MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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USAMPS
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COMMANDANT
BG Kevin Vereen.....563-8019
<kevin.vereen.mil@mail.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Jesse D. Galvan..... 563-8019
<jesse.d.galvan.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Richard A. Woodring..... 563-8018
<richard.a.woodring4.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CW5 Leroy Shamburger.....563-8035
<leroy.shamburger.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
Mr. Mark L. Farley..... 563-6221
<mark.l.farley.civ@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR
COL Glennie E. Burks..... 563-6223
<glennie.e.burks3.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG
MAJ Marc J. Blum..... 563-4570
<mark.j.blum.mil@mail.mil>

QUALITY ASSURANCE ELEMENT
Miss Cathy M. Bower 563-6023
<cathy.m.bower.civ@mail.mil>

14TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
COL Niave F. Knell.....596-0968
<niave.f.knell.mil@mail.mil>

CSM David J. Tookmanian..... 596-1194
<david.j.tookmanian.mil@mail.mil>

701ST MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Mandi L. Bohrer.....596-2377
<mandi.l.bohrer.mil@mail.mil>

787TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Stephen V. Caruso..... 596-2910
<stephen.v.caruso.mil@mail.mil>

795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Richard T. Cranford..... 596-2384
<richard.t.cranford.mil@mail.mil>

USAMPS Directors

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION
COL Bryan W. O'Barr..... 563-8098
<bryan.w.obarr.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS
LTC Chad D. Goyette.....563-8027
<chad.d.goyette.mil@mail.mil>

G-37 PUBLICATIONS
Managing Editor, Diana K. Dean.....**563-4137**
<diana.k.dean.civ@mail.mil>
Editor, Cheryl L. Green.....**563-5004**
<cheryl.l.green26.civ@mail.mil>
Graphic Designer, Dennis L. Schellingberger.....**563-5267**
<dennis.l.schellingberger.civ@mail.mil>
Editorial Assistant, Cynthia S. Fuller.....**563-7651**
<cynthia.s.fuller3.civ@mail.mil>

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
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We regret the omission of the photo credits for the Spring 2016 issue front and back cover photos. Thank you Jeffrey Castro, U.S. Army Crimininal Investigation Command Public Affairs, for submitting the photos.



Cover photo submitted by First Lieutenant Adam J. Murray, 97th Military Police Battalion.

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Kevin Vereen

Hello from the home of the Military Police Corps Regiment! My 1-year mark of serving as the Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) is quickly approaching, and I can honestly say that I have truly enjoyed every moment of my tenure serving our Regiment. I continue to be amazed at all of the things that are happening across our Corps and at the tremendous team of commissioned officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Department of the Army civilians all across our formations performing and supporting world class police efforts across the three major Military Police Corps competencies.

I continue to reinforce our commitment to the Army and highlight the *skills* and *tools* of our policing profession that are so valuable in support of the Army and supported Commanders' missions. The foundation of what our military police Soldiers do each and every day is centered on *trust*. Our Nation places a tremendous amount of trust in our military, and those we (military police) serve place an enormous amount of trust in our ability to do the right thing in whatever circumstances or situations we find ourselves during the execution of our military police duties. Military police Soldiers conducting policing, investigations, and corrections make decisions every day; and they execute these decisions alone and unafraid. Commanders have fully embraced mission command—by providing clear intent through mission orders and demonstrating a willingness to accept prudent risk as our Soldiers perform law enforcement missions across Army installations (both inside and outside the continental United States).

Over the last several months, significant uprisings have occurred between civilian law enforcement personnel and the people whom they serve. As our civilian law enforcement agencies continue to provide service to the communities for which they have jurisdictional responsibility, it has become even more apparent that military police can learn from after action reviews involving these incidents and challenges—not by focusing essentially on the actions that precipitated the incident, but by looking at planning procedures and response and support operations conducted during the subsequent uprisings. Comparatively speaking, these events are much like our military operations that involve careful and deliberate planning, taking into consideration the reality that these operations must be sustained logistically and resourced with rotational manpower to lead to mission success.

USAMPS and our battalion and brigade commands all across our formations have actively engaged in training and leader development sessions with our law enforcement partners at state, federal, and local levels. One of the vital components in the professionalization of our Corps is allowing opportunities for our military police Soldiers to collaborate and train with civilian policing agencies in professional forums that foster learning. Through this interaction, it is my hope that we all learn and ultimately gain a greater appreciation for what we do as law enforcement professionals. After more than 13 years of deployments, our Soldiers provided training to police, reaffirmed the trust of those for whom they serve, and validated our ability to make a difference in capacity building in countries that rely on assistance from the United States and our allies.

It has been an extremely busy year for our Regiment, and it is truly remarkable to see our units at work making a difference across our core competencies. There is no question about our commitment to the Total Army as we continue to integrate and collaborate with Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve military police organizations. Our Army will continue to operate at a very demanding pace, conducting missions globally; and our Regiment will continue to enable our Army to accomplish the mission.

Continue to remember our Soldiers at home and abroad. To each one of you, thank you for your service to the Regiment, our Army, and the Nation!

Assist, Protect, and Defend!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Richard A. Woodring

Greetings again from the Home of the Regiment!



Talent management; broadening opportunities; agile and adaptive leaders; and knowledge, skills, and attributes—these are all topics of great interest and debate as we build leaders of the future to carry the Army into 2025 and beyond.

When I arrived at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, one of the first things I addressed was removing assignment "stovepipes," particularly in regard to our sergeant major population. This was already a work in progress, as Regimental Command Sergeant Major John McNeirney was directed to develop a plan to integrate all Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31 series sergeants major into a new MOS identifier: 31Z. This meant that once a Soldier reached the pay grade of E-9 in MOSs 31B/D/E, he or she lost the primary MOS identifier and became a 31Z, making that Soldier eligible to serve as a command sergeant major/sergeant major in any E-9 billet coded as 31Z. Now that we will have 31K command sergeants major/sergeants major in our formations, I believe that MOS 31K will also be included. The thinking was that our command sergeants major/sergeants major should be able to discuss the entire 31 series enterprise with senior leaders, as opposed to being able to speak only to leaders in their respective MOSs.

This decision to do away with the primary identifier was not made without due process. This deliberate effort required numerous meetings, information papers, e-mails, reviews, and briefings to discuss the pros and cons of implementing the 31Z program. And we were not the only branch that was directed to consolidate our noncommissioned officer (NCO) MOS competencies.

During my travels, I have been asked several questions about the program and heard several comments (positive and negative). I am convinced that this is the right approach to advance senior NCOs so that they are more competitive at the very senior (brigade and nominative) levels of the Army.

Our officers have proven that the goal can be accomplished; I see no reason why senior NCOs cannot do the same. We have some of the most competent, professional, and talented NCOs in the Army; and restricting them to one discipline seems a waste. We have had several command sergeants major/sergeants major work in command positions outside of their MOSs, and they have done a tremendous job. If we are serious about talent management; broadening opportunities; agile and adaptive leaders; and knowledge, skills and attributes, we must embrace this initiative, which is to be ready for implementation in fiscal year 2018.

How do we get a head start on preparing our NCOs for this change and ensuring that our senior NCOs are prepared? There are several ways this can be accomplished: by modifying the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System (primarily at the senior level), by continuing to assign NCOs outside of their MOSs before the fiscal year 2018 implementation; by revising Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*; by writing information papers; and by conducting Leadership Development Program sessions.

We can also shape the 31Z program with board guidance provided to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command for Centralized Selection List boards and through our proponency relationship with the Sergeant Major Branch at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. This will ensure that all command sergeants major/sergeants major have equal opportunities and that the very best will continue to advance to the nominative level.

Again, our NCOs are some of the most talented the Army has to offer; this article describes just one more step that will prepare them to serve at the most strategic levels of the Army and to continue to move the Regiment forward.

Reference:

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*, 11 September 2015.

Assist, Protect, and Defend!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

As many of you know, I will soon relinquish my duties and responsibilities as the Military Police Regimental Chief Warrant Officer to the fifth Military Police Regimental Chief Warrant Officer, Chief Warrant Officer Five Joel E. Fitz. I assumed this position as our Army was challenged with budgetary restraints and a directive to reduce the size of our Army from approximately 570,000 to approximately 450,000 personnel. Although we were directed to inactivate some military police units to meet these congressional mandates, our Military Police Corps Regiment continues to be strong and filled with Soldiers of character, competence, and commitment. The Regiment continues to be trained, ready, and equipped and, in the words of our commandant, Brigadier General Kevin Vereen, "integral enablers of the Army's emerging requirements."

Even with the fiscal restraints, inactivation of units, and continuation of pressure on the Army for continued transformation, we have seen some amazing things happening across the Regiment as we shape organizations and forge the Regiment of the future. These initiatives include—

- Army approval of Military Occupational Specialty 31K.
- Army approval of the Military Occupational Specialty 31Z program for command sergeants major/sergeants major.
- Revamped military police professional military education with more rigorous programs of instruction for the commissioned officer, warrant officer, and enlisted populations across the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserves.
- Many regional engagements with our allies and other partners to exercise unique capabilities and build partner capacity.
- Efforts to make the full capabilities of the Military Police Corps Regiment organic to military police operational units.
- Development of the forensic strategy for the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense.
- Broadening opportunities that provide exposure to other disciplines of the Regiment.
- Incorporation of additional criminal intelligence, forensic, and investigative capabilities into military police units.

In my opinion, the future of the Regiment rests on its ability to deliver the capabilities of all disciplines of the Military Police Corps Regiment (31A, 31B, 31D, 31E, and 31K) in one military police unit to support the needs of the senior mission commander. Many of the above-mentioned initiatives address the need for leaders who can operate in an uncertain environment and the need for increased capability in military police units. The Army operating concept addresses globally responsive, tailored forces exercising mission command in a complex environment. With the Army moving in a smaller and more scalable direction, I don't know if we will have the ability or capacity to deploy several different military police units to provide the capability required by the senior mission commander. I am not sure that we are supporting the direction of the Army with the way we are configured today. I think that we will be driven to creating multifunctional military police units that are capable of delivering all of the unique capabilities of the Military Police Corps Regiment. We are seeing that more and more military police units are required to use a multidisciplinary approach to meet the needs of the operational Army. As we continue to forge the Regiment, I predict that multifunctional units will become the building blocks of the Military Police Corps Regiment.

Although I will soon retire from the military, I am excited about the direction of our Military Police Corps Regiment. I am confident that we have the right senior leaders making tough decisions for the good of the Regiment, and I am amazed at the amount of talent we have in our commissioned officers, warrant officers, junior noncommissioned officers, and civilian employees. The Regiment will be in competent hands for years to come. I will continue to be engaged with the Regiment, as I am a military police officer and Soldier for life. God bless the Military Police Corps Regiment!

Assist, Protect, and Defend!

Dual-Hat Director of Emergency Services at the Battalion Commander Level

By Lieutenant Colonel Jon P. Myers, Major Morisse L. Daniels, First Lieutenant Joshua J. Larson, Chief William E. Nowlin, Mr. Leo M. Stolfi, Chief Gregory W. Funderburk, and Chief Bobby S. Lungrin

Overview

Since the inception of the codified agreement of the U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) to have the senior military police commander (battalion or brigade) also serve as the director of emergency services on the 13 major FORSCOM installations, consternation remains about the effectiveness of the effort. Especially at the battalion level, the directorate of emergency services (DES)-derived requirements from garrison and senior commanders can erode the time and energy that the battalion commander devotes to leading his or her battalion. On the positive side, the ability to synchronize policing, force protection, and emergency responsiveness from the force provider to the customer is unmatched under the dual-hat condition set. The success or failure of the dual-hat arrangement comes down to mission command and the ability to successfully build support relationships across garrison and senior commander directorates and staffs and to build capacity within the military police battalion and DES.

Implementing the dual-hat position of battalion commander/installation director of emergency services concentrates the roles and responsibilities at the O-5 commander level, thus increasing the overall workload and raising expectations for the commander and staff. Depending on the installation garrison architecture, relationships, and garrison and senior commander requirements, the DES-related workload can vary greatly and it proportionally impacts the ability to perform mission command of the military police battalion.

At Fort Polk, Louisiana, the key leader slate increases the ability of the director of emergency services to provide input, guidance, and influence to the garrison and senior commander staffs without directly attending a multitude of battle rhythm events. Cultivating that relationship by employing direct DES involvement on key issues and key leader huddles provides the garrison and senior commander with sufficient confidence in the DES, which makes additional working groups, meetings, and boards unnecessary. By prioritizing direct involvement as the director and sometimes as the battalion commander, the ability to influence garrison requirements of DES can be managed without negatively impacting mission command and leadership for the military police battalion. Daily DES huddles with the police, physical security, and fire chiefs; criminal investigation division representatives; and the installation provost marshal help set conditions, provide an excellent venue to receive important updates from across DES, and allow DES to distribute guidance and taskings and to set priorities. This one synchronization effort pays the greatest dividends and enables the battalion commander/director of emergency services to successfully perform mission command for both organizations.

Defined Roles and Responsibilities

As the senior military police official on the installation, the priority of the battalion commander must be the military police battalion that he or she commands. The way in which the battalion commander employs himself or herself in the director of emergency services role directly impacts the organization.

The main duties of the director of emergency services are to—

- Serve as the garrison director of emergency services. The DES includes police, physical security, and fire divisions. The director is the final authority on recommendations to the garrison and senior commander.
- Serve as the senior military police advisor to garrison and senior commanders.

Each senior civilian manager and leader within DES is responsible for normal management/employee relations; human resources; policy development; and the day-to-day

administrative, training and certification, and operations specific to each DES division. Although the specific tasks and functions may differ slightly, the macro-level outcome (emergency and first responder support to the installation and the community) remains the same.

Deputy Director of Emergency Services

The deputy director of emergency services represents DES and, subsequently, the director of emergency services to the garrison and G-staff for all matters of force protection, law enforcement, security matters, access control, and fire protection and prevention. The deputy director's time is divided among daily staff interaction within the garrison and installation G-staff for the areas of resource management, manpower, civilian personnel management, and table of distribution and allowances (TDA) administration. The deputy director forms and maintains close liaison and day-to-day working relationships with the garrison commander, deputy garrison commander, other garrison directors, and FORSCOM staff to enable the successful delivery of DES services to the command and the community without directly involving the director in micro-level execution and oversight.

The deputy director attends most of the garrison planning, staff, coordination, and in-process reviews and meetings for the director. He or she is also responsible for installation status reports, common levels of support, and contract review processes. The mission of the deputy director within the directorate is related mainly to strategic planning for long-term continuity, resourcing, and equipping, while the police, security, and fire chiefs maintain the near-term operational mission and execution of daily manpower assets. The deputy director and the workforce planning and development specialist (DES administrative specialist) are responsible for overseeing most personnel actions, awards, TDA maintenance, pay and allowances, travel orders, and training, which supports the division chiefs by alleviating administrative burdens, outside taskings, and data calls.

The deputy director of emergency services also serves on the Garrison Real Property Planning Board, Federal Employee Compensation Act Board, Safety and Occupational Health Committee, Violence Intervention Team, Environmental Quality Control Board, and various other garrison functional boards and committees. This enables the director of emergency services to focus on leading the military police battalion. The deputy director brings key issues and management exceptions to the director's attention for decisions and course of action reviews. Whenever the commanding general is involved in a specific decision or information briefing, the director of emergency services can opt to personally attend and interact or to delegate these functions to the deputy director or provost marshal. This allows for more freedom of movement and doesn't overwhelm or burden the director of emergency services with non-battalion-related administrative duties and functions. However, these opportunities do allow him or her to interact with the senior rater as needed.

Provost Marshal

The provost marshal is the garrison commander's second-highest-ranking field grade military police officer. The provost marshal is directly involved with the garrison and installation staff, providing the garrison commander and the military police battalion commander with professional and technical advice concerning policing, security access control, fire objectives, policies and directives, trends, and strategies. The provost marshal assists with the use of military police, security access control, and fire assets; evaluates current operations; and projects future courses of action and organizational and resource requirements with the assistance of the deputy director and division chiefs. The military police battalion commander/director of emergency services may choose to have the provost marshal liaise directly with the garrison commander, or he or she may elect to perform this function himself or herself. The provost marshal's time is divided among three main functions:

- Coordinating with military police battalion staff sections, the law and order detachment, and the military working dog (MWD) detachment to ensure that the provost marshal's office (PMO) staff sections are properly manned and trained.
- Interacting with police, security access control, and fire division chiefs to ensure that DES manning and missions for special law enforcement events are resourced.
- Serving as the military field grade officer point of contact for all manner of needs and service requests for garrison staff, other installation directorates, and tenant unit commanders.

The provost marshal is the senior staff officer assigned to DES under the installation garrison (through the TDA). The military police battalion commander/director of emergency services is assigned under the brigade modified table of organization and equipment. In this particular alignment, the provost marshal is rated by the dual-hat military police battalion commander/director of emergency services, and the senior rater is the garrison commander.

The provost marshal and the PMO operations noncommissioned officer meet weekly with the military police battalion staff, law and order detachment, and MWD detachment to discuss, plan, and forecast training, manning, and trends in regard to the many PMO staff organizations (desk operations section, military police investigations section, traffic accident investigations section, security access control section, special reaction team, and MWD detachment). These weekly meetings are particularly critical for improving specialized military police and MWD detachment policing capabilities with interactions with the local populace for investigations, security, patrolling, and responses to emergent situations. These weekly meetings allow discussions for the thorough evaluation of law enforcement patrols and investigative military police on probationary status within the PMO organizations and more focused, on-the-job training for each individual military police Soldier or MWD detachment.

The provost marshal meets and interacts daily with the police, security access control, and fire division chiefs to analyze calls for service through the centralized dispatch, current and future tasks, manning, and contract concerns of personnel and equipment. This facilitates shared continuity between the provost marshal/deputy director and division chiefs, who possess the experience, knowledge, and historical background to educate the provost marshal when he or she must brief the garrison or senior installation commander.

The provost marshal also meets with garrison staff sections, other installation directorates, and tenant unit commanders for installation level boards (Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, juvenile review board, program review board, background check coordination group, case review committee, Force Protection Working Group, Derogatory Reporting Council [1408/4833 reviews], Community Health Prevention Council). The provost marshal participates in the boards to give perspective (police, security access control, and fire) and guidance based on policies, directives, and emergency service objectives. The provost marshal then briefs the military police battalion commander/director of emergency services on points of discussion and information due-outs that require approval.

