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

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Back cover original photograph: SPC Dustin Biven, 22d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Donna W. Martin

Team,

It's been almost a year since I assumed the position as the 49th Commandant and Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, and I can hardly believe how much I've learned and still have to learn about the Regiment. During the past few months, I have focused on proponency roles and responsibilities, while limiting and balancing requests for my time that required substantial traveling. The regimental team is proud of the work performed here at the Home of Regiment with our efforts to provide capability to maneuver commanders. We read every situational report submitted by our outstanding brigade and group commanders, and we are proud of your accomplishments. The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) staff has been extremely methodical in conducting a detailed doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) assessment; and as the Chief of your Regiment, I want to share the highlights of this assessment with you and give an overview of where we are as a Corps and where we anticipate going in the future.

Doctrine

We are staffing Field Manual (FM) 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, to incorporate FM 3-0, *Operations*.[1, 2] It has become clear that today's operational environment presents threats to the Army and joint force that are significantly more serious in terms of capability and magnitude than those we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the maneuver commanders with whom I have interacted have expressed a desire that combat support elements be well versed in FM 3-0 and understand the operating environment. I couldn't agree more. As a military police force, we exist to support maneuver commanders in accomplishing their objective of closing with and destroying the enemy. To maintain our relevancy, build communication, and synchronize with combat arms, I heavily encourage leaders at all levels to educate themselves on the terminology and methods expressed in FM 3-0. Stay in touch with the forthcoming changes in FM 3-39 in order to be the subject matter experts our Soldiers expect and deserve. We are updating lesson plans and programs of instruction (POIs) to incorporate multidomain battle and large-scale combat operations as quickly as possible.

Organization

We are in the infant stages of initiating a force design update to "organize for purpose" and to provide additional capability to our formations. To better support the force with policing and protection across the range of military operations, the Military Police Regiment is reviewing organizational designs of military police formations and their capabilities and military police headquarters across the military police disciplines to ensure optimal "organization for purpose," with the right versatility to achieve mission sets. There will be more to follow as this initiative matures.

Training

Leaders are planning and executing creative and high-payoff training events that enhance and highlight Soldier readiness and capabilities. In particular, I have noted that training events that require coordination with partner or ally forces, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve elements, and other military occupational specialty friendly forces have a more realistic setting. When the next conflict erupts, it stands to reason that we will fight as one Army: Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve—and I am extremely pleased to see multicomponent training taking place in many locations around the world.

Materiel

During the Senior Leaders Conference in September 2017, we discussed the armored security vehicle (ASV) replacement. Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Daniel B. Allyn, directed the divestment of the ASV in 2028. To provide security and mobility support during large-scale combat operations, the future replacement platform must provide appropriate

levels of survivability, mobility, and lethality to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III threats. On 4 January 2018, the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV) heavy gun carrier as the replacement vehicle for the ASV. The Army Requirements Oversight Council directed an assessment of the ASV life cycle to determine if an interim solution is required and to present the findings to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Financial Management (G-8) by September 2018. The important message here is that the Regiment must continue to train and certify our crews on the equipment on hand. Our readiness depends upon it.

Leadership and Education

I'm so proud of the work being done at USAMPS to incorporate current doctrine into our POIs. The process of updating POIs is not as easy as most think—or as I thought prior to taking the Commandant position. While it is relatively easy to make small changes to the lesson plans, it takes almost 18 months to change and upload significantly altered POIs. By 30 September, all of our POIs will be updated and complete.

Personnel

In an effort to increase USAMPS effectiveness when working with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command processes, we identified a need for broadening officers and noncommissioned officers. The need to understand and take U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command assignments is crucial to the ability to make an impact and get things done, much like taking a Pentagon assignment is to understanding how the Army runs. We must change the Regiment's culture—being assigned to these organizations is not a career ender. We are fortunate to have a civilian workforce at USAMPS that can assist with the education of our future force and provide an enduring continuity.

Facilities

In an effort to continually emphasize our military police training facilities at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri (in accordance with the Chief of Staff's desire to find efficiencies throughout the Army), I have communicated with our sister Services (Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force) information about the facilities and training capacity at Fort Leonard Wood. To this effort, we at USAMPS have looked at reviewing the design of new facilities to potentially become a part of an expanding military police footprint. We are also incorporating the Department of the Army Civilian Police Academy within the Military Police Investigations Division footprint. In addition, USAMPS is increasing crime scene investigations classroom space to overcome structure and facility shortfalls, setting the stage for future criminal intelligence capabilities.

Conclusion

I hope this overview provides a better understanding of what your regimental team has been working toward this past quarter and how we envision accomplishing future goals for the benefit of the Regiment. Continue to lift where you stand, bringing maneuver commanders greater understanding of our capabilities. Thank you for what you do every day in support of our amazing Soldiers of this great Regiment!

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, to be published.

[2]FM 3-0, *Operations*, 6 October 2017.

Of the Troops, For the Troops!
Army Strong!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major James W. Breckinridge

Greetings to all from the Home of the Regiment.

It's hard to believe that it has been a year since I assumed duties as your 13th Regimental Command Sergeant Major. As stated before, I am truly humbled and honored to serve you and your Families as we continue to build readiness and preserve the force. In this article, I would like to share with you a few nuggets of knowledge for your rucksack.

With continuing efforts to promote an increase in aptitude and the professionalization of the enlisted force, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) reached an articulation agreement with Central Texas College for an associate's degree in criminal justice, which will result in a total of 25–33 hours of college credit depending upon skill level (1–4). This good-news story is a result of partnering efforts with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Human Resources Command under the Army Credentialing, Continued Education Degree Program. This partnership is an initiative for all Soldiers to receive appropriate credit for military training, education, and experience, which is transferable across the Army and civilian workforce. Articulation agreements with other colleges and universities have started in order to provide military police enlisted Soldiers plenty of options for a degree plan that works best for them!

The new Distributed Leader Course (DLC), which will replace Structured Self-Development, is scheduled to be released on 14 June 2018. The current plan is for DLC I to be released first and the remaining DLCs to be released in 4-month increments after that. The Army is changing the name and the content and providing a modern look and feel for today's Soldier. The content is being fully redesigned, with multiple-guess testing coming to a well-deserved end. Soldiers will spend less time trying to game the system and more time trying to work their way through the situational training in the modules. Once complete, the DLCs will consist of six levels. Soldiers will be automatically enrolled upon completion of initial military training and each noncommissioned officer professional military education course. Additionally, there are two other key changes coming with the new DLC. First, DLC courses can be completed without a common access card; the DLC final examinations will require Soldiers to log in with their common access cards. Second, DLC final examinations will produce a grade (percentage) that will be placed on the new Department of the Army Form 1059, *Service School Academic Evaluation Report*, which is scheduled to be released on 1 October 2018.[1]

Next, I would like to discuss the Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education Course (SEJPME). SEJPME is offered in two courses (I and II). SEJPME I and II are 100 percent online, Web-based courses that use multimedia instruction. I recommend that all noncommissioned officers complete both courses, especially if they have aspirations to become sergeants major. SEJPME I and II are required for entrance into the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas.

SEJPME I is a 40-hour, stand-alone course. The course contains a pretest, 11 modules of instruction, section knowledge checks (quizzes), module feedback forms, and a final examination. In order to receive a completion certificate, all learning modules and knowledge checks must be completed, a minimum grade of 80 percent on the final examination must be achieved, and a completed electronic course evaluation and feedback form are required. Personnel eligible for SEJPME I include sergeants and above, warrant officers, commissioned officers, and U.S. federal government civilian personnel of equivalent grade.

SEJPME II is a 45-hour, stand-alone course that builds upon SEJPME I, which should be completed before taking SEJPME II. The course contains a pretest, 25 modules of instruction, lesson knowledge checks (quizzes), module examinations, and module feedback forms. In order to progress from one module to the next, all lessons and knowledge checks must be completed, a minimum examination grade of 80 percent on the module examination must be achieved, and a completed electronic module evaluation and feedback form are required. All modules, examinations, and feedback forms must be completed in order to receive a course completion certificate. Personnel eligible for SEJPME II include sergeants first class and above, warrant officers, commissioned officers, and U.S. federal government civilian personnel of equivalent grade.

I urge you to visit the Army Career Tracker Web site at <https://actnow.army.mil> and to frequently check the enlisted military police community page to view policy updates and initiatives that the Military Police Regiment is working. I highly encourage you to become a member of the community. As a member, you will receive messages when updates are available from the Army Career Tracker portal. The Career Management Field 31 community page helps Soldiers stay informed about what is going on within the Regiment. I would also like to have your feedback on the community page itself. Does it have everything it should have? If it is missing something important, please let us know. That is all part of increasing communication with the field.

We have submitted our request to TRADOC and have started initial planning for the 3d Annual Military Police Competitive Challenge, which is tentatively scheduled for 16–18 September 2018 at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. This event will recognize the Regiment's best Soldier (private–specialist) and noncommissioned officer (corporal–sergeant first class) over a 3-day competition. This competition is open to all Military Occupational Specialty 31 series Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers. We will send the operations order with annexes to the field once TRADOC approval is received, which we expect no later than 15 April 2018. We are looking forward to another great competition!

Lastly, I would like to take a few seconds to recognize a military police noncommissioned officer out in the field doing great things for our Noncommissioned Officer Corps and the Army. Master Sergeant Hardenio M. Abdon Jr., U.S. Army–Europe (USAREUR) Military Working Dog (MWD) program manager, recently won first place in the USAREUR Professional Writing Competition. His article, "USAREUR Military Working Dog Strongest Link," captures USAREUR efforts in bridging the gap between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Europe, and U.S. Army canine assets in the combined efforts to defeat the device and attack the network. The USAREUR MWD program is currently the "top" MWD program in the Army due to Master Sergeant Abdon's and Mr. Duane Stinson's extensive efforts with coalition partner interoperability and MWD certification. This is a true testament to Master Sergeant Abdon's professionalism and willingness to exceed the standard.

Again, I am honored to serve in this great Regiment, and I remain committed to providing viable solutions to the Army as it affects the Military Police Corps and our enlisted population.

Endnote:

[1]Department of the Army Form 1059, *Service School Academic Evaluation Report*, to be published.

Of the Troops, For the Troops.
Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Joel Fitz

We live in precarious times. The threat of military engagement continues to rise as certain nation states challenge the resolve of the United States to protect ourselves and our allies. Responses to natural disasters and terrorist threats against the homeland have challenged the capability of our military, federal, and civilian law enforcement and emergency management agencies. In addition, we need to prepare for future warfare that will likely involve a near-peer competitor who will challenge the way we've engaged in combat the last 16 years. Through these situations, we clearly recognize the necessity to be prepared for the unknown. Part of preparing for any contingency is to evaluate current capabilities, capacity, organizational structure, and overall ability to meet mission requirements. This is where we stand as a Regiment—evaluating our preparedness or readiness for what lies ahead. Are we adequately organized, equipped, manned, and appropriately trained to be effective?

Evaluating effectiveness, which requires that we look at ourselves critically and analyze and assess whether we are defining and meeting Army expectations, can be uncomfortable. Certain functions of our Regiment (policing, investigations, and corrections) are meeting those expectations without question. But what about our role in support of the maneuver force? Are we prepared to provide site exploitation, forensic support, criminal intelligence, logistic security, and war crime investigative support? As we take on the tough task of evaluating ourselves, the experiences of those across the Regiment are critical to the discussion and will certainly play a key role in developing concepts and courses of action.

One thing that makes this process somewhat difficult is the lack of doctrine, formal policy, and standard operating procedures for some of the functions that we need to develop or expand. For example, military police forces have conducted logistic security operations and detainee investigations without the availability of formalized doctrine to govern and standardize the processes used for the last 16 years. This is where the experiences of those who have planned, organized, and conducted these missions becomes essential. It may be necessary to draw from past experience to develop doctrine that codifies processes and procedures that are relevant for future operations. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) and military police units produced internal documents to define mission requirements and establish operational procedures. These documents contain vital information and provide a starting point for developing doctrine. We encourage leaders at all levels to locate and protect unit digital and print archives and be prepared to provide access to those archives when requested.

The October publication of Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, presents some additional challenges when attempting to define our mission.[1] Although there are several references to the Military Police Corps, many facets of the mission are implied and not explicitly defined. The challenge then is to interpret the Army's expectations of the Regiment from references addressing threats at home and on the battlefield. There can be no confusion—detention operations are a central part of this new guidance. However, how do we protect deploying unit assets as they prepare to deploy? And what is the expectation when referring to defending "against enemy use of terror or criminal activity to complicate operations . . . at home station, ports of embarkation, in transit to theater, and upon arrival at ports of debarkation," especially when military police may have limited capability and authority to preempt attacks?[2]

When you hear that the task of defining our mission and restructuring our force to meet Army expectations is daunting, it is absolutely true. There are many moving parts to this process, and we must all be willing to provide input—especially those of us with the requisite training and experience. Whether developing expeditionary forensics, criminal intelligence, wet-gap crossing, host nation police training, or logistical security operations, we all play a role. Some of these functions are CID-centric, and some are combat support-related, but they all overlap on the future battlefield. We will be required to rely on each other to successfully complete the mission. Coming together now, as we decipher Army expectations and begin to shape the Regiment of the future, is absolutely imperative. I encourage you to help shape the future by providing input, engaging in discussions, and helping to collectively reinforce the present.

Endnotes:

[1]Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, 6 October 2017.

[2]Ibid.

Do What Has To Be Done—Assist, Protect, Defend!

Joint Analytic Real-Time Virtual Information-Sharing System

By Mr. Patrick B. Dundon

Background

Following the tragic shootings in Fort Hood, Texas, and Chattanooga, Tennessee, it was determined that the Army needed a better process for quickly sharing unclassified threat information. To satisfy this demand, the Antiterrorism Division, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), developed a requirement for a Web-based system that could be fielded to all corners of the Army. The solution was achieved with the piloting of the Joint Analytic Real-Time Virtual Information-Sharing System (JARVISS) on 1 October 2016. After a review of commercial and government systems, a commercial, off-the-shelf product was selected based on its capabilities, flexibility, and ability to best meet the Army's specifications. Following successful pilots that tested the capabilities of JARVISS, the system was approved for Army-wide deployment upon completion of a U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command security assessment.

