however, they lack the level of detail necessary to support the complexity of reconstitution operations and accounting for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. Reconstitution, whether reorganization or regeneration, must be a planned operation to include an approved course of action, tasks to staff and subordinate units, and supporting annexes and tabs in SOPs to leverage support across the formation to accomplish the mission. Battle drills are insufficient to direct reconstitution operations and units relying on these products alone will struggle to generate the staff energy required to fight a formation in contact and reconstitute their combat power.

**Recommendation(s).** Staffs must execute deliberate planning for reconstitution specific to the operational environment and unit mission. SOPs, doctrine, and other generic planning guidance lack the detail necessary to integrate the other warfighting functions and synchronize reconstitution operations with the maneuver plan. In all operations, the enemy gets a vote. Specific to reconstitution, the enemy drives requirements. Unit type, equipment, personnel, and even the mission of reconstituted forces will be determined by unknown enemy effects and an unknown enemy disposition. Achieving the flexibility necessary to support so many unknowns, staffs must have conducted a thorough mission analysis and a fully developed course of action in anticipation of future reconstitution requirements in LSCO. Corps and division staffs must prioritize development of a reconstitution plan suited to their organization. This initial product will provide the framework for battle drills, SOPs, CCIRs, and will accelerate mission-specific planning during the initial phases of LSCO.

### **Doctrinal References**

- ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 31 July 2019
- ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019
- ATP 3-94.4, *Reconstitution Operations*, 5 May 2021



## **Chapter 6**

### **Fires Warfighting Function**

#### **Introduction**

The fiscal year 2024 key observations highlight the requirement for the fires warfighting function to deliberately integrate into all stages of the operations process (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) to exercise the multidomain operations tenets of agility, convergence, endurance, and depth in every operation.

The Army is developing and fielding new lethal and non-lethal effects capabilities capitalizing on emerging technologies to achieve overmatch against peer threats in large-scale combat operations. Corps and divisions seek to use those capabilities to set conditions for subordinate units to maintain positions of relative advantage to achieve their tactical objectives and defeat enemy forces.


New capabilities fielded to Army forces require corps and divisions to anticipate and plan for what is known as the next fight and the fight after next to adequately synchronize capabilities to achieve tactical objectives and commander's desired end-states. The following seven observations focus on concepts that will enable units to more effectively conduct multidomain operations in support of large-scale combat operations.

**Observation 1. Defining Fights through the Operational Framework to enable Fires Planning Synchronization at Echelon**

**Observation.** Corps do not establish operational frameworks that clearly define targeting responsibilities to enable effective fire support planning and execution.

**Discussion.** Fires planning begins with the delineation of targeting responsibilities by assigning areas of operation through boundaries that enable units to clearly define their deep, close, and rear areas. In a multi-corps fight, corps are no longer serving as the land component command and no longer control the fire support coordination line. Corps often assign areas of operation without borders or delineated boundaries to subordinate divisions, or they use fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), such as the fire support coordination line, as unit boundaries. This leads to desynchronizing effects and delinking the fires plan creating confusion as boundaries and FSCMs shift. De-synchronized targeting creates target synchronization matrixes (TSMs) that lack detailed synchronization (initial assessments [decide, detect, deliver, assess]) with fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures (ACMs). This negatively impacts the development and execution of a high-payoff target list (HPTL), attack guidance matrix, and target selection standards. Clearly defined operational frameworks enable responsive fires to support targeting objectives and they should be continually refined through the targeting working groups (TWGs) and target coordination boards (TCBs).

**Recommendation(s).** Units must avoid using FSCMs to define their boundaries and continue to use them to expedite fires (permissive) or safeguard friendly forces (restrictive) within those unit boundaries. Unit forward boundaries must provide adequate depth to enable deep operations against enemy forces to set favorable conditions for subordinate formations. Corps must assign subordinate division areas of operation based on their scheme of maneuver, weapon system capabilities, collection capabilities, and the enemy threat. Similarly, divisions must set favorable conditions for their subordinate brigades by focusing targeting efforts against enemy formations within the division deep area. At echelon, units must communicate risk or adjust boundaries when targeting objectives are not achieved and anticipate boundary shifts to ensure shared understanding of shaping operations. Understanding the relationship unit boundaries have toward targeting requirements enables units to properly execute TWG/TCB to set targeting conditions and requirements at the proper echelon.



