MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Kevin Vereen

Military police team: In this message, I want to focus on key leadership transitions at the Home of the Regiment. All organizations must endure change, and the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) is no different. In October 2016, the regimental chief warrant officer position transitioned from Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Leroy Shamburger to Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Joel E. Fitz. Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Fitz is off and running, assuming all the great work and initiatives that Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Shamburger started. Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Fitz brings a wealth of criminal investigative knowledge and expertise that will enable USAMPS to continue to be drivers of change in professional military education, capabilities and materiel development, and force design as it involves criminal investigations. He will work collaboratively with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) and the Provost Marshal General's Office to ensure that we are nested in the critical areas that affect the CID community. We are excited to have Joel here; and in the near future, he will travel to various installations and units, addressing our warrant officers and capturing important issues that need attention so that we can help.

I want to formally thank Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger for all that he has done during his tenure at USAMPS. I could not have asked for a better warrant officer teammate; he gave wise counsel and fully supported the way ahead for the Military Police Corps Regiment as we provided unique skills, tools, and capabilities for commanders across the range of military operations.

By now, you are probably aware that Command Sergeant Major James Breckinridge was selected as the new regimental command sergeant major. He will replace Regimental Command Sergeant Major Richard A. Woodring. Regimental Command Sergeant Major Woodring was selected as the Provost Marshal General Sergeant Major and will transition in the upcoming months and likely prior to release of this publication. He has been instrumental in shaping the future for military police noncommissioned officer (NCO) development and ensuring that NCOs remain vital to the Profession of Arms. He has been a true advocate, seeking and aggressively pursuing opportunities to broaden our NCOs without sacrificing their opportunities to remain competitive for promotion. He has championed the total Army mantra and has invested time in ensuring that Component 2 and 3 NCOs are not overlooked in any of the Army's initiatives. He also laid out the plan (now in implementation) for our Corps' transition to Military Occupational Skill (MOS) 31Z, making assignment opportunities across MOSs 31B, 31D, and 31E achievable regardless of primary MOS. Not only has Regimental Command Sergeant Major Woodring been a remarkable senior enlisted advisor for me as the Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment and Commandant, he has also been remarkable as the senior enlisted advisor for all of the approximately 49,000 military police Soldiers in the Corps.

Soon we will welcome Command Sergeant Major Breckinridge to the USAMPS team. Command Sergeant Major Breckinridge brings tremendous experience; he served in combat support military police units, most recently as a battalion and brigade level command sergeant major in Europe. Additionally, he served as a command sergeant major in corrections and as an operations sergeant major in garrison and the operational environment.

In closing, let me say that USAMPS remains committed to serving you now and in the future. Despite changes in key leadership, we remain ready to continue service to the operational force—by educating, training, and developing Soldiers and leaders who will fill your ranks and generate great capability that will allow for your success!

Assist, Protect, and Defend!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Richard A. Woodring

Greetings from Fort Leonard Wood! This will be my last letter to the field as the Regimental Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). I would like to reflect on what I have learned.

It has been a fast-paced 2 years, and I learned that you have to make every moment count at USAMPS. There are so many initiatives, strategies, plans, concepts, updates, and countless other events going on every day on behalf of our Corps. I never fully realized or appreciated all of the hard work carried out by our Soldiers, civilians, and contractors at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, until I became part of the process. We have some amazing people who work very hard to ensure that our Military Police Corps is postured, trained, and ready to face the challenges of today and the future.

I also learned that there is still a stigma about being assigned to Fort Leonard Wood. Some still believe that an assignment at Fort Leonard Wood will slow down their career. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Our officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers are extremely competitive with promotions and special assignments. I also once believed that "muddy boot" time was all that mattered, but quickly understood that we need and should expect our very best leaders to return and train the next generation. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) isn't a "take a knee" organization. There are benefits to being in a TRADOC assignment, but you will train and work just as hard as you do in other organizations to maintain readiness. I encourage leaders who have not yet served at Fort Leonard Wood to seek opportunities to do so.

I have learned that, although we are one Corps, we sometimes struggle to connect outside of our own respective military occupational specialties (MOSs). We have four unique MOSs that, individually, do great things; however, we need to better collaborate to take full advantage of those skills. Our Corps is full of talented Soldiers and leaders who are our future. Combining training opportunities, the leadership development program, and noncommissioned officer professional development is a great way to collaborate and expose our future leaders to all of the skill sets of our Corps. Each MOS complements the others; and frankly, we have lost talent when Soldiers have reenlisted for MOSs outside the Corps because they didn't know what existed in-house.

We are one Army! Our Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers and Families are a tremendous asset to our Corps, and I am continually amazed at everything they are asked to do in support of everyday operations. It is sometimes hard to believe that this is done part-time. In addition, their civilian skills are a benefit that reinforces our Corps as the force of choice.

I have learned that our Corps is in great shape. Two things that I will truly miss are hearing the cadences throughout the day and talking to the students. I remember when I first arrived at Fort Leonard Wood: I went to clothing sales and ran into a group of trainees and their Families buying souvenirs, displaying pride in the fact that their Soldiers were military police. It is an awesome responsibility to be entrusted by these parents to teach and lead their children. If that doesn't get you fired up about our profession, I suggest you find a new line of work. I will also miss the graduations and rites of passage ceremonies. At Fort Leonard Wood, you see the diversity and potential of the Soldiers and leaders that make up our Corps and will lead us into the future. They are bright, focused, hardworking, and just as committed as we were when we entered the Army. They will be the problem solvers for things that we cannot yet imagine.

In closing, it has been an absolute privilege to serve as the USAMPS Command Sergeant Major. I have learned more from my experiences here than from any other position I have held. Make every assignment and every duty station better than the last, and be proud that we are "of the troops and for the troops!"

Assist, Protect, and Defend!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Joel Fitz

I am privileged to offer greetings from the Home of the Regiment. On 14 October 2016, I assumed duties as the fifth military police regimental chief warrant officer. I am honored and humbled by this opportunity to serve, and I take the responsibilities of my position very seriously. Although I am somewhat intimidated by the significance of the position, those who have served before me have been instrumental in clearly defining the duties and responsibilities of the position and for that, I am grateful. I especially want to thank Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger, who has done his best to pass on the knowledge he has acquired over the last 4 years. I appreciate his service and the sacrifices that he has made for our Army, and I wish him the best as he leaves active duty for retirement.

I believe that we must have a vision for the future. We must study the Army's strategic vision for 2025 and beyond and ensure that the Regiment is shaping our training, leader development, operational concepts, and technical skills to match the future direction of the Army. My goals for the next few years are to better understand what the Army needs us to do and to assist in determining what direction we must take to meet the complexities of the future operating environment.

Based on past experience, personal observation, and direction provided by our commandant, Brigadier General Kevin Vereen, I have developed a few broad objectives for my tenure as the regimental chief warrant officer:

- Address warrant officer issues as identified by *The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy: In Support of Force 2025 and Beyond*, including professional military education, accessions, and talent management.[1]
- Evaluate the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) investigative courses and actively seek ways to improve the quality of instruction.
- Analyze the interconnectivity between the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) and military police, with a view toward joint training opportunities, multifunctional collaboration, and the enhancement of police operations at all levels.

In order for me to serve the Regiment well and provide the best advice possible to our commandant, I need to hear from you—your thoughts, comments, and innovative concepts matter, and I want to hear what you have to say. Our vision of the future will drive change, and it is our duty as Army professionals to work together toward shaping the Regiment into an adaptable and enduring force, capable and committed to preserving readiness.

I am grateful for the opportunity to serve at a time when our Army is focused on preparing for the future. I want to thank Brigadier General Vereen for selecting me and giving me the chance to be involved in developing the course our Regiment will take. These are very exciting times, and I look forward to working with, and learning from, everyone.

Endnote:

[1]U.S. Army, *The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy: In Support of Force 2025 and Beyond*, 2016, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/misc/WO2025_Strategy_20160329.pdf>, accessed on 10 January 2017.

Assist, Protect, and Defend—Do What Has to Be Done!

Disciplined Disobedience:

Army Chief of Staff Highlights Ethics of Command

By Captain Jonathan L. Duran

Disciplined disobedience that accomplishes the commander's intent should not be ignored; but at times, should be expected from a professional subordinate. Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley, speaking at the 2016 Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting and Exposition, said that Soldiers should have "the willingness to disobey specific orders."[1] This embodies the idea that Army professionals must be willing to do what it takes, ethically and legally, to win battles and wars. The idea of the Army Chief of Staff supporting any level of disobedience to orders and choosing not to support all the tenets of unified land operations highlights the complex relationship between military law and customs on one hand and winning the Nation's wars on the other. General Milley's message supports the unified land operations tenets of flexibility, integration, adaptability, lethality, and depth, but not that of synchronization. By understanding the framework of the tenets and recognizing that current ground conditions are probably different from what is perceived at the tactical operations center, we see that synchronization transforms to coordinated, disciplined initiative.

Fighting and winning the Nation's wars are the main purposes of all branches of the military. Unity of effort is an overarching idea under which every military action is supposed to fit, but it must be fundamentally examined to understand what it means. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines unified action as "a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates and, when appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] to achieve unity of effort."[2] Unified action drives each branch's principles to unify its diverse capabilities to achieve unity of effort. The Army doctrinal perspective is that unity of effort is achieved through the unified land operation tenets of flexibility, integration, adaptability, lethality, depth, and synchronization.

"The Army doctrinal perspective is that unity of effort is achieved through the unified land operation tenets of flexibility, integration, adaptability, lethality, depth, and synchronization."

In General Milley's speech, he described the battlefield of the future and how Soldiers must anticipate situations in which subordinates cannot contact their headquarters due to enemy jamming and hacking. General Milley maintains that Soldiers and leaders in such situations must be willing to disobey some orders. Future conditions will require decentralized execution and the exercise of mutual trust within the team. In his book, *The Mission, the Men, and Me*, Pete Blaber sums up this idea in the lesson of always "listen[ing] to the guy on the ground."[3] Naturally, this results in more control for the commander on the ground than the overall commander, thus transforming a specifically synchronized plan into coordinated, disciplined initiative.

Due to the developing situation, the tenet of synchronization may become impossible to achieve and the ground commander might have to disobey orders to be successful. This characteristic should be expected from professional subordinates, who must remain focused on achieving the commander's intent at all times. The prudent risk accepted by the commander is not limited to physical injury. It recognizes that some degree of control could be exchanged for a better opportunity for mission success. Just as mission variables change the chosen course of action, the physical battlefield of the future will drive the Army to learn and force its publications to evolve. The evolution of Army tactics, techniques, and procedures is constant and necessary for the U.S. Army to lead the world.

Although the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures is practical, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, defines synchronization as "the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time."[4] How Soldiers, weapon systems, and equipment are arrayed on the battlefield at a given time must be mutually supporting to achieve the commander's desired end state. Synchronization is crucial for combined arms operations and is paramount during the fundamental functions of breaching operations: suppression, obscuration, securing, reduction, and assault. All offensive characteristics hinge on the organization and efficiency of breaching efforts to accomplish the mission and gather mass on the objective.

Synchronization is pivotal in all operations, cementing its place as a unified land operations tenet. However, realizing that synchronization is crucial for any mission, the environment that General Milley described is one of volatile mission variables. This may require professionals to disobey outdated orders, exercise disciplined initiative, and shift planned synchronization to coordinated execution from initiatives. No battle in the American Revolutionary War was ever completely synchronized, but goals were always coordinated to ensure unity of effort. This is why there are redundancies throughout every operation, from dual priming and initiating explosives to the succession of command. For this reason, leaders always plan for logistical coordination, not synchronization.

For every idealized plan of execution, there is an execution that suffers from an idealized plan. General George S. Patton Jr.'s maxim that "A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan executed next week"[5] epitomizes the need for coordinated, disciplined initiatives rather than synchronized efforts. Although General Milley's statement reinforces most unified land operation tenets, it does not validate the tenet of synchronization—nor should it, since no plan survives contact with reality.

Endnotes:

[1]Sydney J. Freedberg, "Miserable, Disobedient and Victorious: Gen. Milley's Future US Soldier," 5 October 2016, <http:breakingdefense.com>, accessed on 9 January 2017.

[2]Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011.

[3]Pete Blaber, *The Mission, the Men, and Me: Lessons From a Former Delta Force Commander*, Berkley Caliber, New York City, New York, 2 December 2008.

[4]Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 10 October 2011.

[5]The Official Web site of General George S. Patton Jr., <http://www.generalpatton.com/quotes/>. Accessed on 9 January 2017.

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Reflections on the Army's Training With Industry Program

By Major Maurice (Moe) Green

In 2015, I was bestowed with the honor of participating in a 1-year internship with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The Army's Training With Industry Program allows selected military personnel to gain unique experiences that cannot be captured in military units within civilian organizations. Therefore, the Military Police Corps has partnered with the following agencies through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) to provide broadening opportunities for the officer corps:

- American Correctional Association.
- Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.
- IACP.
- McKesson Corporation.
- Siemens.

The IACP is the largest law enforcement leadership association in the world, with more than 23,000 members in 100 countries. Members include chiefs; commissioners; directors; sheriffs; and command and mid-rank officers from federal, state, county, local, tribal, and other law enforcement agencies. Programs and services provided by the IACP to its members include policy development, legislative support, management studies, training, technical assistance, program development, and research. The preponderance of my time at IACP was devoted to the Center for Police Leadership and Training, a division that provides police officers, police supervisors, and chief executives with the best law enforcement training available.

The IACP internship increased my knowledge of the law enforcement profession and extended my professional contacts. It also provided countless experiences that will forever impact how I view the law enforcement profession.

Before beginning the internship, I would have assessed my overall knowledge of the law enforcement profession as rudimentary—even though I had served as a deputy provost marshal, company commander, and battalion operations officer. Each opportunity provided great experiences and expanded my law enforcement knowledge; however, in my view, I still lacked some of the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to consider myself a law enforcement professional. My experiences at IACP changed this. Through the IACP internship, I completed the Leadership in Police Organizations (LPO), a 5-week leadership development and train-the-trainer program, to become a nationally certified LPO instructor. As an LPO instructor, I taught leadership principles to more than 150 command level law enforcement personnel throughout North America. I benefited from the exchange of ideas inside the classroom just as much or more than the students. It was through these exchanges that I enhanced my knowledge of the law enforcement profession. Using the Socratic Method of teaching (asking questions to stimulate critical thinking), I was able to fully explore the underlying beliefs that shaped the students' views and opinions, which greatly facilitated my professional development.

During my internship, I served as an ambassador for the Department of the Army and the military police profession for local, state, federal, and international law enforcement personnel. At the conclusion of my internship, I had expanded my personal law enforcement networks and facilitated the expansion of Army and law enforcement contacts on four continents.

As an IACP intern, I was provided invaluable opportunities, to include the opportunity to attend the annual IACP conference, participate in outreach opportunities, and experience routine interactions with law enforcement professionals. The IACP hosts an annual conference attended by thousands of police officers from around the world each year—making the conference the largest gathering of its kind. The conference connects law enforcement professionals from around the globe and provides a forum for productive discussions on all aspects of policing. The conference also includes a nearly 3-acre technology exposition consisting of vendors offering demonstrations of new equipment that assists in policing. The conference was even more special because it was attended by the President of the United States, Barack H. Obama; the Director of the Federal Bureau of

(Continued on page 9)

SECURING THE SUPPORT AREA

By Major Early Howard Jr.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark A. Milley, has made readiness his No. 1 priority for Regular Army and Reserve Components. He also provided guidance to Regular Army senior leaders to conduct training events with U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units when possible.

First Cavalry Division (1CD) headquarters recently joined several Army units and conducted Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 16-5 to train and validate its staff in preparation for deployment. The WFX is a home station mission rehearsal exercise conducted as a multiechelon culminating training event for deploying units.[1]

The 720th Military Police Battalion Intelligence and Operations Sections supported the exercise by augmenting the 136th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (U.S. Army Reserve) response cell. In accordance with WFX task organization requirements, the 136th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade employed two military police battalions in support of 1CD.

During the WFX and ramp-up command post exercise, military police units were given a variety of mission sets that enabled the 1CD commanding general to maintain a deep-fight focus and to avoid becoming overly concerned about the support area. Military police secured the division support area by conducting detention operations, security and mobility operations, and policing operations to ensure freedom of movement for maneuver and sustainment units.

Detention Operations

Conducting detention operations in an immature theater requires the close synchronization of sustainment, security, and operational assets to ensure mission success.[2] Military police companies were placed in direct support of brigade combat teams throughout major combat operations to better support detention operations. Military police companies established brigade holding areas so that detainees could be evacuated, then collected and secured throughout the area of operations.[3] Throughout the exercise, the brigade holding areas received 500 to 1,000 detainees who required transport to the division holding area within a 48- to 72-hour timeline. The Army National Guard company provided mission command of the division holding area and used military working dog assets for patrols and security.

