



# Year In Review

November 2009 to November 2010



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Cover: An Afghan National Army color guard marches during the Fourth Term Oath Ceremony at Camp Gazi on October 26, 2010.

Back cover: Afghan National Civil Order Police hand out school supplies to students in Kabul.

Contents: An Afghan Air Force pilot preflights a C-27 Spartan.







## A Letter from the Commanding General

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and our Afghan partners collectively made significant progress in the past year, reversing previous negative trends, but more effort is required for the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) to secure their people and stabilize their country. Continued international support is also required to create a self-sustaining and enduring ANSF.

Before November 2009 there were insufficient resources to properly conduct the NTM-A mission. This led to a singular focus on quantity, recruitment and assignment of soldiers and police with little or no training, paying them less than a living wage, and an inability to properly develop leaders. As our resources grew, our collective focus shifted to growing the force, increasing the quality of the force, and building the foundation to professionalize the force.

Since November 2009, the ANSF has expanded in size and improved its quality. To facilitate this, we collectively increased the capability and capacity of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to man, train, equip, and support police and soldiers. All members of the ANSF attend basic training, which includes survivability, professionalism, and literacy training before being assigned. Pay has been increased to provide a living wage and reduce potential for predatory corruption. Finally, a dedicated focus on developing Afghan leaders has led to increased leadership capability and accountability at all levels. These measures enabled the Afghan National Army and Police to attain their 2010 end strength goals three months ahead of schedule and begin to professionalize. These efforts assisted our partners to field an infantry-centric army and police force capable of participating in counterinsurgency operations.

For this next year, we will collectively maintain our momentum and reinforce our sense of urgency to deal with collective challenges. There will continue to be leader shortfalls in the Afghan National Army, and some corrupt and inefficient leaders remain in the Army and Police. Attrition also is a constant challenge that undermines professionalization, delays growth, and degrades quality. NTM-A will support our Afghan partners to continue growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force.

As you will see in the following pages, each of these challenges can be overcome with the support of our Afghan partners and international community. As the ANSF continues to grow in size and capability, additional trainers are required—"no trainers, no transition." With specialized trainers, we are optimistic that we will achieve our shared vision for the future—Afghanistan secured by Afghans.

This report is dedicated to the members of NTM-A/CSTC-A who have given their lives or have been wounded in support of our mission.



A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "W B Caldwell IV".

WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding

See our photo gallery: <http://ntm-a.com/command/documents/1581-ntm-a-1-year-in-pictures-pdf>  
Read about our Command at: [www.NTM-A.com](http://www.NTM-A.com)



## Executive Summary

Afghanistan requires a professional, enduring, and self-sustaining security force to set the conditions for a stable environment. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established on 21 November 2009 to help build this Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). Since the NTM-A Commander is “dual hatted” as the Commander of the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the two commands were seamlessly combined under the NTM-A flag. To assist the ANSF, NTM-A’s focus areas for the first year were: grow the force, increase the quality of the force, and build the foundation to professionalize the force. This second year NTM-A will sustain the positive momentum achieved with a focus in the following areas—continue growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force.

There were some solid programs at the establishment of NTM-A, but there were urgent challenges due to lack of resourcing and a narrow mandate. Some training facilities were close to being shut down due to lack of manning could only focus on quantity. Most police were recruited and assigned without being trained, and were not paid a living wage and lacked wage parity with other similar security jobs or even the Taliban. Recruiting dropped to near record lows, and there was a lack of solid and credible Afghan leadership. In our first year, NTM-A worked to get the inputs right with respect to resources, strategy, organization, and people. Part of this effort was changing our internal organization to build a seamless, combined headquarters and updating approaches to key programs. These efforts assisted our Afghan partners to reverse negative trends and field an infantry-centric and police force capable of participating in counterinsurgency operations. Together, the

ANSF and NTM-A have built momentum going into NTM-A’s second year of partnership with the ANSF.

The ANSF has enjoyed extraordinary growth and increased training capacity. In ten months, the Afghan National Army (ANA) total strength grew from 97,011 to 138,164, an increase of 41,153 (42%), and the Afghan National Police (ANP) total strength grew from 94,958 to 120,504, an increase of 25,546 (27%). In total the ANSF grew from 191,969 to 258,668, an increase of 66,699 (35%).<sup>1</sup> However, high attrition remains a long-term concern, especially in the Afghan National Civil Order Police. ANSF quality has steadily improved this year. ANSF Leader Development has been NTM-A’s #1 priority, and NTM-A has emphasized literacy, as it is the basis for professional military and law enforcement personnel. Training improved, partly as NTM-A focused on three steps for training: train Afghan recruits, train Afghans to be trainers, and train Afghans to assume control of their systems and institutions. We brought on line the first ANA branch and specialty schools, which will develop the specialized skill sets to facilitate the ANA becoming an enduring, self-generating, and self-sustaining force. The Mol and NTM-A implemented a **new model of “Recruit-Train-Assign,”** which makes training mandatory for all police recruits and thereby providing **entry-level professionalization** for the Afghan Uniformed Police. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan started an initiative to establish Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP are local police forces and will help “thicken” security and set the conditions for enduring local security—enabling increased development and governance. NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) assisted the Afghan Air Force to make significant progress towards becoming a

<sup>1</sup>This information includes the Afghan National Army’s information and the Afghan National Police’s information for September 2010.

professional, fully independent, operationally capable, and sustainable force by 2016. With NTM-A support, the ANSF improved in logistics, intelligence, medical, legal, and communications, but there is still much work to be done.

To properly manage its significant budgets, CSTC-A refined its management and oversight practices. This included developing and executing a strategy to transition facility operations and management to the ANSF, as well as ensure the \$9.6 billion investment in ANSF infrastructure is properly invested and maintained. CSTC-A's ministerial development programs assisted MoD and Mol in building systems required to grow and professionalize their security ministries. Today, our advisory efforts have been reorganized and we have brought in more highly-qualified senior advisors, both civilian and military. These changes allowed NTM-A advisors to facilitate steady, incremental progress in Mol and MoD over the past year. NTM-A anti-corruption efforts focus on preventive behavior modification, and we encourage ANSF leaders to be aggressive in their anti-corruption efforts. Some of the major efforts to stem corruption include implementing electronic funds transfers (EFT) to provide transparency for salaries and following International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) guidance on counterinsurgency contracting practices.

NTM-A's Afghan First and Afghan Made Procurement initiatives created thousands of enduring, sustainable Afghan jobs and ensured we are enabling indigenous manufacturers to outfit and equip the ANSF. Community Outreach is a key part in working to ensure that Afghan civil society organizations—and their international supporters—can play a role in sustaining the long-term training and reform of the ANSF.

NTM-A/CSTC-A is currently 78%<sup>2</sup> manned after receiving an influx of U.S. and NATO personnel since November 2009. Twenty-nine Coalition nations provide troops to NTM-A; another six nations have pledged future troop support. In addition to personnel, twenty-one nations also supported ANSF development through a variety of donations including infrastructure, supplies, equipment, and NATO Trust Fund deposits. At the NTM-A Force Generation Conference held at Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) in February 2010, nations confirmed their pledges for three-hundred institutional trainers. Seven months later, nations pledged an additional six-hundred institutional trainers at the ISAF Force Generation Conference at SHAPE on 22-23 September 2010. Although this progress is promising, nine-hundred more institutional trainers are needed to fill all NATO trainer positions; a lack of these specialty trainers will delay transition.

For this next year of NTM-A, we will assist the ANSF in leveraging the solid foundation we collectively built. While there has been substantial progress in growth and in building the training base, we are realistic about the challenges we face but also optimistic about the future. The NTM-A vision for next year is sustaining the momentum we have built. To support this vision, NTM-A's focus areas will be: continue growth; build support and enabling forces; develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions; and begin the process to professionalize the force. The ANSF and NTM-A have formed a strong, winning team. It is truly a team of teams to meet the challenges of the coming year—challenges that can be overcome with proper planning, effort, stewardship, and resourcing.

<sup>2</sup>As of November 1, 2010.



**Together, the ANSF  
and NTM-A have built  
momentum going into  
NTM-A's second year of  
partnership with the ANSF.**



# One Year Review and the Way Forward

**1. Introduction.** Only the Afghans can ultimately secure and stabilize their country, and a secure and stable Afghanistan is a vital interest of Afghans, the international community, and the Coalition. To assist the Afghans in reaching this ultimate goal, NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must help set conditions for a stable environment, which requires establishing security, fostering legitimate governance, and spurring economic development. Establishing long-term security will require a **professional, enduring, self-sustaining** Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). To assist our Afghan partners in building the capacity of their security forces, NATO established the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) on 21 November 2009. The focus areas for NTM-A's first year were: **grow the force, increase the quality of the force, and build the foundation to professionalize the force.** The ANSF made **significant progress in the last twelve months** with support from NTM-A and collaborating stakeholders.<sup>1</sup> In the next twelve months, our collective effort must **sustain the positive momentum we have created; we must continue growth, build support and enabling forces,**<sup>2</sup> **develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force.** Throughout this effort, we collectively must also focus on **stewardship. We must ensure judicious use and careful maintenance of the past seven years' investment of \$ 19.4 billion, as well as the next two years' investment of over \$20.9 billion.** This document will review conditions at the time of NTM-A activation, detail progress at the one year mark, and provide an examination of our future challenges and concerns.

