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"Simply said, setting the theater provides strategic depth for sustainment across commodities and all classes of supply, and ensures that our forces can move quickly to, and then throughout, a theater to accomplish their mission without a cold start to logictics." Gen. Ed Daly

Light Medium Tactical Vehicles belonging to the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division enter the Green Ridge vessel during port operations on Oct. 18, 2019, in the Port of Gdynia, Poland. (Photo by Staff Sgt. True Thao)

armysustainment@army.mil Enabling Fort to Port Operations and Setting the Theater in Contested Environments III



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ON THE COVER

1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division vehicles are loaded onto a barge Jan. 23, 2019, in Antwerp, Belgium. Barges are one of four different delivery methods being utilized to support the Operation Atlantic Resolve. (Photo by Sgt. Benjamin Northcutt)



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trends; lessons learned; and other experiences.

Port Operations,

Setting the Theater Foundational to Strategic Readiness



By Gen. Ed Daly

Department of Defense released the classified version of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in March, and the unclassified report is expected soon. The NDS specifies three primary ways the department will advance its goals: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages. Effective port operations and setting theaters across the globe-this edition's theme-are unequivocally pivotal across all three.

We must first understand the areas of responsibility and theaters within

(CCMD) in order to effectively set them. Theaters represent extended battlespace; they will be contested, expeditionary, multi-domain, and focused on potential large-scale combat operations. Each theater poses unique challenges for sustaining and maintaining the force. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is focused on the pacing challenge of China in a maritime-dominant domain, while U.S. European Command is focused on the acute threat of Russia in a land-dominant domain. Persistent threats, including Iran, North Korea,

and violent extremist organizations, remain that we must plan and prepare to defend against, all while defending the homeland and our installations from a diverse range of threats.

While joint doctrine varies on the definition of setting the theater, Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment, describes it within the sustainment warfighting function as a continuous shaping activity conducted during a steady-state posture and contingency or crisis response operations. Setting the theater describes the broad range of actions, including port operations, conducted to establish the conditions

the geographic combatant commands in an operational area for the execution of strategic plans.

> Simply said, setting the theater provides strategic depth for sustainment across commodities and all classes of supply, and ensures that our forces can move quickly to, and then throughout, a theater to accomplish their mission without a cold start to logistics. It allows the sustainment enterprise to demonstrate speed of response and agility to support CCMD operational plans and tactical requirements.

> While the operational framework of setting the theater is rooted in the Joint Security Area (JSA), it is enabled by the Strategic Support Area (SSA). From the Army's Organic Industrial Base, where equipment and ammunition are upgraded and stored, to Mobile Force Generation Installations that preserve the Army's ability to project combat power, maintaining readiness in the SSA is a critical first step at the strategic level to set the theater.

> At the operational level, the majority of work to set the theater occurs in the JSA. Field Manual 4-0, Sustainment Operations, and Army Techniques Publication 4-94, Theater

Sustainment Command, direct that theater sustainment command (TSC) conduct mission command of theater sustainment operations and coordinate and synchronize logistics movements and sustainment operations accordingly. Through the TSC, actions to set the theater include:

- Ensuring Army prepositioned stocks are positioned, modernized, and ready for combat.
- · Providing the right commodities, from munitions to wholesale sustainment repair parts, in the right quantities and locations.
- Providing operational contracting support and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program capabilities.
- Hardening interior lines of communication and the distribution network.
- Diversifying and readying air and sea ports of debarkation to demonstrate agility.
- Enabling Foreign Military Sales to build partner capacity.

Sustainers must provide geographic combatant commanders the capabilities to demonstrate access, presence, and influence; ensure freedom of action; extend operational reach; and prolong endurance.

Setting the theater is not a onceand-done activity; it is an ongoing operation that requires logisticians to constantly assess the environment and current posture, think differently about threats, and act decisively. It also requires the right materiel investments in key capabilities in the sustainment sustain it.

A critical component of setting the theater is enabling port operations to facilitate the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces and equipment within a theater. I recently visited ports on the East and West coasts and Gulf of Mexico, and I can attest that our transporters and sustainers are making our enterprise proud. In 2021 alone, we conducted 57 brigade-equivalent deployments, moving more than 27,000 pieces of equipment to support six CCMDs through 23 U.S. and 45 overseas ports. As we further refine the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics, we must ensure our ports are secure from physical and cyber threats, and our strategic lines of communications are protected. Our ports at home and abroad provide a critical capability to project combat power to theaters across the globe.

The Army's effort to set the theater in Europe over the past few years is paying huge dividends today on the world stage in response to Russia's attack on Ukraine. In fact, Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville recently told reporters that the ease with which Army units deployed to Europe and

shore logistics vessel distribution, cargo-unmanned aerial systems, predictive logistics, and advanced manufacturing. Ssustainers have more real-time data at their fingertips than ever before. We must be proficient, anticipatory, and deliberate in leveraging data analytics to remain ahead of need and ensure we do not consume readiness faster than we can

warfighting function such as ship to immediately began operations are due to the planning, staging, and forwardthinking logistics to set the theater before the unprovoked invasion. The Army sustainment and logistics enterprise has proven critical to the U.S. whole-of-government effort to fortify our commitment to NATO and support to Ukraine.

> Our forward presence gives us a competitive advantage, both physically and through our supply chains and strategic partnerships. Effectively setting the theater ensures the right equipment is positioned in the right condition at the right location to enable operational plans in competition, crisis, and conflict. It is foundational to the Army's strategic readiness and our ability to sustain our forces, anywhere, at any time.

> Gen. Ed Daly serves as the commanding general of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. He served three years as the deputy commanding general of AMC in his previous assignment. He managed the day-to-day operations of the Army's logistics enterprise and served as the senior commander of Redstone Arsenal. Alabama. He served as the commanding general of Army Sustainment Command at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and as AMC's deputy chief of staff, overseeing the roles and functions of the headquarters staff.

Driving Readiness at Echelon Now and for the Future



By Lt. Gen. Charles R. Hamilton

assumed duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, on April 6. He most recently served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, G-4 3/5/7, where he oversaw the G-4's integration of strategic and operational logistics functions to sustain Army Forces. He has contributed several articles to the Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin throughout his career, detailing topics such as predictive expeditionary logistics, remote support, and pre-deployment training. In Hamilton's first recurring column as the DCS, G-4, he provides an initial look into how the Army Sustainment From a modernized and resilient Enterprise (ASE) will continue to Organic Industrial Base (OIB) to an

advance its key initiatives that will effectively posture the Army of 2030.

The New Strategic Environment

Recent events at home and abroad such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine—have clearly demonstrated the importance of logistics to strategic readiness that is central to the Army mission. The doctrinal transition from counterinsurgency to largescale combat operations has altered

adversarial assumptions that guided previous decision-making across ditor's Note: Lt. Gen. echelons. Faced with the complex Charles R. Hamilton and dynamic capabilities of nearpeer adversaries, the new strategic environment will test our ability to deter and compete from the homeland to varying tactical points of contact. Those adversaries will seek to undermine our logistics capabilities across multiple domains, including at home. It will be prudent and in our best interest as part of the joint force to proactively prepare for competition, crisis, and conflict. Recognizing the unique constraints of this operational context will prove foundational to our strategic readiness as we posture ourselves to meet the demands set by the National Military Strategy.

agile power projection infrastructure that ensures we can set and reset theaters in contested environments. our critical efforts to advance and sustain the Army's strategic readiness will remain enduring. However, how we drive those areas forward will adapt alongside the evolving nature of future warfare.

Strategic Readiness to Empower the Joint Force

Readiness is our core requirement as Army sustainers. Enabling readiness across the Total Army ensures the force learns from the past to accomplish today's requirements and prepare for future ones. Driving readiness across echelons is a complex, dynamic, and multi-dimensional task that begins, first and foremost, with our greatest asset—our people. The joint force will continue to rely on an agile and adaptive ASE into 2030 and beyond. Successful readiness is made possible in large part due to the Soldiers, civilians, and contractors at the ASE's core. While our high standards will remain the same, the sustainment tasks and strategic environment we operate will continue to evolve across multi-dimensional domains.

To maintain our sustainment capabilities as a distinct and unassailable strategic advantage, we must be prepared to do the following:

• Achieve and sustain a strategic readiness posture that is resilient across all domains. The Joint Strategic Support Area (JSSA) is the center of gravity for generating and sustaining combat power. The ASE is integral to setting the JSSA to enable the Army's strategic readiness. The Army's OIB modernization efforts are critical to this endeavor. Achieving and sustaining strategic readiness will allow the Army to deploy and project combat power effectively. Strategic readiness will ensure the Army's logistics overmatch to sustain operations across distributed and contested environments. This posture is enabled through a resilient command and control network that supports information and decision-making advantage. Reducing sustainment demand which unburdens our reliance on extended lines of communication across echelons, will be decisive in sustaining operations in contested environments. Critical to this demand reduction will be our role in supporting the Army's climate initiatives to simultaneously increase strategic readiness and reduce harmful environmental impacts. Revolutionize our approach to data-enabled sustainment operations. The Army will advance the ways in which we collect, store, access, analyze,

and communicate our large streams of data across echelons. Data must serve as a readiness asset. It cannot simply describe a past reality, and instead, it must be leveraged to reliably and rapidly inform immediate and future decisions from the strategic to the tactical space. Transforming our sustainment information systems, processes, and procedures will establish data as a readiness asset and form the foundation of predictive logistics (PL). To achieve PL, we will revolutionize our approach to data to deliver and execute sustainment before needed. Beyond PL, we also must commit to precise logistics that will be exact, accurate, and refined. This will tactical support areas on behalf provided to the warfighter.

Ensure our doctrine is forward-focused, agile, and reflective of the Army of 2030. Army doctrine provides the foundation for sustainment as a key warfighting function and underpins efforts critical to our readiness posture. Descriptive in nature, allowing for innovative thought and execution, doctrine provides a steady framework for collective action. While the principles of sustainment will remain in place, how we will be called to apply those principles to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and

prolong endurance will evolve. Doctrine that is responsive to those needs and is reflective of the future-ready Army will sustain strategic readiness.

Current Strategic Readiness for Future Overmatch

History has continually told the story of the sustainer being central to battlefield victory. While we take pride in executing our mission in the background, the efforts do not go unnoticed. The Army of 2030 and beyond will place unique demands on our sustainers, but we will be ready to respond.

We must remain committed to the development of our people, prepare for the future through capitalization of revolutionary data-enabled enable exhaustive and proactive sustainment, and ensure our doctrine decision-making across the is reflective of the Army of the future. strategic, operational, and I am honored and humbled to be your 47th Army G-4. People First, of and with the direct benefit Winning Matters, Army Strong!

> Lt. Gen. Charles R. Hamilton currently serves as the Deputy Chief of Staff. G-4. He most recently served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, G-4 3/5/7. Hailing from Houston, Texas, Hamilton enlisted in the U.S. Army. Upon completion of basic and individual training, he was assigned to Fort Hood. Texas. In February 1988, he graduated from Officer Candidate School as the Distinguished Military Graduate and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from Virginia State University and Masters' Degrees in Public Administration from Central Michigan University and Military Studies from Marine Corps University. He also is a graduate of a Senior Service College Fellowship – Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program.

DEPLOY TONIGHT DEPLOYMENT PROCESS ISSUES

An Examination of Fort to Port Deployment Challenges, Shortfalls



By Maj. Gen. Mark T. Simerly

s our Army adapts Deployment Discipline Program prepared to deploy and deliver combat to achieve and maintain deployment power to the combatant commander skill proficiency and meet global or joint force commander. This crisis action requirements. The requires units deploying on short CDDP is a commander's tool to notice to austere locations with all or enhance deployment readiness. a majority of its assigned equipment. Routine field training exercises,

combat operations (LSCO), and deployment readiness exercises, rapid short notice deployment and other training events offer an requirements we must rebuild our excellent opportunity to practice and operational deployment capability. enforce the deployment readiness Years of predictable deployments levels. A focused CDDP will build Regulations, AR 525-93, and Army

under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, coupled with outsourcing the deployment process to strategic enablers and contractors, have eroded expeditionary deployment skills the Army once possessed. Planners cannot rely on Arms theater-provided equipment once (CASCOM) Deployment Process available for recent deployments to Modernization Office (DPMO) Iraq and Afghanistan. Preplanned in coordination with Center of ARFORGEN deployments caused Army Lessons Learned, and the from an operation for commanders to a task for logisticians.

Army organizations are required to develop and adhere to the Command

to challenges future (CDDP) in accordance with (IAW) Army forces must be *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, combat training centers rotations, With the risk of large-scale U.S. Forces Command emergency

deployment competency, capability, and confidence.

In an effort to identify fort to port challenges and provide actionable recommendations, the Combined Support Command the deployment execution to shift deployment community of interest identified three ongoing issues common across the Army.

Fort to Port Deployment Issues

The three most significant fort to port issues and their contributing conflicts may pose, Army Regulation (AR) 525-93, factors impacting unit readiness are: adherence to deployment policy and procedures, deployment skill proficiency, and deployment discipline.

> Adherence to Deployment Policy and Procedures. Deployment standards ensure accuracy and speed of deployment to obtain strategic lift. Across the Army, units are not familiar with existing deployment policies and procedures contained within Defense Transportation

Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-35, Army Deployment and Redeployment. Consistent enforcement of CDDP standards is not uniformly practiced and trained because deployment mission essential tasks (METs) were reintroduced late 2020. We discovered two primary factors that contribute to this shortfall are:

• Standardized Roles and Responsibilities (R2). Speed of deployment depends heavily



from

Soldiers assigned to the 258th Movement Control Team, Division Sustainment Troops Battalion, 3rd Division Sustainment Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, inspect equipment during the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd ID, Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise April 25, on Hunter Army Airfield Savannah, Georgia. (Photo by Sgt. Laurissa Hodges)

on every individual and unit fulfilling their specific actions in deployment process. Across several Army installations, deployment roles and responsibilities throughout the process did not adhere to established procedures as prescribed in AR 525-93 Appendix C. Additionally, R2 adjustments need to be made to accommodate the transition an ARFORGEN

deployment model to a short notice LSCO and rapid deployment scenario. Unfamiliarity with R2 creates an unclear line of responsibility throughout the fort to port deployment operation. Some degree of modification is needed to accommodate the operational requirements of specific installations because of infrastructure and equipment limitations, labor shortfalls and

training weaknesses. We are working with the community of interest to clearly define the R2 in doctrine and ensure Installation Deployment Support Plans are updated.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC) measures at installations. Meeting regulatory and legal transportation requirements are critical to a successful deployment. Our observations frequently found that many units and installations failed to conduct a final QA/QC inspection at the installation prior to cargo movement to the port of embarkation (POE) by surface (rail, commercial truck, and convoy). Significant shortfalls discovered at the POE include bad movement data, frustrated cargo, inaccurate HAZMAT labeling and placarding, and incorrect vehicle configurations. These issues not only affect POE operations, but also violate existing state and federal transportation and HAZMAT regulations, creating potentially larger issues.

Deployment Skill Proficiency at Echelon. The lack of individual and unit deployment skill proficiency is primarily attributed to units not developing and enforcing a CDDP and ensuring individual and unit deployment METs are met. If deployment training is not a priority, allocation of strategic platforms critical deployment skills atrophy over time. The two main factors impacting readiness are:

tors' mation for Movements **Operator Proficiency.** TC-AIMS II is the Army's system of record that requires a level of operator proficiency to provide accurate unit movement data for deployments. TC-AIMS II operators do not work with the system frequently enough to navigate it correctly of rapid requirements deployments. This creates data prevent units from meeting deployment timelines.

(UMO) Proficiency. UMO's are military occupational that receive a two-week certification course assigned every battalion and to company-level organization as an additional duty IAW AR 525-93. UMO personnel were often untrained and did not practice their deployment responsibility frequently enough to display any sort of proficiency.

Poor deployment skills proficiency presents a liability to unit readiness and reduces the unit's ability to respond rapidly to a contingency. Some of the observed results are delayed equipment, incorrect (air or sea), and inaccurate data, all of which creates delays in loading

Transportation Coordina- present challenges that are not Automated Infor- easily overcome while executing a deployment and require significant System II (TCAIMS II) time and expense to mitigate. These delays will likely negatively affect the combatant commander's ability to build combat power.

Deployment Discipline at Echelon. Commanders do not treat deployments as an operation. Deployment discipline is created through routine and programed and respond to the dynamic training. Operational planning of deployment is critical to ensure synchronization of equipment to inconsistencies that could build combat power at destination. Over the past several years, our Army has executed deployments Unit Movement Officer mainly as an administrative move. To properly respond to LSCO requirements and meet critical specialty immaterial personnel response timelines, deployment must be treated as an operation and mission commanded like all other military operations.

