




# MILITARY POLICE

*TRAINING  
FOR THE VERSATILITY OF  
A FORCE PROJECTION ARMY*

**FM 100-5  
OPERATIONS**



# USAMPS

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**COMMANDANT**  
BG Salvatore P. Chidichimo ..... 4333

**ASSISTANT COMMANDANT**  
COL Lucious E. Delk ..... 3626

**EXECUTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER**  
MAJ Thomas P. Harrell ..... 3371

**COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR**  
CSM Marcelino Malavet ..... 3603

---

**DIRECTORATE OF COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS**  
COL Michael P. Sudnik ..... 3016

**DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING**  
COL Charles W. MacPherson ..... 3763

**DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING AND DOCTRINE**  
LTC Charles D. Childers ..... 3413

**DIRECTORATE OF EVALUATION  
AND STANDARDIZATION**  
LTC Charles W. Cox III ..... 3851

**RESERVE COMPONENT  
INTEGRATION OFFICE**  
LTC Charles F. Hurlbut ..... 3112

**BRANCH PROPONENCY**  
LTC Denise E. Jacinto ..... 3183

**701st MP BATTALION**  
LTC Sharie H. Russell ..... 3927

---

Editor  
Lois C. Perry  
Contributing Editor  
SSG Hershhal Chapman  
Typing Support  
Word Processing Center  
Contributing Graphic Support  
Kenneth D. Godfrey  
Laura H. Berry


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About the cover. The new field manual, FM 100-5, *Operations* is featured in this issue. The U.S. Army Military Police School redefined and focused its training to implement the new doctrine. Military police must be prepared to support our nation's efforts in operations other than war or, when necessary, war.

This medium is approved for the official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:



MILTON H. HAMILTON  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

05478

GORDON R. SULLIVAN  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

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


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
**MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE  
AND  
BATTALION LEVEL COMMAND LIST  
(Inside Back Cover)**



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# Commandant's Notes

*Brigadier General Salvatore P. Chidichimo*



This is a time to study and learn the changes in our craft—to ensure we know where the Army is going and how the Military Police Corps fits into this plan. By now you should have read the latest 1993 version of FM 100-5. If not, do it quickly because you are behind the rest of the Army already.

As you read FM 100-5, you will see the focus clearly. The Army must retain its full capability to deter and win wars. However, in this new global environment, it must be prepared also to accomplish whatever other missions and tasks necessary to protect our national interests and reinforce the health and welfare of our nation. We refer to this additional list of missions as “operations other than war.” The continuum of war and other than war missions demands the versatility and flexibility that we in the MP Corps have been demonstrating over the past decade. A quick look at MP deployments from within CONUS and even from forward deployed areas, as well as the in-CONUS humanitarian assistance and security missions

that have been so prevalent, portrays an impressive mosaic of what versatility means. Truly we can go anywhere, anytime and do anything that is necessary.

Understand that versatility and success do not come easily. They demand extensive investments in training and leader development, since these two factors are the keys to developing great units. Training has to be focused, realistic and tough.

the level at which you are called upon to lead.

As the Army draws down and changes, don't get caught up in worrying about things that are not on your plate or within your direct sphere of influence—let the SECDEF, SECARMY and the Chief of Staff of the Army worry about the Congressional budget process. Watch your radar screens. Develop yourself. Develop your subordinates. Develop your unit. Improve the

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A quick look at MP deployments.... portrays an impressive mosaic of what versatility means.

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
Leader development programs must produce competent officers and noncommissioned officers who meet the highest standards in four competency areas: technical/tactical skill; understanding the human dimension and fostering an attitude of human dignity and respect; the ability to instill camaraderie and build strong unit teams; and the ability to demonstrate the full scope of leadership principles regardless of

quality of life for your soldiers and their families. Get ready, stay ready and keep the edge. When called upon demonstrate only one standard—excellence. That's been our hallmark. Continue to make it so.

You can take great pride in our Corps—its past, present, and future. Each of you bears the responsibility of representing our Corps each day. I'm proud you are there. God bless you all for 1994.

# Regimental Command Sergeant Major

*CSM Marcelino Malavet, Jr.*



It might be an understatement to begin this article by saying that we military police are part of an Army that is currently undergoing vast changes—changes made necessary by fiscal constraints, the end of the cold war and reassessment of the threats facing our nation.

One thing we cannot do in these turbulent times, however, is lose focus on what we are all about as an Army. No matter how diverse or incongruous an Army policy or program might seem, the unifying basic purpose is the rapid response and decisive defeat of any enemy, anywhere, anytime.

In this respect the Army is as efficient as nature, where nonfunctional ornaments do not exist. There is a definite purpose for every swirl and curlicue in nature, and everything is interdependent.

If we do not maintain our focus on the basics during these times of a seemingly endless spiral of programs and thrusts, we could easily get lost in the curlicues of some marginal program or theme. Here at the Military Police School our vision is clear; we are firmly on the path to meet the demands of any future challenge.

Leader development is the key. That is the emphasis in what our Commandant refers to as the five jewels of the United States Army Military Police School—Officer Advanced Course, Officer Basic Course, Advanced NCO Course, Basic NCO Course and OSUT (One Station Unit Training).

Leader development at the OSUT level? Yes. Leadership principles apply beginning with our most junior enlisted soldiers. Military police soldiers operate and control mobile, lethal weapons platforms dispersed throughout an area in three-soldier teams.

The importance of critical thinking in making proper decisions is vital in an operations-other-than-war environment where rules of engagement are one key aspect of what differentiates the scope of the operation from war. An error in judgement at this soldier level can have devastating repercussions at the international level.

The leadership excellence (LEAD-EX) model, under which each of our professional development courses is structured, is designed to teach leaders to think. This model ties each lesson to an appropriate phase of a unit's five-phase force projection life cycle: (I) prepare to deploy, (II) deploy, (III) conduct missions, (IV) sustain operations, and (V) redeploy.

Under LEAD-EX, a student actually enters the course as a commander, platoon leader, platoon sergeant or squad leader, depending on the course.

During scenario-driven small group instructions in each phase, students encounter and discuss situations that other students and the small group leader (instructor) have experienced in actual deployments. The lessons are focused on a specific phase and highlighted by case studies of actual experiences shared within a small group.

Upon graduation, students have accumulated a vast array of "experiences," and they take with them the understanding of how to successfully deploy a unit. Thus prepared, leaders can more easily bridge the gap to solve problems in theretofore unfamiliar situations.

Intertwined within each phase and lesson are four competencies essential to military police mission success in today's changing environment.

These competencies are skill proficiency, human dimension and attitude, camaraderie and teamship, and leadership. These competencies mesh with the latest edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*—the Army's keystone doctrinal manual. The manual states that the combination of quality soldiers and professional, caring, and competent leaders in versatile cohesive units presents an indomitable force on the battlefield.

Institutionalizing these four competencies throughout the Regiment will maintain our focus on what really matters, the bottom line of our purpose as an Army—*winning wars*.

About our first competency, skill proficiency, FM 100-5 states that no peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession, understanding the human dimension of leadership, becoming tactically and technically proficient and preparing for war. It is essential to building trust and confidence that leaders master their job.

*(continued on page 4)*

## 1993 Winner of the J. P. Holland Award

The 1993 winner of the annual Brigadier General Jeremiah P. Holland Award was recently announced by the Department of the Army. Taking top honors was the 300th Military Police Company from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The 300th MP Company was determined to be the best active duty military police company based upon performance during fiscal year 1993. Military police companies worldwide compete for this award annually. The overall winner is selected by senior Army and military police soldiers based upon "recorded accomplishments, achievements, and command programs which best exemplify the intent of the award's sponsor" (AR 672-11, *Brigadier General Jeremiah P. Holland Award*).



Brigadier General  
Jeremiah P. Holland

General Holland, a 1927 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, was a distinguished military police officer who retired in 1969. He was a former Commanding General of the Provost Marshal General Center, and Commandant of the Provost Marshal General School at Camp Gordon, GA, from 1952-53 and from 1956-57. After his retirement he sponsored this award to promote *esprit de corps* and professionalism in military police units throughout the active Army.

Runners-up for the award were the 6th Military Police Company, Fort Richardson, AK, and the 501st Military Police Company, 1st Armored Division, Germany.

### *(Regimental Command Sergeant Major Marcelino Malavet, Jr. continued)*

The human dimension, our second competency, is also addressed in FM 100-5. The FM devotes an entire chapter to the human dimension; the last chapter emphasizes the environment of combat.

This chapter is last, I believe, not because of its relative importance to the context of the publication but because, again, it is bottom line. All of the strategic ozone-level planning becomes fact in what FM 100-5 describes as the domain of soldiers: freezing rain, muddied foxholes, blistering heat, physical exertion, and imminent danger.

The FM states that very explicitly. Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army's doctrine and fighting ability... Soldiers are the heart and soul of the Army... Wars are fought and won by soldiers, not machines. Leaders need to be especially sensitive to the human dimension and the effects of the environment of combat on their soldiers.

Sensitivity to people is a key aspect of our duties as military police. The mottos of our Corps and Regiment attest that fact—*Of the Troops, for the*

*Troops and Assist, Protect, Defend.* We are in the people business, and again an indispensable ingredient in an operations-other-than-war environment is the proper interaction with the local populace, based on genuine respect for their culture.

*Camaraderie* and teamship bond soldiers to each other and to a cause. Without this bonding there would be only a loose group of tactical technicians lacking the commitment to persevere during the hardships encountered while operating in dangerous, hostile or inhospitable environments.

Interestingly enough, teamship has the same effect on civilian organizations. The director of the Military Police rehabilitative training instructor course (a demanding two-week course for civilian corrections officers) received a letter from a former student. The student wrote that it was the bonding concept that gave her the crutch to endure the two weeks; after all, her worst fear was letting her fellow candidates down. (*Whomp*, there it is.)

Selfless service, personal commitment or sacrifice for fellow soldiers,

to the unit, to the cause. The one soldier who sacrifices himself or herself by absorbing the impact of a grenade with their body to save other soldiers is the ultimate manifestation of *camaraderie*. We hear about such heroic deeds time and time again during conflicts. *Camaraderie* and teamship are powerful stuff.

Leadership is the overriding encompassing competency. Once again this competency tightly meshes with FM 100-5—the most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Leaders inspire, direct, motivate, give cause to and provide the will to win in conflict; and this, too, is powerful stuff.

This is the bottom line: leading soldiers to accomplish their mission. Regardless of the direction or challenges the future holds in store for us, consistent, high quality leaders at all levels will make the difference. The leadership excellence model and immersion in the four essential military police competencies are preparing leaders for mission success.

# Honorary Colonel and Sergeant Major of the Military Police Corps Regiment



**Honorary Colonel of the  
Military Police Corps Regiment,  
Eugene R. Cromartie**

Congratulations to Major General (Ret) Eugene R. Cromartie, Honorary Colonel of the Military Police Corps Regiment and Command Sergeant Major (Ret) Joshua Perry, Jr., Honorary Sergeant Major of the Military Police Corps Regiment. The former military police career soldiers were appointed December 10, 1993, to serve for three years in their respective positions.

The Honorary Colonel of the Regiment is charged with representing all MP Regimental soldiers, active and reserve components, to include those in a retired status. Important functions include carrying on and fostering the honor and traditions of the Regiment in ceremonies and functions and generally assisting and perpetuating the Regimental history.

The Honorary Sergeant Major of the Regiment serves as the principal advisor to the Honorary Colonel and assists and coordinates with the Command Sergeant Major of the Regiment to promote the lineage, honors and *esprit de corps* of the Regiment as a whole.

General Cromartie retired from active duty in 1990, capping a long and distinguished career as the Commander of Criminal Investigation Command, (CID), Falls Church, VA. Among his many other assignments

he has commanded a Military Police Company, two Military Police Battalions and served as Provost Marshal of the 82d Airborne Division and U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army. He was commissioned in 1957 through the Florida A&M ROTC program. In 1968 he earned a master of science degree in education and counseling from the University of Dayton.



**Honorary Sergeant Major of the  
Military Police Corps Regiment,  
Joshua Perry, Jr.**

Command Sergeant Major Joshua Perry retired in 1990 after serving as the top enlisted military police soldier in the Corps/Regiment, the Military Police Regimental Sergeant Major, Fort McClellan, AL. His military education includes the basic and advanced military police NCO courses and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. His assignments have included military police NCO duties throughout the world to include Korea and Germany.

Along with our congratulations to the new incumbents go our thanks to the previous Honorary Colonel and Sergeant Major of the MP Regiment, Colonel (Ret) Orville N. Butts and Command Sergeant Major (Ret) Roland M. Gaddy.

Colonel Butts served as Honorary Colonel from December 5, 1989 to December 9, 1993. As a career military police officer he has served in a

large variety of command and staff positions from platoon leader to brigade commander. He holds a masters degree in administration of criminal justice and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy.



**Previous Honorary Colonel of the  
Military Police Corps Regiment,  
Orville N. Butts**

Command Sergeant Major Gaddy's last assignment was Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Military Police School. In that position he became the first Regimental Sergeant Major in 1986. He served as Honorary Regimental Sergeant Major from September 17, 1990, to December 9, 1993. He served three tours in Korea, one tour in Vietnam, two tours in Germany and several stateside tours.



**Previous Honorary Sergeant Major of  
the Military Police Corps Regiment,  
Roland M. Gaddy.**

The first Honorary Colonel and Sergeant Major of the Regiment were Major General (Ret) Harley L. Moore (September 29, 1984 – December 4, 1989) and Command Sergeant Major (Ret) James W. Frye (September 26, 1986 – September 19, 1990).