**2. Overview.** NTM-A's mission statement is: *NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with NATO Nations and Partners, International Organizations, Donors and NGOs; supports the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) as it generates and sustains the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity in order to enable accountable Afghan-led security.* To accomplish this mission, NTM-A must synchronize NATO and other stakeholder efforts. This includes the efforts of the United States Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which remains the authority responsible for oversight of U.S. funding and ministerial



Coalition soldiers raise the NATO flag at the standup of NTM-A.

development efforts.<sup>3</sup> While ANSF quality and quantity are more easily measured in terms of input, measuring the output of NTM-A and the ANSF programs is more difficult. Ultimately, the ability of the ANSF to positively impact the operational environment is the most important assessment. All stakeholders are involved in this assessment process, and feedback from the operational force is being used to revise training programs and professional education so that the ANSF is even more effective in the future.

**a. First Year of NTM-A.** In the first year of NTM-A, we assisted our Afghan partners to **reverse negative trends** (for example: high attrition and low training standards) and to **field an infantry-centric (warfighting) force capable of participating in counterinsurgency operations.** NTM-A's focus areas were to: **grow the force, increase the quality of the force, and build the foundation to professionalize the force.** To support these focus areas, NTM-A changed our internal organization to build a seamless, combined headquarters. NTM-A updated

<sup>1</sup>The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-Afghanistan), and nations that are not part of NATO (e.g. Jordan, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates) have made vital contributions in assisting the ANSF, especially the Afghan National Police.

<sup>2</sup>Examples of enablers are Presidential airlift, engineers, route clearance, artillery, and logistics units.

<sup>3</sup>The Commanding General of NTM-A is "dual hatted" as the Commander of CSTC-A

approaches to key programs, which will be examined in detail later in this document. NTM-A created a sense of urgency that supported accelerated ANSF growth. A lack of transparency and professionalism in many parts of the ANSF hampered our efforts, but recent leadership changes in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) this past summer were seen as positive steps, representing a potential shift towards meritocracy and away from the degree of factionalism and nepotism we have seen in the past.

**b. Second Year of NTM-A.** Over the next year we will **use the solid foundation we have built to ensure continued growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force.**

Assisting our Afghan partners to build an enduring and self-sustaining force remains a distinct challenge, and the attainment of the growth objectives for the next year is not assured. While current growth objectives are ahead of projections, combat operations combined with frequent operational deployments, and the resultant attrition will pose real challenges for our collective efforts in both quantity and quality. As our focus shifts to the generation of a more balanced, self-sustaining force,<sup>4</sup> the need for specialized trainers becomes urgent. There is a direct correlation between specialized instructor capabilities and the probability of successful long-term ANSF growth and professional development. We will need to continue to balance the tensions between current operational demands and longer-term ANSF growth and professionalization.

**3. Conditions at Establishment of NTM-A.** There were some solid programs underway at the establishment of NTM-A, such as the force generation process,<sup>5</sup> but there were **urgent issues and challenges due to lack of sufficient resourcing.** Some training facilities were close

<sup>4</sup>A balanced ANSF will be capable of independent operations, from combat operations to ministerial efforts. Afghan operations without Coalition support would require the ANSF having its own enablers (see footnote #2). A self-sustaining ANSF will be capable of maintaining and generating forces from the lowest tactical level to the ministerial level.

<sup>5</sup>Force generation is the manning, training, and equipping of military and police units and individuals.

to being shut down, with several at only 25% required manning. Trainer-to-trainee ratios were too high with an overall 1:79 ratio, reaching as high as 1:466 in some locations. The training **focus was on quantity over quality**, and training standards were nonexistent or so low that all trainees simply present on graduation day typically graduated. Another fundamental issue was most Afghan National Police (ANP)<sup>6</sup> were **recruited and assigned without training.** The ANP were not paid a living wage and lacked wage parity with similar occupations and competing opportunities offered by insurgent networks, all of which undermined recruiting and retention, and increased attrition. In fact, in the fall of 2009 **recruiting dropped to near record lows, including negative growth in the ANA and ANP in September 2009.** Lack of solid and credible leadership was an issue, with many ANSF senior leaders being well past the age when their Western counterparts would have retired. A large number of these senior leaders wanted to retire, but there were no laws or regulations that outlined the legal procedures for retirement, pension, and other personnel actions for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Additionally, contract oversight and end use monitoring by NTM-A and the ANSF were real issues—they **lacked the capacity to provide oversight** to adequately monitor contractor performance, to meet legal and policy directed requirements for accountability, and to meet security requirements for lethal weapons. Finally, ANSF **sustainment was struggling** with respect to policy, procedure, training, accountability, and manning.

**4. One Year Review.** From November 2009 to November 2010—NTM-A's mantra was: **"Quantity is important, but quality is imperative."** Accordingly, NTM-A focused on assisting the Afghans to grow the force, increase the quality of the force, and build the foundation to professionalize the force. To realize this reinvigorated focus on quality, NTM-A worked to get an adequate balance of resources, strategy, organization, and people. Together, the ANSF and NTM-A have **built momentum going into this next year**, and our assessment metrics demonstrate improvements in the performance of our programs.

<sup>6</sup>The ANP consists of five pillars: Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Public Protection Force and Anti-Crime Police.

#### Focus for NTM-A's 1st Year

- Grow the force
- Increase the quality of the force
- Build the foundation to professionalize the force


#### Focus for NTM-A's 2nd Year:

- Continued growth
- Build support and enabling forces
- Develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions
- Begin the process to professionalize the force

**a. ANSF Quality.** The ANSF has enjoyed extraordinary growth and increased training capacity over the past year. Figure 1 depicts growth from November 2009 to September 2010 and includes November 2011 projected growth.<sup>7</sup> The changes in Afghan senior leaders and their determined efforts resulted in achieving all October 2010 growth goals three months ahead of schedule. The Afghan National Army (ANA) total strength grew from 97,011 to 138,164, an increase of 41,153 (42%), and the ANP total strength grew from 94,958 to 117,342, an increase of 22,384 (24%). The ANSF grew from 191,969 to 255,506 an increase of 63,537 (33%). This personnel growth enabled the fielding of additional units in the ANA and ANP. Specifically, the ANA added one corps headquarters, seven infantry brigade headquarters, twenty-five infantry battalions, forty-three separate infantry companies, and fifteen combat service support battalions.<sup>8</sup> The Afghan Air Force (AAF) added six C-27 aircraft, bringing the total number of AAF aircraft to a total of fifty aircraft (27 Mi-17s, 9 Mi-35s, 6 C-27s, 4 An-32s, 1 An-26, 3 L-39s). This includes a C-27 equipped for VIP (very important person) airlift. The Mol's Air Interdiction Unit (AIU) also increased its helicopter fleet, growing from seven to twenty aircraft. AAF manning increased from 2,797 to 4,240, a 41%

<sup>7</sup>Official September 2010 data is used as official October data was not yet available at the time of writing.


<sup>8</sup>Brigade headquarters are generated and subsequently are assigned subordinate battalions. The twenty-five infantry battalions includes both infantry and commando units. The fifteen combat service support battalions include: combat service support, district logistics battalions, corps logistics battalion, and garrison support units.



**Figure 1. Afghan National Security Force quantitative improvements.**

increase. Significantly, the ANSF has also made steps towards gender rights. There are now over 1,000 females serving in the ANSF, mostly in the ANP. Overall, high **ANSF attrition remains a long-term concern, as are significant ANSF officer and noncommissioned officer shortages.**

**(1) Recruiting.** Recruiting was a significant concern when NTM-A stood up. MoD, Mol, and NTM-A agreed change was required to reach growth objectives. NTM-A worked with Afghan leaders to improve recruiting through pay raises, tripling the number of recruiters, and standing up recruiting commands. NTM-A contracted for a major



**Figure 2. Afghan National Army recruiting.**






Figure 3. Afghan National Police recruiting.

Afghan media recruiting campaign to support the Afghan leaders' recruiting efforts.

The ANA and NTM-A also established sixteen mobile sub-recruiting stations. Because of energetic and sustained Afghan leadership efforts and NTM-A supporting activities, recruiting efforts were highly successful and the **driving force behind the ANSF meeting its total strength goals for fiscal year 2010 three months early.**

Figure 2 depicts ANA monthly recruiting and Figure 3 depicts ANP monthly recruiting.<sup>9</sup>

**(2) Attrition Mitigation.** Attrition saps the ANSF combat power and reduces morale; moreover, attrition corrodes the overall ANSF quality through the loss of experienced personnel. While aggregate attrition has decreased for the ANA and ANP over the past year, **specific components, such as Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are still at risk.** High operational tempo, attractive pay from private security companies, and an unpredictable force generation cycle have been significant reasons for high attrition in ANCOP and ANA units engaged in continuous combat. ANCOP is of particular concern due to its vital role in counterinsurgency as a "hold" force and its high level of effectiveness, both of which result in more demand for ANCOP units. While down from the highs of November 2009, the **ANCOP level of attrition remains unacceptable and unsustainable.** To

<sup>9</sup>Official September 2010 data is used as official October data was not yet available at the time of writing.

mitigate the effects of high ANCOP attrition, recruiting has been ramped up, and other initiatives to reduce attrition are being taken to meet ANCOP total strength objectives for 2011. Figure 4 depicts ANCOP attrition from November 2009 to September 2010.<sup>10</sup> ANCOP attrition was at 85.2% in November 2009 and was reduced to 55.85% by September 2010.<sup>11</sup> Using only the last six months of




Figure 4. Afghan National Civil Order Police attrition.

attrition data, annualized attrition was 35.96%, which illustrates the steady, slow decline of attrition. Increased recruiting and initiatives to reduce attrition are expected to translate to further reduced attrition.