JARVISS addresses four major objectives as determined by a Fort Hood independent review, which found that the Department of Defense (DOD) lacks force protection processes and procedures for sharing real-time threat information between commands, installations, and stand-alone facilities. JARVISS—

- Improves real-time threat information-sharing capabilities across the Army.
- Improves threat information-sharing capabilities to all Army stand-alone facilities.
- Enhances the Army's threat assessment and analysis capabilities.
- Enhances the Army's ability to analyze threat information and suspicious activity reports.

JARVISS can best be described as a threat common operational picture, but the system also contains a wealth of information to benefit law enforcement, criminal analysts, emergency management personnel, and operations planners. Functioning as a threat common operational picture, JARVISS is an intuitive system that requires minimal training. The system dashboard uses advanced analytic algorithms and commercial analysts to provide users with threat information originating from more than 80,000 open sources, including social media, news media, local municipality services, commercial businesses, and government sources. The threat information is geo-located, providing users with the distance to the closest Army assets. The workspace functions can be used for detailed analysis, allowing full system users the ability to conduct crime, threat, or emergency management analysis. The workspace features a number of data layers that full users can configure to display information for their specific requirements. JARVISS will be hosted on an approved DOD government cloud service provider accredited by the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command risk management framework process. The risk management framework accreditation enables JARVISS to store controlled unclassified information and for-official-use-only data, to include data with the law-enforcement-sensitive caveat.

Capabilities

The JARVISS platform analyzes data from a myriad of sources, immediately prioritizing threats based on locally developed or command-specified criteria. In addition, the system immediately correlates threats to the closest Army assets and provides notifications of potentially affected personnel and assets. The JARVISS system delivers the following features:

- Data accessed from 20 social media sources.
- Machine translation of more than 200 languages as well as organic analyst translation of the 12 most globally spoken languages.
- Active global data-scrapes of news and blogs with more than 80,000 sources reviewed daily.
- Off-post local/regional crime data from the SpotCrime service, which allows users to look at crime data for trend analysis and planning purposes. (This is specifically beneficial to stand-alone facilities and commands with leased assets.)
- Instant information on natural hazards, weather, and international travel warnings (connected directly to sensor feeds from multiple natural-disaster reporting sources).
- Data from the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program, Department of Homeland Security, which provides antiterrorism and emergency management planners with information on local infrastructure and utilities.
- A listing of local and global emergency management points of contact and a listing of associated elected officials for locations in the United States.
- Detailed geographic information system data with installation building footprints, infrastructure, and boundaries to provide installation planners and emergency responders with detailed information.

- Global geospatial data on points of interests, local demographics, emergency management facilities (hospitals, Drug Enforcement Administration offices, Federal Bureau of Investigation offices, police stations, fire stations), and potential soft targets (tourist attractions, hotels, restaurants) for use in planning.
- A historical archive of threat, terrorism, criminal, and suspicious activity incidents for up to 15 years, depending on the specific data set.

The system is configured to display all critical data (type, time/date, location) of specific events or incidents (suspicious activity, suspicious objects, suspicious substances, bomb threats, chemical incidents, explosions, hazardous incidents, power outages, radiological incidents, transportation incidents). These events or incidents are geospatially tagged and referenced in relation to Army assets.

Future Additions

Upon receiving risk management framework accreditation and the granting of authority to operate, the JARVISS team will include other DOD and U.S. government data sets on the platform. Among these datasets are—

- Army Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (ALERTS).
- Computer-aided dispatch.
- Law enforcement reporting systems from the other Services.
- Homeland Security Information Network, Department of Homeland Security.
- Host nation law enforcement tracking systems.
- Individual antiterrorism plans.
- Open-source centers.

JARVISS has an application program interface for integration and data sharing with existing DOD and federal systems. This provides the capability to input data from government and commercial databases (Army Mapper, Army iWatch, Web Emergency Operations Center) at local installations without collecting and/or storing personally identifiable information.

Users

JARVISS will be fielded to more than 45,000 end users in the Army with various access rights based upon their responsibilities. Full user licenses will be issued primarily to antiterrorism and law enforcement communities, emergency planners, and the operational Army. The full user license provides the full functionality of JARVISS, allowing users to receive immediate threat notifications, report incidents, conduct planning, and conduct analysis using a number of different data layers. A concurrent license for the basic user has also been developed to provide the same full user capabilities for watch officers and operations centers. Multiple personnel share a single account license. The basic user license is intended for users who will not need the analytic capabilities of JARVISS but will only require threat notifications and the ability to report incidents. Basic users include antiterrorism coordinators, designated unit personnel, and stand-alone facility personnel. Stand-alone facilities (recruiting centers, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve locations, Reserve Officer Training Corps detachments, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers offices) will directly benefit from JARVISS by receiving threat information on any commercial computer system or smartphone (through the use of a mobile application).

Feedback from users in the field has been positive, specifically highlighting the information immediately available for real-time events. The system has provided timely notification of multiple incidents that have had a potential effect on Army assets and Army personnel. The ability to quickly identify nearby Army assets has been cited as extremely useful and has allowed JARVISS users to quickly notify nearby facilities of events occurring in real time. JARVISS has consistently provided a notification of threat incidents well in advance of major media sources, giving Army leaders an opportunity to respond quickly.

Implementation and Operational Use

The Antiterrorism Division ran multiple pilots of the JARVISS platform in 2017, achieving program objectives and exceeding the participants' expectations. JARVISS demonstrated the ability to notify users within minutes of a threat or event in their local area or area of interest. During the first 2 months of the initial pilot, JARVISS alerted the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the U.S. Army Cadet Command about the Ohio State University knife attack and relayed the threat information to nearby assets for situational awareness.

The U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York, employed JARVISS as a threat assessment tool before the 2016 and 2017 Army-Navy football games, using it during the games to monitor threats in and around Baltimore, Maryland, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The Army Operations Center began using JARVISS in April 2017—just in time for the hurricane season and severe-weather impacts on Army assets throughout the Caribbean and the southeastern United States. The system was valuable in its ability to geo-correlate Army assets in relation to the projected path of the storm and provide a myriad of associated reporting from social media and other sources.

The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division liaison assigned to the Military District of Washington utilized JARVISS during the 2017 Presidential Inauguration to monitor threats throughout the event.

JARVISS alerted the Army Threat Integration Center 10 minutes before national news media began reporting the London terror attack near London Bridge and the Borough Market on 3 June 2017.

The Antiterrorism Division, OPMG, used JARVISS to directly support an open-post event at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, over the Independence Day holiday. The event was attended by approximately 25,000 military personnel, dependents, and civilians.

Screenshot of JARVISS

Screenshots showing the JARVISS applicaton on a cellphone

By special request, the JARVISS team supported two important engagements. From 25 to 27 July 2017, the Army Antiterrorism Division provided JARVISS support to the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) antiterrorism officers ahead of initial fielding in the Pacific Command area of responsibility. Representatives from Korea, Japan, and other USARPAC locations attended and received in-depth training on JARVISS and provided USARPAC-specific requirements for the configuration of JARVISS. In addition to user training, breakout sessions were held to develop specific configuration requirements.

Law Enforcement Functionality

The JARVISS team worked closely with Army stakeholders to configure the law enforcement data within JARVISS to assist with reporting and analysis requirements. The Law Enforcement and Antiterrorism Divisions, OPMG, met with the Installation Management Command, Law Enforcement Division, and users from Fort Drum, New York; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) to determine what law enforcement-related data from ALERTS and computer-aided dispatch was appropriate for JARVISS. All data pulled into JARVISS from these systems is scrubbed in order to exclude personally identifiable information to prevent any legal objections. This data will be in a stand-alone JARVISS law-enforcement-sensitive portal, restricted to approved full users with a verified need to access law-enforcement-sensitive data. The inclusion of this data in JARVISS will provide geospatial location data to assist law enforcement personnel in the analysis of historical crime data and in the real-time tracking of incidents. This functionality will include the ability to generate tailored reports, fulfilling requests from OPMG and directorate of emergency services personnel at the installation and headquarter levels. Law enforcement users of JARVISS will be able to view installation and off-post crime data overlaid on an installation map, with detailed geospatial data outlining building footprints and other points of interest. This information can be displayed in a number of ways, to include pin mapping and hot-spot mapping for the installation as a whole or by patrol zone. The law enforcement tab in the system allows users to automatically generate crime reports that display crime data over a specified period and detailed information on specific offenses. These functions within JARVISS have been designed to save time for military police users and standardize reporting within the Army.

Threat Reports and Vignettes

The JARVISS team, in conjunction with the Army Threat Integration Center, has worked to prepare threat and incident updates for major events with an impact on Army assets and interests. These reports will be sent out to the field and can be requested through the Army Threat Integration Center or the JARVISS team. In advance of Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma, the JARVISS team produced and forwarded a list of potentially impacted Army assets to aid command emergency and response planners. In addition, the Antiterrorism Division prepared a collection of vignettes that highlight the operational uses of JARVISS during major events.

The Way Ahead

The Antiterrorism Division and JARVISS team are collaborating to fulfill improvement recommendations made by the pilot participants. User interface updates will enhance the ability to meet the specific needs of the following communities of interest:

- Antiterrorism personnel.
- Law enforcement personnel.
- Warfighters.
- Emergency services.
- Defense support to civil agencies.

JARVISS has undergone a number of processes to ensure that the system is fully accredited for use in DOD and across the federal government. These steps will allow JARVISS to store and receive any sensitive but unclassified data from Army and DOD law enforcement information systems (ALERTS) and data from other U.S. government agencies (Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice). Additionally, the Army Antiterrorism Division has coordinated with the Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office to ensure compliance with privacy requirements. The JARVISS concept of operations legal review was completed by the Office of General Counsel and the Office of the Judge Advocate General on 20 June 2017 with no legal objections. JARVISS has strict security controls and an approved methodology to ensure that the system operates in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements.

The JARVISS fielding plan called for beginning Army-wide deployment of the system during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2018, targeting Army commands, supporting commands, and direct reporting units in a collective manner. The fielding plan prioritizes locations based upon mission criticality. During fielding, the Antiterrorism Division will travel and conduct a detailed system configuration and provide training to all user groups on the installation, to include stand-alone facilities in the area.

For additional information about JARVISS, contact the JARVISS team at <usarmy.pentagon.hqda.mbx.jarviss @mail.mil>, (703) 695-6216, or (571) 256-4786 (project manager).

Mr. Dundon is the senior security analyst in the Antiterrorism Division, OPMG, and the program manager for JARVISS. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with 25 years of service.

Synchronizing Operations Across the CJOA-A

By Major Early Howard Jr.

"In a time of modern warfare, [joint warfare] is requiring joint exercises or operations to deter the enemy. But with regard to conducting joint warfare, the Army doesn't talk to the Air force. The Navy doesn't talk to the Army."

—Andrew Yang[1]

Introduction

Following key and developmental time as a battalion operations staff officer and executive officer, a military police field grade officer has several options available to round out his or her experience before competing for lieutenant colonel and centralized selection list command opportunities. Following key and developmental positions at Fort Hood, Texas, I was selected to deploy on a worldwide individual augmentation system tasker as an advisor, working with the Afghan police. This was a great opportunity and broadening assignment; it filled a gap in my joint experience, provided experience in Afghanistan, and contributed to a strategically important mission.

Upon arrival in Kabul, I was assigned to the Resolute Support (RS) Headquarters as the chief of operations in the Combined Joint Operations Center (CJOC), an atypical assignment for a military police officer. I was responsible for leading a joint and multinational team at a four-star headquarters in a deployed environment. The chief of operations position required me to monitor, report, and provide support to all joint and multinational operations across the Combined Joint Operations Area–Afghanistan (CJOA-A). Operational success depended upon my knowledge and employment of joint functions, shared understanding, and synchronized operations across the CJOA-A.

Knowledge and Employment of Joint Functions

Knowledge of joint warfighting doctrine is essential to the relevance of a field grade officer. *Joint functions* refers to related capabilities and activities placed into the six basic groups of mission command, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations.[2] The most utilized joint functions in the CJOC were fires, sustainment, and intelligence, which were employed while conducting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) train, advise, and assist mission.

To employ fires is to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific effect on a target.[3] The U.S. Air Force led the Joint Effects Coordination Cell and formed a Joint Air/Ground Integration Center to provide fixed-wing close air support and conduct air space management across the CJOA-A.

Sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the joint force commander to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.[4] The U.S. Army and Air Force managed the Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell, which supported combined and joint operations. The Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell focused on the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater to conduct medical evacuation and movement of sick and wounded personnel.[5] Since the addition of extra helicopters and forward surgical hospitals in 2009, the length of medical evacuation missions remains less than 1 hour.[6]

The U.S. Navy led a multinational team to conduct intelligence operations and help the commander understand the operational environment. The intelligence function supports this understanding with analysis of the operational environment to inform joint force commanders about adversary capabilities, centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, and future courses of action and to help commanders and staffs understand and map friendly, neutral, and threat networks.[7]

Shared Understanding

In the CJOC, systems were developed to manage the processing and dissemination of information to and from the chain of command. These systems included—

- **Managing information.** Information management is an essential process that involves receiving, organizing, storing, controlling, and securing a wide range of data and information for an organization. It facilitates availability to relevant users to develop understanding through knowledge sharing, while concurrently preventing inadvertent disclosure of sensitive or proprietary information.[8] The classification of information and appropriate clearances

of a multinational CJOC were topics that were constantly addressed.

- **Sharing knowledge.** Commanders and staff require information to make decisions, and the knowledge and understanding that result in wisdom are essential to sound decision making.[9] In the CJOC, point papers, briefings, and strategic storyboards were developed and submitted to subordinate units and higher headquarters, such as the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, for knowledge sharing. Joint Force Command Brunssum has oversight of the NATO-RS mission in Afghanistan, which results in dual hats for the RS commander, currently General John W. Nicholson.[10]
- **Making decisions.** The most important step in building a shared understanding is making decisions about what information to share. Unless given specific guidance from the CJOC director or the combined joint operations, the decision about what information to share resides with the chief of operations. We developed comprehensive standard operating procedures to ensure a deliberate, cross-organizational and functional approach to gaining, sharing, and maintaining knowledge that facilitated understanding.

