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Transcribed by  
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TAPE I of II - SIDE 1

Oral History Interview

NSA-OH-07-84

with

Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, U.S. Air Force, Retired

19 April 1984

Lt Gen Blake's residence in Universal City, Texas

By Robert D. Farley

*INSERT* *A* Today is 19 April 1984. Our interviewee is Lieutenant  
General Gordon A. Blake, United States Air Force, Retired.  
General ~~CSA~~ Blake held the position of Director, National

Security Agency, from July 1962 to May 1965, which was his last assignment before retirement from the Air Force. After graduating from West Point in 1931, he served as a Communications Officer with the Army Air Corps Unit in Hawaii. He set up the Army Airways Communications Office in Alaska, entered the Research and Development field at Wright Patterson Air Force Base and served in various additional command

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positions in the United States Air Force. He commanded the U.S. Air Force Security Service before he was assigned as DIRNSA. The Silver Star was awarded to General Blake for Gallantry on December 7, <sup>1941,</sup> ~~1942,~~ at Pearl Harbor. General Blake will discuss his military career and in particular his assignment at NSA. The interview is taking place in General Blake's residence in Universal City, Texas. Interviewer is Bob Farley. <sup>General</sup> ~~Gen~~ Blake desires that these two tapes be classified TOP SECRET - HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY. This is NSA Oral History Interview No. 07-84.

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FARLEY

First of all, General Blake, thanks much, much, much for seeing me. I have been looking forward to this for a long time. In fact, you are the reason I am here. I just tied in a few other interviews,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

in the area. *Am Alston*

BLAKE

Quite a few Air Force SIGINT types live here.

FARLEY

Right, right. Irwin Labbe, Colonel Labbe. *is over*

BLAKE

I don't recollect him.

FARLEY

Labbe, he was an OPS Officer for a long time. On this interview, I want to concentrate primarily on your career as it relates to the intelligence operation and basically your tour at NSA. We can talk at any level you consider that you would like to talk about.

BLAKE

The level is up to you.

FARLEY

*All right. All right*

BLAKE

~~You may have to~~ *As* We can put a level on when we get through.

FARLEY

We'll put a TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - CODEWORD, whatever you want. *As* I say, I have a lot of questions and we'll try and hurry through them, but I am sure in your

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discussions, you ~~will~~ probably <sup>will</sup> answer some of the questions, ~~already~~. To set the stage, Sir, let's talk about your pre-military life, your background, hobbies, anything, before you entered the Academy.

BLAKE

I grew up in a small town of northern Iowa called Charles City, born in 1910, left there to go to West Point in 1927, <sup>Not</sup> ~~not~~ a particularly eventful life. I always thought how green and inexperienced I was when I went off to West Point in June 1927. I had just graduated from high school three weeks before that and had no idea when I graduated that I would go to West Point. A few days after graduation, Congressman Howitz (?) ~~it~~ called, I had applied and a last minute vacancy came up and he offered it to me, so with virtually no notice I took off. I was 16 years old, which is a little younger than you are allowed to enter West Point, but they do make exceptions if you are fairly close to 17 on July 1st when you enter. My birthday is July 22nd so I was 22 days short of 17, so I paid my way for the first 22 days. (Laughter) Interestingly enough, in my class was another later

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Director, Marshall Carter. *jk*

FARLEY Oh, yes. *tt*

BLAKE He was also 16, and he always chided me for beating  
him <sup>out</sup> as "class baby." (Laughter) I hadn't been north of  
Minneapolis, east of Chicago, south of Des Moines, or  
west of Sioux City, and I was pretty green. *WBR*

FARLEY *Okay.*

BLAKE *Had* no foreign language. My first year at  
West Point was quite a struggle, but I managed to get  
through and did better as I went on, <sup>intellectually,</sup> ~~intellectually,~~ I  
mean. I wound up *65* 55th in the class. *-*

FARLEY *Right. GREAT.*

BLAKE *of course* course at the end of the *plebe year,* ~~plebe year,~~ I think I was about  
290 <sup>or so</sup> ~~or so~~ (laughter) *WBR*

FARLEY So we can brush over it quickly, the West Point period, *but*  
just one question, did they teach any intelligence at  
all in any of the courses during your *WBR* four years?

BLAKE I don't recall a single thing that was related to  
intelligence. It was pretty much basically a mixture  
of, oh, I don't know what you would call it, not  
Social Sciences really, Liberal Arts, I guess. *WBR*

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~~FARLEY~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~Yes~~

~~It~~ was the word given to it. It was a mixture of Liberal Arts and Engineering. Actually, you graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree. Looking back on it, there were things that loomed so very large in my later career that we got very little of.

FARLEY

Huh.

BLAKE

I think about 20 hours of radio. ~~ff~~

FARLEY

Oh, yes.

BLAKE

~~It~~ I spent much more time learning to ride a horse than I did about airplanes, for example. (Laughter)

FARLEY

My gosh! ~~What assignment, let me say it again, in~~ In what branch of the Service were you commissioned ~~before graduation?~~

BLAKE

Well, I was commissioned in the Coast Artillery Corps. There are only certain branches that you are allowed to apply for, and you applied for them in the order of your class standing. For example, the Corps of Engineers usually had about 15 or so vacancies and they went traditionally to the top members of the class. By the time you got down to 20, why the Engineer vacancies would be gone. You could not apply

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for the Air Corps as a basic branch. You could apply if you passed a physical exam. You were automatically detailed to learn to fly and if you successfully graduated from the flying school, which was a year's training, and became a pilot, then you were transferred to the Air Corps. So for the first year while I was learning to fly, I would sign my name, 2d Lt, CAC(AC), meaning that I was detailed to the Air Corps at that particular time.

FARLEY

I see. You went to the Fort Monmouth Signal School soon thereafter?

BLAKE

Well, that was later. I came here to Randolph Air Force Base in September '31 to learn to fly. We were the first class at Randolph. Randolph was a brand new establishment and they were consolidating their primary and basic flying school here. From there I went to a Pursuit Squadron, <sup>They</sup> they are called TAC Fighter Squadrons now. It was the 55th Pursuit Squadron -- it is now the 55th TAC Fighter Squadron stationed in England. I spent a couple of years there and then I spent a year at the Signal School at Fort Monmouth.

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The Air Corps Technical School, which was at Chanute Field, Illinois, had a communications school, but it burned down and in '34, '35 they held a special course at Fort Monmouth which was a mixture of instruction by the Air Corps instructors and by the Signal School people. When I finished that, I went to Chanute Field for four years from '35 to February '39 instructing in the Communications School, which was moved back to Chanute after that *first year at Monmouth.*

*If you're interested in what I did* at Chanute, I interviewed the Historian from there so we won't go into Chanute.

FARLEY

Sir, the Communications Officer School, did they teach you how to use codes and ciphers, or instruct you on any cipher machines at all?

BLAKE

Yes, we had a course in codes and ciphers, concentrated quite a lot on ~~the~~ *the* I think it is called the M-95. ~~It~~  
~~was~~

FARLEY

The disk?

BLAKE

Do I have the right name?

FARLEY

*94-A Ninety four.*

BLAKE

*94-A Ninety four.*

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FARLEY You are close.

BLAKE I was close.

FARLEY Right.

BLAKE And ~~that~~ the disk cipher has, I think, ~~that~~ 25

~~FARLEY~~ That's right.

~~BLAKE~~ <sup>then from then on</sup> disks on an axle and you line them up and ~~then on~~

you can use it. We also played around with cryptanalysis and I remember that that kind of fascinated me. It maybe was a precursor to my later interest, although it probably didn't have too much to do with it. I found that a lot of fun to play around <sup>with</sup> It was very elementary obviously <sup>uh</sup>

FARLEY Of course.

BLAKE <sup>It was mostly to</sup> mostly, you know, count the number of such and such a letter and assume that's an "E" <sup>and</sup> ~~that~~ that sort of thing.

FARLEY Sir, did you remember the nomenclature of any of the radio receivers, or any of the equipments that they exposed you to?

BLAKE Well, the Air Corps at the time was, of course, serviced by the Signal Corps and so I remember the

radio that was used for air to ground communications, not by the pilot. <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ was called the SCR-187, and that was actually a set that was also used in tanks. <sup>So</sup> ~~So~~ the philosophy there was, of course, to make the maximum use of equipment across the board in the various Army activities. The pilot set was known as SCR-183, that was the way he talked to the tower. I don't remember too much of the numbers.

FARLEY

~~That's a great story. That's wonderful.~~ <sup>That's great.</sup>  
Sir, I ~~noticed in your biography~~ <sup>noticed in your biography</sup> you talk about the land base flight from Hawaii to the Philippines. This was a pioneer flight and you got the Distinguished Service Cross.

BLAKE

Well, ~~the whole~~ <sup>everybody</sup> who took part, got it.

FARLEY

I see. Now I was going to ask about the communications. <sup>Were the</sup> ~~Were the~~ communications, "efficient" is the word I use, and were you able to remain in contact with the controllers throughout the flight, and the speciality of the communications people on board other than yourself?

BLAKE

Well, the radio operator, of course, was the position

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that tried to keep track, make position reports and that sort of thing, receive weather reports. <sup>The</sup> ~~To~~ answer <sup>to</sup> your question depends a lot on what leg of the flight you are talking about.

FARLEY Oh, I see.

BLAKE It was a kind of <sup>an</sup> around about way to get from Hawaii to the Philippines. This was the first land-base flight between those two locations. Congress before World War II had refused to fortify Guam, and that included having an airfield there. So there was no airfield on Guam. So to get to Clark, which was our destination in the Philippines, we flew first to Midway and Wake and then flew pretty much directly south. That was an interesting part of the flight because that took us over the Mandated Islands, which Japan had controlled.

~~FARLEY~~ Ah, yes...

~~BLAKE~~ since World War I and that was mystery. Nobody knew much about places like Truk.

~~FARLEY~~

~~BLAKE~~ and other storied names.

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~~EARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

*Yes*

*All* in the Pacific military affairs, to Port Moresby in New Guinea. From Moresby to Clark was a little far for a direct flight so we flew due west to Darwin, and then from Darwin to Clark. This is pretty much flying the two short sides of a right angle triangle because the hypotenuse was a little *long*. From ~~Honolulu~~ *Nielsen* ~~Hickam~~ *to* Midway and Wake communications was satisfactory. We didn't really communicate too much because since we were going to fly over the Mandated Islands we weren't particularly interested in telling the Japanese that here was a flight of B-17's meandering around that part of the world. We didn't send anything at all, of course, we flew at night at high altitude across the Mandated Islands.

Communications was pretty spotty with the Australians *and* ~~Port~~ Moresby and Darwin and we had trouble getting decent weather reports out of the Philippines. We wound up landing at Clark in the beginnings of a typhoon which made it a rather sporty operation, but we all managed to get down.

*All All right. That*

FARLEY

~~Right, that~~ answers it, I think, Sir. I wanted that on the record primarily for my own curiosity. That's great. You were with the 18th Composite Wing in Hawaii in '39, I see, and were you there until Pearl Harbor?

BLAKE

Yes, I was stationed there at Pearl Harbor and I stayed on in the Pacific actually until November 1945. My Headquarters moved to the Philippines when we reentered Manila in early '45, probably January or February.

FARLEY

*Okay.*  
~~OK~~ Sir, just a question on the Unit in Hawaii. I doubt if you had an intercept mission at all. Were you provided any communications intelligence, your Unit, any communications intelligence or any other type information and, if so, from where and how frequent.

BLAKE

Are you talking about during World War II *RA* ?

FARLEY

No, no, prior to World War II, Sir, probably '39, '40, '41 period.

BLAKE

Well, I was not provided any intelligence directly, you know you get some from messages and things like that. We were pretty well alert to the fact that we probably would be at war with Japan and the situation in Hawaii in the summer and early fall of <sup>1941,</sup> ~~1942,~~ '41. I mean ~~that~~

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~Yes, Sir.~~

→ was pretty much one of preparation. For example, we had missions related to the defense of Japan. The War Plan had three phases -- Phase 1 was anti-sabotage, Phase 2 was defense against air attack, and Phase 3 we called "Die on the Beaches" (laughter), and at that point we were presumed to be under amphibious assault.

FARLEY  
BLAKE

Yes  
The air activity was finished, beaten, and the Navy was also out of the picture. <sup>So</sup> ~~By~~ under those circumstances, if you were in an Air Corps Unit, say, a Bomb Squadron, you had an auxiliary assignment. Most of us <sup>would go</sup> to the 35th Infantry and we would shoulder a rifle and become Infantrymen to help defend against the amphibious assault. I recall, we were rather put out by this, we, the Air Corps people there. That phase of readiness we thought was greatly overemphasized. The 35th Infantry had Detachments on <sup>Hickam</sup> ~~Hickam~~ and we were training for Phase 3. Meanwhile, <sup>we'd</sup> ~~we~~ added a whole new Bomb Group going from one Group, Wing <sup>to two. We had</sup> ~~to two~~

increased ~~the~~ we had taken on the B-17, which flew in there for the first time in June '41. We wanted to work on Phase 2 and here we were learning how to be better Infantrymen. *MM*

FARLEY

Yes

BLAKE

*Also*  
*and* we had strong objections to the phasing. The reason for that was two-fold. Phase 1, which we were in on December 7th, defense against sabotage, the airplanes were all pulled together nose to tail on the ramp. Reason: so the Infantry can guard them with less people, instead of being out on the perimeters where they have some protection against attack. Second, a radar network was being installed in 1941 and the circumstances were that under Phase 1, that remained in construction status, that is, it was not operational. The Corps of Engineers and the Department of Engineers was doing the brick and mortar work and the Department Signal Officer (telephone rang) *MM* The radar network which was fairly well along and could have been useful on December 7th was still in construction status. As we went into Phase 2, defense

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against air attack, the rules were that the radar network would be turned over to the Air Corps operationally and, in effect, the construction work and installation work would kind of phase down into a "do what they could, but don't interfere with its operational use". The Air Corps felt that we should not have a separate Phase 1, that defense against sabotage was a function that should be performed at all times, obviously with more emphasis on pre-war. There should only be two Phases -- Defense Against Surprise Air Attack, and Die on the Beaches -- and that recommendation was made to the Department Commander in June 1941 and he turned it down. And there was a chart, which incidentally I had Mr. ~~Hasdorff~~ <sup>Hasdorff</sup> get for me because I have never been able to lay my hands on it, but this was a very telling chart. It was approximately the 800 mile circle, which was the search range for B-17's and Navy Patrol Boats, and Oahu, Pearl Harbor, was at the center of this circle, and what was represented here in different segments was different kinds of attack showing the attack that stood

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out was December 21st. The reason for that was the greatest amount of darkness and in that particular time, given the 800 mile search range, a carrier fleet could stay outside that search radius, steam in under cover of darkness, and launch at dawn and strike Pearl Harbor, <sup>with</sup> and no night radar or anything like that, ~~you could.~~ it was very, very difficult to prevent that attack. And that would be December 21st at 8 o'clock in the morning. It happened December 7th at 7:55.

FARLEY

~~7th night~~ Do you have pretty horrible memories of December 7th, or no?

BLAKE

I wouldn't say horrible, it was not a pleasant morning obviously.

FARLEY

I know, but <sup>you</sup> got the Silver Star I noticed for Gallantry.

BLAKE

Well, I suppose I deserved it. The control tower should have been a very dangerous place. It turned out not to be.

FARLEY

You were staying on duty up there?

BLAKE

Well, I was Communications Officer responsible for the tower and other communications but, also, I was

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*Operation*

Base ~~Communications~~ Officer who is the Airfield Manager. And we had this flight of B-17's due in at 8 o'clock from the West Coast and I was down at Base Operations waiting for them, to see that they were properly parked, crews looked after and the usual functions of the Airport Manager. So all of a sudden we hear this big "karroppp". I raced outside and here was a dive bomber <sup>that</sup> ~~who~~ had bombed a big depot <sup>hangar</sup> ~~hangar~~ at the south end of the ~~hangar~~. <sup>hangar line, It</sup> ~~hangar~~ pulled up and we could see this ~~the~~ red circle under the wing. Well, no guessing as to what the hell had happened. And so, of course, I raced up to the tower because we wanted to warn these planes coming in what had happened and try to get them safely on the ground, which we succeeded in doing. Although they all didn't land nicely at <sup>Hickam</sup> ~~Hickam~~, one of them landed on Kahuka <sup>(?)</sup> ~~Spelling Golf~~ Golf Course, a couple of them landed at Bellows, a little field on the east side of the island, one of them, as I recall, was on Maui. We got ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> of them in between the two attacks, there were two attacks, so we were pretty lucky on that one. But the reason the tower wasn't

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dangerous is kind of interesting from the Jap intelligence point of view. Target folders were captured from some of the Jap planes that were shot down. <sup>Not</sup> ~~not~~ many were shot down, but there were a few, and this target folder listed the Operations Building, which was in the center of the <sup>hangar</sup> ~~hangar~~ line, and had the control tower on top of it, listed that as the Officers Club. (Laughter) And the reason for that is kind of interesting. The Officers Club actually was opened up on New Year's Eve 1940, In other words, 11 months before the war. Prior to that time, not having an Officers Mess, if we wanted to have a social function of some kind, a dance, for example, we would hold it in the Operations Building, because the Operations Building was offices and the tower structure along the <sup>hangar</sup> ~~hangar~~ line and then kind of "T" <sup>shaped</sup> ~~shape~~ a section behind it which was a Wing Briefing Room, and it had a sliding door down the center so you could divide it up into two group briefing rooms. So that is where we would have all our parties. Just move a bar in there and have a dance. But the Japs had it listed

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as the Officers Mess so they didn't shoot at it, they didn't drop a bomb on it. You would think that somebody would have had as a target an opportunity the control tower, wherever it was, but that wasn't the case.

FARLEY I'll be darned. That's an interesting story.

BLAKE I should have been thoroughly shot up and gotten the Silver Star post<sup>h</sup>umously. (Laughter)

FARLEY Better this way. Sir, can we run over just lightly World War II then? I noticed that you were sent to Alaska in 1942 to set up the <sup>for</sup> communications,

BLAKE ~~1942~~ 1943

FARLEY <sup>Is</sup> it '43? 1943?

BLAKE Yes.

FARLEY <sup>To</sup> ~~to~~ set up the Air Communications Office for Alaska and again equipments, if you remember, type radio sets, your prime problem, whether you worked with the Navy COMM Station up there? Do you recall much about that?

BLAKE Well, I don't remember <sup>anything</sup> ~~much~~ about <sup>the</sup> equipment because the name of the game was to settle a feud between primarily

the Army, but with some Navy overtones, and the CIA. The CIA had a large number of Airway Communications Stations in Alaska and there was an Executive Order passed early or just before World War II, <sup>What</sup> the Executive Order said was that in case of hostilities the CIA Airway Communications Stations would come under the Executive Control of the War Department. In the Pacific, where I was running AACS, which was the Army Air Corps Airways Communications Control Towers, weather reports, aids to navigation ~~for~~

FARLEY

Right

BLAKE

~~point-to-point~~ communications, ~~air~~ air ground, that sort of thing, there were two CA stations involved, one in Honolulu and one in San Francisco. They came under my operational control, <sup>The</sup> ~~the~~ one in Honolulu did at first, and they were having some trouble with the one in San Francisco. The CIA boss in <sup>to use</sup> [redacted] wanted this emergency to build a lot of permanent construction, the War Department's rules were <sup>use</sup> ~~not used~~ temporary construction, and there was a big fight going on, <sup>Since</sup> ~~and since~~ I had successfully taken over

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KV Air in Honolulu, they said well maybe Blake can settle this San Francisco flap, ~~at SF~~ <sup>So</sup> they gave me KSF in San Francisco. ~~then they put both ends of the wire~~ <sup>We</sup> were flying a lot of airplanes from the West Coast to Hawaii, and then on to Australia. I ran that, too, for the first nine months of the war before the Air Transport Command came in. So I went back to San Francisco and, to make a very long story short, just served notice on the guy [redacted] that we were going to enlarge the facilities at KSF. ~~at SF~~ <sup>We</sup> were going to do it with the District Engineer's construction, ~~it~~ <sup>It</sup> would be temporary construction, specifically, World War II barracks, and we would furnish the equipment to expand the number of ~~operation~~ <sup>operating</sup> positions and all that sort of thing and, if he didn't like it, he could complain to Washington. And that is the way it went. So with this big feud going on in Alaska, well, if Blake did it in Hawaii, we'll create an Air Communications Office for Alaska, one Colonel and one Sergeant, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup>

EO 3.3b(1)  
6.2(d)

You were a Colonel then?

FARLEY

BLAKE <sup>Yes,</sup>  
~~Yeah,~~ I was a Colonel.

FARLEY Good, you went up in a hurry.

BLAKE Yes, I did, <sup>actually</sup> That was characteristic in those days. And so, well, this horrified me because, in the first place, I knew I was going to Alaska, and, second, I had a firm conviction that the way to do this was to delegate this Executive Authority to the AACS boss, as they had done in the Pacific. So I persuaded them to send me, not transfer me, to Alaska to set up this office while on temporary duty. And so I spent a couple of months up there cruising around, plying people with hot buttered rum, <sup>and</sup> (laughter) <sup>and</sup> and generally getting the thing straightened out, <sup>Also</sup> ~~and~~ ~~also~~ discovering the that the AACS guy was at least half at fault in the way he was operating and suggested that we get a new one up there that could pour oil on troubled waters and operate the thing the way I had in the Pacific, which was essentially to tell the CIA this is what we want, now you run it.

FARLEY Right.

BLAKE Now you know I am not trying to be a hard-nosed boss,

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but delegate <sup>it. They didn't</sup> ~~to their~~ ~~competent~~ ~~people~~ ~~you~~ ~~know~~ ~~we~~ ~~were~~ ~~dealing~~ ~~with~~ ~~that~~ ~~duds~~. And that is the way it worked out. I went back to my war in the Pacific. So it was essentially a political job, I had nothing to do with equipment, I don't even remember Box 1.

FARLEY Good, that's fine. You were in Hawaii still on V-J Day when the Japs surrendered?

BLAKE Well, I was in the Philippines.

FARLEY Were you there? I see.

BLAKE My Headquarters moved to the Philippines in early 1945 so in August '45 when this all broke out, I was ~~at~~ actually <sup>in</sup> Fort McKinley, right outside Manila.

FARLEY Any fond memories about that day?

BLAKE Well, it was a very exciting day, of course. We knew nothing about the atomic bomb, but many of us were convinced the Japs were flat on their face. Their shipping was gone, their cities were in horrible shape. I guess everybody thought they would probably continue to kamikaze the whole operation and it would take a hundred thousand deaths to conquer Japan and <sup>we</sup> were up to our eyebrows in planning for OLYMPIC ~~and there~~ <sup>There</sup> was

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another name. <sup>There</sup> ~~where~~ were two invasions.

FARLEY Yes, yes, I have forgotten the name of the other one.

BLAKE I have, too. OLYMPIC ~~was~~ <sup>wasn't that</sup>, I think was Honshu, the main island, so that was what we were engaged in when the atomic bomb brought an end to all of it.

FARLEY Thank goodness.

BLAKE Although I guess the Jap historically, I believe the Japanese had sent some feelers out even before the atomic bomb so maybe they would have been smart enough, ~~than~~ the Emperor, at least, who was a moving force in all this, ~~he~~ would have been smart enough to say, "Well, let's surrender." The atomic bomb, <sup>in its</sup> cataclysmic nature, obviously gave him a psychological edge in what he was apparently trying to do anyway.

FARLEY Right. Sir, when did you come back from the Philippines?

BLAKE I arrived back in the United States November 2, 1945.

FARLEY Gosh, soon thereafter the war then?

BLAKE Oh, yes, I had been out there since March '39.

FARLEY You had enough points?