<sup>10</sup>For this paragraph official September 2010 data is used as official October data was not yet available at the time of writing.

<sup>11</sup>April 2009 is the earliest date for which NTM-A has validated attrition data. Annualized attrition using April to September 2009 was 85.2%.

**(3) Generation of Additional Units.** Generating additional units will **primarily be focused on combat support and combat service support formations.** Over the next year, the ANA plans to add the following new units: six military police companies, six military intelligence companies, fifteen route clearance companies, nine combat support battalions, and six combat service support/logistic battalions. Planned ANP unit growth includes eight special support battalions, three regional centers, a transport battalion, and a transport brigade.

**b. ANSF Quality.** Over the course of the past year, ANSF quality improved steadily, partly from NTM-A programs being redirected to place a **greater emphasis on quality.** Progress has been noted but **much remains to be done.** Figure 5 depicts three areas of qualitative improvement from the stand up of NTM-A to September 2010, as well as projections for November 2011.<sup>12</sup> ANA NCO throughput has dramatically increased. While increasing the number of NCOs does not directly improve the quality of NCOs, additional NCOs increase the ratio of leaders across the ANA, which provides more supervision and leadership to the ANA soldiers. ANA rifle marksmanship and overall ANSF literacy training increased dramatically. These qualitative improvements are explained in further detail below. Further, 2011 will see improvement in quality as the main effort shifts from accelerated growth to balancing the force with enablers. Enablers (see footnote #2) provide the underpinning support needed by the fighting force.

**(1) Leader Development.** ANSF Leader Development has been NTM-A and Afghan leaders' #1 priority for the past year. Leader development will continue to be our collective top priority for the foreseeable future.

**A. Importance.** Strong leaders are essential for the long-term success of the ANSF, especially its ability to be enduring and self-sustaining. Leaders are a catalyst for positive change and are critical to sustain the progress that has been achieved. NTM-A's overarching theme of leader development is to **inculcate an ethos of 'servant leadership' throughout the ANSF**—moving beyond personal and local loyalties to national loyalties, focused on serving the People of Afghanistan. To build this ethos and perpetuate positive change, NTM-A and our Afghan partners are focusing upon improving leader **education**, providing opportunities for leader **experience**, and creating a systematic approach to leader **training**. In fact, NTM-A has supported Afghan directed leader transitions for a new Minister of Interior, Mol Deputy Minister, ANA Chief of the General Staff, several ANA Corps Commanders, and ANCOF Commander—all of whom are having a very positive impact.

**B. Achievements.** Mol and MoD are making great strides




Figure 5. ANSF qualitative improvements.

in embracing a systematic, transparent approach to training and personnel management. Our Afghan partners developed, reorganized, and improved their leader development courses, such as basic Soldier training, NCO training, officer training, literacy training, and branch and specialty school training. ANSF leaders continue efforts to move towards selection of positions, promotions, schools, and rewards based on performance and need, not cronyism and favoritism. Key developmental positions, training, and education are vital to build the experience of Afghan leaders, such as command assignments, branch schools, specialty courses, and the Afghan National Security University. Parliament passed **Inherent Law for Officers and NCOs (ILON) for both the MoD and Mol** in 2010. These laws and related supporting policy efforts are vital steps to help set the conditions for the long-term effectiveness of the ANSF, outlining procedures for retirement, pension, and other personnel actions.

**(2) Literacy.** The ongoing implementation of Personnel Information Management System (PIMS) facilitates management with respect to training and development, assisting in tracking the training and experience of individual soldiers. PIMS is in the process of being implemented in subordinate headquarters. Finally, the **first female Officer Candidate School class graduated** on 23 September 2010, an important step forward for ANSF leadership.

**A. Importance.** Literacy and numeracy<sup>13</sup> are **fundamental to the quality of ANSF—it is the basis for professional military and law enforcement personnel.** Current officer literacy rates are approximately 93%, among NCOs approximately 35%, and among enlisted

<sup>12</sup>Official September 2010 data is used as official October data was not yet available at the time of writing.

<sup>13</sup>Numeracy refers to the ability to understand, read, and write numbers.





Minister of Defense Rahim Wardak and General Mohammad Karimi, Afghan National Army Chief of General Staff, at the first graduation of the female Officer Candidate School at Kabul Military Training Center.

approximately 11%.<sup>14</sup> Afghan leaders recognize that this low level of literacy for the ANSF is unacceptable, inhibits progress, and will not support a professional ANSF.

**B. Programs.** Literacy undergirds **accountability**, supports **branch and specialized competency**, and helps prevent **corruption** by empowering individuals and increasing individual awareness of rights, responsibilities, and procedures while enabling specialized training. ANSF members who are literate can account for equipment—especially weapons—including filling out paperwork or reading a weapon's serial number. Literacy also supports the various branch and specialty schools, contributing to greater competency and corresponding improvement in the quality of the ANSF. Literate individuals contribute to an increase in overall transparency, and their literacy mitigates corrupt practices, as literate ANSF members can track their pay and are less likely to be defrauded.

NTM-A, in collaboration with the ANSF, revised and standardized the previously voluntary literacy program of instruction, as every stakeholder followed a different program. We also collectively made the decision to make literacy training mandatory. As a result, literacy programs are rapidly expanding. This expansion had multiple impacts,

<sup>14</sup>As of 20 October 2010.

as the programs have enjoyed widespread popularity and are already supporting higher recruiting and retention. NTM-A is now educating 28,534 ANSF at any given time in literacy programs. First grade literacy course completions rose to 18,113 and third grade completions to 5,454. The literacy programs objective is to grow to 50,000 completions of training by December and to 100,000 by July 2011. Intensive programs, especially in the south, will support recruiting and training prospective officers and NCOs, addressing shortages in both.

**(3) Loss / Attrition. Losses from attrition are declining in most components of the ANSF.**<sup>15</sup> Further reductions are essential for long-term viability of the ANSF, especially with respect to retaining experienced quality personnel—personnel who receive proper training are catalysts in improving their organizations. If there is any additional future ANSF growth, attrition must be reduced even further. High attrition is not compatible with growth or sustainment. If not reduced, the ANSF would be working with maximum effort to train thousands of new personnel merely to replace losses from attrition, while not being able to grow in total strength.

<sup>15</sup>Attrition is a percentage of losses relative to overall force, calculated as a sum of losses divided by average strength over one time period. It does not include separations due to retirement or completion of service contract.




Figure 6. Afghan National Army training comparison 2009/2010.




Figure 7. Afghan National Police training comparison 2009/2010.

**(4) Training Programs.** The ANSF made great strides over the past year in developing and implementing training programs. The ANA and ANP focused on the quality of training, and, as a result, improved the quality of their forces. NTM-A has focused on three steps for training: train Afghan recruits, train Afghans to be trainers (train-the-trainer), and train Afghans to run systems and institutions.

**A. Army.** Since NTM-A stood up, the ANA demonstrated considerable improvements in its training program. The establishment of the ANA regional military training centers was vital to **laying the foundation for a professional army**. These centers are vital training hubs that the ANA and NTM-A will leverage to begin the process to professionalize the force in NTM-A's second year.

Figure 6 illustrates four specific annual training throughput examples that dramatically improved from November 2009 to September 2010. Figure 7 also includes projections for November 2010. Officer's training increased from 2,423 to 3,072 students, an increase of 27%, and NCO throughput increased from 900 NCOs to 2,900 an increase of 222%. Drivers training increased by 50%, from 400 students to 600 students. Branch School training increased from no students to 3,705 students. Key examples of improved quality include: basic training individual soldier rifle marksmanship qualification increased from 35% in November 2009 to 97% by September 2010; driver's training increased from one week to five weeks to improve overall driver skill, especially safe driving practices; and the instructor ratio for Basic Warrior Training improved from a marginal 1:79 to a more manageable 1:29. We have collectively focused on increasing the numbers of Afghan trainers, as there were essentially none in November 2009. "Train-the-Trainer" programs were stepped up to generate Afghan trainers—a key element for an **enduring and self-sustaining** ANSF. Finally, the recent addition of the Military Skills Instructor Course—a six-week class to train

officers and NCOs that combines drill sergeant training and advanced instructor training—will pay significant training dividends in the future.

