



MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

Fall 2019

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School



Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre

Military Police Doctrine Aligning FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, With Army Capstone and Keystone Doctrine

Threats to U.S. interests throughout the world are countered by the ability of U.S. forces to respond to a wide variety of challenges along the conflict continuum spanning from peace to war. Future battles against peer and near-peer threats will be increasingly intense, lethal, and brutal and will include a large number of combatants and noncombatants centered in and around large, dense urban cities. Detainee operations, which are typically conducted as tactical operations, are of significant importance at all levels of war and across the range of military operations, producing strategic impacts. Prisoner and detainee operations have followed a similar pattern in every major U.S. military action of the 20th century, and U.S. forces have repeatedly faced the same challenges. We must be ready and prepared to support the joint force through the four strategic roles: shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains to meet the challenges of detention operations in any operational environment. (See field manual [FM] 3-0, *Operations*, the Army capstone manual.¹)



Members of the U.S. Army must be capable of planning, executing, and supporting detainee operations from the point of capture through the transfer, release, repatriation, death, or escape of the detainee. Regardless of the type of operation, there is a potential requirement to detain individuals. Detention operations in multiple conflicts have taught us significant historical lessons, reminding us never to underestimate the number of captured or detained enemy combatants, misjudge the character of the detention operation, or employ limited or undertrained guard forces. And most importantly, we have learned that detention operations are resource-intensive missions that can quickly overwhelm logistical support. Army forces must treat all detainees humanely and be prepared to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for detainees according to applicable U.S. law and policy and the law of war.

FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations* (soon to be published), which will provide guidance on detention operations for commanders and staffs, is aligned with FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations* (the keystone military police field manual), and Joint Publication (JP) 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.^{2,3} The upcoming revision of FM 3-63 will describe detention operations across the range of military operations and depict the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes required for leaders and Army professionals who are tasked with planning, directing, and executing detainee operations at all echelons. As a core discipline for the Military Police Corps, detention operations enable us to protect the force, enable maneuver, and shape the security environment in support of combat operations and decisive action against any enemy in all operating environments. FM 3-63 begins at the point of capture and continues through movement to a detainee collection point, detainee holding area (division or corps), or theater or strategic detention facility until detainee transfer, release, repatriation, death, or escape. FM 3-63 concludes with an expanded discussion on host nation corrections training and development.

On behalf of each of our combatant commanders, who are responsible for implementing the Department of Defense Detainee Program, and their subordinate joint force commanders, who are responsible for planning, directing, and executing detainee operations in their assigned joint operations, I want to thank you for your commitment, dedication, and service to our Nation. We must recognize that detainee operations are much bigger than the Military Police Corps, and we must all be part of one team, one fight. As our military police doctrine manager, I challenge you to read, understand, and propagate doctrinal ideas—including those contained in the soon-to-be published FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.

Authors note: I would like to thank Mr. Doug Loggins, Major Mary Smith, and the entire U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) doctrine team for their assistance with this article, which also serves as the forward for the upcoming FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.

Endnotes:

¹FM 3-0, *Operations*, 6 December 2017.

²FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

³JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 13 November 2014.

Of the Troops, For the Troops—Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force!

MILITARY POLICE

Regimental Command Sergeant Major



Command Sergeant Major Michael P. Bennett

Greetings from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. It has been 10 years since I last drove away from the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), and it is great to be back. In those 10 years, Team Bennett has completed seven permanent changes of station and one deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom. No matter how many times you complete the task of moving, it always seems like you barely achieve a “T” (trained); and as the moves increase, the amount of property that you drag around with you decreases. It is important to know that everyone is extremely busy and carrying a heavy load in support of the Military Police Corps mission.

I would like to thank Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre for selecting me to serve as the 14th Regimental Command Sergeant Major of USAMPS. Being selected has been an extremely humbling experience. All of the candidates who interviewed for the position are of unimpeachable character and reputation. Without a doubt, each of those amazing non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will continue to serve our great Army and Military Police Corps with distinction over the next few years. The Military Police Corps currently has nine sergeants major serving at the general officer level, a true testament to the professionalism of our Regiment.



Command Sergeant Major James W. Breckinridge did an exceptional job of ensuring that I was prepared to the greatest degree possible. I would like to personally thank him for his service to the Regiment and his impacts on education for enlisted personnel. In addition, I would like to officially recognize Sergeant Major Paul R. Millius, Directorate of Plans and Operations Sergeant Major. During the transition of Command Sergeant Major Breckinridge and me, Sergeant Major Millius went above and beyond the call of duty to support the Commandant and me, while—at the same time—running his own directorate. His efforts ensured a smooth transition with no impact to the Regiment.

Starting with the master sergeant and command sergeant major/sergeant major boards in fiscal year 2019, the Army is moving to a merit-based promotion system. No longer will time in grade and a basic active-service date influence the rank order in which a Soldier is placed on a promotion list. Leadership potential will be the leading factor in consideration for promotion to the next-higher rank. NCOs will be notified of where they rank in the Army Career Tracker dashboard. Ranking will be amongst peers of the same career management field.

Moving into fiscal year 2020, the Qualitative Management Program and Qualitative Service Program policies will be revised. Once revised, those policies will be implemented in the annual board. The Army is taking a hard look at what mechanisms are in place to identify those individuals who are not fully qualified and whose continued service is at risk. Ranking near the end of the list might result in early dismissal from the Service based on updated policies.

As the final year of implementation moves into fiscal year 2020, Soldiers who fail to complete the online Distributed Leaders Course (DLC) will receive a Headquarters, Department of the Army, bar on continued service. In order to hold NCOs accountable, grade point averages from all DLC training will carry over into the final grade for the resident portion of training. All leaders should ensure that Soldiers who are enrolled in DLC stay on track and put forth maximum effort.

Merit-based promotion is not the only thing changing in the Regiment or the Army. It is often said, “The only thing that is constant is change”; and right now, that statement is consistent with the Army enterprise. Physical fitness, uniforms, weapons systems, and force design are all going to change in the immediate future. We have a responsibility as stewards of the profession to ensure that we are keeping pace with the critical gaps that threaten our maneuver elements and provide capability for our commanders to ensure the protection of forces.

In order to keep that pace, the cadre of the Fort Leonard Wood NCO Academy is diligently working on solutions to get NCOs at both levels into a field environment that is equivalent to that of the officer cohort. The next big fight will test the capabilities of our platforms, and we can't rely on being the dominate owner of any of the domains in the operational environment. Our NCO Corps will be evaluated through a stress-induced environment amongst peers to increase survivability and lethality, relying primarily on its ability to quickly solve complex problems.

It is truly an honor to be in this position, working with and representing the officers, NCOs, Soldiers, and civilians in the best Regiment in the Army. Thank you all for what you do on a daily basis to protect the Army and our Nation!

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



Chief Warrant Officer Five Joel Fitz

Greetings to all. It is with mixed emotions that I write my last message to the field as the fifth Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. It has been a privilege serving in this position for nearly 3 years, and I have counted each moment a true honor. This has been an extraordinary experience—one that I will cherish for the rest of my life. I've had the opportunity to travel throughout the Regiment and meet Soldiers and civilians who have dedicated themselves to the often underappreciated work of assisting, protecting, and defending our Nation's premier fighting force. I have been awed by their accomplishments and inspired by their commitment.

I've had opportunities to see firsthand the exceptional work performed by those guarding our correctional facilities, patrolling the streets of our military communities, handling Family violence complaints, manning access control points, and investigating serious criminal offenses. No matter where or when, one thing is consistent across the Regiment—our Soldiers are professional. Their patience and restraint are testaments to their devotion to duty and respect for others. And their dedication to duty is clearly witnessed by the remarkable quality of assistance provided to their communities. I have found their stories of courage and commitment inspiring, and I will forever hold dear the opportunity that I've had to meet the truly extraordinary Soldiers of our Regiment.

I've observed everything from basic combat training to advanced law enforcement courses. I've listened to command briefings citing methods to improve unit readiness and participated in concept development and doctrine updates that will shape our Regiment for what lies ahead. What I've seen and heard gives me confidence that our Regiment is on the right path. We must, however, learn to trust our senior leadership and, when given the opportunity, provide input to help our senior leaders shape decisions that will certainly impact the future. We must also work to improve the unity of our Regiment; we must learn to work together toward a common goal. Dissention and discord across the disciplines breed frustration and could result in unnecessary delays or even failure.

We have dug deep into our warrant officer professional military education, foundational investigative courses, and functional training and pushed revisions, updates and, when necessary, full rewrites—all with the intent to provide the highest-quality education possible. Much of this work was done by the civilians within the Training Development Division. Their knowledge of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command systems and processes made these in-depth evaluations of training a little less painful. I will certainly miss the U.S. Army Military Police School civilians who have dedicated themselves to the mundane and often thankless tasks of data entry and training management. I appreciate you all very much.

Our warrant officers have few opportunities to serve at the general officer level and even fewer opportunities to serve in positions with the potential to impact all disciplines of the Military Police Regiment and, in a larger sense, the Army. It has truly been my honor to serve; I am grateful for the ideas, comments, and innovative concepts sent my way. Your thoughts influenced the advice that I provided to our Commandant and, ultimately, helped shape the Regiment into an adaptable and enduring force, capable and committed to preserving readiness. A special thanks to those who took the time to educate and mentor me; you have had a profound impact on how I view the present and the future.

In my nearly 36-year career, I can honestly say that I've never chased after an assignment or position. I've never worked for an evaluation or any recognition. I've focused only on doing the best job possible, no matter the assignment, the location, or the quality of leadership. My goal has always been to ensure that I leave things in better shape than when I arrived and to positively influence others, improve my surroundings, and set the conditions for those who follow. As I move on to the next challenge, I pass the reins to Chief Warrant Officer Five Mark Arnold, who is both highly capable and wholly committed to continuing the forward momentum that we have started.

Finally, I encourage you to continue the hard work of moving our Regiment into the future. It will be frustrating at times, but it is a necessary process. Learn from each other, rely on each other, and collectively take our Regiment toward the Army of 2028 and beyond.



Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force—Do What Has To Be Done!

Military Police Companies at Combat Training Centers

By Captain Sean P. Dixon

Aligning military police companies with brigade combat teams (BCTs) for combat training center rotations serves three purposes. First, alignment provides the company with external evaluations of support to mobility and security operations. Secondly, it provides maneuver commanders with the opportunity to test military police skill sets and integrate those skills into the division's close-fighting capability during large-scale ground combat. Lastly, it affords military police leaders with visibility over how maneuver commanders apply available military police capabilities and resources.

The 91st Military Police Battalion deployed the 511th Military Police Company in support of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) (1/10 IBCT), for Mountain Peak 19-01 and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 19-04. Mountain Peak is the 10th Mountain Division's external evaluation exercise for brigades progressing to a JRTC rotation at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The 91st Military Police Battalion staff synchronized early with the division and brigade planners in order to assist the company in establishing a training progression timeline. The staff of the 91st provided training objectives and key collective tasks to the 10th Mountain Division provost marshal and the brigade provost marshal. The brigade provost marshal shaped the employment of the 511th Military Police Company during Mountain Peak to ensure that the

external evaluations of key collective tasks would best support the mission-essential tasks and commander's training objectives. Brigade planners received a standardized capabilities briefing from the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) to shape integration through a shared understanding of the combat support and capabilities that a military police company can provide. Additionally, the 91st Military Police Battalion provided an observer, coach/trainer (OC/T) team to evaluate the company and one officer and one noncommissioned officer to support exercise control.

The 1/10 IBCT had deliberately planned military police utilization at JRTC and submitted a troop list exception plan, with specified tasks and purposes by phases, to the operations group. Military police supported mobility and security operations through route regulation and enforcement, critical-site security, and convoy security. Additionally, the company was prepared to perform detention operations during both Mountain Peak 19-01 and the JRTC rotation. Figure 1, page 6, depicts the standardized evaluation criteria and assessment plan for all company-and-above echelons during the Mountain Peak exercise. The 91st Military Police Battalion further supported the company's external evaluation process by assessing key collective tasks according to training and evaluation outlines and tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP) validation.

Training for the Mountain Peak exercise and JRTC rotation employed the 511th Military Police Company's support to mobility and security operations skills. Although one platoon was dedicated for detention operations, neither exercise proved to be a robust means of assessing the military police detention operations capability.¹ Following is a brief summary of how the 511th Military Police Company was employed during the Mountain Peak and JRTC exercises.

During 1/10 IBCT Phase I (reconnaissance), the 511th Military Police Company conducted support to mobility and security operations. Route regulation enforcement was conducted by 2d Platoon, 511th Military Police Company (2/511), for the 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment (3/71), along the main and alternate supply routes in order to maintain freedom of movement and to prepare rear-area security for the establishment of a screen. The platoon transitioned to secure bridges to maintain freedom of movement and



A Soldier from the 511th Military Police Company maneuvers through an simulated hazardous environment during Mountain Peak.

OC/T Assessment Plan

Orders/Planning Process				
1	2	3	4	5
No order issued	Fails to develop any paragraph or restate essential tasks. Does not follow one-third/two-third rule.	Issues five-paragraph order, clearly restates essential tasks, and follows one-third/ two-third rule.	Issues all WARNOs and implements parallel planning with platoons and higher headquarters.	All subordinate platoons and enablers have a full understanding of the plan and time to implement platoon level planning, allowing full understanding of commander's intent at the lowest level.
Composite Risk Management				
1	2	3	4	5
Not Done	Risks (only safety-focused) identified but not reduced, no control measures, process not conducted to standard.	Risk management (safety and tactical risk considered), process conducted to standard and briefed.	Tactical and safety risk considered and mitigated as part of the planning process. RM used throughout all phases of mission. Risk considered and updated during mission.	Risk is considered in the AAR, and lessons learned are incorporated into future planning.
PCC/PCI				
1	2	3	4	5
Not conducted	Not conducted to standard or not consistently conducted.	PCC/PCIs conducted to Army standard by lowest-level leaders. Priority of PCC/PCI provided by company commander.	Leaders at every level involved in PCC/PCIs. Company commander, first sergeant, and executive officer conduct inspections.	Unit is a learning organization and incorporates lessons learned into PCI/PCC process.
Rehearsals				
1	2	3	4	5
Not conducted	Incorrect or inadequate rehearsal technique executed. Only baseline tasks to conduct a rehearsal are executed. Subordinates do not attain full understanding of the COA from the rehearsal.	Rehearsal technique selected is appropriate based on considerations. Reinforces the unit's task and purpose, scheme of maneuver, scheme of fires, and scheme of support and IDs the EMLCOA. Participants are prepared and concise in their briefings. Decision points are identified and recognized.	Rehearsal discusses higher intent, scheme of maneuver, fires, CSS, and all forms of contact. Enablers and key CS/CSS functions are briefed as part of rehearsal. Multiple COAs are rehearsed, and overlays are distributed to subordinate leaders.	Multiple rehearsals, including full dress rehearsals, are done at both company and platoon levels, as specified by the commander. Consideration must be given to adjacent unit missions. Subordinates, including all enablers, achieve complete understanding and synchronization from rehearsal.
ABCS/COP/Graphics				
1	2	3	4	5
Graphics not used or produced	Graphics not refined to company operations or not distributed to all ABCSs and to the lowest level.	Graphics for maneuver, fires, and C2 disseminated to TTC level and all ABCSs. All graphics are consistent across company systems.	Graphics support branches and sequels include obstacle, SITEMP, and CSS (plus Column 3).	Unit is using automated graphical updates and consolidated common graphic with platoon leader refinement and additions (plus Columns 3 and 4).

"Climb to Glory"

Figure 1. Standard assessment plan for company-and-above echelons during Mountain Peak 19-01

Legend:

AAR—after action review	CS—combat support	PCI—precombat inspections
ABCS—Army Battlefield Command System	CSS—combat service support	RM—risk manager
C2—command and control	EMLCOA—enemy most likely course of action	SITEMP—situation tempo
COA—course of action	ID—identify	TTC—tactical troop command
COP—common operational picture	PCC—precombat checks	WARNO—warning order

maneuver in preparation for the offense. 3d Platoon, 511th Military Police Company (3/511), established the detainee holding area in the vicinity of the brigade support area. 1st Platoon, 511th Military Police Company (1/511), and the command post prepared for critical-site security and convoy security in the vicinity of the tactical assembly area.

