JAPAHESE-PORTUGUESE MELATIONS AND THE "MACAO PROBLEM" (February - Hay, 1945)

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JAPANESE-PORTUGUESE MELATIONS AND THE "MACAO PROBLEM" (February - May, 1945)

Supplementing the study on "Japanese-Portuguese Relations and the "Timor Problem" (Short Title: FSIS 400-4), dated 23 March, 1945, this summary will reflect recent events in Macao and their sffect on Japanese Portuguese relations.

Prior to Pobruary, 1945, the chief disturbances in Japanese-Portuguese relations had come from questions arising in the island of finor which the Japanese invaded on 19 February, 1942. Although vagualy agreeing "in principle", Japan had not, by the end of 1944, complied with Portuguese demands for the withdrawal of troops from the Partuguese half of the island of Timor, despite the fact that Timor had lost its strategic importance with incriten landings in the Fhilippines. By 1945, Portuguese interest in the Timor question was everehadowed by disturbing events in Matono.

On January 11th, a Macao newspaper published a long article on "The Future of Japan", which included the following passage "most derogatory to the Imperial Family":

> "When discussing whether the Japanese Emperor should be exiled or should be drastically shorn of his powers and allowed to remain on the throns, one member recommended that instead of exiling Mirohite to China, he should be sent to join the other exiles living in London, but all

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the other members agreed that the Japanese Experer should not be allowed to continue to exist."

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Japanese Consul Fukui immediately called on Governor General Trixeira demanding that the paper be suspended. The latter effered his sincere apology stating that the blunder was on the part of the consorship officials. He requested, "Since I assure you that there will be no recurrence of this blunder, can not the affair be settled without involving the home office?" To this Jukui replied that such a matter involving the Imperial Family was very serious and it would have to be referred to Takyo. This difficulty ended with the apologies from the Fortuguese in Lisbon and a promise that there would be no recurrence of the act.¹

Five days after the "derogatory" remark was published Macae was bombed by an American aircraft. The target of the attack was the former Pan American Airway where gasolins was stored. Two persons were Milled and three injured. The Bowerner General sent a request for inmediate protect to the American Covernment, and Lisbon forwarded the domands to Mashington. The Japanese expressed their sorrow for this infringement on Pertuguese territory and eagerly avaited a wave of Pertuguese indignation against the Americans. But the results were disappointing, for in Pertugal there seemed to be a more or less general acceptance of the bombing as an

10 January 1945 10 January 1945

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act of self-defense on the part of the Americans since Japan had been using Keone as a submarine base and all storage. The Japanese Ambassador at Liebon, Morishima, attributed the lack of public resentment against the Americans either to Allied propagands or the undercover activities of Communists who, working to overthrow the Salasar Administration, seised this opportunity to cast doubt on the type of neutrality the present government was maintaining toward the Japanese.²

Eardly had the schoos of American bombs died away when, (on 2 Pebruary), Macao's six square miles reverberated to the shooting to death of the Japanese Consul, Fukmi. Highly incensed by this assassimution of "a representative of the Empire, in a neutral country and in broad daylight", the Japanese demanded that everything possible be done to safeguard the lives of their nationals and to apprehend the assassing. The Japanese Army, hot-headedly branding the Portuguese officials as a "bunch of criminals" endeavoring to "pull the woal over their syss", wanted to occupy Macao immediately.³

The Tokyo Foreign Office managed to quiet the Army officials and ordered an investigation of the circumstances of the shooting

E-167916, 24 Jan. 145; E-165800, 3 Feb. 145.

B-157109, 21, 6 Feb.; B-168482, 47, 6 Feb.; H-188080, 0-175 7 Feb.; H-167768, 022, 10 Feb. '45.

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of Fukui. Unconvering evidences that Chinese agents, reported to be in the pay of Great Britzin and Chungking, had spread throughout the area, the Japanese thought the crime had been suggested by the British Consul, but this was not substantiated. As the majority of the Macas police force, including the officer in charge of the investigation, was pro-British, it was thought there was small likelihood of finding the culprits. Consul Iwai, who arrived on February 12th to replace Fukui, reported that there was absolutely no personal enuity towards the latter, and the only explanation of the incident could be an attempt of energy nations to create an estrangement between Japan and Fortugal. Although the British Consul expressed his sympathy (unefficially), the Japanese were "highly suspicious of this performance". The Portuguese were not believed to be implicated but their police were considered a weak and inefficient lot.⁴