# LEADEX: Training Leaders for the Versatility of a Force Projection Army

by

*Brigadier General Salvatore P. Chidichimo*

There is a sobering, demanding reality that says that a lieutenant graduating from the Military Police Officer Basic Course (MPOB) and a captain graduating from the Military Police Officer Advanced Course (MPOA) will likely deploy to an ongoing or new contingency operation within three to six months of graduation.

Since the purpose of these courses is to train platoon leaders and company commanders, the implication for teaching leadership competence is significant.

## Continuous and Simultaneous Operations

A short review of MP unit deployments over the past thirteen years

demonstrates the essence of what a force projection Army means. The operational continuum (see figure 1 and the notes at the end of this article) reflects the commitment of MP units across the whole spectrum of war and other-than-war scenarios, often deploying first and remaining into later stages of follow-on termination operations.

Their recognized mission capabilities, unique expertise in dealing with the demands of the human dimension of cross-cultural operations, and their universal acceptance as a force focused on security, safety and conflict resolution using minimum force techniques—all have contributed to their

repetitive selection in a primary or supporting role.

It is important to reemphasize that, once called upon, military police often stay longer than initially anticipated, since sustainability is such a major factor in readiness.

Looking at MP deployment operations over the past two years demonstrates the epitome of continuous and simultaneous operations—force projection at its finest. Over the past four years we have focused on developing the most capable graduates of MPOB, MPOA, ANCOC and BNCOC who are prepared on graduation day to take their place as a leader in this MP deployment environment.




Figure 1. The operational continuum reflects the commitment of MP units across the whole spectrum of war and other-than-war scenarios.

## Versatility as a Function of Tasks, Conditions and Standards

A major part of leadership preparation is developing someone who can lead units in a variety of missions and under a vast array of situations. Versatility is usually discussed in terms of the ability to accomplish different missions (tasks).

Those missions/tasks may be a part of our mission essential task list or within our unit capabilities, or they may be new missions/tasks that are not normally seen as part of a unit's standard capabilities list—such as fight Operation Desert Storm and then reconstitute a civilian community after Hurricane Andrew. However, versatility also has significant meaning in the *conditions* under which we perform our missions/tasks and therefore has a major impact on training leaders and units. For example, the following are conditions under which missions/tasks are performed:

- Operate in a variety of global regions.
- Operate under various climate and terrain situations.
- Operate in different cultural settings with a variety of political, economic, social and religious systems.
- Operate in an environment where local populations are friendly (supportive) or unfriendly (un-supportive).
- Operate in an environment where large populations of displaced persons, refugees, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) may be encountered (perhaps early on).
- Operate where host-nation systems are still intact *versus* where factionalism or chaos exists.
- Operate in a coalition outside the continental United States (OCONUS) or in a multiagency CONUS environment.
- Operate where coalition forces are strong, weak or fragile.



LEADEX principles stress leadership and competence building skills during each phase of an MP unit's deployment cycle.

Standards also play a role in versatility. We must be able to identify and adapt to different standards based on the situation—able to go from chaos and zero standard to an acceptable standard, then to our desired standard.

This is most important as we deal with regions, cultures and natural or man-made disasters where our norms and quest for excellence cause us to be impatient and dissatisfied with incremental success. It is real success when you just feed people first, then give them food so they can feed themselves and then help open retail stores so they can buy food and return to self-sufficiency.

It is interesting to consider that operations such as disaster relief are not so different from missions and tasks commanders inherently own. Commanders are fully responsible for the quality of life of soldiers and families and are used to creating and maintaining infrastructure support in peace and war—consider what a division or installation commander does for his military “city community.”

It should not be a surprise that such an individual with a depth of leadership

and management expertise could exercise the versatility to accept performing that mission under the most adverse conditions and within a system of incremental success standards.

### Major Focus for MP Professional Development Training

To meet the challenges of a force projection Army, we have developed four primary focus areas for MP training in one station unit training (OSUT), Noncommissioned Officers Education System (NCOES) and Officer Education System (OES) programs:

- Task and skill proficiency.
- Understanding the human dimension and attitudinal development.
- Camaraderie and team building.
- Leadership competence.

These are the building blocks for the performance capability we expect from an individual we allow to exercise discretion over others, protect and assist those in need, and carry out the varying demands of MP wartime and other-than-war missions. The balance of skill level and level of emphasis on each of



CID Special Agents conduct an interview during Operation Desert Shield.

these is the basis for training development and training execution decisions that lead to the correct program of instruction (POI) for the sequence of MP professional development courses. The result is a versatile, competent leader.

Task and skill proficiency relates to the individual tasks and associated collective tasks that are part of our four basic missions of battlefield circulation control, area security, handling EPWs and law enforcement. It includes not only the tasks, but also execution under a variety of conditions and to a variety of standards as was discussed previously.

Understanding the human dimension is a pacing item to military police success. Not only must we teach the dynamics of dealing with people across the domestic and international cultural spectrum, but we must also instill the core human values such as fairness, patience, compassion and caring that become pivotal determinants of success in situations of stress, conflict, conflict resolution and deterrence, and so many of the scenarios that are part of the other-than-war missions.

There is an expectation that MPs will do that well, and we are called upon in many instances because of that training focus and proven operational capability. It is that dimension of MP performance that causes success in Cuban refugee settlement operations, in the relief operations in St. Croix and in the many operations on foreign soil (shown in figure 1) where continuous sensitive contacts with local populations and host-nation authorities are often fragile and tense.

Camaraderie and team building have always been important, but are more so now for our continually deployed MP forces and for the context of our force projection Army. Continuous deployments and the demands of peak levels of readiness make strong bonded units a must to ensure long-term support systems in difficult times and to reinforce the attitude of a willingness to meet any challenge, anytime, anywhere. This is the catalyst that turns good units into great units and is another key factor in meeting the challenges of sustainability.

Leadership has the prominent place as the critical, overriding task

taught in our NCOES and OES courses. But, because of the nature of how even our young enlisted MP men and women operate, it also becomes a part of what we try to expose them to in OSUT (even though at most rudimentary levels).

#### **LEADDEX as a Vehicle for Success**

The vehicle developed for our professional development courses that has produced the noncommissioned officer and officer leader who is competent to lead in a platoon or company is the Leadership Excellence (LEADDEX) model. It immerses the student into his or her role from day one, into scenario situations that teach and stress tasks, conditions and standards.

It incorporates the task and skill proficiency with the human dimension and teamship elements and focuses leader development against a situational context that is real and likely to be encountered in field MP units. It is sequential and progressive and prepares the student for leadership in the deployment cycles of a force projection Army. Figure 2 reflects the program model.

The goal is that by the time the student departs the course, he or she will have already "commanded" a platoon or company through the course. The student sees that reality from day one, when assigned on orders as the "commander" or "platoon leader" of a notional unit. All aspects of the course are taught in the context of that unit.

By using active student involvement in scenario-based instruction, the course blends the best of task learning with the key ingredient of learning how to think in challenging situations. The strategy is to help develop numerous situational templates in the mind of the student that can be recalled, tempered by critical application to new situations, and lead to good decisions.

Since we know the strength of kinesthetic and visual learning, the methods and media used are designed to create *training flashback* for the student at a later time. The better the training, the more vivid the flashbacks and the better the chance that training will be transferred effectively to the solution of a real-world issue.

The success of this training strategy has been noteworthy. Our MP battalion and brigade commanders are most pleased with the capabilities of our graduates. The real proof has been in their performance over the past four years as the military police have been called upon for extensive deployments across the whole spectrum of wartime and other-than-war missions. It is most

effective for teaching leaders who will operate in a force projection Army.

Future enhancements will increase the scenario options with more versatility of tasks, conditions and standards across the mission spectrum and across a variety of regional locations. Our goal is to reinforce competence, versatility, flexibility and depth of contribution for our MP units.

Our expectation is that our leaders will be prepared to be a task force leader or lead as part of a task force commanded by another. Our precommand focus includes significant discussion of the MP battalion and brigade as a lead task force, given the numerous scenarios where that clearly fits in our force projection Army.

LEADEX is meeting the demands of a Military Police Corps that has been deeply involved in force projection operations over the past thirteen years. We have learned that readiness is not just preparedness as measured by unit readiness reports; it is a state of mind of the soldiers and leaders of that unit. LEADEX is a winner. It has made us ready. It will help keep our leaders ready to go anywhere, anytime and do any mission assigned in support of our national strategy.

**Brigadier General Salvatore P. Chidichimo** is the Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School and Deputy Commanding General, Fort McClellan, Alabama. A graduate of the National War College, he holds a bachelor's degree from Seton Hall University and a master's degree in education from Rutgers University. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the continental United States and overseas, including command of a combat support MP battalion and brigade and provost marshal at division, corps and major command levels.

(General Chidichimo's article, "Training Leaders for a Force Projection Army," appeared in the March, 1993 issue of *Military Review*.)




Figure 2. The vehicle for success in our professional development courses that has produced the noncommissioned officer and officer leader who is competent to lead in a platoon or company is the Leadership Excellence (LEADEX) model.

## NOTES

### MILITARY POLICE DEPLOYMENTS (1980-1993)

**Cuban Refugee Resettlement Operation.** Covering the period May, 1980 through February, 1982 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; and Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; Eglin AFB, Florida. Military police units deployed in humanitarian assistance efforts during that period were the 759th MP Battalion, 720th MP Battalion, 716th MP Battalion, and the 519th MP Battalion with support from the 1st MP Company, 9th MP Company, 502d MP Company, the PRARNG, and many other Reserve and National Guard units.

**Operation Hawkeye.** Humanitarian assistance provided to St. Croix, Virgin Islands in the aftermath of hurricane Hugo in September and October, 1989. Military police units deployed to provide support during that period were the 16th MP Brigade, the 503d MP Battalion and the 720th MP Battalion. Military police companies deployed were the 21st, 65th, 108th, 411th, 258th, 463d and the 10th MP Det (CID).

**Operation Provide Comfort.** April, 1991 through July, 1991 humanitarian assistance operation conducted in northern Iraq. Military police from USAREUR, 18th MP Brigade, 709th MP Battalion, 527th and 284th MP Companies deployed in support of this operation.

**Guantanamo.** Humanitarian assistance operations in Cuba were conducted during the period November, 1991 through the end of November, 1992. Military police units deployed were the 504th MP Battalion, 759th MP Battalion, and the 503d MP Battalion. Military police companies deployed were the 108th, 209th, 437th, 5th, 984th, 411th, 21st, 571st, and the 555th.

**JTF-Andrew.** Humanitarian assistance provided in south Florida in the aftermath of hurricane Andrew in August through October, 1992. Military police units deployed were the 16th MP Brigade, 503d MP Battalion, and the 519th MP Battalion. Military police companies deployed were the 118th, 988th, 209th, 293d, 437th, 978th, 82d, and the 10th. Also deployed were the 3d MP Group and the 87th and 86th MP Dets (CID).

**Operation Provide Relief.** October, 1992 through February, 1993 humanitarian assistance operation was conducted in Mombasa, Kenya. Two military police platoons from USAREUR supported this operation—one platoon of the 287th MP Company, Berlin Brigade, during October through December, 1992 and one platoon of the 272d MP Company, 95th MP Battalion, 14th MP Brigade during December, 1992 through February, 1993.

**Provide Promise.** Rotating squads from the 18th MP Brigade performed security operations in Croatia, from November, 1992 to November 1993.

**Operation Restore Hope/Continued Hope.** This joint coalition humanitarian relief operation for Somalia, Africa began in December, 1992 and continues today. Military police deployed to support this operation were HHD, 720th MP Battalion, 3d Region CID (DSE and CASE), the 10th, 511th, 984th, 978th, 571st, 300th, 977th, 21st, 24th MP Companies, a customs training team from the 14th MP Brigade and the 280th and 62d MP Dets (CID).

**Atlanta, GA, Prison Riots.** Military police deployed in support of the efforts to restrain the riots during the period November, 1987 through April, 1988. Military police companies deployed were the 988th, 555th, and the 437th.

**JTF-LA.** Civil disturbance assistance provided to the city of Los Angeles in the aftermath of the verdict of the Rodney King trial during the period April and May, 1992. Military police deployed were the 49th MP Brigade and the 125th MP Battalion.

**Operation Island Breeze.** This follow-on to Operation Urgent Fury was a nation-assistance operation to assist in the restabilization of civil authority on the island of Grenada during the period December, 1983 through June, 1985. Military police companies deployed in 90-day rotations were the 65th, 21st, 24th, 118th, 984th, 108th, 511th, 1st, and the 437th.

**JTF-Bravo.** Nation assistance to Honduras began in August, 1984 and continues today. Military police units support this operation on a four- to six-month rotational basis. Military police units deploy from both FORSCOM and SOUTHCOM to support this operation.

**Operation Promote Liberty.** A follow-on nation-assistance operation to Operation Just Cause in Panama. Military police units continue to support this operation on a four-month rotation basis.

**Operation Golden Pheasant.** In March, 1988 an infantry task force deployed to Honduras to assist in security and protection. Military police were attached to the task force.

**JTF-Panama.** During March, 1988 through December, 1989 military police deployed in support of a security and protection operation in Panama. Military police units deployed were the 16th MP Brigade, 503d MP Battalion, 519th MP Battalion, 759th MP Battalion, 716th MP Battalion, 720th MP Battalion, and the 504th MP Battalion. Military police companies deployed to support this operation were the 21st, 65th, 108th, 118th, 209th, 293d, 89th, 410th, 984th, 571st, 977th, 978th, 463d, 411th, 437th, and 170th.

**Operation Nimrod Dancer.** During May through November, 1989 an infantry task force deployed to provide security and protection in Panama. Military police were attached to the task force. Additional MP support was provided by MP units from Panama.

**Operation Able Sentry.** This joint law and order mission is ongoing in Macedonia. Supporting units include a Berlin Brigade MP squad (1st rotation) and a 3d Div. MP Company squad (2d rotation).