**B. Police.** One of the most important, pressing issues when NTM-A stood up was that the majority of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) were recruited and assigned to duty without formal training: referred to as "Recruit-Assign-Intend to Train." Although this approach was understandable given the immediate operational need for large numbers of AUP, it had a corrosive impact on the quality of the AUP and fostered a negative public perception of Afghan police in general. In fact, some policemen abused the Afghan population and engaged in criminal activity. The Focused District Development program sought to reform the AUP; however, it was insufficiently resourced to rectify the problems. Consequently, the Mol and NTM-A implemented a **new model of "Recruit-Train-Assign."** This model makes training mandatory for all police recruits, thereby providing **entry-level professionalization** for the AUP. Recruit-train-assign is still being fully implemented but is already improving the quality of the AUP. NTM-A also assisted our Afghan partners in founding a training command to provide a holistic view of police training. Professional development was also increased, as the ANP started leader courses such as an ANCOP Company Commander's Course, a Staff Officer Course, and a SWAT Course, as well as seminars on Domestic Violence, Sexual Abuse, and Women Integration. Finally, we collectively increased training throughput and quality, see Figure 7.<sup>16</sup> ANP training capacity grew from a 7,740 to 13,631 training seat capacity, which is an increase of 5,891 or 35%, and the number of officer recruits grew from 600 to 2,302 officers, a 167% increase. The number of trained up armored HMMWV (UAH) drivers increased by 160%, from 600 to 2,572. ANCOP throughput also increased by 1,480%, from 195 to 3,884.

<sup>16</sup>Official September 2010 data is used as official October data was not yet available at the time of writing.



**(5) Branch and Specialty Schools and Courses.** Our Afghan partners and NTM-A increased significantly the number of branch and specialty schools and courses, a critical step in professionalization. **These schools and courses develop specialized skill sets required to balance the fielded force and facilitate an enduring and self-sustaining ANSF.**

**A. MoD Specialty Schools and Courses.** Since November 2009, the ANA came a long way in developing branch and specialty schools. In fact, there were no branch schools operating when NTM-A stood up, but now ten support the ANA. Figure 8 depicts the varying states of operation of the ANA's branch and specialty schools.<sup>17</sup> One operates with Coalition oversight, eight with Coalition assistance, and one at initial operating capacity. Some branch schools have also started offering vital specialty courses as well. For example, in August the Infantry Branch School graduated its first courses in reconnaissance and heavy weapons training. At present, the Infantry, Legal, Military Police (guard force and correction training only), Logistics, Religious and Cultural Affairs, Intelligence, Finance, Artillery, and Human Resources branch schools are operating. The Signal School will open by the end of 2010.

**B. Mol Specialty Schools and Courses.** A key step for police training was **moving away from contractor trainers to professional trainers.** The Mol is working to open the National Police Staff College (NPSC) and a National Police Training Center at Wardak. EUPOL-Afghanistan played a

vital role in supporting the temporary NPSC by providing oversight and trainers. Mol personnel are also attending MoD courses through cross-ministerial cooperation, thereby reducing administrative and sustainment requirements.

**C. Continuing Education System.** In conjunction with our Afghan partners, we have established a continuing education system for officers and senior NCOs consisting of four educational levels: pre-commissioning, primary, intermediate, and senior. Pre-commissioning education consists of military education received at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan; primary education consists of military education received at the Branch Schools; intermediate education consists of military education received at the Staff Officer Course or the Junior Staff Officer College; and senior education consists of military education received at the Senior Staff Officer Course or Afghan National Command and Staff College or the Sergeant Major's Academy for senior NCOs. The establishment of the Afghan National Security University will educate both Police and Army senior officers and NCOs.

**D. Training outside Afghanistan.** A small, but growing, number of Afghans are being trained outside Afghanistan. Nations that have hosted this training have included Italy, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Other nations have provided trainers and funding in some cases, such as France and Japan, respectively. All of these efforts and schools will **facilitate the professionalization of the ANSF in the short term while Afghan facilities reach full operational capacity.**

<sup>17</sup>As of 22 October 2010.




Figure 8. Afghan National Army Branch School status.

**(6) Afghan Air Force (AAF).** With support from our NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A), the AAF made significant progress towards becoming a **professional, fully independent, operationally capable, and sustainable force by 2016**. AAF training capacity grew from 50 to 500, and key training and educational institutions were established.

**A. Operational and Maintenance Capabilities.** The AAF also demonstrated its operational capability, improved its command and control system, and is building up its training and operational capabilities at Shindand, which will be the key Afghan pilot training facility in the future. The first three Mi-17s have relocated to Shindand air field to support future pilot training. By the end of 2011 there will be twenty aircraft available at Shindand, with plans for fifty-one by mid 2014. The Mol's Air Interdiction Unit (AIU) is Afghanistan's counternarcotics unit. The AIU provides unique aviation capabilities to the Mol, and the AIU increased its helicopter fleet from seven to twenty aircraft. The AIU now has a limited capability to support non-counternarcotics elements within Mol.

**B. Training and Educational Institutions.** **Operational capacity increased from four mission sets to thirteen.** See Figure 9 for more detail. The AAF provided vital support to the Afghan Parliamentary Elections, providing

airlift support to bring election materials and personnel to remote locations. The AAF established airborne medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capability, providing specialized emergency medical care for remote areas. Capabilities were developed for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as demonstrated when the AAF independently deployed **four Mi-17s to support flood relief in Pakistan**, as they had previously done in Afghanistan. The Pakistani flood relief deployment was for 27 days with all-AAF crews that flew over 400 sorties, saved 120 lives, transported 1,904 passengers, and delivered 188 tons of supplies. In support of internal disaster relief efforts, the AAF also rescued survivors of the Salang Pass avalanche, supported search and recovery following the Pamir airliner crash, and delivered generators and supplies to schools. All of these efforts **built the trust and confidence of the population in their government and created goodwill with Afghanistan's neighbors**.

**B. Training and Educational Institutions.** To improve AAF pilot training quality, the AAF and NATC-A opened **"Thunder Lab"** to provide Afghan Air Force officers basic and aviation-specific English language training, along with a focus on leader development. The **Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (PeH) or "Big Air School"** was established to support a comprehensive force development strategy based on education, leadership development, and




Figure 9. Afghan Air Force demonstrating operational capacity.





Afghan National Security Forces conducting logistics activities.

technical training. The PeH curriculum grew from 17 courses to 45—with Afghans now beginning to train Afghans in select courses. One hundred and fifty nine AAF recruits graduated from the PeH literacy program.

**(7) Intelligence.** To provide more concentrated focus on the ANSF intelligence-specific training, equipping, and advising, NTM-A created the Intelligence Training and Advisory Group (INTAG). With the support of INTAG, the ANSF started or refined their intelligence efforts that **support effective, actionable intelligence**, which is fundamental to counterinsurgency. Intelligence training improved markedly once the Intelligence Training Center (ITC) moved into a new facility in December 2009. The ITC currently delivers Basic Intelligence, Advanced Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, and Analysis courses. ITC will deliver additional courses over the next few months. The ITC is primarily an ANA facility, but it has trained ANP officers, both male and female, in basic intelligence, highlighting cross-ministerial cooperation. Another key initiative to improve ANSF intelligence capabilities is military intelligence companies. The training, equipping, and fielding of ANA military intelligence companies has started, and the first of six approved corps-level companies will be operational this December in the 205th Corps.

**(8) Logistics.** Another improvement is the expansion of Project LEGACY, which develops human intelligence capacity within the Directorate of Intelligence in the Mol and the ANA G2. This project leverages skills and doctrine developed in previous successful counterinsurgency efforts to build source networks that are able to target and disrupt extremist and insurgent activity. Mol also established two new facilities at the Directorate of Intelligence's new Kabul compound—the Afghan National Intelligence Training Center (ANITC) and the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC). The ANITC has increased training capabilities, and the NTEC was established to degrade and destroy complex cross-provincial insurgent and terrorist network infrastructures across Afghanistan.

**A. Ministry of Defense.** NTM-A created the Logistics Training and Advisory Group (LTAG) to assist our Afghan partners to improve and operate their logistics systems, which were rudimentary in almost all areas one year ago. To synchronize multiple assistance efforts, including many contracted training programs, under one directorate, NTM-A recently integrated LTAG into NTM-A's Directorate for Logistics. This reorganization facilitated better synchronization with the ANSF, reducing any visible seams between the logistics training systems. Despite this improvement, **the most significant ANSF logistics**




Figure 10. Medical comparison 2009/2010.

**challenge is the shortage of trained Afghan logisticians.** The establishment of the Logistics Branch School and increased focus on the development of specialists are beginning to address this shortage, but it will take time. The Mol and MoD are also working on a landmark agreement cross-ministerial agreement for logistics, which will reduce the cost of ANSF logistics, be more sustainable in the long term, and provide long-term savings. While the ANSF made substantial progress, **logistics remain a significant challenge.**

**A. Ministry of Defense.** The ANA had no logistic center capability at the beginning of 2009 but now has five regional Forward Support Depots (FSDs).<sup>18</sup> The ANA developed and will field Authorized Stockage Levels (ASLs)<sup>19</sup> for forward support depots. Additionally, ANA is in the process of organizing, training, equipping, and fielding corps logistics battalions in the next twelve months. This additional logistics

<sup>18</sup>The five FSDs add to and compliment the national logistics system, which includes three national depots in Kabul.

<sup>19</sup>ASLs are repair parts that are commonly required and are therefore maintained at depots for quick repair.

force structure will significantly improve overall ANA distribution and maintenance. **The equipment levels for the ANA are showing steady improvement.** Units recently graduating from the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC)<sup>20</sup> have been fielded with 98% of their weapons and vehicles, 90% of their communications equipment, and 99% of their organizational and individual equipment.