Chief of the Police Division (Chief of Police)

The chief of police is responsible for the policing function on the installation. His or her time is divided among four major areas of emphasis:

- **Policy development.** The chief of police is integrated with various professional policing organizations (Louisiana Association of Chiefs of Police, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, International Association of Chiefs of Police). These resources are used to search for and find best practices within the law enforcement profession and adapt them for use on the installation. Policy development extends beyond the obvious requirements of standard operating procedures maintenance and refinement and the drafting of punitive policies. It includes a multitude of initiatives, such as police model development; refinement and implementation; incident response guidelines for police, fire, emergency medical services, and security assets; and process improvements, including community surveys and dispatch protocols.
- **Technology integration and equipment procurement.** The chief of police is responsible for researching, procuring, and incorporating various technologies into the installation law enforcement mission. He or she is the directorate lead for projects involving communications equipment, incident command equipment, common operating picture development, and consolidated dispatch. This area of emphasis also addresses the police division's handling of digital evidence, information sharing, and digital trend analysis. The chief of police manages the budget, through which life cycle replacement of police equipment (radar, variable message sign boards, cameras) is accomplished.
- **Police operations.** The chief of police oversees the day-to-day function of the military police station. This area of emphasis is the most time consuming of the four. It includes everything from special-event planning to patrol distribution to facilities management. Some of the specific tasks associated with this area include providing a daily computer comparison statistics briefing, where all sections review the previous 24 hours of calls for service and analyze trends; reviewing cases for legal sufficiency; monitoring the performance of sections and budget management; developing crime statistics; and managing the public safety answering point and crisis response planning. The chief of police maintains habitual working relationships with local police chiefs and sheriffs, which results in instant information sharing.
- **Personnel management.** The chief of police is the senior supervisor for the police division. As such, he or she is responsible for the personnel actions of the police division, to include training, discipline, hiring, and pay actions. He or she is required to coordinate activities with the civilian personnel advisory center, labor attorney, resource manager, and local union. Additionally, he or she is the individual reliability program certifying official for the directorate. The chief of police is also responsible for the training and certification of all police division personnel and is the primary training developer for the military police battalion law enforcement training and certification program.

Chief of the Fire Division (Fire Chief)

The fire chief is responsible for managing a comprehensive fire protection and prevention program for the garrison. His or her duties are divided into four major areas:

- **Administration.** The fire chief is the senior supervisor for the fire division. He or she is responsible for personnel actions for the fire division, to include training, discipline, hiring, and pay actions. The fire chief is required to coordinate activities with the civilian personnel advisory center, labor attorney, resource manager, and local union. He or she manages the budget and develops policy. He or she is also the liaison between the fire division and local officials and negotiates mutual aid agreements.
- **Fire operations.** The fire chief—
  - Directs emergency services personnel and equipment to respond to particular types of emergencies.
  - Implements and directs the crash and rescue protection services for the airfield.
  - Determines protection requirements and schedules subordinates and equipment for standby and special mission responses or public events for DES.
- **Training.** The fire chief—
  - Manages and develops a training program for firefighters according to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6055.6, *DOD Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program,* and Army Regulation (AR) 420-1*, Army Facilities Management*.
  - Ensures that firefighters meet Department of Defense certification standards, receive required

annual proficiency training, and meet live-fire training requirements.
    - Conducts specialized training, to include hazmat response, confined space, and motor vehicle rescue.
- **Fire prevention.** The fire chief—
    - Oversees the management of fire prevention activities for DES, to include educational promotions, training for military and civilian personnel, fire prevention week activities, seasonal campaigns, and regularly scheduled inspections of facilities.
    - Ensures that fire suppression, detection, and alarm systems on the installation are designed and installed according to Department of Defense instructions, National Fire Protection Association standards, and Army regulations and technical manuals.
    - Reviews plans and ensures that on-site inspections of new construction and alteration or maintenance projects are conducted for compliance.

Chief of the Physical Security Division (Physical Security Chief)

The physical security chief is responsible for the day-to-day access control operations and compliance with physical security procedures on the installation. His or her efforts are focused on four major areas:

- **Physical security policy development.** The physical security division is integrated into one of the pillars of the Army's protection program; and as such, the physical security chief is immersed in identifying and prioritizing the protection of critical mission-essential functions, operational requirements, and critical installation assets in order to provide focus to the installation protection program and its limited resources. This is performed through the development of installation level guidance, which establishes priorities and fully implements physical security policies, selected best practices, and the elimination of gray areas within existing regulatory guidance. The physical security chief makes use of meetings and working groups (Force Protection Working Group, Threat Fusion Cell, Operational and Intelligence Group) to report weaknesses and improve the installation security.
- **Inspections, surveys, and compliance.** The physical security chief is responsible for the physical security inspection program on the installation. This program consists of training and credentialing all military and civilian physical security inspectors; obtaining advanced training for inspectors; and scheduling staff assistance visits, inspections, and re-inspections of noncompliant organizations. Byproducts of the inspection program include the refinement of policies and procedures and the identification of resource requirements and funding requirements captured within the physical security budget. Additionally, the physical security chief is responsible for the installation physical security survey that is performed every 3 years and risk/vulnerability assessments that are annually conducted on all mission-essential and vulnerable areas (MEVAs) and critical infrastructure. The physical security inspection program provides the senior mission commander and the director of emergency services valuable insight on the installation protection program and serves as a means to mold the force protection posture and educate the organizational and tenant activities.
- **Installation access control.** The physical security chief oversees the day-to-day function of the installation access control program. This program comprises 75 percent of the budget and 84 percent of division manpower. It includes multiple disciplines, such as law enforcement, antiterrorism, security, and personnel suitability. Some of the specific tasks associated with this responsibility include National Crime Information Center background checks on all visitors, the adjudication of access control waivers, the maintenance of access control databases, daily testing of active vehicle barriers, guard force supervision, the implementation of random antiterrorist measures, and weapons registration. The assess control program supports the staff judge advocate, law enforcement investigations, and local commanders. The division generates a daily summary of access control events that are discussed at meetings (Force Protection Working Group, Threat Fusion Cell, Operational and Intelligence Group) to improve the force protection posture.
- **Personnel management.** The physical security chief is the senior supervisor for Department of the Army security guards, military police assigned to access control duties, and military manpower borrowed from access control point personnel. He or she is responsible for personnel actions for the physical security division, to include training, disciplinary, hiring, and pay actions. The physical security chief is required to coordinate activities with the civilian personnel advisory center, labor attorney, resource manager, and local union. Additionally, he or she must ensure that personnel are certified in the individual reliability program. He or she is responsible for the training and certification of all personnel who perform duties at access control points and must maintain a database of certified personnel to ensure that only those meeting DES requirements are assigned duties at installation access control points.

Operational Mission Command for Emergencies

The dual-hat condition allows for immediate, reactive, and proactive mission command for all hazard response events, but especially for police-centric major crimes, accidents, and incidents. Responsiveness also depends on engaging the battalion leaders and staff and on the relationships and competencies within the DES civilian architecture. But when a garrison or senior commander wants an active duty field grade officer on the scene, the officer with the dual-hat role is a good solution. As practical examples, the Fort Polk senior commander wanted immediate field grade leadership support for three key events:

- An active shooter/insider threat within a rotational training unit.
- A rotational training unit rollover fatality.
- The death of a Soldier during apprehension by military police/Department of the Army civilian police.

Pros and Cons of DES Dual Hat

One of the pros of the dual-hat DES framework—at least at the battalion commander level—is the ability to immediately respond to garrison or senior commander requests for additional policing assets or short-duration emergencies. The dual-hat role provides unparalleled responsiveness while simultaneously maintaining full mission command capacity within the battalion and the DES through subordinate commanders and senior civilian staff. The biggest pros come from the synchronization of mid-term and long-range planning, the professionalization of the force, and the ability to integrate battalion capacity (staff) at critical junctures while furthering the capability of a limited number of DES technical staff. Finally, the dual-hat framework frees up additional military police field grade resources for tactical command and staff and joint billets, allowing military police assets to be assigned to more critical roles.

One of the cons for the dual-hat role is the propensity for overwhelming the battalion commander, especially if mission command systems are not in place, if there is an increase in the battalion operating tempo or deployment, or if DES experiences a high-intensity surge in emergency response actions. Additionally, the dual-hat role increases the likelihood that garrison IMCOM requirements for military police assets are not appropriately reflected on the FORSCOM force provider side. With the DES rating chain going to a functional military police brigade while retaining senior rating responsibility with the installation senior commander, there is ample opportunity to "cut one's own throat" by over-extending the battalion to ensure that garrison or senior commander programs and initiatives are fully sourced. The battalion commander must be the honest broker by balancing IMCOM requirements with the need to train military police forces for war/unified land operations. The day-to-day working relationship between the director of emergency services and the senior DES civilian workforce is often personality-driven and may ebb and flow from mediocre to great depending on who the director is, how he or she conducts business with the DES staff, and how the staff interacts with him or her. The dual-hat framework may also deprive young field grade military police officers from gaining valuable experience while supporting garrison first responder operations.

Conclusion

The dual-hat strategy can work exceptionally well with the proper senior command emphasis and the balancing of time and resources by the individual who is actually serving in the dual-hat capacity. The director must empower DES senior civilian staff, manage by exception, and refrain from overwhelming or undermanaging the talent in DES. However, the ability to prioritize command emphasis in concert with garrison commander, senior commander, and military police brigade commander intent and goals is truly unparalleled for officers who are capable of building relationships and conducting mission command in those condition sets.

References:

AR 420-1, *Army Facilities Management*, 12 February 2008.

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Lieutenant Colonel Myers was the commander of the 519th Military Police Battalion and garrison director of emergency services for Fort Polk from October 2013 to September 2015. He holds a bachelor's degree in aviation management from the Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Florida; a master's degree in business and organizational security from Webster University; and a master's degree in military arts and sciences from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Major Daniels is the installation provost marshal at Fort Polk. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice with a minor in psychology from Florida A&M University, Tallahassee.

First Lieutenant Larson is the police operations officer and special reaction team officer in charge for the Fort Polk DES. He holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from Kaplan University, St. Louis, Missouri.

Chief Nowlin is the fire chief at Fort Polk. He holds an associate's degree in education from Young Harris College, Georgia, and a bachelor's degree from La Grange University, Georgia. He has completed the highest level of accredited fire education, to include Fire Officer IV, Fire Instructor III, and Fire Inspector III classes.

Mr. Stolfi is the deputy director of emergency services at Fort Polk. He holds master's degrees in criminal justice and homeland security administration from Northwestern State University, Natchitoches, Louisiana. In April 2011, he was named the IMCOM Stalwart Award winner by Assistant Secretary of the Army Kathleen Hammock. He retired from the U.S. Army as a master sergeant.

Chief Funderburk is the physical security chief at Fort Polk. He is a veteran with more than 32 years of law enforcement and physical security experience. He holds bachelor's degrees in applied science and security management and a master's degree in security management from Bellevue University, Bellevue, Nebraska.

Chief Lungrin is the chief of police of Fort Polk. He retired from the U.S. Army Military Police Corps in 2004 as a first sergeant. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice administration from Columbia Southern University, Orange Beach, Alabama.

Area Security Missions in Installation Training Areas

By Lieutenant Colonel Yvonne C. Miller, Captain Rebecca K. Hsia, and First Sergeant Jon M. Waterhouse, Jr.

In a complex operational environment, military police units must strike a balance between training on policing tasks and combat tasks. Military police are charged to protect populations and resources as well as enable maneuver forces through security and mobility support missions. On bases with expansive training areas, the security of populations and resources becomes more complex due to limited manpower to conduct police operations over such large areas.

To address the issue of limited training area patrols and training time, the 504th Military Police Battalion conducted a mission analysis to prepare companies that were deploying platoon size elements into the Joint Base Lewis–McChord (JBLM) training areas to conduct operational area security. The intent of this mission was to provide support to JBLM law enforcement operations through the conduct of targeted operational area security missions.

The battalion conducted this area security mission as a law enforcement operation under the authority of the directorate of emergency services (DES). This mission allowed the platoon to train on police operations and operational area security tasks. Conducting this area security mission benefited JBLM security through the deterrence of criminal elements in the training areas and increased the battalion readiness, addressing several mission-essential tasks.

Battalion MDMP

After receiving verbal intent from the brigade commander in August 2015, the battalion initiated the military decision-making process (MDMP). The battalion commander provided the following explanation of the commander's intent to the staff:

- **Purpose.** Provide support to JBLM law enforcement operations through the conduct of targeted operational area security missions. Deter criminal activity and elements, gather criminal intelligence, and increase force protection measures in JBLM training areas. Units will use an organic modified table of organization and equipment to validate the ability to deploy with and utilize assigned equipment. Platoons will establish command posts and designate sectors for mounted and dismounted patrols. The company will monitor platoon mission plans.
- **Key tasks.**
  - Determine current criminal threat in JBLM training areas.
  - Perform reconnaissance and surveillance.
  - Occupy the area of operations.
  - Conduct police operations.
  - Conduct military police battalion support to operations.
- **End state.** Battalion staff should be postured to provide support to sustained operations; military police should be trained to conduct operational area security in support of police operations; and criminal elements should be deterred from use of the training areas.

The battalion staff executed the MDMP, developing the concept of the operation, tasks for the staff and subordinate units, the sustainment plan, and the communications plan. The command and signal paragraph of the operations order was especially critical since this mission would be conducted under DES authority. The battalion briefed the brigade commander at the end of September 2015, seeking approval to execute the mission in the second quarter of fiscal year 2016. The official battalion order was published in November 2015.

Initial Mission Preparation

The company received the battalion operations order in November 2015 and immediately began coordination with DES. The first area security mission was conducted by the 571st Military Police Company in February 2016. The company published an order with the mission to conduct operational area security in JBLM training areas to interdict criminal elements and deter criminal activity.

Vehicles enter the tactical assembly area after a successful patrol mission.

DES selected a remote training area on JBLM that was highly accessible to trespassers. The Training Area Patrol Section (TAPS) identified general trespassing, illegal logging, illegal dumping, illegal poaching, and illicit drug activity as primary offenses in this area.

The 571st Military Police Company worked with TAPS and the DES Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT) Section to conduct an analysis of the area and to coordinate support. To prepare the platoon for deployment into the training area, DES provided all-terrain vehicle training, CRIMINT training, a law enforcement conservation briefing, hazmat training, and area-specific training. In addition to DES training, the company conducted field sanitation training, combat lifesaver training, and weapon ranges.

Two Soldiers lead a patrol mission into the training area northern zone.

The company attached a mechanic, a medic, and a communications specialist from the company headquarters to the area security platoon for the mission, providing a total of 34 personnel and 13 vehicles to deploy into the training area. Integrating the headquarters element into the platoon early in the planning process allowed the elements to synchronize and train together for the mission.

During the planning phase, the platoon split the training area into three zones, allowing the element to conduct in-depth reconnaissance and patrols in each zone. The platoon conducted several leader reconnaissances and ride-alongs with TAPS in December 2015 and January 2016. During the mission preparation phase, the company set up the company command post and the platoon established a tactical operations center to test communications systems and validate reporting procedures.

The battalion staff provided support to the company during mission preparation. The battalion intelligence staff officer provided support in the form of terrain analysis and map acquisition. The battalion law and order officer coordinated training with DES and secured DES equipment for the company. The battalion logistics staff officer supported Class I requests, coordinated refuel missions, and conducted research to provide the company mission-specific equipment (emergency lights and signage for Humvees). The battalion signal staff officer acquired radio frequencies, identified retransmission locations, and planned for RAVEN (unmanned aerial vehicle) frequencies. The chaplain planned field services for the unit.

Mission Execution

The execution phase of the mission began with a company alert using the company deployment sequence. The platoon deployed with its assigned organic equipment and law enforcement gear as well as DES radios and all-terrain vehicles. The Battlefield Anti-Intrusion System and camouflage netting were essential in securing and concealing the platoon base camp.

The platoon executed the 7-day mission with a force protection element, a sustainment element, patrols, and listening posts/observation posts. Each day, the focus was on a specific zone until the platoon had identified the crime trends and patterns in each zone. After mapping out CRIMINT, the platoon began conducting targeted patrols to deter specific criminal activities. The company supported the platoon by sending out logistical support twice per day and tracking the mission through the company tactical operations center, reporting to DES and the battalion as necessary.

Over the course of the mission, the platoon and company created a debriefing format that was used to track what the platoon found during each patrol. These debriefings were used to plot and track CRIMINT. The platoon discovered dump sites, expended ammunition sites, and animal

remains. The company reported CRIMINT information to DES to coordinate with installation agencies to address the violations.

While in the field conducting this law enforcement operation, the platoon increased training readiness on several high-payoff tasks. The tasks included—

- Occupy an area of operations.
- Conduct operational area security.
- Perform police intelligence.
- Plan convoy operations.
- Operate a command post.
- Install antenna group OE-254.
- Conduct field maintenance.
- Conduct a route reconnaissance.
- Establish an observation post.
- Plan base defenses.

The battalion manned a tactical operations center from the battalion headquarters, while the platoon was deployed in the training area. The battalion operations staff officer tracked platoon movements and missions during operations. The battalion also tracked personnel accountability reports, sensitive-items reports, and spot reports, exercising and refining the battalion tactical standard operating procedure.

At the completion of the mission, the platoon redeployed to the cantonment area and conducted recovery operations according to company procedures to ensure readiness for follow-on operations. The company conducted after action reviews and provided briefing recommendations and lessons learned to DES and the battalion.

Police and Combat Operations

Area security missions were conducted under two different reporting chains—DES for law enforcement reporting and the battalion for tactical reporting. The two organizations developed a deeper relationship to accomplish the area security mission. DES supported the battalion in training and all tasks identified by the battalion during MDMP, and the battalion provided critical support to TAPS to provide coverage of the expansive training areas. The planning and execution of the area security mission created greater synergy between the two organizations, contributing to a stronger working relationship for daily law enforcement operations.

The area security mission allowed the company to train on area security tasks while conducting a law enforcement mission. The law enforcement operation was integrated with field operations. Soldiers were able to see the linkage between the policing operations conducted at home station and area security missions that would be conducted during overseas deployments. The unit increased the security of the installation while capitalizing on the training opportunity.

Conclusion

The area security mission in the JBLM training areas allowed the platoon, company, and battalion to increase readiness in key mission-essential tasks. At each echelon, the organization gained experience in operational area security and police operations. During the planning and execution of the area security mission, the company and battalion took advantage of the ability to exercise staff and support functions. The CRIMINT collected during the platoon mission provided key information to DES to plan future patrolling.

A Soldier relays a situation to the company command post while the company mechanic provides the radio operator with an update on field maintenance operations.