**Operation Urgent Fury.** For the invasion of Grenada in October through December, 1983 military police units deployed were 16th MP Brigade, 503d MP Battalion, and the 82d, 118th, 21st, 65th, 108th MP Companies, and the 10th MP Det (CID).

**Operation Just Cause.** The invasion of Panama in December, 1989 through March, 1990. Military police deployed were the 503d MP Battalion and the 519th MP Battalion. Military police companies deployed were the 21st, 65th, 108th, 209th, 555th, 988th, 511th, 401st, and the 10th MP Det (CID).

**Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.** A security and protection operation for Saudi Arabia after the invasion of Kuwait, August, 1990 through May, 1992. Military police from both CONUS and OCONUS deployed to support these operations. The 14th MP Brigade, 16th MP Brigade, 89th MP Brigade, 800th MP EPW Brigade, and 3d Region CID deployed with subordinate and attached units.

# Implementing FM 100-5, Operations

by

Major Ronald D. Reagan

Soon after the publication of FM 100-5, *Operations*, in June 1993, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) began a doctrinal review and analysis of the new manual to ensure proper integration into all courses. The field manual was analyzed in terms of what was the same, what was changed, and what needed to be incorporated into our programs of instruction (POIs). This article describes how the new FM 100-5 was implemented at USAMPS.

The Combined Arms Command (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas provided the initial information that amplified the scope and intent of the manual. The POIs and lesson plans were reviewed to ensure terms and themes were properly incorporated.

Surprisingly, many of the changes in FM 100-5 were already contained

in our POIs and lesson plans. This is a validation of lessons learned from the field into courses of instruction. Military police performing missions during the past decade have gleaned a great many lessons from operations such as Hawkeye, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, JTF-Andrew, and JTF-Los Angeles.

These missions and others provided input crucial to developing a training focus for war and operations other than war. Moreover, those operations expanded the scope of possible military missions and were instrumental in the development of FM 100-5.

## Implementing FM 100-5

After thoroughly analyzing FM 100-5, the themes shown in figure 1 were identified for application within the USAMPS curriculum.

Force projection is the over-arching theme throughout the manual. Additionally, operations other than war add a dimension to our doctrine that is firmly established and supported by the Army during the past fourteen years.

Our course theme is to develop leaders skilled in the application of military police and Army doctrine, prepared to conduct force projection operations across the continuum of operations anytime and anywhere in support of our national military strategy.

## Relationship of LEADDEX and Force Projection

Officers and NCOs are trained using scenario-based instruction in accordance with the leadership excellence model — LEADDEX. (See related article page 6.) The model was introduced in 1988 by the USAMPS assistant commandant and has become the foundation for the USAMPS training program. The LEADDEX model is based upon historical lessons learned during a vast array of Army operations performed since 1980.

The LEADDEX model is the life cycle for success (figure 2). It represents a way of life for MP units. Military police are often among the first soldiers deployed to operations in both peacetime and conflict. When the goal is to promote peace, deter war and resolve conflict, military police are often the most suitable and politically acceptable force.

The LEADDEX phases are depicted to the left from top to bottom of figure 3.

The stages of force projection are depicted to the right. The figure shows how the LEADDEX phases fit within the Army's demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere in the world.




Figure 1. Themes of FM 100-5, *Operations*.




Figure 2. LEADEX, life cycle for success.

**Military Police Competencies**

LEADEX is scenario-based instruction presented within the five phases indicated to the right in figure 3. Leaders are trained within these phases to develop the four essential military police competencies:

- Skill proficiency,
- Human dimension and attitude,
- Camaraderie and teamship, and
- Leadership.

The instruction is progressive, sequential, and cumulative. It is not an instructive method whereby students memorize material and then forget it. Scenario-based instruction provides training flashbacks that will further enhance individual skill proficiency.

Within the LEADEX model, leaders are taught to practice and apply skill proficiency. Military qualifications standards (MQS) common core and branch-specific tasks within the

context of practical exercises, simulations, and field training exercises are trained and evaluated.

We continually stress the importance of the human dimension and attitude because military police are frequently tasked to conduct humanitarian relief or assistance missions such as Operation Restore Hope.

*Camaraderie* and teamship are vital ingredients for military police who often deploy first and redeploy last. Military police leaders are trained and psychologically prepared to conduct operations that may be under long-term, austere conditions. Demonstrating *camaraderie* and teamship within a unit is key to making a good unit a great unit. This is paramount to unit sustainability during long-term commitments.

Leaders must develop *camaraderie* based upon high ethical standards. Sometimes soldiers can develop *camaraderie* for the wrong reasons—for example, pilfering from a crime scene. That element of bonding is based upon unethical behavior. Leadership based upon fundamental ethical behavior keeps soldiers motivated and dedicated to enforcing standards of conduct.

LEADEX provides the vehicle for training leadership. Students perform




Figure 3. Relationship between LEADEX and stages of force projection.

tasks and practice the art of leadership in a school environment. Within our scenarios and in leadership positions, each student is immersed in situations requiring role playing.

The military police essential competencies are the guides that teach soldiers to interact across the cultural spectrum. Moreover, they instill core human values that are vital in situations of stress, conflict, and conflict resolution.

### Critical Thinking and the Socratic Teaching Method

Rote memory has little importance or value at USAMPS. Students are taught to apply Army doctrine that provides a framework for understanding. Military police leaders prepare for the future by learning *how* to think, not *what* to think.

Small group instruction is the mode for enhancing knowledge. The USAMPS carefully selects and trains small group leaders who apply the socratic teaching method in accordance with the military police essential competencies. We believe our method of training officers and NCOs is on target with the needs of a force projection Army.

### Leader Development—the Hub

The fundamental approach to teaching FM 100-5 rests with leader development. At the hub, and the single focus of four training strategies, are the students from the Military Police Officer Advanced Course, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course and the Military Police Officer Basic Course. Students are trained in accordance with the four essential military police competencies, driven by scenario-based instruction in accordance with LEADDEX.

MP students are trained to perform force projection missions across the continuum of operations. The key themes expressed by FM 100-5 are defined, applied, and presented in situational exercises. The situations are real and likely to be encountered in field MP units.

Field Manual 100-5 expresses doctrine that prepares the Army to operate in a new, strategic era. Emerging mission requirements include conditions such as drug trafficking, natural or man-made disasters, regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, and peace-keeping or peace enforcement.

An essential factor for successful integration of FM 100-5 is critical thinking. Critical thinking prepares leaders to operate in uncertain environments where the decisions of relatively junior leaders could have strategic implications.

Field Manual 100-5 refers to critical thinking as *battle command*. Battle command is the art of military leadership. It integrates decision making, critical thinking, and leadership.

The synchronization of LEADDEX, the essential competencies, the key themes of FM 100-5, emerging mission requirements, and critical thinking are the key ingredients for a successful training program.

### Ongoing Reviews

The USAMPS programs of instruction are continually analyzed, updated, and revised. A thorough review of existing courses is ongoing to ensure POIs reflect the Army's new doctrine, input from the field, emerging missions and new equipment.

The POIs provide the direction and ensure coordination within USAMPS for training resources. Moreover, the POIs outline how the professional competencies are trained. Lesson plans are concurrently developed to focus on terminal learning objectives. Every lesson plan was reviewed with the intent of incorporating the main themes of FM 100-5.

The training statement, actions, conditions, and standards describe the reason for training. Using the systems approach to training results in leaders with the skills, knowledge, and attitude that bring victory on any battlefield.

### Continuum of War

What type of military police leader will we need for the future? Leaders

must be trained to think critically and to react—dependent on the situation. Military police must continually ask *who, what, where, when, how, and why*.

For example, in Somalia a critical thinker would consider the following questions: *Who* will support our military effort? *Who* is the enemy? What can be done to win the support of the people in the area of operations? *Where* will the enemy strike next? *When* are our forces most vulnerable? *How* can I cordon off an area to stop snipers? *How* can we avoid land mines? Finally, *why* is the enemy trying to disrupt our humanitarian mission?

Military police apply this kind of critical thinking during peacetime. It is the way we conduct our law enforcement investigations. Also, it is the way we should operate in an environment other than war.

Military police assist, protect, and defend. This is the creed by which we serve. For many operations other than war missions military police are the most suitable and acceptable force. In military operations where attitudes such as restraint, perseverance, security, legitimacy and unity of effort are key ingredients, military police may be a force of choice.

During war military police preserve combat power and protect the force. Whether it was providing battlefield circulation control in southern Iraq, or area security at Kuwait International Airport, military police are combat multipliers.

The USAMPS has fully implemented FM 100-5, ensuring military police are fully trained for the full spectrum of all Army operations.

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**Major Ronald D. Reagan** is the Chief, Officer Advanced Leader Development Division, Directorate of Training, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Murray State University, Murray, KY and a master's degree in psychological counseling from Long Island University, West Point, NY, and he recently completed Command and General Staff College.

# An Overview of FM 100-5

(This article is based on a briefing developed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.—Editor)

The new version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* was completed in June, 1993. This manual is an expression of Army operations well into the next century. To have meaning in the current strategic environment, doctrine cannot afford to focus solely on the business of warfighting; it must account for other missions as well.

This article introduces the concept of full dimensional operations by discussing three areas of emphasis: strategy, doctrine, and changes in our basic doctrinal concepts.

## Strategic Framework

The Army's doctrine must be compatible with the nation's strategic requirements. With the United States emerging from the cold war era as the only super power, the Army's strategic view now encompasses regional concerns, unpredictable threats, the proliferation of technology, and the potential for regional instability between nations.

Doctrine establishes principles for thought and action, not checklists and templates for easy solutions to complex problems. Developed after an evaluation of the lessons of the past and new technological realities of the present, FM 100-5 is a doctrine that is a living body of ideas and not a regulation that prescribes precisely how operations must be conducted. It also functions as a model for the future.

## Sources of Doctrine

The major doctrinal changes found in the 1993 version of FM 100-5 resulted from new or updated versions of the national security strategy, national military strategy, lessons learned from past wars, the impact of emerging technologies, and the development of joint doctrine.

Force projection, the most important change, required a complete reassessment of how the Army fights. The nature of regional threats also shaped doctrine. Similarly, the nature of multiple threats rather than a single, overriding threat guided the Army's efforts.

## The Role of Doctrine

Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army. The Army relies on its doctrine to provide a common bond of understanding in how we fight. Doctrine facilitates communications and stimulates dialogue among Army personnel. It sets the direction for modernization and the standard for leadership development and soldier training.

Doctrine reflects new technology and its potential for the future, as well as its effects on Army operations. It incorporates the lessons of warfare and the wisdom of the Army's collective leadership in establishing a guide to action in war and operations other than war.

The Army has embraced the concepts of AirLand Battle for a decade now. Many changing factors necessitated an in-depth review of doctrine to cope with the many missions the Army conducts now and in the future.

The 1986 doctrine—for the most part—is sound and, therefore, forms the tactical basis for the 1993 version.

## FM 100-5 Constructs

Four key constructs form the basis of the 1993 manual. The first is that the three levels of war are discussed throughout the manual. Another basic construct, force projection, addresses the movement of military forces from CONUS (continental U.S.) or a theater in response to global requirements.

The third construct, the full range of military operations, addresses the many

activities in war and operations other than war. The fourth construct is full dimensional operations, fighting the enemy simultaneously in depth with land, sea, air, and space assets to defeat him. These four constructs form the heart of the Army's new doctrine.

## Chapter Outline

There are numerous similarities between the 1986 and 1993 versions of FM 100-5, *Operations*. The warfighting portion of the 1986 manual (chapters 6-10) can now be found in chapters 7 through 11 of the 1993 version.

The chapters on force projection, operations other than war, and logistics represent new chapters. A modified chapter on the environment of combat is included. The appendices from the 1986 manual have been moved forward in the manual into appropriate chapters.

The principles of war are now in chapter 2, and operational design is in chapter 6 as the battlefield framework (see figure 1). Additionally, joint and combined operations are discussed in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

## Technology and Doctrine

A crucial strength and advantage for the United States has been the breadth and diversity of its technology base. Evolving space operations will open new vistas in command and control and operational execution.

Technology has also brought the United States into an era of instant communication where its effects are manifold. Just as enhanced communications capabilities have expanded the commander's battle space, it also influences his actions relative to appropriate use of force and forces.

Doctrine is the engine that drives this technology exploitation.

FM 100-5 describes the influence of a changing world order and the impact of technology, which combine to compress the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Space-age command, control, and communications, coupled with lethal precision guided munitions provide Army forces with the capability to have influence at all levels of war.

**Military End-State**

Before committing military forces the national command authority defines the military end state at the strategic level that creates the parameters for the military's contribution. The end state provides purpose and achievable objectives for combat operations and operations other than war.

**Force Projection**

As an instrument of national power, the total Army must be capable of force projection. Historically, the underlying assumption in doctrine

was one of forward presence with substantial Army forces prepositioned with their logistical structure. Also assumed were significant portions of the Army, structured and trained for short-notice contingencies. Such assumptions are no longer valid.

Force projection begins as a contingency operation. A combatant commander may be able to resolve a crisis and achieve national goals faster by rapidly committing a smaller forward presence force than by waiting for a larger, but slower response option. The Army's commitment to participate in both war and operations other than war requires it to be prepared for short notice contingencies.

**Joint and Combined Operations**

The new FM 100-5 expresses the fact that on the future battlefield the Army will seldom, if ever, fight alone. Joint, combined and interagency operations will be the norm.

Commanders must understand the difficulties in forming a strong compatible combined force. Among coalition partners, equipment and systems capabilities will vary in modernization levels, maintenance standards, mobility and degree of interoperability. This requires flexible doctrine based on how to think as well as how to act.