Military intelligence assets collected information before the transportation of detainees. Transportation was managed by the 1CD Provost Marshal's Office, which ensured a common operating picture of the detainee situation among organizations. The Provost Marshal's Office coordinated the air movement of detainees with 1CD Air Cavalry Brigade or gave guidance on link-up locations for ground transfer missions.

Security and Mobility Operations

Military police units supported the forward passage of lines between host nation (HN) forces and divisional units by reducing the congestion in the passage area. Military police units aggressively conducted route reconnaissance of main supply routes and alternate supply routes in the 1CD area of operations.

Military police also supported wet-gap crossings by conducting traffic control points to control the flow of units at designated crossing sites. The division tactical command post maintained a 2-day mission command during this operation due to enemy indirect-fire opposition.

Military police provided support to two camps within the division support area for the resettlement of internally displaced personnel. During the exercise, 2,000 internally displaced personnel conducted demonstrations along key main supply routes to protest the American presence in their country. Military police, civil affairs personnel, and several nongovernmental organizations were tasked to clear the route and support established internally displaced personnel camps.

Policing Operations

Military police units were tasked to conduct HN police training and support while major combat operations were taking place. Military police reacted to an attack on a police station in an urban area and established a training and development relationship at the request of the chief.

Military police also provided support to civil law enforcement by performing riot control when a protest became violent. Military police were the first responders to the incident and were later supported by HN police forces.

Lessons Learned

Following are the major lessons learned for military police units supporting WFX 16-5:

- Maneuver support (doctrine):
  - Conduct survivability moves using mobile vice static checkpoints.
  - Conduct aggressive patrolling of the support area (deterrence).
  - Understand how to support forward passage of lines, wet/dry-gap crossings, and HN integration.
  - Understand that detainee operations are not internally displaced personnel operations.
- Keys to success (train-up):
  - Quickly integrate into the division staff planning cycle, military decision-making process, leaders training program, and division combined arms rehearsal.
  - Constantly discuss military police utilization and protection priorities with the division provost marshal's office.

Conclusion

Military police secured the division support area by conducting detention operations, security and mobility operations, and policing operations to ensure freedom of movement for maneuver and sustainment units. Military police are still relevant and credible enablers for maneuver commanders to employ in support of a decisive-action or counterinsurgency battle.

Endnotes:

[1]III Corps and Fort Hood Regulation 350-1, *Training and Leader Development*, 30 March 2009.

[2]Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 26 August 2013.

[3]Ibid.

Major Howard is the battalion executive officer for the 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a bachelor's degree in sociology from Alabama A&M University, Huntsville, and a master's degree in security management from Webster University.

("Reflections on the Army's Training . . . , " continued from page 7)

Investigations, James B. Comey Jr.; and the President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Cornell William Brooks, who joined the conference to highlight the importance of the law enforcement profession and to discuss some of the most recent challenges facing law enforcement professionals.

The internship also provided unique opportunities to explore initiatives aimed at improving the law enforcement knowledge and skills of military police Soldiers. I initiated and developed the framework for partnerships and outreach opportunities between IACP, the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), and military police brigades. This framework resulted in broadening opportunities for senior noncommissioned officers within IACP. I also developed a 3-day critical-incident command management pilot course with the 89th Military Police Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas, to explore national best practices in response to active-shooter incidents.

Lastly, the internship enabled me to experience routine interactions with numerous pioneers of best practices across the law enforcement profession. Most notably, I had the distinct pleasure of teaching several LPO classes throughout Canada. It was through this experience that I had the opportunity to compare and contrast the different approaches in law enforcement as they relate to community engagement and response to active shooters.

After continually hearing how Command and General Staff College is supposedly "the best year of your life," I am reluctant to use the phrase. However, if there is such a thing, the best year of my life would be my year as an IACP intern. I strongly recommend that the Army retain the Training With Industry Program—especially the partnership with IACP. My goals are to serve as a strategic Army leader who is proficient at training and commanding Soldiers and to possess the required attributes to facilitate solutions to the Army's most complex problems. The internship at IACP greatly facilitated my ability to achieve these goals by honing my technical skills, providing continued leader development, and affording me the opportunity to gain advanced education and strategic insights that could not be captured within the ranks of Army units.

Major Green recently completed a Training With Industry internship with the IACP and is now assigned to the Law Enforcement Branch, Operations Division, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from South Carolina State University and master's degrees in business and organizational security management from Webster University; human resource management from Phoenix University, Tempe, Arizona; and public administration from the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

Military Police Battalion Medical Support

By Lieutenant Colonel Clifford F. Porter

The lack of adequate medical support for combat support military police battalions has resulted in high numbers of medically nondeployable Soldiers (MR3s), polypharmacy, and inconsistent medical care. With General Mark A. Milley's directive that readiness is the No. 1 priority, it is time for a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) change for combat support military police battalions.[1] Combat support military police battalions receive varying medical support, and they experience inconsistency in garrison clinics and while deployed. Garrison clinics tend to focus on maintaining appointment volume and customer satisfaction scores, with less emphasis on medical readiness or direct support to large military police battalions. Adding a medical section with a physician assistant (PA) and senior medical noncommissioned officer (NCO) (sergeant first class, Military Occupational Specialty [MOS] 68W40) would provide the organizational medical assets needed to improve military police medical care and to meet the readiness requirements for daily operations and future deployments.

Battalions in brigade combat teams (BCTs) consist of 250 to 750 assigned Soldiers with an assigned battalion PA, aid station personnel, and medics. BCT battalions usually deploy as battalions, and the PA establishes a fully capable Role 1 battalion aid station in support of operations. Military police battalions consist of 700 to 800 assigned Soldiers without an assigned battalion PA. Military police battalions normally deploy as companies or smaller elements rather than as battalions. Medical support for deployed military police units is provided from Role 2 medical units, either from a BCT or area support medical company. In garrison, military police battalions receive medical support from supporting post military treatment facility (MTF) clinics.

The military police mission encompasses far more than deployed operations. It includes permanent and continuous garrison operations, particularly during the law enforcement cycle, that are not well-supported by MTFs. Also, MTFs do not provide support for field training exercises or deployment training; the companies rely on a handful of independent, junior medics. There are no battalion level medical assets to support field or garrison operations, and the absence of a medical section and PA contributes to a significant medical readiness deficit.

There are currently sick call and appointment procedures from supporting MTFs in place for military police battalions. In practice, however, support is highly variable. Some units actually have no sick call available; Soldiers either make appointments a few days or weeks in advance or go to an emergency room for routine medical care that should have been addressed at an aid station or clinic. MTFs work according to set hours that are not adaptable to the variable shift work or training cycle of military police. Military police on law enforcement cycles often have appointments when they should be sleeping after a night shift. Additionally, Soldiers are seen by a variety of providers, which leads to poor continuity of care and allows "doctor shopping" for profiles and prescription drugs.

Polypharmacy is tracked by MTFs, yet dangerous Drug Enforcement Administration schedule prescription drugs remain too easily prescribed to Soldiers. Battalion PAs track polypharmacy in most units, but this critical medical oversight does not exist for the combat support military police battalions. MTFs do not provide polypharmacy oversight for U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) units or individuals. Such oversight is left to the unit or the MTF provider who prescribed the medications. The current structure increases the risk of fatal consequences; anyone who has participated in a fatality review board is familiar with the epidemic of prescription drugs. Medical research clearly shows that the epidemic is increasing.

The absence of battalion level organic medical assets has led to ad hoc relationships with clinics and ad hoc medical sections within military police battalions. The senior medic in the military police battalion, one of a few staff sergeants or sergeants, often assumes responsibility for training medics and tracking unit medical readiness. Depending on the nature of the supporting MTF, some providers take extra measures to participate with military police battalion profile review boards and incorporate military police battalion medics into clinic operations in order to manage sick call and appointments. Such ad hoc relationships rely on professionals taking personal initiative—often with good results. However, most military police battalions do not have ad hoc clinic support with predictably decreased medical readiness and increased risk to the health and life of Soldiers.

The MTF hours of operation are only one organizational difficulty. MTF metrics of success differ from those of FORSCOM commanders and providers. FORSCOM providers (battalion PAs) monitor their unit polypharmacy cases, MR3s, medical support for training, and preparation for deployment, whereas the MTF uses budget-based metrics for customer satisfaction scores and utilization metrics. MTFs may track, but are not accountable for, MR3s or polypharmacy metrics. High customer satisfaction scores benefit the clinic budget, and these scores are often considered on officer evaluation reports. Conversely, refusals to administer a prescription or a profile to a Soldier, especially before an Army

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PARTNERS IN CORRECTIONS

By Major Norma A. Bohaty and Captain Alex D. Green

During the summer of 2016, the 613th Military Police Company (Detention), a U.S. Army Reserve unit from Puerto Rico, conducted annual training in partnership with the 705th Military Police Battalion (Detention) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Unlike most annual training sessions, Soldiers of the 613th gained real corrections experience by performing duties in the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility (MWJRCF), a medium-security correctional facility. The primary mission of the MWJRCF staff is to conduct correctional operations that provide for the safe and humane care, custody, and control of U.S. Service members during pretrial confinement and post-trial incarceration for sentences up to 10 years, while also providing services for their rehabilitation and eventual release back into military Service or civilian society.

The MWJRCF

Before performing duties at the MWJRCF, the staff must complete 40 hours of preservice training, which covers topics such as procedures for escorting inmates, responding to emergency situations, conducting security, and training for oleoresin capsicum exposure and certification. Of all the subjects taught to the correctional staff, interpersonal communication skills training is the area used most often; those skills are used to manage and resolve potentially disruptive behaviors within the inmate population.

By the time U.S. Army Reserve or Army National Guard units complete the mandatory preservice and on-the-job training, their annual training cycle is normally over. However, the 613th Military Police Company Soldiers completed preservice training and on-the-job training in 2015. After returning to their home station, they conducted sustainment training and then returned in 2016 to augment the 165th Military Police Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 705th Military Police Battalion, during four rotations that lasted 14 days each.

The 613th Military Police Company Soldiers were posted in various positions within the MWJRCF; they supervised inmates in housing units, in the dining facility, and at various recreational activities and escorted inmates to numerous appointments inside and outside the MWJRCF. According to the operations sergeant of the 613th Military Police Company, the integration into daily operations was seamless. The Soldiers felt as if they were part of the unit; one team, one fight.

During the 613th Military Police Company rotation, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 785th Military Police Battalion (an Army Reserve unit from Michigan), was also partnered with the 705th Military Police Battalion. Both of these Army Reserve units served critical roles as part of the response force during an exercise that tested the facility emergency action plan for a major disturbance and hostage situation. It was the best response seen in 2 years. The Army Reserve Soldiers fully integrated into the formation and responded to the disturbance as professionals and in accordance with emergency action plan procedures. The 705th Military Police Battalion Command Sergeant Major commended the Army Reserve Soldiers and described their performance as flawless, professional, and motivated.

The partnership had benefits for both units. Personnel shortages within the 705th Military Police Battalion

reduced leave opportunities and often caused 12-hour shifts and "6 and 2" schedules (6 days on and 2 days off) to maintain staffing at the MWJRCF. Augmentation with the 613th Military Police Company prevented the 12-hour shifts and allowed Soldiers of the 705th to take leave.

The 613th Operations Sergeant explained that the ability to conduct real-life training was vital and more valuable than a warrior exercise or combat support training exercise. The augmentation increased Soldier knowledge and provided real-life mission experience.

The training at Fort Leavenworth also allowed the 613th Military Police Company to practice unit mobilization. The company commander of the 613th felt that the unit movement from Puerto Rico to Fort Leavenworth exercised complete mobilization and deployability, which significantly improved unit readiness.

Support military occupational specialties (MOSs) (Army paralegal specialists [MOS 27D], human resources specialists [MOS 42A], and culinary specialists [MOS 92G]) were able to execute their specialties within the MWJRCF as they would during a deployment. According to the 613th Operations Sergeant, working inside the MWJRCF allowed support MOS Soldiers to better understand their mission within a correctional setting.

The 165th Military Police Company first sergeant felt that the partnership between the 613th Military Police Company and the 705th Military Police Battalion provided a great opportunity to merge experiences from different components. Many of the military police Soldiers in the Army Reserve and National Guard have careers in civilian corrections and law enforcement; and by partnering with Regular Army units, all Soldiers benefit through shared experiences. The training experience provided much-needed perspective for the Soldiers from both spectrums and vantage points.

Both units are already planning for future partnership opportunities in 2017. The dual-hatted 705th Military Police Battalion Operations Officer and MWJRCF Director of Operations stated that having Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers "who can augment the correctional force will allow our Soldiers, who would otherwise be on duty within the facility, to conduct crucial training in support of our mission-essential tasks." The company commander of the 613th Military Police Company added, "This experience within the MWJRCF has postured the [613th Military Police Company] to execute U.S. military corrections operations anywhere on the globe."

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physical fitness test or deployment can risk poor customer satisfaction scores that have negative consequences for the MTF budget and the medical director's officer evaluation report. In short, the MTF metrics are not synchronized with the military police mission, Army readiness, or the Army mission.

Since MTF providers are not a part of the units, they do not track Soldiers' secondary issues. Too frequently, narcotics or psychiatric drugs are prescribed to Soldiers with alcohol, legal, or other high-risk problems and behaviors. Also, Medical Evaluation Board or Integrated Disability Evaluation System referrals without command knowledge or input incentivize Soldiers to make subjective complaints when facing adverse actions for misconduct, Army physical fitness test failure, or lack of weight control. Improving access to care allows Soldiers to see a variety of providers, but the resulting lack of continuity without an imbedded PA predictably leads to polypharmacy and MR3s. Soldiers who abuse the medical system are toxic to a company formation, and they contribute to the stigma of Soldiers going to sick call or seeking assistance with behavioral health. The Army supports imbedded behavioral health providers; but in an odd irony, some of the largest battalions in the Army do not have imbedded medical providers.

The concept of a medical platoon led by a PA and senior medical NCO is very well established in the Army and is an essential component of battalions in BCTs. Medical NCOs are very experienced at supporting companies in field training and operations, as directed by the battalion operations officer. Changing the MTOE to create this structure would simply be adding an effective organization to military police battalions.

Based on the lack of organic medical support in combat support military police battalions, it would be prudent to explore an MTOE change that would allocate a PA (captain, MOS 65D) and senior medical NCO (MOS 68W40). By making this MTOE change, the medical section could directly support the unique law enforcement mission of the military police, improve readiness, and avoid the organizational challenges of MTFs that are not designed to support military police battalions.

For all of these reasons, assigning PAs and medical sections to military police battalions would significantly improve medical care, increase access to care, reduce the risk of polypharmacy and, ultimately, meet General Milley's directive that readiness is the No. 1 priority for the Army.

Endnote:

[1]"39th Chief of Staff of the Army," *Military Times*, <http://ec.militarytimes.com/static/pdfs/Initial_Message_39th_CSA.pdf>, accessed on 12 January 2017.

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Organizational Change: Building Critical Thinkers While Undergoing Critical Change

By Captain John P. Brost

U.S. Army units often experience organizational change, as leaders and Soldiers transition every 2 to 3 years. Army force restructuring, doctrine, and modified tables of organization and equipment also change. The Military Police Basic Officer Leader's Course (MPBOLC), under the Command and Tactics Division, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is no different. Leadership changes, complete curriculum modifications, personnel restructuring, altered instructor requirements, and training execution have all been implemented to reflect student-centered learning and an officer development process. The goal is to increase proficiency and better prepare lieutenants for their first unit assignment.

A lieutenant presents a briefing about a training exercise.

Curriculum for Modern-Day Leaders

The last decade required constant deployments and train-ups using doctrine modified by units on the ground, depending on the theater of operations and the unit mission. With recent doctrine changes, including changes to military police doctrine, MPBOLC small-group leaders (SGLs) spent 6 months updating the entire program of instruction. The curriculum now emphasizes platoon level missions and equipment and law enforcement operations at the company level. These changes are based on feedback across the Regiment, from the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. Practical exercises are conducted for each block of instruction, and students receive increased instruction outside the classroom. All program of instruction adjustments were made to reflect a leaner, more agile force and to place more learning responsibility on the students, with the SGL taking on the role of a facilitator.