Synchronized Operations

The CJOC contained several sections with senior officers who ultimately reported to me. A key requirement of working on a joint staff is serving as a team player. Leaders become less reliant on the direct leadership style that is effective at company, battalion, and brigade staff levels. The best field grade officers exhibit a keen sense of organizational and consensus-building leadership, which is essential at the senior-most echelons.

As the chief of operations, I relied heavily on interpersonal communication skills, the ability to "lead up," and a joint doctrine foundation developed at the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Reputation as part of a large staff is incredibly important; to be successful, an officer must start building a positive reputation on Day 1. Positive attitude, teamwork, and preparation are essential. The joint world is a long way from the battalion, where the military police major is the undisputed expert. I had to be humble and hard working to earn my spot as a trusted advisor to the commander. Most importantly, I had to personally develop myself in order to prepare for this new post-key and developmental role.

Leading the CJOC team required that I utilize the tenets of multinational operations of respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, and trust and confidence to be effective. Trust and confidence are essential to synergy and harmony within the joint force and with multinational partners.[11] I mainly focused on this tenet.

Teaching and coaching young officers and noncommissioned officers to think, write, and develop products at the operational and strategic levels were significant challenges. The language and cultural differences within the team sometimes slowed response times to subordinate and higher headquarters. Personal engagement was consistently needed to ensure that the commander's vision, guidance, and expectations were understood and disseminated. The process of giving guidance, restating expectations, and verifying product accuracy became very routine. During my tenure, I stumbled often but for every failure and for every mistake, there were many more successes.[12]

Conclusion

As the RS Headquarters chief of operations, operational success depended upon my knowledge and employment of joint functions, shared understanding, and synchronized operations across the CJOA-A. As military police officers, we should continue to seek positions that require us to challenge traditional career path orthodoxy, think creatively, act independently, and showcase our knowledge and understanding within the combined/joint arena through deliberate talent management.[13] Military police who are performing well within the joint environment add value and relevance to the joint force commander and the Military Police Regiment in order to develop strategic-level leaders.

Endnotes:

[1]"Taiwan Works on Defense Strategy in the Event of Attack from China," *CNN*, 6 November 2000, <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/11/05/taiwan.military/index.html>, accessed on 1 February 2018.

[2]Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, January 2017, p. III-1.

[3]Ibid., p. III-26.

[4]Ibid., p. III-43.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of A Secretary at War*, Random House, New York, May 2015, pp. 304–305.

[7]Joint Publication 3-0, p. III-23.

[8]Ibid., p. III-15.

[9]Ibid., p. III-14.

[10]Ibid., p. III-15.

[11]Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, July 2013, p. I-4.

[12]William H. McRaven, *Make Your Bed: Little Things That Can Change Your Life and Maybe the World*, Grand Central Publishing, New York, April 2017, p. 54.

[13]Tim Kane, *Bleeding Talent: How the US Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It's Time for A Revolution*, Palgrave and Macmillan Publishers, New York, December 2012, pp. 17–18.

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Lessons Learned as a Platoon Leader at NTC

By First Lieutenant Elaniea L. Jinks

As warfare has evolved, the relationship between maneuver arms commanders and military police leaders has drawn closer. Now more than ever, junior military police leaders must have the ability to articulate our capabilities to supported senior commanders and execute military police mission-essential tasks with confidence and proficiency. Junior military police leaders who are equipped with domain knowledge and who are competent in their craft have the power to significantly impact the outcome of the overall mission and gain the consistent respect of combat arms commanders.

During National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 17-01, the 401st Military Police Company supported the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. Before the NTC rotation, the 401st was aligned with the 3d Brigade Engineer Battalion. The 401st military police commander planned training events alongside the 3d Brigade Engineer Battalion in order to synchronize training between the two units and facilitate a smooth transition into NTC operations. The 401st Military Police Company was separated once on the ground. One full-strength platoon was pushed into the training area with the brigade tactical operations center to conduct detainee operations at a detainee collection point or detainee holding area. The other platoon and the headquarters element were pushed into the training area with the combat support sustainment battalion (CSSB). These decisions were delayed; subsequently, the 401st was notified of our tactical control relationship just hours before we left the logistics supply area.

My platoon was assigned to the CSSB, an Army National Guard sustainment battalion that doesn't typically deploy far into the training area. However, on Rotation 17-01, the CSSB was pushed farther out to provide maximum logistics support. The 154th Transportation Company, also under the CSSB, operated in the logistics supply area. My platoon conducted routine convoy security missions for the CSSB with the transportation company and operated as a quick-reaction element to protect the force. The training my Soldiers received during the force-on-force event was limited. At the beginning of the event, the Soldiers were overtasked and running convoy security missions back to back. Toward the end of the event, the mission became routine. Platoon leaders implemented a supplementary training plan to take advantage of the available time.

The training plan consisted of individual, team, and squad opportunity training as well as large-scale mission rehearsals for the upcoming situational training exercise lanes. The brigade requested that only one platoon participate in the situational training exercise and the other platoon participate in the live-fire exercise. Only four of the nine squad leaders in the company participated in the situational training exercise lanes. Because Soldiers may not be utilized throughout the entire rotation in each mission, it is wise to develop a strong supplementary training plan.

Lessons Platoon Leaders Should Utilize

Military police platoons are no longer integrated within brigade combat teams. Now, successful alignments are based on relationships and the perception of the supporting military police units at brigade level. Military police companies support brigades according to doctrine. To get the most out of NTC, it is important to develop a backup training plan according to the mission-essential task list crosswalk. Leaders should implement supplementary training to maximize Soldier development if the unit isn't utilized as much as expected.

The level of accepted risk became an issue between the battalion commander of the unit to which we were attached and the military police commander. The battalion commander was willing to accept more risk regarding safety hazards than my company commander was. Many units don't know or understand military police capabilities. When military police leaders cannot verbalize the efficiency in our functions, or are not given the opportunity, we become a less-effective force multiplier for supported commanders. Collaborative planning, timely feedback, and tenets of mission command must be in operation for the maneuver commander to best use military police capabilities. During our rotation, the CSSB wanted military police to run several convoy security missions that eliminated the work-rest cycle. At one point, the lack of knowledge concerning the military police operational strength put Soldiers' lives at risk. In order to mitigate the high risk of black-out driving and keep Soldiers from potential harm, I had to clearly verbalize our capabilities and limitations for the convoy security mission.

A 401st Soldier fires at enemy elements attacking the CSSB logistics supply area.

There are several classes on Biometrics Automated Toolset Systems, Raven® [an unmanned aircraft system], and the Common Remote Operating Weapon System that leaders can request with unit coordination. Each platoon should have a Raven and a certified Raven operator. Having these capabilities significantly increases the opportunity for mission accomplishment and mitigates risk to Soldiers by enabling leaders to make informed decisions when conducting reconnaissance during troop-leading procedures. The executive officer can plan for the training and reserve over-the-shoulder training before arriving at NTC.

Military police units can preplan for NTC by—

- Creating systems to effortlessly track Soldiers, sensitive items, and combat power.
- Taking advantage of company command post exercises before NTC.
- Getting the timeliness and durability of battle-tracking systems assessed within the unit first.
- Acquiring unbiased feedback from assessment by an outside organization.

Platoon leaders should fight for communications equipment once on the ground. At the vehicle draw yard, they should ensure that vehicles are equipped with a Blue Force Tracker/Joint Capabilities Release system if not organic to the unit. Platoon leaders should request to deploy a company communications representative early to verify that vehicles are compatible with unit Joint Capabilities Release equipment. They should bring extra communications equipment to validate the pace plan.

NTC tests how effectively military police units are integrated into the supported brigade or battalion. The unit can show relevance and enhance the maneuver commander's ability by—

- Coordinating training for the supported brigade with leaders from the military police line units through the provost marshal. Training may include topics such as tactical site exploitation, proper completion of apprehension forms, detainee capture and site exploitation kits, military police-specific crowd control measures, and escalation of force procedures.
- Communicating the importance of capture kits when hosting detainee operations training, explaining the importance of gaining intelligence from the lowest level possible through site exploitation or military intelligence reports and implementing an effective information funnel inside a detainee collection point or detainee holding area, and explaining the time-sensitive nature of that intelligence. Intelligence drives the operation.
- Delivering a clear and concise capability briefing to the supported command in synchronization with the provost marshal office. Military police units support maneuver commanders through security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. They must bridge the gap from doctrinal guidance to combat readiness within the formation. In order to assist mission commanders with understanding military police doctrinal capabilities and functions versus the actual capabilities within the platoon, military police units should—
  - Be transparent about platoon or company capabilities while supporting the maneuvering element.
  - Reference training abilities based on manning, task proficiency level, and supplies.
  - Explain the personnel required to execute current and projected missions.
- Building working groups early for detention operations to have clear lines of effort and to present the supported commander with the most accurate information during battle update briefings. The proper working group should include military intelligence, legal, medical, nongovernmental organization, and military police personnel. Establishing this working group and developing standard operating procedures early will ensure that each party can contribute to the overall goal of supporting the brigade commander.

Absence of Action

Understanding our capabilities and exercising a disciplined initiative are two very different subjects. Domain knowledge can be a passive expression of what we can potentially bring to the fight, but that will not suffice. We must have the ability to communicate clear capabilities and execute tasks in controlled aggression as a major asset for our supported commander to assist in winning the fight.

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Young Alaka'I

By Captain Edgar M. Conrad and First Sergeant Daniel A. Laakmann

Regional alignment allows the U.S. Army the means to accomplish national strategic objectives outlined in the *National Security Strategy,* the *National Defense Strategy,* and *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*.[1, 2, 3] The last published *National Security Strategy* specified, under international order, the key regional area focuses. The administration stated in the *National Security Strategy* that "America would advance our rebalance to Asia and the Pacific."[4] *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* nested with the *National Security Strategy*, stating, "Therefore we will press forward with the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, placing our most advanced capabilities and greater capacity in that vital theater."[5] How do a mid-career commander and first sergeant understand the nested priorities of each strategy? The answer, not surprising to most senior noncommissioned officers and officers, has remained "not very well."

The Army and the 8th Theater Sustainment Command are looking at new, innovative ways to teach leaders about the dynamics of operational and strategic levels.[6] The 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, created the Young Alaka'I leader development program. The program evolved over the last 2 years to become the new Regional Leader Development Program–Pacific (RLDP-P), managed at U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the Army Service Component Command for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The vast amount of time, money, and resources required for the program has many Army leaders questioning the return on investment. While the return on investment will remain an unknown variable for years to come, the program provides mid-career Army leaders with focused strategic-level education that they typically would not receive until they reached Senior Staff College. From the viewpoint of two mid-career military police leaders, the program provided the bigger picture for operating in the PACOM area of responsibility.

Program Overview

The combination of officers, noncommissioned officers, Department of the Army civilians, and members of other Services provides a unique opportunity to network, collaborate, and create future opportunities for innovation. Establishing relationships with those stationed around the largest regional area of responsibility in the world is critical to problem solving and working through other issues created by the tyranny of distance in the Pacific. The program consisted of three phases, a capstone writing assignment, and a military briefing.

Phase 1 was conducted locally and consisted of command and orientation briefings, critical thinking, problem solving, a Pearl Harbor staff ride, and the Asia-Pacific Orientation Course at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Phase 2 was conducted in our Nation's capital and included visits to the Pentagon, State Department, and U.S. Senate in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the significance of U.S. interest in the Pacific. The course concluded with Phase 3, which was a trip to partner nations with various levels of military and economic cooperation (Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Japan), highlighting the diversity of the region and demonstrating the significance of partnering.

As company level leaders in worldwide deployable units, this exposure is invaluable while conducting operations throughout the theater, executing missions and exercises in places such as Guam, Japan, Nepal, Bangladesh, South Korea, and Australia. The knowledge gained, relationships built, and enhanced understanding of the regional complexities are crucial in developing training for Soldiers as well as delivering the importance of every mission to every Soldier within our organizations.

Complex Region

The PACOM area of responsibility has a multifaceted security environment. The 36 nations comprising the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than 50 percent (4 billion) of the world's people, who speak 3,000 different languages; contain 24 of the 36 megacities; and include five nations allied with the United States through mutual defense treaties. Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific, along with 10 of the 14 smallest. The area of responsibility includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. More than one-third of Asia-Pacific nations are smaller, island nations.[7]

The region is vital to the global economy and includes the world's busiest international sea lanes and nine of the 10 largest ports. The Asia-Pacific region is also a heavily mili-

tarized region, with seven of the world's 10 largest standing militaries and five of the world's declared nuclear nations.

The Pacific is the highest-risk disaster area in the world. A 2016 United Nations report states that by 2030, 1 billion people living in the Indo-Asia Pacific will reside in disaster-prone areas classified as high to extreme risk.[8] Recent natural disasters in the region include the hurricane in the Philippine Islands, the Nepalese Earthquake, and the typhoon in Saipan. Developed nations remain at risk, as evident by the tsunami that destroyed a nuclear power plant on mainland Japan.

Aggressive actions by North Korea over the last 6 years since Kim Jong Un's rise to power have resulted in more than twice as many ballistic missile tests as were conducted in the 15 years prior to his reign. Increasing numbers of missile tests from North Korea represent the tip of the iceberg for emerging threats in the PACOM area of responsibility. China's increased aggressive island building, to include the Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea, and Russia's recent bombers being intercepted off the coast of Alaska demonstrate the volatile nature of the security environment.

The New Strategic Mid-Career Leader

As a military police combat support company commander with a forward-deployed unit to conduct critical-site security in support of the Guam Defense Mission, this program provided the experience and knowledge needed to ensure that the company understood the strategic importance of the mission. The company, down to the individual Soldier, prepared, trained, and deployed with an understanding of how our mission nested into the PACOM ballistic missile defense strategy. The shared understanding ensured vigilance from Soldiers conducting critical site security. The Soldiers recognized that a breach to site security meant thousands of lives and millions of dollars of equipment could potentially be lost, resulting in a catastrophic blow to available PACOM forces.

