MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

2021 Annual Issue



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

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
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Military Police, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. The objectives of *Military Police* are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. *Military Police* reserves the right to edit material. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to *Military Police* and the authors. All photographs are official U.S. Army photographs unless otherwise credited.

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Military Police

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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The Military Police Doctrine Update is now available separately at the following website address:

<https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/9216/2627/3499/MP_Doctrine_Update.pdf>

The brigade-level-and-above and battalion level command lists are now available separately at the following website address:

<https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/6916/2610/3015/brigade_battalion_level_commands-1.pdf>

We are the Army's premier dual-purpose force.

In competition, we preserve readiness.

In crisis, we secure critical capabilities, assets, and activities.

In conflict, we support maneuver with security and mobility support, police, and detention operations.

Our actions mitigate strategic risk, all day, every day.

Front cover: Image from video by Sergeant Kris Wright, 358th Public Affairs Detachment

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Niave F. Knell



Greetings from the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS)!

We have a lot to be excited about this summer. We just celebrated the Army's 246th birthday. Since its establishment in 1775, U.S. Army Soldiers and civilians have supported our Nation, bearing true faith and allegiance to the Nation, the Constitution of the United States, the Army, their units, and fellow team members. We are also hard at work preparing for the celebration of the 80th birthday of the Military Police Corps in September.

We are excited that the installation at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, was able to lift some of the restrictions put in place due to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19). We now have Families attending our graduations, and we can hail and farewell our great teammates in person. Although virtual platforms have been helpful, it is so much better to hold those ceremonies and events in person.

We also had the opportunity to recognize our great instructors and have selected four new instructors of the year—one of whom was selected in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) category! Congratulations to—

- Captain Lindsey M. Madero.
- Chief Warrant Officer Four Steven M. Geniuk (also selected as TRADOC warrant officer instructor of the year).
- Staff Sergeant Joseph A. Mullett.
- Mr. David A. Brown.

Finally, we have selected our hall of fame inductees. Thanks so much to our selection panel members; they tackled twice the number of nominations that we normally receive. And we encourage the field to continue with the great nominations. Of the more than 1 million military police who have served in the Army Military Police Corps over 79 years, only 99—or about 0.01 percent—have been inducted to the hall of fame. We are thrilled to announce that the following military police Soldiers will join them—

- Lieutenant General David E. Quantock (Retired).
- Brigadier General Mark S. Spindler (Retired).
- Colonel Robert B. Abernathy (Retired).
- Colonel Arnold Daxe Jr. (Retired).
- Colonel Thomas Keller (Retired).
- Colonel Alexander Mascelli (Retired).
- Colonel Herman (Tracy) Williams III (Retired).
- Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Blair (Retired).
- Command Sergeant Major Brenda K. Curfman (Retired).
- Master Sergeant Daniel T. Andrews (Retired).
- Master Sergeant Natalie J. Kindrick (Retired).
- Sergeant First Class Wentz J. B. Shanaberger III (†).
- Staff Sergeant Gene E. Baxley (Retired).

Two areas that are being emphasized throughout our courses are assessments and profession. Our Army is working hard to ensure that we select the right leaders for command, and we are implementing assessments in professional military education areas to ensure that potential leaders are aware of their strengths and weaknesses. More than 2 years ago, the Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the Army Talent Management Task Force and that task force transformed the command selection process. Based on their evaluations, a number of promotable majors and lieutenant colonels were selected to compete for battalion command. They then traveled to Fort Knox, Kentucky, and in a week's time, completed a physical fitness test, a battery of other tests, and an oral board with a panel of senior officers. The panel of senior officers, which had access to all of the test results as well as evaluations from peers and subordinates, determined whether the individuals were ready to command. This year, the program was expanded to brigade command—and it will soon extend to command sergeants major. Additionally, TRADOC instituted the Project Athena initiative to promote personal professional self-development this year. Our Basic Officers Leader Course and Captain's Career Course students were assessed on everything from critical thinking, to reading and writing, to social skills. They leave USAMPS with a very good idea about which areas they need to work on years in advance of competing for command, leaving

(continued on page 4)

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Michael P. Bennett



Military Police Corps Regiment: Today, I am writing my final message as the 14th Regimental Command Sergeant Major. Additionally, this will be my last address as a Regular Army Soldier. The last 26 years have been some of the most rewarding experiences of my entire life.

This September, the Military Police Corps Regiment will celebrate its 80th year of support to the greatest Army in the world. In my opinion, this Regiment is simply the best because of the officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, junior enlisted Soldiers, and civilians who routinely achieve excellence at everything they do to support our Army.

As our Army comes out the other side of all things related to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), we are once again greeted by the large numbers of Family members who descend upon Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, on a weekly basis to show their support to graduating Soldiers. This pandemic might have thrown a number of things across this Nation off track, but it has not broken the support of our community for the newest members of our team, who raised their right hands and swore an oath to the principle of freedom. Our future is bright!

My Family and I will not be too far away from the Regiment, as we will transition out of the Army in the Fort Leonard Wood area. This was my fourth assignment to Fort Leonard Wood and was, by far, one of my most humbling assignments. Watching the commands work to support senior mission commanders across the globe as they responded to the priorities of, first, Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre and, then, Brigadier General Naive F. Knell was amazing.

At this time, I want to thank all of my teammates who helped me work toward a more educated Noncommissioned Officer Corps and those who helped facilitate a more level communication process with Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve formations. Time is not on your side in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and it takes significant time to accomplish even the smallest of tasks. Eventually, those little "wins" will result in more tactical and technically focused noncommissioned officers at the conclusion of Professional Military Education.

Last and most importantly, I want to welcome Command Sergeant Major Shawn A. Klosterman, his wife, and his Family to Fort Leonard Wood. Arriving from the 18th Military Police Brigade, Command Sergeant Major Klosterman is no stranger to the depth and reach that the Regiment has on the role of military police in large-scale combat operations. He will continue to improve the capabilities of the Regiment. Congratulations, Shawn; we are all extremely proud of you and excited to see what you accomplish during your time at the Home of the Regiment!!

Assist, Protect, Defend!

"This pandemic might have thrown a number of things across this Nation off track, but it has not broken the support of our community for the newest members of our team, who raised their right hands and swore an oath to the principle of freedom."

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Mark W. Arnold

Greetings from the Home of the Regiment!

Last year was a year full of challenges, and this year started out no differently. The Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic made us look at how we do business and adapt to a new environment while we continued to accomplish the mission. Like true professionals, the members of our Regiment admirably reacted and responded across all disciplines. I am exceptionally honored to be a part of the Regiment, and I am extremely proud of what you do every day. Thank you for supporting our Regiment, our Army, and our great Nation.

In the previous issue of *Military Police*, I mentioned that readiness is one of the Army's top priorities and that it is a result of the effective application of the Chief of Staff of the Army priority—taking care of Soldiers. As leaders, we take care of Soldiers, but we also take care of them as organizations. One such organization is the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), which is an independent criminal investigative organization that investigates serious, felony level crime (murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery, arson, fraud, and cybercrime) and provides online resources. CID Lookout is a CID initiative that establishes a partnership with the Army community and provides Soldiers and their Families with information and resources to help protect themselves and to prevent, reduce, and report felony level crime. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Internet usage increased due to social distancing and more time spent indoors, CID published a media release, "Safeguard Children From Online Predators,"[1] to remind parents to safeguard children and teenagers against invasions of privacy, cyberbullying, sexting, and other forms of harassment that occur online. CID explains threats and provides recommendations to protect children against them, emphasizing that parental involvement is critical to safe Internet use. CID Lookout information and resources are available online at <https://www.cid.army.mil/cid-lookout.html>.

CID special agents and military police cannot solve and prevent crime on their own. As professional law enforcement officers, we must work hand-in-hand with the Army community to fight serious crime. Therefore, CID depends heavily on Soldiers, Family members, and civilian employees to be on the lookout and to provide assistance in keeping the Army strong and safe.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Endnote:

[1]"Safeguard Children From Online Predators," CID, 29 October 2020, <https://www.cid.army.mil/cid-lookout.html>, accessed on 29 June 2020.

(Brigadier General Niave F. Knell, continued from page 2)

them a chance to improve as they gain knowledge and experience. They can then focus their efforts on that last pillar of development—self-development.

When I address USAMPS classes for the first time, I discuss the military police profession and what it means to be a professional. The small-group leaders direct the students to watch the Center for the Army Profession and Leadership videos available at: <https://capl.army.mil/army-profession-video-series.php>. We then discuss examples of character (actions in line with values), what is required and expected of the students (competence), and their obligations (commitments). With Basic Officers Leader Course students, we emphasize how the Army meets the essential characteristics of a profession by having the students give examples of professions and full time occupations. We then tell the students that they are about to join units and work with all levels of leaders who embody the profession. We are very proud of the Military Police Corps discipline and its professionalism!

80th anniversaries are referred to as "oak anniversaries." This moniker is very appropriate for our Corps this year, as we now have a thick, solid trunk with lots of strong branches growing from it. We look forward to celebrating with all of you this September!

We love highlighting our contributions and sharing yours on our social media platforms, including Facebook© (at <https://www.facebook.com/UsArmyMilitaryPolice/>), Twitter© (at <https://twitter.com/USArmyMPcorps>), and Instagram© (at <https://www.instagram.com/usarmy_mpcorps>).

Providing C2 in the Support Area–
A Proof of Concept for LSCO

By Major Joshua P. David and Captain Matthew R. Bigelow

Background

With the dissolution of the brigade special troops battalion from the brigade combat team (BCT), command and control (C2) has increased the challenges for securing or controlling security in the rear support area. Historically, BCTs struggled with controlling ground lines of communication and providing security to critical sites in the rear support area. The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) provides C2 in the support area as a shaping operation, while the BCT focuses on the close fight. Unfortunately, the current BEB construct struggles in providing C2 with echelons above brigade. The span of control for assets and enablers is limited, and better C2 can unlock more of an economy-of-force effort. The challenge is due to manning and force design within the BEB, which prohibits effective securing or controlling of the support area. This has been identified as a critical gap, 6 of 17, in supporting effective large-scale combat operations (LSCO).[1, 2] To address this military problem set, a new proof of concept was constructed and tested during Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Rotation 20-10. In September 2020, a military police tactical command post (TAC) was established at Fort Polk, Louisiana, to better enable mission command in the rear area. According to Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operation*, a TAC controls the execution of an operation or a specific task as an extension of the main command post.[3]

The military police TAC concept was created to augment the BEB to ensure effective C2 in controlling or securing the support area. The 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, provided the personnel and equipment necessary to test this concept in support of the 1st Brigade "Bastogne," 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, during JRTC 20-10. The TAC training objectives were to test the concept through the implementation of area security operations to limit Level I and Level II threat abilities to disrupt ground lines of communication in the support area and to provide C2 capacity for the unity of effort, integration, and significant employment of echelons-above-brigade enablers under the BEB.[4]

Composition

The personnel package design for officers within the military police TAC consisted of one Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31A–Military Police Officer major to serve as the officer in charge, three MOS 31A captains to serve as battle captains and planners, one MOS 35D–Military Intelligence Officer captain to serve as the intelligence officer, and one MOS 31A second lieutenant to serve as a battle captain. One MOS 13A–Field Artillery

A briefing at the TAC

Officer second lieutenant served as the fire support officer. For enlisted personnel, the package consisted of two MOS 31B–Military Police sergeants first class to serve as the battle noncommissioned officer and the first sergeant, two MOS 25U–Signal Support Systems Specialists to serve as signal support, and one MOS 35F–All-Source Intelligence Specialist to serve as the intelligence analyst for the security officer. Except for the fire support officer, the entire personnel package was internally sourced from within the 716th Military Police Battalion. The fire support officer was sourced from within the BEB. Upon conclusion of the exercise, it was determined that the personnel package needed to be adjusted to include an MOS 31E–Corrections Specialist and an MOS 74D–CBRN Specialist to enhance operations and protection planning in the support area.

To ensure mobility, the equipment package design for the military police TAC consisted of two M1165 Humvees™ with trailers attached and one M1087 Expandable Van with a 10-ton trailer and generator. At the conclusion of the exercise, it was determined that the TAC should substitute two M1151s for the two M1165s to provide self-security during mobility across the battlefield. The use of vehicles with gun platforms would increase the capability of the TAC and allow for battlefield circulation without the use of other assets for security.

Mission Sets

At the JRTC, the military police TAC enabled and supported the BEB with control of the rear support area. Without the TAC, the BEB would have struggled to provide the economy-of-force effort to area security due to a lack of training, personnel, and equipment for those mission sets for C2. In Phase 1 (offense) of the rotation, the military police TAC served as the movement control team for the ground assault convoy into the JRTC "box." The mobility support that was provided enhanced the brigade in pushing forward combat power in a controlled and coordinated effort. In addition to its work in Phase 1, the military police TAC provided C2 for ensuring that military police and civil affairs assets controlled the ground lines of communication from the close area to the support area. With the transition to Phases 2 and 3, the military police TAC provided C2 with enduring missions of maintaining ground lines of communication and securing key critical sites within the brigade support area boundaries. These mission sets allowed the BEB, traditionally responsible for rear support area command and control, to focus on engagement area development and the placement of obstacles for countermobility.

Challenges

One of the significant challenges for the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC was to clearly define the command and support relationships throughout the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 326th BEB, Fort Campbell, commands. According to FM 6-0, command relationships are important because they ". . . unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of the Army gaining commander."[5] At the beginning of the rotation, neither the 716th Military Police

The TAC battle captain updates the trifold board prior to a shift change.

Battalion TAC nor the 326th BEB clearly articulated the command and support relationships, which created invalid assumptions of roles and responsibilities in the brigade rear area of operations. As the gaining unit, the BEB commander needs to provide clear guidance for unity of effort, with maximum flexibility to resource and enable the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC. This, in turn, will better synchronize enablers and assets for rear area security and secure ground lines of communication.

In addition, if the command relationship is not appropriate for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 326th BEB to support the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC, then the support relationship must be defined during the JRTC rotation. The supportive relationship does not constitute commanding authority; however, it exclusively employs unit capabilities of support as "indirect support" or to a broad level of general support to enable the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC to receive proper guidance and coordination of sustainment priorities of work in the rear area of security.[6]

The 716th Military Police Battalion TAC faced several friction points regarding roles and responsibilities, which led to miscommunications that hindered shared understanding for the ground assault convoys (GACs) going into the area of operations. Ownership of reporting requirements for personnel and sustainment reports from subordinate units was diluted through verbal orders from the battalion staff. The 716th Military Police Battalion was not aware of reporting requirement responsibilities. The main battalion priority of effort consisted of GAC operations at the marshaling yard, and the brigade did not rehearse GAC operations with subordinate staff. Successful rehearsals could have ensured shared understanding for reporting requirements regarding movements from North Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Intermediate Staging Base, Alexandria Airport, Louisiana. Simply stated, there was limited C2 of deploying combat power forward from the assembly area. However, the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC developed a plan that involved inputting movement data on engineer marking tape in order to battle-track the numbers of vehicles and personnel and to record unit information when departing from each location. The battle plan orders were sent through the Joint Battle Command Platform; the unit expressed shared understanding through that sole platform.

Another critical point was the dependency of the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC on the upper tactical Internet for receiving data and information from upper echelons and adjacent units. The upper tactical Internet consists of a transverse chat system and command post computing environment, which replaced the Command Post of the Future for mission command systems to depict multiple overlays of graphic control measures for battle-tracking units on the battlefield. Furthermore, the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC relied on the BEB for connectivity to the upper tactical Internet due to having the location of the signal platoon with the BEB main command post.

"The use of vehicles with gun platforms would increase the capability of the TAC and allow for battlefield circulation without the use of other assets for security."

Suppose that the 716th Military Police Battalion could coordinate with a signal unit for support before a JRTC

rotation. In that case, the upper tactical Internet for mission command systems would allow the TAC to be expeditionary and to receive opportunities for displacement from the BEB when conducting GAC and support area security.

Sustainment

A critical aspect of training as a cohesive team is that it builds resilient and adaptable leaders. The 716th Military Police Battalion TAC team proved that it had disciplined initiative, which fostered a team environment that was conclusive to learning and adapting to the operational environment. The team consisted of 12 personnel who were flexible with regard to their work and rest cycles and could endure the daily changes in tasks and mission sets to support rear area security and enable movement for sustainment and maneuver units. With limited resources and personnel, the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC persevered through many hardships and continued to produce plans and assess current operations. The TAC developed fragmentary orders and briefed enablers on situations and missions well enough to execute within a 24- to 48-hour process. It leveraged the Joint Battle Command Platform and radio communications to achieve most of its tasks to support the rear area security.