BLAKE I developed infectious hepatitis. I was yellow as a

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were under the Air Transport Command as subordinate units and Langley was being readied as the new home for the Tactical Air Command.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

So phasing down was the name of the game. I recall one crash trip I had to take. It was actually <sup>an</sup> around-the-world-trip, ~~the~~ I think it was February 1946. There were a number of air fields and the associated communications and other facilities that had been built around the world in North Africa, and through the Middle East and India, and across the Pacific and up the Canadian coast, Goose Bay, places like that, and ~~these~~ <sup>These</sup> were called National Interest Stations, ~~the~~ <sup>The</sup> theory there was that with World War II, land plane flying across the oceans had come of age and there would be a tremendous expansion of commercial aviation using those same types of transport aircraft. Of course, that is what happened. The idea was to try to preserve these National Interest Stations until discussions with various governments could take place and these facilities could be transferred and this

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network not just collapse with the end of the war. Well, it was hard to tell who was going to be there. There was a point system and <sup>if</sup> you had a certain number of points, you just <sup>collected</sup> ~~slue~~ and said "Goodbye" and went home. ~~And so~~ <sup>So</sup> they told General Saville, who was Deputy Commander of Air Transport Command, you take a weather guy and a communicator and you go visit these places, and you find out what needs to be done to preserve this National Interest potential. So we flew across the Atlantic, to North Africa and the Middle East and up to China, <sup>we</sup> ~~we~~ were not too much interested in China from this point of view but General Marshall was there as the big honcho. ~~By~~

FARLEY

Yes

BLAKE

~~And he~~ <sup>He</sup> had a C-54 assigned to him and it needed three engine changes and some other maintenance, and so rather than try to do all that out there they simply gave Saville a ~~new~~ <sup>newer,</sup> better shape, C-54 and said, "you take this to Marshall and pick his airplane up and come home in it." So we did that. That was an interesting trip, but it was sort of characteristic of the times.

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Post-war problems were predominant and it was phasing down and accommodating change rather than austere budgets.

FARLEY Good. In '47 you moved to R&D at Wright Patterson.

BLAKE In '47 I went to the <sup>add Air</sup> War College for a year, and then to R&D at Wright Patterson.

FARLEY OK, then let's just pick up Wright Patterson. Two questions: were you primarily concerned with R&D for new aircraft equipments, COMMS systems, radar and navigational side, across the board, was it this sort of concern?

BLAKE Well, it was across the board. Actually, there was an organization called the Electronic Sub-Division which had been a Signal Corps activity stationed at Wright Field and it was there to support <sup>Army</sup> ~~Armament~~ Air Force operations of all kinds insofar as electronics was concerned. So it dealt with airborne as well as ground. Most of the ground radar and things like that and, <sup>instrument</sup> ~~guess~~ landing systems and what have you, was at Rome, New York, the depot at Rome. Much of the pure research business was in an old broken down

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warehouse called the Cambridge Research Center, I think that's the right name, Cambridge some or another, which was in Boston and that was the beginning of what's now Hanscom and actually had a great impetus, this was later on, on what's now called the Miracle Mile, Route 128, around Boston.

FARLEY

Oh, yes.

BLAKE

I was later sort of a mid-wife in all that. So here was this Electronic Sub-Division, which was transferred lock, stock and barrel to the new Air Force, you see, and it was headed by an Army Brigadier General Tom Reeves, who had transferred to the Air Force, and I was Chief of Operations. And then in '49, I believe it was, they decided they wanted to put in the Armament Lab somebody with some black box experience, and transfer certain things like the auto-pilot and so forth from other laboratories. It was the beginning really of the idea of an integrated airplane <sup>with</sup> ~~where~~ all of the electronic and hydraulic, and guidance. <sup>for</sup> The theory was that the devices that steered the airplane ought to also be available to <sup>aim it,</sup> ~~aim it,~~ I recall

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that the bombing system in those days in the Armament Lab was an interesting thing. It had an optical sight, very complicated affair, of course, that you ~~could aim the~~ could visually look at the target and with the computer and so forth, figure out when do I push the button. It also had a Signal Corps radar that could perform the same function in bad weather. These two were incompatible. One was to make a very complicated matter over-simplified. The optical sight worked on rectangular coordinates, and the radar worked on polar coordinates. ~~It was~~ <sup>So</sup> in order to fit these things together so they would work for the ~~bombardier~~ <sup>Commodore</sup> as a single system, a thing called the A-1A Interconnect was devised and this black box turned out to be bigger than ~~either~~ <sup>either of</sup> the radar. So one of ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup> first projects <sup>in</sup> of the Armament Lab was the high speed bomb director, which was the first time that all the elements of a bomb aiming arrangement was combined into a single development tailored to go into an airplane. And, ~~that~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~they~~ as a matter of fact, some of the offspring of that development ~~some of them~~ <sup>MAVW</sup> are still flying.

FARLEY Great.

BLAKE Which shows you how long they last. ↗

~~FARLEY That's right.~~ ↗ One interesting phase of that, the first contract was the IBM Company, and their President, Thomas Watson, Sr., came in to see me in the Armament Lab and he had one simple question. "Is this really something that's high on your list?" He said, "We haven't gone in much for defense contracting. We feel a little guilty about that. We would like to pick something to compete for which is new, challenging, and damn well needed." And I said, "Well, this one and a similar project, which had already gone to Hughes for fighter aircraft, interceptors, MX-179 that was called, <sup>These</sup> ~~these~~ are the top two projects in this laboratory." I explained, you know, the old background where you buy this from this manufacturer, and this from this manufacturer, and you would buy an airplane, and these were called GFE, Government Furnished Equipment, and you would tell the company making the airplane, <sup>all right</sup> ~~all right~~ now, when you build this airplane, make a place for all these things.

FARLEY Oh, I see. So that was really the beginning then of IBM becoming involved in supporting defense.

BLAKE <sup>In</sup>~~in~~ becoming involved in that sort of thing, you know. I have no recollection at all of how and when they got involved as they have been, as you know, for NSA. That is a totally different, <sup>bb,</sup> situation.

FARLEY Of course, of course.

BLAKE ~~and they~~ <sup>They</sup> may have done that much earlier. I would expect given their basic technology, which is, of course, computers <sup>at</sup> ~~at~~ the heart of it.

~~FARLEY~~ ~~BLAKE~~ <sup>Yes</sup>

that they may have been involved in the cryptologic business even earlier than that, I just don't know.

FARLEY Right. Sir, how useful to the R&D people were captured enemy equipments and using the state-of-the-art developed by the enemy, using for making new equipments for U.S.

BLAKE I don't ever recall this, it may be that I didn't pay enough attention to it. I have a gut feeling though that U.S. technology, in the kind of world in which I operated, essentially the electronic world, probably

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was out in front and we didn't learn all that much.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

That is just my gut feeling. I can't prove that.

FARLEY

Well, that is very satisfying to hear that.

BLAKE

Well, it could be that way, but I don't have much personal recollection of "Oh ~~OK~~ boy, that gadget there really opened our eyes". I don't recall that at all.

FARLEY

Good. Sir, in this time period now, with the establishment of AFSA and the establishment of the Air Force Security Service, we can sort of gloss over that, do you have any comments on the Air Force attitude when AFSA was established?

BLAKE

I had no association with that or the Security Service until sometime in the summer of ~~late~~ <sup>late</sup> ~~1956~~ <sup>1956</sup>.

~~FARLEY~~

~~...<sup>7</sup>...oh...OK...~~

~~BLAKE~~

...because General O'Donnell, Wright Air Force personnel, called me in, I was at the Pentagon at the time as Assistant DCS OPS, and they wanted to assign me to the Security Service. And as far as my recollection goes, that's the first time I had paid much attention to the Security Service.

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FARLEY

OK, fine. We'll pick that up later, but I want to talk about the assignment as Director of Communications in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for OPS and you established pioneer operational circuits using scatter COMMS, and other questions, new equipments, new procedures, any innovations in codes and ciphers, did we have scrambled communications yet, COMSEC, OPSEC and real problems, things like that. I don't want to pile it all <sup>on, talk</sup> ~~about~~ about the scatter communications first, Sir.

BLAKE

Well, scatter came about because we were putting in radar network from Newfoundland to Frobisher, which is up the Labrador coast, <sup>past</sup> ~~passed~~ Goose Bay, there was a chain, I believe, of eight radar stations, approximately 175-200 miles apart, forbidding country, and the plan called for conventional microwave transmissions between these various stations, which would mean, of course, a series of microwave towers about every 25-50 miles depending upon terrain, up this coast.

FARLEY

Uh-huh.

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BLAKE

We got next to scatter through a couple of *u* events,

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TAPE I of II - SIDE 2

BLAKE

*It was*  
*an* exciting because it meant that we could scrap all those intervening microwave stations and instead put a single scatter station at each radar site which, of course, had to be developed with access, and place for people to live, and logistics support, and everything else. So we not only would have a much cheaper arrangement, but we would get away from the horrendous maintenance problems of servicing these microwave stations which probably would be unattended as they are commercially, but would have to be visited occasionally, and so on and so forth. This was such an exciting prospect, scatter was fairly new then, and there was some gamble involved. I went to my boss and I said, "I think we ought to go for this." And I had a briefing, you know, how much money we would save, and

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so on and so forth, and I always look back on that. My  
lifetime active duty and <sup>retired</sup> retirement involvement in the  
Federal budget was paid for in that one decision.  
Never mind any others that might have been equally  
useful. To get the earliest possible test that we  
could, we commissioned the Bell Labs, a fellow  
George Gilman that I worked with, I remember George  
because I made a bet with him on this, <sup>We</sup> we put in from  
Newfoundland to, ~~NY~~ I don't remember where the other end  
was, ~~NY~~ but it was kind of a <sup>link</sup> length that we would have to  
use, and so we put that in and it was successful, <sup>So</sup> ~~so~~ we  
went ahead and had a target date, of course, for these  
scatter stations and it was Washington's ~~B~~ Birthday about  
1955, I would say, along in there somewhere, <sup>So</sup> ~~and so~~ the  
bet I made with Gilman was that if I got a telephone  
call, one of the things that you could do over scatter,  
because it was broadband like microwave, was you could  
have <sup>all the</sup> ~~audible~~ voice circuits, and so forth, and other  
communications up and down that line by narrow channel  
HF, and so forth, could really do that. And I was at  
home in Falls Church on the night of December 22nd and

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I got a call from John McDavid, who was a Signal Officer for Northeast Air Command in Newfoundland, and he was calling me from Frobisher over the scatter network. So that meant I owed George Gilman a bottle of bourbon which I paid him at the IEEE Convention in New York a couple of weeks later. (Laughter)

FARLEY

Oh, yeah. Let's talk about new equipments procedures. Were there any innovations in codes and ciphers during your tenure as Director of Communications?

BLAKE

I remember very little related to codes and ciphers. We were pretty much getting those from the National Security Agency, who was responsible for them. My principal role was ~~AWW~~ while we were superintending the overall use of them, ~~AWW~~ was defending the electronic budget in the Congress, which I did for four successive years, the P200 Budget. And I recall, particularly in COMSEC, repeated failures to beat targets, and I was constantly apologizing to the Congress, "Sorry, Sir, we didn't spend that money you gave us last year, but we still need it, and here's

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why, and here's the amount, and here's what we hope to get out of it." That was my biggest frustration in the whole P200 thing. The other things that we were after, that's when the DEW Line Radar came in, and the SAGE System for Air Defense Communications, the whole SAC Communications Network was before the Congress at that time, <sup>So</sup> ~~and we~~ we had a lot to say to Congress about electronic money and we were pretty successful in almost all cases. We had some slippages, but not enough that I recall frustration, but I sure recall a lot of frustration on that COMSEC stuff.

FARLEY

Good. Well that ties in with another one, <sup>T</sup>alking about COMSEC or OPSEC, as Director of Communications, did you institute any new procedures whereby the pilots would try to be conscious of Communications Security and not chatter and use basic codes <sup>or</sup> ~~of~~ whatever they were instructed to do?

BLAKE

Well, this was a periodic campaign. Looking back on it, I think I would have to, ~~as~~ as a Monday morning quarterback, ~~plead~~ plead guilty of not paying as much attention to that as I would have if I had been with

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the Security Service before I was Director of Communications.

FARLEY I see. So it was a continuing problem?

BLAKE It was a continuing problem, but I pushed it a lot more and with more success when I was Commander of the Security Service than I did as Director of Communications.

~~FARLEY~~ *Good, that's*

~~BLAKE~~ I make that admission with some regret

FARLEY *That's good.* (laughing) When you were Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for OPS in '56 you served on the permanent Joint Board for Defense. You mentioned this, but I had a question. Were there any decisions made by this Board on any joint intelligence collection effort or project?

BLAKE We were almost totally related to the Air Defense business. That was really the purpose of the Board.

~~FARLEY~~ *Yes.*

~~BLAKE~~ *And* and that was what we worked on. I don't recall a single thing related to the subject of your question.

FARLEY *All right.* ~~Alright.~~ Sir, Just a few minutes ago you talked about

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being called in and asked whether you would like to be assigned to the Security Service and you became Commander of that Security Service. Would you talk about the major problems that you encountered when you assumed the command.

BLAKE Well, I only encountered one which you might say the instant assumption of command and that was in relation to the National Security Agency. My predecessor, a Major General named Hunt Bassett. *yes*

FARLEY Oh, yes (laughing)...

BLAKE He is living here, incidentally.

FARLEY Is that right?

BLAKE Hunt was carrying on a terrific feud with Ralph Canine who was then the Director of NSA and, of course, in my mind, I have always looked on Ralph as the father of modern NSA. ~~was~~ I didn't particularly know it at the time, I ~~never~~ *learned while I was* with the Security Service, *later on* as Director, of the ~~history~~ <sup>history</sup> of the ~~beginnings~~ <sup>beginnings</sup> of NSA, and how important Canine's strong-willed defense of the centralized nature of NSA. I remember remarking to Lou Tordella when I was Director, I said,

"You know, Lou, sometimes this Agency comes up with the right Director at the right time." I said, "Somebody like Canine to fight for a strong central organization. <sup>If</sup> ~~he~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>here</sup>, it would have made a lot of difference. Someone like me, good at compromising and finding ways around the problem, I would probably have failed. <sup>But</sup> ~~but~~ I think if Canine had to handle ~~the CCP~~ <sup>Fukushima</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>Fubini</sup> the CCP, which I always thought was my biggest contribution, I think Canine would have failed." Anyway, here was this feud. Bassett, even in one of our conversations, equated NSA and the Kremlin. <sup>So</sup> ~~in~~ in an equation, NSA is to the Kremlin as Ralph Canine is to Stalin.

FARLEY

Wow!

BLAKE

Well, I had my first staff meeting, and I have never been a "new broom" in the sense that I go in and sweep everything out and then start over. That has never been my way. But I did "new broom" one thing at that first meeting, I said, "I am <sup>aware</sup> ~~weary~~ of the arguments and discussions, I would call <sup>it a</sup> ~~the~~ feud, that's going on between our Command here and NSA, ~~that~~ that is simply

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between my predecessor and the Director, and I just want to say that ~~it~~ is stopped herewith. They are our operational boss and it's ill-becoming, I don't care whose fault it is, or the background of it, I am not interested in it. It stops! I want that thoroughly understood right now."

FARLEY

Sir, was the area of controversy primarily in the mission, the responsibility of the Security Service, or the guidance from NSA?

BLAKE

Well, the specifics are a little hazy at this point, but I am fairly certain that the bottom line of this was Canine's unwillingness to delegate sufficiently to the Security Service. I mean, it is one thing to stand strong when you are being formed, and so forth, and getting all this control over the three Cryptologic Agencies, but you don't run them that way, if you want a harmonious arrangement. I think Ralph's side of this feud dealt primarily with failure to delegate sufficiently, and on Bassett's side was failure to win some accommodation of the Service views. I am sure it was complicated by the fact that they couldn't see each

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other as often as the two chaps in Washington, <sup>in NSG</sup> ~~NSG~~ and

ASA. ~~He~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~Yes.~~ <sup>Looking</sup> In my mind, looking <sup>part of</sup> ~~Looking~~ back on it, it was the pot calling the kettle black, and what was called for was a clean slate, and I have to say that since my Director was <sup>Sammy</sup>

<sup>Samford, ~~Sandy Sanford~~</sup> <sup>not only</sup> who was an Air Force Officer, which may

have had some influence in how he would

<sup>the situation and would</sup> treat, naturally have some bias even when you try to

be completely unbiased, <sup>for own</sup> his ~~old~~ Service activity, ~~but~~

<sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ had a very close personal relationship. He was in

the class of '28, <sup>He</sup> he was Company Commander of the

Company I was a <sup>Pleb</sup> ~~Ally~~ in, <sup>When I</sup> ~~but~~ I came to Kelly the last

four months of Flying School; <sup>he</sup> ~~he~~ and his wife lived

right next door. I was married to a classmate's sister

in August '32 while I was going through Kelly, <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ were

assigned in World War I sort of <sup>as an old</sup> ~~intentionally~~ <sup>cantonment.</sup> ~~and~~

<sup>2.</sup> We had a one-story building <sup>with</sup> four married apartments, side by side. Betty and <sup>Sammy Samford</sup> ~~Sandy Sanford~~ lived in the one next to my late wife and I. <sup>nd</sup>

FARLEY

Yes.

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BLAKE

~~And so~~ <sup>So</sup> when I became his subordinate, there was a relationship there that starts with a totally different viewpoint and he knew, of course, what I had said about the necessity to recognize our relationship.

FARLEY

He was a fine <sup>gentleman,</sup> ~~gentleman,~~ I remember.

BLAKE

Yes, he was, yeah, yeah.

FARLEY

Sir, had the ELINT controversy arisen by this time? This was the problem of who would manage and who would control the collection of electronic intelligence.

BLAKE

Yes, that was on the books at that time and continued as a matter of some controversy and in a combination for some time, as I recall.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

It is still going on.

FARLEY

It has been sort of like a tennis game, but I guess the Air Force has it now for sure. Before we move to DIRNSA, any comments on your assignment as Vice Commander <sup>in</sup> and Chief, and Chief of Staff in <sup>PACAF</sup> ~~PACAF~~ and <sup>maybe</sup> ~~Navy~~ CONAC? Anything that stands out that you would like on the record for NSA?

BLAKE

Oh, I don't think we ought to take <sup>the</sup> time. <sup>^</sup>

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FARLEY *All right,*  
Alright, fine.

BLAKE ~~And~~ I have taken a lot of time already, it is a quarter of ten now. There is one thing about CONAC. The assignment at ~~PACOP~~ <sup>PACAF</sup> was a very pleasant assignment, of course. My boss, <sup>Paul</sup> O'Donnell, ~~he~~ was the Commander of that flight to the Philippines, incidentally,...

~~FARLEY~~ *Oh, yes.*

~~BLAKE~~ ~~And~~ had been a friend for years, ~~And~~ I loved Hawaii, and it was totally away from intelligence and other matters. Oh, I continued to have an interest in it obviously, but when you are Vice Commander you tend to kind of keep your nose out of that DCS, <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ don't want the front office running the staff, so <sup>your</sup> ~~you're~~ tendency is to kind of back away and leave <sup>it to</sup> them. In CONAC I was flabbergasted when I was put on the three-star list as Commander of CONAC, which runs the Reserve Program, because I <sup>hadn't</sup> ~~had~~ had a nickel's worth of experience with it. ~~T~~ There were some people, notably one a classmate of mine, Major General Robert Eaton, Bob Eaton, who had had a lot of Reserve experience and at the time was the staff man in the Pentagon.

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FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

And here was this three-star Field Command down in Georgia and instead of giving it to Bob Eaton, they gave it to me. I thought to myself, I said, "Eaton must be livid at this point." And I didn't know ~~At~~ at the time that I was given that assignment to keep me from retiring. ~~I was all set to go~~ <sup>As</sup> a matter of fact, I was going back to talk to people in New York and AT&T. <sup>They</sup> they had offered me a very interesting assignment with no conflict of interest at all, and I was going back for final discussion on that in June <sup>of</sup> '59 when this whole thing broke and Rosie O'Donnell's mother died and I had to cancel that. When he came back, he told me <sup>"You</sup> ~~you~~ are on the three-star list and it will be out tomorrow." And he said, "I know that you planned to retire," he said, "I hope you think it over." I said, "Well, we'll talk it over at lunch, my wife and I, and I'll let you know." I went home to lunch and two <sup>airman</sup> ~~Aides~~ Aides came in sheepishly with their hands behind their back, and they said, "Sir, we know we are not supposed to give you anything, but hope you won't

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mind," and they handed me this little box which had two of these three-star things you put on your collar.

FARLEY

Beautiful.

BLAKE

And I thanked them, and I said, "I know the necessity <sup>has to go</sup> ~~of going~~ before the Senate and it wasn't effective <sup>until</sup> ~~before~~ the 1st of October," and all that sort of thing.

"So if I ever wear them, I will wear these." I didn't say anything about my quandry. I looked at my wife and I said, "You know, they wouldn't understand if I did anything else but accept it." She said, "I have been thinking our boys would feel the same." They were both Junior Officers in the Air Force at the time. They are both Colonels now. So I went to the phone and called Rosie and said, "Rosie, I must have rocks in my head, but if the Chief wants to make me a three-star General, I am honored."

FARLEY

That's great.

BLAKE

I didn't find out until much later that LeMay had put me on ice at CONAC because he wanted to nominate me as Director of NSA. That's the reason I bring this story in. WA

FARLEY

That's good, that's great.

BLAKE

~~A. because~~ Jack Frost was under some nebulous status because of the Martin/Mitchell case.

FARLEY

Yes.

~~BLAKE~~

I didn't know that, because Jack was a World War II friend and I very much felt badly about coming in over his prostrate form.

~~FARLEY~~

~~Yes.~~

BLAKE

...and he understood that.

FARLEY

It happens, Sir. When you became DIRNSA in July '62 and you anticipated it, what unresolved problems were passed from Admiral Frost? Was there any ~~fall out~~ <sup>fall out</sup> in the Dunlap spy case, and then Martin and Mitchell? ~~What~~ <sup>What</sup> hadn't been resolved?

BLAKE

Martin and Mitchell was still a trauma in the Agency. The ~~Dunlap~~ <sup>Dunlap</sup> case, of course, happened later on on my watch, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup>

~~FARLEY~~

~~I'm sorry!~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~The~~ <sup>The</sup> ~~Dunlap~~ <sup>Dunlap</sup> case was one that I had to front for, and it took a lot of footwork. It may be, I never thought about this, but looking back on it, it may well be that

coming so soon after the Martin and Mitchell case, which was a more important case, obviously, than the <sup>Dunlap</sup> ~~Dunlap~~ case, and the sacrifice of Frost in that one. <sup>They</sup> ~~They~~ may have been <sup>leathic?</sup> ~~leathic?~~ to get rid of a second Director so soon, <sup>so</sup> ~~though~~ I may have benefitted by Frost's demise. It was a case of far less import, <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ it took a lot of talking to Congressmen and the White House, Defense Department, and so on and so forth.

FARLEY Right. Sir, you have probably answered this question already, but you inherited a reorganization, in that reorganized NSA as well as a Second Management Board which had been established by Frost. <sup>Did</sup> ~~Did~~ you continue the declared objectives or <sup>cancel</sup> ~~counsel~~ or revise the guidance?

BLAKE I don't remember.

FARLEY You don't? ~~You said earlier.~~

BLAKE That facet of NSA, I don't remember too much about actually. It must not have been very important to me at the time.

FARLEY Well, I think you said earlier that you didn't consider

yourself a new broom, so maybe you just let it drift. *Am*

BLAKE

I don't recall coming out with any great management changes, internally *to*

FARLEY

*All right*  
Alright, fine. Let's get into one of the big ones.

*Soon*  
*Let's say that soon* after you were getting your feet on the ground came the Cuban *CRISIS.* I would like to talk

about the support to the White House, the JCS, the State Department, and so forth, and the White House SIT Room, *what* do you recall about that? What you did...

BLAKE

There are two things about that that I remember most vividly. First has to do with the USIB, the Intelligence Board which the Director, of course, is an *ex-officio* ~~official~~ member, and we were meeting, *THIS* particularly centered on a weekend, and we were meeting almost constantly. *AC*

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

~~We~~ We would recess for a few hours so the staff could type something, and then we would come back again, and the basic question we were addressing is, if we belly-up to the Russians, what will they do? Well, I

am sure you realize how hard that question is because you talk about intent, you see, and you don't read any messages that give you intent. And I recall our final paper on the subject to the President, pretty much bottom line is "we think the Russians will blink", and so Kennedy did go ahead with essentially the blockade approach, and so on and so forth, and that leads up to the second significant ~~remembrance~~ <sup>remembrance,</sup> There were Russian ships steaming for the Philippines <sup>((Cuba))</sup> and from aerial reconnaissance, as I recall it, we were convinced that they carried missiles and so what happened to those ships was a crucial indicator.