After considering the case the Pokyo Foreign Office decided that maintenance of Fortuguese neutrality, already under pressure of the Anglo-Americane, was of more immediate importance than the lose of a

4-170532,		11 Tebruary 1945
E-168168	5	15 Yebruary 1945
E-171098,		29, 24 February 1945
E-171384.		2 Xarch 1945
E-173352,	: 	3 March 1945

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Consul, and varned Japanese officials in Macas that they must keep in mind the importance of Pertugal as a source of intelligence. However, as the sheeting could not be ignored, a formal demand was premented to the Pertugness Government fort a formal apology; apprehension and severe punishment of the guilty; discharge of negligent Macas officials; a guarantee of maintenance of order in the future and the payment of condolence funds and dector bills².⁵

The next incident eccurred on the 19 February, when a Japanese Army plane made a ferced landing at a race course at Xacao.⁶ The Japanese Consul rushed to the Sovernor General and requested that the plane be given time for repairs and then permitted to take off. Teixeira replied that it was impossible to accede to this request, that the plane would have to be dismantled and stored and the pilot placed under police supervision. The Japanese reluctantly accepted this decision, seeing no alternative course that diplomatically could be taken.⁷

"Traffic doce not reveal the Portuguese Government's action on these desards.

⁵H-170647, <u>5 March 1945</u> H-172252, <u>7, 8 March 1945</u> ⁶H-170410, <u>20 February 1945</u> ⁷H-173190, <u>15 March 1945</u>

A week later, an American plane again bombed Macao, 8 affording the Japanese Consul opportunity to recall piously the friendliness with which Japan ascepted the forced-landing decision out of respect for Peringuese neutrality, and to contrast it with the lawless American bombing. Deciding to avail himself of the occasion to sound out the Governor General about the possibility of a fature change in Portuguese Foreign policy, the Consul advanced the supposition that the Anglo-Americans were exerting considerable pressure on Portugal to abandon her neutrality. The Governor General hastened to assure him that Portugal would not change in any way her fixed policy of strict neutrality, "However, if Spain should line up with the anti-Axis countries, it would create a rather difficult situation for Portugal". The Tokyo Fereign Office, reflecting on this statement, decided that "it behaves us to be more careful than ever in our handling of these relations, the more so in that the maintenance by Portugal of neutrality towards Japan will be valuable in checking a rupture of relations with Spaint, 10

The month of March brought two shooting affrays to try further the relations between Japan and Pertugal.¹¹ These appear to have

⁸H-158997, _____, 25 February 1945; H-169102, ____, 27 Feb. ¹45 ⁹H-159745, _____, 26 February 1945 ¹⁰H-178500, _____, 23 March 1945 ¹¹H-177802, _____, 14 March 1945

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involved activities of Chinese and Japanese undercover agents, resulting in killings on both sides. Sawa, (head of what appears to a Japanese Foreign Office special intelligence agency in Nasae)¹² heatedly confronted the Nacao Chief of Pelice, lebe, charging inefficiency of the Portuguese pelice and demanding that Japanese houses be guarded by competent Japanese guards. With acceptance of the principle that there could be only one police force, the dispute was settled, it being agreed that some guards, indicated by the Japanese as not being hostile, would be allowed on the force provided they met the neuel Portuguese pelice requirements.¹³

Sawa expressed to Tokys his doubts as to the wisdom of its negative policy towards Macano, which, in his opinion, was a perfect base for future United Estion operations and was already an Allied espoinage center.¹⁴

12 H-179787, - 21 April 1945 H-172784, H-174368 12 H-172784, 1, 14 March 1945 14 H-174358, -- 30 March 1945

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Reference to Chinase Communist plans to assist the American Army landings in China was made in a report to Tokys on April 2nd. One Liu Ping-Chang was reported to have been sent from Chinese Communist Headquarters at Yenan to consolidate Communist forces in South China in preparation for the landings. He had arrived in Macao on 19 March and had talked to the British Consul, discussing preparations for a "revolt" in Kongkong.¹⁶

In April, another shooting in Macao heightened the tension between the Portuguese Governor General and the Japanese. This time the vistim was the Japanese officer-in-charge of the Macao branch of the Canton Exval Attache's office. The killing was reported to be the work of a group of Chinese. Irate, Japanese Consul Iwai, refused to call on the Governer General, insisting that the latter call on him to discuss the affair. Iwai dwelt on the apparent inability of Portuguese authorities to maintain order and implied that they deliberately allowed the culprits to escape. Two days later the Japanese imposed a blockede on foodstuffs being brought into Macao. About a