SGL Certification

The Military Police Corps is the only Army branch that selects SGLs from an available pool of post-command captains and experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Other branches make the selection right after the career course. Even with extensive experience, SGLs are still required to attend a large amount of instructor certification training, beginning with the Foundations Instructor Facilitator Course and ending with Phase II of the Faculty Development Program. These courses lay out the basics of instructing and assist the instructor in effectively teaching and assisting students in retaining acquired knowledge. SGLs must also qualify on all military police modified table of organization and equipment-assigned weapons in order to train students on those weapon systems. The end state of the increased instructor and weapons training is a well-balanced, highly educated SGL that is able to demonstrate competencies in and out of the classroom.

Sergeants and Soldiers

In the past, a sergeant first class was always the team NCO of each instructor team. To correctly match the Command and Tactics Division table of distribution and allowances (TDA), increase standardization and synchronization

Students engage in a law enforcement exercise in a mock village.

across teams, and provide additional opportunities for NCOs to instruct and mentor a larger population of lieutenants, sergeants first class were replaced by staff sergeants. There was great hesitancy and resistance to the change by senior SGLs; but after roles and responsibilities were formally assigned, senior NCOs increased their time spent managing training and resources, while officers increased time conducting developmental counseling and mentorship. Instructor duties were balanced, and every staff sergeant earned the basic instructor's badge and attended necessary professional development schools to maintain competitiveness. The students maintain senior NCO contact throughout the course during certain training events, blocks of instruction, and senior NCO leadership professional development sessions.

The formation of the NCO-led law enforcement committee is related to the NCO instructor change of responsibilities. During the law enforcement phase, students are taught basic policing skills (mechanical advantage control holds, policing concepts, two forms of nonlethal exposure, active-shooter response) in preparation for the military police duty officer position. The academic and practical knowledge is applied during a 3-day culminating law enforcement exercise at a mock village. During the exercise, students respond to common law enforcement scenarios and receive subject matter expert feedback from NCOs assigned to the class. This method of training increases basic officer proficiency and provides a policing perspective from a Soldier's point of view.

Training Management

One of the first extensive classes for the lieutenants is Training Management. The concepts of training found in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, and the eight-step training model are discussed.[1] The students also conduct practical exercises using the Army Training Network and the Army Publishing Directorate to demonstrate their ability to research and execute a planned training event. The students are each tasked with planning one of the many training events within the 17-week course. Planning requirements include verifying land and ammunition, coordinating weapons, picking up vehicles, and requesting necessary training aides for the tasked event. All requests go through student leaders to their SGL, who assists with coordination between installation representatives and the students. This allows the students to learn and lead throughout the course in preparation for assignment as the primary planner for their platoon.

Students participate in the weapons phase of the 9-day exercise.

Students traditionally conducted a 5-day situational training exercise that focused on individual and team level training, followed by an 8-day field training exercise that evaluated their collective training abilities as a platoon. The two training events are now combined into a single, 9-day training exercise that trains basic Soldier tasks through platoon level leadership tasks. Scripted role players assist in replicating the deployed environment and add additional stress to the decision-making process. The students conduct platoon command post operations, force-on-force missions, stability operations,

and defense operations on a forward operating base. Within the 9-day training event, each class is exposed to a wide range of military police missions and recovery operations post-deployment. The most memorable moments that occur during this training event are when the students realize how to effectively apply what they have learned to mission execution.

An SGL instructs a student during weapons training.

Before the culminating field exercise, the students are required to pass a training exercise without troops. They endure more stress from this single event than all of the other events combined. This event requires the demonstration of basic doctrinal knowledge, critical thinking, and articulated planning and the ability to analyze an enemy problem and arrive at a successfully applied solution. Historically, this involved a fragmentary order briefed by SGLs, followed by a late night of deliberate operation order writing by the students. This has been changed to writing a base deployment order, receiving short fragmentary mission orders with a focus on the execution paragraph, and briefing a scheme of maneuver. Instead of working all night, students receive only 3 hours to plan before the mission is briefed. The change was made to reflect a more realistic order production experienced by a lieutenant as a platoon leader. Many lieutenants in the past left MPBOLC with the ability to write and understand the deliberate orders-producing process, but were unable to apply critical thinking in real time and develop a basic executable plan without extensive research.

High-Physical-Demand Training

To assist with implementing gender-neutral standards throughout the Army, MPBOLC began testing students on Army-approved, high-physical-demand tasks. These standards include properly carrying a 78-pound, replicated MK-19 weight a distance of 100 feet; lifting a 39-pound ammunition can above the head; and marching 12 miles with an Army combat helmet, an improved outer tactical vest with plates, necessary personal protective equipment, and a 35-pound ruck sack. The students are allowed four attempts throughout the course to complete these tasks. Those not able to successfully complete all tasks in four attempts are discharged from service. These tasks are the main impetus for MPBOLC's current emphasis on combat-focused physical fitness. Each student leads a physical readiness training session according to Field Manual (FM) 7-22, *Army Physical Readiness Training*, but the instructors set the physical readiness training schedule to reflect increased ruck marches, water survival fitness, rifle drills, obstacle courses, and physical training in full combat gear.[2] Beyond increasing combat fitness, the training acclimates the students' bodies to a full range of motion with increased weight and potentially restrictive protective gear. It is crucial for students to understand their physical capabilities under less-than-optimal conditions. Even with this new focus, students will increase their overall Army physical fitness test scores through strict adherence to doctrinal fitness guidance and modification of eating habits throughout the course.

Conclusion

As MPBOLC moves forward with course and leadership changes, the center of gravity will always be the students. All course modifications are implemented with the best interests of the students and the Army operating concept in mind. As a Regiment, we cannot train and execute with a business-as-usual attitude. The Nation and the Army continue to move forward, and so must we if we are to continue to produce the best officers and NCOs for the U.S. Army. Like all organizational changes, there will be resistance, heartache, anxiety and, at times, painful transition. The Regiment will do what we, and the rest of the Army, always do: change, adapt, learn, lead, and win.

Endnotes:

[1]ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, 23 August 2012.

[2]FM 7-22, *Army Physical Readiness Training*, 26 October 2012.

References:

FM 6-22, *Leader Development*, 30 June 2015.

MPBOLC Phase B Individual Student Assessment Plan, 14 September 2016.

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Homeland Operations: Army Warfighter Challenge No. 6

By Mr. Tony W. Sexton

Defending U.S. territory and the people of the United States is the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DOD), and providing appropriate defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is one of the Department's primary missions.
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities[1]

The Army develops capabilities for homeland operations based on national strategies, joint and DOD directives, and current doctrine. These capabilities enable the Army to protect the homeland by deterring and defeating attacks and mitigating the effects of attacks and natural disasters as described in the 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC), as stated in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept—Win in a Complex World:* "The AOC describes how future Army forces will prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars while operating as part of a joint force and working with multiple partners. It provides the intellectual foundation and framework for learning and for applying what we learn to future force development under Force 2025 and Beyond."[2] Concepts do not constitute doctrine, but they serve as the beginning of the process for delivering capabilities to future Army forces. The AOC presents 20 Army warfighting challenges (AWFCs) as first-order problems, the solutions to which improve the effectiveness of the future force. AWFCs provide an analytical framework to integrate efforts across warfighting functions while collaborating with key stakeholders in learning activities, modernization, and future force design.[3] The U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, has been assigned the responsibility to lead AWFC No. 5, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and AWFC No. 6, Homeland Operations. The AOC requirements reflect the two primary missions identified in the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities:*

- Defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and nonstate actors.
- Provide assistance to domestic civil authorities in the event of natural or man-made disasters.[4]

The role of MSCoE as the AWFC No. 6 lead is to guide, facilitate, and integrate learning across Army missions that support deterring and defeating attacks; mitigate consequences of attacks and disasters; support integration into capability development for future force required capabilities; and develop capabilities for MSCoE equities.

Where We Started

When the AOC was issued in 2014, it stated, "To protect the homeland, the Army deters and defeats attacks and mitigates the effects of attacks and natural disasters."[5] These two missions, 1) deter and defeat attacks and 2) mitigate effects, although equally important, had not received equal consideration. Over the preceding decade, TRADOC and the operational force conducted extensive work on the DSCA requirement to mitigate the effects of attacks and natural disasters, primarily for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. It was evident that the Army had a role in deterring and defeating attacks, but initial analysis identified very limited learning to support capabilities development. This mission is complex and crosscutting and includes many civilian organizations.

Where We Need to Be

The Army must not focus on the homeland itself but must equally balance efforts across the homeland, in the approaches, and in the far regions. This is a whole-of-government approach that will be pursued in the building of the community of practice. The Army's responsibility to protect the homeland is a primary strategic priority. The homeland is increasingly at risk as threats become greater and the world effectively becomes smaller. To meet these more dangerous threats, the Army must prioritize the development of capabilities to deter and defeat attacks

against the homeland and to mitigate the consequences of attacks and disasters in the homeland. The homeland mission must be a consideration for the development of Army capabilities to address the full range of military operations. These considerations must be developed in a concept for homeland operations that describes an Army total force approach to synchronize efforts across components and between the operating and generating forces. A concerted effort is necessary to gain a shared understanding of the homeland defense and DSCA principles and the Army role in DOD missions in support of civil authorities. This entails an analysis of policies that impact the Army ability to conduct homeland operations; define or refine its homeland defense and DSCA principles; and enable capability development across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLPF addresses critical challenges affecting the operating force ability to perform missions and fosters readiness through coordinated contingency planning and exercises between the Army total force and joint and civil authorities.

The Army must integrate homeland considerations into new and existing scenarios to provide an accurate foundation for Army capabilities development. These scenarios must include a comprehensive model of the domestic operational environment that accounts for the unique homeland conditions, including statutory constraints and relationships with federal, state, and local governments. Experimentation must deliberately evaluate Phase 0 through Phase 2. Given the growing interconnectedness of the homeland with the world, the Army must also account for the mutual effects of domestic events and expeditionary operations to accurately portray the challenges to be faced by the future force.

Within the operational environment affecting homeland operations beyond 2025, the future challenges are too numerous and complex to be addressed solely by U.S. military and civilian agencies. A significant portion of national unified action efforts must be oriented around building foreign partnerships and helping partners attend to their internal challenges. The Army, for example, must enhance partner activities. This approach establishes long-term relationships fostering mutual trust and confidence, promoting a more stable international security environment, and setting conditions to prevail during armed conflict. To prevail, future Army forces must collaborate with unified action partners to develop security capacity and support capacity building of partners' efforts through security cooperation activities at the individual, institutional, and ministerial levels.

Conclusion

The Army must develop capabilities to support assigned missions as an integral part of its effort to develop the Army of 2025 and beyond in support of *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*.[6] Army analysis over the last 2 years provided some much-needed background, particularly the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response enterprise force modernization effort, to establish a thorough integrated learning plan and solutions strategy for the task of mitigating effects. Moving forward, the primary lines of effort required to support this AWFC are to—

- Define the operational environment for homeland operations in terms of unified action partners, the global operational environment, and homeland-specific conditions.
- Clarify Army roles and responsibilities associated with homeland operations and prioritize their integration into concept and doctrine development as a basis for all Army capabilities development.
- Develop and educate Army leaders at all levels of homeland operations.

MSCoE will continue to lead the collaboration among the stakeholders through monthly meetings of the AWFC No. 6 workgroup, the proposed governance forum, and other venues to ensure the integration of homeland operations throughout Army capabilities development. The homeland operations community will approach this AWFC with a near-term emphasis on readiness and implementation of mature, high-payoff solutions.

Endnotes:

[1]DOD, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, February 2013.

[2]TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept—Win in a Complex World*, 31 October 2014, p. i, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf>, accessed on 15 December 2016.

[3]Ibid.

[4]*Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.

[5]TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1.

[6]Joint Chief of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf>, accessed on 15 December 2016.

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Leader Responsibility in the MWD and Traffic Management Programs

By Captain Karmalita L. Irlmeier

The Military Police Corps has stressed the pursuit of credentialing in the areas of law enforcement and corrections throughout the last 10 years. As the knowledge base increases in our Profession of Arms, it must also include other facets of the Military Police Corps. Commanders and staff officers often second guess themselves and their noncommissioned officers (NCOs) on proper utilization, regulatory requirements, and personnel selection in law enforcement and corrections positions. Yet, we are significantly lacking in equipping leaders with knowledge through education, training, and experience to make informed, calculated decisions.

The mission of Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, 14th Military Police Brigade, Joint Base San Antonio (JBSA)–Lackland, Texas, is to execute the Department of Defense (DOD) military working dog (MWD) and traffic management training programs. Company D provides commanders with competent professionals able to execute military police disciplines across the full range of military operations. The 37th Training Group, U.S. Air Force, is the executive agent for the DOD Canine Training Center (Dog Training School, MWD Handler Course, and Kennel Master Course) and the Traffic Management Collision Investigator (TMCI) Course. Company D provides cadre for these courses and is responsible for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31K Phase II advanced individual training.

In my first few months as the commander of Company D, I quickly became enamored with the MWD world—a side of the Military Police Corps that I knew very little about, but surprisingly more than many of my peers. I set out to attend the MWD Handler Course; everything was set up for me to attend the different parts of each block of instruction necessary to meet the graduation requirements. It was a great plan in theory, but unjustifiable considering the required absence from my regular post and the lack of return to the Army for sending an employable captain who would never work in an official MWD handler capacity.

As I visited training and became more involved in the mentorship of 31K Soldiers, I also paid more attention to the cadre leading them. It became increasingly obvious that the experiences and training of 31K Soldiers were much different than those of MOS 31B Soldiers, resulting in an entirely different mentality and leadership style of a complete subgroup of military police officers. As I shared my thoughts and experiences with peers and subordinates, I encountered a lack of knowledge and interest from many. Through no fault of their own, most military police leaders have had little to no experience working with dog handlers.

How do we properly educate leaders across the force? Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, describes leader development as a continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader's entire career, that comprises training, education, and experience gained in schools, while assigned to organizations, and throughout an individual's own program of self-development.[1] Collectively, military police officers share similar institutional experiences. Operational experiences are shaped by units of assignment, including combat training center rotations and deployments. Leader development is unit-specific and an individual responsibility.

An Air Force instructor demonstrates how to lead an MWD through an obstacle course.

Institutional Experience

At the institutional level, the MWD proponency initiatives and integration NCO at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) briefs leaders as they go through each individual professional development course. This is a great

Students attend Block 1 of medical training with training aids.

way to spread the knowledge. Unfortunately, selective listening sometimes takes over. This is unfortunate because this information affects every military police officer at some point in their career, whether it is as a future law and order detachment executive officer responsible for the kennel budget, a detachment commander attempting to slot traffic investigators, or a company commander with an MWD team attached for a combat training center rotation. It also affects staff officers, battalion commanders, and anyone who works with or for the department of emergency services.

Operational Experience

I approached Master Sergeant Timothy Timmins, previous Company D first sergeant and said, "I know why I wanted to attend the course. Why did you want me to attend the MWD Handler Course?" His response has stuck with me for more than a year now. "I want to ensure my commander knows everything there is to know about the MWD program. If you know the information, you can share it with your leaders, subordinates, and peers. Eventually, you will be a member of a battalion operations staff, and it is beneficial to every handler in our formation that you know what we are capable of, how to properly train and utilize teams, and understand the challenges we face along the way," he said.

MWD handlers have a desire to share their passion. First Sergeant Edgar Arnall, current Company D first sergeant, has voiced the same priorities, and he continues to find mentorship opportunities for me at every training event. Kennel masters and program managers know that leaders throughout the Regiment are not particularly well-versed in the training, utilization, certification, and administrative requirements (which are assessed through the annual kennel inspection and assessment) that come with their MWD formations. By communicating with these NCOs, leaders learn the challenges of building an MOS with NCOs who have little traditional leadership experience and whose only responsibility for the last few years has been MWDs.

Proof of Principle

Some leaders conduct their own research, diving into available resources and Army doctrine. Other leaders attend unit training to assess the organization, despite not completely understanding the requirements. The rest wait until a suitable solution is offered at an institutional level. Some commanders have reached out to the ground element and requested professional development to educate their leaders on the MWD and traffic management programs, which encouraged me to start considering ways to facilitate this option for more leaders.

The train-the-trainer program at JBSA–Lackland is an informal program that mitigates the training gap between attendance at the MWD Handler Course and the Kennel Master Course. The program has been very successful since its creation in 2013. The 4-week program immerses Soldiers in the DOD Dog Training School, where they learn about new training tactics, techniques, and procedures (clear signals training, deferred final response, odor recognition, imprinting) and receive an overview of the initial MWD integration process of screening, procurement, training, certification, and shipment. MWD handlers get a better understanding of MWD training methods and problem-solving procedures to boost sustainment training and certification percentages throughout the operational force. The program dates are published at the beginning of each fiscal year to ensure that unit MWD program managers can budget accordingly.