**B. Ministry of Interior.** NTM-A has been focused on four areas to support Mol logistics: **training and education, leader development, fighting corruption, and promoting quality living and working conditions.** The Mol stood up four of seven planned regional logistics centers and eighteen of thirty-four provincial supply points; however, none have approached full operational capacity, primarily due to lack of civilian manning. These centers provide critical logistics hubs for the receipt and forward distribution of supplies to directly support the equipping of combat and security forces. The efficiency of these depots will be improved with the fielding of ASLs at brigade and provincial levels, reducing the frequency of equipment shortages. The Mol also prepared and began executing its own winterization plan, built their first itemized manager spend plan, and developed a logistics status reporting tool.

**C. Transportation Improvements.** The capacity and effectiveness of the ANA Central Movement Agency (CMA) and ANP Transportation Battalion have significantly improved, although their capacity remains limited. These organizations **transported thousands of tons of essential supplies along Afghanistan's most dangerous roads.** Also, the CMA demonstrated its growing autonomy by conducting interagency coordination to transport twenty-two trailer loads of school books for the Ministry of Education, an operation conducted without Coalition assistance.

<sup>20</sup>The Consolidated Fielding Center is the ANA facility where battalions are initially formed, equipped, and trained as a cohesive unit. This is the first time that these platoons, companies, and battalions conduct collective training.



Afghan National Army judges presiding over a hearing.





**Afghan National Police conduct IED awareness training at schools in Kunar.**

**(9) Medical.** The Medical Training and Advisory Group (MTAG) helped the ANSF improve the quality of its medical community; however, the **full maturation of the Afghan medical system will require years of effort.** The ANSF medical community, supported by MTAG, had five key accomplishments in the past year. First, the ANSF established a Physician Assistant Course, which began as an ANA course but is planned to be delivered to the ANP (see Figure 10). Second, the Afghans assumed the lead for five medical training programs: Combat Medic Instructor Training, Kabul Combat Medic Course, Medical Officer Basic Course, Medical Sergeants Course, and Medical Logistics Course. Third, the combat medic training completion increased from 600 to 2,000 per year, a 233% increase, which Figure 10 illustrates. Fourth, the ANSF has developed Afghanistan's only sustainable intensive care unit (ICU) capacity, with thirty-three ICU beds. Fifth, the ANSF established educational and clinical standards for doctors, which will pay long-term dividends. Finally, Figure 10 illustrates the improvements in their X-ray course and the Nurse course. These medical improvements are vital for the future of the ANSF, as **disease and non-battle injuries cause significant ANSF losses.**

**(10) Legal.** The ANA and ANP **improved their legal procedures and apparatus over the past year, but it has been a slow process and much work remains.**

Improving the legal aspects of the ANSF is essential for improving the credibility and performance of the ANSF. A positive perception of justice within the ANSF should improve job satisfaction, improve recruiting, lower attrition, and improve retention. Additionally, a just ANSF should improve its public perception and consequently improve the Afghan perception of GIRoA as a whole, helping to diffuse a contributing factor to insurgency.

**A. Army.** The ANA justice system in November 2009 was **functional for soldiers but ineffective when it came to dealing with senior leader misconduct.** This had a corrosive impact on both quality and quantity of their Army. When soldiers believe they are not being cared for in a fair and just manner, their morale plummets, creating an environment conducive to desertion and AWOL. The MoD made several efforts to improve the ANA justice system. The most important of which was **diminishing the influence of Corps Commanders over the military justice system.** Training is also ongoing. The first Basic Legal Officer Course, an NCO paralegal course, and a judge's course were conducted this year. ANA opened a new Legal School and provided support by assigning ten officers to serve as teachers and trainers.

**B. Police.** In November 2009, the ANP had no senior civilian Mol Legal Advisor (LegAD) or lawyers at headquarters, regions, or provinces, and the vast **majority of the**



**police did not know the law they were responsible to enforce, having been brought into the ANP under the “Recruit and Assign” model without the benefit of proper training.** Not unexpectedly, most Afghans had come to view the ANP as lawless armed men, rather than trusted law enforcement officials. To improve ANP performance and its public perception, the ANP moved to the “Recruit, Train, and Assign” model. As part of this model, instruction included the Afghan Constitutional, Police, and Human Rights Law. The new Minister of Interior approved the appointment of a MOI senior civilian legal advisor in September, a critical position that had been vacant since July 2009. This appointment was a first—a senior MOI official selected by an independent civil service organization outside the MOI. The Minister also appointed a new Chief of Legal Affairs, who was instrumental in the **passage of the ANP Code of Conduct, the Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) Presidential Legislative Decree, and the ANP Inherent Law (ILON).** For the first time, the ANP have legally enforceable obligatory service lengths, established retirements, and personnel laws designed to stimulate recruiting and retention. In addition to legislative advances, the Mol created positions for ANP Legal Affairs at the province level and the senior civilian LegAD’s office at Mol Headquarters. ANP Legal Affairs also is conducting Afghan taught Rule of Law training in five of six regions and provided Rule of Law training for fifteen of thirty-four provinces, with additional training planned. Finally, public perception of the ANP is still plagued by allegations of corruption at the district, province and region levels, which will take time to overcome. However, **polls indicate gradually improving perception of the ANP** (see Enclosure 1).

**(11) Communications.** The ANSF, with support from NTM-A, made great progress in fielding and improving communications capabilities—particularly with organization, radios, and computer networks—to **facilitate command and control.**

**A. Data Networks.** The number of data networks supporting ANA and ANP **grew from 47 to 118 networked-sites over the last year.** User-level information technology (IT) training was provided to approximately 1,500 Afghan soldiers to facilitate the use of the expanded networks. With a fourth quarter 2010 award of two network infrastructure contracts, the number of sites networked throughout ANA and ANP will grow dramatically in fiscal year 2011 – possibly reaching 400 networked sites. With the award of these contracts over 2,000 Afghans will be employed installing and maintaining these networks, which supports the Afghan First initiative (details of this initiative can be found below).

**B. Capabilities.** The ANSF’s communication capabilities did increase over the last year. For example, the ANA Communications Support Unit (CSU) deployed outside the Kabul area four times to provide mobile support combat operations. The last CSU deployment supported Parliamentary Elections and was made at the request of the ANP. The CSU’s cooperation with the ANP **demonstrated the growing level of cooperation** between the ANA and ANP. This unit is progressing extremely well and is moving towards self-sufficiency.

**C. Radios.** NTM-A assisted the ANSF in fielding thousands of radios and improving ANSF use of this equipment. Over 7,000 radios have been fielded throughout the ANP in the past year, and over 1,300 radios were fielded in support of




Figure 11. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Budget from Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2011.




Figure 12. Infrastructure Program for 305K Afghan National Security Force.

first responders in Kabul and surrounding areas. maintainer training. The ANA made similar progress by fielding 9,000 radios. To support these fielding efforts, radio operator training was delivered to over 4,600 ANSF members, while a smaller group received maintainer training. The coming year will see additional radios fielded throughout the ANSF, including the new Afghan Local Police (ALP). However, **challenges remain with ensuring compatibility and coordination between the ANA and the ANP.** They operate on different radio frequency bands, but there is an operational concept in place to use the operational coordination centers (OCCs)<sup>21</sup> to address this challenge.

**D. Future.** There are several initiatives for the upcoming year. First, the Afghan Mission Network-Unclassified will be established by combining the Mol and MoD networks, a significant step toward GIRoA-net. Second, NTM-A and the ANSF will create a connected, wireless campus for the Afghan National Security University. **The National Military Coordination Center, the National Police Coordination Center, and Presidential Information Coordination Center will also gain increased IT capabilities.** Fourth, we collectively will create a Coalition/Afghan IT Governance Board that will prioritize, integrate, and align IT and information system initiatives. The CSU will complete its fielding when the 4th Communications Company is established. Additionally, six ANA signal battalions will be established next year.

<sup>21</sup>OCCs are combined Coalition and Afghan organizations that facilitate synchronization and communication amongst Coalition and Afghan forces.

**c. Programs and Resources.** CSTC-A controls a **significant budget** to assist the ANSF. This budget is subdivided into sub-budget activity groups (SAG): sustainment, training, equipment, and infrastructure. Figure 11 depicts CSTC-A's budgets by categories from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. Note that large portions of the Fiscal Year 2010 and Fiscal Year 2011 budgets are for building ANSF infrastructure, which is critical to enable enduring institutions.

**(1) Management and Oversight.** To properly manage its large budgets, CSTC-A refined its management and oversight practices. More specialists were assigned, which improved U.S. funding support and ensured the most effective use of Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF). NTM-A/CSTC-A also **improved stewardship and contract management**, which increased contract oversight from less than 50% to 93%. Over the past year, increased oversight capability allowed the obligation of 99.9% of CSTC-A's fiscal year 2009 supplemental funds by September 30, 2010, as well as pre-position several contracts in support of fiscal year 2010 supplemental funding. Another key accomplishment was our efforts with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to secure ASFF direct funding authority, which provided increased ASFF flexibility via local contract authority. NTM-A/CSTC-A also expanded direct contributions to the Mol and MoD budgets in an effort to give the Afghans more authority, responsibility, and experience with budgeting, procurement and acquisition—a vital learning process for future transition. Over the past year, the End Use Monitoring (EUM) Division conducted thirty-one inspections throughout Afghanistan, which enhanced EUM for all night

vision devices and ensured registration of 100% of all U.S. transferred weapons and vehicles.