The initial mission provided a valuable proof of concept to prepare other platoons in the battalion to target higher-threat areas. The mission benefited JBLM security by deterring criminal activity in the targeted training area, providing additional support to the TAPS, and increasing surveillance and awareness of the training areas. The mission also benefited battalion training readiness by addressing multiple key collective tasks, exercising the battalion staff in MDMP, and providing real-world experience in gathering CRIMINT. The battalion will continue to conduct the area security mission in different training areas throughout JBLM.

Lieutenant Colonel Miller is the battalion commander for the 504th Military Police Battalion, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. She holds a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York, and a master's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Minnesota.

Captain Hsia is the company commander for the 571st Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. She holds a bachelor's degree in global security intelligence studies with minors in defense studies and Arabic and Middle Eastern studies from Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, and a master's degree in diplomacy with a focus on international terrorism from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.

First Sergeant Waterhouse is the first sergeant for the 571st Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. He holds a bachelor's degree in information technology management and a master's degree in criminal justice with a focus on rehabilitation and reintegration from American Military University, Charles Town, West Virginia.

Integrating Personnel Recovery Into Corps Protection

By Major Gregory S. Jones

"If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy."

—Executive Order 10631, *Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States*[1]

This article discusses the role of personnel recovery (PR) and its integration into the protection warfighting function (WfF). It also addresses how III Corps evolved to adapt to new doctrine while preparing the personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) to operate in a combined joint task force.

The roots of PR can be traced back to World War II and the Korean War. In 1942, a military intelligence service was established to aid U.S. forces in evading and escaping the enemy. In 1952, the Department of Defense (DOD) designated the U.S. Air Force as the executive agent for escape and evasion activities. Training was initially intended primarily for pilots and aircrews, as they were considered the most likely to be isolated. Today, PR training is required for all Service members before deployment; in addition, personnel from across the Services can attend Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training. After the Korean War, DOD implemented Executive Order 10631, which was revised following the Vietnam conflict.[2] Today, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, which is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-controlled activity, is designated as the DOD office of primary responsibility for DOD-wide PR matters, less policy.

When Field Manual (FM) 3-50, *Army Personnel Recovery*, was published in September 2014, responsibility for PR was transferred from the movement and maneuver WfF to the protection WfF.[3] However, III Corps had made the transition after redeployment from Afghanistan in March 2014 to align with the fiscal year 2014 modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The fiscal year 2017 III Corps MTOE currently authorizes four PRCC billets:

- **Director**—a branch-immaterial lieutenant colonel billet.
- **Plans officer**—an infantry captain.
- **Controller/planner**—an aviation captain.
- **Senior intelligence sergeant**—an intelligence sergeant first class all-source analyst.

With the normal postdeployment transition of staff and personnel, the III Corps PRCC had to be reconstituted and the program rebuilt from the ground up. Once stood up, one of the first goals of the PRCC director was to interact with the new III Corps staff, educating personnel on the changes that PR had undergone. The term *PR* is commonly misconstrued to refer to *public relations*. When clarified as referring to *personnel recovery*, most people immediately think of an aviation incident or response. Therefore, a progressive communication plan was developed to define PR, convey that it falls under the protection WfF, and explain that it applies not only to personnel involved in aviation incidents, but to all U.S. military personnel, DOD civilians, and others designated by the President or the Secretary of Defense. However, before it could properly train and educate the III Corps staff, the PRCC needed to first train and certify itself. The training for the four members of the PRCC needed to be thoughtfully planned and could not be rushed.

The training requirements for subordinate PRCCs are laid out in U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-1, *Training in the United States Army Forces Command Units*.[4] The total cumulative time necessary for formal PRCC training is 23 weeks, with the director required to attend the lengthiest portion (9 weeks). Most of

the training is conducted by the Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center, Fredericksburg, Virginia—one of the training arms of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. The Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center training, which is crucial for the safe recovery of isolated personnel, also helped build the foundation necessary for the III Corps PRCC to create the III Corps PR standard operating procedure, the PR battle drill, and the PR reintegration standard operating procedure. Once the PRCC members were trained, they, in turn, ensured that the corps staff and subordinate division PRCCs were manned, trained, and equipped to support their commanders and subordinate units. Unfortunately, PR training requirements are cyclical in nature and are fiscally challenging to maintain. However, Army Regulation (AR) 525-28, *Personnel Recovery*, contains a directive to "Ensure funding is allocated to support PR training and education for Soldiers staffing PR billets."[5] This statement not only allowed the III Corps PRCC to schedule training, but also allowed subordinate PRCCs to follow suit.

Once the formal PR training was complete, the PRCC identified capabilities and limitations across the Army and assessed its own training shortfalls that needed to be addressed. For example, as a military police officer serving as the PRCC director, I knew little about aviation capabilities so I leaned on the controller/planner, an aviation captain, for specific aviation information—ultimately increasing my knowledge of aviation terms. Another area requiring additional education was that of special-access programs. When using a whole-of-government approach, there are several programs that are vital to PR efforts. The challenge for the PR director is to incorporate and explain those capabilities to leaders who may not have access to, or an understanding of, those programs. Finally, probably the most important shortfall identified was the lack of PRCC proficiency with joint doctrine. When a corps is deployed under the auspices of serving as the land component commander, Army doctrine is often employed. However, the PRCC operates under Army and joint doctrine and must understand both.

In the spring of 2014, III Corps welcomed a new commanding general and transitioned new members of the staff. III Corps conducted a series of leader development seminars and command post exercises based on the Mission Command Training Program Caspian Sea Decisive Action Training Environment scenario. Acting as the higher command for the 82d Airborne Division and the 38th Infantry Division, Indiana Army National Guard, III Corps conducted a staff exercise—with virtual interaction from subordinate units—and Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 15-02. The culmination of the training in February 2015 was marked by the corps' own evaluated WFX 15-03, in which III Corps led a simulated coalition of 1st Infantry Division and 38th Infantry Division ground forces. These exercises provided much-needed training opportunities for the PRCC to operate with the corps staff under the Protection Directorate.

WFX 15-03, a decisive-action construct, was the first exercise that allowed III Corps to experience PR under the auspices of the protection WfF. The Army has no doctrinally dedicated or designated conventional PR assets in its inventory. A dedicated PR asset is an asset with the sole mission of conducting PR. An example of a dedicated PR asset would be an Air Force Guardian Angel team. A designated PR asset is an asset that is PR-trained and -equipped, but is not assigned PR as its sole mission. An example of a designated PR asset would be a U.S. Navy Combat Search and Rescue crew, which performs non-PR-related missions. A capable PR asset is an asset with no formal PR training, but which can effect a recovery based on the situation at hand.[6] The Army has a multitude of PR-capable forces that can be leveraged during an isolating event.

The PRCC learned many valuable lessons from WFX 15-03. The first lesson learned was that the PRCC had to work simultaneously with the chief of operations and the protection director during an isolating event. Addressing that issue prior to exercises or operational missions is critical to PRCC success when time is of the essence. Another lesson learned was that the problem set needed to be framed in such a way that subordinate maneuver commanders could visualize how their formations could respond to an isolated event. Commanders often default to aviation options when assessing how they could respond to an isolating event. To counter this single-scope mindset, the PRCC needed an understanding of all the assets on the battlefield. This included non-Army units attached to III Corps and other governmental agencies operating in the combined joint operations area (CJOA). Identifying response options from a whole-of-government or from a whole-of-force approach is critical for the PRCC as it works with the chief of operations to present options to the commander. The last lesson learned was that a PR event impacted all III Corps staff sections—not just the PRCC and the chief of operations. Many sections did not fully understand their responsibilities before the exercise and worked to close the gap during the exercise. The result was the creation of an extensive, in-depth execution checklist that fully supported isolated personnel operations.

III Corps was first exposed to an isolating event under the protection WfF in January 2015. A Soldier from a subordinate division was involved in a peacetime governmental detention in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility. Because there were no III Corps forces attached to AFRICOM, III Corps PRCC was required to liaise with the U.S. Department of State (DoS), AFRICOM, FORSCOM, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, and the subordinate division to share information. Requests for information and status updates on the detained Soldier were critical in the early stages when it was determined that, due to location, DoS would be *supported* and DOD would be *supporting* utilizing joint doctrine definitions. When the incident was concluded, valuable lessons learned were identified and shared across III Corps and FORSCOM. Two important lessons were learned. The first was the importance of keeping isolated personnel reports updated. The detained Soldier had not updated his isolated personnel report since entering the Army. The isolated personnel report is used to provide critical and identifying personal information in the

event that a person goes missing or is captured. The result of the failure to keep the report updated was that the unit had to search for critical data that needed to be shared with other organizations that were working to gain the Soldier's release. The second lesson learned was the importance of completing the online SERE training. The detained Soldier had not completed the training and was not prepared for the captivity environment, potentially placing him in a position to violate the Code of Conduct.[7]

III Corps deployed in the summer of 2015 and assumed the role of the Headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve. This was the first time that a PRCC had deployed within the protection WfF under a three-star expeditionary command. It was immediately determined that the scope of responsibilities for the PRCC exceeded that for which the PRCC had trained during the WFX. Given the complexity of the CJOA, the PRCC needed to establish working relationships with embassies in Baghdad and Jordan, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters, the Air Force Central Command, the Navy Central Command, the Special Operations Central Command, the Army Central Command, and coalition partners in the Combined Joint Task Force to ensure PR coverage and planning in the CJOA. The PRCC applied a nonlinear, 3-D approach when planning a PR response to missions. Given the finite dedicated PR assets in-theater, the identification of all potential avenues that could be placed against an isolating event was critical.

The PRCC identified several lessons learned throughout the deployment; this article discusses the three most important. The first lesson learned dealt with manning. Due to the complexity of the CJOA, the PRCC must deploy with its full complement of personnel according to the MTOE authorizations. CENTCOM recognized the shortfalls in PR manning authorizations and authorized an additional plans officer, controller/planner, and SERE specialist to the PRCC, who deployed as individual augmentees to the headquarters. The scope of responsibilities requires that the PRCC be filled, and any degradation resulted in a ripple effect across the combined joint task force. The second lesson learned dealt with interaction with DoS. The regional security officer is the PRCC counterpart for DoS. Because of the nontraditional authority environment (Title 22 U.S. Code, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*, versus Title 10 U.S. Code, *Armed Forces*), it was imperative to establish a relationship with the regional security officer. DoS is a great PR multiplier when leveraged properly. This relationship was critical for establishing a working relationship with the many coalition partners operating in the CJOA. The third lesson learned was that units deploying to theater must complete theater entry requirements before their arrival and need to understand how to incorporate PR into mission planning. The PRCC routinely had to train units on basic PR planning methodologies to improve recovery chances if there was an isolating event. Additionally, incoming units routinely did not complete or follow CENTCOM PR theater entry requirements, requiring the PRCC to spend additional time trying to identify what hadn't been completed after the units arrived. PRCC is currently working with CENTCOM and FORSCOM to address this shortfall.

PR is a critical mission that commanders and staff must incorporate into every mission. The PRCC and the protection WfF are incorporating the lessons learned from deployment to share with the field. The PRCC has transitioned to training subordinate division PRCCs to support future exercises, ensuring that they are trained and equipped to support the commander.

Endnotes:

[1]Executive Order 10631, *Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Article III, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10631.html>, accessed on 8 June 2016.

[2]Ibid.

[3]FM 3-50, *Army Personnel Recovery*, 2 September 2014.

[4]FORSCOM Regulation 350-1, *Training in the United States Army Forces Command Units*, 15 July 2014.

[5]AR 525-28, *Personnel Recovery*, 5 March 2010, para. 2-7.

[6]Joint Publication 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, 2 October 2015.

[7]Executive Order 10631.

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DOD Instruction 1300.21, *Code of Conduct Training and Education*, 8 January 2001.

Title 10 U.S. Code, *Armed Forces*, <http://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title10&edition=prelim>, accessed on 28 June 2016.

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Major Jones is the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve and III Corps PR director. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from East Central University, Ada, Oklahoma, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University, Webster Groves, Missouri.

Parting Words for Future Commanders: Lessons Learned While in Command

By Captain Christopher M. Davis

Introduction

The famous Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, is credited for the quote, "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man." The world, along with the people in it, changes. I have long believed that one should strive to improve daily. In the U.S. Marine Corps and the profession of arms, this reality is amplified today by the presence of an unknown enemy that is constantly training to impart its agenda upon us. If we are not ready for the challenge, we will fail. Are you ready for that reality? As a company commander in the U.S. armed forces, this responsibility rests upon your shoulders.

Before assuming command of a company in 2013, I sought guidance from many professionals and mentors and from publications—seeking to prepare myself for the challenge of command. I owed it to my Marines to be ready when I was called upon to lead.

"Training is your best (and only!) opportunity to develop Soldiers/Marines into a cohesive unit. Those who suffer together survive and win together."

Now, having served 2 years in command, I believe it is my duty to return the favor by ensuring that my fellow captains are best prepared for the challenges that await them. I have prepared a nonexhaustive list of lessons learned and recommendations for the way ahead. Many of these lessons have been formed through collaboration with respected military professionals, but some have resulted from independent thought.

Prepare Now

Once the order to assume command has been issued, it is too late to begin preparing. Each day that goes by brings you one step closer to standing in front of your first formation as a company commander. Therefore, it is less important to rest and refit during the Captain's Career Course than it is to immediately begin preparing.

Take a moment to remember the leaders whom you respect the most. What is it about them that you respect? Have you been assigned to leaders that inspired you? What did they do that was so inspirational? Have you experienced poor leaders or a bad command atmosphere? What did you notice about the unit that you felt could be improved? Have you suffered under leaders who demotivated you? Was there something that you vowed you would never repeat? From this refined list, draft a command philosophy. Prepare initial counseling for key billet holders. Formulate a plan to incorporate family group programs (Army Family readiness groups) and social/team-building gatherings. Draft a welcome-aboard letter, and create training plans.

It is likely that some time has passed since you last served in the type of unit that you will command. Familiarize yourself with published orders, doctrine, governing regulations, and the requirements of your craft. Each of you already knows what right looks like, so ensure that you always act within the limits of your office.

Build Company Training Plans

Training is your best (and only!) opportunity to develop Soldiers/Marines into a cohesive unit. Those who suffer together survive and win together. Relationships forged during times of hardship are the strongest. In particular, small-unit leaders need tough, realistic training opportunities to grow within the profession of arms. Creating these opportunities is important.

Develop your most ideal field training exercise. Collect ideas from quality training that you've conducted and lessons that you've learned from poor training experiences. While relaxing within the confines of a comfortable atmosphere, with doctrinal publications in hand, formulate a

mission-oriented field training exercise to be executed at the company level. This should take days or weeks to develop. If done correctly and prudently over the course of your first 6 months, the training plans will fit into the framework of your battalion commander's plan. These training ideas, developed without the stressor of a short fuse, will likely produce higher-quality plans.

Training cannot be conducted with a "check the block" mentality. You will be pressured and even micromanaged for *annual training* this and *campaign plan requirement* that. Sometimes the five Ws (who, what, when, why, and where) are determined for you; don't relish it. Find a way to make your company training plan your own training plan. Your plan must account for where your unit is now and where you want it to be. Online annual training and lockstep battalion level block-checking requirements are not conductive to ensuring current unit readiness or encouraging the growth necessary to get to the required end state. This is why you're the commander.

"Break bread with your first sergeant early and often. Within days after assuming command (but not before you take command), invite him or her to dinner to discuss the present situation of the company, expectations of one another, and mutual goals for the company."

As commander, you need to be cognizant of the fiscally-constrained environment in which you operate. As we transition the focus in the Global War on Terrorism, the endless supply of resources and ammunition will soon expire. Training plans should be conducted at little or no expense. You are limited only by your creativity.

Your next challenge when conducting training is to incorporate living, breathing role-players and enemy aggressors. Training against an enemy that can think breeds healthy competition and improves overall tactical competence.

Finally, save professional military education (PME) material. Good handouts and briefings that have been collected over the years should be shared. As a commander, it is your responsibility to impart the PME lessons learned from past experiences. Regardless of operational tempo or professional requirements, don't let a month pass without a formalized period of instruction/PME with your immediate subordinates and platoon leaders. Topics can range from applicable critical battle studies to recent real-world current events to book discussions; never shy away from terrain walks and battlefield analyses. (Numerous societies and groups, such as the Marine Corps University, sponsor more complex PME ideas. I took my 165-man company to Fort Sumter, South Carolina, for the mere cost of an essay submission and an after-action report. Seek out these opportunities.)

Learn One Thing and Teach One Thing Daily

Read 10 pages of information dedicated to widening your knowledge base as a leader, tactician, and mentor per day. Familiarize yourself with today's fight and tomorrow's potential conflict. Each branch of Service has a professional reading list (the Commandant's Reading List in the Marine Corps). If you cannot find a book to read, begin tackling the rank-specific book list for your Service. The books on the list usually represent a well-rounded array of topics related to professional and personal life. As President Harry S. Truman once said, "Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers."

Be it leading a robust PME program with your platoon leaders or training evolution for the company, teach Soldiers/Marines to be self-sufficient. A regularly occurring theme in the modern counterinsurgency battle is the *strategic corporal* concept (training to make the hard decisions at the lowest levels).

Finally, as military police Soldiers/Marines, you must understand law enforcement. This is what makes us unique. Understand global events and your role within the Army or Marine Corps. Work the road beside your Soldiers. Subscribe to a scholarly journal or magazine. Educate yourself. There is much information to be learned from these credible sources.

Form Relationships

Arguably the most important relationship that you will form will be the one with your first sergeant. These leaders have obtained their rank by being good at their job. They have been through numerous competitive promotions, multiple deployments, and a plethora of leadership opportunities. Break bread with your first sergeant early and often. Within days after assuming command (but not before you take command), invite him or her to dinner to discuss the present situation of the company, expectations of one another, and mutual goals for the company. Take this informal setting as an opportunity to listen. Remember—once you take command, you are in charge. The successes and failures of your unit are ultimately your responsibility.

And you're not the first company commander on the base or in the unit. Seek out those fellow leaders/peers, and form relationships for mutual professional and personal growth. Do not make the same mistakes they have—true professionals do not do that.

Next, your operations noncommissioned officer can provide unique insight into the general preparedness and overall capability of your unit. Shortfalls in support and readiness will become a primary concern. Therefore, establishing a healthy rapport with your operations noncommissioned officer can significantly impact your effectiveness as a commander.