A benefit of the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC was its use as a mission command node for other enablers that were tactically assigned to the TAC for specific missions or timeframes in the rear area of operations. The TAC used enablers such as human intelligence teams (for enemy prisoner-of-war operations), military working dogs (for explosive detection), civil-affairs teams, U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers, a psychological-operations team, and a signal intelligence team. These enablers provided the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC with the assets necessary to develop an intelligence targeting cycle for the rear area. The rear area targeting cycle represented an attempt to identify lethal and nonlethal targeting options with the enablers to mitigate enemy disruption and enable freedom of maneuver for the brigade. The 716th Military Police TAC tried to identify high-payoff targets whose loss to the enemy would significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action.[7] However, the challenge was to synchronize its efforts with brigade targeting working groups to integrate nominations with the attack guidance matrix.

A significant example of sustainment for the 716th Military Police Battalion TAC was the consistent improvement of its analog products throughout the JRTC rotation. The TAC used a trifold board with a map in the center, and staff members continuously updated the unit icons, graphic control measures, and graphic overlays. The battle-tracking of significant activities paid dividends by creating a shared understanding during the displacement of the BEB main command post. The battalion commander could seamlessly utilize the TAC as a C2 node to assist the BEB during expeditionary movements in the rear area. The ability to battle-track both digitally and by analog established a good rapport and good working relationships with the BEB, which helped to manage current operations and will facilitate future operations.

Way Ahead

The new concept of the military police battalion TAC supporting rear area security by exercising C2 capabilities to contribute to the ability of the brigade to protect critical enablers and equipment and to prevent disruption to the ground lines of communications is becoming invaluable. The way ahead for the proof of concept is to continue conducting multiple rotations with different military police battalion TACs to produce measurable data that can be used to build upon this concept. The 16th Military Police Brigade will be supporting more JRTC rotations to test the concept and to maximize training opportunities for military police units in LSCO.

Endnotes:

[1]Army Modernization Strategy, U.S. Army, 1 November 2020.

[2]Critical gap 6 of 17 is the identification of limited military police support and force structure to security and mobility support in the rear area.

[3]FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Army Technical Publication 3-60, *Targeting*, 7 May 2015.

Major David is the chief of training for the 16th Military Police Brigade. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the University of Central Florida, Orlando, and a master's degree in leadership and organization management from the American Military University, Charles Town, West Virginia.

Captain Bigelow is a small-group leader for the Military Police Captain's Career Course, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He was previously the company commander of the 591st Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Hartwick College, Oneonta, New York, and master's degrees in business and organizational security management from Webster University and public administration from Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant.

Brigade Provost Marshal: Impactful Development for Junior Officers

By Captain Craig T. Carlisle

When I left the Captain's Career Course, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, I did not consider that I would ever become a brigade provost marshal. However, during the 17 months that I spent as a provost marshal with the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (Devils), 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, I learned more about the role of the Military Police Corps than I had in any previous assignment. Every junior military police officer should strive for the opportunity to serve as a brigade provost marshal. The experience is incredibly demanding, but it broadens your understanding of combined arms operations, deepens your understanding of Military Police Corps mission sets, provides opportunities to articulate military police capabilities to maneuver commanders, and helps you prepare military police Soldiers and leaders to fight alongside combined arms formations in future conflicts.

The challenge of articulating military police capabilities to combined arms units falls squarely on the shoulders of brigade provost marshals. Brigade provost marshals must articulate the roles and capabilities of military police formations to combined arms units on the battlefield and in garrison. Often, the first time that maneuver, fires, and sustainment officers encounter military police leaders is when they are on brigade staff. The provost marshal position requires that officers be experts in their field and be driven to

Soldiers conduct a combined arms breach during Combined Resolve XII.

A Soldier returns fire during a Combined Resolve XII engagement.

promote the benefits that military police units provide to the combined arms fight. For a branch that consistently debates how to promote its importance to the wider Army, the Military Police Corps places a lot of trust in young captains and lieutenants serving in brigades.

A provost sergeant (usually a senior staff sergeant) serves alongside the provost marshal. The provost sergeant, who possesses vital knowledge gained from years of working as a military policeman, helps integrate the priorities of the brigade senior noncommissioned officers into the provost marshal's protection plans and assists the provost marshal by tracking military police unit operations on the battlefield. To be successful, brigade provost marshals must balance humility and a willingness to learn with relentless advocacy for military police employment on the battlefield and on the brigade staff. An inability to assert his or her own importance on the brigade staff will limit the provost marshal's capacity to plan for efficient military police employment on the battlefield.

Although provost marshals usually report to a brigade operations officer or executive officer, they ultimately work for the brigade commander. Success or failure is determined by how well they understand and support the brigade commander's priorities. Therefore, they must understand the importance of supporting the unit mission.

In two combined training center rotations, with two different brigade commanders, I observed two different methods of employing military police forces—both of which proved successful. One commander aggressively employed a platoon of military police in support of maneuver units in the brigade close area. The other employed a company of military police to defend critical assets in the brigade rear and close areas. In both rotations, the operational environment and the capability gaps in the brigade arsenal played the biggest roles in shaping how the military police units were employed.

Whether military police units are efficiently employed during training is heavily dependent on the ability of the brigade provost marshal to influence brigade operational planning. I have had spirited discussions with current and former brigade provost marshals about where (in terms of organization) a provost marshal can be most effective on a brigade staff. Field Manual (FM) 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*, identifies the provost marshal as a special staff officer.[1] Some commanders believe that a provost marshal independently working as a special staff officer is most appropriate; however, most argue that serving as a member of the current operations or future operations section is most effective. In my opinion, to best fulfill their duties in a tactical environment, the provost marshal must serve primarily in the operations planning cell while still maintaining awareness of current operations. A provost marshal serving primarily as a battle captain will struggle to manage the brigade fight and simultaneously integrate protection assets and plan future operations. Still, the need to monitor current operations in the brigade command post is essential in order to maintain awareness of the supporting military police unit actions and capabilities. Provost marshals must also capitalize on the trust and expertise of their commanders in policing and detention operations to serve as liaisons between their brigades and governmental and nongovernmental actors in the operating environment. A provost marshal with an accurate understanding of the common operating picture is better positioned to influence and plan future operations. My experiences at both the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany,

"Whether military police units are efficiently employed during training is heavily dependent on the ability of the brigade provost marshal to influence brigade operational planning."

underscored the importance of heavy provost marshal involvement in the planning process.

In August 2019, during my first combined training center rotation as a provost marshal (NTC Rotation 18-10), the 3d Platoon, 300th Military Police Company, Fort Riley, Kansas, supported the Devils. Arriving 1 week before the rotation, I had little time to assess mission-essential task proficiency or training objectives and conceptualize how the Devils could efficiently employ 3d Platoon. I was designated a battle captain, while the provost sergeant served as the tactical command post battle noncommissioned officer; these assignments afforded us little time to aid in the planning process. I felt overwhelmed as I learned about the integration of maneuvers and fires in real time. Serving as a battle captain, I found that dropping in to participate in the military decision-making process at targeted times (during mission analysis, course-of-action development, and war gaming) left me sufficiently out of the loop. I could not spend enough time in the plans tent to understand the whole concept of operations because most of my time was spent battle tracking in the main command post. My lack of situational understanding left me unable to effectively assist the brigade planners or advise the commander during the military decision-making process.

The commander of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team favored aggressive employment of the 300th Military Police Company. Through most of the rotation, the 3d Platoon was assigned missions to secure recently captured urban centers in the close brigade area, train host nation security forces, transfer authority back to civilian leaders, and move on to the next urban area. These mission sets were well within the scope of execution for a military police platoon; however, the brigade was never challenged with a large number of detainees, displaced persons, or subversive criminal elements at NTC. During the rotation, critical assets such as the brigade main and sustainment convoys occasionally fell victim to enemy attack—a trade-off for employing the 300th farther forward. At the time, I didn't realize that my role as a provost marshal involved more than just advising the brigade commander on military police employment. My role also included analyzing the operating environment and working with other members of the protection warfighting function to develop plans for the coordinated use of protection capabilities to protect the brigade assets.

After nearly a year as a brigade provost marshal, I was determined to implement all that I had learned during the upcoming Combined Resolve XII exercise at JMRC. Months before this combined training center rotation, I met with the leaders of the 554th Military Police Company, Stuttgart,

Leaders brief the scheme of maneuver during a Combined Resolve XII brigade combined arms rehearsal.

Germany, to understand their training capabilities and objectives. The brigade provost sergeant would not be present during this rotation, so my role in influencing military police employment and protection practices became even more essential. The new brigade commander favored using the 554th to secure the brigade critical assets, maintaining clear lines of communication and mitigating potential disruptive forces among the civilian population in the rear area. Given the highly developed operating environment of JMRC, this proved to be a very efficient use of the military police company. The exercise planners did a fantastic job of replicating the challenges of the European operating environment. The brigade was forced to confront civil unrest, large numbers of detainees and displaced civilians, irregular enemy forces, criminal elements, and unsupportive civil authorities within the rear area.

Unlike my time spent as a battle captain during the previous NTC rotation, I served as a protection planner during Combined Resolve XII and was focused on planning operations within the rear area. Working alongside the maneuver planners, and with direction from the 1st Brigade Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, leadership, I drove a concerted planning effort to ensure that the ever-enlarging rear area remained secure. The planning effort centered on developing a scheme of protection to defend critical assets and a nonlethal targeting process to drive operations in the rear area. As a planner, I could observe the current fight in the brigade main, consult with other staff sections, and return to the plans cell with input to guide future operations. The brigade scheme of protection, which stressed the security of logistics convoys and communications nodes, enabled the uninterrupted movement of classes of supplies forward to the maneuver units, allowing the brigade to maintain the initiative throughout the entire exercise. Alongside other staff sections (particularly fires, civil affairs, and the assistant brigade engineer), I helped develop a nonlethal working group, which provided input to the brigade target working group and targeting board and drove operations throughout the rear area. We aimed to support the brigade enabler units to secure the rear area, gain favor among the population, and leverage their ability to defeat enemy forces. Through the 1st Brigade Engineer Battalion, we directed the 554th to secure logistics convoys and critical civilian infrastructure and conduct route regulation, enforcement, and detention operations. Each mission that the 554th received was grounded in staff analysis and well-reasoned planning efforts that indicated where and how the unit could most efficiently be employed to shape the operating environment and further mission accomplishment. Serving as a protection planner, I enabled the efficient brigade employment of the 554th at JMRC and gained a greater ability to plan and leverage military police to support maneuver forces.

The garrison environment does not necessitate a change in the organizational position of a provost marshal, but it does demand that the provost marshal act more independently in advising the brigade commander. The role of the provost marshal as a special staff officer is highlighted in garrison, where the expertise in force protection and law enforcement directly influences the commander's decisions. In garrison, where threats to the force are not as evident or urgent, provost marshals must still highlight those threats and help commanders enact mitigation measures to protect their formations against criminal or terrorist activity. Provost marshals must implement, assess, and modify protection practices and utilize Army antiterrorism, operations security, and physical security programs to identify and prevent threats, as appropriate. Often trained in these specific fields, a brigade provost sergeant also plays a key role in assessing unit threat mitigation measures. The provost marshal and provost sergeant must understand the brigade commander's priorities in order to implement protection practices without disrupting mission execution or degrading readiness.

The importance of the provost marshal's role as a special staff officer in garrison is most evident when dealing with law enforcement matters. The policies enacted by commanders armed with data about Soldiers who have been victims or subjects of crimes or accidents can prevent future incidents and preserve force readiness. Brigade provost marshals provide their commanders with this data by maintaining access to the Army Law Enforcement Tracking System and receiving daily blotter reports from the installation provost marshal office. Sifting through blotter reports allows the identification of demographic trends. Comparing data against certain times of the year or certain training cycles can help commanders predict potential rises in incidents. For example, the provost sergeant and I collected and analyzed trends from the months following the Devil Brigade NTC mission. A year later, the data collected and incident trends discovered from the Devil Brigade NTC rotation guided battalions as they worked toward preventing similar incidents from occurring upon their return to Fort Riley. The time that I took to understand the priorities of the brigade commander enabled me to provide value-added support that impacted the entire formation.

During my time in the Devil Brigade, I came to understand the role of the Military Police Corps in supporting combined arms operations and the importance of advocating for my position on the brigade staff. Whether operating in a field or garrison environment, the role of the brigade provost marshal challenges junior military police officers to promote the protection warfighting function and military police integration. Had I known how much I would learn and grow in this position 2 years ago, I would have jumped at the opportunity. I hope that other junior officers will be encouraged to step up to this challenging assignment.

Endnote:

[1]FM 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*, 19 January 2021, p. 4-49.

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Closing the Distance and Filling the Gap:

Designated Marksman Rifles for the Military Police Squad

By Major Joshua K. Frye

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps lacks a dedicated non-crew-served weapon that provides long-range precision direct-fire capability within the combat support military police squad. However, the Corps now has an opportunity to define a requirement and rectify this issue as the Army fields the new M110A1 squad-designated marksman rifle (SDMR) to thousands of infantry squads across the force.

Military police squads currently field a variety of individual and crew-served weapons systems in accordance with the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). Individual weapons include the M17 pistol, M4A1 carbine, M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), M320 grenade launcher, and M26 shot-gun. They may also field a combination of crew-served weapons, including the M240 series medium machine gun, M2A1.50-caliber machine gun, and the MK19 40-millimeter grenade machine gun.

While the M249 SAW has a maximum effective range of 800 meters against area targets, ballistic limitations render the weapon useless against point targets at more than 600 meters. The M4A1 is relegated to usefully engaging point targets at a range of up to 500 meters, while the standard qualification tables only address targets at a distance of 300 meters. The M249 SAW and the M4A1 utilize 5.56- x 45-millimeter North Atlantic Treaty Organization ammunition. Many unit commanders also choose to exchange their standard M249 barrels for short barrels in order to enhance dismounted maneuverability—which has a detrimental effect on long range-accuracy and projectile velocity.

Military police squads must currently maneuver crew-served weapons when engaging targets beyond 600 meters. When dismounted, this involves primarily bipod- and tripod-mounted M240 medium machine guns. Military police squads retain the M2 series and MK19 as vehicle platform-mounted weapons. Each of the currently fielded crew-served weapons operates primarily in automatic-fire mode, which potentially complicates engaging individual targets and increases the chance of inadvertent collateral damage; both of these problems are compounded by long-range engagement.

"Future operational environments will require that the military police squad operate dismounted. Examples of these environments include dense cities, jungles, forests and mountains. An SDMR will allow squads and commanders to tailor their combinations of weapons for the appropriate environment."

Introducing an SDMR into the gap would address the issue of individual precision. The Army needs the SDMR because projected conventional and irregular enemy forces will have the capabilities necessary to engage at ranges in excess of 600 meters—just as forces historically did in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

The Army currently plans to field 5,000 to 6,000 complete M110A1 SDMR weapons systems across the force, providing the capability to most infantry squads. The Military Police Corps has an opportunity to field a common system as part of an established program of record. The M110A1 is based on Heckler & Koch's® proven G28 and HK417.[1] Furthermore, the base M110A1 rifle is common with the Army's Compact Semiautomatic Sniper System, which replaces the M110, M24, and M21/M14 enhanced battle rifles used by snipers. The M110A1 utilizes 7.62- x 51-millimeter North Atlantic Treaty Organization ammunition, so it will operate with the 7.62-millimeter ammunition already used in military police platoons, if necessary. These rifles are visually similar to the M16/M4 family and retain a familiar theory of operation and fire controls.

While the M110A1 kit would address the range gap, it would also provide the military police warfighter with new capabilities, including a sound suppressor, a variable magnification optic, and the ability to defeat threat body armor that can stop currently fielded ammunition. Offset mechanical sights complement the Sig Sauer®-manufactured 6- x 24-millimeter riflescope, allowing the operator to contribute to the close-range fight. The 16.3-inch barrel is only slightly longer than the 14.5-inch barrel of the M4A1.

It is important to distinguish the M110A1 SDMR from a true sniper system. The Compact Semiautomatic Sniper System kit includes a more powerful and expensive Schmidt & Bender© optic and a dedicated sniper stock, and objective engagement ranges and the training burden for SDMR-equipped Soldiers are reduced in comparison to those for a trained sniper. Nonetheless, the SDMR does provide expanded options that military police squads could integrate into counter-sniper tactics, techniques, and procedures. A system such as the M110A1 would considerably enhance dismounted military police squads and provide previously unavailable precision direct fire. The SDMR is carried by personnel who act in other roles, such as riflemen or team leaders.