**(2) Afghan Security Forces Funds.** The ASFF budget execution is on track. CSTC-A obligated over 99.96% of its fiscal year 2009 Supplemental budget. CSTC-A has committed roughly 73.5% of its fiscal year 2010 Base and Supplemental budgets—this totals \$9.3 billion, of which \$3.1 billion is obligated. Over \$2.6 billion is currently awaiting contract award, but CSTC-A have until September 30, 2011 to spend these funds. GIRoA, CSTC-A, and other stakeholders cooperated to secure a **pay increase for the ANSF**. This increase closed a pay gap between the army and police and brought their pay on par with comparable employment, thereby helping to improve recruiting, retention, and reduce attrition.

**d. Infrastructure.** NTM-A established the Infrastructure Training Advisory Group (ITAG) to develop and execute a strategy to transition facility operations and management to the Afghans. ITAG **ensures the \$9.6 billion investment in ANSF infrastructure has the necessary stewardship during construction and throughout its operation and maintenance**. With ITAG in the lead, NTM-A spent \$1.3 billion on ANA and ANP facilities with \$1 billion for infrastructure and \$300 million for sustainment. Program management and contract awards were made in conjunction with our Corps of Engineers, Air Force Center for Engineering and Environment, and CENTCOM Contracting Command partners. The first year of NTM-A saw the completion of 89 projects totaling \$365 million, including signing over ANA facilities for one corps, two brigade, and eight battalion headquarters, as well as ANA training and logistics facilities. For the ANP, NTM-A signed over three ANCOP, four Border Police, and sixty-three Uniform Police facilities. As Figure 12 depicts, NTM-A completed construction totaling \$2.2 billion, which is only 23% of the entire \$9.6 billion infrastructure program. Planned commitments with fiscal year 2010 funding are \$2.4 billion, followed by \$2.9 billion using fiscal year 2011 funds. Afghan-initiated ministerial-level facilities meetings are fostering greater communication with the highest levels of the MoD and Mol—deputy ministers, Afghan general officers, Coalition general officers, and various other leaders are resolving land conflicts, security challenges, corruption issues, and tashkil<sup>22</sup> changes. A recent CSTC-A decision directed that all future permanent infrastructure builds will be K-Spans. K-Span construction has several advantages over standard construction: it is simple to construct, as it takes half the time; it is sustainable, as it has lower maintenance costs; and it produces savings, as it is less expensive.

**Ministerial Development.** NTM-A's ministerial development programs assisted MoD and Mol in building systems required to grow and professionalize these two

<sup>22</sup>A tashkil is an authoritative Afghan document that lists a unit's authorized personnel and equipment.

ministries. A year ago, NTM-A had few advisors (referred to as mentors at that time) on the ground, and the overall effort was disjointed. Today, our advisory efforts have been reorganized and we have brought in more highly-qualified senior advisors. These changes allowed NTM-A advisors to facilitate **slow but steady incremental progress** in Mol and MoD over the past year. For example, both ministries have improved immensely with respect to **preparing and disseminating policies and decrees**, including preparing draft products for the President of Afghanistan. Much work remains to increase the security ministries capability and capacity to allow independent operations.

**(1) Ministerial Development Boards (MDBs) and Ministerial Development Plans (MDPs).** MDBs and MDPs are vital synchronization efforts for ministerial development. There are four key questions that summarize the assessment of the MDPs: Are the fundamental functions to be performed clearly defined – and are they at an appropriate level of complexity? Is the ministry manned, trained and equipped to perform the functions? How well can the Afghans perform the functions? Is the performance of these functions sustainable? The answers to these questions drive NTM-A support to the Mol and MoD.

**(2) MoD and ANA Development Team.** In November 2009, ANA Development consisted of a very small group of eight senior advisors who were seconded by an even smaller contingent of two contractors. While a large number of other NTM-A personnel were part time advisors, their work was not integrated. The senior advisors had no authority to supervise the work of other advisors working in their sections. As a consequence, focused, effective advising was not possible. Today, over one hundred full-time advisors and one hundred sixty part time advisors operate in an integrated fashion. The overarching reorganization and additional personnel enabled much greater depth and focus within the MoD and General Staff. For this next year, NTM-A will focus on assigning centrally selected advisors who completed or were selected for battalion and brigade command.

**A. Ministerial Development Board (MDB) Progress.** With Minister Wardak in the lead, recent MDBs demonstrated incremental progress in the MoD. A year ago, the MDB rated twenty-two of thirty-six areas as advisors doing most of the work “for” the ministry and General Staff and thirteen with advisors working “with” their Afghan counterparts. The most recent MDB, in October, showed six areas remain with advisors doing most of the work and twenty-eight with advisors working shoulder-to-shoulder with their Afghan counterparts. The development of the MoD as a whole was rated as “on track,” with movement to “Afghan lead” projected for late 2012.

**B. Institutional Development.** Three significant MoD achievements highlight the real impact of NTM-A's institutional development efforts. First, Afghan-led





An Afghan Air Force Mi-17 delivers supplies to flood victims in Pakistan.

security for this year's Parliamentary elections was well executed, which was a vast improvement. The ANA was in considerable disarray for the previous Presidential elections, particularly where the ANA had to interact with other security services. Second, significant progress was made in personnel policies. A year ago there were few real policies, attrition rates were at unacceptable levels, and it seemed unlikely that growth targets would be met. While challenges remain in each area, ANA administration and operations are much more coherent, total end strength growth is ahead of targets, and attrition is steadily being reduced, in part, by MoD and General Staff policies and directives. Third, NTM-A assisted in the revision of strategic- and operational-level organizations, which will be coupled with a revision of Decree 5001.<sup>23</sup> NTM-A also assisted MoD in producing six logistics decrees, National Military Strategy, National Threat Assessment, Defense Capability Planning Guidance, and multiple Chief of the General Staff Directives.

**(3) Mol and ANP Development Team.** The appointment of a new Minister in July 2010 was one of the most important events in the last year. Minister Mohammadi has been an active leader and quickly established his priorities and presence. After his initial 60-day assessment was completed, the minister replaced twenty-two key leaders—

<sup>23</sup>Decree 5001 focused on the MoD and General Staff roles, responsibilities, and organization.

and the new leadership is already improving the capability and operations of his Ministry. The Minister directed a review of ministerial and police roles and responsibilities, a framework for independent civilian oversight of the police, effective internal affairs, and an enforceable code of conduct. The Minister also directed the formation of the Mol International Coordination Cell (MICC) to more effectively coordinate efforts with all stakeholders. Finally, for this next year NTM-A will focus on assigning centrally selected advisors who completed or were selected for battalion and brigade command.

**A. Ministerial Development Board Progress.** The key measure of effectiveness of Mol ministerial development is them assuming the lead in each area, a key step toward the Afghans becoming self-sufficient. The capability and capacity that the Mol needs to develop are defined in twenty-five ministerial development plans, which are based on the National Police Strategy and National Police Plan. A year ago, the MDB rated eight of twenty-four areas as Coalition members performing most of the work, fifteen with advisors doing most of the work “for” the ministry and General Staff, and one with advisors working “with” their Afghan counterparts. The October MDB showed significant progress. There are no areas left where advisors are performing the work, seventeen areas with advisors doing most of the work, and eight with advisors working with their Afghan counterparts.



An Afghan National Civil Order Police Lieutenant instructs members of the elite force during convoy emergency action training.

**B. Mol International Coordination Cell.** The MICC is a critical coordination organization that facilitates a comprehensive approach in supporting Mol. The MICC provides participants, especially the Mol, mutual awareness of stakeholder programs and activities. It also provides coherent support to match donated international resources with Mol requirements and, in turn, recommend ways to enhance ANP generation, training, development, sustainment, and appropriate measuring. Created over several months, the MICC has unanimous support from international community police stakeholders. Although the MICC is led by a senior Afghan official, NTM-A is currently providing most of the supporting personnel; however, many members of the international community have offered to provide personnel in the future. The MICC has succeeded with a proof of concept and has already accomplished several key coordination efforts. For example, the MICC facilitated coordination for the United Arab Emirates support to building a border training site, coordination of Japanese funding for Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan ANP projects, and clarification of MOI adviser requirements.

**C. Institutional Development.** The Mol has markedly improved over the last year. The routine planning and conduct of supply convoys increased over the course of the year from one convoy every two weeks to four a week. Investigations were initiated and corrective actions were applied when student selections were not based on merit. Effectiveness improved and the Afghans led

operations in the MOI National Police Command Center, particularly during the Kabul Conference, the Security Shura, Ramadan, and Parliamentary Elections. Leaders in MOI are now managing their own command plan, including force structure and an overall review process. This complex effort demonstrates the growing capability of Mol leaders. Finally, the Minister approved six vital new policies: Anti-Corruption, Assignments and Rotation, Drugs and Alcohol, ANP Code of Conduct Policy, ANP Inherent Law, and the ANP Active Duty Service Obligation.