In Phase II (offense), 1/10 IBCT, and 2/511 secured bridges behind 3/71's screening operations. 2/511 returned to the main body, collocated with the 7th Brigade Engineer Battalion. 3/511 received limited numbers of detainees. As a result of the reduced detainee operations, the brigade support battalion retasked military police teams of the 3/511 to perform convoy missions with field litter ambulance security instead of detainee operations.

During 1/10 IBCT Phase III (defense), 3/511 continued detention operations while 1/511 and 2/511 performed critical-site security of the 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery Regiment, and the brigade commander circulated the battlefield.

The brigade employed military police at JRTC in a manner similar to the way it did in the Mountain Peak exercise. During JRTC 1/10 IBCT Phase 1 (offense), one platoon was tasked to support civil affairs operations and the brigade human intelligence team and to secure a town. During this phase, military police tasks included assisting with host nation policing skills, conducting area security, and managing town traffic control points while maintaining a command post near the outskirts of the city. One element of the platoon provided security to the brigade



Soldiers from the 511th Military Police Company assist another Soldier during Mountain Peak.

commander, who was circulating the battlefield. Another element secured critical sites, and the remaining elements of the platoon established the brigade detainee holding area in the vicinity of the brigade support area. The brigade captured no detainees during the offensive phase.

In 1/10 IBCT Phase II (defense), two platoons were tasked with route regulation enforcement along two main supply routes. The brigade captured no detainees, and 3/511 was reassigned to the 7th Brigade Engineer Battalion. The remaining military police assets provided critical-site security as well as protection and security of the brigade commander. The brigade tasked the 7th Brigade Engineer Battalion to provide a military police unit to the brigade command sergeant major for critical-asset security to allow him to safely circulate the battlefield. The priority of effort for the 511th Military Police Company changed from route security to critical-site/asset security during the defense phase. Military police conducted route regulation enforcement on the main supply routes for only one mission. The company command post continued to operate in the town throughout this phase.

During 1/10 IBCT Phase III (counter-attack), the 511th Military Police Company priority of effort was route regulation enforcement along main supply routes. Based on the concept of the operation, the 3/71 would control intersections until military police elements were able to establish traffic control points to guide the rest of the brigade components to their tactical assembly areas. 3/71 and the military police departed first. Military police were only able to establish half of the assigned traffic control points due to heavy special-purpose force attacks.

The Mountain Peak and JRTC exercises reinforced how military police companies may be integrated

with maneuver formations in the division for the close fight. The 511th Military Police Company was evaluated over a range of key collective tasks, including area security, route regulation enforcement, critical-site security, host nation policing, asset security, and traffic control points. However, the area of detention operations was not significantly assessed due to the extremely low number of enemy prisoners of war taken by the brigade.

Incorporating the 511th Military Police Company into the Mountain Peak and JRTC exercises was significant in assessing the utility of the military police company during large-scale ground combat operations. The 511th Military Police Company received valuable feedback regarding support to mobility and security operations during the Mountain Peak and JRTC exercises.² Continued support provides military police the necessary visibility to rebuild connectivity with maneuver formations. The 10th Mountain Division will again integrate a military police company with 1/10 IBCT at the next Mountain Peak and JRTC rotations. This will afford our Military Police Corps further assessment of our mission-essential tasks and challenge the 91st Military Police Battalion to integrate scenarios that would better test detention operations during combat training center rotations. This will allow a better assessment of proficiency of the military police unit.



Endnotes:

¹1/10 IBCT Provost Marshal's Office after action review, Mountain Peak 19-04, 8 March 2019.

²Ibid.

Captain Dixon was the training officer for the 91st Military Police Battalion at the time this article was written.



Soldiers from the 511th Military Police Company work to secure the perimeter during Mountain Peak 19-01.

Command and Leadership in the Military Police Corps (Past, Present, and Future)

By Major Michael D. Brimage and Captain Derrick M. Davis

As we approach the 78th anniversary of the Military Police Corps, we should look to our past, present, and future to maintain our strong commitment to the U.S. Army. Military police leaders, not unlike other professionals, must continuously assess and improve their organizations. Continuous self-assessment is required to hone the competencies that the Army requires of its leaders. The Army provides leadership doctrine for self-analysis and the personal development of junior leaders. This article describes the challenges of command, specifically as a U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) headquarters and headquarters detachment commander; readiness within the Military Police Corps; suggestions for restructuring military police units to further enhance military police utility for the Army and the future of the Military Police Corps; and diversity within the Military Police Corps.

Challenges of Command in a Military Police Organization

Command is defined as the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.¹ Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions.²

The focus of a detachment commander in a CID battalion is on marksmanship, physical fitness, and warrior time training. Even with a very narrow focus, accomplishing tough and realistic training proves quite difficult at times. The difficulty lies in the unique operating environment of the unit and the highly specialized investigative skill set of CID organizations.

The 5th Military Police Battalion (CID), Kleber Kaserne, Germany, is responsible for providing felony level investigative support on the continents of Europe and Africa. CID units differ from combat support units. CID units are highly trained and specialized to investigate felonies perpetrated by Army personnel and to provide protective services to Department of Defense-designated high-risk personnel. The capabilities of combat support units in conducting military police operations are more generalized. CID detachments and offices have little to no organic force sustainment personnel; force sustainment of an entire battalion is the mission of the

headquarters and headquarters detachment in a CID battalion.

“The Workhorses,” as the Soldiers of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 5th Military Police Battalion, are known, provide unparalleled support to the nine CID offices of the battalion. Soldiers assigned to staff sections travel throughout Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Poland on a regular basis to ensure that the offices receive the support needed in order to successfully accomplish the strategic mission. However, the constant temporary duty assignments that headquarters and headquarters detachment personnel execute in support of the offices create a strain on the commander’s priorities and also create a negative impact on the commander’s relationships within the battalion. The battalion operations officer and executive officer assign homework to the commander; they direct the commander to Chapter 6 of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*.³

As a commander of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, it is imperative to challenge the Soldiers and motivate them to balance their professional and personal growth while completing the mission. Our detachment accomplished these tasks through teamwork, Family support, and resiliency. With the support of the battalion commander, the executive officer, the operations officer, and detachment noncommissioned officers, our organization successfully trained, fought, and sustained, all while supporting CID agents within the battalion. But there were times when our leadership team needed to become creative in order to meet the battalion commander’s intent, guidance, and end state goals. The commander and detachment senior noncommissioned officer needed to focus efforts on the main priorities of the 5th Military Police Battalion, 3d Military Police Group, and CID. It was important to review workloads and not overwhelm Soldiers and agents with distractions that would take away from providing excellent investigative services to our communities. This allowed our unit the time to receive quality training on criminal intelligence, digital forensic evidence, polygraph testing, protective-service details, and Army warrior tasks and battle drills, which sometimes get lost during the balancing act.

Army leadership involves influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. We believe that

motivated Soldiers, dedicated Family members, and care of the troops equate to successful mission accomplishment within any unit in the Military Police Corps. Leaders are not always professional, competent, or confident. Too many leaders of today are focused on personal goals and accomplishments rather than on unit accomplishments. We must balance professional and personal goals to become more effective leaders. Leaders should mentor subordinates and Soldiers and lead from previous experience (good and bad), current knowledge, and future concepts. A subordinate does not want to hear about a leader's awards, accolades, or evaluations; he or she needs to know how that leader became the leader that he or she is today. Leaders should stop worrying about the image that they are trying to craft and start worrying about being true to their experience level by maintaining authenticity.

The commander's philosophy, intent, guidance, and end state goals are tools that outline his or her vision for a unit. Our command team philosophy/mantra is that the Military Police Corps is the best organization in the military. The Military Police Branch is one of the only branches that can send the lowest-ranking troops, with little to no previous leadership experience, to work in the highest-level environments. As a military police officer/detachment commander, your leadership skills will be challenged but you must lean on your chain of command and trust that it will remain committed to the mission, Soldiers, and Families. Without a command philosophy, intent, or end state goal, it will be challenging to lead an organization at any level of the Corps. Various leaders make our Regiment great; however, some leaders lack the discipline, ethics, morals, and education necessary to effectively lead the force. Ask your peers: Are you a problem solver or a problem starter? Effective problem-solving skills are critical for great and effective leaders in the Military Police Corps. Through conducting a true self-assessment, you will begin to understand the difference between doing your job as a leader and garnering favor with your boss in order to get a great officer evaluation report.

Readiness, Restructuring, and the Future of the Military Police Corps

The Army Chief of Staff's main priorities are readiness, the future Army, and care of the troops.⁴ To have an effective organization, commanders must have unit goals. Once a unit accomplishes a goal, it should be highlighted so that every Soldier continues to feel part of a successful organization. As we expand the military police force over the next 2 to 8 years, leaders should think about how to continue to improve commitment to maneuver commanders.

The Military Police Corps must change how units are structured. One way to show how the Military Police Corps can complete missions in garrison and deployed environments would be to build a combat support unit with military police capabilities that the brigade combat team needs in order to deploy in any environment and accomplish its mission. The new structure should consist of a military police battalion and four military police companies that include a headquarters platoon, a law and order platoon, a detention platoon,

and a maneuver support platoon. The battalion should be attached to the maneuver brigade on the installation. These units should take the place of the brigade combat team military police platoon structure that was developed to support maneuver commanders. One unit, with one company/battalion commander, in one location, would give the commander on the ground the support that is truly needed. Engaging multiple personnel can be confusing and misleading for a commander on the ground when that commander is focused on defeating the enemy.

When examining current units (company, battalion, or brigade), a commander focuses on the main areas of training, combined arms training in support of unified land operations, the Family readiness group, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.⁵ In considering the two main objectives—law enforcement (garrison environment) and maneuver support (deployment environment)—on which should we focus on being trained (at a “T” level)? Many leaders say that a unit can only be properly trained and fully capable of conducting one objective at a time. In the garrison environment, military police units focus on Family readiness groups and the readiness of troops and equipment; they continue to build relationships with their sister Services and, once they deploy, rely heavily on their North Atlantic Treaty Organization counterparts. Deployment changes our mindset; when we go into war mode, we stop focusing on garrison tasks until we redeploy. As we rotate our units through Iraq and Afghanistan, we must focus on training for both objectives—law enforcement and maneuver support. Readiness in both of these areas starts with leaders who have the power to prioritize the shaping of objectives.

Military police continue to train the force on the three military police disciplines: security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. We are more than security guards and police officers; we are warfighters. We assist maneuver elements in all battles, defeating threats with assets that have been developed over the last 15 years.

If maneuver commanders are to incorporate the Military Police Corps into more training and exercises, we must be “at the table” in order to have the opportunity to be heard and make a difference when they ask for maneuver support. We must continue to send our best leaders to this table in order to explain our capabilities. Diversifying the three military police disciplines and highlighting them to maneuver commanders will showcase our firepower and illustrate how we can assist or support the overall mission. If we continue to allow others to define our Corps, we will continue to serve as a support element and we will be called upon by the maneuver commander only when he or she needs elements to provide law and order on the battlefield.

Military police should support the maneuver forces in defeating all types of external threats in the area of operations. But we have been left behind, and we must catch up in order to be a part of the main battle. We cannot continue our silence and allow our assets to be excluded from the fight.

(Continued on page 11)



Being the Best Advocate for Your Unit: A Guide for Combat Training Center Rotations

By Captain Alexis A. Marione

Throughout my tenure in the Military Police Corps, leaders have told me that I must be able to explain to maneuver commanders how to employ military police assets. I never quite understood that directive until October–November 2018, when I experienced a National Training Center (NTC) rotation, NTC 19-02, at Fort Irwin, California. The 110th Military Police Company, Fort Carson, Colorado, sent two platoons and the company headquarters, which comprised the largest military police unit that our observer, coach/trainers (OC/Ts) had seen to date. We were attached to a brigade engineer battalion under an armored brigade combat team. Having attended a previous culminating event consisting of a 2-week field training exercise with the same units 2 months earlier, my senior leaders and I knew that we would need to continuously fight for our Soldiers to get valuable training and opportunities that they would not get elsewhere. In an effort to advocate for our company and ensure that our Soldiers received the best training possible, we realized that the following three actions would set the company up for success:

- Ensuring that we articulated our unit assets and capabilities.
- Balancing assigned missions with company training objectives.
- Knowing our higher commander's intent and priorities.

One of the significant challenges throughout the rotation was ensuring that our unit modified table of organization and equipment capabilities and assets were well understood by external units and organizations. Two unmanned aerial systems in the military police combat support company modified table of organization and equipment provided the capability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance prior to sending troops forward into contested areas; however, acquiring the restricted operating zone permission necessary to fly the unmanned aerial systems proved to be nearly impossible. Despite a successful unmanned aerial system flight during the culminating field training event prior to arriving at NTC, the brigade engineer battalion was unable to acquire the restricted operating zone permission. Next, our

operations team sent multiple joint capabilities release messages to various echelons each day, attempting to gain the restricted operating zone permission, but also to no avail. We then appealed to OC/Ts to use avenues available to them to request permission on our behalf. Finally, after more than 10 days of requests and after force-on-force operations had ceased, we received the restricted operating zone permission during the urban operations/squad training exercise portion of the rotation. According to the OC/Ts, we were the second military police company to use unmanned aerial systems at NTC and the first to do so on a mission. Although it was late in the rotation and valuable training hours had been missed, our Soldiers were able to provide the collocated military intelligence company with intelligence during that portion of the training. Persistence from the company operations team allowed the Soldiers to apply the skills for which they had previously trained on a much larger and more easily applicable scale.

Balancing the missions received from the brigade combat team and subordinate battalions with our company training objectives required some creativity. Originally, the company had been task-organized to a combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB). The CSSB was in the support area—nearly in the rotational unit bivouac area—as units moved into the maneuver area or “box” to begin force-on-force operations. During the day-long CSSB movement from the rotational unit bivouac area to the next location, CSSB asked our company to conduct security missions for seven convoys. Rather than conduct repetitive missions, we suggested that we secure the route, providing the same level of protection to the convoys with fewer combat crews and affording our Soldiers a better work-rest cycle. Our company arrived at the location knowing that we would eventually be task-organized to another battalion farther forward in the battlefield.

When tasked with providing base security for the CSSB, we offered to conduct area security instead. This allowed us to locate the enemy using an offensive rather than defensive approach and thereby create a buffer, which also allowed the CSSB to practice performing the base security that it would

need to internally provide upon our departure. By keeping our training objectives in mind, we were able to perform the missions assigned by the CSSB; junior leaders were allowed the opportunity to think more dynamically; and missions were executed with multiple subtasks, such as incorporating area reconnaissance into the area security mission.

Knowing the brigade commander's intent and priorities allowed our company to accept significantly more missions and garner as much training as possible for the Soldiers. Based on past experience with the combat training center rotations, many leaders were worried that the missions would not escalate beyond base defense and critical-site security; therefore, company leadership was present early and often during the train-up before deployment. Any rehearsal, in-progress review, or operations order briefing executed by the brigade engineer battalion or brigade combat team constituted an opportunity to articulate and advocate the capabilities of military police Soldiers. These events also served as opportunities to understand the intent and priorities of the brigade commander with regard to military police—protecting critical assets and conducting detainee operations in order to allow maneuver units to focus on the near fight and prevent premature culmination. Despite many conversations regarding the doctrinal use of military police in elements no smaller than the size of a squad, higher units were so eager to use military police that our leaders needed to advocate for work-rest cycles for their Soldiers. At one point during force-on-force operations, the company was performing six missions: two critical-site security missions at radar sites, a personal security detail for the brigade command sergeant major, base defense for a collocated brigade engineer battalion, internally displaced civilians missions, and detainee collection point operations. Executing these missions and maintaining a safe work-rest cycle, along with resourcing our scattered squads, proved to be a challenge. The Soldiers, however, demonstrated their competence; by the end of the force-on-force training, they had been assigned missions on the forward line of troops, supporting breaching missions in the offensive.