[Redacted]

And we flashed that into all the

people that you tell this to.

FARLEY

Yes. Did you mean that the Russian ships were going to the Philippines or Cuba?

BLAKE

Oh, no, they were going to Cuba.

FARLEY

OK, you said...

BLAKE

They were out in the mid-Atlantic, you see.

FARLEY

OK, you mentioned Philippines, and I...

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

BLAKE Did I say Philippines?

FARLEY OK, Cuba. We wanted to correct that for the transcript.

BLAKE Yes, correct that.

FARLEY *All right,*  
~~Alright,~~ Sir.

BLAKE I don't know where the Philippines came in there. Anyway, they were en route to Cuba and they were out in the Atlantic. I don't remember how far away from Cuba they were, but they turned around and went home. And it was a SIGINT indicator that was the first positive intelligence that ~~Khrushchev~~ *Khrushchev* had blinked and, of course, a great sigh of relief in the whole USIB Community. Oh, I never heard what Kennedy had to say about the subject, but he must have had a sigh of relief also.

FARLEY That's right. Sir, I was working the Watch Committee area at the same time *with*  *and that*  
*crew* *~~~~~* and I know pretty much that there was much SIGINT used. What percentage of SIGINT was used in the USIB discussions?

BLAKE A lot of it. As a matter of fact, my general impression of USIB over the three years I served on it

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was that, in terms of hard rock intelligence, SIGINT is the predominant source.

FARLEY

Good. Sir, did you have to make many command-level decisions or adjustments in collection or distribution of product during the Cuban crisis, or did you have a good OPS Officer, <sup>?</sup> ~~or did someone,~~

BLAKE

I didn't make many personally. The emphasis, obviously, went on trying to get information, ~~and I never really got into.~~ <sup>It's</sup> not my way of delegating really to say, <sup>Will right</sup> "Alright now, we want to emphasize this, now you come back in with the specific tasking for my approval." I didn't do that. I think if I had I would have been the biggest thorn in the side of progress that you could possibly imagine.

FARLEY

You were wise.

BLAKE

You often ~~get~~ <sup>AW</sup> get it in daily briefings and things like that, you know, we have taken these down and put these up, or we double our effort here and we had to sacrifice this for awhile. I suppose at the time I might have said, "Well tell me more ~~of~~ <sup>why,</sup> ~~with~~" if I was curious. I don't recall ever making that kind of specific "drop

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

this circuit and pick up this one."

FARLEY

Well, that's low level.

BLAKE

Well, I wasn't smart enough to do that to begin with (laughter), I was smart enough to realize that.

FARLEY

Sir, did you <sup>have a</sup> ever ring down ~~the~~ phone to the White House, or the SIT Room, or CIA, or State? <sup>de</sup>

BLAKE

Yes, there was a special phone there that linked pretty much the USIB members and I think, it seemed to me, that there was a White House Watch Phone on it, too, although I am a little hazy on this. The general pattern, in my time, was that we didn't by-pass CIA too much to communicate with the White House. <sup>That</sup> It was pretty much, ~~what was~~ the CIA's job. That was <sup>McCone's</sup> ~~McCone's~~ <sup>job</sup> ~~job~~ to brief the President at the Interface, the Community with the President, and so I don't recall too many conversations, <sup>de</sup>

FARLEY

Right

BLAKE

~~de~~ with the White House. I recall a lot of them with <sup>sp 7?</sup> ~~McCone~~ over the...

~~FARLEY~~

surely...

~~BLAKE~~

<sup>secret</sup> SECRET phone.

FARLEY Marshall Carter was the Chairman of the Watch Committee, as I recall, during that critical period.

BLAKE Yes. Well, ~~McKeen~~ I remember ~~McKeen~~<sup>McCona</sup> was present during a lot of that Cuban stuff. But you are right, the Deputy Director classically ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> served ~~as~~ as Chairman.

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

*The one*

One to start with, of course, was Dicky Helms, and he pretty much worried about that sort of thing.

FARLEY Sir, is there anything else about the Cuban Crisis we should record?

BLAKE I don't think so.

FARLEY We looked pretty good. ~~UNSA~~ looked pretty good during that ~~crisis~~ crisis.

BLAKE Yes, we were effective in that crisis, I think.

FARLEY Let's move on to another ~~subject~~<sup>Area</sup>. When you moved in to take command of NSA, what was your view when you became aware of the cliques in the Agency, and the tight control exercised by some high level civilians? Did you attempt to correct it immediately?

BLAKE Well, on this subject, I always lead the law of ~~you~~<sup>him</sup> Tordella. I had a great deal of respect for ~~it~~<sup>him</sup>. There

were many activities there that generally fell in the <sup>compartmented</sup> ~~COMPARTMENTED~~ category, and activity of that kind tends to <sup>be</sup> cliques. The security features of that were extremely sensitive, the number of people limited, and I took the view about  and things like that, that ~~it~~ are now out in the open as a result of the ~~PUZZLE PALACE~~ "Puzzle Palace,"

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

Unfortunately, ~~F~~

FARLEY

~~The time~~ *Verrill*.

BLAKE

That it would be better for NSA and for those activities if I left that to Tordella, and that was our working relationship. And so while I usually had a general knowledge of this ~~COMPARTMENT~~ <sup>compartment</sup> and that <sup>compartment</sup>, ~~COMPARTMENT~~, I made no attempt to be really knowledgeable about it and, therefore, just less involved security-wise. Maybe that's an odd view, ~~or~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~No, that's fine...~~

BLAKE

~~..~~ but Director's come and go <sup>and</sup>

~~FARLEY~~

~~That's a point.~~

BLAKE

~~..~~ for them to become a repository of every last little

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ <sup>secret</sup> never struck me as being really very useful.

FARLEY

Very fine. *N*

BLAKE

There were so many of them anyway that if you tried to do that, <sup>you'd</sup> ~~you~~ probably missed ~~some~~ some things you ought to be doing.

FARLEY

Yes. That's a good answer, Sir, I like that. Let's switch to Congressional Committee Hearings and the ~~T~~estimony by DIRNSA before some of them. How difficult was it to tell the complete story under the security restrictions imposed on you?

BLAKE

Well, it was very difficult and, therefore, we didn't do it. And my technique for that dealt with two gentlemen who were very cooperative and being able to talk more frankly to them and let them see to it that the rest of the Committee didn't get too far afield was obviously a tremendous boon to the Director and his budget activities. Those two gentlemen were Gerald Ford, who was in the House Appropriations side, and Senator Russell, who occupied a similar position on the Senate side. And I would have a private meeting with those two only *uu*



~~TOP SECRET - COMINT - CHARISABLE ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

*Oh, I see.*

→ ...and we would talk rather frankly, *but this* tended to concentrate on the big items, *u*

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~of course~~

→ financially and I would answer their questions freely and when this session was over, in effect, they were satisfied. And when we held the classified hearing with the rest of the Committee, I suppose they talked to their Committee people and said, "We have sat down to all the fine, highly classified, details of this." That was my technique, and it worked beautifully.

FARLEY

I see. Sir, during some of the public hearings where you had the entire Committee participating, reading some of the testimony looks to me like some of the Congressmen were deliberately antagonistic or anti-NSA, or were they just plain unfriendly?

BLAKE

Well, I don't know. ~~As a result~~ I can't give you any names, ~~u~~ but I recall that sort of thing. Perhaps I tend to brush this off because when I was Director of Communications for the Air Force, I spent four years

giving a lot of Congressional testimony, not only the budget, but I remember one committee was investigating a flap involving the ARK-34, which was a new UHF Airborne Communications System that was in a big flap with RCA and became the subject of Congressional investigations. <sup>the</sup> I became the lead witness, <sup>So</sup> ~~for~~ I was really an old hand on the Hill and so maybe I was a bit ~~inured~~ <sup>inured</sup> to tendency to kind of attack the Defense Department witnesses a bit unfriendly about all the money that was being spent, and probably bridling somewhat at the security restrictions that their own ~~Chairman~~ <sup>Chairman</sup> were imposing as indicated by what I had to say about Mr. Ford and Mr. Russell. But I don't have any burning recollection of <sup>incident</sup> ~~incident~~ A, B, or C, and perhaps it's because you come to expect that and it's like water off a duck's back.

FARLEY  
BLAKE

*Yes, Sir*

..and doesn't become something you live with the rest of your life. ~~for~~ <sup>you</sup> know. You go home and forget it. Right. Sir, was there a single "Intelligence Oversight Committee" during that period, or were there two ad hoc

FARLEY

committees on the Senate side and the House side?

BLAKE Well, I regret to say, I don't remember the formation of Oversight Committees and I don't know historically when were they formed.

FARLEY I think that was a little bit later. I think before that ~~there~~ <sup>they</sup> were single, <sup>one</sup> on the House side and one on the Senate side.

BLAKE I don't have any recollection of ever appearing before an Oversight Committee such as you read about now with Goldwater and

~~FARLEY~~ <sup>Yes.</sup>

BLAKE ...what's this New York fellow's name who quit?

FARLEY ~~Moynehan?~~ <sup>Monyihan?</sup>

BLAKE Moynehan and, of course, Frank Church, <sup>He</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> on it,

~~FARLEY~~ <sup>Yes.</sup>

BLAKE <sup>and</sup> he was a great one to blow the lid, I recall, just reading the papers.

FARLEY Right. When you participated or were involved in budget hearings, in general, did you achieve most of the funding that you wanted?

BLAKE

For the most part. Our big fight really was the Pentagon, who were the CCP aspects in terms of how the overall budget for the three Cryptologic Services and the NSA fit together, and that the money was ~~usefully~~ <sup>usefully</sup> programmed and results measured. My recollection of the budget process was that the real hurdles were from Eadie and company in the Pentagon rather than over on the Hill.

FARLEY

I see, ~~Ah Ah~~ Was this time an austere period? Was it more difficult to get <sup>money</sup> when you were DIRNSA than before that ~~then~~ <sup>and</sup> subsequent to that?

BLAKE

Well, I have no way of measuring before and after. It was not easy, it took a lot of homework and we had to be a little hard-nosed to ourselves to begin with. ~~Now~~ <sup>It</sup> was a time of growth for NSA, of course, a new building was being built, we were in a position of considerable favoritism in terms of our mission and the whole growth of <sup>use of</sup> ~~usable~~ electronics, I think, obviously reflects in an activity of that kind. My recollection is a pretty successful three years in terms of resources.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY

Yes, very much. Sir, would you try to discuss your meetings and association with Dr. Fubini. ~~And~~ I have heard so much about this man, I am just wondering whether it was his modus operandi or was he truly a difficult person with whom to deal, or was his reputation distorted?

BLAKE

Well, from my point of view, I don't know what reputation you are putting together from what you said introducing the subject, I guess, my guess would be that maybe it's distorted, because I saw him so much that I probably saw all sides of him and we had, I think, essentially a work relationship that was productive. It had its moments of conflict and serious discussion. He was a brilliant man, scientifically he was utterly fascinated, I always thought, with the nature of the cryptologic operation. It was the sort of thing that appeals intellectually to a man like Fubini. This led, of course, to a considerable probing in the kind of detail that normally a man in that position isn't going to fool with. But he was so curious about it, he was so intellectually stimulated,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

and sometimes this has some good results -- his questions and his suggestions -- and so I really looked on that facet as one of those plus and minus things and you politely try to respond to his intellectual curiosity in a very small detail. I am sure confessing, "Look, Gene, I don't know enough about that kind of detail, <sup>+</sup> ~~Add~~ I'll send a guy down who does. -

FARLEY

OK

BLAKE

"If <sup>you</sup> he wanted to chat with him, that would be fine. If you have any suggestions, please communicate them to me rather than tell him what to do," ~~and his~~ <sup>his</sup> nature was such that that's a lesson he had to learn because his tendency would be to start reinventing with our low level engineer who knew all about this you see. Together <sup>they</sup> ~~they~~ start inventing. Some of this interplay probably was useful.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

But when you start changing things and issuing new directives and say, "Well, let's do this," instead of that, my problem was to get him in channels, and I think by and large we managed to do that.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY

Excellent.

BLAKE

The care and feeding of Fubini became one of my principal chores, and I like to think the way he acted when we were together and when I left that essentially there was a situation of mutual admiration for our respective personalities and ways of doing business that produced a useful rather than a disastrous result. It was the kind of situation that could be disastrous. Some of this centered around the CCP, of course. There Fubini was merely reflecting Robert McNamara's "pull things in from a ~~decision~~ broad decision point of view to the Defense Department," and that's what *the* McNamara's regime is famous for and, of course, it has pretty much continued in that vein ever since. The CCP was the mechanism for that. The problem of NSA was to retain sufficient control over the preparation of the CCP and the compromises and the decisions, and not have those made for us without the benefit of the kind of give and take <sup>and</sup> in family discussion that we could bring to it. And here again, I look back on that as being not totally successful, but I was satisfied with it.

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~~BRIDGE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"Puzzle Palace"

and if someone ~~the PUZZLE PALACE~~ says I am most famous for square dancing and the Travis Trophy (laughter) and that suits me fine. ~~HA~~ If I had talked to that author, which I would not have done, (laughter), ~~and~~ if he had asked me, "What do you think was your most important contribution to the National Security Agency?", I would say, "Bringing the CCP on board and the new relationship with the senior officials in the Defense Department." <sup>Cy</sup> ~~Sy~~ Vance was involved in this, too. I had quite a few dealings with <sup>Cy</sup> ~~Sy~~, not on my initiative. I had never tried to bypass Fubini to get to Vance, but <sup>Cy</sup> ~~Sy~~ would often call both of us in on some very important matter. And so as I look back on it, that's the place where I contributed the most to the mission of the Agency.

FARLEY

Excellent. I am very pleased with that.

BLAKE

And that is followed closely by a new team work with the Cryptologic Agencies. I am the only Director who ever served as the Chief of Cryptologic Agency, which struck me as rather odd. I would think that over the years that this would happen more often than that.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY It would be good basic training, wouldn't it?

BLAKE Well, it has its merits.

FARLEY Sir, would you care to comment on Jack O'Gara? Did you have much dealing with O'Gara?

BLAKE Yes, we had a lot of dealings with O'Gara (laughter) and the care and feeding of O'Gara presented some of the Fubini-type problems, but never seriously enough. Jack could be helpful and sometimes we had to straighten him out, and sometimes we had to accommodate, particularly if he happened to be reflecting some directive. A flamboyant character. I always liked Jack,

FARLEY Yes.

~~BLAKE~~ we got along.

FARLEY Yes, I knew him when he worked <sup>at a</sup> ~~out of~~ lower echelon at the Hall. Let's move to another area, Sir. During your tenure at NSA, were there any major internal ~~crisis~~ <sup>crises</sup> that you had to resolve, and I am talking about compromises, spies, defectors, any friction with the SCA's?

BLAKE There was the ~~Dunlap~~ <sup>Dunlap</sup> affair, of course, which we

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~~TOP SECRET~~

already talked about. I don't recall any SCA <sup>crisis</sup> ~~crisis~~.  
We had a relationship with people there that was very  
fruitful, Dick <sup>Klacks,</sup> ~~Clark~~ ~~(spelling???)~~, of course, I knew  
well because he had worked for me when I was in the  
Security Service, and I'm trying to remember the name  
of the Army fellow, ~~now~~

TAPE II of II - SIDE 1

FARLEY Let's see, I don't remember who was the Chief of the  
Army Security Service then.

BLAKE He was a short, kind of chubby fellow, bald-headed. <sup>W</sup>

FARLEY Wasn't <sup>Rolya?</sup> ~~Roullia?~~ ~~(spelling???)~~

BLAKE No, but I think the head of the <sup>Army</sup> and Navy Cryptologic  
Services, knowing <sup>I had</sup> ~~I~~ had their job, gave me a leg up in  
teamwork with them. We didn't have any problems with  
them.

FARLEY <sup>All right,</sup> Alright, Sir. ~~Let me move on to another. A while the~~ <sup>The</sup>  
Navy's effort to push the TRS concept, <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ that  
something that you had to decide on <sup>or</sup> ~~act~~ on?

BLAKE I don't even remember what TRS stands for.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Seaborne

FARLEY That's the ~~SEABORNE~~ Collection Operation, the Technical Research Ships.

BLAKE Oh, the Technical Research Ship<sup>s</sup>, yes, SIGINT ships.

FARLEY You know, the PUEBLO and ~~the~~ others

BLAKE My recollection of that is that that was a very, very potentially useful exercise and we tried to give strong support to it. I don't recall any feuds over this.

FARLEY OK

BLAKE We may have ~~wacked~~ <sup>wacked</sup> them back from a dollar point of view simply because that often had to be done, but I don't recall any crises where the Navy got up in arms and said NSA is stabbing us in the back.

FARLEY Yeah, and I think you certainly favored also the Air Force Airborne Collection Operation.

BLAKE Yes, these were new and there were some inklings that someday they might have some satellites, too, and I am happy to see that come about later on.

FARLEY Sir, how strong was the influence on NSA by other Intelligence Community Agencies, the CIA, and State, and DOD, and FBI?

BLAKE Well, this mostly took place, as I recall, in USIB in

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~~TOP SECRET~~

terms of what they wanted us to do and they were valued customers. We would often be in conversations, particularly the Navy fellow, I don't remember his name either, I heard him on TV the other day. ~~Mr~~ Roger Hillsman

~~FARLEY~~

~~Oh, yes~~

~~BLAKE~~

and Roger was a very likeable fellow and very intelligence-minded and he and I would on the phone occasionally, but I don't recall any knock down, drag outs where they said you are not doing what we want you to do, or please do this, we need it. Our whole attitude was these guys were customers, <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ are not doing this just for our own pleasure.

~~FARLEY~~

~~Right~~

~~BLAKE~~

and if we think it is useful in this direction, our first response ought to be, "Yeah, let's try that."

FARLEY

Good. Sir, there was one point where CIA was doing a lot of covert collection and they wanted to publish their own product with their own serial, and this was a controversial area, <sup>do</sup> ~~do~~ you remember that, Sir?

BLAKE

Yes, I remember that, and it seemed to me, as I recall,

~~TOP SECRET~~

I left that one to Lou for some reason or another to sort it out.

FARLEY

*All right,*  
~~Alright,~~ fine, fine.

BLAKE

He and Dick Helms were thick as thieves and I recall enough about that sort of thing that my tendency was to say, "Lou, see if you can put that one in place."

FARLEY

Good enough.

BLAKE

You probably will want to interview him.

FARLEY

You know, I have been trying to for two years and he won't talk.

BLAKE

He won't?

FARLEY

But I will tell him I interviewed General Blake.

BLAKE

If I get up for the Travis Commission and see Lou, I'll have to chide him on that.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

I think any history of NSA that doesn't have a lot of Lou Tordella input is grossly inadequate.

FARLEY

Absolutely. Sir, do you have any comments on the controversial subject that has been plaguing NSA and its predecessor Agency for years, that the Agency is a producer of raw material rather than finished

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~~TOP SECRET~~

intelligence, and we got this from DIA later?

BLAKE

No, no, that I treated when I became involved in it from time to time as an interesting, intellectually philosophical argument. Obviously, if we are reading their mail to the extent that you get a message that is absolutely incontrovertible and you hand that to somebody that needs that information, you handed him finished intelligence. If he prefers to call it "raw" and put his own stamp, I believe, on it, that's his privilege, that's his job really. If he starts, and of course he does with great glee and gusto, if they ever started which I never recall a case, by saying, "Well, we're not too sure that these guys know what they are talking about," because we were usually the first. <sup>This</sup> one thing that I always admired and certainly supported, that to the extent that it is raw and requires some analysis, and has got some holes in it, and I recall a famous message having to do with the Tonkin Gulf and the single word, I don't know what that word was now, but I recall being briefed on this particular subject, <sup>What</sup> ~~what~~ was that word, was it "key"

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~~TOP SECRET~~

and it cast some shadow on the Tonkin Gulf message that I guess still exists.

FARLEY Yes,

BLAKE But I never fought about that. I dismissed it. ~~And~~ It depends, it may be raw as can be, and it may be finished, or maybe somewhere in between, and I expect the customer to receive what we give them with whatever analysis we may tack on tending to validate or say, "Wait a minute, now don't put \$100 on this one, the odds are a bit long," and as long as we were honest, I never worried about that, because we produced a lot of finished intelligence.

FARLEY I know, call it what you will. Sir, you may have answered this, how deeply were you personally involved in the Bross Committee, '63, '64, in their discussions and decisions and actions?

BLAKE Well, I remember the Committee and I don't really remember how much I met with them. Don't even remember how it turned out.

FARLEY OK, well I can check that, and you talked about the CCP already. Relationship with other producers, were you

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

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pleased with the agreements between the Agency and the Second (the British), Second Party Organizations, and was the division of effort mutually beneficial?

BLAKE

Well, I don't recall any great discussions over the fine print of the contract, and I probably didn't pay a hell of a lot of attention to the exact terms of the contract. I regarded it as an arrangement that was already made, <sup>that had</sup> ~~and had~~ the potential for useful contributions, probably given the resources and the capability for the ones involved, and I am talking about GCHQ and the Canadian and the Australian outfits and NSA in terms of who got what, <sup>it was probably</sup> ~~it was probably~~ pretty one-sided. But historically, it, of course, had its great benefits in War World II. Maybe we continued to live on that. I recall, and I visited all of these activities at one time or another, GCHQ more than any other, I visited Australia only once, <sup>My</sup> ~~and my~~ net recollection is that to confirm my one-sided feeling about the matter, primarily because what I saw was pretty old fashioned. But I was never motivated to say, "Well, let's throw this in the ash can, or let's


change the rules." I simply continued by personal relationship with the Directors of those activities to try to promote a useful arrangement.

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE



EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET~~

and he came to NSA and we <sup>ostensibly</sup> ~~ostensively~~ gave him the red carpet, but we didn't give him the keys to the back room. I don't think he ever realized that.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

I am sure he went away, "Boy, NSA really gave me the ranch in ~~the~~ Kansas." On a visit  I made a point to put myself at his disposal. I said, "I would like to visit your field stations," and <sup>primitive</sup> ~~primitive~~ is the only word to describe them. <sup>Probably</sup> ~~and so probably~~ what we got there didn't have much to do with better SIGINT, but hopefully it had the potential of having something to do with keeping our own more sophisticated operations.

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~Yes~~ to the extent that that didn't happen. I guess I'd have to say I didn't accomplish anything.

FARLEY

Uh-hum.

BLAKE

But that was my purpose with respect to how much SIGINT we got. I don't suppose under those circumstances I was too excited about it. I recall one little incident with great pleasure because it was kind of unique.

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When you go to a [redacted] military establishment and you are a distinguished visitor that they turn the Honor Guard out for, their rule is that you command that Honor Guard. You are not just there along side the Commander, but you actually command it. Now for a foreign visitor with a language problem, and so on and so forth, technically they do that, but they give the commands.

FARLEY

I see.

BLAKE

Well, I found out about this, and I don't remember the name of this chap, tall dark-haired fellow, <sup>he</sup> he was our head man [redacted]

FARLEY

Jim Harris?

BLAKE

Harris, that's it, Harris. He was traveling with me, ~~and~~ I said, "What do you say [redacted] Is this very complicated?" "No, you give only three or four commands." So I learned those. Another interesting thing about the way this ceremony takes place is the troops respond, and when you say to them, "Welcome soldiers," [redacted] I have forgotten the commands that I learned, but I told

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET~~



I said, "Would you mind if I issued the commands  
Boy, he was fascinated. And the troops  
were fascinated. Here was this American three-star  
General...

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE



FARLEY

Which means?


BLAKE

That's the "Welcome, soldiers."

FARLEY

Oh, I see, I see.