**Figure 6-1. Doctrinal Template of Depths and Frontages**

### Doctrinal References

- ATP 3-60.1 *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting*, 5 January 2022 (CAC restricted)
- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022
- FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024
- FM 3-60 *Targeting*, 11 August 2023

## Observation 2. Multi-domain Targeting

**Observation.** Corps struggle to synchronize and integrate effects across all five domains (land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace) and within all three dimensions (physical, human, and information) through the targeting process.

**Discussion.** Corps plan and execute convergence opportunities while subordinate divisions exploit them to maximize effects across all domains and dimensions as outlined in FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022. Most units focus on land and air domains while overlooking the integration of maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities. It is incumbent upon all members of the enterprise to understand capabilities in multiple domains in TWGs and TCBs to ensure the commander can employ all available capabilities. Although these capabilities are typically requested as generic effects through the Army targeting process, those targeting at all levels must prioritize the integration of all domain capabilities to achieve convergence. Approved effects should be rehearsed prior to execution to resolve technical issues that may desynchronize the operation.




Figure 6-2. Multidomain Approach to Lethality

**Recommendation(s).** Corps must ensure that all domains are represented in the TWGs/TCBs and ensure that planned effects are technically rehearsed prior to execution. Attack guidance matrixes must include all available delivery assets to include all domains.

## Doctrinal References

- FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023


### **Observation 3. Integration of High to Medium Altitude Air Defense in Support of Maneuver**

**Observation.** Employment of high to medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) units and short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities are not well understood or executed.

**Discussion.** Training audiences are challenged to identify the gap in coverage between the maximum altitude of SHORAD capabilities and the operational altitude of hostile unmanned aircraft vehicles within corps and division assigned airspace. U.S. Army air defense artillery (ADA) HIMAD weapon systems are under operational control to the Army and tactical control to the area air defense commander, normally the U.S. Air Force air component commander. The lack of robust and detailed information preparation of the operational environment affects the identification of gaps and subsequently the employment of available air defense systems. When gaps are identified, units are challenged to request capabilities to mitigate the risk. Corps and divisions lack the subject matter expertise to plan for and employ Patriot missile units with governing documents for ADA systems. These documents include the area air defense plan and special instructions, both owned by the air component commander. HIMAD units are theater assets that are tied to the defended asset list owned by the joint force commander and normally delegated down to the air component commander, who also serves as the area air defense commander. Training audiences lack an understanding of the Joint Theater Air Missile Defense (JTAMD) process, managed by the Army Air Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), to be able to request addition of their assets. The aforementioned documents will also dictate the command relationship required for the employment of the units. Lastly, HIMAD units require their own protection assets and must be planned for and resourced. Training audiences which receive HIMAD units should plan for and emplace HIMAD resources to be defended against all types of enemy attacks (direct, indirect, electronic warfare, etc.).

**Recommendation(s).** Training audiences should execute robust information preparation of the operational environment to successfully identify the enemy air threat and subsequent capability gaps. One option to cover gaps is to layer HIMAD systems with SHORAD. Identify product list assets requiring HIMAD capability early to be able to submit for consideration in the JTAMD process. Command relationship for Patriot missile units should be discussed with the air component with a full understanding of the area air defense plan and special instructions applicable to the theater. The command relationship must balance the need to avoid fratricide while being able to provide responsive surface to air fires in defense of the ground component. HIMAD units in support of the product list should be added to this list as well to provide appropriate protection including SHORAD.

The ADA brigade is under the command of the AAMDC. ADA brigades can be tasked under command and control of the supported corps commander. The structure of command and control would not matter regarding weapons control procedures. The brigade will always follow the measures established by the AAMDC when conducting air and missile defense operations. ATP 3-01.7 *Air Defense Artillery Brigade Techniques*, 16 March 2016.



**Figure 6-3. Mission Command Structure for Brigade Air Defense (Notional)**  
**Doctrinal References**

- ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024
- FM 3-01, *U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations*, 22 December 2020
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

**Observation 4. Staff Transitions to enable Joint Air-ground Integration Center and Current Operations Integrating Cell Integration**

**Observation.** Divisions do not deliberately transition plans between staff/integrating cells to refine and enable the Joint Air-ground Integration Center (JAGIC) and current operations integration cell (COIC) to execute approved targeting objectives.

**Discussion.** Divisions need to deliberately handoff plans and fighting products of target synchronization matrices, high payoff target lists, attack guidance matrices, target selection standards, priority information requirements, and commander's guidance as they are developed and refined between each integrating cell. The scheme of fires that is developed in plans needs to have draft products to transition to future operations for refinement through the targeting process. Units fail to complete rehearsals to synchronize and integrate fire support with other warfighting functions and fail to synchronize execution of responsibilities between the JAGIC and COIC.