Solution

The MWD/traffic management site visit and program overview proposal offer the same developmental opportunity to leaders throughout the Regiment. The proposal provides an opportunity for a hands-on tour of the DOD Dog Training Center, breeding program, and veterinary clinic. Company D, the MWD Proponency Initiatives and Integration Section, and the MWD program manager at the Provost Marshal General's Office support this program. In partnership with the 341st Training Squadron and 343d Training Squadron (the Air Force units responsible for the DOD MWD Handler Course and TMCI Course), a 4-day program was established to provide a general overview of the DOD Dog Training School, Military Working Dog Handler Course, Kennel Master Course, and TMCI Course. The program breaks down the components for success in each course and provides a general overview of the Army's MWD and TMCI programs. The program is funded using unit travel funding.

Interest From the Field

Many operational leaders recognize a lack of knowledge in the MWD and traffic management programs and have reached out to Company D. U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) Provost Marshal, Colonel Ramona Laib, and her staff partnered with the Mexican Sedena Army (*Secretaria de la Defensa*) to advise in fulfilling its goal of building its military police branch to an organized, trained, and cohesive combat arms branch of the Mexican military. USARNORTH has executed multiple site visits to

Company D and the DOD Dog Training Center to ensure that the latest information and tactics, techniques, and procedures from the Army MWD program were available to its Mexican counterparts.

In April 2016, Colonel Ross Guieb and his staff at the 89th Military Police Brigade invited Griffin Military Police Detachment commanders and kennel masters to JBSA–Lackland for a 2-day leader's roundtable. The roundtable provided leaders with the chance to get a better understanding of the structure, procurement, and training that handlers and MWDs receive in the field. Recent changes in Army Regulation (AR) 190-12, *Military Working Dogs*, and an increased awareness of the recent standardization of the MWD certification process were also highlighted.[2] Outside of the MWD program, leaders discussed the disparity between the numbers of additional skill qualifier Q9 vacancies throughout the force, with the limited amount of TMCI course seats allocated to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) through the Interservice Training Review Office process. This brought forth discussion of the controversial decision, often made as a reenlistment option, of offering the TMCI course to many lower-enlisted Soldiers and NCOs who struggle with mathmatics or who will never fill a position as a traffic investigator.

The MWD National Monument located at JBSA–Lackland.

At the end of the roundtable, a thorough after action review was conducted. Comments and concepts that stemmed from this discussion include the following:

- This training would benefit detachment commanders and detachment sergeants. Additionally, the training would benefit current and future department of emergency services, operations officers, battalion and brigade operations staff officers, and battalion commanders who were not provided the opportunity to work at the department of emergency services or as a detachment commander prior to assignment to their current positions.
- Opportunities such as the train-the-trainer program are not well known outside of the MWD program. This information often funnels from the Provost Marshal General's Office and TRADOC directly to MWD program managers and does not filter to leaders throughout the Military Police Corps. One key recommendation for the TMCI program is to issue a pretest that focuses on the mathmatics contained in the course to potential TMCI candidates. This would benefit leaders in vetting personnel before investing a substantial amount of time and money on a candidate who might struggle to complete the course.

Conclusion

Visits from the 89th Military Police Brigade and USARNORTH are examples of an informal program to educate the officer corps on a small scale. In conjunction with continued program updates through institutional courses and leaders' interest in their own programs, the MWD/traffic management site visit and program overview provide leaders with a baseline of information on the MWD and TMCI programs to enable informed decisions on manning, training, and the use of MWD and TMCI assets. By running one iteration of this program each quarter into fiscal year 2017 and offering it as an enduring opportunity for leaders throughout the Military Police Corps, we provide leaders with the education and knowledge necessary to make informed decisions, enhance their leadership experience in key developmental positions, and continue to shape the Military Police Corps of 2025.

Endnotes:

[1]ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, 23 August 2012.

[2]AR 190-12, *Military Working Dogs*, 11 March 2013.

Captain Irlmeier is the commander of Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, 14th Military Police Brigade, JBSA–Lackland, Texas. She holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Military Police Among First USASMA Fellows

By Sergeant Major Steven M. Townsend

The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), Fort Bliss, Texas, launched a fellowship program with Pennsylvania State University in mid-2015. The USASMA selected 20 sergeants major from a list of applicants. Those selected spent the next year earning a master's degree in education.

Three military police sergeants major (Sergeant Major Scot D. Cates, Sergeant Major Jason B. Johnson, and Sergeant Major Steven M. Townsend) were among the selected applicants. The USASMA fellows started their courses in September 2015 and finished in August 2016. The fellows were required to complete four courses during each of the Fall 2015 and Spring 2016 semesters and three courses during the Summer 2016 semester.

Unlike other fellowship programs in the Army where students spend a year at a university or college taking courses, the USASMA fellowship assigns its students to USASMA to take online courses through Pennsylvania State University World Campus. The intent of the fellowship program is to meet the Army's objective of developing agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos.

To help the fellows kick off their academic year, Pennsylvania State University sent Dr. William C. Diehl, advisor and professor, to USASMA to provide a 2-day orientation of the master's degree program and Pennsylvania State University World Campus. Throughout the year, the sergeants major remained in constant contact with their professors, faculty advisors, and classmates, using technology to synchronously meet. Dr. Diehl proved to be a tremendous adviser for the fellows, even ensuring that the Shamrocks Irish Pub on Fort Bliss was open to allow the fellows to take in the Pennsylvania State University–Army football game during their first semester. The fellows enjoyed their academic year and their newfound affiliation with the university.

In late August, the fellows participated in a special graduation ceremony that was hosted by the USASMA, with Pennsylvania State University staff and faculty in attendance. Now that the military police fellows have graduated with master's degrees in lifelong learning and adult education, they will teach future enlisted leaders who attend the Sergeants Major Course, fulfilling their 3-year service obligation to the Army. Sergeant Major Cates was assigned to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine; Sergeant Major Johnson was assigned to the Department of Force Management; and Sergeant Major Townsend was assigned to the Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Department.

Applications for Class 3 of the fellowship program are now open in accordance with Military Personnel (MILPER) Message Number 16-218, *Fiscal Year 2017 U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Fellowship Program*.[1] Cates, Johnson, and Townsend strongly recommend the program for those interested in furthering their education and giving back to the Corps.

As mentioned on the USASMA Web site, "The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, went before the Armed Services Committee on March 25, 2014, and said that 'We must continue to educate and develop Soldiers and civilians to grow intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment to better lead Army, joint, interagency, and multinational task forces and teams. Therefore, we will reinvest and transform our institutional educational programs for officers and noncommissioned officers in order to prepare them for the complex future security environment.' General Odierno's approval of this program is a testament to his commitment to transform our institutional education programs."[2]

Endnotes:

[1]MILPER Message Number 16-218, *Fiscal Year 2017 U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Fellowship Program*, 8 August 2016.

[2]USASMA Fellowship Program, USASMA Web site, <http://usasma.armylive.dodlive.mil/advanced-leaders-course-alc-cc-dl/>, accessed on 22 November 2016.

Sergeant Major Townsend is an instructor for the Sergeants Major Course, Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Department, Fort Bliss. He holds a master's degree in education from Pennsylvania State University.

Two Lieutenant Colonels: A Story of Twins and Their Aunt

By Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Kane

Promotions are some of the best moments of a military career. They are a reflection of accomplishments and an anticipation of future potential; a celebration where Families, colleagues, and friends can come together to pay tribute. But every once in a while, there are promotions that will never be forgotten.

Lieutenant Colonel Whitney Jensen, U.S. Army (Regular Army), and Lieutenant Colonel Asheleigh Gellner, U.S. Air Force (California Air National Guard), were promoted together in the spring of 2016. That alone does not make this promotion unforgettable, but the details of the event made it special.

Lieutenant Colonel Whitney Jensen (left) and Lieutenant Colonel Asheleigh Gellner (right) pin each others ranks on their covers.

Lieutenant Colonel Jensen and Lieutenant Colonel Gellner are identical twin sisters, serving in different Services and components. As luck would have it, the sisters were stationed in the same area for the first time in their military careers, making it possible to organize a joint promotion ceremony. They also managed to coordinate with the two general officers they wanted to preside over the ceremony and with their parents, Don and Laura Jensen, to travel from California. "I know Asheleigh and I were both overwhelmed by the support showed to us by our chains of command, friends, and Family." stated Lieutenant Colonel Jensen.

Ms. Suzanne Calley pictured with her husband.

The most important detail of this story is the promotion ceremony that was held in the Pentagon Memorial Chapel, at the location where American Airlines Flight 77 crashed on 11 September 2001. Ms. Suzanne Calley, a special aunt of the sisters, was a passenger aboard Flight 77. Lieutenant Colonel Jensen said, "I was deployed to Kosovo during September 11th, and I remember vividly receiving an email from my dad the next day informing me that Suzanne was on the flight that crashed into the Pentagon. There's not a day that goes by when I walk into the building that I do not think of her."

Aunt Suzanne was a very active woman who loved life. An avid scuba diver and traveler, she lived life off the beaten path. She was extremely kind and gracious and was an inspirational person. Lieutenant Colonel Gellner said, "It is a good thing to use memorial venues to celebrate life's successes and not just for solemn remembrances." She then invited the audience to join the Family at their aunt's memorial just outside the windows of the chapel. "Her memorial is there to celebrate that life goes on," she said.

Lieutenant Colonel Kane is the Director of Emergency Services at U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland—Pfalz, Germany.

How the Tet Offensive Changed the Military Police Corps

By Master Sergeant Joshua M. Kreitzer

"Crack the sky. Shake the earth." This was the Hanoi, Vietnam, message to the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong insurgents indicating that they were starting the greatest battle in the history of Vietnam—fighting for independence.[1] This battle, known as the Tet Offensive, started on 31 January 1968. The valorous actions of military police Soldiers dramatically redefined the military police role from a combat service support unit to a combat support unit.

Traditional Military Police Roles

Before the Tet Offensive, the military police role had evolved over the years, but the mission remained fundamentally unchanged. The first use of military police in the U.S. Army began during the American Revolutionary War in 1778. The first military police units, known as the Marechaussee or Dragoons, performed law enforcement activities in military encampments, quelled disturbances, prevented desertions, and provided field commanders with executioners.[2] In 1779, military police units conducted prisoner-of-war operations and protected the flank and rear of the columns during troop movements. After deactivation in 1783, U.S. Army commanders established military police type units as needed during particular periods in U.S. history. These "general police" came from the most intelligent and physically capable Soldiers in the units.[3] In 1918, the Criminal Investigation Command was established, adding police investigations to the military police role.[4] The Secretary of War established the Military Police Corps as an official combat service support branch of the U.S. Army on 26 September 1941, with the mission of conducting law enforcement operations and investigations, enforcing traffic regulations, and operating the prisoner-of-war system.[5]

World War II to Vietnam

Military police units were combat service support units prior to 1968. Field Manual (FM) 4-0, *Combat Service Support*, states that combat service support deals primarily with "supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services" that enable combat support and combat arms units.[6] Military police units participated in combat landings on the beaches of Normandy with the 1st Division, 4th Division, 29th Division, and 90th Division; jumped or glided with the 82d Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division; and followed engineer units to establish beachheads to enforce traffic regulations and conduct river crossings for Allied forces.[7] These missions remained largely unchanged during World War II, the Korean War, and the beginning of the Vietnam War. The military police mission changed after the 716th and 720th Military Police Battalions engaged and defeated the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong forces during attacks on critical sites in and around Saigon during the Tet Offensive.

The Tet Offensive

The Tet Nguyen Dan is the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, which lasts from one to several days. During this time, the Vietnamese people celebrate in the streets by making loud noises using firecrackers, bells, whistles, gongs, and other implements to ward off evil spirits. In addition to celebrations, many Vietnamese travel to visit family members. During the 1967 Tet Nguyen Dan, the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong entered into a cease-fire with the South Vietnamese army and American forces. The North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong used this time to resupply and refit their units in the field.[8] For the 1968 Tet Nguyen Dan, the groups made the same 7-day cease-fire agreement. Based on North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong troop movements and the lull in combat engagements, American forces believed that the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong would violate the cease-fire.

Enemy Movement of Forces

In late 1967, North Vietnamese forces launched several large-scale attacks on Allied forces in an effort to draw the Allied forces away from large population centers.[9] During this time, the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong traveled undercover into Saigon under the pretense of visiting family for the holiday. The South Vietnamese army was responsible for the security of Saigon, a city with more than 2 million inhabitants, with several U.S. forces staged far outside the city. General Frederick C. Weyand, the III Corps Commander, was the first to identify the patterns of enemy movements and actions and notified General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam.[10] Westmoreland requested that the South Vietnamese army cancel the cease-fire; he knew something was going on, but not what or when. In response, South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu shortened the cease-fire from 7 days to 3 days, but did not cancel it. Most members of the South Vietnamese army were traveling to visit family and were unavailable to mobilize quickly if they had to fight North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong forces. Friendly forces were relatively relaxed, but the enemy was poised and waiting for the signal to commence the attack.

Celebration Battle

Under the guise of celebration, North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong forces attacked Saigon shortly after midnight on 31 January 1968. Sergeant Donald Taylor, an experienced Special Forces sergeant, was drinking with other Soldiers at his hotel in Saigon and later said that he thought the noise of gunfire and grenades was the Vietnamese people celebrating as usual.[11] Military police at the U.S. Embassy, the Military Assistance Command–Vietnam Annex, the Embassy Hotel, the officer's quarters, and the Phu Tho racetrack quickly sprang into action. This was the most intense battle in which the military police had ever been involved.

The military police battle against the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong in defense of key sites resulted in the valiant earning of several awards for heroism and the Presidential Unit Citation, and it became the impetus for the new designation and new roles in combat. This was the greatest challenge military police had yet faced, and it would be the fiercest battle they would see for decades to come.

Military Police Valor in Action

North Vietnamese forces, mostly Viet Cong guerillas, surprised the military police with their sudden and audacious attack. Military police were forced to delay or repel North Vietnamese regular forces and guerillas while waiting for the tactical combat forces to move in from outside the city. Sniper fire rang out, the U.S. Embassy became a combat zone, and streets became ambush sites.[12] The military police were now frontline fighters and were forced to defend critical sites, fighting and repelling the enemy.[13] The military police needed to succeed. When describing the 716th Military Police Battalion, Thomas Johnson and Mary Himes stated:

> *The battalion had the . . . daily responsibility of committing 350 military policemen to the physical security of over 130 officer and enlisted quarters strung throughout Saigon and Cholon. During the Tet Offensive, when the Viet Cong made an all-out effort to capture Saigon, not one of these facilities fell to the enemy, although 27 military policemen were killed in action and another 44 wounded while defending them.*[14]

The Soldiers of the 716th and 720th Military Police Battalions displayed tremendous leadership, valor, and sacrifice in defeating North Vietnamese forces. Colonel Richard George, the Saigon Provost Marshal, said:

> *These brave men won a costly change of image for the military police, one for which all past, present, and future members of the Military Police Corps can justifiably point to with pride and humility—for this was indeed the Corps' finest hour.*[15]

The Embassy

The U.S. Embassy was the first critical site to be attacked. Specialist Charles Daniel and Private First Class William Sebast were on duty at the vehicle gate when they exchanged fire with the enemy. They quickly locked the gate, delaying the enemy, and reported the attack to other military police. The Viet Cong sappers breached the embassy wall with explosives. Daniel and Sebast killed the first enemy soldiers through the breach, but they were then shot and killed. Their actions killed the sapper leader and delayed the enemy long enough so that the U.S. Marines could secure the front door of the embassy.[16] The 101st Airborne Division tried to land a helicopter in the compound, but the Viet Cong repelled them. First Lieutenant Frank Ribich seized the initiative and led a military police team, which included Private First Class Paul Healey and Sergeant John Shook, to secure the embassy. The military police maneuvered across open terrain in the courtyard, braved enemy fire, killed numerous Viet Cong, and saved a trapped embassy official.[17] Ribich earned the Bronze Star Medal with Valor; Shook earned the Silver Star; and Healey was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, which is the second highest valor award bestowed by the United States. In addition to securing the embassy, military police all over Saigon reacted quickly to repel multiple attacks.