The Army's Next-Generation Squad Weapon Program continues to make progress and would provide a long-term solution to the identified range gap and provide improved terminal ballistics that may be effective against evolving body armor.[2] At some point, military police squads will likely receive the Army's next-generation squad weapon, which would improve upon the performance of legacy ammunition and would increase the lethality of the Army's small-arms portfolio even beyond the M110A1 7.62- x 51-millimeter North Atlantic Treaty Organization round. The Army chose to field the M110A1 SDMR as an interim capability.

Each military police combat support squad is authorized multiple M249 SAWs and machine guns, with accompanying accessories. A future modified table of organization and equipment change could support the replacement of some machine guns with the M110A1 SDMR. This change would allow for the increased flexibility described in this article while preserving the quantity of weapons in each squad.

Future operational environments will require that the military police squad operate dismounted. Examples of these environments include dense cities, jungles, forests, and mountains. An SDMR will allow squads and commanders to tailor their combinations of weapons for the appropriate environment. Direct-fire precision engagements may be prominently featured in populated urban environments and may render machine gun employment excessively risky.

The Military Police Corps should consider clearly defining a requirement. The Corps should act now to guarantee that future military police leaders will maintain overmatch and have the flexibility that they need to decisively win on the future battlefield.

Endnotes:

[1] "Heckler & Koch to Supply New U.S. Army Squad Designated Marksman Rifle," Heckler & Koch, 15 July 2019, <https://hk-usa.com/heckler-koch-to-supply-new-us-army-squad-designated-marksman-rifle/>, accessed on 17 May 2021.

[2] "AUSA News: Army to Field Squad Designated Marksman Rifle in May 2020," *National Defense*, 16 October 2019, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/10/16/army-to-field-squad-designated-marksman-rifle-in-may-2020>, accessed on 17 May 2021.

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Jumpmasters Answer the Call!

By Captain Luke J. Grieder, First Lieutenant Angel L. Ortiz III, and Sergeant First Class Chad M. Theriault

For the third time in the history of the Military Police Regiment, paratroopers of the 21st Military Police Company (Airborne), 503d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, answered the Nation's call to deploy overseas as a part of the XVIII Airborne Corps Immediate Response Force (IRF), formerly known as the Global Response Force. In response to Iranian aggression and civil unrest in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations, the IRF was alerted on New Year's Eve 2019. As a part of this larger IRF activation, the 21st Military Police Company "Jumpmasters" were called upon to provide a platoon with critical nonlethal response capabilities to the deploying maneuver unit, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg. Commonly known as the "Devil Brigade," the unit was outfitted with numerous other enabling units from across the XVIII Airborne Corps and was tasked to alert, marshal, and deploy in a well-rehearsed 96-hour sequence.

Upon receiving the alert to deploy, the 21st Military Police Company immediately sprang into action, recalling all necessary leadership and personnel. As with all rapid deployments, initial challenges faced by the platoon that was identified to deploy included finalizing the deployment manifest, conducting numerous predeployment personnel actions, and preparing/loading out equipment for transport overseas. As the out-load timeline entered the 48-hour mark, the unit was instructed to deploy the entire company, which included receiving multiple military working dog (MWD) teams from the 550th MWD Detachment, Fort Bragg, with no deployment sequence extension. Naturally, this development introduced a new set of major challenges since the company is normally allotted 14 days to conduct the IRF out-load sequence. In true paratrooper fashion, the Jumpmasters rose to the challenge and began operating in overdrive. Receiving out-load assistance from the 503d Military Police Battalion "Enforcers" as well as the Devil Brigade, the company was able to execute the out-load sequence within the established 96-hour timeline, ending with successful deployment to the Middle East.

"As a part of this larger IRF activation, the 21st Military Police Company "Jumpmasters" were called upon to provide a platoon with critical nonlethal response capabilities . . ."

Executing the compressed and expedited 96-hour deployment sequence required that many different company and

1st Platoon, 21st Military Police Company (Airborne) conducts training in an urban environment at Camp Buehring, Kuwait.

battalion personnel lead and support the out-load. Navigating and supervising the process—including prioritizing out-load actions, providing guidance and direction through friction points, and liaising with multiple entities from the 1st Brigade Combat Team—fell to the company commander. Critical actions such as rapidly changing and validating the unit distribution list, loading/sealing containers, and rigging baggage pallets were spearheaded by the company executive officer. Validating packing lists, finalizing the deployment manifest, and leading personnel through predeployment tasks such as equipment issue and medical screenings fell to the company first sergeant and operations team. Platoon leadership teams simultaneously executed numerous out-load actions while managing and accounting for their respective personnel and equipment. With assistance from the Enforcers and the Devil Brigade, the Jumpmasters successfully conducted an expedited out-load in a fraction of the time typically allocated for a company to execute the IRF deployment sequence.

Initially assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade Combat Team, the Jumpmasters received final task organization orders halfway through the out-load sequence and ultimately fell under the 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment "Gun Devils," Fort Bragg. Upon arriving in-theater, the company quickly integrated into the Gun Devil formation, conducting numerous weapon qualification ranges and field exercises alongside its maneuver counterpart. Arriving in-theater without rolling stock, the company primarily trained on dismounted operations until vehicles (the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle and the M1151A1 Humvee) were acquired. In addition to serving as a member of the Gun Devils, the company executed its role as a brigade-wide enabler by aligning individual platoons to many different maneuver battalions within the brigade formation. Supporting the newly enacted fourth platoon concept, the company successfully aligned platoons to four separate units at once.[1] This presented the advantage of a more robust and flexible military police company capable of supporting more maneuver battalions while still maintaining platoon integrity. Once aligned, military police teams, squads, and platoons began becoming integrated into maneuver collective-training events. These actions quickly created the conditions necessary for the development of strong support relationships between the Jumpmasters and maneuver leadership.

Realizing that different maneuver formations require different types of military police support, the Jumpmasters trained on many different tasks—mostly those associated with the core disciplines of security and mobility support and detention operations. To maximize mission flexibility, training was conducted in mounted and dismounted

The 21st Military Police Company provides security during a training exercise.

21st Military Police Company paratroopers and the 550th MWD Detachment conduct cordon-and-search training at Camp Buehring, Kuwait.

capacities, as applicable. While attached to the Gun Devils, the Jumpmasters conducted area, route, and firing-point security for numerous and varied 105-millimeter and 155-millimeter gun batteries. Support for an artillery formation required emphasis on the extensive area, route, and aerial reconnaissance necessary to scout out follow-on firing points and to discover approaching enemy forces. Jumpmaster RQ-11 Raven® unmanned aircraft system pilots and scouting teams provided critical early warning so that firing batteries could delay/defeat approaching enemy units, allowing critical time for break down of the batteries and changes of locations. When attached to infantry battalions such as the 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry Regiment "Red Devils," Fort Bragg, the Jumpmasters executed a wide variety of tasks encompassed by the military police core disciplines of security and mobility support and detention operations. Providing training on critical enabler support operations to the forward passage of lines, operating enemy prisoner-of-war collection points, conducting route-signing operations, and providing support to cordon-and-search operations are just a few examples of how the Jumpmasters enabled their maneuver counterparts. In addition to training for a large-scale, kinetic fight, the Jumpmasters were heavily relied upon for their expertise in providing nonlethal options in a semipermissive operational environment. This dependency was especially important due to the civil unrest and the protests occurring throughout the CENTCOM area of operations. Frequently tasked to provide additional escalation of force/nonlethal oversight and assistance with liaising with host nation police, the Jumpmasters could be found at nearly every training event conducted by the Devil Brigade.

One of the critical components that enabled the Jumpmasters to provide such a robust nonlethal option to maneuver commanders was access to specialized nonlethal equipment. Once in-theater, the Jumpmasters fell in on the brigade nonlethal capabilities set that was meant to be used to respond to potential civil unrest anywhere in CENTCOM. The set allowed the company to effectively train with all nonlethal equipment and to cross-train many of the maneuver units. Maneuver units also became familiar with the critical support provided by the explosive detection and patrolling capacity of MWDs. MWD teams, complete with a team or squad of accompanying Jumpmasters, were integrated into dismounted training exercises, where both MWD and military police support were provided to the maneuver platoon or company. Numerous familiarization events in which Jumpmasters thoroughly instructed and trained infantry and support personnel on tasks ranging from employing vehicle-arresting barriers to executing riot control operations occurred, further solidifying the support relationship and bond between the Jumpmasters and the maneuver units that they were meant to enable.

Dubbed the "Devils New Year," 2020 proved to be yet another historic year for the 21st Military Police Company and the U.S. Army Military Police Regiment. The tireless effort required to execute a rapid deployment followed by the resiliency necessary to maintain a high state of readiness embody the true fighting spirit of the Military Police Corps and the airborne community. The paratroopers of the 21st Military Police Company Jumpmasters continue to assist, protect, and defend, and they are ready to "fight tonight".

Endnote:

[1]Military police companies were instructed to change their internal task organization from three to four line platoons. Personnel and equipment were internally sourced within the company, resulting in four platoons of 32 Soldiers instead of three platoons of 42 Soldiers. Squad sizes decreased from four teams to only three teams. The intent of the task organization change was to allow for additional flexibility when supporting maneuver formations on the battlefield.

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PROACTIVE POLICING:
Community Policing at JBLM

By Major Meghan E. Starr

While the concept of community policing is often discussed, many do not realize that community policing is more complex than simply talking to people or playing basketball with the residents of a neighborhood. First, it is essential to understand who makes up the community served by the police. At most military installations, the community is broadly broken into three categories: the residential population, the daily population, and the unit leadership. Next, there are three elements of community policing: problem-oriented policing, community engagement, and organizational change. Since August 2020, the staff of the Joint Base Lewis–McChord (JBLM) Provost Marshal Office (PMO) has worked to inculcate these three elements into its policing approach and to ensure that all efforts address each component of the community; the result has been a PMO staff that is more proactive, efficient, and effective at supporting the needs of the community.

Problem-Oriented Policing

There is extensive literature that explains what problem-oriented policing is and describes the different approaches to the concept. Most of the literature centers on a scan, analyze, respond, assess model. The model essentially pushes police officers from responding to a crime that has already occurred to focusing on current problems and developing solutions to prevent further crimes from occurring.

Neighborhood officer with a child

Problem-orientated policing is not a novel idea for military installations. Every U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) Computer Comparison Statistics (CompStat) requires that installation personnel brief their initiatives in the scan, analyze, respond, assess model format. Most installations conduct some form of prevention, whether the emphasis is on mitigating drunk driving during long weekends or employing physical-security inspectors to ensure that sensitive equipment is not stolen. The JBLM PMO recently took a more deliberate and precise approach; unveiling a new crime prevention program in December 2020, the PMO sought to improve analysis and partner with the community and other agencies.

Each month, the PMO hosts a provost marshal (PM) council in which unit PMs or unit judge advocate general representatives convene to discuss current trends across the installation and gain feedback from unit commanders on their top issues. The council deliberates on the issues and develops solutions. In many cases, the PMO assists and other units share their best practices with the group. The council also allows the PMO to address administrative issues such as handling late turn-ins of Department of the Army (DA) Form 4833, *Commander's Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action*,[1] or obtaining feedback on revised installation regulations (such as the installation traffic

code). The units also receive brigade crime data for the previous month, enabling unit PMs across the formation to do their own analysis and home in on their own trends.

In addition, each month, law enforcement and security agencies across JBLM participate in the Law Enforcement Crime Prevention Working Group, which includes members of the JBLM Criminal Investigation Command, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the hospital PMO, the 627th Security Forces Squadron, the police department, and the Security and Access Control Division. There, they discuss current problems and trends from their perspective as well as the issues raised during the PM council in order to ensure that all agencies are aware of current efforts. The working group collaborates on solutions and develops plans for interagency support.

Based on feedback from the working group and interaction with the local community through crime perception surveys and the Neighborhood Officer Program, the PMO develops a bimonthly crime report for brigade commanders and above. The top three crime prevention focus areas for the next quarter are previewed. The report builds on the initial PM council discussion and outlines a response plan that includes actions undertaken by the PMO and recommendations for unit commanders. The report also includes information on repeat offenders from within their formations. Such offenders may warrant special attention, prompting commands to focus their efforts on the individuals who contribute the greatest indiscipline in the unit.

Getting community feedback

In addition, the PM attends installation prevention team meetings to discuss the focus areas and generate feedback from other installation agencies, such as the Family Advocacy Program, on initiatives and areas for collaboration. This ensures that these agencies are aware of the emphasis and can contribute to the effort. These partnerships ensure a holistic approach across the installation, rather than one that is law enforcement-centric.

While all units are aware of the response plan, the PMO only reached one third of the JBLM customer base. In order to reach the resident and daily populations, the PMO coordinated with the installation Public Affairs Office to generate a social media campaign that included videos, flyers, and online discussions, reminding the public of appropriate regulations and explaining what individuals can do to prevent crime. Once the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) protection measures are lifted, the campaign will include in-person engagement through neighborhood officers and targeted-emphasis patrols. The PMO also uses the communication channels of other agencies to help publicize its initiatives.

The PMO presents the deputy commanding general with a quarterly briefing on the finalized crime prevention focus areas and current response. This generates command emphasis from the highest levels of the installation and often leads to additional response resources. In addition to covering the particular focus areas for the quarter, the briefing updates leadership on hotspots and crime trends in the local area surrounding the installation. The information is useful for situational awareness and for identifying potential locations that should be off limits. The crime prevention briefing often also serves as the foundation for the commander's quarterly Ready and Resilient Council, hosted by the III Corps commanding general and attended by brigade level commanders. By this point, the commanders are well aware of the crime prevention focus areas for the quarter and are prepared to discuss actions that they are taking to address the problems with the commanding general. The commander's Ready and Resilient Council provides an opportunity for initial feedback on the results of the efforts of the unit and PMO, and allows the PMO to adjust its response if necessary. The meeting follows a discussion-based format and allows commanders to be candid, while also providing a forum for asking the PMO additional questions to help it refine its plan.

Assessment continues throughout the quarter, and updates on measures of performance and effectiveness are briefed at follow-on PM councils and contained in the bimonthly crime reports. The assessment allows the PMO to more effectively respond to focus areas, but also generates

"At most military installations, the community is broadly broken into three categories: the residential population, the daily population, and the unit leadership."

feedback to units in order to identify which unit practices are working (and should be shared across the formation) and which are not.

This framework ensures that the PMO is identifying and addressing issues of interest to the community, incorporating the community members (and partner agencies) into the response, and continually refining its approach through feedback and quantitative analysis. The PMO is flexible enough to adapt to changing issues, while keeping efforts focused and coherent throughout the quarter. The framework prevents gradual expansion of PMO priorities and prevents the PMO from being inundated with a variety of requests to solve different issues, which makes it impossible to effectively address any one.

Crime perception survey

Community Engagement

In addition to implementing a problem-oriented policing strategy, the JBLM PMO also increased community engagement efforts. While these efforts have been limited by COVID-19, the PMO is adapting new and innovative ways to ensure that the community can provide feedback and get the information it needs.

The PM and provost sergeant routinely engage with unit leaders to answer their questions and improve their situational awareness. This engagement ranges from discussions about how to report missing Soldiers to conversations about how to address habitual offenders within their units. Dozens of unit level trainings have been conducted at commanders' requests, increasing PM face time with Soldiers and Airmen across JBLM. As part of a 2d quarter, fiscal year 2021, focus on the prevention of barracks crime, the PMO conducted crime prevention surveys of all installation barracks and dormitories in order to provide commanders with tips on how to make their areas less susceptible to criminal behavior.

In August 2020, the PMO developed and implemented its Neighborhood Officer Program, in which senior leaders in the police department are assigned a neighborhood on the installation. The intent is to have a consistent face within the police department that residents can call upon for nonemergencies and to raise concerns. While patrols change daily and units rotate through law enforcement cycles, these senior leaders provide a more consistent presence. Once assigned, the neighborhood officers began their duties by a walking on patrol through the neighborhood, talking to residents and conducting informal crime prevention surveys. They now follow up on complaints received and reach out to other installation agencies, as necessary, to address issues. Neighborhood officers are also expected to follow up with residents to address rumors after major neighborhood incidents, respond to any interactive customer evaluation complaints from the neighborhood, and interact with the residents through social media.

The program got off to a great start; however, competing demands and COVID-19 protocols became a problem. In January and February 2021, the JBLM PMO conducted an online crime perception survey. It was discovered that most residents were unfamiliar with the Neighborhood Officer Program or who their neighborhood officer was. Neighborhood officers indicated that their other duties and responsibilities prevented them from routinely getting out into the community. While many wanted

to conduct neighborhood meetings, COVID-19 restrictions and colder weather prevented meetings from taking place. As a result, the PMO formed the Community Engagement Tiger Team in March 2021 to determine how to improve the Neighborhood Officer Program and identify other changes that the PMO could make to more fruitfully engage with the community.