**Recommendation(s).** Planners must communicate effectively between each integrating cell to ensure that the executors understand the targeting objectives across all domains in time and space. Units must conduct a plans handover from the future operations team to the current operations team to ensure shared understanding between the COIC and the JAGIC. The COIC must complete clearance of fires battle drills to understand when and what warfighting functions outside of the JAGIC are responsible for and are codified in the tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) and JAGIC standard operating procedures. The JAGIC and COIC leadership must fully understand what the information requirements are from the JAGIC to maintain situational understanding across the current operations team. The JAGIC and COIC must understand the common operational picture. Leadership must understand who has the delegated authorities to dynamically adjust execution and priorities supporting the shaping requirements that enable the maneuver plan and understand the risk associated with deviating from the intended purpose.

**Doctrinal References**

- ATP 3-09.90, *Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division*, 12 October 2017
- ATP 3-91.1, *Joint Air Ground Integration Center*, 17 April 2019
- FM 3-60, *Army Targeting*, 11 August 2023



## Observation 5. Airspace Synchronization


**Observation.** Units do not effectively plan and refine unit airspace plans (UAPs) to enable joint fires execution.

**Discussion.** The airspace element develops an airspace control appendix as part of the base operations order, outlining UAPs submission requirements for each echelon. During execution, subordinate airspace elements encounter challenges in submitting ACM requests earlier than a 24-hour planning horizon.

Units use the targeting process to link specific ACMs to targeting efforts to submit requests and they are predominately immediate requests. The ACMs on division artillery and field artillery brigade UAPs are often arbitrarily deemed unrealistic by higher headquarters airspace elements or the airspace control authority. This leads to them being disapproved.

A complete UAP is required for the JAGIC to understand and control the consolidated air common operating picture, preventing them from relying on dynamic ACM request submissions.

**Recommendation(s).** Units must understand the responsibilities delegated to them for their assigned airspace and plan and submit UAPs to support responsive fires execution. Senior leader interest in airspace planning is critical to maximize permissive fires and ensure that an airspace working group will synchronize the requirements of all airspace users to support the division's operations. A formalized airspace working group allows the airspace managers to manage and refine the UAP based on subordinate unit inputs and targeting requirements. UAP refinement synchronizes airspace, surface to surface fires, rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial systems. Focus targeting efforts on a limited number of targets on the high-payoff target list with dedicated sensor-to-shooters to find and destroy those critical targets within preplanned airspace.




**Figure 6-4. Pre-Planned Airspace Coordination Measures to Facilitate Fires**

### Doctrinal References

- ATP 3-52.1, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control*, 21 June 2023 (CAC restricted)
- ATP 3-91.1, *The Joint Air Ground Integration Center*, 17 April 2019

## Observation 6. Field Artillery Technical Rehearsals

**Observation.** Corps and divisions do not conduct field artillery (FA) technical rehearsals that validate sensor-to-shooter linkages and rehearse unit battle drills through mission command systems.



**Discussion.** FA technical rehearsals validate fire support plans to be executed by the fire support element, FA brigades, subordinate FA battalions, and attached unit enablers. These rehearsals focus on digital database verification, fire mission routing, unit positioning, active FSCMs, and ACMs. Most fire support elements lead an FA technical rehearsal six hours prior to the start of the exercise. However, these rehearsals are typically not planned well or communicated across the enterprise. Most units produce a generic mission-routing battle drill to help execute the rehearsal, but often lack detail on missions to be rehearsed and details are often not disseminated to subordinate units. Airspace clearance and cross-boundary fires procedures are also not defined well or rehearsed, which adds additional friction during execution.

**Figure 6-5. Field Artillery Technical Rehearsal**

**Recommendation(s).** Units must assign primary, alternate, and tertiary points of contact for the execution of FA technical rehearsals early in the orders process and publish orders that provide detailed inputs/outputs, unit battle drills, and digital standard operating procedures for mission command systems. Rehearsals must involve all representatives from the current operations staff and enablers such as the FA brigade, tactical air control party, special operations forces, and the security force assistance brigades to validate sensor-to-shooter linkages that create shared understanding across the force.