The final relationship that should be established is one with the senior enlisted Soldier/Marine at least one echelon higher than your company. Senior sergeants major are fountains of knowledge. They provide a perspective and level of

clarity that you will need. Ask them what they expect from company commanders. Ask them how company performance and effectiveness could be improved. Ask them what they have seen that works. Ask them how you should best utilize your first sergeant. If you don't make the sergeant major's office a stop during your in-processing as a future commander, you're missing a great opportunity.

Be a Leader

A fellow company commander once told me that he believed in leadership—not in "likership." Likership refers to appeasement for the sake of favoritism without regard for what is best for the unit or the institution. We should all agree that, by that definition, we don't want to be likers; rather, we want to be leaders. Does this mean that we should never strive to be liked? No! How many people have we been willing to follow that we didn't, in some way, like?

I've had colleagues who were similar to dictators. They knew every order and ruthlessly enforced the Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, *Uniform Code of Military Justice,* and a standard of perfection for every task. However, anyone who has the power to enforce the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* could lead Soldiers/Marines to toe the line. While leadership is a people business, dictatorship is not. What happens when the dictator leaves? How far will the unit extend to meet the commander's intent? My answer is: only as far as the leash will reach. It is important to consistently enforce the standard and insist on discipline because failing to enforce the standard creates a new standard. And it is important not to be blind to other factors. Who is actually being punished if you take money from a Soldier's/Marine's young, single-income family? On the other hand, leaders inspire correct action and moral decision making within their units—even in the absence of immediate direction, guidance, or the leaders themselves. Leaders are admired for being engaged, leading from the front, and showing affection for their people. They simultaneously enforce the standards of the institution and the unit. As a leader, you should do this because you genuinely care. If you don't love the Soldiers/Marines, they'll know it and it'll be time for you to find another job. Teach those who lead to do what's right for the right reasons.

"If you lead your company with the principles you learned from respected leaders and the morals you swore to uphold, you will succeed."

Find a Mentor

Possibly one of the most difficult preparation steps that one should take is finding a professional mentor. This should be someone whom you respect and possibly with whom you share similar career tracks, but the individual should have the schedule flexibility necessary to keep in communication with you and to proactively provide mentorship. These are some of the most useful and rewarding relationships you'll ever create.

Before making tough decisions as a company commander, I often contacted my mentor. There was not an event or decision that I faced that he had not already personally experienced. Hearing his perspective and understanding how he tackled the same situations provided me with a great resource before taking action. And this relationship lasts long after handing over command to a replacement. Also, don't be afraid to seek professional career advice from your mentor. He or she can often paint a more complete picture of career track considerations than your branch headquarters. It's as simple as this: In the beginning, it's about what you know, then it becomes about who you know and, finally, about who knows you.

Conduct Exit Interviews

As a commander, you will rarely experience a medium in which a subordinate can or will provide honest, critical feedback about the operation of the company or any shortfalls. I challenge you to take advantage of the rare opportunity you have to gather feedback as each of your Soldiers/Marines clears your unit. Establish criteria, and draft legitimate questions to pose to them. Many of the sentiments that a Soldier/Marine might hesitate to divulge to a company commander will be unfettered with orders in hand. Record and track the data anonymously. It's the content you want—not the individual. Roll up the information, and discuss it with your staff. It doesn't matter if you're a month into your command or if your replacement is inbound, you can always improve company effectiveness!

Conclusion

Ultimately, your job is to prepare Soldiers/Marines for combat. If your actions do not advance that effort, you're wasting time. Understand that no plan survives first contact, so be prepared to conduct a critical assessment of your implementations and company progress after 90 days in command. Remember, you prepared for much of this before taking command. If you lead your company with the principles you learned from respected leaders and the morals you swore to uphold, you will succeed. Finally, have fun. Your command should be the time of your life—the reason you joined the military and earned your commission. You will not have a more humbling experience in your life. Enjoy it.

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Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, <http://www.ucmj.us/>, accessed on 28 June 2016.

Captain Davis completed the Military Police Captain's Career Course before serving as an instructor for the Marine Corps Military Police Basic Officer Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is currently on orders attending the University of Tennessee College of Law through the Law Education Program. Upon graduation, he will transition to the Staff Judge Advocate Corps.

Awareness:
Can It Help Prevent a Terrorist Attack?

By Lieutenant Colonel Craig F. Benedict (Retired)

In 2001, the United States Ship (USS) Cole Commission "found that the terrorist threat is one of our most pervasive challenges and one that shows no sign of abating."[1] Persistent attacks that have taken place around the world since 2001 confirm that estimate. The United States and others continue missions to eliminate terrorists. Are we doing all we can to prevent an attack on the Army community? Have attempts to enlist the community's help succeeded?

The terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, in December 2015 might cast doubt on the value of building community awareness. Although the San Bernardino incident was not an Army concern, it can prompt reexamination and improvement. Now is the time to study the problem and reinvigorate Army antiterrorism (AT) awareness.

Federal Bureau of Investigation reports imply that the terrorists in San Bernardino may have left markers that could have been observed and reported by neighbors. If there were no citizen reports, or if those reports went unheeded, is the gaining of community involvement useful? If it is, what can we do to improve?

Manhattan advertising executive Allen Kay coined the phrase, "If you see something, say something," on 12 September 2001, in response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.[2] The Army uses that phrase to educate and involve the Army community in an attempt to prevent terrorist attacks. However, the sound bite doesn't explain what to look for, how to report it, or how to correlate many reports. The Army solution is called AT awareness.

After the San Bernardino attack, a Columbia Broadcasting Systems (CBS)–Los Angeles radio affiliate interviewed a man working in the area where the attackers had lived.[3] He had decided not to report seeing "Middle Eastern men in the area," as "he did not wish to racially profile those people," but he did wonder what they were doing.

The challenge of awareness is closely linked with a common-sense concept of how terrorists operate up to the time of attack. Perhaps surprisingly, terrorist actions are like any operation or activity. Terrorists move, communicate, gather material and, most often, physically or virtually observe an objective prior to attack. This provides an opportunity for discovering terrorist intentions. The actions associated with the terrorist planning cycle leave a footprint and are subject to observation by an alert community member. They emphasize the need to refine the Army's awareness campaign at the grassroots, which requires information and, perhaps, training.

"Knowledge is a vital resource for any organization and can make the difference between success and failure—perhaps even life and death," observes terrorism expert Dr. James J. F. Forrest.[4] This is the essence of the Army awareness campaign. It includes protecting against terrorism. The Army's sustained emphasis on AT awareness in the Army community aims at preventing or responding to a terrorist attack. A wide variety of signs, pocket cards, news articles, and computer notifications inform the public, explaining what to look for in terrorist preparations; reporting what has happened in past terrorist attacks; and circulating alert notifications of possible terrorist activity. Since 2010, the Army has designated August as AT awareness month. But, considering the San Bernardino attacks, are those prompts alone sufficient?

Reminding those who might be attacked to be aware and providing a telephone number to call do not automatically create awareness. In fact, we may inadvertently confuse the issue by directing members of the community to be vigilant. Note the subtle difference in definitions: *Vigilance* reminds observers to look for possible danger or difficulties; *awareness*, which has broader implications, requires informed knowledge. Much terrorist preparation is not dangerous to the eventual target. To be sure, collecting munitions could be dangerous, but many of the indicators are actually everyday activities—it's just that the activities may seem out of place, or they may be conducted more often than would reasonably be expected.

For example, before kidnapping Brigadier General James Dozier in Verona, Italy, in 1981, the kidnapper-terrorists observed his apartment from across the street in a park used almost exclusively by families with small children. Not

only did the terrorists have no children, but their activities were also clearly something other than a traditional use of a family-oriented park. An astutely aware individual might have reported such an anomaly. Awareness must surely be encouraged in general, but that encouragement must be accompanied by more specific instruction. What the terrorists did in the park was not dangerous, but it was unusual. This example illustrates the essential difference between awareness and vigilance.

Many recall the Where's Waldo™ books, first published in 1987. They challenge readers to discover Waldo amid many and variegated landscapes. Indeed, some have compared finding a terrorist to finding Waldo. But preventing a terrorist attack is not at all like finding Waldo. The Waldo books provide specific instructions, telling the reader what to look for. In real life, finding a terrorist does not allow for such precise instruction. An American inventor and owner of more than 200 patents, Jacob Rabinow realized that not all of his ideas were useful. "You must have the ability to get rid of the trash which you think of," he notes. "You cannot think only of good ideas or write only beautiful music."[5] This is also true of clues left by terrorists. Experience allows the observer to determine which elements might have meaning. To be sure, all terrorists leave clues that could allow attentive observers to find them. But those clues are often different and perhaps unique. Although examples help, the final analysis and decision to report require the observer to distinguish between routine activities and legitimate indicators. Moreover, each situation is potentially different.

In preparing Virginia for defense before the American Revolution, Patrick Henry declared, "I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience."[6] Preparing our defense to prevent terrorist attacks has the same implications. Experience increases the prospects of good judgment.

But having the opportunity to gain experience becomes problematic in the case of a terrorist attack. Observers must gain experience toward good judgment through ways other than participating in or experiencing a terrorist attack. Exercises, training, and sharing information on indicators of terrorist preparations provide knowledge that improves judgment.

Consider the Army community with its enormous variety of situations, environments, and people. How does it improve awareness judgment beyond the written word? Any successful AT awareness program for building that judgment starts with the organization commander, who must issue the guidance necessary to involve the entire associated community. The commander's staff must plan, teach, and train in a way that links employees and Families through the command mission. The design and content of any AT awareness program depend a great deal upon the organization mission, level of command, and situation. The organization antiterrorism officer (ATO) is the focal point for collective AT awareness efforts and recommendations to the commander for action. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon writes, "To each strategy corresponds a unique set of consequences."[7] Each plan to build awareness must address the unique characteristics of that command or activity. This is the challenge at the grassroots. Determining who should be involved in planning, executing, and building the desired awareness judgment for the command is a key element for consideration.

For example, assume two planning scenarios: first, a continental United States garrison supporting a population of 25,000 Soldiers, civilians, Families, and contractors; second, a deployed infantry platoon potentially facing combat. The garrison ATO must address mutual support with tenants, Family support groups, the garrison mission, and overall AT protection. The deployed platoon may need to coordinate with host nation elements, other U.S. contingents, and tactical planning scenarios that do not directly relate to terrorism. In fact, it is impossible to define any situation in the abstract. Commanders and ATOs must address considerations that are guided, but not constrained, by higher instructions and prescribed doctrinal terms.

Awareness is more than simple participation by community members. It includes a command planning element. ATOs and coordinators, logisticians, law enforcement personnel, and intelligence specialists must actively keep the community informed. This planning element must convey the commander's guidance, plan and execute exercises, and continuously inform the associated community. Even more importantly, it must build the capability to accept, organize, and correlate community reports. Without the ability to show links among multiple reports, officials greatly reduce prospects offered by a trained community.

Vigilance and awareness have become watchwords for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. It's not uncommon to see signs posted above highways, imploring people who see something to report it. The message (along with a telephone number) is posted in bus stations, airports, Army orderly rooms, post exchanges, barracks, and elsewhere, making it difficult to ignore. But does it help, or does it simply drift by as another overused, meaningless sound bite? Psychologist Keith Payne refers to the problem as "selective selectivity."[8] As the words suggest, people tend to have selected focus, most often on everyday tasks. The infrequency of terrorist attacks may make us less likely to pick up on terrorist-related clues. Moreover, community members see the references but have no experience to assist in guiding attention toward observing potential terrorist clues. Sustaining community awareness requires creative and situational approaches.

The ground level commander is not alone, but must receive appropriate guidance from higher headquarters. Each headquarters level plays a role in awareness. Since 2009, Headquarters, Department of the Army, has assigned a high priority to awareness and has initiated actions to encourage and assist commanders and ATOs at all levels in building their awareness plans.

Awareness is indispensable to the Army's ability to prevent a terrorist attack. But building innovative solutions

(Continued on page 22)

Military Police Officers Get an Inside Look at How CID Works

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Elliott and Captain Christopher K. Young

After assuming command of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), Major General Mark S. Inch directed CID headquarters staff to design, develop, and execute a program to familiarize military police (Military Occupational Specialty 31A) officers with CID assignments. The intent of the program was simple—create one standard program to teach CID basics and reduce the learning time required for traditional military police officers to function in the CID environment.

In October 2015, the first CID for Leaders Course was conducted at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia. The 3d Military Police Group (CID) headquarters served as the primary host. This first iteration was attended by 26 military police officers from across CID, from the rank of lieutenant to major, and three civilian employees from the Defense Forensics Science Center (DFSC).

The comprehensive, 5-day training event focused on critical subject matter related to daily CID operations. Instruction included CID history, the technology used to increase agent efficiency (live scan [fingerprinting technology] and tablet personal computers), digital forensics, and Advanced Law Enforcement Response Technology (ALERT®). There were multiple guest speakers, including the CID deputy commanding officer, command chief warrant officer, command sergeant major, and multiple former CID commanders from battalions and groups.

"The course was very productive and I believe met the intent of hosting a familiarization event, while allowing fellowship among officers from across CID with varying experiences and backgrounds," said First Lieutenant Randy J. Papadinec, assistant S-3 (operations staff officer) for the 3d Military Police Group (CID). "The training was a quality training event that should be provided for everyone within an assignment to CID. I would strongly recommend this course to every individual of CID. The course strengthens the reason behind why we do what we do, and it lays an informative foundation for individuals not accustomed to CID."

"I think, over the course of the past few years, there has been a shift in thinking and concept for 31As getting experience within CID," said Major Mary M. Smith, 19th Military Police Battalion (CID) S-2 (intelligence staff officer)/S-3 officer in charge. "CID must be viewed as a great experience that provides exposure into a true professional law enforcement agency. What CID does and its reputation is aboveboard and should be competitive to get into."

The final day was a tour of the DFSC and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL). The USACIL tour was a great tool to show military police officers the processes involved in evidence collection and cataloging from the field. The USACIL staff also explained that, at times, cutting-edge evidence recovery techniques and equipment are developed and used. During the USACIL tour, the group learned that many of the employees go on regular rotations to and from current theaters of operations to recover forensic evidence that can be leveraged at a later date.

"The tour of the [laboratory] is a must," added Smith. "This was the second time I have had the opportunity to visit the DFSC and the way the [laboratory] laid out the tour with the [Staff Sergeant] Bales case really made the visit."

Examples of the laboratory capabilities were emphasized during the discussion of the Staff Sergeant Bales case. Due to the high-profile nature of the case, the DFSC had to run the evidence through multiple forensic processes separately, but also simultaneously. As explained during the tour, this procedure is not standard but DFSC does execute expedited evidence recovery when there is an extreme need. With mounting pressure from the Afghanistan's provincial government for legal adjudication, the laboratory focused multiple efforts on expedited evidence processing. The laboratory examiners dedicated multiple days to establish and corroborate Bales' actions. Overall, the facility tour emphasized the relationship between field collection and laboratory processing, further improving the tour attendees' understanding of CID processes.

"Personally, I was positively affected by the CID for Leaders Course," added Papadinec. "Following the course, I was influenced to submit a packet to become a CID warrant officer. I am very intrigued by the mission of CID, and I desire to contribute to the future success of the organization."

"I wanted to attend this course because commissioned officers, like myself, are narrowly educated in an institutional setting about CID operations and organizational structure," said Captain Erin A. McClain, the commander of the 11th Military Police Battalion (CID), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. "I would recommend that military police officers be offered this course prior to working within CID. The course is an excellent overview of CID organizational structure, capabilities, and daily operations."

The overall consensus was that the course provided an efficient indoctrination process for military police officers recently assigned to CID. The knowledge gleaned from the training event benefits CID by creating a foundation of knowledge within the 31A community so that personnel better understand CID capabilities and functions. CID has opened enrollment to non-military police officers who are assigned to CID and non-CID-assigned military police officers to facilitate a better understanding of the unique roles and capabilities of CID to a broader military police audience.

Lieutenant Colonel Elliott is an interagency fellow to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Washington, D.C. His previous assignment was with CID at Quantico, Virginia. He holds a master's of military arts and science degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a master's degree in business and organizational security from Webster University.

Captain Young serves as the G-3 (assistant chief of staff, operations) training officer in charge, CID, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. He holds a bachelor's degree in nonprofit management and criminal justice and a master's degree in criminal justice administration from Lindenwood University, St. Charles, Missouri.

("Awareness: Can it Help. . . ," continued from page 20)

takes hard work. Building community members' judgment and attention while improving analytic capability through experiential exercises and information sharing is critical.

In the 4th century B.C., Rome was practically destroyed by a surprise attack; yet, authorities had been warned by a citizen who had reported overhearing a remark that, taken seriously, could have prevented the attack. In rebuilding the city, the Romans erected a temple to "Rumour" to remind them of the importance of citizen reporting.[9] Today, the threat is different but the requirement for awareness is just as real. Our abiding concern is the prospect of a terrorist attack. AT awareness is a foundational component in successfully preventing one.

Endnotes:

[1]Department of Defense USS Cole Commission, "USS Cole Commission Report," 8 January 2001, p. 1.

[2]Manny Fernandez, "A Phrase for Safety After 9/11 Goes Global," *The New York Times*, 10 May 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/nyregion/11slogan.html?_r=0>, accessed on 5 July 2016.

[3]"Authorities Search Redlands Home Tied to Suspect Syed Farook," *CBS Los Angeles*, KNX Radio, 2 December 2015, <http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2015/12/02/authorities-search-redlands-home-tied-to-supect-syed-farook/>, accessed on 5 July 2016.

[4]James J. F. Forest, *The Terrorism Lectures*, Nortia Press, Santa Ana, California, 2012, p. 42.

[5]Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention*, Harper Collins, New York, 1996, p. 49.

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[7]Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations* (Fourth Edition), Free Press, New York, 1997, p. 82.

[8]Keith Payne, "Your Hidden Censor: What Your Mind Will Not Let You See," *Scientific American*, 11 June 2013, p. 43, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/your-hidden-censor-what-your-mind-will-not-let-you-see/>, accessed on 5 July 2016.

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Lieutenant Colonel Benedict (Retired) is a senior military analyst with the AT Branch, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. He is also a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Eight Lessons Learned From Integrated Policing Implementation

By Captain Spencer R. Williamson

Introduction

This article describes eight significant lessons learned from a staff officer's point of view during the implementation of an integrated policing (IP) strategy. The intent is to add perspective and contribute to the current discussion among professionals from Army-wide garrison directorates of emergency services (DESs) and the U.S. Army Military Police Corps. These professionals have remained committed to sharing recent experiences while working toward a common mission of base support and a collective goal of improving installation emergency response.