If we had not articulated our capabilities and assets early and often, integrated with the higher headquarters units from the beginning of the training cycle, kept our own training objectives in mind to shape missions accordingly, and understood the intent and priorities of higher commanders, I truly believe that our company would not have accomplished as much as we did at NTC. Because our leadership and our operations section were relentless in the pursuit of more frequent and more challenging missions, our Soldiers were entrusted with demanding, continuous missions that allowed them to clearly demonstrate how military police help brigade combat team commanders achieve their end-state goals.




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(“Command and Leadership . . .,” continued from page 9)

Military police leaders at every level (company, battalion, brigade, and division) need to be equipped with the knowledge to sit at garrison or deployment planning conferences to describe military police capabilities. Military Police Corps roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations must be clearly defined to maneuver commanders and staffs so that they continue to include our Soldiers in the fight. We should embed our leaders and Soldiers with our infantry, artillery, and armor counterparts to strengthen their capabilities and provide more options to defeat the enemy.

Diversity Within the Military Police Corps

The Corps has come a long way with diversity in its ranks. Over the last 77 years, things have changed for the better; however, we must continue to improve in the area of diversity. As we consider what makes the Military Police Corps so unique, we must continue to build upon the legacy that has been left behind. In reviewing the multiple deployments, tasks, and missions that we continue to accomplish, no one can deny that our leaders are strong, smart, agile, and complex. As we move to the next phase of our history, we must continue to groom Soldiers who can lead and command at every echelon. Once leaders realize that they have received fair assessments or chances at promotions and command positions, they will work harder to improve the Military Police Corps. While it is not possible to treat and evaluate everyone exactly the same, we can strive to change the old systems and mentalities of some leaders. This is a chance for leaders with the power to change the process to preserve one of the best forces in the Army. 

Endnotes:

¹Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 1 August 2012.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

⁴39th Chief of Staff of the Army Initial Message to the Army, <https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/leaders/csa/Initial_Message_39th_CSA.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2019.

⁵Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, *Uniform Code of Military Justice*.

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Captain Davis is a small-group leader for the Military Police Captain's Career Course at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a master of administration degree in justice and security from Webster University.

THE REVISION OF ATP 3-39.20: POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

By Captain Todd J. Rossbach and Sergeant Major Douglas M. Loggins (Retired)

Police intelligence operations (PIO), which has been an integral aspect of military police operations since the Vietnam War, was first mentioned as a task performed by military police in Field Manual (FM) 19-5, *The Military Policeman*.¹ Since that time, PIO has evolved from a stand-alone function to an integrated task that continuously supports military police operations and complements traditional military intelligence in support of the operations process and common operational picture.

The recent revision of FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, establishes a framework for PIO, and the subsequent publication of Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.20, *Police Intelligence Operations*, provides the detailed techniques and methods used to execute the PIO framework.^{2, 3} The PIO framework guides military police and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) personnel to generate police intelligence that integrates two components—criminal intelligence and crime analysis—into a holistic understanding of criminal offenders, crime environments, and police effectiveness in addressing those offenders and environments. Awareness of a few definitions from FM 3-39 is essential to generate common understanding before discussing the new PIO framework (see Table 1).⁴

PIO Framework

PIO parallels the Army intelligence process to allow mutual understanding through common terminology, potential collaboration at each step, and doctrinal nesting under established Army intelligence constructs. PIO consists of four steps: plan and direct, collect and process, produce, and disseminate (see Figure 1). While these steps can be considered independently and designated tasks performed at the appropriate step, the steps of this iterative process often overlap or are simultaneously conducted by different participants in

the PIO process. For instance, while commanders and staffs plan and direct future collection efforts, military police patrols execute the collection tasks that the commander previously directed. The police intelligence analyst concurrently analyzes collected police information to produce police intelligence products for dissemination.

This article evaluates each step of PIO. For further details, consult ATP 3-39.20.⁵

Step 1: Plan and Direct

The first step in executing PIO is developing an information collection plan and directing assets to perform collection. PIO is a requirements-driven process that begins with the development of information and intelligence requirements based on the commander's intent and guidance and continuous scanning of crime problems existing within an area of operations. During this step, military police staffs (military police battalion, provost marshal's office, criminal investigation division, detention staff) determine collection objectives, methods, assets, and tasks and direct available collection assets or subordinate units that will be using the information collection plan, information collection matrix, information collection overlays, operations orders/taskings, or mission briefings. Supplied with adequate priorities and direction, military police collection assets may begin the second step of PIO.

Step 2: Collect and Process

The second step of PIO consists of collecting police information through various methods, sources, and tasks and processing that information into a useable format for analysis or immediate dissemination (if it is time-sensitive). PIO is a task that is integrated throughout the conduct of the three military police disciplines of police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. Military police disperse across an area of operations and actively

Term	Definition
<i>Police Information</i>	Information collected during military police operations concerning crime, disorder, criminal activity, and criminal threats
<i>Crime Analysis</i>	The systematic examination and interpretation of police information to determine when, where, and why crime, disorder, fear of crime, and other destabilizing events occur in specific places
<i>Criminal Intelligence</i>	Police information compiled, analyzed, and disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity
<i>Police Intelligence</i>	The product resulting from the collection, processing, analysis, and integration of criminal intelligence and crime analysis regarding crime, disorder, criminal activity, and criminal threats

Table 1. Terms and definitions




Figure 1. PIO framework

collect against directed information requirements such as a commander's critical information requirements. Additionally, military police use their continuous engagement with populations as a means of passively collecting police information that may not immediately appear to be important, but may reveal patterns or indicators of criminal activity or crime problems. Military police collection assets may include military police patrols, military police investigators and CID special agents, forensics and biometrics personnel, detention guard forces, or military working-dog teams. Regardless of the asset or task performed, military police are always collecting relevant information about crime, criminal activity, or other threats within the area of operations and providing that collected police information for analysis through debriefings or appropriate reporting systems.

Step 3: Produce

The third step of PIO involves the analysis of collected police information through integrated and overlapping criminal and crime analysis processes to create police intelligence products that are focused on both the environmental conditions that create opportunities for crime and the people who carry out that crime (see Figure 2, page 14). During this step, military police leverage police intelligence analysts to carry out the criminal and crime analysis processes. While military police units do

not currently possess dedicated police intelligence analysts, commanders can send Soldiers to the U.S. Army Military Police School Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analyst Course. Additionally, the recent revision of ATP 3-39.20, which was written with this constraint in mind, deliberately seeks to provide the framework, examples, products, and tools (an appendix explaining how to establish a company PIO team) necessary for any military police Soldier, CID special agent, or military police unit to perform the basic elements of PIO.⁶ This step results in the production of various categories of police intelligence products that are packaged for dissemination based on the focus and purpose for which they are intended.

Criminal Analysis

There are the two categories of criminal analysis based on the purpose served:

- **Strategic.** Strategic criminal intelligence focuses on identifying broad patterns and trends of criminal activity and offenders across a broad jurisdiction or area of operations by serial offenders, large-scale criminal networks, and transnational criminal organizations to prevent, deter, or mitigate criminal activity.
- **Tactical.** Tactical criminal intelligence results from directing criminal analysis toward identifying potential




Figure 2. Step 3 of PIO: Produce

criminal offenders, co-offending networks, or criminal organizations responsible for specific crimes or crime patterns within a given jurisdiction or area of operations to target or apprehend criminal offenders, networks, or organizations.

Crime Analysis

There are three different categories of crime analysis, and many different products can be created and disseminated for a variety of purposes:

- **Administrative.** Administrative crime analysis refers to the administrative functions of military police, corrections personnel, and government partners. Examples of administrative functions include providing community town hall participants with updates on crime trends in specific neighborhoods, providing an overview of crime across an installation or area of operations, composing military police activity reports, responding to media requests, providing host nation police assessments, and providing corrections capabilities and facilities.
- **Strategic.** Strategic crime analysis is directed toward identifying broad patterns, trends, and problems to determine long-term issues across space and time and the root causes of those issues.

- **Tactical.** Tactical crime analysis refers to directing crime analysis toward solving a crime problem (such as responding to a criminal incident or to patterns of incidents) at specific locations or times and/or profiling victims or targets to determine environmental factors, patterns or trends, and other factors contributing to a particular crime problem.

Step 4: Disseminate

The final step of PIO is dissemination. This step focuses on sharing police information and police intelligence with relevant stakeholders to enhance situational awareness and influence decision making. The primary purpose of police intelligence dissemination is to shape military police operations conducted to prevent, mitigate, and respond to crime and criminal activity. Disseminating police intelligence also supports homeland operations and the Army operations process through integration efforts (intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, risk management) to support situational awareness, contribute to the common operational picture, and impact decision making.

Key considerations for dissemination include—

- The appropriate classification of products.
- The use of automated information systems.




Figure 3. Focus of police intelligence products

- Networks of relevant stakeholders.
- The packaging of products into the format/medium appropriate for the intended audience and purpose.

Police intelligence products identify indicators of, and contributing factors for, crime, disorder, criminal threats, and criminal behavior that may impact Army operations or threaten Army property, facilities, and/or personnel. The focus of these police intelligence products is on criminal intelligence or crime analysis, with an emphasis on administrative, tactical, and/or strategic purposes (see Figure 3).⁷

Conclusion

ATP 3-39.20 is an evolutionary product that codifies proven concepts and lessons learned while providing the foundations for the conduct of operations. The manual was staffed across all relevant stakeholders and approved by the U.S. Army Military Police School Commandant. It is flexible enough for application across different operational environments and diverse circumstances. The most recent revision of ATP 3-39.20 was published in May 2019; however, it has not settled the ongoing debate about the appropriate role, framework, terminology, and function of PIO. Our hope is that the manual advances PIO into the 21st century without discarding several decades of experience in the process. General summaries for the five chapters and three appendixes that make up the new ATP are as follows:

- Chapter 1 describes crime and criminal threats that exist within complex operational environments, establishes the revised PIO framework, discusses roles and responsibilities, and describes how PIO contributes to unified land operations.
- Chapter 2 introduces the first step of PIO—planning and directing information collection.
- Chapter 3 provides detailed guidance for the collection of police information and the subsequent processing and reporting of that information.

- Chapter 4 describes the integrated criminal and crime analysis processes that produce police intelligence.
- Chapter 5 demonstrates how police intelligence products are disseminated to influence military police operations, support homeland operations, and support the Army operations process through the integrating processes (intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management).
- Appendix A addresses the applicable laws, regulations, and directives that are most relevant to PIO.
- Appendix B provides examples of different types of police intelligence products.
- Appendix C discusses employment considerations at various echelons to help practitioners operationalize PIO.

Endnotes:

¹FM 19-5, *The Military Policeman*, 26 November 1969.

²FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

³ATP 3-39.20, *Police Intelligence Operations*, 13 May 2019.

⁴FM 3-39.

⁵ATP 3-39.20.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

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The Train, Advise, and Assist Mission as a Joint Task Force in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned From a Military Police Officer

By Major Steven M. Martin

“The most important single ingredient in the formula of success is knowing how to get along with people.”

—Theodore Roosevelt, 26th President of the United States¹

In November 2017, I was selected to fill a Worldwide Individual Augmentation System tasker for a year-long deployment to Afghanistan as the detentions officer in charge of Joint Task Force (JTF) Parwan. Upon arriving in-theater in February 2018, I was officially tasked to be the operations officer and to conduct the train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission for the Afghan National Army (ANA), Military Police Guard Command (MPGC), in the National Security Justice Center (NSJC) under the Resolute Support mission. As the operations officer, my primary responsibilities were synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating team actions across the joint, interagency, and Resolute Support Headquarters (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) staff. My primary advisor duties included interacting with the brigade commander, Brigadier General Abdul Razaq Baray, and the division chief of staff, Colonel Allah Kakar.

JTF Parwan Team, Mission, and Area of Operations

JTF Parwan is composed of a small joint team that includes military police, criminal investigation division agents, law enforcement professionals, lawyers, linguists, Department of Defense civilians, and a communication contractor. The JTF Parwan mission is to TAA members of NSJC in investigations, prosecutions, judicial hearings, detention operations, and sustainment operations. JTF Parwan conducts daily key leader engagements with designated senior leaders within the NSJC to ensure that our partners are following the approved standard operating procedures (SOPs), rule of law, and international standards. NSJC is enclaved from Bagram Airfield and is composed of three main areas: the Afghan National Detention Facility and Prison—Parwan (ANDFP-P), the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP), and the Logistics Support Area (LSA).

ANDFP-P contains modular detainee housing units, segregated housing units, a detention operations center, a hospital, a kitchen, a laundry facility, and ANA and National Security Directorate (NDS) administrative offices. ANDFP-P, which is operated with ANA guards, has historically been occupied daily, nearly to capacity. JCIP prosecutes

terrorist-related crimes. LSA contains barracks, armories, dining facilities, administrative offices, motor pools, and mosques.

JTF Parwan TAA Partners

JTF Parwan collaborates with MPGC, JCIP, NDS 501 and NDS 600 personnel. MPGC consists of a division headquarters, a brigade headquarters, five *kandaks* (battalions), and a garrison support unit (combat sustainment support battalion) composed of ANA personnel who are responsible for corrections operations in ANDFP-P. ANDFP-P is the only Ministry of Defense prison responsible for the incarceration of national security threats. Another of the MPGC missions involves security operations in the Bagram Ground Defense Area (BGDA). JCIP personnel are responsible for the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of terrorism-related offenses. NDS 501 personnel are responsible for compiling prosecution packets against suspected terrorists. NDS 600 personnel are responsible for investigating potential green-on-blue and green-on-green attacks within NSJC.

JTF Parwan partners with designated ANA, JCIP, and NDS senior leaders. In addition to these leaders, the team collaborates with outside agencies to ensure the solicitation of support for our NSJC partners. Some of the outside nongovernmental organizations include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the Afghan Office of the National Security Council, and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. These outside nongovernmental organizations ensure that NSJC is transparent and that it follows international standards and laws.

Lessons Learned From an Advisor

Teamwork and communication are essential for any advisory team. All TAA team members must communicate the same message to their counterparts in order for the mission to be successful. JTF Parwan incorporated synchronization meetings at the end of each day to ensure that the correct message was sent to our partners. These meetings covered key leader engagements for the following day to ensure that

key associates had the most up-to-date information. The meetings facilitated cross-talk among different sections, helping to identify Afghan solutions to emerging problems. For example, our senior partners asked us to request that NDS comply with the ANDFP-P SOP. However, the proposed Afghan solution was to speak with the brigade and division commanders and suggest that NDS leadership be invited to a meeting to explain the purpose of the SOP. At first, NDS personnel seemed disgruntled about complying with the SOP; but when they asked our team about it, we reinforced the commanders' message of the importance of standardized instructions and procedures.

An advisory team must effectively teach the processes and procedures to its counterparts and coach them in order for a TAA mission to be successful. The Afghan processes and procedures have not changed in the last 10 years; however, the Afghans either do not know the processes or they refuse to conduct them correctly. When Afghan counterparts ask for equipment or personnel, it is easy to say, "no," but it is important to then explain that they have the tools necessary to complete the requests and actions. When working with TAA partners, advisory teams should remember the old Chinese proverb, "Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime."

Assuming that U.S. troops will not occupy Afghanistan indefinitely, advisory teams should encourage TAA partners to use Afghan processes and procedures. There is a sense of accomplishment when a TAA partner first understands and uses Afghan processes. Afghans need just a little encouragement and reassurance to complete an action; afterward, they continue to use what they know—with some reinforcement.

MPGC requested that JTF Parwan create changes to the *tashkil* (the Dari word for organization, personnel, and equipment) to add a second brigade (from personnel already assigned to MPGC) under the division in order to execute security operations in BGDA. MPGC personnel (chief of staff, personnel officer in charge, and logistics officer in charge) provided JTF Parwan with the correct form (completed in Dari) to change force structure. JTF Parwan translated the form and submitted it to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and MPGC submitted it through Ministry of Defense channels. MPGC started working on the *tashkil* changes to add a sixth *kandak* and increase personnel in the second and third *kandaks* for the following year. During the course of a year, NSJC personnel began to solve their own problems, with little guidance from coalition forces. NSJC leadership took ownership of issues and started informing JTF Parwan of different possible courses of action to solve problems.