## Doctrinal Reference

- FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024

### **Observation 7. Fighting Products Codified in Tactical Standard Operating Procedures**

**Observation.** Units fail to codify their fighting products within unit TACSOPs.

**Discussion.** Fighting products like the TSM, HPTL, target selection standards, and other unit synchronization matrices are rarely codified within unit TACSOPs, which creates challenges for new Soldiers during transition periods. The TSM indicates the alignment of sensors and shooters against high payoff targets (HPTs) across the joint air-tasking cycle and often serves as the primary fighting product for current operations. Some units develop TSMs with limited data that inhibits current operations and the subordinate unit's ability to visualize the fight in time and space. The fire support element at each echelon typically owns the responsibility of developing the TSM (as they are integrated with the higher headquarters staff) works directly with the information collection manager and leads the targeting process.

Also, some fighting products, such as the attack guidance matrix and target selection standards, are rarely updated throughout the duration of the operation and need to list all available delivery options to the commander.

**Recommendation(s).** Units must standardize the formats and production responsibilities of their targeting products within their TACSOP.

#### **Doctrinal Reference**

- FM 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*, 12 August 2024

## Chapter 7

### Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function

#### Introduction

As battlefield lethality continues to rise, the imperative for agile maneuver has not been more critical. This chapter explores themes necessary for effective combat maneuvering, highlighting the need for division and corps to operate as cohesive units rather than isolated entities. This section will validate that agility is essential for achieving tactical and operational objectives in today's complex multidomain environments with observations centering on tactics, fires and maneuver, reconnaissance, and integrated operations. This chapter underscores Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Key Observation 1: Managing Fights. As corps and divisions coordinate their efforts across various operational areas, we must address how to adapt to the enemy's actions, which demand constant assessment of areas of operation and the sharing of critical intelligence.

It is important to understand the role of setting conditions to allow for maneuver in planning, especially as the Army restructures the brigade combat teams (BCTs) to brigades. Now organized with less combat power, it is critical that divisions ensure their brigades are adequately resourced for the assigned task and that conditions are met prior to committing brigades in the close fight. Maneuvering brigades to ensure they are attacking the enemy's weaknesses rather than strengths is critical to success. This shift presents challenges requiring divisions to take the lead in maneuver responsibilities, particularly through the lens of the current operations integration cell (COIC).

This chapter will explore the intricate relationship between fires and maneuver. Effective combat operations depend on the seamless integration of fire support and tactical movements. The chapter discusses how planning the scheme of maneuver and fires in isolation undermines tactical coherence, thereby urging mutually supporting efforts.

Further observations show that a renewed focus on reconnaissance provides early warning, reaction time, and maneuver space for commander's decision making. Trends demonstrate reconnaissance and sharing critical information about enemy composition and disposition with intent is suboptimal. Reconnaissance fundamentals must be integrated to provide the understanding of the enemy and operational environment required to enable freedom of maneuver.

Finally, this chapter will address current operations integration cells, highlighting the role in enabling maneuver among various echelons. This will illuminate how successful integration, and synchronization can lead to greater tactical effectiveness and reduced attrition on the battlefield.

Through presenting these observations, MCTP aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how maneuver warfare must evolve to more agile systems and processes to meet the challenges of modern conflict, ensuring that commanders and troops are equipped well to win in multidomain large-scale combat operations.


## **Observation 1. Setting Conditions to Enable Maneuver**

**Observation.** Corps and division schemes of maneuver heavily rely on shaping deep before subordinate commands are committed to the close fight. However, these shaping efforts often fall short of achieving desired effects which leaves brigades to attack into enemy strength while being under resourced for the fight.

**Discussion.** During Warfighter exercises, divisions often maneuver by advancing multiple brigades abreast, covering the entire width of the division's area of operations. This approach unintentionally pushes brigades into fights with less than a 3 to 1 force ratio. Divisions that fight this way intend to heavily shape objectives ahead of brigades with fires, but then fail to achieve favorable force ratios. To enable success, divisions must have a good information collection plan to accurately assess the enemy's combat power two levels down prior to committing the brigades to the objective. Failing to assess that conditions have not been met prior to an attack leads to heavy attrition and commanders are forced to commit unplanned combat power which slows the division's tempo.

It is important for planners to develop a scheme of maneuver that leverages positions of relative advantage, concentrating their combat power on enemy weaknesses. When divisions inaccurately assess progress of shaping efforts, do not understand where the enemy weakness is, and then transition the fight to an under-resourced brigade too soon failure becomes inevitable. By applying good tactics, effective fires to achieve favorable force ratios, and combined arms maneuver in the close area the divisions can capitalize on their strengths and achieve greater tactical success. Divisions that also adhere to the characteristics of the offense (surprise, concentration, audacity, and tempo) achieve much higher degrees of success.