In the current environment of competing requirements, limited training opportunities, and constrained resources, military leaders are being forced to do more with less to maintain unit readiness. Through IP, military police develop and sustain mission-essential task proficiency through the execution of installation policing as a mission set, while simultaneously providing a more capable military police force. Therefore, military police leaders must continue to pursue IP strategies to capitalize on the unique ability of military police to refine skill sets that are unconstrained to training scenarios through the execution of concentrated and integrated daily policing operations.

The lessons described in this article represent only a fraction of the overall lessons learned from IP implementation. Moreover, it would be misleading to suggest that DES and the 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, now employ a flawless policing model as a result of IP implementation. Rather, the 716th Military Police Battalion and DES are in the process of adapting to the newly embraced structure, while continuing to take steps toward refinement.

Background

The demand for IP was twofold: 1) DES and the military police battalion were determined to improve organizational efficiencies and the effectiveness of base support operations, and 2) the Military Police Force Strategic Plan 2020 directed IP implementation. With Department of the Army civilian police (DACP) and Department of the Army security guards (DASGs) still fulfilling daily installation requirements, military police reintegrated within the existing DES structure and assumed a supporting role. The direct result was organic military police units serving as force providers to the provost marshal's office under DES. With the eventual downsizing of civilian contracts, military police continued to serve as force providers while DACP and DASG leaders maintained policing authority. Given this support relationship, mission command of police operations remained within DES, while battalion military police were provided to execute daily policing and access control point (ACP) duties. This resulted, in part, in degraded military police installation policing competency at all levels and created interorganizational friction between the leadership from both entities. With separate priorities and separate planning and staff operations, both organizations continued to work independently while moving toward separate goals.

The Office of the Provost Marshal General's recommendation to have the senior military police commander serve as the director of emergency services was a momentous step toward the reintegration of DES and battalion elements. The implementation of the now dual-hat role of military police battalion commander and director of emergency services forced both organizations to reexamine the existing separation and adapt to a newly developing organizational structure. Despite this significant step toward reintegration, both entities continued to operate independently—often competing for the commander's/director's time rather than working together in a single, concerted effort.

Despite the initial disorganization, DES and military police battalion leaders continued to bridge the gap and make several important improvements toward reintegration. The catalyst of IP success involved the issuance of a battalion policing mission command order, which redefined and solidified the mission command relationship between both organizations and eliminated the existence of military police responsibility without authority. This order transitioned company commanders from performing the previous task of managing military police force provider pools to serving as policing and ACP mission commanders. Therefore, the battalion commander now held mission commanders responsible for operational outcomes rather than maintaining a

solely quantitative focus of military police readiness. Both organizations began to reinvigorate efforts toward synchronization. This seemed to echo Colonel Robert Dillon's report, *Putting the Police Back Into the Military Police*, which states that "If police are to mature as a profession, they must concern themselves more directly with the outcomes of their efforts."[1]

Integrated Policing Defined

The previous state of policing included the following:

- The mission was impeded by disjointed staffs.
- There was a lack of company ownership of assigned areas of operations (AOs).
- Battalion or brigade combat team (BCT) cycles were unaligned.

Designated key tasks included consolidating DES and battalion elements, establishing a clear unity of command for contingency and policing operations, maintaining mission-essential task list proficiency, and synchronizing training with BCTs to allow for combined arms operations. The intended end state consisted of integrated policing efforts, assets, and staffs. The approved course of action included many notable changes to the status quo, which provided advantages and inevitable disadvantages to policing operations.

The creation of a joint staff was the first step in consolidating DES and military police battalion elements into a single support effort. With a joint battle rhythm, battalion targeting operations were implemented and executed through targeting meetings and police working groups (PWGs). Companies nominated targets within their AOs, and resources were allocated through the provost marshal. PWGs brought subject matter experts together from DES, the military police battalion, and civilian police agencies to create a common operating picture for all local policing stakeholders.

Beyond the development of a joint battle rhythm, IP further refined PWGs and company level PWGs provided another essential step toward IP success. The significant efforts by company level leadership provided valuable and consumable police intelligence and a synchronization of policing efforts across the installation. Common practices within the PWG framework included the execution of named policing operations, identification of named areas of interest, nomination and approval of specific crime targeting and associated metrics, and implementation of information operation campaigns in high-crime areas. As a result, the PWG enabled united policing elements to develop courses of action to detect, deter, and deny crime within named areas of interest to provide a safer community for Soldiers, civilians, and their Families.

Ownership of company-assigned AOs began by dividing the installation into four AOs, with consideration given to BCT alignment, analysis of historical trends in military police calls for service, and equitable division of geographical areas. The resulting AOs included ACPs, housing areas, schools, mission-essential vulnerable areas, and brigade footprints, each with unique communities, crimes, and policing requirements. The patrol distribution plan and the roles and responsibilities of military police supervisors were updated to reflect the new AOs. Area supervisors would remain responsible for all policing within their AO; patrol supervisors and military police duty officers would provide oversight for the installation. While the provost marshal would remain responsible for the control of all policing efforts, company elements would identify, target, and influence crime trends within a defined AO while enabled through provost marshal's office and DES subject matter experts.

The reorganization of company training cycles provides an increased opportunity for proficiency training. IP allows for more consistent proficiency across mission-essential tasks by eliminating the cyclical rotation of companies through ACPs, policing, tasking support, or collective training cycles. While the previous model designated companies to conduct a single mission for an extended period of time, IP mandates that companies conduct three cycles:

- Policing and ACP operations.
- Collective training.
- Individual training and task support at the platoon level.

The new cycle arrangement allows platoons to internally rotate and conduct three cycles within the same 6-month period. Furthermore, by ensuring that a minimum of four platoon elements are freed from installation support and able to conduct collective training, the battalion maintains the ability to rapidly alert, marshal, and deploy these assets in support of an operation at any time.

Before IP, the battalion executed internal company cycles that were unaligned with division training cycles. While this allowed companies to cycle through mission sets, it often denied military police the ability to train with habitually aligned BCTs. While requests for brigade support were often fulfilled, the period of collective training before the culminating event was frequently hampered by unaligned cycles. Therefore, the battalion recalibrated to BCT training cycles to provide additional opportunities for synchronized training. As a result, military police companies can fill a force protector role within an assigned BCT footprint on the installation while simultaneously serving as an enabler during a brigade combat training center rotation.

Integrated Policing Implementation

The joint military decision-making process (MDMP) and rehearsals aided the successful launch of IP as a combined venture with mutual support from DES and the military police battalion. Going beyond the conventional application of MDMP, a clear intention was made to incorporate not only battalion and company leaders, but also various levels within DES and the provost marshal's office. This consolidation effort to collaborate on the crucial steps of course-of-action development, analysis, and comparison was imperative in forming a realistic, integrated framework. Key

players were gathered to conduct an objective evaluation of the current construct in order to redefine task organization as well as command and reporting relations between both organizations.

Following course-of-action approval and orders production, a joint brief and rehearsal of concept were vital in preparing for the actual implementation date. The rehearsal allowed the commander/director to provide refined intent and guidance before implementation. This allowed all parties to voice concerns, refine the plan, and work together to mitigate risk during the transition period. It would be misleading to suggest that implementation was a simple, unabated process that occurred rapidly and required little outside support. Rather, integration was only possible through the compilation of multiple crucial factors over time, to include the correct leadership, necessary autonomy from higher elements, and sustained unit readiness.

Lessons Learned

The implementation of an IP strategy led to several significant lessons learned, which remain relevant for additional integration efforts.

Lesson 1. Previous deficiencies must be admitted, and movement must continue. The first lesson of IP implementation was that DES and the military police battalion needed to reconcile past differences and move toward common ground. One of the significant shortfalls that continued to negate the development of an organizational relationship was the policing mission command order. While this order resulted in significant strides toward improving base support operations, its implementation ultimately resulted in friction between both organizations. The genesis of the friction was partly due to a disagreement over installation policing authority and a perceived lack of collaboration on integration efforts. When multiple organizations lack leadership that provides similar direction, little will be collectively accomplished. This shortfall became apparent during MDMP initiation, in which members presented legitimate concerns and remained cautious during the initial steps. While unintentional, this friction required recognition by both organizations and instilled a desire to avoid similar outcomes. It was through this shared determination that joint MDMP became a successful and productive enterprise.

An additional element of this lesson learned is that military police company and field grade officers must admit, regardless of the previous circumstances, that military police possess an internal lack of expert knowledge as a professional policing force. As Colonel Dillon states, "military police performance . . . in comparison to industry standards . . . is weak in the professional element of expert knowledge in the area of policing."[2] Not to suggest that military police are unable to effectively perform policing duties as part of the base support mission; but due to previous operating tempos and competing requirements, we lack proficiency comparable to civilian agencies. The first step in rectifying the situation should be to admit the deficiency and move toward a solution. Consequently, an additional benefit of IP that must not be overlooked is the ability for DES, the battalion, and local agency subject matter experts to systemically converge to create a shared understanding.

Lesson 2. Development of a joint staff is necessary and far from instantaneous. The effort to develop a joint staff must be seen as necessary to streamlining policing operations. While past decisions (such as changing the patrol distribution plan) were relatively isolated, the new joint staff required additional interaction and communication to identify and mitigate second- and third-order effects. The reality of organizational growth undoubtedly decelerates information flow at times and, if left unchecked, can potentially impact decision making. However, the advantages of possessing an efficient, capable, and truly unified staff working to empower the commander will likely outweigh the disadvantages. The effort must be seen as required to effectively execute base support operations. A joint staff streamlines operations and increases the interaction between civilians and military police working toward a common goal, which in turn, builds mutual trust and support.

Furthermore, a joint staff does not become joint immediately following implementation; it is developed over time through a deliberate and sustained effort. This lesson became apparent following the initial implementation period, in which DES and the military police battalion took calculated approaches toward the refinement of cross-staff efficiencies. For example, if an incident requires additional military police beyond the current force arrangement, DES and battalion operations personnel must rapidly and collectively surge combat power. This synchronization must remain constant since a purely reactionary collaboration will result in the failure to quickly adapt to the operational environment. While both organizations must execute staff functions according to the operating tempo, it is essential that they move in unison toward common goals and end states (such as the employment of a meaningful joint operational schedule). It is the joint staff's responsibility to ensure shared understanding.

Lesson 3. Military police must conduct policing rather than provide policing support. As demonstrated before the policing mission command order, the reality of policing responsibility without authority results in ineffective operations. While the overconcentration of military police professionals within the combat support mission spectrum is understandable due to a high operating tempo and competing requirements, this trend must be mitigated and eventually reversed. Colonel Dillon suggests that military police may, at times, be viewed as illegitimate because they "are least prepared to apply this area of expert knowledge because their home station jurisdiction to practice and exercise this same knowledge is being reduced to bring in DACP experts."[3] Military police must begin to develop and regain expertise in installation policing operations. This experience should be fostered with military police leaders at all levels and especially through commanders who remain responsible for mission accomplishment rather than providing a force pool.

The first step in correcting the deficiency is to redefine roles and responsibilities across both organizations. Possessing an in-depth knowledge of internal systems, processes, and people before any restructuring effort allows for more productive outcomes. For example, DACP, DASG, and military police combined their efforts for policing, training, and administrative requirements. Not only did this reorganization free manpower, but it also increased the number of first-line supervisors with expanded responsibilities and established a clear unity of command. During initial integration efforts, communication should be increased and continued among the joint staff.

Lesson 4. The "us versus them" mentality must be challenged to recognize significant added value. Yet another crucial lesson of IP implementation involved directly recognizing and challenging the "us versus them" mentality that exists between military police and civilian police/contractors. IP directly challenges this mindset through the execution of a joint battle rhythm and mutual cooperation on a day-to-day basis. Whether emotional friction is a result of reorganization, past differences, or a combination of factors, it directly and indirectly inhibits operations on multiple levels. The underlying concept is that battalion and DES personnel are employed for the same goal: protecting the local community.

DES personnel provide essential continuity and possess policing expertise that typically exceeds that of military police professionals. Military police should attend relevant DES meetings and invite DES professionals to attend internal military police meetings if those meetings would be beneficial to both parties. Not to suggest that this mentality will be eliminated through additional battle rhythmic events, but rather a natural competition for the commander's/director's time may be inevitable, which might be mitigated though further organizational integration.

Lesson 5. The focus should be on empowering Soldiers. The joint staff should become increasingly integrated, but it is arguably all for naught if the value is not delivered to the patrol level. A key focus of IP must remain the empowerment of military police and, more specifically, squad leaders serving in a patrol supervisor capacity.

An example of such a shortfall involves the biweekly intelligence summary, which provides a brief criminology snapshot of the reporting period and identifies potential trends. While this tool is useful at various levels of the battalion and DES, its function is diminished at the patrol level. This could be the result of a lack of information flow, clarity, relevant actionable intelligence, or perceived benefit.

The reality remains that if intelligence mechanisms are not reaching patrol supervisors or enabling patrols in pursuit of problem-oriented policing initiatives, the value of such mechanisms is extremely diminished. Perhaps the answer lies in the utility of the data being collected—not the cycle of adopting new statistical illustrations. Policing efficiency boils down to maintaining proactive patrols that possess the necessary knowledge and leaders determined to seek out creative solutions. Regardless, efforts must remain focused on assisting the Soldiers who are responsible for daily mission execution.

Lesson 6. Military police value must be demonstrated in order to enable BCTs. IP fosters a mutually beneficial relationship between brigades, their provost marshal cells, and the military police assigned to their area through day-to-day interactions. Systemic problems (such as equipment theft) can be collectively targeted, which frees patrols from monotonous response and helps to maintain brigade readiness. The advantage of this alignment cannot be overstated; military police are able to more effectively target crime on the installation, pursue mission-essential task list proficiency through combined arms training, and demonstrate increased military police utility to brigade leadership. Company leaders provide capability briefings at the onset of IP to build a rapport with BCT leaders. The ability for companies to continually provide platoon level support (at a minimum) quickly demonstrated value and flexibility to brigade commanders. As a result, the battalion began simultaneously planning and coordinating for three combat training center rotations.

Lesson 7. Bracing for impact can affect day-to-day operations. One of the more straightforward and distinct lessons of IP implementation is the simple fact that change and the growing pains experienced with any new initiative are inevitable. More importantly, if left unchecked, the overanticipation of adverse reactions can negatively impact current operations. With the application of the new integrated structure, leaders from multiple levels began to prepare for the repercussions of transition, which were echoed down to the lowest level. Leaders and their organizations must remain focused on tasks that can be accomplished rather than on things that are beyond their control.

Lesson 8. There is no perfect policing model, but creative solutions can get close. Following the implementation of IP, the continual need for innovative policing solutions stemming from military police professionals is apparent. Despite significant scholarly efforts within the field of criminal justice, a universally acceptable model for policing does not exist. Various law enforcement agencies employed across the United States have developed unique policing strategies applicable to their respective counties, cities, and towns. The same is true with regard to military police doctrine. Therefore, while the referencing of civilian policing models can provide significant value to installation policing models, the clear distinctions that exist between an installation and a civilian population cannot be ignored. This reality should motivate military police professionals to pursue new, unique, and adaptable approaches to policing. Creative and realistic solutions can only be developed and applied through innovative leaders who remain focused on empowering from the Soldier up, while working toward a common goal of community protection.

(Continued on page 29)



By Mr. Ted W. Solonar

Once again, it is range day and shooters are on the gun line. "Ready on the right? Ready on the left?" We hear those familiar words as we prepare to punch holes in targets. When I ask the question, "Why are you really at the range?" the most frequent answer I receive is "to qualify." Although that is certainly one reason, I do not believe it is the best answer. Qualification is a requirement, and law enforcement professionals can't work without it. But I believe that the focus on qualification may overshadow what should be the primary purpose of the range. As law enforcement professionals, we shoot for one main reason: survival. We raise our guns in dangerous situations for the sole purpose of keeping ourselves and others alive. Our time on the range should reflect that survival mentality.

Qualification to Survival

The focus on qualification is a product of limited ammunition and time. Police officers and law enforcement leaders across the Army routinely state that there is only enough ammunition available to qualify, and several Soldiers need to shoot three or four times to qualify. Admittedly, the ammunition shortage prevents us from shooting as much as we want or should and we must ensure that everyone is qualified. But this shortage has brought about a qualification-based shooting culture that has existed for a long time. I believe it is time to start challenging that culture.

We all hope that we go through our careers without being in a shoot-out situation. We all hope that we can deescalate things before they get to that point. We must recognize, however, that we could potentially find ourselves in a battle for our lives every time we go to work. This mindset necessitates expanding our thinking well beyond range day. Take a look at your duty belt to ensure that your tools are positioned in such a way to allow you to reach them without effort and without having to look. You should be able to quickly disengage retention systems and draw your pistol without having to think through the process. You should practice drawing your pistol, engaging targets, reloading on the move and under pressure, and transitioning between a pistol and a rifle or shotgun. When was the last time you engaged multiple targets, in less-than-ideal conditions, while out of breath, after running from your patrol vehicle to a simulated emergency situation? Shooting is a critical skill that keeps us alive; yet, we frequently devote less time and energy to it than the physical fitness or ability test.

As mentioned earlier, very few organizations have enough ammunition or time to practice beyond qualification. So how do we get there? Like everything in our Regiment, I believe we need to look at the issue from a team approach, placing the responsibility on the individual and the organization. We already openly do that for physical fitness, routinely informing Soldiers that unit physical training alone is not enough to make them high-caliber athletes. The same approach is necessary if we want law enforcement professionals to become high-caliber shooters.

As law enforcement professionals, we shouldn't wait for our organization to provide all of the training and ammunition needed to become proficient shooters. If we have that mentality, we are setting ourselves up to be a statistic. If we want to be highly proficient shooters, mentally and physically prepared for a potentially lethal encounter, we must also train and shoot on our own. We already know that if we shoot in the line of duty, we are shooting to survive. If we are unwilling to spend personal time and energy to hone our shooting and tactical skills, then we should consider whether we are serious about our own survival. When finding ourselves in a lethal situation, chances are that our adversary already has his or her weapon out and we are starting at a disadvantage. The first round out of our barrel may be the only round we get to shoot. Can we make that shot on a potentially mobile target, as we draw from the holster, at night, from an off angle, while moving backwards, and being shot at? The answer to that question should be the starting point of our quest for survival.