All training and leadership doctrine and all combat, combat support, and combat service support doctrine derive directly from, and must support the Army's fundamental tenets of operations.

These tenets are initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility.

The Army's five operations tenets are applicable to the new doctrine across the entire range of military operations. The Army's success on and off the battlefield depends on its ability to operate in accordance with these tenets. They represent the fundamental characteristics of successful full dimensional operations.

STATES OF THE ENVIRONMENT	GOAL	MILITARY OPERATIONS	EXAMPLES
WAR	Fight and Win	WAR COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large-scale combat operations</li> <li>Attack</li> <li>Defend</li> </ul>
CONFLICT	Deter War and Resolve Conflict	OTHER THAN WAR COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strikes and raids</li> <li>Peace enforcement</li> <li>Support to insurgency</li> <li>Antiterrorism</li> <li>Peacekeeping</li> <li>NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Ops)</li> </ul>
PEACETIME	Promote Peace	OTHER THAN WAR COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Counterdrug</li> <li>Disaster relief</li> <li>Civil support</li> <li>Peace building</li> <li>Nation assistance</li> </ul>

Figure 1. The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.

## Versatility

Versatility, a new tenet, underscores the necessity of Army units at every level to anticipate and shift among various tasks and activities while retaining essential warfighting readiness.

To understand the difference between versatility and agility consider the analogy of the decathlete and the boxer. A boxer competes in one event. He must be fit, skilled, faster and stronger than his opponent in the ring. This is similar to agility in combat units. Versatile units, however, are similar to decathletes, who must perform successfully in ten separate events.

In a force projection, Army versatility means that all Army forces must be able to respond on short notice to a wide range of contingencies.

## Battlefield Framework

The battlefield framework has evolved. No longer a linear concept designed to fit the conduct of operations against the Warsaw Pact, the battlefield can take on many different manifestations.

Army commanders and staffs in force projection operations need to go beyond this single alternative in planning the correct battlefield framework at the tactical and operational levels. In order to do this, commanders need to understand the interrelationships among the area of operations, battle space, and operations in depth.

Options available range from a linear framework (one with clearly defined geometry and lines with contiguous units and deep, close, and rear boundaries), to a less precisely structured framework (one where units might not be adjacent to one another nor have a linear relationship).

## Battle Space

Commanders seek to dominate the enemy in a given battle space—the physical volume related to a commander's ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It includes the three dimen-

sional area in which friendly combat power can be applied to dominate and defeat the enemy. Within a given battle space, commanders must understand the effects of geography and terrain, appropriately use organic capabilities, and integrate joint and combined assets that can be brought to bear against the enemy.

At tactical levels, battle space is determined by the range of direct and indirect fire systems and the terrain on which they are employed. The higher the echelon, the greater the complexity and the number of variations of battle space.

A corps commander envisions the combined battle space of his divisions, long-range weapons, airborne and ground acquisition systems, satellite intelligence systems, real-time precision strike capability, and other capabilities given to him or used in his behalf, such as special operations forces, interdiction assets and fires of adjacent units.

Units that effectively use simultaneous attack in depth and appropriately use available intelligence to bring the enemy down at once make best use of the concept of battle space.

## Close, Deep, and Rear Battle

The concept of close, deep, and rear battle has evolved. No longer is the close battle the central and principal concern of all operations on the battlefield.

While the close battle remains important, full dimensional operations throughout the depth of the battlefield are designed to defeat the enemy in detail, if possible, in a single stroke. The close battle is only part of that effort.

## Simultaneous Attack in Depth

Warfare is multidimensional. It includes conventional and special operations that integrate air, land, sea, and space activities, the lethal effects of all types of conventional weaponry, and exploits the full potential of the electromagnetic spectrum. The synchronization of all of this in space,

time, and resources presents the enemy with a series of simultaneous attacks that quickly denies him options while increasing the initiative of friendly forces.

Offensive and defensive operations can be conducted simultaneously on different parts of the battlefield. The transition to the offense is the ultimate objective in order to seize and retain the initiative and prosecute the fighting to decisive victory.

## Full Dimensional Operations

Full dimensional operations are the application of all capabilities available to an Army commander to accomplish his mission. The intent is to bring the enemy down at once. This is done by integrating weapon systems and command and control systems in simultaneous close, deep, and rear operations. These operations rely on joint, multiservice, and national systems.

## Tempo

Tempo is redefined and developed further in the current doctrine as more than just speed; rather it is the pace of operations. Tempo can be fast or slow and can be applied to friendly as well as to enemy forces.

The commander manipulates tempo to throw the enemy off balance. When employed effectively, the enemy's tempo is disrupted while ours accelerates to increasing levels of violence that completely denies the enemy any opportunity to react.

## Combat Functions

Combat functions involve intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, and logistic battle command.

These combat functions help the commander link the theory of combat power with the training use of the battlefield operating system (BOS). Commanders integrate and coordinate these functions to synchronize battle effects in time, space, and purpose.



Military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) training at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) Fort McClellan, Alabama, is an example of a situational exercise supporting the key themes of FM 100-5, *Operations*.

Command and control has been re-named battle command to enable a more comprehensive execution of successful combined-arms operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Since battle command represents the only fundamental change in the new doctrine from past thinking of the BOS, only it is discussed here.

### **Battle Command**

Battle command is the expression of the will of the commander, the way in which a commander forms his vision of battle, how he is helped in fully articulating it, and how he anticipates and adjusts as information and events unfold.

While the requirement for control and communication is included within the description of battle command, the emphasis is on the decision and leadership aspects of the art of command- knowing what has to be decided, the consequences of decisions and when to make them; taking responsibility for decisions made; inspiring and directing forces from

forward positions with soldiers in combat; engendering a positive command climate that includes moral and physical courage and vision; and anticipating the future course of events.

Agile-thinking, intuitive commanders are required in a force projection Army where conditions of employment of forces, and force, are more ambiguous than in the cold war.

### **Fundamentals of Tactical Offense**

There has been no great change to the fundamentals of offense. The classic forms of maneuver remain as they were. The phases of the offense in the 1986 manual, however, are now called the forms of the offense.

This change removes the tendency to consider them as sequential activities and recognizes the fluid nature of the battlefield. These forms complement the forms of maneuver as commanders arrange them in continuous operations using a tempo that keeps pressure on the enemy and produces the greatest battlefield advantage.

### **Fundamentals of Tactical Defense**

In a force projection Army, forces already in a theater or early-arriving forces initially defend at the tactical level to support the campaign plan and maintain operational initiative.

The two primary forms of defensive operations are area and mobile defense. These apply to both the tactical and operational levels of war. Area defenses orient on holding terrain by absorbing the enemy in an interlocking series of positions and destroying him largely by fires.

Mobile defenses orient on the destruction of the enemy by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. Commanders transition smoothly from offense to defense and defense to offense.

### **Conflict Termination**

Knowing when and how to end a conflict, as well as how to preserve the objectives for which it was fought, is a vital component of campaign design.

The combatant commander and his principal subordinates consider the conditions necessary to bring the conflict to a favorable end. If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending a conflict, the enemy should be both unwilling and unable to continue his resistance.

A period of postconflict operations exists from the immediate end of hostilities to the redeployment of the last U.S. soldier. These operations must also be considered and planned for.

### Postconflict Activities

The postconflict operations stage focuses on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing the host-nation infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve the overall strategic aims.

Army forces are extremely well suited for postconflict operations. The Army has the skills and staying power to control prisoners, handle refugees, mark mine fields and destroy unexploded ordnance, support the social

needs of the civilian population, provide emergency restoration of utilities and perform other required humanitarian assistance activities.

### Force Projection Logistics

Logistics provides the means to sustain operations. The current strategic context has also prompted changes to how the Army thinks about logistics concepts to support war and operations other than war for its force projection role.

As missions arise that may combine joint, combined, and interagency resources to accomplish missions in war and operations other than war, regional CINCs will ask for different combinations of logistics units and functions tailored to the situation.

Once the mission to deploy has been received, the Army tailors its forces to put the right mix of people, materiel, and capabilities into the sequence of movement that provides a mix of joint and combined forces within the theater of operations capable of doing the mission.

This edition of FM 100-5, expands the discussion of logistics for force

projection operations. What follows is a short discussion of logistics for force projection operations at each level of war.

### Strategic Logistics

Strategic logistics deals with mobilization, acquisition, projecting forces, and strategic mobility describing the links between the nation's economic base and military activities in a theater of operations.

For example, smaller rapidly deploying forces may be best served by resupply of critical parts that are delivered directly from the factory or depot stocks left in CONUS to the unit in the field. Enhanced and assured communications allow selected logistics management functions to be accomplished from CONUS or from a forward-presence location, deploying only those functional capabilities absolutely necessary.

This is called split-based operations. Split-based operations can be used as a means of providing material management support to the force wherever it is located.



FM 100-5's doctrinal philosophy is woven throughout the courses taught at USAMPS, where the training is often fast-paced and intense.

### Operational Logistics

Operational logistics encompasses those support activities required to sustain campaigns and major operations. It enables success at the tactical level of war.

Assured logistics communications supporting high data-transmission rates with the national industrial base provide total asset visibility of critical items of supply. In-transit visibility enables the commander to know the location of resources in transit and to allocate them based on their projected arrival.

Host-nation support is another operational logistics activity that can significantly reduce the requirement for early augmentation of U.S. logistics assets. Host-nation support arrangements may include operations, maintenance, and security of seaports and airports; construction and management of routes, railways, and inland waterways, petroleum pipelines, and bulk storage or warehouses for other facilities; and operation of existing communications networks.

### Tactical Logistics

Good planning at the operational level facilitates tactical logistics functions. The discussion of tactical logistics

describes how the familiar functions of manning, fixing, fueling, arming, moving, supplying, and sustaining the soldier can be more responsive for the tactical commander as a result of strategic and operational capabilities.

Combat service support (CSS) units, supported by engineer units, accomplish tactical logistics functions. Tactical logistics units normally operate from tactical rear operations areas.

### Operations Other than War

Operations other than war can span the globe and take many different forms—from support to domestic civil authorities in the United States or support to drug enforcement operations, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief operations abroad.

As in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the Army must be prepared as never before to take on new and challenging missions. These operations may precede or follow war. They may be conducted in conjunction with wartime operations to complement the achievement of strategic objectives, or they may support a combatant commander's forward presence operations.

Army warfighting doctrine is based on well-established principles of war.

Similarly, operations other than war are also based on principles that guide thought and action. Some of the principles of operations other than war are taken from the principles of war. The other principles expressed address the strategic environment in operations of this type.

### Doctrine Is Dynamic

Army doctrine is dynamic. It is the engine of change that carries the Army forward. Its path is visible from the Army's very beginning at Valley Forge. The road has been long with many twists and turns.

The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 is written considering the rich and varied experiences of the past; but more importantly, it recognizes the many impacts on the strategic environment today. This doctrine looks to the future of the Army.

As the keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 is the authoritative statement on how the Army thinks about conducting its operations. Its views will undoubtedly impact on the development of all subordinate doctrine. It will also impact on all other aspects of military development: organization, training, modernization, and leadership. *(This article is based on a briefing developed by TRADOC.)*

## FM 100-5, OPERATIONS EDUCATIONAL TRAINING PACKAGE

TRADOC has released an FM 100-5 educational training package. The package has three elements: a CD-ROM computer disk; a 35mm slide presentation with recommended script, and a VHS video tape. The CD ROM disk has both the 1986 and the 1993 versions of FM 100-5, *Operations*; FM 100-1, *The Army; The National Security Strategy of the United States; and the U.S. National Military Strategy*.

The programs on the disk include three audio-visual animations explaining: Battle-space; the dynamics between operational offense and defense as illustrated in the Yom Kippur War, and the concept of simultaneous attack in

depth, as represented in Operation Just Cause. Explanatory teaching points accompany each animation. The disk allows the user to perform a variety of research and word processing functions such as word search and split screen comparison.

The initial distribution plan will send 1200 copies of the CD-ROM disk and 650 copies of the VHS taped and slide presentation to the active and reserve components.

The educational packages should be available through local Training Support Centers in early 1994. The FM 100-5 package will be identified as TVT 22-32, PIN # 710365



This CD-ROM is a component of the FM 100-5 educational package. It was developed to provide an interactive training tool by TRADOC.



## National Guard and Active MP Team Up

*by*

*Mr. David Abrams*

The two squads had not worked together long. They separated, both squads on a recon mission. One squad came slowly out of the woods to a surprise attack of enemy fire. Teamwork and training paid off: Their buddy squad appeared, flanking the OPFOR—perfect timing.

Another surprise—the soldiers were regular Army and National Guard working side-by-side in a field exercise. World conditions call for this kind of teamwork; training together ensures troops are ready.

In a field training exercise at Fort McClellan, Alabama, military police from Fort McPherson, Georgia joined 120 National Guard from the 190th MP Company, Georgia National Guard. The two squads taking part in the field training exercise received

their orders late in the afternoon: conduct an area reconnaissance around a water tower facility. Enemy contact, probable.

The Fort McPherson Military Police Company moved quickly and silently through the forest, scanning carefully for opposing forces (OPFOR) lying in wait, ready to ambush. The other squad on recon moved along a ridge several meters away.

Suddenly, as the squad came out of the woods, they heard the popping sound of blank rounds. The OPFOR pinned them down with a hail of gunfire. Just as they started to return fire, the other squad appeared at their side, laying down supporting fire in a classic L-shaped pattern.

The OPFOR was totally surprised at being flanked; they had nowhere to go.

It was perfect timing on the part of the National Guard squad.

The active duty MPs were invited to supplement one of the Guard company's weekend drills as part of a mutual support program initiated by the Commander, Fort McPherson MP Company; and the Commander, 170th MP Battalion, Georgia ARNG; and the 190th training NCO. The National Guard MPs lacked a law enforcement environment, and active-duty MPs at Fort McPherson lacked a tactical environment.