**Recommendation(s).** Divisions succeed when they employ forms of maneuver that position brigades at points of relative advantage where they can attack enemy weakness instead of strengths. This requires setting conditions for the brigades and a successful information collection effort that provides an understanding of where the enemy's weakness is on the battlefield. Unity of effort, arraying forces, and developing a cohesive scheme of maneuver puts divisions in positions of strength. Additionally, divisions should prioritize a main effort that achieves a decisive point, ensuring that all efforts contribute to gaining that decisive advantage over the enemy. By adopting these practices, divisions will optimize their operations and increase their overall effectiveness on the battlefield.




**Figure 7-1. Division Scheme of Maneuver Example**

### Example

A good division scheme of maneuver that attacked enemy weakness is depicted in Figure 7-1. The division used four of its assigned maneuver brigades to fix strength and attack weakness as part of one scheme.

The division deliberately shaped Objectives Lincoln, Jefferson, and Grant to achieve favorable force ratios for each of their brigades. Upon confirming enemy strength two levels down on each of the objectives, the division committed their first Stryker brigade to fix a heavily attrited enemy armor battalion to the north. The division was then able to bypass this formation and maneuver south with supporting effort two, which was an infantry brigade air assault seizing key terrain in vicinity of a wet gap crossing and establishing security for the main effort.

The main effort then moved south with two brigades to penetrate obstacles along the route, enable the crossing, and continue the fight into the enemy rear area. The enemy commander had to decide whether to withdraw to more advantageous terrain or lose connection to their logistical trains and begin to lose combat power. Rear area forces were then able to move up to contain the enemy and prevent their retrograde to their lines.



### Figure 7-2. Example of a Single Envelopment

## Doctrinal References

- FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022
- FM 3-90, *Tactics*, May 2023



## **Observation 2. The Relationship between Fires and Maneuver**

**Observation.** MCTP observed varying degrees of mutual support between fires and maneuver.

**Discussion.** Units may encounter the pitfall of focusing exclusively on fires shaping in the deep area or exclusively on fires in the close area. This type of isolated focus usually results in overall poor fires results and contributes to attritional maneuver warfare. A significant amount of initial observer-coach/trainer (O-C/T) effort assists senior training audiences in finding a balance in the close and deep efforts during a Warfighter exercise.

After achieving this proper balance, coaching efforts transition to enabling the processes and techniques whereby balance is maintained through planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. A second related pitfall is division maneuver planners often fail to appreciate the symbiotic relationship between an operational framework, the associated scheme of maneuver, and what is feasible in terms of fire support. For example, one common observation is a division, with all three of its subordinate brigades online in a frontal attack is unable to simply weight a main effort in terms of fire support unless it has some form of external fires augmentation (which may be unlikely to come unless the division is the main effort). This is a product of the division artillery being forced to disperse its three cannon battalions to direct support of their respective habitual brigades who each own a piece of the forward line of troops. These (or similar) fire support limitations directly influence division maneuver and should give commanders and staff pause before they employ all maneuver units abreast or otherwise dilute fire support.

### **Example**


A key concrete experience illuminating this dynamic is the 2003 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) “Thunder Run” to Baghdad, where the lack of outside reinforcing cannon artillery assets forced the division to accept risk in using division artillery direct support (DS) cannon battalions in mutually reinforcing roles weighted towards its lead BCT. During the rapid offensive operation and with a portion of their division rocket artillery allocated by higher headquarters as time-sensitive target shooters, the unit was very limited in the ability to weight the main effort with cannon fires. Meanwhile, division supporting efforts were often left with no dedicated artillery support. Another valid requirement that exacerbated this issue was assignment of one DS cannon battery to the division cavalry squadron. All told, two of the unit’s cannon battalions mostly operated with only two firing batteries. 3rd Brigade Comat Team fought on a 100-kilometer front with only one DS cannon battery for most of the operation. 2nd Brigade Comat Team (the division main effort in Baghdad) fought the entire operation with only two firing batteries.

Figure 7-3 illustrates multiple approaches to field artillery task organization for combat, showing:

- Division artillery direct support to the division, versus
- Field artillery units assigned direct support missions accounting for all subordinate maneuver units with a lightly weighted main effort of one DS cannon battalion plus a reinforcing High-mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalion in general support, versus

- A heavily weighted main effort of two DS cannon battalions plus a reinforcing HIMARS battalion in general support which leaves one subordinate maneuver unit without DS fire support

See also Observation 1 for more discussion on the importance of seeking out and acting on enemy weaknesses with a properly resourced and weighted main effort. See also Observation 3 for more discussion on considerations for division reconnaissance organizations and operations.