BLAKE

That's when they come back with  (Laughter)

FARLEY

What does that give them, the port arms, or the present  
arms? *or. v.*

BLAKE

No, that's later. *fa*

FARLEY

Oh, I see.

BLAKE

*When* when you first *meet* see them, you say kind of "Welcome,"  
*You* you come to the salute position, which I think was  
present arms, but I don't recollect that, then you come  
back to normal position, and you walk by just as you do  
in the U.S. Honor Guard. So the commands I had to  
learn, I think, were about four of them, very simple.


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~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY

BLAKE



I don't

remember his name either. ~~He~~<sup>me</sup> kept in touch with me, kept sending me Christmas cards long after I retired. Very nice young fellow.

FARLEY

A military man?

BLAKE

Yes, yes, he was...

FARLEY

Wasn't ~~Delmar Klein~~<sup>Delmar Lang</sup> ~~or~~<sup>Lang?</sup> Del ~~Lang~~<sup>Lang?</sup>?


BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE



FARLEY

Good. A general question, Sir. ~~Is it~~<sup>During</sup> ~~during~~ your tenure ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> the Third Party relationship across the board worth the investment at the risk of a possible loss of intelligence as a result of a compromise?

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~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE Well, I don't think we gave them enough so that there was a tremendous risk in compromise. I don't recall this was a heavy investment, maybe my memory is faulty on that score. All I can say is that I was not motivated to make any dramatic changes either up or down.

FARLEY Good, that's fine. I think that covers the Second and Third Party without any problem. And you have already answered part of this, but just let me ask again. What projects and programs <sup>---</sup> how are we doing for time, a half hour. <sup>7. Can</sup> ~~can~~ we make it for a half hour?

BLAKE Oh, yeah, sure.

FARLEY Good. What projects and programs developed or completed during your tour are you most proud? You mentioned the CCP and the development of the association with the SCA's and the improvement in that area, but is there one or two projects or programs that might stand out?

BLAKE Well, one thing that's hard to remember the specifics, but I recall a lot of attention, a lot of money went to the increasing sophistication of the computer

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capability in the basement.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

Part of this, of course, was buying new hardware and a significant part of it went into <sup>research, I</sup> remember some <sup>research, I</sup> research, <sup>I think</sup> with IBM. <sup>Multi-million</sup> ~~multi-million~~ <sup>MM</sup> dollar projects which hopefully would lead to greater sophistication.

Essentially, you are <sup>just</sup> trying to handle more data in less time and, of course, we were on the threshold of very significant changes which had taken place. (Laughter) I always use as a simple example, I quit carrying a watch. I carry this now.

FARLEY

A computer, I'll be <sup>learned</sup> ~~born~~ A little vest pocket <sup>computer</sup>

BLAKE

To go back when I was Director and put this in a box of some kind, I don't know how big it would be, and I can remember some philosophical discussions about whether the basement would be big enough, the pious hope that this would take care of the basement. <sup>But</sup> ~~but~~ if there is a single broad area that we put a lot of emphasis on, I would have to say that that's probably the one I remember the best.

FARLEY

Excellent. And you sort of <sup>alluded</sup> ~~eluded~~ to this question.

~~TOP SECRET~~

What  
~~was~~ percentage of the Agency's operation were being accomplished by outside contractors, Agencies, corporations <sup>while</sup> ~~when~~ you were Director? Was that the beginning, primarily the beginning, of the contractual agreements?

BLAKE

Frankly, I don't recall great emphasis on this other than this computer hardware. I had, of course, over in Howard Barlow's COMSEC shop there were contracts there and we were contracting essentially for communications hardware, <sup>Teletypes</sup> ~~but, you know, teletypes~~ and all that kind of stuff, that we were expanding that. The amount of information collected and handled, I am sure increased dramatically during the time I was there, not so much through any decisions I made, it was just the natural trend of what was happening. The Air Force was putting in all of these Wollenweber stations. That whole process started, I didn't mention this, the Security Service, I think it is very important historically, <sup>when</sup> ~~when~~ I came to the Security Service, if I may digress a minute, there were no real R&D programs and no construction programs for the ~~collection~~ stations.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Essentially it was a little family that didn't really participate in these broad Air Force programs. I had just come from the Pentagon defending these for everybody else and then as Chairman of the Budget Committee which ex officio went with the Deputy DCS OPS hat, so I was very, very sensitive to the Air Force budget process. Here was my new command that had none of this and so I marked on two major programs; one was to build the SIGINT stations overseas so they were decent places to be and operationally efficient, and to launch an R&D program which the Wollenweber was one of the FR-9, I think they called it, was one of the major items financially. But programs like that and the Navy SIGINT ships, for example, the whole airborne thing, all of this was piling more stuff into the building and handling it computer-wise and transmission-wise. I like to think that some of the neat ways that it is being done now, because you have dramatically altered the response time, I guess.

~~FARLEY~~

~~Yes~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~BLAKE~~

is the way to look at it, and those tended to be pious hopes or fond dreams that we were trying to move toward. I don't remember how much we succeeded moving in that direction. I like to think so. We certainly recognized the need for that kind of change.

FARLEY

I am talking about contracts also for linguistic support, something like [redacted] I don't know if you recall [redacted] or not.

BLAKE

I remember that name, but I can't remember its *unclassified* classified significance.

FARLEY

[redacted]

BLAKE

I remember that, but I don't remember the size of this or the extent of it.

FARLEY

Insignificant, I would guess less than 20 people, I have no idea. And also contracts for management surveys and studies.

BLAKE

I probably did very little of that because I don't have too much faith in that instinctively. I probably did very little of that. I don't recall any, but that

doesn't say that you couldn't find one if you went through the books.

FARLEY

Of course not. But the question, too, right now the trend is to contract just about everything out, and I have a question, <sup>Would</sup> ~~would~~ you think that this technique would weaken the effectiveness of the Agency Analysts, Engineers, Linguists, Researchers by taking away some of their basic responsibilities?

BLAKE

Oh, absolutely. I have never been a very strong believer in this sort of thing. I find that unless you structure that study effort very carefully that you ~~spend~~ <sup>spend</sup> most of your time educating the study team, using the people that could do it themselves better <sup>you</sup>

~~FARLEY~~

~~Beautiful.~~

BLAKE

<sup>to</sup> and I'm very chary about this technique. I think it needs very tight control and a very realistic approach to it. If we are going down that road, all I can say is I hope it works.

FARLEY

It's interesting that you say that because I remember some management group came out and interviewed all the Analysts, put the notes down and bound the book and

~~TOP SECRET~~

sold it back for \$50,000.

BLAKE I think you are wasting the taxpayer's money.

FARLEY That's the tragedy. I think you have already answered this one. I'll ask it just to make sure. Comments on the ~~value~~ value of the Collection activities by the TRS and the Airborne Collectors, was it worth the money for the material that they provided?

BLAKE Well, I think it was worth the money because it is a technique you have to use because it is unique in terms of what it can reach. When you ask, "Is it worth it?" I draw an analogy with <sup>health</sup> health care here. If you say, "Is this heart operation worth the expense?" <sup>The</sup> and the answer is, "You <sup>can't</sup> ~~can~~ put a price on life." ~~an~~

FARLEY Good

BLAKE ~~Now~~ I think it is very difficult to put a price on a unique SIGINT source. It may be valuable enough in the right kind of a crisis that you don't give a damn what it costs, and yet you may look at it historically and you haven't contributed hardly anything. But because of the nature of the input, you have to do it. What ~~is~~ <sup>does</sup> this whole satellite thing cost now? But it's a unique

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look right into the heartland.

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

You can't do that any other way.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

What does that mean? Maybe nothing. Maybe it is worth the <sup>reach in</sup> rights of Kansas. So you can't answer that question really.

~~FARLEY~~

Fine, fine..

~~BLAKE~~

. . . except philosophically.

FARLEY

Of course, of course. Sir, you mentioned Howard Barlow sometime ago and the Communications Security Organization. Did you have any problems with that organization, that is, in so far as maintaining control or keeping it under the Agency umbrella?

BLAKE

I don't think so. I always considered Howard a loyal subordinate <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ was effective in a very difficult area. I found some of the same frustrations that I spoke of as Director of Communications when I had to tell Congress, "Sorry, that box isn't ready yet, but it

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will be next year, they tell me."

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

And so I suppose I would needle <sup>Howard</sup> about those experiences and say, "I see you haven't succeeded in inventing that thing yet."

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

But I do think that some of these cryptographic black boxes began to come of age again, perhaps because the time was ripe in terms of development and in terms of electronics. My service there and the period following it, and some period before, were at the beginnings of a real electronic revolution, I think.

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~it's~~

to the extent some of that came to fruition during my watch, I don't know that I claim too much credit for it. <sup>It's just that its</sup> ~~its~~ time was there.

FARLEY

OK. Many of the people who work in COMSEC or the S Organization have the attitude that they should be a separate organization, not responsible to DIRNSA at all. In fact, I've been chastised myself for referring to them as S Group, rather than the S Organization. Do

~~TOP SECRET~~

you have any thoughts on that?

BLAKE

Well, I recall vaguely some of that, but it never became an <sup>a burning issue</sup> ~~aberration~~ when I was Director, and I guess you could organize it that way, if you wanted to do so. There is an interrelationship, the opposite sides of a coin, and I always thought that was a sensible way to organize it. When you start reorganizing on that basis, sometimes the presumed advantages to the very people who were plugging it, turn out to be a bit nebulous when you <sup>learn</sup> find out, "Well now I've got to move," and so on and so forth, I don't recall that as a big flap on my watch.

FARLEY

*All right,*  
~~Alright~~, fine. Sir, I have just a few more questions here, I am sort of picking and choosing.

BLAKE

Sure

FARLEY

Would you care to comment on whether there was any SIGINT post facto related to the <sup>assassination</sup> ~~assassination~~ of President Kennedy?

BLAKE

No, I don't remember anything in that vein at all. I remember being at my desk when word of Kennedy's <sup>assassination</sup> ~~assassination~~ came in, but that's all.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

*All right,*  
 FARLEY ~~Alright,~~ that's fine. Another question right out of the blue, what was your attitude toward the practice of establishing ~~COMPARTMENTS~~ <sup>All Compartments</sup> in the Agency? Did they serve a purpose? Do you think it was overdone?

BLAKE It could have been overdone. I didn't have any strong feeling on that. I thought they were ~~an unnecessary~~ <sup>a necessary</sup> security measure, ~~tending~~ <sup>tended</sup> to restrict the knowledge of sometimes an activity that would have been hard to restrict without that technique. Given the traumatic approach to security in an Agency like NSA, probably ~~COMPARTMENTS~~ <sup>All Compartments</sup> tend to get overdone, but that's just an observation.

*All right,*  
 FARLEY ~~Alright,~~ Sir. Should certain material, now this is collected by Overhead, the TK material, ~~TALENT KEYHOLE,~~ <sup>Talent Keyhole,</sup> do you think it should be made available to anybody with a ~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~ <sup>Top Secret Codeword</sup> clearance, or should there be another ~~COMPARTMENT~~ <sup>All Compartment for</sup> that these people? <sup>?</sup>

BLAKE I don't have any thoughts on that except generally. Your clearance is just one step and I always thought that the second step, ~~NEED TO KNOW,~~ <sup>the "Need to Know,"</sup> should be carefully applied, that that's the real control over how many

~~TOP SECRET~~

people are involved and exactly who they are.

FARLEY OK, good. Any comments on clandestine collection, and I am talking about <sup>Shamrock,</sup> SHAMROCK, and I would like to know what was your position on this type of collection?

BLAKE Tell me what <sup>Shamrock,</sup> SHAMROCK.

FARLEY <sup>Shamrock</sup> SHAMROCK was the surveillance of U.S. citizens, or picking up material from Western Union. ~~It~~

BLAKE I remember the Western Union wastebasket. (Laughter)

FARLEY Yes, that's right. Did you go along with that, or did you have any strong feelings one way or the other?

BLAKE I guess I'm not much of a flaming liberal when it comes to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> First Amendment, and all these sorts of ~~things~~ <sup>things</sup>. (Laughter) If we could pick something out of the wastebasket, <sup>that was useful,</sup> why not?

FARLEY Beautiful. Thank you, Sir. Again, just bits and pieces here, in the spring of 1964, Public Law 88-290 was enacted provided for a full background investigation, provided for a three-member Appraisal Board to evaluate suspected security risks and the employment of any employee or officer, ~~to~~ to be terminated if in the national risk. What was the immediate impact

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of the law, as you remember?

BLAKE I don't even remember that law.

FARLEY Didn't you?

BLAKE When was it passed?

FARLEY This was in the spring of 1964, probably May '64, and the question was, do you recall whether any employees were discharged?

BLAKE Don't recall the law, don't recall any application of it. (Laughter)

FARLEY Fine. Also, in March '64, the DOD Resident Audit Group was established and moved into the Agency. Any changes that were brought about as a result of this within the Agency?

BLAKE I don't remember that either.

FARLEY *All right, All right,*  
~~Alright, Alright,~~ maybe this one -- the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred in August '64. What actions did you take? Did you establish a Task Group, a SIGINT alert, any adjustment of tasking? You talked about the message, the question on one word. *h*

BLAKE The only thing I recall there was when SIGINT became so crucially important to whether the Tonkin Gulf incident

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was exactly as it was portrayed. That was one of the few cases that I remember being briefed on very specific detail of that particular input, and I suppose the reason for that was that sometimes the Director had to be in a position to say, "Yes, I know all about that, I have gone into every last detail of it, and I believe what we say." That was probably the reason that I wanted to be on top of that particular one, but ~~I recall~~ I wish I could remember that word. It had different meanings.

FARLEY

Oh, I see.

BLAKE

depending on exactly how the thing was used.

FARLEY

I should dig it out of the Archives and send you a copy, if I can. (Laughter) No?

BLAKE

Don't worry about it.

FARLEY

~~All right.~~ Alright. In April '65, I guess you were still there in April '65? Yes.

BLAKE

Yes, but I retired at the end of May '65, so it was near the end of my watch.

FARLEY

OK, in April '65, we had the Dominican Crisis, and the question <sup>15</sup> ~~was~~, "Did the Agency look good? Did we

~~TOP SECRET~~

contribute? Did we produce, or <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ we ill-prepared for this type of crisis?"

BLAKE

I don't really know. It will be interesting to see what history says about that. It's the kind of a crisis, looking back on the things we were paying attention to, that I would tend to suspect that maybe we weren't listening to the right things, in retrospect. You can't task everything. As I read the papers, that's the impression I got from Grenada. *ph*

FARLEY

Yes, we were in bad shape.

BLAKE

*That*  
~~...that~~ we weren't tasking the right things at that particular point, in retrospect.

FARLEY

Of course. Sir, the discussions concerning the need for a National Cryptologic School, it was established in May '65 and has been in existence every since. Who did you select as the first Commandant, and did you have any reasons for choosing that individual?

Remember, <sup>?</sup> was it *Rowlett?* ~~Rowlette?~~ Was it Rowlett?

BLAKE

It was ~~Rowlette~~ <sup>*Rowlett*</sup> or Walter...what the hell was his last name. <sup>?</sup> *ph*

FARLEY

Jacobs? Walt Jacobs? No?

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~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE

I'm trying to remember now. Was it <sup>Roulette?</sup> Roulette? I'd be surprised if I put <sup>Roulette</sup> Roulette in there. Maybe I did. Was he the first Commandant? That was a mistake.  
(Laughter)

FARLEY

OK, so the reason <sup>we</sup> -- .

BLAKE

I remember a lot of discussions about this school and generally feeling that it had useful potential <sup>but</sup> ~~my~~ that you have to wait and see if the potential is realized. A lot depends upon the caliber of the instructions and who goes to it, and so on and so forth, and I would be interested in, has it turned out to be a useful thing?

FARLEY

Very much so, very much so.

BLAKE

Well, I am happy that it got started on my watch then.

FARLEY

How much pressure...

BLAKE

That isn't the person I have in my <sup>mind's</sup> ~~mind~~ eye. A scholarly fellow, wore glasses, medium height, <sup>graying</sup> ~~gray~~ hair, not overly bald, could be Walt Jacobs. Wonder why we put <sup>Roulette</sup> ~~Roulette~~ in <sup>my</sup> ~~my~~ so near the end of my tour? I might have said, "Lou, you pick." That's possible.

FARLEY

OK

BLAKE

You have to live with who it is.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY Right. Did you have pressure from outside the Agency, from other Agencies, for the establishment of a Cryptologic School? <sup>Because</sup> because a lot of individuals from these Agencies are coming out to the school for orientation-type courses?

BLAKE No, I recall it mostly as an in-house proposition. I suppose that we saw students from other walks of life as a useful broadening of the base of understanding. That's probably part of ~~it~~ <sup>it. I</sup> think it was viewed primarily as a family institution.

FARLEY Right. <sup>All right,</sup> ~~Alright,~~ good. It has proved very valuable. You were involved in the Cuban ~~Crisis~~, the Dominican ~~Crisis~~, the Gulf of Tonkin. <sup>At</sup> ~~at~~ that time did you feel that there should be a centralized area to control the operations of the Agency, and I am talking about a Watch Office, a Command Center? ~~to~~

BLAKE I remember we did some planning ~~and~~ about internal arrangements, primarily not so much changing the organizational makeup, but just better facilities, a better place to do it, faster communications, faster analysis <sup>and</sup> and better response.

~~FARLEY~~

Good

~~BLAKE~~

~~... better response.~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~All right.~~

~~BLAKE~~

Those were the things that I recall we tended to work toward rather than any sweeping change. ~~There~~ <sup>We</sup> already had ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> who were charged with reporting ~~and so forth,~~ <sup>and so forth,</sup> and I think some of that has come about, as I recall, in some of my visits up there ~~to~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~Yes~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~... in the past 15 years or so.~~

~~FARLEY~~

Right. The Command Center was established during your tenure.

~~BLAKE~~

We tended to be a little fragmented and mostly the place to do this and the facilities to cut corners and talk to each other, and get to the customer rapidly. The ~~response~~ <sup>It was their</sup> response time, ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> bothered me the most.

~~FARLEY~~

Right. Were you responsible for establishing the DEFSMAC, the Defense Missile Center, the operation combined with DIA and NSA? What do they call it? The Defense Missile ~~something~~ <sup>something</sup> + Satellite and Missile ~~Center~~ <sup>Center</sup>.

BLAKE I remember that, but my memory doesn't tell me whether it came about while I was there or later on. Do you the date of its... establishment?

FARLEY I don't have the date, Sir. I really don't, ~~but it was either.~~

BLAKE My recollection is that it happened a bit after I left.

~~FARLEY~~ ~~Subsequent to~~

~~BLAKE~~ ~~It~~ was the subject of considerable discussion. This was a whole new area, ~~of course and~~

FARLEY Right

BLAKE ~~My~~ I would be interested in knowing if that came on my watch or later.

FARLEY I'll find out.

BLAKE If I were to bet, I would say a little later.

FARLEY ~~Alright~~ <sup>Oh right.</sup> Did you support the establishment of such units as the <sup>NOGs,</sup> ~~NSAGs,~~ NSA Operational Groups, which would side-saddle with the G-2's [redacted] the <sup>EUCOMs,</sup> ~~UCOMs,~~ and interpret or support or provide SIGINT information. ~~to~~

BLAKE Well, I did support the idea that we ought to be close to the customer in the field. That's one way to do it.

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I don't particularly remember ~~any~~ ~~units~~ units that were actually created during my time there. It's possible that some were. Certainly it is the kind of a thing that improved our ability to deliver

~~FARLEY~~

Right

~~BLAKE~~

and understanding of what we have delivered.

FARLEY

Right. Sir, you have <sup>answered</sup> ~~been~~ ~~through~~ these achievements, contributions, did you ever attempt to implement any changes but could not do so for any reason? I am wondering about ~~it~~ <sup>anything</sup>.

BLAKE

I don't remember any, but I'm sure there are some. I tend to forget my failures. (Laughter)

FARLEY

Don't we all? Don't we all? How would you compare your tour as DIRNSA to other ~~Command~~ or management positions you held during your career?

BLAKE

Well, it's the only joint Defense activity that I ever established so it had some different facets than other commands I had. A fascinating operation in terms of what its working with and trying to do. In a way, it sort of capped a lot of command experience. I notice now these young fellows, thinking of my two sons, for

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example, and others, command opportunities seem to be a lot harder to come by now. I spent 34 years on active duty, 17 of it roughly in command positions; ~~commanding~~ <sup>commanded</sup> everything from a Detachment to a ~~National Agency~~, you know, Squadron, Group, Wing, Division, two major Air Commands, and so <sup>I guess</sup> the top of that heap is <sup>the</sup> National Agency.

FARLEY

Right

BLAKE

A very satisfying career because leadership is the bottom line really.

FARLEY

Absolutely. Sir, is there anything else? I have run to the bottom of the list of my questions. Are there any other comments you have, or anything else you would like to put on the record? Any guidance to the youngsters coming along? (Laughter) Let me ask this -- what <sup>is</sup> ~~about~~ your attitude, <sup>like</sup> excuse me, I don't mean to talk over you <sup>that</sup>, the transcriber will ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> go <sup>like</sup> wild, "What <sup>?</sup> what did you say, what did you say"; ~~your~~ <sup>your</sup> your attitude toward the future of the intelligence community? Are we in good shape, bad shape? Do you have confidence in them?

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~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE

Well, I have a great deal of confidence in them, and I particularly have a great deal of confidence in the people at NSA which I have always had, and everytime I go back there, usually for the Travis Trophy, which I have a sentimental interest in, <sup>and</sup> ~~add~~ as an excuse to get some space available orders, but I'm usually tagging along with the Commander of the Electronic Security Command, and so I find myself with maybe the afternoon of Travis ceremony, and they very kindly ask if I would like to ~~go around~~ kind of look around a little, and naturally I take that up, <sup>So</sup> ~~so~~ I find myself in the bowels of the place for a few hours just being kind of caught up in what that particular segment is doing. It is always fascinating and it reinvigorates my enthusiasm for the people there, because I have a chance to see their own enthusiasm, their own tech confidence, and to some extent the end result. I think as long as you have that and given the nature of SIGINT as a potential contributor to the intelligence problem overall, I think that is very comforting and I would expect, unless some very revolutionary change takes

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~~TOP SECRET~~

place, which is hard to see, that it will continue to be the bedrock of national intelligence.

FARLEY

Good.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

place, which is hard to see, that it will continue to be the bedrock of national intelligence.

*FARLEY*

Good.

TAPE II of II - SIDE 2

*You can use*

BLAKE

.all that beautiful speech or rub it out.

FARLEY

Yes, I do. No, no, it was beautiful. That was excellent.

BLAKE

*I think that was one of my better efforts.*

*FARLEY*

*That was excellent.*

~~CANNOT TRANSCRIBE THIS SECTION BECAUSE BOTH TALKING AT THE SAME TIME.~~

BLAKE

*Things that*  
\* come from the heart tend to be better, I think.

FARLEY

That was outstanding and I do appreciate that. You mentioned the rash of <sup>exposés</sup> ~~exposés~~ "Puzzle Palace," being the most recent. Do you think that these people should be permitted to continue to do this type of revelation?

BLAKE

Well, the answer to that is a resounding NO, but more

~~TOP SECRET~~

significant is how do you go about it, <sup>We</sup> and ~~we~~ don't have what England has, for example, or the United Kingdom, the Official Secrets Act, and so the mechanism for doing something about disclosures, you're confronted with the rights of free speech and all that sort of thing, and the rights of people to know against the necessity to control your sources. And this conflict is not going to go away. It's <sup>built in to</sup> ~~building~~ our society and, of course, the nature of those protections of liberty we all support and don't want that taken away. So it's a very difficult problem and it happens too often and it happens by people that should be willing to do better, <sup>So</sup> ~~and~~ you have to ask yourself, is it deliberate on their part, or is it ignorance, <sup>?</sup> and <sup>To</sup> ~~the~~ extent that the media, both electronic and written, are in this sometimes, I will only say there are occasions when I would like to see a greater sense of responsibility by the media and to the extent they need to overcome some ignorance that maybe that's a source of hope for some correction of this, <sup>But</sup> ~~but~~ everytime I see it, all I can do is say that shouldn't

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

have happened.