18 H-173136. 49, 16 Karoh 1945

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week later, noting that the blockade had essand undue alars of the populace and a sharp rise in local prices, the Japanese decided that the "Portuguese had reflected sufficiently", and lifted the ban. As a gesture of good will, the Governor General ordered the suspension for two days of two anti-Japanese newspapers.¹⁷

A third bombing of Macao by American planes was resented by the Pertuguese, who felt that this was detrimental to their prestige in the Orient and to the lives of the thousands of people who had taken refuge there.

When Spain finally severed relations with Japan, the Portuguese Governor General of Macas. called

a press conference to announce that Pertugal's policy of strict neutrality remained unchanged. The Japanese Consul hastened to anneunce that Japan was contemplating no change in her relations with Pertugal.¹⁹

17 DS-#1140, 9 May, 1945; E-177922, , 4 April; E-179198, , 11 April; E-178159, , 12 April; E-178261, 14 April

19 8-170244, , 13 April 1945

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In mid-April,

British Consul ______ (salled and give _____ the fellowing message received from the Allied Command in China:

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"We are aware that the Japanese are bringing strong pressure to bear on the Government of Macse. Call on the Gevernor personally and tell him, so that he can play for time, that an Allied landing in the neighborhood of Macso is scheduled to take place this very month (April) in conjunction with landings in Indo-China and the east coast of China.""

The Governor General ______ had been following this policy and ______had conferred with his Chief of Police, Lobo, em the introduction of epecial security measures on the pretext of giving protection to the Japanese.- Lobe, meanwhile, let one of the Japanese consular afficials in on a "secret" (promptly passed to Tokyo), to the effect that the Governor General had been instructed to go along with the Japanese, and to do everything possible to aroid friction.²¹

Thile the Geverner General and Lobe scatted the Allied landing, the pepulace" evidenced great interest in the American progress on

²⁰DS-#1120, 19 April 1945

21 H-179463, 475, 30 April 1945

"Macao's population before the war was reported as 340,000, of whom 4300 were Portuguese, the rest Chinese.

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Ohinews and the heavy boshing of the cities of Japan, and were much impressed on hearing that about 1400 ships were used at Ohinawa, which indicated an early defeat of Japan. To combat this attitude, the Japanese Consul rashly announced to the press that of the armada only 300 ships had curvived Japanese attacks. But to his disconfiture, the Tokyo radio claimed only 13% of the American vessels.²² Mpperently decoming its present Consular representation in Maccoo inadequate, the Tokyo Foreign Office, disregarding Consul Ivai's plaintive protest that "too many cooks will spoil the broth, decided in April to appoint a Consul General to Macco, determined to keep Portugal in the dwindling list of countries not already at war with Japan.²³

By May, 1945, the Pertugaese and Japanese were both waiting for the next "incident" to occur in Macao. The Japanese were doggedly pursuing their pelicy of keeping Portugal neutral, while the Portaguese were humoring the Japanese and playing for time, heping to stave off occupation by the Japanese military until the expected arrival of Allied forces.

As noted in a prior report (PSIS 400-4, 23 Xarch, 1945), Pertagal resented the Dutch-Australian invasion of Timor as deeply

22 ps-fil20, 19 April 1945 23 B-180101, 22 April 1945

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as she did that of the Japanese. Mixtremely jealous of her sovereignty, any attack on that sovereignty whether it came from the Japanese Empire ar from one of the United Mations was bound to arouse her indignation⁴. Whether or not she still holds so closely to this view after enduring more than three years of Japanese officiousness, it is undoubtedly her hepe that the tide of war will pass around and not over Maczo, leaving that small island free from occupation by troops of any foreign mation.

It may be worthy of note that there has been practically no Chinese agitation or sentiment, official or popular, for either immediate or eventual return of Kacao to China; as against the very intense feeling regarding Hongkong. Present pepular and semiefficial epimion appears to be that Macae is more use to China in its present status, especially as the Portuguese have rarely been discriminatory or arrogant in Chinese-Portuguese relations. The Chinese believe Macae could eventually be regained by arbitration after the whole Asia question is settled.

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