An advisory team should internally create lines of effort for its TAA mission. This was the first time that I had been a part of a unit that created lines of effort from scratch. The initial effort from each section was a little painful since only four team members had received official military education on the development of lines of effort. JTF Parwan developed



Major Martin talks with an Afghan general during a joint inspection of perimeter security.

four logical lines of effort: mission command, operations, training, and sustainment; and our deputy director, a Command and General Staff Officers' Course instructor, was a tremendous help. The key team tasks are woven throughout these foci, with a desired end state of an established, self-sufficient, self-sustaining, and self-operating NSJC. This will enable the ultimate goal of the United States exiting Afghanistan with a citizen-elected government. My professional advice to any unit deploying on a 9-month rotation is to initiate this process during the predeployment period and validate it on the predeployment site survey so that the unit can hit the ground running.


Conclusion

There are always more lessons learned during a deployment, but I wanted to share some of the most significant lessons that I learned during my TAA mission. Take note of the quote by President Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of this article; we all need to respect our partners and the partners who support the team efforts. JTF Parwan would not be able to conduct its mission without our coalition force partners, including our Polish, Georgian, and Czech Republic partners. I believe that our team had a positive impact on NSJC personnel. 

Endnote:

¹John C. Maxwell, *Your Attitude: Keys to Success*, Here's Life Publishers, San Bernardino, California, 1984, p. 25.

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The 411th Military Police Company: *Ready to Answer the Nation's Call*

By First Lieutenant Michaela C. Lang

Since June 2018, “Grizzlies” from the 411th Military Police Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas, have been assigned to the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Force (DCRF) mission. This critical mission enables the Army to potentially save lives and mitigate suffering on what could be a disastrous day for the American population—a day with a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) event. The Grizzlies have consistently proven themselves through certification exercises, while also demonstrating that they are postured to respond to a CBRN event at a moment’s notice. The company has continuously trained and self-validated during multiple exercises under a variety of scenarios, all while maintaining proficiency in law enforcement operations in support of the Fort Hood community. A mobile training team from the Chemical Regiment taught a course on hazmat operations to help prepare Soldiers of the 411th for the DCRF mission.

The Hazmat Operations Course covers a variety of topics that are not only beneficial to military police assigned to the DCRF mission, but also to those serving in a law enforcement capacity. With 411th Military Police Company Soldiers responding daily to a variety of calls on Fort Hood, the importance of DCRF training cannot be overstated. The training teaches Soldiers the proper way to approach a scene that is suspected to be chemically contaminated. The training was beneficial to the company, allowing the proper flow of knowledge and communication of information while under duress during a potentially life-or-death situation presented during the DCRF certification exercises.

One of the DCRF certification exercises occurred on 20 August 2018, when Soldiers from the 411th Military Police Company participated in the Task Force-2 DCRF quarterly evaluation at Camp Bullis, Texas. The Grizzlies

partnered with the 2d Chemical Battalion, Fort Hood, for the exercise, which was not the first for the Grizzlies. The company had previously been certified by the U.S. Northern Command during a 2-week DCRF certification exercise held at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, in the spring of 2018. The company was assigned the critical task of conducting mass casualty decontamination (MCD) line operations at a variety of locations and in a variety of situations. The 411th Military Police demonstrated professionalism and exceptionalism in using interpersonal communication skills and tact to assist civilians through MCD lines. These skills are required to effectively conduct MCD line operations.

Before entering the MCD line, Soldiers don Level B suits and report to the medical company for medical monitoring. The MCD line begins in the hot zone (the control zone surrounding hazmat and weapons of mass destruction events), extends far enough to prevent adverse effects to personnel outside the hot zone, continues through the warm zone (where secondary contamination can occur through contact with an affected person), and ends in the cold zone (where there should be little, if any, contamination and where those who are not contaminated remain and victims who have been decontaminated are released). All zones are delineated based on the potential hazard size.

When a state of emergency has been declared, military police are used as general-purpose forces. In such an emergency, military police go through medical monitoring and are positioned at the origin of the MCD line, right in the hot zone. They take their equipment and casualty identification capabilities to the front line. Here, military police are critical; the skills needed to deal with hundreds to thousands of civilians who have experienced a devastating event are not available in just any Soldier. When questioned about the value and importance of military police on a DCRF



A Soldier tags an individual who has been exposed to contamination.



Soldiers conduct MCD line operations.

mission, Mr. Jerry Lair, hazmat operations mobile training team instructor, said, “The [military police] on DCRF—it is life or death. There is no order in an incident unless security is provided and enforcement happens in a hot zone. This substantiates what [civilians] are going through at that time.”

Military police escort each contaminated individual through the decontamination process. This is vital. Even if the civilian is injured, he or she must be decontaminated in order to prevent secondary contamination once processed through the MCD line. The decontamination process includes cleaning victims from head to toe. Incredible physical stamina and psychological control are required to properly conduct operations in such an environment. Soldiers cannot sustain the MCD line operations process for hours at a time. They rotate through shifts in order to maintain their ability to execute the operation to standard.

During the quarterly exercise at Camp Bullis, Soldiers interacted with medical, CBRN, and engineer Soldiers to best simulate an MCD line operation. An additional benefit of this training event was that military police were located just north of San Antonio, Texas, which allowed them to conduct MCD line operations in a small-town environment as well as a massive urban setting.

Due to the ability of military police to work on a variety of team sizes, the military police role in conducting DCRF

operations is critical to operational success. Another advantage of using military police in this capacity is their ability and experience in communicating across barriers (such as through a mask). Leaders and Soldiers within the 411th Military Police Company have displayed ingenuity and creativity in working with civilians and other units to arrive at the most efficient way to operate. They have used these training events to prepare for deployment at a moment’s notice. They have conducted deployment readiness exercises with only the initial notification, proving that they are ready to answer the Nation’s call.



First Lieutenant Lang is a platoon leader with the 411th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor of science degree in physical education, and she is working toward a master of science degree in physical education from the University of Idaho, Moscow.



Forged by the Regiment

By Sergeant First Class Nicole B. Moates



The National Defense Authorization Act implemented an increase of 28,000 U.S. Army troops by the end of fiscal year 2017; this call to arms went up from a Nation in distress in order to meet the demands of the ever-uncertain security environment.¹ Our country asked young men and women to stand and serve in large numbers during a harsh time of unrest, and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, welcomed these people and the challenge. The 14th Military Police Brigade reactivated a battalion to help with the influx of initial-entry training Soldiers during the summer of 2018. Company C (Champions), 1st Battalion, 58th Infantry Regiment (1-58th), was the first company to stand up in answer to the call. To a passerby, the reactivation ceremony may have seemed like any other commemoration, but the leaders involved ensured that the 26 July 2018 ceremony was unlike any other.

The 14th Military Police Brigade proudly stands between undisciplined new recruits and military police Soldiers who are ready and willing to serve their Nation. Every successful military police Soldier has trod the halls of the companies and battalions and earned a place in the Army. Three battalions had been producing trained military police warriors: the 795th Military Police Battalion, the 701st Military Police Battalion, and the 787th Military Police Battalion. In June 2018, the 14th Military Police Brigade unexpectedly added the newly reactivated 1-58th.

Working with military police Soldiers is not new to the 1-58th. The unit was called to serve with the 92d Military Police Battalion, first during World War I and then during World War II and the Vietnam War. The 1-58th Soldiers earned many accolades for their actions, from performing long-range reconnaissance missions; to reflagging with the 75th Ranger Regiment; and, now, for training our Nation's recruits under the 14th Military Police Brigade.

At the front of the July 2018 ceremonial formation, in the midst of the high expectations of the 14th Military Police Brigade, stood a commander from the 795th Military Police Battalion, an executive officer from the 701st Military Police Battalion, and a first sergeant from the 787th Military Police Battalion, all of whom would soon train non-military police Soldiers under a military police brigade. Even before the guidon was unfurled, Company C, 1-58th, was prepared

for success.

Captain Julia N. Means had been slated to complete her company command assignment with Company A, 795th Military Police Battalion, in the summer of 2018. While most company commanders were moving to post-command assignments, she was hand-selected to stand up and command the as-yet unformed Company C for a year. Likewise, First Lieutenant Richard C. Wetherbee III had served his time as an executive officer in Company C, 701st Military Police Battalion, where he had trained military working dog handlers and internment/resettlement specialists. He should have been on his way to his next assignment or the Captain's Career Course; instead, he stayed to ensure the development and success of a new company. Sergeant First Class Robert J. Streit had been a senior drill sergeant with Company A, 787th Military Police Battalion, from 2014 to 2016. In the summer of 2016, Sergeant First Class Streit departed Fort Leonard Wood for a follow-on assignment as a detachment sergeant at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Less than 2 years later, now First Sergeant Streit was called upon to return to the Home of the Regiment and stand up a company with mainly new Regular Army and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) drill sergeants, with only three seasoned drill sergeants with time on the trail.

With the urgency of standing up a new organization and the operational tempo knocking at the door, the new company was housed in the only facilities available, the recruits trained with older-model weapons, and personnel strength was at 60 percent manning on the day of reactivation. Company C was expected to fill its slots with the first cycle of recruits only 5 days later. For most leaders, this would seem an impossible task; but with a command team forged by the 14th Military Police Brigade, there was no choice but to adapt, overcome adversity, push forward, and succeed.

When Company C reactivated on 26 July 2018, battalion leaders and staff were slowly arriving at Fort Leonard Wood. Only the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Rodney Johnson, and a handful of staff members were in their assigned slots. USAR Soldiers from all over the Nation were stepping up to serve as the battalion executive officer, on the operations and training staff, and as company leaders. Just like Company C, the 1-58th was undermanned and

undersupplied, but that never stopped or even slowed the mission. Companies formed without equipment or staff; but despite all the obstacles and challenges, the battalion was forged into a highly adaptive, progressive, and successful unit. The Soldiers were guided by their love of country and esprit de corps. Many did not yet have clear-cut paths for training or validated operating procedures to help guide them. Each company stood up on its own and collectively produced tactics, techniques, and procedures based on the current operational environment and its own battalion priorities. Because of the uniqueness of the battalion, there were no historical documents that could be mimicked. Therefore, the team began digging into the regulations to ensure that it was meeting the commander's intent and that the mission was successful.

The challenges placed before Company C and the rest of the 1-58th did not end with the lightning-fast activation or first manning arrivals. Company C was asked to field the new basic combat training program of instruction immediately upon its dissemination. Company C was one of the first in the brigade and on Fort Leonard Wood to institute the new program of instruction, which meant lessons learned in the first cycle needed to be incorporated and material needed to be retaught and adapted for the second cycle. The 1-58th fought an uphill battle; and every step of the way, each challenge was made more daunting by circumstances beyond the unit's control. But the 1-58th still thrived and rose to stand toe to toe with its sister units in the 14th Military Police Brigade.

When the leaders of the 14th Military Police Brigade wanted to learn about the newly developed standards of the Army combat fitness test, they did not reach out to a unit that was on cycle break or a unit with 100 percent manning; they reached out to the Champions. The brigade leaders wanted Company C to teach the rest of the Soldiers and leaders of the 14th Military Police Brigade about the new combat fitness test. Every new obstacle and every new challenge was met and answered with pride and professionalism by the Soldiers of Company C. The Company C motto is "Those who are prudent will be victorious," the 1st Battalion motto is "Love of Country," and the 14th Military Police Brigade motto is "Forge the Regiment." The Champions are fulfilling the organizational mottos and answering the call by training the future leaders of our Army to assist, protect, and defend our Nation.

Endnote:

¹ "Army is Hiring: Army Increases End Strength by 28,000 Soldiers," *U.S. Army*, <https://www.army.mil/article/184431/army_is_hiring_army_increases_end_strength_by_28000_soldiers>, accessed on 9 June 2019.

Sergeant First Class Moates is the senior drill sergeant for Company C, 1-58th. She holds associate's and bachelor's degrees in general studies and is currently seeking a master's degree in irregular warfare from the American Military University.



Top: A drill sergeant inspects troops from Company C, 1-58th.

Bottom: A drill sergeant directs troops out of the gas chamber during chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training.

DEBT

is Looming Over Military Households, Even in Retirement

By Lieutenant Colonel Rodney S. Morris (Retired)

There is a debt problem in America. There is a debt problem in the military. Debt is prevalent in most American households, and it is the single largest reason that families are not building wealth. When a large percentage of family income is used to make a car payment or two or to pay off student loans, credit cards, or other incurred debts, there isn't enough money remaining to invest in the family's future. That is not okay. That is especially not okay when the government Social Security Program, designed to supplement retirement, is in danger of failing to meet its mission by the year 2035.

Statistics show that unemployment is at its lowest level in 16 years. Furthermore, the economy has fully recovered since the 2008 housing crash and American families are much better off financially. However, the debt crisis in America suggests that Americans are in a much darker place economically than unemployment statistics show. A new study that surfaced in 2018 suggests that Americans are heading into retirement with larger amounts of debt than ever before.¹ Researchers found that since 2010, a higher percentage of people are retiring in their early 60s and that 70 percent of them are in some level of debt, up from 64 percent in 1992.²

According to a 2017 Harris Poll, 78 percent of working Americans live paycheck to paycheck, up from 75 percent in 2016, and 8 out of 10 Americans claim they are working and using all of their earned income to pay debt.³ The survey highlights a troubling trend in American family households. At a time when unemployment continues to decrease, income earners continue to lose ground to debt problems.

Another recent study shows that Americans who are at retirement age are filing for bankruptcy at triple the rate since 1991.⁴ These senior citizens now represent more than 12 percent of bankruptcy filers. This number has skyrocketed 479 percent over the last 25 years. There are several factors that contribute to this, including delayed

social security benefits, eliminated pensions, out-of-pocket health care costs, and stagnant wages. The biggest reason, though, is the lack of a plan to maneuver through these times to ensure that disposable income is available for needs and is not going toward extraneous debt.

In speaking with military personnel over the past several years, I have discovered that trends for military Families are no different than recent nationwide statistics. But a survey for the National Foundation for Credit Counseling found that Regular Army Soldiers and veterans carry 7 percent higher credit card debt and 15 percent higher debt expenses than their civilian counterparts.⁵ Regular Army Soldiers and veterans also have 16 percent fewer tangible assets than their civilian counterparts. The survey attributes these problems to frequent relocations and numerous deployments, which prevent consistency and predictability and cause significant strain on personal finances. Carrying excessive debt is particularly concerning for military personnel and Department of Defense employees because it could affect their security clearances.

Financial mismanagement is often the culprit that causes excessive debt. It is derived from the "I want what I want, and I want it now" mentality. The idiom "keeping up with the Joneses" was coined to describe this mentality. Purchasing items on impulse or without a budget or plan is almost always a mistake. Spending money that one does not have is almost always a mistake. Borrowing money to fund that next big purchase (with the exception of a reliable used car or a reasonable place to live) is almost always a mistake. Purchasing something that one wants when there are actual needs is almost always a mistake. Making bad financial decisions causes setbacks in attaining financial goals and objectives. When one bad decision is piled on top of another, the situation is further exacerbated. Eventually, there is no way out. Living paycheck to paycheck is inevitable; sometimes even bankruptcy is inevitable.

Making smart decisions about spending, saving, and investing is paramount to successful financial planning. It is not difficult to develop a financial plan, but it can be hard for some to follow one. It takes discipline and an intense desire to be freed from the chains of debt. A well-developed, detailed personal financial plan can lead toward financial freedom.

The most important first step in developing a successful financial plan is to recognize that excess spending is the cause of debt accumulation. Spending on anything that is not a necessity must stop immediately. This won't necessarily always be the case, but it is for now. Borrowing money, including borrowing on credit cards, must also stop. Most people find this step the most difficult because it involves changing poor financial habits that may have developed over many years. It can be done, but it takes discipline and commitment.