Survival Mentality

It can be very challenging for leaders in a resource-constrained environment to provide essential training opportunities. That does not lessen the responsibility. You must allow the time and resources to train, which may require changes in how business is conducted and resources are allocated. Short-term adjustments in mission support and a willingness to provide overtime as needed may also be required. Creative thinking may be necessary



to facilitate training. Much of this begins with a look at how leaders think and what they know. To instill a survival mentality, leaders must—

- Understand current doctrine and industry practices for shooting and weapons training.
- Understand the practical and tactical application of use-of-force policies.
- Ensure that current policies enable personnel to confidently escalate force if and when necessary to address a threat.
- Ensure that personnel routinely train with the various tools associated with each level of force.
- Know which weapons their personnel are carrying—and not just assume that the assigned weapon is drawn.
- Ensure that proper weapon maintenance is conducted so that weapons function properly when needed.
- Ensure that the training program addresses unique considerations of each weapon (M9, M11, M16, M4, shotgun) used.
- Ensure that the training program incorporates weapon transition drills.
- Ensure that weapon policies and training allow personnel to carry firearms in a manner that provides the best tactical advantage.

Leader engagement is the engine that drives operational and training processes. Seriousness about the survival mentality begins at the top. Leaders must emphasize the importance of being combat ready at all times, and they must engage with the energy that is necessary to get that message across the entire organization.

Weapon Training Program

There are several things to consider as part of a weapon training program. The following considerations are not intended to represent an inspection checklist, but rather to generate thought and discussion on the subject.

Consider the value of setting aside 15 to 30 minutes of each shift for individual training (safe dry-fire, weapons handling, reloading, transition drills). Good training does not necessarily include rounds down range. Making time for each officer to practice the critical movements associated with proficient shooting can net huge benefits over time.

Tactical training weapons are effective training aids that teach muscle memory and solidify the fundamental elements of combat readiness. They are also effective training platforms to evaluate shooting basics (grip, sight alignment, breath control). Boresight laser inserts provide valuable feedback to personnel when developing intuitive shooting skills, and they can be employed in a safe area as part of dry-fire drills during that 15 to 30 minutes set aside for individual training.

Simulation centers are excellent resources for practicing the mechanics of shooting. They can provide more for you than just the familiar “Shoot–Don’t Shoot” scenarios. My experience with these centers is that what can be done is mostly limited by your imagination. Designing drills and training scenarios that start simple and build on each other facilitates the stepping-stone effect that allows shooters to build skill and confidence. Building confidence is the real value of simulations. The more time officers spend handling a weapon and developing those intuitive shooting skills, the more proficient and confident they become. Simulation centers are not limited by round count. If simulation centers are available, take advantage of the resource.

There is no better training tool than sending rounds down range. Some units turn in ammunition they won’t be using. If possible, acquire any extra ammunition throughout the year. This may require some initiative and flexibility in your range-scheduling procedures and mission support, but your organization could benefit.

Review how you are managing your time at the range. Are you risk-averse and managing ranges in the lock-step military manner; or are you allowing safe movement, tactical and emergency reloads, and creative scenarios with the ammunition available? Are personnel required to operate on ranges with the same clothing and gear that they wear on duty? Shooters should not downgrade uniforms and equipment to only that needed to qualify or for personal comfort; if you don’t do it on duty, don’t do it on the range.

Obtain marking rounds if possible. They are good for more than just force-on-force training scenarios. They are excellent tools to enhance the fundamentals of shooting when ammunition is unavailable, and they provide instant feedback to the shooter.

Have you invested the time and money necessary to train and certify firearms instructors? If so, ensure that firearms instructors stay current with refresher training on current tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Trying something new on a range may require an exception to policy—and an exception can be granted to almost every policy in the Army. Two questions to ask are: who can grant an exception, and who needs to sign the request? Develop proper mitigation strategies for the actual and perceived risks of trying something new and creative at the range. If you still get a "no" from range control, ask what it takes to get a "yes." Maybe you need to take smaller steps; allow senior leaders time to become comfortable with one idea before taking another step forward. This is a leadership responsibility that should receive the necessary emphasis and involvement. Don't place full responsibility for this type of action on your training coordinator. These things sometimes require command emphasis.

There isn't a one-size-fits-all approach to firearms training. Each installation has different issues, concerns, constraints, challenges, and capabilities. Don't let the way things have been done in the past be the driver for how things can or should be done in the future; don't let naysayers block training efforts. Seek creative solutions to challenges and constraints. Safely push the boundaries of convention, and bring more realism to training. Reach out to partner agencies. There are many opportunities on and around the installation that may not cost anything. To use an old cliché, "Train as you fight." If we are not training the mechanics of survival, I believe that we are wasting time that we don't have and potentially laying the foundation for a tragedy in the future.

Conclusion

The intent of this article is to provide food for thought based on experience and personal observations as a law enforcement leader. We need to change the way we think about shooting and instill the survival mentality across everything we do. We need to challenge the qualification culture that dominates our profession. I am not marginalizing the importance of qualifying. Qualification is necessary and required for multiple reasons; however, out on the street, we shoot for our survival and the survival of others. If we train to survive, the ability to qualify will take care of itself.

Mr. Solonar is the police chief for the Directorate of Emergency Services, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. He holds a bachelor's degree in sociology and criminology from the University of Montana. He is a graduate of the Department of the Army Police Academy and a retired military police officer.

("Eight Lessons Learned . . . ," continued from page 26)

Conclusion

While military police will continue to be called upon to fulfill roles with increasing scope and complexity, an IP strategy allows the development of increased proficiency and the pursuit of solutions that are scalable to larger problem sets. As Colonel Eugenia Guilmartin states, "Instead of leveraging combat or crime-fighting models for training international police forces, perhaps military leaders should look at policing in small towns and rural areas on and off military installations for examples."[4] The value of an IP strategy can be demonstrated by the continued efforts of military police, DES, and local police agencies toward the refinement of policing operations to provide a safer community for Soldiers, civilians, and their Families.

Military police leaders must continue to take pragmatic steps toward IP strategy improvement in order to capitalize on the unique ability of military police to refine skill sets through the execution of concentrated IP operations. With the current development of the Military Police Force Strategic Plan 2025, it is vital that the discussion surrounding the refinement of DES, battalion, and the provost marshal's office integration remains at the forefront of the Military Police Corps strategic goals.

Endnotes:

[1]Robert Dillon, *Putting the Police Back Into the Military Police*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2011, p. 12, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a553025.pdf>, accessed on 21 June 2016.

[2]Ibid, p. 15.

[3]Ibid, p. 18.

[4]Eugenia K. Guilmartin, "The Paradox of Police Department: Community Policing for High-Threat Environments," *The Police Chief*, August 2015, pp. 40–43, <http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=3822&issue_id=82015>, accessed on 21 June 2016.

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Office of the Provost Marshal General, Military Police Force Strategic Plan 2020, 2012, <https://www.army.mil/article/97162/MP_Strategic_Plan_2020/>, accessed on 21 June 2016.

Captain Williamson serves as a battalion assistant operations officer, 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He holds a bachelor's degree in international relations from Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and a master's degree in homeland security from American Public University.

Military Police Soldiers Participate in Exercise Keris Aman

By First Lieutenant Collin A. Ford

On 6 August 2015, 3d Platoon, 558th Military Police Company, 728th Military Police Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, deployed to Port Dickson, Malaysia. The 3/558th Military Police Company represented the United States in support of Exercise Keris Aman, a United Nations (UN) training mission that entailed a staff training exercise and a field training exercise. The event involved 31 countries representing North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia. The field training exercise involved 11 platoons from across the globe, demonstrating capabilities while adapting their standard operating procedures (SOPs) to perform peacekeeping missions. Soldiers of the 3/558th Military Police Company were physically and mentally challenged to hone their skills inside and outside the training scenarios. Throughout the 3-week exercise, Soldiers were trained on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and developed a skill set that has become unfamiliar to most units in the U.S. Army over the past decade.

The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders perform a map reconnaissance during Exercise Keris Aman.

Exercise Keris Aman focused on providing standardized rule of engagement (ROE) training conducted to the UN standard, which was accomplished through rigorous, scenario-based lanes. These lanes, which were designed to replicate humanitarian missions, included conducting foot patrols, performing humanitarian distribution, conducting convoy operations, operating a UN-designated site, operating a checkpoint, and conducting cordon-and-search operations. Each lane was evaluated by cadre consisting of internationally certified trainers assisted by UN-provided humanitarian aid subject matter experts. Platoons were evaluated on their application of the ROE and the code of conduct rather than their tactics. This was to ensure that platoons representing countries with less tactical experience were not penalized and were able to gain real-world experience.

The primary focus of the 3/558th Military Police Company became the proper use of ROE. The transition from years of training on a combat-based ROE to a peacetime-based ROE proved to be more challenging than initially expected. One key difference was that UN trainers expected a more deliberate progression through the ROE steps, regardless of any actions by the enemy or civilian populace.

The 3/588th Military Police Company used the three military police disciplines—police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support—to successfully complete each mission. With these core disciplines as fundamental maneuvers, the platoon had the advantage of having knowledge from similar assessments of previous operations. The platoon used the training event to demonstrate the Military Police Corps capability of operating across a broad spectrum since the primary functions aligned with the UN peacekeeping mission focus. With this versatile capability, the platoon was able to apply skills acquired from law enforcement and tactical

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LESS-THAN-LETHAL OPTIONS FOR MILITARY POLICE

By Second Lieutenant Brittany L. Muth

Military police officers perform law enforcement duties worldwide to protect and serve Soldiers and their Family members. Military police units are expected to continuously improve themselves and master specific skills to remain prepared for combat, train others, and further their careers. In addition to accomplishing daily administrative and other unit level tasks, Soldiers in blue cycle perform law enforcement duties for military post communities.

One-station unit training prepares military police officers for duty at a very basic level; however, these officers are expected to perform at an advanced level once they arrive at their assigned duty stations.

Protecting and serving the active duty Army is a privilege valued by Corps military police officers. Most junior military police officers do not have backgrounds in law enforcement; however, they quickly learn about the Uniform Code of Military Justice and police equipment, standard operating procedures, and state laws at each new directorate of emergency services office for which they work. The only constant among these critical training areas is the Uniform Code of Military Justice. However, mission-essential equipment, standard operating procedures, and state statutes significantly contribute to an officer's ability to properly uphold the law and process infractions.

Soldiers learn how to use police equipment from the instruction that they receive at various law enforcement academies and from the hands-on training that they acquire by shadowing experienced military police personnel. Furthermore, each police department has standard operating procedures that help synchronize the operation of the directorate of emergency services, especially during times of crises that require the involvement of several different entities. Military police need to be familiar with the most important standard operating procedures, which are the post-specific rules and regulations that address the use of force and the escalation of force. Finally, military police are introduced to state-specific laws throughout their training and are provided with references and resources to ensure that citations are properly administered.

During one-station unit training, military police are tested and certified on the levels of force required to perform their law enforcement duties. These levels of force include the ability to communicate (verbal persuasion), show force, engage (or be engaged) in hand-to-hand combat, use impact weapons, and engage targets on M4 and M9 weapon systems. Military police officers are also certified on the use of chemical sprays once they arrive at their duty stations. These levels of force can help deescalate most situations that military police encounter.

However, one level of force that is not standard to every military police department, but should be, is the use of a Taser®. Military police officers are not equipped with any other weapon similar to the Taser. Police work is considered more of an art than a science. Law enforcement officers must remain vigilant and be ready to safely (but quickly) deescalate any situation at any given time. In situations for which deadly force is authorized, the standard escalation of force changes from the presentation to the use of deadly force. Deadly force is authorized as a last resort and should only be used when all lesser means of force have proven unsuccessful

or when lesser forces cannot reasonably be employed. Hand-to-hand combat or other physical force measures, batons, or chemical sprays do not possess the temporary incapacitation capabilities of a Taser.

Tasers are electroshock weapons that cause temporary paralysis. When employed, they fire two prongs that make contact with an individual's body, administering an electric shock that temporarily disrupts superficial muscle functions for a duration of mere seconds without causing further lasting damage. When used safely, properly, and with caution, they are the best police equipment alternative to deadly force. To protect military police officers and civilians who may be involved in an escalating incident in which deadly force is authorized, Tasers provide officers with another level of force that they can use to quickly and safely gain compliance.

It is a police officer's duty to keep everyone safe; however, police officers must also protect themselves (and other military police officers) from harm. One method of defense is to maintain a standoff distance. Military police training specifies this distance as approximately 21 feet from the officer to the individual(s) with whom he or she is responding or communicating. Situations can rapidly intensify when the presence of law enforcement personnel is perceived as a threat. When reacting to situations that present short stand-off distances which allow only seconds to think and when death or serious injury is imminent, officers must be trained to make split-second decisions that minimize the likelihood of fatalities and injuries. Properly training military police officers on the use of Tasers and adequately providing them with the appropriate Taser equipment offer military police officers a less-than-lethal alternative for use during high-intensity situations.

To serve, cooperate, and maintain a positive relationship with the public, military police personnel should be afforded every available means to help them perform their duties. Law enforcement is mentally, physically, and emotionally challenging. The use of force (especially deadly force) is taken seriously by the Military Police Corps. It is something that Soldiers are trained to avoid unless serious injury or death will otherwise occur. Tasers help provide law enforcement personnel with one more level of force that they can employ if a threatening situation requires it but deadly force can be prevented.

Reference:

U.S. Code, Title 10, Chater 47, Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Second Lieutenant Muth is a platoon leader in the 116th Military Police Company, 97th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas. She holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Montana, Missoula, Montana.

("Military Police Soldiers Participate . . . ," continued from page 30)

training. This combination of flexibility and adaptability proved useful in situations where immediate action and decision making were required. The technical capabilities and tactical tasks within a military police unit set the conditions for success across a wide range of missions. The most beneficial asset specific to the military police was the interpersonal skills developed through law enforcement operations. The application of these skills allowed military police to effectively communicate and negotiate their way through dangerous situations presented in the scenarios.

Exercise Keris Aman provided the opportunity for concurrent training at the company and battalion levels. The platoon's deployment to Malaysia allowed the battalion and brigade staffs to rehearse and enhance their tactics, techniques, and procedures and SOPs to refine any outdated or ineffective systems. Through these SOPs, higher command was enabled and unit readiness was supported by streamlining Soldiers through the medical and administrative sections necessary for deployment. The battalion's support was instrumental in the success of the platoon's predeployment preparation.

Exercise Keris Aman placed a significant focus on the acceptance of women—not only in the military, but in leadership roles. Many countries in attendance prohibit females in the armed forces, and most of those that do allow females only allow them in non-leadership and non-combat positions. Females are often placed in medical, administrative, or operations staff positions. With a female platoon sergeant, the 3/558th Military Police Company set an exceptional example for foreign militaries, demonstrating that females can and should be in leadership positions. Multiple countries began Exercise Keris Aman unsure about the use of females in leadership roles and left with a newfound respect and admiration for females.

The 3/558th Military Police Company represented the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and the U.S. Army with honor and distinction while participating in Exercise Keris Aman. The outstanding efforts of the 3/558th Military Police Company yielded a new understanding of the applicability of the military police skill set and how this skill set correlates to UN peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Malaysian armed forces and partner nations expressed admiration and the desire to include the Military Police Corps in future joint training operations. The platoon was able to demonstrate how the capabilities of a military police unit tie directly into the training objectives that the event was designed to achieve. The outstanding experience and partnership created between the U.S. Army and Malaysian army will benefit future operations and pave the way for joint training exercises.

First Lieutenant Ford is a platoon leader in the 558th Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor's degree in kinesiology from the University of Massachusetts–Amherst.

The National Training Center: An OC/T Perspective

By Sergeant First Class Miguel A. Espinoza

Not every junior officer or noncommissioned officer has the opportunity to train at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. For the ones who do, the first rotation can often be grueling and frustrating. However, with proper preparation, planning, and execution and the aid of NTC-assigned noncommissioned officers (known as observer coach/trainers [OC/Ts])—who have the institutional and doctrinal knowledge and experience of 10 NTC rotations a year—your rotation can be successful.

OC/Ts are not evaluators; rather, they embed with the unit and provide candid feedback through coaching and after action reviews. Unit metrics data and after action reviews, which are gathered using the Decisive Action Big 10 (10 focus areas used at NTC to assess the functionality of each unit), are mission-specific. Although all 10 actions are important, this article provides insight on the friction points that I witnessed while assigned as the senior enlisted military police OC/T for 18 rotations.

The Orders Process

The orders process is often a source of initial friction upon arrival to NTC because military police companies are not organically assigned to the brigade combat team (BCT). Despite receiving a formal operations order from the BCT, the unit must develop a warning order to be issued to the company; this is followed by a five-paragraph operations order. Units must clearly restate essential tasks so that platoon leaders have the opportunity to complete an analysis of implied tasks and further develop their plans. At NTC, the company very rarely issues an operations order—and it's even more rare for platoons to develop their mission-specific operations orders. When possible, rotational training units should execute command post exercises at their home station to prepare operations sergeants and platoon leaders with regard to new concepts; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Risk Management

Risk management and mitigation are vital to the success of any unit during operations. At NTC, these items are often overlooked because they are considered administrative tasks executed at garrison level, which is not the case. The goal is to incorporate tactical safety and risk management. These should be considered part of the planning process and briefed to the lowest level. Furthermore, they should be considered throughout all phases of the mission and be continuously updated during and throughout future missions. A good practice is the use of the deliberate risk assessment worksheet, which is updated throughout the battle periods to incorporate direct-fire control plans, fratricide prevention measures, and any other risk reductions associated with continuous operations.

Precombat Checks/Precombat Inspections

To be successful at NTC, a standardized checklist for precombat checks/precombat inspections should be used at the lowest leader level. The inspection is often overlooked as an unimportant part of mission planning; but when not conducted to standard, it is evident that Soldiers were not checked. Noncommissioned officers typically conduct precombat checks/precombat inspections; however, they aren't conducted to standard if a standardized checklist or mission-specific checks (dictated by guidance from higher headquarters) are not used. Leaders at every level must be incorporated into the precombat check/precombat inspection process; and once they are, leaders at every level within the unit must become teachers and appropriately incorporate changes to ensure mission success.

Rehearsals

Another point of failure at the execution of any mission is the failure to properly rehearse. Due to time management failure, most units practice incorrect or inadequate

rehearsal techniques. Only baseline tasks on OC/T-directed mandatory rehearsals are conducted. On battalion or higher missions, subordinate units do not fully synchronize or understand the course of action for the rehearsal. Units should aim to incorporate rehearsal techniques that are selected based on mission-specific considerations. This reinforces the unit task, purpose, scheme of maneuver, scheme of fires, and scheme of support. Units must have the proper audience for the rehearsal, be prepared, and understand their role in the mission. Rehearsals should be conducted at all levels when supporting any mission.