The Tiger Team is currently working through the recommendations. Some of the initial recommendations are promising. They include neighborhood level National Night Out style events, rather than an installation-wide event; the use of under-the-uniform ballistic vests instead of plate carriers for neighborhood officers; the use of a bicycle patrol around the post exchange and commissary to interact with the daily nonresident (retiree) population; the restructure of patrol area checklists to increase time available for community engagement; and military and civilian employee performance plan metrics focused on community engagement. The Tiger Team is also examining how to use access control points as unique touch points with the community. While engagement with drivers is brief, access control points provide the greatest number of daily interactions with the community.

Finally, the PMO is examining how to use the Internet and social media in more innovative ways, encouraging two-way communication between the community and the police (rather than merely disseminating information).

Organizational Change

The final—and most challenging—element of community policing is organizational change. Community policing is a concept that has no clear end state objective. It is not a mission to be accomplished so that police can move on to the next item on the agenda; it is an enduring cultural philosophy to be inculcated in all police operations. While many PMO personnel understand and agree with the concept of community policing, resource constraints play a huge factor in whether or not it is successful. Continual budget cuts, manning levels below those that are required, and competing demands hamper the ability of the PMO to truly embrace community policing. Even with these constraints, there are a few areas, where the PMO can be reorganized to better support this form of policing.

The JBLM PMO is fortunate enough to have two crime analysts. They do an outstanding job of providing information to command staff and higher, but offer few tactical-level products for the average patrol starting a shift. Providing these products would not only enhance the capability and efficiency of patrols on the streets, it would also provide incentive for patrols to perform more thorough case work. Through the analysts' hard work, patrols would be better equipped and more motivated when using the Army Law Enforcement Reporting System.

The PMO does not have a public affairs officer or police information officer. While it utilizes social media, the management of online communication is an additional duty that quickly surpasses the threshold of what one person can handle in conjunction with his or her other duties. The PMO is examining how it can be reorganized in order to dedicate one person to this now full-time mission. While this will come at some cost to something else in the PMO, it will likely pay for itself, as effective crime prevention and reduction programs decrease the need for immediate response capability.

The PMO is also working with the 42d Military Police Brigade, JBLM, to refine the training curriculum for its law enforcement academy, known as the Dragon Fighter Academy, in order to include training on the problem-oriented policing and community engagement aspects of community policing. Civilian police officers and gate guards will also receive this training. All personnel assigned to the PMO will be evaluated on their community engagements to further incentivize this cultural change.

Perhaps the biggest hurdle that the PMO faces is the constant rotation of military police Soldiers who perform law enforcement duties. The PMO trains law enforcement officers to improve their case work, get out of their cars, speak to people, and become familiar with the community—and then, 90 days later, a new group rotates in and the training process starts all over again. The numerous brigade priorities and the operational tempo make this unavoidable. The PMO is working to address this problem where it can, offering assistance and role players for company level exercises before the Soldiers assume the duties of the road and providing daily crime analysis updates to military police duty officers, regardless of when they will work law enforcement again. Fortunately, the PMO has a strong backbone of civilian and law enforcement detachment personnel who can help maintain progress despite the constant rotation of patrols.

Although there is still much progress to be made, the JBLM PMO has taken the vital first steps to better incorporate community policing into its operations. Through problem-oriented policing, community engagement, and organizational change, the PMO is improving its responsiveness to community concerns and becoming more efficient and effective in its operations. Despite challenges such as resource constraints, high operational tempo, and the rotation of manpower, these efforts are already paying off. There have been significant declines in offenses in the focus areas of the crime prevention program. Units and residents are more willing to interact with the PMO and participate in developing solutions. So far, the results are promising and JBLM will continue to embrace community policing and make further strides in the coming months and years.

Endnote:

[1]DA Form 4833, *Commander's Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action*, 2014.

At the time this article was written, Major Starr was the PM at JBLM. She holds master's degrees in urban and social policy from Columbia University, New York, and military arts and sciences—and was an art of war scholar from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

CAD Benefits Fort Lee and Surrounding Community

By Captain Jessica L. Deaton, Captain John J. Doran II, and Captain Daniel S. Nagle

A joint venture between the Department of Emergency Services (DES), Fort Lee, Virginia, and Prince George County began in 2018, after a review of the Fort Lee Emergency Dispatch Center. The review exposed an antiquated system in dire need of an upgrade. The dispatch center had been operating entirely with a manual pen-and-paper system; tracking locations of incoming emergency calls and officer locations was impossible unless the location was provided on a telephone call.

Ms. Warshawsky explains the CAD system to a Fort Lee dispatcher.

The *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013* encourages mutually beneficial partnerships that lower costs and improve government services.[1] In the fall of 2018, Fort Lee and Prince George County discussed creating a joint intergovernmental support agreement (IGSA). Within 4 months of the discussion, the IGSA was signed; however, it took an additional year to prepare, coordinate, and implement the agreement. The Provost Marshal Office communications supervisor, Ms. Jennifer L. Warshawsky, led the process for Fort Lee.

The two most significant aspects of the IGSA are the joint use of the Prince George County computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system and the implementation of the enhanced 911 (e-911) system for Fort Lee and Prince George County.

Prince George County has been using the CAD system since 2006. The system makes use of mobile data terminals placed in vehicles to communicate with law enforcement officers and track the locations of each military and Department of the Army civilian police officer and fire and emergency medical services vehicle. Ten categories of calls are generated by the system. The first category consists of priority calls, or "in-progress" calls, which is followed by Categories 1 to 9. In-progress and Category 1 calls automatically generate a recommendation for which officer is dispatched based on proximity, thereby decreasing response time.

The CAD system has made a positive impact on Fort Lee dispatchers. According to Fort Lee

desk sergeant Staff Sergeant Robert V. Graham Jr., "Prior to CAD, we were averaging 3 minutes for a normal dispatch; with CAD in play, we are now down to 1 minute for a routine dispatch."

Once the location of an incident has been identified, the CAD system allows the dispatcher to simultaneously dispatch and continue to place notes in the system; the notes are sent directly to the police officer, firefighter, or emergency medical services team. The mobile data terminals in the vehicles are programmed to communicate with each officer, providing updates and improving the safety of personnel while driving to the scene. At the user level, individuals can program a multitude of aspects with the mobile data terminals. Ms. Warshawsky said, "Dispatch time is expected to continue to decrease as staff becomes more familiar with the system."

The CAD system is also useful as an investigative tool. Whether on the scene of an incident or at a routine traffic stop, police officers can utilize the National Crime Information Center and the Virginia Criminal Information Network for driver's license and vehicle registration checks. The system also enhances Soldiers' ability to access the Army Law Enforcement Reporting Tracking System from within their patrol cars. The CAD system not only serves as a way to transmit information, but also provides a running accountability that supervisors and patrols can later reference, if needed.

A Soldier types notes into the CAD system.

"Prior to CAD, we were averaging 3 minutes for a normal dispatch; with CAD in play, we are now down to 1 minute for a routine dispatch."

Fort Lee and Prince George County share concurrent jurisdiction along Route 36, which separates the Ordnance Campus on North Fort Lee from the main post. Due to system tie-in, state and local police can provide backup to military patrols or Prince George County patrols—and vice-versa—if needed. From an officer safety standpoint, this is invaluable since a large number of individuals from the general public access Fort Lee daily.

Initially, neither Fort Lee nor Prince George County were equipped with the e-911 system, which has been mandated nationwide. The joint e-911 implementation venture initially saved each agency more than $485,000. The e-911 system allows for the calculation of pinpoint locations for all calls and includes the ability to receive and respond to e-911 text messages.

The IGSA is not only financially beneficial for Fort Lee and Prince George County, but it also promotes teamwork within the community. The agencies can communicate with each other, and they can access and utilize the systems for continuity of operations should a major system error or outage occur. The IGSA has only strengthened the partnership between Fort Lee and Prince George County. Furthermore, the communities have been awarded the 2020 Army Community Partnership Award.

Endnote:

[1]Public Law 112-239, *The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013*, January 2012.

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THE RETURN OF THE COMMAND TRIAD IN THE CID DETACHMENT

By Captain Christopher M. Trendell

Until recently, all U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly refered to as CID) detachments were commanded by a CID warrant officer in the rank of chief warrant officer two to chief warrant officer four, contingent upon the size and location of the detachment. Several medium- to large-size offices, such as those located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Bliss, Texas; and Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington, have now integrated a captain into the commander's seat to support and enhance the overall effectiveness of the detachment. As the first captain to command an Army CID detachment in approximately 20 years, it's an absolute privilege to witness firsthand the awesome responsibility that special agents, drug suppression team investigators, and investigative analysts have in accomplishing their piece of the Army CID mission. This article shares lessons learned and perspectives regarding the return of the detachment command triad—a command team consisting of a military police captain, special agent in charge (SAC) warrant officer, and CID detachment sergeant.

Changes

After taking command of the 87th Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Bragg, it became abundantly clear that CID warrant officers are incredibly skilled and capable leaders. Moreover, they are highly specialized technical experts in the field of criminal investigations, with some even more specialized in polygraph examinations, protective service, and forensic science. So, what was the purpose of adding a military police captain without this background, training, or experience to command? In short, the captain was added to assist with managing the volume and pace of daily operations. There's not enough time for the SAC of most large offices to execute his or her investigative duties while also balancing the responsibilities of the commander. And to be candid, investigations are always a priority for the SAC because a misstep in that area can lead to an unsolved case, the mishandling of evidence, a dismissal of charges, or even a wrongful conviction—things that can have catastrophic implications. This is not meant to downplay the importance of command responsibilities, but it does present many challenges because accepting risk in that area is almost inevitable. For perspective, the SAC's normal day ranges from fielding telephone calls and answering requests for information from multiple general officers and senior leaders to attending meetings with local law enforcement and federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. On top of that, he or she reviews dozens of cases, speaks with military attorneys, responds to serious calls (including all deaths), and somehow finds time to mentor agents and investigators on a daily basis, conduct monthly evidence inventories, and complete evaluations. Even for a skilled SAC, these duties, which are really just the tip of the iceberg, take up an immense amount of time.

The detachment sergeant is equally busy managing the on-call duty roster, supervising and overseeing training, counseling and mentoring enlisted personnel, and covering down on all administrative and readiness responsibilities inherent to the role of a first sergeant, typically without a human resource specialist or supply specialist. Adding a captain with command authority decreases the burden of the many support-related responsibilities, allowing the SAC and detachment sergeant to focus more on the primary CID mission—conducting and managing felony level criminal investigations in which the Army is, or may be, a party of interest.

Considerations

Weeks before taking command, I discussed priorities, roles, and responsibilities with the SAC and detachment sergeant. We agreed upon a command philosophy, drafted new policies, and developed a daily battle rhythm to clearly communicate our intent. I understood that this position requires the right officer with the right mindset, that investigations are the priority, and that this command is uniquely different than any other. To this day, the invaluable experience of the SAC and detachment sergeant is always considered and leveraged, especially when making major decisions. The art of command within the detachment command triad is truly founded on a unified voice and harmonious relationship.

Timing is a key consideration. The SAC and I joined the triad at relatively the same time, which made it easier for us to listen to and consider each other's views. I believe this helped to slowly integrate new changes with minimal resistance. Additionally, the arrival of a captain who assumes the role of a commander, which was previously held by a SAC, may create animosity, especially if the SAC remains at the office. Although timing is not always something that can be controlled, it is, nonetheless, a significant consideration.

Lastly, personalities and human relationships are the most important considerations for achieving success. This reigns true for any command team, but is especially true for a command triad. There must be a degree of humility, mutual respect, and a willingness to adjust and compromise each day in order to maintain a positive climate.

Successes

Upon taking command, my focus immediately shifted to the typical responsibilities of most company level commanders—those associated with readiness. We reinvigorated the Command Supply Discipline Program by turning in pallets of unserviceable and outdated equipment, accurately sub-hand-receipting all property, and conducting a thorough change-of-command inventory and monthly inventories thereafter. We focused efforts on the Medical Protection System and developed a proactive tracker to predict annual Medical Readiness Category 4 requirements. Other responsibilities such as those involving the unit commander's financial report, monthly personnel management, promotion reports, awards and personnel actions, facilities upgrades and repairs, purchasing requests, and other high-priority additional duties received full attention. As the commander, I assumed the role of supervising and evaluating four civilian investigative analysts and assisted with reviewing and closing CID commander's report of disciplinary actions. The detachment sergeant and I were able to spend more time on training and other administrative tasks. By and large, the capabilities of our command team were enhanced, as we were afforded more time and effort to take care of the unit and its equipment.

It is incredibly important to note that, although not provided in our CID detachment's military table of organization and equipment (MTOE), a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 42A–Human Resources Specialist and an MOS 92Y–Unit Supply Specialist were relocated from our battalion and placed under our operational control. These personnel had a direct impact on the ability of the unit to manage human resource metrics and to conduct daily supply operations; they essentially improved self-sufficiency within the detachment. Although not organic, these personnel address key and critical capability shortfalls. The captain position is currently borrowed from the battalion MTOE, typically from the supply position. Therefore, until there is a change in the MTOE, key and critical capability shortfalls will remain at the battalion level, while the enhancement of CID detachment operations and noninvestigate support continues.

Investigations

Seeing special agents and drug investigators conduct felony level investigations firsthand is a rare and invaluable experience. Any military police captain would benefit professionally from this early exposure; and if the same military police officers continue to serve and command within CID, then the exposure is of mutual benefit to the CID enterprise. I have accompanied the SAC to several death scenes in which evidence was photographed, triangulated, collected, and documented; witnessed polygraph examinations and multiple interviews that ended with confessions; accompanied a drug suppression team while conducting a brigade level barracks walkthrough; observed the digital media extraction process; and have been a part of multiple briefings and training events that teach the intricacies of CID regulatory requirements and techniques.

". . . the capabilities of our command team were enhanced, as we were afforded more time and effort to take care of the unit and its equipment."

To be clear, this exposure has undoubtedly been developmental. But the role of conducting and directing investigations does not belong to the commander; the SAC remains responsible for all investigative decisions. Regardless, being a supervisor and spectator has allowed me to see and understand the many challenges that special agents and investigators face every day, the status and readiness of equipment, and the importance of teamwork with other law enforcement entities from a commander's perspective. I've gained a greater appreciation for relationship building with local police and sheriff's departments and the installation department of emergency services and military police and also a greater understanding of how friction or failed efforts in this area can cause a tremendous strain on daily operations. This assignment has undoubtedly provided a unique viewpoint from an investigative lens. I have immense respect and appreciation for the resiliency of CID professionals, given the burden they carry after responding to heinous crime scenes, interviewing victims of all ages, and spending hours of investigative activity in search of the truth. They are dedicated professionals with an undeniable calling to serve.

Conclusion

The CID detachment command triad is a delicate command structure that hinges on having the right people, with the right personalities, at the right time. In our particular case at the Fort Bragg CID Office, we have achieved harmony. I immensely trust and respect my command team, and believe that I have the best SAC and CID detachment sergeant in the Army. They have made my tenure in command an unforgettable experience that I will cherish.

I also cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to all of the decision-making stakeholders who allowed input and bought in to shaping this initiative into something that would benefit everyone.

Captain Trendell is the commander of the 87th Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Bragg. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Saint Leo University, Florida, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

By Major Matt D. Montazzoli

> *". . . an inescapable responsibility rests upon this country to conduct an inquiry . . . into the culpability of those whom there is probable cause to accuse of atrocities and other crimes. . . . The groundwork of our case must be factually authentic. . . . We must establish incredible events by credible evidence."*
>
> —Robert H. Jackson[1]

As reflected in *The Illiad*, war crimes are as old as war itself.[2] As the U.S. Army refines its operational focus to prepare for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against near-peer competitors, the chance of fighting an enemy who violates the law of armed conflict (LOAC) at scales exceeding U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly referred to as CID) capabilities or current doctrine will only increase.[3, 4] The Army should implement a specialized war crimes investigation unit (WCIU) composed of military police investigators integrated with Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) legal professionals, organized to provide the expertise and capacity to handle the war crimes investigations likely to be associated with a future conflict.