The second step in developing a successful financial plan is to gather all unpaid invoices, bills, and financial statements. To avoid unnecessary confusion, discard all except for the most current statement from each debtor. Next, develop a list of all expenses and debts owed and to whom they are owed and place them in order of importance. Anything that is required (food, energy, prescriptions) should be a priority. Anything that is not required (cable bills, streaming subscriptions) should be placed at the bottom of the list.

The third and final step necessary to get spending under control is to develop a monthly budget. If married, this step requires buy-in from the spouse—and the budgeting process should be done together when possible. While developing a budget is a simple process, care should be taken to ensure that every expense is included. Anything left out will cause unforecasted expenses that can lead to financial problems later in the month.

During the budgeting process, income is balanced against expenses. Every dollar of earned income should be included in the budget and accounted for in an expense or savings category. This ensures that each dollar is committed in the budget and is not lost. Managing spending is important; otherwise, it is the spending that will do the managing.

The phrase “knowledge is power” is often used by educators when they want to motivate their students to learn. Actually, it is the execution of knowledge that brings power. This is particularly true when it comes to personal finances. In order to build wealth and enjoy a financially stress-free retirement, debt must be eliminated.

There is a debt problem in America. There is a debt problem in the military, and it is wreaking havoc on Families who work hard to get ahead. It is time to get control of your financial world. This is the time to make a commitment to stop unnecessary spending and borrowing. This is the time to develop a realistic budget and follow it. This is the time to eliminate the debt that is following so many military Families into retirement.



Editor's note: Contact your installation Army Community Service office for information on financial readiness.

Endnotes:

¹Annie Nova, “This Growing Problem Threatens to Delay Your Retirement,” *CNBC*, 4 June 2018, <<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/debt-levels-could-delay-your-retirement.html>>, accessed on 20 March 2019.

²Ibid.

³Ladan N. Hayes, “Living Paycheck to Paycheck is a Way of Life for Majority of U.S. Workers, According to New CareerBuilder Survey,” *CareerBuilder* Web site, 24 August 2017, <<http://press.careerbuilder.com/2017-08-24-Living-Paycheck-to-Paycheck-is-a-Way-of-Life-for-Majority-of-U-S-Workers-According-to-New-CareerBuilder-Survey>>, accessed on 20 March 2019.

⁴Jill Schlesinger, “Behind the Surge in Seniors Filing for Bankruptcy,” *CBS This Morning*, August 2018, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Ojsol6-nhI>>, accessed on 20 March 2019.

⁵Herb Weisbaum, “Survey: Military Families Carry More Debt, Have Fewer Assets Than Civilians,” *National Broadcasting Company*, 13 July 2015, <<https://www.nbcnews.com/better/money/survey-military-families-carry-more-debt-have-fewer-assets-civilians-n390046>>, accessed on 20 March 2019.

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Employment of a Military Police Company at a Combat Training Center

By Staff Sergeant Benjamin A. Terrell

The 128th Military Police Company, 203d Military Police Battalion, Athens, Alabama, participated in Rotation 08-18 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The training exercise was very educational for the company and the supported brigade combat team (BCT). This article provides an overview of the employment of a military police combat support company.

Military Police Company Foundations

The military police company consists of a company headquarters and subordinate platoons. The headquarters contains a command group, food service section, maintenance section, and military police operations center (MPOC). According to the *Force Ratio Calculator*, from a combat power perspective, the military police platoon is rated comparable to an infantry weapons company.¹ A military police company is capable of addressing each military police discipline described in Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, and Training Circular 3-39.30, *Military Police Leader's Handbook*.^{2,3} Figure 1 details the tasks that a military police company can perform.

Courses of Action for the Employment of Headquarters

Deciding how leaders employ the MPOC is key to the effective and efficient use of military police squads and platoons. An MPOC has the manning necessary to rival a military police battalion operations section. Possible courses of action include—

- **Placing the military police company headquarters independently within a battalion base or assembly area.** This course of action allows the military police company commander the greatest number of personnel to battle-track the company, but isolates the most knowledgeable military police Soldiers from the planning and execution of support to BCT major operations.
- **Assimilating the MPOC into its assigned headquarters.** This course of action could be effective if the battalion commander is in the most advantageous position to effectively employ the military police company. Unfortunately, many battalion commanders do not effectively

employ military police assets and a single battalion seldom controls the majority of the most effective and efficient locations to employ military police assets.

- **Placing the MPOC under tactical control of the provost marshal.** This course of action provides the brigade commander with the most flexibility. A brigade provost marshal office has a slim staff. Augmentation by an MPOC allows the provost marshal and military police company commander the ability to focus on the battle rather than on battle tracking. The military police company commander can operate from the provost marshal's office, utilizing the wealth of information in the brigade headquarters to assist in planning and providing the provost marshal with keen insight into the proper employment of the military police company. Here, the military police company commander (or representative) is placed in the midst of the brigade planning and execution effort and is able to sway the employment of company assets in the most effective and efficient direction.

Basic Doctrinal Employment of Military Police

The most popular uses of military police are for three tasks: convoy security, base security, and detainee operations. Military police perform these tasks—and a whole lot more—and can perform them better when afforded freedom. The two disciplines associated with the basic doctrinal employment of military police are security and mobility support operations and detainee operations.

Security and Mobility Support Operations

The discipline of security and mobility support operations includes four basic subdisciplines: critical-site security, area security, traffic regulation and enforcement, and convoy security. Commanders should keep two key factors of critical-site and area security in mind:

- The protected assets are critical and require additional defense.
- Military police are most effective when mobile.

It is essential that the brigade prioritize military police support to ensure the proper employment of military police

Technical and Tactical Tasks	Military Police Disciplines		
	Police Operations	Detention Operations	Security and Mobility Support
	Perform law enforcement	Confine U.S. military prisoners	Provide support to mobility <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide support to breaching• Provide support to clearing• Provide support to gap crossing• Develop a traffic control plan• Conduct main/alternate supply route regulation and enforcement• Support passage of lines• Conduct straggler movement control
	Conduct police engagement	Conduct detainee operations	
	Conduct crime prevention		
	Conduct criminal investigations		
	Conduct law enforcement raids		
	Employ forensic analysis or biometric identification capabilities support	Conduct host nation corrections training and support	Conduct area security <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conduct base/base camp defense• Conduct critical-asset security• Conduct protective services• Conduct response force operations• Conduct lines-of-communications security• Conduct checkpoints• Support port area and pier security• Conduct area damage control
	Conduct traffic management and enforcement		Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance
	Provide customs support		
	Provide support to civil security and civil control <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Restore and maintain order• Support border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement• Establish an interim criminal justice system• Conduct host nation police training support		Apply antiterrorism measures
	Perform civil-disturbance control		
	Provide support to civil law enforcement		Implement physical security procedures
	Provide evidence response team support		Provide MWD support
	Employ special-reaction teams		Provide support to populace and resources control <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conduct dislocated-civilian operations• Support noncombatant evacuation operations
			Conduct logistics security
Legend: MWD—military working dog			

Figure 1. Military police doctrinal tasks by discipline



Soldiers conducting a terrain model rehearsal prior to a mission.

resources. Using military police to conduct security in an area that does not require employment of such a combat power is a poor application of mission command.

It may be easy to assign military police assets to guard entry control points or to employ them with heavy machine guns and automatic grenade launchers at key perimeter locations; however, military police are more effective when establishing contact with enemies outside the perimeter. Military police can shape the battle so that the enemy finds itself in an engagement area as it approaches the perimeter.

Assured mobility is a popular task assigned to military police by maneuver enhancement brigades. Doctrinally, assured mobility is a multifunctional task that requires reconnaissance, clearance, observation, patrol, convoy security, and elimination of hostile forces in the route area. Although military police cannot conduct assured mobility, they do largely contribute to the effort. Just as confining military police assets to a perimeter reduces combat effectiveness, locking military police into a convoy formation also reduces combat effectiveness. Other applications should be considered instead. Military police could be assigned to conduct a hasty route reconnaissance ahead of a convoy. Military police traffic control posts could be placed along the route to ensure that the convoy remains on the correct path and that there is

an armed presence at vulnerable locations. Convoy security and traffic regulation are tasks that extend beyond logistics convoys to movement into a tactical assembly area. They even support movement to attack by maneuver elements.

Detainee Operations

Detainee operations are crucial. Military police assets should be employed to secure detainees from the point of capture to the brigade detainee collection point. Military police, in coordination with the provost marshal and operations staff, should man the detainee collection point and ensure proper documentation and segregation of detainees. When possible, military police coordinate rearward movement of detainees using supply convoy backhaul with military police guards. The crux of detainee operations lies in a well-thought-out standard operating procedure (SOP) so that detainee operations from the point of capture to handover to division control are seamless and understood by all within the organization.

Nontraditional Employment of Military Police

Military police also provide support to brigade commanders in nontraditional ways. Nontraditional does not mean nondoctrinal; rather, nontraditional ways refer to creative ways to apply doctrinal tasks. Nontraditional employment

of military police capabilities occurs during offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

In offensive operations, military police support the forward passage of lines by providing a liaison to the supported unit at traffic control points and continuously reporting on the situation. Military police augment cavalry forces by providing flank screens and performing actions as rear guards. Military police support the shaping of deep operations by accompanying cavalry forces and establishing traffic control points for the control of maneuver units approaching the objective. Straggler control helps maintain combat power, and population control supports freedom of maneuver.

In defensive operations, military police augment cavalry forces by providing flank screens or filling gaps between maneuver forces.

In stability operations, military police are, first and foremost, police officers; they are Soldiers who interact with the populace “to protect and to serve,” as opposed to close with, engage, and destroy the enemy. Military police train in the use of interpersonal communication to de-escalate situations. They also train to sharpen their observation skills to recognize and then neutralize a threat in a way that causes the least amount of collateral damage. Military police should—

- Accompany leader engagements and security patrols.
- Train host nation police forces.
- Train maneuver forces on interaction with local civilians.

Advanced Doctrinal Employment of Military Police

Beyond the basic and nontraditional employment of military police, military police also support the most complex and difficult military operations. Gap crossings and breaches are highly complex, risky, combined arms operations. Operational decontamination is stressful and confusing. Area damage control takes place when situations are at their most chaotic. Sensitive-site exploitation requires highly developed situational awareness and observation skills.

The employment of military police at a gap-crossing, breach, or decontamination site significantly improves movement control. Employment starts at the staging area and continues through the far side of the site. Military police elements provide area security and movement control so that maneuver forces can focus their efforts on movement through the site, to the objective, and beyond.

Military police play a crucial role in conducting area damage control. While area damage control is a “be prepared to” task, each headquarters must consider and plan for the tasks. Military police can provide a rapid response, quickly cordon an area, provide a situation assessment, and restore order to the situation.

Military police train for sensitive-site exploitation and the employment of police intelligence techniques. A single, properly equipped military police team can greatly enhance intelligence collection at a sensitive site. If a technical

intelligence team is available to conduct site exploitation, a military police team or two can assist a senior leader to ensure preservation of the sensitive area.

Military Police-Oriented Topics for Brigade Tactical SOPs

The brigade provost marshal is responsible for planning the integration of military police into brigade operations. Planning begins at home station as the provost marshal considers each military police discipline and identifies how the brigade should address each task listed in the tactical SOP. The provost marshal briefs the supporting military police company on the contents of the tactical SOP (particularly the sections pertaining to military police) before the completion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

Conclusion

Attached military police companies bring a tremendous amount of combat power to a BCT. They perform common military police functions and advanced military police tasks, and they execute military police tasks in creative ways. Military police easily task-organize with maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment units. They execute in team, squad, platoon, and company size elements. Yet, for effective employment, planning personnel must weigh the criticality of the supported task against the combat power expended by the brigade commanders.

Author’s note: During the writing and review process of this article, the Army published a graphic training aid (GTA) that covers the same topic as this article; however, that information was not used in the preparation of this article. The author recommends that BCT commanders, operations officers, and provost marshals consult the GTA for additional information.



Endnotes:

¹*Force Ratio Calculator*, Version 2017-01, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2017.

²Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

³Training Circular 3-39.30, *Military Police Leader’s Handbook*, 11 August 2015.

Staff Sergeant Terrell was a squad leader with the 128th Military Police Company, Alabama Army National Guard, at the time this article was written. He is a graduate of the Reserve Component Military Police Advanced Leader Course.



Special-Event Security Planning

By Special Agent Patrick Wines

Introduction

The Army holds thousands of public events each year. Many of these events entail a large number of people and may pose a tempting target for protestors or violent individuals, criminals, and terrorists. The challenge for Army anti-terrorism officers (ATOs), Army event planners, and Army law enforcement personnel is to ensure a safe and secure event for everyone in attendance.

Planning for special events must include the inner perimeter of an event site and the areas surrounding the venue. Attackers were positioned outside the inner security perimeter of the venues at both the May 2017 suicide bomber attack outside of Manchester Arena in England and the October 2017 Route 91 Harvest Music Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada. During the Las Vegas tragedy, the attacker shot victims inside and outside the venue from an elevated position. The focus of such an attack may be on those inside the event or crowds gathering outside the event, in ticketing lines or parking areas, or on access roads.

Planning for and managing special events can be some of the most challenging tasks for public safety officials. Rarely are events identical in nature; security planners must think “outside the box” for procedures and resources that are relevant and effective for their specific events. Even with recurring events, there are often factors (such as weather, adjacent events, and visiting dignitaries) that drive adjustments to the security plan. The guidance presented in this article pertains to those events in which the U.S. Army is the lead agency for security planning.

The primary factors involved in successful event security are planning, communication, and the proper assessment and acquisition of necessary resources. Hopefully, the content of this article will help you identify your special-event security requirements, coordinate resources, and plan for contingencies. An on-post event normally allows for more security due to the restricted access and additional controls that most installations offer; however, the basic planning

concerns for an event, whether on or off a military installation, are similar.

Event security training should be built into in-service security and law enforcement training programs. Training materials designed specifically for special-event planning are available through the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A publication entitled *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement* is an excellent source and one with a large bibliography.¹

ATOs, like their law enforcement counterparts, should be knowledgeable about the National Response Framework (IS-800) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Courses in both IS-800 and NIMS are available online through the Federal Emergency Management Institute at <http://training.fema.gov>.

A key topic in the IS-800 and NIMS training is the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS establishes clear lines of communication and decision-making relationships and outlines who will be the primary decision maker for agencies providing security for special events, particularly at off-post venues.

Guidelines for Special Events

The Army’s operations process, which provides the framework for the preparation and execution of all major activities, should be followed in order to establish security for special events. For a successful operations process, it is necessary to plan, prepare, execute, and assess.

Plan

Start planning as soon as you are notified of an event. Long before any large-scale public event occurs, perhaps 6 months or more, you should review planning considerations, start coordination efforts, and conduct vulnerability assessments. An event with multiple event locations presents an opportunity for ATOs to provide additional guidance, as some venues offer more security-friendly options

than others. While a more extensive checklist can be tailored specifically for your event, the following can be used as a basic checklist:

- Obtain information on the type, location(s), and estimated number of attendees.
- Determine if specific security protocols are required based on the classification of agenda items.
- Assign responsibilities for security planning and management review of the planning process.
- Determine if dignitaries or high-risk personnel (HRP) will be attending and, if so, how many.
- Identify and coordinate with personal security details (PSDs) or security details for all HRPs/dignitaries to exchange planning information regarding the event.
- Establish liaison with venue managers and appropriate local officials (usually, police, firefighters, and emergency medical service personnel).
- Contact the local U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) field office for a criminal activity threat assessment. This coordination must be concluded 60–90 days in advance to allow CID time to gather current data and properly assess it.
- Coordinate with local authorities to ensure that there are no parades, protests, or other events simultaneously taking place. Most states have regional and local law enforcement joint intelligence-sharing units that may identify potential threats and share information with you.
- Coordinate with post uniformed security personnel for military-sponsored events, such as military balls, that are held off-installation. In the event of a violent threat, a contracted civilian law enforcement agency may serve as an appropriate response force. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, Army personnel are restricted from enforcing civil law; therefore, Army personnel should not be placed in the position of directing civilian law enforcement actions.² The rules of engagement/use of force should be clearly set forth in the event operations order and approved by the installation/command legal affairs office.
- Encourage the organizer to direct the wearing of civilian attire (if the event can be held in a low-key setting and uniforms are not necessary for the success of the event). Also ensure that basic operational security measures are practiced. For example, do not use signs (or use only discreet signs) to avoid drawing unwanted attention.
- Post emergency evacuation procedures and diagrams. The security director must review the security plan with all elements of the security team and local first responders to ensure a complete understanding. Include evacuation security procedures to be followed should an evacuation be necessary.
- Contact the local veterinary office, if available, and request an assessment to determine whether a food and water defense team is appropriate if food and beverages will be served. Coordination should be conducted early, but no later than 30 days prior to the event.
- Coordinate, if possible, with the local Army National Guard civil support team, which may offer special-event

security and incident response capabilities pertaining to potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks.