Earlier in the year several of the National Guard soldiers who crawled through the foot-deep mud at Fort McClellan's Pelham Range with the active-duty MPs went to Fort McPherson to get a taste of garrison law enforcement.

This type of training is vitally important for the National Guard. Results of a recent test showed the need for refresher training in MP law enforcement duties. The company spends 95 percent of its time on drill weekends training for tactical war-time missions.

When the National Guard went to Fort McPherson, they observed the active-duty MPs conducting area patrols, performing gate guard duties, and working on the main desk.

The 190th MP Company provided the Fort McPherson MPs all the necessary equipment, meals and transportation. The recon mission around the water tower at Fort McClellan was a dramatic example of how the two Army components meshed together in a field training exercise. During the 30-second fire fight, the Fort McPherson MPs had no radios, so there was no communication. However, they were so tuned to each other's actions and how each would react to certain situations that they went into the classic "L" pattern. There was no escape for the OPFOR.

The National Guard might be civilians during the week, but on weekends they are soldiers. They put their hearts and souls into the mission. They were up at 4 a.m., had chow by 5 a.m. and were training by 6 a.m.

The experience did more than just improve active Army and National Guard relationships. The chance to practice wartime mission skills—such as planning route reconnaissance, reading map overlays and driving high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles—was invaluable to the Fort McPherson soldiers who would otherwise read about these skills in books.

Being in the field also provided a better perspective on daily law enforcement duties. Some of what the Fort McPherson MPs do applies in concept to what they did there. For example, the main gate resembled a traffic control

**NEXT ISSUE THEME**


**OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

The theme of the next issue of *MILITARY POLICE* will focus on Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

Readers are requested to submit articles about military police roles in performing their missions. Some possible subjects include: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Support to Domestic Civil Authorities, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Security Assistance, Nation Assistance, Support to Counterdrug Operations, Combating Terrorism, Peace Enforcement, and Peacekeeping Operations.

Manuscripts need to be typed double-spaced on plain bond paper; if a computer is used, it will be helpful if the disk is included. Photographs and artwork add a great deal to enhance an article. Black-and-white photos are preferable. A brief biography of the author(s) is needed.

The manuscripts and related materials should be mailed to Editor, *MILITARY POLICE* Magazine, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030. The telephone numbers are DSN 865-4326/5405 and commercial (205) 848-4326/5405.



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OTHER  
THAN  
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post (one of the battlefield operations of military police), and the chain link fence around the installation resembled the concertina wire around the area of operation in the field.

In the event of war, military police take on a combat support mission that includes battlefield circulation control and area security.

Some of the wartime skills the MPs practiced during the weekend exercise included deploying to the operation site by convoy, using map overlays, analyzing routes for possible drop zones or ambush sites, coordinating and conducting area and zone recons, setting up traffic control posts, and writing operation orders.

Before going to Fort McClellan the MPs spent four days attending refresher courses on land navigation

and route recon techniques. However, the best "classes" came as they worked side-by-side with the National Guard, getting a three-day taste of what they practice all year long.

Interoperability was outstanding during the weekend exercise. The Fort McPherson soldiers received no special treatment. They immediately pitched in by setting up shelters and coordinating operations. When they came back to the National Guard armory on Sunday, they cleaned their equipment and washed vehicles just like everybody else.

The field exercise paved the way for future regular Army and National Guard training.


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**Mr. David Abrams** is a writer in the Fort McPherson Public Affairs Office, Fort McPherson, GA.

# A Line in the Sand

by

*Captain Thomas H. Tatum*



The summer of 1990 was not unlike previous summers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Training was the focus of the 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) activities, with the usual distractors of meetings, surprise IG maintenance inspections and the never-ending rumors of which company was next to deploy to Panama or Honduras.

After two back-to-back deployments to the Virgin Islands and Panama it appeared that the brigade was back to routine operations.

Suddenly once again routine operations in the brigade ceased when on August 2, 1990 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. On August 7 the brigade received the familiar phone call to report to their unit area, beginning a deployment sequence to participate in drawing a line in the sand.

## Deployment

The first members of the brigade arrived in Saudi Arabia on August 9 as part of the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post staff and security force. By August 30 the brigade HHC, the 503d MP Battalion and the 10th MP Detachment (CID), all from Fort Bragg, arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

After a 21-hour journey, the arrival was a shock to body and mind. Like an exploding flame, blistering 120-degree heat completely engulfed their bodies. In a make-shift holding area while waiting for transportation the MPs were given plastic water bottles and told to drink all of it. Bottled water would sustain over a half a million men and women for many months to come.

A large convoy of rickety buses appeared at the location. Several non-English-speaking men wearing white robes and strange-looking head pieces emerged from the buses to welcome the units to Saudi Arabia.

The brigade's first mission at its destination was to assist in the security and efficient movement of incoming forces from ports of debarkation to assembly areas in the desert. The 503d MP Battalion's primary mission was the security of the XVIII Airborne Corps command post, the King Abdul Aziz seaport in Dammam, and the corps ammunition supply point outside of Dhahran.

In addition to the security missions, the battalion conducted detailed route reconnaissance of all proposed corps main supply routes (MSRs). Military police teams covered thou-

sands of miles of roadway, recording conditions and trafficability of each road. This operation paid off greatly as the battalion discovered that many of the routes required extensive maintenance, and one proposed route did not even exist. The battalion also provided traffic control for units moving from the airport and seaport to assembly areas.

The brigade began planning for Operation Desert Shield and the arrival of follow-on MP forces. The brigade force package included the 503d, 160th, 519th, and 759th MP Battalions, consisting of a total of fifteen combat support MP companies (see figure 1).

This team of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard units from all over the United States came together for the first time to accomplish an array of tasks in support of a major military operation.

As MP units arrived in country, the majority of their initial activity was getting soldiers acclimated to the harsh environment, receiving unit equipment as it arrived at the seaport, and training for future operations. For the most part, commanders at all levels had never worked or trained with each other before.

Fortunately, the months prior to actual combat operations provided an opportunity for the brigade, the battalions, and the companies to train and develop into cohesive and effective units. Operation Desert Shield was both a real-world and training operation for brigade units in preparation for Operation Desert Storm.

**Desert Shield**

By November, all brigade forces had arrived in country. As XVIII Airborne Corps forces continued to arrive in country, the corps area of operations expanded, requiring increased MP support.

The brigade increased circulation control operations along the MSR's by conducting mobile patrols, traffic control posts, check points, and the always-present speed enforcement. The radar-equipped, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) were extremely effective in controlling vehicle speeds in the corps area. This was important because one of the leading causes of injury and death during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was traffic accidents involving excessive speed.

As forces began to build up in country, the possibility of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities became a major concern. As a preventive measure the corps designed a base and base cluster defense plan. Each

base became a virtual fortress. Remembering the Lebanon bombing incident, base commanders surrounded their bases with wire, fences, concrete barriers, lights, bunkers, and guards with antiarmor weapons.

As a major part of the corps force protection plan, the 503d and 519th MP Battalions conducted security for all heavy equipment and ammunition convoys moving from the Dammam-Dhahran area to their specified destinations in the corps area.

The brigade also conducted intensive area security patrolling in the corps area, which included base response force responsibilities for nineteen base clusters consisting of over one hundred bases. The brigade conducted this operation in coordination with the XVIII Airborne Corps rear command post. To test procedures in combatting the possible terrorist threat, military police patrols conducted daily base response force rehearsals and situational training exercises with bases and base clusters.

With thousands of soldiers in country, maintenance of law and order became a concern of the corps commander. The brigade established an area provost marshal system essentially making each MP battalion commander and division provost marshal an area provost marshal responsible for law and order in their specific areas of operation.

Throughout the deployment, the corps provost marshal office, located at the corps main command post, served as the focal point for all law-and-order operations by overseeing the law enforcement reporting process to higher headquarters. As part of law-and-order operations, the brigade established combined U.S. and Saudi police operations in the Dhahran area to facilitate sharing of information and coordination of police matters between the corps and the Saudi government.

Most importantly, the combined operations allowed both the military police and Saudi police to conduct combined traffic accident investigations involving Americans and Saudis.

**Desert Storm**

On January 17, 1991 Desert Shield turned into Desert Storm as coalition forces commenced offensive operations to drive Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait. To support this operation, the XVIII Airborne Corps' mission was as follows:

*On order, XVIII Airborne Corps attacks to penetrate Iraqi forward defenses and to interdict Iraqi lines of communication along the Euphrates River in order to prevent reinforcement of and escape from the Kuwaiti theater of operations by Iraqi forces; on order, continues the attack east to assist in the destruction of the Republican Guard Forces command.*

The XVIII Airborne Corps conducted Desert Storm operations in five phases.

*Phase I* was the corps logistical buildup in northwestern Saudi Arabia, prior to the corps repositioning. This phase actually began prior to the air campaign.

*Phase II* involved a massive flanking movement of the corps from Desert Shield positions in eastern Saudi Arabia to tactical assembly areas in the northwestern portion of the country along the Saudi-Iraq border.

16th MP Brigade (Abn) Force			
160th MP Bn*	503d MP Bn (Abn)	519th MP Bn	759th MP Bn
320th MP Co.*	21st MP Co. (Abn)	209th MP Co.	132d MP Co.**
351st MP Co.*	65th MP Co.	293d MP Co.	210th MP Co.**
810th MP Co.*	108th MP Co.	437th MP Co.	211th MP Co.**
	118th MP Co. (Abn)	805th MP Co.*	984th MP Co.
* Army Reserve Units ** Army National Guard Units			

Figure 1. Task organization chart.

Phase III was the initiation of corps combat operations. This phase consisted of three subphases: *phase IIIa* was the corps initial attack into Iraq to penetrate Iraqi forward defenses; *phase IIIb* was the attack to cut Iraqi lines of communications along the Euphrates River valley; and *phase IIIc* was the attack east to assist in the destruction of the Republican Guard forces.

Phase IV was the movement of the corps back to redeployment assembly areas in eastern Saudi Arabia.


Phase V was the redeployment of all corps forces back to the United States.

The brigade supported the XVIII Airborne Corps Desert Storm operations in each of the phases. In phase II, the brigade conducted battlefield circulation control operations along thirteen hundred miles of MSR in support of the repositioning of the corps. With the limited road networks in country, the corps moved along on only two routes.

To support the repositioning operations, the brigade handed off its area

of operations and responsibilities to theater military police forces and moved west prior to execution of phase II. The brigade established a command-and-control headquarters at King Kalid Military City (KKMC).

The 519th and 503d MP Battalions conducted battlefield circulation control operations along both routes, with the 519th MP Battalion along the northern route and the 503d along the southern route. This operation took seven military police companies to accomplish.



Corps military police conducted mobile patrols along the routes to assist lost or stranded motorists, controlled movement in and out of rest and refueling stops, provided control at the start points to ensure convoys departed on time and in proper order of movement, and to provided the corps with a redundant means of communication by FM radio relays along the routes. The brigade also set up several hundred directional road signs along the routes to assist convoys in reaching their destination.

Military police support was primarily conducted at the squad and MP-team level along both routes. With such a large distance to cover, MP assets were stretched incredibly thin. This heavily impacted on communications capabilities. Even with relays established along the routes, the FM communications network had gaping holes in it and was not as effective as anticipated.

The 759th MP Battalion moved to KKMC, where it provided security for critical logistics convoys moving forward to corps-controlled logistics bases in northwest Saudi Arabia. The battalion maintained one company on standby to serve as an immediate response force to repel possible Iraqi or terrorist attacks against units moving during force repositioning.

On-call Army aviation support was available to transport MP response forces rapidly throughout the corps area. In addition to providing security during this phase, the 759th MP Battalion was called upon to receive, process and temporarily hold EPWs who were captured prior to commencement of ground operations.

The 160th MP Battalion, with three MP companies, moved forward to the town of Rafha in the northwest sector of the corps area of operations. The battalion provided security and traffic control for inbound units and additional security for the XVIII Airborne Corps main command post at the Rafha airport. In addition, the

160th MP Battalion provided security for the key corps logistics base (Log-base Charlie) in northwest Saudi Arabia.

In support of phase II force repositioning, the brigade employed all of its MP assets to secure and assist the movement of the corps across the desert. It took twenty-one days to move the entire corps across Saudi Arabia—displacing over 27,000 vehicles hauling over 100,000 troops, equipment, and thousands of tons of food, water, ammunition, and repair parts to sustain the corps for sixty days.

This massive movement was completely undetected by Iraqi forces even though much of the movement occurred only a few miles from the Iraqi border.

Prior to phase III (combat operations) and in accordance with MP doctrine, the brigade attached MP units to the divisions: the 810th MP Company was attached to the 82d Airborne Division; the 210th MP Company was placed OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (ASSLT); the 211th MP Company was attached to the 24th Infantry Division (Mech); and a platoon from the 437th MP Company was attached to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The brigade's task organization to support ground combat operations is shown in figure 2.

The period before commencement of ground operations allowed the brigade to shift operations. The brigade headquarters displaced north to a major

corps logistics base near the Saudi-Iraq border. From this location, the brigade was able to command and control all corps MP operations and coordinate with the XVIII Airborne Corps rear command post.

The 503d MP Battalion established a corps enemy-prisoner-of-war (EPW) holding facility in an abandoned housing area north of the town of Rafha. The concrete buildings and walls provided an excellent facility for housing EPWs. The battalion, in coordination with the XVIII Airborne Corps G4 and 1st Corps Support Command, began collecting and stockpiling blankets, water, food, and tents in preparation for receiving thousands of Iraqi EPWs. The corps estimated capture rates of up to sixteen thousand EPWs within the first week of ground operations.