FARLEY Absolutely. Our big problem, Sir, is the Freedom of Information Act. Being in the History and the Archives, it's amazing the information that the people on the outside are asking for and it's also more amazing that we have to give it to them in general.

BLAKE *I think perhaps*  
~~I think it may be~~ it's being much more loosely intended than it really should be.

FARLEY Sir, do you have any other comments that we should record forever?

BLAKE I think not.

FARLEY *All right.*  
~~Alright~~ First of all, I do appreciate your time, and we came pretty close to the allocated time.

BLAKE *all right.*  
Oh, that's ~~alright~~ I just want to use the next hour to run two or three errands...

FARLEY Of course, of course. I understand.

BLAKE *Then*  
~~...and then~~ grab a quick lunch and check on Mrs. Blake who I haven't seen since last night.

FARLEY Well, I hope she is doing better.

BLAKE Well, we were very happy with the results. *ah*

FARLEY That's great.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

That's right. Sir, this has been a very, very pleasant experience. *fw*

BLAKE

I enjoyed rehashing old times.

FARLEY

This is wonderful. It has been a delightful interview and I want to thank you. *fw*

BLAKE

Let me give you back your microphone.

FARLEY

*All right.*  
~~Alright,~~ before you take it off, let me ask you how we shall classify it. I think **TOP SECRET...**

BLAKE

I think you will have to make that decision. I'm not privy to the classification of some of the things that we have talked about freely, and I think when you finish transcribing it, you will have to look it over and say, "What do we put on it?"

FARLEY

OK, I suggest **TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS**. Sir, I am

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~~TOP SECRET~~

going to leave you a form. I don't think Generals have to get a dispensation from their oath, do they? But if you do, I have one here.

BLAKE

The Maxwell people and the Chanute people asked me to sign some kind of release, which I, of course, did.

FARLEY

I can leave that with you, Sir, it's a thank you letter and it also contains an agreement, an accessibility agreement whereby you designate who should be able to hear these tapes, who should be able to see the transcripts, and you have to designate who you would like to be permitted to hear them, but there's no urgency. You can, as I say, read those at your leisure, ~~and then~~ I would like to take your picture before I go and I'll just switch this off at the moment. Thank you again, Sir.

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from the

*DECLASSIFIED*

*ORAL HISTORY  
COLLECTION*

**Subject: *LTG Gordon A. Blake, USAF,  
retired***

**NSA OH - 1984 - 7**

**Interviewer: *Robert Farley***

~~TOP SECRET~~

Transcribed by

FOIA (b)3

TAPE I of II - SIDE 1

Oral History Interview

NSA-OH-07-84

with

Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, U.S. Air Force, Retired

19 April 1984

Lt Gen Blake's residence in Universal City, Texas

By Robert D. Farley

*Robert D. Farley* Today is 19 April 1984. Our interviewee is Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, United States Air Force, Retired.

General ~~can~~ Blake held the position of Director, National Security Agency, from July 1962 to May 1965, which was his last assignment before retirement from the Air Force. After graduating from West Point in 1931, he served as a Communications Officer with the Army Air Corps Unit in Hawaii. He set up the Army Airways Communications Office in Alaska, entered the Research and Development field at Wright Patterson Air Force Base and served in various additional command

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positions in the United States Air Force. He commanded the U.S. Air Force Security Service before he was assigned as DIRNSA. The Silver Star was awarded to General Blake for Gallantry on December 7, <sup>1941,</sup> ~~1942,~~ at Pearl Harbor. General Blake will discuss his military career and in particular his assignment at NSA. The interview is taking place in General Blake's residence in Universal City, Texas. Interviewer is Bob Farley. <sup>General</sup> ~~Gen~~ Blake desires that these two tapes be classified TOP SECRET - HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY. This is NSA Oral History Interview No. 07-84.

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FARLEY - First of all, General Blake, thanks much, much, much for seeing me. I have been looking forward to this for a long time. In fact, you are the reason I am here. I just tied in a few other interviews, General Hetherington, Russ French, Jim Shean, Bob Gibson in the area. ~~Bob Gibson~~

BLAKE Quite a few Air Force SIGINT types live here.

FARLEY Right, right. Irwin Labbe, Colonel Labbe. ~~Labbe~~

BLAKE I don't recollect him.

FARLEY Labbe, he was an OPS Officer for a long time. On this interview, I want to concentrate primarily on your career as it relates to the intelligence operation and basically your tour at NSA. We can talk at any level you consider that you would like to talk about. —

BLAKE The level is up to you.

FARLEY ~~Right.~~ All right

BLAKE ~~You may have to.~~ We can put a level on when we get through.

FARLEY We'll put a TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - CODEWORD, whatever you want. ~~and then~~ <sup>As</sup> I say, I have a lot of questions and we'll try and hurry through them, but I am sure in your

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discussions, you ~~will~~ probably <sup>will</sup> answer some of the questions, ~~already~~. To set the stage, Sir, let's talk about your pre-military life, your background, hobbies, anything, before you entered the Academy.

BLAKE

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A few days after graduation, Congressman Howitz (?) called, I had applied and a last minute vacancy came up and he offered it to me, so with virtually no notice I took off. I was 16 years old, which is a little younger than you are allowed to enter West Point, but they do make exceptions if you are fairly close to 17 on July 1st when you enter. My birthday is July 22nd so I was 22 days short of 17, so I paid my way for the first 22 days. (Laughter)  
Interestingly enough, in my class was another later

Director, Marshall Carter. *u*

FARLEY

Oh, yes. *u*

BLAKE

He was also 16, and he always chided me for beating  
him <sup>out</sup> as "class baby." (Laughter) I hadn't been north of  
Minneapolis, east of Chicago, south of Des Moines, or  
west of Sioux City, and I was pretty green. *u*

FARLEY

*Okay.*

BLAKE

~~had~~ <sup>Had</sup> no foreign language. My first year at  
West Point was quite a struggle, but I managed to get  
through and did better as I went on, <sup>intellectually,</sup> ~~intellectually,~~ I  
mean. I wound up ~~at~~ 55th in the class. *u*

FARLEY

~~that~~ <sup>GREAT.</sup>  
~~of course~~

BLAKE

<sup>plebe year,</sup>  
at the end of the ~~plebe~~ year, I think I was about  
290 <sup>or 200</sup> (laughter) *u*

FARLEY

So we can brush over it quickly, the West Point period, <sup>but</sup>  
just one question, did they teach any intelligence at  
all in any of the courses during your ~~at~~ <sup>four</sup> years?

BLAKE

I don't recall a single thing that was related to  
intelligence. It was pretty much basically a mixture  
of, oh, I don't know what you would call it, not  
Social Sciences really, Liberal Arts, I guess. *u*

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~BLAKE~~

was the word given to it. It was a mixture of Liberal Arts and Engineering. Actually, you graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree. Looking back on it, there were things that loomed so very large in my later career that we got very little of.

FARLEY

Huh.

BLAKE

I think about 20 hours of radio.

FARLEY

Oh, yes.

BLAKE

~~But~~ I spent much more time learning to ride a horse than I did about airplanes, for example. (Laughter)

FARLEY

My gosh! ~~What assignment, let me say it again.~~ In what branch of the Service were you commissioned ~~upon graduation?~~

BLAKE

Well, I was commissioned in the Coast Artillery Corps. There are only certain branches that you are allowed to apply for, and you applied for them in the order of your class standing. For example, the Corps of Engineers usually had about 15 or so vacancies and they went traditionally to the top members of the class. By the time you got down to 20, why the Engineer vacancies would be gone. You could not apply

for the Air Corps as a basic branch. You could apply if you passed a physical exam. You were automatically detailed to learn to fly and if you successfully graduated from the flying school, which was a year's training, and became a pilot, then you were transferred to the Air Corps. So for the first year while I was learning to fly, I would sign my name, 2d Lt, CAC(AC), meaning that I was detailed to the Air Corps at that particular time.

FARLEY

I see. You went to the Fort Monmouth Signal School soon thereafter?

BLAKE

Well, that was later. I came here to Randolph Air Force Base in September '31 to learn to fly. We were the first class at Randolph. Randolph was a brand new establishment and they were consolidating their primary and basic flying school here. From there I went to a Pursuit Squadron, <sup>They</sup> they are called TAC Fighter Squadrons now. It was the 55th Pursuit Squadron -- it is now the 55th TAC Fighter Squadron stationed in England. I spent a couple of years there and then I spent a year at the Signal School at Fort Monmouth.

The Air Corps Technical School, which was at Chanute Field, Illinois, had a communications school, but it burned down and in '34, '35 they held a special course at Fort Monmouth which was a mixture of instruction by the Air Corps instructors and by the Signal School people. When I finished that, I went to Chanute Field for four years from '35 to February '39 instructing in the Communications School, which was moved back to Chanute after that *first year at Monmouth.*  
*Of your interest in what I did* at Chanute, I interviewed the Historian from there so we won't go into Chanute.

FARLEY

Sir, the Communications Officer School, did they teach you how to use codes and ciphers, or instruct you on any cipher machines at all?

BLAKE

Yes, we had a course in codes and ciphers, concentrated quite a lot on ~~the~~ *the* I think it is called the M-95. It was ~~was~~

FARLEY

The disk?

BLAKE

Do I have the right name?

FARLEY

~~94.4~~ *94.4* Ninety four.

BLAKE

~~94.4~~ *94.4* Ninety four.

FARLEY You are close.

BLAKE I was close.

FARLEY Right.

BLAKE And ~~that's~~ the disk cipher has, I think, ~~25~~ 25 )

~~FARLEY~~ ~~BLAKE~~ That's right.

~~BLAKE~~ disks on an axle and you line them up and, <sup>then from there on</sup> ~~then on~~ you can use it. We also played around with cryptanalysis and I remember that that kind of fascinated me. It maybe was a precursor to my later interest, although it probably didn't have too much to do with it. I found that a lot of fun to play around <sup>with</sup> ~~It~~ was very elementary obviously ~~all~~

FARLEY Of course.

BLAKE ~~mostly~~ <sup>It was mostly to</sup> you ~~know~~ count the number of such and such a letter and assume that's an "E" <sup>and</sup> ~~that~~ that sort of thing.

FARLEY Sir, did you remember the nomenclature of any of the radio receivers, or any of the equipments that they exposed you to?

BLAKE Well, the Air Corps at the time was, of course, serviced by the Signal Corps and so I remember the

radio that was used for air to ground communications, not by the pilot. <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ was called the SCR-187, and that was actually a set that was also used in tanks. <sup>So</sup> ~~So~~ the philosophy there was, of course, to make the maximum use of equipment across the board in the various Army activities. The pilot set was known as SCR-183, that was the way he talked to the tower. I don't remember too much of the numbers.

FARLEY

~~That's great. That's wonderful.~~  
Sir, I ~~noticed~~ <sup>noticed</sup> in your ~~biography~~ <sup>biography</sup> you talk about the land base flight from Hawaii to the Philippines. This was a pioneer flight and you got the Distinguished Service Cross.

BLAKE

Well, ~~the whole~~ <sup>everybody</sup> who took part, got it.

FARLEY

I see. Now I was going to ask about the communications. ~~Were they~~ <sup>Were the</sup> communications, "efficient" is the word I use, and were you able to remain in contact with the controllers throughout the flight, and the speciality of the communications people on board other than yourself?

BLAKE

Well, the radio operator, of course, was the position

that tried to keep track, make position reports and that sort of thing, receive weather reports. <sup>The</sup> ~~To~~ answer <sup>to</sup> your question depends a lot on what leg of the flight you are talking about.

FARLEY

Oh, I see.

BLAKE

It was a kind of <sup>an</sup> around about way to get from Hawaii to the Philippines. This was the first land-base flight between those two locations. Congress before World War II had refused to fortify Guam, and that included having an airfield there. So there was no airfield on Guam. So to get to Clark, which was our destination in the Philippines, we flew first to Midway and Wake and then flew pretty much directly south. That was an interesting part of the flight because that took us over the Mandated Islands, which Japan had controlled.

~~FARLEY~~

~~Ah yes...~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~since World War I and that was mystery. Nobody knew much about places like Truk.~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~add~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~and other storied names~~



~~DARWIN~~  
~~CLARK~~

*OK*

*Al* in the Pacific military affairs, to Port Moresby in New Guinea. From Moresby to Clark was a little far for a direct flight so we flew due west to Darwin, and then from Darwin to Clark. This is pretty much flying the two short sides of a right angle triangle because the hypotenuse was a little ~~long~~ <sup>long</sup>. From ~~Honolulu~~ <sup>Hickam</sup> ~~Hickam~~ ~~Atoll~~ to Midway and Wake communications was satisfactory. We didn't really communicate too much because since we were going to fly over the Mandated Islands we weren't particularly interested in telling the Japanese that here was a flight of B-17's meandering around that part of the world. We didn't send anything at all, of course, we flew at night at high altitude across the Mandated Islands. Communications was pretty spotty with the Australians *and* ~~Port~~ Moresby and Darwin and we had trouble getting decent weather reports out of the Philippines. We wound up landing at Clark in the beginnings of a typhoon which made it a rather sporty operation, but we all managed to get down.

*OK* All right. That

FARLEY

- ~~Alright that~~ answers it, I think, Sir. I wanted that on the record primarily for my own curiosity. That's great. You were with the 18th Composite Wing in Hawaii in '39, I see, and were you there until Pearl Harbor?

BLAKE

Yes, I was stationed there at Pearl Harbor and I stayed on in the Pacific actually until November 1945. My Headquarters moved to the Philippines when we reentered Manila in early '45, probably January or February.

FARLEY

*OK* Sir, just a question on the Unit in Hawaii. I doubt if you had an intercept mission at all. Were you provided any communications intelligence, your Unit, any communications intelligence or any other type information and, if so, from where and how frequent.

BLAKE

Are you talking about during World War II *RA* ?

FARLEY

No, no, prior to World War II, Sir, probably '39, '40, '41 period.

BLAKE

Well, I was not provided any intelligence directly, you know you get some from messages and things like that. We were pretty well alert to the fact that we probably would be at war with Japan and the situation in Hawaii in the summer and early fall of ~~1942~~ <sup>1941</sup> ~~1941~~ <sup>1941</sup> I mean.

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~Yes, Sir.~~

was pretty much one of preparation. For example, we had missions related to the defense of Japan. The War Plan had three phases -- Phase 1 was anti-sabotage, Phase 2 was defense against air attack, and Phase 3 we called "Die on the Beaches" (laughter), and at that point we were presumed to be under amphibious assault.

FARLEY  
BLAKE

Yes

The air activity was finished, beaten, and the Navy was also out of the picture. <sup>So</sup> under those circumstances, if you were in an Air Corps Unit, say, a Bomb Squadron, you had an auxiliary assignment. Most of us <sup>would go</sup> to the 35th Infantry and we would shoulder a rifle and become Infantrymen to help defend against the amphibious assault. I recall, we were rather put out by this, we, the Air Corps people there. That phase of readiness we thought was greatly overemphasized. The 35th Infantry had Detachments on <sup>Hickam</sup> ~~Hickam~~ and we were training for Phase 3. Meanwhile, <sup>we'd</sup> ~~we~~ added a whole new Bomb Group going from one Group, Wing <sup>to two. We had</sup> ~~to two~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

increased ~~the~~ we had taken on the B-17, which flew in there for the first time in June '41. We wanted to work on Phase 2 and here we were learning how to be better Infantrymen. M

FARLEY

Yes

BLAKE

Also  
~~and~~ we had strong objections to the phasing. The reason for that was two-fold. Phase 1, which we were in on December 7th, defense against sabotage, the airplanes were all pulled together nose to tail on the ramp. Reason: so the Infantry can guard them with less people, instead of being out on the perimeter, where they have some protection against attack. Second, a radar network was being installed in 1941 and the circumstances were that under Phase 1, that remained in construction status, that is, it was not operational. The Corps of Engineers and the Department of Engineers was doing the brick and mortar work and the Department Signal Officer (telephone rang) M The radar network which was fairly well along and could have been useful on December 7th was still in construction status. As we went into Phase 2, defense

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against air attack, the rules were that the radar network would be turned over to the Air Corps operationally and, in effect, the construction work and installation work would kind of phase down into a "do what they could, but don't interfere with its operational use". The Air Corps felt that we should not have a separate Phase 1, that defense against sabotage was a function that should be performed at all times, obviously with more emphasis on pre-war. There should only be two Phases -- Defense Against Surprise Air Attack, and Die on the Beaches -- and that recommendation was made to the Department Commander in June 1941 and he turned it down. And there was a chart, which incidentally I had Mr. ~~Hasdorff~~ Hasdorff get for me because I have never been able to lay my hands on it, but this was a very telling chart. It was approximately the 800 mile circle, which was the search range for B-17's and Navy Patrol Boats, and Oahu, Pearl Harbor, was at the center of this circle, and what was represented here in different segments was different kinds of attack showing the attack that stood

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out was December 21st. The reason for that was the greatest amount of darkness and in that particular time, given the 800 mile search range, a carrier fleet could stay outside that search radius, steam in under cover of darkness, and launch at dawn and strike Pearl Harbor, <sup>with</sup> and no night radar or anything like that, ~~you could~~ it was very, very difficult to prevent that attack. And that would be December 21st at 8 o'clock in the morning. It happened December 7th at 7:55.

FARLEY

~~At night,~~ Do you have pretty horrible memories of December 7th, or no?

BLAKE

I wouldn't say horrible, it was not a pleasant morning obviously. —

FARLEY

I know, but <sup>you</sup> got the Silver Star I noticed for Gallantry. ~~by~~

BLAKE

Well, I suppose I deserved it. The control tower should have been a very dangerous place. It turned out not to be.

FARLEY

You were staying on duty up there?

BLAKE

Well, I was Communications Officer responsible for the tower and other communications but, also, I was

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~~TOP SECRET~~

*Operations*

Base ~~Communications~~ Officer who is the Airfield Manager. And we had this flight of B-17's due in at 8 o'clock from the West Coast and I was down at Base Operations waiting for them, to see that they were properly parked, crews looked after and the usual functions of the Airport Manager. So all of a sudden we hear this big "karroppp". I raced outside and here was a dive bomber <sup>that</sup> ~~who~~ had bombed a big depot <sup>hangar</sup> ~~hangar~~ at the south end of the ~~hangar~~ <sup>hangar line, ~~It~~ pulled up and we could see this ~~big~~ red circle under the wing. Well, no guessing as to what the hell had happened. And so, of course, I raced up to the tower because we wanted to warn these planes coming in what had happened and try to get them safely on the ground, which we succeeded in doing. Although they all didn't land nicely at <sup>Hickam</sup> ~~Hickam~~, one of them landed on Kanuka <sup>(?)</sup> ~~Isle~~ <sup>Wright</sup> ~~Isle~~ Golf Course, a couple of them landed at Bellows, a little field on the east side of the island, one of them, as I recall, was on Maui. We got ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> of them in between the two attacks, there were two attacks, so we were pretty lucky on that one. But the reason the tower wasn't</sup>

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dangerous is kind of interesting from the Jap intelligence point of view. Target folders were captured from some of the Jap planes that were shot down. <sup>Not</sup> ~~not~~ many were shot down, but there were a few, and this target folder listed the Operations Building, which was in the center of the <sup>hangar</sup> ~~hangar~~ line, and had the control tower on top of it, listed that as the Officers Club. (Laughter) And the reason for that is kind of interesting. The Officers Club actually was opened up on New Year's Eve 1940, in other words, 11 months before the war. Prior to that time, not having an Officers Mess, if we wanted to have a social function of some kind, a dance, for example, we would hold it in the Operations Building, because the Operations Building was offices and the tower structure along the <sup>hangar</sup> ~~hangar~~ line and then kind of "T" <sup>shaped</sup> ~~shape~~ a section behind it which was a Wing Briefing Room, and it had a sliding door down the center so you could divide it up into two group briefing rooms. So that is where we would have all our parties. Just move a bar in there and have a dance. But the Japs had it listed

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**THREE PAGES REFERRED  
TO ANOTHER AGENCY**

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BLAKE

*Yes,*  
~~Yeah,~~ I was a Colonel.

FARLEY

Good, you went up in a hurry.

And so, well, this horrified me because, in the first place, I knew I was going to Alaska, and, second, I had a firm conviction that the way to do this was to delegate this Executive Authority to the AACS boss, as they had done in the Pacific. So I persuaded them to send me, not transfer me, to Alaska to set up this office while on temporary duty. And so I spent a couple of months up there cruising around, plying people with hot buttered rum, *MM* (laughter) *MM* and generally getting the thing straightened out, *Also* ~~then~~ *also* discovering the that the AACS guy was at least half at fault in the way he was operating and suggested that we get a new one up there that could pour oil on troubled waters and operate the thing the way I had in the Pacific, which was essentially to tell the CIA this is what we want, now you run it.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

Now you know I am not trying to be a hard-nosed boss,

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but delegate <sup>it. The Army</sup> ~~to their~~ ~~people you know we~~ <sup>They were competent people We weren't</sup>  
~~were~~ dealing with ~~lots of~~ duds. And that is the way it  
worked out. I went back to my war in the Pacific. So  
it was essentially a political job, I had nothing to do  
with equipment, I don't even remember Box 1.

FARLEY Good, that's fine. You were in Hawaii still on V-J Day  
when the Japs surrendered?

BLAKE Well, I was in the Philippines.

FARLEY Were you there? I see.

BLAKE My Headquarters moved to the Philippines in early 1945  
so in August '45 when this all broke out, I was ~~at~~  
actually <sup>in</sup> Fort McKinley, right outside Manila.

FARLEY Any fond memories about that day?

BLAKE Well, it was a very exciting day, of course. We knew  
nothing about the atomic bomb, but many of us were  
convinced the Japs were flat on their face. Their  
shipping was gone, their cities were in horrible shape.  
I guess everybody thought they would probably continue  
to kamikaze the whole operation and it would take a  
hundred thousand deaths to conquer Japan and <sup>we</sup> were up to  
our eyebrows in planning for OLYMPIC ~~and there~~ <sup>There</sup> was

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another name. <sup>There</sup> ~~where~~ were two invasions.

FARLEY Yes, yes, I have forgotten the name of the other one.

BLAKE I have, too. OLYMPIC ~~Masa~~ <sup>that</sup>, I think was Honshu, the main island, so that was what we were engaged in when the atomic bomb brought an end to all of it.

FARLEY Thank goodness.

BLAKE Although I guess the Jap historically, I believe the Japanese had sent some feelers out even before the atomic bomb so maybe they would have been smart enough, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Emperor, at least, who was a moving force in all this, ~~he~~ would have been smart enough to say, "Well, let's surrender." The atomic bomb, <sup>in its</sup> cataclysmic nature, obviously gave him a psychological edge in what he was apparently trying to do anyway.

FARLEY Right. Sir, when did you come back from the Philippines?

BLAKE I arrived back in the United States November 2, 1945.

FARLEY Gosh, soon thereafter the war then?

BLAKE Oh, yes, I had been out there since March '39.

FARLEY You had enough points?

BLAKE I developed infectious hepatitis. 

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FOIA (b)6



(Laughter)

FARLEY Where were you assigned in the States then?

BLAKE I came back to Langley Air Force Base as <sup>Commander</sup> Deputy ~~Commander~~ <sup>Ivan Farman,</sup> AACS. First ~~at~~ <sup>Harold</sup> ~~Harold~~ <sup>McClellan,</sup> who was shortly thereafter transferred to Japan to command the Air Transport Command, Western Pacific Operation, and General Harold ~~McClellan~~ <sup>McClellan</sup> took over AACS and I was his Deputy for the next period.

FARLEY Was there a problem then, the war had ended, and there was a cutback in personnel and probably funding, slim budgets, <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ there a problem at Langley trying to keep things continuing at the same pace of operations?

BLAKE Well, the problem, of course, was to phase down, ~~it~~

~~FARLEY~~ Oh, that's good...