> Effective Mission Command. LSCO deployments are extremely fast paced, requiring constant monitoring and updating. Failure to establish mission command oversight, activate an operations center, publish deployment orders, and publish or update an N-Hour Sequence impact the effectiveness of the deployment mission.

Deployment Planning. Effective deployment planning is critical to the success of any operation. Commanders at all echelons should treat all deployments as operations driven by the operations officer. This conveyances. LSCO deployments will ensure the proper allocation of combat power at destination.

Fort to Port Deployment Issue Mitigation Initiatives

CASCOM is responsible for integrating efforts across doctrine, training, and system improvements to mitigate ongoing issues, provide operational Army.

Doctrine. DPMO's Deployment Standards Branch made great Transportation School is also strides in late 2021 and into 2022 revising deployment regulations increase training capacity for UMO and doctrine. The major revision personnel. They are expanding for AR 525-93 is currently at the the Unit Movement Officer Armv for final review and publication, from 600 students to about 3,100 tentatively late-Summer 2022, students annually. In addition along with a first-ever Department to One Army School System of the Army Pamphlet 525-93, supported sites, they are positioning Army Deployment and Redeployment instructors to teach the accredited *Processes and Procedures.* The course at five satellite locations and regulation and the pamphlet update mobile training team coverage for synchronize authorities, roles, and Hawaii and Korea. This approach responsibilities across all Army will provide accredited instructors units and organizations deploying teaching a consistent course to or providing support to deployment. the locations with the greatest ATP 3-35.1, Army Prepositioned demand. These training initiatives Operations, published in April 2022, updates APS alignment globally individuals in key positions. In order and includes updated accountability, to build proficiency, commanders visibility, and employment processes must seek out opportunities for and systems. ATP 4-16, Army their personnel to practice, gain Movement Control, also published in experience, and become proficient April 2022, realigns the movement in their deployment skills. controls functions and tasks to support the 3-0 and 4-0 series of publications, updates movement improvements with TC-AIMS control units and responsibilities, II have made the program more and movement control at echelon as a enhancements include property

resources and the sequencing of maneuver commander. Also open reset security enhancements, an Army Deployment and Redeployment, and ATP 4-13, Army Expeditionary Intermodal Operations. ATP 3-35 and ATP 4-13 are being revised to fully align with the changes in AR 525-93 and the 3-0 and 4-0 series of publications and will be vital recommendations and support the resources supporting the Army's ability to project force globally.

Training. The U.S. Army working on several initiatives to Publishing Directorate Deployment Planning Course load will help ensure units have trained

Systems Improvement. Recent better presents Army versatile and user friendly. These critical battlefield enabler for the book synchronization, password

for major revision are ATP 3-35, improved graphical user interface, the ability to merge plans, a theater operations' cost management module, and a data validator. To help reduce operator error, DPMO Systems Branch, along with the program manager, is developing a future release to create an interface with the Weigh in Motion System, which will import actual equipment dimensions into TCAIMS II.

Conclusion

Solutions to the Army's deployment challenges require more than just our mitigation initiatives. Commanders must reclaim ownership of the deployment process by placing equal emphasis on deployment planning and execution as they do on any other operation. All skills require practice and repetition before one can build proficiency, and commands must develop their CDDP and identify opportunities and capitalize on them to build individual skills. As command emphasis is more consistently applied and standards adhered to, many of these challenges can be solved.

Maj. Gen. Mark T. Simerly serves as the commanding general of the Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee, Virginia. He previously served as the commander of the 19th Expeditionary Support Command. He was commissioned as a lieutenant of Air Defense Artillery and awarded a Bachelor of Arts Degree as a Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Richmond. He holds a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy from the National Defense University and a Master of Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the Army Command and General Staff College.

EVO EVIN EVOLV IN TO A CONDITION OF THE SECTION OF THE SECTI **RESOLUTE TASKS** The Future of Deployment Readiness

An Interview With Maj. Gen. Heidi Hoyle and Mike Hutchison By Lt. Col. Altwan Whitfield and Mike Crozier

Distribution and (SDDC)—the Army United Command Army Ordnance School, Hoyle now evolve.

Gen. Heidi Hoyle has 5,000 transportation professionals readiness, a key takeaway was served as the 22nd across the world. In coordination commanding general of with her deputy, Mike Hutchison, the Military Surface Deployment the two have principally prioritized Command SDDC's people and their collective Service ability to simultaneously advance the Component Command to the command's current readiness and States Transportation future mobility posture in support of (USTRANSCOM) the Army and its joint force partners. and a major subordinate command Army Sustainment sat down with to U.S. Army Materiel Command Hoyle and Hutchison to discuss (AMC). A 1994 graduate of West the expeditionary deployment and Point who commissioned as an sustainment challenges facing the ordnance officer and most recently Army as the future of warfare across served as Commandant of the U.S. contested domains continues to



June 2020, Maj. oversees a workforce of more than When we last covered strategic that it is perishable and part of our short-term muscle memory. How has SDDC exercised and adapted that same muscle memory to meet the needs of rapidly emerging requirements as outlined by the National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

> Hoyle: As we look at 21st-century warfare, especially as outlined in the NDS, we look at many things that have changed how our senior leaders and logisticians need to effectively and efficiently deploy and

biggest difference I see is that it will events in the U.S. and across the with threats that are both kinetic and a hard, close look at how this will non-kinetic. As we look across the impact future operations. We must what's happening across geopolitical called to respect while establishing spaces. Our commercial industry partners understand the nation's priorities and help us to prioritize DOD, have committed to upholding commercial and military cargo to avoid economic impacts that could undermine domestic and international public support.

Additionally, our new operating environment within great power competition is defined by highly complex technology, which greatly compresses our response timelines. The cyber network is the foundation within which this all operates and can be fragile as great power comes together. Our adversaries will aim to restrict our access to and capability within once familiar terrain. Let's take China's Belt and Road Initiative as an example: the key space and terrain they're after and aim to occupy is being sought so that it will change the way we can project and sustain power. Equities we had full or near-full access to in the past are contested and may change moving forward, so we mitigate risk by ensuring clear and consistent civilian, governmental, and multinational integration and cooperation.

Climate is another key aspect of may have positive ripple effects down this changing terrain; the Army the line. Our effective collaboration We're not just anticipating contested

sustain combat power. The concept of recently released its climate strategy warfare in the 21st century is vastly to control these changing factors. different than previous conflicts. The The recent increase in severe weather be done in a contested environment, globe has forced the DOD to take Assuming a contested homeland Joint Deployment and Distribution commit to deliberate planning that Enterprise (JDDE), we're taking considers environmental factors a strategic and operational view of and regulations we are dutifully a framework for exceptions based on contingency demand. We, in the the International Maritime Organization's 2023 environmental plan, which aims to cut vessel carbon dioxide emissions by 40% and 70% in 2030 and 2050, respectively; our close collaboration and partnership with industry will ensure we can do that without any negative operational implications. Industry will help us evolve how we should do business,

> Hutchison: We must emphasize that communication with our industry partners is critical to keep them informed about what we see on the horizon, both strategically and operationally. We do this to strengthen the feedback loop between all parties; by sharing our experiences, we're strengthening that operational relationship.

> but it will not change our mission set.

Hoyle: That's a huge piece of the puzzle, effectively engaging in information exchange with our industry partners, almost to a butterfly effect where every piece of

with industry ensures that they remain a critical piece in the strategic and operational puzzle.

seems to be a mainstay of the Army's campaign planning. In your talks with industry, did they anticipate the same given their existing roles and responsibilities?

Hoyle: Given our consistent communication, they were certainly in lockstep, as our business is certainly theirs, and vice versa to an extent. For example, the military constitutes a small piece of the rail industry's business in the continental United States, so the focus has been on maintaining the status quo and their current posture.

Hutchison: One of the biggest challenges of this newly contested space is in the cyber realm. Even though we exist as a small piece of the commercial industry's business, we're working alongside them to identify and analyze cyber vulnerabilities in the commercial and defense transportation sector. What is a DOD problem also may play out in the commercial space, so there are certainly incentives for parties to work diligently alongside each other. We're preparing for updated Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification requirements that will begin in 2025, both in our systems and the contracts with the industry that develops those systems. So, we're approaching this data we can share is important and from all angles in tandem with and alongside our industry partners.



Lt. Col. William Prince Jr., then commander of the 838th Transportation Battalion, 598th Transportation Brigade, guides an M1A1 Abrams tank off a commercial vessel in support of Defender Europe on Feb. 20, 2020, in the port of Bremerhaven, Germany. (Photo by Sqt. Dommnique Washington)

operations-we're actively practicing operations assuming some extent of system degradation to verify and and sustain the force in this new battlespace, starting with our power projection platforms and mobilization force generation installations. Partner capacity adds to the options provided to a commander in that operational and tactical space, and much of this is borne from our execution of exercises like Defender Europe and Pacific.

SDDC has always been a key member of the JDDE—how have your roles in this cohort shifted, if at all, when operating under the assumption of a future contested homeland?

Hoyle: The easy and right answer ensures that capabilities are available here is, "No"— we don't see our role to deploy when and where needed. changing. We're here to deliver the We also have similar programs on validate our ability to move cargo armed forces to their point of need our rail and highway networks to and effectively synchronize global communicate and amplify the DOD's surface deployment and distribution requirements across all nodes in the requirements. As a command, we've transportation space and ensure the structured our collective lines of commitment of the right resources at effort accordingly: people as our the right time. Roles certainly haven't strategic advantage, deployment changed, but all stakeholders in this and distribution readiness in the space operate with an understanding midst of emerging requirements, of the changing conditions and and the ability to rapidly evolve how we need to be positioned to for the future. We've talked about respond rapidly. When the Army our commercial partnerships, but trains, we look at tasks, conditions, another critical piece here is our and standards. Whether we're other national programs, like the executing counterinsurgency or Strategic Seaport Program alongside large-scale combat operations, the the Department of Transportation's standards and tasks we're committed Maritime Administration, which to don't change. It's the conditions



A vehicle belonging to 1st Air Cavalry Brigade (1ACB), 1st Cavalry Division (1ID), is driven down the rear ramp of the commercial vessel ARC Independence Nov. 28, 2021, at the port of Alexandroupoli, Greece, in support of Atlantic Resolve. (Photo by Staff Sqt. Jennifer Reynolds)

assess how we operate within our central force multipliers, along with and we're ensuring our own parallel environment's conditions, and so the people who execute operations progress as those conditions change. much of this is enabled by our within those systems. We've started persistent engagement with industry to treat data as a provided commodity and the suite of diverse capabilities as we order transportation services, they've brought to past, bring to and we want to be judicious in sustained readiness efforts and current, and provide for future fights how we distribute that data so we across any given condition.

hasn't shifted, but, as Hoyle requirements side of the house as mentioned, the ways in which they explore enterprise capabilities to we're able to support that role have use data and information better. The advanced. Our information systems JDDE writ large has done a good SDDC to have the Transportation and other supporting technology job keeping pace with the transition Engineering Agency (TEA) on

can control that information flow as conditions change. We're tied Hutchison: Our role certainly in with USTRANSCOM on the

that change. We must constantly will continue to be some of our to a digitally enabled organization,

How does SDDC strike a balance between their modernization initiatives? Are the two at odds?

Hoyle: There is certainly a balance to be struck between the two, but we don't see them as being competing interests. We're lucky at our staff to lead our transportability as a command, also work alongside mind, we mustn't take our current can as the Army evolves from the M113, Ocean Terminal Sunny Point in Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Terminal Concord in California— heavily on the commercial industry (AMPV), we are integrating its so they're ready to support our rapid into our operational framework—all necessary. enabled by TEA. When we acquire new equipment, we're able to What are some of the most immediately tie current and future crucial operational effects requirements into that acquisition sustainers and transporters to fully leverage that materiel to need to be aware of as SDDC its maximum operational affect modernizes its key in-transit from day one. As a command, we're *and business operational* focused on ensuring our current systems? transportation requirements best support immediate readiness but are evolving needs. So, readiness and modernization really are inextricably linked at SDDC.

maintain our current readiness even

assessments so that our readiness the Army Corps of Engineers to capabilities for granted as we work in track alongside vehicle maintain and advance our two modernization efforts. For instance, military ocean terminals-Military Armored Personnel Carrier, to the North Carolina and Military Ocean varying movement requirements deployment needs when and where

Hoyle: As we work through our also tailored to meet future warfare's modernization efforts, we recognize a key effort is preparing the relevant sustainment and transportation Sustainers who recognize that community for any changes, especially those that are systems or it appropriately to increase our Hutchison: We believe we can based on technology. For example, capabilities will be successful now we were some of the earliest adopters as we look specifically at what will of the cloud for data storage across be needed in 2030 and beyond. Army Materiel Command for Tactically speaking, we check the mission assurance purposes. We're Program Objective Memorandum forward looking in how we want to (POM) cycle to ensure the leverage advances made in artificial readiness of our currently fielded intelligence to help us make smarter equipment. We're simultaneously cargo decisions faster at scale. For identifying the requirements for instance, we are currently testing new future equipment dictated by that technologies to capture available outlook toward 2030 and even volume across staging areas at our 2050, with much of this enabled by 842nd Transportation Battalion in TEA's assessments and analysis. We Texas. Additionally, we're focusing synchronize with Army Materiel on connecting the end-to-end unit Command and the Deputy Chief move process - from ordering for of Staff, G-4, on the budget side air or surface movement to stow of this equation so we can address planning and terminal management those critical materiel development and even billing-into a single, and acquisition requirements. We, authoritative system. With this in

tandem with industry and academia on these projects.

Hutchison: We certainly rely to accomplish our mission. Central to that partnership is our ability to intelligently structure contract modes which offer us agility and flexibility. Tied to this dynamic are our port diversification efforts, we want to minimize costly, one-time only, limited duration agreements for stevedoring, or cargo loading and unloading, and other services. Regardless of port location, leveraging regional contracts with one key service provider helps us avoid administrative costs and increases our terminal readiness. relationship and work to bolster and in the future.

Lt. Col. Altwan Whitfield is currently serving as the deputy director of the Army G-4's Loaistics Initiatives Group. Previously, she was the commander of the 841st Transportation Battalion at Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. She holds a bachelor's degree in Special Education from Converse College in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and a master's degree in Public Administration with a concentration in Education from Troy University in Montgomery, Alabama.

Mike Crozier is a strategic analyst in the Army G-4's Logistics Initiatives Group. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees from Georgetown University.

Feature Photo

After arriving at the port, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, from Fort Bliss. Texas. move armored and tracked vehicles and other equipment forward to their final destination via the Korean rail system on Feb. 27 at Busan, Korea. (Photo by Kevin Bell)



maintaining dominance and overmatch across conflict, and no community has a bigger role than our sustainment and logistics enterprise. Simply said, operational, and tactical activities that establish and maintain favorable conditions for conducting Army and joint operations. It requires having the forces, equipment, infrastructure, and relationships firmly established forward to provide combatant commanders with the range of tools they need to respond quickly. This enduring forward presence builds trust and helps assure allies and partners in a region and serves as a credible deterrent to potential adversaries.

Army Materiel Command (AMC) leads efforts at the strategic level to set theaters with sustainment supplies and commodities. This starts by assuring the Army's strategic power projection capability projects combat power globally. It's further accomplished through the forward positioning of Army prepositioned stock (APS) and equipment and through foreign military sales (FMS), which build shared capabilities and capacity with allies and partners.

Power Projection Infrastructure

To effectively set the theater, the Army must have the right infrastructure to project combat power from its installations in the U.S. and abroad into potentially

etting the theater is key to away by land, sea, or air. Having the at our military ocean terminals and very best trained, ready, and equipped forces in the world does nothing if we crisis, competition, and cannot get them to where they need a strategic advantage, and they rely to be and sustain them once there. on ready, modern infrastructure. The ability to rapidly surge combatready forces into and across theaters setting the theater involves strategic, is critical in projecting forces at a moment's notice to support the joint force and our allies and partners.