To accomplish the EPW mission, the 503d MP Battalion committed one MP company to operate the facility, with a second company conducting the EPW escort and evacuation operation. A third company prepared to move forward to establish a temporary EPW facility closer to the division's areas of operation.

As a result of corps cross-border operations, the brigade actually began receiving EPWs a few days prior to the official commencement of ground operations.

The 519th MP Battalion colocated with the brigade headquarters and began conducting operations in the eastern sector of the corps rear area.

<b>16th MP Brigade (Abn) Task Organization</b>			
<b>160th MPBn</b>	<b>503d MPBn (Abn)</b>	<b>519th MP Bn</b>	<b>759th MP Bn</b>
<b>320th MPCo.</b>	<b>21st MP Co.(Abn)</b>	<b>209th MP Co.</b>	<b>132d MP Co.</b>
<b>351st MP Co.</b>	<b>65th MP Co.</b>	<b>293d MP Co.</b>	<b>805th MP Co.</b>
	<b>108th MP Co.</b>	<b>437th MP Co.</b>	<b>984th MP Co.</b>
	<b>118th MP Co. (Abn)</b>		

**Figure 2. Task organization chart.**



The battalion's operations included area security and battlefield circulation control, and the unit had the major responsibility for base response force operations within the corps rear area.

One aspect of the 519th MP Battalion's mission was providing security and traffic control for the aircraft landing strip in Logbase Charlie. This was a significant operation in that the landing strip was actually a portion of a corps MSR.

When the landing strip was in operation, military police had to divert

traffic around the area—the challenge was to divert the vehicle traffic while keeping *both* the aircraft and vehicle traffic moving along as scheduled. The battalion also had a be-prepared mission to accept EPWs from forward units in the eastern sector of the corps area.

The 160th Battalion remained in Rafha and conducted area security and battlefield circulation control operations in the western sector of the corps rear area. The battalion also established combined security and law-and-order

operations in Rafha with Saudi police and military forces.

The 759th MP Battalion, with three companies, moved to an assembly area north of Rafha, placing it in position to move forward into Iraq and establish control of the corps main supply routes forward of the line of departure (Saudi-Iraq border).

At the commencement of ground operations (G-Day) the 759th MP Battalion moved forward behind the French 6th Light Armored Division and assumed control of a critical road to be used as the

primary corps MSR. Within twenty-four hours, the 759th MP Battalion was in control of MSR Texas, providing critically needed battlefield circulation control and security along the entire 120-mile route.

The battalion's first mission was to unclog the MSR, where literally hundreds of vehicles were halted bumper to bumper. As a result of this situation, units and supplies could neither move forward nor rearward, which jeopardized the corps' ability to continue operations. Military police soldiers worked for hours along the route assisting priority convoys forward while halting unauthorized or low-priority traffic.

As the corps shifted operations to the east, the 759th MP Battalion extended operations easterly along another corps MSR (MSR Virginia). The battalion controlled nearly two hundred miles of MSR. Encountering little enemy contact along the roadways the 759th MP Battalion's primary focus became conducting battlefield circulation control operations.

The 519th and 160th MP Battalions continued operations in the corps rear area, which remained basically unchanged throughout the duration of the ground offensive. However, the 160th MP Battalion eventually moved MP forces north and assisted the 759th MP Battalion by assuming control of the southern portion of MSR Texas.

A company from the 503d MP Battalion moved forward into Iraq and established a temporary EPW holding facility to facilitate the quick evacuation of EPWs out of the division areas. This operation was difficult in that it involved evacuating large numbers of EPWs over long distances with limited transportation assets. To execute the mission successfully, the brigade obtained more than thirty commercial buses to transport EPWs.

The travel distances along a single route prevented quick evacuation. To remedy the problem the brigade requested and received Army aircraft to

quickly evacuate large numbers of EPWs from the division collection points to the forward corps holding facility or the main facility in Rafha. When EPWs arrived at the Rafha facility, theater military police (800th MP EPW Brigade) came forward with buses and evacuated the EPWs to the theater EPW camp.

The total number of EPWs and civilian internees processed by the XVIII Airborne Corps totaled 5,782. This number includes those prisoners captured prior to G-Day and those prisoners evacuated through medical channels.

During Desert Storm the corps operated on a nonlinear battlefield with extended lines of communication and used a single MSR (MSR Texas) to support multiple divisions. This situation, coupled with mass Iraqi surrenders, prevented the brigade from relying on backhaul transportation to evacuate EPWs quickly out of the division areas.

To accomplish the EPW mission, the brigade not only committed a full MP battalion to conduct EPW operations, the brigade established an additional forward corps EPW holding facility in Iraq and relied heavily on aviation support and buses to evacuate EPWs out of the division areas.

### Redeployment

Operation Desert Farewell was the movement of forces out of Iraq and subsequent redeployment of forces back to the United States. In phase IV 16th MP Brigade forces, specifically the 759th MP Battalion, conducted circulation control operations to assist corps units in moving out of Iraq and back to redeployment assembly areas near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The battalion first provided traffic control for all corps units as they withdrew from Iraq and moved into assembly areas in northern Saudi Arabia. As the corps moved back to Dhahran in eastern Saudi Arabia to prepare for redeployment back to the United States, the 759th MP Battalion

again provided the traffic control along the route.

To support the corps redeployment effort, the brigade established a customs cell at the corps headquarters in Dhahran, which was responsible for coordinating and overseeing the customs operation in the corps. The cell's primary role was managing customs inspector training and supervising the customs inspection process of thousands of vehicles and containers.

With a lack of adequate wash points, staging facilities, and qualified customs inspectors in country, the customs operation became a major management challenge for the small customs cell.

The brigade began redeploying at the end of March 1991 and completed redeployment of all brigade units by mid-May 1991.

### Conclusion

Nearly twenty-five hundred men and women comprising the 16th MP Brigade came from all over the United States and from all walks of life to participate in this conflict. For months, Regular Army, Reserve and National Guard Military Police worked around the clock to assist, protect, and defend the XVIII Airborne Corps while it deployed to and defended Saudi Arabia, dashed across the Arabian desert, and attacked deep into Iraq during the "Hundred-Hour War."

As it turned out, Desert Storm was not the mother of all battles. For American soldiers it was not the lethal and dirty battle that they prepared for. However, the war was a significant conflict that allowed MP forces to validate MP doctrine on a modern battlefield. During both Desert Shield and Desert Storm FM 19-1, *Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle*, was the guide for conducting MP operations.

It is important to pursue developing wartime alignments and training relationships among MP units to ensure readiness for future conflicts. This is especially important as the Army of the future moves toward a force projection army.

Although the brigade conducted all four battlefield missions, the most important missions were battlefield circulation control and enemy-prisoner-of-war operations. The brigade exercised all aspects of these two battlefield missions.

Area security was extremely important to force protection and was a major part of the brigade's operations. Extensive security efforts during Desert Shield provided the corps with protection against the always-present terrorist threat. However, during Desert Storm, Iraq was unable to place military forces into the rear area. Therefore, it is difficult to measure the success and effects of MP area security efforts during actual combat operations.

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**Captain Thomas H. Tatum** is a Fellowship Student in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Program of graduate studies at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He served as Commander, 118th MP Company (Abn) and Assistant S3 and Plans Officer, 16th MP Brigade (Abn), Fort Bragg, NC during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.



During Desert Storm military police were called upon to perform all four battlefield missions to include enemy-prisoner-of-war operations.

## Accounting for Prisoners During Wartime

by

*Mr. F. Peter Wigginton*

In Arabic it's *Inta sajeen*. In German it's *Du bist ein kriegsgefangener*. In Vietnamese it's *Ong la tu binh*.

Regardless of the language that says "You are a prisoner," more countries than just those belonging to the United Nations have laws that protect certain rights of soldiers and civilians captured during time of war. Known as the Geneva Conventions, several treaties have formed and expanded these agreements since Red Cross founder Henri Dunant initiated the first negotiation in 1864.

The current code was developed in the four conventions of August, 1949

The first deals with military wounded and sick in the field; the second with wounded, sick and ship-wrecked members at sea; and the third with treatment of prisoners of war. The last addresses protection of civilians.


One significant provision of those conventions pertains to the processing, handling and accountability of prisoners. While some other nations have ignored these requirements, the United States made Desert Storm a model to be followed.

The United States and its allies were in full compliance with the prisoner of war convention, setting an example for

others to follow in the future. All through the Desert Storm operation, the United States was careful to set up the procedures necessary to protect the enemy wounded and sick and soldiers taken into U.S. hands and to account for them.

Coalition member nations processed their own captives. Saudi Arabia agreed with the United States to accept processed captives and hold them in internment camps.

The 800th Military Police Brigade, an Army Reserve unit from Uniondale, New York was responsible for enemy-prisoner-of-war operations in the Desert Storm theater.



The unit was responsible for accumulating the data about prisoners and sending it to the Red Cross and maintaining accountability for those prisoners captured by U.S. forces. The brigade's 72-hour processing system was substantially faster than the month or more that was needed during World War II.

The enemy was captured or surrendered in a forward fighting area. Intelligence representatives were usually on hand to interrogate. Captives were then moved quickly to a transient corps holding area where combat troops transferred custody to guards and returned to the battlefield. From there prisoners traveled to one of two theater camps for more processing.

Theater camp staffs provided medical screening and treatment and gathered information in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. They gave each captive a card to fill in, the right side in Arabic and the left in English. Information required by the

convention includes the prisoner's name, place and date of birth, rank and serial number. However, some refused to fill in more information, such as next of kin and family address, for fear the Iraqi government would retaliate against their families.

This information was entered into laptop computers. At the end of the day the data was integrated on a disk and sent to the prisoner-of-war information center in Saudi Arabia, where reports from various camps were integrated. The aggregate was verified and given to the Red Cross in Geneva for forwarding to the Iraqi government.

United States forces processed about half of perhaps a total 100,000 Iraqis captured. Equally important as accounting for them was ensuring that their general health was all right and comfort items were available. They ate as well as U.S. troops.

The prisoners were startled that the military police were sensitive enough

to their needs to provide them with prayer mats. Seven advisory teams visited the Saudi camp daily to make certain of their care. And the Saudis handed out copies of the Koran.

The International Red Cross had access to prisoners of war at virtually every step of the way and visitation rights to internment camps. The Red Cross was high in its praise for how the U.S. treated prisoners, in contrast to what Baghdad did.

The third Geneva Convention stipulates that prisoners shall be treated humanely, adequately fed and clothed. They must not be pressured for information beyond the bounds of the convention. They must be quartered away from the field of battle and separated men from women, officers from enlisted.

They must be afforded appropriate medical treatment and hygienic facilities, including sufficient water and soap. They shall be allowed to engage in physical exercise and enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious beliefs. Any relief supplies mailed to them must be delivered.

Other clauses of that convention require that prisoners not be transferred to a location that would make it more difficult to repatriate them. They are to be given their new postal address to inform their next of kin.

Enlisted personnel, who may be required to work, must be paid according to a Swiss franc ratio, must be given one day off a week and eight holidays a year and must not be worked to excess. Officers may not be compelled to work, and noncommissioned officers shall be required to perform only supervisory work. Prisoners shall be returned to their homeland without delay after cessation of active hostilities, unless they request not to be repatriated.

Mr. F. Peter Wigginton is a writer for the American Forces Information Services.

# Protection of Refugees

by

*Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Pearson*

What is a refugee? The dictionary provides a definition, but doesn't go far enough. The men and women of the 793d MP Battalion, Nuremberg, Germany learned about refugees firsthand when tasked to protect some.

The war had ended; Desert Storm was over. The 793d MP Battalion was the first VII Corps battalion in Saudi Arabia, had attacked into Iraq with 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, survived the fighting and minefields in Iraq and Kuwait, had taken more than seven thousand prisoners, and was ready to go home.

Some Iraqi citizens, however, were trying to get into Saudi Arabia, near a place called Rafha. The battalion was tasked to protect them from the Iraqi secret police and a possible Iraqi armor attack.

Soldiers of the 793d MP Battalion learned what refugees are. They are much more than what *Webster's New World Dictionary* says: *refugee, n.* a person who flees from home or country to seek refuge elsewhere, as in a time of war or of political or religious persecution.

**Person.** A refugee is a person, but not an average person. An elderly woman racked in pain from arthritic knees and legs swollen twice their size from walking. An old man, young in years, bent from the weight of his three young children and all his worldly possessions. The seven-year-old girl, too young to understand, but with only thirty minutes to live because she carries the bullet of an Iraqi soldier. And the six-year-old boy watching his sister die because she tried to take a short-cut through an Iraqi minefield. These are refugees.

**Flees.** One envisions running when thinking of fleeing. Refugees flee any way they can: walk hundreds of kilometers—offer the family savings for a ride on a flatbed trailer having no sides—ride hundreds of kilometers, with two other passengers, on the flat spot behind the cab of an 18-wheeler—or ride a camel (owned, bought, or found). Worldly possessions brought or abandoned, depend on the means to flee. A lifetime of belongings and only moments to decide what can be saved. These people are fleeing.

**Seek Refuge.** Sanctuary. A place of safety. That was what they wanted and needed. But wait...The Iraqi army surrendered; it was over. They waited in Iraq, in a camp out on the desert, while coalition leaders decided their fate. This so-called refuge had no sanitation. They walked outside

of camp for relief; no matter that the camp grew larger by the day. Each new arrival lived in someone else's filth, with others condemned to live in theirs. Food? Water? Provided (when available). One must stay in line.



**Refugee camp in Iraq, vicinity Rafha, Saudi Arabia. (April 20, 1991)**

Soldiers of the 793d MP Battalion saw and lived this for three days. They spent the next twenty-seven putting a stop to it and moving the 13,000+ refugees into the safety of Saudi Arabia. What started as a five-day mission to defend a refugee camp became a labor of love.