War crimes are generally defined as ". . . violations of the laws or customs of war."[5] The exact definition of a war crime depends on the type of conflict and the parties to that conflict; but as a general rule, war crimes include grave or serious breaches of LOACs, such as murder, torture or abuse of detainees, deliberate targeting of noncombatants, recruitment of child soldiers, use of prohibited weapons, perfidy, genocide, and failure to respect protections for wounded or surrendering enemies.[6]

According to White House policy, "Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States."[7] The 1949 Geneva Convention imposes obligations to investigate alleged war crimes, search for perpetrators, and try such individuals by conducting courts-martial or military commissions or by rendering them to another country for trial.[8]

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) regulations amplify the requirements of international law. All personnel assigned to or accompanying U.S. forces must report LOAC violations.[9] Commanders are required to preserve evidence, report allegations, and conduct an administrative investigation or "request an investigation by a responsible defense criminal investigation organization" such as the CID.[10] CID is responsible for investigating suspected violations of the law of land warfare.[11] Alleged war crimes committed by foreign enemies or partners must be reported, but U.S. investigation into these alleged war crimes may only occur at the direction of the appropriate combatant commander.[12] During LCSO, a combatant commander would almost certainly authorize investigations of enemy war crimes, both to foster accountability and to provide compelling material for information operations.

LSCO ". . . are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed."[13] Historically, LSCO battlefields "have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced in the past several decades."[14] The Army must be prepared to undertake war crimes investigations as a part of the consolidation of gains.[15] Military police doctrine emphasizes that consolidation of gains is not separate or isolated from LSCO; consolidation of gains activities are a form of exploitation inherent to LSCO.[16] While current Army doctrine makes only a glancing reference to war crimes investigations, history makes it clear that the Army will almost certainly have primary responsibility for investigations of enemy LOAC violations.[17]

There is historical precedent for a dedicated WCIU. During World War II, the Allies investigated and prosecuted international criminality on an unprecedented—and, as yet, unequaled—scale. The U.S. Army in Europe formed the

"According to White House policy, 'Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.'[6]"

7708 War Crimes Group, commanded by a JAGC colonel and composed of attorneys, interrogators, and Soldiers who were selected due to their special skills such as linguistic or photographic abilities.[18] The unit investigated and prepared for the trials of Nazi war criminals by sifting through hundreds of thousands of documents and interviewing thousands of potential witnesses and defendants.[19] It produced a comprehensive report "to provide a historical summary of the problems encountered, together with their solutions, for the benefit of those who might, in the future, be assigned a similar mission."[20] While available CID historical files contain very little historical documentation on the role that criminal investigators played on past European battlefields, it appears that most CID efforts were devoted to counterintelligence and routine criminal investigations.[21]

A dedicated WCIU was established during the Korean War.[22] This War Crimes Division was commanded by a JAGC colonel, and it investigated more than 1,800 cases involving many thousands of victims.[23] This WCIU included field teams conducting on-the-spot investigations.[24] It also included a Case Analysis Branch, composed of attorneys to review and analyze the evidence.[25] While 34 cases, including the case of the infamous "Hill 303 massacre," were identified as eligible for trial, given the terms of the armistice, no trials were ever conducted.[26, 27] During the Vietnam War, alleged enemy war crimes were documented via administrative investigations at the unit level and there was no dedicated WCIU.[28] There was a dedicated, CID-centric WCIU during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but " . . . the existing CID structure of field agents and case managers did not anticipate close interaction between CID and judge advocates during the investigation phase."[29] Unit activities did not result in any prosecutable cases.

CID is doctrinally responsible for addressing war crimes, but current doctrine does not sufficiently distinguish war crimes investigations from general CID criminal investigations.[30] For routine criminal investigations in a deployed environment, one CID battalion supports a corps or division.[31] However, in an LSCO environment where there are significant enemy war crimes, resources are likely to be quickly overwhelmed. Doctrine recognizes that force tailoring of military police elements requires ". . . thinking beyond home station structures to embrace combinations of military police capabilities and mission command to provide . . . the right support."[32] In the case of LSCO, the right support is a dedicated WCIU, which would allow other CID detachments to focus on their law enforcement investigative mission. This would ensure "responsive CID support [via] an organizational structure that is flexible enough to meet the needs of the various situations that will be encountered in a theater of operations."[33]

Conclusion

More than 30 years ago, scholars lamented that while U.S. procedures for investigating and prosecuting war crimes by American Soldiers were robust and well understood, ". . . little, if any, training contains guidance on how to report or process war crimes committed by the enemy."[34] Then, as now, the investigation of enemy war crimes would benefit from a specialized unit composed of trained criminal investigators supervised by an attorney.[35] Civilian law enforcement agencies employ specialized units such as the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center, Washington, D.C., to investigate war crimes and mass atrocities.[36]

The commander of the World War II War Crimes Group noted that ". . . advance planning, together with the organizing and staffing of the war crimes unit responsible for all aspects of the mission in advance of the opening of a theater of operations, is essential."[37] Leaders in the Military Police Corps and JAGC must coordinate and collaborate to ensure that the Army is capable of investigating war crimes during LSCO before such a conflict begins.

Endnotes:

[1]Robert H. Jackson, *Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals*, 7 June 1945, <https://www.roberthjackson.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Report_to_the_President_on_the_Prosecution_of_Axis_War_Criminals.pdf>, accessed on 25 May 2021.

[2]Homer, *The Illiad*, Book XXIII, George Chapman, trans., Charles Knight & Co, London 1843. Achilles brags about desecrating a corpse and murdering prisoners, stating, "Hector lies slaughter'd here / Dragg'd at my chariot; and our dogs shall all in pieces tear / His hated limbs. Twelve Trojan youths, born of their noblest strains / I took alive: and (yet enrag'd) will empty all their veins / Of vital spirits, sacrific'd before thy heap of fire," which even Homer identifies as shameful and outside of Greek customs of war, p. 199.

[3]*Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, United Nations Human Rights Commission, New York, 28 January 2020, p. 6, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25638&LangID=E>, accessed on 25 May 2021.

[4]Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, "U.S. Says China's Repression of Uighurs Is Genocide," *New York Times*, 20 January 2021, p. A-9.

[5]*Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Charter of the International Military Tribunal*, Article 6 (b), United Nations,

London, 8 August 1945, <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp>, accessed on 25 May 2021.

[6]*Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, U.S. Department of Defense, December 2016, para. 18.9.5, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190>, accessed on 8 June 2021.

[7]Presidential Study Directive 10, *Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities*, the White House, 4 August 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities>, accessed on 24 May 2021.

[8]Durward Johnson and Michael N. Schmitt, "The Duty to Investigate War Crimes," *U.S. Military Academy Lieber Center for Law and Armed Conflict Articles of War Blog*, 22 December 2020, <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/duty-investigate-war-crimes> accessed on 24 May 2021.

[9]Directive 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program*, DOD, Washington, D.C., 2 July 2020, p. 4., <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/231101p.pdf?ver=2020-07-02-143157-007>, accessed on 8 June 2021.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Army Regulation (AR) 195-2, *Criminal Investigation Activities*, 21 July 2020, p. 3.

[12]DOD Directive 2311.01E, p. 4.

[13]Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations*, 31 July 2019, p. 1.

[14]Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 6 October 2017, p. 1.

[15]ADP 3-0, p. 1.

[16]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019, p. 4.

[17]FM 1-04, *Legal Support to Operations*, 8 June 2020, p. 4.

[18]John J. Dunphy, *Unsung Heroes of the Dachau Trials: The Investigative Work of the 7708 War Crimes Group, 1945–1947*, McFarland & Co., Jefferson, North Carolina, 2019, p. 3.

[19]Joshua M. Greene, *Justice at Dachau The Trials of an American Prosecutor*, Broadway Books, New York, 2003, p. 25.

[20]*Report of the Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes European Command June 1944 to July 1948*, U.S. Army, 1949, p. 4.

[21]Daniel G. Karis, *Criminal Investigative Activities World War II and Vietnam Battlefield Implications*, 3 June 1988, pp. 4–5, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/b125460.pdf>, accessed on 24 May 2021.

[22]*Korean War Atrocities Report of the Committee on Government Operations Made Through Its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations by Its Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities Pursuant to S. Res. 40*, U.S. Senate, 11 January 1954, p. 2, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/KW-atrocities-Report.pdf>, accessed on 24 May 2021.

[23]*Extract of Interim Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division: Cumulative to 30 June 1953,* 1953, <https://oregondigital.org/sets/easia/oregondigital:df72rv564>, accessed on 14 July 2021.

[24]Ibid. p. 2.

[25]*Korean War Atrocities*, pp. 2–3.

[26]"Massacre at Hill 303," *Time*, 28 August 1950, <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,813074-1,00.html>, accessed on 24 May 2021.

[27]*Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command on the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea*, 27 July 1953, <https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/index.html?dod-date=727>, accessed on 8 June 2021.

[28]Steven F. Lancaster, *Enemy War Crimes: How to Investigate and Prosecute*, Army War College, 20 March 1988, p. 26, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a192499.pdf>, accessed on 24 May 2021.

[29]*Forged in the Fire: Legal Lessons Learned During Military Operations, 1994–2006*, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Center for Law and Military Operations, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2006, p. 176, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/forged-in-the-fire.pdf>, accessed on 8 June 2021.

[30]ATP 3-39.12, *Law Enforcement Investigations*, 19 August. 2013.

[31]FM 3-39, p. 3.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Karis, p, 108.

[34]Lancaster, p. 32.

[35]Ibid, p. 28.

[36]"Human Rights Violators & War Crimes Center," U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <https://www.ice.gov/partnerships-centers/hrvwcc>, accessed on 14 July 2021.

[37]Dunphy.

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THE MPEP

By Captain Nicolas R. Boeschling and Captain Richard N. Steinouer

For more than 73 years, the United States has supported the exchange of military personnel between allies and partners from 17 participating countries around the globe to build, sustain, and expand international relationships and enhance interoperability through a program called the Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP).[1] U.S. exchange officers fill unique roles in their assigned units, typically serving as the sole U.S. Army officers or noncommissioned officers in their communities. They usually operate a great distance from the closest U.S. military installation, allowing them to fully experience the host nation culture without the American influences commonly prevalent while stationed overseas. Exchange officers also experience a level of interoperability that does not exist at typical training events, exercises, or multinational operations, with daily business conducted using the language and planning, decision-making, and staff processes of the host nation.

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps participates in multiple exchanges throughout North America and Europe, and the experiences vary greatly based on position. A military police exchange officer in the United Kingdom (U.K.) serves as a regimental operations officer (battalion operations officer equivalent) to a U.K. military police regiment. In Germany, an exchange officer serves at the German Military Police Command, with a focus on staff work in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military police community and development of NATO doctrine. While each experience is unique, the impacts are similar.

This article discusses the importance of the MPEP program and explains its value as seen through the eyes of two experienced officers—Captain Nicolas R. Boeschling, serving at the 3d Regiment Royal Military Police (RMP), Bulford Camp, U.K., and Captain Richard N. Steinouer, serving at the German Military Police Command, Hannover, Germany.

Since 1949, the United States has been dedicated to freedom, security, and collective defense through cooperation as a member of NATO, which is a political and military alliance that connects 30 European and North American member countries. It is grounded in the belief that establishing dialogue and cooperation is crucial for peaceful relations and deeper international understanding. NATO affords member and partner countries the ability to consult on security issues, build trust and, ultimately, prevent conflict. If diplomatic efforts fail, NATO has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis management and peacekeeping operations alone or in cooperation with other countries or international organizations.[2] The unique role of exchange officers further strengthens the NATO alliance and the U.S. Army by maintaining or enhancing relationships between the United States and its allies, enhancing interoperability, and preparing for future assignments in support of multinational operations.

History has shown that large-scale combat operations (LSCO) are best conducted alongside strong and supportive allies and with a foundation of trust and interoperability.[3] As the Army continues to shift focus from limited contingency operations to LSCO, interoperability, the building and maintaining of relationships, and an understanding of multinational operations are more important now than ever. Army Regulation (AR) 34-1, *Interoperability*, defines interoperability as ". . . the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives" and further elaborates on the importance of

Subject matter experts convene at NATO Military Police Panel III in September 2019.

The U.K., U.S., and German flags fly at Scharnhorst Kaserne, Hannover, Germany.

interoperability in the current dynamic operating environment by stating, ". . . the U.S. Army will have only days, not weeks or months, to integrate [unified action partners] UAPs in key functions and capabilities. Therefore, interoperability must become a fundamental condition of how the Army plans to fight tonight and tomorrow and prepares to fight in the future."[4] Interoperability is best achieved and most effective through face-to-face interaction, repetition, knowledge through experience, and a sound understanding of U.S. Army and NATO doctrine. The MPEP provides an excellent opportunity for officers to master the objective.

Exchange officers have a direct role in influencing daily operations, exercises, and professional development opportunities during their assignments. As the regimental operations officer, 3d Regiment RMP, Captain Boeschling plans, directs, and executes operational and training activities; coordinates individual and unit deployments; and drafts operational staff work. He also supports the 3d Armoured Division, the only division at continual operational readiness in the U.K., as an operations officer for exercises and deployments. At the German Military Police Command, Captain Steinouer serves in the Multinational Cooperation Branch of the Headquarters, where he has an active role in the NATO military police community of interest, which focuses on developing NATO military police doctrine, priorities, and future capabilities. He also supports the Operations Division during major exercises and instructs monthly at the *Schule für Feldjäger und Stabsdienst der Bundeswehr* (German Military Police School House), Hannover.

While the daily tasks of these exchange officers vary, the benefits to the U.S. Army and the host nation are identical. Learning is a two-way street. Both the exchange officers and the host nation that they support gain valuable knowledge about the other's decision-making processes, capabilities, limitations, and communication and leadership styles. Most importantly, they develop an understanding of systems and processes and build strong and sustainable relationships that form the foundation of effective interoperability. All of these things are indispensable when time is limited and immediate action is required to preserve peace in the future.

The MPEP offers significant personal and professional development opportunities for exchange officers. Because most leaders remain within one Army branch, working primarily with other U.S. Army junior enlisted Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers for their careers, it can be easy to focus only on the U.S. Army way of doing things. The exchange program provides a means to break out of this sometimes homogeneous bubble and gain a different perspective on not only professional military matters, but also on personal and cultural issues. As the only U.S. Army officers in their organizations, Captains Boeschling and Steinouer are the sole organizational representatives of the U.S. Army and the Military Police Corps. By observing the uniquely British, German, and NATO ways of doing things, these captains experience a level of immersion that enhances their personal and professional growth.

In his role as a regimental operations officer, Captain Boeschling has learned countless lessons about British customs and courtesies, leadership and mentorship in the British army, and staff procedures and management; in his role as the operations officer, he has presented briefings on RMP and U.S. Army military police capabilities regarding mobility support and detention operations during brigade and regimental study days, the 1st U.K. Military Police Brigade Strategic Detention Seminar, and the British Army Combat Power Demonstration. The best way to better understand one's own capabilities is often by discussing them in relation to the capabilities of other organizations. These conferences provide a forum for just that. They are essential in developing a clearer understanding of each country's military police capabilities and strengthening the humane, procedural, and technical components of interoperability to overcome friction in LSCOs.

The British army also uses sporting events, adventure training, and shooting and marching competitions to recruit and reward soldiers and to maintain morale within its services. Captain Boeschling regularly plans, resources, and attends these events, which allows him to learn best practices for building morale and esprit de corps among British army military police officers. Captain Boeschling had the opportunity to compete in the 2019 1 Military Police Brigade (U.K.) Southern Cross Challenge, Colchester, England—an annual competition designed to assess physical endurance, military skills, and general military knowledge

among all RMP regiments. The competition consisted of four separate events, including a 2.5-mile ruck march with a 55-pound pack, six representative military tasks skills tests, a 1.2-mile run with a 22-pound rucksack (to simulate flanking maneuver/advance), and a rifle stress fire event. Captain Boeschling and his team of eight officers and noncommissioned officers placed second among all RMP regiments and gained invaluable lessons in teamwork at the tactical level.

Captain Steinouer's diverse role at the German Military Police Command involves supporting multiple departments. He actively supports the review and promulgation process for NATO doctrine and has personally reviewed Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.14B, *Force Protection*[5]; AJP 3.22, *Stability Policing*[6]; AJP 3.4.3, *Humanitarian Assistance*[7]; and AJP 4.5, *Host Nation Support*,[8] among others. Twice a month, he instructs part of the *English für Feldjäger* course at the *Schule für Feldjäger und Stabsdienst der Bundeswehr*, providing an overview of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Army, and the Military Police Corps and a comparison to their German counterparts. He also coordinates and supports the historic U.S. Army military police and *Feldjäger* partnership by planning U.S. and German military police visits and support to senior-leader conferences, coordinating mutual support during exercises, and ensuring that U.S. Army and German military police companies have an open line of communication with one another. Finally, Captain Steinour is a member of the German delegation to the NATO Military Police Panel and Military Police Chiefs' Conference.