> AMC's transportation offices, depots, arsenals, plants, ports, and installation infrastructurerailheads, roads, and airfields-are key to the nation's power projection capabilities and must be modernized theater-specific combat equipment to support current, surge, and future required to respond rapidly, speeding Army readiness requirements. To troops to the frontlines. More than accomplish this, AMC is leading just tanks and artillery pieces, APS the Army's effort in developing includes combat sustainment and and implementing a holistic enablers such as command, control, facility investment plan (FIP) that computers, communications, cyber, identifies all requirements for more intelligence, surveillance, and than 141,000 facilities across its installations and aligns resources with Army and commander priorities. Using the latest capabilities in data analytics and visualization, the FIP provides a 10-year outlook, updated annually, that ensures funds are allocated to the highest priority projects based on Army readiness requirements.

AMC also is nested with Army Futures Command and the modernization community to ensure that power projection infrastructure is modernized alongside the Army's weapon systems.

From airfields and railheads at mobilization force generation contested theaters thousands of miles installations to cranes and docks

commercial ports, our strategic power projection capabilities provide

Army Prepositioned Stock

As a critical component of the strategic mobility triad, with sealift and airlift, APS is strategically placed sets of equipment ready for Soldiers to draw and move out immediately to tactical assembly areas. APS cuts the timeline and reduces the strategic lift requirements for deploying units by providing the reconnaissance. APS is separate from commodities such as food, fuel, medical supplies, and munitions staged in theater but work together to provide commanders with the equipment, supplies, and sustainment capabilities they require. Managed by Army Sustainment Command, the Army currently maintains six APS sets aligned with a geographic combatant command or afloat.

The Army is employing a 21stcentury APS strategy focused on expansion, repositioning, and modernization to ensure the right equipment is postured in the right regions for rapid employment. For example, in the last two years, AMC repositioned thousands of pieces of equipment and modernized APS requirements for the European and into crisis or conflict. African theaters.

strategy uses APS in competition to support exercises and deployments of regionally allocated forces, not just as a war reserve. During the Defender-Europe 21 series of linked exercises, equipment configuration, and handoff area teams assigned to Army Field Support Battalion-Benelux issued 281 pieces of APS equipment to exercise, sites at Zutendaal, Belgium, Evgelshoven, Netherlands, and received, inspected, and performed maintenance on all forward-issued

facilities and infrastructure to best builds skills and muscle memory that support combatant commander will pay dividends should we move

APS also demonstrates its Part of the 21st-century APS relevance and criticality in real-world contingency operations in Europe. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, President Biden ordered the deployment of several thousand U.S. troops to Europe to assure our NATO allies and partners and deter further aggression. Soldiers from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, infantry, signal, and support units in who deployed from Fort Stewart, AMC and our U.S. Army Security Germany and Estonia. Following the Georgia, to Germany on short notice, Assistance Command (USASAC) drew equipment from APS-2 stocks, and immediately began training with maintaining military partnerships allies and partners at the Grafenwoehr through execution of its security Training Area. Elements from the assistance and FMS program. The equipment to ensure it was ready for German armed forces Bundeswehr AMC Security Assistance Enterprise issue again. Exercising the draw and Logistics Command delivered currently executes more than 6,100 employment of APS in competition multiple loads of vehicles and FMS cases with more than 135

equipment from Mannheim to Grafenwoehr, demonstrating the interoperability and partnership with allies. APS serves its purpose on a global stage as troops quickly deploy, draw equipment, and move out to conduct their missions.

Foreign Military Sales

We will not fight the next war alone. Security assistance and FMS sustain strong relationships with allies and partners and build their capacity and readiness while supporting combatant commander priorities. are critical in establishing and



An M1A2 Abrams main battle tank is loaded onto a German rail car on March 10, at Coleman worksite in Mannheim, Germany. The 405th Army Field Support Brigade recently began augmenting its line-haul heavy equipment transporter deliveries of an entire armored brigade combat team's worth of Army Prepositioned Stocks-2 equipment with rail. (Photo by Maj. Allan Laggui)



Military vehicles originating from the 402nd Army Field Support Battalion are downloaded from U.S. Navy Ship Red Cloud in preparation of Army Prepositioned Stock 3 on Feb. 24 at Subic Bay, Philippines. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Katie Nelson)

countries, the preponderance of all Army FMS security assistance provided to our allies and partners.

As we have seen during the current conflict in Ukraine, FMS is proving invaluable to enabling our allies and partners. From 2019 to the present, been a strategic advantage for the USASAC implemented 107 FMS cases and provided more than \$300 million of equipment to Ukraine. From ammunition to small arms; Javelin missiles to night vision devices and radios; and from HMMWV variants to Toyota Land Cruisers, FMS demonstrates our commitment theater is foundational to success. to building partner capacity.

The key to successful FMS is modernizing offering partners and allies a total package of materiel, spare parts, future requirements and preposition training, publications, technical documentation, maintenance support, and other services AMC allies and partners through security

provides to Army units. This ensures assistance. Setting the theater partners and allies receive equipment through the Army principles of and can effectively train, utilize, and maintain it.

Conclusion

Our logistics capability has long U.S. Army. With current events in Eastern Europe, our nation's ability to respond with dynamic force deployment and employment to assure our allies and partners and deter our adversaries has never been more important. Properly setting the

We must lean forward in critical power projection infrastructure, anticipate equipment accordingly, and continue to develop critical relationships with

logistics and sustainment-from the strategic support area to the tactical point of contact-assures our ability to maintain a combat-credible force that can demonstrate clear strategic and operational overmatch over adversaries and do it second to none.

Lt. Gen. Donnie Walker currently serves as the deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Materiel Command and the senior commander of Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Walker was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps upon his graduation from Auburn University in 1987. He earned master's degrees in Logistics Management from the Florida Institute of Technology, and Military Arts and Sciences from the U.S. Army War College.

Feature Photo

Soldiers with the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division conduct rail operations on April 20, 2020, at the rail head on Fort Bliss, Texas. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Michael West)

Forward Thinking Required for Fort to Port Operations By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kevin Coleman

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he U.S. Army has well-being of Soldiers. Leaders must to-port are vital to the reception, faced many adverse continually educate subordinates staging, onward movements, and challenges due to on the importance of successful integration (RSOI) process to COVID-19, and yet execution during the first two ensure units stay lethal and ready. we continue to stay ready and lethal deployment phases. These phases— Mobility warrant officers (MWOs) for deployment and redeployment pre-deployment activities and fort- play a vital role in supporting the operations. This requires forward to-port operations-set conditions deployment and redeployment thinking to meet mission for the rest of the deployment. process. MWOs need to look at requirements while caring for the Pre-deployment activities and fort- operations from a transportation

Setting



This requires synchronization at the a pandemic. PPPs are Army levels which allows MWOs to assist one or more brigade combat teams anywhere during the deployment and/or mobilize and deploy highprocess.

Brigade Combat Team (1st and Redeployment. Installations ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, should provide the installation senior leaders understood the importance of educating all leaders on the importance of People First, should include measures to address Command Deployment Discipline the quality of its services as it Program (CDDP), critical tasks, maintenance readiness, accountability of equipment. In the required to de-conflict the utilization spring of 2020 during Operation of assets, while others outsource these Atlantic Resolve, brigade readiness assets. Also, other organizations are was more dependent on personnel available to augment the civilian implementing CDDP to meet workforce, such as movement control the commanders' intent. The 1st teams (MCT). Incorporating the ABCT developed a Combat MCTs early during the planning Leaders University where leaders phase will aid in identifying shortfalls learn the importance of reporting and bridging capabilities gaps for accurate equipment status reports, fort-to-port operation. Additionally, especially concerning non-mission- this provides experience to the capable equipment that would MCT personnel, helping them stay hinder the fort-to port operation. proficient in their occupation. PPPs Additionally, commanders learn the should host a synchronization significance of reporting accurate meeting with the unit, installation unit deployment lists, as these transportation office, supporting affect the allocation of resources and assets, including commercial trucks, railcars, vessels or aircraft, intent is being met. and material handling equipment for fort-to-port operations.

Power Projection Platform

operation, your power projection imperative to project combat power platform (PPP) must efficiently at decisive points. Thinking ahead support operations for rotational deploy- process to ensure leaders achieve space, especially potential delays

feasibility lens and convey their ments, training exercises, and nocommander's strategic message. notice missions, especially during tactical, strategic, and operational installations that strategically deploy priority Army reserve component units per Army Techniques During my time in 1st Armored Publication 3-35, Army Deployment deployment support plan, which defines the concept of support and prepares units for deployment. Some hand, specialized occupations, and and installations possess the capabilities key personnel. agencies, and higher echelons to ensure the combatant commander's

Troop/Equipment Movement

The ability to conduct equipment's rapid and orderly movement For a successful fort-to-port throughout fort-to-port operations is multiple simultaneous is essential during the planning

"Ready to Fight" standards for the equipment and personnel arriving in the theater. The Military Decision-Making Process will help the unit determine the different types of force packages based on prioritizing equipment departing from installation. While working with the brigade S3 operations staff, I learned that operations drive logistics, and understanding this helps prioritize personnel and equipment outflow from installation. This includes your recovery support, life support, communication plans, mission at

Rehearsal of Concept Drill

A rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill is a dry walk-through of a plan between a commander and their subordinates. The ROC drill creates a shared understanding of the unit's plan and is key to the fort-toport operation. The recommended attendance is the brigade and battalion command teams, brigade and battalion staffs, and node officers in charge. Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, is a good reference when discussing how to prepare, plan, and execute. A best practice is for other units on the same installation deploying later to attend the ROC drills and to have a planner embedded into the current unit deployment operations. ROC drills allow the execution of fort-to-port operations to be a seamless process. In 1st ABCT, we used a ROC drill to cement our brigade plan and allow us to see potential issues in time and



Maj. Bo Olsen, the S-3 from the 1-7th CAV CAV, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (1ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, assisted with the accountability of equipment arriving at the Port of Beaumont for 1ABCT while collaborating with the 842nd Battalion SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Com mand on Oct. 8, 2020, at the Port of Beaumont, Texas. (Photo by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Sidig AL-Uqdah)

Distribution Command personnel down tasks across the port detail.

with the sterile yards. It also allowed and they require constant status needed and kept the brigade moving us to fragmentary order the plan as updates. Placing field grade officers the agricultural sanitization node or senior captains with a senior handed off equipment to the sterile NCO facilitated a great reporting yard. Furthermore, we conducted chain throughout the brigade and the initial site survey with the provided crosstalk among units. battalion that owned the port and Understanding that multiple systems created a mutual understanding of are in place for in-transit visibility and port operations. Additionally, upon having representation throughout arrival at the Port of Beaumont, the process always stresses the Texas, we conducted a ROC drill importance of accountability. This with the Surface Deployment and assists in command and control of personnel and equipment, allowing that demonstrated how we broke leaders to speak with outside agencies on behalf of commanders as changes in the execution phase Have you ever heard leaders occur. Additionally, the unit held continuously ask where their nightly fusion cell synchronization equipment is located? This is meetings with brigade and battalion because equipment accountability is leaders, which allowed the team extremely important to commanders, to rapidly reallocate resources as

in the right direction.

The goal is for all Soldiers to understand the importance of how we move, and how we fight to continue to be a lethal force and to be ready when called upon. We must learn from one another and be openminded to new ideas to reach the same objective.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kevin Coleman currently serves as a mobility warrant officer. He holds an associate degree in Homeland Security, Emergency Management.

Feature Photo

Then Warrant Officer 1 Kevin Coleman, a brigade mobility officer from the 91st Engineer Battalion, guided the rail load team in prioritizing loading containers on Sept. 28, 2020, at the rail operation center at Fort Hood. Texas. (Photo by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Edilma Cruz)

Theater Logistics Analytics

Describing, Visualizing, Understanding the Operational Environment

By Maj. Gen. David Wilson and Maj. Tanya Leonard

Fort to Port Operations and Setting the

etting the operate to identify what is needed enemy, terrain, weather, and civil begins before setting the theater to execute operations within the considerations. Field Manual 4-0, and is refined throughout crisis, theater. It is incumbent that strategic Sustainment Operations, describes competition, and conflict as the planners across all warfighting the sustainment preparation of the operational environment evolves. functions analyze the operational operation environment (SPoOE) as The TLA is essentially a theater environment to understand an assessment tool used by theater sustainment common operating constraints that will affect their planners to analyze the OE and picture for the GCC at Phase 0, ability to execute the mission. identify resource factors that could which is maintained to ensure the The DOD has six geographic impact sustainment operations. commander has an accurate sight combatant commands the globe, including U.S. Africa Logistics, describes the SPoOE as and constraints across the area of Command, U.S. Central Command, the TLA, a supporting process used responsibility. The GCC's ability U.S. European Command, U.S. by planners that provides an initial to understand, visualize, and Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. sustainment assessment of resources, describe sustainment within the Northern Command, and U.S. infrastructure, and logistics within theater enables the execution and Southern Command. Each geo- an OE. The TLA is the genesis of graphic combatant commander theater sustainment planning and (GCC) is responsible for an area facilitates the development of the of responsibility within their theater logistics overview (TLO), region. Each GCC must develop a the concept of logistics support theater campaign plan and theater (COLS), and the logistics estimate. engagement plan while setting conditions within the theater to conduct operations during a crisis, competition, and conflict. and the foundation of sustainment A comprehensive analysis of the preparation and planning at the OE is required to understand the theater level. The TLA is a powerful theater of operations and ensure the sustainment tool used to inform development of suitable, acceptable, feasible, and flexible theater plans.

OE Assessment Tools

Planners use several tools to assist is one of the most frequently used and

theater the OE from an intelligence enterprise (JLEnt) partners, and requires an analysis of the lens and assists commanders in partner nations all facilitate the operational environment understanding mission variables that development of the TLA. The (OE) in which forces will could affect operations to include TLA is a continuous process that across Joint Publication 4-0, Joint picture of sustainment capabilities

Theater Logistics Analysis

TheTLA is a strategic-level process decisions across all phases of the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities conflict continuum and assists in is key to understanding the OE setting and shaping the theater. in which U.S. forces deploy and The TLA is a detailed analysis of operate. The threat analysis entails each country within a theater. This a granular assessment of enemy commanders in visualizing the analysis provides commanders capabilities, operations, investments, operational environment, including with critical information about and alliances within the theater. the intelligence preparation of the each country, including threats, Additionally, it examines critical battlefield (IPB) and the theater geography, environmental fac- U.S. and host nation networks and logistics analysis (TLA). The IPB tors, host nation agreements, infrastructure, which enemy forces country tools that provides an analysis of the and military resources. Theater has taught us that targets OE. The IPB is a tool that analyzes sustainment planners, joint logistics assigned to non-lethal assets are

sustainment of operations. The TLA enables the JLEnt to conduct integrated and synchronized logistics operations through a shared understanding of the environment and posture of sustainment within the OE across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Threat

The threat analysis is one of the most important features of the TLA. Identifying and evaluating infrastructure could target. Counterinsurgency

frequently more important than the theater. Kinetic capabilities like targets assigned to lethal assets. chemical warfare remain a risk to Sustainment nodes and networks are forces and sustainment across the often vulnerable targets for enemy theater. The first large-scale use of forces due to the adverse effects chemical warfare was chlorine gas degraded logistics have on military during World War I. Since then, operations. It's important to identify chemical warfare has advanced and threats, risks, and vulnerabilities is likely to be used in conflict by in the TLA to execute appropriate near-peer adversaries to specifically countermeasures to protect critical target sustainment nodes like theater nodes and assets.

Examining enemy capabilities, operations, investments, and alliances is an in-depth process. It's important to identify and understand enemy capabilities due to their direct ability to hinder and investments must be scrutinized and limit operations. Enemy forces have the means to target theater operations and sustainment through U.S. operations. The employment kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. of advanced technologies and For instance, increased technology capabilities within the region by has enabled near-peer adversaries adversaries can be used to determine to exploit U.S. networks through current enemy capabilities and cyberwarfare. The use of cyber- future operations. Furthermore, attacks to degrade sustainment infrastructure investments, emergnetworks is probable in all theaters, ing weapon systems, and alliances and the identification of this risk must be explored to ensure the during the TLA will prepare GCC understands U.S. forces' U.S. forces for future operations. potential threats within the theater. Economic diplomacy is another Planners must remain abreast of all non-kinetic capability used by enemy threats and activities within near-peer adversaries that affects the region to anticipate enemy sustainment. Near-peer adversaries strategies that may be used to use economic diplomacy to lure disrupt operations and sustainment. nations into debt traps to increase political leverage. Countries that **Geography and Environmental** fall into debt traps are often pressured to support lender nation interests, resulting in forced factors affect every aspect of war and strategic alliances. Alliances forced must be considered when analyzing by economic diplomacy become the OE. These factors can limit and problematic when U.S. forces look at hinder operations within a theater.

aerial and seaports of debarkation. This risk requires analyzing mitigation efforts and sustainment requirements in the event of a chemical attack within the theater.