Army Battle Command Systems, Common Operating Picture, and Graphics

To ensure a shared understanding of the brigade fight, units must produce, use, and update analog and digital systems to gain an understanding of the common operating picture. This is done by using graphics for company operations. Unfortunately, graphics are not being refined to unit operations, distributed to all Army Battle Command Systems, or pushed to the lowest level. Units must incorporate the use of the appropriate overlays so that squad leaders can be prepared with the proper information (significant activities, obstacles, routes, maneuver task force locations, plans). Failing to properly maintain a clear common operating picture results in squads and platoons that have no understanding of how they can support the fight from their foxholes. This translates into not having a shared understanding of what is going on throughout the battlefield.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are typically overlooked by military police units at NTC, but ISR capabilities are often the single most underutilized capability that units have to offer higher headquarters. Every unit that has deployed to NTC has had RQ-11 Raven (lightweight unmanned aircraft system)-qualified individuals; but averages over the last 20 months have significantly dropped, with only 1 to 2 hours of flight time during force-on-force operations. When units are able to use this capability, they fail to properly task specified reconnaissance and surveillance tasks or fail to answer priority information requirements. Units often fail to synchronize or coordinate their ISR plans with higher headquarters. Operations cells within a unit usually lack an understanding of the use of ISR plans or how to incorporate them into future missions.

Sustainment

Sustainment planning, tracking, and forecasting are often hard to replicate at home station, which often translates to units not being properly prepared to conduct sustainment operations. The goal is to conduct sustainment planning with little to no impact on the company or higher headquarters mission. The unit should use logistic planning tools for forecasting commodities, and platoons should be familiar with conducting proper logistics operations within the unit battle rhythm.

An officer with the 411th Military Police Company issues a warning order.

Security and Force Protection

As experts in the field of security and force protection, military police Soldiers must often be reminded that this capability is our bread and butter. Unit leaders must remember that security is the No. 1 priority of work, and they must designate a security plan, maintain security, and assign sectors. Adjacent unit coordination must be conducted to ensure that the security plan is mutually supporting. Range cards and sector sketches must be actively verified and checked by leaders at all levels. The security plan must be rehearsed, and battle drills should be incorporated into plans. Properly conducting exterior patrols, ISR capabilities, and sector sketches can aid in an effective security plan for the unit.

Conclusion

It's not uncommon for units to arrive at NTC with inexperienced leaders. Soldiers need thick skin throughout the numerous after action reviews and "sustains" and "improves," and they must be willing to listen. NTC is often looked upon as a culminating training event; many of the topics covered can be easily executed to standard when considered as a continuation of home station training. Through the use of unit level tactical standard operating procedures, leaders at every level will understand what is expected. For many Soldiers, an NTC deployment may be their first real taste of living in an austere environment, executing a mission at full combat speed, and accepting feedback on how to improve.

Sergeant First Class Espinoza is the law enforcement division operations noncommissioned officer for the U.S. Army Garrison–Hawaii, Directorate of Emergency Services. At the time this article was written, he was the senior enlisted military police OC/T on the maneuver support trainer team (Sidewinders), Operations Group, NTC. He holds an associate's of applied science in criminal justice degree from Central Texas College, Killeen, Texas.

Leading 31 Bravos Into a 31 Echo World

By First Lieutenant Kathryn K. Martin

I am a combat support military police company platoon leader for the 108th Military Police Company, 503d Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade. My platoon was recently tasked to support the 15th Military Police Brigade at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by working inside the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB)—the Army's only maximum-security prison. Before arriving, the only knowledge I had of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31E (internment/resettlement specialist), the USDB mission, or Army corrections was from a short class that I received at the Basic Officer Leader's Course and some books and regulations that I had read. The learning curve was significant; however, learning and experiencing the detention and correction mission of the Military Police Corps has made my Soldiers and me more knowledgeable and my noncommissioned officers and me more well-rounded leaders.

Upon reporting, the platoon went through the 15th Military Police Brigade accelerated 5-day pre-serve course, which provided the platoon with a baseline knowledge of the specific, very unique, and difficult mission. Coming from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the platoon was well acquainted with adaptability, attention to detail, and excelling in an unsure and austere environment. For the previous 3 months, my Soldiers showed up to work prepared to respond to everything from medical emergencies and destroyed government property to suicides and car crashes with injuries. A quiet day is practically unheard of on the roads of Fort Bragg; however, one of the first things the platoon learned while training with the 15th Military Police Brigade was that a quiet day is a good day.

How can a quiet day be considered a good day? It was a question many of the Soldiers struggled with the first few days of training. But the answer was clear once they began on-the-job training with MOS 31E Soldiers in the 40th Military Police Battalion. There are 450 inmates (many of them high-profile) housed in the USDB. Six of the inmates are on death row. The ratio of inmates to internment/resettlement specialists is, on average, 70 to 1. Soldiers do not carry the same tools on their utility belts in the USDB as they do when they patrol at Fort Bragg. Their M9 pistols, oleoresin capsicum spray, batons, and stun guns are replaced with a whistle, a radio, a Personal Alarm Locating System (PALS) device, and a single pen. The PALS device, which works through sensors in the facility, is a small box with a red button that Soldiers press if they are under any type of distress. When a Soldier presses the device, a distress signal is sent out to the control booth in the facility. Instructions are then sent to available personnel to respond to the area where the PALS device was activated. Inmates are assessed at several risk levels; however, with the exception of the inmates currently assigned to special housing units, they are allowed to roam free within the confines of their housing unit and they do not need to be escorted to and from the dining facility, work call, or the various recreational areas within the facility. If an inmate gets rowdy or physical with an internment/resettlement specialist or another inmate, the internment/resettlement specialist is to use the minimum amount of force necessary to create space and distance to deescalate the situation until backup arrives. However, it is the job and responsibility of the internment/resettlement specialist to do his or her best to ensure that situations are diffused before resorting to the escalation of force. That task is much more difficult than it sounds.

In the USDB, everything is governed by standard operating procedures (SOPs) and USDB Regulation 600-1, *Manual for the Guidance of Inmates*. An internment/resettlement specialist executes his or her job differently than an MOS 31B (military police Soldier) on patrol. MOS 31B Soldiers are taught the regulations and rules, and they are expected to apply them to an ever-changing environment and to every unique situation encountered while on patrol. Good 31B Soldiers are quick on their feet, creative, and able to

USDB

adapt to new situations in an ever-changing environment. However, there is no room for creativity in the USDB. There are more than 100 SOPs carefully created by highly experienced internment/resettlement experts that instruct other internment/resettlement specialists about every imaginable situation—from how to deal with a missing inmate to how to properly ensure the safety of the inmates under their custody and control in the event of a fire. A good 31E is proficient and knows every aspect of the facility SOPs and USDB Regulation 600-1. He or she is able to flawlessly execute the SOPs and to ensure that fellow Soldiers do the same. MOS 31B Soldiers are more valuable if they read an SOP and ensure that it is perfectly executed as well as adapt the rules to new situations. That is precisely what my Soldiers learned to do from their MOS 31E counterparts while working in the USDB. Additionally, an MOS 31A (military police officer), 31B noncommissioned officer, or 31B Soldier who has experienced corrections or detention operations and mastered the important skills and traits necessary to be successful while in a nondeployed environment will be successful if deployed outside of the United States and tasked with a corrections or detention operation.

In the 31B and 31E fields, interpersonal communication (IPC) skills are key. However, IPC skills used by a 31B are slightly different than the IPC skills required of a 31E. When one internment/resettlement specialist is with up to 70 inmates, his or her words can easily incite anger and trigger a negative reaction or, conversely, calm the inmates. Ultimately, the safety of the internment/resettlement specialist and the inmates is crucial. Instead of addressing issues aggressively, 31Es address issues one report at a time. Taking care of an issue carefully and quietly is more effective and safer than bluntly addressing it. An inmate in a housing unit has more than 60 other inmates as back-up. The internment/resettlement specialist on the floor can hit a red button and within minutes, some back-up arrives. The home court advantage goes to the inmates on the floor. Soldiers who work in corrections know that inmates at the USDB are there for punishment, not to be punished. Soldiers must treat inmates humanely and use their IPC skills. Those Soldiers usually gain the professional working respect of the inmates and are the most successful Soldiers. For a 31B, practicing a calm, passive type of IPC skill is incredibly beneficial. Allowing time for 31Bs to practice different IPC types helps them in the future, whether they apply it while on patrol or in a counseling session with future Soldiers.

Lastly, the opportunity to practice integrating into a team of Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers whose expertise is slightly different than our own is incredibly valuable. A combat support military police company functions differently than a military police detention company. My Soldiers and I were exposed to another side of the Military Police Corps, and we have all learned from this new environment. Not many other 31Bs and young lieutenants are afforded the opportunity to become experts in law enforcement operations and corrections. Although 3d Platoon, 108th Military Police Company, will not be conducting corrections or detention operations regularly upon returning to Fort Bragg, the Soldiers and leaders will continue to use the valuable skills learned while working with Army internment/resettlement experts inside of the only maximum level security prison within the Army and the Department of Defense.

Having briefly experienced both the law and order and corrections sides of the Military Police Corps, I can say that our Soldiers are tasked with heavy burdens from the day that they signed up and donned the uniform. Other branches stand ready, but Military Police Corps Soldiers stand guard 24 hours a day, 7 days a week across the globe, executing law and order and internment/resettlement operations. The 108th Military Police Company had not performed internment/resettlement operations since 2008, when the company was deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is difficult to predict whether the Soldiers in my platoon will ever again work in corrections before they take off their uniforms for the last time. However, the lessons they have learned, and will continue to learn, from the Soldiers and leaders of the 15th Military Police Brigade are lessons that they will be able to apply to their careers as they move forward. Very few 31Bs have the opportunity to learn, experience, and conduct detention operations until they are deployed. Some 31As go their entire careers without experiencing detention operations. It is a shame that all 31Bs and 31As are not required or encouraged to experience and work in a detention company or in support of a unit whose primary mission is detention and corrections. The Military Police Corps could truly benefit by allowing more 31Bs and 31As to gain experience with detention and corrections operations in expert detention units. My platoon is a living testament.

Reference:

USDB Regulation 600-1, *Manual for the Guidance of Inmates*, 14 November 2013.

First Lieutenant Martin currently serves as a platoon leader for the 108th Military Police Company (Airborne/Air Assault), 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne). She holds a bachelor's degree in science and a commission from the U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York.

Counter Explosive Hazards Planning Course

By Mr. Jason Lee Smith

The Counter Explosive Hazards Planning (CEH-P) Course was developed to mitigate the vulnerability caused by a lack of current threat information at the company level. Many students attending the CEH-P Course at the Counter Explosive Hazards Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, have mentioned the lack of intelligence products at company and battalion levels.

The CEH-P is designed to develop the thought process needed to defeat the explosive hazard threat in a contemporary operating environment. The course, which is aimed at maneuver and maneuver support lower echelons, was designed to assist in developing situational awareness of the explosive hazard threat environment, which improves the ability to develop plans and operations that target the explosive hazards threat within the area of responsibility. The CEH-P prepares Soldiers to facilitate the collection, analysis, processing, and coordination of all-source intelligence across the brigade combat team to support explosive hazard targeting, influence the operational environment, support company level operations, and build the bottom-up intelligence needed.

During the 80-hour course, Soldiers receive hands-on training with the Tactical Information Ground Reporting System, Combined Information Data Network Exchange, and Web-Based Timeline Analysis System. Soldiers learn to query these systems for information that they can use for producing intelligence products (such as vulnerable point analyses, route and area analyses, and point analyses). At the end of the course, students should be able to query systems for data, create maps and charts of explosive hazards threats, recommend named areas of interest and target areas of interest, develop link diagrams and time wheels, and provide prebriefings and debriefings to patrols. The course ends with a 2-day mission readiness exercise to test the students' understanding of the material.

Major tasks associated with the training include—

- Create a situational awareness briefing for the company.
- Use Microsoft® Excel to create graphs and charts depicting enemy activity.
- Prepare and present a patrol prebriefing.
- Establish information requirements for the company.
- Recommend named areas of interest and target areas of interest in each area of operations and assign information requirements to these areas.

Students receive classroom instruction as part of the CEH-P Course.

- Develop association and activity matrixes, link diagrams, and time wheels.
- Conduct a route analysis that covers vulnerable points and the relative threat assessment of the route.
- Conduct an area analysis of the area around a specific location to establish the relative threat level of the area.
- Conduct operational assessments and provide recommendations to the planners to ensure that the explosive hazard threat is included in the planning process.
- Conduct explosive hazards threat assessments for a fixed facility and make recommendations to increase force protection of the fixed facility.

The CEH-P Course is geared toward company and battalion level Soldiers ranging from specialists to captains. There are no clearance or military occupational specialty restrictions. The course is available at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, or through mobile training teams. The course can accommodate up to 15 Soldiers. For additional information or questions, please contact the Counter Explosive Hazards Center via e-mail at <usarmy.leonardwood.engineer-schl.mbx.cehc>.

Mr. Smith is a cartographic technician for the Counter Explosive Hazards Center. He is a former Military Occupational Specialty 25C (radio operator-maintainer) with the Missouri Army National Guard. Mr. Smith holds a bachelor's degree in management information systems from Columbia College, Missouri.

Regionally Aligned Forces Used in Basic Training

By Captain Blake A. Rulison

The year is 2016, and the United States is preparing for a full-scale deployment to Tierra Santos to quell a hostile takeover of the government by a local rebel faction. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have advised the President that action must be taken as soon as possible, and the President is looking to the units regionally aligned with the command to deploy to Tierra Santos and establish ground operations as soon as possible. The 14th Military Police Brigade is at the forefront of the preparations and will be key in maintaining a secure foothold and bolstering Tierra Santos security forces. The battlefield awaits.

The preceding scenario may seem implausible based on current U.S. Army conflicts, but it is similar to what trainees of the 14th Military Police Brigade experience when preparing for field training exercises in One-station unit training. Each of the three battalions of the 14th Military Police Brigade are "aligned" with a combatant commander, and company commanders create scenarios for the field exercises using the regionally aligned forces concept. As in the scenario above, names of countries, locations, and people are changed to prevent confusion with real-world missions. This initiative creates an environment that forces trainees to look at the larger, global picture from the very start of their careers. Company commanders brief an enemy situation using the characteristics, tactics, and standard operating procedures of known, hostile factions. The trainees must retain that knowledge while conducting operations throughout the field training exercises, which teaches trainees to think outside the box and to adapt their newly found skills as they perform in different areas of operations. Trainees also learn the concepts behind basic warfighting functions instead of merely mimicking the actions that they have seen in the news and movies or heard from recently returned veterans. After two field training exercises, the trainees begin to understand that the future is uncertain and that as Soldiers, they need to be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world.

Using this concept, trainees also learn how to fight in an undeveloped environment. Instead of falling-in on equipment that has been set up by another unit at an established forward operating base, trainees march to a location, set up a patrol base, and begin operations by conducting patrols. Their drill sergeants teach and reinforce warrior tasks, battle drills, and basic Soldier skills. Although the *Shoot, Move, Communicate* slogan does not mention field craft and hygiene, those skills are also taught so that the trainees learn to survive and fight effectively in adverse conditions and undeveloped theaters.

Not only is this concept better preparing the trainees physically by forcing them to adapt to a more unpredictable environment, but it is also demonstrating that they can defeat the enemy no matter where they may meet. The scenarios range from dismounted patrols to cordon-and-search operations with host nation security forces and allow for thought and adaptation, which keeps the trainees engaged and interested. As trainees prepare to join U.S. Army Forces Command units after graduation, they will be prepared to deploy anywhere with the basic skills required to execute policing, detention, and security mobility support across the range of military operations.

Captain Rulison recently completed the Military Police Captain's Career Course and is currently assigned to the 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a bachelor's degree in information technology from the U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York.

A DETACHMENT'S FIGHT FOR READINESS

By Captain Danelle R. Gamble

Facing the unknown is stressful and, at times, results in an incredible amount of fear. Engaging in war is stressful no matter how many times it occurs. Performing as a leader is stressful, whether leading a team or a brigade. Being responsible for lives is the ultimate stressor. Stress is inherent in soldiering, and the Military Police Corps requirements compound that stress as junior leaders of squads, platoons, and companies embark on the unknown at the front of a formation.

The Army employs readiness to combat the stressors associated with facing the unknown. As leaders, we are obligated to maximize every resource and to provide every opportunity to improve Soldier readiness. Readiness is multifaceted, with some aspects applying to all Soldiers and others uniquely applying to a particular military occupational specialty (MOS), unit, or mission. One readiness responsibility unique to military police detachments is ensuring that individual augmenters as junior as a private first class are prepared to deploy with military working dogs (MWDs) and to engage in a war, oftentimes protecting Soldiers at the front of formations. Additionally, military police detachments are inherently obligated to ensure that current and future leaders leave the detachment ready to serve the Corps in any of the military police core competencies, capable of directing Soldiers into battle.

Among the ranks of the 73d and 523d Military Police Detachments, 97th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas, there are many Soldiers with no deployment history as a driver, gunner, or handler; several sergeants and specialists who have never led a team; and many MWD handlers who had never participated in a field training exercise that physically and mentally challenged them and their dogs. After identifying the inexperience, the detachment's goal was to ensure that its Soldiers reach a level of readiness extending beyond that achieved under the administrative readiness systems already in place, ensuring that Soldiers are fully prepared to support military police companies as future leaders (MOS 31B, Military Police) and to support formations with personnel protection (MOS 31K, Military Working Dog Handler).

The fight for expanded readiness began with an opportunity to reduce the number of unknowns associated with deployment through Operation Air Max, a multiunit operation comprised of the two detachments; the 977th Military Police Company; and Company B, 3d Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Through Operation Air Max, the Soldiers experienced the challenges associated with traveling, via aircraft, in full military gear and executing dismounted movement with MWD teams as the lead. The operation also provided an opportunity for the MWDs and handlers to experience all aspects of air transportation, including the challenge of executing a search immediately following transport. The handlers were further challenged with the realistic, but stress-inducing activities of communicating, presenting MWD capabilities briefings to lieutenants and noncommissioned officers, participating in dismounted movements with limited squad rehearsals, and working through failures on the ground.