**(4) Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA).** This program placed seventeen senior U.S. Department of Defense individuals as senior advisors in the Mol and MoD. The MoDA **pilot program has been providing superb support** to our ministerial development efforts since July 2010. A significant amount of this is being done by extremely qualified MoDA personnel who have provided a welcome reinforcement and added dimension. They have notably improved the professional development of Afghan senior officers. These advisors have been a very positive addition, and both ANSF and NTM-A personnel enthusiastically support the program. MoDA is set to increase to forty-seven individuals early next year, and to almost one hundred individuals by this June next year. The program is currently funded for two years.

**f. Anti-Corruption Efforts.** Pervasive corruption in Afghanistan undermines the nation's stability and the effectiveness of the ANSF. NTM-A anti-corruption efforts are focused on preventive actions and behavior





**Afghan National Army soldiers participate in radio repair and maintenance training.**

modification. NTM-A has also encouraged ANSF leaders to be **aggressive in their anti-corruption efforts**. Some of the major efforts to stem corruption are implementing electronic funds transfer (EFT) to provide transparency for salaries. Since November 2009, EFT payments for the ANA have risen from 65% to 95% of the force. Similarly, the ANP EFT payments rose from 39% to 78%. NTM-A has also supported ISAF guidance on counterinsurgency contracting practices and biometric efforts. In a proactive effort, the Mol signed a new **ANP Commitment of Promise** in August 2010, an important step towards professionalization of the force and fighting corruption within the police ranks. The Commitment directs professional behavior and provides a vision of the ANP as the public's servant and protector. The Mol also created six **mobile anti-corruption teams** as a means to investigate police corruption in the provinces. These teams travel throughout the country investigating allegations of corruption, and they report directly to the Mol Inspector General.

**g. Afghan First and Afghan Made Procurement.** Our Afghan First and Afghan Made Procurement initiatives have **created thousands of enduring, sustainable Afghan jobs**. The Afghan First and Afghan Made process also ensured that there are benefits to the funds spent on outfitting and equipping the ANSF. These efforts had immeasurable value in supporting indigenous manufacturing.

**(1) Afghan Economic Progress.** Building local capacity to manufacture equipment and supplies in Afghanistan encouraged local entrepreneurs to invest locally and

provided trade and skills training to Afghans. Local manufacturers now produce and deliver ANSF uniforms, boots, other organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), connexes, furniture, and tents. The overall impact of these initiatives on the Afghan economy has been immense: **Over 6,000 sustainable Afghan jobs have been created**, the ANSF purchased 1.7 million uniforms for \$87 million, and the ANSF procured over 160,000 pairs of the extremely popular Kabul Melli boots.

**(2) Process Improvements.** NTM-A created the Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan (SAO-A), a key CSTC-A organization that is long-term and will ultimately become part of the U.S. Embassy. SAO-A focused on converting procurements from Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) to Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts. This organization grew to over one hundred personnel, managed \$12.7 billion, and decreased the average processing time of foreign military sales Letters of Offer/Acceptance from eighty to thirty-three days. BPAs do not have quality or local manufacturing controls, where IDIQ contracts require Afghan-produced items to be made to US-grade specifications. This shift to IDIQ contracts facilitated the growth of Afghan business. For example, in August 2010, six IDIQ contracts worth up to \$54.3 million in the first year were awarded to three Afghan women-owned businesses to manufacture 23 OCIE items for the ANSF. This months-long effort is worth approximately \$356 million over five years, employing hundreds of workers, and empowering Afghan women to compete for



unrestricted solicitations. As another example, we phased out Afghan vendors who imported tents and now made agreements with vendors who make tents in Afghanistan.

**h. Community Outreach.** NTM-A is working to ensure that Afghan civil society organizations—and their international supporters—can play a role in shaping the training and reform of the ANSF. In particular, we want to be sure that these vital supporters have access to ANSF officials, processes, and institutions to make ANSF (especially the ANP) **more accountable and responsive to the communities they serve.** Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are already making a difference in helping the ANSF “protect and serve” the Afghan people. NTM-A is working to institutionalize those efforts into the training base and make constructive ANSF engagement with civil society partners. Other outreach initiatives include training for police to deliver safety briefs in schools, facilitating police-community consultation, NGO training for police on human and civil rights, and creative programming to enhance ANSF literacy.

**i. Afghan Local Police (ALP).** ALP is a GIRoA-led, Mol controlled, and ISAF-supported initiative that established local security forces. These local security forces will help **set the conditions for local security enabling development and governance.** The ALP current program will establish up to 10,000 civilian “guardians” in select districts across Afghanistan. The ALP’s mission is defensive in nature, serving as a **“neighborhood watch”** that will alert the AUP to respond to illegal activity; they are armed with AK-47s for self-defense and have no arrest or investigative authority. A local shura and district leadership nominate individuals for the ALP, thereby combining both traditional local governance and national, democratic GIRoA governance. After selection, each prospective member of the ALP is biometrically screened and trained by special operations forces and AUP. Coalition forces also partner with the ALP during operations. The ALP program is going well, with the first eight ALP sites were established. An ALP validation team, which included representatives from all stakeholders, visited the ALP sites and completed in-processing and validation. NTM-A delivered weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment to each ALP site, and NTM-A **ensured proper accountability and stressed good stewardship of equipment.** Overall, the ALP program is rapidly growing in membership and dramatically improving local security.

**j. 2010 Parliamentary Elections.** The ANSF’s ability to successfully provide security for the recent Parliamentary elections validates NATO’s efforts to assist the ANSF, as well as demonstrates the growing capability and capacity of the ANSF from the individual level to the ministerial level. The successful security for the June Peace Jirga, the Kabul Conference, and the September Parliamentary Elections are

data points that indicate a positive trend that underscores the ANSF’s ability to secure the population and defeat insurgents. Elections take on a special importance when a democratic government is countering insurgency. Insurgents will naturally attempt to disrupt elections to discredit the government and support their anti-government narrative. It was therefore clear that the 2010 Afghan Parliamentary Elections would be a **litmus test for the ANSF** and its ability to provide security to the population. Despite repeated Taliban threats and pervasive intimidation efforts, millions of courageous Afghans went to the polls for the elections, exercising their democratic right to vote. **The security required for this level of voter turnout speaks volumes.** The Afghans assuming more responsibility and demonstrating their ability to work together in planning, positioning, and coordinating was key to the security success.

**k. NTM-A Organization.** The organization of NTM-A is vital for mission accomplishment, and NTM-A’s unique mission required self-reliant subordinate commands able to act semi-autonomously. This organization increased each commander’s freedom of action and flexibility to work closely and transparently with ANSF counterparts.

**(1) NTM-A Organizational Vision.** Designing NTM-A’s initial organization was one of our first undertakings. NTM-A combined personnel from existing bilateral organizations—including CSTC-A and personnel from other troop contributing nations—and additional NATO personnel. These personnel and existing organizations were merged, and NTM-A was developed as a fully-integrated and transparent organization. This approach was essential as a security assistance command must be seamless to maximize its impact and the effectiveness of the security forces it is assisting. In this case, Afghan leaders, with support from NTM-A, determine the vision for their security forces, and Afghan leaders fully understand all NTM-A supporting efforts. In addition to integration and transparency, manning was another design consideration. NTM-A’s initial manning level was clearly inadequate when compared to its requirements. These shortages necessitated a strict economy of effort, requiring the maximization each person’s contribution. NTM-A’s new internal structure **unified support for the ANA and ANP from the individual level to the ministerial level.**

**(2) Key Leader Positions.** NTM-A reorganized and created several key leader positions. These senior leader positions included deputy commander (DCOM) positions and assistant commanding general (ACG) positions to **focus on, and provide oversight for, key functions.** Enclosure 2 depicts NTM-A’s organization in November 2009 and NTM-A’s current organization. The Deputy Commander-Army (DCOM-A) is responsible for support the ANA, which includes MoD ministerial development




Figure 13. NATO critical trainer requirements.

and supporting the ANA's institutional base. The Deputy Commander-Police is responsible for supporting the ANP, including Mol ministerial development and supporting the ANP's institutional base. The Deputy Commander-Air is responsible for supporting and employing all aspects of Afghan Airpower. The Deputy Commander for Programs (DCOM-PROG) is responsible for fiscal and contract oversight. NTM-A also established the Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan under the DCOM-Programs in March 2010. The Deputy Commander for International Security Cooperation (DCOM-ISC) is NTM-A's interlocutor with troop contributing nations' representatives and NATO. DCOM-ISC established an International Engagement Cell to work with senior national representatives, defense attaches, and Ambassadors. The Deputy Commander-Regional Support is responsible for the six Regional Support Commands (RSCs), which in turn are a vital linkage with, and provide support to, the six ISAF regional commands and NTM-A's training facilities throughout Afghanistan. The RSCs integrate training, oversee regional construction, and manage the Afghan Security Force Funding within their assigned areas.

## 5. Looking Forward. While there has been substantial

**progress in growth and in building the training base, we are realistic about of the challenges ahead, but we are also optimistic about the future.** The NTM-A vision for next year is **sustaining the momentum** we have built. To support this vision, NTM-A's focus areas will be: **continue growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force.** The ANSF and NTM-A have formed a strong, **winning team**; it is truly a team of teams to meet the challenges of the coming year. These challenges can be overcome with proper planning, effort, stewardship, and resourcing.