Near-peer adversarial operations to identify potential strategies that will be used to limit and hinder

Factors

Geography and environmental access, basing, and overflight across The TLA analyzes how geography, **Planners who** can describe current infrastructure and resources within a theater can assist the GCC in understanding available capabilities that can be used for immediate response to crises in the region.

terrain, climate, and weather ports of debarkation, theater storage influence how the theater is set and the execution of operations and sustainment. Geography and terrain geographically dispersed, consisting region. In contrast, the Middle East region is predominately landsignificantly less. The time and increasing sea levels in all regions. The theater.

Geography and terrain are critical to sustainment regarding natural resources within a region. Natural resources like water, wood, oil, and steel are vital assets used to sustain operations and should be considered when setting and sustaining the can impede operations; heavy theater. Planners must determine precipitation and winds affect air, what natural resources are available in the region and how to obtain within a theater. Without fail, Furthermore, ACSAs can support those resources that are unavailable. Terrain that offers abundant natural factors will impact operations within a theater. As U.S. forces continue resources reduces the burden of a theater. Planners must analyze to increase joint multinational sustainment in a theater. Similarly, every aspect of geography, terrain, exercises across theaters, the lack terrain is often used as a tactical climate, and weather to ensure the of agreements affects the ability advantage in war and is key when GCC recognizes and understands planning forward posture sites and sustainment nodes within a theater. hinder operations within the theater. multilateral and bilateral peacetime Planners must assess key terrain and infrastructure to identify suitable Host Nation Agreements locations for prepositioned stocks

areas, and theater gateways.

are linked to time and distance. For affect force health and sustainment example, the Indo-Pacific region is operations. Extreme temperatures and weather increase loss of life and of chains of island nations; the adversely affect personnel, equipment distribution of islands across the readiness, and equipment storage. Pacific affects the time and distance Endemic diseases within the region required to move throughout the impact force health, so identifying diseases during the TLA facilitates force health protection measures based, making the time and distance before deployment. Rising global to travel throughout the region surface temperatures are slowly distance required to deploy forces constant rise in sea levels is causing and materiel in and around theater coastal erosion, affecting existing rapidly is critical information the infrastructure throughout the globe. GCC must understand to set, If existing infrastructure becomes sustain, and operate within the inoperative, new infrastructure will be required for operations across theaters globally. Hence, the need for continuous site surveys and country assessments within every combatant command to understand the impact

> Furthermore, weather conditions maritime, and surface operations host nation logistics support. geography and environmental all elements that could degrade or

of environmental factors on terrain.

enable operations and sustainment within the theater. Agreements provide host nations with logistics Additionally, climate and disease capability, access, basing, and overflight. Two primary host nation agreements facilitate military operations within a theater. These agreements include the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Agreements are negotiated through the Department of State and delegated from executive power by the president or legislation from Congress.

ACSAs are bilateral agreements to exchange logistics support, supplies, and services with host nations. Supplies and services covered by ACSAs include medical services, port services, storage services, communication services, and more. ACSAs reduce the logistics tail, increase multinational interoperability, and provide commanders flexibility by using supplies and services that reside within the host nation. ACSAs enable U.S. forces to rapidly deploy and begin initial operations using joint multinational exercises within to execute exercises throughout the theater. SOFAs are unique agreements that establish the rights and privileges of U.S. forces while in The TLA analyzes host nation host nations. SOFAs vary and can and essential sustainment nodes like agreements due to their ability to include provisions covering entry

and more. The U.S. currently holds SOFAs in several nations, enabling U.S. forward presence and access across the globe.

agreements the U.S. holds with each country within a region to shape, set, operate, and sustain the forward presence, the posture planners must identify existing at the tactical level. When the TLA, of Army prepositioned stocks, military capability within the host logistics support, and multinational interoperability. The lack of agree- all sustainment capabilities within better postured to achieve unity ments within a theater can be a region that can be used to enable of effort, which will ensure that agreements that need to be forged.

Infrastructure and Resources

The TLA examines existing the theater to identify what is resources within a theater can assist local or brought in by military region. forces. Local infrastructure within the theater can be used to facilitate **Conclusion** several sustainment operations, storage, theater distribution, and environment. This process and nation infrastructure, including concept of logistics support, and communications and Additionally, planners analyze host sustainment gaps that will force nation resource facilities that can the culmination of the joint force

and exit of personnel, access and use be used to execute sustainment if not addressed. The TLA is the of facilities, criminal jurisdiction, operations. These resources include refineries, water production, and sanitation facilities, manufacturing there is no true understanding of plants, cold storage facilities, and what sustainment capability exists more. Furthermore, an analysis of to execute competition, crisis, and host nation services is required to conflict operations. The TLA is Planners must understand what determine the amount of local labor a powerful tool, but it's only as used to support military operations.

theater. These agreements impact nation resources and facilities, nation. Planners must understand used to inform the Global Posture the GCC's priorities, including there's sustainment unity of action. Review, Theater Engagement Plan, sustainment forces, sustainment Most importantly, the joint force and Department of State at large on nodes, and Army prepositioned stocks. All military resources must be considered regardless of service; supporting the GCC's priorities is a joint effort. Planners who can resources and infrastructure within describe current infrastructure and available and needed to set, operate, the GCC in understanding available and sustain the theater. The theater's capabilities that can be used for resources and infrastructure are immediate response to crises in the

The TLA is how joint forces including theater opening, theater analyze the theater and operational health service support. Planners tool prepare planners to develop conduct a broad analysis of host the theater logistics overview, financial logistics estimate, which all describe networks, road and rail networks, the "what, how, and when" for waterways, ports, airfields, and sustainment within the theater. bridges, all of which are key to Through a comprehensive view of enabling distribution operations. sustainment, this tool highlights

genesis of all sustainment planning within a theater. Without this tool good as its existence and use by strategic and operational planners, In addition, to identifying host who develop operational plans and inform the execution of operations TLO, COLS, and running estimates are all in alignment, the JLEnt is commander can achieve JLEnt wide visibility through access to resources, data, and processes, ensuring that our logistics responses are rapid and precise in support of joint all domain operations.

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> Maj. Tanya Leonard is the commander's initiative group officer for the 8th Theater Sustainment Command. She holds a master's dearee in General Administration from Central Michigan University and a bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Delaware.

Feature Photo

Soldiers of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command unload an airbeam tent during a training exercise on Aug. 23, 2021, at Fort Knox, Kentucky. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Godot G. Galgano)

War Reserves Strategic Opportunities

Manage Risk, Cost, Effectiveness By Col. Ronnie D. Anderson and Maj. Eric D. Baca

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Operations and Setting the Theater in Contested Environments

stocks (APS), and munitions are a strategic risk in the on the strategic lift, geographic combatant commands current global environment-especially in large-scale (CCMD) determine PWRM requirements to fulfill combat operations (LSCO). Consolidated stockpiles their operational plans (OPLAN)s as consistent with that are both mal-positioned and within range of national strategic direction. Service components enemy long-range fires can imperil the Army's ability to establish, fund, manage, and maintain PWRM located rapidly deploy and penetrate adversaries' anti-access and in the geographic CCMD area of responsibility (AOR). area denial (A2AD) systems as described in the multi- By prepositioning stocks afloat and ashore, we reduce domain operations (MDO) concept. Compounded U.S. Transportation Command requirements to provide by adversarial long-range fires capabilities, near-peer dedicated lift to support the movement of forces, competition through contested, access-denied areas has equipment, and materiel. The Secretary of Defense significantly complicated the calculus of how and where to deploy crisis response forces to create dilemmas for overarching strategic guidance concerning planning and our enemies and mitigate their disruption operations.

packages to dispersed seaports and airports of debarkation. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, states that the side that most rapidly builds combat power can seize adversaries necessitate the strategic locating of stocks the initiative. These deploying forces will be required to along with a PWRM triad: expediting force closure conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) operations, including receipt of the cost to store and maintain, and mitigating risk to their allocated PWRM, APS, and munitions within the stocks. kinetic capability of enemy long-range fires. Significant strategic planning is required to balance the costs of staging large, consolidated material stockpiles against the associated risk incurred from A2AD strikes on and munitions across the globe in consolidated, those stockpiles while still making them operationally service-specific warehousing and storage areas to relevant. This article proposes a risk mitigation strategy gain the financial benefits of economies of scale. for regional and global threats while reclaiming the These operations generally have a single warehousing fiscal benefits of economies of scale and identifying requirement, which includes the costs of facilities opportunities for additional efficiencies.

What is PWRM?

Instruction 4310.01E, Logistics Planning Guidance For Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel, PWRM refers to war reserve materiel strategically located to facilitate a operational requirements. However, given the current timely response in support of combatant commander global environment, optimizing any one leg of the triad (CCDR) requirements during the initial phases of increases the risk to OPLANs that should be mitigated an operation. Rapid power projection centers on our with deliberate decisions by the SECDEF, CCDR, ability to provide strategic air and sealift capabilities component commanders, and the services. Allowing

he fiscal benefits the Army and all military expeditiously to meet established and emerging services realize in exercising economies of crises. To act as a deterrent in competition, prevent scale to stockpile prepositioned war reserve adversaries from attempting a fait accompli attack, materiel (PWRM), Army prepositioned mitigate the tyranny of distance, and reduce the burden (SECDEF) has Title X responsibility to provide resourcing priorities. These link the DOD current and future needs for prepositioned stocks-such as desired The MDO concept proposes deploying in smaller responsiveness-to evolving national defense objectives and ensure financial resourcing is provided to maintain the PWRM. Evolving threats from global and regional through positioning in line with OPLANs, reducing

Bridging The Efficiencies Gap

Services and service components store PWRM maintenance, climate control, energy, security, and other associated costs. They also have the benefit of a single, broadly written, large-scale statement of work As defined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to generate a single contract to operate the facility, manage and care for personnel, maintain and account for the materiel, conduct daily operations, and support any one service to consolidate nearly all their PWRM service components coordinated joint force PWRM and munition storage requirements, the triad could be harmonized and smaller capability-sets executed across dispersed joint operating facilities closer to their intended point of use, including key OPLAN JRSOI nodes. Doing so would enable components and the services to gain back funding and contracting economies of scale by Seeking harmony—not balance—within the PWRM sharing oversight responsibilities and streamlining site operations costs proportionately to the requirements of each stakeholder. The graphic below depicts an exercise map illustrating current storage methods and proposes the alternate joint storage concept.

or munitions in one storage location is an exceptionally grave risk—doing so could eliminate that component's contributions to the OPLAN should enemy long-range fires target that location. Put simply, it is equivalent to putting all your eggs in one basket. triad is key when determining how, where, and why PWRM is stored globally. Perfect balance is not always the answer, as commanders assume unequal risk or responsibility along all triad axes. Decisions are often made based on service-specific Title X requirements How Do We Fund Joint Operations? without seeing the benefits of joint solutions to common problems shared by all the services. If, however, Each location's lead service is charged with the Title



The Army Prepositioned Stock-2 site completed the fielding of 36 Avenger Air Defense Systems and 10 M1083 cargo trucks on May 2, 2018, in Dülmen Germany. The site is set up to house a brigade's worth of vehicles and equipment as part of NATO's deterrence operations. (Photo by Brittany Jones)

X responsibilities to develop, execute, and supervise DOD levels. contracted capabilities for joint support locations. There are at least three methods to fund and conduct of agreement. The two component commands agree joint storage operations in a manner that buys back on reimbursement through military interdepartmental the economy of scale enjoyed with large-scale, singleservice storage operations. The first, and most easily arrangements. This method cannot be neglected because controlled at the service component level, is a jointly some munitions storage functions are still conducted by funded contract. In this case, the lead service—typically military personnel. In this case, one component may offer

the service with the preponderance of forces and requirementswould issue the contract, but all the components would identify requirements and fund their proportional share of the contract. If properly executed, this could afford maximum flexibility to support each service component's requirements unique in a joint environment. The contract could be built to streamline contract line items. corresponding lines of accounting, and contract management functions unique to each service components' requirements. This method requires extensive planning, execution, and

a resource-constrained environment and improve the shared facilities with common-user requirements. overall capability to urgently respond in times of crisis.

The second method is a lead service contract to Adds Efficiencies conduct the joint storage operation, where the lead and accomplishes readiness and dispersion objectives,

The third method is an inter-component memorandum purchase requests or other payment-in-kind

Evolving threats from global and regional adversaries necessitate the strategic locating of stocks along with a **PWRM** triad: expediting force closure through positioning in line with OPLANs, reducing the cost to store and maintain, and mitigating risk to stocks.

to conduct ammunition storage operations and ask another service to provide movement control functions, for example, an equitable force requirement that is also jointly beneficial.

One may argue reconsolidating that equipment and munitions at a joint support facility increase the consolidation risk that the concept is trying to avoid. However, the joint force realizes reduced overall adversarial risk by dispersing servicespecific capabilities across multiple joint nodes with smaller footprints. Dispersing service capabilities across joint storage locations reduces

management commit-ment from the joint community, threats to large stockpiles, operationally links capabilities but the result could ultimately achieve cost savings in to points of intended use, and optimizes costs through

Cross-Combatant Command PWRM Planning

The U.S. military can further improve our ability to service is reimbursed through an Inter-Service Support influence competitor decision calculus, enable rapid Agreement. This case still retains the economy of scale deployment, and more safely penetrate enemy A2AD or long-range fires capabilities by developing joint but the financial benefits are realized at the service and PWRM and munitions storage activities near the seams




Illustration of current storage methods and proposes the alternate joint storage concept for an exercise. (Army graphic)

of geographic CCMD boundaries. Our adversaries are U.S. allies and partners, deter adversarial aggression, not hindered by self-imposed geographic boundaries and and readiness for crisis response or OPLAN execution. thus see the globe as one strategic battlefield. Blurring While the threat of long-range fires changes the U.S. posture calculus for positioning PWRM and munitions, our geographic boundaries through global reach and expeditious response increases deterrence. It provides dispersing and protecting forward resources through joint more opportunities to exercise equipment sets and the solutions can create dilemmas during competition, reduce tools to simultaneously influence multiple AORs through force closure times in crisis, and create potential cost snap deployments and exercises. Efficiencies are created savings. Further policy changes to create cross-CCMD when critical stocks are prepositioned such that the resourcing can increase readiness and reduce global storage PWRM triad becomes mutually beneficial to one or more requirements while simultaneously reducing force closure CCMD due to geographic proximity along key ground or timelines and risk to force and mission during LSCO. sea lines of communication. CCMDs would have access Col. Ronnie Anderson is currently serving as the division chief for U.S. to these stockpiles and could use them for exercises and Central Command J-4 plans and operations divisions. He holds a master's degree in Logistics from the Florida Institute of Technology and planning for contingency operations serving multiple a master's degree in Strategic Studies from Marine Corps University. OPLANs. Posturing along CCMD seams could serve to Maj. Eric Baca is currently serving as a joint logistics planner and assure multiple partners, deter multiple adversaries, and PWRM manager for U.S. Central Command J4 plans and operations potentially reduce the overall requirement for forwarddivisions. He is a certified theater logistics and joint planner and holds a master's degree in Supply Chain Management from Kansas positioned stocks. University.

Conclusion

Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain vehicles are staged Proper positioning, planning, and resourcing of PWRM for issue on June 27, 2019, at the Army Prepositioned Stocks-5 remote lot, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. (Photo by Justin Graff) and munitions remain vital to maximize assurance to



Feature Photo

OPINION:

Joint Sustainment Support to Agile Combat Employment

By Maj. Bradley Mejean

entrenched counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism fights, every service is conducting an operational overhaul reorienting towards large-scale conflict against a near-peer threat. The Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force tactics and technology require significant revamp from the permanent basing, air superiority, and uncontested logistics we enjoyed for most of the Global War on Terror. One major emerging theme is a switch to decentralized operations to offset new adversarial deep-strike capabilities despite our different approaches.

published Doctrine Note (AFDN) 1-21, outlining their new Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept. between the MOB to a contingency

operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders." This concept is not unique to the Air and Force, but the logistical challenges, specifically transportation, associated with decentralized operations for the Air Force are unique.

The ACE concept attempts to address main operating bases (MOB) vulnerabilities by dispersing small amounts of aircraft and associated support personnel to airfields across the area of operations for short durations. However, one of the In December 2021, the Air Force main logistical shortfalls is the lack of organic Air Force transportation assets to move support packages

fter 20 years of From AFDN 1-21, "... ACE shifts landing site. In addition to the initial support package, decentralized sites may require additional Class III, V, or IX deliveries, depending on the length of stay. AFDN 1-21 recognizes that this level of decentralization associated transportation requirements have never been within their organic capability. As such, they have highlighted the sustainment core element as a joint function.