**Figure 7-3. Field Artillery Task Organization for Combat, "A Way"**

Corps commanders and staff must be cognizant of the above considerations when providing divisions with task and purpose in an assigned area of operations within the context of the overall operational framework. When a division is a supporting effort and thus weighted with less fires capability, for example, it may be prudent for the corps to own more of the deep area forward of the supporting effort division as compared to the main effort division. Similarly, corps analysis of correlation of forces and means must extend into the close area and account for maneuver and fires capabilities of subordinate division and brigades in the area.

Corps and divisions may employ maneuver forces in deep areas in the form of reconnaissance organizations or aviation deep attacks. Units are typically prepared for close coordination between fires and maneuver in the close area of the operational framework, yet they struggle to recreate the same successful conditions in the deep area. Units must apply the same rigor of coordination found in close area fire and maneuver planning/preparation to their deep area coordination. The combat aviation brigade (CAB) provides most combat power to aviation deep attacks, such attacks must be resourced and synchronized appropriately by the corps or division.

Fires must support maneuver across the depth/breadth of the operational framework regardless of volume and frequency of execution and adjustment decisions. Maneuver warfare hinges on synchronization of movement and maneuver warfighting function with fire support. Corps and divisions must recognize the relationship between fires and maneuver is complex and complementary rather than simple and sequential. It is not just fire to maneuver or maneuver to fire. Tactical coherence suffers in a compounding way when fires and maneuver across echelons disconnect. Vertical/horizontal integration in fires/maneuver must occur to reduce attrition rates.



**Figure 7-4. Warfighting Function Interdependency in the Operations Process**

**Recommendation(s).** Vertical and horizontal integration must be achieved through a field artillery support plan (FASP) at echelon that includes an understanding of the field artillery task organization for combat and the movement and maneuver means for artillery units to occupy position areas for artillery that support the overall scheme of maneuver.

After the two-dimensional operational framework is drafted, the G-3 must oversee in course of action development so that all warfighting functions nest their own scheme into the scheme of maneuver and three dimensional multidomain battlespace. The unit must account for the unit air plan and sustainment and protection of these assets throughout the duration of operations.

Wargaming must account for position area for artillery validation in terms of terrain availability and the feasibility to range planned targets as well as the acceptability of the unit air plan.

The scheme of maneuver, scheme of fires, artillery task organization, and planned position areas for artillery all come together in the timely publication of the FASP blending fire support with movement and maneuver. Changes to these FASP components should be planned out at a minimum by phase or air tasking order day, and in some cases, for critical and complex events like an air assault or wet gap crossing. The changes may need to be planned down to the hourly level of detail on the synchronization matrix. It is imperative that the COIC and Joint Air-ground Integration Center control execution of this plan in tandem so that fires and maneuver cells remain synchronized and that these cells are well-postured to proactively assess when execution or adjustment decisions are needed. The target audience is unit G-3s, maneuver planners, and current operations maneuver leaders. These individuals must oversee fires and maneuver integration and the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of the FASP at echelon with their fires peers. Multiple repetitions in training and codification of best practices in SOPs can overcome leader and key personnel turnover.

### **Doctrinal References**

- ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014
- ATP 3-91.1, *The Joint Air Ground Integration Center*, 17 April 2019
- ATP 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 April 2016
- FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

### **Observation 3. Division Reconnaissance**

**Observation.** Units that do not clearly define the purpose of reconnaissance and security for the entirety of the operation fail to properly and effectively resource and synchronize enabling operations. This results in challenges with understanding the enemy's effects on the operating environment and with providing the commander with enough decision space.

**Discussion.** Divisions find it challenging to clearly define the purpose of reconnaissance and security based on the mission, commander's intent, and their understanding of the enemy. This purpose should be defined early and validated or refined throughout the operation to enable operations for the division with updated PIRs and refined reconnaissance and security operations. The deliberate effort to define the purpose and tasks associated will allow the organization to evaluate risk and allocate the appropriate level of capability to:

- Make contact with the smallest force possible.
- Preserve freedom of action for the commander.
- Identify positions of relative advantage.