Prepare

Soldiers and units perform the following preparation activities, which are vital to the overall success of a special event:

- Physically examine the site, note physical security “soft targets” (such as uncontrolled adjacent parking or driving areas where vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices could be detonated or public thoroughfares that allow direct access to the event), and prepare a vulnerability assessment. Refer to Army Regulation (AR) 190-13, *The Army Physical Security Program*; AR 190-58, *Designation and Protection of High Risk Personnel*; AR 525-13, *Antiterrorism*; and Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.32, *Physical Security*,^{3, 4, 5, 6} for additional guidance and sample checklists.
- Establish checklists based on the asset or area to be protected, acceptable risk levels, and other factors (such as installation security guidance and requirements). Sample checklists are available in *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement* and other sources, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency *Special Event Contingency Planning—Job Aids Manual*.^{7, 8}
- Prepare an operations order outlining the complete security plan and the specific responsibilities of each security position. Include detailed instructions on use of force/rules of engagement. Also include contact information for all key individuals. Request that the plan be reviewed by the installation/command legal affairs office. Ensure that all security team leaders receive a copy of the order and that they brief the teams accordingly.
- Coordinate for medical support from the nearest military medical facility. In some instances, it might be beneficial to have the medical facility contact information—especially for large, off-post events in busy metropolitan areas or in small towns, where local ambulance service and fire and rescue capabilities are limited or frequently stretched to capacity.

Execute

Security managers must put the special-event plan into action. They must execute by employing the force protection assets and measures necessary to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. They must—

- Establish an operations center, if required (depending upon the size of the event). An operations center provides a common area for representatives from various elements involved in the event to coordinate operations and allows for the centralized command and control of security assets. The operations center should have direct contact with the venue security office and command and control of the security team. The operations center must have the capability to communicate via all communication networks used by the various elements of the security team and other supporting agencies.

- Arrange to have a representative assigned to the host venue internal security office, if available. These offices normally have systems that provide additional situational awareness for key areas. The presence of a representative in the security office allows the ability to monitor the facility throughout the event. The representative also provides a direct point of contact to facilitate communication and avoid misunderstandings.
- Conduct a complete search of all areas of the venue with explosive detection dog teams, which are generally available through the provost marshal's office or local police departments. The sweeps are conducted based on the details of the security plan. Trash bins, flower pots, and other items that may be used to conceal improvised explosive devices may need to be removed.
- Secure the area with a physical barrier, if possible. In the event that a barrier is not feasible, protocols for the identification of authorized personnel (event staff identification, ticketing, wrist bands) and a challenge procedure must be established. For instance, if a military usher at a doorway encounters an individual attempting to enter with no ticket, he or she should immediately call for assistance from the venue security officer, who will intercede and escort the person from the premises or take other action (as necessary). Hotel security personnel may choose to summon a police patrol and, if the situation turns violent, utilize established protocols for a response.
- Employ the use and assistance of CID surveillance detection teams (if available and legally permitted), particularly when large crowds are expected or if several dignitaries are present. Surveillance detection demands highly trained and experienced personnel.
- Be aware of surveillance teams and the protocols that are in place to delineate lines of communication between the security manager and the surveillance detection team leaders.
- Consider the use of blue force unmanned aircraft systems to provide aerial observation capability in support of the security force (if resources permit and capabilities are available).

Assess

To properly assess the situation, the security team must continuously determine the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving the objectives. The team must—

- Exploit previous planning documents and after action reviews to determine best practices and integrate future planning actions.
- Document any security shortfalls and vulnerabilities for mitigation.
- Conduct after action reviews to identify quantifiable actions for sustaining or improving future special events.

Army ATOs and law enforcement staff may request assistance from the Antiterrorism Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, via e-mail at <usarmy.pentagon.hqda.list.aoc-at-division@mail.mil>.

Conclusion

By understanding threat tactics and conducting a detailed vulnerability assessment for a special event, staff who are responsible for security can prevent, respond, and/or mitigate the impact of an attack. Attacks by terrorists, violent extremists, or groups merely seeking to disrupt an event continue to take place at open-access events, mass gatherings, outside the perimeters of secured events, and other locations commonly associated with crowds. It is vital that those who are responsible for the security of events take every precaution possible to plan, prepare, and execute a safe and secure event.



Endnotes:

¹Edward Conners, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, U.S. Department of Justice—Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, March 2007, <http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/Managing_Security_for_Major_Special_Events.pdf>, accessed on 14 August 2019.

²18 U.S. Code 1385, *Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus*.

³AR 190-13, *The Army Physical Security Program*, 27 June 2019.

⁴AR 190-58, *Designation and Protection of High Risk Personnel*, 25 February 2018.

⁵AR 525-13, *Antiterrorism*, 17 February 2017.

⁶ATP 3-39.32, *Physical Security*, 30 April 2014.

⁷Conners.

⁸*Special Events Contingency Planning—Job Aids Manual*, Federal Emergency Management Agency, March 2005 (updated May 2010), <<https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is15aspecialeventsplanning-jamannual.pdf>>, accessed on 15 August 2019.

Special Agent Wines is the special-events security manager supporting the Antiterrorism Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army. He holds a bachelor's degree in occupational education, with a major in criminal justice, from Texas State University and a master peace officer license from the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement. He has more than 30 years of combined military and civilian law enforcement experience.

Camp Blanding, Florida, and the Military Police Corps in World War II

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

The area presently known as Camp Blanding, Florida, played a significant part in the history of the Florida militia, the safety and security of Florida and, later (during World War II), the safety and security of the United States. Camp Blanding which is located in Clay County, near the town of Starke, Florida, has been known by various names over the years. Originally named Camp Joseph E. Johnson after a Confederate general from Florida, the camp was renamed in honor of Brigadier General J. Clifford R. Foster in 1929. Finally, it was renamed once again—this time, in honor of Major General Albert H. Blanding in 1939.¹

In 1939, Camp Blanding was designated as the training site for Florida National Guard Soldiers. At the beginning of World War II, the U.S. Army took over the camp to train federalized Army National Guard units and portions of the Regular Army. Once under the control of the federal government, Camp Blanding was rapidly expanded to approximately 160,000 acres, which enabled the accommodation of at least two divisions for training. Construction boomed, and thousands were employed. The Army built a complete infantry training facility with more than 800 buildings, including a large hospital, a prisoner-of-war (POW) camp, and other improvements (roads and electrical, water, and sewer systems). At first, housing for troops consisted of pyramid tents with wooden floors; wooden walkways were constructed due to ankle-deep sand, and drills were conducted on paved roads.² As the troops moved in, Starke soon grew to be the fourth largest city in Florida.

During World War II, the area of responsibility for Camp Blanding was close to half the size of the state of Florida. Military police assigned to Camp Blanding came under the operational control of the Security and Intelligence Division. A total of eight officers and 350 enlisted men were under the supervision of the director, Lieutenant Colonel S. E. Minikes. Due to its size, Camp Blanding had four district offices—St. Augustine, Palatka, Ocala, and Gainesville. The Investigative Branch, which consisted of one captain, one staff sergeant, and four sergeants, was responsible for conducting criminal investigations. The military police criminal investigators were Captain H. T. Van Notes, Staff Sergeant George W. Simms, Sergeant Leo L. Osborne,

Sergeant James R. Fleming, Sergeant Walter A. Scales, and Sergeant Lawrence B. Wilkerson.³

There were two locations for permanent-party military police of Camp Blanding—Section 1 and Section 2 (the segregated area). Military Police Detachment B (Colored), which was commanded by Captain Thomas M. Love, began with 27 members in 1942 and had expanded to 137 members by the end of the war. (The segregated Army units of the early 1940s generally did not have numerical designations.) At Camp Blanding, Military Police Detachment B patrolled Section 2, guarding sensitive structures in those areas, and performed town patrol duties in Starke, Gainesville, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine.



Soldiers on civil patrol duty at Camp Blanding

There was a military police detachment assigned to the St. Augustine Recreation Area, which was a miniature post with its own post office, library, training areas, motor pool with two gasoline pumps, and medical clinic offering dental and limited outpatient medical services. This military police detachment conducted joint patrols with Navy shore patrolmen under the command of Lieutenant Commander J. P. Crowley. The Navy brig and city jail were used for the detention of offenders.

The 825th Guard Squadron of the Army Air Corps Miami Beach Training Base, Army Air Force Technical Training Command, worked security around Camp Blanding and provided military police for other duties. The Army Air Corps Miami Beach Detachment headquarters was located at the Governor Hotel. Some other major cities also requested that military police join their city officers on patrol. These smaller detachments patrolled with the Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Orlando Police Departments.



Camp Blanding auxillary military police

As the need for manpower in combat zones increased due to the number of casualties, a shortage of men was created back home. As a result, auxiliary military police units were activated throughout the United States during World War II. Their mission was to assist local provost marshals by providing manpower to guard various war production plants, direct traffic, and perform other duties as needed. Major William A. Miller, Director of Internal Security and Intelligence for Camp Blanding, posted an advertisement seeking 50 recruits between the ages of 45 and 50 for positions as auxiliary military police. Applicants with qualifications that could be used in military police work were sought. These men would be assigned to the Camp Blanding Military Police Detachment.

On 14 May 1942, Congress passed a bill creating the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). In 1943, WAAC personnel were no longer considered auxiliary staff, their status was converted to Regular Army, and they were renamed the Women's Army Corps (WAC). According to Army regulations, any installation with WAC personnel was required to have WAC military police available to handle issues with female personnel. Because Camp Blanding was a training center for Army nurses, a detachment of WAC military police was assigned to the post headquarters. The original complement of 12 WAC military police graduated from training on 23 November 1942 and these Soldiers were assigned to the headquarters to form the nucleus of the military police detachment. Although WAC military police had jurisdiction over all military personnel, their primary duty was to deal with WAC personnel. A second WAAC training center was located at Daytona Beach, Florida, and

a military police training course for WAAC personnel was created. Upon graduation, 20 additional WAAC personnel were assigned to the military police detachment.

WAC military police held the same schedule as male military police; they worked 8-hour shifts and had 1 day off per week. Their general duties were also the same as their male counterparts. While on patrol, WAC military police spent 2 days on walking patrol and a third day on vehicle patrol.

The Tampa Bay Area Military Police Detachment received six WAC military police, who also worked joint patrols with the Tampa Police Department.


Other military police units assigned to Camp Blanding included the 202d Military Police Company; the 204th Military Police Company; the 315th Military Police Escort Guard Company; the 575th Military Police Escort Guard Company; the 326th Military Police Battalion; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 724th Military Police Battalion; and the 795th Military Police Battalion. These units were in transition and training for overseas duties and deployments.

The following divisional military police platoons were either transferred to Camp Blanding with their divisions or were activated at Camp Blanding: the 1st Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 29th Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 30th Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 31st Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 36th Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 43d Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 63d Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, the 66th Infantry Division Military Police Platoon, and the 79th Infantry

Division Military Police Platoon. The normal World War II military police platoon consisted of one first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, and 30 enlisted men. While infantry units conducted training, divisional military police units also conducted training in the areas of tactical operations center security, division headquarters security, prisoner of war (POW) operations, traffic control, checkpoints, route reconnaissance, and other military police duties.

German POWs were sent to Camp Blanding, where they were assigned to one of 22 camps in the state. There were two POW compounds on Camp Blanding. From March to December 1945, about 250 POWs were interned at a camp just east of Belle Glade, Florida, next to the Everglades Experimental Station. Another camp was located at Clewiston, Florida, in Hendry County. Many other camps were scattered throughout the state. The 315th Military Police Escort Guard Company, the 575th Military Police Escort Guard Company, and other Service troops provided security for all POW compounds under Camp Blanding control.

Many POWs worked in a bean-canning factory, helped build the Lake Okeechobee Dike, or chopped sugarcane in the fields in and around the camp. The sugarcane farm workers were paid 80 cents per day. While temperatures over 100°F often made fieldwork miserable, many POWs enjoyed hunting snakes and making souvenirs from the skins.

In spite of being at war and on opposing forces, years later, some of the guards reported having had a mutual respect for, and camaraderie with, many of their captives. 

Endnotes:

¹W. Sanford Smith, *Camp Blanding: Florida Star in Peace and War*, Research Triangle Publications, North Carolina, 1998, p. 12.

²Ibid.

³"Camp Blanding Report," Vol. 22, 30 August 1944.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, he was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), and finished his career working cold cases.

Photograph and Illustration Guide

Photographs and illustrations contribute a great deal to the visual appeal of an article. When submitting them with your article, please keep the following in mind:



- **Subject matter**—Action shots that show Soldiers who are training or performing their jobs are the best way to enhance an article. Static photographs of landscapes, structures, or distant machinery in action are less useful. Photographs of groups of people smiling at the camera or “grip and grin” shots add little to an article and are unlikely to be used.
- **Format**—Photographs saved in JPEG (or JPG) format and sent as attachments to an e-mail are best. Photographs and other graphics should not be embedded in a Microsoft® Word document or PowerPoint presentation. Graphics files are large, and e-mail systems frequently have limits to the size of messages that can be sent. For example, our system cannot accept messages larger than 20 megabytes (MB). One solution is to send separate e-mails with just one or two attachments each.
- **Size and resolution**—The ideal photograph or graphic for reproduction is 5x7 inches, but smaller sizes may be acceptable. If the photograph is a JPEG, it should be no smaller than 150 kilobytes (KB). When taking photographs, use the highest-resolution setting on your camera and save them at a resolution no lower than 200 dots per inch. Photographs appearing on the Internet usually have a resolution of only 72 dpi. Do not manipulate photographs by sharpening, resizing, retouching, or cropping the image. Using a graphics software program (such as Adobe® Photoshop) to increase the size and/or resolution of a small photograph will not increase the quality of the photograph so that it can be used in a publication. Do not compress photographs. We will do all postproduction work. We will not publish photographs that are pixilated or out of focus.
- **Copyright**—Images copied from a Web site or a book must be accompanied by copyright permission.
- **Captions**—Include captions that describe the photograph and identify the subjects. Captions are subject to editing.
- **Email photographs**—Photographs can be emailed to: <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>.
- **Photographs of foreign nationals**—Due to security restrictions, photographs of foreign nationals cannot be published without digital editing (blurring faces) unless the photographs are accompanied by a permission-to-release form signed by the subject(s).
- **Graphs/charts and illustrations**—We prefer to work with original digital graphic files. Submit the original PowerPoint™ slides and/or layered Adobe Photoshop/Illustrator files. Do not save them in a different format or flatten the layers.



Operation Stable Sentry '18

By Major Joshua Larson

The 720th Military Police Battalion conducted Operation Stable Sentry, a battalion field training exercise, at Fort Hood, Texas, from 1 to 15 November 2018. The exercise consisted of two combat support military police companies (the 401st Military Police Company and the 410th Military Police Company), one law enforcement detachment (the 178th Military Police Detachment), one military working dog detachment (the 226th Military Police Detachment), and the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. During the first week, we conducted force-on-force training using the preestablished Caspian Sea scenario. During the second week, we conducted tailored squad lanes with retraining built in for all elements, as needed. Although the exercise lasted only 2 weeks, the planning, preparation, and execution of the event lasted more than 8 months. This article explores the techniques that a unit can use to simultaneously manage and participate in training exercises with minimal outside support. It also addresses lessons learned, from a battalion perspective, for use in any exercise.