> ACE sustainment requirements will have to be theater specific to fit the unique challenges and assets of the region. Specific to U.S. European Command (EUCOM), the Army could use the extensive land networks in Europe and provide rapid response transportation assets to make ACE a reality. ACE operations are currently delegated to wing commanders (O-6 command). The average wheeled

transportation availability for the command is somewhere below 15 platforms total, which will be expected to support the distributed operations and the MOB. These assets are likely barely enough to handle transportation requirements on the base, let alone assisting in force projection.

EUCOM Based on their requirements, Army Transportation can assist with a combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB) with transportation platforms and traffic management assets. An example construct and command relationship could consist of two composite truck companies (CTC) (Light), one support maintenance company (SMC), and a movement control team (MCT) aligned under the 21st Theater Sustainment Command and tactical control to 3rd Air Force. The missions using both organic and CTCshave cargo-carrying capabilities, the SMC provides maintenance support to the wheeled vehicle fleet, and the MCT will coordinate and manage transportation support for the movements. If we transition to large-scale conflict, CTCs also come with organic security to protect the logistics convoys traveling between airfields. For an even more modular approach, the aligned CSSB could generate forward logistics elements tailor-made to provide the movement coordination and platforms for a wing commander to execute ACE operations. At the same time, the maintenance assets remain centrally located. ACE is still a new concept, and the exact transportation requirements will differ depending on the aircraft manifest, airfield capabilities, and

duration of stay.

Before committing to support, the Army has opportunities to test this support model at a version of the Rapid Forge exercise the Air Force conducted in 2019 where, in addition multinational interoperability to tests, members of the 4th Fighter Wing set up austere command and control and maintenance assets to practice decentralized operations. A good secondary option is designing one of the several annual Red Flag exercises held at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, to test whether this Army structure is an efficient fit for their transportation needs.

Assuming this model is taken to the operational phase in EUCOM, the Army stands to gain considerable experience through coordinating and executing transportation host capabilities on multinational routes. In addition to operational experience, our sustainment units can begin understanding the types of international support and cooperative agreements necessary to streamline coalition logistics during large-scale combat operations. Whether this model runs for one deployment or many, the lessons learned could be valuable insights that save time, effort, and lives if we are forced to fight in Europe again.

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Specific to **U.S. European** Command (EUCOM), the Army could use the extensive land networks in Europe and provide rapid response transportation assets to make ACE a reality.

OPERATION ES WELCOME

Immediate Support to America's Largest Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

By Lt. Col. Matthew Rivera, Maj. Michael McCrory, and 1st Lt. George Ngoh



imminent danger in a Talibancontrolled Afghanistan. Numerous amounts of people flocked to Kabul to board U.S. evacuation flights and flee imminent danger. What ensued was Operation Allies Welcome, the largest non-combatant evacuation and ensure the speediest route to safety.

operations would consist of seven movements. distinct life support areas (LSAs), providing comprehensive life

n August 2021, as the Islamic buildings called the Deployment sustainment functions. However, Republic of Afghanistan Processing Center (DPC) and the this mission called for the unit to collapsed amid a blistering others as temporary camps. The Taliban offensive, thousands following is a recounting of 39th centering upon supply and service of Americans and allies saw MCB's sustainment efforts to operate Task Force Home through bulk of the work done by the ground exercising its mission essential tasks and providing non-standard sustainment support.

The 39th MCB's mission essential VI/VIII, and facilities support, which tasklist(METL)includesestablishing included Classes III, IV, and VII. operation in history. To facilitate movement control operations, These supply classes were provided the evacuation, Ramstein Airbase managing assigned and attached through a combined contractor, (RAB) in Germany served as an Air units providing transportation military, and civilian effort and were Force-administered intermediate support, conducting expeditionary scaled to match demand. These types staging base to provide life support deployment operations at the of non-standard support required the to evacuees. However, a high rate battalion level, directing establishemployment of 15 companies acting of inbound travelers and capacity ment of subordinate units and as camp leadership teams and two restrictions at final destinations in headquarters units, and conducting contracting officer's representatives the United States forced the Army's actions associated with area defense. (CORs) assigned to the area of 21st Theater Sustainment Command The unit performed these functions operations. (TSC) to expand holding capacity by assuming mission command of the Army's operation by establishing Life support and population a tactical operations command, morale represented the core of 39th MCB's mission. Over time, the unit establishing a unit area with Tactical Headquartered in Kaiserslautern, Control (TACON) infantry and established several lines of operation Germany, the 21st TSC established military police providing security, to guarantee a suitable quality of life the Army's complex on Rhine and leveraging organic and TACON for the evacuees. This was a complex Ordnance Barracks (ROB), close logistics units to lead camps and task that required significant to RAB. The unit selected to provide logistics support. For the optimization of the unit's approach. mission command the Task Force 39th MCB to establish its area of With maturation, reductions in Home operation was the 39th operations, it needed to execute supply chain disruptions, redundancy Transportation Battalion (39th large-scale deployments to achieve of efforts, and wasted time led to MCB). Task Force Home grew to full operational capability. Finally, successful mission completion. a holding capacity of more than the unit performed movement 8,000 evacuees and would support control functions to control evacuees' Provision of Class I, food and more than 12,000 evacuees by the flow between locations on RAB, water, represented a significant mission's end. To accommodate ROB, Landstuhl Regional Medical portion of the supply support and different populations, the area of Center, and other miscellaneous was complicated due to the evacuees' differing cultural expectations of food. The first step in determining While 39th MCB can self-sustain how to approach this challenge support functions, one being a large, in a garrison footprint, its METL was identifying the population's centralized facility with hardstand does not support large-scale external needs. The extensive Class I support

provide non-standard sustainment management. Supply consisted of the units involving supply Classes I, II, III, IV, VII, VIII, and X. These can be divided into two categories: life support, which included Classes I/II/

was obvious immediately upon stayed free of food waste. As the items. As the largest encampment, establishing the task force; however, mission matured, food distribution the DPC leveraged its interagency several assumptions about Class operations changed to allow family liaison to research, I proved incorrect. Furthermore, representatives to take food back to and employ several charitable adjustments occurred frequently as the living quarters. the unit adapted to sustain longerterm life support operations when holding times.

Quartermaster Company (55th caused confusion and resulted in the in a dramatic increase in evacuee underfeeding of babies and toddlers. satisfaction of the food and a transiting the camps had medical conditions and were skeptical of exercising flexibility in constructing disruptions in the Class I supply chain and varying portion sizes raised tensions.

military-contractor early days, evacuees would join long queues to receive and eat their meals from dining facility/cafeteria lines of effort to satisfy the need distribution point provided a baby

presented with increased evacuee I, 39th MCB used a two-track strategy. One was working with contractors to adjust meal support, While the issues with Class and the assigned CORs maintained Afghan civil groups, local religious I varied, a few were significant. supervision of the feeding operations The style and ingredients used to ensure quality. The other track was in the food cooked by the 55th to work through the 55th QM Co to adjust military meals by increasing QM Co), an attached field feeding the amount of served fruits, seeking company, stood in stark contrast to more recognizable ingredients, the average Afghan's diet. The lack and providing specialized culinary of bread, flavored rice, and fruits training. These efforts resulted Additionally, several evacuees noticeable decrease in undereating among vulnerable populations.

From the outset, 39th MCB their diets. Furthermore, avoidable leadership knew that the inbound evacuees would be mostly without clean clothes, blankets and pillows, and hygiene items. Clothing and personal items, Classes II and VI, evacuees to the DPC camp and 39th MCB adopted a blended respectively, were in great demand most of the evacuees to other LSAs. approach for the duration of the operation. It evolved into three independent to satisfy Class I demands. This Evacuees were initially supposed consisted of field feeding support to be in Germany no longer than and overseen by DPC leadership: to the DPC by the 55th QM ten days, and, as such, clothing the Red Cross distribution point, Co consisting of hot meals for laundering services and equipment the USO distribution point, and a breakfasts and dinners with rations were not contracted. However, this miscellaneous donations distribution served for lunch. Contractors filled proved unrealistic, and evacuees often point. The Red Cross provided the capabilities gap left by the 55th spent weeks in the encampments comfort kits, including hygiene items QM Co and serviced the rest of the while their clothing became soiled camps. During Task Force Home's and hygiene items rapidly consumed. donated clothes and winter wear

tents to ensure that living spaces for clothing, blankets, and hygiene bottle exchange service, donated

contact, organizations to fulfill requirements. These organizations provided To address issues with Class significant amounts of clothing, bags, blankets, toys, and other miscellaneous personal items. The liaison also contacted local German organizations, and other individual donors to coordinate the delivery of needed supplies. A later effort to establish a permanent solution was direct MCB coordination with the local United Service Organization (USO) and Red Cross, who provided structured, larger-scale support.

Class II and VI supplies primarily distribution occurred from the DPC's central processing building because the DPC was the largest distribution site within the task force. External LSAs would draw from DPC stocks to fulfill their supply demands. This central processing building processed all sections managed by volunteer leaders and blankets. The USO provided to the evacuees unused to the cold 39th MCB established multiple German weather. The miscellaneous



Volunteers and 21st Theater Sustainment Command Soldiers from the Kaiserslautern community give Afghan evacuees cold weather clothing items on Sept. 22, 2021, at Rhine Ordnance Barracks. The clothing came from donations from the local community. (Photo by Sqt. 1st Class Aaron Duncan)

requested items.

CLVIII, were also in great demand. vaccination doses and COVID patients for medical care. Before their arrival, leadership assumed inbound evacuees were likely to arrive with a wide array of physical injuries, infections, and behavioral health issues. The 30th with the language skills capable of to support this type of mission; Medical Brigade (30th MED BDE) procured medical supplies to provide continuous healthcare. 30th MED BDE established its initial routine an individual's symptoms and then supply Classes III, IV, VII, and X and

testing. The attached linguist team was

baggage items, and specific winter care clinic in the DPC central guided them to their relevant Role wear items. These locations relied on processing building, and increased 1 clinic. There, dedicated linguists interpreters to communicate with role is throughout the LSAs to reflect at each of the clinics would sit with customer evacuees and distribute increasing demands as the population the evacuees individually and assist enlarged. In addition to routine care, them in communicating with medical 39th MCB facilitated the distribution professionals. Linguists also played a Through the entirety of Task of thousands of Varicella, MMR, critical role in gathering personnel Force Home, Medical supplies, Johnson and Johnson COVID-19 data from evacuees and locating

> In addition to life support, facilities support played a key role in 39th the only element in the task force MCB's mission. ROB is not designed assisting medical experts in providing the unit made significant efforts care. For routine visits to Role 1 to establish and improve necessary clinics, interpreters first determined facilities. This required employing

capacity, cultural accommodation, and facilities maintenance.

The MCB used supply Classes for security forces and controlling adequate security. Fences and barriers movement within each of the were employed in all LSAs and the

the diesel-electric light sets, and other miscellaneous equipment.

III, IV, and VII to bolster security combined military and contractor light sets and fuel to camps that by providing greater observation approach was necessary to provide camps. Construction fencing was DPC. Camp leadership leveraged the erected along key perimeters for DPC's stocks of construction fencing access control, evacuee flows, and and traffic barriers to control traffic had an array of pre-constructed privacy. Furthermore, the unit set up flows, restrict areas, and obscure personnel holding areas (PHAs) that lights to ensure security forces had external observation of the camp's clear lines of sight at weak points operations. To achieve the same effects along these perimeters. Fuel was in the outlying LSAs, contractors, needed for the trucks and forklifts supervised by assigned CORs, used anticipated population. Planned sites

contracted services to provide security, transporting construction materials, preexisting fencing to establish parts of the LSA perimeters and then erected temporary construction fencing to fill gaps. Contractors also Due to supply constraints, a provided their own diesel-electric needed them.

> To address the impending billeting challenge, lodging capacity on ROB required rapid expansion. The DPC could house evacuees but lacked beds. It also lacked restrooms and showers required to accommodate the



Afghan evacuees receive the Measles vaccine from 30th Medical Brigade, 21st Theater Sustainment Command personnel on Sept. 18, 2021, at Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Aaron Duncan,



Soldiers from 21st Theater Sustainment Command provide security and assistance to Afghan evacuees at the transit area known as pod 51 on Sept. 9, 2021, at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The transit center provides a safe place for the evacuees to complete their paperwork while security screenings and background checks are conducted before they continue on to their final destination. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Aaron Duncan)

infrastructure and required temporary be emplaced. This merited heavy reliance on contractors to provide tents, climate control, restrooms, and showers. Contractors also provided inspected daily for serviceability.

Each of the camp leadership contractors to emplace tents,

for the other LSAs had no preexisting provided for privacy between men, and evacuees conducted more women, and families. Tents were routine cleaning in living areas. This tents and ancillary facilities to placed based on terrain availability, required an assortment of cleaning cultural restrictions, and inputs from contractors to allow for adequate organization and servicing. Evacuee methods to procure these supplies: use patterns informed the locations the DPC and the outlying LSAs with of equipment, and those locations toilets and showers, which CORs evolved to accommodate shifting needs.

Concerning facilities maintenance, teams coordinated with the relevant 39th MCB identified cleaning supplies and other miscellaneous Before construction, these teams services and waste disposal as considered the cultural norms necessities. Soldiers intermittently of the evacuee population and did basic, non-hazardous cleaning, Home and tapered off as the mission

supplies to ensure regular cleaning activities. The unit used two distinct government purchase card (GPC) and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army). High urgency and non-standard purchases required the use of the unit GPC. Camp leadership communicated immediate needs of miscellaneous items to battalion (BN) S-4, who restrooms, and other key assets. items and contracted deep cleaning further submitted requests. The use of the GPC was most prevalent during the beginning of Task Force predictability. Conversely, the use of then synch with camp leadership GCSS-Army was initially sparse but teams to ensure quality control grew to encompass most purchases of the services. If services were by the end of operations. However, dissatisfactory, they would follow both methods relied on BN S-4's engagement in procurement.

Servicing of contracted assets fell into two categories: hazardous services included laundering soiled bedsheets, cleaning restrooms and showers, and cleaning human waste initially requested or added to the established contracts based on emerging demands.

Soldiers collected laundry, which the contracting company returned throughout the week based on demand. Evacuees gathered their bedsheets before departing and deposited them in a collection from performing its traditional bin located in their buildings. Soldiers took the bins to laundry trucks parked at the DPC central processing building. Clean laundry Force Home. This effort included would return to the DPC to be two component services, three unloaded by soldiers and for further battalions, 15 companies, and use. Assigned CORs handled any several interagency organizations. delays in laundry processing or It constituted seven encampments' dissatisfactory laundering.

Contractors who provided restrooms and showers also provided daily cleaning services for their units. The servicing rates were detailed in operation cost more than \$24 the initial contracts and adjusted replenished once or three times a safety, security, and comfort to its day, their CORs would ensure the tenants.

ended due to increased long-term arrival of the cleaning crews and the same procedures to address issues as the laundry service.

Human waste and bodily fluid cleaning emerged as a requirement material cleaning and waste disposal. as the operation matured, and many Hazardous materials cleaning evacuees became long-term tenants. Since the MCB's Soldiers were not consistently trained for this type of waste disposal, contract adjustments or bodily fluids. These services were were necessary to ensure clean living spaces and proper site closeout. This occurred mainly at the DPC because it was the only camp to use preexisting hardstand buildings extensively. However, biohazardous disposal functions were performed at other locations.

All 39th MCB's efforts, ranging mission set to adapting to execute novel functions, culminated in the successful execution of Task missions commanded by a central tactical operations center, which provided critical life support functions to more than 12,000 evacuees. The entirety of the million and covered a wide array of to address fluctuating demand. contracted services and assets, which Whether units were cleaned and 39th MCB leveraged to provide

By the mission's end, ROB emptied and the units that led their camps had completed their recovery tasks. While this operation rests in the past, the likelihood of similar calls to action looms large in the near future. Across the globe, as governments falter and authoritarian aggression spikes, units like 39th MCB may well be called to provide life support to Americans and America's allies fleeing danger. From places in Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the need to learn from Operation Allies Welcome and Task Force Home become increasingly relevant to the U.S, keeping its promise of leaving no one behind.

Lt. Col. Matthew Rivera currently serves as the 39th MCB commander and commander for Task Force Home. He holds a master's degree from Kansas State University in supply chain management.