First Lieutenant Ribich

Quick-Reaction Force

At the Phu Tho racetrack, the Viet Cong established a stronghold to coordinate attacks against South Vietnamese and U.S. forces moving within Saigon and near the bachelor officer's quarters. Staff Sergeant Herman Holness, Sergeant Michael Grieve, and Private First Class Roland Bowen moved to secure the racetrack area and confront enemy forces. Enemy fire disabled Grieve's and Bowen's jeep as they tried to flank the dug-in enemy. Pinned down under intense machine gun fire, Grieve and Bowen maneuvered within 25 yards of the enemy and provided suppressive fire while Holness moved into the kill zone to draw fire so that other Soldiers could escape.[18] The enemy mortally wounded Grieve and Bowen and badly injured Holness. All three military police earned the Silver Star. The fighting intensified on every street and alley near the racetrack, and the enemy concurrently attacked the officer's quarters and ambushed vehicles coming in and out.

First Lieutenant Gerald Waltman was leading a quick-reaction force along with Specialist Charles Miller and Specialist Ronald Kendall. As they drove to the officer's quarters, the Viet Cong ambushed them with mines, rockets, grenades, and machine gun fire. Miller was in the lead vehicle when the ambush disabled it; he was injured and covered with fuel. Ignoring the danger, Miller laid suppressive fire so that a Soldier could evacuate the kill zone. Waltman moved toward the lead vehicle to assist Miller in providing fire and

then directed an attack toward the Viet Cong position. Kendall, in the second vehicle, positioned the vehicle between the enemy and evacuating Soldiers. Although wounded, Kendall maintained his position until all Soldiers cleared the kill zone. Waltman, Kendall, and Miller all earned Silver Stars for exhibiting bravery in extreme circumstances. The military police repelled the Viet Cong for the next 24 hours until a tactical combat force maneuvered into the city and relieved them. This type of heroism and steadfast dedication to the mission and each other changed the face of the Military Police Corps.

Combat Support

The courage, effectiveness, and valor displayed by the military police during the Tet Offensive led to the Military Police Corps designation as a combat support unit.[19] Instead of assignment as a logistical unit under combat service support, military police assumed numerous additional duties to "improve the effectiveness of forces across the full range of military activities."[20] Military police became the "Force of Choice" for their versatility in garrison and combat environments, in war, and in operations other than war. Military police doctrinally became the reaction force ready to defeat Level I and Level II threats and delay Level III threats until relieved by the combat arms tactical response force. As Sergeant First Class Marcus Brown said:

> *We're the force of choice. Bottom line, [a military police] company cannot only go out in the battlefield and be a force multiplier, but we can also be a quick-reaction team. We can train local police and host nation police. . . . We carry a lot of firepower, and on top of that, we're Johnny on the spot. A good [military police] team, no matter what, will be there, no fail.*[21]

Military police can close with, engage, and destroy enemy forces in a linear or nonlinear, contiguous or noncontiguous battlefield. Far from the logistical, sustainment, and transportation mission the Military Police Corps was at inception, it is now resourced and ready to enable combat arms on the front lines.

Conclusion

Whenever called, for whatever task or mission, military police handle situations with aplomb. Military police heroism, valor, actions, and capabilities against the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong during the Tet Offensive proved that they are capable of delaying and defeating enemies in direct combat. This event directly prompted the U.S. Army Chief of Staff to change the Military Police Branch from a combat service support unit to a combat support unit, and this is how the military police became the "Force of Choice."

Endnotes:

[1]C. Barnsley, "Tet Offensive," *Germany 1918–1939*, 11 June 2014, <http://wordpress.as.edu.au/modern2014/2014/06/11/tet-offensive/>, accessed on 26 January 2017.

[2]Robert K. Wright, *Military Police*, Center of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1992, p. 3, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/060/60-9-1/cmhPub_60-9-1.pdf>, accessed on 26 January 2017.

[3]Ibid., p. 4.

[4]Harry H. Bandholtz, "American Expeditionary Forces," Memorandum from Provost Marshal General to Chief of Staff, 30 April 1919.

[5]Wright, p. 10.

[6]FM 4-0, *Combat Service Support*, 29 August 2003. This publication is now obsolete.

[7]Jim Rogers, "History on Display: The Military Police During World War II," *Military Police*, Fall 2007, pp. 39–42.

[8]Donald J. Taylor, *1968 Tet Offensive*, Free Republic Web site, 30 January 2014, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/vetscor/3117363/posts>, accessed on 26 January 2017.

[9]Terrence Maitland and Peter McInerney, *A Contagion of War (1965–1967): The Vietnam Experience*, Boston Publishing Company, Maine, 1983, p. 160.

[10]Ibid., p. 88.

[11]Taylor.

[12]Andy Watson, "Military Police Heroism," *Military Police*, Spring 2008, pp. 56–60.

[13]Shelby L. Stanton, "Vietnam Order of Battle: A Complete Illustrated Reference to U.S. Army Combat and Support Forces in Vietnam 1961–1973," *U.S. News and World Report*, Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 176–178.

[14]Thomas L. Johnson and Mary R. Himes, *Assault on the American Embassy, Tet, 1968*, The Military Police Museum, Fort McClellan, Alabama, 1983, p. 1.

[15]Jim Rogers, "Tet Offensive: The Battle That Changed MP History," *Guidon*, 10 September 2015, p. A2, <http://www.myguidon.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19081>, accessed on 26 January 2017.

[16]Rogers, "Tet Offensive: The Battle That Changed MP History."

[17]Watson, p. 58.

[18]Ibid., p. 56.

[19]Rogers, "Tet Offensive: The Battle That Changed MP History."

[20]FM 100-5, *Operations*, 14 June 1993, p. 2-17. This publication is now obsolete.

[21]Michel Sauret, "Force of Choice: Military Police Trains for Combat Support" *U.S. Army Reserve News Articles*, 6 May 2016, <http://www.usar.army.mil/News/Article/753796/force-of-choice-military-police-trains-for-combat-support/>, accessed on 26 January 2017.

At the time this article was written, Master Sergeant Kreitzer was a student at the Sergeant Major Course, Fort Bliss, Texas. His previous assignment was with the 127th Military Police Company, 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado.

III Corps Protection Directorate Support to CJTF-OIR: Challenges and Lessons Learned

By Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Pelley, Major Gregory Jones, Major Adam C. Stocking, and Major Brandon K. Wallace

In August 2015, III Corps Headquarters deployed from Fort Hood, Texas, to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, to take command of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) from the U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT). To support this operation, the III Corps Provost Marshal, Colonel Ronald T. Cuffee Sr., and eight other military police officers and noncommissioned officers formed the heart of the CJTF-OIR, the Directorate of Security and Protection (CJ36).

USARCENT created the combined joint task force to counter the spread of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but quickly found itself without the personnel required to conduct the existing mission throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility while simultaneously commanding the new CJTF-OIR. To close this capability gap, USARCENT created and implemented a joint manning document (JMD) based partially on manning from its forward headquarters and augmented by Service members from the U.S. Marines, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force and contributions from coalition nations to fill the unique requirements of the joint and combined command. CJ36 had the right personnel with the right skills to fulfill the doctrinal security and protection mission of a corps in unified land operations, but the CJTF-OIR mission quickly evolved, expanded and, ultimately, strained the limits of CJ36. It found itself testing the feasibility of supporting the protection warfighting function in a coalition environment. Each of the subcomponents of the CJ36 experienced their own unique challenges to ensure mission success.

"CJ36 had the right personnel with the right skills to fulfill the doctrinal security and protection mission of a corps in unified land operations, but the CJTF-OIR mission quickly evolved, expanded and, ultimately, strained the limits of CJ36."

CJ36 was divided into the following sections: Operations; Plans; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE); Personnel Recovery; Air and Missile Defense; and Identity Operations. While the Operations and Plans Sections were sufficiently manned by the III Corps staff when augmented by the initial joint fills, the Personnel Recovery Section required immediate additional augmentation. When III Corps assumed the role of the CJTF-OIR Headquarters, it marked the first time that a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) had deployed within the protection warfighting function under a three-star expeditionary command.

The CENTCOM requirements for PRCC exceeded III Corps military table of organization and equipment authorizations; the JMD identified additional Air Force and Navy personnel necessary to complete the team. With the complexity of the combined joint operations area (CJOA) generated by Title 22, U.S. Code, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*, versus Title 10, U.S. Code, *Armed Forces*, the PRCC was required to establish working relationships with the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, the U.S. Embassies in Baghdad and Jordan, CENTCOM Headquarters, the U.S. Air Force Central Command, the U.S. Navy Central Command, the Special Operations Central Command, USARCENT, and the coalition partners in the combined joint task force to ensure personnel recovery coverage and planning in the CJOA.[1, 2]

The PRCC applied a nonlinear, 3D approach to planning a personnel recovery response during missions. The identification of all potential avenues that could be placed against an isolating event was critical given the finite dedicated personnel recovery assets in-theater. In addition, PRCC doctrinally filled its senior intelligence analyst billet and leveraged available Joint Personnel Recovery Agency courses to ensure appropriate training for recovery personnel. CJTF-OIR was ordered to provide Phase 1 reintegration

to recovered isolated persons. The training received before deployment was paramount in completing the intelligence debriefing task mandated by personnel recovery regulation and policy.

The second section to request additional support was the CBRNE Section. The increasing threat of toxic industrial chemicals and homemade chemical weapons quickly strained the single explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer deployed from III Corps to become the CBRNE Section Chief. The JMD for CJ36 contained one position for a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) lieutenant colonel; however, III Corps home station manning requirements personnel decided to fill this position with an EOD major instead. Since EOD personnel provide a special staff capability and subject matter expertise concerning all facets of explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, CBRN and weapons of mass destruction threats and hazards, and technical exploitation, selecting an EOD officer to fill the JMD position did not hinder the mission. This was only one example in which self-imposed limitations on total troop strength in the CJTF-OIR Headquarters specifically, and in-theater in general, demanded a leaner organization to reduce the total number of U.S. troops deployed in support of this operation.

The primary responsibilities of the CJ36 CBRN officer were to provide CJOA CBRN threat assessments on a continuous basis in support of subordinate task forces; assess, develop, coordinate, and oversee the employment of CBRN operations within the CJOA to assist commanders to protect, deter, and defend against enemy chemical weapon threats to U.S. forces and coalition personnel; and advise subordinate units and staffs on CBRN matters in support of the CJTF-OIR campaign plan. Upon the III Corps assumption of mission, CJ36 faced several CBRN-related events within the CJOA. Chemical weapon attacks against Syrian, Iraqi, and Kurdish security forces; the challenge of equipping Iraqi forces with CBRN individual protection equipment, detection and decontamination equipment, and smoke obscuration equipment; and mission planning were just a few of the tasks CJ36 was required to undertake.

Due to the limitations of only one CBRN subject matter expert position on the JMD and a zero-growth environment, CJ36 worked with the CJTF-OIR Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Cell to add six CBRN intelligence and operations personnel to Task Force Atlas, the newly developed, counter-improvised explosive device task force in support of CJTF-OIR. Task Force Atlas was able to add and fill these positions with experts from the 20th CBRNE Command CBRNE Coordination Element. In addition to providing direct support to the CJTF-OIR, Task Force Atlas attached one CBRN lieutenant colonel and one CBRN sergeant first class to CJ36. This assistance was valuable in combating the chemical weapon threat within the CJOA.

In accordance with Army doctrine, air and missile defense is part of the fires warfighting function; but in the joint environment of CJTF-OIR, became a separate cell, the Air and Missile Defense Cell (CJ39), with a coordinating relationship under the CJ36. In Iraq, the enemy had no aircraft and the initial air defense threat to coalition forces was limited to attacks from rockets and mortars. To counter this, CJ39 conducted regular planning and resourcing under CJ36, specifically to request the required systems and the forces needed to operate those systems to protect the coalition troops and critical assets using the counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) system of systems. C-RAM is an evolutionary program initiated by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in response to the indirect-fire threat and a validated operational needs statement. The primary mission of the C-RAM program is to detect rocket, artillery, and mortar launches and provide localized warnings to the defended area with sufficient time for personnel to take appropriate action. This sense-and-warn capability was augmented at high-risk coalition bases by a modified U.S. Navy intercept system (the Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System), which provided the ability to intercept rounds in flight, thus preventing damage to ground forces or facilities.

"In addition to the threat of rockets and mortars, CJ36 faced the emerging threat of unmanned aerial systems (UASs), commonly referred to as drones."

Providing protection to coalition forces with the Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System was hampered by two factors: time and availability. The operational needs statement and request for funds process, even in an expedited combat zone, can take 6 to 9 months. The protection planners coordinated with Army G-3/5/7 and joint staff to resource and fund the units and equipment needed to provide the intercept capability to emerging bases as the coalition established new bases in support of the Iraqi operation to isolate Mosul.

In addition to the threat of rockets and mortars, CJ36 faced the emerging threat of unmanned aerial systems (UASs), commonly referred to as drones. The Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) Director, Lieutenant General Michael H. Shields, went on a fact-finding mission at the request of Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter in July 2016 to determine how the Pentagon might help the government in Iraq stabilize and secure Baghdad. Navy Captain Mike Egan, JIDA chief of the Integrated Delivery Branch, in an interview with *Defense News*, stated: "What the uniformed guys are telling me, and this is what I'm telling industry, is if anybody hasn't noticed, there is no successful counter-UAS systems in Iraq."[3] "Some of those enemy-owned drones carry improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while others are being used for reconnaissance," stated a JIDA spokesman.[4] Through JIDA, the Pentagon is attempting to defeat the UAS threat in Iraq and asked Congress for an additional $20 million to deal with the ISIS drone threat. With this level of support, CJ36 was able to secure additional cutting-edge counter-UAS systems and field them to the units in harm's way.

The CJ36 led the planning and resourcing of all security and force protection measures, unit capabilities, and resources in the CJTF-OIR Operations Section. The team chaired cross-functional joint planning groups and working groups; participated as a member of planning groups across the other warfighting functions; and conducted antiterrorism/force protection inspections, personnel recovery training and exercises, and CBRN training and equipping in Iraq.

"CJ36 quickly discovered that the essential component in the proper execution of the FPVA was the availability of sufficiently trained personnel experienced in conducting the assessment."

Critical to coordinating these functions and ensuring the proper vulnerability mitigation assets, resources and equipment were effectively applied to the force protection vulnerability assessment (FPVA). CJ36 quickly discovered that the essential component in the proper execution of the FPVA was the availability of sufficiently trained personnel experienced in conducting the assessment. Sufficient personnel were also needed to continue the daily operations of the protection mission. CJ36 reached out across the rest of the CJTF-OIR staff to build the FPVA team, and it allotted 1 month to conduct assessments of the 13 existing CJTF-OIR bases and camps. These assessments identified minor and critical shortfalls, provided immediate- and long-term mitigation strategies, and served as the justification for the requisition of equipment and personnel to ensure that the greatest measure of security was provided to coalition members and critical assets in Iraq.

III Corps conducted its relief-in-place and transfer of authority of the CJTF-OIR to XVIII Airborne Corps in August 2016. The limits implemented by the National Command Authority, which imposed force caps on the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Kuwait, challenge the CJTF-OIR to perform its mission. Amazingly, in the year it commanded the task force, CJ36 was able to reduce U.S. Army requirements from the Corps to fill the JMD, while adding joint and coalition manning and augmenting the task force with enablers from Task Force Atlas and U.S. Air Forces Central Command. XVIII Airborne Corps will continue to modify the headquarters manning to most efficiently and effectively command the war on ISIS, and CJ36 will work within those constraints to protect all the brave men and women of the coalition dedicated to the defeat of ISIS.

Endnotes:

[1]Title 22, U.S. Code, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*, <http://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title22&edition=prelim>, accessed on 27 January 2017.

[2]Title 10, U.S. Code, *Armed Forces*, <http://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title10&edition=prelim>, accessed on 27 January 2017.

[3]Jen Judson, "JIDA: Iraqis Want Counter-Drone Gear, Layered Security in Baghdad," *Defense News*, 21 August 2016, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/08/02/jida-fact-finding-mission-iraqis-want-counter-uas-layered-security-baghdad/87968548/>, accessed on 27 January 2017.

[4]Jen Judson, "Pentagon Asks for More Money to Counter ISIS Drones," *Defense News*, 8 July 2016, < http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/07/08/pentagon-needs-more-money-counter-islamic-state-drones/86867452/>, accessed on 27 January 2017.

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"C-RAM System of Systems," Missiles and Space Web site, <https://www.msl.army.mil/Pages/C-RAM/cram.html>, accessed on 27 January 2017.

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Lieutenant Colonel Pelley is the deputy provost marshal for III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. His previous assignment was as the CJ36 Security and Protection Plans Officer with CJTF-OIR at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. He holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from Excelsior College, Albany, New York, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

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Major Stocking is the provost marshal operations officer for III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. His previous assignment was as the CJ36 Security and Protection Operations Officer with CJTF-OIR at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois.