~~BLAKE~~ and a lot of attention spent on that, and moving around. We moved to Gravelly Point, which is next to Washington National Airport, the Air Transport Command was there and at Langley was the Air Weather Service and the Army Air ~~Adviser~~ <sup>Rescue (?)</sup> Communications System, which, of course, was what I was with. The Weather Service and the AACS were moved to Gravelly Point. They

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were under the Air Transport Command as subordinate units and Langley was being readied as the new home for the Tactical Air Command.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

So phasing down was the name of the game. I recall one crash trip I had to take. It was actually <sup>an</sup> around-the-world-trip, ~~the~~ I think it was February 1946. There were a number of air fields and the associated communications and other facilities that had been built around the world in North Africa, and through the Middle East and India, and across the Pacific and up the Canadian coast, Goose Bay, places like that, and ~~these~~ <sup>These</sup> these were called National Interest Stations. ~~the~~ <sup>The</sup> theory there was that with World War II, land plane flying across the oceans had come of age and there would be a tremendous expansion of commercial aviation using those same types of transport aircraft. Of course, that is what happened. The idea was to try to preserve these National Interest Stations until discussions with various governments could take place and these facilities could be transferred and this

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network not just collapse with the end of the war. Well, it was hard to tell who was going to be there. There was a point system and you had a certain number of points, you just ~~slue~~<sup>oriented</sup> and said "Goodbye" and went home. ~~And so~~<sup>So</sup> they told General Saville, who was Deputy Commander of Air Transport Command, you take a weather guy and a communicator and you go visit these places, and you find out what needs to be done to preserve this National Interest potential. So we flew across the Atlantic, to North Africa and the Middle East and up to China, ~~we~~<sup>the</sup> were not too much interested in China from this point of view but General Marshall was there as the big honcho. ~~Am~~

FARLEY

Yes

BLAKE

~~and he~~<sup>He</sup> had a C-54 assigned to him and it needed three engine changes and some other maintenance, and so rather than try to do all that out there they simply gave Saville a ~~newer~~<sup>newer,</sup> better shape, C-54 and said, "you take this to Marshall and pick his airplane up and come home in it." So we did that. That was an interesting trip, but it was sort of characteristic of the times.

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Post-war problems were predominant and it was phasing down and accommodating change rather than austere budgets.

FARLEY Good. In '47 you moved to R&D at Wright Patterson.

BLAKE In '47 I went to the <sup>off Air</sup> War College for a year, and then to R&D at Wright Patterson.

FARLEY OK, then let's just pick up Wright Patterson. Two questions: were you primarily concerned with R&D for new aircraft equipments, COMMS systems, radar and navigational side, across the board, was it this sort of concern?

BLAKE Well, it was across the board. Actually, there was an organization called the Electronic Sub-Division which had been a Signal Corps activity stationed at Wright Field and it was there to support <sup>Army</sup> ~~Armament~~ Air Force operations of all kinds insofar as electronics was concerned. So it dealt with airborne as well as ground. Most of the ground radar and things like that and, <sup>instrument</sup> ~~guess~~ landing systems and what have you, was at Rome, New York, the depot at Rome. Much of the pure research business was in an old broken down

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warehouse called the Cambridge Research Center, I think that's the right name, Cambridge some or another, which was in Boston and that was the beginning of what's now Hanscom and actually had a great impetus, this was later on, on what's now called the Miracle Mile, Route 128, around Boston.

FARLEY

Oh, yes.

BLAKE

I was later sort of a mid-wife in all that. So here was this Electronic Sub-Division, which was transferred lock, stock and barrel to the new Air Force, you see, and it was headed by an Army Brigadier General Tom Reeves, who had transferred to the Air Force, and I was Chief of Operations. And then in '49, I believe it was, they decided they wanted to put in the Armament Lab somebody with some black box experience, and transfer certain things like the auto-pilot and so forth from other laboratories. It was the beginning really of the idea of an integrated airplane <sup>with</sup> ~~where~~ all of the electronic and hydraulic, and guidance. <sup>mu</sup> The theory was that the devices that steered the airplane ought to also be available to <sup>aim it.</sup> ~~aim it.~~ I recall

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that the bombing system in those days in the Armament Lab was an interesting thing. It had an optical sight, very complicated affair, of course, that you ~~could aim the~~ could visually look at the target and with the computer and so forth, figure out when do I push the button. It also had a Signal Corps radar that could perform the same function in bad weather. These two were incompatible. One was to make a very complicated matter over-simplified. The optical sight worked on rectangular coordinates, and the radar worked on polar coordinates. ~~So~~ <sup>So</sup> in order to fit these things together so they would work for the ~~bombardier~~ <sup>bombardier</sup> as a single system, a thing called the A-1A Interconnect was devised and this black box turned out to be bigger than ~~either of~~ <sup>either of</sup> the radar. So one of ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup> first projects <sup>in</sup> of the Armament Lab was the high speed bomb director, which was the first time that all the elements of a bomb aiming arrangement was combined into a single development tailored to go into an airplane. And, ~~that~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~they~~ as a matter of fact, some of the offspring of that development ~~some of them~~ <sup>are</sup> are still flying.

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FARLEY . Great.

BLAKE Which shows you how long they last. 7

~~FARLEY~~ ~~That's right.~~ One interesting phase of that, the first contract was the IBM Company, and their President, Thomas Watson, Sr., came in to see me in the Armament Lab and he had one simple question. "Is this really something that's high on your list?" He said, "We haven't gone in much for defense contracting. We feel a little guilty about that. We would like to pick something to compete for which is new, challenging, and damn well needed." And I said, "Well, this one and a similar project, which had already gone to Hughes for fighter aircraft, interceptors, MX-179 that was called, <sup>these</sup> ~~these~~ are the top two projects in this laboratory." I explained, you know, the old background where you buy this from this manufacturer, and this from this manufacturer, and you would buy an airplane, and these were called GFE, Government Furnished Equipment, and you would tell the company making the airplane, <sup>all right</sup> ~~all right~~ now, when you build this airplane, make a place for all these things.

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FARLEY Oh, I see. So that was really the beginning then of IBM becoming involved in supporting defense.

BLAKE <sup>In</sup>~~an~~ becoming involved in that sort of thing, you know. I have no recollection at all of how and when they got involved as they have been, as you know, for NSA. That is a totally different <sup>as a</sup> situation.

FARLEY Of course, of course.

BLAKE ~~And~~ <sup>They</sup> they may have done that much earlier. I would expect given their basic technology, which is, of course, computers <sup>at</sup> ~~are~~ the heart of it.

~~FARLEY~~ ~~BLAKE~~ <sup>Yes</sup> that they may have been involved in the cryptologic business even earlier than that, I just don't know.

FARLEY Right. Sir, how useful to the R&D people were captured enemy equipments and using the state-of-the-art developed by the enemy, using for making new equipments for U.S.

BLAKE I don't ever recall this, it may be that I didn't pay enough attention to it. I have a gut feeling though that U.S. technology, in the kind of world in which I operated, essentially the electronic world, probably

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was out in front and we didn't learn all that much.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

That is just my gut feeling. I can't prove that.

FARLEY

Well, that is very satisfying to hear that.

BLAKE

Well, it could be that way, but I don't have much personal recollection of <sup>"Oh</sup> ~~Oh~~ boy, that gadget there really opened our eyes". I don't recall that at all.

FARLEY

Good. Sir, in this time period now, with the establishment of AFSA and the establishment of the Air Force Security Service, we can sort of gloss over that, do you have any comments on the Air Force attitude when AFSA was established?

BLAKE

I had no association with that or the Security Service until sometime in the summer of ~~1955~~ late <sup>summer</sup> 1956.

~~...57...OK...~~

~~BLAKE~~

...because General O'Donnell, Wright Air Force personnel, called me in. I was at the Pentagon at the time as Assistant DCS OPS, and they wanted to assign me to the Security Service. And as far as my recollection goes, that's the first time I had paid much attention to the Security Service.

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FARLEY OK, fine. We'll pick that up later, but I want to talk about the assignment as Director of Communications in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for OPS and you established pioneer operational circuits using scatter COMMS, and other questions, new equipments, new procedures, any innovations in codes and ciphers, did we have scrambled communications yet, COMSEC, OPSEC and real problems, things like that. I don't want to pile it all <sup>on. Talk</sup> ~~talk~~ about the scatter communications first, Sir.

BLAKE Well, scatter came about because we were putting in radar network from Newfoundland to Frobisher, which is up the Labrador coast, <sup>past</sup> ~~passed~~ Goose Bay, there was a chain, I believe, of eight radar stations, approximately 175-200 miles apart, forbidding country, and the plan called for conventional microwave transmissions between these various stations, which would mean, of course, a series of microwave towers about every 25-50 miles depending upon terrain, up this coast.

FARLEY Uh-huh.

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BLAKE We got next to scatter through a couple of *m* events,

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TAPE I of II - SIDE 2

BLAKE

*It was*  
*m* exciting because it meant that we could scrap all those intervening microwave stations and instead put a single scatter station at each radar site which, of course, had to be developed with access, and place for people to live, and logistics support, and everything else. So we not only would have a much cheaper arrangement, but we would get away from the horrendous maintenance problems of servicing these microwave stations which probably would be unattended as they are commercially, but would have to be visited occasionally, and so on and so forth. This was such an exciting prospect, scatter was fairly new then, and there was some gamble involved. I went to my boss and I said, "I think we ought to go for this." And I had a briefing, you know, how much money we would save, and

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so on and so forth, and I always look back on that. My lifetime active duty and <sup>retired</sup> retirement involvement in the Federal budget was paid for in that one decision. Never mind any others that might have been equally useful. To get the earliest possible test that we could, we commissioned the Bell Labs, a fellow George Gilman that I worked with, I remember George because I made a bet with him on this, <sup>we</sup> we put in from Newfoundland to <sup>NY</sup> I don't remember where the other end was, <sup>NY</sup> but it was kind of a <sup>kind</sup> length that we would have to use, and so we put that in and it was successful, <sup>so</sup> so we went ahead and had a target date, of course, for these scatter stations and it was Washington's Birthday about 1955, I would say, along in there somewhere, <sup>so</sup> and <sup>so</sup> the bet I made with Gilman was that if I got a telephone call, one of the things that you could do over scatter, because it was broadband like microwave, was you could have <sup>all the</sup> ~~audio~~ voice circuits, and so forth, and other communications up and down that line by narrow channel HF, and so forth, could really do that. And I was at home in Falls Church on the night of December 22nd and

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Officer for Northeast Air Command in Newfoundland, and he was calling me from Frobisher over the scatter network. So that meant I owed George Gilman a bottle of bourbon which I paid him at the IEEE Convention in New York a couple of weeks later. (Laughter)

FARLEY

Oh, yeah. Let's talk about new equipments procedures. Were there any innovations in codes and ciphers during your tenure as Director of Communications?

BLAKE

I remember very little related to codes and ciphers. We were pretty much getting those from the National Security Agency, who was responsible for them. My principal role was ~~NOV~~ while we were superintending the overall use of them, ~~NOV~~ was defending the electronic budget in the Congress, which I did for four successive years, the P200 Budget. And I recall, particularly in COMSEC, repeated failures to beat targets, and I was constantly apologizing to the Congress, "Sorry, Sir, we didn't spend that money you gave us last year, but we still need it, and here's

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why, and here's the amount, and here's what we hope to get out of it." That was my biggest frustration in the whole P200 thing. The other things that we were after, that's when the DEW Line Radar came in, and the SAGE System for Air Defense Communications, the whole SAC Communications Network was before the Congress at that time, <sup>So</sup> and ~~we~~ we had a lot to say to Congress about electronic money and we were pretty successful in almost all cases. We had some slippages, but not enough that I recall frustration, but I sure recall a lot of frustration on that COMSEC stuff.

FARLEY

Good. Well that ties in with another one, <sup>T</sup>Talking about COMSEC or OPSEC, as Director of Communications, did you institute any new procedures whereby the pilots would try to be conscious of Communications Security and not chatter and use basic codes <sup>or</sup> of whatever they were instructed to do?

BLAKE

Well, this was a periodic campaign. Looking back on it, I think I would have to, ~~as~~ as a Monday morning quarterback, ~~plead~~ plead guilty of not paying as much attention to that as I would have if I had been with

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the Security Service before I was Director of Communications.

FARLEY I see. So it was a continuing problem?

BLAKE It was a continuing problem, but I pushed it a lot more and with more success when I was Commander of the Security Service than I did as Director of Communications.

FARLEY *Good, that's*

BLAKE *I* I make that admission with some regret

FARLEY *That's good.* (laughing) When you were Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for OPS in '56 you served on the permanent Joint Board for Defense. You mentioned this, but I had a question. Were there any decisions made by this Board on any joint intelligence collection effort or project?

BLAKE We were almost totally related to the Air Defense business. That was really the purpose of the Board.

FARLEY ~~Yes.~~

BLAKE *It* and that was what we worked on. I don't recall a single thing related to the subject of your question.

FARLEY *All right,* Alright, Sir, Just a few minutes ago you talked about

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being called in and asked whether you would like to be assigned to the Security Service and you became Commander of that Security Service. Would you talk about the major problems that you encountered when you assumed the command.

BLAKE Well, I only encountered one which you might say the instant assumption of command and that was in relation to the National Security Agency. My predecessor, a Major General named Hunt Bassett. *you*

FARLEY Oh, yes (laughing)...

BLAKE He is living here, incidentally.

FARLEY Is that right?

BLAKE Hunt was carrying on a terrific feud with Ralph Canine who was then the Director of NSA and, of course, in my mind, I have always looked on Ralph as the father of modern NSA. ~~but~~ I didn't particularly know it at the time, I ~~never~~ *never* ~~heard~~ *heard* ~~of~~ *of* with the Security Service, *later on* as Director, of the *history* ~~History~~ of the *beginnings* ~~beginnings~~ of NSA, and how important Canine's strong-willed defense of the centralized nature of NSA. I remember remarking to Lou Tordella when I was Director, I said,

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"You know, Lou, sometimes this Agency comes up with the right Director at the right time." I said, "Somebody like Canine to fight for a strong central organization. <sup>If he had</sup> ~~if~~ he had been here, it would have made a lot of difference. Someone like me, good at compromising and finding ways around the problem, I would probably have failed. <sup>But</sup> ~~but~~ I think if Canine had to handle ~~the CCP~~ <sup>Fubini</sup> and the CCP, which I always thought was my biggest contribution, I think Canine would have failed." Anyway, here was this feud. Bassett, even in one of our conversations, equated NSA and the Kremlin. <sup>So</sup> ~~in~~ in an equation, NSA is to the Kremlin as Ralph Canine is to Stalin.

FARLEY

Wow!

BLAKE

Well, I had my first staff meeting, and I have never been a "new broom" in the sense that I go in and sweep everything out and then start over. That has never been my way. But I did "new broom" one thing at that first meeting, I said, "I am <sup>glad</sup> ~~wary~~ of the arguments and discussions, I would call <sup>it a</sup> ~~the~~ feud, that's going on between our Command here and NSA, ~~that~~ is simply

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between my predecessor and the Director, and I just want to say that ~~is~~ is stopped herewith. They are our operational boss and it's ill-becoming, I don't care whose fault it is, or the background of it, I am not interested in it. It stops! I want that thoroughly understood right now."

FARLEY

Sir, was the area of controversy primarily in the mission, the responsibility of the Security Service, or the guidance from NSA?

BLAKE

Well, the specifics are a little hazy at this point, but I am fairly certain that the bottom line of this was Canine's unwillingness to delegate sufficiently to the Security Service. I mean, it is one thing to stand strong when you are being formed, and so forth, and getting all this control over the three Cryptologic Agencies, but you don't run them that way, if you want a harmonious arrangement. I think Ralph's side of this feud dealt primarily with failure to delegate sufficiently, and on Bassett's side was failure to win some accommodation of the Service views. I am sure it was complicated by the fact that they couldn't see each

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BLAKE

~~And so~~ <sup>So</sup> when I became his subordinate, there was a relationship there that starts with a totally different viewpoint and he knew, of course, what I had said about the necessity to recognize our relationship.

FARLEY

He was a fine ~~gentleman~~ <sup>gentleman</sup>, I remember.

BLAKE

Yes, he was, yeah, yeah.

FARLEY

Sir, had the ELINT controversy arisen by this time? This was the problem of who would manage and who would control the collection of electronic intelligence.

BLAKE

Yes, that was on the books at that time and continued as a matter of some controversy and in a combination for some time, as I recall.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

It is still going on.

FARLEY

It has been sort of like a tennis game, but I guess the Air Force has it now for sure. Before we move to DIRNSA, any comments on your assignment as Vice Commander <sup>in</sup> and Chief, and Chief of Staff in <sup>PACAF</sup> PACOP and <sup>maybe</sup> Navy CONAC? Anything that stands out that you would like on the record for NSA?

BLAKE

Oh, I don't think we ought to take <sup>the</sup> time. <sup>^</sup>

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FARLEY *Will right.*  
- ~~Alright~~, fine.

BLAKE ~~And~~ I have taken a lot of time already, it is a quarter of ten now. There is one thing about CONAC. The assignment at ~~PACOF~~ <sup>PACAF</sup> was a very pleasant assignment, of course. My boss, <sup>Case</sup> O'Donnell, ~~he~~ was the Commander of that flight to the Philippines, incidentally,...

~~FARLEY~~ *Oh yes.*

~~BLAKE~~ ~~And~~ and had been a friend for years, ~~And~~ I loved Hawaii, and it was totally away from intelligence and other matters. Oh, I continued to have an interest in it obviously, but when you are Vice Commander you tend to kind of keep your nose out of that DCS, <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ don't want the front office running the staff, so <sup>you're</sup> ~~you're~~ tendency is to kind of back away and leave <sup>it to</sup> them. In CONAC I was flabbergasted when I was put on the three-star list as Commander of CONAC, which runs the Reserve Program, because I <sup>hadn't</sup> ~~had~~ had a nickel's worth of experience with it. ~~There~~ There were some people, notably one a classmate of mine, Major General Robert Eaton, Bob Eaton, who had had a lot of Reserve experience and at the time was the staff man in the Pentagon.

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FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

And here was this three-star Field Command down in Georgia and instead of giving it to Bob Eaton, they gave it to me. I thought to myself, I said, "Eaton must be livid at this point." And I didn't know ~~at~~ at the time that I was given that assignment to keep me from retiring. ~~I was all set to go~~ <sup>As</sup> a matter of fact, I was going back to talk to people in New York and AT&T. <sup>They</sup> ~~they~~ had offered me a very interesting assignment with no conflict of interest at all, and I was going back for final discussion on that in June <sup>of</sup> '59 when this whole thing broke and Rosie O'Donnell's mother died and I had to cancel that. When he came back, he told me <sup>"You</sup> ~~you~~ are on the three-star list and it will be out tomorrow." And he said, "I know that you planned to retire," he said, "I hope you think it over." I said, "Well, we'll talk it over at lunch, my wife and I, and I'll let you know." I went home to lunch and two <sup>Airman</sup> ~~Airman~~ Aides came in sheepishly with their hands behind their back, and they said, "Sir, we know we are not supposed to give you anything, but hope you won't

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mind," and they handed me this little box which had two of these three-star things you put on your collar.

FARLEY

Beautiful.

"I don't know. This

BLAKE

And I thanked them, and I said, "I know, <sup>it</sup> ~~the necessity~~ ~~of going~~ before the Senate and it wasn't effective <sup>has to go</sup> ~~until~~ ~~before~~ the 1st of October," and all that sort of thing.

So if I ever wear them, I will wear these." I

didn't say anything about my quandry. I looked at my wife and I said, "You know, they wouldn't understand if I did anything else but accept it." She said, "I have been thinking our boys would feel the same." They were both Junior Officers in the Air Force at the time. They are both Colonels now. So I went to the phone and called Rosie and said, "Rosie, I must have rocks in my head, but if the Chief wants to make me a three-star General, I am honored."

FARLEY

That's great.

BLAKE

I didn't find out until much later that LeMay had put me on ice at CONAC because he wanted to nominate me as Director of NSA. That's the reason I bring this story in. <sup>WA</sup>

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FARLEY

That's good, that's great.

BLAKE

~~A. because~~ Jack Frost was under some nebulous status because of the Martin/Mitchell case.

FARLEY

Yes.

~~BLAKE~~

I didn't know that, because Jack was a World War II friend and I very much felt badly about coming in over his prostrate form. *W*

~~FARLEY~~

~~Yes.~~

BLAKE

...and he understood that ~~well~~.

FARLEY

It happens, Sir. When you became DIRNSA in July '62 and you anticipated it, what unresolved problems were passed from Admiral Frost? Was there any ~~fall out~~ <sup>fall out</sup> in the Dunlap spy case, and then Martin and Mitchell? *Things that* ~~what~~ hadn't been resolved?

BLAKE

Martin and Mitchell was still a trauma in the Agency. The ~~Dunlap~~ <sup>Dunlap</sup> case, of course, happened later on on my watch. ~~AND AN~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~I'm sorry!~~

~~BLAKE~~

*The* ~~The~~ <sup>Dunlap</sup> case was one that I had to front for, and it took a lot of footwork. It may be, I never thought about this, but looking back on it, it may well be that

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coming so soon after the Martin and Mitchell case, which was a more important case, obviously, than the <sup>Dunlap</sup> ~~Dunlap~~ case, and the sacrifice of Frost in that one. <sup>They</sup> ~~They~~ may have been <sup>loathe?</sup> ~~loathe?~~ to get rid of a second Director so soon, <sup>or</sup> ~~though~~ I may have benefitted by Frost's demise. It was a case of far less import, <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ it took a lot of talking to Congressmen and the White House, Defense Department, and so on and so forth.

FARLEY

Right. Sir, you have probably answered this question already, but you inherited a reorganization, in that reorganized NSA as well as a Second Management Board which had been established by Frost. <sup>Did</sup> ~~did~~ you continue the declared objectives or <sup>cancel</sup> ~~counsel~~ or revise the guidance?

BLAKE

I don't remember.

FARLEY

You don't? ~~You said earlier.~~

BLAKE

That facet of NSA, I don't remember too much about actually. It must not have been very important to me at the time.

FARLEY

Well, I think you said earlier that you didn't consider

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yourself a new broom, so maybe you just let it drift. *At*

BLAKE

I don't recall coming out with any great management changes, internally. *to*

FARLEY

*All right.*  
Alright, fine. Let's get into one of the big ones. *Let's say that* *Soon* after you were getting your feet on the ground came the Cuban *Crisis.* ~~Crisis~~ I would like to talk about the support to the White House, the JCS, the State Department, and so forth, and the White House SIT Room, *What* ~~what~~ do you recall about that? What you did...

BLAKE

There are two things about that that I remember most vividly. First has to do with the USIB, the Intelligence Board which the Director, of course, is an *ex-officio* ~~official~~ member, and we were meeting, *This* ~~this~~ particularly centered on a weekend, and we were meeting almost constantly. *to*

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

~~...We~~ We would recess for a few hours so the staff could type something, and then we would come back again, and the basic question we were addressing is, if we belly-up to the Russians, what will they do? Well, I

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am sure you realize how hard that question is because you talk about intent, you see, and you don't read any messages that give you intent. And I recall our final paper on the subject to the President, pretty much bottom line is "we think the Russians will blink", and so Kennedy did go ahead with essentially the blockade approach, and so on and so forth, and that leads up to the second significant ~~remembrance~~ <sup>remembrance.</sup> There were <sup>((Cuba))</sup> Russian ships steaming for the Philippines <sup>^</sup> and from aerial reconnaissance, as I recall it, we were convinced that they carried missiles and so what happened to those ships was a crucial indicator.

NSA25X3

And we flashed that into all the

people that you tell this to. <sup>to</sup>

FARLEY Yes. Did you mean that the Russian ships were going to the Philippines or Cuba?

BLAKE Oh, no, they were going to Cuba.

FARLEY OK, you said...

BLAKE They were out in the mid-Atlantic, you see.

FARLEY OK, you mentioned Philippines, and I...

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BLAKE Did I say Philippines?

FARLEY OK, Cuba. We wanted to correct that for the transcript.

BLAKE Yes, correct that.

FARLEY *OK right,*  
~~Alright,~~ Sir.