The NATO Military Police Panel and the Military Police Chiefs' Conference are important events for the NATO military police community; they are attended by senior military police leaders from NATO nations, Partnership for Peace nations, and key military police organizations throughout Europe and North America. The NATO Military Police Panel is a triannual forum dedicated to the coordination of all military police-related doctrine publications and handbooks as well as the development of doctrine, techniques, tactics, and procedures for military police operations in combined and joint environments. The Military Police Chiefs' Conference represents the sole annual NATO military police community conference in which general officers, senior leaders, and senior enlisted advisors serving as representatives of their headquarters or organizations have the opportunity to interact and collaborate on topics that enhance military police standardization with allies and partners around the globe. The presidency for each of these events rotates every 2 years, with Germany assuming presidency in 2018 and—with an extension due to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)—continuing through 2021. Captain Steinouer coordinates these events with the hosting nations, supports the German presidency during execution, and participates in the doctrine development working groups.

These diverse activities provide Captain Steinouer with the opportunity to view military policing through the perspectives of various NATO nations. Each nation in NATO has slightly different capabilities and priorities with regard to military policing; the exchange officer has a front-row seat from which to observe these differences. In addition, these week-long conferences are ideal for identifying key military police points of contact and developing strong personal relationships with senior military police leaders throughout NATO.

Serving as an exchange officer is an exceptional assignment for professional and personal growth. The geographic locations of the U.K. and Germany allow for many opportunities for traveling throughout Europe and learning about different cultures, histories, and languages. Exchange officers can finish their tenures as experts in multinational operations; more knowledgeable leaders, with experiences gained outside of the U.S. Army; and well-traveled individuals, with unique perspectives on the cultures and ways of life of multiple countries.

The MPEP is beneficial to the U.S. Army and its allies and partners around the world. It helps build adaptable leaders who are capable of operating in a multinational environment, enhances mutual trust and interoperability among participating nations, and builds on a capability that will undoubtedly be needed in LSCO. For military police officers who are looking for a position "outside the box," the MPEP is an outstanding broadening opportunity that can help with further development as adaptable leaders with a unique perspective on leadership and organizational management.

Endnotes:

[1]Devon L. Suits, "Building Relationships, Interoperability Through Exchange Program," U.S. Army website, 8 October 2019, <https://www.army.mil/article/224669/building_relationships_interoperability_through_exchange_program>, accessed on 18 May 2021.

[2]*What is NATO?*, NATO, 2019, <https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200327-What-is-NATO-en.pdf>, accessed on 20 May 2021.

[3]Peter J. Schifferle, *Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies of Combined Arms Maneuver in LSCO*, Army University Press, 2018.

[4]AR 34-1, *Interoperability*, 9 April 2020, p. 2.

[5]AJP 3.14B, *Force Protection*, 2 April 2015.

[6]AJP 3.22, *Stability Policing*, 14 July 2016.

[7]AJP 3.4.3, *Humanitarian Assistance*, 8 October 2015.

[8]AJP 4.5, *Host Nation Support*, 28 April 2021.

Captain Boeschling is the regimental operations officer for the 3d Regiment RMP. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminology from Kansas State University, Manhattan, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Captain Steinouer is an exchange officer for the German Military Police Command. He holds a bachelor's degree in German from Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

By Captain Austin C. Peregory

For many years, the mission of military police basic combat training units has been to mold civilians into professional Soldiers to enable them to defend the United States of America. Basic combat training units do not waste time in the transformation. In the current Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) environment, additional protective measures are required. New trainees no longer arrive at their units and immediately begin their first phase in training; instead, they are medically monitored for 2 weeks.

Company A, 795th Military Police Battalion, coordinated with explosive ordanance disposal personnel to use a Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle during a static display. Photograph by Staff Sergeant Austin B. Garell.

So, how do drill sergeants truly motivate trainees to be the best Soldiers they can be? A new motivational event may be the answer; Operation Hammer Drop offers a glimpse of the many assets and skills that can be developed by the U.S. Army. The 795th Military Police Battalion, 14th Military Police Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, designed Operation Hammer Drop to motivate basic combat trainees, inspiring them with the desire to earn the title of military police Soldier following a grueling 19 weeks of training.

A Soldier volunteers to wear a K-9 bite suit during a high-risk traffic stop demonstration. Photograph by Staff Sergeant Pierre M. Burts.

The events and demonstrations of Operation Hammer Drop are intended to motivate trainees and encourage them to focus on their future. Some of the activities include requests for medical evacuation via Blackhawk helicopter, supported by the 1st Battalion, 135th Aviation Regiment, Whiteman, Air Force Base, Missouri; tactical assault vehicle demonstrations by the Special Reaction Team, Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, Fort Leonard Wood; and military working-dog demonstrations by the 252d and 180th Military Police Detachment, Fort Leonard Wood. Following

First Sergeant Tony L. Sweat spoke to trainees at a static display of a weapons table during Operation Hammer Drop. Photograph by Staff Sergeant Garell.

these activities, static displays are available for trainees to have their first look at the capabilities of the Military Police Corps. Operation Hammer Drop also includes a team-building exercise that helps establish cohesiveness among trainees through positive experiences and prepares them for the next 19 weeks and their future in the Military Police Corps after graduation. During a field interview, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan T. Yasuda, 795th Military Police Battalion Commander, said, "This motivational event will give these Soldiers an idea of what they can expect in the field and inspire them to successfully complete basic combat and advanced individual training."[1] The 1-day event showcases the capabilities of the Military Police Corps, and trainees have the opportunity not only to observe, but also to receive hands-on experience with what the Military Police Corps has to offer upon completion of One-Station Unit Training.

A special reaction team from the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division conducts a tactical vehicle assault demonstration during Operation Hammer Drop. Photograph by Sergeant Jocelyn A. Claudio-Hite.

One-Station Unit Training Class 15-20 experienced an exceptionally inspirational event. Operation Hammer Drop introduced these trainees to Military Police capabilities as a motivational transition from the yellow phase (medical monitoring) to the red phase of Military Police One-Station Unit Training. The first iteration of Operation Hammer Drop proved to be successful, as trainees in Class 15-20 were ready to endure the 19-week, 28 July to 10 December 2020 course with a better understanding of what the future could hold.

An operations officer for the 795th Military Police Battalion, Captain Christopher R. Parker, identified how this event enhanced trainee motivation and battalion networking when he said, "Planning and coordinating this event really strengthened the 795th Military Police Battalion's network by working with several organizations on Fort Leonard Wood and utilizing the available assets. This event has opened up opportunities for advance cadre training during cycle breaks."[2]

In hopes of continuing to motivate and inspire all trainees, Operation Hammer Drop will be executed for every future basic combat training class in the 14th Military Police Brigade.

Endnotes:

[1]Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan T. Yasuda, personal interview, July 2020.

[2]Captain Christopher R. Parker, personal interview, July 2020.

Captain Peregory is an operations officer for the 795th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the University of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.



By First Lieutenant Jessica A. Farley

"This generation is weak"; "It's their parents' fault that these kids don't know how to deal with adversity"; "Back in my day, this never would have happened"; and "I had it harder than these trainees when I went to basic training; they are just soft" are common generalizations. How many times have you heard comments like these? Or, how many times have you made comments like these? They are made on a daily basis whether you want to admit it or not. We constantly blame the trainees, their parents, or their generation for the trainees' lack of resilience. But instead of placing the blame on the trainees or the environment from which they came, let's look at what we can control and how we can positively influence trainees in an initial-entry training (IET) environment in order to enhance their resiliency.

The U.S. Army created the Comprehensive Soldier Family Fitness (CSF2) program to increase resilience and enhance performance by building on the five dimensions of strength, which Army Regulation (AR) 350-53, *Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness*, identifies as physical, emotional, social, spiritual, and familial.[1] The annually mandatory Global Assessment Tool (GAT) questionnaire also serves as a self-assessment tool that guides us in improving our overall health and well-being. The GAT identifies Soldiers' strengths and weaknesses and prompts them with training modules that help build resilience and enhance their performance in each of the five dimensions of strength. Unfortunately, the questionnaire may sometimes be overlooked or viewed as a "check the box" requirement. As leaders, we must remember that a Soldier's psychological health is just as important as his or her physical health and we must ensure that trainees have the opportunity to complete the training modules, as they are useful tools that can help build resiliency in an IET environment.

More recently, the Army initiated the Ready and Resilient (R2) Campaign, which is the Army's strategy for strengthening individual and unit personnel readiness and fostering a culture of trust.[2] CSF2 falls under R2. The R2 website says it perfectly: "It is our duty and responsibility [as leaders] to maintain routines and build relationships with our Soldiers to foster a culture of trust so that Soldiers are motivated to seek our guidance."[3] Drill sergeants in an IET environment have certain responsibilities, and some might subscribe to the old-school way of thinking that they need to break trainees down before building them back up. But cultivating relationships and getting to know trainees will enhance the ability to recognize subtle changes in behavior (lack of motivation, withdrawal) that are out of character for the Soldier, and concerns can be addressed as needed.[4] It is not necessary for leaders to be the Soldiers' friends, but you should be building their trust and asking questions to get to know more about them and where they came from before joining the Army.

Building trust leads to another means of supporting resiliency in an IET environment—building social relationships. Numerous studies have been conducted on social support as it relates to happiness and resiliency. Social support is defined as the encouragement that an individual receives from others within his or her respective environment.[5] One study found a statistical correlation between levels of social support and suicidal ideation among Army personnel; increases in the perception of social support coincided with reductions in suicidal ideation among Army personnel.[6] Studies involving social support and posttraumatic stress disorder indicated an inversely proportional relationship among military veterans who had returned from Iraq and Afghanistan.[7] Veterans who reported low levels of social support experienced greater difficulties with functioning in social settings and increases in suicidal ideation. However, this does not mean that these veterans lacked resiliency—only that they had a more difficult time adjusting because of a lack of social support. It illustrates the importance of social support, especially when faced with adversity.

Leaving home and entering a new environment can be hard for Soldiers beginning IET and advanced individual training. Those experiences cannot be compared with combat or posttraumatic stress disorder experiences, but it is normal to have negative thoughts, be unenthusiastic, or become stressed while in an IET environment. However, cadre cannot let Soldiers get trapped in the idea that this is the worst thing that has ever happened to them or that this is the end. Don't just tell Soldiers to be resilient—actually talk to them and teach them positive coping strategies involving optimism and hope. One strategy that I used as a basketball coach made use of the "but" technique. As soon as a player started complaining or speaking negatively, I required that she finish the sentence with, "but . . . " and then follow that with a positive statement. For example, she might say, "I hate that we have to wake up at 4:30 every morning, BUT at least we get a place to sleep and three meals a day" or, "I never get any days off or time to rest, BUT at least I still have a job and am still getting paid every 2 weeks." This is a simple strategy that can be used to assist trainees in thinking more positively and searching for gratitude, even in unwanted situations. It is psychologically impossible to be in a beautiful state of mind and a negative state of mind at the same time; you cannot be simultaneously stressed and blessed. Reminding trainees that they have control over their thoughts is imperative.

So, what can you do to support resiliency in an IET environment? First, use Army resources to your advantage. The R2 Campaign and CSF2 websites include many helpful products for teaching Soldiers about resilience and about how to become stronger in areas that will enhance their physical and mental performance. Second, build trust amongst your Soldiers and within the training environment. Be a role model who walks the talk and whom trainees seek out for guidance. Get to know the trainees so that you are aware of small behavioral changes that may be a warning sign of something bigger. Moreover, encourage trainees to get to know their battle buddies and to talk to each other. Encourage them to talk to someone about their feelings and what they are experiencing—not to their parents, spouse, or friends back home, but to someone who is there with them in training. Access to a stable support system and a person to whom they can turn when times get tough only increases resiliency. You don't need to teach them the information in every single module included in the Master Resiliency Training, but you could start encouraging them to express their gratitude using the "but" statements or getting them to think positively.

Because of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, there are many unknowns—especially within the IET environment. Recent changes, such as drill sergeant extensions, postponed permanent-change-of-station moves, and limits on travel, can place additional stress on cadre and their Families. Although we allow trainees to more frequently call their loved ones, they still think about what is going on back home and the uncertainties of the future. One thing that we must remind ourselves of is that instead of worrying about what is out of our control, we must focus on what we can control. We must voice and reiterate this to the trainees and set an example for them. It is difficult to support resiliency in an IET environment if we, ourselves, are not resilient. It is completely normal to stress about problems and/or to complain, but we must consciously choose to think positively and find gratitude so that we, in turn, can pass that mindset on to subordinate Soldiers.

Learning how to be resilient is a process—not a destination or a "check the box" action. Resilience describes the ability to rebuild and grow after being faced with adversity. In the end, what do you want to be known for? What do you want Soldiers who graduate to be known for? That you gave up in tough situations or that your trainees were not resilient? One of the words that we used on our basketball team was "legacy"; we used that term to remind the players to leave everything out there on the court each day. We also used it to remind them of what they wanted to be known for after they graduated. What do you want your legacy to be? Practice the old adage of "Leave the place better than you found it" in all aspects of your life. There is no black and white; you are resilient, or you are not. Instead of pointing fingers and placing blame on the younger generation, control what you can and positively influence the trainees to help develop their resiliency. You, the cadre, and the Soldiers are doing a phenomenal job, but we must remind ourselves to maintain balance in our lives and be there for one another.

Endnotes:

[1]AR 350-53, *Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness*, 19 June 2014.

[2]"U.S. Army Ready and Resilient", U.S. Army Resilience Directorate, <https://www.armyresilience.army.mil/ard/R2-home.html>, accessed on 15 April 2021.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Evan M. Kleiman and Richard T. Liu, "Social Support as a Protective Factor in Suicide: Findings From Two Nationally Representative Samples," *Journal of Affective Disorders*, March 2013, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23466401/>, accessed on 13 May 2021.

[6]John Franklin Ambrose, "Gender, Social Support, and Resiliency in Suicidal Ideation Among U.S. Army Soldiers," *Walden University ScholarWorks*, August 2018, <https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6723&context=dissertations>, accessed on 15 April 2021.

[7]Jack Tsai et al., "The Role of Coping, Resilience, and Social Support in Mediating The Relation Between PTSD and Social Functioning in Veterans Returning From Iraq and Afghanistan," *Psychiatry: Interpersonal & Biological Processes*, 2012, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23466401/>, accessed on 13 May 2021.

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Leading a Geographically Separated Platoon

By Captain Kyle D. Hinzman

Editor's note: *Images in this article were taken prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.*

Military police junior officers are commonly thrust into different but equally challenging positions. Company commanders may arrive in Europe as part of a rotational law enforcement augmentation force and find their company supporting law enforcement operations across eight garrisons. Platoon leaders may lead splintered formations that are spread among installations and subinstallations spanning across hundreds of miles. This article contains an assessment of practices and lessons learned that have proven to be vital to leading a geographically separated platoon.

Geographically separated formations present challenges that require leaders to develop adaptive solutions to lead and influence in their physical absence. Leaders can achieve success in leading a geographically separated formation by building a team or "family" and leveraging support. They can impact the entire formation by establishing systems, processes, cultures, and directed activities that help achieve intended outcomes without the benefit of daily or constant interaction.

The culture of co-located units is heavily swayed by commanders at every level; however, as echelons become more and more geographically dispersed, the higher level of autonomy granted to a subordinate unit presents the opportunity to foster a branching subculture derived from higher echelons. The keys to building a positive subculture that runs concurrent to the interests of the organization are to place a collaborative, team-centric focus on daily operations and to nurture familial support. Leaders must recognize those individuals who selflessly give of themselves for the betterment of the team, and they must strive to promote healthy competition. Teamwork, which is an essential aspect of the military profession, is built from trust, training, and pride. It is not produced in a vacuum; rather, it is achieved through challenging subordinates and balancing rewards for collaborative behavior with healthy competition. For many Soldiers and Families, the unit is not only the workplace for the Service member, but also the entity responsible for bringing Soldiers and Family members into the fold and assisting them with integration into a new assignment. The Army presents a challenge to all Soldiers; they begin their careers separated from the support structure in which they were reared, and their Families deal with challenges without the presence of traditional

Members of a senior leader courtesy patrol near Vicenza.

Members of the 529th Military Police Battalion conduct community engagements at the Caserma Ederle, Vicenza, Italy.

familial support. For these reasons, it is vital to build a unit culture that promotes the organization as a family that is available to meet the holistic support that Soldiers require. Leaders can establish a familial support network through organizational events and competitions, which foster teamwork. The Soldier Family Readiness Group further serves as a resource for building the familial atmosphere that connects Soldiers and provides a support network among the team.