Major Wallace is the explosive ordnance disposal officer for III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. His previous assignment was as the CJ36 CBRN Officer with CJTF-OIR at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. He holds a bachelor's degree in administration of justice from Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania.

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENTS: EXERCISE UNIFIED ENDEAVOR

By Captain Zachary A. Brown and First Lieutenant Mitchell A. Carroll

Functional alignment is best defined as combining key capability sets that integrate the complementary and reinforcing tasks of involved units to minimize knowledge gaps and enhance freedom of action for the maneuver commander. This concept was used by military police forces in brigade combat teams until early 2010. Military police support to any unit, including a brigade combat team, is dynamic in nature. Military police forces provided the brigade combat team commander with a versatile, adaptive, and proactive force that notably built upon the common operating picture and increased freedom of maneuver within the area of operations. For military police to be used as a force multiplier, the maneuver commander needed to better understand their vast capabilities.

Functional Alignment Concept

The 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, introduced a detention operations-focused functional alignment concept during the postconflict era. This alignment includes a detention operations task force consisting of military police, military intelligence, staff judge advocate, and medical personnel. The military police and military intelligence personnel align with common tasks in interrogation and detention operations. The staff judge advocate personnel ensure that all actions are legally justified and will likely be successful in a court of law. The medical personnel ensure safety for all task force members and detained persons. The task force is a single unit that provides rear area security and simultaneously fills knowledge gaps through multiple human and signal intelligence collection assets.

Moving forward, the 16th Military Police Brigade began increasing proficiency in detention operations at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The brigade began rotations by sending platoon size elements to execute daily operations alongside subject matter experts at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks.

Training Opportunity

This functional alignment was tested when 1st Platoon, 563d Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York, received a training opportunity to act as the maneuver element in support of the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion Exercise Unified Endeavor at Fort Bragg. The units worked in unison to train their respective mission-essential tasks (detention, security, and mobility support operations). This allowed military police and military intelligence commanders to see how their relationship can be mutually beneficial and can drive each other to attain goals that were previously unattainable.

Multifunctional team members engage the local populace during lane training.

The battalion tactical operations center issued fragmentary orders to the multifunctional team and military police leaders each night. This practice allowed the full execution of troop-leading procedures that were to drive the missions the next day. Mission execution was dynamic in nature and covered a wide range of individual and collective tasks, including area security, route reconnaissance, cordon and search, react to contact, convoy security, react to improvised explosive devices, conduct traffic control points, and movement to contact. The platoon operated as a true maneuver support unit and achieved a wide range of training objectives.

In addition to daily missions, 1st Platoon operated a detainee holding area throughout the exercise. On a daily basis, the platoon transported detainees to a counterintelligence operations area that was run by the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion. Detainees simultaneously arrived at the detainee holding area for processing and safeguarding. This provided Soldiers with valuable hands-on training.

Exercise Unified Endeavor allowed the 563d Military Police Company to practice deploying within 14 days in

support of a prepare-to-deploy order. It also tested the abilities of the military police platoon leader and platoon sergeant to operate as a detached platoon under operational control of another battalion. The execution of missions away from local unit training areas improved readiness on, and knowledge about, the logistical requirements of moving Soldiers and equipment.

A connection between the military police and military intelligence communities proved to be a viable means of attacking the hybrid threat. Multifunctional teams seamlessly integrated into the military police platoon and excelled at common mission-essential tasks. Creating a task force that consists of military police, military intelligence, staff judge advocate, and medical personnel created a single rear area security source for the maneuver commander. This task force will accomplish mission-essential tasks such as detention operations, area security, and police operations and will be nearly self-sustaining.

Military police and multifunctional team members escort a village police deputy.

It would be beneficial for the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) to continue to research, dissect, and exploit the benefits associated with integration and alignment of the military police and military intelligence communities. The 16th Military Police Brigade has already established the training relationships and framework necessary to expand this concept and test it in a training environment. Training opportunities could range from units at the same installation joining together for a field training exercise to multiple units from XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, participating in a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Basel Mixon IV, Battalion Commander, 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, "In a decisive-action training environment, there are multiple opportunities for military police and intelligence professionals to train together in a manner that enhances the training readiness of each respective unit. From establishment and management of a detainee holding area through interrogation operations, multiple individual, leader, and collective tasks can be trained simultaneously, realistically, and to the benefit of all. Additional value can be found while conducting multiechelon training through the conduct of signal intelligence training, additional human intelligence training, and dismounted and mounted maneuver with a maneuver element—in this case, military police. When possible, combining small-unit individual and collective training for military police and military intelligence professionals simultaneously enhances technical and tactical skill sets for both entities in a realistic manner at reduced operational costs."[1]

Conclusion

Operations similar to Exercise Unified Endeavor will continue to grow as we test functional alignments. Incorporating emergency deployment readiness exercises and increasing participation from the staff judge advocate and medical teams only strengthen the task force concept and emphasize interoperability. Further exercises minimize knowledge gaps and familiarize all units with complementary capability sets. This task force concept could be implemented during all phases of the operation, especially during the shape and deter phases. Functionally aligning forces to execute detention operations from the point of capture rearward reduces personnel requirements in-theater and increases success in the rear area of operations.

Endnote:

[1]Basel M. Mixon IV, "Unified Endeavor Quote," e-mail message, 3 May 2016.

Captain Brown is the company commander of the 563d Military Police Company, 91st Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania.

First Lieutenant Carroll was the platoon leader of 1st Platoon, 563d Military Police Company, 91st Military Police Battalion, at the time this article was written. He recently graduated Ranger and Airborne Training, Fort Benning, Georgia. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania.

Military Police Support to Operations in Decisive Action

By Captain Angelo Q. Taylor

Recent changes in the Army have shifted the focus from a counterinsurgency strategy to decisive action to address a more developed, complex, hybrid threat. The impacts of this change are still being realized more than 3 years after the combat training centers shifted operational environment variables toward a decisive-action training environment to facilitate meeting the brigade combat team commander's new training objectives. Military police leaders, realizing the implications, emphasized the need for the effective conveyance of military police capabilities in support of decisive action. There are three necessary foundational principles that will contribute to the successful employment of military police forces in the future:

- Conveying a doctrinal understanding of the Army's contribution to unified action in the range of military operations.
- Communicating capabilities by interfacing the military police disciplines with decisive-action tasks (offense, defense, and stability [defense support of civil authorities in the United States]).
- Developing a holistic understanding of how military police maintain relevance and refine expertise by exercising the military police disciplines in any operational environment.

The brigade combat team commander changes focus as the fight progresses, shifting the decisive operation and the main effort designation accordingly. As the brigade combat team conducts the operations process in preparation for the fight, military police must have a doctrinal understanding of the Army's operational concept of unified land operations to articulate effective employment during every phase. Decisive action is executed with varying combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. These tasks make up a foundational context that military police must use to express capabilities in an operational environment. The ability to address each phase of the fight with the fluent use of doctrinal language will establish credibility and set the stage for the efficient use of military police forces.

After 15 years of counterinsurgency doctrine and fighting, military police gained a respectable reputation for conducting the three military police disciplines in support of stability operations. However, junior leaders sometimes fall short in demonstrating the versatility to employ these disciplines at any phase during the simultaneous execution of all decisive-action tasks. Military police are not limited to conducting missions exclusively during stability operations; support is necessary, and even critical, to all operations. Junior leaders should communicate the need to secure mobility corridors during the opening of a theater. When attacking offensively, it is imperative to display the ability to support the breach and provide straggler control once in contact. During defensive actions, military police offer robust combat power with area security, which provides friendly forces with an early warning of the enemy, ensuring maximum time to plan and transition to the offense.

Once conditions are such that the brigade combat team commander can transition to stability operations, military police provide civil support and host nation security force training. Military police offer a skill set of quick reactionary support and mission control expertise that can restore civil order, mitigate threats, and enhance the flow of maneuver forces toward the enemy. Operations and operations support counterparts see the contributions of the Military Police Corps from numerous perspectives, which include conserving maneuver assets by committing military police to missions that they are best fit to accomplish; ensuring the security and mobility of forces; processing and maintaining detainees; and policing logistical support, base support, and tactical assembly areas. With an increased likelihood of threats, mobility support is provided to facilitate the offense. Relevance is established when junior leaders can articulate the ability to deliver mobility support en route to the objective at the height of enemy presence or to process detainees under attack while laying down a base of fire against threats. This is where military police distinguish themselves.

This wide purview of missions is exclusively conducted for one main reason: Military police execute missions in the garrison environment and other operational environments. The practical employment of the three military police disciplines at home and abroad affords the continuous refinement of expertise. Each time a subject is handled at an installation, it also creates muscle memory for processing a detainee abroad. When military police direct traffic at heightened hours, they prepare for straggler control or support to the breach in the offense. While a patrol rotates through residential neighborhoods, he or she refines his or her tactics, techniques, and procedures for policing the logistical support area during hours of darkness. The services that military police provide endure despite the location. This is an invaluable attribute in which military police should take pride. They should communicate with junior leaders so that they can apply this principle to their training strategy regardless of the mission set.

The Army continues to adapt to the enemy as the threat evolves. Military police must quickly adjust to the operational needs of maneuver forces and react to the enemy threat to ensure an adaptive corps of professionals who support friendly forces and defeat threats at home and abroad.

Captain Taylor is the commander of the 300th Military Police Company, 97th Military Police Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in criminal justice from Iowa State University.



THE 133D MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

In many instances, military operations present the commander with unforeseen requirements for specialized personnel in order to complete a mission. To solve this problem, personnel are reassigned, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS), to establish the much-needed units. A case in point is the formation of the 133d Military Police Platoon.

The 133d Military Police Platoon was organized on 1 August 1943 at Port Vila, Efate Island. The authority for organization of the unit was contained in General Order No. 177 in accordance with U.S. Army Table of Organization and Equipment 19-7.[1] The original unit consisted of one officer, Second Lieutenant Paul B. Williams (platoon commander), and 69 enlisted men. Second Lieutenant Williams was the only member of the Military Police Corps. The enlisted men came primarily from artillery units or the 6th Replacement Depot, which required training on military police duties.

During July of 1944, the unit went through several reorganizations, mainly to add to the authorized strength. A second officer, Second Lieutenant Louis S. Slovin, was authorized, and the enlisted strength was brought to 70. By September, the enlisted strength was increased to 83.

September was also the month when tragedy struck. On the 23d, the unit departed Port Vila aboard the Sailing Ship (S.S.) Elihu Thomson, an Army transport. The ship arrived at Noumea, New Caledonia, on the 26th. As the men prepared to disembark, explosions ripped through two troop compartments and the order was given to abandon ship. Survivors were picked up and taken ashore. However, Second Lieutenant Williams and 19 of his men were killed as a result of the explosion. That was probably the worst single-day tragedy for the Military Police Corps. Including casualties from other units, a total of 32 personnel were killed. All the bodies were reportedly recovered and buried at U.S. Cemetery #1, New Caledonia. Eleven bodies that had been identified as military police now rest at the Honolulu National Cemetery.

Second Lieutenant Slovin assumed command upon the death of Second Lieutenant Williams. On that same day, the 133d was augmented by one officer and 33 enlisted men to bring the unit back to its authorized strength. At least four members of the ship's crew were awarded Meritorious Service Medals for their efforts in rescuing survivors of the incident. They were Junior Engineer Frederick Bautista, a fireman; Robert Hall, an able seaman; Albert I. Heard Jr., an oiler; and Joseph Pawlowski, a messman.

A newly arrived Army chaplain, Captain Lawrence Lynch, a Catholic priest from Brooklyn, New York, helped save several men. He was in conference with the port commander when news of the disaster arrived. Against his commander's wishes, Father Lynch insisted on going to the ship to minister to the men. Upon arrival at the rescue boat, he again disregarded the orders of his commander, secured a line, and climbed aboard the stricken vessel. He guided several men, identified only as military police, to a ladder and to safety on the rescue boat. As the ship was sinking and the signal to "stand clear" was announced, Father Lynch appeared at the top of the ladder with yet another Soldier slung over his shoulder; he carried the Soldier down to the rescue vessel. Shortly thereafter, the ship's bow section slid under the water. Once in the rescue boat, Father Lynch went to each of the wounded men to console them. The last man that Father Lynch had brought down, a man identified only as Jacob, requested a rabbi to administer a traditional prayer for the time of death. Father Lynch took the man's hands in his own and quietly recited the requested prayer in fluent Hebrew.

Once the unit was up to strength and the newly acquired personnel were trained, an alert for movement was received on 22 April 1945. The unit assignment to operate the Island Command Stockade, New Caledonia, ended. Before its departure, the unit received the following comments from Major Gus S. Peters, Island Command Provost Marshal: "It is with pleasure that I commend all officers and enlisted

men of the 133d Military Police Platoon in recognition of an exemplary performance in guarding and maintaining the Island Command Stockade for the past 6 months."[2]

On 1 May 1945, the unit minus a rear echelon embarked on the Army Attack Transport Sea Scamp. Three weeks later, unit members disembarked at Batangas, Luzon, in the Philippine Islands. After a 3-day encampment, the 133d moved by motor convoy to Manila and was assigned to Military Police Command, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, and attached to the Manila District Stockade for American garrison prisoners. The unit designation was again changed, from the 133d Military Police Platoon to the 133d Military Police Service Platoon, with an authorized strength of two officers and 105 enlisted men. The stockade was opened on 16 June 1945. The rear echelon rejoined the unit on 28 June 1945.

Improvements to the stockade were made by adding concertina wire barriers around the perimeter and constructing solitary-confinement cells. A trip wire was also set up 5 feet inside the fence, and prisoners were warned that anyone crossing the wire would be fired upon. An additional responsibility, operation of the 312th General Hospital prison ward, was assigned to the unit. On 8 August 1945, Corporal Thomas C. Hofrichter of the 133d Military Police Service Platoon received a commendation from First Lieutenant Bill Grubert, Military Assistance Command Provost Marshal, for the superior manner in which he performed his duties as the noncommissioned officer in charge of a detail, guarding up to 56 prisoner patients at the 312th General Hospital from 13 June 1945 to 8 August 1945.

Headquarters, South Pacific Base Command

In July, a contingent of 30 Philippine scouts from the 7th Military Police Battalion (Provisional Support) were attached to the 133d Military Police Service Platoon. They were assigned as tower guards.

With Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945, the unit strength fluctuated due to the redeployment program. Many men qualified for rotation, but replacements were needed to continue the mission. In September, many 133d Military Police escorted prisoners to various islands in the Philippines to be tried by courts-martial. By the end of December 1945, the unit strength was reduced to three officers and

Members of the 133d Military Police platoon

62 enlisted Soldiers. Prisoners were transferred to facilities in the United States. No other historical records for this unit have been discovered.

Note: Father Lynch was killed by enemy fire on the island of Okinawa, Japan, as he was administering communion to a wounded man. He was posthumously awarded the Silver Star.

Acknowledgement: A special note of thanks is extended to Ms. Dianne Delitto, daughter of Technician Grade 5 James A. Delitto, a member of the 133d Military Police Service Platoon and survivor of the explosion on S.S. Elihu Thomson. She provided her father's military records, photographs, and reminiscences, which made this project so much easier. It was only through her that we were able to identify three more men who were lost in the events of 26 September 1944.

Endnotes:

[1]General Order No. 177, Section 1, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in South Pacific Area, U.S. Army Postal Service 502 in accordance with Table of Organization and Equipment 19-7, 1 March 1943.

[2]Gus S. Peters, Unit History Report, 133d Military Police Platoon, May 1944.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), and finished his career working cold cases.

Military Police of Operation Overlord

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

Several U.S. Army military police units were awarded assault landing credit for the Normandy, France, invasion on 6 and 7 June 1944. The following list includes all military police units involved except for platoons and detachments that were part of larger organizations:

- 1st Military Police Platoon.
- 29th Military Police Platoon.
- 4th Military Police Platoon.
- Military Police Platoon, 82d Airborne Division.
- 90th Military Police Platoon.
- Military Police Platoon, 101st Airborne Division.
- Military Police Platoon, VII Corps.
- 210th Military Police Company.
- 302d Military Police Escort Guard Company.
- 428th Military Police Escort Guard Company.
- 449th Military Police Company.
- Company A, 507th Military Police Battalion.
- Company B, 507th Military Police Battalion.
- Company C, 509th Military Police Battalion.

During the early morning hours of 6 June 1944, an armada of ships from British ports moved toward the coast of Normandy, ready for the largest amphibious assault in history. By dawn, men from Britain, Canada, France, and the United States had landed on the beaches in an attempt to liberate France and destroy the Axis powers.

At the same time, thousands of aircraft dropped paratroopers inland to secure the areas behind the beaches and to prevent German reinforcements from coming to the aid of those defending the beaches. Bombers also attacked German troop concentrations, bridges, supply depots, and other targets of opportunity.