Planning

Conceptual Planning

The idea of Operation Stable Sentry started as the 720th Military Police Battalion was finishing Griffin Watch, a 2-week brigade training exercise orchestrated by the 89th Military Police Brigade in January 2018. The battalion performed fairly well, but the exercise did not realistically test the personnel and logistic elements of the sustainment warfighting functions. The simple reason for the lack of a realism is that the exercise was virtual, with no subordinate or higher headquarters elements to predict and deliver just-in-time sustainment other than what the simulations indicated were equipment, supply, and personnel deficiencies. From this assessed shortfall in the mission-essential task list training, the battalion designed a draft field training exercise that would incorporate live, virtual, and constructive training environments to not only test company and battalion mission-essential tasks but also degrade sustainment in real time to test battalion level systems and processes. This would also force down-trace (subordinate) units to anticipate their sustainment requirements.

From the initial task organization design (Figure 1), the battalion developed a quarterly training plan that integrated leader development with key training events (see Figure 2, page 36). Leading up to the field training exercise, this “road map” set intermediate objectives within the lines of effort and served as the driving force for quarterly training guidance and training priorities throughout the next three quarters. The battalion had unknowingly

set a long-term objective that focused all efforts on a tangible and common goal for all the subordinate units. This is uncommon within military police battalions, which differ significantly from combined arms battalions within brigade combat teams.

From the training plan, the battalion began to refine its processes for detailed planning. The battalion simultaneously prepared for its short-term objective—Warfighter Exercise 18-05 (scheduled May–June 2018), in which the battalion would replicate a military police brigade headquarters. This exercise confirmed the importance of sustainment in a live training environment.

Detailed Planning

To transition to detailed planning, the battalion set quarterly military decision-making process sessions that focused on the exercise design (Figure 3, page 37), rather than on mapping out exactly how units were to fight during the exercise. The first question that we struggled to answer was: “How do you plan an exercise that you must not only run, but must also participate in?” We realized that we must focus on the “good to have” versus the “not needed” aspects of the exercise.

Virtual and constructive training environments were not needed. Collectively, the unit decided that a live opposing force (OPFOR) executing its own mission set and objectives would provide the stimulus required. By choosing a force-on-force, live training environment only, extra planning and manpower needs were alleviated. We relied on the OPFOR commander to execute the enemy mission with less tactical oversight. This greatly reduced the manpower necessary for exercise control (EXCON). If we had kept the virtual and constructive elements, those personnel would have been needed to run the exercise.

EXCON was a crucial element simply because we had no idea who would do it. We enlisted the help of the staff collective trainers with the Fort Hood, Texas, Mission Command Training Team to observe the battalion staff. The trainers also offered advice on the makeup of the EXCON cell during one of the exercise design military decision-making process sessions. The EXCON cell was comprised of the battalion executive officer, the senior staff captain within the battalion S-3 (operations), and the battalion S-2 (intelligence) officer. This resulted in an overwhelmingly new and untested staff for execution of the operation.

The EXCON cell members had their hands full. The execution plan allowed minimal oversight, along with changes




Figure 1. Initial task organization design with live, virtual, and constructed units

organic battalion assets. These included a signal team, seven OC/Ts, human intelligence (to support detention operations), and fueler support. The limited resources were designed to purposely constrain the battalion in order to potentially challenge the tactical execution of the exercise, logistics, or personnel replacement.

Preparation

The preparation phase of Operation Stable Sentry was nearly simultaneous with the planning phase, with each subordinate unit aligning training plans three quarters in advance to achieve its field training exercise objectives. As shown in Figure 2, the battalion used the plan to align quarterly training guidance and shape training objectives leading into the field training exercise. From this point, as shown in Figure 4, page 39, units executed the supporting collective tasks in preparation for the assessment on key company collective tasks. The preparation phase also included quarterly leader development focused on decisive action, with a subsequent tactical exercise without troops.

The 720th Military Police Battalion executed Warfighter 18-05 as a brigade headquarters and, in September, completed mission command leader professional development, which was comprised of two intermediate training objectives prior to execution of Operation Stable Sentry. During this same time period (August–October 2019), companies began preparing to ensure that maintenance and personnel requirements (services, weapon gauging, use-or-lose leave status, and other readiness factors) were satisfied in advance to ensure minimal negative impacts and to quickly resolve any readiness issues following the field training exercise. The final steps in the preparation phase included creating an

only at decisive points, to ensure that all units reached their training objectives. There were three key elements of the general concept to stress sustainment and test tactical execution:

- To replicate personnel loss, we devised a “dead cell concept” in which casualties were to be held until all requirements to request replacements (Department of the Army [DA] Form 1156, *Casualty Feeder Card*)¹ had been completed.
- For Classes I, III, and V resupply, the battalion S-4 (logistics), in conjunction with the headquarters and headquarters detachment, were to run daily logistical packages to friendly forces and OPFOR within the training areas based on down-trace unit reports and 72-hour predictions.
- The goal of our friendly forces and the OPFOR EXCON cell was to limit interaction with all elements, only interacting when necessary to reach a training objective. All elements were to execute their plans from the day on which operations commenced (D-day) until conditions within the training environment required the battalion to adjust with minimal prodding or direction from the EXCON cell or observer controller/trainers (OC/Ts).

With the EXCON cell established, the battalion requested the resources that were needed in addition to the




Figure 2. Quarterly training plan used to display lines of effort for training guidance leading into Stable Sentry

OC/T academy, executing rehearsals at echelon, and completing the final D-day maintenance deployment readiness exercise.

Rehearsals

The 720th Military Police Battalion executed operational and support rehearsals a week prior to D-day. These rehearsals helped create and refine a solid, shared understanding of the overall plan. Three days prior to rehearsals, the staff issued the battalion operations order, while the rest of the organization reviewed the terrain models or sand tables to be used for rehearsals. The terrain models were available to any of the subordinate units at all times. The resources used to script and execute the rehearsals were the Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter Number 98-5, *Rehearsals*, and Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.^{2,3}


The operations rehearsal consisted of company commanders briefing each of their concepts, with the task and purpose listed by the phases of the operation, and walking

through each platoon section's responsibilities and with the S-2 setting the stage for the enemy forces' most likely and most dangerous courses of actions. Activating certain decision points caused the participants to react to the events, which helped them identify and understand seams, gaps, and friction points in the battalion's plan to test the warfighting functions and subordinate units.

The support rehearsal synchronized the efforts of the S-1 (personnel), battalion maintenance, S-4, and S-6 (signal) officers in relation to resupply for Classes I, III, and V; personnel evacuation; primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communication plans; enemy prisoner-of-war flow; and maintenance support. The support rehearsal process proved to be as important as the operations rehearsal process during actual execution of the field training exercise.

Maintenance Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise

The maintenance emergency deployment readiness exercise was a surprise to the participating subordinate units.



The training was designed to test the current maintenance status of the battalion and identify key factors on which to focus efforts after the exercise. The emergency deployment readiness exercise occurred at 0400 on D-day. Once the organization was prepared for inspection, the battalion evaluators checked the communication status, load plans, safety checks on vehicles, and weapon qualifications. The deployment readiness exercise provided leaders with a true snapshot of the state of readiness of the battalion. Most of the deficiencies resulted from improper preventive maintenance checks and services, as Soldiers and junior leaders failed to follow guidance from technical manuals for assigned equipment. The last group to join the training exercise consisted of elements of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, which deployed to the exercise at 2100, or 17 hours after the official start time.

Execution

D-day to D+5

During execution, the battalion staff (minus the EXCON cell members) began to fight the enemy in a degraded communication environment. The battalion began the exercise with three training objectives—to conduct mission command, execute tactical operations center functions, and coordinate and synchronize logistics. From D-day to redeployment, the battalion operated with degraded mission command systems due to the lack of available Command-Post-of-the-Future assets, leaving the joint capability release and frequency modulation communication assets as the only available frequencies. Additionally, tactical operations center functions were impacted through the limitation of any running estimates, battle tracking, and briefings to analog (hard copy) products only. Despite

these setbacks, the staff quickly realized that in a near-peer threat environment, degradation of mission command systems would be the norm and the command quickly adapted. This left the joint capability release as the primary means of communication for subordinate units, with the frequency modulation communication asset as the alternate means due to the layout of the terrain, line-of-sight issues, and the limitation—or lack of—retransmission sites. After receiving the initial alert orders, marshaling together with the gear, and deploying, the exercise finally started 17 hours later.

The battalion S-2 served as the exercise controller for the OPFOR, ensuring that the 401st Military Police Company commander received updated fragmentation orders so that he could place each element of his unit in the correct area to achieve the training objectives. However, this did not preclude the OPFOR commander from executing additional tasks within the parameters of the commander's intent, which was written into the OPFOR operations order. These additional tasks allowed for training realism and created the “fog of war” effect—a term often associated with chaos and uncertainty—which oftentimes occurs between friendly forces, or blue forces, (BLUEFOR) units and the battalion staff.

At first, the combat support military police company (the 410th Military Police Company) struggled with the “free play” aspect of the exercise. Instead of the prescribed standard lanes concept of training, the commander and his leaders were expected to execute continuously within the scope of the base order. This resulted in a delay of the occupation of the area of operations (AO), and it allowed the OPFOR to gain a terrain and observation area advantage. Once within its AO, the company conducted reconnaissance and security operations, area defense, and detention operations.

The 178th Military Police Detachment and the 226th Military Police Detachment (Military Working Dog) also executed missions continuously. Their tasks included physical security assessments of mission-essential vulnerable areas, host nation police training, explosive and narcotic sweeps, special-reaction team missions, and train-the-trainer instruction (consisting of traffic control drills and training on how to conduct military police investigations) for the 410th Military Police Company.

For the next 4 days, BLUEFOR and OPFOR engagements were constant. This allowed for the realistic degradation of personnel and supplies, thus helping the battalion achieve its third training objective—coordinating and synchronizing logistic support. The battalion S-4, in conjunction with the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment commander, accomplished this objective through the development of logistical resupply points throughout the battalion AO, with a 72-hour projection window in which to deliver just-in-time logistics. Reports from subordinate units were accurate and timely, alleviating concerns that existed prior to the start of the field training exercise. OC/T performance evaluations of unit execution of the exercise, testing support functions, rehearsals, and accurate reporting contributed

greatly to our logistical success. These factors also served to validate the battalion tactical standard operating procedure and command post standard operating procedure.

Tactically, subordinate units struggled with priorities of work in the defense phase (patrol base) and local security at the halt. A lack of cover and concealment and inadequate dispersion of forces allowed the OPFOR to pinpoint locations and accurately call for indirect fire. However, units executed collective-level reconnaissance, security, and detention missions with precision.

D+6 (The Culminating Event)

The culminating event for the battalion before transitioning to the slower-paced squad lanes concept with the 401st Military Police Company was the battalion level cordon and search—Operation Vera. From the receipt of operation orders to the execution of the mission, the entire process took approximately 34 hours. The battalion staff executed the rapid decision and synchronization process to develop a base plan, with the planning efforts transitioning through shifts while the teams shared information and lessons learned. The battalion commander's directed course of action saved time for the orders briefing and rehearsals in a dispersed AO. Again, the battalion executed an operations rehearsal over a large-scale terrain model to understand the seams, gaps, and friction points of the plan. All echelons within the battalion—and, most importantly, the leaders at all levels—began seizing the initiative and maintaining constant communication for an overall shared understanding with each element that set the standard for planning and preparation.

The execution of Operation Vera allowed the combined battalion with heavy OPFOR resistance to quickly execute cordon-and-search missions of multistory buildings. The battalion tactical command post was established 12 hours prior to execution, with the battalion main command post remaining 20 miles away. Joint capability release assets served as the primary means of communication between the two command posts. The culminating event brought together all combat enablers from the battalion, including the headquarters and headquarters detachment, which provided Class V resupply and casualty evacuation; the special-reaction team, which formed part of the search element; the patrol explosive detection dog teams, which conducted back sweeps of military operations in urbanized terrain sites; and the main effort of the 410th Military Police Company, which executed search-and-cordon tasks, ensuring a successful operation.

Assessment and Retraining

Although the lessons that were learned during Operation Stable Sentry '18 were paramount to the success of the operation, the execution of the mission was not hindered. The focus of the following assessment is on the performance of the EXCON cell and tactical lessons learned in the execution of the mission:

- **Planning**

- The use of mission command training teams from the start of the planning process is essential in

OPERATION STABLE SENTRY '18

Conditions: Wooded and urban terrain, both day and night, with CBRN threat

Operating Environment: Near-peer threat with criminal (high) and terrorist (low) threat

Political: Pro-government, criminal, and terrorist threats

Military: Near-peer, including SPF

Economy: Poor to middle class impacts sympathy for near-peer and criminal activity

Social: one social group

Information: Equal information for BLUEFOR versus REDFOR

Infrastructure & Physical Terrain: Essential services and civil control intact


Time: 2 weeks

Scenario: ENY has begun counterattack to the northwest of our area of operation. We are in support of 1st Cavalry Division providing security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations to deny or defeat an SPF company operating in the division rear area.


Legend:

BLUEFOR—blue forces	MWD—military working dog
CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear	MP—military police
CDR—commander	OPFOR—opposing force
Co—company	REDFOR—red forces
DA—Department of the Army	SPF—special-purpose forces
ENY—enemy	TLP—troop leading procedures
FRAGO—fragmentation orders	MET—mission essential task

PHASE IIIA



PHASE IIIB



Assessment Plan: Based upon DA Standard METs for MP Co.

19-CO-1002 Perform Support to Mobility

19-CO-2001 Perform Support to Security

19-CO-3111 Perform Detention Operations

19-CO-4001 Perform Police Operations

55-CO-4830 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations

Key Collective Tasks:

19-CO-1102 Perform Reconnaissance and Surveillance

19-CO-2004 Perform Critical-Site Security

19-CO-2201 Perform as a Response Force

19-CO-5002 Collect Police Information

19-CO-3103 Operate a Detainee Holding Area

19-CO-2206 Perform Cordon & Search

OPFOR Plan: OPFOR is near-peer threat special-purpose forces Co. OPFOR company receives ENY BASE ORDER, conducts the operations process, TLPs, and executes ENY MISSION. OPFOR Co receives FRAGOs, as necessary, to facilitate the BLUEFOR Co reaching its training OBJs or for retraining.

PHIIIA: 410th MP Co serves as OPFOR. Co CDR serves as OPFOR CDR.

PHIIIB: 401st MP Co serves as OPFOR. Co CDR serves as OPFOR CDR.





Figure 4. Exercise design: conditions, scenario, assessment plan, OPFOR plan

understanding the elements that the battalion needs prior to execution. These elements include communication support, evaluators, land, ammunition, administrative support, and tactical operations orders, at a minimum.

- Establishment of a master scenario event list as early as possible creates a menu of options and allows for the flexibility to adjust during execution. A master scenario event list is similar to a decision support matrix. (For example: If this condition occurs and the enemy has done this, then we do that.)
- The entire staff should be involved in the exercise design. Although most will be involved during execution, they will have work to do in setting the conditions. Whether planning a tactical operation or a field training exercise, working together as a staff creates a great learning experience.
- The training audience should be involved as early as possible and should understand the training objectives. This helps shape the master scenario event list and provides an understanding of the resources needed.
- **Preparation**
 - The orders briefing and rehearsals were keystones to the success of the exercise, but a terrain model large enough to allow visualization for commanders and staffs is just as important.
 - The maintenance deployment readiness exercise allowed each subordinate unit to understand the importance of maintenance. Involving all staff sections during the inspections created a greater sense of ownership among the subject matter experts as we transitioned into a more robust maintenance plan after the exercise.
 - OC/T academy attendance is a must. We incorporated the academy before the orders briefing and rehearsals to help guest OC/Ts gain a better understanding of the exercise.
 - The plan for Operation Stable Sentry was established 8 months in advance of execution. The plan allowed for multiple intermediate objectives for subordinate units. Overall, the desired end state helped align all training guidance and tasks within the battalion over the time period. Priorities were aligned to the exercise, with resources (time, land, ammunition, and personnel) adjusted to the main and supporting efforts before execution.
- **Execution and Retraining**
 - It was a struggle for the battalion staff to function properly without the executive officer, senior staff captain with the battalion S-3, and the battalion S-2 officer, who were occupying the EXCON cell slots. This manning method is not recommended, and these slots should be filled with higher-headquarters personnel. However, this conglomeration of staff personnel worked in this particular case since these three individuals were the primary planners of the exercise over the previous 8 months.
 - Skills in local security and tactical dispersion are atrophying skills. Near-peer and hybrid threats alike can

easily take advantage of this pitfall. Security is always the first priority, followed by communication capability, and then local reconnaissance. There was a gap in patrol-based operations and adherence to patrol-based priorities of work.