**a. Leader Development.** Leader Development has been and **remains NTM-A's #1 priority—it is essential to developing a professional ANSF leadership cadre, both officer and NCO.** Leadership deficiencies remain across the spectrum, from an insufficient number of junior officers and NCOs to some corrupt, untrained, and inefficient senior officers. This is still the greatest threat to the success of our Afghan partners, especially as poor leadership contributes to attrition. In conjunction with our Afghan partners, we will focus on ANSF leader development in the coming year.



An Afghan National Police officer pauses at a graduation ceremony.

NTM-A and the ANSF **must inculcate an ethos of “servant leadership” throughout the ANP and ANA.** Additionally, the branch and specialty courses already discussed will play a vital role in ANSF leader development in this next year.

**(1) Officer Education.** We have planned several collective efforts to rectify the current deficit of approximately 4,300 ANA officers, such as adding four additional Officer Candidate School training companies, doubling the training capacity of the Mujahedeen Integration Course, and working to retain professional officers. At the current pace, the officer shortfall will gradually decrease. **We project the shortage to be eliminated by the end of fiscal year 2012.**

**(2) NCO Education.** In September 2010, there was a **shortage of approximately 10,500 ANA NCOs.** A key initial effort to address the ANA NCO shortage was to increase the capacity of the “1U” direct-entry NCO program, especially the highly effective Turkish-run 1U program. Additionally, NTM-A and the ANA increased throughput at our Regional Military Training Centers, which provided increased NCO producing courses to narrow the gap in first-line leadership. **These efforts were implemented to allay the shortage of ANA NCOs, but the ANA and NTM-A will be challenged as we close this shortage.**

**b. Attrition.** There is a complex interaction amongst recruiting, retention, and attrition. This interaction affects ANSF efforts to meet quantitative goals while maintaining adequate quality. Attrition must be reduced to acceptable levels or quality will suffer. One of our major challenges is to balance this complex interaction. Any reduction in attrition has a demonstrable impact on both the quantity and quality of the component in question. Within the ANP, ANCOP attrition must be addressed, as ANCOP growth is not possible even with the current improved attrition rate. **Unless ANCOP attrition is significantly reduced and recruiting significantly increased, meeting the October 2011 total strength objective of 18,520 will not be possible.**

**c. Ministerial Development.** The Mol and MoD have also assumed more responsibility and have improved their general planning and execution. However, a lack of Afghan quality leaders, middle-level staff, and bureaucracy pose real challenges. NTM-A and the ANSF are working to mitigate these challenges through training and education programs, as well as by experience gained through partnering. Improving the MoD and the Mol remain distinct challenges, but, like the operational forces they oversee, **the security ministries have improved and now have a solid foundation to leverage** to move forward in this year.

**(1) MoD.** Factional and ethnic agendas remain an obstacle to change. In June 2010, a wholesale restructuring of key ANA leadership occurred and most Corps Commanders were changed. ANA leaders are, at present, operating in a more collaborative fashion, resulting in improved effectiveness. **The creation of the Ground Forces Command** to provide operational command and control to fielded forces will enable the MoD leadership to focus on strategy, plans, and policy formulation and be less focused on the operational or tactical realm. This separation will provide a better framework for providing the command and control for fielded units, especially as the ANA is balanced with enablers.

**(2) Mol.** The Mol’s key challenges for the next year include: meeting quality and quantity goals (especially the ANCOP total end strength), implementing the Presidential Decree on Private Security Companies, and reintegration of insurgents. Mol advisors are preparing to meet those challenges by improving advisor support to police pillars, increasing focus on ministerial development process, using MoDA expertise, and increasing Afghan participation in the ministerial development plan process.

**d. Shortfalls in Manning.** NTM-A/CSTC-A has received an influx of U.S. and NATO personnel since November 2009 and the command is currently 78%<sup>24</sup> manned overall. Twenty-nine Coalition nations provide troops to NTM-A today; another six nations pledged future troop support. Despite this progress, NTM-A is only 56% resourced for police, 71% for air, 26% for medical, 73% for army, and 0% for logistics.<sup>25</sup>

**(1) Institutional Trainers.** In addition to personnel, twenty-one nations also supported ANSF development through a variety of donations including infrastructure, supplies, equipment, and NATO Trust Fund deposits.

**(2) Current NTM-A Priority Trainer Status. Trainers are the greatest combat multiplier for the ANSF. As the ANSF grows and becomes more specialized, the number of specialized trainers required will also increase.** Figure 13 illustrates the shift from basic training to specialized

<sup>24</sup>As of 01 November. While overall 78% Manned, NTM-A is only 67% manned for CJSOR (see below).

<sup>25</sup>As of 01 November 2010.






Figure 14. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan priority trainer progress.

training and projects how our requirements will be resourced over time. In March 2012, 2,800 NTM-A trainers will be needed to sustain the size and quality of the ANSF. These requirements are specified in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR version 10.0) that was released by Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) in September 2010. When combined with the CSTC-A requirement for trainers, the total grows to 5,200. NTM-A has refined its focus to fifteen critical training capabilities to **maintain our momentum and professionalize the ANSF**, as well as our projected ANSF build plan and support for the stand-up of the branch and specialty schools. These critical training capabilities need to be filled between December 2010 and July 2011 – the pivotal period for transitioning security to the ANSF. These NATO specialists will reduce our reliance on civilian contractors and deliver better—and faster—training, leading to greater ANSF quality. For example, Enclosure 3 lists nations' personnel contributions. If the specialty trainer capabilities are not filled, expansion of the training base will be hindered, branch and specialty school development will be delayed, and efforts to professionalize the force will be hampered.

**(2) Current NTM-A Priority Trainer Status.** Nations confirmed their pledges for 300 institutional trainers at the NTM-A Force Generation Conference held at SHAPE

in February 2010. Seven months later, nations pledged an additional 600 institutional trainers at the ISAF Force Generation Conference held at SHAPE on 22-23 September 2010. Although this progress is promising, 900 more institutional trainers are needed to fill all NTM-A trainer positions, which Figure 14 illustrates.<sup>26</sup>

**6. Conclusion.** This document reviewed the key efforts in NTM-A's first year; a year where our Afghan partners exhibited significant progress, in both quality and in quantity. This document also detailed our challenges, building an ANSF of sufficient quantity and sufficient quality to protect and serve the Afghan population. **The two greatest challenges for the future of the ANSF are leader development and having sufficient specialized capabilities.** Additional trainers are required to sustain the ANSF growth and improve ANSF quality. Conversely, insufficient trainers and lack of specialized trainers significantly threaten ANSF growth and delays transition: geographical or institutional. In closing, as the ANSF continues to grow in size and capabilities, trainers, especially specialized trainers, are required—**no trainers, no transition.** We are realistic about the challenges we face today, but we are optimistic that we will achieve our shared vision for the future—Afghanistan secured by Afghans.

<sup>26</sup>As of 3 October 2010.

## Enclosure 1: Polling Data

NTM-A utilizes surveys as a means to collect data on the perceptions of the Afghan people regarding security and their opinion of the ANSF.


The results of NTM-A's Afghan Nationwide Data Polling (ANDP) over the past year indicate that the positive perception of the ANSF is increasing. Each ANDP survey gathered data from over 6,700 Afghans tracking perceptions and opinions. The first graph illustrates the improvement in perception that the Afghan Government is headed in the right direction, an increase from 40% to 54%. The second graph provides the view of security in local areas, which saw an increase from 24% to 33% in improvement. The third graph displays the Afghan view of ANP performance over the last six months, the improvement went from 21% to 37%. The last graph displays how Afghans feel about serving in the ANSF. NTM-A believes this to be a very encouraging statistic—approximately 70% of Afghans view both the ANA and ANP favorably.

Another survey by the Asia Foundation looks at the perception of the Afghan people on various topics; of particular interest is the security perspective of the Afghan people. The Asia Foundation-sponsored 2008 survey found that since 2006 there was a declining trend of respondents that say the country is moving in the right direction. However, the 2009 survey found a significantly higher percentage of respondents stated that the country is moving in the right





Transportation of election ballots.

direction. The survey found the main reason behind this change in perception was the improving security situation. Improving security in Afghanistan is mentioned as a source of increased optimism by a larger and larger percentage of survey respondents each year. A contributor to the increasingly positive security in the country is Afghanistan's security forces: the ANA and ANP. NTM-A views this positive trend in security perception as an external indicator that the ANSF is maturing into a professional force that instills pride among Afghans. NTM-A is awaiting the release of the 2010 Asia Foundation survey to continue to balance independent organizational findings of Afghan perceptions with NTM-A contracted survey results.



## Enclosure 2: Organizational Charts

NTM-A/CSTC-A  
Initial Organization:  
November 2009






## Enclosure 3: Contributions and Air Sites

### Troop Contributing Nations



 Albania	 Germany	 Portugal
 Australia	 Greece	 Romania
 Belgium	 Hungary	 Singapore
 Canada	 Italy	 Slovenia
 Croatia	 Jordan	 Spain
 Czech Republic	 Republic of Korea	 Sweden
 Denmark	 Mongolia	 Turkey
 Estonia	 Netherlands	 United Kingdom
 Finland	 Norway	 United States
 France	 Poland	

### Air Training and Operations Sites



## Enclosure 4: ANSF Training Facilities

### Afghan National Police Training Sites



### Afghan National Army Training Sites