American forces included in this initial phase of the operation were the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 29th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and their supporting units. Each of these divisions had an assigned military police platoon, which was closer to the size of a company. Other military police units were assigned or attached to V Corps, VII Corps, and relatively new units that were referred to as special engineer brigades. Military strategists strived to ensure success on all levels while planning for the invasion. Military police missions (circulation control, force protection, enemy prisoner of war management) would require numerous military police units. Based on the need, a large number of military police were involved in the landings at Normandy.

At 0630 on 6 June, U.S. forces simultaneously landed on Omaha and Utah Beaches. The 1st Infantry Division and 29th Infantry Division landed on Omaha Beach, and the 4th Infantry Division and 90th Infantry Division landed on Utah Beach.

Two officers and 28 members of the 1st Military Police Platoon traffic section were ready to disembark their landing craft when a shell landed on the deck, wounding 15 men. Moments later, a second shell struck the boat just as the last man exited. By the end of the day, one enlisted man had been killed in action and three officers and 19 enlisted men had been wounded. A second landing craft carrying members of the platoon and unit vehicles was forced away by enemy fire several times. Once the beach was secured, the landing craft struck an underwater obstacle and the vehicles were lost in deep water. The men from this landing craft had to wade to the beach in water up to their armpits.

Meanwhile, the men of the 29th Military Police Platoon were having problems of their own. Due to weather conditions, one traffic section landed 2 miles away from its designated area and found itself with an infantry unit of the 1st Division. The traffic section fought as infantry, directed troops, and assisted the wounded until it could be reunited with its unit the following day. The platoon headquarters landed in its designated area and set up traffic posts and a prisoner of war cage on the beach. The platoon took nine prisoners of war from the German 716th Infantry Division.



D-Day Memorial, Bedford, Virginia

During this assault phase, two enlisted men were killed in action, five men were wounded, and one man was missing in action.

In April 1944, the 4th Military Police Platoon got an early start on the war when Private First Class Leon B. Cole and Private David Fogel captured a German radioman from a Dornier bomber that had been shot down in England. At Normandy, the 4th Military Police Platoon landed in five groups at Utah Beach on the Cotentin Peninsula. The first group, which landed at 0700 on 6 June, included the provost marshal, one officer, and 25 enlisted men. The men immediately set up traffic points and guided vehicles and personnel off the beach. A prisoner of war collection point was set up by 8 June; and before the end of June, the platoon had processed 9,957 German prisoners. No platoon members were killed in June, but three men were wounded.

From 1000 until 1600 on 6 June, the 90th Infantry Division, acting as reserve for the 4th Infantry Division, landed its lead elements on Utah Beach and assembled in Saint Martin de Varreville. The main body arrived at Utah Beach mid-morning on 8 June and began debarkation by noon. By midnight, all foot elements had closed into allocated positions. The 90th Military Police Platoon set up traffic control points, established prisoner of war collection cages, and performed security for division headquarters.

Next to hit the beaches were the 210th Military Police Company and 214th Military Police Company, specially trained amphibious companies attached to the 5th Special Engineer Brigade and 6th Special Engineer Brigade. These units were experts on beach traffic and supported the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, and the 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division.

Military police units at the corps level that were tasked for the invasion included Companies A and B of the 507th Military Police Battalion, with Company B becoming VII Corps' military police company. The 518th Military Police Battalion companies were divided between V Corps and VII Corps. The 428th Military Police Escort Guard Company was assigned to V Corps for the invasion and later attached to various divisions within V Corps. Company C of the 509th Military Police Battalion, a First Army military police unit, took part in the invasion. Some First Army, V Corps, and VII Corps military police Soldiers were freed from their normal assignments and attached to special engineer brigades.

(Continued on page 37)

Building a Better Force

By First Lieutenant Kelsey A. Brewer

In 2015, more than 4,200 narcotic-related crimes impacted the mission readiness of units throughout the Army. Upon taking command of the Fort Benning Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Battalion, Georgia, the battalion commander charged the special agents within the battalion with a line of effort that proactively engaged drug distribution prevention on military installations within the battalion area of responsibility. Implementing a strategy using the analysis of historical criminal data, tracking of positive urinalysis results, and effective monitoring of social media, his intent was to proactively identify and target would-be drug distributers and dealers.

While identifying possible distributors of illegal narcotics is a team effort, the targeting, apprehension, and successful prosecution of these individuals falls on a specialized team within the organizational structure—the drug suppression team (DST). Upon conducting an analysis of battalion capabilities, emphasis was placed on providing the various DSTs throughout the battalion with tough and realistic training to prepare for the myriad of situations they would face in the counter-drug operations environment.

During the week of 13–17 June 2016, the Fort Benning CID Battalion hosted DST training—the first of its kind. The training was conceived, organized, and executed by the battalion commander, the battalion operations officer, the assistant operations officer, and the battalion staff. The event was structured to provide complete validation of DST special agents and military police Soldiers on tactics, techniques, and practices in modern counter-drug operations. Training was conducted on all topics of relevancy to the DST, including management of confidential informants, surveillance, undercover operations, controlled purchases, development and issuance of warrants, and courtroom testimony. These training topics were reinforced with a lecture delivered by a hand-selected group of DST operations experts from within the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and quality, hands-on, scenario-based situations.

The training event included DSTs from the Fort Benning CID Battalion and other battalions within the 3d Military Police Group (CID). The content and conduct of the event ensured that the training was successful in emphasizing cohesiveness amongst DST members and that all members were trained in conducting operations in overt and covert situations. Specific training focused on the utilization of technical listening equipment and cooperation with installation level military working dog support.

The assistant operations officer served as the event coordinator throughout the training event. The introductory phase of the training event involved a welcome briefing by battalion leaders. The briefing was followed by an introductory "crawl" phase of training, which provided a full day of classroom presentation and relevant lectures from DST experts. Topics included undercover violence, apprehension and search authorizations, the utilization of .0015 funds, source recruitment and handling, technical listening equipment, and digital stakeout. Following this day of training, participants were introduced to their first practical exercise scenario. They were afforded time to plan an operation that would take place the following day.

The subsequent practical training exercise, which included planning, preparation, and execution, comprised the main portion of the week-long exercise. Practical exercises were executed at multiple locations across Fort Benning to simulate a variety of environments that might be experienced by DST members. As training progressed, time available for Soldiers to develop operational plans and risk assessments was reduced, simulating the true spontaneous nature of counter-drug operations. Each practical exercise was conducted under the guidance of a DST subject matter expert serving in an observer controller capacity. The teams executed phased operations ranging from "buy and walk" to "buy and bust" scenarios. Teams were provided with information that was used to establish probable cause, leading to the development of search warrants and later to the serving of the search warrants. Simunition (simulated ammunition) training was used during search warrant execution, as the DST conducted room-clearing operations in search of subjects. Military working dogs and their handlers were incorporated throughout the entire process to provide additional realism in warrant execution training, room clearing, and other scenarios.

The final phase of the training was conducted at the Fort Benning courtroom, where a former military judge and trial defense attorneys from the Fort Benning Staff Judge Advocate's Office facilitated the DST presentation of testimony in a mock courtroom. For many of the DST members, this courtroom practical exercise represented the first time they

Soldiers participate in DST training at Fort Benning.

had provided testimony and had been exposed to the intricacies of a courtroom environment. The training event successfully concluded following a full day of exhausting courtroom testimony as the trials were contested.

At the end of each day throughout the week-long training, an after action review was conducted and observer controllers provided feedback about how the teams performed. For training at the military operations in urban terrain site, the teams were provided with video footage that was collected during their training, which allowed the teams to continue to learn from the actions they took. Daily after action reviews focused the teams on issues that had been identified the previous day, allowing for recognizable continuous improvement throughout the training.

Training is absolutely essential in ensuring that special agents and military police remain proficient in their assigned duties. The DST training not only enabled the teams to refresh their knowledge of DST operations, but also helped leaders assess team members. At the conclusion of the training, attendees returned to home station with a better understanding of how to conduct counter-drug operations within their areas of responsibility. The skills they learned, the abilities they acquired, and the connections they made with the observer controllers and fellow DST teams throughout the command will serve as an invaluable resource as they conduct future operations. The event was well received by the attendees, gaining specific accolades from the 3d Military Police Group (CID) Commander. The Fort Benning CID Battalion intends for this comprehensive DST training to become an annual event. It hopes to attract additional teams from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command in upcoming years.

First Lieutenant Brewer is the battalion assistant operations officer and battalion security manager, Fort Benning CID Battalion. She holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky. She graduated from the Military Police Basic Officer Leaders Course, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

("Military Police of Operation Overlord," continued from page 35)

Between 6 and 10 June 1944, 10 military police Soldiers were reported as killed in action:

- Private Robert June L. Barker, 210th Military Police Company, killed in action on 6 June 1944.
- Private James H. Day, 507th Military Police Battalion, killed in action on 6 June 1944.
- Corporal Frank J. Krasnosky, 1st Military Police Platoon, killed in action on 6 June 1944.
- Sergeant Steve J. Tepovich, 210th Military Police Company, killed in action on 6 June 1944.
- Private Claude Drummond, 29th Military Police Platoon, killed in action on 7 June 1944.
- Sergeant John J. Gallo, 210th Military Police Company, killed in action on 8 June 1944.
- Private John Clister, 29th Military Police Platoon, killed in action on 9 June 1944.
- Private Raymond L. Tyson, 449th Military Police Company, killed in action on 10 June 1944.
- Private First Class John T. Fahey, 437th Military Police Company (Escort Guard), killed in action on 10 June 1944.
- Corporal Robert W. Ulm, 437th Military Police Company (Escort Guard), killed in action on 10 June 1944.

A few of these men are memorialized at the D-Day Memorial, Bedford, Virginia.

References:

Rick Atkinson, *The Guns at Last Light: The Day of Battle, The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2008.

Jonathan Gawne, *Spearheading D-Day: American Special Units, 6 June 1944*, Histoire and Collections, Paris, 1998.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) and finished his career working cold cases.

The Installation Provost Marshal: Much More Than Law Enforcement

By Major Brian W. Pilch and Chief Ted Solonar

When people think about the installation provost marshal (PM), they often think of law enforcement. The provost marshal's office is synonymous with the police station, and it is true that new PMs frequently gravitate toward their law enforcement responsibilities. In doing that, however, they lose sight of the full scope of responsibilities that each installation PM must embrace and be ready to perform. At the most fundamental level, installation PMs have three primary missions:

- Assist commanders to maintain readiness.
- Protect commanders' ability to project combat power.
- Defend operational and strategic resources.

Whether the installation is a power projection platform, a training installation, or something in between, everything the installation PM does is intended to help ensure that units are ready to fight and win America's wars. The PM must carefully integrate law enforcement, physical security, and access control into one well-synchronized operational construct. These programs must also be carefully nested with installation antiterrorism and emergency management programs and support the installation commander's various priorities and initiatives. On a joint base, Service-specific requirements and mission sets must be accounted for. This must generally be done in a resource-constrained environment, with a personnel pool that is rotational in nature.

The provost marshal's office must be a resource for commanders—not just a response and reporting agency. Routine key leader engagements with commanders keep the PM relevant and in a position to effectively influence matters of security and good order and discipline. In the joint environment, this requires a firm understanding of the cultural and operational differences between associated Services and a knowledge of what it takes to enhance their readiness and preserve their power projection capabilities. To be relevant and influential, the PM must be ready, willing, and able to put in time with junior and senior commanders across the installation. He or she must be able to talk the talk and walk the walk across the full spectrum of issues, operations, initiatives, and programs that either support or impact these commanders. Installation PMs might be required to field questions in command forums where they don't have the luxury of deferring to a subject matter expert or using the old phrase, "I owe you an answer on that." The PM must be adept enough to provide definitive answers to tough questions to gain the level of credibility required to do the job that commanders expect. The credibility of the Military Police Corps Regiment is at stake in the eyes of these very same commanders, some of whom may someday be in a position to decide the future of the Regiment.

On the law enforcement front, the PM is the installation commander's expert on policing, criminal intelligence, good order and discipline, and incident response. Providing legally sufficient and progressive law enforcement support is essential to remaining relevant to supported commanders and to the Army. This becomes increasingly more challenging the more often personnel rotate. Much like deployment life cycles, the provost marshal's office experiences an ebb and flow in operational capability whenever a new military police unit comes into the law enforcement rotation. There is a ramping up–steady state–ramping down cycle to all law enforcement unit rotations. No matter how well-trained, led, or experienced a unit is, it will go through this cycle when joining the rotation. These rotations have an operational impact and corresponding influence on overall installation support and the quality of law enforcement work. An experienced PM must understand this impact and employ the mitigation strategies necessary to give the new unit time to get up to speed, while reducing any degradation in service and legal sufficiency of the law enforcement work.

The recent trend toward prevention and resiliency has added an expectation that the installation PM hold additional levels of expertise in the following areas:

- Sexual assault response and prevention.
- Domestic violence response and prevention.
- Suicide prevention.
- Crime analysis and prevention.
- Juvenile issues.
- Drug and alcohol prevention issues.
- Risk reduction and resiliency.

PMs have become primary figures on a growing number of boards, panels, and committees, where their expertise is routinely sought to support installation programs and initiatives. They become key advisors to commanders as the commanders attempt to answer the question: "How do I solve this problem?" Their presence in these forums has direct bearing on their overall perceived relevance to the command. When a sitting PM departs the job, the new PM is given a limited amount of time to get up to speed and engaged in all of these areas, with specific and relevant knowledge of the units and installations they support. Commanders expect PMs to be able to provide that same high level of support and advice to help them manage their respective units. PMs must be confident, knowledgeable, and articulate enough to walk into a room filled with senior combat arms leaders and engage in operational- and strategic-level conversations about the things that are impacting their ability to sustain readiness and project their combat power.

Installation physical security and access control are readiness issues that should be managed by the PM. These issues must be closely integrated with law enforcement to ensure that the PM is providing the depth of protection needed to enhance readiness and project combat power on the installation. Physical security and access control come with a long list of nonnegotiable regulatory requirements and highly challenging issues (use of borrowed military manpower, maintenance of systems, traffic impacts, construction projects, life cycle processes for systems that cost taxpayers millions of dollars).

PMs who manage all three programs (law enforcement, physical security, and access control) are being asked to do so in ever-increasingly resource-constrained environments that are heavily reliant on rotational manpower. This necessitates some fairly sophisticated operational management strategies to ensure that all three programs are mutually supportive, necessarily resourced, and fully synchronized to prevent reductions in service or gaps in overall installation security.

All of these things are part of the typical day of a PM. But everything can go on hold with a single radio transmission: shots fired, a barricaded individual, or an aircraft down. The PM must have the mental flexibility to immediately transition from the current task to incident response. He or she must know how to manage a potentially large-scale, complex incident that extends across multiple operational periods and requires the close integration of resources from multiple on- and off-post agencies. PMs must be very adept at managing operations, while also providing sufficient top cover to allow empowered subordinate leaders to create order out of chaos and facilitate a return to normal operations. All previous military leadership training and experiences are valuable, but they do not prepare PMs to manage complex incidents with multiple responding agencies or predict the expectations of leaders when major incidents occur and lives are lost. Great leadership skills do not necessarily equate to great management skills. When incidents happen, the PM's ability to manage resources and information surrounding the incident becomes critical. It takes training, experience, and a willingness to dedicate time to individual and organizational development.

The PM position is one of the most multidisciplinary positions in the Regiment. The PM is a jack of all trades and is expected to be a master of most. Whether it is law enforcement, access control, or physical security, there is a level of knowledge that an effective PM must have to be relevant and influential among primary leaders on the installation. PMs must enter the job with a wide view and an open mind. They must develop and manage an overall operational construct that assists commanders in maintaining readiness, protects commanders' ability to project combat power, and defends operational and strategic resources. The PM position is one of the most visible positions we have and one of the most valuable positions for showing commanders what the Military Police Regiment can do for the Army.

Major Pilch is the provost marshal at the Directorate of Emergency Services, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. He holds a bachelor's degree in occupational education from Wayland Baptist University, Plainview, Texas, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Chief Solonar is the police chief at the Directorate of Emergency Services, Joint Base Lewis–McChord. He is a retired military police officer. His Army career spanned across positions in combat support, physical security, law enforcement, corrections, and criminal investigation division units. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in sociology / criminology from the University of Montana, Missoula, Montana. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Civilian Police Academy, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Leaving a Legacy for the Military Police Corps

By Major Jeremy E. Kerfoot

In building a legacy for the Military Police Corps, senior leaders must work tirelessly within our spheres of influence to promote military police professionalism, balancing our unique skills with our need to maintain a warfighting edge. Leaving a legacy to an organization is important; it shows the dedication, initiative, and commitment that leaders have to their profession and reflects the elements of passion that drive leaders to influence the future of their vocation. Senior leaders can leave a lasting, positive legacy for the Military Police Corps by enhancing our identity as law enforcement professionals and maintaining the ability to be warriors when needed.