As a first sergeant and lead trainer of my company, this program has given me the ability to understand the role that my organization has in strategic-level thinking and decision making. Maintaining readiness at the company level gives the combatant commander more options. Every unit has a role in the fight, and the ability to articulate to junior leaders and Soldiers the importance of conducting quality training and maintaining individual readiness—not to mention the impact that individual readiness has on strategic-level options within the area of responsibility—is invaluable. This program greatly enhances the ability to understand strategic-level thinking and apply it to company level organizations.

When the increasing threats are combined with the complexity of the security environment, a dire situation results. As uncertainty grows, the character of war becomes even more ambiguous. General Robert B. Brown, USARPAC Commanding General, hosted the 5th Annual Land Forces of the Pacific (LANPAC) in 2017. Forum 7, Leveraging Leadership and Mission Command to Maximize the Human Dimension, discussions indicated that the only variable that remains unchanged is the centrality of the human dimension and that in order to hedge against this complexity and uncertainty, we must absolutely develop, train, and educate our people.[9] By providing mid-career leaders with education, training, and regional experiences beyond the traditional institutional military basics, USARPAC RLDP-P has created a more strategic, adaptive, and professional leader who can prepare, train, and deploy to successfully execute a multitude of missions in a complex environment.

Endnotes:

[1]President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015.

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[3]Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, June 2015.

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[5]*The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*.

[6]8th Theater Sustainment Command Public Affairs, "Young Alaka'I Program Develops Tomorrow's Strategic Leaders," 9 February 2015, <https://www.army.mil/article/142527/Young_Alaka_i_program_develops_tomorrow_s_strategic_leaders/>, accessed on 11 January 2018.

[7]U.S. Pacific Command, "USPACOM Area of Responsibility," <http://www.pacom.mil/About-USPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/>, accessed on 11 January 2018.

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[9]Defense Media Activity–Pacific, "LANPAC Symposium, Forum 7: Leveraging Leadership and Mission Command to Maximize the Human Dimension," 25 May 2017, <https://www.dvidshub.net/video/527234/lanpac-symposium-forum-7leveraging-leadership-and-mission-command-maximize-human-dimension>, accessed on 11 January 2018.

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Task Force Winter Soldier—A Lesson in the Multifaceted Role of the Military Police Corps

By First Lieutenant Trevor M. Barton

The role of military police in Afghanistan throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014) and the succeeding Operation Freedom Sentinel (2015–present day) has been crucial in the effort to provide security and training to Afghan partners. The military police combat role, which was emphasized during Operation Enduring Freedom, transitioned to a train, advise, and assist mentality. The transition became increasingly visible due to the relevant and multifaceted core competencies exercised by military police units.

Task Force Winter Soldier (TFWS) was a designation used to identify our detachment of 31E military police Soldiers deployed in support of Operation Freedom Sentinel in Bagram, Afghanistan, in 2017. Despite being a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31E unit, which was expected to focus on corrections and detention operations, the mission evolved and grew until TFWS was simultaneously executing three core competencies and engaging with Afghan partners. This situation is not unique and has occured in other deployed military police units. Deploying under the designation of a particular military police specialty does not spare these units from being tasked to fulfill other military police tasks for higher headquarters, especially when multiple military police units are not at their disposal. These headquarters elements usually only have one military police unit available, and they expect the unit to be able to fulfill any military police core competency. Certainly, this was the case for TFWS; the detachment quickly found itself engaging in its primary core competency and other core competencies out of necessity for mission success.

As outlined in the *2025 Military Police Force Strategic Plan*, commanders involved in supporting unified land operations benefit greatly from the offense, defense, and stability operations that are unique and specialized to the military police force.[1] The military police force uniquely demonstrates the ability to serve as a bridging function during the simultaneous application of offense, defense, and stability operations during unified land operations through decisive action. As outlined, the Military Police Corps can be expected to conduct policing, soldiering, corrections, and investigation tasks in a professional and proficient manner that supports unified land operations objectives.[2] The current dynamic of the Military Police Corps is composed of MOS 31B, 31D, 31E, and 31K units. Each of these specialized military police Soldiers make up a military police unit that focuses on one or two regimental core competencies (and the mission-related tasks associated with those competencies) to support its respective mission. The MOS 31B units focus on policing, security and mobility support operations, and soldiering; MOS 31D units focus on investigations; MOS 31E units focus on corrections and detention operations; and MOS 31K units provide military working dog capabilities at home station and in contingency operations. Although the focus these units have on their designated specialty is certainly the primary training concern for leaders, recent deployments in support of stability operations in Afghanistan have made it clear that higher-echelon commanders expect military police units to execute multiple military police core competencies.

Members of the Army Corrections Command and the U.S.-led National Security Justice Directorate and Development (NSJDD) in Afghanistan identified training gaps that existed with Afghan soldiers under the Afghan-designated Military Police Guard Command (MPGC) in 2016. It was from these host nation training needs that the TFWS mission was conceived. In 2013 and 2014, a U.S. military police-focused task force, Joint Task Force 435, was preparing to turn over control of Afghanistan's only maximum security prison. While under U.S. and coalition control, the facility was known as the Parwan Detention Facility; however, once transferred to MPGC control, the facility was officially known as the Afghan National Detention Facility Prison–Parwan (ANDFP-P). ANDFP-P, located adjacent to Bagram Airbase, housed captured insurgent members of the Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Haqqani networks, and other terrorist organizations.

NSJDD was tasked as the successor to Joint Task Force 435 and continued observing the maintenance of ANDFP-P as well as training Afghan MPGC personnel. In 2016, after several assessments by NSJDD officers and noncommissioned officers, it became apparent that a training program was needed to assist Afghan MPGC in military police-specific tasks, especially in corrections and detention operations at the ANDFP-P. A task force composed of 16 Soldiers from three different units (the 42d Military Police Brigade, the 18th Military Police Brigade, and the 15th Military Police Brigade) was created. These Soldiers belonged to MOS 31E units and understood that the mission would focus on training, advising, and assisting Afghan MPGC personnel on corrections and detention tasks.

A TFWS guard provides external security at a training event for Afghan MPGC personnel.

TFWS had several objectives, some of which developed over time as our usefulness as military police Soldiers became more evident to higher command. The primary objective was to create a self-sustaining program of instruction that Afghan training noncommissioned officers could use after our departure to train MPGC personnel on corrections-specific tasks. Prior to our arrival, most Afghan MPGC personnel who worked in ANDFP-P had little to no additional training on their corrections and detention mission. After graduating from initial soldiering training, they were sent to ANDFP-P to shadow senior personnel and then begin executing prison facility tasks. Naturally, this resulted in Afghan soldiers being trained to different standards—each shadowed individual applied his or her own subjective standard to certain correctional tasks within the facility. This led to a wide disparity in technical proficiency among the more than 4,000 MPGC personnel in the prison.

TFWS assisted in mitigating the training gap that existed in the MPGC and accomplished this mission by teaching six 2-week cycles of specific tasks to hundreds of Afghan counterparts. These tasks were deficiencies in areas that NSJDD had identified as lacking or substandard while observing Afghan personnel at ANDFP-P. The classes were taught in ANDFP-P and other Afghan-led secondary training locations. The initial cycles were taught by TFWS using interpreters. Afghan training noncommissioned officers observed the verbal and practical training applications during the first few cycles and then begin incorporating these training techniques in the latter cycles while gradually taking over responsibility for the training program. The goal was for the sixth cycle to be completely Afghan-led, with respective TFWS instructors observing and validating their Afghan counterpart on the teaching and demonstrating portions of each instructional section.

Once we arrived at Bagram, it became evident that our mission would require more than corrections and detention operations knowledge and instruction. The detachment noncommissioned officer in charge pointed out that while members of our detachment were creating a program of instruction for our Afghan counterparts, our operational environment required a substantial security posture. Due to the training of Afghan personnel taking place in Afghan-controlled areas, with all entry control points and security being provided by Afghan National Army personnel, it became obvious that our detachment would be required to provide interior and exterior security while classes were being instructed. Additionally, a prerequisite for Afghan participation in these classes included mandatory biometric enrollments. Our detachment conducted its primary mission of instructing Afghans on corrections and detention while simultaneously engaging in soldiering tasks (providing our own security posture) and investigation tasks (performing biometrics enrollment of all Afghan students).

Standard operating procedures were developed and discussed with our task force members, while enhanced training on soldiering and investigation tasks commenced with support from our headquarters element, NSJDD. These MOS 31E Soldiers from different units quickly became aware that their role in this mission was going to encompass two other core competencies that many military police would not recognize as important MOS 31E tasks. Typically, a member of TFWS could expect to teach restraint procedures to nearly 100 Afghans one day, provide security by searching class members for internal and external threats before allowing entry into the area of operations the next day, and then biometrically enroll Afghan students another day. Our mission encompassed multiple military police specialties, which exposed TFWS to a wide variety of tasks that became essential to mission success.

With the successful completion of an Afghan-led sixth cycle and with an Afghan-led self-sustaining program in place, it became apparent that throughout our deployment to Afghanistan, each of the MOS 31Es in TFWS had grown substantially in his or her understanding of the Military Police Corps as a whole. Out of necessity and accomplishing the mission end state, TFWS stepped outside its niche of corrections and detention operations and embraced several other tasks traditionally assigned to other military police units. These Soldiers did a phenomenal job and were proof

(Continued on page 20)



Understanding the Murder-Suicide Continuum

By Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

At some point during a police officer's law enforcement career, he or she will be called to the scene of a death. The death could be a homicide; suicide; or natural, accidental, or equivocal death. The standard for first-responding officers and investigators is to assume that the death is a homicide until evidence proves otherwise. Each death investigation could be very complex or very simple. This article focuses on incidents of murder-suicide.

"An investigator must understand that murder is a physical event with some psychological components and that suicide is a psychological event with some physical components."

I have spent more than 40 years as a police officer, detective, and senior criminal intelligence specialist. During this time, I studied suicide as it relates to the law enforcement field, suicide intervention, and suicide investigation. In addition, I taught these subjects as an associate professor of psychology. I have spent the last 5 years looking at the distinct types of murder-suicides.

An investigator must understand that murder is a physical event with some psychological components and that suicide is a psychological event with some physical components. Murder-suicide combines types of death; when combined into a single incident, the incident may become a complex investigation. Types of murder-suicides discussed in this article include—

- Murder-delayed suicide.
- Domestic murder-suicide.
- Workplace murder-suicide.
- Social murder-suicide.
- Other murder-suicides.

Each type of murder-suicide has different components that occur during the incident. Furthermore, the suicide could be a "suicide-by-cop" incident.

Murder-Delayed Suicide

A murder-delayed suicide is when a subject murders someone but delays suicide until he or she is in prison. Subjects may not wish to complete their prison time. Due to the length of time that a homicide trial can take, there can be years between the time of the murder and the suicide.

Domestic Murder-Suicide

In cases of domestic murder-suicide, families or relationships are involved. In a male-dominated family, the man may believe that since he is unable to handle the problems of the world, his girlfriend or wife and children won't be able to cope either. So, he kills them to "protect" them and then commits suicide.

There are a considerable number of incidents now occurring in which a mother takes her child's life and then commits suicide. The mother, who does not wish to leave her children motherless in a "cruel" world, kills them before committing suicide. Perhaps the most difficult type of this incident occurs in a traffic incident with the mother and child. One cause of this type of domestic murder-suicide could be postpartum depression.

In other dominated relationships, an "If I cannot have him or her, then no one else can" mentality sometimes prevails. Transference of guilt in suicide and murder-suicide incidents occurs when the subject transfers guilt from himself or herself onto a third party. For example, a subject calls his girlfriend so that she hears him kill himself or others. Thus, in his mind, she is responsible for his death and those of the others.

In cases of hostage/barricade murder-suicides, the breakup of a relationship is often a crucial factor leading to the murder-suicide incident. The relationship is the only thing that anchors the subject into "normal society." When that relationship is lost, that foothold is jeopardized. Thus, negative comments made to the subject by family and friends are perceived to be true. The subject questions the purpose of continuing to live.

The risk of a domestic murder-suicide incident is higher if a terminal patient is without external social or family support. For example, if a wife is sick, her husband may not want to see her suffer. The husband kills her and then kills himself because he doesn't want to live without his loved one.

In feud-related murder-suicide incidents, the subject goes too far and kills someone. The subject may feel shame or fear about going to jail. He or she then commits suicide.

Workplace Murder-Suicide

For this type of murder-suicide, there must be a relationship with the workplace. The subject can be a customer, an employee, or the spouse of an employee. If no relationship exists, the incident is social in nature and the location is not part of the incident. Workplace incidents can be either murder without suicide, murder-suicide, or suicide by cop.

Social Murder-Suicide

Social murder-suicide has subcategories that are further identified by the type of incident or the location. In social murder-suicide incidents, the targets are institutions or their population or a targeted segment of society.

For instance, a subject may feel that college is his or her final chance to fit into society. He or she may have been told that once in high school or college, "Things will get better." The subject might feel invisible. Now that he or she is in college, where everything is supposed to change, nothing has changed. The subject strikes out, feeling that it's better to have 15 minutes of infamy than to feel invisible. The people or the institution targeted may be the victim.

Other Murder-Suicides

There are other murder-suicide incidents that don't fit into these murder-suicide types. Some examples include a stalker who fixates on an individual, kills the victim, and then commits suicide and a strong cult leader who talks unaware members into committing suicide by verbal manipulation.

Conclusion

Diagnosed or undiagnosed mental illness may be present to some degree in each of the murder-suicide types. In some cases, the cause cannot be clearly identified. Once investigators understand the type of murder-suicide they are investigating, they are able to narrow the direction of the investigation.

Mr. Lindsay has studied and researched the subject of suicide for 44 years. He began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), and finished his career working cold cases.

("Task Force Winter Soldier. . . ," continued from page 18)

that, in a deployed environment, many operational factors might require units to fill a greater role and provide a greater footprint than originally anticipated. While I don't argue against focusing on the core competencies that support the unit mission, I certainly encourage leaders at all levels to train their Soldiers in tasks that might normally be delegated to military police units outside their specialty. Commanders unfamiliar with different military police designations might require a unit to support itself in a way that is different than initially envisioned. In these situations, it certainly helps if the unit has training on policing, security and mobility support operations, soldiering, investigations, and corrections and detention operations, regardless of its military police-specific niche. As a Regiment, we can readily answer the call to support unified land operations wherever they take us.