Units that had arrived in Saudi Arabia long after the battalion did, went home. The 793d MP Battalion stayed. Its soldiers talked longingly about going home, but only after every refugee was safely across the border.

The battalion left Rafha after thirty long, hard days, the last VII Corps battalion out of Iraq. Although extraordinarily successful in the war, these soldiers are most proud of what they did at Rafha. Their image of a refugee is much, much more than Mr. Webster can define.

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Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Pearson is assigned to the 24th Infantry Division, (MECH), Fort Stewart, GA. He wrote this article as a student at the National War College, Washington, DC. As Commander of the 793d MP Battalion, Nuremberg, Germany, he served in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait.

# Operational Readiness Evaluation

by

*First Lieutenant William Black*

The 21st Military Police Company (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina became the first active duty MP company to undergo the new FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command) operational readiness evaluation (ORE). *One Army—One Standard* is the driving force behind the Army's newest evaluation and inspection program.

The ORE Division, Headquarters, 1st U.S. Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland conducted the inspection. There are six different inspection and evaluation teams that comprise the ORE division: two combat arms evaluation teams, two combat support evaluation teams, and two combat service support evaluation teams.

Each team consists of ten to twelve subject matter experts in personnel records, readiness, training management, supply management, and maintenance management. The team has an equal distribution of personnel from the National Guard, Army Reserve and Active Component.

This provides greater representation and support to all Army components and reinforces the *One Army—One Standard* principle. The ORE team is augmented by MOS-specific personnel according to the type of unit being inspected, (*i.e.*, 95B and 31A for an MP unit).

The ORE is broken down into **four phases**.

**Phase 1** is the notification phase. This is done six to eighteen months out for Reserve Component units and sixty days out for active units. During this phase all coordination is made to get training areas for the situational training exercise (STX), ammunition for the qualification range, and support for the

ORE team (communications, drivers, vehicles, *etc.*)

**Phase 2** is the compliance evaluation phase. During the compliance phase the ORE team inspects the unit's maintenance management, supply management, personnel records, MOS qualification, training management, mobilization and movement plans and unit security.

**Phase 3** is the collective task evaluation. During the collective evaluation, the unit executes a one-day ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) STX. The field problem is ARTEP-based and is used to evaluate the unit's training program and validates the unit's METL (mission essential task list) assessment.

**Phase 4** is the individual task evaluation. During the individual evaluation 100 percent of the unit is given an APFT (Army physical fitness test). In addition to the APFT, 25 percent of the unit is given common task testing (CTT), 25 percent of the unit participates in M16A2 weapons qualification, and 25 percent of the unit conducts PMCS (preventive maintenance checks and services) certification. The ORE lasts for four days and is a snapshot of the unit's ability to deploy and perform its wartime mission.

The company participated in the ORE from April 20-23, 1993. During day one of the evaluation the ORE team looked at military personnel records jackets, personnel readiness files, family care plans, dental records, and medical records. The unit did very well with its personnel readiness files and family care plans.

All files that were evaluated were found to be maintained in accordance

with the rigid requirements of the 16th Military Police Brigade (ABN) readiness standing operating procedures (RSOP). Some challenges during this portion were that the personnel and medical records being inspected were not under direct control and management of the unit, thereby placing responsibility for records on the respective personnel service center and troop medical clinic. This created problems when a few actions taken at the company level were not posted to the soldiers records properly.

On day two of the evaluation key leaders of the company received an in-brief from the ORE team chief. After the in-brief the subject matter experts for the section evaluations were paired up with the corresponding personnel in the company. Also at this time the company commander received the operations order (OPORD) for the collective task evaluation phase to be conducted on day three.

During day two of the compliance phase the inspectors used FORSCOM checklists to evaluate the different sections within the unit. The inspectors went one on one with the unit section personnel to evaluate the unit's preparedness and ability to deploy and support its wartime mission. At the end of the day the commander had to back-brief the ORE team chief with the company OPORD and the scheme of maneuver.

On day three the unit executed the company commander's mission as stated in the company OPORD. The unit rolled through its start point (SP) with the intent of performing a tactical road march to its assigned sectors with each platoon

securing and defending its CP (command post) locations. The platoons each had follow-on missions of performing route reconnaissance, route signing and MSR (main supply route) security to develop and support the company traffic control plan.

Throughout the day the platoons received FRAGOs (fragmentary orders) giving them the additional missions to conduct area and zone reconnaissance, perform security of designated convoys, execute movement techniques, conduct special circulation control measures, use passive air defense measures and respond to a chemical attack. The combat support mission of the 21st made the collective evaluation a challenge not only for the soldiers and their leaders but for the nine MOS-specific observer controllers augmenting the ORE team.

During the 12-hour STX each of the platoons performed no less than five of the tasks listed above. The stress initiated by these conditions made planning and coordination between platoons and observer an essential element in the success of the company. Every minute of the twelve hours in the field had to be used wisely and productively, or failure was imminent.

Throughout the STX the ORE team had a video camera in the field filming the different missions the platoons were conducting. This film was used at the end of the day to assist the team in conducting the company-level after-actions report (AAR) on the STX portion of the evaluation.

Day four began with the APFT. At 6:30 a.m. the ORE team administered the APFT to every soldier in the unit. At 9 a.m. 25 percent of the assigned soldiers, including platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, participated in CTT. Twenty-five percent of the assigned drivers and assistant drivers conducted PMCS certification. Another 25 percent participated in M16A2 qualification. This portion of the evaluation demonstrated the unit's individual soldier's ability to excel.

Particularly noteworthy was the unit's strong maintenance training, which resulted in all soldiers commendably passing the PMCS test. At the completion of these events the ORE team compiled a draft report and conducted a final out-brief with the key leaders of the unit.

An ORE is a snapshot of a unit's ability to perform its wartime mission and is an evaluation of the unit's sup-

port activities. The evaluation is thorough and standardized; 114 different areas in the unit's support sections were evaluated. Fifteen different collective tasks were evaluated during the STX portion, and every soldier in the unit participated in two individual evaluations.

The 21st MP Company (ABN) received GOs in every major area, with only three minor deficiencies out of the 114 areas in the support sections evaluations and no deficiencies in any collective task. The company was assessed as having highly competent leadership with truly motivated and skilled soldiers. Unit leaders and soldiers benefited from the evaluation from the preparatory stages throughout the actual exercise.

The unit found that the key to success during an ORE is attention to detail in all areas of unit support activities and extensive preparation and training in all METL tasks. The 21st set the stage for future MP units and upheld the motto of the 1st Army ORE Division, *One Army—One Standard*.

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**First Lieutenant William Black** is the Assistant S3, 503d MP Battalion (ABN), Fort Bragg, NC.



For the collective task evaluation the unit executed a one-day ARTEP situational training exercise.

# Leadership Expectations for Military Police

by

*Major Harry W. Christiansen*

The job that each military police soldier performs is essential to the Army's readiness. In combat or on routine patrol it is MP leadership that others see and judge. Whether running a traffic control point on MSR Dodge in Saudi Arabia or on routine patrol in garrison, military police lead other soldiers.

It is each MP's decision to do the right thing at the right time as a team leader or on patrol. It is their responsibility to keep critical supplies moving on the MSR or to give first-aid to an accident victim. The military police leadership role on the battlefield and in garrison is clear.



**Leadership is critical to military police soldiers. Here, a team leader briefs a team.**

The MP's service to the nation in war and in peace rests upon a solid ethical base. Because military police discharge such moral responsibilities, they must uphold and abide by the highest standards of behavior. That ethical base, the Army's professional ethic, is the cornerstone of the Army.

The Army professional ethic consists of values that govern MP behavior both as a group and as individuals. Values tell what is important and declare what *we will* do. In the absence of specific policy or procedures, values pro-

vide unit members with a set of tools to guide their behavior. The Army's professional ethic consists of four values: loyalty, duty, selfless service, and integrity.

Loyalty is a two-way street. Leaders care for soldiers entrusted to them, and soldiers support their leaders.

Leaders show loyalty by carrying out tough orders without expressing disapproval. They show loyalty by defending soldiers against unfair treatment. They place the unit's needs ahead of their own.

Duty is a legal or moral obligation to do the right thing without orders. It means accomplishing the task to the fullest of one's ability.

Leaders show duty by being responsible for taking action to insure success. They show duty by taking the initiative and anticipating requirements. They effectively do the job so others will not have to.

Selfless service is putting the nation's welfare and mission accomplishment ahead of personal needs.

Leaders show selfless service by meeting soldiers' needs before attending their own. Leaders show selfless service by sharing hardship, danger, and discomfort with their soldiers. They take action to provide for the welfare of their soldiers.

Integrity means being honest and living the values of the Army's professional ethic. Integrity is the basis for trust and confidence that must exist among leaders and soldiers.

Leaders show integrity by using their power to work for mission accomplishment or for their soldiers' benefit. Leaders show integrity by encouraging honest and open communication. They do the hard right, not the easy wrong.

The Military Police Corps contains men and women of character who live the Army professional ethic every day. Because of their duty to protect and assist, military police frequently find themselves in a leadership role directing the efforts of other soldiers. Soldiers and family members, for whom the military police serve, expect the military police to exhibit the Army professional ethic of loyalty, duty, selfless service and integrity.

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**Major Harry W. Christiansen** is the Leadership Development Officer, Human Resources Directorate, Department of the Army, Washington, DC.



## A Platoon Leader's Lessons Learned

by

*Captain Thomas N. Cummings*

The Army's Combined Arms Center published several bulletins of lessons learned from Operation Just Cause that were targeted primarily at battalion level and above. Those publications held much for the senior commander and staff officer. Leaders at platoon level, however, need additional information on applicable lessons learned.

This article will attempt to bridge that gap by presenting lessons learned from Just Cause for military police leaders at the platoon level.

Leaders and soldiers of the third platoon, 511th MP Company, Fort Drum, New York made observations on how peacetime training and operational habits affected performance in this low-intensity conflict (LIC). Later these observations were recorded, discussed with other MP leaders during after-action reviews,

and distilled into detailed lessons learned.

Some of these notes are on training, and some are on platoon operations. Most important, however, is that they are all from a platoon leader's point of view and could be helpful to other MP platoon leaders.

### **Train for LIC**

After the serious fighting ended, most operations were conducted with a strong law enforcement twist because of the strict rules of engagement (ROE).

These ROE were designed to (1) protect innocent civilians and reduce property damage, especially in urban areas, and (2) transition the intent of operations from combat to stabilization measures in support of a legitimate civil government.

While some units, trained to react to dangerous situations by executing

combat drills, may have had difficulty acclimating their troops to the conservative ROE, military police were prepared to work in this LIC environment. For example, when reacting to snipers, military police took cover, warned people in the immediate area to do the same, and then started the slow process of isolating and capturing the sniper. Many times the sniper disappeared, but unnecessary casualties and property damage were kept at a minimum.

Often leaders of combat support units feel that law enforcement duty interferes with training. Law enforcement duty, however, can be excellent training ground for LIC. The restraint and public relations techniques the MP learns while performing law enforcement duties are a good preparation for missions conducted during an operational deployment.

When training a platoon to conduct missions on the battlefield, it can be put in conditions in which it must limit the use of firepower and violence. It is useful to train the platoon to conduct missions in urban terrain, employing a strict ROE and using role players as civilians.

If there is no way to conduct military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) training, TEWTs (tactical exercises without troops) can be conducted in garrison. Discuss how the unit would conduct checkpoints, cordon and search operations, and enforcement of curfews—while limiting damage and protecting unarmed civilians. Such scenarios can be used to develop situational exercises for military police.

### Automatic Fire

Given the limited force options under the ROE and the close conditions in the city, military police had to be extremely careful with automatic fire.

In the first few days of Operation Just Cause, M-60 gunners could have engaged targets without orders, spraying the area with fire. After a near disaster at a gas station, the platoon leaders instructed gunners to fire only on their team leader's command or in self-defense. When they did fire, leaders tried to ensure that they were engaging specific targets, not just pointing the weapon and firing off rounds.

Most of the fire from machine guns went too high to be effective. This was true of both military police and the infantry. One cause of this problem was in the way M-60 gunners are trained during field exercises. Using the MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system), M-60 gunners are forced to move their point of aim up to chest level to be effective. To avoid this problem, it is preferable to train M-60 gunners to use grazing fire or aim at a point below the center of mass.

Squad and team leaders must maintain strict control of automatic fire. In a LIC environment stray auto-

matic fire could produce disastrous results.

### Use Pistols in Urban Terrain

Driving through the narrow and crowded streets of Panama City was a hair-raising experience at best. Often during the later days of the operation military police in HMMWVs would find themselves surrounded by large crowds of curious Panamanians. The crowds were usually supportive of the United States, but MPs still had to be alert for potential attacks by individuals.

In training, drivers and assistant drivers have their M-16s ready to fire out their window if attacked while the vehicle is moving. With a large crowd around the vehicle, the problem with this practice is that someone could easily grab the weapon away from the MP. In order to avoid the problem, MPs put the M-16s away in the vehicle, unholstered their pistols and held them in their laps.

Pistols had the advantage of being less visible (and therefore less threatening than the M-16) and more controllable in a close situation. If the driver and team leader felt threatened by the crowd, all they had to do was raise the pistol to a position where it could easily be seen, and usually the point was made.

Military police have several different types of weapons available to them, and should be trained to tailor the weapons they use to the situation at hand. In some cases the pistol may be a better choice not only for control, but also for the sake of appearances because it is less threatening than a rifle or machine gun.

### Critical Operating Procedures

Two SOPs critical to the platoon's success were the accountability-and-status reporting procedure and the precombat inspection. Of course, these SOPs do not have to be used specifically for a LIC deployment, but can and should be used during all platoon operations.