Maj. Michael McCrory currently serves as the battalion executive officer for 39th MCB and the deputy commander for Task Force Home. He holds a master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in supply chain management.

1st Lt. George Ngoh currently serves as the 1st Inland Cargo Transfer Company executive officer and was the deputy commander for the DPC during Operation Allies Welcome. He holds a bachelor's degree from West Point in Chinese- Mandarin.

Featured Photo

Capt. Emily Copple, 23rd Modular Ordnance Ammunition Company Commander. 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, leads the Operation Allies Welcome Female Engagement Team made up of Soldiers from the 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion. 16th Sustainment Brigade and 39th Transportation Battalion, 21st Theater Sustainment Command on Sept. 14, 2021, at Rhine Ordnance Barracks and Ramstein Air Force Base. The FET ensures a female Soldier presence at the temporary housing facilities for Afghan travelers at all times, helping to bridge cultural gaps and provide a supportive environment for men and women. (Photo by Spc. Elliott Page)

Institutional Operational

Doctrine Guides Collective Training By Lt. Col. Seneta Burns, Maj. Lehman Smith, and Capt. David (Chad) Moll

he primary mission of the United States Army combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas per Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations. The Army uses doctrine, organization, training, materiel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) as a lens for examining problems and developing solutions. A structured approach validates the problem statement and corresponding solution to a specific issue. This article aims to is and how it is operationalized into collective training products.

Army doctrine is a collection of do not understand doctrine's value fundamental principles, tactics, to the development of collective is to organize, train, techniques, and procedures on training products that impact the and equip its forces to conducting operations. Doctrine operational Army. conduct prompt and sustained land is an ever-evolving collective body of professional knowledge that Army doctrine publications guides Soldiers in performing (ADP) contain the fundamental military operations in the land principles on how the Army operates domain. It must be applied using as a force and those elements of sound judgment based on the the institutional force that directly leadership and education, personnel, circumstances of an operational support operations. FMs include environment. Changes to doctrine principles, tactics, procedures, and are driven by the operational other doctrinal information to help environment, observations, organizations conduct and train insights, lessons learned, force for operations. Army techniques structure, advancing technology, publications (ATP) contain and numerous other influences. techniques on accomplishing provide an overview of what doctrine Many of us within our ranks know missions, completing functions, doctrine publications exist, yet and performing specific tasks there are probably more of us who according to ADP 1-01, Doctrine

Primer. All levels of doctrine have Development Division operatio- Essential Task List (METL) as a asrp/.

the potential to trigger changes nalizes doctrine through analysis, Mission Essential Task (MET). A to collective training products. design, and development of MET, of course, directly feeds the The Combined Arms Support current doctrinal publications to unit's readiness rating as reported Command (CASCOM) Doctrine develop unit training products in through the unit status report. This Division develops the sustainment support of the active and reserve is just one example of a doctrinal doctrine (less medical) used by the components for Quartermaster, change triggering both needs force. It can be found at the Army Ordnance, Transportation, and and mission analysis by training Publishing Directorate website, multifunctional logistics units. If developers. https://armypubs.army.mil, and the doctrine outlines a new collective Army Sustainment Resource Portal technique or tactic for a unit to (ASRP) at https://cascom.army.mil/ implement, be it a crew or as high unit's combined arms training as a theater-level, that task will strategies (CATS). Per Army require a training and evaluation regulation 350-1, Army Training Doctrinal updates directly outline. Depending on the level and Leader Development, "Unit influence the collective training of importance of these tasks, such combined arms training strategies products developed by CASCOM's as having a direct link to a unit's (CATS) are METL-based training Collective Training Development doctrinal mission or capability, they strategies which support readiness

Updates in doctrine also impact Division. The Collective Train-ing could be added to the unit's Mission reporting requirements. They are



Sgt. Marquies Cotton and Spc. Devin Reyes, Army Motor Transport Operators from 51st Composite Truck Company, 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, deliver Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) to 1st Air Cavalry Brigade Troopers on Jan 26, during Allied Spirit. (Photo by Sgt. Jason Greaves)



Soldiers of 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division offload a vehicle during a training exercise on Sept. 24. 2019, at Training Area 5 at Fort Carson, Colorado . The Soldiers were transported to their helicopter landing zone by vehicles of Soldiers of 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 4th Sustainment Brigade, 4th Infantry Division prior to an air assault exercise. (Photo by Sqt. James Geelen)

multiple locations online.

designed to train a unit to perform its These valuable collective training Logistics Estimation Tool and missions, employment, capabilities, products, among others, also are Operational Logistics Planner. and functions, and contain all the located on the ASRP. The collective Lt. Col. Seneta Burns is currently the deputy collective tasks designed to train the training tab on the ASRP provides director of training and doctrine for G-3/5/7. unit." Naturally, an update to a unit's a direct link to the unit's METL, CASCOM, Fort Lee, Virginia. She has a Bachelor of Science in Bus. Admin. from Shaw METL would trigger an in-depth CATS, and UTL. Additionally, it University, North Carolina. She is a Master of analysis of the training strategy. The provides links to helpful products Project Management degree candidate from the University of Arkansas Grantham. updates mentioned above also will such as Sustainment Training impact the unit task list (UTL). Per Strategy, ATP 4-90.5, Logistics Maj. Lehman Smith is currently a doctrine developer in the joint and multinational branch, the training FM 7-0, Training, the Platoon Leader, the Division CASCOM, Fort Lee, Virginia. He received UTL is a list of every collective task Sustainment Brigade Playbook, his Bachelor of Science in Bus Admin. from Azusa Pacific University, California. He is a and battle drill the unit is designed and more. The ASRP also provides Master of Business Administration candidate to perform. The tasks on the UTL multiple training references to at the William and Mary College, Virginia. are specifically tailored to the unit assist with the operations process Capt. David (Chad) Moll is currently a seand updated regularly based on (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). nior collective training developer for the multi-functional training branch, CASCOM, mission and needs analysis by the Finally, ASRP has links to various Fort Lee, Virginia. He is a graduate of the Unicollective training developers. These virtual training products from the versity of Louisiana at Lafayette. He received a master's degree in logistics management products are accessible through CASCOM Training Technology from the Florida Institute of Technology. Division, and the latest Quick

Equip, Train Logistics Formations now to Fight, Survive in Large-Scale Combat Operations By Maj. Heath A. Bergmann

An Appeal to

Sunnebility

Opinion:

Combat Team Cross-Domain Maneuver teams (BCT) will conduct operations against the operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance near-peer threats. This publication's framework for modernization depicts how the Army will organize, failure to reach a supported element can jeopardize the train, educate, man, and equip itself to fight under tactical mission by causing the supported formation to the multi-domain operations (MDO) concept. reach a point of culmination prematurely. BCTs are employed within the MDO construct to conduct a range of military operations across the conflict continuum, from deterrence to largescale combat operations (LSCO). Operating with (BSB) and subordinate forward support companies 'semi-independence', BCTs fighting in a LSCO environment are likely to face resource constraints that make them more vulnerable to culmination. The These formations have had to improvise at combat lethality and survivability of logistics platforms are training centers, receiving external augmentation critical to preserving the endurance and extending the from within the BCT, or redirect inadequately trained operational reach of maneuver formations. Regrettably, sustainment crews to protection platforms. Neither of logistics formations within BCTs lack organic crewserve weapons systems and the skills required to fight commanders at echelon must compromise flexibility, and endure during LSCO. Therefore, the Army must firepower, or protection in other areas. In the latter, look to equip forward logistics formations with the distribution assets are simply unable to carry doctrinally tools and faculties to ensure lethality and survivability required basic loads, potentially compromising the unit's to sustain the operational tempo of the brigade combat ability to conduct one of its core missions: resupply. To team.

Multi-Domain Operations and Large-Scale **Combat Operations**

Training and Doctrine Command defines MDO as "how the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force (Army, M978A4, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck Navy, Air Force, Marines, or Space Force), can counter Fueler, and the M1075/M1120, Palletized Load and defeat a near-peer adversary capable of contesting System/Load Handling System, families of vehicles the U.S. in all domains (air, land, maritime, space, or cyberspace), in both competition and armed conflict." Importantly, MDO drives the Army's operational and Additionally, distribution and forward support organizational structures, and modernization efforts. Within MDO, "conducting LSCO presents the greatest challenge for BCTs and represents the most listed in any modified table of organization and significant readiness requirement."

Sustaining the operational tempo of the BCT demands turreted system securing mounted maneuver.

n 2020, Army Futures Command published logistics formations generate their own security and Army Futures Command Concept: Brigade fight through enemy contact to defeat threats. Without proper weaponry and training, logistics formations are 2028, describing how future brigade combat vulnerable to degradation and defeat, compromising of supported units. A logistics package (LOGPAC)

Current Mitigations

In their current structure, brigade support battalions (FSC) within BCTs are not equipped and trained to fight independently and survive across contested battlefields. these ad hoc solutions is without cost. In the former, alleviate this deficiency and sustain the endurance of BCTs, three critical areas require remedy.

The Issues

Army BCT logistics platforms, particularly the lack organic crew-served weapons platforms such as turret-mounted M2s, MK-19s, M240Bs, or M249s. companies are not allocated protection platforms to accompany LOGPACs. There are no turreted platforms equipment for these most forward logistics formations. Crew-serve weapons systems are in short supply inside Executing logistics operations within a kinetic these formations in general. The doctrinal employment battlefield during LSCO requires resupply executed of these limited assets assumes a dismounted and stable across contested and extended lines of communication. area weapon used to defend perimeters instead of a

Lack of institutional training further exacerbates quires profound change. The first in a series of changes this dilemma. Enlisted logisticians receive insufficient must occur within the Army's organizational design training on the employment of crew-serve weapons and doctrinal framework. The Army must update the during initial entry training (IET). Further, neither table of organization and equipment (TOE) to reflect logistics officers nor non-commissioned officers receive organizational changes in equipment and capabilities for training and certification in a mounted maneuver during BCT logistics formations. This revised TOE must direct professional military education (PME). In situations either the addition of protection vehicles (with requisite where the priority of fires may provide an opportunity crew) or require logistics platforms to include a turret and for the protection of LOGPACs, logisticians across all crew-serve weapon system. Given the addition of this

ranks lack the call for fire skills necessary to employ indirect fires.

Finally, compounding the paucity of equipment and skill development is the stateside training calendar, where operational BCT logistics formations simply do not have the white space to conduct mounted maneuver training and complete the gates to exercises such as convoy live fire. Meaning even if logistics platforms had turreted crew-served weapons platforms, Soldiers were skilled in employing these systems, and leaders could orchestrate mounted manand employ euvers direct and indirect fires;

current operational tempo and requirements to support include mounted land navigation and maneuver, crew-serve weapon systems employment, and call for unit planners within BCTs must carve out adequate calendar space or incorporate logistics formations into maneuver training to ensure ample time for logistics formations to build proficiency in the areas of mounted maneuver and employment of fires. Most profoundly Creating logistics formations that can fight and Army logisticians must adopt a new mentality that

The Proposal

combat arms training exercises make collective logistics maneuver training nearly impossible. In short, BSBs fire training. Operationally, logistics and supported and FSCs rightfully sacrifice their readiness to ensure that supported combat arms formations can train free from the constraints of inadequate sustainment. survive in a contested LSCO environment re- embraces proficiency within both the maneuver and

The lethality and survivability of logistics platforms are critical to preserving the endurance and extending the operational reach of maneuver formations.

equipment, the amended TOE should direct that these logistics formations can secure themselves while conducting LOGPAC operations. Lastly, a revision of the organizational design of BSBs and subordinate FSCs necessitate changes across Army doctrine to account for the employment of these new capabilities.

The second series of changes must occur in both the institutional and operational training realms. Within the institutional Army, the program of instruction (POI) for all officers, NCOs, and initial entry logistics series Soldiers requires revisions to



A Soldier with 325th Brigade Support Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, reacts to indirect fire during a convoy movement as part of a Home Station Combat Training Center brigade level collective training event on Oct. 20, 2021, at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, East Range, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. JPMRC Rotation 22-01 is a Home-Station Combat Training Center (HS-CTC) rotation that will build combat readiness in America's Pacific Division. (Photo by Pfc. Matthew Mackintosh)

the idea of warrior logisticians.

entire premise hinges on a material solution. Without plans. fielding protection platforms or turreted crew-serve weapon systems to forward logistic formations, there

support realms; a frame of mind that truly embodies execution of this proposal is sequential and necessitates the appropriate platforms and tools be fielded to formations and institutions before any significant A significant weakness in this proposal is that its changes are made to doctrine, POI, or unit training

Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the challenges are no cascading requirements to change doctrine or of adding requirements to institutional POIs. Time reimagine training for the security of LOGPACs. The is a limited resource, and new requirements must

come at the expense of some existing requirements. mission." The last part of this description is critical; The discussion here is one about tradeoffs and risk. survivability demands fulfillment of the mission. Fortunately, a significant portion of the POI across In a LSCO environment, survivability must take logistics IET and PME is directly replicated in precedence over force protection. This, of course, does everyday garrison operations and can be trained not mean the abandonment of prudent risk. But it 'on the job.' Conversely, as discussed above, support does mean that future logistics formations must fight requirements and operational tempo make collective through contested battlespaces to reach their objective. logistics training extraordinarily challenging. Therefore, If leveraging unmanned platforms can enhance Soldiers and leaders must receive this training in an survivability, then the Army should requisition institutional setting free from competing requirements, and employ these assets to complement logistics enabling time for instruction and replication. The skills formations. But if unmanned systems simply heighten gained in this institutional setting will pay dividends force protection at the expense of survivability, then in the operational setting, where experience and these platforms may be counterproductive during expertise can help maximize limited collective training LSCO. opportunities.

The Unmanned Vehicle Conundrum

Modernization and the pivot from counterinsurgency The Army Vision calls for the Army of 2028 to to LSCO brings complexities and dilemmas to the employ "modern manned and unmanned" platforms, to battlefield unseen since World War II. The future include "ground combat vehicles, aircraft, sustainment battlefield will see the Army contested by near-peer systems, and weapons." The appeal of unmanned enemies across all domains, with the idea of a linear resupply convoys has attracted the attention of the battlefield unlikely to match reality. BCTs will face Army's Combined Arms Support Command, where resource constraints in this emerging environment some have projected a "fully automated convoy system" while operating in non-contiguous battlefields distant to be employed later this decade. There are generally from traditional supply nodes. To ensure victory, Army two arguments in favor of unmanned systems. The first logistics formations must be capable of fighting and argues that unmanned systems will free Soldiers to surviving across contested lines of communication. complete other tasks. The second, and more popular, To this end, it is time we equip forward logistics revolves around the protection of the force. In other formations with the tools and faculties to ensure words, the use of unmanned vehicles will reduce the lethality, survivability, and sustainment of the risk of injury or death to Soldiers in the event of operational tempo. enemy contact. In essence, we are talking about force Maj. Heath A. Bergmann is a student at the United States Army's Comprotection.

The difference between force protection and Kentucky University; and a Bachelor of Arts in General Studies from survivability is often lost in the discussion about Eastern Kentucky University. unmanned systems. Force Protection refers to Feature Photo "preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions Soldiers with 325th Brigade Support Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, reacts to indirect fire during a convov movement as part of a Home against DOD personnel (to include family members), Station Combat Training Center brigade level collective training event resources, facilities, and critical information." However, on Oct. 20, 2021, at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, on East Range, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. (Photo by Pfc. Matthew force protection and survivability are not synonyms. Mackintosh) Survivability is defined as "a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary

Conclusion

mand and General Staff College. His formal education includes a Master of Arts in Public Policy from the University of Michigan; a Master of Science in Safety, Security, and Emergency Management from Eastern

Sustainment for Echelons Above Brigade **Engineer Operations**

DEL DELLA

Capt. Garrett M. Curry

armysustainment@army.mit | Enabling Fort to Port Operations and Setting the Theater in Contested Environments | 57

s the Army continues to refocus its efforts operations (LSCO) in a conventional quickly through a limited, defined warfare environment against peer space on the battlefield to rapidly or near-peer actors, two essential expand the forward line of troops capabilities of the combatant on the far side. Army Techniques commander are the capacity to Publication 3-90.4, Combined Arms breach enemy obstacles and conduct *Mobility*, focuses primarily on the wet gap crossings at a division- operational procedures necessary level or higher. These capabilities to complete these maneuvers are provided by the echelons above successfully. brigade (EAB) engineer battalion, listed sustainment tasks within which may be deployed to conduct the publication include movement these activities to enable mobility of control, bulk petroleum distribution, maneuver forces on the battlefield. recovery operations, maintenance, These operations may prove decisive if the Army fights another major crossing the gap and returning to conflict overseas.