The TFWS accomplishments were a direct result of the noncommissioned officers and Soldiers who comprised the detachment. These Soldiers worked under conditions that demonstrated the incredible strategic and tactical assets that military police units bring to the operational environment. I owe the success of the mission to the TFWS Soldiers. To these military police Soldiers: Thank you for all you did, and continue to do, for our Regiment.

Endnotes:

[1]Office of the Provost Marshal General, *2025 Military Police Force Strategic Plan*, 23 June 2016, <https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/470400.pdf>, accessed on 5 January 2018.

[2]Ibid.

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Investigative Statement Analysis

By Mr. Stanley B. Burke

An investigator responded to the burglary of a warehouse containing military equipment. After arriving at the scene and conducting a preliminary investigation, the investigator interviewed the warehouse guard. Specifically, the investigator said, "Tell me what happened." The guard provided the following written statement:

"I arrived at work at 11:00 p.m., as I always do. I have been working here for 6 years and have a perfect work record. I had a conversation with the guard I relieve, Mike Jones. We talked about the championship football game and the referee's call at the end of the game. We both felt that the call was wrong and cost the Drifters the game. No doubt. We then talked about the flooding of the downtown stores caused by the recent rainstorms and the upcoming election. We both agreed that Senator Smith was the best candidate for the job because of his strong stance on crime and his pledge to increase military spending. Mike may have left at 11:15 p.m. I don't know, but I think I started my rounds a short while later. I believe I heard a loud noise coming from the rear of the warehouse at around 2:00 a.m. I walked in that direction and noticed that the back gate was unlocked. I looked around and saw the door to the warehouse loading dock was open. I shined my light into the bay area and noticed a shipping container was open and empty. Everything was gone. Next, I immediately called my supervisor and told him what happened. He was pretty upset when I called him at 4:00 a.m. He suggested we add another guard to the shift. I told him that was a good idea since the warehouse is large and located near an isolated part of the base. I knew something like this would happen eventually. I remember reading about a similar theft that had happened at another base not too far from here. The people were never caught. To the best of my knowledge, I did not hear or see anything unusual during the night. A short while later, you guys showed up. That's basically what happened."

After reading the guard's statement, the investigator had a strong suspicion that something wasn't right. He couldn't specify exactly what made him suspicious, but he decided to analyze the guard's statement.

What is Investigative Statement Analysis?

Investigative statement analysis (ISA) is the examination of the words in a statement in order to identify possible indicators of deception.[1] Generally, the words we use reflect a psychological state and mirror our thoughts and feelings.[2] By examining words, we can learn how people think and guide their future thinking. As such, words can be considered mirrors and tools.[3]

"Investigative statement analysis (ISA) is the examination of the words in a statement in order to identify possible indicators of deception."

ISA is a formalized technique that provides articulation and structure to the initial reaction that a person may have after listening to or reading a statement—the reaction that causes the person to believe or disbelieve what he or she just heard or read.

How Does ISA Work?

Through the application of a simple multistep process, ISA allows investigators to determine the quality of a statement by examining the linguistic forms found within it. This article reviews techniques for examining equivocations, extraneous information, and statement balance.

Equivocation Analysis

Sometimes referred to as "hedges" or "qualifiers," equivocations are words or phrases used to avoid a definitive answer.[4] When someone uses equivocations, they undermine their own claim, indicating a possible struggle with committing to what has been said.[5] When investigators locate equivocations in a statement, they should carefully view the statements in order to determine if the incidents occurred as reported.[6] Some examples of equivocations include—[7]

- I think.
- I believe.

- Kind of.
- I guess.
- Sort of.
- From what I recall.
- Maybe.
- Like.
- Perhaps.
- May have.
- Somewhat.
- Somewhere.
- Something.
- About.
- Possibly.
- Probably.
- Around.
- A little.
- To the best of my knowledge.

The guard in the example uses the equivocations "may have," "I don't know," "believe," and "around" in his statement. By using these linguistic forms, he avoids committing himself to what happened just before the discovery of the burglary and Mike's departure.

Further analyzing the statement, the guard avoids committing himself to the activities described in his last three sentences by using the equivocations "to the best of my knowledge" and "basically." By using these equivocations, the guard conveniently escapes commitment to what he heard, saw, and did during his shift. Remember, the guard was asked to explain what happened—not what "basically" happened.

"Determining statement balance involves dividing a statement into three sections: a prologue, an incident, and an epilogue."

These equivocations are of particular concern because the guard goes into great detail when providing an equivocations-free description of his conversation with his coworker—a conversation that was essentially extraneous to the initial question asked by the investigator.

Extraneous Information Analysis

A response that contains extraneous information or is irrelevant to the question asked is an evasive response.[8] For instance, when asking carjacking victims if they were hurt during the theft of their car, victims usually provide a dichotomous response of yes or no—a short and simple, yet relevant, answer to the inquiry. However, imagine if the victim responded, "I remember once watching a movie about someone who was carjacked, and it took the cops 2 months to solve the crime." In this case, the victim's response is extraneous and should be viewed as a possible indicator of deception.[9]

When provided with extraneous information in a statement, an investigator should examine it closely to determine if the author is simply conveying a message or trying to provide a convincing answer.

The high level of extraneous or evasive information found in the guard's statement—information about his work record, the football game, the weather, and the upcoming election—should cause concern for the investigator. The statement not only avoids providing a direct answer to the inspector's inquiry, but it also causes an imbalance within the statement itself.

Statement Balance Analysis

Determining statement balance involves dividing a statement into three sections: a prologue, an incident, and an epilogue. To begin, the investigator notes when the incident portion of a statement starts and ends—with the incident typically starting the moment the author perceives a threat, crime, or concern and ending when the threat, crime, or concern has disappeared.[10]

Once the incident is located within the statement, the portion of the statement before the incident is designated as the prologue and the portion of the statement following the incident is designated as the epilogue. Once these areas have been identified and apportioned, the investigator determines what percentage of the statement is dedicated to the prologue, the incident, and the epilogue.[11]

A statement should have a percentage balance of approximately 20-60-20. Twenty percent should be dedicated to the prologue, 60 percent should be dedicated to the incident, and the remaining 20 percent should be dedicated to the epilogue. The further a statement deviates from the 20-60-20 percentage balance, the more likely it is deceptive.[12]

The guard's statement consisted of 312 words, of which only 64 (20 percent) were dedicated to the incident. The overall percentage balance is approximately 44-20-36, which is a strong deviation from the standard 20-60-20 percentage balance.

Why does this statement so strongly deviate? The investigator should consider the possibility that the statement is out of balance because the author intentionally undercompensated for the incident because it may not have occurred as reported.

What Do the ISA Results Show?

As a result of examining the statement provided by the warehouse guard, it is apparent that the information may not be accurate. Specifically—

- The guard's statement contains numerous equivocations to describe his actions before and after the burglary, possibly indicating a lack of commitment to what occurred.
- More than half of the statement contains extraneous information that has no relevance to the burglary but, instead, acts to provide filler for the reader.
- The statement appears to be out of balance. The guard provided a very small description of the event, indicating

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Property Accountability Virtual Playbook: The Right Tool at the Right Time

By Captain Matthew J. Johnson

Improving Property Accountability

In January 2017, the Logistics Training Department, U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia, began an initiative to create a Property Accountability Virtual Playbook (PAVPB). The playbook is an online, computer-based training resource that promotes property accountability and improves Army readiness.

Army leaders have the responsibility to achieve and sustain Army readiness, ensuring that Soldiers have the right types and quantities of equipment needed to "fight tonight." Department of the Army investigations of excess equipment and financial liability of property loss derived from inventories indicate that the Army is attacking the problem but that challenges remain with Soldier knowledge of property accountability principles.

To address the knowledge gap, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Fort Lee, and the Quartermaster School assembled a team of experts spanning several different organizations to design and develop the interactive training product with an overall objective of improving property accountability across the Army. "CASCOM is here to help our units in the field," the Quartermaster General, Brigadier General Rodney D. Fogg, stated. "The Property Accountability Virtual Playbook is the right tool at the right time to help our junior leaders succeed," he added.

Interactive Training

PAVPB is an interactive, virtual, 3-D training resource that teaches users about property accountability by demonstrating the proper way to conduct a change-of-command inventory. The target audience for PAVPB is nonlogistician leaders across the Army, from commanders to sub-hand receipt holders.

PAVPB focuses on the change-of-command inventory (a vital inventory that is conducted at the tactical level) to demonstrate proper property accountability techniques.

PAVPB users are able to virtually interact with the PAVPV 3-D arms room.

PAVPB users are be able to conduct a virtual inventory of several different weapons systems and components.

PAVPB users are able to inventory a 3-D-rendered M1126 Stryker infantry carrier vehicle and its components.

A company commander is fully dedicated to property accountability for all equipment in the unit at the time of the inventory. The change-of-command inventory forms the baseline inventory process for inventory types, to include cyclic and sensitive-item inventories. The PAVPB user learns about the people, property, and processes that are encountered during the preinventory, inventory, and postinventory phases of a change-of-command inventory.

Relevant Resources

According to Chief Warrant Officer Five Jonathan O. Yerby, Quartermaster School Regimental Chief Warrant Officer, "Interactive digital media is a force multiplier, and it is how young people learn." PAVPB is a digital training enabler that allows users to participate in interactive inventories of a Stryker armored vehicle, Abrams tank, and three different weapon systems. PAVPB also includes tactics, techniques, and procedures and best practices that have been collected from units and subject matter experts across the Army. It explains the roles of officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers who are involved in the change-of-command process, ensuring property accountability. With the Army transition from the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced System to the Global Combat Support System–Army (GCSS–Army), PAVPB familiarizes the user with the new GCSS–Army terminology. It also links users to valuable property accountability and Command Supply Discipline Program resources and references to assist those with property responsibility across the Army.

Teamwork and Collaboration

The collective efforts of numerous organizations, including the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia; the U.S. Army Ordnance School, Fort Lee, Virginia; and the GCSS–Army developers, Midlothian, Virginia, yielded impressive results toward the creation of a final product. Great care was taken to ensure that PAVPB is user-friendly and does not require a common access card. The end product is also intended to be adaptable for mobile versions and touch screen deployment in the future. PAVPB will be published on multiple platforms, including Sustainment One Stop, Army Training Network, and additional public Web sites. After receiving feedback from the field and incorporating the beta testing results, PAVPB is available across the Army. PAVPB provides Soldiers with a valuable resource that delivers training on property accountability and promotes Army readiness. It can be accessed at <http://www.cascom.army.mil/index.htm>.

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("Investigative Statement Analysis," continued from page 22)

that he may have been uncomfortable recalling what actually happened during the time of the burglary.

Was the guard involved in the burglary? In this case, ISA provided articulation and structure to the instinctive concerns that the investigator had about the guard's statement. Equipped with his analysis, the investigator is now in a firm position to reinterview the guard and possibly obtain a greater awareness concerning what happened at the warehouse.

Conclusion

ISA is a multistep process that involves much more time and effort than what could possibly be described in this article. However, by simply examining statements for equivocations, extraneous information, and balance, investigators can greatly enhance their ability to gain valuable insight into the statements of victims, witnesses, and suspects.

Endnotes:

[1]Susan Adams, "Statement Analysis: What Do Suspects' Words Really Reveal?" *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, October 1996, pp. 12–20.

[2]James Pennybaker, *The Secret Life of Pronouns*, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2011, p. 14.

[3]Ibid., p. 15.

[4]Susan Adams and John Jarvis, "Indicators of Veracity and Deception: An Analysis of Written Statements Made to Police," *International Journal of Speech, Language, and the Law*, 2006, Volume 13, No. 1, p. 3.

[5]Don Rabon, *Investigative Discourse Analysis*, Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina, 1994, p. 20.

[6]Adams, "Statement Analysis."

[7]Rabon.

[8]Wendell Rudacille, *Identifying Lies in Disguise*, Kendall-Hunt Publishing, Iowa, 1994, p. 63.

[9]Ibid., p. 66.

[10]Ibid., p. 134.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 135.

Mr. Burke served as a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent for 23 years. While assigned to the FBI Academy, he taught investigative statement analysis, interviewing and interrogation, and law enforcement ethics. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Maryland and a master's degree from Midwestern State University, Wichita Falls, Texas.

THE TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968

By Mr. Ronney Z. Miller

During the early morning hours of 31 January 1968 and in a calculated and deliberate violation of the Lunar New Year (Tet) cease-fire agreement, a combined force of Vietcong guerrillas and regular soldiers of the North Vietnamese army (numbering approximately 80,000) simultaneously attacked major cities, hamlets, and key military installations from the demilitarized zone south to the Mekong Delta (the whole of South Vietnam). The enemy violently attacked the northernmost provincial capital of Quang Tri City, seized and occupied the ancient imperial capital of Hue for 24 days, and committed 11 battalions to assault six key targets in Saigon (to include the U.S. Embassy). The primary purpose of this operation was to secure a decisive battlefield victory by destabilizing the Saigon regime, instigate a popular uprising amongst the general populace, compel U.S. forces to abandon Vietnam, and "liberate" South Vietnam. To their credit, the senior military leaders of the North Vietnamese army engineered a brilliantly synchronized major offensive against the South, which included the use of deception, surprise, speed, and shock action. The Tet Offensive of 1968 represented the most defining moment of the Vietnam War. Although it qualified as a costly military failure for the North Vietnamese army, it set the United States on a determined path of disengagement from the war that would ultimately lead to the fall of Saigon 7 years later on 30 April 1975.

Two U.S. military police Soldiers aid a fellow Soldier during fighting at the U.S. Embassy compound.

Despite battlefield success, American public opinion of the Vietnam War began to shift in the fall of 1967. The lack of perceived progress in concert with mounting casualties created a credibility gap between the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson and the American public; media-military relations were strained at best. The "Year of the Monkey" (1968) was a presidential election year in the United States. In an effort to instill optimism and bolster and maintain public support, the Johnson administration launched an aggressive "good-news campaign" program with selected political and military leaders bearing the torch to highlight positive and factual messages. These messages included increased stability within the South Vietnamese government, significant progress in pacification programs, and the enhanced battlefield performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In recognition of the latter, responsibility for the defense of Saigon was transferred to ARVN on 15 December 1967. This left the 716th Military Police Battalion and attached elements (the 527th Military Police Company; Company C, 52d Infantry Regiment; and the 90th Military Police Detachment) as the only U.S. military formation in the capital city. Selective media reporting on the good-news campaign program omitted caution flags. Instead, the press reported that the enemy was in retreat, victory was imminent, and there was "light at the end of the tunnel" (a phrase often misattributed to General William C. Westmoreland).