Attempts to train MOS 31B Soldiers during Operation Air Max met with many challenges along the way. As a result, the detachment evaluated the lessons learned and executed a 3-day field training exercise to better prepare the 31Bs for their future as military police Soldiers. For the field training exercise, leaders of the 73d Military Police Detachment identified some nonnegotiable "must have" tasks for deploying as leaders—individual and team movement techniques, communications, and driver's training. The detachment executed all planned training at a high operational tempo, grouping Soldiers into teams and squads and rotating leadership responsibilities to maximize effectiveness. Additionally, the MWD teams were incorporated into key tasks, with emphasis placed on individual movement, communications, and driving. Soldiers left the field training exercise familiar with the responsibilities associated with leading troops into

Soldiers receive training on proper mounting of the M2 and MK19.

the unknown, refreshed on how to operate equipment listed in a combat support military police company modified table of organization and equipment, and with a renewed sense of what it means to be a ***ready*** military police Soldier.

The primary mission of a military police detachment is law enforcement, which is challenging—as evidenced by the current state of civilian law enforcement nationwide. However, a detachment's training cannot stop there. As responsible leaders, we cannot accept the successful completion of law enforcement tasks as the "end" and abdicate any additional responsibility to the Soldiers under our command. The Military Police Corps makes it clear: Military police Soldiers must be capable of executing not only law enforcement tasks, but also soldiering tasks. Partners at the Department of Emergency Services (DES) at Fort Riley understand this philosophy and fully support the 73d Military Police Detachment goals and initiatives; without that, training would not be successful. With support from DES and higher headquarters, the opportunities for expanded training run deep. As leaders, we owe it to our Soldiers, their Families, and our future Soldiers to provide an opportunity to reduce the number of unknowns and to prepare them for what they face today and may face tomorrow through challenging and varied training events that induce stress now in order to reduce the stress of tomorrow. If we ignore tomorrow, we are ignoring the future.

Captain Gamble is an instructor for the Basic Officer Leader's Course, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She holds a bachelor's degree in business economics from the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.

Photograph and Illustration Guide

Photographs and illustrations contribute a great deal to the visual appeal of an article. When submitting them with your article, please keep the following in mind:

- **Subject matter**—Action shots that show Soldiers who are training or performing their jobs are the best way to enhance an article. Static photographs of landscapes, structures, or distant machinery in action are less useful. Photographs of groups of people smiling at the camera or "grip and grin" shots add little to an article and are unlikely to be used.
- **Format**—Photographs saved in JPEG (or JPG) format and sent as attachments to an e-mail are best. Photographs and other graphics should not be embedded in a Microsoft® Word document or PowerPoint presentation. Graphics files are large, and e-mail systems frequently have limits to the size of messages that can be sent. For example, our system cannot accept messages larger than 20 megabytes (MB). One solution is to send separate e-mails with just one or two attachments each.
- **Size and resolution**—The ideal photograph or graphic for print reproduction is 5x7 inches at 300 dots per inch (dpi), but smaller sizes may be acceptable. If the photograph is a JPEG, it should be no smaller than 150 kilobytes (KB). A 5x7-inch, 300-dpi photograph saved as a TIF should be 1 MB to 3 MB in size. When taking photographs, use the highest resolution setting on your camera and save them at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Photographs appearing on the Internet usually have a resolution of only 72 dpi. They will look fine on a computer monitor, but do not reproduce well in print. However, photographs that are available for download as "high resolution" will probably meet the minimum requirements. Do not manipulate photographs by sharpening, resizing, retouching, or cropping the image. Using a graphics software program (such as Adobe® Photoshop) to increase the size and/or resolution of a small photograph will not increase the quality of the photograph so that it can be used in a printed publication. Do not compress photographs. We will do all postproduction work. We will not publish photographs that are pixilated or out of focus.
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- **Captions**—Include captions that describe the photograph and identify the subjects. Captions are subject to editing.
- **Hard copy photographs**—Hard copy photographs can be mailed to: Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, ATTN: G-37 Publications Support, 14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702.
- **Photographs of foreign nationals**—Due to security restrictions, photographs of foreign nationals cannot be published without digital editing (blurring faces) unless the photograph(s) are accompanied by a permission to release signed by the subject(s).
- **Graphs/charts and illustrations**—We prefer to work with original digital graphic files. Submit the original PowerPoint slides and/or layered Adobe Photoshop/Illustration files. Do not save them in a different format or flatten the layers.

CUSTOMIZED:

126th Military Police Company Learns and Excels at Unique Middle East Mission

By Staff Sergeant Victor O. Joecks

The 126th Military Police Company, New Mexico National Guard, is full of trained investigators; but during their current deployment to the Middle East, these Soldiers are putting their policing skills to use in ways they never imagined. Rather than examining crime scenes or questioning suspects, they're searching for dirt, snails, and spiders. That's because the Soldiers of the 126th Military Police Company are deployed as customs agents in more than one dozen locations throughout half a dozen Middle East countries.

As customs agents, their job is to inspect military equipment and personnel before they are returned to the United States to ensure that all items and individuals meet customs regulations, which are designed to protect U.S. agriculture and wildlife. The Bahrain site noncommissioned officer in charge stated that the 126th Military Police Company was taught how sterile America is and how the smallest thing (parasites, mosquitos) can affect America's most precious farmland.

The assistant operations noncommissioned officer recounted that the introduction of a foreign insect, the Asian citrus psyllids, caused billions of dollars of economic damage to the Florida orange industry. That's why the 126th Military Police Company, acting as trained customs inspectors, ensures that equipment is clean and free of dirt and organisms. Military equipment is searched for agriculture-related items (dirt, spiders, snails). According to the office manager, military vehicles are sterile when they leave. "It involves going through every nook and cranny to make sure it's clean and sterile," said the remote operations noncommissioned officer. "That's the most time-consuming piece."

But the mission of the 126th Military Police Company is twofold. In addition to protecting U.S. agriculture; the company also serves as the first line of defense in enforcing U.S. laws regarding contraband items that cannot be taken back to the United States. The customs agents must stay current on items that are not allowed by customs.

"When we're looking through personal equipment, we're still looking for agricultural, but also for contraband—knifes, supplements, sand," said the office manager. "Every once in a while, we'll find a shell. Some of the shells they fire are really big, and they want to make it into something else." Taking back battlefield souvenirs, even expended ammunition casings, isn't allowed without an exception to policy memorandum.

During the first few months of their deployment, these military police searched and cleared numerous types of military equipment, including missile launchers, Humvees, helicopters, airplanes, and ships. On average, the unit preclears more than 2 billion dollars' worth of equipment and thousands of individuals a month. Conducting customs checks at the point of origin allows cargo to be returned to its unit faster and creates significant time and money savings for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. When a Soldier of the 126th Military Police Company stamps an item, he or she accepts full responsibility for verifying that it's perfect. If there's something wrong, the penalties are high.

Before obtaining that level of authority and responsibility, the 126th Military Police Company received training from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the opportunity to assist with checkpoints at the U.S./Mexico border. "It was unique, because the training is more specific to border crossings than military equipment," noted the Bahrain operations manager, "so you learn how to do it as you go. Especially here, where you have everything you'd do with customs here—planes, ships. We had to learn how to do each thing on our own."

When 126th Military Police Battalion Soldiers must inform a Service member that he or she isn't allowed to take back a fish in a bottle or an opened bottle of pills, they do so wearing the attire of a customs agent.

While the officer manager acknowledged that the job is "pretty unglamorous," military police find purpose by remembering the importance of the mission. "We're still protecting our homeland, our country," said the Bahrain site noncommissioned officer in charge.

Staff Sergeant Joecks is the public affairs operations noncommissioned officer for the 17th Sustainment Brigade, 1st Sustainment Command (Theater). He holds bachelor's degrees in history and math from Hillsdale College, Michigan.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
720th Military Police Battalion
(Gauntlet)

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 10 January 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 720th Military Police Battalion.
Activated 20 January 1942 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.
Allotted 25 October 1951 to the Regular Army.
Companies A, B, and C inactivated 31 August 1972 at Fort Hood, Texas.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

Papua
New Guinea
Luzon

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

Southwest Asia

Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of Kuwait
Cease-Fire

Armed Forces Expeditions

Somalia

War on Terrorism

Iraq:
Liberation of Iraq
Transition of Iraq
(Additional Campaigns to be Determined)

Decorations

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered PACIFIC AREA, 1950–1954
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967–1968
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1969
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 1990–1991
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2004–2005
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2007
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2011–2012
Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1994–1996
Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 2005–2006
Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966–1972

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS				
COMMANDER	**CSM/SGM**	**CWO**	**UNIT**	**LOCATION**
Mark Inch	Timothy Fitzgerald		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
Mark Inch	Crystal Wallace	John Welch	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Kevin Vereen	Richard Woodring	Leroy Shamburger	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Mark Inch	Timothy Fitzgerald		Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Michael White	Catherine Farrell		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Michael Hoban			USARC PM	Ft Bragg, NC
Phillip Churn	Craig Owens	Mary Hostetler	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Timothy Pulley	Robert Provost		2nd Bde, 102nd Division, 80th Tng Cmd	Fort Snelling, MN
Shannon Lucas	Teresa Duncan		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Cary Cowan	Winsome Laos		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Niave Knell	David Tookmanian		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Dawn Hilton	Jeffrey Cereghino		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Eugenia Guilmartin	Jeffrey Maddox		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Arturo Horton	James Breckinridge		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Christopher Burns	Jon Matthews		42d MP Bde	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Javier Reina	Robert Wall		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Peter Cross	Byron Robinson		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Carl Parsons	Bradley Cross		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Thomas Vern	David Folsom		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Peter Vanderland	John Schiffli		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Richard Giles	Abbe Mulholland		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Keith Nadig	Andrew Lombardo		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Joseph Decosta	Peter Harrington	Edgar Collins	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Detrick Briscoe	Arthur Williams	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Terry Nihart	Brian Garon	Celia Gallo	701st MP Gp (CID)	Quantico, VA
Stephen Gabavics	Michael Bennett		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS				
Wesley Huff	Terrence Allen		2-80th MP Bn (TASS)	Owings Mill, MD
John Schwab	Brian Johnson		2-95th MP Bn (TASS)	Baton Rouge, LA
Patricia Hamilton	Gregory Jackson		2-100th MP Bn (TASS)	Nashville, TN
Stephen VanDoren	Andrew Johnson		1-104th MP Bn (TASS)	Aurora, CO
Edward Diamantis	Paul Duros		2-108th MP Bn (TASS)	Ft Jackson, SC
Joseph Elsner	Nate Reagin	Anderson Wagner	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Ginamarie McCloskey	Chad Aldridge	Billy Higgason	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Juan Nava	Francisco Huereque	Phillip Curran	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Michael Crane	Gordon Lawitzke	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Christine Whitmer	Christian Dixson	Joel Fitz	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Marcus Matthews	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Travis Jacobs	Bryan Schoenhofer		40th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jason Turner	Kevin Pickrel		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Michael Jensik	Christopher Reeves		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Sharon Lyght	William Mayfield		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Tim Mahoney	Michael Jeanes		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Peter Robertson	Freddy Trejo		96th MP Bn (C/D)	San Diego, CA
Alexander Murray	Billy Ray Counts		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael Fowler	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (C/D)	Auburn, NY
Craig Maceri	Scott Smilinich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Steven Jackan	Alpheus Haswell		105th MP Bn (C/D)	Asheville, NC
Robert Watras	Craig Payne		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Mary Staab	Aarion Franklin		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
John Gobel	Michael Plemons		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Kenneth Niles	Robert Wall		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Richard Candelario	Francisco Ramos		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Norberto Flores II	Matthew Lamonica		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Dawn Bolyard	James Summers		151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
John Dunn	Gregory Derosier	David Knudson	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
Thomas LeMoine	Daniel Williams		160th MP Bn (C/D)	Tallahassee, FL
Richie Gammons	Harold Cook		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Erik Anderson	Callie Leaver		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Larry Crowder	Edward Stratton		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)				
COMMANDER	**CSM/SGM**	**CWO**	**UNIT**	**LOCATION**
Robert Paoletti	Andraus Williams		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Daniel Lawler		192d MP Bn (C/D)	Niantic, CT
Isaac Martinez	Jon Crowe		193d MP Bn (C/D)	Denver, CO
Timothy Starke	Michael Rowan		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Eugene Butler	Nathan Deese		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Lance Shaffer	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Kenneth Dilg	Ed Williams		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
James Blake	James Sartori		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Randolph Velarde	Theodore Skibyak		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James Lake	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Timothy Winks	Ben Adams		304th MP Bn (C/D)	Nashville, TN
Loring Bush	James Rogelio		310th MP Bn (C/D)	Uniondale, NY
Damien Garner	Fred Waymire		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Rudy Placencia	Paul Shaw		324th MP Bn (C/D)	Fresno, CA
Richard Vanbuskirk	Peter Schimmel		327th MP Bn (C/D)	Arlington Heights, IL
Andre Holder	Joseph Rigby		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Karen Connick	Keith Magee		340th MP Bn (C/D)	Ashley, PA
Alexander Shaw	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
Vance Kuhner	Brett Goldstein		382d MP Bn	Westover AFB, MA
Kelly Jones	William Henderson		384th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Wayne, IN
Robert Matthews	Jeffrey Baker		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
John Myers	Andrew Howard		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Roger Glenn	Michael Poll		391st MP Bn (C/D)	Columbus, OH
Antoine Williams	Allen Freeman	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Cheryl Clement	Shelita Taylor		400th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Meade, MD
Eric Hunsberger	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Andrea Schaller	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Timothy Macdonald	Patrick O'Rourke	Mauro Orcesi	502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
John Curry	Mark Hennessey		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Yvonne Miller	Richard Lopez		504th MP Bn	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Stephen Newman	William Ramsey		508th MP Bn (C/D)	Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA
Kirk Whittenberger	Rusty Lane		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Andrew Deaton	Jametta Bland		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Jason Ruffin	Mark Bell		530th MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Jennings Bunch	Hardy Milton		535th MP Bn (C/D)	Cary, NC
Daniel Kuhn	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Mandi Bohrer	Casey Freeman		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Karen Watson	John Fair		705th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jeffrey Searl	Ethan Bradley		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Michael Johnston	John Vicars		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Karst Brandsma	Veronica Regalbuti		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Sean Brown	Brian Bertazon		724th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Chad Froehlich	James Tyler		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Eric Prugh	Karla Standifer	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Forest Park, GA
Christopher Minor	Rodney Ervin		744th MP Bn (C/D)	Easton, PA
Robert Mcnellis	Gregory Kleinholz		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	George Julch		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Mark Howard	Todd Marchand		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Daniel Orourke	Richard Weider		785th MP Bn (C/D)	Fraser, MI
Stephen Caruso	Paul Millius		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Richard Cranford	Rebecca Myers		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Joe Murdock	Scott Flint		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Randolph Morgan	Cole Pierce	Martin Eaves	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Russell Stewart	David Astorga	Lane Clooper	Washington CID Bn	Joint Base Myer–Henderson Hall, VA
Derek Bellows	Frank Jeppe	Gerald De Hoyos	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

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DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	26 Aug 13	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	28 Apr 14	A manual that addresses detention operations across the range of military operations and provides detention operations guidance for commanders and staffs. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and military police Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	06 Apr 15	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. **Status:** Current.
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	11 Aug 15	A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. TC 3-39.30 provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. **Status:** Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>.			

"Doctrine is indispensable to an Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."

—General George H. Decker,

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962

Military Police Writer's Guide

Military Police is a Department of the Army-authenticated publication that contains instructions, guidance, and other materials to continuously improve the professional development of Army military police. It also provides a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army military police community. *Military Police* includes articles by and about commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things. Shorter, after action type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. Avoid using acronyms when possible. When used, acronyms must be spelled out and identified at the first use. Also avoid the use of bureaucratic jargon and military buzzwords. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages).

Articles submitted to *Military Police* must be accompanied by a written release from the author's unit or activity security manager before editing can begin. All information contained in an article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. It is the author's responsibility to ensure that security is not compromised; information appearing in open sources does not constitute declassification. *Military Police* is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations. For convenience, a fillable security release memorandum is provided at the following link <www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/documents /SecurityReleaseForm.docx>.

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Include photographs and/or graphics that illustrate information in the article. Graphics must be accompanied by captions or descriptions; photographs should also be identified with the date, location, unit/personnel, and activity, as applicable. Do not embed photographs in Microsoft® PowerPoint or Word or include photographs or illustrations in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. If illustrations are created in PowerPoint, avoid the excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Please see the photo guide on page 40 for more information.

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Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including full name, rank, current unit, job title, and education; U.S. Postal Service mailing address; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

When an article has multiple authors, the primary point of contact should be clearly designated with the initial submission. The designated author will receive all correspondence from *Military Police* editors and will be responsible for conferring with coauthors concerning revisions before responding to the editors.

Military Police will notify each author to acknowledge receipt of a manuscript. However, we make no final commitment to publish an article until it has been thoroughly reviewed and, if required, revised to satisfy concerns and conform to publication conventions. We make no guarantee to publish all submitted articles, photographs, or illustrations. If we plan to publish an article, we will notify the author. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.

Manuscripts submitted to *Military Police* become government property upon receipt. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for length, clarity, and conformity to *Military Police* style. We will send substantive changes to the author for approval. Authors will receive a courtesy copy of the edited version for review before publication; however, if the author does not respond to *Military Police* with questions or concerns by a specified suspense date (typically five to seven working days), it will be assumed that the author concurs with all edits and the article will run as is.

Military Police is published two times a year: March (article deadline is 15 November) and September (article deadline is 15 May). Send submissions by e-mail to usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil or on a CD in Microsoft Word, along with a double-spaced copy of the manuscript, to:

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Military Police Professional Bulletin
14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661
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Note: Please indicate if a manuscript is being considered for publication elsewhere. Due to the limited space per issue, we usually do not print articles that have been accepted for publication at other Army venues.

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

The Military Police Creed

I am a Soldier and proud member of the United States Army Military Police Corps Regiment.

I am Of the Troops and For the Troops.

I believe there is no higher calling than to ASSIST, PROTECT, and DEFEND my fellow Soldiers, their families, and the basic ideals of our Constitution that guarantee our freedom and our American way of life.

I am always ready to help individual Soldiers retain or regain their dignity.

I assist commanders in performing their missions, safeguarding their commands, and maintaining discipline, law, and order.

I am proud of the Military Police Corps Regiment and fully understand the awesome responsibility given to all military police Soldiers.

At the same time, I am humble because I know that I am a servant of my Country and my Army.

To perform my duties properly, my honesty, integrity, and courage must be balanced by competence, alertness, and courtesy.

I know I am constantly in the public eye and my behavior sets the standards of excellence of my fellow Soldiers.

To my unit, my commander, and myself, I promise sustained, just, and honorable support.

To my Country, the Army, and my Regiment, I promise the skills of my training, my physical ability, my mental initiative, and my moral courage, for I am a Soldier in the MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENT.

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