- Everyone must understand the mission variables and their applications. We have often seen that mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations are not completely understood in relation to friendly forces. We recommend a continuous focus on the relationship of terrain, weather, time, troops, and civil considerations from both friendly (mission) and enemy perspectives.
- Retraining must occur. With the battalion commander's approval, all units were given 12–16 hours to retrain in areas where they thought that they needed retrained. Staff retrained on the creation of a tactical standard operating procedure/command post standard operating procedure, the integration of warfighting functions, and tactical operations command functions. This retraining, due in part to the absence of the staff officers in the EXCON cell, paid huge dividends for the staff members as they executed another warfighter exercise, Warfighter 19-03, 2 months later.

Conclusion

Operation Stable Sentry brought together four companies in a decisive-action training environment Caspian Sea scenario. The exercise took 8 months to plan and prepare. The results provided the 720th Military Police Battalion with a snapshot of the capabilities it uses on a daily basis in deployed environments and while conducting continuous law enforcement operations on Fort Hood. The lessons learned in planning, preparing, executing, and retraining within a self-contained exercise are invaluable. We assumed some risks with certain staff functions in order to successfully participate in the exercise. These risks were apparent during the retraining stage because of gaps in knowledge (due largely to the requirement to internally fill the EXCON cell) within the remaining battalion staff. Units understood the basic principles of the rules, tactics, and operations. This exercise illuminated the need for setting priorities of work in the defense phase and the constant need for local security, communication, and reconnaissance. Finally, the importance of maintenance and the ability to generate combat power cannot be overlooked. Overall, the exercise was a huge success. A military police battalion can plan an exercise and participate in it with minimal external support.

Endnotes:



¹DA Form 1156, *Casualty Feeder Card*, 1 June 2015.

²Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter Number 98-5, *Rehearsals*, March 1998.

³FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014.

Major Larson is the executive officer of the 720th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree from North Georgia College & State University and master's degrees from Webster University and the University of Louisville.



Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Military Police Battalion



Lineage and Honors

Constituted 12 August 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 10th Military Police Section, Criminal Investigation.
Activated 14 August 1943 at Fort Custer, Michigan.
Reorganized and redesignated 19 March 1944 as the 10th Criminal Investigation Section.
Reorganized and redesignated 15 September 1944 as the 10th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section.
Reorganized and redesignated 29 December 1944 as the 10th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment.
Inactivated 25 February 1946 in Germany.
Activated 2 January 1947 at New York, New York.
Allotted 1 August 1951 to the Regular Army.
Reorganized and redesignated 16 August 1954 as the 10th Military Police Detachment.
Inactivated 24 December 1965 at New York, New York.
Activated 16 January 1968 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
Inactivated 25 July 1969 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
Activated 1 August 1973 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Military Police Battalion.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

Normandy
Northern France
Rhineland
Ardennes-Alsace
Central Europe

War on Terrorism

Iraq
National Resolution
(Additional campaigns to be determined)

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 2005–2006
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered CENTRAL AND SOUTHWEST ASIA 2008–2009





Military Police of the Women's Army Corps



By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

In the 1940s, there was a debate about whether or not women should be allowed in the Army. Pros and cons were offered. Initially, the Army was against establishing the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). Some personnel expressed concern that men would not be able to function properly when fighting alongside women. And the possibility that male Soldiers might seek to defend and protect military women instead of carrying out their assigned missions was cited by military experts as a primary example of potential dangers in fully incorporating women into the military structure.¹ But Congress passed the WAAC bill on 14 May 1942.²

WAAC was created as the result of a bill introduced by Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts. President Theodore Roosevelt Jr. signed the bill into law as Public Law 554.³ Two days later, Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby was appointed as the first director, with the rank of colonel. There were restrictions; Army regulations required that any installation with assigned WAAC personnel must also have WAAC military police. While these WAAC military police had jurisdiction over all military personnel, their primary duty was handling WAAC personnel. WAAC military police were noncombatants—armed only with whistles, flashlights, and a military police brassard.

The initial WAAC military police unit was established as the first WAAC training center at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. At Des Moines, the WAAC Provost Marshal interviewed all women who wanted to be military police. The second WAAC training center was established at Daytona Beach, Florida. An original complement of 12 WAAC military police graduated on 23 November 1942 and was assigned to Headquarters, Camp Blanding, Florida, to form the nucleus of the military police detachment.

In 1943, WAAC was converted to the Regular Army and renamed the Women's Army Corps (WAC). According to a 4 January 1944 article in the *Tampa Times*, "WAC [military police] attended a month-long training in civilian law, military law, first aid, map reading, traffic control, driving, investigation, interviewing, and judo. Judo classes were conducted at the Army Air Corps School of Applied Tactics located in Orlando, Florida."⁴

WAC military police held the same schedule as male military police; they worked 8-hour shifts and had 1 day off per week. When on patrol in a city, WAC military police spent



WAC Soldiers participating in judo training



Military police members of the WAC

2 days on foot patrol and a third day on vehicle patrol. Their duties were generally the same as those of their male counterparts: checking passes, ensuring that uniforms were worn properly and, if required, apprehending personnel for violations of Army regulations or the law.

Ms. Nancie Stiltner, who is now a very alert 95-year-old, graciously shared her story of becoming a WAC military policewoman. Ms. Stiltner, who had recently turned 18, was working at Triumph Explosives Corporation, Elkton, Maryland. She was assigned to work in the Fuze Department, making 40-millimeter antiaircraft shells. Her job was to place the fuze into the ammunition. On the afternoon of 5 May 1943, one of the buildings blew up. Ms. Stiltner was blown off of the stool on which she had been sitting. The explosion killed 15 female workers and injured 54 others. Ms. Stiltner decided that it might be a good idea to find new employment.

On 13 October 1944, Ms. Stiltner went to the Armed Forces Recruiting Station, Baltimore, Maryland, and enlisted as a WAC. She attended basic training at Camp Oglethorpe, Georgia, from 18 November 1944 to 31 December 1944. On 4 January 1945, she was transferred to Camp Wheeler, Georgia, where she became one of 12 WACs on post, and was assigned to the 1477th Military Police Detachment. The duty uniform for WAC military police was the WAC dress uniform. Ms. Stiltner said that because nylon was needed for parachutes, their stockings were made from cotton. WAC military police wore the standard military police brassard and carried a whistle and a truncheon, for which Ms. Stiltner received very little training. Ms. Stiltner worked 8-hour shifts, sometimes with a male partner and sometimes with another WAC military police Soldiers. Their duties included working gates or working on foot patrol with the Macon, Georgia, Police Department in downtown Macon. When working the gates, one of the duties was to check returning male Soldiers for alcohol. While on duty, WAC military police always tried to eat in the male Soldiers' mess hall because the food was better.

Ms. Stiltner stated that one of her favorite memories of her time at Camp Wheeler was when she provided security on the opening night of the movie, "God is My Co-Pilot,"⁵ which was shown in Macon. Ms. Stiltner and fellow WAC Ms. Lee Turner were stationed at the top of the red carpet, and all of the stars walked past them to enter the theater.

As with the male Soldiers, there came a time when WAC personnel were shipped overseas. Each day, the women checked the bulletin board to see if they were on the list to go. Ms. Stiltner did not go overseas. On 18 October 1945, Ms. Stiltner was reassigned to Camp McPherson, Georgia. Then, in 1946, she was transferred to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where she was later discharged from the Army.

Times have certainly changed since the days of WAC. In the mid-1960s, the first female agents were introduced into



Female CID Soldiers

the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID).

Our units are no longer segregated, and female military police are equipped just the same as their male counterparts. Many have shown their mettle, performing heroically in battle situations. We have even had female general officers, including one provost marshal general, in the Corps.

Ms. Stiltner and the other women of WAC were pioneers for the ladies who now serve so well as military police Soldiers of the Military Police Corps.

Authors note: After this article was written, Ms Nancie Stiltner passed away. At the time of her death, on 6 August 2019, she was 96 years old.



Endnotes:

¹Josephine Ripley, "No Place for Woman, Would Release Young Men," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 1942.

²Public Law 554, Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, 14 May 1942.

³Public Law 554.

⁴Staff writer, "Topkick Takes Pride in Tampa WAC MP's," *Tampa Times*, 4 January 1944.

⁵Robert Lee Scott Jr., "God is My Co-Pilot," Warner Bros. Film, 1945

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, he was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to CID, and finished his career working cold cases.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Kevin Vereen	Larry Orvis		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
Kevin Vereen	Brian Flom	Joel Fitz	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Brian Bisacre	Michael Bennett	Mark Arnold	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Duane Miller	Brian Flom		Army Corrections Cmd (ACC)	Alexandria, VA
Michael Stone	Jody Arrington		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Marian Garcia	Craig Owens	Robert Combs	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Martin Pennock	Gerald Schmell		2d Bde, 102d Division, 80th Tng Cmd	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Michelle Goyette	William Mayfield		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
John Hafley	Anthony Kresta		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Robert Arnold	Gregory Kleinholz		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Caroline Horton	William Ramsey		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jon Myers	Veronica Knapp		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Timothy MacDonlad	Shawn Klosterman		18th MP Bde	Vilseck, Germany
Omar Lomas	Norman Laird		42d MP Bde	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Craig Maceri	Robert Wall		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Robert Paoletti	Andraus Williams		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Richard Ball	Veronica Regalbuti		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Hector Herrera	Jose Perez		92d MP Bde	San Juan, PR
Scott Hiipakka	Catherine Farrell		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
David Samuelson	John Jenkins		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Kelly Jones	Lawrence Canada		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Vincent Duncan	Anthony Simpson		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Darcy Overbey	Jeffrey Baker		3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Kevin Hanrahan	Scott Painter	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Kirt Boston	Pete Harrington	Celia Gallo	701st MP Gp (CID)	Quantico, VA
Steven Yamashita	Casey Freeman		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

Christopher Minor	Jeffrey Culberson		2-80th MP Bn (TASS)	Owings Mill, MD
Robert Hogue	James Lamberson		2-95th MP Bn (TASS)	Baton Rouge, LA
Benjamin Hach	Jeffrey Caquelin		2-100th MP Bn (TASS)	Nashville, TN
David Minaschek	Jason Rhue		2-104th MP Bn (TASS)	Aurora, CO
Jeffrey Hill	Kermit Cook		2-108th MP Bn (TASS)	Ft Jackson, SC
Jessie Brewster	Nathaniel Reagin	Veronica Ferrer	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Brian Bettis	Elvis Rodriguez	Anderson Wagner	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Christopher Rivers	James Miller	John Lemke	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Franklin Dennis	Brice Rae	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Melissa Cantwell	Anthony Christianson	Anthony Caprietta	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Justin Towell	Richard Carroll		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Matthew Hoffman	Mark Haliburton		40th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Erika Perry	Michael Montrose		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Matthew Leblanc	Charles Smith		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Timothy Johnson	Joseph Jonas		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Douglas Curtis	Matthew Selvaggio		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Jason Coughenour	Marcus Mitchell		96th MP Bn (C/D)	San Diego, CA
Joshua Campbell	Daniel Leasor		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Matthew Schaffer	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (C/D)	Auburn, NY
Marshall Hunt	Javier Lugo		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Bryan McIlvaine	Jim Hummel		105th MP Bn (C/D)	Asheville, NC
Robert Bartran III	Craig Payne		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Charles Taylor	Franklin Lynn		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
John Kinton	Michael Plemons		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Michael Cote	Anthony Atella		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Josue Mercado Rosado	Luis Cora		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Michael Perez	Matthew Lamonica		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Bobby Britton	Abraham Hinojosa		143rd MP Bn (Det)	Lancaster, CA
Dawn Bolyard	James Summers		151st MP Bn	Gassaway, WV
Mark Campbell	Robert Rose	Kevin Grimes	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
Jeffrey Hill	Fredinal Chisholm		160th MP Bn (C/D)	Tallahassee, FL
Brad Pierson	Tony Bruno		165th MP Bn	Annnville, PA
Richie Gammons	Harold Cook		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
James Collie	James Scott		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Joy Grimes	Patrick Cunningham		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Peter Lewis	Ian Bones		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Matthew Boski	Jimmy Smith		192d MP Bn (C/D)	Niantic, CT
Alyssa Aarhaus	Chelsea Marx		193d MP Bn (C/D)	Denver, CO
John Blackburn	Daniel Truex		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Todd Wheeler	Robert Pickett		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Scott Turner	Gabe Medina		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Russel Harden	Ed Williams		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
Richard Cipro	Sean Ready		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Daniel Olson	Luis Tellez		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
Robert Collins	Michael Smith		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Jason Small	Jeffrey Whitworth		304th MP Bn (C/D)	Nashville, TN
Christopher Kidd	Paul Duros		310th MP Bn (C/D)	Uniondale, NY
Jack Gray	Fred Waymire		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Jason Nagel	Reza Hajipour		324th MP Bn (C/D)	Fresno, CA
Porfirio Campos-Cruz	Mike Mega		327th MP Bn (C/D)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Farabaugh	Sammie McCall		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
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John McFarland	Michael Lacuesta		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
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Jason Ruffin	Anthony Quinonez	David Knudson	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
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Steven Collins	Benjamin Radke		402d MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Audrey Fielding	Robert Carr		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
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Robert Rodock	Justin Shad		705th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
John Copeland	Joshua Kreitzer		709th MP Bn	Vilseck, Germany
Christopher Church	William Shoaf		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Michael Capps	Wayne Butterbrodt		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
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Emma Thyen	George Julch		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
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Jamon Junius	Michael Odle		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
William Karlage	Reginald Smith		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Joshua McCully	Nicholas Kreiner	Martin Eaves	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
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Current as of 6 September 2019

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DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence G-3/Directorate of Training and Doctrine			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	9 Apr 19	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. Status: Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	28 Apr 14	A manual that addresses detainee operations across the range of military operations and provides detainee operations guidance for commanders and staffs. Status: Under revision. Projected publication in 4th quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2019.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. Status: Under revision. Projected publication in 1st quarter of FY 21.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	13 May 19	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations that support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. Status: Current.

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence

G-3/Directorate of Training and Doctrine

Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
ATP 3-39.30	Security and Mobility Support	30 Oct 14	<p>A manual that provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all echelons a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support in support of decisive action. The tasks in this manual are primarily focused on applying military police combat power in support of the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions.</p> <p>Status: Under revision. Projected publication in 2d quarter of FY 20.</p>
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	<p>A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications.</p> <p>Status: Current.</p>
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	<p>A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil-disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities.</p> <p>Status: Current.</p>
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	<p>A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations.</p> <p>Status: Current.</p>
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	<p>A manual that provides guidance for protective-service missions and the management of protective-service details.</p> <p>Status: Current.</p>
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leader's Handbook	11 Aug 15	<p>A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. It provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations.</p> <p>Status: Current.</p>
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	<p>A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle.</p> <p>Status: Current.</p>
<p>Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@mail.mil>.</p>			
Emerging Publications			
ATP 3-39.21	Tactical Employment of Expeditionary Forensics	To be published	<p>A multi-Service forensics TTP that will support planners and warfighters by establishing TTP for tactical-level commanders, staffs, small-unit leaders, and Skill Level 1 collectors. This publication will detail the six forensic functions of recognize, preserve, collect, analyze, store, and share in support of operations and exploitation activities across the force.</p> <p>Status: Under development. Projected publication in 2d quarter of FY 20.</p>



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