In its entirety, the Tet Offensive was overly ambitious and the multiple attacks on metropolitan Saigon proved especially disastrous. The expectation that the general populace would rise up in revolt never materialized, and the North's violation of the most sacred holiday in all of Southeast Asia alienated the vast majority of the villagers country-wide. ARVN soldiers failed to mutiny, the South Vietnamese government did not collapse, and the enemy failed miserably in its attempt to achieve a decisive battlefield victory (sustaining 40,000 casualties in the process, from which the Vietcong never fully recovered). As a result of this catastrophic military defeat, a rift in the North Vietnamese army high command emerged.

Military police capture a Vietcong guerrilla after a surprise attack on the U.S. Embassy and South Vitnamese government buildings in Saigon.

Although not organized for tactical combat missions, military police units would engage the enemy in multiple firefights, roadside skirmishes, and urban warfare. During the course of the Tet Offensive, military police defended key military installations, flushed out enemy snipers, conducted security patrols, provided convoy security, and established critical checkpoints. Responding with quick-reaction teams, military police units fought block-to-block, house-to-house, and floor-to-floor—effectively disrupting the enemy battle rhythm and providing the margin necessary for infantry and armor units to arrive on the scene. Employing small-unit infantry tactics, military police units fought significant actions at Da Lat, Kontum, Pleiku, Quinhon, Ban Me Thoat, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Thu Duo, Vinh Long, Can Tho City, and Soc Trang. During the Battle of Saigon, the 716th Military Police Battalion and its attached units emerged as the first line of defense in the most intense battle in which military police units have ever been engaged. Significant combat actions were fought in the vicinity of bachelor officer quarters No. 3; the Phu Tho Racetrack on Plantation Road; the South Korean Embassy; the vicinity of the South Vietnamese Presidential Palace; and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam annex (co-located with Ton Son Nhut Air Base).

Specialist Fourth Class Charles R. Miller from Company B, 716th Military Police Battalion, and First Lieutenant Gerald L. Waltman, Specialist Fourth Class Ronald P. Kendall, Specialist Fourth Class Alvin F. Toyer, and Private First Class Steven W. Sears from Company C, 716th Military Police Battalion, each earned the Silver Star for gallantry in action during the desperate fight at bachelor officer quarters No. 3. Thirteen military police were killed, and another 13 were wounded. Sergeant Michael A. Grieve and Private First Class Roland M. Bowen from Company A, 716th Military Police Battalion, were awarded the Silver Star for heroism in ground combat during the fight at the Phu Tho Racetrack. Serving as a rally point for the Vietcong, fighting continued at the racetrack for an additional 10 days. More so than any other action of the Tet Offensive, the Battle of Saigon captured the media headlines. And the attack against the U.S. Embassy—the symbol of American authority and prestige—would be the center of gravity for war correspondents. (An American embassy had not been the target of an organized attack by hostile forces since the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900.)

The Vietcong attack against the U.S. Embassy began at 0245, when sappers blew a hole in the compound perimeter wall and attacked through the breach. The two military police guards who were on duty (Specialist Fourth Class Charles L. Daniel and Private First Class William E. Sebast) engaged the enemy and immediately alerted the provost marshal's office. Daniel and Sebast killed two enemy leaders before they were shot in their backs by two Vietcong who were already inside the embassy compound (employed as drivers by the U.S. Embassy). The actions of these two military police Soldiers provided the time that U.S. Marine security guards needed to seal the embassy building doors. Despite determined efforts, the Vietcong were never able to enter the building. Soon after, a military police quick-reaction force arrived and surrounded the compound. The enemy, trapped, was unable to enter the U.S. Embassy building or escape the compound.

Attempts to airmobile an infantry company onto the U.S. Embassy roof were unsuccessful. At dawn, the order was given to retake the compound. Under the capable leadership of First Lieutenant Frank Ribich, military police stormed the compound. In the end, 19 Vietcong were dead and three were captured.

For extraordinary heroism in recapturing the embassy compound, Private First Class Paul V. Healey was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and Sergeant John H. Hook was awarded the Silver Star. They were assigned to Company B, 716th Military Police Battalion. During the Battle of Saigon, 27 military police were killed and 45 wounded; the majority of these were killed or wounded during the first 12 hours of the battle.

On 24 February 1968, the Tet Offensive came to an end with the recapture of Hue, although scattered fighting continued across South Vietnam for another week. For extraordinary heroism in ground combat, the 716th Military Police Battalion and its attached units were awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation—the first military police unit so acclaimed. Adapting to a different style of warfare in Vietnam, the Military Police Corps was also redesignated from a combat service support branch to a combat support branch on 14 October 1968. This was largely due to its combat success during the Tet Offensive.

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Body and Dash Cameras:
What U.S. Army Military Police Must Consider

By First Lieutenant Christopher M. Trendell

"The police are the public, and the public are the police; the police being the only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence."

—"Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement"[1]

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps (USAMPC) remains relevant in today's operating environment and rapidly changing world by providing unique skills and tools to the Nation at home and abroad. However, it was not long ago that relevance and change were topics of discussion for the Regiment. Brigadier General David D. Phillips (Retired) once identified the need to redirect the focus of the Corps by emphasizing the "P" in "MP" following years of persistent conflict.[2] In other words, while maintaining the current level of commitment to the maneuver, mobility support, and area security functions, military police must enhance the fundamental skill sets inherent to policing, such as law and order.

While USAMPC has made strides in developing more efficient and contemporary ways to execute its discipline, the topic of trust in law enforcement, while always fundamentally important, has been headlined in response to civil unrest in recent years. For civilian agencies and military police, trust is and always will be the bedrock of the profession. Police officers are entrusted with making decisions that profoundly impact the safety and welfare of society. It is critical for the Regiment to capitalize on these lessons learned by nesting relevancy, trust, and transparency into its decision matrix for future capabilities.

One of the capabilities that should be considered is the use of dash and body cameras. The purpose of this article is to identify advantages and disadvantages of these cameras while raising key questions with the implementation of camera technology.

Powerful Evidence: A Clear Advantage

Body and dash cameras provide evidence that is often difficult to contest. They offer "one-eye, no lie" capability that can assist in identifying a suspect or vehicle, provide a timeline or sequence of events, and capture key elements of a crime or statements from witnesses. Ultimately, video evidence can be the difference in reaching a verdict in court—guilty or not guilty. Throughout the investigative process, video-recording capabilities also provide more reliable and direct evidence that expedites findings. Potential second- or third-order effects of employing body and dash cameras include saving time and resources while lessening the burden of caseloads.

Trust and Protection

In addition to providing evidence, body and dash cameras offer protection to military police and the communities they serve. As previously mentioned, diminished trust calls into question the effectiveness and legitimacy of any police organization. Allegations or mere perceptions of misconduct and corruption can be exonerated or substantiated in cases where there is recorded proof of an officer-involved event. In one study, research demonstrated that the number of false, malicious complaints against civilian law enforcement officers decreased by 40 percent after the adoption of body cameras.[3]

Video and audio recording from an officer's perspective can also assist in illustrating an encounter from a much different point of view as well as assist the community in understanding how quickly situations can escalate.[4] As Soldiers "of the Troops and for the Troops," military police must share a mutual trust with society; body and dash cameras offer a means to uphold this confidence by providing answers, solutions, and accountability.

Missed Opportunities

The Missouri National Guard, for example, could have seized a unique opportunity to employ body cameras during its mobilization in response to the Ferguson uprisings. This incident and others involving Title 32, *National Guard*, activation and homeland defense activities in the past are important cases to examine, especially from the perspective of improving protection for Soldiers in all Army components.[5] However, because body cameras were not an employable option at the time, it is relevant to the topic of this article to consider the overwhelming need for body and dash cameras. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, Army National Guard Soldiers were called upon nearly 200 times in response to emergencies in the homeland, to include civil disturbances.[6] Furthermore, more than 2,500 Soldiers in the Army National Guard conducted domestic operations in FY 16, seizing 10,000 illegal weapons and approximately 1.9 million pounds of illicit drugs.[7] Perhaps now more than ever, Soldiers mobilized to mitigate property damage or assist civilian law enforcement agencies find themselves in a predicament where escalation of force is warranted as the only reasonable option. Stakes are high in any civil disturbance, and it is prudent to provide

deliberate forethought to mitigate risk and maximize protection. With magnified attention and strain on the police-community relationship across the Nation, USAMPC is in a position to act as the standard-bearer for professional policing by enhancing its protection of the force, resources, and populations.

Training and Influence

Cameras offer a useful capability to the Law Enforcement Training Division as an extension of a training tool. For example, in a law enforcement training exercise such as an active-shooter or felony traffic stop scenario, footage can enhance learning opportunities during the after action review process by providing an additional means for leaders to assess their Soldiers. Corrections and detention specialists could benefit from this capability during forced cell move team extractions and emergency response training. Visual playback of a squad's performance can provide a more effective way to teach and mentor its members. Body cameras also offer key features to expand capability, such as night vision and global positioning systems, and options to link recordings with other cameras to present different angles of view.[8] Real-life incidents can be reviewed, if warranted and permitted, to teach valuable lessons to law enforcement professionals in training.

Body and dash camera systems also provide an advantage to USAMPC in terms of leveraging social behavior and compliance. According to recent studies, people interviewed by police officers are generally more cooperative after they have been notified that they are being recorded.[9] Even confrontational situations have been deterred or deescalated by announcing the use of dash and body cameras. Influencing professional conduct and model behavior on both sides presents ideal conditions for all.[10]

Disadvantages: The Cost of Protecting Evidence

Equipment that stores personally identifiable information and case data involves additional controls and user training, especially when adhering to the rules of evidence. In court proceedings, the preservation, genuineness, policy, and admissibility of video evidence will be heavily examined for any indication of questionable reliability.[11] Therefore, processes for controlling and storing video recordings must be meticulous in order to abide by law. The Regiment must thoroughly understand that this undertaking requires significant effort.

In the preservation phase of evidence, as it relates to body and dash camera footage, the *Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002*; Privacy Act of 1974, *Systems of Records Notices*; and information technology outlined in Department of Defense Instruction 8500.01, *Cybersecurity*, provide directives for controlling the storage of data.[12, 13, 14] This includes the length and locality of storage and the transmission, configuration, maintenance, and disposal of recordings.[15] Developmental and operational testing throughout the life cycle of systems must be conducted in accordance with cybersecurity standards and policies to ensure that the integrity of the evidence is never compromised.[16]

Physical control is another matter. For military police, maintaining proper chain of custody is a common fine-tuned practice, but video evidence may require even more attention to detail and restrictive practices. Tampering, improper information destruction, unauthorized use, and disclosure of footage that is "leaked" or otherwise compromised can affect an entire case and have severe implications against the operations of a provost marshal office. Additionally, missing or disrupted footage only causes the competency and trust of USAMPC to be questioned.

New Fiscal Requirements

Perhaps the most significant drawback associated with the use of body and dash camera systems is the anticipated cost. Purchase price, maintenance costs, warranty, sustainment, and estimated life cycle replacement (if applicable) must be factored into procurement. Specific servers and computers may be required to operate camera systems, which results in an additional expense associated with ensuring the protection of information technology and personally identifiable information.[17] Vehicle camera systems are typically higher in price, but that can vary depending on the installation of cameras on existing patrol vehicles or the inclusion of systems in the procurement of new vehicles altogether. Ultimately, estimated expenses may be difficult to justify amidst reduced FY 18 funding from the Budget Control Act.[18]

Complications With Policy

Body and vehicle cameras must be regulated by clear and concise policy to protect police and the populace. Will military police be required to record every incident while on duty, to include informal interactions with the community? Will computer-aided dispatch systems autonomously control cameras based on calls for service that warrant recording? Or is it more desirable to allow military police to use discretion when recording? Discretion is encouraged to allow flexibility in controlling what a camera captures, and it protects public dignity and respect without alienating relationships, such as those with victims of sexual offenses. The downside is the risk associated with failing to record an incident and losing the benefit of video evidence. A more restrictive approach to policy may mandate recording at all times while on duty. This eliminates ambiguity, tampering, the risk of user error, discretion, and the freedom to act on experience and personal judgement to assist the public. It also sends a message that leaders question the credibility and trust of subordinates. Another disadvantage is the restriction placed on police intelligence-gathering efforts when recording every situation. Witnesses may be unwilling to provide information out of fear of reprisal and disclosure, which works against the goal of building confidence in law enforcement professionals.[19]

Privacy and Legal Concerns

Infringing upon privacy is a topic of powerful debate in today's society, especially with respect to modern technology and the interpretation and evolution of law. For USAMPC, it is also an area of ambiguity. With insufficient guidance from court systems and the absence of a singular

overarching policy for the Army, the legal uncertainty of recording capabilities and expectation to privacy still remains. While some states follow a strict one- or two-party consent rule, where prior permission is mandated, this law may or may not transfer to federal installations.[20, 21] Furthermore, the right to record is not always automatic or guaranteed and should not be confused with force protection or antiterrorism measures at check points, gates, and critical infrastructures where right to refusal is nonexistent. Within this uncertainty, it is important to remember that the very purpose of the Regiment is to "assist, protect, and defend" the public without violating civil rights.

According to "United States v. Jones," the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects ". . . the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses . . ." and ". . . against unreasonable search and seizure."[22] Adhering to the Fourth Amendment while using body and dash cameras may place military police in various predicaments.[23, 24, 25] Will evidence that is captured by cameras without knowledge or permission, even in the execution of official policing duties, be admissible in court? Will a warrant be required to enhance digital imagery on body or dash cameras? If evidence revealed by a body camera is not otherwise seen by an officer, will it be considered "plain view?" It is nearly impossible to anticipate every challenge that may arise with the introduction of video recordings, especially in private residences where privacy is expressively a right. Many potential challenges remain ahead if body and dash cameras are utilized.