Based on recent observed Warfighter exercise trends, divisions that consider leveraging corps and above assets, special operations forces, and security force assistance brigades with host nation forces by sharing PIRs to gain intelligence create efficiency while preserving reconnaissance and security assets. Divisions should also consider using the attack reconnaissance squadron within the CAB to accomplish reconnaissance and security tasks, especially within divisions that now lack organic motorized reconnaissance squadrons. Divisions are successful at reconnaissance when they apply all available assets for collection and targeting beyond surveillance and expand it to meeting the needs of assessments of the enemy's actual capabilities.

Divisions that identify the need for a reconnaissance and security task force are frequently challenged to assign them tactical tasks that are within their capabilities and nested with the commander's reconnaissance and security guidance. Doctrine describes echelons above brigade planning considerations which must begin with identifying the purpose and intent of reconnaissance and security operations based on commander's guidance and mission analysis (FM 3-98, *Reconnaissance and Security Operations*, 1 October 2023, Appendix A). Planners commonly identify the requirement for a reconnaissance and surveillance task force early during course of action development but rarely validate their assumptions during wargaming. This can lead to the task organization of the reconnaissance and security task force not being suited to the purpose it is supposed to achieve for the division and the task organization is only combat effective for the first phase of the operation while waiting for reconstitution operations. Additionally, division planners are challenged to consider the capabilities of the reconnaissance and security task force's staff when they assign enablers to them. This leads to limited or niche assets within the division not being employed effectively. A common example of this is failing to attach an aviation planner or similar capability when providing an air cavalry troop in a direct support role to the reconnaissance and security task force.

In an operational framework commonly seen at Warfighter exercises, the intelligence handover line (if identified), is placed at a point that outpaces the brigades' maneuver and detection capability. This leads to stale data on the objective and brigades entering contact with the enemy

in a movement-to-contact approach as the collection assets have pushed deeper into the battlespace and are not together with the maneuver plan.

**Recommendation(s).** Divisions should leverage non-organic assets, when possible, to conserve combat power considering the most recent Army structure impacts to reconnaissance and intelligence assets at the brigade level. Units should consider the use of all capabilities available to create a layered and comprehensive reconnaissance and security effort. Regardless of whether the division employs a division-level reconnaissance organization, divisions should identify reconnaissance and security purpose and intent during mission analysis. If a division chooses to employ a division-level reconnaissance and security organization, planners must consider capabilities and combat power required to accomplish the desired reconnaissance and security tasks throughout all phases of the operation. In lieu of dedicated division reconnaissance organizations, divisions should align reconnaissance and security tasks with their subordinate maneuver brigades nesting collection plans with the maneuver plan and the decision support matrix to ensure continuous collection on the objective and not solely on the deep objective. Divisions should identify and publish intelligence handover lines to mitigate the risk of intelligence seams. This will ensure continuous awareness of the enemy and enable the division to adequately weight the main effort.



**Figure 7-5. Potential Intelligence Gaps**

Many staffs lack experimental or tacit understanding of reconnaissance and security doctrine to appropriately plan for and employ a division reconnaissance task force. Staffs should conduct leader professional development to increase depth of knowledge about reconnaissance and

security prior to command post exercises. The division also lacks a dedicated reconnaissance and security formation for the division commander. Staff must analyze the risk associated with their chosen solution to reconnaissance and security based on assets available.




Figure 7-6. Intelligence Handovers

#### Doctrinal References

- FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 2023
- FM 3-98, *Reconnaissance and Security Operations*, 1 October 2023


### Observation 4. Enabling Agility in the Current Operations Integration Cell

**Observation.** Units tend to fight from meetings rather than from the COIC. COICs enable agility when they effectively anticipate decisions and empower senior leaders to assess, decide, and direct subordinate commands in the short-range time horizon.

**Discussion.** COICs serve as the critical hub for understanding and shaping the battlefield. Led by the chief of operations (CHOPS), or assistant G-3, the COIC is responsible for synchronizing current operations striving to meet the unit's end state through continuous coordination and short-range planning. It is essential for COICs to actively monitor the battle and fight through friction to ensure synchronization and concentration of combat power at decisive points. However, staff in the COIC are often not prepared to apprise on execution decisions such as CAB out-of-contact attacks, air assaults, and division-level maneuvers with multiple brigades. Additionally, COIC staff frequently fail to recognize mission variable changes from across the warfighting functions that require adjustments to the plan and overlook shifts in relative advantage that could disrupt division synchronization.