While the Army continues to refine its doctrine for engineer operations, the ability of Army logisticians to sustain these operations becomes essential to their success. Most of the internal sustainment capability for EAB engineer operations comes from the forward support of the greatest sustainment assets company (FSC) assigned to each for the maneuver commander while battalion. These FSCs are tasked the task force prepares to conduct a with maintaining Headquarters breach or gap crossing. Movement and Headquarters Company/FSC control teams work at the direction vehicles and possess a distribution of the crossing site commander to platoon responsible for transporting ensure a steady flow of traffic from Class (CL) I, III, IV, and V to the near side to the far side of a engineer forces. Engineer FSCs operate under a heavy workload commander determine the number IX is on hand before crossing will as the only internal sustainment of crossing sites established based on maximize the number of repairs elements within an engineer brigade. terrain and the number of forces to that can be completed without However, it is important to note that be moved across. These assets prevent for a division-level breach or wet gap a backlog of traffic at the crossing crossing operation to be successful, site, which is necessary to push the additional sustainment assets will be correct maneuver elements forward participating within the task force.

The sustainment implications the gap while conducting logistics for a breach or wet gap crossing towards conducting are similar. They both involve large-scale combat large maneuver elements moving However, several and field trains are responsible for to build a bridge or to transport the near side in coordination with the task force engineer and crossing area commander. Most of these sustainment capabilities are provided by forces that are external to the

Movement Control

engineering element.

Movement control is perhaps one gap. They help the crossing area

package (LOGPAC) operations.

Bulk Petroleum Distribution

Bulk petroleum distribution remains an essential task in crossing site development as well. Refueling points are established in battalionlevel staging areas leading to the crossing sites. These refueling points will need to be established by brigade support battalions within the brigade combat teams preparing to conduct a crossing. Fuel points must also be made available at the crossing sites themselves to refuel bridging vehicles and rafts utilized forces across a gap. The petroleum distribution section typically establishes these fuel points within a multi-role bridge company, internal to the EAB engineer battalion.

Maintenance Operations

The field maintenance team is the commander's most effective maintenance asset on the far side of a breach or crossing. These teams can repair vehicles on-site using parts on hand. Once a vehicle has crossed the far side of a gap, it must either be repaired by the field maintenance team or recovered to the rear for any fault requiring additional equipment or parts to repair. Ensuring the proper CL significant hardship.

On the near side of a wet gap crossing, rapid maintenance of and enable field trains to cross bridging vehicles and rafts is bridge company, this also means must be carefully coordinated with that can be positioned forward.

Recovery Operations

to be prioritized according to from utilizing that crossing site area to the far side of a gap. to push forward simultaneously. Recovering an armored vehicle Higher Echelon Sustainment from the far side of a gap to the near **Planning** side for field or sustainment level maintenance has the potential to be tasks are performed by elements a timely endeavor. It may need to spread wait for the bridgehead to expand echelons, from brigade combat in depth beyond the crossing site teams, sustainment brigades, EAB to be worth the investment in engineer battalions, and others. the bridgehead is established, the these elements must be carefully maneuver commander will have an planned by the G-4 section within and maintenance operations for crossing, whether at the corps equipment damaged during the wet be carefully coordinated by the gap crossing or breaching operation. support operations officers within

Field Trains

Field trains

essential to preserve traffic flow erations delivering all supply to the far side. While the field classes on the far side of the gap maintenance team can conduct the following a successful breach or sustainment priorities relative to majority of this within a multi-role wet gap crossing. These field trains that sustainment planners must the crossing area commander. prioritize CL IX parts required to They must be prioritized based on repair these vehicles. They must be battlefield conditions relative to all readily available on the near side other friendly elements that must Army may have to fight, whether of a gap crossing to ensure these make a crossing. Field trains may in Europe or the Pacific. Planning repairs can be rapidly completed also have the added requirement sustainment for these EAB on site. Ensuring these systems of a return trip to the near side engineer operations will prove remain mission capable is crucial to of the gap following a successful essential to the success of division maximizing the number of forces LOGPAC mission, providing a or higher-level maneuvers within further consideration for movement a LSCO environment. Sustainers control planners. This return trip will play an active role in ensuring requirement will last for a wet gap operational success for maneuver Recovery operations will need crossing until the bridgehead on elements forging across barriers, the far side of a wet gap crossing whether manmade in breaching battlefield conditions by the or a breach extends 12 to19 miles. maneuver commander. A return At that time, the crossing brigade trip across a breach or gap crossing combat team would have the depth will prevent another element required to jump its brigade support

Each of the above sustainment throughout various time needed to complete it. Once The sustainment coordination of opportunity to conduct recovery the headquarters conducting the non-mission capable vehicles and or division level. They must also the sustainment brigades and brigade combat teams at the perform the echelons conducting a breach or backbone of sustainment op- a wet gap crossing. These sections

provide recommendations to the crossing area commander regarding the situation on the battlefield.

Breaching and wet gap crossing operations will become necessary during any continental conflict the operations or terrain based as in wet gap crossings. As sustainers, it is key we continue to plan to support maneuver forces as they prepare to forge these obstacles on tomorrow's battlefield.

Capt. Garrett M. Curry serves as the commander of Forward Support Company, 5th Engineer Battalion, 36th Engineer Brigade at Fort Leonard Wood. MO. He previously served as a 12B Combat Engineer before commissioning as a logistics officer through Army ROTC at the University of North Texas. He holds a Master of Business Administration from West Texas A&M University.

Feature Photo

U.S. Army Reserve engineers with the 671st Engineer Company and 301st Maneuver Enhancement Brigade cross the Columbia River aboard an Improved Ribbon Bridge raft system during a wet gap crossing exercise on Aug. 17, 2021, at the 555th Engineer Brigade's Yakima Strike exercise, Yakima Training Center, Washington. (Photo by Sgt. John Weaver)

Supply Chain Vlanagement in a Data-Driven World

Army Logistics University's Approach to Supply Chain Education By Capt. Matthew G. MacDonald and Dr. Robert Neeley

transportation end-user needs them.

SCM led directly to failure.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia them. is a classic case study in the failed planning and execution of Supply Chain Balance distances.

he production and the supply chain spectrum. Eastman such as Napoleon's Grande Armée. of Kodak placed too much emphasis It is important for the Army to goods and services on supply chain optimization and develop leaders with an awareness to those who need not enough on operational needs. In and understanding of its supply chain them has evolved over the centuries. the 1970s, Kodak was a behemoth needs. The Army tends to prioritize However, at its most basic, supply of a company that owned every part effectiveness over efficiency. This is chain management (SCM) relies on of the print photography industry. both important and correct. While converting data about the availability Their supply chains enabled the Army has an obligation to be of materials and the associated vertical integration that allowed good stewards of taxpayer dollars, demand for said supplies into plans them to profit in every aspect of Army sustainers also need to ensure of action to ensure the conveyance the photography industry: the warfighters have the supplies they of the materials when and where the cameras, the film, the chemicals that need at the right time and place to developed the film, the photo paper, complete any mission. However, this the printing kiosks, etc. Despite does not mean we should not search In June of 1812, Emperor pioneering digital photography in for improved efficiency. Increased Napoleon Bonaparte led his Grande 1975, Kodak was reluctant to alter efficiency and effectiveness are Armée in an invasion of Russia. By their historically strong supply chains mutually exclusive in an already the end of the year, he abandoned to adopt digital photography. As a optimized supply chain. Only then the campaign. In 1975, Steven result, Kodak incrementally ceded is it impossible to improve efficiency Sasson, an engineer working for market share until the company's or effectiveness without sacrificing Eastman Kodak, invented the first products became obsolete as print the other. digital camera. The company filed photography gave way to digital. for bankruptcy in 2012. In both of The failures of Napoleon and Kodak

Army Logistics University (ALU) these examples, improperly executed highlight the importance of having offers a Defense Supply Chain leaders knowledgeable of supply Management course that examines chains and capable of managing the effective and efficient balance and mechanics of the Army's supply chain. The course provides enterprise-to-tactical defense SCM SCM. After a summer and fall Efficiency and effectiveness are instruction to qualified military of campaigning through Russia, often at odds with each other in and civilian personnel assigned to his army, starving and freezing, SCM. Simply put, efficiency targets operational DOD supply chain retreated during the harsh Russian reduced costs, and effectiveness positions. Students learn how winter because there was no supply targets high availability rates. It to analyze the management and chain capable of supporting them. is important to strike a balance operations of the defense supply The French planned a long-distance best suited toward the goals of the while studying its competencies campaign focused on operational organization that the supply chain and major functions. The primary goals without considering the supports. As in the Eastman Kodak audience for this course is Army inherent challenges of establishing example, an organization can fail if Civilians assigned, or on orders to, supply chains over vast geographical it focuses too heavily on efficiency. a management assignment requiring An overreliance on effectiveness knowledge of defense supply chains can lead to failure resulting and distribution management. The lesser-known story of Eastman from unmanageable costs or an Exposing students to a broad view Kodak's demise communicates a assumption that supply chains will of the Army's supply chain enables cautionary tale at the opposite end of be effective under all circumstances, them to make decisions that are in

armysustainment@army.mil Enabling Fort to Port Operations and Setting the Theater in Contested Environments [6]

line with optimizing the Army's is equally important. Organizations visibility enabled CAG to identify overall supply chain rather than develop programs and implement sub-optimizing within a silo of procedures to maximize this excellence. The SCM course is a understanding to enable and enhance subject matter experts for assistance key component of the educational supply chain visibility. For example, opportunities provided by ALU to as part of the military response to Control Room does the same thing broaden career development and COVID-19, the Countermeasures enhance the performance and skills of mid-level managers working within the DOD supply chain and analytics system to maintain holistic view of their supply chains environment.

Supply Chain Visibility

Visibility and understanding of supply chains are vitally important to sound decision-making. Without is happening within the supply chain, leaders can't make informed decisions. This idea is so important that Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, specifies of the seven principles of mission

Acceleration Group (CAG) developed a comprehensive tracking visibility of all activity involving the CAG mission. The CAG system before they become an issue. provides real-time tracking visibility and data analytics of all aspects of their operation, including CAG

planning, vaccine and therapeutics a clear comprehension of what development, supply chain management, distribution, real-time tracking and analytics, vaccine control, security, and assurance to every stakeholder.

creating a shared understanding of Digital Control Room. Like the civilian sector into the military is the operational environment as one CAG system, this Digital Control important when developing synergy Room provides Airbus with and efficiencies. To accomplish command. Possessing a shared visibility throughout their entire this, the Combined Arms Support understanding of Army supply chains supply chain. Total supply chain Command (CASCOM) maintains

VCU for Sustainment Captains: Timeline

vaccine manufacturers experiencing potential issues and respond with and problem resolution. The Digital with parts manufacturers for Airbus. Having these systems in place enables organizations to maintain a and identify/address bottlenecks

Civil-Military Supply Chain Links

Many supply chain principles carry over from the civilian sector to the military. Due to the military's reliance on the industrial base, there is an inherent link between military and civilian supply chains. Therefore, incorporating supply In 2016, Airbus launched its chain principles developed in the

0-3 YR 6 IFEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL A YR4 YR 5 YR7 NOVIDEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV T NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AD JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL A 0-3 YR 10 2 YR 7 YR 8 YR 9 YR 11 IMAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUGSEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP O VCU-UTILIZATION IF RESIDENT CGSOC (11 MTHS) LOGC# (6 MTHS) C JAN FEB MAR PCS Move Ideal Candidates are here in their timeline

Timeline for Army Logistics Captains to apply for, attend, and service their utilization for the Virginia Commonwealth University's Master of Supply Chain Management Program. (Contributed Graphic)

with the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU).

Army captains to VCU to complete a master's degree in Supply Chain Management, a program centered on global supply chain management, innovation, and analytics. For the conclusion of this they need to see what is happening program, VCU professors guide the in their supply chain and present students through a capstone project recommendations to their leadership. centered on a real-world problem that an Army organization is facing. Upon graduation, the officers serve in a utilization assignment where military operations also threaten their organizations directly benefit military supply chains. For example, from the institutional knowledge gained at VCU. The VCU master's program ensures that the Army has

and practices, vital for a military operating in an environment facing constant supply chain challenges.

Data Analysis in SCM

Data production and gathering are more prevalent in an increasingly digital world than ever. Supply chains produce massive amounts of data in every aspect of their operations. However, data is useless without the ability to process and analyze it. This holds true in the Army and the civilian sector and is why ALU is developing new strategies to teach Army the Data Analysis and Visualization large portion of the world. (DAV) course. The DAV course is intended for civilian and military students who collect or analyze data to these potential disruptors.

a collaborative academic relationship to communicate to others. The course a key concern for the U.S. military. aligns with the Army G-4's desire to build analytic talent and create a smart data culture. Graduates of the DAV Army Futures Command all have Every year, CASCOM sends course can garner information from data using descriptive and predictive statistics and present findings using visualization techniques. Having knowledge of these tools arms graduates of DAV with the skills

Supply Chain Risks

New and emerging threats to cyber-attacks can shut down a supply chain just as quickly as they degrade operational security. The ransomware a steady supply of leaders on the attack on the Colonial Pipeline in edge of emerging SCM techniques May 2021 is a recent reminder of Kodak Company. Proper supply this. The attack shut down the largest pipeline system supplying fuel to the Army to maintain agile and secure Southeast United States for nearly a week. The COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed a plethora of potential areas of supply chain vulnerability. Labor issues, transportation shortages, and the non-availability of solesource supplies because of lockdowns are just a few examples. There also are unpredictable supply chain disruptions, such as the container ship Ever Given running aground in the Suez Canal in March of 2021, resulting in the complete closure logisticians how to analyze data. In of the canal for a week, effectively fiscal year 2020, ALU began offering cutting the supply chain from and to a

The military is not immune regularly or personnel who use data Supply chain risk management is

The Defense Logistics Agency, Joint Munitions Command, and deliberate processes in place to analyze their supply chains and detect potential risks within them. Military organizations increasingly use many of the same innovative techniques as civilian companies, such as machine learning, to manage their supply chains.

Conclusion

It is vital that the Army continue training leaders to understand its supply chains and stay abreast of current SCM techniques. Doing so can help avoid crucial SCM errors such as the ones that led to the demise of Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armée and the Eastman chain management enables the supply chains that are always ready to support the next mission.

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Arctic Winter Conditions **Effects on Tactical Field Maintenance**

By Lt. Col. Ralphael Jimenez, Capt. Alexander Banks, and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Brian Cox

aintenance operations in Arctic winter conditions carrv weather from and requirements mentioned in this operations in the Arctic winter.

variables, such as the need for heated mobility limitations and constraints. maintenance shelters, thawing vehicles, and longer work-rest cycles Arctic strategy, it is critical that unique due to ECW exposure which can challenges. This article will present affect the speed and throughput of what distinguishes extreme cold repair for any piece of equipment. (ECW) maintenance Understanding these challenges will temperate field condition help better prioritize personnel and maintenance. The specific methods equipment to support maneuver article for conducting maintenance This article is intentionally focused in ECW are primarily based on on performing maintenance at the in ECW field conditions. Heated feedback and experience of subject brigade support battalion (BSB) matter experts currently operating level and, therefore, does not address in Alaska. There are multiple vehicle recovery and its associated

As the U.S. Army pivots to the maneuver and logistics professionals understand the cascading effects of ECW on personnel, equipment, and planning sustainment timelines.