The critical binding of the elements of collaborative teamwork and familial support constitutes leadership presence. This goal is realized through a concerted effort of leaders at every level. Leadership is a "contact sport"; the actions required to foster teamwork and build an organizational family cannot be achieved through e-mail messages. Leaders at every level must be present to convey purpose, ensure understanding, provide motivation, and engage in honest interaction on a frequent basis. Vast opportunities are available for leaders to make use of "touch points," including military police duty officer shifts, shift ride-alongs, physical readiness checks, barracks checks, and guard mounts. Each encounter provides leaders with valuable subordinate perspectives and an azimuth check on the road to building the desired organizational subculture. These engagements additionally serve as crucial opportunities to redirect and adjust the organization perspective. Leaders have a unique understanding of organizational constraints as conduits for the flow of information within their formations.

In addition to presence, managing the culture of a geographically separated formation requires clear communication in order to shape Soldier perspectives and to provide Soldiers with context to create an understanding of organizational systems, processes, and administrative requirements and their overall importance. It is extremely important that leaders do not perpetuate a narrative indicating that higher headquarters does not care about, or is lax in processing, actions because—in most cases—that is false. Unfortunately, Soldiers don't see how hard administrative clerks work at the company and battalion levels, so it is important to draw attention to the people performing these tasks. Leaders should not promote a climate that reinforces Soldiers' conceptions that leadership does not value each Soldier, as that only contributes to a negative atmosphere within the organization. Awards and actions must be correctly completed and must provide perspective and understanding to the team. Most commanders would prefer a telephone call and the expedited processing of a last-minute award over failure to recognize the hard work of their Soldiers.

"Leaders at every level must be present to convey purpose, ensure understanding, provide motivation, and engage in honest interaction on a frequent basis."

Military leaders can shape the positive culture of an organization through involvement in building teams, developing a familial network, and providing perspective; however, leaders also have a crucial role in leveraging the full support of extrinsic resources to build upon the internal infrastructure set within the culture of an organization. The use of external support can vastly improve the existing culture, as these resources highlight the myriad of entities working toward a common goal in support of individuals or the greater organization. To earn the support of local directorates, it is important to immediately began to build personal connections and support relationships. A tremendous amount of support can

Members of the 529th Military Police Battalion are recognized for supporting the U.S. Army Garrison Italy 2019 Domestic Violence Awareness Run.

be found through local entities such as installation personnel services offices, local finance offices, adjacent units, the garrison housing division, and more. Leaders, chiefs, and civilians of these entities can provide an extensive amount of information to suit mission-specific requirements.

A memorandum of understanding between leaders can provide a clear reference to ensure that basic unit needs are met. The memorandum of understanding should cover administrative and finance actions, clarify local Uniform Code of Military Justice[1] convening authority, establish computer network support channels, identify administrative system access and clearance processing, and address items such as ration cards to ensure that Soldiers have their needs met. There is a unique onus for geographically separated formations to maintain a shared understanding and common operational picture with higher echelons. As leaders pursue relationships, arrangements, and agreements for local or mutual support, they retain the responsibility of remaining informed. The principle of shared understanding is designed to generate a common organizational purpose. Much more can be achieved when the whole of an organization works toward a common purpose, and far less can be achieved in situations in which the organization is entirely unaware of a lack of a significant resource or capability. As junior leaders disperse from unit headquarters, every effort must be made to ensure that each action is nested in the commander's intent and that the overall mission of the company is supported. A shared understanding is essential—especially when mission sets differ. And it's important to create touch points in order to verify the shared understanding. Business should be taken care of as appropriate, but a key aspect is understanding what needs to be elevated to higher levels for guidance or a decision. Units should capitalize on in-person meetings, training, senior-leader huddles, e-mails, telephone calls, and text messages to ensure that a common operational picture is established in order to direct unity of effort.

Serving in a geographically separated platoon is a challenge; but as a leader, it is also an awesome responsibility. Such a position reflects a level of trust rarely granted junior officers in a garrison environment. Leaders strive to create systems to better conduct routine functions, build professional development programs, and build trust and teamwork within organizations to improve the unit and its Soldiers for many years to come. Identifying problems and implementing solutions before the problems arise result in disciplined initiative. As leaders, this requires insight and creativity at every level so that organizations can determine which future problems should be fought. Leaders must exercise initiative to adapt to the constantly changing variables affecting the operational environment. The Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has highlighted the importance of familial support networks. The pandemic has revealed that the presence of leaders is a critical factor in maintaining morale and ensuring a shared understanding of standards and discipline amid ever-changing and overlapping restrictions. COVID-19 has required that formations leverage the power of teleworking and build new and innovative efficiencies. The U.S. Army continues to excel in developing creative solutions to meet the challenges of integrating and training new Soldiers, building teams through alternative mediums, and maintaining the readiness of organizations amid the pandemic. Leaders of dispersed formations can achieve success by aligning these goals with the simple principles of building the team, building the family, and leveraging support.

Endnote:

[1]10 U.S. Code, Chapter 47, "Uniform Code of Military Justice."

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MWD Leader Course:
Increasing Understanding

By Captain Christopher J. Pettit

The Department of Defense Military Working Dog (MWD) Training Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, is where the 341st Training Squadron, U.S. Air Force, acquires, trains, and fields MWDs for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Lackland is home to Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, which has the primary mission of providing dog handler training for Military Occupational Specialty 31K–MWD Handler, advanced individual training, and the Kennel Master Course, in which Soldiers and leaders develop their skills in the art of dog training and management. The 341st and Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, operate in harmony to train, equip, and sustain the best MWD team members in the Nation prior to them joining the ranks of their respective branches all across the world.

MWD detachments in the Military Police Corps balance numerous missions and requirements with high standards of training and certification rates. These MWD detachments routinely deploy for overseas contingency operations, provide support to U.S. Secret Service missions, and perform U.S. Army Garrison law enforcement and antiterrorism tasks. The mission of MWD detachments is one of the high stress and high visibility, and the operational tempo is fast-paced.

To better manage the specialized MWD handler skill set and recognize the nuances of the profession, leaders of small units need to be better educated and more aware of the tools, resources, and requirements necessary to maintain a high level of MWD readiness. Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, has recently begun offering an MWD Leader Course tailored to the needs of MWD leaders. This 3-day course, originally designed for detachment commanders, department of emergency services personnel, operations officers, and battalion training officers, provides a baseline of material on the MWD Program, enabling informed decisions on manning, training, and utilization, both in deployed and garrison environments. The course provides leaders with a venue to share challenges and lessons learned and offers a general overview of the Department of Defense MWD Training Center, the MWD Handlers Course, and the Kennel Master Course; it culminates with a tour of the MWD Training Center.

The expertise of the instructors and subject matter experts and the general information delivered underscore the need for all incoming detachment commanders to attend the MWD Leader Course. The Military Police Captain's Career Course provides only a basic and minuscule overview of the MWD capability; most of the Captain's Career Course instructors have never served as a detachment commander or had any MWD experience. The focus of the Military Police Captain's Career Course is primarily on combat support military police tasks and capabilities, leaving little to no time for in-depth instruction on MWD aspects. This widening gap in knowledge was highlighted by an incoming battalion commander who attended the course. He confessed that his understanding of the MWD mission and his confidence in the utilization of MWD handlers had been minimal; but after attending the course, he said that his newly acquired knowledge and awareness of the challenges and considerations of MWD handlers will complement his next leadership role.

In closing out the week's training, an after action review revealed that this course, or some version of it, would benefit the Military Police Precommand Course by expanding upon the limited knowledge about MWD employment that currently exists across military police formations.

The Army MWD capability, which predominately exists in the Military Police Corps, cannot be easily replicated; as a result, if leveraged effectively, it can provide value in all missions and to commanders at all levels. MWD leaders and Soldiers should not miss an opportunity to train and develop their craft during a time when the demand is so great.

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MWD Conflict Management

By Captain Sean K. McLachlan, Sergeant First Class Christopher E. Ogle, and Mr. Duane E. Stinson

Between October 2019 and May 2020, there was a string of dog bites among the three military working dog (MWD) detachments in Europe, resulting in the hospitalization of several dog handlers with moderate to severe injuries. The dog bites, which occurred during normal daily routines, took place at four separate kennel locations. Although the occasional dog bite is not out of the ordinary for a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 31K–Military Working Dog Handler, the increased frequency of bite incidents was alarming. Why the surge in dog bites? Were these just coincidental isolated safety incidents? Were they accidents? Or were they signs of a deeper problem within the 31K program? What we discovered led to a fundamental change in the way we conduct MWD training and in the creation of the MWD Conflict Management Seminar.

At first, it appeared that the problem was procedural. Most of the handlers had been injured while feeding another handler's dog as they provided kennel care. Each Soldier performs kennel care for all dogs in the kennel on his or her assigned day. The Soldiers are required to interact with all of the dogs, cleaning their kennel runs and replacing food and water as necessary. Much like a doctor would attack an illness, we attacked the symptoms. Because the handlers were getting attacked while providing kennel care, we completely revamped the kennel care standard operating procedures. We ensured that handlers conducted kennel care in pairs and that they used a guillotine or house to isolate each dog prior to entering its kennel run. These procedural changes were very effective; dog bite incidents during kennel care procedures dropped completely. However, this did not explain the previous surge in dog bites. While the kennel care procedures, admittedly, did need to be revamped, they were the same procedures in use at most other kennels in the U.S. Army. Furthermore, while using the old procedures, no bites had occurred at the MWD detachments in Europe for more than 2 years. What was the underlying cause of these recent bites?

We studied the bite incidents in an attempt to determine and analyze trends. A handler bitten in Miesau, Germany, was attacked while he was demonstrating his confidence around a particularly aggressive dog. The dog, which was participating in obedience training with its handler in the kennel training yard, immediately became agitated by the demeanor of the approaching handler and subsequently bit him. A handler in Ansbach, Germany, became uncomfortable with a dog while it was in its kennel, so she went to her squad leader for guidance. The squad leader returned with the handler to observe the dog's behavior and was bitten in the process. In Stuttgart, Germany, a young dog attempted to escape its kennel run when a handler opened the kennel door. When the handler put his hand down to stop the dog, the dog bit him. Finally, a handler in Wiesbaden, Germany, was refilling a dog's water bowl and failed to notice that the dog had become aggressive—and she was bitten. After reviewing these incidents, two themes jumped out at us: handler overconfidence and the inability of the handlers to correctly read and react to dog behaviors.

In discussing our findings with the U.S. Army Europe MWD program manager, we discovered a root cause of these themes: Handlers were not being taught how to understand and respond to the primarily nonverbal communications and behaviors of canines during

An MWD reacting during a pack-building exercise

MWDs are calm and comfortable walking and interacting with each other.

31K Advanced Individual Training. While emergent safety concerns had been addressed with the new kennel care procedures, we now had to tackle the real problem. We brought together key MWD leaders from across Europe—including the U.S. Army Europe MWD program manager, senior 31K noncommissioned officers from each kennel and on brigade staff, local veterinarian teams, and the senior canine behaviorist in Europe—to develop a comprehensive training strategy to fill the training void. This strategy evolved into the MWD Conflict Management Seminar, which was taught at the seven kennels in Europe. We created two complementary learning objectives: First, we would teach the handlers how to properly identify and react to canine behavior in order to establish more effective communication between the dogs and handlers; and second, because dogs are social species and MWDs rarely interact with one another, we would attempt to alleviate stress and anxiety by allowing them to interact in a safe environment—basically, establishing a normal "pack mentality" within each kennel.

Teaching the handlers started with a simple question: What is the number-one influencer of MWD behavior? The answer is the handler. Stress, anxiety, and avoidance of tasks among both handlers and dogs are all symptoms of bad conditioning. Once symptoms reach this point, the handler has ultimately confused and lost control of the dog. We teach handlers to train dogs through methods; in other words, "If you do this action, then this result will occur." The handlers then apply these learned concepts to their MWDs. But as with people, MWDs are not all the same; an approach that works with one may not work with another. The key is to identify when a particular method is not working before any damage is done, understand why that method is not working, and try an approach that may be more conducive for that individual dog.

During the MWD Conflict Management Seminar, handlers were exposed to several training events in which they were required to identify a dog's behavior and then try to understand why the dog was exhibiting that behavior. They then discussed how to properly respond to the behavior with senior MWD leaders, canine behaviorists, and veterinarian teams. During the final segment of the seminar, the handlers viewed a video of the Ansbach dog bite incident. Kennel masters led the handlers on an after action review of the incident, discussing both the dog behaviors and handler behaviors that led to the escalation of aggression. The discussion was tied to the behaviors covered in the seminar as well as the recent kennel care program changes to illustrate how the situation could have been better handled.

Stress management in and out of the kennel environment was also discussed in the seminar. The importance of building and maintaining a strong rapport while fulfilling the dogs' needs and managing their stress was highlighted.



Kennel masters check MWD muzzles for proper fit in the event that a fight would break out between the MWDs.

An MWD is temporarily moved behind the pack and gradually worked back into the pack.

Handlers were reminded that dogs are not machines; like humans, dogs have bad days and they get distracted and sick, which affects their performance. It is important to allow MWDs to relax and be normal dogs as part of their daily routines.

The seminar also involved a practical exercise designed to let the handlers see what behaviors their dogs display during normal socialization with other dogs. MWDs rarely socialize with other MWDs due to the risk of fights that can result in injuries and lead to nonoperational teams. However, placing working dogs in a kennel without first socializing them with the other working dogs can create a stressful environment and lead to undesirable behavior within the kennel. Lieutenant Colonel Desiree R. Broach, director and veterinary behaviorist at Veterinary Medical Center Europe, Kaiserslautern, Germany, observed during the seminar that "The original intent [behind nonsocialization] was [that] we didn't want [the dogs] to socialize together because we wanted them to be bonded to people. Getting them together in a safe manner is going to force you to watch their behaviors. When you are a bit more tense and vigilant, your dog reacts to you. How they react to other dogs together may surprise you. We want them to be dogs and interact, but they may not know what to do because they never had the opportunity."

Putting appropriate safety measures in place and ensuring that each dog was properly muzzled, the seminar participants went on a group walk. The results were eye-opening. Many of the dogs were initially very anxious; they immediately gravitated to their handlers, crawling between the handlers' legs to avoid the other dogs. This behavior was a direct result of the dogs having been taught to avoid people and other dogs to prevent accidental bites. During the outing, the MWDs also exhibited shy, timid, and even overt excitement, which initiated aggressive behavior amongst them. Lieutenant Colonel Broach compared this type of behavior to that of a teenager who does not know how to interact with others and says "hello" by punching someone in the arm in an inappropriate gesture. The objective was to get all of the dogs to walk comfortably together as a pack. If they fought, they were removed from the group and placed 10 meters back, where they were forced to walk by themselves until they slowly worked their way back into the group over a 3–5 minute period.

Apart from socializing the dogs, the group walk also helped the handlers identify dog behaviors. Since the walk presented a new situation, each dog exhibited a clear behavior. Lieutenant Colonel Broach and the MWD program manager, Mr. Duane E. Stinson, explained the behaviors as they transpired. Alongside the kennel masters, they offered advice on how to correct or further influence those behaviors.

The seminar has been presented five times, and the results are tangible. In one kennel, a handler had been proud that other handlers were afraid of his dog. In another, the kennel staff had viewed one dog's timidity issues as a problem with the assigned handler. Those types of cultures have changed; the noncommissioned officers at each kennel have integrated canine behaviors and stress management into each of the training events. If a dog has aggression issues, all of the handlers within the kennel respond in collaboration with the veterinarian. They each try to socialize the dog and overcome his aggressive tendencies. If the dog is timid, they try to improve his confidence using various techniques learned from their kennel master and the veterinarian teams. The seminars have not only made the kennels safer, but have also created a better team atmosphere in each kennel; individual problems, both human and canine, are now pack problems.

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MWDs in Europe: A Combined Solution

By Captain Alexander D. Larson, Captain Sean K. McLachlan, First Lieutenant Philip J. White, and Sergeant First Class Christopher E. Ogle

The U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) Military Working Dog (MWD) Program was inefficient, which inhibited the overall MWD Program in Europe. To increase command and control, three military police detachments were combined in a single command under the 18th Military Police Brigade, Vilseck, Germany. This article discusses the development and creation of the Combined Military Working Dog Detachment Europe (CMWDD-E). Each kennel is staffed with a kennel master and a planning noncommissioned officer responsible for nine to 30 MWD teams and equipped with a slate of combat support military police equipment designed to deploy and set up a functional, independent kennel in a combat environment.