**Recommendation(s).** Rehearse fundamental current operations integration processes with all warfighting functions represented through division battle drills, 2-minute drills, operations synchronization meetings, BUBs, and CUBs

Do not produce tedious slide decks for operations synchronization meetings, BUBs, and CUBs. Instead, leverage live data and collaborative tools in Army battle command systems to the maximum extent possible. The G-33, the CHOPS, must be the conductor of the COIC and ensure all warfighting functions representatives thoroughly understand the critical events, transitions, and decisions anticipated during their shift and in the next 24 hours. Then continuously monitor and direct coordination efforts to achieve the necessary conditions for success. Unit senior leaders must prevent processes from other integrating cells disrupting key COIC processes and personnel, particularly the G-33 CHOPS. It is recommended that the G-3 and deputy commanding general are always present in the COIC as tasking/delegated decision authorities. The appropriate decision authority must chair meetings where decision-making authority is needed.



**Figure 7-7. Current Operations Integration Cell Processes and Key Events Example**



### Example of Directing Execution in the COIC

At 0200 local time in the division main command post, the division is engaged in a high intensity fight to cross a wet gap with two maneuver brigades and seize key terrain before sunrise. 1st Brigade reports an unexpected complex obstacle at their crossing point, which is too deep to breach and the brigade has lost over a battalion of combat power. Meanwhile, 2nd Brigade encounters only a minor obstacle but faces an enemy armored vehicle positioned to counterattack within two hours. The division commander is currently off the network after a battlefield circulation, making it critical to act without his presence.

Fortunately, the deputy commanding general of maneuver is present and engaged in the fight from the COIC floor. He quickly connects the brigades and division staff, conducts a commander's dialogue to generate options, and makes an immediate adjustment decision. He issues a verbal order to prioritize support for 2nd Brigade and updates the contingency operations and execution matrix for immediate execution. The 2nd Brigade then becomes the new division main effort, crosses the gap, transitions to a hasty defense, and prepares to defeat the enemy counterattack with prioritized support from the division.




Figure 7-8. Feeding into the Common Operational Picture

### Doctrinal References

- ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 October 2014
- ATP 3-91.1, *The Joint Air Ground Integration Center*, 17 April 2019
- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022

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ADP 3-19, *Fires*, 31 July 2019.

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ATP 3-94.4, *Reconstitution Operations*, 5 May 2021.

ATP 4-02.2, *Medical Evacuation*, 12 July 2019.

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FM 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 July 2019.

FM 4-02, *Army Health System*, 17 November 2020.

FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*, 16 May 2022.

FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 16 May 2022.

FM 6-02, *Signal Support to Operations*, 19 September 2019.

FM 6-05, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*, 1 January 2022 (CAC restricted).

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## Appendix B

### Glossary

AAMDC	Army Air Missile Defense Command
ACM	air coordinating measure(s)
ADA	air defense artillery
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFATDS	Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AIDP	Army Intelligence Data Platform
AMCS	Army Mission Command System
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCT	brigade combat team
BDA	battle damage assessment
B2C2WG	boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups
CAB	combat aviation brigade
CAC	common access card
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement(s)
CHOPS	chief of current operations
CIP	common intelligence picture
CJSOTF	combined joint special operations task force
COIC	current operations integrating cell
COP	common operational picture
CPCE	Command Post Commuting Environment
CUOPS	current operations
DCGS-Army	Distributed Common Ground System-Army
DS	direct support
FA	field artillery
FASP	field artillery support plan
FSCM	fire support coordination measure
FM	field manual
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
FUOPS	future operations
GS	general support
HIMAD	high to medium altitude air defense
HIMARS	High-mobility Artillery Rocket System
HPTL	high-payoff target list
ICP	information collection plan

IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
IHL	intelligence handover line
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAGIC	Joint Air-ground Integration Center
JTAMD	Joint Theater Air Missile Defense
LSCO	large-scale combat operations
MCP	main command post
MCTP	Mission Command Training Program
MDMP	military decision-making process
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
MIB	military intelligence brigade
MICO	military intelligence company
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
NIPR	non-secure internet protocol router
OPT	operational planning team
PACE	primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (plan)
PIR	priority of intelligence requirement
PWG	plans working group
RCP	rear command post
RS	religious support
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SCME	sustained casualty ministry at echelon
SHORAD	short-range air defense
SIPR	secure internet protocol router
SOF	special operations force(s)
SOP	standard operating procedure
TAC	tactical command post
TACSOP	Tactical standard operating procedure
TC	training circular
TCB	target coordination board
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSM	target synchronization matrix
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
TWG	targeting working group
UAP	unit airspace plan
WFF	warfighting function
WFX	Warfighter exercise



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