Conclusion

As USAMPC continues to leverage technology to shape operational effectiveness and maintain trust, the implementation of body and dash cameras remains complex in consideration. Individual recording capabilities can profoundly transform military policing and also damage the police-community relationship without proper application and forethought. Perhaps it is important to ask if there is truly a requirement and whether the Regiment is ready.

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[25]The Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV, 1789 (rev. 1992).

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13th Military Police Detachment During World War II

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

Author's note: *Although never formally assigned to the unit, it seems appropriate that I write about the 13th Military Police Detachment (formerly the 13th Military Police Section [Criminal Investigation]). In 1959, while assigned to Company D, 508th Military Police Battalion, I was attached to a two-man detachment of the 13th as an apprentice, or a provost marshal investigator, as we were called back then. My duty station was in Regensburg, Germany, and my mentor was Specialist–6 Sanford W. Fields. I was unable to attend a criminal investigation class at the U.S. Army Military Police School until October 1963.*

—Patrick Garland

The 13th Military Police Section (Criminal Investigation) was activated at Fort Custer, Michigan. The unit was authorized one officer and 10 enlisted agents. Initially, 12 enlisted men were assigned to temporary duty to attend an 8-week course on criminal investigation starting 23 August 1943 at the Provost Marshal General School, Fort Custer. The class was designated as "First Class Detached Specialists, Criminal Investigation." The first hour on the first training day consisted of an orientation by Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Purvis, a well-known former Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, who volunteered his service to the Army during the war. Purvis served as the commandant of the Officer Candidate School and the Enlisted Men's School of the Provost Marshal General at Fort Custer.[1]

The criminal investigation course was intense, with classes on military law, investigations, drill, weapons training, and calisthenics. The following Soldiers attended the class:[2]

- Corporal Harold E. Bernadickt.
- Private First Class George B. Freeman.
- Private Harold W. Behrends.
- Private Joseph I. Dwyer.
- Private William F. Kitchens.
- Private Henry L. Manfredi.
- Private Norman C. Mountain.
- Private Edwin D. Northrup.
- Private Richard V. Pitt Jr.
- Private James A. Romberger.
- Private David S. Sutcliffe.
- Private William M. Stevenson.

On 3 September 1943, Second Lieutenant Joseph Rosengarden joined the unit as the commanding officer. The class completed its training on 14 October; and on this date, Private Sutcliffe was transferred out of the unit. In November 1943, authorized equipment was drawn and packaged for shipment and unit members were assigned to additional specialized training. The 13th Military Police Section was one of fourteen 10-man detachments (the 7th Criminal Investigation Division through the 20th Criminal Investigation Division) attending training, and all 140 agents were promoted to satisfy the requirements of Table of Organization 19-36. All members of the 13th Military Police Section were granted 10 days of leave in anticipation of an overseas movement.

On 20 November 1943, with leave over, the men of the 13th Military Police Section were transferred to Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts, in preparation for overseas duty. Before boarding the S. S. Cristobal at Boston, Massachusetts, all shortages of the table of organization and equipment were drawn and immunizations were given for a departure date of 5 December for points unknown. Only after they were at sea were the men notified that they were headed for Scotland and a duty assignment in London, England. Private Manfredi was not listed on the manifest or anywhere else in the unit history.

When the ship arrived in Gourock, Scotland, trains awaited the men for their overnight trip to London. In London, the unit was billeted in an empty house with other criminal investigation units. The men attended 10 days of orientation and were issued credentials, badges, and ration

cards. They were then taken to department stores for civilian clothing: two suits, two shirts, two pair of slacks, topcoat, hat, shoes, and socks. The unit was then transferred to Wiltshire County, England, and divided into teams that covered the cities of Salisbury, Tidworth, Devives, and Warminster.[3] On 1 January 1944, the section was transported by train to its new assignment.

Each two-man team was assigned to work with British police agencies to learn their customs and procedures while gaining assistance in investigating cases involving American Service members. The agents were housed and fed with local families and wore their newly purchased civilian attire. Working with the British police, the investigators were called upon to investigate a variety of offenses within their respective cities.

In early June, the teams were recalled to Tidworth and alerted to prepare for overseas movement. Once in the marshalling area, the 13th, now redesignated as the 13th Criminal Investigation Section, was formed into two teams of five men each and boarded two different ships. One ship sailed for Omaha Beach, France, on 25 June, and the other sailed 2 days later with the commanding officer and unit vehicles. The initial group of five men was preparing to pitch its tents and bivouac on the beach when a truck driver informed the men that he was to transport them inland. They were then housed in a large school-like building with scant or no furnishings rather than the tents.[4] The unit was reunited on 1 July at Les Vey, France, and reported for duty with the Provost Marshal, Communications Zone. On 23 June, in an exchange between criminal investigation units, Technical Sergeant Bernadicki was transferred from the unit and replaced by Technical Sergeant Meyer Horwitz.[5]

On 9 July 1944, the 13th was attached to the Headquarters, 713th Military Police Battalion. It moved forward with that unit as the Army moved forward, and requests for criminal investigation assistance were received through the Military Police Radio Net. In mid-August, the unit was detached from the 713th Military Police Battalion and attached to the Provost Marshal, 3d Army (Rear Echelon). A few weeks were spent living and working under canvas, and the build-up of incoming troops became enormous. During this period, the working area of the 13th was within an apple orchard shared with many other types of Service organizations. Rape of French women began to be reported and had to be investigated. In one case, a widow was held and raped by several military personnel in front of her young daughter. Three different companies were known to have been in the vicinity of the woman's home, and investigators requested that the widow view three different line-ups from each of the units. The widow and her daughter separately identified three suspects. The line-ups were shuffled and viewed again, and two of the three suspects were identified again. Interviews were conducted from within the unit. Two men reported that they were aware of the incident but had not participated.[6]

A second incident occurred soon after; a military carbine was fired within a woman's house in an effort to get her to cooperate with her attackers. The woman and her daughter fled but were pursued and caught. Both women were attacked. Military police turned the fired cartridge cases and bullets recovered from the house where the assault began over to the agents. A suspect was identified by the women and witnesses. A carbine was retrieved from the suspected shooter and test fired. The specimens were compared with the evidence recovered from the house and sent to London, England, for ballistics testing.

Within days, another woman was found in her bed, clutching her infant child. The woman had died of a single gunshot wound to the head; the bullet also penetrated the child's brain. Initial investigation failed to produce any evidence of American involvement, although the deformed bullet was similar to those used in the .30 carbine.

Cases like these caused the 12th Army Group Headquarters to look into the formation of a forensic science unit to support military police and criminal investigations. It was determined that a mobile crime laboratory capable of offering the scientific evaluation of evidence in forward areas would be a valuable asset. Captain George R. Bird—an experienced criminalist from Illinois—obtained and outfitted a small-arms repair truck to enable field examinations in the areas of ballistics, photography, fingerprinting, handwriting, and chemical analysis.[7] The unit was designated the 27th Military Police Section (Criminal Investigation), the first of the U.S. Army crime laboratories, and was initially situated in Paris.

As the U.S. 3d Army moved across France, the 13th Criminal Investigation Section traveled and resided with 3d Army Headquarters Company. The section maintained its own command post with its own filing cabinets, folding tables, chairs, and typewriters. Fortunately, it also obtained a lantern and small stove for heating the tent. Many of the two-man teams spent weeks away, running down investigation leads. As the armies forged forward, many of the rear support units found themselves with the opportunity to frequent bars and taverns and get more involved with the civilian populace. Reports of barroom brawls, assaults, and rapes continued to plague the men of the 13th. Massive amounts of food and supplies were being pushed toward the front, but enterprising military personnel succumbed to the idea of "black marketing." American cigarettes, chocolates, and gasoline were in big demand. The French economy had been shattered by the fleeing Germans and the advancing U.S. troops. The very necessities of life were scarce. The 13th also devoted a good bit of time to investigating black market activities.

On 27 December 1944, the 13th (now redesignated as the 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section) and the 3d Army Headquarters moved into Luxembourg and were billeted in a school building. The 13th immediately set up liaison with civil authorities in the country and established a relationship with local police.

In January 1945, the unit was reorganized into a 14-man section; and over the next several months, new men

were assigned to fill the vacancies. Two were assigned in January, one in March, and another in April. Some of the original men were promoted to conform to the new unit grade structure.

At the end of March 1945, the unit departed Luxembourg and entered Germany at the city of Trier. During April, with the collapsing German Army in retreat, the unit kept on the move to Oberstein, Frankfurt, Erlangen, and finally Grunwald—a municipality in the district of Munich, Bavaria, Germany. In Grunwald, the 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section occupied the former home of Joseph Ley, a Nazi era German politician who headed the German labor front from 1933 to 1945. He committed suicide while awaiting trial at Nuremberg for war crimes.

On the day the war in Europe ended, the following men were assigned to the 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section:

- Captain Joseph Rosengarden, commanding officer.
- Master Sergeant William A. Stevenson.
- Technical Sergeant Meyer Horwitz.
- Technical Sergeant Edwin D. Northrup.
- Staff Sergeant George B. Freeman.
- Staff Sergeant Norman C. Mountain.
- Staff Sergeant Richard V. Pitt.
- Technician Fifth Grade Robert C. Clough.
- Technician Fifth Grade Gilbert J. Smith.
- Technician Fourth Grade Harold W. Behrends.
- Technician Fourth Grade Joseph I. Dwyer.
- Technician Fourth Grade William F. Kitchens.
- Technician Fourth Grade James A. Romberger.
- Corporal Ray E. Wachs.

All of these men were original members of the organization except for Technicians Fifth Grade Clough and Smith and Corporal Wachs.

On 12 June 1945, the 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section was authorized to go 100 percent over strength under the provisions of a message from the 12th Army Group. By September, with replacements being assigned, the original men of the 13th started rotating home, their Army service completed. The 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section remained in the Munich area for many additional years—with a final redesignation as the 13th Military Police Detachment in 1954.

13th Military Police Section at Fort Custer, Michigan, 1943

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Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), and finished his career working cold cases.

The Army Soldier Enhancement Program

By Sergeant Major Thomas B. House II (Retired)

The *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991* established the Army Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) to enhance equipment used by dismounted Army Soldiers using commercial, off-the-shelf; government, off-the-shelf; and nondevelopmental item products.[1] SEP makes use of a "buy, try, and decide" methodology. If the review panel, which convenes twice a year, selects an item, SEP buys and evaluates the item in order to gain firsthand feedback from Soldiers. After evaluating an item for functionality, protection, and lethality, the Army considers issuing the product Army-wide.

With the Army immersed in conflicts around the world, Soldiers need equipment that reflects the best technology—and they need it fast. Before transformation was part of the Army lexicon, the SEP, within the Project Manager Soldier Warrior (a program that supported Soldiers through the acquisition of integrated Soldier systems), promoted transformation of Soldier systems with an accelerated acquisition process that issued better weapons and gear to Soldiers. SEP continues to play a key role in the effort to meet Soldiers' needs. The SEP panel reviews more than 100 proposals every 6 months with the objective of identifying and obtaining items a dismounted Soldier wears or carries in order to further enhance the effectiveness of the Soldier in a tactical environment.

Unlike many military acquisition programs, SEP represents an aggressive effort to identify and procure items that have already been developed and have the potential to substantially improve weapons and support equipment. SEP evaluates products from the warfighting functional areas: fires, mission command, movement and maneuver, sustainability, and protection. Previous SEP items include lighter and more-lethal weapons, weight-reduced and more-comfortable load-bearing equipment, field gear, survivability items, navigational aids, and training capabilities.

Soldier Needs

Soldiers serving in a dismounted role rely heavily on equipment and oftentimes have knowledge of commercial items that can better help them accomplish a mission. SEP provides Soldiers with an avenue to recommend those products directly to the acquisition community. SEP also makes use of themes to help industry leaders and Soldiers focus on items for which combat developers generate requirements. The current goal for SEP is to enhance Soldier mobility by reducing Soldier load. SEP reviews all products submitted, but products that reduce overall weight without increasing bulk or stiffness or compromising current capabilities receive higher priority for consideration and assessment within SEP.

The Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, in coordination with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager–Soldier, reviews item submissions. A council of colonels meets each February and July to decide if an item is worth evaluating. If the item is approved, SEP funds the evaluation of the item and provides a final report with findings and recommendations. The recommendations could include adopting the item as an Army capability, not adopting the item as an Army capability, using the data/information gained during the evaluation to inform requirements generation, or assigning a National Stock Number (so that units can buy the item as-is).

Some past SEP successes include the M110 semi-automatic sniper system, clip-on sniper night sight, combat shotgun enhancement kit, squad common optic, extreme cold-weather socks, parachute electronic activation device, fuel handler coveralls and gloves, modular ghillie suit, ghillie suit accessory kit upgrade, individual combat shelter, PD-100 Black Hornet (nano unmanned aircraft system), Datron© Scout™ (unmanned aircraft system), InstantEye® (unmanned aircraft system), and Recon Scout® throwable robot. Current initiatives within SEP include fire control systems, weapons accessories and upgrades, cold-weather clothing and equipment, power charging and scavenger systems, Soldier-borne sensors, and 40-millimeter ammunition upgrades.

SEP Now

For more than 25 years, the SEP has been providing Soldiers with items that help them complete their missions more effectively. Many of these items were recommended to the SEP by Soldiers operating in a dismounted role. Anyone can submit suggestions, and all submissions are processed through the Program Executive Office Soldier Web site at <http://peosoldier.army.mil/SEP>. For more information about SEP, the process, or meeting dates, call (706) 626-8600 or send an e-mail to <thomas.b.house3.ctr@mail.mil>.

Endnote:

[1]House Resolution 2461, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991*, <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/101/hr2461/text>, accessed on 11 September 2017.

Sergeant Major House currently works with the SEP at Fort Benning, Georgia. He served in the Army for 29 years and retired in 2006 as the TRADOC Capabilities Manager–Soldier Sergeant Major. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas.