The Military Police Corps struggles with an identity crisis. On one hand, some of our leaders want the organization to be seen as a premier police agency, full of law enforcement professionals who truly understand the art and science of policing. On the other hand, some leaders want the Military Police Corps to remain on the cutting edge of our warrior skills and abilities. After more than a decade at war, military police became accustomed to fulfilling the role of the warrior and embracing the motto: "everyone is a Soldier first." This is not inherently a bad creed to live by, but it is one that took our focus away from our prime specialty. Some organizational leaders didn't want to be left behind or in the rear of a combat situation, so they readily volunteered for missions not entirely within the scope of the military police mission. More resources were given to units at the front lines. The bottom line is that even though law enforcement was necessary, it was not exciting enough.

With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, the military is in a holding pattern of reduction due to mandates from the most recent *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017*.[1] If military police units are seen as no different from infantry or combat maneuver units, we are at risk for further downsizing and shuttering. Have we failed to highlight our roots, our specialized skills at all levels? To reverse this trend and provide balance to the dichotomy of views, we could create a potential legacy by building the Military Police Corps identity as a professional police force, while simultaneously maintaining our warrior edge when called upon—not losing our law enforcement expertise through combat operations.

Law Enforcement Professionalism

To enhance our identity as law enforcement professionals, we must take several actions: conduct training and education, credential Soldiers, and build relationships with commanders at every level of the Army.

Within the realm of training and education, our military police must not neglect participation in continuing education and professional police instruction. Beyond military police basic training, there is a lack of ongoing efforts to hone policing skills. Small numbers of military police individuals (such as criminal investigators) attend specialized police investigative training, but we lack the organizational aptitude of law enforcement competence when compared to similar law enforcement organizations outside the military. Granted, our police are generally younger—but that is no excuse to avoid providing continual professional development on law enforcement topics. It is actually all the more reason to provide additional training, thus reducing organizational risk. We must partner with local law enforcement agencies and train alongside them, building law enforcement skill sets and relationships that will establish rapport within the military-civilian communities we serve. We need to push through the common Department of the Army Military Police Peace Officer Standards and Training certification that qualifies all military police to the same standard. This certification should also be transferrable to law enforcement service outside the military. This may extend military police training time, but it will help legitimize the military police profession in the eyes of the military and those of its outside partners. This level of training and education should bring about a sense of heightened professionalism to the communities we serve.

Credentialing every military police officer—not just our felony investigators—is another action that can help enhance our identity as law enforcement professionals. Given

that the Military Police Corps is the professional policing branch of the Army and given the level of emphasis, resources, and time placed on police skill development, why is it that the Army Military Police Corps is the only joint Service police organization in which the badge is not used as a universal symbol to denote and identify its practitioners as certified professionals?[2] By providing badges to military police, rather than having them wear the traditional military police brassard (or patch), we would distinguish military police as having skills different from the skills of other Soldiers, and military police would be readily identified by all members of the Army as professionals in our specific area of expertise.

A final action for enhancing our law enforcement identity is the engagement of leaders at every level within the Army on military police capabilities and what we bring to bear. We must fight for a seat at the table and effectively explain how law enforcement contributes to the readiness of Army units when conducting combat missions, whether it be through community policing efforts on an installation, investigations into felony crimes that damage integrity within units, or nation building through expertise in the bolstering of rule of law with indigenous security forces. Military police must educate the community on what we can do for commanders, namely to serve as an extension of command efforts to promote good order and discipline and to provide deterrence support in an effort to increase readiness and the combat effectiveness of units.

Warrior-Police Identity

We must also remain capable of being warriors when called upon. To maintain our warrior ethos and edge as a combat fighting element, the Military Police Corps must continue to balance law enforcement training with warrior skills and to integrate rule of law principles in combat missions. The Military Police Corps must integrate Army warfighting principles into our training regimen—whether maintaining skills on the range, in a field environment, or within a collaboration of full spectrum operations alongside our Army brethren—and seek opportunities for enhancing law enforcement skills when practical. Army military police never lose our responsibility to be Soldiers first; we must approach our responsibilities with a "warrior-police" mindset. Military police Soldiers must be able to recognize different situations in which we will be called upon to execute the Army mission; it is that understanding that will strengthen the ability of the Military Police Corps to be seen as consisting of legitimate warriors with unique expertise. When military police can speak and act as warrior-police alongside our Army brothers and sisters, we will be respected for our capabilities, have influence over our leaders, and have access to the resources needed to improve combat ability and policing skills.

Some obstacles to building the tenants of this legacy are timing, resources, and military downsizing. Time is an important component in the realm of training and education, but it is in short supply. Commanders at every level already struggle with finding time to train our organizations on a myriad of mandated training, and they are reluctant to add more to their overflowing plates. To overcome this obstacle, we would need to change the mindset of leaders and allow greater flexibility in accomplishing mandated training using unique methods, possibly freeing up time to add additional law enforcement professional courses or warrior-police skills-based training. Some of the most significant obstacles to this legacy plan are the lack of resources and military downsizing. Credentialing and adding additional law enforcement skills training and education will invariably cost more money, regardless of the levels of partnership we have with sister agencies. Military police commanders, much like other Army commanders, face challenges in fighting for the same pots of money and resources. We must effectively argue for the need for professionalization in our budget proposals, training plans, and unit restructuring efforts. Using law enforcement data and expertise, we should be able to provide convincing arguments for the necessity of our branch to the Army and the need for funding across all efforts of professionalizing the organization.

Legacy Duty

We need to develop continuing education programs that enhance skills and the law enforcement profession and engage Army senior leadership in order to promote military police capabilities. We must demonstrate how we can effectively enhance the readiness of our combat fighting force and show how we are a combat enabler on the battlefield. This is how we will regain our identity as a premiere law enforcement agency—through increased law enforcement professionalism and a warrior-police balance. This is our opportunity for a legacy that could carry on for future military police generations.

Endnotes:

[1]Report 114-840, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017*, House of Representatives, 30 November 2016, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-114hrpt840/pdf/CRPT-114hrpt840.pdf>, accessed on 27 January 2017.

[2]David P. Glaser and David A. Charbonneau, "Badges? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Badges!" *Military Police*, Spring 2012, pp. 40–41.

Major Kerfoot is the chief of the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. At the time this article was written, he was attending the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy at Quantico, Virginia. He holds a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster Univiersity, and he is a former interagency fellow with Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

Military Police Writer's Guide

Military Police is a Department of the Army-authenticated publication that contains instructions, guidance, and other materials to continuously improve the professional development of Army military police. It also provides a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army military police community. *Military Police* includes articles by and about commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things. Shorter, after action type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. Avoid using acronyms when possible. When used, acronyms must be spelled out and identified at the first use. Also avoid the use of bureaucratic jargon and military buzzwords. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages).

Articles submitted to *Military Police* must be accompanied by a written release from the author's unit or activity security manager before editing can begin. All information contained in an article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. It is the author's responsibility to ensure that security is not compromised; information appearing in open sources does not constitute declassification. *Military Police* is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.

Authors are responsible for article accuracy and source documentation. Use endnotes (not footnotes) and references to document sources of quotations, information, and ideas. Limit the number of endnotes to the minimum required for honest acknowledgment. Endnotes and references must contain a complete citation of publication data; for Internet citations, include the date accessed.

Include photographs and/or graphics that illustrate information in the article. Graphics must be accompanied by captions or descriptions; photographs should also be identified with the date, location, unit/personnel, and activity, as applicable. Do not embed photographs in Microsoft® PowerPoint or Word or include photographs or illustrations in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. If illustrations are created in PowerPoint, avoid the excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Please see the Photograph and Illustration Guide on p.48 for more information.

Copyright concerns and the proliferation of methods used to disseminate art, illustrations, and photographs require that the origin of any graphics be identified. If a graphic is copyrighted, the author must obtain copyright approval and submit it to *Military Police* with the proposed manuscript. As a general policy, *Military Police* will not use artwork that cannot be attributed.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including full name, rank, current unit, job title, and education; U.S. Postal Service mailing address; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

When an article has multiple authors, the primary point of contact should be clearly designated with the initial submission. The designated author will receive all correspondence from *Military Police* editors and will be responsible for conferring with coauthors concerning revisions before responding to the editors.

Military Police will notify each author to acknowledge receipt of a manuscript. However, we make no final commitment to publish an article until it has been thoroughly reviewed and, if required, revised to satisfy concerns and conform to publication conventions. We make no guarantee to publish all submitted articles, photographs, or illustrations. If we plan to publish an article, we will notify the author. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.

Manuscripts submitted to *Military Police* become government property upon receipt. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for length, clarity, and conformity to *Military Police* style. We will send substantive changes to the author for approval. Authors will receive a courtesy copy of the edited version for review before publication; however, if the author does not respond to *Military Police* with questions or concerns by a specified suspense date (typically five to seven working days), it will be assumed that the author concurs with all edits and the article will run as is.

Military Police is published two times a year: March (article deadline is 15 November) and September (article deadline is 15 May). Send submissions by e-mail to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil> or on a CD in Microsoft Word, along with a double-spaced copy of the manuscript, to:

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Military Police Professional Bulletin
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Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702.

Note: Please indicate if a manuscript is being considered for publication elsewhere. Due to the limited space per issue, we usually do not print articles that have been accepted for publication at other Army venues.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
97th Military Police Battalion
(Guardians Take Charge)

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 8 June 1945 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 97th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 13 June 1945 at Stenay, France.

Inactivated 12 November 1945 at Sissonne, France.

Allotted 27 September 1951 to the Regular Army.

Activated 28 October 1951 in Korea.

Inactivated 20 March 1953 in Korea.

Activated 1 June 1966 at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Inactivated 30 April 1972 at Oakland, California.

Redesignated 16 June 1989 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 97th Military Police Battalion, and activated in Germany.

Inactivated 15 August 1994 in Germany.

Redesignated 17 October 2005 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 97th Military Police Battalion, and activated at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Campaign Participation Credit

Korean War

United Nation Summer–Fall Offensive
Second Korean Winter
Korea, Summer–Fall 1952
Third Korean Winter

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

War on Terrorism

(Campaigns to be determined)

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967–1968

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2006–2007

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2009–2010

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1952

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1952–1953

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966–1972

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS				
COMMANDER	**CSM/SGM**	**CWO**	**UNIT**	**LOCATION**
Mark Inch	Richard Woodring		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
Mark Inch	Bradley Cross	Edgar Collins	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Kevin Vereen	James Breckinridge	Joel Fitz	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Mark Inch	Bradley Cross		Army Corrections Cmd (ACC)	Alexandria, VA
Michael White	Jody Arrington		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Michael Hoban			USARC PM	Ft Bragg, NC
	Craig Owens	Robert Combs	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Timothy Pulley	Robert Provost		2nd Bde, 102nd Division, 80th Tng Cmd	Fort Snelling, MN
Shannon Lucas	Teresa Duncan		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Cary Cowan	Winsome Laos		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Niave Knell	Michael Weatherholt		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Dawn Hilton	Jeffrey Cereghino		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Eugenia Guilmartin	Mark Hennessey		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Arturo Horton	Ted Pearson		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Christopher Burns	Brian Flom		42d MP Bde	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Javier Reina	Joseph Klostermann		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Peter Cross	Byron Robinson		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Carl Parsons	Clayton Sneed		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Thomas Vern	Jon Sawyer		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Peter Vanderland	John Schiffli		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Eric Mullai	Paul Bianco		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Anthony Hartmann	Lawrence Canada		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Joseph Decosta	Peter Harrington	Mark Arnold	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Detrick Briscoe	Arthur Williams	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Terry Nihart	Brian Garon	Celia Gallo	701st MP Gp (CID)	Quantico, VA
Stephen Gabavics	Michael Bennett		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS				
Wesley Huff	Terrence Allen		2-80th MP Bn (TASS)	Owings Mill, MD
John Schwab	Brian Johnson		2-95th MP Bn (TASS)	Baton Rouge, LA
Patricia Hamilton	Gregory Jackson		2-100th MP Bn (TASS)	Nashville, TN
Stephen VanDoren	Andrew Johnson		1-104th MP Bn (TASS)	Aurora, CO
Edward Diamantis	Paul Duros		2-108th MP Bn (TASS)	Ft Jackson, SC
Joseph Elsner	Peter Harrington	Anderson Wagner	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Ginamarie McCloskey	Chad Aldridge	Billy Higgason	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Juan Nava	Francisco Huereque	John Lemke	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Michael Crane	Gordon Lawitzke	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Vincent Amerena	Christian Dixson	Anthony Caprietta	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Marcus Matthews	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Travis Jacobs	Veronica Knapp		40th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jason Turner	Kevin Pickrel		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Matthew Dick	Marcus Mitchell		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Sharon Lyght	William Mayfield		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Tim Mahoney	Michael Jeanes		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Peter Robertson	Freddy Trejo		96th MP Bn (C/D)	San Diego, CA
Ann Meredith	Billy Ray Counts		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael Fowler	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (C/D)	Auburn, NY
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Robert Watras	Craig Payne		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Mary Staab	Aarion Franklin		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
John Gobel	Michael Plemons		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Kenneth Niles	Robert Wall		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Richard Candelario	Francisco Ramos		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Norberto Flores II	Matthew Lamonica		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
John Dunn	Gregory Derosier	David Knudson	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
Thomas LeMoine	Daniel Williams		160th MP Bn (C/D)	Tallahassee, FL
Richie Gammons	Harold Cook		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Richie Gammons	Victory Watson		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Larry Crowder	Edward Stratton		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)				
COMMANDER	**CSM/SGM**	**CWO**	**UNIT**	**LOCATION**
Robert Paoletti	Andraus Williams		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Daniel Lawler		192d MP Bn (C/D)	Niantic, CT
Marc Reyher	Jon Crowe		193d MP Bn (C/D)	Denver, CO
Matthew Boski	Daniel Lawler		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Marc Reyher	Jon Crowe		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Lance Shaffer	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Kenneth Dilg	Ed Williams		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
James Blake	James Sartori		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Randolph Velarde	Theodore Skibyak		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James Lake	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Kimberly Wilson	Bruce Hall		304th MP Bn (C/D)	Nashville, TN
Robert Collins	Robert Engle		310th MP Bn (C/D)	Uniondale, NY
Damien Garner			317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Mark Vinci	James Rochester		324th MP Bn (C/D)	Fresno, CA
Dennis Doran	John Jenkins		327th MP Bn (C/D)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Farabaugh	Joseph Rigby		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Michael Brancamp	Patrick Scanlon		340th MP Bn (C/D)	Ashley, PA
Alexander Shaw	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
Vance Kuhner	Brett Goldstein		382d MP Bn	Westover AFB, MA
Joseph Adamson	William Henderson		384th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Wayne, IN
Robert Matthews	Jeffrey Baker		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
John Myers	Michael Jaquesta		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Chelley Gabriel	Mark Bell		391st MP Bn (C/D)	Columbus, OH
Antoine Williams	Hyung Kim	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Lawrence Kapp	Shelita Taylor		400th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Meade, MD
Eric Hunsberger	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Andrea Schaller	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Whitney Jensen	Patrick O'Rourke	John Scarlett	502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
John Curry	John Eastwood		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Yvonne Miller	Richard Lopez		504th MP Bn	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Stephen Newman	William Ramsey		508th MP Bn (C/D)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Kirk Whittenberger	Rusty Lane		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Andrew Deaton	Jametta Bland		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Christiaan Whitted	Kerry Hommertzheim		530th MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Jennings Bunch	Frankie Smalls		535th MP Bn (C/D)	Cary, NC
Daniel Kuhn	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Mandi Bohrer	Casey Freeman		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Karen Watson	John Fair		705th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jeffrey Searl	Ethan Bradley		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Michael Johnston	Jose Shorey		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Karst Brandsma	Veronica Regalbuti		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Sean Brown	Brian Bertazon		724th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
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DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	26 Aug 13	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. **Status:** Under revision. Staffing projected for 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2017.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	28 Apr 14	A manual that addresses detention operations across the range of military operations and provides detention operations guidance for commanders and staffs. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and military police Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	06 Apr 15	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. **Status:** Current.
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	11 Aug 15	A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. TC 3-39.30 provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. **Status:** Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>.			

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—General George H. Decker,

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962

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