Heated Maintenance Shelters

Heated maintenance shelters are required to conduct maintenance maintenance shelters prevent coldweather injuries to maintenance personnel, bring equipment up to safe

ARTIC WORK-REST CYCLES WITHOUT HEATED WORK AREA				
LEST TIME BASED ON COLD WEATHER SMART CARD FROM NWICAR				
TURE RANGE	WORK/REST CYCLE	PLANNING FACTOR TO INCREASE MAC CHART MAN HOUR (MH) REQUIREMENT		
۶F	30 MIN ON, 30MIN OFF	2 X MAC CHART MH REQ		
0 °F	20 MINN, 40 MIN OFF	3 X MAC CHART MH REQ		
9 °F	10 MIN ON, 50 MIN OFF	6 X MAC CHART MH REQ		
BELOW	5 MIN ON, 55 MIN OFF	12 X MAC CHART MH REQ		

ARTIC WORK-REST CYCLES WITHOUT HEATED WORK AREA					
WORK/REST TIME BASED ON COLD WEATHER SMART CARD FROM NWTC AK					
TEMPERATURE RANGE	WORK/REST CYCLE	PLANNING FACTOR TO INCREASE MAC CHART MAN HOUR (MH) REQUIREMENT			
0°F TO -10 °F	30 MIN ON, 30MIN OFF	2 X MAC CHART MH REQ			
-11 ºF TO -20 ºF	20 MINN, 40 MIN OFF	3 X MAC CHART MH REQ			
-21 °F TO -39 °F	10 MIN ON, 50 MIN OFF	6 X MAC CHART MH REQ			
-40 °F AND BELOW	5 MIN ON, 55 MIN OFF	12 X MAC CHART MH REQ			

Figure 1. Artic work-rest cycles without heated area. (Contributed Graphic)

Maintenance tents. In addition to as a limited heating enclosure. The affecting repair throughput. FRS itself has a heating capability, but external tentage is required Equipment Thawing Time to contain the heat sufficiently to

handling temperatures, and enable Light Medium Tactical Vehicle, and damage to the equipment due to efficient and timely maintenance Load Handling System. The FRS on "cold induced brittleness" of the without the interference of wind- their own provide the capability for materials. Also, it reduces the risk to borne debris and extreme cold. small repairs such as battle damage maintenance personnel of incurring The BSB utilizes light-weight assessment and repair but leave contact frostbite from handling maintenance enclosures (LME), maintenance personnel exposed to equipment and materials initially commonly referred to as Field colder temperatures. The absence or at sub-zero temperatures. It should presence of heating sources in LME be noted that the BSB's current the LMEs, the BSB has a forward and FRS shelters will determine available LMEs require the use of repair system (FRS) that can act work-rest ratios and man-hours, commercial off-the-shelf heaters. No matter how many LMEs you have in a field environment, ETT will reduce repair throughput in Arctic winter Understanding conditions. This extremely critical equipment support maintenance operations in thawing time (ETT) is essential to factor is not accounted for in the ECW. The LME and FRS systems conducting field maintenance in Army maintenance allocation chart.

do not provide insulation and require ECW. ETT is an important limiting Cold Weather Work-Rest two to three 120,000 British thermal factor in conducting maintenance unit (BTU) heating systems to keep in ECW. Thawing can take 2 to Cycle internal ambient temperatures above 12 hours, depending on shelter Finally, in ECW, maintenance freezing. Without these heating temperature. Thawing time refers personnel should conduct shortened systems, the LME will not stay warm to bringing a piece of equipment work iterations followed by rest and enough to conduct larger jobs such into a heated maintenance area and rewarming cycles to prevent coldas engine swaps for High Mobility allowing it to warm up to ambient weather injuries. These work-rest Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, temperature. Doing this prevents cycles are dependent primarily on

ARTIC WORK-REST CYCLES WITH HEATED WORK AREA AND HAND WARMING STATION PRESENT FOR MECHANIC TO PERIODICALLY WARM GLOVES AND HANDS

WORK/REST TIME BASED ON DATA PROVIDED BY THE WORKPLACE INJURY PREVENTION GUIDE, SASKATCHEWAN OIL SAFETY BOARD				
INTERIOR TEMPERATURE OF HEATED SHELTER	WORK/REST CYCLE	PLANNING FACTOR TO INCREASE MAC CHART MAN HOUR (MH) REQUIREMENT		
0°F TO 10 °F	1 HR ON, 10 MIN OFF	1.2 X MAC CHART MH REQ		
11 ºF TO 20 ºF	1.5 HR ON, 10 MIN OFF	1.15 X MAC CHART MH REQ		
21 °F AND ABOVE	2 HR ON, 10 MIN OFF	1.1 X MAC CHART MH REQ		

Figure 2. Artic work-rest cycle with heated work area and hand warming station. (Contributed Graphic)

temperature, type of equipment specifically addresses maintenance for maintenance personnel. The being repaired, and the level of conducted in the open without improvement of productivity using acclimatization of the service shelter or heat source. The work-rest a heated shelter is shown in Figure member performing the maintenance cycle describes the maximum safe 2. The information on Figure 2 acts task. Once temperatures drop below time a mechanic can work "ON" as a guide for safe work-rest cycles freezing, the risk of cold weather the equipment followed by the for maintenance personnel operating injuries increases; once temperatures minimum required time "OFF" they in ECW and highlight the impact drop below zero, the risk increases need to warm up before resuming to work throughput. This table exponentially. Conducting main- work. The third column on the chart specifically addresses maintenance tenance in outdoor ambient shows how the required work-rest conducted in some type of enclosure temperature poses the highest risk cycle impacts the established man- or shelter with a heat source that of cold weather injury, and service hour requirement detailed in the raises the ambient temperature of members conducting repairs must Man-hour Allocation Chart (MAC) wear contact gloves to safely touch located in the Technical Manual for vehicle parts. Even with the best that specific piece of equipment. personal protective equipment, the prescribed work-rest cycle for subzero temperatures, shown in Figure LMEs with a heating source reduces 1, substantially increases to the man- the risk drastically, but this depends hour requirement for any given job. on what temperature you can can work "ON" the equipment The purpose of Figure 1 is to act as maintain inside the LME. Another followed by the minimum required a guide for safe work-rest cycles for factor in considering the work-rest time "OFF" they need to warm up maintenance personnel operating cycle while conducting maintenance before resuming work. The third in ECW and highlight the impact in an LME is the addition of column on the chart shows how the

the wind-chill computed real-feel on work throughput. The table a hand-warming heater station

the enclosure above environmental and provides an additional nearby heat source to allow the mechanic the ability to periodically warm their Conducting maintenance in hands in order to continue working. The work-rest cycle column describes the maximum safe time a mechanic piece of equipment.

outside or in an LME, leaders who are not hyper-vigilant on work- of repair of nine vehicles per day rest cycles expose service members based on the BSB organic assets (two to cold weather injuries. The loss repair timelines.

Logisticians planning operations in the Arctic winter must understand the cascading effects of ECW on personnel, equipment, and planning sustainment timelines. As discussed, variables such as heated maintenance shelters, thawing must consider for operating in ECW vehicles, and work-rest cycles due environments: to ECW exposure can affect repair speed, man-hour requirements, and equipment repair throughput. Furthermore, the Army maintenance allocation chart does not capture ECW planning factors that increase man-hour requirements. As the Army pivots to the Arctic strategy, maneuver and logistics professionals must understand the increased planning factors ECW to deliver the required effects to maneuver commanders.

Recommendations

Although there is limited research on Army maintenance in ECW, we have gained first-hand knowledge on the subject as the senior sustainer for our Arctic brigade. A battalion task force was utilized for our 2020 extreme cold-weather exercise. We

required work-rest cycle impacts the concluded that LME maintenance established man-hour requirement was critical for conducting larger detailed in the Man-hour Allocation repairs while increasing the speed Chart (MAC) located in the of repair throughput. Small repairs Technical Manual for that specific could be conducted in our FRS; however, the curtain system does not trap the heat well and is not optimal Whether maintenance is conducted for repair. We concluded that our forward logistics element had a rate LME and one FRS). We eliminated of personnel will affect equipment one vehicle space of the 10 available for battery pallet chargers because the extreme cold temperature for conditions necessitated additional battery charging capabilities.

> Based on our experience in an arctic airborne BSB, there are three general points that all Army leaders

- BTUs.

The Army Maintenance Allocation Chart does not account for repairs in extreme cold weather temperatures. It should include general consideration for repairs inside an LME and in the open. This is critical for leaders to account for the significant reduction in maintenance throughput due to ETT and work-rest cycles.

The Army must add a program of record for bullet heaters, improve heating systems for our LME, improve the FRS curtain system, and upgrade the FRS heater with higher

BSBs and forward support companies require additional ground support equipment

mechanics to support the repair of heating ventilation, air conditioning systems, machinery, quartermaster heaters and other related equipment enabling adequate personnel replacements due to cold weather work-rest cycles. Equipment thawing time (ETT) is a planning factor in repairing combat power for maneuver commanders. ETT must be understood by all echelon leaders while considering that conducting any operation in extreme cold weather takes 30 up to 1200 percent more time than operations in temperate weather.

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DEFENDING the **BSA** in an

Island Fight

By Capt. Jesse Nelson

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the first-ever home station Joint area of operations. While providing placing them in a situation where Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) scenario designed as an island-hopping campaign. The line lengths. The alternative is to forces in direct conflict. Therefore, exercise scenario featured an invasion place the BSA significantly closer being vital to continuous operations, by a northern army on its southern to the FLOT. This can decrease the BSA becomes a high-value neighbors, where the U.S. needed to or eliminate required SLOCs target. As a high-value target, the prepare a counter-offensive on the peninsula. The 3rd IBCT was tasked more danger. While there are ways air attack (CAA), indirect fire (IDF), with seizing an archipelago made to mitigate some of the dangers of and direct fire from special purpose up of five islands to protect sea lines of communication (SLOC) to the aerial resupply, more robust forward division's western flank.

island to island first to clear opposing forces (OPFOR) and then to retain the terrain. The 325th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) established a brigade support area (BSA) within the archipelago by the third day to sustain the fight. We found that the current doctrine and the modified table of organization do not provide the proper guidance or assets required friendly forces separating it from for the BSA to be successful in largescale combat operations (LSCO) in a non-contiguous environment.

Where To Place the BSA?

From the start, the island concept presents both the brigade and support battalion commanders with for a fight against the Chinese army, a new set of issues not adequately covered in multi-domain operations. The current doctrine states that BSAs should be established approximately 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, states that 20 to 40 kilometers (km) from the in a conflict, the Peoples Liberation forward line of troops (FLOT). This Army (PLA) will focus on targeting can be challenging or even impossible networks instead of shooters, sensors in a non-contiguous environment, instead of aircraft, and command

n October 2021, the 3rd such as an archipelago. Commanders and communication nodes instead Infantry Brigade Combat must decide where to establish the of maneuver forces. In practice, this Team (3rd IBCT) 25th BSA. One option is to establish the means the PLA will strive to achieve Infantry Division conducted BSA on the nearest landmass to the victory by isolating U.S. forces and greater security for the BSA, this defeat is inevitable rather than can dramatically increase supply attempting to destroy maneuver potentially exposing the BSA to BSA faces three main threats: close having the BSA farther away (i.e., forces. logistics elements, etc.), we will focus here on how mitigating the risks of For ten days, 3rd IBCT moved from having the BSA located closer to the FLOT.

> The BSA is, by definition, a large, cumbersome element not easily concealed or well suited for rapid movement. In the past, BSA security was often supplemented by nearby reserve elements or was established in areas with a large number of the enemy. What the 325th BSB found during JPMRC was that as friendly forces displace from island to island, the BSA can very easily find itself isolated, guite literally alone on an island. This becomes render the entire BSA combat especially dangerous when planning the most likely force the U.S. will face in an island campaign such as this. Army Techniques Publication

Defending the Sky

Since the Vietnam War, the U.S. has enjoyed air supremacy in its military operations. During this time, the U.S. Army has had little need to develop assets to defend itself from CAA or prevent aerial envelopment. The 325th BSB found this to be a significant weakness when, on two separate occasions, enemy aircraft were able to disrupt operations with CAA. In the training scenario OPFOR could only use small arms fire from a UH-1 helicopter door gunner. However, in a real-world LSCO scenario, the enemy could deploy a Hind D or similar helicopter gunship, and one attack run could ineffective. The rest of the IBCT would acutely feel the effects of such attacks within 72 hours as resupplies of food, ammo, and water ceased, and the Role II no longer functioned.

Mitigation of this threat is fairly straightforward. The FIM-92 Stinger Man-Portable Anti-Air Defense System (MANPADS)



Lt. Col. John M. Roy, commander, 325th Brigade Support Battalion, and Capt. Jesse O. Nelson, battalion S-2, discuss where to emplace the Brigade Support Area on Oct. 20, 2021, at the East Range, Honolulu, Hawaii. (Photo by Sqt. Julio Hernandez)

has a proven combat record against the FLOT, is IDF. In a conventional 325th BSB was quite successful even the most heavily armored battlespace, it is possible to place in this realm by using engineer gunships. Fortunately, emplacement the BSA about 18 miles behind the assets to emplace berms around of the Stinger does not require a FLOT thus allowing the logistics the Role II and the fuelers, thereby MANPADS operator. To become node to be outside of the range for increasing survivability. The BSB qualified, any military occupational most tactical level IDF assets. In an commander and staff must work specialty can attend a 3-week island campaign, that is not always with the brigade staff and engineer course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. After feasible. Therefore, it is critical that battalion to request priority for that, the unit would only have to several steps be taken to increase engineer assets while the BSA is resource the weapon system itself. the BSA's survivability. The first is being established. It is recommended that a BSB send dispersion and cover. Ensuring the four Soldiers. This would provide the spacing of vehicles and equipment teams, giving the base defense dramatically increasing the required operation commander a key asset to number of rounds the enemy must incorporate into their defense plan expend to achieve effects. 24 hours per day.

Defending from IDF

Another way to mitigate the battalion (BN) with two qualified helps ensure survivability by risk of IDF is to incorporate the use of counter-fire radars into the defense plan. Every brigade has 3 to 5 radars available, but they are generally tasked organized to Additionally, having protection help protect maneuver BN tactical obstacles such as berms around operations center (TOC)s. The The second main threat a BSA key assets helps them survive in brigade commander must weigh faces, particularly when closer to the event of an IDF attack. The the criticality of protecting the BN TOCs and the BSA and distribute IDF capabilities. While any good to assume risk to their logistics. center commander maneuver forces.

Taking the Fight to the Enemy

While counter-fire radars are excellent defensive measures, to 30 minutes an artillery mission bolstering the BSA's offensive can take fundamentally alters the capabilities could also prove vital. dynamic of the fight around the The main direct fire threat the BSA. BSA will typically face is a special purpose forces type threat: small **Conclusion** teams of highly trained infantrymen equipped with small arms, when to place it is always a explosives, and the ability to call vitally important question for for fire from mortars and artillery. any IBCT. This becomes even While the BSA can protect itself by more critical when operating in a blocking and reinforcing obstacles non-contiguous environment. In and crew-served weapons, the BSA such an environment, the brigade would dramatically increase its and the BSB commanders must combat power with the addition of determine where they are willing

the counter-fire radars accordingly. base defense plan must integrate Placing the BSA farther away This can be accomplished by either fires and have pre-planned targets, increases its security but lengthens co-locating a radar at the BSA or this usually requires artillery assets, supply lines. Placing it closer to the ensuring a nearby system is always given the traditional distance and FLOT shortens the supply lines but within range to provide coverage. placement of the BSA. While a exposes the BSA to a greater threat One of the issues the 325th BSB good tactic technique and procedure of direct and indirect fire from the experienced was that without (TTP), the reality is that the BSA enemy. Therefore, the BSA must any Soldiers trained in the use of will almost always be lower in the be able to protect itself. To do this, artillery, there was a knowledge gap priority of fires resulting in delays the BSA must have the ability to about the capabilities and value to fire missions if they even get defend from aerial threats; poses of counter-fire radars. This can be processed at all. To give the BSA the assets, knowledge, and ability to mitigated by classes and training the ability to place accurate and have an effective counter fire; and provided by the aligned fires BN timely fires without disrupting the finally, to be able to coordinate its or even a BN fire support officer. brigade information collection/fires own indirect fires. These measures In reality, a base defense operations plan or pulling too much combat are not comprehensive, and each cannot power from the fight, one or two of them requires prior planning, successfully employ a weapon 60mm or 81mm mortars should training, and integration to be system they do not know exists or be placed within the BSA. While used effectively. What they do how to use properly. As an added these mortars are valuable weapon provide is the BSA the ability to benefit, the enemy could potentially systems to maneuver companies, be a significantly harder target expose its IDF assets by firing at these companies possess enough than it often is. This allows the what it assumes is an unprotected other fires assets to augment the brigade to shorten its supply lines soft target allowing friendly fires to loss of 1-2 tubes. Meanwhile, this engage and destroy enemy artillery one small addition provides the logistics assets, thus enabling the before it can be massed against BSA with the ability to conduct a more in-depth engagement area development at the BSA. The operational environment. ability to bring indirect fire on a target in seconds instead of the 20

Where to place the BSA and

while ensuring the survivability of continuation of the fight across multiple domains regardless of the

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Feature Photo

Soldiers from 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Brigade Support Area prepares for nighttime operations on Oct. 21, 2021, at the East Range, Honolulu, Hawaii. (Photo by Sgt. Julio Hernandez)



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