716th Military Police Battalion
(Saigon Warriors)

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 10 January 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 716th Military Police Battalion.
Activated 15 January 1942 at Fort Wadsworth, New York.
Allotted 27 October 1950 to the Regular Army.
Companies A, B, and C inactivated 29 March 1973 in Vietnam.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Defense
Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

Southwest Asia

Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of Kuwait
Cease-Fire
Armed Forces Expeditions
Somalia

War on Terrorism

Afghanistan:
Consolidation I
Iraq:
Liberation of Iraq
Transition of Iraq
Iraqi Surge
Iraqi Sovereignty
(Additional campaigns to be determined)

Decorations

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAIGON—TET OFFENSIVE
Presidential Unit Citation (Navy), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AMERICAN THEATER
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1969
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 1990–1991
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003–2004
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2004–2005
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2007–2008
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2012
Navy Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered SAIGON
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965–1968
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1973

MILITARY POLICE SOLDIERS PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISE SHANTI PRAYAS III

By First Lieutenant Megan E. Capobianco

On 16 March 2017, 2d Platoon, 57th Military Police Company, 728th Military Police Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, deployed to Panchkhal, Nepal, in support of Exercise Shanti Prayas III, Global Peace Operations Initiative. This capstone training exercise was held at the Birenda Peacekeeping Operations Training Center from 20 March to 3 April 2017. The event featured critical enabler and enhancement training, a staff training exercise, and a field training exercise. The event involved military personnel from more than 30 countries, with representation from six continents. The 57th Military Police Company participated in the field training exercise, which included nine other platoons from eight different countries across the globe. Each platoon showcased its different military tactical capabilities and standard operating procedures in support of United Nations peacekeeping missions. Additionally, each platoon was evaluated on its ability to adapt and implement the eight troop-leading procedures and rules of engagement to execute peacekeeping missions.

2d Platoon Soldiers perform riot control of local civilians rioting outside of a United Nations distribution site.

The primary focus of Exercise Shanti Prayas III was the education of United Nations peacekeeping task organization and humanitarian operations personnel. This focus was applied through demanding scenario-based lanes and supplementary classes (protection of civilians, improvised explosive device awareness, United Nations rules of engagement, the treatment and evacuation of casualties). The courses, taught by subject matter experts from around the world, provided Soldiers the fundamental knowledge needed to conduct training lanes. Each of the scenario-based lanes was specifically designed to train Soldiers in the various types of humanitarian missions. This required Soldiers to implement the rules of engagement in difficult situations. The lanes included tasks such as conduct dismounted patrols, convoy operations, and humanitarian distribution; operate a United Nations-designated site; operate a check point; and conduct cordon-and-search operations. The teams were not evaluated on their tactics; rather, they were evaluated on how well they adhered to the strict rules of engagement and code of conduct, allowing all participants to gain beneficial real-world knowledge due to the varying levels of tactical experience among participating countries.

The primary focus of the 57th Military Police Company was to properly apply the rules of engagement with each diverse escalating situation. The rules of engagement for United Nations peacekeeping missions may seem foreign to many combat-oriented, decisive-action-driven U.S. units. However, due to dual garrison law enforcement missions and tactical exercises, military police units excel in environments like this training exercise and stand out amongst the rest. Peacekeeping operations require a more focused and methodical analysis through negotiations and escalation of force in order to deescalate situations and protect civilians against hostile forces. Military police Soldiers possess the intellectual and interpersonal skills needed to operate with impartiality and to safeguard the populace from any threat based on exercising these skills in daily law enforcement duties. Consequently, when compared to other combat

(Continued on page 40)

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS				
COMMANDER	**CSM/SGM**	**CWO**	**UNIT**	**LOCATION**
David Glaser	Richard Woodring		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
David Glaser	Bradley Cross	John Welch	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Donna Martin	James Breckinridge	Joel Fitz	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Brian Bisacre	Bradley Cross		Army Corrections Cmd (ACC)	Alexandria, VA
Michael Stone	Jody Arrington		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Michael Hoban			USARC PM	Ft Bragg, NC
Marion Garcia	Craig Owens	Mary Hostetler	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Timothy Pulley	Robert Provost		2d Bde, 102nd Division, 80th Tng Cmd	Fort Snelling, MN
Michelle Goyette	William Mayfield		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
John Hafley	Winsome Laos		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Curtis Schroeder	Michael Weatherholt		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Carolin Horton	William Ramsey		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Larry Dewey	Mark Hennessey		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Glenn Schmick	Ted Pearson		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Thomas Russell Tutty	Brian Flom		42d MP Bde	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Javier Reina	Robert Wall		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Robert Paoletti	Byron Robinson		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Richard Ball	Clayton Sneed		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Thomas Vern			177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
David Samuelson	John Schiffli		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Kelly Jones	Lawrence Canada		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Vincent Duncan	Anthony Simpson		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Darcy Overbey	Peter Harrington	Mark Arnold	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Sarah Albrycht	Scott Painter	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Kirt Boston	Brian Garon	Celia Gallo	701st MP Gp (CID)	Quantico, VA
Steven Yamashita	Casey Freeman		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS				
Wesley Huff	Terrence Allen		2-80th MP Bn (TASS)	Owings Mill, MD
John Schwab	Brian Johnson		2-95th MP Bn (TASS)	Baton Rouge, LA
Patricia Hamilton	Gregory Jackson		1-100th MP Bn (TASS)	Nashville, TN
Stephen VanDoren	Andrew Johnson		2-104th MP Bn (TASS)	Aurora, CO
Edward Diamantis	Paul Duros		2-108th MP Bn (TASS)	Ft Jackson, SC
Fjessie Brewster	Nathanial Reagin	Veronica Ferrer	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Brian Bettis	Elvis Rodriguez	Vacant	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Eric Marhover	James Miller	John Lemke	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Terry Hahn	Brice Rae	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Melissa Cantwell	Larry Avancini	Anthony Caprietta	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Marcus Matthews	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Travis Jacobs	Veronica Knapp		40th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jason Turner	Carl Pickrel		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Scott Blanchard	Charles Smith		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Timothy Johnson	Joseph Jonas		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Douglas Curtis	Matthew Selvaggio		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Matthew Dick	Marcus Mitchell		96th MP Bn (C/D)	San Diego, CA
Ann Meredith	Daniel Leasor		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Matthew Schaffer	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (C/D)	Auburn, NY
Craig Maceri	Scott Smilinich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Steven Jackan	Alpheus Haswell		105th MP Bn (C/D)	Asheville, NC
Robert Watras	Craig Payne		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Charles Taylor	Aarion Franklin		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
John Gobel	Michael Plemons		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Kenneth Niles	Robert Wall		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Richard Candelario	Francisco Ramos		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Norberto Flores II	Matthew Lamonica		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Dawn Bolyard	James Summers		151st MP Bn	Gassaway, WV
John Dunn	Gregory Derosier	David Knudson	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
Thomas LeMoine	Daniel Williams		160th MP Bn (C/D)	Tallahassee, FL
Richie Gammons	Harold Cook		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Richie Gammons	Victory Watson		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Larry Crowder	Edward Stratton		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)				
COMMANDER	**CSM/SGM**	**CWO**	**UNIT**	**LOCATION**
Robert Paoletti	Andraus Williams		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Daniel Lawler		192d MP Bn (C/D)	Niantic, CT
Isaac Martinez	Jon Crowe		193d MP Bn (C/D)	Denver, CO
Matthew Boski	Michael Rowan		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Marc Reyher	Jon Crowe		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Scott Turner	Gabe Medina		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Richard Mann	Ed Williams		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
James Blake	James Sartori		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Randolph Velarde	Theodore Skibyak		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James Lake	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Kimberly Wilson	Jody Craig		304th MP Bn (C/D)	Nashville, TN
Edward Dimantis	Paul Duros		310th MP Bn (C/D)	Uniondale, NY
Jack Gray	Fred Waymire		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Mark Vinci	Reza Hajipour		324th MP Bn (C/D)	Fresno, CA
Porfirio Campos-Cruz	John Jenkins		327th MP Bn (C/D)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Farabaugh	Sammie McCall		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Jordan Papkov			340th MP Bn (C/D)	Ashley, PA
Alexander Shaw	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
Stephen Anest Jr.	Kathleen Menard		382d MP Bn	Westover AFB, MA
Joseph Adamson	Carrie Bruzzese		384th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Wayne, IN
Martin Schmidt	Jonathan Emerick		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
John Myers	Michael Jaquesta		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Lauronnda Lane	Mark Bell		391st MP Bn (C/D)	Columbus, OH
Jason Ruffin		Donald Sullivan	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Jonathan Bennett	Shelita Taylor		400th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Meade, MD
Eric Hunsberger	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Andrea Schaller	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Whitney Jensen	Patrick O'Rourke	John Scarlett	502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Jason Avery	John Eastwood		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Israel Thompson	Antonio Cox		504th MP Bn	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Matthew Jemmott	Shawn Klosterman		508th MP Bn (C/D)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Kirk Whittenberger	Robert Mattson		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Steven Kane	Kathryn Fair		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Steven Padilla	Kerry Hommertzheim		530th MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Vivek Kshetrapal	Michael Oneill		535th MP Bn (C/D)	Cary, NC
James Jeffress	Darrell Tigue		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
James Sheffield	Jason Vankleeck		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Robert Rodock	Justin Shad		705th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
John Copeland	Joshua Kreitzer		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Joel Schuldt	Jose Shorey		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Charles Green	Wayne Butterbrodt		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Philander Pinckney	Edmead Smith		724th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Charcillea Schaefer	Shelley Marlowe		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Robert Merry	Donald Rackley	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Forest Park, GA
Michael Cramm	Robert Snyder		744th MP Bn (C/D)	Easton, PA
Ryan Cagle	Matthew Thompson		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	George Julch		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Mark Howard	Todd Marchand		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Aaron Combs	Anthony Swancutt		785th MP Bn (C/D)	Fraser, MI
William Jennings	Paul Millius		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Jamon Junius	Michael Odle		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Joe Murdock	Scott Flint		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Joseph DeCosta	Nicholas Kreiner	Martin Eaves	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Norman Pollack	Jesus Goytia	Matthew Rayburn	Washington CID Bn	Joint Base Myer–Henderson Hall, VA
Jason Sama	Shola Walker	Paul Arthur	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

Current as of 19 March 2018
For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.ppo@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	26 Aug 13	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 4th quarter fiscal year (FY) 2018.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	28 Apr 14	A manual that addresses detention operations across the range of military operations and provides detention operations guidance for commanders and staffs. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publicaton in 1st quarter FY 19.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	6 Apr 15	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations that support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 1st quarter FY 19.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. **Status:** Current.
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leader's Handbook	11 Aug 15	A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. Training Circular (TC) 3-39.30 provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. **Status:** Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>.			

"Doctrine is indispensable to an Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."

—General George H. Decker,

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962

("Military Police Soldiers . . . ," continued from page 35)

Soldiers search a civilian for contraband at a United Nations checkpoint.

units, military police units are more apt to successfully execute these peacekeeping missions. The 2d Platoon, 57th Military Police Company, was able to use its knowledge of the three military police disciplines to help complete each lane. The platoon's experience, in law enforcement and tactical operations, was extremely useful in the high-stress scenarios created in each lane involving anxious men, women, and children. Overall, the diverse skill set embedded into the Military Police Corps allowed the unit to adapt to a wide range of real-world scenarios presented by the different lanes.

Exercise Shanti Prayas III not only benefited the individual Soldiers and platoon, but also had a positive impact at the company and battalion levels. Preparing a unit to mobilize for overseas missions presents a wide range of dynamic challenges. This exercise allowed the company and battalion to exercise standard operating procedures for the deployment of a platoon. Furthermore, Exercise Shanti Prayas III catalyzed the extension of influence beyond the normal chain of command. The 57th Military Police Company strengthened international partnerships with allies of the United States. Soldiers led by example and set the standard for all other nations to emulate in training and general practice. Specifically, the 57th Military Police Company underlined the importance of the integration of female Soldiers and demonstrated how critical they are to unit capabilities. The outstanding efforts of the 57th Military Police Company generated a new application of the military police skill set and will positively impact future joint training exercises.

First Lieutenant Capobianco is a platoon leader for the 57th Military Police Company, 728th Military Police Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. She holds a bachelor of science degree in biology from Widener University, Chester, Pennsylvania.

Photograph and Illustration Guide

Photographs and illustrations contribute a great deal to the visual appeal of an article. When submitting them with your article, please keep the following in mind:

- **Subject matter**—Action shots that show Soldiers who are training or performing their jobs are the best way to enhance an article. Static photographs of landscapes, structures, or distant machinery in action are less useful. Photographs of groups of people smiling at the camera or "grip and grin" shots add little to an article and are unlikely to be used.
- **Format**—Photographs saved in JPEG (or JPG) format and sent as attachments to an e-mail are best. Photographs and other graphics should not be embedded in a Microsoft® Word document or PowerPoint presentation. Graphics files are large, and e-mail systems frequently have limits to the size of messages that can be sent. For example, our system cannot accept messages larger than 20 megabytes (MB). One solution is to send separate e-mails with just one or two attachments each.
- **Size and resolution**—The ideal photograph or graphic for print reproduction is 5x7 inches at 300 dots per inch (dpi), but smaller sizes may be acceptable. If the photograph is a JPEG, it should be no smaller than 150 kilobytes (KB). A 5x7-inch, 300-dpi photograph saved as a TIF should be 1 MB to 3 MB in size. When taking photographs, use the highest resolution setting on your camera and save them at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Photographs appearing on the Internet usually have a resolution of only 72 dpi. They will look fine on a computer monitor, but do not reproduce well in print. However, photographs that are available for download as "high resolution" will probably meet the minimum requirements. Do not manipulate photographs by sharpening, resizing, retouching, or cropping the image. Using a graphics software program (such as Adobe® Photoshop) to increase the size and/or resolution of a small photograph will not increase the quality of the photograph so that it can be used in a printed publication. Do not compress photographs. We will do all postproduction work. We will not publish photographs that are pixilated or out of focus.
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- **Graphs/charts and illustrations**—We prefer to work with original digital graphic files. Submit the original PowerPoint slides and/or layered Adobe Photoshop/Illustrator files. Do not save them in a different format or flatten the layers.

Digital Archives

Scan the QR code below the image to access the digital version of past issues of *Military Police*.

Fall 2012

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

Spring 2015

Fall 2015

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Spring 2017

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