The accountability-and-status reporting procedure was a verbal SOP

used primarily by the platoon sergeant and the squad and team leaders. Every time the platoon or part of the platoon moved, subordinate leaders were required to give the platoon sergeant a report on accountability.

The ACE (ammunition, casualties, and equipment) format was used. When the platoon trained, the NCOs ensured that soldiers used it all the time and that the reports given were accurate. Later when the unit was knee deep in get-it-and-go missions during Operation Just Cause, team and squad leaders checked their equipment and gave ACE reports as if it were second nature.

This sounds like a simple procedure to use; but if leaders do not practice it during training, they will not think about it during battle. When the third platoon redeployed after four months, not a single piece of platoon equipment had been lost.

The second SOP used by the platoon, the precombat inspection, was a checklist of critical points of readiness. Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) was important.

The SOP required team and squad leaders to check each item, while the platoon sergeant and platoon leader made spot checks.

Each soldier had a copy of the checklist and was expected to prepare and check their equipment accordingly. If the platoon or a squad was given an urgent mission, leaders checked only the critical items. This took only a few extra seconds to complete and averted potential headaches.

Given that military police are often considered as a force of choice for low-intensity conflict situations, an MP platoon leader would do well to consider these lessons learned and apply them to future training and unit operations.

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**Captain Thomas N. Cummings** is at the USA ROTC Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, VA. He was a student in the MP Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written.

# From Military Green to Civilian Blue

by

*Commander (Ret) Armand L. Chapeau*



Military police, whose career in the Army is nearing a close and who want to stay in law enforcement, should consider trading their green Army suit for a civilian police blue suit.

There are approximately twenty thousand or more job vacancies each year in police and sheriff's department nationwide. Former members of the military service with a specialty in law enforcement are in great demand. The time to start planning for the transition is at least six months prior to separation.

Most departments are seeking men and women who are at least 21 years old, are citizens of the United States, have no felony convictions, are in good

physical condition, have good character, and have a high school diploma or a college degree. Starting salaries range from \$14,000 a year in the rural south to \$30,000 in California and New York. Health benefits can vary, vacation ranges from one week a year to six weeks a year, depending on location and length of service with an employer.

Some agencies purchase equipment and uniforms while others rely on the employee to furnish everything, including a handgun. Some departments have take-home cars while others do not. All departments have a probationary period for new employees that range from six to twenty-four months.

Retirement plans differ from state to state and from department to department. Some have twenty-year half-pay plans with no employee contributions while others require a minimum of fifteen years with the department, age 62 or older, and employee contributions. In some states union membership is mandatory, in other states it is optional, while some states prohibit unionization of public safety. Each has its own advantages and drawbacks.

There is important documentation needed before applying for a job as a police officer or sheriff's deputy. Having it will make applying easier and cause fewer delays in processing

the application for employment if the data is obtained before leaving the service: a current driver's license, a birth certificate, copies of any high school and college diplomas or courses completed, and a DD Form 214, *Report of Separation from Active Service*.

Since most police departments do a background investigation on all new hires, a copy of the background investigation (if one was completed) from the Army will be a big help. A copy of the background investigation can be requested under the Freedom of Information Act from Defense Investigative Services. If one was not and completed, list all places of residence for the past few years even if that residence was on-board ship or abroad.

Basic training of police officers varies from state to state and within states from department to department. However, each state has a minimum number of hours of training each officer must have prior to being certified as a police officer in that state. That number varies from 160 to over a thousand hours. Most states will give credit for military training that relates to police work if the number of hours of training on a particular subject is similar to the number of hours required by state.

Basic police training can be attended part-time taking only the courses needed. Military training records are important; in addition to certificates of completion of the courses, course content and number of hours of training on a specific subject must be documented. For example, training in the proper use of first aid in a six-hour course may satisfy the requirement in first aid for that state.

The world of police work today is hours of routine work punctuated by moments of stark terror. Local police do not have many of the advantages enjoyed by the military. The first on the list is immunity from suit. Each state has different tort laws and differing lev-

els of immunity from suit as an individual. In the federal sphere immunity is automatic if you follow agency rules. Tort laws in each state vary.

For military police interested in wearing law enforcement blue, contact a local department within the desired state. Most departments have a series of written, practical, physical, and psychological tests that are given to each candidate in addition to a personal interview. Find out what their requirements are for becoming a police officer and try to get answers to the questions raised above about retirement, vacation, health benefits, and union membership.

Contact the agency that certifies police officers in that state and ascertain the minimum requirements for hiring. Next ask what their minimum basic training requirements are, whether they accept related military training in place of their own, whether they have programs for veterans, whether they have veteran's preference for hiring and if the training is available for applicants who do not have a job with a local department.

This would provide status as a state-trained officer looking for a job rather than as a new recruit. This reduces the cost of employment to the new employer and increases chances of obtaining employment. It may also allow using the GI bill to pay for the training.

The state certification agency may also be able to provide information on agencies within the state that are hiring.

For a listing of law enforcement agencies nationwide, the best reference source available is *The National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrator Correctional Institutions, and Related Agencies*. The publication is available for about \$50 from the National Police Chiefs and Sheriffs Information Bureau, P.O. Box 365, Stevens Point, WI 54481-0365; telephone (800) 747-2772. Local libraries, provost marshals offices, or police departments may have copies.

Resumes are important for police positions above the entry level. For anyone looking for a chief's job, a good reference is *How Bright Is Your Badge*, available from Appellate Publishing, P.O. Box 120423, Arlington, TX 76012 for about \$14.

Contact the police departments in the desired geographic area and request employment applications. Return each with a letter that lists the reasons for wanting to be a member of their department. Emphasize in the letter those skills necessary for police work: writing skills, observation skills, computer skills, verbal communication skills, firearms skills, and driving skills.

Be prepared to take leave to go to the department to take the entrance examination and any other exams or interviews required. If successful, the GI bill may pay the difference between the salary as a trainee and the salary as police officer for thirteen months.

Once on the job, be prepared for a rude awakening. The job is not like television police shows or any other. Many police academies are like boot camp all over again. Most police recruits ride with a field training officer who does a performance evaluation daily, and most new police officers wind up on the midnight shift for a few years. Promotions, depending on the size of the department, can be at a snail's pace.

Lastly, because of the uniform and the job, be prepared to live in a glass house and have everyone in town tell how to do the job, especially when issuing them a citation. But remember the thin blue line of dedicated police officers is all that stands between a democratic society and chaos.

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**Chief Armand L. Chapeau, Commander (Ret), USCG**, is the Chief of Police for the city of Griffin, GA. He retired from the U.S. Coast Guard with the rank of Commander in 1987.

# A Measure of Success

## The Self-Development Test

by

*Ms. Karen Spath*

The Army's new self-development test (SDT) for sergeants, staff sergeants, and sergeants first class has completed its second year. By now most Active Army noncommissioned officers in these ranks have taken the SDT at least once, but not for record.

The Army senior leadership directed that the first two years of the SDT be for assessing, debugging, and fine tuning the test. Soldiers would take it, but scores would not be used for decisions affecting their careers.

The validation period has come to a close. While the validation will continue another year for the Reserve Component, in FY 94 Active Army NCOs began testing for record. This means that SDT scores are entered into personnel records and influence important decisions affecting their careers, such as promotions and school selection. The SDT became an

integral part of the Army's Leader Development Program.

What does this mean for an NCO's professional development as a leader and for their future military career?

Self-development is one of the three important pillars of leader development. A former Sergeant Major of the Army described it as probably the most neglected pillar. There are reasons for the neglect. Self-development is not something an NCO, or anyone else, has to do today. It can be put off until next week or next month, when perhaps there will be more time.

Then if a day comes along when there is some spare time for self-development, what can be done? Read a book? Which book? Practice a skill? Which skill? Solve a problem? Which problem? After doing any of these, how do NCOs


know how well they did? Is there any feedback?

When fully implemented, the SDT promises to make self-development a stronger and less-neglected pillar of leader development. The SDT provides incentive for self-development. It serves to guide and focus the self-development efforts of NCOs, and it provides feedback. These are always necessary conditions for effective learning, and this is what self-development means—effective learning.

The SDT provides incentive because the NCO has a stake in doing well. Good SDT scores increase the chances of being promoted. The tests give focus to the NCO's self-development efforts. The SDT notice tells NCOs what material they need to study in preparing for the test. This gives direction and discipline to self-development. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, NCOs are given feedback on their self-development efforts.

A wise teacher once said that in order to learn, one must *want* something, *do* something, and *get* something. Given the importance of SDT scores, soldiers almost certainly want to score well on SDT. Given the guidance they get through the notice, they know what to do in order to score well. In the short term what they get are scores that tell them how well they do on the SDT and its different sections, and in the longer term they get the career benefits that come from doing well on the SDT.

For an NCO, what does the SDT mean in terms of development as a leader? The SDT provides a stronger incentive for self-development, guidance to focus and discipline self-development, feedback in test scores to tell the results





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET  
 NO. 95B2093(AC&RC)N  
 95B3093(AC&RC)N  
 95B4093(AC&RC)N

**NOTICE FOR MOSC 95B2/3/4**

**MILITARY  
 POLICE**

TEST PERIODS  
 APR 83 - JUN 83(AC)  
 APR 83 - MAR 84(RC)

**GENERAL INFORMATION**

This notice identifies the references you should study in order to answer the leadership, training management, and MOS-knowledge questions that will appear on your NCO Self-Development Test (SDT). You are responsible for studying for the SDT on your own.

- Your unit will issue you copies of FMs 22-100, 101, 102, and 103 on leadership, training management. These field manuals will become your responsibility for keeping and maintaining them.
- Questions on the MOS portion of the SDT will cover the MOS knowledge portion of the soldier's manual (SM). They will come only from the references listed in this notice. You should find these references in your work area.

**NOTE FOR THE TRAINING STANDARD**

As the TSO, you will distribute sufficient copies of this notice to all NCOs holding the above MOS and Skill Level will have access to it.

HEADQUARTERS  
 151

PERSONAL IN NATURE  
 \*\*\*INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER'S REPORT\*\*\*  
 (P-I-N-A-L)

TO: SFC WARD, GARY W.  
 CO A 701st MP BN  
 FORT MCCLELLAN, AL 36205-5030

SSN: 123-45-6789      TSO: 156  
 MOS: 95B MILITARY POLICE

SDT SCORE: 99  
 PERCENTILE: 95  
 SDT: 95B4093  
 TESTED: 12 MAY 93  
 SCORED: 16 AUG 93  
 UIC: W41000X

	# CORRECT / TOTAL
LEADERSHIP	20 / 20
TRAINING MANAGEMENT	20 / 20
MOS KNOWLEDGE	59 / 60
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS	9 / 10
CREW-SERVED WEAPONS	2 / 2
COMMUNICATIONS	7 / 7
COMBAT MOVEMENTS	5 / 5
EPW/CI	3 / 3
ADVANCED NBC	3 / 3
SUPERVISE COMBAT TECHNIQUES	3 / 3
ADVANCED BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL	3 / 3
PERIMETER WARNING SYSTEMS	2 / 2
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\* YOUR SCORE OF 99 WAS AS GOOD AS OR BETTER THAN 95 PERCENT OF THE NCO'S IN YOUR MOS/GRADE.

of self-development, and the long-term rewards for doing well. What does the SDT mean in terms of a military career? It means that career progress is strongly influenced by self development efforts. Who will be tomorrow's successful noncommissioned officer? The soldier who uses personal time and effort to increase technical and tactical skills will be.

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recognition for those who succeed in that effort. Ms. Karen Spath is a Senior Education Specialist in the Directorate of Individual Training Evaluation, U.S. Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, VA.

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Robert L. Baldwin	Gary M. Travis	8th MP Bde	Seoul, Korea
Donald Ryder	James Shakell	14th MP Bde	Stuttgart, GE
Michael Sullivan	Charles Joas	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
David W. Foley	vacant	18th MP Bde	Frankfurt, GE
Joseph P. Hebert	Carl L. Kreiger	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, Texas
Ernest H. Dinkel	Paul J. Sefcik	3d MP Gp	Ft Gillem, GA
Daniel Lynch	Billy Vaughn	6th CID Rgn	Ft Lewis, WA
Robert Majauskas	Morgan H. Merrill	Trng Bde	Ft McClellan, AL
Gregory A. Lowe	Michael L. Davis	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS

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BATTALION LEVEL COMMAND DESIGNATED LIST**

<b>COMMANDER</b>	<b>CSM/SGM</b>	<b>UNIT</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>
Gerald A. Prentice	Ronald Herrington	92d MP Bn	Panama
John DellaJacono	Harold Burleson	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
James Clifford	Burt Arthur	97th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
Thomas Keller	Sam F. Chapman	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Dario A. Compain	M. Brandsetter	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Otis Cooksey	Edward M. Keuten	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Sharie H. Russell	Benny Conner	701st MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Vicki Warren	Diane Chaisson	704th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Allen Stahl	Thomas Kolle	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Michael A. Lansing	Arthur J. White	709th MP Bn	Frankfurt, GE
Mark Boyer	Layton Benson	716th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Anthony Stamilio	Donald Thomas	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
David F. Trueting	Richard Youngs	728th MP Bn	Taegu, Korea
Jose Vazquez	William Burt	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Manolito Garabato	vacant	787th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
John Davies	Bobby Henry	793d MP Bn	Fuerth, GE
Richard M. Sackett	James E. Marsh	795th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Larry R. Johnston	Wayne Heinold	2d MP Det	Seoul, Korea
Daniel M. Quinn	Michael Misiamowycz	5th MP Det	Heidelberg, GE
Fred S. Lydick	N/A	10th MP Det	Ft Bragg, NC
John R. Dye	N/A	CID District	Ft Hood, TX
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