A Problem

There are three types of MWD detachments (small, medium, and large) in USAREUR-AF, spread across seven U.S. Army garrisons in Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Originally, the detachments were individually task-organized under three combat support military police companies in the 709th Military Police Battalion, Vilseck. The MWD Program was far removed from the strategic decision makers since all operations had to be routed through a company command team, a battalion operations cell, and a battalion command team. Furthermore, the subject matter knowledge on the employment of MWDs at these lower

A Soldier and an MWD search an apartment during certification in Ansbach, Germany.

echelons is typically insufficient, which creates unnecessary friction between echelons.

Military police companies traditionally regard MWD detachments as additional platoons that can augment their primary mission. In this operationally dense theater, companies sometimes tasked MWD detachments to perform as regular military police detachments due to a focus on the military police company mission, while the strategic MWD mission was often an afterthought. The platoon-like treatment of the MWD detachments resulted in a loss of training time and a lack of professional development for handlers and, ultimately, inhibited the detachments from operating at an efficient level.

Due to the nature of MWD operations, missions are often not resourced until the last minute. Previously, the 709th Military Police Battalion managed all MWD operations and was required to task multiple military police companies in order to task detachments with a mission.

A Soldier and an MWD prepare to conduct a health and welfare search in USAREUR-AF.

A Solution

The 18th Military Police Brigade addressed these issues by simplifying the command structure. On 3 March 2020, the brigade combined all three detachments into the CMWDD-E and the unit established one commander over all of the detachments; that commander reported directly to the brigade commander for all MWD matters. The orders process understandably takes time; the creation of the CMWDD-E streamlined the orders process and removed unnecessary echelons and operations hurdles between the MWD organizations and the orders-issuing authorities. This small but significant command structure conversion had an immediate and positive impact on the USAREUR-AF MWD Program.

Prior to combining the detachments, each kennel quickly exhausted all of its resources in support of local units. Now, the CMWDD-E can respond to mission requests with the

A Soldier and an MWD prepare to conduct a search following a high-risk traffic stop exercise.

A Soldier and an MWD run through a modified obedience course during the European MWD Competition.

full combat power of all Army MWDs in Europe. For example, if an entire battalion/brigade and/or several units make requests for health and welfare support, the entire CMWDD-E combat power can be surged to the appropriate location. The command MWD utilization numbers skyrocketed by more than 800 percent within the first few months of establishment with health and welfare sweeps alone.

Creation of the CMWDD-E substantially impacted the focus and direction of all MWD detachments in Europe. The CMWDD-E allowed for an expeditious line of communication between itself, USAREUR-AF, and the 18th Military Police Brigade. The commander was able to make MWD employment decisions in hours instead of days. It no longer took three company commanders, a battalion operations officer, a battalion commander, and a brigade operations officer to present courses of action for MWD employment. The decision process was simplified to involve just two leaders: the CMWDD-E commander and the brigade commander. Taking issues and operations to the senior military police commander in Europe is more effective for command and control than staffing decisions through lower echelons.

A Soldier and an MWD at an observation post in Hohenfels

Limitations

U.S. Army MWD units do not have dedicated support channels for administrative functions, such as personnel actions, school assignments, supply requests, and maintenance operations. Due to the dispersed nature of the detachments in Europe, there will always be a support issue for internal maintenance of assigned equipment. The addition of a personnel actions clerk and supply specialist to the CMWDD-E headquarters has allowed the unit to accomplish normal unit level functions. The CMWDD-E headquarters must fulfill duties that a skilled operations cell would normally perform in a traditional headquarters element. This hinders the ability of the command to focus on the holistic point of view.

A Soldier and his MWD after discovering a suspect in an exercise as a part of the European MWD Competition.

Uniform Code of Military Justice authority for MWD handlers in Europe is by regional jurisdictional boundaries.[1] The commander of CMWDD-E does not have direct Uniform Code of Military Justice authority over Soldiers in two of the three MWD detachments.

The military table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for an MWD detachment involves tactical vehicles and equipment that are not utilized for their intended purposes due to the realities of employment of MWD teams in combined arms environments. There are administrative servicing requirements for this equipment that cannot be maintained internally by the CMWDD-E due to a lack of infrastructure and skilled personnel. Maintaining assigned equipment that will not be utilized drains time and resources from CMWDD-E as well as other units.

Proposed MTOE Force Structure

In order for CMWDD-E to function effectively, the creation of a headquarters element with MOS 31A–Military Police officers as the commander and executive officers, a sergeant first class MOS 31K–MWD Handler as the detachment sergeant, a staff sergeant MOS 31 series operations noncommissioned officer, an MOS 92Y–Unit Supply Specialist, and an MOS 42A–Human Resources Specialist is proposed. This MTOE should be able to effectively manage all subordinate detachments dispersed within USAREUR-AF.

Conclusion

The creation of CMWDD-E by the 18th Military Police Brigade has tremendously improved the command and control of MWD assets across the European theater. This command structure is not suitable at most locations; most U.S. Army installations have only one MWD detachment, and this force structure would not fulfill the operational requirements of all locations. The European theater is unique and requires a specific, focused MWD unit that can quickly mobilize at the discretion of the senior military police commander in Europe.

Endnote:

[1]Army Regulation 27-10, *Military Justice*, 20 November 2020.

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Consolidating Institutional Gains:

The Case for Military Police as the Army's Repository for COIN Capabilities

By Captain Samuel R. Ruppert

The U.S. Army has historically proven incapable of maintaining counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. During both the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War, the Army—at great expense through years of war—developed its COIN capabilities, then subsequently lost those abilities as it reemphasized conventional conflict after each war.[1] Now, the Army faces a similar challenge: After fighting 20 years of insurgencies during the Global War on Terrorism, the resurgent conventional threats of Russia and China loom large. The Army's pivot to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) to meet those threats creates the risk of again losing its COIN experience. However, the Army could leverage the existing COIN-related capabilities of the Military Police Branch as well as the doctrinal role of the Branch within LSCO to create a repository of COIN capabilities within the Army and to mitigate this risk.

The Army's transition to LSCO is not probable; rather, it is certain. LSCO—which represents the most extreme end of the conflict continuum, where the Army conducts major operations and campaigns to defeat peer and near-peer enemies—is discussed at the beginning of the first chapter of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*.[2] A revanchist Russian Federation and an emboldened People's Republic of China, combined with the assessment that the Army had lost its LSCO capabilities during 20 years of small wars in the Middle East, spurred this change.[3] The prioritization of LSCO should concern those interested in COIN because much Army professional writing specifically characterizes this move as a transition from COIN to LSCO.[4]

The Army risks losing its hard-gained COIN capabilities and experience in the transition from COIN to LSCO. While losing COIN capabilities is neither deliberate nor desired, the Army must contend with this reality. During the reinvention of the Army after the Vietnam War, some officers and civilians argued that the COIN experience from Vietnam should be maintained and fortified. Army leadership ultimately decided to prioritize conventional conflict, though, and codified that priority in now-obsolete FM 100-5. Like today's FM 3-0, FM 100-5 stated that the Army must allocate its limited time and resources to preparing for the Nation's "worst-case scenarios"; accordingly, it prioritized what we now refer to as LSCO.[5, 6] Whether intentional or not, the post-Vietnam Army decision to prioritize LSCO caused the gradual atrophy of Army COIN capabilities. That atrophy culminated in a lack of Army expertise in conducting COIN operations after the initial invasion of Iraq.[7]

The Army can avoid repeating this costly mistake by deliberately developing a portion of its force as a proponent or repository of COIN capabilities. In this sense, COIN capabilities include the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in COIN as well as the doctrine and equipment developed through 20 years of COIN experience during the Global War on Terrorism. The Army has already laid the foundation for this repository by codifying its COIN experience in FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.[8] The large amount of professional writing about COIN over the past 2 decades further supplements the FM and creates a readily accessible body of knowledge.[9] Documented experience, however, is useless if practitioners do not revisit it.

The problem is not that the Army lacks a written repository of COIN knowledge; a written repository exists, but it is only relevant if it drives the training and operations of active Army units. Commanders have limited training time, and they prioritize training based on what the Army measures and evaluates. Few—if any—formations or institutional units are tasked to seriously revisit, learn, train on, or develop COIN capabilities. Instead, the Army relies upon the knowledge of the latent pool of officers and noncommissioned officers with personal COIN experience.[10] The Army's focus on LSCO naturally prompts most commanders to prioritize learning and practicing the doctrine and skills of LSCO rather than COIN. That focus is as it should be because the intent of the Army's pivot to LSCO is so that its maneuver units can become more proficient in high-intensity conflict. With most formations prioritizing the upper end of the conflict continuum though, the Army must designate an institutional group to be accountable for owning, practicing, and mastering the COIN capabilities developed over the past 20 years.

Military police constitute the institutional group best suited to become the living repository of COIN capabilities for the Army. First, the organic skills and training of military police make them especially suitable for COIN. If COIN truly is about hearts and minds, then Soldiers who train and practice de-escalation of force on a daily basis

offer the best opportunity to perform COIN in a way that maximizes interaction and empathy while minimizing unnecessary damage, which is the crux of policing. The police intelligence task fits naturally within the framework of the intelligence-driven operations of COIN.[11] Traditional police skills and partnerships directly support indirect methods for countering insurgencies.[12]

If COIN is about fighting outmatched and under-equipped enemies, then the existing modified tables of organization and equipment and doctrine for military police performing maneuver support functions fit readily into this framework. Military police maneuver support tasks involving offense, defense, and stability operations nest naturally within the direct methods for countering insurgency.[13] Military police doctrinally train for specific tasks—including clearing, securing, performing cordon/search activities, and disrupting—and broader areas of emphasis—such as enforcing the rule of law, defending critical sites, and performing route regulation—that have driven tables of organization and equipment especially suitable for COIN. Highly mobile, squad-independent formations that can quickly concentrate overwhelming firepower while covering a large area are well-suited for combating transient insurgents and fulfilling the kinetic requirements for successful COIN.[14] Mobile teams in armored vehicles armed with an M2 .50-caliber machine gun, an M240B 7.62-millimeter machine gun, and an MK19 40-millimeter grenade machine gun may be vulnerable to LSCO near-peer armored forces but need little alteration for COIN.

FM 3-0 already proscribes an LSCO role for military police that designates them for a COIN-like mission within the consolidation area. FM 3-0 identifies the consolidation area as "the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains."[15] FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, specifically highlights the consolidation of gains as an area of importance to military police; and outside of the six primary stability tasks, most of the military police tasks listed under offense and defense take place within the consolidation area.[16] Performing those tasks as part of the larger task of consolidating gains within the consolidation area is performing COIN—only reoriented for supporting LSCO. After all, the intent of consolidating gains is to pacify those in the area behind the forward line of troops (FLOT). Securing the consolidation area enables decisive action to continue in an unimpeded manner and facilitates the transfer of control of those areas behind the FLOT back to civil authority.[17] FM 3-0 and FM 3-39 direct military police to perform consolidation area tasks that enable maneuver forces to continue fighting at high tempos and facilitate the return of control to civil authorities. In other words, military police conduct COIN activities behind the FLOT during LSCO.

Two of the other most likely contenders for assuming responsibility for stewarding Army COIN knowledge are security force assistance brigades (SFABs) and special forces (SF). Consolidation of COIN experience is, admittedly, an important task for both of these groups. Conducting COIN is a primary mission of SF. The Army created SFABs so that it had a formation capable of teaching COIN skills to host nation (HN) forces. HN forces, in lieu of Americans, could then conduct COIN, further transferring power back to HNs and civil authorities. If SFABs and SF are mandated to practice COIN and already concentrate COIN expertise within their ranks, why not designate one of those formations as the Army repository of COIN knowledge in the context of LSCO?

"The police intelligence task fits naturally within the framework of intelligence-driven operations of COIN.[11] Traditional police skills and partnerships directly support indirect methods for countering insurgencies.[12]"

Because they are not structured to conduct COIN on their own, SFABs would be insufficient as the sole Army repository of COIN expertise in the context of LSCO. Despite the COIN proficiency of SFAB Soldiers, SFABs lack the manning necessary to fight an insurgency themselves due to their train-and-advise structure.[18] In the high-intensity, near-peer conflicts of LSCO, the Army cannot waste time. Even a period of 2 days—let alone weeks or months—is too long for insurgents to operate uncontested in the consolidation area during a near-peer conflict. No degree of SFAB proficiency would enable the training of HN forces quickly enough to allow those forces to conduct COIN directly in the wake of a fast-moving FLOT. COIN must begin on Day 1 of an LSCO conflict in order to sustain the tempo needed to defeat a near-peer threat. However, SFABs are geared toward developing a slower approach to COIN, which enables an HN to become self-sufficient in the long term. The SFAB approach is, by itself, insufficient for supporting LSCO.

Conversely, SF could provide the immediate COIN expertise required to sustain LSCO, but the opportunity cost of employing SF in this manner is too great. By their nature, SF are a limited but crucial Army resource. While SF can independently conduct COIN or train HN forces to counter insurgents, SF should likely have other priorities. Only SF can perform decisive actions and foment partisan activity behind the enemy FLOT. Leveraging SF to the maximum advantage during LSCO means disrupting enemy operations behind the enemy FLOT as much as possible—something only SF can do—instead of spending their limited time and manpower conducting COIN behind the friendly FLOT—something other branches can accomplish.

Similar to SF, neither infantry nor armor units are suited for the COIN repository role because their resources and

training time are also limited. Just as the Army as a whole has admitted that it cannot prioritize both COIN and LSCO (instead, making COIN a subsidiary of LSCO in the consolidation area), so too must maneuver units make choices regarding prioritization. The entire shift to LSCO is an admittance that near-peer conflict represents the greatest risk to the Army. Army decisive maneuver units should, accordingly, train to that risk. If the Army designated another branch as its COIN repository and tasked that branch with conducting COIN behind the FLOT, then maneuver units would be further unshackled and could concentrate on maximizing their lethality against conventional threats.

The Military Police Branch reemerges as the branch best-suited to fill the role of conducting COIN during LSCO. Military police already possess many of the skills and much of the equipment necessary for COIN. In addition, the Army has already prescribed military police doctrinal roles for LSCO that also fit within COIN frameworks. With a deliberate mandate as the Army repository for COIN, military police could fully embrace the role and develop as a readily deployable force capable of initiating COIN operations behind the FLOT on Hour 1 of an LSCO conflict. This would provide the Army with entire battalions and brigades ready to immediately begin conducting COIN tasks. In a near-peer conflict, this would enable maneuver echelons to better seize the initiative, dictate the tempo, and decisively engage the enemy. The new designation would require minimal reorganization, build upon extant skills and doctrine within the Military Police Corps, and free maneuver units to focus on decisive action.

Today's Army includes many resident COIN experts, but that population shrinks with each passing year. The Army transition to LSCO and the simultaneous slowing of deployments in support of COIN operations risk atrophying the Army's practical knowledge of COIN. The risk can be mitigated by tasking specific elements to focus on both sustaining that COIN knowledge in practice and being prepared to conduct large-scale COIN operations on short notice. Considering America's two most prominent near-peer threats (pioneered partisan and guerilla warfare), maintaining a ready reservoir of COIN capabilities is a relevant concern regarding the Army's LSCO pivot—even if viewed as a subset of LSCO capabilities within the consolidation area.[19, 20] Given their extant experience, doctrine, organization, and equipment, the military police stand out as the best-suited branch for shouldering this critical task.

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Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 400th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

- Constituted 19 November 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 400th Military Police Battalion.
- Activated 20 November 1944 in Lyon, France.
- Inactivated 9 April 1946 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.
- Allotted to the Organized Reserves and activated 1 May 1947 at Washington, D.C.
- Organized Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps; on 9 July 1952 as the Army Reserve.
- Inactivated 25 May 1959 at Washington, D.C.
- Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment activated 16 September 1989 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.
- Ordered into active military service 15 November 1990 at Fort Meade; released from active military service 20 May 1991 and reverted to reserve status.
- Ordered into active military service 25 October 2001 at Fort Meade; released from active military service 24 October 2002 and reverted to reserve status.
- Ordered into active military service 24 February 2003 at Fort Meade; released from active military service 23 February 2004 and reverted to reserve status.
- Ordered into active military service 8 November 2007 at Fort Meade; released from active military service 11 December 2008 and reverted to reserve status.

Campaign Participation Credit

- World War II.
  - Rome-Arno.
  - Rhineland, Germany
- Southwest Asia.
  - Defense of Saudi Arabia.
  - Liberation and Defense of Kuwait.
- War on Terrorism
  - Iraq.
    - Iraqi Surge.

Decorations

None.


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