BLAKE I don't know where the Philippines came in there. Anyway, they were enroute to Cuba and they were out in the Atlantic. I don't remember how far away from Cuba they were, but they turned around and went home. And

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it was a [REDACTED] intelligence that ~~Khrushchev~~ <sup>Khrushchev</sup> had blinked and, of course, a great sigh of relief in the whole USIB Community. Oh, I never heard what Kennedy had to say about the subject, but he must have had a sigh of relief also.

FARLEY That's right. Sir, I was working the Watch Committee area at the same time with Robbin Minnick and that crew and I know pretty much that there was much SIGINT used. What percentage of SIGINT was used in the USIB discussions?

BLAKE A lot of it. As a matter of fact, my general impression of USIB over the three years I served on it

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was that, in terms of hard rock intelligence, SIGINT is the predominant source.

FARLEY

Good. Sir, did you have to make many command-level decisions or adjustments in collection or distribution of product during the Cuban crisis, or did you have a good OPS Officer, ~~or did someone.~~

BLAKE

I didn't make many personally. The emphasis, obviously, went on trying to get information, ~~and I never really got into.~~ <sup>It's</sup> ~~It's~~ not my way of delegating really to say, "Alright now, we want to emphasize this, now you come back in with the specific tasking for my approval." I didn't do that. I think if I had I would have been the biggest thorn in the side of progress that you could possibly imagine.

FARLEY

You were wise.

BLAKE

You often ~~get~~ <sup>hear</sup> it in daily briefings and things like that, you know, we have taken these down and put these up, or we double our effort here and we had to sacrifice this for awhile. I suppose at the time I might have said, "Well tell me more ~~of~~ <sup>why,</sup> ~~with~~" if I was curious. I don't recall ever making that kind of specific "drop

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FARLEY Well, that's low level.

BLAKE Well, I wasn't smart enough to do that to begin with (laughter), I was smart enough to realize that.

FARLEY Sir, did you <sup>have a</sup> ever ring down ~~the~~ phone to the White House, or the SIT Room, or CIA, or State?<sup>?</sup>

BLAKE Yes, there was a special phone there that linked pretty much the USIB members and I think, it seemed to me, that there was a White House Watch Phone on it, too, although I am a little hazy on this. The general pattern, in my time, was that we didn't by-pass CIA too much to communicate with the White House. <sup>That</sup> It was pretty much ~~what~~ was the CIA's job. That was McCone's <sup>that</sup> job to brief the President at the Interface, the Community with the President, and so I don't recall too many conversations, <sup>of</sup>

~~FARLEY~~ Right

BLAKE <sup>sp 7/</sup> with the White House. I recall a lot of them with McCone ~~McCone~~ over the...

~~FARLEY~~ Surely...  
~~BLAKE~~ <sup>secret</sup> SECRET phone.

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FARLEY Marshall Carter was the Chairman of the Watch Committee, as I recall, during that critical period.

BLAKE Yes. Well, ~~McKeen~~, I remember ~~McKeen~~<sup>McCona</sup> was present during a lot of that Cuban stuff, But you are right, the Deputy Director classically ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> served ~~as~~ as Chairman.

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~ → The <sup>one</sup> ~~one~~ to start with, of course, was Dicky Helms, and he pretty much worried about that sort of thing.

FARLEY Sir, is there anything else about the Cuban Crisis we should record?

BLAKE I don't think so.

FARLEY We looked pretty good. ~~NSA~~<sup>NSA</sup> looked pretty good during that ~~Cuban~~<sup>Cuban</sup> crisis.

BLAKE Yes, we were effective in that crisis, I think.

FARLEY Let's move on to another ~~subject~~<sup>area</sup>. When you moved in to take command of NSA, what was your view when you became aware of the cliques in the Agency, and the tight control exercised by some high level civilians? Did you attempt to correct it immediately?

BLAKE Well, on this subject, I always lead the law of ~~the~~<sup>law</sup> Tordella. I had a great deal of respect for ~~him~~<sup>him</sup>. There

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were many activities there that generally fell in the <sup>compartmented</sup> ~~COMPARTMENTED~~ category, and activity of that kind tends to <sup>be</sup> cliquey. The security features of that were extremely sensitive, the number of people limited, and

NSA25X3

I took the view about [redacted] and things like that, that ~~they~~ are now out in the open as a result of the ~~PUZZLE PALACE~~ "Puzzle Palace".

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

Unfortunately, ~~F~~

FARLEY

~~The time~~ *is* ~~available~~.

BLAKE

That it would be better for NSA and for those activities if I left that to Tordella, and that was our working relationship. And so while I usually had a general knowledge of this ~~COMPARTMENT~~ <sup>compartment</sup> and that <sup>compartment</sup>, ~~COMPARTMENT~~, I made no attempt to be really knowledgeable about it and, therefore, just less involved security-wise. Maybe that's an odd view, ~~is~~

~~FARLEY~~

~~No, that's fine...~~

BLAKE

→ but Director's come and go <sup>and</sup>

~~FARLEY~~

That's a point.

BLAKE

→ for them to become a repository of every last little

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ <sup>secret</sup> never struck me as being really very useful.

FARLEY

Very fine. *N*

BLAKE

There were so many of them anyway that if you tried to do that, <sup>you'd</sup> you probably missed ~~some~~ some things you ought to be doing.

FARLEY

Yes. That's a good answer, Sir, I like that. Let's switch to Congressional Committee Hearings and the ~~T~~estimony by DIRNSA before some of them. How difficult was it to tell the complete story under the security restrictions imposed on you?

BLAKE

Well, it was very difficult and, therefore, we didn't do it. And my technique for that dealt with two gentlemen who were very cooperative and being able to talk more frankly to them and let them see to it that the rest of the Committee didn't get too far afield was obviously a tremendous boon to the Director and his budget activities. Those two gentlemen were Gerald Ford, who was in the House Appropriations side, and Senator Russell, who occupied a similar position on the Senate side. And I would have a private meeting with those two only *m*



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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

*only to see*

...and we would talk rather frankly, ~~about~~ <sup>This</sup> tended to concentrate on the big items, *in*

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~of course:~~

*→* financially and I would answer their questions freely and when this session was over, in effect, they were satisfied. And when we held the classified hearing with the rest of the Committee, I suppose they talked to their Committee people and said, "We have sat down to all the fine, highly classified, details of this." That was my technique, and it worked beautifully.

FARLEY

I see. Sir, during some of the public hearings where you had the entire Committee participating, reading some of the testimony looks to me like some of the Congressmen were deliberately antagonistic or anti-NSA, or were they just plain unfriendly?

BLAKE

Well, I don't know. ~~At least~~ *At least* I can't give you any names, ~~but~~ but I recall that sort of thing. Perhaps I tend to brush this off because when I was Director of Communications for the Air Force, I spent four years

giving a lot of Congressional testimony, not only the budget, but I remember one committee was investigating a flap involving the ARK-34, which was a new UHF Airborne Communications System that was in a big flap with RCA and became the subject of Congressional investigations. ~~I~~ I became the lead witness. <sup>So</sup> I was really an old hand on the Hill and so maybe I was a bit ~~inured~~ <sup>inured</sup> to tendency to kind of attack the Defense Department witnesses a bit unfriendly about all the money that was being spent, and probably bridling somewhat at the security restrictions that their own <sup>Chairman</sup> ~~Chairman~~ were imposing as indicated by what I had to say about Mr. Ford and Mr. Russell. But I don't have any burning recollection of <sup>examining</sup> ~~inspecting~~ A, B, or C, and perhaps it's because you come to expect that and it's like water off a duck's back.

~~EARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~That bit~~

..and doesn't become something you live with the rest of your life. ~~For you~~ You go home and forget it.

FARLEY

Right. Sir, was there a single "Intelligence Oversight Committee" during that period, or were there two ad hoc

committees on the Senate side and the House side?

BLAKE Well, I regret to say, I don't remember the formation of Oversight Committees and I don't know historically when were they formed.

FARLEY I think that was a little bit later. I think before that ~~there~~ <sup>add they</sup> were single <sup>one</sup> on the House side and one on the Senate side.

BLAKE I don't have any recollection of ever appearing before an Oversight Committee such as you read about now with Goldwater and ~~v~~

FARLEY

*Ads.*

BLAKE ...what's this New York fellow's name who quit?

FARLEY ~~Moyhan?~~ *Monyhan?*

BLAKE Moyhan and, of course, Frank Church, ~~with~~ <sup>He</sup> ~~he~~ was on

*it, N*

FARLEY

*Yes?*

BLAKE ~~it~~ and he was equal one to blow the lid, I recall, just reading the papers.

FARLEY Right. When you participated or were involved in budget hearings, in general, did you achieve most of the funding that you wanted?

~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE

For the most part. Our big fight really was the Pentagon, who were the CCP aspects in terms of how the overall budget for the three Cryptologic Services and the NSA fit together, and that the money was <sup>usefully</sup> ~~usefully~~ programmed and results measured. My recollection of the budget process was that the real hurdles were from Eadie and company in the Pentagon rather than over on the Hill.

FARLEY

I see. ~~Abraham~~ Was this time an austere period? Was it more difficult to get <sup>money</sup> ~~money~~ when you were DIRNSA than before that <sup>and</sup> ~~than~~ subsequent to that?

BLAKE

Well, I have no way of measuring before and after. It was not easy, it took a lot of homework and we had to be a little hard-nosed to ourselves to begin with. ~~Now~~ <sup>I</sup> It was a time of growth for NSA, of course, a new building was being built, we were in a position of considerable favoritism in terms of our mission and the whole growth of <sup>usable</sup> ~~usable~~ electronics, I think, obviously reflects in an activity of that kind. My recollection is a pretty successful three years in terms of resources.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY

Yes, very much. Sir, would you try to discuss your meetings and association with Dr. Fubini. ~~And~~ I have heard so much about this man, I am just wondering whether it was his modus operandi or was he truly a difficult person with whom to deal, or was his reputation distorted?

BLAKE

Well, from my point of view, I don't know what reputation you are putting together from what you said introducing the subject, I guess, my guess would be that maybe it's distorted, because I saw him so much that I probably saw all sides of him and we had, I think, essentially a work relationship that was productive. It had its moments of conflict and serious discussion. He was a brilliant man, scientifically he was utterly fascinated, I always thought, with the nature of the cryptologic operation. It was the sort of thing that appeals intellectually to a man like Fubini. This led, of course, to a considerable probing in the kind of detail that normally a man in that position isn't going to fool with. But he was so curious about it, he was so intellectually stimulated,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

and sometimes this has some good results -- his questions and his suggestions -- and so I really looked on that facet as one of those plus and minus things and you politely try to respond to his intellectual curiosity in a very small detail. I am sure confessing, "Look, Gene, I don't know enough about that kind of detail, <sup>Add</sup> I'll send a guy down who does. --

FARLEY

OK

BLAKE

"If <sup>you</sup> ~~he~~ wanted to chat with him, that would be fine. If you have any suggestions, please communicate them to me rather than tell him what to do." <sup>and his</sup> nature was such that that's a lesson he had to learn because his tendency would be to start reinventing with our low level engineer who knew all about this you see. Together <sup>they</sup> start inventing. Some of this interplay probably was useful.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

But when you start changing things and issuing new directives and say, "Well, let's do this," instead of that, my problem was to get him in channels, and I think by and large we managed to do that.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY

Excellent.

BLAKE

The care and feeding of Fubini became one of my principal chores, and I like to think the way he acted when we were together and when I left that essentially there was a situation of mutual admiration for our respective personalities and ways of doing business that produced a useful rather than a disastrous result. It was the kind of situation that could be disastrous. Some of this centered around the CCP, of course. There Fubini was merely reflecting Robert McNamara's "pull things in from a ~~decision point~~ broad decision point of view to the Defense Department," and that's what *the* McNamara's regime is famous for and, of course, it has pretty much continued in that vein ever since. The CCP was the mechanism for that. The problem of NSA was to retain sufficient control over the preparation of the CCP and the compromises and the decisions, and not have those made for us without the benefit of the kind of give and take <sup>and</sup> family discussion that we could bring to it. And here again, I look back on that as being not totally successful, but I was satisfied with it.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

<sup>"Puzzle Palace"</sup>  
and if someone <sup>T</sup> the ~~PUZZLE PALACE~~ says I am most famous for square dancing and the Travis Trophy (laughter) and that suits me fine. ~~and~~ If I had talked to that author, which I would not have done, (laughter), ~~and~~ if he had asked me, "What do you think was your most important contribution to the National Security Agency?", I would say, "Bringing the CCP on board and the new relationship with the senior officials in the Defense Department." <sup>Cy</sup> Vance was involved in this, too. I had quite a few dealings with <sup>Cy</sup> ~~Sy~~, not on my initiative. I had never tried to bypass Fubini to get to Vance, but <sup>Cy</sup> ~~Sy~~ would often call both of us in on some very important matter. And so as I look back on it, that's the place where I contributed the most to the mission of the Agency.

FARLEY

Excellent. I am very pleased with that.

BLAKE

And that is followed closely by a new team work with the Cryptologic Agencies. I am the only Director who ever served as the Chief of Cryptologic Agency, which struck me as rather odd. I would think that over the years that this would happen more often than that.

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FARLEY It would be good basic training, wouldn't it?

BLAKE Well, it has its merits.

FARLEY Sir, would you care to comment on Jack O'Gara? Did you have much dealing with O'Gara?

BLAKE Yes, we had a lot of dealings with O'Gara (laughter) and the care and feeding of O'Gara presented some of the Fubini-type problems, but never seriously enough. Jack could be helpful and sometimes we had to straighten him out, and sometimes we had to accommodate, particularly if he happened to be reflecting some directive. A flamboyant character. I always liked Jack, →

FARLEY Yes.

BLAKE → we got along.

FARLEY Yes, I knew him when he worked <sup>at a</sup> ~~out of~~ lower echelon at the Hall. Let's move to another area, Sir. During your tenure at NSA, were there any major internal ~~crisis~~ <sup>crisis</sup> that you had to resolve, and I am talking about compromises, spies, defectors, one trick with the SCA's?

BLAKE There was the ~~Dunlap~~ <sup>Dunlap</sup> affair, of course, which we

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already talked about. I don't recall any SCA <sup>crisis</sup> crisis.  
We had a relationship with people there that was very  
fruitful, Dick <sup>Kirsch,</sup> ~~Clark (spelling???)~~, of course, I knew  
well because he had worked for me when I was in the  
Security Service, and I'm trying to remember the name  
of the Army fellow, ~~now~~

TAPE II of II - SIDE 1

FARLEY Let's see, I don't remember who was the Chief of the  
Army Security Service then.

BLAKE He was a short, kind of chubby fellow, bald-headed. <sup>W</sup>

FARLEY Wasn't <sup>Rolya?</sup> ~~Rouli-a?~~ (spelling???)

BLAKE No, but I think the head of the <sup>Army</sup> and Navy Cryptologic  
Services, knowing <sup>I had</sup> ~~I~~ had their job, gave me a leg up in  
teamwork with them. We didn't have any problems with  
them.

FARLEY <sup>All right,</sup> Alright, Sir. ~~Let me move on to another. A while <sup>The</sup> ago~~  
Navy's effort to push the TRS concept, <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ that  
something that you had to decide on <sup>or</sup> ~~or~~ act on?

BLAKE I don't even remember what TRS stands for.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

*Seaborne*

FARLEY That's the ~~SEABORNE~~ Collection Operation, the Technical Research Ships.

BLAKE Oh, the Technical Research Ship<sup>s</sup>, yes, SIGINT ships.

FARLEY You know, the PUEBLO and ~~the~~ *others*

BLAKE My recollection of that is that that was a very, very potentially useful exercise and we tried to give strong support to it. I don't recall any feuds over this.

FARLEY OK

BLAKE We may have ~~wacked~~ *wacked* them back from a dollar point of view simply because that often had to be done, but I don't recall any crises where the Navy got up in arms and said NSA is stabbing us in the back.

FARLEY Yeah, and I think you certainly favored also the Air Force Airborne Collection Operation.

BLAKE Yes, these were new and there were some inklings that someday they might have some satellites, too, and I am happy to see that come about later on.

FARLEY Sir, how strong was the influence on NSA by other Intelligence Community Agencies, the CIA, and State, and DOD, and FBI?

BLAKE Well, this mostly took place, as I recall, in USIB in

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- terms of what they wanted us to do and they were valued customers. We would often be in conversations, particularly the Navy fellow, I don't remember his name either, I heard him on TV the other day. ~~NA~~ Roger Hillsman.

~~FARLEY~~

~~OR, yes~~

~~BLAKE~~

and Roger was a very likeable fellow and very intelligence-minded and he and I would on the ~~phone~~ occasionally, but I don't recall any knock down, drag outs where they said you are not doing what we want you to do, or please do this, we need it. Our whole attitude was these guys were customers, <sup>We</sup> we are not doing this just for our own pleasure.

~~FARLEY~~

~~Right~~

~~BLAKE~~

and if we think it is useful in this direction, our first response ought to be, "Yeah, let's try that."

FARLEY

Good. Sir, there was one point where CIA was doing a

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lot of [REDACTED] and they wanted to publish their own product with their own serial, and this was a controversial area, ~~do~~ you remember that, Sir?

BLAKE

Yes, I remember that, and it seemed to me, as I recall,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- I left that one to Lou for some reason or another to sort it out.

FARLEY

*Well right,*  
~~Alright,~~ fine, fine.

BLAKE

He and Dick Helms were thick as thieves and I recall enough about that sort of thing that my tendency was to say, "Lou, see if you can put that one in place,"

FARLEY

Good enough.

BLAKE

You probably will want to interview him.

FARLEY

You know, I have been trying to for two years and he won't talk.

BLAKE

He won't?

FARLEY

But I will tell him I interviewed General Blake.

BLAKE

If I get up for the Travis Commission and see Lou, I'll have to chide him on that.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

I think any history of NSA that doesn't have a lot of Lou Tordella input is grossly inadequate.

FARLEY

Absolutely. Sir, do you have any comments on the controversial subject that has been plaguing NSA and its predecessor Agency for years, that the Agency is a producer of raw material rather than finished

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intelligence, and we got this from DIA later?

BLAKE

No, no, that I treated when I became involved in it from time to time as an interesting, intellectually philosophical argument. Obviously, if we are reading their mail to the extent that you get a message that is absolutely incontrovertible and you hand that to somebody that needs that information, you handed him finished intelligence. If he prefers to call it "raw" and put his own stamp, I believe, on it, that's his privilege, that's his job really. If he starts, and of course he does with great glee and gusto, if they ever started which I never recall a case, by saying, "Well, we're not too sure that these guys know what they are talking about," because we were usually the first. This one thing that I always admired and certainly supported, that to the extent that it is raw and requires some analysis, and has got some holes in it, and I recall a famous message having to do with the Tonkin Gulf and the single word, I don't know what that word was now, but I recall being briefed on this particular subject, <sup>what</sup> ~~what~~ was that word, was it "key"

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and it cast some shadow on the Tonkin Gulf message that I guess still exists.

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

But I never fought about that. I dismissed it. ~~and~~ *and* it depends, it may be raw as can be, and it may be finished, or maybe somewhere in between, and I expect the customer to receive what we give them with whatever analysis we may tack on tending to validate or say, "Wait a minute, now don't put \$100 on this one, the odds are a bit long," and as long as we were honest, I never worried about that, because we produced a lot of finished intelligence.

FARLEY

I know, call it what you will. Sir, you may have answered this, how deeply were you personally involved in the Bross Committee, '63, '64, in their discussions and decisions and actions?

BLAKE

Well, I remember the Committee and I don't really remember how much I met with them. Don't even remember how it turned out.

FARLEY

OK, well I can check that, and you talked about the CCP already. Relationship with other producers, were you

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pleased with the agreements between the Agency and the Second (the British), Second Party Organizations, and was the division of effort mutually beneficial?

BLAKE

Well, I don't recall any great discussions over the fine print of the contract, and I probably didn't pay a hell of a lot of attention to the exact terms of the contract. I regarded it as an arrangement that was already made, <sup>that had</sup> ~~and had~~ the potential for useful contributions, probably given the resources and the capability for the ones involved, and I am talking about GCHQ and the Canadian and the Australian outfits and NSA in terms of who got what, <sup>it was probably</sup> ~~it was probably~~ pretty one-sided. But historically, it, of course, had its great benefits in War World II. Maybe we continued to live on that. I recall, and I visited all of these activities at one time or another, GCHQ more than any other, I visited Australia only once, <sup>my</sup> ~~and my~~ net recollection is that to confirm my one-sided feeling about the matter, primarily because what I saw was pretty old fashioned. But I was never motivated to say, "Well, let's throw this in the ash can, or let's

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change the rules." I simply continued by personal relationship with the Directors of those activities to try to promote a useful arrangement.

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE

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NSA25X6

NSA25X9

*MACIA ARMADY*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

...but he didn't give him the keys to the back room. I don't think he ever realized that.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

I am sure he went away, "Boy, NSA really gave me the ranch in ~~the~~ Kansas." On a visit [REDACTED] I made a point to put myself at his disposal. I said, "I would like to visit your field stations," and <sup>primitive</sup> primitive is the only word to describe them. <sup>Probably</sup> ~~and so probably~~ what we got there didn't have much to do with better SIGINT, but hopefully it had the potential of having something to do with keeping our own more sophisticated operations.

NSA25X1

~~FARLEY~~

~~Yes~~ ✓

~~BLAKE~~

~~to~~ to the extent that that didn't happen. I guess I'd have to say I didn't accomplish anything.

FARLEY

Uh-hum.

BLAKE

But that was my purpose with respect to how much SIGINT we got. I don't suppose under those circumstances I was too excited about it. I recall one little incident with great pleasure because it was kind of unique.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**NSA25X3** When you go to a [REDACTED] military establishment and you are a distinguished visitor that they turn the Honor Guard out for, their rule is that you command that Honor Guard. You are not just there along side the Commander, but you actually command it. Now for a foreign visitor with a language problem, and so on and so forth, technically they do that, but they give the commands.

FARLEY

I see.

BLAKE

Well, I found out about this, and I don't remember the name of this chap, tall dark-haired fellow, [REDACTED]

**NSA25X1**

FARLEY

BLAKE

[REDACTED] "No, you give only three or four commands." So I learned those. Another interesting thing about the way this ceremony takes place is the troops respond, and when you say to them, "Welcome soldiers," [REDACTED] I have forgotten the commands that I learned, but I told

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NSA25X1



Boy, he was fascinated. And the troops were fascinated. Here was this American three-star General...

FARLEY

Good.



BLAKE

NSA25X1

FARLEY

Which means?

BLAKE

That's the "Welcome, soldiers."

FARLEY

Oh, I see, I see.

NSA25X1



BLAKE

That's when they come back with

FARLEY

What does that give them, the port arms, or the present arms, *or...?*

BLAKE

No, that's later. *to*

FARLEY

Oh, I see.

BLAKE

*when* you first *meet* ~~see~~ them, you say kind of "Welcome," *you* you come to the salute position, which I think was present arms, but I don't recollect that, then you come back to normal position, and you walk by just as you do in the U.S. Honor Guard. So the commands I had to learn, I think, were about four of them, very simple.

NSA25X1  
NSA25X6

FARLEY



BLAKE

I don't


remember his name either. <sup>He</sup> ~~He~~ kept in touch with me,  
kept sending me Christmas cards long after I retired.  
Very nice young fellow.

FARLEY

A military man?

BLAKE

Yes, yes, he was...



FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE

NSA25X1  
NSA25X6

FARLEY

Good. A general question, Sir. <sup>During</sup> ~~As to~~ ~~during~~ your  
tenure <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ the Third Party relationship across the  
board worth the investment at the risk of a possible  
loss of intelligence as a result of a compromise?

~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE Well, I don't think we gave them enough so that there was a tremendous risk in compromise. I don't recall this was a heavy investment, maybe my memory is faulty on that score. All I can say is that I was not motivated to make any dramatic changes either up or down.

FARLEY Good, that's fine. I think that covers the Second and Third Party without any problem. And you have already answered part of this, but just let me ask again. What projects and programs <sup>MM</sup> how are we doing for time, a half hour. <sup>7. Can</sup> ~~can~~ we make it for a half hour?

BLAKE Oh, yeah, sure.

FARLEY Good. What projects and programs developed or completed during your tour are you most proud? You mentioned the CCP and the development of the association with the SCA's and the improvement in that area, but is there one or two projects or programs that might stand out?

BLAKE Well, one thing that's hard to remember the specifics, but I recall a lot of attention, a lot of money went to the increasing sophistication of the computer

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capability in the basement.

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

Part of this, of course, was buying new hardware and a significant part of it went into <sup>research, I</sup> remember some research, <sup>I think</sup> with IBM. <sup>Multi-million</sup> ~~multi-million~~ <sup>MM</sup> dollar projects which hopefully would lead to greater sophistication.

Essentially, you are, <sup>just</sup> trying to handle more data in less time and, of course, we were on the threshold of very significant changes which had taken place. (Laughter)

I always use as a simple example, I quit carrying a watch. I carry this now.

FARLEY

A computer, I'll be <sup>damned</sup> ~~damn~~ A little vest pocket <sup>is sufficient</sup>

BLAKE

To go back when I was Director and put this in a box of some kind, I don't know how big it would be, and I can remember some philosophical discussions about whether the basement would be big enough, the <sup>pious</sup> hope that this would take care of the basement, <sup>but</sup> ~~but~~ if there is a single broad area that we put a lot of emphasis on, I would have to say that that's probably the one I remember the best.

FARLEY

Excellent. And you sort of <sup>alluded</sup> ~~eluded~~ to this question.

What  
~~what~~ percentage of the Agency's operation were being accomplished by outside contractors, Agencies, corporations <sup>while</sup> when you were Director? Was that the beginning, primarily the beginning, of the contractual agreements?

BLAKE

Frankly, I don't recall great emphasis on this other than this computer hardware. I had, of course, over in

FOIA (b)3

 COMSEC shop there were contracts there and we were contracting essentially for communications hardware. <sup>Teletypes</sup> ~~But, you know teletypes~~ and all that kind of stuff, that we were expanding that. The amount of information collected and handled, I am sure increased dramatically during the time I was there, not so much through any decisions I made, it was just the natural trend of what was happening. The Air Force was putting in all of these Wollenweber stations. That whole process started, I didn't mention this, the Security Service, I think it is very important historically. <sup>When</sup> ~~when~~ I came to the Security Service, if I may digress a minute, there were no real R&D programs and no construction programs for the ~~collection~~ stations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Essentially it was a little family that didn't really participate in these broad Air Force programs. I had just come from the Pentagon defending these for everybody else and then as Chairman of the Budget Committee which ex officio went with the Deputy DCS OPS hat, so I was very, very sensitive to the Air Force budget process. Here was my new command that had none of this and so I marked on two major programs; one was to build the SIGINT stations overseas so they were decent places to be and operationally efficient, and to launch an R&D program which the Wollenweber was one of the FR-9, I think they called it, was one of the major items financially. But programs like that and the Navy SIGINT ships, for example, the whole airborne thing, all of this was piling more stuff into the building and handling it computer-wise and transmission-wise. I like to think that some of the neat ways that it is being done now, because you have dramatically altered the response time, I guess.

~~FARLEY~~

~~Yes~~

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~BLAKE~~

is the way to look at it, and those tended to be pious hopes or fond dreams that we were trying to move toward. I don't remember how much we succeeded moving in that direction. I like to think so. We certainly recognized the need for that kind of change.

FARLEY


I am talking about contracts also for linguistic support, something like <sup>Cloister.</sup> ~~CLOISTER~~. I don't know if you recall <sup>Cloister</sup> ~~CLOISTER~~ or not.

BLAKE

I remember that name, but I can't remember its <sup>unclassified</sup> classified significance.

FARLEY

FOIA (b)3



BLAKE

I remember that, but I don't remember the size of this or the extent of it.

FARLEY

Insignificant, I would guess less than 20 people, I have no idea. And also contracts for management surveys and studies.

BLAKE

I probably did very little of that because I don't have too much faith in that instinctively. I probably did very little of that. I don't recall any, but that

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

doesn't say that you couldn't find one if you went through the books.

FARLEY

Of course not. But the question, too, right now the trend is to contract just about everything out, and I have a question, <sup>Would</sup> ~~would~~ you think that this technique would weaken the effectiveness of the Agency Analysts, Engineers, Linguists, Researchers by taking away some of their basic responsibilities?

BLAKE

Oh, absolutely. I have never been a very strong believer in this sort of thing. I find that unless you structure that study effort very carefully that you ~~spent~~ <sup>spend</sup> most of your time educating the study team, using the people that could do it themselves better <sup>you</sup>

~~FARLEY~~

~~Beautifully~~

BLAKE

<sup>to</sup> and I'm very chary about this technique. I think it needs very tight control and a very realistic approach to it. If we are going down that road, all I can say is I hope it works.

FARLEY

It's interesting that you say that because I remember some management group came out and interviewed all the Analysts, put the notes down and bound the book and

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

sold it back for \$50,000.

BLAKE

I think you are wasting the taxpayer's money.

FARLEY

That's the tragedy. I think you have already answered this one. I'll ask it just to make sure. Comments on the ~~value~~ value of the Collection activities by the TRS and the Airborne Collectors, was it worth the money for the material that they provided?

BLAKE

Well, I think it was worth the money because it is a technique you have to use because it is unique in terms of what it can reach. When you ask, "Is it worth it?" I draw an analogy with <sup>health</sup> ~~health~~ care here. If you say, "Is this heart operation worth the expense?" <sup>The</sup> ~~and the~~ answer is, "You <sup>can't</sup> ~~can~~ put a price on life." ~~AM~~

FARLEY

Good

BLAKE

<sup>Now</sup> I think it is very difficult to put a price on a unique SIGINT source. It may be valuable enough in the right kind of a crisis that you don't give a damn what it costs, and yet you may look at it historically and you haven't contributed hardly anything. But because of the nature of the input, you have to do it. What ~~it~~ <sup>does</sup> does this whole satellite thing cost now? But it's a unique

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~~TOP SECRET~~

look right into the heartland. [REDACTED]

NSA25X1 [REDACTED]

FARLEY

Yes.

BLAKE

You can't do that any other way.

FARLEY

Right.

BLAKE

What does that mean? Maybe nothing. Maybe it is worth the <sup>reach in</sup> ~~rights~~ of Kansas. So you can't answer that question really. *JM*

~~FARLEY~~

~~Fine, fine...~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~...except philosophically.~~

FOIA (b)3

FARLEY

Of course, of course. Sir, you mentioned [REDACTED] sometime ago and the Communications Security Organization. Did you have any problems with that organization, that is, in so far as maintaining control or keeping it under the Agency umbrella? **FOIA (b)3**

BLAKE

I don't think so. I always considered [REDACTED] a loyal subordinate <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ was effective in a very difficult area. I found some of the same frustrations that I spoke of as Director of Communications when I had to tell Congress, "Sorry, that box isn't ready yet, but it

will be next year, they tell me."

FARLEY

Right.

FOIA (b)3

BLAKE

And so I suppose I would needle about those experiences and say, "I see you haven't succeeded in inventing that thing yet."

FARLEY

Good.

BLAKE

But I do think that some of these cryptographic black boxes began to come of age again, perhaps because the time was ripe in terms of development and in terms of electronics. My service there and the period following it, and some period before, were at the beginnings of a real electronic revolution, I think.

~~FARLEY~~  
~~BLAKE~~

~~Oh-ahh.~~

to the extent some of that came to fruition during my watch, I don't know that I claim too much credit for it. <sup>It's just that its</sup> ~~its~~ time was there.

FARLEY

OK. Many of the people who work in COMSEC or the S Organization have the attitude that they should be a separate organization, not responsible to DIRNSA at all. In fact, I've been chastised myself for referring to them as S Group, rather than the S Organization. Do

you have any thoughts on that?

BLAKE

Well, I recall vaguely some of that, but it never became ~~an aberration~~ <sup>a burning issue</sup> when I was Director, and I guess you could organize it that way, if you wanted to do so. There is an interrelationship, the opposite sides of a coin, and I always thought that was a sensible way to organize it. When you start reorganizing on that basis, sometimes the presumed advantages to the very people who were plugging it, turn out to be a bit nebulous when you ~~find out~~ <sup>learn</sup>, "Well now I've got to move," and so on and so forth, I don't recall that as a big flap on my watch.

FARLEY

~~Will right,~~ <sup>Will right,</sup> fine. Sir, I have just a few more questions here, I am sort of picking and choosing. ~~for~~

BLAKE

Sure

FARLEY


Would you care to comment on whether there was any SIGINT post facto related to the ~~assassination~~ <sup>assassination</sup> of President Kennedy?

BLAKE

No, I don't remember anything in that vein at all. I remember being at my desk when word of Kennedy's ~~assassination~~ <sup>assassination</sup> came in, but that's all.

*Well right.*  
 FARLEY ~~Alright,~~ that's fine. Another question right out of the blue, what was your attitude toward the practice of establishing ~~COMPARTMENTS~~ <sup>the compartments</sup> in the Agency? Did they serve a purpose? Do you think it was overdone?

BLAKE It could have been overdone. I didn't have any strong feeling on that. I thought they were ~~an unnecessary~~ <sup>a necessary</sup> security measure, ~~tending~~ <sup>to</sup> to restrict the knowledge of sometimes an activity that would have been hard to restrict without that technique. Given the traumatic approach to security in an Agency like NSA, probably ~~COMPARTMENTS~~ <sup>the compartments</sup> tend to get overdone, but that's just an observation.

*Well right.*  
 FARLEY ~~Alright,~~ Sir. Should certain material, now this is collected 

NSA25X1

do you think it should be made available to anybody with a ~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~ <sup>Top Secret Codeword</sup> clearance, or should there be another ~~COMPARTMENT~~ <sup>the compartment for</sup> ~~that~~ these people? <sup>?</sup>

BLAKE I don't have any thoughts on that except generally. Your clearance is just one step and I always thought that the second step, ~~NEED TO KNOW~~ <sup>the "Need to Know,"</sup> should be carefully applied, that that's the real control over how many

~~TOP SECRET~~

people are involved and exactly who they are.

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

**NSA25X1**

BLAKE

FARLEY

BLAKE

FARLEY

Beautiful. Thank you, Sir. Again, just bits and pieces here, in the spring of 1964, Public Law 88-290 was enacted provided for a full background investigation, provided for a three-member Appraisal Board to evaluate suspected security risks and the employment of any employee or officer to be terminated if in the national risk. What was the immediate impact

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~~TOP SECRET~~

of the law, as you remember?

BLAKE

I don't even remember that law.

FARLEY

Didn't you?

BLAKE

When was it passed?

FARLEY

This was in the spring of 1964, probably May '64, and the question was, do you recall whether any employees were discharged?

BLAKE

Don't recall the law, don't recall any application of it. (Laughter)

FARLEY

Fine. Also, in March '64, the DOD Resident Audit Group was established and moved into the Agency. Any changes that were brought about as a result of this within the Agency?

BLAKE

I don't remember that either.

FARLEY

*Well right. Well right,*  
~~Alright. Alright,~~ maybe this one -- the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred in August '64. What actions did you take? Did you establish a Task Group, a SIGINT alert, any adjustment of tasking? You talked about the message, the question on one word. *ff*

BLAKE

The only thing I recall there was when SIGINT became so crucially important to whether the Tonkin Gulf incident

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

was exactly as it was portrayed. That was one of the few cases that I remember being briefed on very specific detail of that particular input, and I suppose the reason for that was that sometimes the Director had to be in a position to say, "Yes, I know all about that, I have gone into every last detail of it, and I believe what we say." That was probably the reason that I wanted to be on top of that particular one, but ~~I recall~~ I wish I could remember that word. It had different meanings. ~~It~~

FARLEY

Oh, I see.

BLAKE

depending on exactly how the thing was used.

FARLEY

I should dig it out of the Archives and send you a copy, if I can. (Laughter) No?

BLAKE

Don't worry about it.

FARLEY

~~All right.~~  
Alright. In April '65, I guess you were still there in April '65? Yes. ~~It~~

BLAKE

Yes, but I retired at the end of May '65, so it was near the end of my watch.

FARLEY

OK, in April '65, we had the Dominican Crisis, and the question <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~, "Did the Agency look good? Did we

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

contribute? Did we produce, or <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ we ill-prepared for this type of crisis?"

BLAKE

I don't really know. It will be interesting to see what history says about that. It's the kind of a crisis, looking back on the things we were paying attention to, that I would tend to suspect that maybe [redacted] in retrospect.

FOIA (b)3

[redacted] As I read the papers, that's the impression I got from [redacted]

FARLEY

Yes, we were in bad shape.

BLAKE

<sup>That</sup> ~~...that~~ we weren't tasking the right things at that particular point, in retrospect.

FARLEY

Of course. Sir, the discussions concerning the need for a National Cryptologic School, it was established in May '65 and has been in existence every since. Who did you select as the first Commandant, and did you have any reasons for choosing that individual?

Remember, <sup>?</sup> was it <sup>Rowlett?</sup> Roulette? Was it Rowlett?

BLAKE

It was <sup>Rowlett?</sup> ~~Roulette~~, or Walter...what the hell was his last name. <sup>?</sup>

FARLEY

Jacobs? Walt Jacobs? No?

BLAKE I'm trying to remember now. Was it <sup>Roulette?</sup> Roulette? I'd be surprised if I put <sup>Roulette</sup> Roulette in there. Maybe I did. Was he the first Commandant? [REDACTED] (Laughter) **FOIA (b)6**

FARLEY OK, so the reason ~~was~~ -- .

BLAKE I remember a lot of discussions about this school and generally feeling that it had useful potential <sup>but</sup> ~~my~~ that you have to wait and see if the potential is realized. A lot depends upon the caliber of the instructions and who goes to it, and so on and so forth, and I would be interested in, has it turned out to be a useful thing?

FARLEY Very much so, very much so.

BLAKE Well, I am happy that it got started on my watch then.

FARLEY How much pressure...

BLAKE That isn't the person I have in my <sup>mind's</sup> ~~mind~~ eye. A scholarly fellow, wore glasses, medium height, <sup>gray</sup> ~~gray~~ <sup>graying</sup> hair, not overly bald, [REDACTED] **FOIA (b)3** Wonder why we put <sup>Roulette</sup> ~~Roulette~~ in ~~it~~ so near the end of my tour, I might have said, "Lou, you pick." That's possible.

FARLEY OK

BLAKE You have to live with who it is.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY Right. Did you have pressure from outside the Agency, from other Agencies, for the establishment of a Cryptologic School? <sup>Because</sup> ~~because~~ a lot of individuals from these Agencies are coming out to the school for orientation-type courses.

BLAKE No, I recall it mostly as an in-house proposition. I suppose that we saw students from other walks of life as a useful broadening of the base of understanding. That's probably part of ~~it~~ <sup>it. I</sup> think it was viewed primarily as a family institution.

FARLEY Right. <sup>All right,</sup> ~~Alright,~~ good. It has proved very valuable. You were involved in the Cuban Crisis, ~~██████████~~ ~~██████████~~ the Gulf of Tonkin. <sup>It</sup> ~~at~~ that time did you feel that there should be a centralized area to control the operations of the Agency, and I am talking about a Watch Office, a Command Center?

BLAKE I remember we did some planning ~~and~~ about internal arrangements, primarily not so much changing the organizational makeup, but just better facilities, a better place to do it, faster communications, faster analysis <sup>and</sup> and better response.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FARLEY

Good

BLAKE

a better response.

FARLEY

Alright

BLAKE

Those were the things that I recall we tended to work toward rather than any sweeping change, <sup>file</sup> ~~file~~ already had ~~not know~~ people who were charged with reporting ~~and so forth~~ <sup>and so forth</sup>, and I think some of that has come about, as I recall, in some of my visits up there ~~ing~~

FARLEY

Yes

BLAKE

in the past 15 years or so.

FARLEY

Right. The Command Center was established during your tenure.


BLAKE

We tended to be a little fragmented and mostly the place to do this and the facilities to cut corners and talk to each other, and get to the customer rapidly. The ~~time~~ <sup>It was their</sup> response time, ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> bothered me the most.

FARLEY

Right. Were you responsible for establishing the

NSA25X3



~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE I remember that, but my memory doesn't tell me whether it came about while I was there or later on. Do you the date of its... establishment?

FARLEY I don't have the date, Sir. I really don't, ~~but it was~~ either.

BLAKE My recollection is that it happened a bit after I left.

~~FARLEY~~

~~BLAKE~~

~~Subject to~~  
7 <sup>3</sup> was the subject of considerable discussion. This was a whole new area, ~~of course and~~

FARLEY Right

BLAKE ~~My~~ I would be interested in knowing if that came on my watch or later.

FARLEY I'll find out.

BLAKE If I were to bet, I would say a little later.

FARLEY

~~Well, right.~~  
~~Alright~~ Did you support the establishment of such units as the <sup>NOGs,</sup> ~~NSAGOs,~~ NSA Operational Groups, which would side-saddle with the G-2's [REDACTED]

NSA25X1

[REDACTED] and interpret or support or provide SIGINT information, ~~do~~.

BLAKE Well, I did support the idea that we ought to be close to the customer in the field. That's one way to do it.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

I don't particularly remember ~~you know~~ units that were actually created during my time there. It's possible that some were. Certainly it is the kind of a thing that improved our ability to deliver

~~FARLEY~~

Right

BLAKE

and understanding of what we have delivered.

FARLEY

Right. Sir, you have ~~had~~ <sup>achieved</sup> ~~these~~ these achievements, contributions, did you ever attempt to implement any changes but could not do so for any reason? I am wondering about ~~it~~ <sup>anything</sup>.

BLAKE

I don't remember any, but I'm sure there are some. I tend to forget my failures. (Laughter)

FARLEY

Don't we all? Don't we all? How would you compare your tour as DIRNSA to other ~~Command~~ <sup>Command</sup> or management positions you held during your career?

BLAKE

Well, it's the only joint Defense activity that I ever established so it had some different facets than other commands I had. A fascinating operation in terms of what its working with and trying to do. In a way, it sort of capped a lot of command experience. I notice now these young fellows, thinking of my two sons, for

~~TOP SECRET~~

example, and others, command opportunities seem to be a lot harder to come by now. I spent 34 years on active duty, 17 of it roughly in command positions; <sup>is command</sup> ~~commanding~~ everything from a Detachment to a National Agency, you know, Squadron, Group, Wing, Division, two major Air Commands, and so <sup>Agency</sup> the top of that heap is <sup>the</sup> National Agency.

FARLEY

Right

BLAKE

A very satisfying career because leadership is the bottom line really.

FARLEY

Absolutely. Sir, is there anything else? I have run to the bottom of the list of my questions. Are there any other comments you have, or anything else you would like to put on the record? Any guidance to the youngsters coming along? (Laughter) Let me ask this -- what <sup>is</sup> ~~about~~ your attitude <sup>like</sup> excuse me, I don't mean to talk over you <sup>^</sup> that, the transcriber will ~~drive~~ go <sup>^</sup> wild, "what <sup>What</sup> did you say, what did you say"; ~~your~~ your attitude toward the future of the intelligence community? Are we in good shape, bad shape? Do you have confidence in them?

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

BLAKE

Well, I have a great deal of confidence in them, and I particularly have a great deal of confidence in the people at NSA which I have always had, and everytime I go back there, usually for the Travis Trophy, which I have a sentimental interest in, <sup>and</sup> ~~add~~ as an excuse to get some space available orders, but I'm usually tagging along with the Commander of the Electronic Security Command, and so I find myself with maybe the afternoon of Travis ceremony, and they very kindly ask if I would like to ~~you know~~ kind of look around a little, and naturally I take that up, <sup>so</sup> ~~so~~ I find myself in the bowels of the place for a few hours just being kind of caught up in what that particular segment is doing. It is always fascinating and it reinvigorates my enthusiasm for the people there, because I have a chance to see their own enthusiasm, their own tech confidence, and to some extent the end result. I think as long as you have that and given the nature of SIGINT as a potential contributor to the intelligence problem overall, I think that is very comforting and I would expect, unless some very revolutionary change takes

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- place, which is hard to see, that it will continue to be the bedrock of national intelligence.

*FARLEY*

Good.

TAPE II of II - SIDE 2

BLAKE

*You can use*

.A.all that beautiful speech or rub it out.

FARLEY

Yes, I do. No, no, it was beautiful. That was excellent.

BLAKE

*I think that was very good.*

*FARLEY*

*That was excellent.*

CANNOT TRANSCRIBE THIS SECTION BECAUSE BOTH TALKING AT THE SAME TIME.

BLAKE

*Things that*

\*come from the heart tend to be better, I think.

FARLEY

That was outstanding and I do appreciate that. You mentioned the rash of ~~exposed~~ <sup>is known</sup> "Puzzle Palace," being the most recent. Do you think that these people should be permitted to continue to do this type of revelation?

BLAKE

Well, the answer to that is a resounding NO, but more

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

significant is how do you go about it, <sup>Wiz</sup> and we don't have what England has, for example, or the United Kingdom, the Official Secrets Act, and so the mechanism for doing something about disclosures, you're confronted with the rights of free speech and all that sort of thing, and the rights of people to know against the necessity to control your sources. And this conflict is not going to go away. It's <sup>built in to</sup> ~~building~~ our society and, of course, the nature of those protections of liberty we all support and don't want that taken away. So it's a very difficult problem and it happens too often and it happens by people that should be willing to do better, <sup>So</sup> ~~and~~ you have to ask yourself, is it deliberate on their part, or is it ignorance, <sup>?</sup> and <sup>To</sup> ~~to~~ the extent that the media, both electronic and written, are in this sometimes, I will only say there are occasions when I would like to see a greater sense of responsibility by the media and to the extent they need to overcome some ignorance that maybe that's a source of hope for some correction of this, <sup>But</sup> ~~but~~ everytime I see it, all I can do is say that shouldn't

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

have happened.

FARLEY Absolutely. Our big problem, Sir, is the Freedom of Information Act. Being in the History and the Archives, it's amazing the information that the people on the outside are asking for and it's also more amazing that we have to give it to them in general.

BLAKE *I think you're right.*  
~~I think it may be~~ perhaps it's being much more loosely intended than it really should be.

FARLEY Sir, do you have any other comments that we should record forever?

BLAKE I think not.

FARLEY *OK right.*  
~~Alright.~~ First of all, I do appreciate your time, and we came pretty close to the allocated time.

BLAKE *OK right.*  
Oh, that's ~~alright~~. I just want to use the next hour to run two or three errands...

FARLEY Of course, of course. I understand.

BLAKE ~~...and then~~ *Then* grab a quick lunch and check on Mrs. Blake who I haven't seen since last night.

FARLEY Well, I hope she is doing better.


BLAKE Well, we were very happy with the results. *14*

FARLEY That's great.

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~~TOP SECRET~~



BLAKE  
FOIA (b)6

FARLEY  
BLAKE

FARLEY That's right. Sir, this has been a very, very pleasant experience. *AW*

BLAKE I enjoyed rehashing old times.

FARLEY This is wonderful. It has been a delightful interview and I want to thank you. *AW*

BLAKE Let me give you back your microphone.

FARLEY *OK, right.*  
~~Alright~~, before you take it off, let me ask you how we shall classify it. I think **TOP SECRET...**

BLAKE I think you will have to make that decision. I'm not privy to the classification of some of the things that we have talked about freely, and I think when you finish transcribing it, you will have to look it over and say, "What do we put on it?"

FARLEY OK, I suggest **TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS**. Sir, I am

~~TOP SECRET~~

going to leave you a form. I don't think Generals have to get a dispensation from their oath, do they? But if you do, I have one here.

BLAKE

The Maxwell people and the Chanute people asked me to sign some kind of release, which I, of course, did.

FARLEY

I can leave that with you, Sir, it's a thank you letter and it also contains an agreement, an accessibility agreement whereby you designate who should be able to hear these tapes, who should be able to see the transcripts, and you have to designate who you would like to be permitted to hear them, but there's no urgency. You can, as I say, read those at your leisure. ~~and also~~ I would like to take your picture before I go and I'll just switch this off at the moment. Thank you again, Sir.

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~~TOP SECRET~~